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Pt. 17

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Mrs R. C. Wells

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 17

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 111 THROUGH 123

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

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EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. 11, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Wells and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942). Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943). Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943). Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (#70645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (061255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12-15-45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A	2768 1-19-46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12-15-45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11-15-45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12-15-45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12-17-45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12-17-45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12-17-45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12-17-45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12-17-45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83	1754 12-17-45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12-17-45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. I. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123-----	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A-----	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124-----	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125-----	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126-----	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127-----	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128-----	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129-----	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130-----	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131-----	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158-----	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159-----	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160-----	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161-----	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162-----	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A-----	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163-----	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164-----	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165-----	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166-----	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and anti-aircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 111

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Australian Minister called to see me last night. The Minister told me that Sir Keith Murdock, a leading newspaper publisher in Australia, had now suggested that Wendell Willkie visit Australia. You may remember that this matter was discussed some months ago but nothing came of it.

The Minister showed me a telegram which he had received from his Prime Minister stating that if Mr. Willkie were now to visit Australia with the "imprimatur" of the President his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government.

The Prime Minister in his cable to Mr. Casey expressed the hope that this could be arranged or possibly that you might appoint him your personal representative.

The telegram from the Prime Minister concluded with a message to the effect that the Australian Government "welcomes the leadership of President Roosevelt in these critical times."

I told the Minister that I would have to submit the question to you and that I would let him have any comment which you wished me to make.

Will you let me know what your wishes may be?

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

/s/ S. WELLES.

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

DEAR WENDELL: The enclosed has just come to me from Sumner Welles and I want to assure you that it would give me very great pleasure if you would care to make a short trip to Australia. I could arrange the official procedure any way you like—and because it would follow precedent I could give you special letters as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia—in which case you would travel at government expense. Or you could go as a private citizen with the letters from me to the Prime Ministers giving your visit my blessing.

I leave this matter wholly in your hands, as I think you should consult your own convenience—and I think both of us should be extremely careful, if you do go, lest it be said that I am sending you "out of the country"!

It would, of course, be of real value to cement our relations with New Zealand and Australia and would be useful not only now but in the future. There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malays or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter.

[2] In any event, I do wish you would let me know the next time you come to Washington as there are many things for us to talk over.

Always sincerely,

s/ F. D. R.

[In longhand the President wrote:] This was dictated Friday morning—long before this vile attack started. F. D. R.

Honorable WENDELL WILLKIE,
15 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

fd
ggt/dj

Enclosure. Let. from Welles to the President 12/5/41 saying that if Mr. Willkie were now to visit Australia with the "imprimatur" of the Pres. his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Govt.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The attached letter which you dictated to Wendell Willkie but which did not get out before the Japanese trouble is brought to your attention because I know you will want to change it.

G.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Memorandum for Sumner Welles:

I have sent the following letter to Wendell Wilkie. I will let you know what he says.

F. D. R.

Enclosure.

Transmitting copy of President's letter of 12/5/41 to Hon. Wendell Wilkie, in re appt. of Mr. Wilkie as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia.

EXHIBIT NO. 112

DISPATCHES AND OTHER MATERIAL REFERRED TO IN FOOTNOTES TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STATEMENT

[1] *Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral Kimmel's Statement*

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UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

[1] CinC File No.

P16-3/(0217)

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *February 7, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Recommended Complements.

Reference: (a) Secnav Rest. ltr. FS/S80/(400525) of 1 June 1940.

Enclosures:

- (A) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (04447) of 21 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Battleships).
- (B) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (035) of 18 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Aircraft Carriers, and Tenders and Seaplane Tenders).
- (C) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (04) of 4 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Heavy Cruisers).
- (D) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (046) of 25 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, BROOKLYN and ST. LOUIS class).
- (E) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (049) of 28 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, OMAHA Class).
- (F) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16(C) (04551) of 31 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Destroyers).
- (G) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (024) of 11 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Mine Layers, Fleet Mine Sweepers, Submarines, Submarine Auxiliaries and Train Ships).
- (H) Combasefor Conf. ltr. P16-1/MM/(0103) of 22 January 1941 (Proposed compliments for ships of the Train).
- (I) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1/S1(C) (026) of 14 January 1941.

1. The additional armaments which have been placed on combatant ships in accordance with the directive established by reference (a), and the need for manning additional stations incident to reported experience in the present war, required that consideration be given to increasing the complement of ships to meet these added war-time requirements.

[2] 2. Enclosures (A) to (G), forwarded herewith, are the reports of the "Fleet Personnel Board" with Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. Navy, as

Senior Member, appointed to determine the complement required to fight and maintain ships of the included types in accordance with the above requirements. These reports are submitted after the board had held exhaustive hearings and made a thorough study for each type. Before arriving at their conclusion the Board took the following steps:

(a) Members of the Board visited each type of ship and observed the stationing of the crews, the manning of batteries and the supplying of ammunition.

(b) Provided for the maximum utilization of the services of each man on board.

(c) Included the assignment of all available flag personnel to ships' battle stations.

(d) In so far as possible considered every phase of battle and justified the demand for each additional man.

3. The Commander-in-Chief concurs in the recommendations of the Board regarding all the complements necessary to fight the ships efficiently, subject to the following comments:

(a) Further study after submission of the report on destroyers, enclosure (F), by the Board makes the following modification in the recommendations for high speed minesweepers (DMs) advisable:

(1) HOVEY and LONG. Increase number of Seamen second class recommended to 10 (add 3) to make total complement 146.

(2) HOPKINS. Decrease number of Seamen first class recommended to one (decrease by 2) and number of Seamen second class to 4 (decrease by 3) to make total complement 138.

(b) The total complement of the Fleet minesweepers (AMs), enclosure (G), may be reduced from 96 to 85. This may be effected by reducing the recommended number of Seamen first class from 16 to 11, and Seamen second class from 18 to 13, [3] and Mess Attendant second class from 1 to 0. This would eliminate the 7 non-watchstanders in Condition II, and require the Type Commander to make readjustments in the stationing of personnel to operate without the other four.

In connection with the recommended complements for Train ships, enclosure (H) is submitted for consideration.

4. The major part of the increases recommended result directly from personnel required to man the additional armament installed in compliance with reference (a), and to provide for increased demands for battle lookouts.

5. A considerable part of the increases result also from the studies made by the Board of the ammunition supply for previously existing armament. The result of these studies and comments thereon are included in enclosure (I). Particular attention is invited to this enclosure, and to the increased number of men required in the ammunition train as a result of this study.

6. The information furnished by the Department regarding the numbers of men assigned to ships of the various types in the British Navy is of great interest. From the differences in complements of similar types in the two services, the following is apparent:

(a) British ships are mechanized to a considerably greater extent than our,

(b) They accept much lower rates of fire or standards of performance than we are willing to accept.

7. We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judgement of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warshipmen be adequately trained, every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the fleet than any other single factor.

[4] 8. The study of the Board definitely indicates that the recommended complements can be housed and fed and, until conclusively proved otherwise, should be accepted.

9. Subject to the comments made in this letter, it is recommended that the complements contained in enclosures (A) to (G) inclusive be approved and that the additional men be assigned as quickly as possible by the Bureau of Navigation.

10. By copy of this letter, Force and Type Commanders will initiate necessary changes in existing ships to provide for the additional complement.

directed, and they will expedite their proceedings. I cannot urge you too strongly to fill the ships to capacity with both enlisted men and officers.

I request that you kindly show this letter to Admiral Stark.

My kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL

Rear Admiral C. W. NIMITZ, U. S. Navy,
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[7] 4 April 1941

Top secret

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Info: CINCLANT, COMBATFOR, COMSCOFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMDTS
NAVY YARDS BOSTON, PORTSMOUTH, NEW YORK, PHILADEL-
PHIA, NORFOLK, CHARLESTON, MARE ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR,
PUGET SOUND, NAD PUGET SOUND, MARE ISLAND, OAHU &
CAVITE

041700

Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization. At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition. Strip ship in accordance with orders action Adees. Ships assigned availability for drydocking at Adees discretion. For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

[8] 48

Copy

In reply refer to initials and No. Serial 033612

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 3, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.

[9] 5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.

8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

[10] 9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy within about two months but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility.

11. Your Operating Plan for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders.

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

/s/ H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK.

cc: Rear Admiral Ghormley.

[11]

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).

Enclosures: (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 47, including List of Effective Pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in the "Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL-8.

Original, May, 1941 WPL-46

[12] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".

9. It is forbidden to make extracts from or copy portions of this publication without specific authority from the Chief of Naval Operations, except in subordinate plans based upon this publication.

H. R. STARK.

[13] *Secret*
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46 (16)
Serial 063W

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

[14] 5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

[s] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

[15]
Op-12B-2-djm
(SC) A16/EF12 (FF12)
Serial 098912 D-33956
Secret

Sep 9 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

[16] 24 May 1941

Top Secret

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT, COMDG GEN 2 MAR DIV, COMBASEFOR, COMTRANS-BASEFOR, COM 11

242130

A courier is being sent to commanding general of the Second Marine Division carrying orders for an organization of a reinforced regiment for duty with the First Marine Division X Direct HEYWOOD, FULLER, BIDDLE, MANLEY, LITTLE, McKEAN, STRINGHAM under appropriate transport commander to combat load this regiment at San Diego at earliest practicable date then proceed Canal Zone transit and report to CINClant for duty on arrival Cristobal X This movement is to be kept in the strictest secrecy X Advise what itinerary you plan to make.

[17] 15 May 1941

Top Secret

From: CINCPAC

Action: OPNAV

150625

Following are movements and compositions of task groups:

GEORGE 71: COMCRUDIV 8 in SAVANNAH and MISSISSIPPI; COMDES-DIV 15 in LANG, STERRETT, and WILSON; depart Hawaii 19 May arrive Canal Zone 2 June. (Refer your 132019)

GEORGE 72: COMBATDIV 3 in IDAHO and BROOKLYN; COMDESRON 8 in WINSLOW, WAINWRIGHT, and STACK; leave 20 May transit 4 June night.

GEORGE 73: NEW MEXICO and NASHVILLE; COMDES-DIV 17 in MORRIS, BUCK, and ROE; depart 20 May thru Canal June 6.

GEORGE 74: PHILADELPHIA leave this area 23 May; DESDIV 3 leave from SAN DIEGO 29 May; 30 May meet at sea arrive Taboga Island 8 June.

Forwarding OPORD copy. Can deliver to units concerned without use COM15 radio if info similar COM15 0513000 April is received by 18 May from OPNAV.

[18] 13 May 1941

Top Secret

From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
132019

OPNAV Serial 6538 instructions modified as below:

Organize 3 groups each consisting of 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 3 DDS from units contained in that serial. Wish these groups to leave at intervals of 1 or 2 days. Fourth group to be composed of 1 light cruiser plus DESDIV 3, latter DDS to join cruiser at sea prior arrival Panama this group to follow third group through canal at 1 or 2 day interval. Utmost secrecy desired about the fact ships are leaving Hawaiian area or west coast for Atlantic X. Wish ships leaving Hawaii to go direct to Canal Zone and all groups transit at night. Advise as soon as possible composition of groups, proposed departure dates, and expected arrival dates at Canal Zone so arrangements for transit can be made by OPNAV. As soon as practicable initiate these movements. Small groups like YORKTOWN can apparently make transit without publicity.

[19] A16-1/
ND14(01084)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 October 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces of Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Ref:

- (a) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 30 Dec. 1941, Ser. 629.
- (b) CINCUS conf. 1st end. to Com14 Ser. 629, CINC File A16(022) of 7 January 1941.
- (c) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 7 May 1941, Ser. 0430.
- (d) CinCPac secret ltr Ser. 038W of 20 May 1941 to OpNav.
- (e) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 31 Oct. 1940 Ser. 510.

1. All of the above references bear on the local defense forces and security measures of this area.

2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the Department has been fully informed about the deficiencies in this District, he feels it necessary to again bring the subject to attention.

4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success, from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate for the purpose.

5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the District are the four destroyers of Destroyer Division Eighty, one being still unequipped with listening gear, and three Coast Guard Cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and security patrol in a very extensive front.

[20] 6. It is urged that the Department send a number of small, fast craft to this District equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose. It is further urged that the Department send to this District at least two squadrons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may be expressed in the cliché "Too little and too late." It is hoped that we may profit from their errors.

C. C. BLOCH.

[21] ND14/(18)
Serial 096W
Secret

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

My

1st Endorsement to Com-14 secret ltr S-A16-1/ND14 (01084) of 17 October 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

1. Forwarded.

2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for the security at sea, is, in a real sense no fleet at all. Moreover, this fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United States by registered mail is authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

cc: Com-14

[22] C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629)
Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 30 December 1940.

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.

Ref:

- (a) OpNav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
- (b) OpNav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
- (c) CNO's personal ltr addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940.
- (d) Com14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
- (e) Com14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiry contained in reference (a), (b), and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the 14th Naval District to meet surprise hostile attack of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. *Aircraft raids.*

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distance reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area 59 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing types of planes are expected some time in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distance reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in Hawaiian area, 36 pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

[23] The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii 26 fixed 3'' guns and 44 mobile 3'' guns. There are projected 24 more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-mm and only 109-.50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-mm and 308-.50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3'' guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other main objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3'' gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army made no plans for the anti-aircraft defenses of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor or Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited number of anti-aircraft barges afloat, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-mm and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning center which will consist of eight radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite date in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The additional defense against submarines would be continued by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The District has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division Eighty which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The District has recently built and equipped one sweeping barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably work out of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The District has no vessels available for use as sweepers for anchored mines. A number of minesweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

[24] 5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the Government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank has an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently a guardhouse has been erected and an alarm has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photograph passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civil contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, etc. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, etc., are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rush; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made, not only of the yard, but of all the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

[25] 9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently, none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measures of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines, and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous, and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the District for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that it will proceed vigorously with a view to overcome deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH.

[26] A16/
Serial 022
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1941.

1st Endorsement to Com14 conf. ltr.

A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of
of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. As a result of this conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished on which the Commandant, 14th Naval District prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant, 14th Naval District in the opinion that the present Army pursuit squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are adequate to protect the Fleet at Pearl Harbor against air attacks. When established, the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area, a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. If neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet

which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by fleet air units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness with fighter squadrons were required.

[27] 3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area, any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this as an impossibility of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to send a carrier sufficiently near in war time in the face of active fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peacetime conditions, but early installation of under-water sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the 14th Naval District defense forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, is urgently recommended that local defense forces, adequate for the protection of Naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant, 14th Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity of detailing important fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of the ships of the United States Fleet. It is further considered that the provisions of adequate local defense forces for the 14th Naval District should be given high priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibility of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

cc: Com-14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 May 1941.

[28] Via Clipper Mail
Confidential

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District,

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small fast seagoing vessels equipped with listing gear, depth charges and guns.

(b) Aircraft.

(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the Island Bases and the other ports of the Islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to the anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the Coastal Frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters-pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the Island Bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph one of this letter will be required at these places.

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before

the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship at Wake is ten days. Imagine a vessel moored ten [29] days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1 (a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this District at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

(C) C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac.

[30] Attached thereto is a routine slip, CINCUS routing No. 04122, containing a number of unintelligible initialings and bearing the notation under the heading Remarks, "All too true".

[31] In reply refer to initials and No.
Op-12B-7-dlm.
(SC) A16-1/ND14.
Ser. 0135412.
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 25, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and The Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Subj: Local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Ref.:

- (a) CinCPac secret ltr A16/(038W) of May 20, 1941 to CNO.
- (b) W. P. L.—46.
- (c) W. P. Pac—46.
- (d) CNO secret ltr Op-12B-7-djm, (SC) A16-1/ND14, Ser. 070312; of June 23, 1941, to CinCPac, copy to Com14.
- (e) Com14 secret ltr (SC) A16-1/ND14 (01084) of Oct. 17, 1941.
- (f) CinCPac end. ND14/16, Ser. 096W of no date, to ref. (a).
- (g) CNO conf. ltr. Op-22-A2, (SC) A16-3(9), Ser. 0115422 of Oct. 23, 1941.

1. The request of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his War Plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both fleet and local defense forces, in the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

[32] 4. Neither the *local defense forces operating plan*—Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan 0-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan*, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army Air Forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of both defense plans.

5. The augmentation of the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material, and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval local defense forces

of the 14th Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of under-water detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned to these vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. subchasers (PC) is progressing slowly, and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May 1942. Eight of these, due for completion in May 1942, are *tentatively* assigned to the 14th Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. subchasers (PC) is indefinite, due to the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command, the Coast Guard of the 14th Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the following are equipped with depth charges and under-water detection gear: TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS's, expected to have depth charges and *sound gear when available*, are tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District. Two of these are due for completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

[33] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessary and is authorized: within the continental limits of the United States by registered airmail; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A. locked box.

/S/ H. R. Stark
H. R. STARK

Com14 told to comply with paragraph four, * * * of 12/17/41.

[34] In reply refer to initial and No.

Op30C1-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 09330
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subj: Anti-Torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installations of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes, 150' of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for drop is 60' or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

[35] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side more difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of natural, well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation baffles would be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest, the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported range by the individual aviators of 400 to 1,300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between fourteen and fifteen fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic antiaircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

[36] 4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes there. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island, protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand, constructed harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which are relatively deep, probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, antitorpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, are heavily anchored and moored, take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander in Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

cc: CinCLant
CinCAsiatic

[37] Op30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Ser. 010230
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

February 17, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.

1. In previous correspondence, the Commandants and local joint planning committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making a study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the large fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

[38] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

cc: CinCPac
 CinC Atlantic
 CinC Asiatic

CO, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOrd
 CO, NavNetDep, Newport Od-12

[39] Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC)M20-12
 Serial 055730
 Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, June 13, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District
 The Commandant, Third Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attack.

Ref: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Ser. 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a), the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases. In paragraph three were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles, among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300', and in some cases may initiate dives of considerably less than 75', and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

[40] 3. While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

cc: CinCPac; CinCLant; CinCAF; Co. NavNetDep, Tiburon; Co. NavNetDep, Newport; Comdt., NavSta Guantanamo; Comdt., NavSta Samoa; BuOrd; Op-12.

[41] 4 December 1941

Secret

From: CINCPAC

Action: COMTASKFOR 3 }
 COMFOURTEEN } Mailgram
 COMPATWING 2 }

Info: COMBATFOR }
 COMBASEFOR } Mailgram
 COMAIRBATFOR }
 LEXINGTON }

Ø40237

Myser Ø1825 of 1Ø Nov marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force Twelve under COMCRUSCOFOR consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland Desron Five less DESDIV Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 13Ø degrees from Midway at 223Ø GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X Return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X COMTASKFOR Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight X Communications radio condition 19 guard continuously NPM primary fox X COM 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about Ø2ØØ GCT on 8 Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X COM 14 pass this report to COMTASKFOR 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised.

[42] From: CNO

Action: CINCUS, CINCAF, COMROLFOR (Mailgram)

Date: 21 January 1941

212155

The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my

memorandum to the secretary X. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW Three with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment X. Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan X. Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

[43] From: Alusna, London

Top Secret

Action: OPNAV

Date: 3 February 1941

03140 Passed to CINCUS CINCLANT CINCAF for info as OPNAV 032300

I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indochina Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese Merchant vessel sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating that Indochina scene meeting aboard Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits.

[44] CINCPAC FILE NO.

Sn

A4-3/FF12/(13)

Serial 01254

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *August 13, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).

Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).

Commander Base Force.

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincus ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.

(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 4CL-41.

(c) Cinpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure (Under separate cover): (A) Copy of subject schedule—Action Addressees 10 each, information addressees 3 each.

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5 September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, information Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in exercises. Commander Scouting Force assign submarines and Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.

[45] (c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR
SARATOGA and planes
Crudiv NINE
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
 $\frac{1}{3}$ available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE
ENTERPRISE and planes
Crudivs THREE and FIVE
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv TWO
 $\frac{1}{3}$ available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR AND SIX
LEXINGTON and planes
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
Transports, Base Force (when present)
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.
Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv TWENTY-ONE) less $\frac{2}{3}$ available submarines.
Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.
[46] **BASE FORCE**, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).
NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE—Vessels operating under Opnav and Com 14.

4. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

6. One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry of the other force commences.

7. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

8. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practicable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21–25 November, 1941.

9. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	<i>Operating</i>	<i>Upkeep</i>
Task Force One-----	10–18 Oct	28 Sep–9 Oct
	1–10 Nov	19–31 Oct
	22–28 Nov	11–21 Nov
	13–20 Dec	29 Nov–12 Dec
	31 Dec	21–30 Dec
Task Force Two-----	24 Sept–2 Oct	3–17 Oct
	18–26 Oct	27 Oct–9 Nov
	10–17 Nov	18–27 Nov
	28 Nov–5 Dec	6–17 Dec
	18–26 Dec	27 Dec
[47] Task Force Three-----	2–10 Oct	20 Sep–1 Oct
	23 Oct–1 Nov	11–22 Oct
	17–25 Nov	2–16 Nov
	5–13 Dec	26 Nov–4 Dec
	26–31 Dec	14–25 Dec

10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:
 Task Forces Two and Three—23-26 Oct.
 Task Forces One and Three—22-25 Nov.
 Task Forces One and Two—18-20 Dec.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:	Comdesbatfor
Opnav	Comsubscfor
CincLant	Comairscfor
CincAF	Cominron TWO
Combatships	Compatwing TWO
Comcrubatfor	Compatwing ONE
Cominbatfor	Com 14
Comeruscfor	

P. C. Crosley,
 /S/ P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

[48] Date: 24 May 1941
 From: OPNAV
 To: CINCPAC
 242150

Top Secret

The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detachments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. It is not desired that detachments of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing of Hawaiian concentration. Your recommendations are requested.

[49] Date: 17 Oct 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMSUBSCFOR
 Info to: COM 14
 170354

Secret

When in all respects ready for war service send two submarines to Wake X Patrol radius fifteen miles of Wake X Direct submarines report contacts and be prepared take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPAC.

[50] Date: 17 Oct 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMSUBSCFOR
 Info to: COM FOURTEEN
 170426

Secret

Direct submarines now operating Midway assume war patrol ten mile radius X Report contacts X Take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPAC.

[51] Date: 17 Oct 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMFOURTEEN
 170319

Secret

Direct an alert status in outlying islands.

[52] Date: 17 OCT 1941
 Originator: COM 14
 Action: Naval Air Stations, Midway; Johnston; Palmyra; Marine Detachment at Wake.
 Written up for CINCPAC Info
 170356

Secret

In view international situation assume alert status.

[53] Date: 17 OCTOBER 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMPATWING 2 (TWO)
 Info to: COMFOURTEEN
 170429

Secret

When in all respects ready for war service send one squadron patrol planes to operate from Midway until further orders X Carry out daily patrol within 100 miles of island X Report contacts X In addition be prepared on further orders to send six of the above planes to Wake and replace them at Midway by six planes Form Pearl X Planes will take offensive action only if planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from CINCPAC.

[54] November 26 1941
 From: Chief of Naval Operations
 To: CINCPAC
 270040

Secret

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

[55] 26 November 1941
 From: Chief of Naval Operations
 To: CINCPAC
 270038

Secret

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty-five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an Aircraft Carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

[Telegram]

[56] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret.
 Approved by The President March 10, 1926.
 From War Department
 Bureau A. G. O.
 AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E
 EHB/cdm-1712
 November 29 1941
 Cablegram
 COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Sent No. 489, 11/29.

Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army Pursuit Squadrons as indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two

six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadrons should however be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended period War Department has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian Garrison specially organized as task forces for particular areas period If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States will be furnished period Report your conclusions and recommendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date.

ADAMS.

OFFICIAL: Secret.

/s/ (Illegible)
Adjutant General.

47 AGO Dec 8 1941 Received

True copy:
Based on: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41.
Green cy w/d & destroyed by
burning. 12/30/41, CDM-1705
[Stamped] Secret.

[57] Nov. 28, 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: OPNAV
Action: 12
28 Ø 627

Top Secret

Reference Urdis 270040 and 270038; Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron of marine planes. It proceeds afterwards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary operation of 12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Army bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now available there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Usefulness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by their doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. Their use is possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed, and flexibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional antiaircraft guns needed this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army troop reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Navy command, 12 marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On Dec. 1st sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. The feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.

[58] EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W
Secret

My

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 2 December 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operation.
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.
Reference:

- (a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
- (b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
- (c) Cincpac despatch 280627 of November 1941.
- (d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
- (e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
- (f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of Dec. 3, 1941.
- (g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of Oct. 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to reinforce defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, might occupy but that they could provide no anti-aircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, which referred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

[59] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, trained assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and 5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155 mm guns from Hawaii the Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155 mm guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.

[60] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reinforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord

with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency, Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

[61] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a squadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases make feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[62] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions):

[63] (b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination.

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if their is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. [64] If our progress in the war has brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

[65] 16. It seems appropriate to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over the establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

[66] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g)):

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (see paragraph 8);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

C. G., Haw. Dept.

Com 14

[67] Date: 1 December 1941

From: Opnav

To: CinCaf

Com Sixteen

Information: CincPac: Com Fourteen

Top Secret-Ultra

~~011400~~

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on twenty ninth sent to Tokyo as number eight seven two the following quote conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu X Since Thai intends to consider first invador as her enemy comma Orange believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa X Thai would then declare war and request Orange help X This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto XX Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between proBritish and proOrange until twenty five November but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange have silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision X Early and favorable developments are possible unquote

[68] Date: 28 November 1941
 From: Opnav
 Action: CinCaf
 Information: CincPac; Com 14; Com 16
 281633

Confidential
 Top Secret

Following from State Department: Saigon—November 26—5 days ago Orange troop and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon taking up all available quay space, about 20,000 troops have landed and 10,000 arrived from the north by rail during same period. Troops in south Indo-China total about 70,000. Some estimate 128,000 but this is yet too high. Many trucks landed moving troops and supplies to interior. This movement which is of large proportions indicates hostilities against Thailand may soon begin. Hanoi—November 26—supplies and military equipment particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Paiphong even recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns. Japanese have recently purchased considerable number native boats along coast Tongking province. Reported they desire purchase 500. These boats are being sent south, Hanoi—November 26—American consul received reliable information governor general has ascertained from agent that around December 1 without either declaration of war or ultimatum Nippon navy will attack Isthmus Kra. Simultaneously army will advance on Thailand. Great increased troop landings and movements south during last few days about 4000 men landed. On November 25 and 26 1500 will go south by special train. In Tongking there are approximately 25,000 Orange troops and at Gialam around 90 airplanes. Hanoi—November 26—Early on November 25 all interested persons advised by Haiphong mayor that Japanese intended sequester all freight en route to China. Nips had demanded keys to all bonded warehouses by noon November 25. Mayor added [69] protest had been lodged by French officials but individuals effected by demand must use own judgment whether or not to comply.

[70] Dec. 6, 1941
 From: CINCAF
 To: OPNAV
 Action: 38W
 061255
 Copies: 12; 13; 16; 38; 388; Nayaide; CNO; 20 OP.

Secret

Report by Cine China "25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 10 DD's lat 08-00 N, 106-00 east at 0316 GMT today. Convoy of 10 ships with two cruisers and 10 destroyers 07-40 north, 106-20 east two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships 07-51 north 105 east at 0442, course 310. This indicates all forces will make for Kontron"

Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay—30 ships and one large cruiser.

Info: CINCPAC; COM 16; COM 14

[71] 8 December 1941
 From: ComSixteen
 To: OpNav
 Information: CincPac; CinAF; ComFourteen
 080333

Secret

The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveriest since December first and are conservative: There is a heavy concentration of aircraft at Taiwan at the Kaki, Takao, and Taichu Airstations. South China Airforceheadquarters is now in the Saigon area with at least four groups of planes. Strength unknown. Eight Maru Airtenders in South China area estimated distribution as follows: At Takao five, at Saigon one and two at Sama. Intercepts of large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in Saigon area indicate that extensive operations may be imminent. Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.

[72] Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

5 JANUARY 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary is respectfully submitted:

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information was lacking in regard to the location or activity of a group, type or unit of the Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general review of the procedures and methods followed:

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted traffic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at sea. During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities. When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power, limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of originated traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative to a unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed it either by the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the originator.

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 November change the Japanese began using a "blanket broadcast" system in which no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher text.

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a relatively inactive status.

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the *simultaneous* location of *each* Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or [73] submarines is not possible. Therefore, the locations of Fleet Flagships and some subordinate units of the above types must be relied upon to establish the presumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.

5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the occasions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types were:

Type	Total days uncertain	Number of periods	Range of periods
Battleships.....	70.....	Seven.....	8-14 days.
Cruisers (1st Fleet).....	Nearly all.....	Almost continual absence of positive indications.	
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7).....	113.....	Eight.....	10-20 days.
CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty).....	63.....	Six.....	8-16 days.
Destroyers.....	Very indefinite.....	Seven.....	9-33 days.
Carriers.....	84.....	Eight.....	8-22 days.
(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is more typical.)			
Carriers (less Cardiv 2).....	134.....	Twelve.....	9-22 days.
(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941.)			

Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Certified to be a True Copy :

/s/ J. M. LEE,
Comdr., U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary, Staff, CINCPAC-CINCPOA.

[74] 28 Nov 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMPATWING 2
Info: COMSCOFOR
COMBATFOR
COM 14
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBATFOR

Secret

280450

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search en-route X Provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X After arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X Present intention return Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December.

[75] 11/30/41
ORIGINATOR CTF 9

Action: COMPATRONS 21, 22; COMTASKGROUP 9.2
Information: CINCPAC; COM 14; COMSUBSCOFOR; CO NAS Midway; CO NAS Wake 292103

Operation order 9S1 X Information CINCPAC 280447 and 280450 X Task Force 8 ENTERPRISE, CHESTER, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, 6 DD transporting Marine FigRon which will base on Wake X Planes will be launched 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 X Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 400 miles south of Midway X Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. X WRIGHT expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December X Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching Marine planes X Tasks PatRon 21 search as indicated: Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 260-280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 2 sector 200-237 to 525 miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles using 6 planes X PatRon 22 Search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec. 2 sector 060-102 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles using six planes; one plane be 200 miles bearing [76] 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs; unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 X On December four X On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway X On December five take off at daylight for Pearl XRAY critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. X Logistics fuel as required X Special provisions use Zone 0 times X Task Force 9 Basic Communications and Aerological Plans X Frequency Plan FOX COMTASKFOR 9 with FAIRDET at NAS Pearl X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies X Arrange for bases to broadcast MO's on schedule without request X.

[77]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A2-11/FF12

A4-1/VZ

A3/VZ(95)

Serial 59

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1942.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Airplane Situation, Hawaiian Area.

Reference:

- (a) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed to OpNav.
- (b) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941, addressed to Buairo.
- (c) CincCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.
- (d) CincPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.

Enclosure: (A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 1941

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.

2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft requirements here:

(a) *The attack of 7 December will be followed by others.* The enemy has exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not maintained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commercial docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objective the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured with the forces now available to us.

(b) *Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the advantage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of development.* This applies with full force not only to material and to the training, skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, [78] planned and handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) *Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long range search, for striking and for local interception.* All of these are vital for effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate. It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligence reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which provided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning of any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second. As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)), the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) *Carrier aircraft may be launched 300 miles from Oahu.* There is definite evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance

that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) *Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.* This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.

[79] (c) *It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) *Air Search visibility is 25 miles.* That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, *which include perfect visibility*, is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when *reliable* radar equipment for airplanes is *available*, for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) here is 42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures.) This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times [80] the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B-17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol planes and 12 Army Z-17's are being used daily for search (18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force). The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only *four-fifths* of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-

half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.

[81] 10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immediately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion now at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBV-3 planes now here, is earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an important immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander-in-Chief concurred in reference (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack, which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided. The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose, and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be decisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, *Hawaiian air defense* alone has been considered. Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.

13. Returning to the immediate situation: With present limited numbers of searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is no answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to [82] play the inevitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that *any* immediate increase for either will vitally improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Copy to:
ComAirScoFor
ComPatWing TWO
BuAero
Opnav
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.

[83]

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

PW2/A16-3
(0033)

Secret

From: The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; Recommendation for Assignment of.

Reference: (a) Comairscofor Confidential Letter A4-1 (0755) dated December 18, 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.
- (B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.

1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth the need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protective searches from Oahu, and stated briefly the advantages and further uses of such aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of this

subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wing is vital, not only to defense, but also to future offensive air operations.

2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search operations require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B-17 aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles; or by B-17 aircraft and VO-VS of VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200-300 miles, when the B-17s available for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only partially effective. The lack of experience and training of Army Air Corps flight crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a condition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force, are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to [84] release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the material required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon utilizing PBY aircraft, and upon alternate long range equipment having cruising speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below:

	PBY	150-knot airplane (4 engine)	200-knot airplane (4 engine)
Radius of daily search	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility)	50	54	54
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	24,750	19,415	14,580
Total number of planes required	150	162	162
Number of flight crews required	225	243	243
Engine changes per month	82.5	129.6	97.2
Spare engines required	182	286	214
Fuel consumption per month-gal	1,980,000	2,912,250	2,916,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	50%	60%	60-70%
With A. S. V. (40-mile visibility assumed)			
Radius of daily search	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily	32	34	34
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	15,840	11,934	9,180
Total number of planes required	96	102	102
Number of flight crews required	134	153	153
Engine changes per month	52.8	79.5	61.2
Spare engines required	117	175	137
Fuel consumption per month-gal	1,267,000	1,790,100	1,836,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	75%	95%	100%

3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabulations and from the study, enclosure (A), are as follows:

(a) PBY aircraft are *too slow* for the mission required of them. Their lack of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover the required area during [85] daylight hours, but also because the excessive duration of flight increases pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.

(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be increased to near 100%, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined, with shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear that A. S. V. equipment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a not-to-delay basis.

(c) The PB2Y-3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adequate range. But the operation of 102 PB2Y-3 airplanes presents more difficulties than the operation of a similar number of landplane bombers. PB2Y-3s are not fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of these planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement for search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.

(d) Surveying the landplane field two types are available; the B-17 and the B-24. Experience with the B-17 on search has been disappointing. Their cruising speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In order to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, precluding the carrying of bombs.

(e) The B-24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective search in this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure (B). Provision of 102 B-24 airplanes would provide not only for effective search but also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed that a number of B-24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion from Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to the defense of Oahu.

[86] (f) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B-17-E aircraft, I am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short order take over the operation of four-engine landplane bombers.

(g) Some fields are available and others can shortly be made available in the Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as necessary to accommodate 102 B-24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fields include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maui, Barking Sands on Kauai, and Hilo Airport at Hawaii.

4. Recommendations:

(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B-24 bombers be allocated to Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.

(b) Immediate equipping with B-24s of the three patrol squadrons now on the West Coast equipping with PBV-5As is recommended as the first increment.

(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBV-3s now in this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B-24s, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the PBV-3s in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning with B-24s.

(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a *not to delay* basis:

- (1) A. S. V. equipment.
- (2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
- (3) I. F. F. equipment.

/s/ P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Enclosure "A"

[87] *Determination of search group requirements*

A. PBV Aircraft

Assumptions

1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier—27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBV ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark:

(At Pearl)	Dec. 22	June 22
Daylight.....	11.0 hrs.....	13.6 hrs.
Dark.....	13.0 hrs.....	10.4 hrs.

5. Daily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300-mile launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 300-mile circle.

6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching Radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	351	(27×10.4) 281
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle: $\frac{300}{100} \times 27$	81	81
Radius to cover effective at dark.....	732	662

Let a=hours of daylight remaining when plane starts return leg.

Radius of search required is (r) $732+27(a)$ $662+27(a)$

[88] Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus a, times plane speed.

$$732+27a+50=(11-a) 100$$

$$a=2.5 \text{ hrs.}$$

$$662+27a+50=(13.6-a) 100$$

$$a=5.1$$

Radius of search (r)	$732+27(2.5)$	$662+27(5.1)$
Radius of search r	799.5	799.7

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is about 60%. On 22 December plane flies last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces to 290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.
4. Plane hrs/mo—24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)—1,980,000 gal.
6. Engines changes per month (at 600 hrs)—82.5. Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes)—182.

[89] B. *PBY Aircraft with A. S. V. (Radar)*

Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6-41A) stated that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following performance.

Forward antenna system

Range—30 miles.

Cone of search—60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the beam); directly ahead and almost vertically downward.

Lateral antenna system

Range—80 miles on both sides.

Cone of search—18° in azimuth (9° on either side of the beam); 30° in elevation; 30° in depression."

Weight 290 lbs)

From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our PBY airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected from PBY airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First shipment sunk). Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an

effective range of at least 40 miles, the following benefits would result from installation of A. S. V. in PBY aircraft:

For 40 mile A. S. V. "visibility"

1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to 32.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 50% to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce fuel consumption for search from 1,980,000 to 1,267,000 gallons per month; reduce engine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.
- [90] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engines required from 182 to 117.
5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plane crews required.

Conclusions

1. *The immediate installation of A. S. V. in search aircraft is vital to successful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and personnel required for any search.*

C. 150 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search aircraft

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	351 (27×10.4)	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reached 300 mile circle: $\frac{300}{150} \times 27$	54	54
Radium to cover <i>effective at dark</i>	705	635
705 80 27a=150 (11-a) 635 80 27a=150 (13.6-a) a=4.87 a=7.5		
Radius of search r=840		r=835

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.
- [91] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes daily (40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 102 planes; without A. S. V. 54 planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without.
4. Plane hrs/mo;
 - With A. S. V..... 11, 934
 - Without A. S. V..... 19, 415
5. Fuel consumption/mo: (at 150 gal/hr)
 - With A. S. V..... 1, 709, 100
 - Without A. S. V..... 2, 912, 250
6. Engine changes/mo: (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/plane)
 - With A. S. V..... 79. 5
 - Without A. S. V..... 129. 6
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 - With A. S. V..... 175
 - Without A. S. V..... 285

D. 200 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircraft.

	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run.....	351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle:		
$\frac{300}{200} \times 27$	41	41
Radius to cover <i>effective at dark</i>	692	622
[92] $692+80+27a=200$ (11-a) $622+80+27a=200$ (13.6-a)		
a=6.3		a=8.9
r=860		r=862

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
 2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.
- Total force required:
- | | |
|----------------------|------------|
| With A. S. V..... | 102 planes |
| Without A. S. V..... | 162 planes |
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without. All search made during daylight.
 4. Plane hours/month:

With A. S. V.....	9, 180
Without A. S. V.....	14, 580
 5. Fuel consumption/month (at 200 gallons/hour):

With A. S. V.....	1, 836, 000
Without A. S. V.....	2, 916, 000
 6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours):

With A. S. V.....	61. 2
Without A. S. V.....	97. 2
- Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes):
- | | |
|----------------------|-----|
| With A. S. V..... | 137 |
| Without A. S. V..... | 214 |

[93] 1. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day in three: i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.

2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sunrise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes are on one hour's notice otherwise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice otherwise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available airplane on the ground.

3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.

4. Initially a minimum of 150% plane crews will be required. The excess over one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.

[94] *Confidential*

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander Coe, USN
From: Major W. J. Holzapel, U. S. A.

The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:

B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830 with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during take-off.

The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550 gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Corporation however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.

On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The airplanes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at altitudes of 7-10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumption at these altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, was 150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180-200 statute miles per hour.

This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity of the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of 9 .50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.

The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gross weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,000 pounds. However, conversations with a mechanic who made a trip to England brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pounds and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,000 pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplane.

/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL

Deferred—Secret

[95] Date: 29 Nov 41
Originator: OpNav
Action: CincPac
28054

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct Comgen Hawdept to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future

Ref: 11-862; Wright now at Wake . . discharge Marine planes crews and material afterwards proceeds to Midway to land similar items . . . etc . . .

[96] Date: 28 Nov 1941
From: CincPac
To: PacFlt
Information to: OpNav (RDO)
280355

Classification—Secret

Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduct submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on surface X Depth bomb all sugmarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.

[97] Cinc File No.
A4-3/QL/0243
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 11, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941—Report of.
Reference: (a) Base Force Operation Plan No. 1-41.
Enclosure:

(A) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0187 of 7 Feb. 1941 with its enclosure.

(B) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file AS Serial 0189 of 7 February 1941.

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE, of a sonic contact experienced off Diamond Head on 3-4 February (Enclosure (A)), and a supplementary report thereto (Enclosure (B)).

2. It will be noted that the contact was developed outside the Defensive Sea Area as established by General Order No. 118, and that at no time was there any sonic indication of a contact within that area.

3. The concurrent air operations conducted with the destroyers are shown in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) and in the supplementary report, (Enclosure (B)).

4. In this connection pertinent parts of reference (a) are quoted herewith to indicate the orders under which the destroyers maintaining the Channel Entrance Patrol operate:

"In case evidence of a submerged submarine is obtained maintain contact and report to Commander Base Force.

"Take no offensive action until directed, unless the submarine enters the Prohibited Area (Defensive Sea Area, General Order one hundred eighteen)."

[98] 5. The Commanding Officer of the DALE is an officer of considerable experience in sonic work. His reports and the despatches incident to the contact indicate that he is convinced contact was established with a submarine. Our own submarines were not operating in the area where the sonic contact was made.

6. It is interesting to note that Destroyers had been on patrol in the particular, and adjacent area since 1800 on 2 February. A submarine in the vicinity when contact was made would, therefore, likely have operated submerged from that time and during previous daylight hours. It is noted too, that contact was retained for about 24 hours, beginning 0600 on 3 February; that a daylight period followed the loss of contact; that a patrol was maintained on the night of 5 February; and a search was conducted on 5 February. This totals a submerged operating period well in excess of anything that might have been expected.

7. When the Destroyer reported that the contact appeared definitely to be a submarine, the Commander-in-Chief was inclined to order depth charges dropped in the area. However, he realized that to do so might create an international incident of serious consequence at the time. As there seemed every reason to expect that contact could be maintained, and that the suspected submarine would eventually be forced to surface, he directed the Destroyers to retain contact and drop depth charges only in the event that the suspected submarine took aggressive action.

8. After a careful study of all attending circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief does not subscribe to the contention of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE that contact was established with a submarine. He cannot visualize any motive for a foreign submarine to be operating submerged in this particular area. The reported propeller noises, may have resulted from internal noises in the Destroyers themselves, or from the propellers of small craft [99] in the area. Attention is also invited to the statement in paragraph 3 (a) of enclosure (A), regarding the presence of fish in that area. There had been also a decided change in the direction of the wind just previous to this experience, with attending cooler weather. This may have introduced a temperature gradient in the water in this area.

9. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to continue the present anti-submarine patrol. He sees no reason to expand it incident to this experience. He will continue to operate under the present directive as quoted in paragraph 4.

10. If the Department does not approve of the action taken, the Commander-in-Chief will be delighted to issue orders for offensive action whenever a contact similar to the one reported is made. In that event it seems wise to extend the limit of the Defensive Sea Area as prescribed in General Order No. 118, and to make notification of same.

[s] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL

[100] File AS
Serial 0187
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES FLEET
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE
U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 7, 1941.

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941—Report of.

Enclosure: (A) Report of Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE.

1. Enclosure (A) is the report of the subject contact submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE who was designated as the officer in charge of the operations by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. This report incorporates the observations of the following destroyers which were in company with the DALE—AYLWIN, HULL, LAMSON and MAHAN.

2. A separate report submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LAMSON, adds nothing to the enclosure. The MAHAN is now at sea and will be directed to submit a report immediately upon her return to Pearl Harbor.

3. Concurrently with the operations of destroyers the following air operations were conducted:

(a) The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by the DETROIT planes during the forenoon and afternoon of February 3. The DETROIT aviators report that at about 1030 some porpoises were observed between the destroyers and ahead of them and shortly thereafter several blackfish were observed on the port bow of the DALE. They further report sighting several blackfish at about 1400 in the same vicinity.

(b) Patrol planes patrolled the area throughout the day of 3 February.

(c) The sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor was searched by patrol planes during the forenoon of 4 February.

(d) No reports of sighting a strange submarine were received from any aircraft.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

[101] File
AS
Serial 0189
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 7, 1941.

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941—Report of.

Reference: (a) Comdesbatfor Itr. AS Serial 0187 dated February 7, 1941.

1. Supplementing reference (a), the following additional data are submitted.

2. The first report of contact by DALE was received at 0813, February 3, 1941. DALE was immediately directed to maintain contact. The contact report was retransmitted for information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Base Force, Commander Battleship Division ONE (who was approaching Pearl Harbor enroute from the mainland), and all Task Group Commanders of Task Force One then operating at sea. Patrol planes were directed to investigate and the patrol plane Task Group Commander established a patrol over the area, which patrol was maintained until darkness 3 February.

3. The AYLWIN was in company with the DALE from 0736 to 0854, at which time she proceeded on other assigned duty and was replaced by HULL about 1015.

4. The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by DETROIT planes during the forenoon and afternoon of 4 February.

5. When the DETROIT finished her scheduled exercises about noon, 3 February, she proceeded to visual contact with DALE. In reply to direct questions DALE stated that the contact was considered to be a submarine and that the HULL (in company) concurred.

6. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to rendezvous with Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, at 1700, at which time the LAMSON and MAHAN were directed to assist the DALE and HULL, and the DRAYTON and FLUSSER to join Battleship Division THREE as antisubmarine screen. The four destroyers engaged in the contact were directed to maintain contact and to take offensive action only if attacked. They were authorized to use navigational lights, and all other units directed to keep clear. The DETROIT then proceed to the Maui range for D. G. calibration.

[102] 7. During the night reports of losing and making contact were received intermittently. In response to the question as to whether or not there was good reason to believe that the contact was not a whale, the DALE advised that good contacts were checked by several ships and propeller sounds had been heard.

8. At daylight of the 4th the routine patrol plane flight covering the operating areas was initiated.

9. At 0725, February 4, the DALE reported contact lost. After a reasonable length of time in which to ascertain whether or not this was a repetition of previous experiences, it seemed established that the contact would not be regained. At 0925 the patrol planes were directed to search the sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor.

10. At 1120 DALE and HULL were directed to return to Pearl Harbor, leaving the LAMSON and MAHAN to continue the search. The DRAYTON and FLUSSER were directed to join the LAMSON and MAHAN. These four destroyers continued the search until dark at which time the search was abandoned.

11. At 1800, 4 February, the destroyer offshore patrol was established for the sortie of Task Force Two the next morning. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to patrol Areas S-1 and S-2 outside of the areas of the offshore patrol.

12. After the contact was lost at 0725, February 4, no further evidence of the presence of a submarine was forthcoming from either destroyers or patrol planes.

13. Any estimate or conjecture as to whether a submarine was in this area appears of little real value. Three ships reported hearing propeller noises; two of these reported hearing propeller noises on two occasions. The Commanding Officer of the DALE has had two years experience in working with our own submarines. His sound operators are experienced. If these reports were correct the propeller noises can be explained only by the actual presence of a submarine.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

10/Fs

[103] In Reply Refer to File No. DD353/A9-8/S68 (57)
Confidential

U. S. S. DALE, PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
February 7, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Destroyers, BATTLE FORCE.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February, 1941, report of.

1. On Monday 3 February 1941, the U. S. S. Dale was on station as Off Shore Patrol in Sector 3. Two Radiomen, graduates of the sound school and qualified operators were on Echo Ranging Watch.

2. At about 0657, a contact was reported and developed. This contact was maintained until 0638, 4 February 1941. A chronological record of events is forwarded herewith:—

Zone (Time)

Event

February 3, 1941

0657 Made contact on QCA—stopped to develop. Maintained contact.
0720 Determined that submarine was on Southerly Course at very slow speed. Notified Commander Destroyer Division TWO in Aylwin of contact.
0736 Position Lat. 20°09.3' N. long. 157°50' W. U. S. S. Aylwin approached and made contact, verifying Dale contact.

2500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0736-
0850 Aylwin and Dale maintained contact.
0850 Position Lat. $21^{\circ}05.1'$ N. Long $157^{\circ}50'$ W.
0854 U. S. S. Aylwin ceased tracking and proceeded to station as Inner Patrol, ordering Hull as her relief.
0929 Lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range 900 yards. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}02.7'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}50.3'$ W.
1000 Regained contact. Range 4100 yards. Lat. $21^{\circ}02.3'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}50.8'$ W.
[104]
1024 U. S. S. Hull made contact. Range 2,100 yards.
1035 Position Lat. $21^{\circ}02.3'$ N. and Long. $157^{\circ}53.4'$ W.
1041 U. S. S. Hull lost contact.
1053 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range 1,550 yards. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}03'$ N. Long $157^{\circ}54'$ W.
1125 U. S. S. Dale regained contact. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}03.8'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}55'$ W. Range 3,100 yards.
1144 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Range 1,000 yards.
1240 U. S. S. Dale and Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards. Submarine apparently circling.
1250 Lost Contact. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}00.5'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}55.4'$ W. Range 1,800 yards.
1350 Dale regained contact and heard propeller noises.
1353 Hull regained contact. Dale heard propeller noises.
1414 Hull lost contact.
1458 Maintaining contact. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}02'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}55.8'$ W.
1536 Position Lat. $21^{\circ}01.7'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}55.3'$ W.
1622 Lost contact. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}01.8'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}54.4'$ W. Range 1,500 yards.
1705 Dale regained contact. Position Lat. $21^{\circ}00.3'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}55.3'$ W. Range 1,900 yards.
[105] 1747 Dale lost contact. Range 2,200 yards.
1800 Lamson and Mahan joined Task Unit formed scouting line interval 1,000 yards.
1847 Dale regained contact. Range 1,500 yards.
1900 Submarine appeared to pass through formation on a southerly heading.
1913 Lamson made contact. Range 2,200 yards.
1917 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}07'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}51.5'$ W.
1921 Mahan reported propeller noises.
1935 Mahan lost contact.
1938 Lamson heard slow beat of propellers.
1945 Lamson and Mahan lost contact.
2000 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}05.3'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}50.9'$ W.
2140 Lamson detached to investigate shore line east of Diamond Head.
2354 Dale regained contact. Range 540 yards.

February 4, 1941

- 0000 Dale maintaining previous contact.
0036 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}04'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}54.3'$ W.
0115 Mahan made contact.
0127 Hull made contact. Range 2,000 yards.
0130 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}06.8'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}53.3'$ N.
0150 Dale and Mahan contacts show submarine in same position.
[106] 0152 Mahan reported hearing propeller noises.
0158 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}07'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}53'$ W.
0209 Hull reported range 400 yards.
0247 Hull reported range 1,400 yards, Lamson 2,100 yards.
0250 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}07.5'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}52'$ W. Dale, Lamson and Mahan lost contact, Hull maintaining contact; range 1,350 yards.
0326 Dale regained contact. Range 2,600 yards.
0328 Mahan regained contact. Range 4,100 yards.
0345 Dale position Lat. $21^{\circ}05.2'$ N. Long. $157^{\circ}52.7'$ W. Range 1,800 yards.
0400 Dale contact, range 1,550 yards. Hull, contact 1,700 yards.
0413 Hull lost contact.

0415 Hull regained contact.
 0431 Hull lost contact.
 0441 All ships lost contact, last range from Dale 2,600 yards.
 0555 Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards.
 0614 Dale regained contact. Range 2,450 yards.
 0638 Hull and Dale lost contact. Lat. 21°00 N. Long. 157°53' W.
 0815 Went head continuing search without results.
 0921 Sighted smoke bombs on starboard beam, being dropped by planes.
 [107] Turned right into column at 20 knots, course 103° T. to investigate.
 0934 Lamson and Mahan detached to investigate smoke bombs being dropped
 on starboard beam.
 0935 Sighted four sanpans ranging from dead ahead to broad on the starboard
 bow.
 0946 Changed course to pass close aboard one of sanpans which was making
 about 15 knots and apparently attempting to evade.
 0955 Sighted about ten men in sanpan.
 0958 Passed close aboard sanpan Kasura Maru number FJ82.
 1000 Changed course to rejoin Lamson and Mahan to continue search in
 area S-1.
 1034 Formed scouting line course 180° T. scouting interval 1000 yards scouting
 speed 10 knots. Started echo ranging.
 1125 Changed course to 270° T.
 1132 Changed course to 000° T.
 1215 Received message to return to port.

J. P. WOMBLE, Jr.

Secret

[108] Date: 28 Nov. 1941.
 Originator: HELENA.
 COMTASGR 1.5.
 COMTASKFOR 1.
 Action: COMTASGR 1.5; COMTASKFOR 1.
 Information: CINCPAC; COMTASKFOR 2.
 280835

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a submarine was in area east 9 during HELENA firing approach about 1900.

[109] From: Alusna, Batavia.
 Date: 5 Dec. 1941.
 Addresses: OPNAV.
 031030

From Thorpe for Mills War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; West wind clear England with attack on Thailand, Malay, and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Top Secret

Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 113

PACIFIC FLEET EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES

Fall and Winter 1941

18 No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 1819, THEMISTWATER, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T.H.
 August 13, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
 Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).
 Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).
 Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).
 Commander Base Force.
 Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules; U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 15 May, 1941.
 (b) U.S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 202-41.
 (c) Cincpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0751 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject schedule - Action Addressees (under separate cover) 10 each, information addressees 3 each.

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5 September, printed and distributed by 10 September, 1941, as follows:-

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base Force of the times in the schedule that they intend to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit to Task Force Commanders, in confirmation Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in all species. Commander Scouting Force assigns submarine and Torpedo Squadrons to Task Forces.

Cincpac File No.
 A4-3/FF12/(13)
 Serial 01254

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Subject: Employment Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second
 Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE - Commander Battle Force.

Batdiv TWO and FOUR
 SARATOGA and planes
 Crudiv THREE
 Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE
 Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
 1/3 available submarines
 2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO - Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE
 ENTERPRISE and planes
 Crudivs THREE and FIVE
 Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
 Mindiv TWO
 1/3 available submarines
 2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE - Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR and SIX
 LEXINGTON and planes
 Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
 Transports, Base Force (when present)
 Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions
 and Advance Detachment.
 Submarines, Scouting Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv TWENTY-ONE) less 2/3 available submarines.
 Aircraft, Scouting Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, less
 4 Patrol Squadrons.

U.S. Pacific Fleet,
1942.

U.S. Pacific Fleet, less transport
vessels.

PERMITS - Vessels operating
under Sec 24.

Yachts assigned in accordance with regulations (1) have been included in
operating purposes.

9. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual
requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another
and operating area.

All Task Forces will be at sea at all times.
After leaving Pearl Harbor the same day,
entry of the other Task Forces.

Reference (c) remains effective, when appropriate.

Schedules will provide for as many Task Forces
as possible to participate in Fleet operations
November, 1942.

operating and sleep periods are as
follows:-

	<u>OPERATING</u>	<u>SLEEP</u>
Task Force 1	16-17 OCT	21-22 OCT
Task Force 2	18-19 OCT	23-24 OCT
Task Force 3	20-21 OCT	25-26 OCT
Task Force 4	22-23 OCT	27-28 OCT
Task Force 5	24-25 OCT	29-30 OCT
Task Force 6	26-27 OCT	31 OCT - 1 NOV
Task Force 7	28-29 OCT	1-2 NOV
Task Force 8	30 OCT - 31 OCT	3-4 NOV
Task Force 9	1-2 NOV	5-6 NOV
Task Force 10	3-4 NOV	7-8 NOV
Task Force 11	5-6 NOV	9-10 NOV
Task Force 12	7-8 NOV	11-12 NOV
Task Force 13	9-10 NOV	13-14 NOV
Task Force 14	11-12 NOV	15-16 NOV
Task Force 15	13-14 NOV	17-18 NOV
Task Force 16	15-16 NOV	19-20 NOV
Task Force 17	17-18 NOV	21-22 NOV
Task Force 18	19-20 NOV	23-24 NOV
Task Force 19	21-22 NOV	25-26 NOV
Task Force 20	23-24 NOV	27-28 NOV
Task Force 21	25-26 NOV	29-30 NOV
Task Force 22	27-28 NOV	1-2 DEC
Task Force 23	29-30 NOV	3-4 DEC
Task Force 24	1-2 DEC	5-6 DEC
Task Force 25	3-4 DEC	7-8 DEC
Task Force 26	5-6 DEC	9-10 DEC
Task Force 27	7-8 DEC	11-12 DEC
Task Force 28	9-10 DEC	13-14 DEC
Task Force 29	11-12 DEC	15-16 DEC
Task Force 30	13-14 DEC	17-18 DEC
Task Force 31	15-16 DEC	19-20 DEC
Task Force 32	17-18 DEC	21-22 DEC
Task Force 33	19-20 DEC	23-24 DEC
Task Force 34	21-22 DEC	25-26 DEC
Task Force 35	23-24 DEC	27-28 DEC
Task Force 36	25-26 DEC	29-30 DEC
Task Force 37	27-28 DEC	31 DEC - 1 JAN
Task Force 38	29-30 DEC	2-3 JAN
Task Force 39	31 DEC - 1 JAN	4-5 JAN
Task Force 40	1-2 JAN	6-7 JAN
Task Force 41	3-4 JAN	8-9 JAN
Task Force 42	5-6 JAN	10-11 JAN
Task Force 43	7-8 JAN	12-13 JAN
Task Force 44	9-10 JAN	14-15 JAN
Task Force 45	11-12 JAN	16-17 JAN
Task Force 46	13-14 JAN	18-19 JAN
Task Force 47	15-16 JAN	20-21 JAN
Task Force 48	17-18 JAN	22-23 JAN
Task Force 49	19-20 JAN	24-25 JAN
Task Force 50	21-22 JAN	26-27 JAN
Task Force 51	23-24 JAN	28-29 JAN
Task Force 52	25-26 JAN	30 JAN - 31 JAN
Task Force 53	27-28 JAN	1-2 FEB
Task Force 54	29-30 JAN	3-4 FEB
Task Force 55	31 JAN - 1 FEB	5-6 FEB
Task Force 56	1-2 FEB	7-8 FEB
Task Force 57	3-4 FEB	9-10 FEB
Task Force 58	5-6 FEB	11-12 FEB
Task Force 59	7-8 FEB	13-14 FEB
Task Force 60	9-10 FEB	15-16 FEB
Task Force 61	11-12 FEB	17-18 FEB
Task Force 62	13-14 FEB	19-20 FEB
Task Force 63	15-16 FEB	21-22 FEB
Task Force 64	17-18 FEB	23-24 FEB
Task Force 65	19-20 FEB	25-26 FEB
Task Force 66	21-22 FEB	27-28 FEB
Task Force 67	23-24 FEB	29-30 FEB
Task Force 68	25-26 FEB	1-3 MAR
Task Force 69	27-28 FEB	4-5 MAR
Task Force 70	29-30 FEB	6-7 MAR
Task Force 71	1-2 MAR	8-9 MAR
Task Force 72	3-4 MAR	10-11 MAR
Task Force 73	5-6 MAR	12-13 MAR
Task Force 74	7-8 MAR	14-15 MAR
Task Force 75	9-10 MAR	16-17 MAR
Task Force 76	11-12 MAR	18-19 MAR
Task Force 77	13-14 MAR	20-21 MAR
Task Force 78	15-16 MAR	22-23 MAR
Task Force 79	17-18 MAR	24-25 MAR
Task Force 80	19-20 MAR	26-27 MAR
Task Force 81	21-22 MAR	28-29 MAR
Task Force 82	23-24 MAR	30 MAR - 31 MAR
Task Force 83	25-26 MAR	1-2 APR
Task Force 84	27-28 MAR	3-4 APR
Task Force 85	29-30 MAR	5-6 APR
Task Force 86	31 MAR - 1 APR	7-8 APR
Task Force 87	1-2 APR	9-10 APR
Task Force 88	3-4 APR	11-12 APR
Task Force 89	5-6 APR	13-14 APR
Task Force 90	7-8 APR	15-16 APR
Task Force 91	9-10 APR	17-18 APR
Task Force 92	11-12 APR	19-20 APR
Task Force 93	13-14 APR	21-22 APR
Task Force 94	15-16 APR	23-24 APR
Task Force 95	17-18 APR	25-26 APR
Task Force 96	19-20 APR	27-28 APR
Task Force 97	21-22 APR	29-30 APR
Task Force 98	23-24 APR	1-3 MAY
Task Force 99	25-26 APR	4-5 MAY
Task Force 100	27-28 APR	6-7 MAY

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Deployment Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

	<u>OPERATING</u>	<u>UPKEEP</u>
ONE	2-10 OCT	20 SEP - 1 OCT
TWO	23 OCT - 1 NOV	11-22 OCT
THREE	17-25 NOV	2-15 NOV
FOUR	5-13 DEC	26 NOV - 4 DEC
FIVE	26-31 DEC	14-25 DEC

Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:-

- Periods TWO and THREE - 23-26 OCT.
- Periods ONE and THREE - 22-25 NOV.
- Periods ONE and TWO - 18-20 DEC.

H. E. KIMMEL

Finished - CRAWLEY - WILK

1. Chief of Staff
 2. Asst. Chief of Staff
 3. Director of Operations
 4. Director of Intelligence
 5. Director of Logistics
 6. Director of Maintenance
 7. Director of Personnel
 8. Director of Training
 9. Director of Administration
 10. Director of Communications
 11. Director of Security
 12. Director of Public Affairs
 13. Director of Legal Affairs
 14. Director of Medical Affairs
 15. Director of Dental Affairs
 16. Director of Veterinary Affairs
 17. Director of Chaplaincy
 18. Director of Physical Education
 19. Director of Recreation
 20. Director of Music
 21. Director of Art
 22. Director of Library
 23. Director of Printing
 24. Director of Post Office
 25. Director of Civil Control Administration
 26. Director of War Relocation Authority
 27. Director of War Relocation Administration
 28. Director of War Relocation Council
 29. Director of War Relocation Commission
 30. Director of War Relocation Service
 31. Director of War Relocation Bureau
 32. Director of War Relocation Office
 33. Director of War Relocation Center
 34. Director of War Relocation Camp
 35. Director of War Relocation Station
 36. Director of War Relocation Point
 37. Director of War Relocation Area
 38. Director of War Relocation Zone
 39. Director of War Relocation Region
 40. Director of War Relocation District
 41. Director of War Relocation Territory
 42. Director of War Relocation State
 43. Director of War Relocation Union
 44. Director of War Relocation Kingdom
 45. Director of War Relocation Empire
 46. Director of War Relocation Republic
 47. Director of War Relocation Commonwealth
 48. Director of War Relocation Dominion
 49. Director of War Relocation Protectorate
 50. Director of War Relocation Principality
 51. Director of War Relocation Grand Duchy
 52. Director of War Relocation Free City
 53. Director of War Relocation Free State
 54. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 55. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 56. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 57. Director of War Relocation Free District
 58. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 59. Director of War Relocation Free State
 60. Director of War Relocation Free City
 61. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 62. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 63. Director of War Relocation Free District
 64. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 65. Director of War Relocation Free State
 66. Director of War Relocation Free City
 67. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 68. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 69. Director of War Relocation Free District
 70. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 71. Director of War Relocation Free State
 72. Director of War Relocation Free City
 73. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 74. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 75. Director of War Relocation Free District
 76. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 77. Director of War Relocation Free State
 78. Director of War Relocation Free City
 79. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 80. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 81. Director of War Relocation Free District
 82. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 83. Director of War Relocation Free State
 84. Director of War Relocation Free City
 85. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 86. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 87. Director of War Relocation Free District
 88. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 89. Director of War Relocation Free State
 90. Director of War Relocation Free City
 91. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 92. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 93. Director of War Relocation Free District
 94. Director of War Relocation Free Territory
 95. Director of War Relocation Free State
 96. Director of War Relocation Free City
 97. Director of War Relocation Free Zone
 98. Director of War Relocation Free Region
 99. Director of War Relocation Free District
 100. Director of War Relocation Free Territory

Crawley

Secretary.

OCT 1942
 SEP 1942
 DEPT. OF THE NAVY
 Doc. No. _____
 Copy No. _____
 BY _____

10-1-42
 10-1-42
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 10-1-42

Finished
V116

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE ONE

EMPLOYMENT

SCHEDULE



REVISED FILES
BY GYM (M)

SEP 30 1941

SECOND QUARTER

SOUL 10 111

On File No. 154 1942

No.
No.

c-1

7-60

7 24

A4-3/FF1(1)/(0896)

**UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE ONE
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship**

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
13 September 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force ONE.
To : Task Force ONE.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac conf. ltr. A2-11/FF1-1/A3/A16/(0690) of 30 April 1941.
(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13)/(01254) of 13 August, 1941.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.
2. The Train services required for this schedule will be furnished by Commander Base Force.
3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.
4. If unforeseen circumstances arise that make it apparent that changes in this approved schedule within a type would be advantageous, Type Commanders are responsible for making such changes without reference to higher authority; provided, these changes do not modify Fleet or Task Force directive schedules.

W. S. PYE

DISTRIBUTION:

List II, Case 1: A, B (less B4, B5).

List I, Case 2: B4, B5, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, JO, K, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6, X7, AA1, AAA1.

SPECIAL: BD10 (1); EN3 (50); EN3-6 (2); EN4 (20); EN5 (3); EN6 (5); EN7 (5); EN9 (5); EN9-24 (1); EN10 (3); EN11 (5); FPO (2); ND11 (3); ND12 (3); ND13 (3); ND14 (3); ND15 (2); NM12 (1); NM13 (1); NT1-9 (1); NT1-10 (1); NT4-4 (1); NT7-5 (1); NY8 (3); NY9 (4); NY10 (3); BatFor Mail Clerk (2); QA(1).

H. S. COVINGTON,

Flag Secretary.

BATTLESHIPS, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER																
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS - INTERTYPE TACTICS - GUNNERY - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY - UPKEEP - TENDER UPKEEP - MATERIAL INSPECTIONS																														
WEST VIRGINIA (BB43)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
COLORADO (BB46)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
MARYLAND (BB46)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
TENNESSEE (BB43)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
CALIFORNIA (BB44)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
PENNSYLVANIA (BB38)	AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND																														
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	EMBARKEE. COMPLETE MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICES 1, 2 and 3. TRAIN FOR AND FIRE FIRST TWO MANDATORY PRACTICES, COMMUNICATION, NIGHT, INSTRUMENT AND NAVIGATION TRAINING. UTILITY SERVICE FOR PARENT SHIPS AS REQUIRED.																														
VO-4	COLORADO UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO UNTIL ABOUT 23 NOVEMBER. WEST VIRGINIA UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO FROM ABOUT 3 NOVEMBER.																														
VO-2	13-18 Oct. 4 19-17 Dec. 3																														
SERVICES REQUIRED	4																														
Training Vessel	2																														
Searchlight	4																														
SRP Target	3																														
Hullon Balloons	1																														
Photo Plane	3 with Mk XIV sleeve																														
Towing Plane	4 with Mk VII sleeve																														
Reference Vessel	4 with Mk VII sleeve																														
AA Camera Vessel	3 with Mk XIV sleeve																														
Surface Camera Party	1																														
Sid Target	2																														
VP Ptn. for BP (Cam. Gun)	2																														

Activity	OCTOBER			NOVEMBER			DECEMBER			
	9-19	20-31	31-1	10-11	21-22	23-26	27-29	12-13	14-15	16-18
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	MAINTENANCE, PREPARATION FOR TASK FORCE MISSIONS, TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF AIR GROUPS, PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NIGHT OPERATIONS, EMBARKED A.A. LOOKOUT, IDENTIFICATION AND FIRE CONTROL TRAINING, GUNNERY - UPKEEP & A.A. - SERVICES - TACTICS - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY.									
SARATOGA (CV8)	UPKEEP PEARL	ENROUTE	ENROUTE	INTERIM OVERHAUL - NYPS	ENROUTE	ENROUTE	ENROUTE	ENROUTE	ENROUTE	ENROUTE
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	NIGHT TRAINING IN EXTENDED FLIGHT, SEARCH, AND ATTACK AT SEA, INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING, A.A. TRAINING EXERCISES WITH FLEET UNITS, DAY AND NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC AND RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING, EXERCISES IN DISPERSED ATTACK, PRE-FLEET TRAINING OF NEWLY GRADUATED PILOTS, BEARING DRILLS, FLEET TACTICAL EXERCISES, CONTINUE INDIVIDUAL QUALIFICATIONS (BOMBS AND GUNS).									
SARATOGA GROUP	Formation torpedo practice VF condo 4 (BP (Camera Guns). Training in laying smoke screen using game board (VS.V8). Monthly training practice. Master horizontal bomber qualification practice VF condo 4 (BP (Camera Guns), instrument flight training Bomb, man. 42 (UTAH)	Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. Monthly training practice. Complete individual qualifications (bombs and guns). Train free gunner on rifle range. Instrument flight training Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. Monthly training practice. Complete individual qualifications (bombs and guns). Train free gunner on rifle range. Instrument flight training Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. Monthly training practice. Complete individual qualifications (bombs and guns). Train free gunner on rifle range. Instrument flight training Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).	Formation torpedo practice. Master horizontal bombers' qualification practice. FBP (Live Bomb). Instrument flight training Bombing and strafing of a towed target. Monthly training practice Bombing of maneuvering target (UTAH).

* FBP (Torpedoes) to be fired during Intertype Tactics if practicable - otherwise on 14 October.
 ** (Torpedoes) to be fired during Fleet Tactics if practicable - otherwise on 16 December.

PATROL PLANES, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Activity	9-19	20-31	31-1	10-11	21-22	23-26	27-29	12-13	14-15	16-18
VP-23	Preparation for UPKEEP To San Diego	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes
VP-22	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING	EXPANSION TRAINING
VP-24	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment of New Planes	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP

MINECRAFT, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Activity	FLEET TACTICS - INTERTYPE TACTICS - GUNNERY - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY - UPKEEP - TENDER UPKEEP - MATERIAL INSPECTIONS									
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS - INTERTYPE TACTICS - GUNNERY - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY - UPKEEP - TENDER UPKEEP - MATERIAL INSPECTIONS									
OGLALA (CM4)	ANTI AIRCRAFT TRAINING	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS	INTERTYPE TACTICS
FRUIT (DM22)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
TRACY (DM10)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
PREBLE (DM28)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
BICARD (DM21)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP

NAVY YARD OVERHAUL AT PEARL HARBOR (to January 30, 1942)

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S CALIFORNIA, Flagship

IVCS

BATTLESHIP'S — TASK FORCE ONE

WEST VIRGINIA (F)

Batdiv TWO

TENNESSEE (F)
CALIFORNIA (FF)
PENNSYLVANIA (FF)
VO-2 (9 VOS)

Batdiv FOUR

WEST VIRGINIA (F)
COLORADO
MARYLAND
VO-4 (9 VOS)

AIRCRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE

SARATOGA (F)

2VM Planes — Flag Unit
1 VSB (Group Com. Plane)
VB-3 (21 VSB)
VF-3 (18 VF, 2VM)
VS-3 (21 VSB)
VT-3 (12 VTB)
Utility Unit (3 VSO, 2 VJ)

CRUISERS — TASK FORCE ONE

HONOLULU (F)

Crudiv NINE
HONOLULU (F)
PHOENIX
BOISE (RF)
HELENA
ST. LOUIS
RICHMOND
VCS-9 (22 VSO)

DESTROYERS — TASK FORCE ONE

RALEIGH (F)

2 VSO Planes

DOBBIN (Tender)

WHITNEY (Tender)

DESTROYER SQUADRON ONE

360 PHELPS — Squadron Flagship

DESTROYER SQUADRON THREE

361 CLARK — Squadron Flagship

DESDIV TWO

355 AYLWIN (F)
348 FARRAGUT (RF)
363 DALE
354 MONAGHAN

DESDIV ONE

349 DEWEY (F)
351 MACDONOUGH (RF)
352 WORDEN
350 HULL

DESDIV SIX

370 CASE (F)
365 CUMMINGS (RF)
373 SHAW
374 TUCKER

DESDIV FIVE

372 CASSIN (F)
371 CONYNGHAM
369 REID
375 DOWNES (RF)

MINECRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE

OGLALA (F)

Mindiv ONE

PRUITT (F)
TRACY
PREBLE
SICARD

PATROL PLANES — TASK FORCE ONE

(VP-23) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Three — (12 VPB)
(VP-22) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two — (12 VPB)
(VP-24) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Four — (12 VPB)

SUBMARINES — TASK FORCE ONE

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY-TWO

185 SNAPPER
186 STINGRAY
187 STURGEON
191 SCULPIN (F)
192 SAILFISH
193 SWORDFISH

SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE

198 TAMBOR
199 TAUTOG
200 THRESHER
206 GAR
207 GRAMPUS
208 GRAYBACK

CONFIDENTIAL

Finished
R

TASK FORCE TWO

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Finished
ES-200-118



SEP 29 1941

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE TWO
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
September 12, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Task Force TWO.
To : Task Force TWO.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Serial 01254 of August 13, 1941.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. Type Commanders will make own arrangements for services required.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

W. F. HALSEY

DISTRIBUTION:

Basis: List II, Case 1.

Fleet, Force and Type Commanders, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Units of Task Force TWO less DD's, DM's, and Airons.

List I, Case 2.

DD's, DM's, and Airons of Task Force TWO.

List I, Case 1.

B2-2; B3-9; B4-01; B4-1; B4-3; B4-5; B5-1; C1-01; D2-4; D2-6; E1-1; F2; G4; H2-0; H2-1; H2-2; H4-1; H4-3; H6-0; H6-1; I4; I6; I6-2; I6-4; I8; I9; I10.

SPECIAL:

AA-1; AB-1; AAA-1; EN-1; EN-3; EN-4; EN-6; EN-11; FATU; FPO; NA-8; NA-11; NA-12; NA-37; ND-11; ND-12; ND-13; ND-14; H4-0; Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.; Fleet Post Office.

H. D. MOULTON,
Flag Secretary.

TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
SUBMARINES AND PATROL PLANES

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER													
	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29			
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	GUNNERY — UPKEEP — TACTICS — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY																											
ARGONAUT (SM1)	DTP "J" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP	MP MG "B" DTP "T" UPKEEP
NARWHAL (SS167)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
NAUTILUS (SS168)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
DOLPHIN (SS169)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
TRITON (SS201)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
TROUT (SS202)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
TUNA (SS203)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
GRAYLING (SS209)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
GRENADIER (SS210)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
GUIDEON (SS211)	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP
VP - 12	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP
VP - 14	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP	At San Diego UPKEEP

REBURY M. J. TWO

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(CV6) U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

BATTLESHIPS - TASK FORCE TWO

BatDiv ONE

(BB39) ARIZONA (F)
(BB36) NEVADA
(BB37) OKLAHOMA

CARRIER - TASK FORCE TWO

CarDiv TWO

(CV6) ENTERPRISE (F)

CRUISERS - TASK FORCE TWO

CruDiv FIVE

(CA26) NORTHAMPTON (F)
(CA25) SALT LAKE CITY
(CA24) PENSACOLA
(CA27) CHESTER

DESTROYERS - TASK FORCE TWO

(CL8) DETROIT (F)
(AD11) ALTAIR
(AD14) DIXIE

DESTROYER SQUADRON FOUR

(DD357) SELFRIDGE (F)

DesDiv EIGHT

(DD389) MUGFORD (F)
(DD393) JARVIS (RF)
(DD392) PATTERSON
(DD390) RALPH TALBOT

DesDiv SEVEN

(DD391) HENLEY (F)
(DD386) BAGLEY
(DD388) HELM
(DD387) BLUE (RF)

DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX

(DD363) BALCH (F)

DesDiv TWELVE

(DD384) DUNLAP (F)
(DD398) ELLET
(DD385) FANNING (RF)
(DD397) BENHAM

DesDiv ELEVEN

(DD380) GRIDLEY (F)
(DD401) MAURY (RF)
(DD382) CRAVEN
(DD400) MC CALL

(1) DESTROYER DIVISION FIFTY

(DD113) RATHBURNE (F)
(DD114) TALBOT
(DD115) WATERS
(DD116) DENT (RF)

MINECRAFT - TASK FORCE TWO

MinDiv TWO

(DM15) GAMBLE (F)
(DM18) BREESE
(DM16) RAMSAY
(DM17) MONTGOMERY

PATROL SQUADRONS - TASK FORCE TWO

(VP12) Patrol Squadron TWELVE
(VP14) Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN

SUBMARINES - TASK FORCE TWO

SubDiv FORTY-TWO

(SS167) NARWHAL (F)
(SS168) NAUTILUS
(SS169) DOLPHIN
(SM 1) ARGONAUT (FF)

SubDiv SIXTY-TWO

(SS201) TRITON (F)
(SS202) TROUT
(SS203) TUNA
(2) (SS209) GRAYLING
(2) (SS210) GRENADIER
(2) (SS211) GUDGEON

(1) In reduced commission. Operates with underwater sound training school.

(2) On reporting.

MEMORANDUM

The attached document was introduced as an exhibit before the examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T.H., on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944, addressed to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, Retired.

It is highly important that attached document be retained on file indefinitely where it will be certainly available for future call.

Thos. C. Hart

Thos. C. Hart

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE THREE

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE



Destroyed

48-28-31-32-35-3-4-47-12-1-2

~~██████~~ 23-25-36-29-30-49-26

RECEIVED S-C FILES
Room 155

SEP 29 1941

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C.S.F. File No
A4-3/FF3/ (90)
Serial 0670

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
TASK FORCE THREE
U.S.S. LOUISVILLE, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
September 11, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

From: Commander Task Force THREE.
To : Task Force THREE.
Subject: Schedule of Employment, Task Force THREE for the period 1 October - 31 December, 1941.

1. Appended is the Employment Schedule for Task Force THREE for the period 1 October - 31 December, 1941.

2. This schedule has the effect of orders. Attention is invited to United States Pacific Fleet Regulations, paragraph 146.

3. Commander Base Force is requested to provide the necessary Train services required by this schedule.

4. Fuel and mileage allowances impose the necessity for planning ahead. Type Commanders and Commanding Officers will reduce expenditures and mileage to a minimum consistent with efficient operations and training.

WILSON BROWN

DISTRIBUTION:

List I (Case 2): B (less B4-5), C, 1 (less I6-2), X, A1 (Atlantic), A1 (Asiatic), JO.
List II (Case 1): A-1 (Pacific), E1-0, H (less H2-1, H4-1, H4-3), M.
List III (Case 1): B4-5, D-2 E1-1, F, G, H2-1, H4-1, H4-3, I6-2, K.

SPECIAL

EN3(50), EN4(20), EN5(3), EN6(5), EN7(5), EN9(5), EN10(5), EN11(5), EN24(1), EN25(1), KS3(3), KS4(3), NA11(2), NA12(2), NA26(2), ND1-10(2), ND11-13(3), ND14(10), ND15(3), NM5-12-13(1ea), NP1, 3,7,11, (3ea), NT1-9 to 11 (1ea), NY1 to 10(3), Dea Base, San Diego (2), CO NITRO, SIRIUS, WM W. BURROWS, RECULUS, KAULA, HENDERSON, WHARTON, VEGA, LASSEN, (2ca), Bd I&S, Long Beach (3), Nav. War College, Newport (3), 2nd Asst. Postmaster General, Washington (3), Postmaster, New York, CO USCG Hdqts. Los Angeles, Director and Instructor Naval Reserves, 11th Naval District Navy Civil Liaison Officer, Room 900 Law Bldg. 139 N. Brdy., Los Angeles, Fleet Per. Off., Fed. Bldg., San Francisco, Branch Intelligence Off., Rm 452 Fed. Bldg. Los Angeles, (1ea), Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. G3, Ft. Shafter (1), Lexington (30).

T.J. Casey,
Flag Secretary.

CRUISERS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER																
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	31	
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP		
CHICAGO																															
LOUISVILLE																															
PORTLAND																															
INDIANAPOLIS																															
MINNEAPOLIS																															
ASTORIA																															
NEW ORLEANS																															
SAN FRANCISCO																															
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Search and Communication Exercises - Gunnery - Aircraft Anti - Submarine Exercise - Spotting Drill - Night Training - Instrument Flying - Miscellaneous Services to Parent Vessels and other types - Prefleet and Transition Training - Shore Bombardment Observation and Spotting - Visual Reconnaissance of Shore Objectives.																														
CRUISER WING	Gunnery Services To Ships Miscellaneous Tactics 8 11 Train For and Fire IBP Suction Camera Guns Night Flying 23 Fleet Tactics 27 Services Aircraft Sub Exercises 2 TRAIN AND FIRE IBP DIVE BOMBING NIGHT FLYING 26 Calibrate Compass Air Speed Meters UPKEEP 22 Fleet Tactics 28 Train Fire Bomb and Rearing 26 Monthly Program Asst Exercise 26																														
EXCEPTIONS	NEW ORLEANS UNIT SHORE BASED NAS SAN PEDRO UNTIL ABOUT 31 OCTOBER - INSTRUMENT AND NIGHT-FLYING - COMPLY WITH WING DIRECTIVE																														
CRUISER WING	SAN FRANCISCO UNIT SHORE BASED NAS PEARL HARBOR COMMENCING 11 OCTOBER - COMPLY WITH WING DIRECTIVE.																														

NAVY YARD - PEARL HARBOR

NAVY YARD - PUGET SOUND

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NAVY YARD - CHICAGO

NAVY YARD - PORTLAND

DESTROYERS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31		
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP	UPKEEP		
PORTER							ENROUTE NAMI TO PEARL UPKEEP PEARL Comply Cincpac OP. ORD. 27-41																										
DRAYTON							OVER-HAUL NAMI																										
FLUSSER																																	
LAMSON																																	
MAHAN																																	
CUSHING																																	
SMITH							Enroute Diego To NAMI																										
PRESTON																																	
PERKINS																																	
DESIGN FIVE																																	
HOPKINS																																	
PERRY																																	
TREVER																																	
WASMUTH																																	
ZANE																																	
SOUTHARD																																	
LONG																																	
CHANDLER																																	
HOVEY																																	
DORSEY																																	
ELLIOT																																	
LAMBERTON																																	
BOGGS																																	
DESIGN FIVE																																	
DESIGN FOUR																																	
DESIGN THREE																																	
DESIGN TWO																																	
DESIGN ONE																																	

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SUBMARINES, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
ACTIVITY

GENERAL DIRECTIVE	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER													
	5-6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31		
SUB DIV TWENTY-ONE	SALMON	NYMI 4	RFSF	11 ENR 14 Submarine Serv. Com	17 ENROUTE Submarine Serv. Com	21 UPKEEP	25 ENROUTE Submarine Serv. Com	31 1 2	31 1 2	31 1 2	30 1	29 24	29 24	30 1	30 1	29 24	29 24	30 1	30 1	29 24	29 24	30 1	30 1	29 24	29 24	30 1	30 1	
	SEAL	DTPQ DTPD				DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	DTEL DTPD	
	SKIPJACK	DTPQ DTPD																										
	SARGO	DTPQ DTPD																										
	SAURY	BMPE DTPD																										
	SPEARFISH	DTPQ DTPD																										
SUB DIV FORTY-THREE	CACHALOT	Overhaul SubBase																										
	CUTTLEFISH	RS																										
	PLUNGER	MGAABP "B"																										
	POLLACK																											
	POMPANO																											
SUB DIV FORTY-ONE	8-16																											
	8-23																											
	8-27																											
	8-28																											
	8-34																											

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TRAIN DIVERS - SERVICES

 ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS

 (CA35) INDIANAPOLIS --- Flagship
 Ship Unit -- 4VSO (Attached to VCS-4)
 1 VSO - Flag Unit

 CRUDIV FOUR
 (CA29) CHICAGO (F)
 (CA28) LOUISVILLE
 (CA33) PORTLAND
 (CA35) INDIANAPOLIS (FF)
 VCS-4 SCOUTING SQUADRON
 FOUR-16 VSO

 CRUDIV SIX
 (CA36) MINNEAPOLIS (F)
 (CA34) ASTORIA
 (CA32) NEW ORLEANS
 (CA38) SAN FRANCISCO
 VCS-6 SCOUTING SQUADRON
 SIX - 16 VSO

 CARRIER AND MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY ONE

 (CV2) LEXINGTON
 1VSB (Group Com. Plane)
 VB-2 (2IVSB)
 VS-2 (2IVSB)
 VF-2 (18 VF, 2VM)
 VT-2 (12 VTB)
 Utility Unit (3VSO,2VJ)

 MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-ONE
 VMSB-231 (18 VSB)
 VMSB-232 (18 VSB)
 VMF-211 (18 VF, 2VM)
 VMJ-252 (3VJ, 3VJR, 6VR)

 DESTROYERS

 DESRON FIVE
 (DD356) PORTER - Flagship

 DESDIV NINE
 DD366 DRAYTON (F)
 DD368 FLUSSER
 DD367 LAMSON (RF)
 DD364 MAHAN

 DESDIV TEN
 DD376 CUSHING (F)
 DD378 SMITH
 DD379 PRESTON (RF)
 DD377 PERKINS

 MINRON TWO
 (DMS13) HOPKINS - Flagship

 MINDIV FOUR
 DMS17 PERRY (F)
 DMS16 TREVER
 DMS15 WASMUTH
 DMS14 ZANE (RF)

 MINDIV FIVE
 DMS10 SOUTHARD (F)
 DMS12 LONG
 DMS9 CHANDLER
 DMS11 HOVEY (RF)

 MINDIV SIX
 DMS1 DORSEY (F)
 DMS4 ELLIOT
 DMS2 LAMBERTON
 (RF)
 DMS3 BOGGS

 TRANSPORTS, BASE, FORCE (When Present)

SECOND MARINE DIVISION

(Less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment)

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

SUBMARINES

SUBDIV TWENTY ONE (SS182) SALMON (F)	SUBDIV FORTY THREE (SS170) CACHALOT	SUBDIV FORTY ONE (On West Coast) (SS123) S-18 (F)
(SS183) SEAL	(SS171) CUTTLEFISH	(SS128) S-23
(SS184) SKIPJACK	(SS179) PLUNGER (F)	(SS132) S-27
(SS188) SARGO (FF)	(SS180) POLLACK	(SS133) S-28
(SS189) SAURY	(SS181) POMPAÑO	(SS139) S-34
(SS190) SPEARFISH		(SS140) S-35
(DD336) LITCHFIELD	(AS14) PELIAS	
(ASR3) HOLLAND	(AM30) SEAGULL	
(ASR5) ORTOLAN	(ASR1) WIDGEON	

PATROL WINGS

PATROL WING ONE	PATROL WING TWO
(VP-13) Patrol Squadron Thirteen (5PB2Y2)	(Less Patrons Assigned Task Forces ONE and TWO)
(AV1) WRIGHT (Flagship Comairscopor)	(VP-11) Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (12 PB5)
(AVD6) HULBERT (F)	(VP-21) Patrol Squadron TWENTY ONE (12PB3)
(AVD10) BALLARD	(VP-24) Patrol Squadron TWENTY FOUR (6 PB5)
(AVP4) AVOCET	(OLD VP-12)
	(AV4) CURTISS (F)
	(AV8) TANGIER
	(AVD11) THORNTON
	(AVD14) McFARLAND
	(AVP7) SWAN

PATROL WING FOUR

(VP41) Patrol Squadron FORTY ONE (6PB5)
 (VP42) Patrol Squadron FORTY TWO (6PB5)
 (VP43) Patrol Squadron FORTY THREE (6PB5)
 (VP44) Patrol Squadron FORTY FOUR (6PB5)
 (AVP12) CASCO (F)
 (AVD2) WILLIAMSON (F)
 (AVD12) GILLIS
 (AVP5) TEAL
 (AVP6) PELICAN

Cinepac File No.
A16 P16-3 (0300)
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 21 February 1941.

EXHIBIT NO. 113-A

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.

1. The problem of battle organization and Condition of Readiness for Action for all types in the fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution. The fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requiring a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.

2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personnel assigned to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed by the Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditions of Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be examined in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, susceptible of great improvement.

3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battle and condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basic and fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may know what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest for the crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Action.

4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined; since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and since, however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attack, the three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental consideration is stressed—these conditions were devised as much to give men adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement is to keep every station manned—to provide maximum security—there can be only one condition, Condition One.

The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand or caught unaware on the other.

5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to their various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know where he goes and when, in shifting from one of these conditions to another; to permit these shifts to be made without confusion; and to insure that the maximum number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desired is a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Watches as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by their efficient use.

6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board reveals that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a Condition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting latest

maximum requirements; also that even with complements less than those recommended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. *The Commander-in-Chief has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all, instead of half, the A. A. battery being manned in Condition Two.*

7. *It follows that, if in Condition Two all of the A. A. battery can be manned, in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned. This should be the minimum requirement for Condition Three. However, the number of men available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of a watch in four. When this can be done a measure of security is obtained approaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, without the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.*

8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery personnel is obvious. To man all A.A. guns in Condition Three without calling on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on A.A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation at sea permits the setting of Condition Three of the situation in port requires the manning of A.A. guns only over long periods of time, to require the A.A. battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making efficient use of the men and material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized. But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion than to make full use of our men.

9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict adherence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadrilateral organization of two watches and four sections. This is essential, and in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished without confusion and without the imposition of successive double watches on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms "Watch One" and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing, since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it disguises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated in all ships, using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established in port.

10. To permit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the turrets fully manned, in Condition Two; or it may be accomplished by having half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned. Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch. Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return considering the material installations in the individual ships and the difficulty of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby falling far short of the requirement of having one half the battery manned, is not approved.

11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been in effect in some heavy cruisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved feasible. Indications are, since many of the installations in a triple turret are in duplicate rather than triplicate that fire can be opened with all and continued with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off watch responds

to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruisers should settle this question conclusively for that type.

12. Certain types such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activities in heavy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend themselves to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three section basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualified personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When the latter is truly the case this situation should be recognized and accepted. When the A.A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequently impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in two. If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient service. However, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis of a watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions Two and Three identical—a straight watch in three.

13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types:

(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches and four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries as cannot meet this requirement).

(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of the ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, mess attendants, etc., for essential services, be placed on watch.

(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and efficient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report made to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirements for Condition Three can be changed in basic directives.

14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Commanders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth principles which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. The end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:
CinClant
CinCaf
Compatwing TWO

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT NO. 113-B

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *October 31, 1941.*

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions
Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41.

(b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (Furnished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second Marine Div.).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 November 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

Task Force One (Commander Battle Force)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR.....	6 BB
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON.....	1 CV
Crudiv NINE.....	5 CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE.....	1 OCL, 2DL, 16 DD
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE.....	1 CM, 4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force)

Batdiv ONE.....	3 BB
Cardiv TWO.....	1 CV
Crudiv FIVE.....	4 CA
Desflot TWO.....	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
Mindiv TWO.....	4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; [2] to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three (Commander Scouting Force)

Crudivs FOUR, SIX.....	8 CA
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air-Group 21.....	1 CV
Desron FIVE.....	1 DL, 8 DD
Minron TWO.....	13 DMS
Trainron FOUR.....	6 AP
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.....	

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases *in order to* insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

Task Force Seven (Commander Submarines, Scouting Force)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE-----	1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD
Subron SIX-----	12 SS, 1 AS
Subron EIGHT*-----	6 SS, 1 AS
Subron TEN*-----	4 SS, 1 AS

*Upon reporting.

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

[3] (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two)

Patwing ONE-----	36 VPB (A), 1 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Patwing TWO-----	42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient long range *Air Scouting and Air Striking Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force)

Units assigned-----	4 CA or CL
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Primary Mission:

To escort trans-pacific shipping *in order to* protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and operations of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the allocation of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise periods of the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of the Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to the above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, and development of the Island Bases.

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operations of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. For the present, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation and in the proportion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, insofar as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Trans-pacific westbound convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila Area by the Commandant Sixteenth [4] Naval District. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Com-

mandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway
2. Wake
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra

in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group 4.1—District Activities at Midway.

7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.

9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of [5] submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating period of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,
(A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT NO. 113C

- I. Revised Employment Schedule of Task Force Nine, for Remainder of 2nd Quarter of Fiscal Year 1942.
- II. Watch and Duty Schedules for December, 1941 for Patrol Wing Two.

Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force Nine,
submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential
Letter 14CL-41, together with documents - which
approve same.

Date 22 NOVEMBER 1941.

NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF
 U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

OUTGOING

From: CINCPAC	Info to:	Classification: PLAIN	Originator: 12
COMPATIMING 2		Precedence: ROUTINE	Reference: 01
		System: LL	Show to: 13 95

Z F5L 224130 M9U GR3

JR SER 0780 AFFIRMATIVE

REF :- CLASSIFIED.

SENT AT 0131/TT

PN 0131A / 2
MPA

CONFIDENTIAL

Taken up by DAW Date 19 Nov 1941 CINCUS Routing No. 1004

Office of Origin FW2 (ComTaskFor 9) Date 19 Nov 1941

File No. FW2/A4-3/(0780)

CINCUS FILE NO.
A4-3/FF12-7

Cross File No. ~~AW2/111~~

No. copies received Orig & 3 List of Enclosures received A-2

Subject: Revised Schedule for remainder of second quarter fiscal year, 1942.

[Handwritten initials/signature]

No.	Title	Routing Order	Act. Sym.	Date Rec.	Initial
00	Admiral				
01	Chief of Staff		-		
06	Flag Secretary				
11	Op. Officer	5	A	24 NOV	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
15	Flag Lieut.				
16	War Plans	4	R	24 NOV	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
20	Comm. Officer				
30	Asst. Comm. Off.				
21	Security Off.				
22	Radio Officer				
25	Intell. Off.				
50	Maint. Off.	3	R	24 NOV	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
75	Medical Off.				
90	Gunnery Off.	2	R	22 NOV	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
95	Aviation Off.	1	R	1119	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
96	Aerologist				
	Out. Mail Yeo.				
	File Yeoman				

SYMBOLS
 A - Action
 I - Information
 C - Copy distributed
 R - Recommendation

FILE *[Handwritten mark]* **TRACE** *[Handwritten mark]*

REMARKS

Copy sent to 11
by affirman sent
by mail from
action taken
file

MEMORANDUM

From: *W. J. 3.*

To : 11

Note

Tauqier held
indefinite -
depends on
gov. of C. in 1110
to islando.
2) Patton 21
ulicors 22 at
re. away 5/6 The

A4-3/FF12-7
A4-3/VZ
 PW2/AA-3/0780

PATROL WING TWO
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
 PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

Wn

CONFIDENTIAL

19 NOV 1941

From: The Commander Task Force NINE.
 To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
 Subject: Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter,
 Fiscal Year, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule.

1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter.

2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested.


 P. N. L. BELLINGER.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATING NUMBER: **FORM NO. 9** SERIAL NO. **2** MONTH: **NOV 1941**

MONTH	DAY	MONTH	DAY
NOVEMBER	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	DECEMBER	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

EXPANSION TRAINING, TACTICS, PATROLS, INDOCTRINATION, ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS

GENERAL DIRECTIVE

PATROL WING ONE

EXPANSION TRAINING
 EXPANSION FLEET EXPANSION TRAINING
 RE-EQUIPMENT EXPANSION TRAINING
 SAN DIEGO

WING TACTICS
 TACTICS

EXPANSION TRAINING AND PATROL PLANE-SUBMARINE INTER-TYPE TACTICS
 EXPANSION TRAINING WING TACTICS
 FLEET OR WING TACTICS
 WING TACTICS
 EXPANSION TRAINING

EXPANSION TRAINING

PATROL WING TWO

EXPANSION TRAINING
 ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS
 TASK GROUP S.I
 RE-EQUIPMENT EXPANSION TRAINING
 SAN DIEGO

EXPANSION TRAINING AND PATROL PLANE-SUBMARINE INTER-TYPE TACTICS
 EXPANSION TRAINING WING TACTICS
 FLEET OR WING TACTICS
 WING TACTICS
 EXPANSION TRAINING

EXPANSION TRAINING

NOTE: EXPANSION TRAINING WILL BE CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MISSIONS WHENEVER PRACTICABLE. EXPANSION TRAINING INCLUDES TYPE TACTICS, SUBMERC, COMBATATIONS, ADVANCED FLIGHT INSTRUCTIONS, PILOT QUALIFICATIONS, FLIGHT CREW INDOCTRINATION, RECOMBAT FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, ETC.

MONTH	DAY	MONTH	DAY
NOVEMBER	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	DECEMBER	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing Two.

December 1941

PA2/A4-4/
(3298)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

25 NOV 1941

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.
Subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941,
to January 1, 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.

1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and
Duty Schedule for the period December 1, 1941, to January 1,
1942.


L. C. DAVIS,
By direction.

Copy to:
Comptwing ONs.
Compatron 21.

ENCLOSURE "A"

M	T	W	T	F	S	M	T	W	T	S	S	S	M	T	W	T	S	S		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
PATRON 22(1) : W : W : M : A : W : S : P : W : W : W : P : DP : T : T : T : P : T : P : T : P : S																				
PATRON 22(2) : W : W : W : W : S : W : P : DP : W : W : S : P : T : T : T : T : P : P : DP : S																				
PATRON 23(1) : DP : P : WT : WT : P : DP : S : W : W : P : W : W : S : S : P : DP : T : W : T : P : S																				
PATRON 23(2) : BLD : WT : P : DP : WT : P : S : W : W : W : P : DP : S : S : T : P : T : T : T : P																				
PATRON 24 : P : DP : WT : P : WT : S : P : DP : M : M : M : P : S : S : T : T : P : DP : T : T : S																				
PATRON 11 : BLD : WT : WT : K : DP : S : K : W : W : K : DP : W : K : S : T : K : DP : T : K : T : S																				
PATRON 12 : BLD : K : DP : WT : K : S : S : K : DP : W : K : W : S : K : DP : T : K : T : K : DP																				
PATRON 14 : BLD : WT : K : WT : WT : K : DP : M : K : W : W : K : DP : S : K : T : T : K : DP : T : K																				

M	T	W	T	F	S	M	T	W	T	S	S	S	M	T	W	T	S	S	
22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1									
PATRON 22(1) : M : P : DP : S : M : S : P : M : W : M : S																			
PATRON 22(2) : M : M : P : S : M : S : S : P : DP : W : S																			
PATRON 23(1) : W : W : W : P : DP : S : S : W : P : W : S																			
PATRON 23(2) : DP : W : W : S : P : S : M : W : P : DP																			
PATRON 24 : P : W : M : S : W : P : DP : W : W : W : P																			
PATRON 11 : K : DP : M : A : W : S : K : DP : W : A : S																			
PATRON 12 : W : K : W : S : K : DP : S : K : W : W : K																			
PATRON 14 : W : W : K : DP : W : K : S : W : K : DP : S																			

T - Fleet or Mine tactics.
 BLD - Bomb loading drill.
 P - Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
 K - Kaneohe ready duty division (other division of squadron secured).
 DP - Dawn Patrol; division making dawn patrol secures upon completion; other division normal duty 0700 - 1300 except Saturday and Sunday.
 S - Secured.
 SST - Tactics with submarines.
 WT - Mine Tactics.
 W - Regular Working Hours.

2

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

FW2/4-3(4),
(3238)

RESTRICTED

November 25, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 45-41 (Week of Nov. 26 - Dec. 2, 1941)

	25	27	28	29	30	Dec. 1	2
	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUES
COURTES	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	T1	T1
TANGIER	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
WRIGHT	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
McFARLAND	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	SPH	SPH
HULBERT	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
SWAN	PG	PG	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
AVOCET	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
PATRON 11	G4 V8 RD	G4 V8 DP	G4 V8	SHW	SHW	F1 V8	F1 V8
PATRON 12	G2 L1 L2	G2 L1	G2 L1	UK	SHW	F1 V7	F1 V7
PATRON 1A	UK	UK	UK	RD	DP	E1	E1
	DP G2 F1	G2 F1	RD G2 F1			G2 F1	G2 F1
PATRON 21	V4 VC9	L2 VC9	L2 VC9	DP	SHW	L1 VC9	L1 VC9
PATRON 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23	E1	E1	E1	SHW	RD	E1	E1
	F1 G3	F1 G3				F1 G3	F1 G3
PATRON 24	Y1 VC9	VC10	G1 V4	P1	SHW	V4	V4

- E1 Family Practice.
- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G2 High altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
- G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
- G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
- PG Plane Guard.
- P1 Inspection.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- T1 Tactics.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

READY DUTY T / DFR

HULBERT

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing T.O.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS PH HI	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
F.D OOD	3
Pat Wing T.O Photo. Unit	2

41

PW2/nd-3/VZ/
(3287)
RESTRICTED

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wa

November 25, 1941.

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week Nov. 26--Dec. 2, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 26 #Patron 24 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VJ-1 (3 landplanes) practice landings 1800-1900. 2 (JRS planes) will operate without lights in areas C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 27 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (9 planes) will return to Pearl Harbor from operating areas at sea.

Friday, Nov. 28 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 29 VJ-1 (1 PBV) takeoff 1800. Will operate without lights in areas C8, C9, C10 altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet.

Sunday, Nov. 30 NONE.

Monday, Dec. 1 AVCS-7 (8 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130 - 2230. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

Tuesday, Dec. 2 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. Navigation flights to Maui and return. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

Y 2

L. C. Ralley
L. C. RALLEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3(2)/

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

7a

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT GUNNERY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CINCPac	9
Comairbatfor	3
Comscofor	1
Combatships	6
Combatdiv ONE	3
Combatdiv FOUR	6
Comcrubatfor	6
Comcruscofor	6
* Comcrudiv THREE	x5
Comcrudiv FOUR	6
Comcrudiv FIVE	6
Comcrudiv SIX	6
Comcrudiv NINE	5
Patwing ONE Units (each)	6
Patwing TWO Units (each)	6
Lexington Air Group	11
Enterprise Air Group	11
* Saratoga Air Group	x11
Marine Air Group 21	20
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	10
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	10
* C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	x10
C.O., H.A.S., Pearl Harbor	20
C.O., H.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	6
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
Commander Hawaiian Air Force	6
Combatfor	4
Comsubscfor	1
Comdt. 14 N.D.	6
Combasefor	2
Cominbatfor	2
Comutwing, Basefor	3
Squadron FOUR	1
CO, KSC, B, Fort DeRussy	6
Comdesbatfor	6
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	6
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger	6
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	6
PHO 00D PH TH	1

Y3

PWZ/AL-5/PZ

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

~~SECRET~~

NAVY AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION:

240Pac	1
Comairbatfor	1
Comscofor	1
Combutships	1
Combatdiv ONE	1
Combatdiv FOUR	1
Comcrubatfor	1
Comerdiscofor	1
x Comcradiv THREE	x3
Comcradiv FOUR	1
Comcradiv FIVE	1
Comcradiv SIX	1
Comcradiv NINE	1
Compatwing ONE	1
Patrol Wing ONE (All units - each)	1
Patrol Wing TWO (All units - each)	1
Lexington Air Group	1
Enterprise Air Group	1
xSaratoga Air Group	x2
Marine Air Group 21	1
C.O., USS LEXINGTON	1
C.O., US ENTERPRISE	1
xC.O., USS SARATOGA	x2
C.O., NAS Pearl Harbor	1
C.O., NAS Kaneohe Bay	1
Wingfisher-Melrose Av. Sp. Unit	1
18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field.	27
89, Hawaiian Air Force.	1
Combatfor	1
2AS COD PH TH	1
VI-1	1
VI-2	1

PW2/AL-3/VZ/
(3231)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 18, 1941.

FLYING AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week of Nov. 19 - 25, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 19 #Patron 21 night bombing 2030-2200 area VS2.
Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For
tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1
above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 20 NONE.

Friday, Nov. 21 Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For
tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1
above 2000 feet.
2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 22 NONE.

Sunday, Nov. 23 NONE.

Monday, Nov. 24 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 land-
ings and air tactics. For tactics operate in
areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-V3 planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Tuesday, Nov. 25 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 land-
ings and air tactics. Navigation flights to
Hawaii and return. For tactics operate in areas
V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required
by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl
Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTES: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic
during this period except on permission of the Tower
Duty Officer.

2554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

742/A4-2(4) /
(3230)

PATROL WING T.O
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wb

RESTRICTED

November 18, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 44-41 (Week of November 19 - 25, 1941)

	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUES
CURTISS	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	SPH	SPH
TANGIER	UK	UK	UK	T1	T1	T1	T1
WRIGHT	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
McFARLAND	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
THORNTON	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
HULBERT	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
SWAN	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
AVOCET	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
PATRON 11	DP	SHW	RD E1	DP	SHW	RD G4	DP G4
	RD Y1	DP Y1				V4	V4
PATRON 12	V5 V6	V5 V6	P1	UK	T1	T1	T1
PATRON 14	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	UK	UK
	G2 Y1	RD G2 P1	DP G2 P1		RD G2 P1	DP G2 P1	RD G2 P1
PATRON 21	L1 VC10	L1 VC10	L1 VC10	SHW	L1 V4	L1 VC10	L1 VC10
PATRON 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	UK	UK
PATRON 24	E1	SHW	E1	RD	DP	E1	E1

- E1 Familiarization.
- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- V4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
- PG Plane Guard.
- P1 Inspection.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- T1 Tactics.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dam Patrol.

2 2

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing T.O.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS PH TH	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
FAD COD Pearl Harbor	1

22307

Z-2/AL-3(2)/
(3229)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 18, 1941.

AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AREA ASSIGNMENT (Week of November 19 - 25, 1941).

PATROL WING TWO	: V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups Marine Air Group 21	: V1, V2, V3, VS1, L3. Illio Point target, Kahuku Point Target (except 25 & 26 Nov.)
VO Wing	: V7, V8.
CA Wing	: VU3.
CL Wing	: VA9, VC9.
VCS-5	: Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3(2)/

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wa

RESTRICTEDAIRCRAFT GUNNERY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comcrubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv SEVEN	5
PatWing ONE Units (each)	5
PatWing TWO Units (each)	5
Lexington Air Group	11
Enterprise Air Group	11
Saratoga Air Group	11
Marine Air Group 21	20
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	10
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	10
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	10
C.O., H.A.S., Pearl Harbor	20
C.O., H.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	5
C.G., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
Commander Hawaiian Air Force	5
Combatfor	4
Comsubscorfor	4
Comdt. 14 W.D.	8
Combasefor	2
Cominbatfor	2
Comutwing, Basefor	5
Subron FOUR	5
CG; KSC, 3, Fort DeRussy	5
Comdesbatfor	5
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	2
C.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger	2
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	5
PAD OOD PH TH	3

PW2/AL-3/VZ

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTEDFLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comcrubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv NINE	5
Compatwing ONE	5
Patrol Wing ONE (All units - each)	5
Patrol Wing TWO (All units - each)	5
Lexington Air Group	2
Enterprise Air Group	2
Saratoga Air Group	2
Marine Air Group 21	4
C.O., USS LEXINGTON	2
C.O., USS ENTERPRISE	2
C.O., USS SARATOGA	2
C.O., NAS Pearl Harbor	6
C.O., NAS Kaneohe Bay	6
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	4
CG, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field.	27
CG, Hawaiian Air Force.	5
Combatfor	3
F.D COD PH TH	3
VJ-1	5
VJ-2	5

AW2/4-3(4),
(3176)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVY AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 11, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 43-41 (Week of November 12 - 18, 1941)

	WED 12	THURS 13	FRI 14	SAT 15	SUN 16	MON 17	TUE 18
CURTIS	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
TANGIER	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
WRIGHT	UK	UK	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
McFARLAND	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
THORNTON	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
HULBERT	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
SWAN	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
AVOCET	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
PATRON 11	RD V1	L1	G2 L1	RD	DP	E1	G2 L1
PATRON 12	E1	RD	DP	UK	RD	E1	E1
PATRON 14	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 21	DP G1	F1 Y1	RD Y1			G1	
PATRON 21	L1 L2	VC10	VC10	DP	SHW	L1 L2	G2 L2
PATRON 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 24	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SHW	UK	UK

- V1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- E1 Familiarization.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW: Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

READY DUTY TENDER

THORNTON

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS FH TH	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
PAD OOD	3

V1

PJ2/AA-3(2)
(3175)

PATROL WING TWO
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T.H.

7a

RESTRICTED

November 11, 1941.

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL AREA ASSIGNMENT (week of November 12-18, 1941).

Patrol Wing Two	: V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups Marine Air Group 21	: V6, V8, V9, V10, VS1, L3, L5, L6, Kahuku Point and Illio Point targets.
VO Wing	: V1, V2, V3.
CA Wing	: A7, A8, A11.
CL Wing	: VU3, VA3.

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

P:2/A4-3/VZ/(3174) PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 10, 1941.

NAVAL AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week of Nov. 12 - 16, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 12 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet. Patron ELEVEN (Kaneoha) night bombing 1830-2000 in area VS2.

Thursday, Nov. 13 #Patron TWENTY-ONE night bombing 1830-2000. Area VS2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.

Friday, Nov. 14 VJ-2 (6 landplanes) practice landings 1830-2100. 2 VO-VS planes exercise A-4.

Saturday, Nov. 15 NONE.

Sunday, Nov. 16 NONE.

Monday, Nov. 17 #VCS-9 (10 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise A-4. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.

Tuesday, Nov. 18 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, V31 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. RUSBY
L. C. RUSBY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing T.O.

V 3

PW2/AA-3/VZ/

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTEDFLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION

CinCPac	5
Comairbatfor	5
Comiscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comerubatfor	5
Comeruscofor	5
Comerudiv THREE	5
Comerudiv FOUR	5
Comerudiv FIVE	5
Comerudiv SIX	5
Comerudiv NINE	5
Compatwing ONE	5
Patrol Wing ONE (all units - each)	5
Patrol Wing TWO (all units - each)	5
Lexington Air Group	2
Enterprise Air Group	2
Saratoga Air Group	2
Marine Air Group 21	4
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	2
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	2
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	2
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	6
C.O., N.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	5
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	4
C.G., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
C.G., Hawaiian Air Force	5
Combatfor	3
F.A.D., O.O.D., P.H., T.H.	3

PATROL WING TWO
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

70

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT GUNNEY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

6thCPac	5
6thAirbatfor	5
6thScofor	5
6thCombatships	5
6thCombatdiv ONE	5
6thCombatdiv FOUR	5
6thComcrubatfor	5
6thComcruscofor	5
0 6thComcrudiv THREE	5
6thComcrudiv FOUR	5
6thComcrudiv FIVE	5
6thComcrudiv SIX	5
6thComcrudiv NINE	5
6thPatWing ONE Units (each)	5
6thPatWing TWO Units (each)	5
6thBurlington Air Group	11
6thEnterprise Air Group	11
0 6thSaratoga Air Group	11
6thMarine Air Group 21	20
6thC.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	20
6thC.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	20
0 6thC.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	20
6thC.O., H.A.S., Pearl Harbor	20
6thC.O., H.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	20
6thKingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	5
6thC.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	27
6thHeadquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	27
6thCommander Hawaiian Air Force	5
6thCombatfor	4
6thComsubscofor	4
6thComdt. 14 K.D.	5
6thCombasefor	5
6thCominbatfor	5
6thComutwing, Basefor	5
6thSubron FOUR	5
6thCG, KSC, B, Fort DeRussy	5
6thComdesbatfor	5
6thC.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	5
6thC.O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger	5
6thC.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	5
6thFAD OOD PH TH	5

V5

FW2/14-3(4)/
(3110)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wa

RESTRICTED

November 4, 1941.

OPERATION SCHEDULE NO. 42-41 (Week of November 5 - 11, 1941)

	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUES
CURTISS	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SPE	SPH
TANGLER	SPH	SPE	SPH	SPH	SPE	SPH	SPH
WRIGHT	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
McFARLAND	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
THEORNTON	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
HULBERT	SPH	SPE	SPE	SPH	SPE	ABE	ABE
SWAN	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
AVOCET	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
PATRON 11	RD G3 Y1 V4	DP G3 Y1 V4	G3 V4	RD UK	DP	RD G2 L2	DP G2 L2
PATRON 14	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 21	F1 VC10	F1 VC10	RD F1 VC10	DP	RD	DP G1 L1	RD G2 L1 VC10
PATRON 22	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 24	DP	RD	DP	UK	SW	ABE	ABE

- E1 Familiarization.
- F1 Prec or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
- PG Plane Guard.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SLW Holiday Routine.
- SPE Services Pearl Harbor.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

READY DUTY TENDER

HULBERT 5 - 8 Nov.
SWAN 9 - 11 Nov.

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each)	10
Tenders (each)	10
NAS Ft H	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay	20
NAS Maui	20
P&D OOD	3

UI

PW2/A4-3/VZ
(3109)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

November 4, 1941.

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE (Week November 5 - 11, 1941)

- Wednesday, Nov. 5 *Patrol 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
- Thursday, Nov. 6 *Patrol 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
- Friday, Nov. 7 *VO-1 (9 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VUS above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (12 planes total) will return to Pearl Harbor from operations at sea with Fleet at about 2130. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.
- Saturday, Nov. 8 NOTE.
- Sunday, Nov. 9 NOTE.
- Monday, Nov. 10 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise A-1.
- Tuesday, Nov. 11 Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

*Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. RUSSEY
L. C. RUSSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

U 2

PW2/A4-3(2)
(3108)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.


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RESTRICTED

November 4, 1941.

AIRCRAFT GUNNEY AREA ASSIGNMENT (Week of November 5 - 11, 1941).

Patrol Wing TWO	: V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups	: V6, V8, V9, V10, L3, L5, L6. Kahuiku
Marine Air Group 21	: Point and Illio Point targets.
VO Wing	: V1, V2, V3.
CA Wing	: VU3, VA3.
CL Wing	: A7, A8, A11.


E. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

FW2/A4-3(2)/

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wn

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT GUNNERY AREA ASSIGNMENT DISTRIBUTION:

CinCPac	
Comairbatfor	
Comasofor	
Combatships	
Combatdiv ONE	
Combatdiv FOUR	
Comcrubatfor	
Comcrusofor	
○ Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	
Comcrudiv FIVE	
Comcrudiv SIX	
Comcrudiv SEVEN	
PatWing ONE Units (each)	
PatWing TWO Units (each)	
Lexington Air Group	
Enterprise Air Group	
○ Saratoga Air Group	
Marine Air Group 21	
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	
○ C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	10
C.O., N.A.S., Pearl Harbor	
C.O., H.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	
Kingfisher-Kedusa Av. Rp. Unit	
C.O., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	
Commander Hawaiian Air Force	
● Combatfor	4
Comsubsofor	
Comdt. 14 H.D.	
Combasefor	
Cominbatfor	
Comwing, Basefor	
Subron FOUR	
CC, KSC, 3, Fort Dekussy	
Comdesbatfor	
C.O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor	
C.O., Harbor Defense, Port Ruger	
C.O., U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA	
PAW OOD PH TH	3

U 4

FW2/A4-5/VZ

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Wa

RESTRICTED

FLIGHT AIR DETACHMENT NIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION

CinCPac	5
Comcrbatfor	5
Comscofor	5
Combatships	5
Combatdiv ONE	5
Combatdiv FOUR	5
Comerubatfor	5
Comcruscofor	5
Comcrudiv THREE	5
Comcrudiv FOUR	5
Comcrudiv FIVE	5
Comcrudiv SIX	5
Comcrudiv NINE	5
Patrol Wing ONE (all units 1/2 each)	5
Patrol Wing TWO (all units 1/2 each)	5
Lexington Air Group	5
Enterprise Air Group	5
Saratoga Air Group	5
Marine Air Group 21	5
C.O., U.S.S. LEXINGTON	5
C.O., U.S.S. ENTERPRISE	5
C.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA	5
C.O., P.A.S., Pearl Harbor	5
C.O., H.A.S., Kaneohe Bay	5
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit	5
Comdg.Gen. 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field	5
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field	5
Comdg.Gen. Hawaiian Air Force	5
Combatfor	5
Pat OOD P.M. TE	5
Compatwing ONE	5

EXHIBIT NO. 114

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinepac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 21, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)O40W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[ii] *U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac-46

Subject Matter	Page Number ¹	Change in Effect
Promulgating letter: CincPac file A 16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W of July 21, 1941.	i	Original
List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46	ii	"
Table of Corrections	iii	"
Distribution List	iv	"
Title Page	1	"
Table of Contents	2, 2a, 2b	"
Parts I to V (incl.)	3-52 incl	"
	52a-52h incl	"
	53-56 incl	"
	56a-56d incl	"
	57-74 incl	"
Annex I	I-1 to I-11 incl	"
Annex II	II-1 to II-9 incl	"
Annex III	III-1 to III-5 incl	"
Annex IV	IV-1 to IV-3 incl	"

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[iii] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change

[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to Whom Issued	Registered Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	10, 11
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor)	12, 13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor)	14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor)	16, 17
Commander, Battleships Battle Force	18
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Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force	32
Commander, Patrol Wing Two	33
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Commanding General, Second Marine Division	37

[iv]

DISTRIBUTION LIST—Continued

<i>Official to Whom Issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa.....	38
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.....	39
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.....	40
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.....	41
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	42
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Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

(SECRET)

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

[2]

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[3] SECRET

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6] CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two	B-1, "
Task Force Three	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force	F-1, "
Base Force	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. <i>TASK FORCE ONE</i> Commander Battle Force	
Batdivs 2, 4.....	6 BB
SARATOGA.....	1 CV
Crudiv 3, 9.....	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9.....	4 OCL#
	2 DL
	16 DD#
	2 AD
(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)	
2. <i>TASK FORCE TWO</i> Commander Aircraft Battle Force	
Batdiv 1.....	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN.....	1 CV
Crudiv 5.....	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50.....	1 OCL
	8 DD
	2 AD
(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)	

3. *TASK FORCE THREE* Commander Scouting Force
- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----|-----|
| Crudivs 4, 6..... | 8 | CA |
| Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA..... | 1 | CV |
| Desrons 4, 5..... | 2 | DL |
| | 16 | DD |
| Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6..... | 5 | DM |
| Available Transports Base Force..... | — | AP |
| | — | APD |
- 2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.
- [12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)* Commander Aircraft Scouting Force
- | | | |
|---|-----|-----|
| All units of Aircraft Scouting Force..... | 107 | VP |
| | 2 | AV |
| | 2 | AVP |
| | 4 | AVD |
| Utility Squadron from Base Force..... | 10 | VJR |
5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)* Commander Submarines Scouting Force
- | | | |
|--|----|-----|
| All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School.. | 30 | SS |
| | 2 | OSS |
| | 1 | SM |
| | 1 | ODD |
| | 3 | AS |
| | 2 | ASR |
| | 1 | AM |
6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)* Commander Minecraft Battle Force
- | | | |
|--|---|----|
| All units of Minecraft Battle Force..... | 1 | CM |
| | 8 | DM |
7. *TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)* Commander Base Force
- | | | |
|--|----|--------------|
| All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less | 8 | DMS |
| Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. | 4 | AF |
| | 6 | AT |
| | 1 | AH |
| | 13 | AO |
| | 2 | AR |
| | 1 | ARD |
| | 2 | AK |
| | 2 | AE |
| | 1 | AKS |
| | 10 | AM |
| | 4 | AG |
| | | Utility Wing |
- [13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
- [14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15]

CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern-

ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note.—As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.

4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the

defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1). Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC 22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

- a. Capture of Guam.
- b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
- d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
- e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
- f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
- b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reinforcement of the Mandates.
- c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
- d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
- e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
- f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.
- [23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.
- h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

- a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
- b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
- c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
- d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;
- e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
- f. Defend Guam in category "F";
- g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
- h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
- i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
- j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
- k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

[26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

k. Continue training operations as practicable.

l. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.

c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.

d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.

e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.

f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.

i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.

- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5''/51 caliber guns
12 3''/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5''/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
4 3''/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
8 3''/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task.*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One and Two*

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

39]

CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941 tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four*-(Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252. a. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft

usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

*Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE*3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*3331. *Task Force Three* will:

- a. Continue training for landing attacks.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.
- c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
- d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 e, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

*U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

- a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54]

CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For.	{ 2 OCL..... 1 Desdiv.....	} When directed..	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CL.....	W-Day.....	
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS..... 1 ASR.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3.....	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfo).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM..... 8 DM.....	} J-Day.....	Until further orders.
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
All Forces.....	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.....	When directed..	For escort duty. To revert on completion.
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph. 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b]

CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c]

CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d]

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58]

CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59]

CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] Section 1. Phase I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from *Task Force Six*, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from *Task Force Seven* for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscovor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to *Task Force Three*.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—

(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One*. Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two*. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three*. Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan R5 1-.

[69] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three.*

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

- (f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).
 (1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.
- (g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).
 (1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.
 (2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).
- (h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.
 [74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.
 (2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).
 4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.
 5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
 (b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
 (c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
 Commander-in-Chief,
 U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan
 No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 (b) Task Force Two.
 (c) Task Force Three.
 (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2. *Phase I*

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- [I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
 (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
 (c) Covering.
 (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
 (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is applicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reenforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reservice such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage, and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by *Task Force Commander* for operations in

conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reinforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Com-

mander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they

can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ———

Initial Task Organization.

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*
- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reinforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reinforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep

along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;
- guns and observation posts;
- mines;
- channel and beach obstructions;
- other defense installations;
- beaches suitable for landing operations;
- extent of anchorage area;
- hydrographic, topographic, and meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

- combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
- other ships;
- fuel tanks;
- power and radio installations;

troop concentrations;
storehouses;
other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two*, to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.
- (b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.
- (c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
- (b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
- (c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.
- (d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.

No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position. .

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

EXHIBIT NO. 115

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES CONCERNING LOCATIONS OF JAPANESE
FLEET UNITS

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
1 NOVEMBER 1941.

GENERAL- Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

COMBINED FLEET- The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

CARRIERS- The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

SUBMARINES- Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

THIRD FLEET- This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

CHINA- The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAFA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

3 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIVI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

COMBINED FLEET - Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

THIRD FLEET - Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

AIR - A WE address today broke down as "ITIKUKUU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct. It indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

4 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

AIR - High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

MANDATES - The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No Change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

SUBMARINES - No activity noted.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
5 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WWTI messages in Kena Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

THIRD FLEET - Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section ?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several despatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANCI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

6 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

TAKAO-BAKO AREA - It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

COMBINED FLEET - A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

MANDATES - The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNC PALOA continue to be the most active units.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY7 November, 1941

GENERAL - Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

AIR - Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

FLEET - Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

8 November 1941

GENERAL -

Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the NTU. All NTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S.C.O. Combined INFO. S.C.O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (MEO Co) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

FLEET -

Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

AIR - Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

8 November, 1941

AIR - (Continued)

Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

COMMUNICATION-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY9 November 1941GENERAL -

Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Marianas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

10 November, 1941

- GENERAL - Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.
- COMBINED FLEET - Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.
- THIRD FLEET - The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.
- FOURTH FLEET - Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.
- FIFTH FLEET - One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.
- AIR - The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
12 November 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

COMBINED FLEET - The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

AIR - CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

FIFTH FLEET - Nothing to report.

FOURTH FLEET - The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

CHINA - The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
13 November 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIMI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N.G.S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIFAWIWI from N.G.S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIMI from N.G.S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N.G.S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

COMBINED FLEET - The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

THIRD FLEET - Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

FOURTH FLEET - The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

AIR - Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KUPÉ. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

CHINA - The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one ^{by} the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

14 November. 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N.G.S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIWI from N.G.S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N.G.S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

COMBINED FLEET - Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

THIRD FLEET - Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

FOURTH FLEET - No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

SUBMARINES - No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

AIR - One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

COMMUNICATION TRAFFIC 16.000 - SUMMARY

15 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U E 9 (D.F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sana Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sana and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was continued. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MEM 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.

COMBINED FLEET - Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

THIRD FLEET - Inactive.

FOURTH FLEET - Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

SUBMARINE FORCE - Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force and some Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls have been made.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

15 November 1941

AIR - Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOBE 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

16 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTCM series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers - (Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives - Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc.."

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
 Carrier Division Four
 Destroyer Squadron Seven
 Destroyer Squadron Three
 Battleship Division Three
 Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

16 November 1941

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - (Continued)

It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

THIRD FLEET - Believed inactive in Sasebo - Kure area.

FOURTH FLEET - FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (LEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC, Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

FIETH FLEET - Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

SUBMARINES - Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet commands continues.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

17 November, 1941

- GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.
- COMBINED FLEET - No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
- THIRD FLEET - Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R.N.O. Palao.
- FOURTH FLEET - The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.
- AIR - The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.
- CHINA - Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R.N.O. Taihoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

18 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N.G.S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R.N.O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N.G.S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N.G.S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N.G.S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

THIRD FLEET - The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R.N.C. TAINOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

FOURTH FLEET - Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

19 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAITA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

COMBINED FLEET - The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

THIRD FLEET - Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

FOURTH FLEET - Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

FIFTH FLEET - Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

20 - 21 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N.G.S. sent a UNI WLWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

COMBINED FLEET - Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

MIRA 9	(Carrier Division Thraee)	ENO 7	(Unidentified)
TAE 1	(Airron 7)	AKU 8	(Air Unit)
KAME 5	(Airron 6)	KUSU 7	(Unidentified)
YAWI 1	(Crudiv 5)	SATU 88	(Unidentified)
KENU 3	(Crudiv 7)	KUNI 88	(Unidentified)
RESE 4	(Desron 3)	OYU 9	(Unidentified)
AKI 0	(Desron 4)	KONA 0	(Unidentified)
TIYA 7	(Comdr. 1st Base For)	NOTU 6	(Unidentified)
SASE 3	(Comdr. 2nd Base For)	NETE 5	(Unidentified)
YOMO 9	(Desron 5)	NSI 3	(Unidentified)
REA 2	(Shiogama Air Corps)	SUTE 1	(Unidentified)
KUNO 9	(Erimo)	YAYU 1	(Unidentified)
MIMO 3	(Air Unit?)	MARE 5	(Unidentified)
TUE 7	(Unidentified)	Plus 11 Marus.	

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out - so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

20 - 21 November 1941

MANDATES AND FOURTH FLEET - The R.N.O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R.N.O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

JALUIT

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

22 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3)(at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI) (at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

THIRD FLEET - CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

CHINA - The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

23 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expeditionary Force. ✓
Precedence
NIKA-JIWI
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff. ✓
NIKA
3. KESANA BONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SAMRUYUTI" at Sawa Hainan. ✓
WIWI
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NKA 2, information Radio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship. ✓
NIKA
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAF Information Kure, Bako, and MIMO 3 in Takao.
KIU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following TE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAMOTI.TENGO.RI.SI".

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

- KENU 3 - CruDiv 7 Flagship?
- HOWI 2 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- MIE 8 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- MUSE 5 - Naval Auxilliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

COMBINED FLEET - CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

23 November, 1941

a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. ✓ Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

AIR - Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

CHINA - CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third, Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

24 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heels intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS - Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

THIRD FLEET - Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET AND MANDATES - Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

SUBMARINES - Comparatively little activity.

CHINA - Comparatively quiet.

CARRIERS - No definite indications of location.

COMBINED AIR FORCE - Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Tokyo. Otherwise no change.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

25 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WTWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

COMBINED FLEET - Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

AIR - Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

26 November, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureau still dispatching AllNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only NAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working
(170 ASA) ITSUBA (Spratleys).

COMBINED FLEET - Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.

FOURTH FLEET - No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

FIFTH FLEET - The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

SUBMARINES - As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

CHINA - Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

THIRD FLEET - Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

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COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

27 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

COMBINED FLEET - No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

THIRD FLEET - Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATEIYUJAIYU'TAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
 "KORONJITISIAI"
 "KIZUYEYANASITA'UTAI" (in care of RYUJO)
 "HEIZEN'AICHUNDAIGONREUGEU"

These is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

FOURTH FLEET - CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at MIKUMI and SHIMOTON were heard from after being silent for weeks. Gaitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

AIR - An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

SUBMARINES - Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

November 28, 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NREØ (the TOKYO D.F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and CMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R.I. net is operating at full strength upon U.S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS. |||

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMI SI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

COMBINED FLEET - No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CMBDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

THIRD FLEET - Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

FOURTH FLEET - Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

SOUTH CHINA - SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

SUBMARINES - Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

. 29 November 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AINavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

COMBINED FLEET - The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE	2 CV	DESRON TWO	1 CL-13DD
SUBRON FIVE	14+10SS	DESRON FOUR	1 CL-13DD
SUBRON SIX	11+45M	THIRD FLEET	
CRUDIV FIVE	3 CA	FRENCH INDC CHINA FORCE	
CRUDIV SEVEN	4 CA		

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet

THIRD FLEET - Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKA. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

FOURTH FLEET - Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

2634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SUBMARINES - Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

SOUTH CHINA - CRUDIV Seven now in SAIPA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
November 30, 1941.

GENERAL - Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

COMBINED FLEET - The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSEIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

THIRD FLEET - Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

FOURTH FLEET - Believed to be still in TRUK area. D.F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Ccm 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

SOUTH CHINA - BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

SECRET
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1 December 1941

GENERAL - All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

FIRST FLEET - Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. ~~It is believed that the fleet is proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).~~

SECOND FLEET - This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

THIRD FLEET - Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

FOURTH FLEET - No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

FIFTH FLEET - Nothing to report.

SUBMARINES - Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Flagship somewhere in this general area.

CARRIERS - No change

COMBINED AIR FORCE - No change.

WAC

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 December 1941

GENERAL - The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

FIRST FLEET - Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

SECOND FLEET - No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

SECRETCOMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

2 December 1941

THIRD FLEET - Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

MANDATES - Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

CARRIERS - Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

COMBINED AIR FORCE - This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - 3 DECEMBER 1941

GENERAL- Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addressees.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

SECRETCOMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

4 December 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

COMBINED FLEET - The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET - The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

SOUTH CHINA - Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

*Written by [unclear]
5 Dec 1941*COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

December 5, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, SAMA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

COMBINED FLEET - Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

THIRD FLEET - In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

FOURTH FLEET - The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio ~~and~~, the RNO PALAO and the Commander Second Fleet.

SOUTH CHINA - SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

Handwritten initials

Whitten Saturday P. M.
6 December 1941.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
December 6, 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

COMBINED FLEET - Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

FOURTH FLEET - The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

FIFTH FLEET - This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

SUBMARINES - The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

SOUTH CHINA - Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

by

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

27 October 1941 - 2 December 1941

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability _____ Serial No. 12 Date 17 October 1941
 Rating _____

Interest in content of this report of units of Orange fleet is:

Tokyo Area:	<u>CVs</u>	<u>AVs</u>
	10	KOTYUO
	11	KENJO HARU
	Unidentified	Haru Type
		Haru Type
		DD (Plane Guards)
		DD " "

Tokyo Area: Commander's Office Air Force

Tokyo Area & Ariake Bay Area: FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCE except:

Tokyo Area: YAMATO IRO

Maizuru: KONGO

Kanoya - Eastern
 Kyushu Area: CVs: AMAGI HIRYU
KAGA HOUNO
 Unidentified
 Unidentified
 Unidentified

Oasebo Area: THIRD FLEET

(continued)

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating CONFIDENTIAL Serial No. 34 Date 11 APR, 1941.

The following information is from sources which has been thoroughly reliable in the past:

From 1 Nov. the navigation through OMAKA Channel is restricted as follows. Seven fixed buoys are in the channel.

- (1) Lighted buoy: From K. IKA IKA lighted buoy 15 degrees, 50 meters (.27 miles). Lighted painted black.
- (2) Lighted buoy: From AOMIKA IKA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters (.35 miles). Painted black.
- (3) Lighted buoy: From NOMIKA IKA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 1700 meters (.80 miles). Painted red.
- (4) Flag buoy: From AOMIKA IKA lighted buoy 87 degrees, 6600 meters (.35 miles).
- (5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190 (1704) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).
- (6) Flag buoy: From K. NOMIAMI LIGHT 88 degrees, 4900 meters (2.57 miles).
- (7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles)

NAVIGATION:

Sail to the east of lighted buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3). Sail to the east of the northern four buoys because the area to west of them is dangerous. Do not enter (this area).

When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3), the ship leaving port is to wait.

There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout station on the northwest point of NOMIAMI YAMA.

Take care!

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		

(NO)

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 75 Date 19 November 1941

Reliable informatio. indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru Tenders have returned to the Sasebo - Kure Area. RYUJO is still in Taiwan. The KENJO MARU is in the Saigon - Camranh Bay Area.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A-20

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 86 Date 12 November 1941

It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26

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4-19

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating ? Serial No. 67 Date 22 Nov 1941

Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese Expeditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI or Portuguese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past a line through Davao - Waigea - Equator the Governor General of the NEI will regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun.

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A-18

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 87 Date 23 Nov 1941

CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk - Saipan area. The following increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus; Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing force (7.); Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders.

The activity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps is believed to be at Palao and Airon Twenty four is concentrated in the Marshalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

A-17

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 14 Date 23 Nov 1941

CinCAF has no information confirming the Dutch report of a Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao. His information does not indicate the presence of units other than the Fourth Fleet in the mandate area and no unusual concentration of that force. It is possible that there may be an increase in the number of transports and auxiliaries. There has been a concentration of 30 - 40 marus in the Saipan area since the middle of October. CinC Fourth Fleet at Saipan has reported and it is possible that Airon 24 may also be present. Current indications are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the mandates but so far there has been no signs that the movement has begun.

[Handwritten Signature]

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

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A-16

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability
Rating _____

Serial No. 70

Date 29 November 1941

The U.S.M. Liaison Adviser in Batavia reports that the Dutch report concerning the Japanese Expeditionary Force near Lelone, isolated from the Dutch Army in Timor, Portuguese Timor, is aimed at the objective of the Expedition. The information would seem to be doubtful and no further confirmation has been obtained.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

1 #11

A-15

11/29/41

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability
Rating _____

A-1

Serial No. 12

Date 25 November 1941

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
		<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>B</i>				<i>W</i>	<i>W</i>																							

- 262A -

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability A-1
 Rating _____

Serial No. 13

Date 25 Nov 1941

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet - Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division) - Combined Air Force - Desron Three -

Airson 7 - Subron 5 - possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet)

These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The ^{been} Commander Second Fleet has intensely/interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may be enroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one-third and one third of the submarine force.

Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
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- 260A -

Handwritten initials

SECRET**INTELLIGENCE REPORT***Top Secret*Reliability
Rating

Serial No.

94

Date

page 3 (cont)

8. Sa believes that

CinC Combined	1st	"	"	"	MAZDA (BB)
"	2nd	"	"	"	HYUGA (BB)
"	3rd	"	"	"	ATAGO (CA) (In KURE area)
"	4th	"	"	"	YAMAZAKI (CA) (In SAJERO area)
"	5th	"	"	"	MIYAMA (CA) (In SAJERO area)
"	6th	"	"	"	YAMAZAKI (CA) (In YOKOSUKA area but this is unreliable)

7. CinC 1st Flt, CinC 3rd Flt and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force apparently have the major roles.
8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet (probably torpedo boats).
9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.



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SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability Rating

Serial No. 99 Date November 26, 1941.

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

- 1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:
 - Section I to operate in South China area.
 - Section II to operate in the Mandates.
- 2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

Section I

Crudiv 7 (From 2nd Flt) (4 CA's--KUMANO, NODAMI, MIKUMA, SUGUYA)

Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 KAV's--KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KUNO MARU)

1st Defense Division (From 3rd Flt)

Subron 6 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs(4 ~~CV~~))(^{2nd + SM})

It is possible but not known for sure that Crudiv 6 may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's--KAKO, FURUTAKA, NOBA, HIYUGAKA)

Section II

Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's(maybe 4)--IYOKO, NACHI, HAYASHI)

Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's--RYUJOU?, HOSHO)

RYUJOU and HOSHO 1 CV

(cont)

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating B-3 Serial No. 96 Date 27 November 1941.

Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states:

Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the IMA Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bangkok and Singapore.

Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SUNGKHLA).

Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) and HAINAN Is.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

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SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Top Secret

Reliability Rating L-1 Serial No. 97 Date 28 Nov 41

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedures will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at the beginning and the end will have this significance:

- HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese - American
- KITA KITA : Russia
- NISHI NISHI : England (including occupation of Thai ^{or} ~~the~~ invasion of Malaya and NEI)

On Japanese language foreign/broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

- "~~HIGASHI~~ HIGASHI NO KAZE AKE" (American)
- "KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia)
- "NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England)

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26			
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Py 2/5

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 108 Date 1 Dec 41

There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days: ComDesRon 5 in the MATSURI; USSA to join DesRon 4; Units of Number Two Base Force; CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdivs). All of these units are under command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area in the MATAGO apparently enroute South China Waters.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

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SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating A-1 Serial No. 101 Date 1 Dec 1941

Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai, at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
X	X																													

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SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability A-1 Serial No. 102 Date 8 December 1944
Rating _____

W 4749b

CinC Second Fleet, and the CinC Third Fleet have put in their appearance in the TAILO Area. The Commander Southern Expeditionary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAMA, HAINAN.

The U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of Codes.'

Three I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from SAIGON, course 180 speed 15.

Nine (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10, longitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.

Reported at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol overhead.

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26						

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Pg. #52

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

•f

1 December 1941

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS

Cincpac File No

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
December 1, 1941.

C-0-0-1-F-1-0-0-0-1-1-1-1

~~C-0-0-1-F-1-0-0-0-1-1-1-1~~

From: Fleet Intelligence Officer.
To: Admiral.
Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are thought to be located as listed below:-

Yokosuka Area

TAKAO (CA)	1 CA	
3rd Fleet HQ	?	
1 Patrol Force	?	
AIR GROUP of 5th Fleet (Chichijima?)	36 planes ?	<i>Japan</i>

Total = 1 CA plus ? 36 planes

Kure - Sasebo Area

CinC Combined Fleet
CinC First Fleet

BatDiv 1 & 2	6 BB ?	
Crudiv 0 - may head for Mandates (?)	4 CA ?	<i>Japan</i>
Desron 1	1 CL	
	12 DD	

CinC 3rd Fleet in HAGARA - 1 CL - ~~(at Takao)~~

1 CL	1 CL
DesDiv-12 (?)	1 CL
	4 DD

Cruiser Division EIGHT 2 CA

Total - 6 BB - ~~4~~ CA - ~~2~~ CL - 16 DD + CV
6 1

Shanghai Area

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO	1 - OCA
Shanghai Base Force	1 - PG
	3 - ODD

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

Bako - Takao Area (Continued)

Cardiv-4	2 CV & 4 DD
Cardiv-3	2 CV & 3 DD
Batdiv-3 less HARUNA	3 BB (maybe 2 BB)
<hr/>	
Total -- 3 BB - 4 CV - 3 CL - 4 DD - 1 SS - 4 SA - 3 AV - 4 IAV -	
4 CA - 3 CM - 17 IAP - 5 XPG - 450 planes.	

Hainan - Canton Area

CinC South China (in ISUZU)	1 CL
(CinC S. China Force)	1 CA
Cruciv-7	4 CA
Desron-3	1 CL
	15 DD
<u>1st Base Force (?)</u>	3 CM
(part of this may be in	12 AM's
Formosan waters)	6 XPG
	12 PC
	27 AP
<hr/>	
Total -- 5 CA - 2 CL - 15 DD - 3 CM - 12 AM's - 6 XPG	
12 PC - 27 AP	

French Indo China

<u>CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI</u>	1 CA
	1 CL
	1 CM
	9 Torpedo Boats
	? XPG

Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force	Total -- 1 SS - 1 CL - 12 AM's
may be here (27 AM's)	(?) - 1 CM - 9 Torp. Boats & Miscellaneous

OMURA AIR GROUP

12 Air Group) Some may be on Hainan	36 planes
13 Air Group		36 planes (?)
14 Air Group		36 planes (?)

Mandate Area

<u>PALAO</u>	
16th Air Group	36 planes

CinC Fle No

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CENTRAL-PACIFIC-THEATRE

Subject: ORANGE FLEET - Location of.

Sanito Area (Continued)2nd Base Force

10 XPG
4 SS (No)

Total -- 36 planes - 10 XPG - 4 SS

TrukCinC 4th Fleet

1 JL
~~2~~ 2 JL 2 - OCL
1 JL
8 DD

4th Base Force

4 XPG
4 XAP
4 XAL's

17th Air Group

36 planes

Total -- 36 planes - 2 JL - 2 OCL - 8 DD - 4 XPG
4 XAP - 4 XALPalmyraCinC Submarine Force

1 JL
1 AS
7 SS

plus subs (?) 1 Subron (?)

Chitose Air Group

36 planes

13th Air Group

36 planes

5th Base Force

2 CM
8 XPG
5 XAP

Total -- 72 planes - 1 JL - 1 AS - 7 SS - 2 CM
8 XPG - 5 XAPMarshall Area19th Air Group

36 planes

Yokohama Air Group

36 planes

Wotje Air Group

24 planes

Kwajalein Air Group

24 planes

Cinepac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipC-0-0-F-1-D-0-1-1-1-1Subject: WARREN FLEET - Location of.
-----Marshall Area (Continued)

<u>Air Squadron 24</u>	2 XAV
KAYU (?) plus plane guards	20 planes 1 CV 4 DD
Submarine Squadron 7	1 AS 7 SS (no)
Subdiv (?)	4 SS (I)
Submarine Squadron 3	9 SS (I)
<u>6th Base Force</u>	4 XAV's 8 XPG 3 PG
⁴² HATSUMI	1 AS (survey)

Total -- 140 planes - 2 XAV - 1 CV - 4 DD - 1 AS - 22 SS
4 XAV - 8 XPG - 3 PG - 3 PC - 1 AG.

Respectfully,


E. T. LINTON,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.,
Fleet Intelligence Officer.

EXHIBIT NO. 115A

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES

of

9 & 10 December 1941

showing

ASSUMED COMPOSITION OF JAPANESE STRIKING FORCE

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

9 December 1941

COMBINED FLEET - The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are believed to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as initiated by Second Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South East Asia or elsewhere.

Handwritten: ~~1st~~ ~~2nd~~ ~~3rd~~ ~~4th~~ ~~5th~~ ~~6th~~ ~~7th~~ ~~8th~~ ~~9th~~ ~~10th~~ ~~11th~~ ~~12th~~ ~~13th~~ ~~14th~~ ~~15th~~ ~~16th~~ ~~17th~~ ~~18th~~ ~~19th~~ ~~20th~~ ~~21st~~ ~~22nd~~ ~~23rd~~ ~~24th~~ ~~25th~~ ~~26th~~ ~~27th~~ ~~28th~~ ~~29th~~ ~~30th~~ ~~31st~~

FIRST FLEET - First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Divisions. Battle Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HIYE I and KIRISHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA and KONGO are probably with the or a #2 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likely that Striking Force #1 is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32 N Long. 164 W).

SECOND FLEET - Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with Striking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief, Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force are under one command; also that Indo-China Force and South China Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination, probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China Coast and Indo-China.

THIRD FLEET - Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this assumption.

FOURTH FLEET - Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of operations of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close connection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north; on the other hand Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar to Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the primary duties of a radio intelligence unit and is assumed to be headquarters in the "Field".

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

9 December 1941

FIFTH FLEET - Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area continues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from the Fifth Fleet units. This fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka north to Ominato area shortly before war opened. The composition of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed to have very few so called fleet vessels. Probably a large percentage of fleet auxiliaries and converted air tenders?

CARRIERS - #1 Striking Force operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to comprise Carrier Division One - AKAGI (Flagship CarDivs)

KAGA

Carrier Division Two - HIRYU
SORYUCarrier Division
Four (or Five) - SHOKAKU
ZUIKAKUCruiser Division Eight
Destroyer Squadron One
KIRISHIMA - - First Section BatDiv Three.
HIYEI.

By deduction #2 Striking Force, if such an organization exists, comprises Carrier Division Three - RYUJO
HOSHO

Carrier Division
Five (or four) - KORYU

and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three and RYUJO were definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war.

SUBMARINES - A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions.

CHINA - China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

10 December 1941

GENERAL - Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traffic intercepted at Heeia has not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all known circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the immediate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two days in the sector 295 - 300 true from Oahu; since most calls involved have been tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broadcasted from Takao Radio:

"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all hands (?).

"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men".

COMBINED FLEET - No change.

FIRST FLEET - No indications of any change. The calls identified as First Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this.

SECOND AND THIRD FLEETS - Appear to be "intact" in the South eastern Asia area.

FOURTH FLEETS - Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

FIFTH FLEET - No apparent change in the available information on this fleet. Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore stations.

SUBMARINES - Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area. From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength were lower than actual numbers.

CARRIERS - Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship, AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received for the First Air Fleet during the period 7 - 10 December. To this office, the inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.

EXHIBIT NO. 115B

**PACIFIC FLEET
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

#45-41

27 NOVEMBER 1941

2678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Cincpac File No.
A8/FF1/(25)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Serial 01954

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
HRK
Pearl Harbor, T.H.
November 27, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.


Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE C O N F I D E N T I A L CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.


P. C. CROSLY,
By direction.

DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)

List I, Case 3; P, X.
Atlantic Fleet A1;
Asiatic Fleet A1;
One copy each to:
FATU; NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

CONFIDENTIAL

Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

CONTENTS(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS Pages 1 to 12 inclusive

Major Fleet Commands -	Page 1
Combined Fleet and First Fleet -	" 2
Combined Fleet and Second Fleet -	" 3
Third Fleet -	" 4
Fourth Fleet -	" 5 and 6
Fifth Fleet -	" 7
Sixth Fleet - (Submarine Fleet)	" 7
Carrier Fleet -	" 8
Combined Air Force -	" 9
Train. for Combined Fleet -	" 10
Japanese Naval Forces in China -	" 11 and 12.

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS

Pages 13 and 14.

General Situation.

Air Distribution.

Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in mandates (2 pages to be pasted together).

Sketch of PALAO (PENEU)

Sketch of SALANGAL Harbor, etc.

Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941. (10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet

1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.

II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters) in China. 1 PG and 3 DD's

1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

CONFIDENTIAL

Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

NAGATO, Flagship

FIRST FLEETBatdiv One

NAGATO (F)
MUTSU
YAMASHIRO

Desdiv 27

SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE

Batdiv Two

FUSO (F)
ISE
HYUGA

Desron Three

SENDAI (F)

Batdiv Three

HIYEI (F)
KONGO
KIRISHIMA
* HARUNA

Desdiv 11

FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
HATSUYUKI

Crudiv Six

KAKO (F)
FURUTAKA
AOBA
KINUGASA

Desdiv 12

SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGOMO
MURAKUMO

Desron One

ABUKUMA (F)

Desdiv 19

ISONAMI (F)
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI
URANAMI

Desdiv 6

IKAZUCHI (F)
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
HIBIKI

Desdiv 20

ASAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI

Desdiv 21

NENOHI (F)
HATSUHARU
HATSUSHIRO
WAKABA

TOTAL

10 BB
4 CA
2 CL
27 DD

* NOTE: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

COMBINED FLEETSECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

Crudiv FourTAKAO (F)
ATAGO
CHOKAI
MAYACrudiv Five *MIYOKO (F)
NACHI
HAGUROCrudiv SevenKUMANO (F)
MOGANI
MIKUMA
SUZUYACrudiv EightTONE (F)
CHIKUMADesron Two

JINTSU (F)

Desdiv 8ASASHIO (F)
ARASHIO
OSHC
MICHISHIODesdiv 15KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
HAYASHIODesron Two (Cont'd)Desdiv 16HATSUKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
TOKITSUKAZEDesdiv 18KASUMI
ARARE
KAGERO
SHIRANUHIDesron Four

NAKA (F)

Desdiv 2YUDACHI (F)
MURASAME
HARUSAME
SAMIDAREDesdiv 9ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMO
NATSUGUMODesdiv 24KAWAKAZE (F)
YAMAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
UMIKAZE

* NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.

TOTAL13 CA
2 CL
28 DD

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THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo - Vice Admiral
NAGARA, Flagship

NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE

CHOGEI (F)

Subdiv

Subdiv

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE

Desron Five

NATORI (F)

Desdiv 5

ASA KAZE
HARUKAZE
MATSUKAZE
HATAKAZE

Desdiv 12

SATSUKI
FUJITSUKI
MINATSUKI
NAGATSUKI

Desdiv 34

HAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
TACHIKAZE

TOTAL

1	CL	12	AM
12	DD	6	XPG
1	AS	12	PC
6	SS	46	AP
6	CM		

1st BASE FORCE

_____ Maru (F)

Minelayer Division

ITSUKUSHELL (F)
MOTAKA
HITSUTAKA

Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21

AM-1	AM-7
AM-2	AM-8
AM-3	AM-9
AM-4	AM-10
AM-5	AM-11
AM-6	AM-12

Gunboat Division 1

6 Gunboats
(Converted Fishing Vessels)

SUBCHASER SQUADRON

_____ (F)

Subchaser Division 1 and 11

PC-1	PC-7
PC-2	PC-8
PC-3	PC-9

Subchaser Division 21 and 31

PC-4	PC-10
PC-5	PC-11
PC-6	PC-12

27 AP - Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

_____ Maru, (F)

Minelayer Division 17

SHIRATAKA
YUEYAMA
KUNAJIRI

At least 5 other men of war, and
17 merchant ships.

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FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA - Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudiv Eighteen

TENRYU (F)
TATSUTA
KASHIMA

Survey and Patrol Division

KOSHU
KATSURIKI (CM)
KOMABASHI (AS)

Desron Six

YUEARI (F)

Repair and Salvage Division

MATSUEI MARU
NAGAURA (MARU)

Desdiv 29

OITE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI

3rd BASE FORCE

Palao, Headquarters
_____ Maru (F)

Desdiv 30

MITSUKI (F)
KISARAGI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI

Guard Division 3

_____ Maru

Subron Seven

JINGEI

Subdiv 6

RO-55
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59

Subdiv 26

RO-60
RO-61
RO-62

Subchaser Division 55

_____ Maru (F)

XPG 551 (?)
XPG 552 (?)
XPG 553 (?)
XPG 554 (?)

Subdiv 27

RO-65
RO-66
RO-67

Subdiv 33

RO-63
RO-64
RO-68

9 AP or AK

Subdiv

THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALAO)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force
_____ Detach. 4th Def. Force
_____ " " " "
_____ " " " "
_____ " " " "
_____ " " " "

8 XPG

(Estimate these unknown locations to be SCORL, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

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FOURTH FLEET (Cont'd.)

4th BASE FORCE

Truk, Headquarters
 _____ Maru (F)

Guard Division 4

_____ Maru (F)

4 AP or AK

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ - SAIPAN)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including
 Air Group #18
 Tenian Detachment, 5th Defence Force
 P.IGAN " " " "

6th BASE FORCE

Jaluit, Headquarters
 TAKUHAN MARU (F)

Mine Sweeper Division 16

MAGATE MARU (F)
 CHOKAI MARU
 DAIDO MARU
 IKUTA MARU

FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-TRUK)
 Miscellaneous Forces Ashore,
 including Air Group #17 and
 Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force
 Kusaie Detachment " " " "
 Olol Detachment " " " "
 Greenwich Detachment " " " "
 Liortlock Detachment " " " "
 Pingelap Detachment " " " "
 Puluwat Detachment " " " "
 Lamotrek Detachment " " " "
(Hall ?) " " " "

_____ ? _____ ? (This may
 _____ Maru be the SALVAGE
 _____ Maru Unit known to
 _____ Maru be in 6th Base
 Force)

Subchaser Division 5

PC-51
 PC-52
 PC-53

5th BASE FORCE

Saipan, Headquarters
 SHOEI MARU (F)

SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-JALUIT)

KAIKEI Maru
 #5 FUKU Maru
 _____ Maru

Guard Division 5

Composition unknown

Miscellaneous Forces ashore
 including AIR GROUP #19 at IMIEJI,
 Jaluit Atoll and probable Air
 Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and
 RUOTTC Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)

Mineslayer Division 19

OKINOSHIMA (F)
 TOKIWA

Detachment 6th Defence Force
 KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)
 TARCA Is. (Maloelap Atoll)
 ENIETOK Is. (Eniwetok Atoll)
 UJELING Atoll
 ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll)
 IMIEJI Is. (" ")

Subchaser Division 20

KASHI (F)
 XPG 561 (?)
 XPG 562 (?)
 XPG 563 (?)

WOTJE Atoll - Detach. of 6th Def. Force
 UTIRIK Atoll- " " " " "

Gunboat Division 8

Composition unknown

9 AP or AK

TOTAL

4	CL	16	SS	15	XPG
9	DD	1	Survey Ship	3	PC
2	AS	3	CM	4	XLM
				41	AP or AK

- 6 -

^

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FIFTH FLEET

CL _____ (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.

SIXTH FLEET

(Submarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

Subron One

TJIGEI (F)

Subdiv 1

I-9
I-15
I-16
I-17

Subdiv 2

I-18
I-19
I-20

Subron Two

KITAGAWA (F)

Subdiv 7

I-1
I-2
I-3
I-7

Subdiv 8

I-4
I-5
I-6

Subron Three

NAGOYA MARU (F)

Subdiv 11

I-74
I-75

Subdiv 12

I-8
I-68
I-69
I-70

Subdiv 20

I-71
I-72
I-73

Subron Five

YURA (F)

Subdiv 28

I-59
I-60

Subdiv 29

I-61 (Sank 10-2-41)
I-62
I-64

Subdiv 30

I-65
I-66

Subron Six

KINU (F)

Subdiv 9

I-123
I-124

Subdiv 13

I-121
I-122

Subron Ten

KARASAKI (F) *

Subdiv 18

I-53
I-54
I-55

Subdiv 19

I-56
I-57
I-58

Subdiv 21

RO-33
RO-34

* NOTE: The old sub-tender
KARASAKI appears to have been
recommissioned.

TOTAL

3 CL
2 AS
1 AP
42 SS

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CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)CV KAGA FlagshipCardiv 1AKAGI
KAGA (F)Desdiv 7ODORO (F)
USHIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKICardiv 4ZUIKAKU
SHOKANUDesdiv 3HOKAZE
SHIOKAZE
NAMIKAZE
NUMAKAZECardiv 2SORYU (F)
HIRYUDesdiv 23UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
YUZUKICardivCV KORYU
CV KASUGA (MARU)Cardiv 3RYUJO (F)
HOSHODesdiv 17ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
HIMAKAZETOTAL10. CV
16. DD

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COMBINED AIR FORCEKanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e.g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

SHIP-BASED SQUADRONSAir Ron 6

KAIKAWA MARU (F)
FUJIKAWA MARU
KENJO MARU

(Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)

Air Ron 7

CHITOSE (F)
CHIYODA
MIZUHO

(Has been working with the 1st Fleet)

Air Ron 24

KASOI (F)
1 XAV
Yokohama Air Group
Chitose Air Group

(Has been working with the 4th Fleet)

Patrol Squadron 2

NOTORO

(Formerly with Air Ron 6)

SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS

8th Air Group
10th Air Group
11th Air Group
12th Air Group
14th Air Group
16th Air Group
17th Air Group
18th Air Group
19th Air Group
23rd Air Group

Chichijima
Chinkai
Genzan
Hyakurihara (or Moribara)
Iwakuni
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Kashima
Kasumigaura
Kisarazu
Kure
Maizuru
Oita
Ominato
Omura
Saeki
Sasebo
Suzuka
Takao
Tateyama
Tsukuba
Usa
Yatabe
Yokosuka

TOTAL

5 AV
3 XAV
35 Air Groups

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TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SHIRETOKO
 SATE
 TSURUJI
 SHIRIYA
 IRO
 ONDO
 HAYATONO
 MARUTO
 NEMIYA
 ASHI
 AKASPI
 MUROTO
 OTOMARU
 SETTSU

Total:

3 .C
 1 .F
 2 .R
 1 .C
 1 Ice Breaker
 1 Target Ship

2690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi - Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

ASUGA
TSUGA
KURI
HASU

Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section

Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai

Nanking Base Force

Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking

TOTAL

1 OCA
1 PG
3 DD

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, or
FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KOLATSU, Teruhisa - Vice Admiral
UJI, Flagship

Patrol Division 11

ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
ATAMI
FUTAI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE

Air Group 10

Hankow Base Force

Kiukiang Base Force

Gunboat Division ??

SHINFUKU MARU (F)

HITONOSE
CHIKUBU

TOTAL

4 PG
10 PR
1 AP

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, or
SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral
ISUZU, Flagship

Cruidiv 15

ISUZU (F)
ASHIGARA

Patrol Division 14

SACA
AM-17
AM-18

Torpedo Boat Division 1

OTORI
HAYABUSA
HIKOTORI
KASASAGI

Guard Division 15

Guard Division 16

Canton Base Force

Amoy Base Force

Hainan Is. Base Force

13 Special Service Ships

TOTAL

1 CA
1 CL
4 TB
1 PG
2 AM
13 Misc.

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JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA (Cont'd)NORTH CHINA FLEET, or
THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEETSUGIYAMA, Rokoze, Vice Admiral
IWATE, FlagshipPatrol Division 12IWATE (F)
MURAI MAREUTorpedo Boat Division 11HATO
SAGI
KARI
KIJITorpedo Boat Division 21CHIDORI
MURAZURU
TOMOZURU
HATSUKARI
KARUKAYAGunboat Division 1Gunboat Division 2Gunboat Division 13Gunboat Division 14Tsingtao Base ForceSOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEETKASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMUSHU (CM)

AP

TOTAL1 OC:
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP

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(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.

1. **FOURTH FLEET**, which may be termed the **MANDATE FLEET**, apparently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle **Fourth Fleet** operating base.

2. Up to the **present** the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ - YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

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6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategic disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

<u>Identification</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Includes</u>
Airron 24	Marshall Area	(AV) KAKOI (AV?) Maru ex-CHITOSE Air Group ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group	PALAO Area	
16th Air Group	PALAO Area	
17th Air Group	TRUK	
18th Air Group	SAIPAN	
19th Air Group	MIYEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	WOTJE	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	KWAJALEIN	
? AIR GROUP	TRUK	

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total/strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62 - 268 planes.
plane

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T A B L E A (PAGE TWO)

GROUP	W. CAROLINES - PALAO, Headquarters	MARIANAS HQ - SAIPAN.	IRON-MANDATE	NON-MANDATE		ADMINS. OFFICE/HQ=O	NAVAL RADIO/HQ=O	NAVAL DEFENCE FORCE Hq. = Headquarters 4th Div. Force.	LANDING FIELD	SEAPLANE FACILITIES	AIR BASE = B	AIR TECH SECT. #2 = S/A	AIR GROUP OR AIR CORPS	PUBLIC WORKS DEPT.	CIVIL ENG. UNITS	NAVY YARD UNITS	ORDNANCE SPECIALISTS	SHORE BATTERIES = S AA BATTERIES = A	LOOKOUT TOWERS = A	CONTROL STATIONS	METEOROLOGICAL STATIONS OR FACILITIES	MUNITIONS DEPT.	SUPPLY DEPT.	BRANCH #	MILITARY POST OFFICE	ARMY TR COPS ESTIMATED NO.	FLEET ANCHORAGE	SUBMARIN BAS..
				ISLAND OR ATOLL	ATOLL																							
	ULITHI	X	JRF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	FAIS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	SOROL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	YAP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	KOROR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ARAKABESAN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	BABELTHUAP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	PELETIC	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	HELEN REEF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	TOBI (LORD NORTH)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	PAGAN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	SAIPAN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	TINIAN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ROTA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	MARCUS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	CHICHIJIMA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	HAHAJIMA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	PARACE VELA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

PASTE THIS END TO PAGE ONE (TABLE A) TO FORM ONE SHEET

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PALAO ISLANDS
(PELEW)

KAYANGEL
Is.

Rumored
Seaplane
Base under
construction.

KOSSOL PASSAGE

Fleet
Anchorage

Observation tower (or
Battery Control Sta-
tion) and Shore Bat-
tery Emplacements
under construction.
Dismantled guns re-
cently unloaded from
Transports were "Ten-
foot" barrels six-
inch bore".

Babelthuap I.
(Babeldaop)

Rumored
Fleet
Anchorage

(Ngarabesan)
Arakabesan

Korror
Is.


Barracks.

NOTE: All Lighthouses are
now undoubtedly being used
for observation posts or
Battery Control Stations.
Informant believes batteries
are emplaced near each light-
house. All are "PROHIBITED
AREAS".


PELELIU Is.

Village
3 Barracks
"Naval Base"
Seaplane - Land Plane "Base"
Barracks
Shore Batteries

Angaur I.



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MALAKAL HARBOR AND APPROACHES



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NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. Aviation Facilities - Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. Headquarters - Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bitumen and powdered coral roads.

3. Radio towers - Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. Shore Batteries - Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

Mobile Batteries - Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. Government Pier - 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. Mole - 150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner of JABOR (1933).

7. Conspicuous red building (may be red-roofed building)(1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N.B.K. or "NABO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear? -- small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings. (1936).




EXHIBIT NO. 116

Op-30C-MD
 (SC) N20-12
 Serial 07830
 Confidential

FEBRUARY 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
 Subject: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.
 Reference: ALUSNA London Dispatch 041625 of February 5, 1941.

1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

H. R. STARK.

Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC) N20-12
 Serial 09330
 Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
 To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
 Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited [2] number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

[s] H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet.
CinC Asiatic Fleet.

[1] Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC) N20-12
 Ser. 010230
 Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 February 17, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District
 The Commandant, Third Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
 The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subj: Anti-Torpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.

1. In previous correspondence, the Commandants and local joint planning committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making a study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles, especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the large fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

[2] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a Fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

cc: CinCPac
 CinC Atlantic
 CinC Asiatic

Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOrd
 Co, NavNetDep, Newport Op-12

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No.
S81-5/0398
Confidential

AT SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, Mar. 12, 1941.

From: Comander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. file Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

C-N20-12/ND14
(0250)

Confidential

20 MARCH 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO Classified ltr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: to

CINCPACIFIC
BUORD

Op-30C1-LH
(SC) N20-12
Serial 027830

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, Apr. 9, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance

Subject: Anti-Torpedo Nets

Reference:

(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 Feb. 1941

(b) O. N. I. Serial 24-41, Monograph Index Guide 603-600

1. In reference (a) the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experimental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now used by the Germans.

/s/ R. E. INGEBOLL,
Acting.

Op-30C1-AJ-5/19
 (SC) N20-12/ND14
 Serial 046230

Confidential

MAY 20, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
 Subject: Net Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.
 Reference:

- (a) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 367330 of Dec. 7, 1940.
- (b) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 375930 of Dec. 23, 1940.
- (c) CNO ltr. OP-30C Serial 18530 of Jan. 21, 1941.

1. The Commandant is directed to lay the net defenses in the Fourteenth Naval District, when the procurement of material permits, if this meets with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to expedite the procurement of the necessary material.

2. The laying of the above defenses will necessitate certain protective measures to shipping and to the nets, and will necessarily place the harbors to some extent in a situation similar to that existing under war conditions. In reference (a) the Commandant was directed to take preliminary steps to be prepared to lay the nets and to properly tend them after laying. In reference (b) an estimate of personnel necessary at the beginning of a war was submitted for information. In reference (c) the Commandants were authorized to confer with Local Coast Guard authorities concerning necessary additional navigational aids. Local regulations and instructions considered necessary for the information and control of shipping should be taken up with the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and the District Commander, U. S. Coast Guard.

3. The present standard A/T net is 30 feet in depth, which when suspended protects to a depth of 35 feet when not affected by currents. Hence, it is possible that magnetically fired torpedoes may be fired under the nets and exploded below ships berthed inside of the nets. It is suggested, therefore, that the inner of the double A/T nets be suspended as much as 15 feet in order to give necessary vertical protection where the depth of water permits torpedoes being fired under the nets and under ships berthed inside. The suspension of the inner net decreased partially the protection furnished by two nets for shallow running torpedoes. Later it may be advisable to order aprons to be secured to the present type of net.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to:
 BuOrd
 Op-12
 CinCpac

Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC) N20-12
 Serial 055730

Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
 Washington, June 13, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
 To: The Commandant, First Naval District
 The Commandant, Third Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
 The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
 Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially

for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives [2] of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to:

CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12

Op-30C1-FM
SS1-3 (410916)
Serial 470330

SEPTEMBER 16, 1941.

Restricted

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.

Reference:

(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 February 1941.

(b) Op-30C1 Serial 027730 of 9 April 1941.

(c) Alusna London ONI Report Serial 1674, Mono. Index Guide No. 910-4000 of 24 July 1941.

(d) ONI Serial 1745 Guide No. 910-4000 of 1 August 1941.

1. It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested, may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport. It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental and development work.

2. In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

3. Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the

A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to placing the ship (or ships) in a "dry-dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As such nets may desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.

4. Designs of A/T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be designed.

5. Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a torpedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of Ordnance in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar development work for the protection of ships underway at sea.

6. It is possible that in our Navy the assumption has been reached that anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures and, in general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunction with net defenses, and of the two measures of defense, the vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is not believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worthwhile to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.

7. Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to: BuShips

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

Cinpac File No.
A16/ND14/(16)
Serial 086W
Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Scp 20, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.

Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. Ltr. C-A16/H3/ND14 (0800) of August 16, 1941.

1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.

2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to progress.

4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat, assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide. Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in paragraph (3) of the reference (a) be made available to Commander Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical facilities be furnished him.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Op-30C1-HF
 (SC)N20-12/ND12
 Doc. 35904
 Serial 0101130

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 3 October 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
 To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
 Subject: A/T Net Defenses, San Francisco Bay.
 Reference: (a) Proceedings of meeting of Local Joint Planning Committee, Northern California Sector, Pacific Coastal Frontier, of September 17, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
 2. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

[S] R. E. INGERSOLL,
 Acting.

[1] PW2/A16-3/022
 Confidential

Sr.

EXHIBIT NO. 117

PATROL WING TWO
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 16 Jan. 1941.

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force.
 (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
 Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.
 Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me

that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO:

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present, the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.:

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe:

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon:

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) Outlying Bases: Wake, Johnston, Palmyra:

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway:

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General:

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

/s/ P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:

Comairscopor.

Com. 14.

N. A. S., P. H., T. H.

Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.

C. S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)

Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. INDIANOPOLIS, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Jan 21, 1941.*

First endorsement to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline

and lubricating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

/s/ ADOLPHUS ANDREWS.

Copy to:

Comairscofor Compatwing Two
Com FOURTEEN
NAS, Pearl Harbor
Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe

[1] CinC File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)
Confidential.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Jan 31, 1941.

Second endorsement to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

4. Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and one aircraft carrier group.

(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammunition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to:

Comscofor
Comairscofor
Compatwing-2
Com-14
NAS P. H.
NAS KANEHOE

Confidential

Op-23-H-KB 2/19

(SC)A16-1/PW2

Serial 015823

FEB. 27, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.

Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.

Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Subject: Patrol Wing Two—Readiness of.

Reference: (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2. In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)

(a) 1.	(a) 3.	(b) 2.	(b) 4.
(a) 2.	(a) 4.	(b) 3.	(b) 5.

3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy:

In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to:

Cincpac, Comscofor.

Comairscofor, Compatwing 2,

Com. 14, NAS Pearl.

[1] Confidential

G-A16-1/A7-3(2)/

ND14(0135)

Headquarters

Hawaiian Department

Fort Shafter, T. H.

Headquarters

14th Naval District
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

14 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

To: Officers named in par. 2, herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject, dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195)).

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13; Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April, 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and to improve the effectiveness of the defenses against hostile air attacks, the following joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:

a. Air Operations Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 a, c, and d, Reference A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in Oahu against surprise aircraft raids.

Army Members: Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC.; H. S. C. A. B.; Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA.

Navy Members: 14ND NAS Operations Officer, Lt. Comwr. H. F. Carlson; Staff, Com. AirBatFor., Comdr. M. R. Browning; Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22, Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs.

Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941

[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects, listed in subparagraph 5 b., Reference A.

Army Members: Hq. Haw. Dept.: Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy, SC; Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. C. F. Hoppough, SC; H. S. C. A. B.: Major I. H. Ritchie, CAC.

Navy Members: PatWingTwo C. O. Patron 22; Lt. Comdr. W. P. Cogswell; 14ND Communication Officer: Comdr. H. L. Thompson; Staff ComAirBatFor Communication Officer: Lt. L. J. Dow.

c. *Air-Antiaircraft Committee*: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 *e*, *f*, and *h* of Reference A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination of ship and shore antiaircraft artillery gun fire against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability of using balloon barrages in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.

Army Members: Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC; H. S. C. A. B.: Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA; Capt. M. G. Weber, CAC.

Navy Members: 14ND District Marine Officer: Col. H. K. Pickett; BatFor Gunnery Officer, USS Mississippi: Lt. Comdr. W. W. Juvenal; Asst. Air Officer, USS Yorktown: Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey.

d. *Armament Committee*: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 *g* of Reference A:

Army Members: Hq. Haw. Dept.: Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf.; Major R. McK. Smith, OD; Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. A. B. Custis, OD.

Navy Members: 14ND 10C NAD Oahu: Comdr. W. W. Meek; Staff ComAirBatFor, Gunnery: Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr.; Staff, ComPatWingTwo, Gunnery: Lt. H. P. Cooper.

[3] e. *Chemical Warfare Committee*: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices;

Army Members: Hq. Haw. Dept.: Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS; Haw. Air Force: Major M. E. Jennings, CWS; H. S. C. A. B.: Major F. T. Ostenberg, 64th CA.

Navy Members: 14ND CO Barracks Detachment: Major J. M. Smith, USMC; PatWingTwo CO Patron 21: Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris.

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committees will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. The senior officer of each committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint operation plans for defense against air attacks.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

5. All members of all committees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on other duty will assemble at 0930 seventeen February in Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter.

C. C. BLOCH

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

WALTER C. SHORT

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

COMMANDING HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Copies to:

C. G., H. A. F.

Fort Shafter, T. H.

C. G., H. S. C. A. B.

Fort DeRussy, T. H.

C. G., Schofield Barracks

CinCus

ComBatFor

ComScoFor

ComAirBatFor

ComPatWingTwo

EXHIBIT NO. 117A

SECRET

Initials: C. G.

Date: 17 Feb. 1941

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 17, 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 354.2/JAX

Subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Division,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. In a recent confidential letter of instructions to commanders of the six major echelons of the United States Fleet, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expressed the pressing necessity for maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. I am in agreement with Admiral Kimmel in his belief that much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect, but that much can now be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.

2. With above in mind and under provisions contained in Joint Control Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, 14 April 1939, joint planning representatives have been selected from echelons concerned in order that detailed plans and recommendations may be undertaken. Upon completion, plans and recommendations will have been formulated to implement the following;

a. Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject. Frequency and scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical lines.

b. Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous communication, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon Joint communication exercises.

c. Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of air control as may be necessary.

d. Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use and servicing.

[2] *e. Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization.* Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel—air, ground, and ship—with all local Navy and Army types.

f. Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Requirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of personnel and material.

g. Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.

h. Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic approaches.

i. Employment of balloon barrages, smoke and other special devices for improving defenses of Pearl Harbor.

j. High priority to increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and establishment of air warning net.

k. Effective coordination of Naval and Military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

l. Joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

m. Joint exercises, at least once weekly, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces on Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids.

3. In the joint planning enumerated herein it is directed that all echelons or individuals concerned render every possible aid and cooperative assistance to the end that maximum needs for Army-Navy joint action may be met.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 118

[1] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
 2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective.
 - (b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
 - (c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating areas, return to PEARL HARBOR.
 - (d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart ----- and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at -----; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost dispatch, report expected time of their arrival.
 - (e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
- [2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
- (b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbatfor (Com Task Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
- (c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
- (d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
- (e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

[1] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

RECOMMENDED STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).
 - (b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One. Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl.

[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(s) C. H. McMorris.

EXHIBIT NO. 119

RADIO LOG

of

BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION

7 December 1941

RADIO LOG
SECTION BASE
BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T.H.

WATCH
C.E. GIBSON SUPERVISOR
R.B. MOYLE OPERATOR

RECEIVER &
CONTROLS O.K.

FREQ. 2670 KCS. 1941 P.V.H.
DATE 7 DECEMBER 1942

1445 DZ5Y DB1L V DN3L AR
 (45) DN3L V DZ5Y K
 DZ5Y DB1L V DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY
 DB1L DZ5Y V DN3L AR
 DN3L V DZ5Y COME IN
 DN3L V DB1L K
 DZ5Y V DN3L WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K
 DZ5Y V DN3L WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE OF THE
 SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K
 1450 DN3L V DZ5Y THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT THE
 5 10 TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE
 ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
 1451 DZ5Y V DN3L R
 1456 DZ5Y V DN3L BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE
 SUB K
 DN3L V DZ5Y NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K
 DZ5Y V DN3L WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU SAW
 THE SUBMARINE K
 DN3L V DZ5Y APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY HEADING
 FOR THE ENTRANCE K
 1458 V DN3L R
 1505 DZ5Y V DN3L AR PLEASE
 DN3L V DZ5Y K
 DZ5Y V DN3L BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF YOU
 (44) HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH M
 1508 V DZ5Y R
 1524 DB1L V DZ5Y AR
 DZ5Y V DB1L K
 V DZ5Y WE ARE FINISHED K
 V DB1L R
 1525 DR7Y V DJ8A PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K
 1535 V DJ8A R
 1538 DW2X V DB1L AR
 1539 DB1L V DW2X K
 DW2X V DB1L CLEAR K
 V DW2X R
 1555 DJ8A V DR7Y AR
 DR6Y V DJ8A K
 DJ8A V DR7Y 815 FEMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID
 YOU
 DR7Y V DJ8A R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K
 1557 DJ8A V DR7Y R
 1630 DE2A V DW2X AR
 DW2X V DR9Q K
 DW2X V DN3L K
 V DZ5I K
 DE2A V DW2X Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K
 1641 V DN3L R
 V DZ5I R
 DW2X V DN3L AR
 DN3L V DW2X K
 1642 DW2X V DN3L ZCD DZ5I R AR
 1643 DN3L V DW2X R
 1647 DW2X V DZ5I AR
 1650 DW2X V DR9Q ZCE DZ5I K
 DR9Q V DZ5I ZSF K
 DZ5I V DR9Q S3 K
 DW2X V DN3L ZCE DZ5I AR
 DZ5I V DW2X K
 DW2X V DZ5I ZSF K
 V DW2X S5 K5 K
 1652 V DZ5I R
 1714 DR7Y V DJ8A HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME
 DJ8A V DR7Y YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA
 1715 DR7Y V DJ8A R

2718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

6 June 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T.H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey
Richard Wilmot Humphrey
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U.S.N.R.

This copy was certified in my presence.

Walter H. Kozacko
Walter H. Kozacko
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE
BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T.H.

WATCH

RECEIVER &
CONTROLS J.K.

G.E. GIBSON SUPERVISOR

FREQ. 2670 KCS. 1941 P.W.H.
DATE 7 DECEMBER 1942

ROB. MOYLE OPERATOR

1715 TIME OF LAST ENTRY
1721 DW2X V DN3L AR
DN3L V DW2X K
DW2X V DN3L P BT WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS
OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR
DW2X V DN3L STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES
DN3L V DW2X IMI YOUR LAST PRIORITY K
1723 DW2X V DN3L WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH
CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA
AREA AR
DW2X V DN3L DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K
V DW2X R
V DN3L STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES
V DW2X R
1727 DW2X V DN3L AR
1749 DN3L V DW2X K
DW2X V DN3L ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY AR
V DW2X R
1755 DW2X V DN3L AR
V DW2X K
DW2X V DN3L ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR
V DW2X R
1756 DJ8A V DN3L P P AR PLEASE
1803 DR9Q V DN3L ZCG DJ8A AR
AJ8A V DR9Q AR
DW2X V DN3L P AR
V DW2X K
V DN3L BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU
PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO BELIEVE
US OF SAMPAN AR
R P K
1805 V DW2X AS 1 MINUTE
V DN3L K
V DJ8A K
V DN3L BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING SAMPAN
INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE US OF
SAMPAN AR
DN3L V DW2X Z DW2X 071807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN
1810 SVDER LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQZ BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K
DR7Y V DJ8A IMI GR 1
1813 DJ8A V DR7Y GR 1 402
DR7Y V DJ8A R
MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY - - - - -
1817 DE1T V DW2X AR
1821 DN3L V DW2X AR
DW2X V DN3L K
V DW2X Z DW2X 071820 DE1T Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED
IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD AR
1826 DW2X V DN3L R
DR7Y V DJ8A R
DJ8A V DR7Y K
DR7Y V DJ8A HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK3K 071801 DR7Y GR 4 BT
PROCEED CONTACT HARBOR PATROL
DJ8A V DN3L IMI THAT EAST MESSAGE
1830 DW2X V DR6K ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DU1P
DJ8A V DN3L
1830 RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT--POWER OFF
1830 AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES

6 June 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy
of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu,
T.H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey
Richard Wilmot Humphrey
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U.S.N.R.

This copy was certified in my presence.

Walter H. Kozacko
Walter H. Kozacko
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

EXHIBIT NO. 120

[1]

KIMMEL EXHIBIT 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am forwarding to you the following information:

1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December, 1941:

Squadron	In commission	Total available for flight	Location	Under repair	Ready at base	In air
VP-11	12 PBY-5	12	Kaneohe	0	12	0
VP-12	12 PBY-5	11	Kaneohe	1	11	0
VP-14	12 PBY-5	¹ 10	Kaneohe	2	7	¹ 3
VP-21	12 PBY-3	² 11	Midway	1	4	² 7
VP-21	1 PBY-3 (spare)	1	Pearl Harbor	1	0	0
VP-21	1 PBY-3	12	Pearl Harbor	2	12	0
VP-22	14 PBY-3	12	Pearl Harbor	1	11	0
VP-24	6 PBY-5	5	Pearl Harbor	1	1	³ 4

RECAPITULATION

Squadron	In commission	Total available for flight	Under repair	Ready at base	In air
At Kaneohe	36	¹ 33	3	30	¹ 3
At Pearl	33	³ 28	5	24	³ 4
At Midway	12	² 11	1	4	² 7
Total	81	72	9	58	14

[2]

NOTES

¹ 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan (9-1). 3 planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).

² 5 planes conducting search of sector 120°-170° radius 450 miles; departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130° from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes, additional plants, armed with 2-500 pound bombs each were on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about 2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor, and searched sector 060° to 100° radius 400 miles. One plane was under repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

³ Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. Submarine.

⁴ All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

[3] 2. Material condition:

(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:

Squadron	Number planes	Arrival date	Squadron	Number planes	Arrival date
VP-11	12	28 Oct. 1941	VP-23	12	23 Nov. 1941.
VP-24	6	28 Oct 1941	VP-14	12	23 Nov. 1941.
VP-12	12	8 Nov. 1941			

(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare parts. In addition, a program for installation of leakproof tanks, armor, and modified

engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.

(c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of its planes were [4] approaching 18 months service and were due for overhaul.

(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and maintenance.

(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there were no replacements.

(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the job required. For the commander of a search group to be able to state with [5] some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, adequate spare parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations.

(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A16-3/
016
Confidential

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 1942.

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO

To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.

Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows:

24 April, 1941,	20 August, 1941,
12 May, 1941,	5 September, 1941,
13 May, 1941,	27 September, 1941,
19 June, 1941,	13 October, 1941
10 July, 1941,	27 October, 1941,
26 July, 1941,	12 November, 1941.
1 August, 1941,	

P. N. L. BELLINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF ARMY-NAVY BOARD 31 OCTOBER 1941

[1] In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas for all purposes

for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction of the Kabuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 1941 and frequently thereafter until final recommendations were submitted. Present were:

Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.
Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A.
Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.

1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy aviation activities, the available training areas, the present congestion of aircraft areas, the expected expansion of aircraft of both services in the near future with the attending operational difficulties which such expansion would produce.

2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem which confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was available as to the total number of airplanes of both services for which operating facilities should be made available. The following lists show the number of airplanes which were considered.

Navy

14th Naval District Aircraft: 84 Patrol planes, 48 VSO seaplanes.

Fleet Aircraft: 750 airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).

Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes: 75 seaplanes (approximately).

Patrol Wings One and Two: 98 Patrol planes.

[2] *Marine Aircraft Groups:* 162 airplanes

Utility Aircraft: 88 Airplanes (various types)

Total, 1305.

Army

54 Group program:

Combat Airplanes

B-17.....	170
A-20-A.....	27
P-40.....	163
P-38.....	163
C-47.....	20

Present Assignment:

Combat Airplanes

B-17.....	12
P-40.....	104
A-20-A.....	12
O-47.....	13

Obsolescent Airplanes

B-18.....	30
P-36.....	50
P-26.....	17

Total.....	781
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Air Fields Available:

Oahu

Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.

Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.

Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers, (Commercial), Barbers Point, Keeki Lagoon (commercial—under construction).

[3] *Outlying Islands—Hawaiian Archipelago*

Army: Barking Sands, Kauai; Burns Field, Kauai (Commercial—too small for bombardment airplanes); Morse Field, Hawaii; Hilo, Hawaii (Municipal Airport); Lanai (Under construction); Homestead Field, Mologai (Used jointly Army-Navy and commercial).

Navy: Maui (Navy and Commercial; Hilo (Temporary facilities patrol planes).

3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation was summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:

a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. With the imminent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft operating from Oahu, the congestion of air space for training and the shortage of suitable sites for air bases on Oahu must be recognized as becoming serious problems. Lack of suitable harbor and dock facilities in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu precludes the development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, since it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their parent vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island for the development of additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air groups. Carrier aircraft, when based on shore, must, on account of the nature of their functions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness and not definitely fixed or attached to any shore base. Nevertheless, there must be provided on shore suitable and adequate facilities for the basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely and specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore bases be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of training may be maintained. These shore bases must necessarily be located on the island of Oahu where transportation facilities are available between bases and berths of parent vessels both for transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness. In addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be available not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku Point. There is a landing strip and a dive bombing target on this area that is continually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection with training operations. If this area is given over to the Army for construction of an air base, its loss will be strongly felt even now, when congestion on Oahu is but a portion of [4] that of the future, and adjustments must be made not only for loss of the existing landing strip and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to proceed.

c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base." The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of Army Forces and Navy District Forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and continued in effecting operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of Fleet units and which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian Area, should be based on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

d. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all sites on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary fields where practicable; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will defeat operating effectiveness. In planning the above developments, due consideration should be given to providing adequate dispersion.

e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base sites on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their maximum practicable capacities. In order to carry out estimated requirements, these developments should precede or at least proceed with any further developments on Oahu. This may not be entirely practicable of accomplishment, but every effort should be made to do so. A far-sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are subordinated to and coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should be adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more difficult problem to arise at a later date.

f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is insufficient space on the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft involved, even in current plans, to base thereon at the same time. As both services are basing their requirements on the part they are expected to play in national defense, it follows that final decision as to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various alternatives on over-all national defense.

[5] 4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.

(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation.

b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of ascertaining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air fields from which pursuit aviation operates, in the performance of this mission, be situated on the Island of Oahu. Under no other condition could there be assurance that enemy aircraft could be intercepted before they reached their bomb release line. The minimum requirements of pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of airplanes at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now permanently located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at times offer an obstacle to their continuous operation. To insure that at least one group of pursuit aviation may operate without being hampered by weather conditions, it should be located at approximately sea level elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected as having the necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, removing all pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which prevails over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to the establishment of ground targets, in its immediate vicinity, which are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This still leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The nearest point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of Molokai where one gunnery range has been established.

c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A-20-A airplanes which form the support command to assist the ground forces of the Hawaiian Department in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. These airplanes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the ground troops which they serve, both for training and to facilitate their employment in time of war. The home for the support command is established at Bellows Field.

[6] d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182 heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy bombardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the Island of Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of Hickam Field, their home station, to such an extent that provisions must be made for the training of approximately one-half of this force from outlying fields on other islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago.

e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other islands in this group entails changing the defense plans for these islands that security for these bases may be established. This would require a decided increase in the number of ground troops or such a dispersion of available forces as to destroy their effectiveness. This cannot be done except at enormous expense of time and money. For this reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the large quantities of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations must be placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu. Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. While the training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas distant from the Pearl Harbor area, it would be practically impossible to control this force in

time of actual hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands. Radio is the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to interference to furnish a positive medium of control. A positive means of communication is a prime requisite for successful air operations. It must be in being and constantly used prior to the beginning of hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment aviation must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft defense, i. e., pursuit aviation anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is manifestly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the protection of the Interceptor Command.

f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the transports furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is being conducted. Supply and maintenance facilities also require the same protection from the ground and air as is required for grounded bombardment aviation.

g. In the case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with their carriers attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation as might be left behind and for all Army aviation participating in the defense of these islands. Therefore, the problem which confronts this board is to find a solution which will permit the maximum use of existing air fields for aviation training for both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be developed to increase these facilities.

[7] h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with the exception of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be available for air fields is either so occupied, projects are underway for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence in the air created by the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such development. The site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will accommodate two 5,000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handicap to the use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the congestion of the air over this part of the island. It would also remove from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch area is the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed. The principal objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it would be as a station for Army pursuit aviation. The use of this site by the Navy would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval aviation on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point, Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from these stations would be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traffic regulations which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of airplanes of the two services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area is advantageously located for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels of the carrier groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all carrier-based Naval aviation.

i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-based aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to sufficient air and ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the fact that air units in Hawaii will, within the next few months, be reinforced with pursuit and bombardment aircraft for which bases must be available now, while the additional carriers anticipated for this area will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to three years.

j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three years should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and employment of the Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they may be required for immediate use against a hostile threat.

k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier groups to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy facilities and those Navy projects which are now under development.

[8] 5. *Conclusions:*

That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to the fact that—

a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the War Department.

b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the Navy Department.

c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the estimated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy.

6. *Joint recommendations:*

a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development of an important strategical base, the board recommends:

(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as an air base.

(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for temporary use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent of availability of this base to the Navy as well as the extent of the availability to the Navy of all other Army air bases on the Island of Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority as the solution of this problem transcends the prerogatives of this board.

b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under construction.

c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be expanded or developed to maximum practicable capacities and that such developments have the same high priority as any development proposed for the Island of Oahu.

d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be developed to maximum practicable capacities at the same time avoiding the creation of an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu.

e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to operating areas be placed in force—adjustments which may become necessary, from time to time, to be accomplished by conference between local representatives.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Senior Naval Member.*

F. L. MARTIN,
*Major General, U. S. A.,
Senior Army Member.*

Confidential
17 WAR

WASHN, D. C., 210P Oct. 2, 1941

COMMANDING GENERAL

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department instructed Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September twenty six to confer with you and submit joint recommendations covering allocation aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian area stop This has War Department approval stop Navy radio stated further joint recommendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to confer on this latter matter but will be guided by instructions to you in General Marshall's letter of August nineteen.

ADAMS.
156P/2

EXHIBIT NO. 121

FACTS AND CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S RETIREMENT

FACTS ABOUT ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S RETIREMENT

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U.S.N., Commander 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,

Washington, D. C., had telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for retirement.

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me.

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, I stated in part: "I submitted this request solely to permit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment."

The approval of my request for retirement included the statement: "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court Martial at some future time.

Nav-3-HC

APRIL 24, 1942.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Retired, 280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville, N. Y.

Subject: Duty.

Reference: (a) Your letter of April 21, 1942.

1. The receipt is acknowledged of reference (a) in which you express your readiness to perform any duty which may be assigned you.

[s] RANDALL JACOBS.

Certified a true copy.

[s] H. E. KIMMEL.

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK.

21 April 1942.

Rear Admiral RANDALL JACOBS, U. S. Navy,

Bureau of Navigation,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JACOBS: Enclosed herewith is my request for any duty to which the Navy Department may see fit to assign me. I know that you and Admiral King understand my desire to do anything to help, but I believe the enclosed request should be on file to keep the record straight.

My kindest regards,

Sincerely,

[s] H. E. KIMMEL.

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK,

21 April 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

To: Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subject: Duty.

1. Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 26 January 1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the Navy Department may assign me.

[s] H. E. Kimmel,
H. E. KIMMEL.

Letter from Admiral Stark

FEBRUARY 23, 1942.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: I tried to get you by phone last night at the St. Francis where Jacobs told me you were staying, only to find out you are not registered there. I then called Johnny Greenslade, and I trust he got over to you what I wanted to say, which was particularly to clear any doubts in your mind so far as I could regarding the situation here.

Also, I should have so liked just to talk to you for a couple of minutes and, incidentally, to send you some birthday wishes, which are almost due.

It might not have just fitted to have said "Happy Birthday", but I do wish it and I also know that it will be just as happy as you will to make it, and that the measure of that happiness will be commensurate with your innermost strength.

We all have a tough year ahead amid the present clouds of uncertainty, and we all need courage that will enable us to think bravely, act wisely, and endure. I do not have to tell you that my faith in one Husband Kimmel and in the fine fiber in his innermost makeup is such that I know it will carry him through, regardless of how rough the going.

I told Kit I was going to drop you a line this morning when I had failed to reach you last night, and she said to be sure to join all her good wishes with mine to you and to Dot.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.

c/o Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade, U. S. N.

Twelfth Naval District, San Francisco, California.

22 FEBRUARY 1942.

DEAR BETTY: I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.

I understand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.

I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment.

When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.

When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short and me in such light before the public.

On February 19, I received notification by the Secretary that I would be placed on the Retired list on March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time.

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt of letters from irresponsible people over the country taking me to task and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it shows the effect on the public of articles published about me.

I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of February 16 will further inflame the public and do me a great injustice.

I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it is humanly possible.

I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen. I wish that I had been smarter than I was and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I cannot now reproach myself for any lack of effort.

I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know what I think of it. I will say in passing that I was not made an interested party or a defendant.

All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors can be published.

But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even though you may consider I erred grievously.

You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can be added to my burden.

I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship, which is a precious thing to me.

My kindest regards always.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
(Written in San Francisco, California.)

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
(2218-11-Kn)

FEBRUARY 21, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy

To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

Reference: (a) The Secretary of the Navy's letter of February 16, 1942 informing me that I will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy.

1. I hereby acknowledge the receipt of reference (a).

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

Op10-KR

FEBRUARY 21, 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: A few days ago I thought that you would have something definite before long. I am inclined to think now that this is not the case, and that for the time being at least you will just be continued on leave. I know that from your standpoint this is terribly indefinite, but I believe that if you knew all the cross-currents you would concur with this decision and that it is made with much thought regarding your own interest.

Pending something definite, there is no reason why you should not settle yourself in a quiet nook somewhere and let Old Father Time help this entire situation, which I feel he will—if for no other reason than that he always has.

I would like you to know the remark the Secretary made a day or two ago and that was:

"As for Kimmel, he has conducted himself in an exemplary fashion since this thing happened." And to which I believe the entire Navy would give a hearty "Aye, Aye!"

We realize how tough it is, but again I am counting on you to rise above it and be master of yourself in the future just as you always have been in the past.

Every good wish.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,
Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

21 FEBRUARY 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: Unless I am mistaken, you have another landmark in the near offing. May I send you some thoughts which I recall from something I once read and which is in substance:

On this occasion, instead of a wish for a happy birthday, knowing as I do that it will be just as happy as you choose to make it, and instead of wishing you the happiest year just ahead, knowing as I do that the measure of happiness will be exactly commensurate with what you, in your innermost strength, choose to make it; I wish for you, amid the clouds of uncertainty, *COURAGE*—courage that will enable you to think bravely, act wisely, and endure; courage to defend all the virtues and therefore itself, the greatest of them; courage that will steel the arm without clouding the brain; courage that can and will lift both body and mind above their present levels and capacity. Make over your own world. Let your courage be its architect. May God give you strength, wisdom, balance, courage, and hope.

Affectionately,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*,
c/o Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade.

[First endorsement]

FEBRUARY 17, 1942.

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Twelfth Naval District.
Via: The Commandant.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

1. Forwarded.

/s/ RANDALL JACOBS

[Second endorsement]

ON LETTER FROM SECNAV. DATED FEB. 16, 1942, TO REAR ADM. H. E. KIMMEL

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

1. Delivered, February 19, 1942 at 11:05 A. M.

/s/ J. W. Greenslade.
J. W. GREENSLADE.

Certified a true copy:

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
WASHINGTON, February 16, 1942.

From: The Secretary of the Navy:
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

Reference: (a) Your request for retirement, dated January 26, 1942.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 381 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.

2. This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

Certified a true copy:

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2208-11-Kn)

JANUARY 28, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: My Request for Retirement.

Reference: (A) My ltr. to the Secretary of the Navy of 26 January 1942 requesting retirement under the provisions of Article 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short had requested retirement.

2. I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.

3. I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

Op-10 Hu

27 JANUARY 1942.

DEAR KIMMEL: Yesterday Jacobs called up directing Greenslade to continue you on leave.

Our feeling here is that until definite action is taken regarding your future orders, it is better for you not to return to any temporary duty. We also think that it would be well for the two Secretaries to confer before any final action is taken and at the moment Colonel Knox is out of the City and will not be back until Thursday.

I showed the Secretary and the President your splendid letter stating that you were not to be considered and that only the country should be considered.

Marshall informed me yesterday while we were talking over the situation, that Short had submitted a request for retirement. We all thought this information would be of interest to you and Jacobs sent it on to Greenslade. I do not want you in any sense to consider the transmission of this information as request on you by the Department to follow suit. We do not desire to influence your initiative in any way. If and when we have any definite recommendations—suggestions—we will definitely say so.

I do want you to know that we will try and solve the problem on the basis of your letter—"whatever is best for the country"; that is about all I can say.

That you are sitting on a question mark hoping for something definite at the earliest possible moment, we realize and I can assure you you are very much in our thoughts.

Every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
c/o Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade,
12th Naval District.

P. S. The information about Short is confidential. I do not know what action will be taken on his request.

Copy to Adm. Jacobs.

KIMMEL, HUSBAND E.
Rear Admiral, USN
 (2207-00-Kn)

JANUARY 26, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
 To: The Secretary of the Navy
 Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty one years and eight months service in the United States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

/s/ H. E. Kimmel
 HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.

[First Endorsement]

JANUARY 27, 1942.

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco, California.
 To: The Secretary of the Navy.
 Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. Forwarded.

J. W. GREENSLADE.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu

29 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Just received your note of 24 December 1941.

You certainly are entitled to a short leave and shall have it.

Don't worry about our finding duty for you. I value your services just as much as I ever did and more and I say this straight from the heart as well as the head.

If there is any way in which I can help you when you arrive here, call on Kit and me at once.

We had a great and wonderful surprise yesterday when Kewpie called up from San Francisco. The head of the concern her husband works for had informed me they were going to close their business out in Honolulu so it was a joy that transportation was made available for them and I have just dropped Admiral Bloch a line telling him of our appreciation.

Every good wish in the wide world as always and with the admonition of the old Irishman who said "if you can't be cheerful, be as cheerful as you can."

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu
 Ser. #9

17 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I want you to know how deeply I feel for you.

I am not going to tell you the developments here. Nimitz can.

Tell the Gang for me that it is almost superfluous for me to say that regardless of their personal feelings, I know in a time like this, they will give Nimitz all the support they have in every ounce and fiber of their makeup.

Suffice it to say that what is happening had never even occurred to Nimitz, but like a good soldier he is obeying orders.

I wish there were something I could do for you, both officially and personally, but I know you will keep your chin up regardless.

My best to all hands and good luck.

Sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

P. S. King is here and echoes what I have to say.
Copy to Adm. Nimitz.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

HRS/hu
#8

11 DECEMBER 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: I am enclosing a page from the Congressional Record covering the remarks of Congressman Jimmie Van Zandt. Thought it might be of interest to you.

Keep cheerful.

Good luck.

We'll fight it out.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL STARK

In reply refer to Initials and No. #7.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL: We are feeling for you just as hard as we can in just what you have been through and are biding our time until you can send us some details which are eagerly awaited. We did not want to bother you while you were applying first aid but will welcome news as soon as you can get some for us.

Hundreds of telegrams and messages are being received from the families of ships and we know that as soon as you can you will start sending us a list so that we may acquaint them with the facts.

I dropped Admiral Bloch a line and will just repeat what I told him that I am not going to bother you now knowing that you will give us reports as soon as you can.

Very good wishes from all.

Sincerely,

HAROLD R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. N.

P. S. Send us your needs and we will do everything we can to assist in any way we can.

EXHIBIT NO. 122

CinCPac File No.
A16-3/AD/(11)
Serial 1836

(Es)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Aug. 16, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Subject: Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
Reference: (a) CG, Hawaiian Dept. ltr. File SIG. 676.3 AWS of 5 August 1941.

1. In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, the Communication Officer of my Staff, has been assigned to that duty.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com FOURTEEN (with copy of ref.)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 August 1941.

SIG.676.3 AWS

Subject: Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. The Army's Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months.

2. The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans for a similar system of their own, it seems greatly to the interest of both services to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be highly cumulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation greatly enhanced.

3. Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer between your Headquarters and mine.

(S) WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

S-S67/RADAR
ND14(0576)
Secret

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
19 June 1941.

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Combined Communication Training.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A. to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (SECRET) dated 12 June 1941.

1. There is forwarded herewith enclosure (A) for such action as you may care to take.

(S) C. C. BLOCH.

Secret

12 JUNE 1941.

Rear Admiral C. C. BLOCH, USN,
*Commandant 14th Naval District,
 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

MY DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: AS you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone to sea on cruises on board the CALIFORNIA, CHICAGO, CHESTER, and PENSACOLA. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and experience in the operation of RADAR equipment, preparing them for the operation of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated with the fleet personnel.

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equipment shortly after it has been placed in operation.

Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other Naval Commanders concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both services should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service Personnel.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 123

Naval Message
 Drafter ND14/N3-1 (Y&D)
 From OPNAV
 Released by H. R. STARK
 Date 15 OCT. 1941
 Navy Department
 COMFOURTEEN
 CINPAC

152227 OCT. 1941 NCR 425

URDIS 140400 to BUDOCKS X Request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activities of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X Comment with recommendations including location and estimates of cost requested

(This is a copy made from microfilm records) 10/ July 45
 Confidential

[1] C-A16/A&N/ND14
(01171)

Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

Fourteenth Naval District
and
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Combined Operating Center, Army and Navy.

References:

- (a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.
- (b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29 October 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).

1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R.N., who gave his views on this subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; his comments in connection therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Aliamanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived therefrom.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

[2] 6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post; this is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air Corps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.

7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Headquarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.

8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What should be done later in connection with a combined operating center can best be determined by actual experience.

(Signed) C. C. BLOCH.

Advance copy to:
Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).

[1] Confidential

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.

Admiral C. C. BLOCH,
*Commandant, 14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21, 1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined operating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.

While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same structure. The Different elements have distinct missions, and while it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.

The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Aliamannu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of Aliamannu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, anti-aircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter. Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrangements can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.

[2] It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, consideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located in the Aliamannu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post, and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,
*Lieutenant General, U. S. ARMY,
Commanding.*

[1] CinC File No. A1/A&N/ (18).
 Serial 01810
 Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

My
 PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

1st Endorsement on Com-14 C-A16-1 A&N/ND14 (01171) dated Nov. 3, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.

2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the following:

(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of orders and information.

(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.

(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.

(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication system were damaged or destroyed.

(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post—with the post necessarily in an inactive area.

(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.

5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph (1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without further delay.

(Signed) H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-7-My
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0134212

Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 18, 1941.

FIRST MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, War Plants Division.
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Via: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as desired.

2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers, comment, and recommendations be returned.

(Signed) R. K. TURNER.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-14/LJH
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 01114

Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 6, 1941.

SECOND MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded.

2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme command is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.

3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel duties, and command of local units of their respective over-all commands, will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.

4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.

5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops, respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local duties and routine.

(Signed) S. L. HOOPER.

Op-12B-7-Br

2669

CNO

Commanders all

Naval Coastal

Frontiers less

Philippine

CinCpac

CinClant

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

It is essential that joint operations centers be established in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors in which joint operations are being or likely to be carried on X Request funds by despatch if required X Immediate action directed X A similar directive is being issued by the Chief of Staff US Army X Consult Army authorities.

Copy to:

BuAero

BuNav

BuShips

BuDocks

Army WP Division

Confidential Top Secret

Com 14

OPNAV

29 December 1941

1731/29

Greenman

V Tucker

291535 CR0190

13545

RRRRRRR

Propose to temporarily set up joint center in Army tunnels Aliamanu Comgen and Com 14 agree this unsatisfactory and recommend bombproof building to be placed in deep gulch near Salt Lake in which center Army Navy Cincpac can be properly accommodated. Estimate for building utilities and for lease of land later. Your 182010 Cincpac concurs and has this.

Distribution

12

10/11 BUAER BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS ARMY 38N 13 38

20OP FILE FILE

Confidential Top Secret

29:535

COM 14 OPNAV

30 December 1941

CINPAC

Slade

Slade

292120 CR 0348

13 KCS

RRRR

RRRR

Mydis 291535 Salt Lake center primarily for Army and COM 14. CINPAC to be provided for at new SITE near Makalapa as substituted for subbase site.

Action

10/11 13 38 38W BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS FILE FILE: 20-OP

COS Army

Confidential Top Secret

292120

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30C-DG
(SC) A16-3 (9)
Doc. 37746

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, December 31, 1941.

MEMO FOR CAPTAIN READ

Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to CNO via Cincpac C-A16-1/A&N/N14 01171 of 11-3-41)

1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now does, I am returning this informally.

2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed the boat".

(Signed) R. W. CARY,
Room 1066.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

(Du-Et)

Op-12B-6
(SC) A16-3 (9)
Doc. 37746
Serial 01212

Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
7 January 1942, Washington.

Fourth Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director, War Plans Division.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Combined operating center for Army and Navy.

References:

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
- (b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December 1941.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

(Signed) R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:

Op-12B
Op-14
Op-30

EXHIBIT NO. 123A

JAN. 10, 1942.

Confidential Memorandum

From: The Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans).
 To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
 Subject: Joint Operations Centers.

Enclosure: (A) Letter on above subject to be signed by the Commander in Chief.

1. As a result of negotiations with the Army through the War Plans Division, a joint letter on Joint Operations Centers for Coastal Frontiers was agreed on, and the joint letter had been signed on December 6 by the Chief of Naval Operations but was awaiting signature of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on December 7.

2. The letter was revised to conform to current directives and conditions and was signed by both Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on December 31, 1941.

3. It is recommended that the joint letter be promulgated by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, by means of the attached letter, enclosure (A), herewith submitted for signature.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:
 CNO
 F12Z-6

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Jan. 10, 1942. Route to 30. Op File No. (SC) A16-3 (9), Doc. No. 41197.

Cominch File FF1/A16-3 (9)
 Serial 014
 Confidential

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
 UNITED STATES FLEET, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Washington, D. C., January 10, 1942.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
 To: Commanders all Naval Coastal Frontiers, less Philippine.
 Subject: Joint Operations Centers.
 Reference: (a) Joint letter of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, of December 31, 1941, on Joint Operations Centers.
 Enclosure: (A) Copy of Reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information and guidance.

(S) E. J. King
 (T) E. J. KING.
 (S) C. B. Lanman
 (T) C. B. LANMAN,
 Acting Flag Secretary.

Copy to:
 Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
 Chief of Naval Operations (10 copies)
 CinCpac
 CinClant
 Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Jan. 14, 1942. Route to: 10-11. Op. File No. (SC) A-16-3 (9). Copy No. 1 of 10.

[1] Confidential

Dec. 31, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander; North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.Subject: Cooperation in Joint Defense; formation of Joint Operations Centers
in Coastal Frontiers.

References:

- (a) Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).
- (b) Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.
- (c) CNO and Chief of Staff's joint letter quoted in CNO confidential file Op-22-A2 (SC) A16-3 (9), Serial 0115422 of October 23, 1941, subject: "Joint Army and Navy Training" and in AG 354.2 (10-3-41) dated October 17, 1941, subject: "Joint Army and Navy Training".
- (d) CNO despatch 182010 of December 1941.
- (e) Adjutant General's message AG 370.26 of December 19, 1941.

1. Operations during the present war have demonstrated the value of close personal contact of the commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Forces engaged in a given theater of war. In nearly all cases the combatant forces which have had such close personal contact or complete unity of command have been successful.

2. Present instructions for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a), provide for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a), provide for mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy at all times, and for unity of command in certain contingencies by joint agreement or when directed by the President. Instructions regarding joint planning are contained in references (a), (b), and (c).

[2] 3. The ideal method of obtaining close personal contact between Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders on shore is through the use of a joint operations center for each Frontier and subdivision of the Frontier. Commendable progress in approaching this ideal has been made in the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, where a "Joint Operations Office" has been established, and in various Coastal Frontiers where joint Harbor Entrance Control Posts have been placed in operation. A layout plan showing one of these centers is enclosed for your information.

4. The recent joint directive of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, reference (c), provided for a joint training program in the Coastal Frontiers. Actual joint operations, as required by this directive, were expected to indicate existing deficiencies of joint organization and planning and to point the way towards improvement in joint military efficiency.

5. The establishment of Joint Operations Centers in Coastal Frontiers, sectors, and sub-sectors where joint operations are being carried on or are likely to be carried on has been directed by references (d) and (c). Early completion of these operations centers is desired.

(S) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

(S) H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Inclosure: Copy of Comdr. North Atlantic N. C. F. serial 539 of December 13, 1941, with enclosures thereto.

[1] Op-22-A2
 (SC) A16-3(9)
 Serial 0115422
 Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT, (hw)
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, October 23, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
 The Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training.

1. The Following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (serial 704), subject: Joint Army and Navy Training, for necessary action:

"From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and
 The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

"To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
 Chief of the Army Air Forces.
 Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.
 Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.
 Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
 Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
 Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
 Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
 Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

"Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training

[2] Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).

"1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training of army field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of the major portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is not practicable at this time.

"3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expeditions employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second Division, U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division, U. S. Army, and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar joint training for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and the Navy Departments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will be accomplished by the assembly of a Task Force.

"4. A large field for joint training exists in the coordinate operations required between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might involve:

"(a) Joint air defense operations, both for attack and defense, including operations of anti-aircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.

"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, including ground, sea, and air.

"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol, and the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor. The cooperation of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be obtained.

"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy posts and stations; exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention of damage by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense installations; [3] and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.

"5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their subsidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground, sea and air forces required in defense of the Coastal Frontiers. Based upon these plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are likely to occur and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training exercises shall be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint communications. To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures provided by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training exercises, where necessary, which place them in a higher category of defense than that prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alternate command in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of the exercises under the principle of mutual cooperation.

"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly. It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication personnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"7. It is desired that:

"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier, Joint Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives contained in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, and in accordance with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.

"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this letter, the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Commanding Generals of [4] the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program of minor joint exercises.

"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.

"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph 119.b., Chapter VII, Section II of reference (a).

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

/S/ H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ R. M. Griffin
/T/ R. M. GRIFFIN,
By direction.

Copy to:

CinCPac
CinCLant
CinCAF
Op-12
Op-20
Op-30
Op-38

Confidential
AG 354.21 (10-3-41) MC-E-M

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, October 17, 1941.

Subject: J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704)—Joint Army and Navy Training.

To: The Chief of Staff, GHQ;

The Chief of the Army Air Forces;

The Commanding Generals, Northeast, Southern, Western and Caribbean Defense Commands; U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; and Hawaiian Department.

Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Oct. 20, 1941. Route to: 12 Op File No. (SC) P-11-1 (A&N). Doc. No. 36793. Copy No. 1 of 1.

The following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704), subject: Joint Army and Navy Training, for necessary action:

"The following joint letter is furnished you for necessary action:

"From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

"To: The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.

Chief of the Army Air Forces.

Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.

Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.

Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

"Subject: Joint Army and Navy Training.

"Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).

[2] "1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training of army field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of the major portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is not practicable at this time.

"3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expeditions employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second Division, U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division, U. S. Army, and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar joint training for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and Navy Departments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will be accomplished by the assembly of a Task Force.

"4. A large field for joint training exists in the coordinate operations required between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might involve:

"(a) Joint air defense operations, both for attack and defense, including operations of anti-aircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.

"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, including ground, sea, and air.

"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol, and the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor. The cooperation of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be obtained.

"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy posts and stations; exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention of damage by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense installations; and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.

"5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their subsidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground, sea and air forces required in defense of the Coastal Frontiers. Based upon these plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are [3] likely to occur and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training exercises shall be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint communications. To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures provided by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training exercises, where necessary, which place them in a higher category of defense than that prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alternate command in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of the exercises under the principle of mutual cooperation.

"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly. It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication personnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent compatible with other urgent preparations for war.

"7. It is desired that:

"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier, Joint Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives contained in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5*, and in accordance with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.

"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this letter, the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Commanding Generals of the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program of minor joint exercises.

"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.

"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph 119.b., Chapter VII, Section II of reference (a).

/S/ H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff."

[4] * Sufficient information to carry out this directive is contained in WPD WDOP-R5-41 and WPD WDCP-R5-41. However, Joint Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 is undergoing revision and a copy will be sent to you in the near future.

By order of the Secretary of War :

/S/ E. S. ADAMS,
Major General
The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished :

The Chief of Coast Artillery ;
The Chief Signal Officer ;
The Divisions of the War Department General Staff ;
The Chief of Naval Operations.

EXHIBIT NO. 124

SECRET

From: Washington (Nemura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

#709 (Part 1 of 5)

At half past four the afternoon of the 18th, I had a private and secret interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). The President, opening his remarks by saying that he had spent some few days enjoying life at sea, remarked that sailing was fine, and little fog had been encountered to mar the pleasure of the voyage. He went on to say that he sailed on his yacht, transferred to a warship, and then kept a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then, speaking as though there were many advocates of war, he took up the business of the interview and, holding notes in his hand, he said, "The Secretary of State, you, and I are continuing our efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else is." I said, "There are many among the third powers who desire war in the Pacific." He affirmed this, and continued by saying, "The United States, Britain, and probably the Soviet too, hope for peace in the Pacific. But there are not many others who desire it."

21230

ARMY

SECRET

trans. 8/20/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Memora)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941.
Purple (CA)

#709.

(Part 2 of 5)

After joking about "our German friend" who maintains no warships in the Pacific, the President said, "Neither you, the Secretary of State, nor I, have come up through the diplomatic ranks and, therefore, do not observe diplomatic conventions. What we have here is not in the form of a diplomatic document, nor is it in the form of an aide memoire but is merely what we want to say." Having said this, he read in a clear-cut, spirited manner the material which I incorporated into my #707^a and then said, "I have no desire to put these things in writing." Yet he seemed to be of the opinion that it should be expressed in writing.

Bearing in mind your instructions

a - Not available.

ARMY

21231

SECRET

Trans. 8-20-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (YO)

#709 (Part 3 of 5^a)

I expressed myself on the following points:

ITEM - The Japanese Government is sincere in its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japan-American diplomatic relations.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince KONOE.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of informal conversations being realized in the near future along lines of conversations of the past few months.

ITEM - The Japanese Government, having already expressed its various opinions with regard to the French Indo-China question to the Secretary of State, feels that no additional explanations are necessary.

ITEM - The Japanese Government wishes to advise that Prince KONOE is willing for an exchange of opinions along general lines from the viewpoint of world peace.

ITEM - The Japanese Government has every expectation that the finest statesmanship will be exercised by the United States Government. The Japanese Government will reciprocate in like manner.

I went on to say: "We have every confidence in your exemplary statesmanship and your ability to settle matters." The President listened closely to my remarks. Holding the Memoire outlined in my #708^b in his hand, he said: "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to

ARMY

Page 1
SECRET

SECRET

Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."

a - For part 4 see S.I.S. #21178

B - Not available.

21232

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/30/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 August 18, 1941.
 Purple. (CA) Urgent.

#709. (Part 4 of 5)^a

The President said: "The Japanese Prime Minister has (never?) been either to (this city?) nor to Seattle. How about Juneau? (It seems to me that he was once in Alaska (visiting?) Sitka^b, though I am not sure.) How many days would it take from Japan?"

I replied: "About ten days. I believe."

"How about the middle of (?)?"

I replied: "I think it would be all right up until about that time."

Then he continued by saying: "For these reasons I have made a few changes in this paper." He then explained that it is merely for geographical reasons that he had stricken out the word "President" from the original text in which it was stated that the President himself would be present, and he read the paper to me. He added the remark: "It is not that I welcome the 'closed door' such as we have today, but, since we have been forced to it by Japan's actions, there is only one country that can open the door. This time it's Japan's turn." He changed his subject to that of French Indo China, stating that an official representing the Secretary of State was -----.

a - Parts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of 5 are not available.

b - District, Alaska, W. Coast of Baronef Island.

ARMY

21178

SECRET

Trans. 8-19-41 (3)

SECRET

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

#709 (Part 5 of 5)

The President from beginning to end maintained an extremely tactful attitude and received me with kindness. (I got the impression that he was undoubtedly thrilled at the reception given by the British people to the joint British-American peace terms which he had succeeded in getting from CHURCHILL in his conversations with him during the past few days. (Unlike the independent declaration by the American Government in Wilson's Fourteen Points, this time, because of the insistence of the United States, joint peace terms by England and America were achieved.) In addition, some 14 or 15 days of life at sea, which he likes so well, have left him in the best of spirits.) Furthermore, the Secretary of State when we parted asked me to call any time that I so desired. The China question, being a separate problem, was not referred to at all in our conversations today.

During the course of our conversations, the President casually mentioned by name Postmaster General WALKER as being ardently endeavoring to bring about Japanese-American good will and, with regard to the early realization of the suggested interview, it seems that he had spoken in its favor.

With regard to our conversations of this day, I shall make a full report of my humble opinions separately.

21233

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

From: Washington (Komura).
 To : Tokyo.
 19 August 1941
 (Purple)

#719 (in 2 parts, complete).

The fact that upon his return to the capital on Sunday, the President wished to see me before any other person, with the exception of the Secretary of State with whom he talked for several hours, clearly indicates the graveness with which he views Japanese-U.S. relations. It is apparent that the note contained in my message #707* was prepared in advance of the President's return. I have already reported that while reading the note, the President interrupted himself on several occasions to make minor and major comments thereon.

The note with I relayed to you as my message #708**, on the other hand, seemed to contain much that was the President's own attitude and opinion. From that, it seems as if the President was inclined to be in favor of our proposal on certain conditions.

However, when I said that the matter depended entirely on the President's statesmanship, he replied that the United States was not in favor of the "closed door" and that it was Japan's turn to figure out ways and means of opening it.

The impression I got throughout my talks with him was that he harbored other desires. There is no room for doubt, however, that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, the President is fearful of the dangers of the United States being drawn into a war in the Far East. Apparently, he believes that there is a 50-50 chance that Japan will attempt further aggression.

It is true that by our proposal that talks be held between the leaders of the two countries, the attitude of the U.S. Government has been considerably eased. However, it is of the utmost importance that this matter be kept strictly secret for if it should once leak out, attempts will be made from every direction to destroy the project. I feel above all else that it is essential that a strict secrecy be maintained in Japan, also.

We, too, are giving this matter our careful attention and study, and should we stumble on to some good

JD-1: 12

(continued) (L) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ideas, we shall report them to you for whatever value they may have.

*JD-1: 4672.

**JD-1: 4696 and 4713.

21242

JD-1:

(D) N. v. M. S. 8-22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (LA)

#722.

(Part 1 of 2)

During my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The President has a broad-minded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese. In his past speeches and in his recent statement he has never referred to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference and replied to you. This is an unprecedented thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question; whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment."

Trans. 8-21-41 (7)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From Washington, D.C.,
August 20, 1941
Purple (1A)

722 (Part 2 of 2)

"and when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if
in fact leaks out there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be
made, but if the conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained
in the Pacific, the people will for the first time ----- since
I myself had endeavored in the same direction, the success would make
me feel that life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of tell-
ing whether the President will continue to take such an open-hearted
attitude in the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to
successfully settle this question."

21274

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/21/41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nemura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#723. Part 1 of 2.

It seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier FONOYE depending on circumstances (my #722^a). It is not hard to imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worse. It is well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of the concrete points until some future date - - - - - and show that there is nothing that would conflict with - - - - - and I think it is imperative that we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which have been disrupted.

From this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (- - - #724^a). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire them later. This

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ARMY

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SECRET

proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by the United States Government.

a - See S.I.S. #21273 and #21274.

b - See S.I.S. #21350 to #21356 inclusive - text of Nomura's proposal.

Trans. 8/25/41 (X)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#723. Part 2 of 2.

It explains the immutable policy of our government based on the important statements by Prime Minister KONOYE and Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA and MATSUOKA and attempts to correct misunderstandings regarding this policy. I believe that since it is limited to those points included in the American proposal, it would be accepted as a sufficient statement and is within the possibility of the United States giving it careful consideration. Of course, it is not wise to refer to those points which the President had not taken up. This is only a convenient method for opening Japanese-American negotiations and is not of a nature that could be proclaimed to the world as Japan's national policy.

I would like to have this proposal considered by the Foreign Office bearing in mind the points I have mentioned above. If the Japanese Government is determined to adjust Japanese-American relations, this is the time. Losing this opportunity, there will be no other that we can take. If the meeting is to take place about the middle of September, as the President has suggested, there is left for preliminary negotiations less than two months, in fact a little more than a month. Besides, if the meeting is really to take place, it would be necessary to

Page 1

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ARMY

21419

SECRET

have a ship ready and to select those who will accompany the
part. For these reasons I urge that you decide on this
matter quickly.

SECRET

ARMY

SECRET Trans. 8/25/41 (X)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941.
 Purple. (English text)

4724. (Part 1 of 7)

To be handled in Government code.

Strictly confidential.

Reference is made to the communication conveyed, on August 17th, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

The Government of the United States contemplates and anticipates circumstances and measures considered as incidental to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international tension, it is difficult to ascertain whether an event is a cause or a consequence.

Accordingly, not unlike the press in Japan, much news and editorial comment in the United States has forecasted the general approach as the outcome of American-British policy to the war in the Pacific. Speculations have been made by the press to indicate that, with the assistance of Russia, Japan would be deprived of natural resources and opportunity in the East Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States had taken her own course which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing friendly procedure at variance with our then current public conversations.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 41-41-11

SECRET

From Washington (Nomura)
 To Tokyo
 August 2, 1941.
 (Purple. English text)

2724. (Part 2 of 7)

The Government of the United States considers that certain of its actions vis-a-vis Japan have been only counter-measures to policies and procedures prejudicial to American interests and principles. On the other hand, the Government of Japan considers that its own actions have been dictated by considerations responsive to hazards, circumstantial and political, affecting the national sufficiency and protection of Japan.

It is quite conceivable that both Governments are right.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed, frequently, unswears that the words of policy are weighted with the immense power of America's natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the way of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nationals, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, so long as they lack that assuagement of possible threat (so convincingly eliminated from South America by the good neighbor policy) there will be some, geographically less well endowed and, by nature, poor in essential resources, who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text)

#724

(Part 3 of 7)

It is not, therefore, surprising that temporary measures taken by the Government of Japan for the protection of its own equitable and necessary supply of living commodities, should be interpreted, though never so intended nor operated, prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials.

Equally, it is not surprising that, lacking such guarantees as are mentioned in the communication of August 17th, and in default of a consummated understanding with the United States, the Government of Japan felt compelled by current conditions to take certain measures of precautionary defense.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan appreciates that, having indicated difficulties, the Government of the United States now encourages an exchange of basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area.

For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation - the Government of Japan would be proud to make sacrifices.

ARMY

21352

SECRET

Trans. 8/22/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Text)

. 724 (To be handled in government code.) Part 4 of 7.

The government of Japan, with lively appreciation, endorses as its own, without qualification, the recent "program attainable by peaceful methods". As outlined in the communication of August 17, 1941, the program is such as has long been desired and sought by Japan.

The government of Japan desires, for itself and all others, the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The government of Japan desires to make possible for itself and all countries, access to raw materials and to all of her essential commodities. The government of Japan desires cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis, for the utilization of available resources of capital, technical skillfull, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own but also the economy of regions where the productive and distributive capacities can be improved, in such manner that for the nations and peoples concerned, purchasing power will be increased, living standards raised and conditions conducive to peace will be created.

ARMY

SECRET Trans. 5/22/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Komura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Text)

#724

(Part 5 of 7)

(To be handled in Government Code)

If such a program, based upon peaceful and constructive principles, is adopted for the Pacific and if, thereafter, any of the countries or areas in the Pacific were menaced, the Government of Japan would cooperate with the other nations in extending assistance to any nation so threatened. The Government of Japan believes that such a program if faithfully carried out, with the consideration for the relative conditions of the various nations, would preclude the extension, by any one country, of political or military control to attain economic right of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, it is expected that the Government of the United States will use its great influence to see that all countries are given fair and guaranteed share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies, and at a fair price.

Moreover, the Government of Japan rejects any intention of territorial aggrandizement or exploitation of other peoples. It desires the orderly establishment of effective, responsible, independent sovereignty in a united aim. It desires the political inviolability of all Pacific nations.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/21/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Memura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941.
 Purple.

#724. To be handled in Government Code.

(part 1 of 7)

The government of Japan does not desire, unless forced thereto by political or economic aggression, that the East Asian region should be cut away from a world economy of equitable and peaceful processes, but it does desire that the principle of non-discrimination should be operative and exercised by other nations, no less than by Japan, for both citizenry and commerce. The government of Japan has sought to express, in its international procedures, the cultural and ethical ideals of peace and harmony which are part of Japanese national culture. Japan participated in the League of Nations and cooperated in various disarmament conferences. But multiple events of world turmoil -- of discrimination -- of boycott and barriers -- of personal indignities and attack, motivated the governments, responsible for the welfare of the Japanese people, to take certain counter measures which they would have preferred to avoid. Some of these measures, whether faction or alliance, were interpreted as aggressive.

The government of Japan has no intention and no alliance and no policy of aggression. The government of Japan conceives its people as members of the family of nations, each of whom ought to live, and let live, under the common bond of brotherhood and just tolerance.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. -22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text) Urgent

#724

(Part 7 of 7)

We consider that the natural position and circumstances of Japan and her people is not incomparable to that of Britain; and the deprivation of economic opportunity by boycott and discrimination are measures against which, not less than against military attack, the precepts of national security and honor require resistance. It is this policy of resistance, extended to armed conflict, that has been interpreted by some as aggressive.

But, the Government of Japan prefers a policy of cooperation and desires to sincerely respond to the cordial, penetrating proposals of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State by the rapid conclusion of our informally negotiated, and almost completed, understanding. The meeting of the responsible head of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be insisted with the date of that meeting.

It is with great good will that the Government of Japan anticipates the complete resumption of the historic friendship with the United States.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 7/22/41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
21 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

?

- - - (Preamble and first couple of lines missed).

- - - in view of this request (the said Ambassador notified me, also, on the 15th), I had the various circles concerned make investigations, I said. I went on to say that we are trying to dispose of the matter in accordance with the desires expressed by the United States and that I was certain that I would be able to submit a reply to him at an early opportunity.

Then, on condition that he keep it strictly confidential and "off the record" I talked to him for over two hours concerning the letter contained in my message #452*. I pointed out to him, in accordance with the lines contained in my previous messages, the absolute necessity of displaying some real statesmanship if we are to surmount the crisis which now confronts us.

So saying, I strongly urged that the proposed talks take place. I added that since he had worked so tirelessly during the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.S. friendship, I was counting on his services in the promotion of these talks.

The above is for your information.

JD-1: 4380. Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Prince Konoe for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

4040

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington.
 To : Tokyo.
 21 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#725

According to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722*, there are indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the note which I sent to you as my message #708**, was composed by the President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated points in the composition of our reply and instead gave it in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724***. Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal integrities and attack" as it appears in section 18, to, simply, "circumstances in the recent pact". I also feel that it is essential that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.

*JD-1: 4695. Nomura reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with Tokyo) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.

**JD-1: 4696. Text of memorandum handed to G. Nomura by the President.

***JD-1: 4735. Text of G. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note.

21 Aug 41

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
 To : Washington.
 23 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#495

(Strictly Confidential)

According to newspaper reports, it is alleged that a British-U.S.-Soviet conference will be held early in September. This comes at the same time as the reports that the United States is shipping goods to aid the Soviet Union, which in many respects confirms the already existing rumors of "encirclement". Under these circumstances, if the proposed talks between the leaders of Japan and the United States comes subsequent to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general impression would be that Japan had given in in the face of the threat of "encirclement".

We are, therefore, doing everything in our power to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the "leaders conference" at an earlier date. Under these circumstances, will you please exert as much effort as possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please draw the United States' attention again to the matter contained in the last part of my message #487.*

*JD-1: 4694. Tokyo's intentions regarding her northern policy are outlined to A. b. Nomura for his information, with the request that should the U.S. question the increase of Jap troops in the North, it should be explained as a precautionary measure taken to offset dangers that might arise from a Soviet defeat and subsequent political confusion in Eastern Russia. Also, that should the U.S. ship vital materials to Russia via Japanese coastal waters, it would provoke the feelings of the Japanese people and have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting U.S.-Japanese relations.

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
23 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#739

I called on Secretary Hull again at 5 o'clock this (Saturday) afternoon, and in accordance with the contents of your message #425 (?)*, reported that Japan was prepared to make an early reply and at the same time to hold the "leader's conference" at an earlier date than previously proposed. As you instructed, I requested that the Moscow conference be delayed and the proposed material aid to the Soviet Union be withheld for the time being.

The Secretary made no comment with regard to the first part. With regard to the second portion of my statement, he again - as he did this morning - pointed to the Japanese-U.S.S.R. Neutrality Pact.

He did assure me, however, that my statement would be relayed to the President. According to reports - - - - - the President has made inquiries as to whether Japan's reply had arrived or not. In my opinion, the President is the one who shows the most interest in the "leader's conference".

*JD-1: 4769. Tokyo wires Washington that every effort is being made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.

21465

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-26-41 (2)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
25 August 1941
(Purple)

Unnumbered

To Chief of Telegraph Section, from
Iguchi*.

We are expecting your reply concerning
revisions in U.S.-Japanese relations within a very few days.
Will you please insert the one word "SABURA" in plain language
at the beginning of that message when it is dispatched so that
we may decode it without loss of time.

Sadao Iguchi - Counselor.

2158.

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#501

Re your #707^a and 708^a.

This is a matter of great gravity and the Premier is eager concerning these conversations. Therefore, I am wiring you under this date, message #502 containing a message from the Premier to the President and in #503 the reply of the Imperial Government, (in which connection see also #504.)

Will you please go and report them immediately to both the President and the Secretary of State.

a - For 707 see S.I.S. #21226 and for 708 see S.I.S. #21334 & #21339 which are the parts of two notes handed Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt.

ARMY

SECRET

True. 8/26/41

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)

#502 (Part 1 of 2) (To be handled in Government Code)

I am very much pleased to learn from the document which you handed to Ambassador NOMURA on August 17 that you are in agreement with the idea contained in our proposal regarding holding a meeting between you and me.

Today, when the whole world is in confusion, for the two countries of Japan and the United States, who held the key to world peace, to drift as we are drifting toward the worst of relations, not only is an unfortunate thing in itself but also means the downfall of world civilization. The reason for Japan being so concerned over the question of peace in the Pacific lies in no other than her desire not only to improve the relations between Japan and the United States, but also to contribute to the realization of world peace through the opportunity which such improved relations would afford.

It seems to me the reason that Japanese-American relations have come to be so bad as they are today is to be found largely in the fact that the governments of the two countries have been lacking in mutual understanding and have repeatedly doubted and misconstrued each other's intentions. It seems also to have been due to machinations on the part of third-power countries. Unless we begin with the elimination of such causes, we cannot by any means hope that the relations between the two countries could be adjusted. Herein lies the reason for my proposing that I meet you face to face for the purpose of frankly exchanging our views.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/26/41 (5)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)

1502

(Part 2 of 2)

However, the method upon which we have hitherto been replying, namely, the method of informal negotiations, which was disrupted in July-- though it may have been, on the whole, appropriate in consideration of the attitude then taken and of the matters discussed--even if continued from now on with a view of having the leaders of the two governments later giving recognition to the matters discussed, is not a suitable method under the present circumstances in which rapid changes are taking place and the possibility of an unfortunate condition arising is unforeseeable. I believe the need of the moment is for the leaders of the two countries to meet face to face and to discuss whether there is any possibility of saving the present situation by studying together with a proper perspective the important questions which affect the whole area of the Pacific Ocean lying between the two countries, and to do this without being bound by the customary method of negotiations. It would be all right to have the details settled by those officials specializing in such matters according as the necessity arises after the leaders have conferred on them.

This is the idea underlying my proposal. It is my earnest wish that you would accept this proposal in an understanding spirit and reciprocate. The situation being such as explained above, I am eagerly

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ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

waiting for the day of our meeting. As to the place of the meeting, I believe that, in view of various circumstances, it would be best if it were somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
 Via: Washington
 August 20, 1941
 Tokyo

(Part 1 of 7) (to be handled in Government Code)

The Imperial Government has received the communication which was given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17, 1941, and sets forth the substance as follows:

The Government of the United States, stating that the actions and measures which Japan took in French Indo-China have departed in all the main aspects which the Government having to do with settlement by peaceful means of problems affecting the Pacific area should be considered, states that the Japanese Government would abandon its expansionist activities, adjust its activities, and work toward the progress of peace in the Pacific, in accordance with the principles embodied in the program which the United States upholds. At the same time, the United States Government states that the Japanese Government would adopt a clearer attitude than those hitherto exhibited regarding Japan's present activities and plans. Furthermore, the United States Government has emphatically stated the fact that it will resort at once to every method it deems necessary should Japan take any further steps in line with the policy of militarily dominating Japan's neighboring countries by threat of force or by means which are in the nature of a threat by force.

(Note: In deciphering this message certain corrections.)

21474

SECRET

Trans. 5/15/41 (15)

SECRET

From Tokyo
By Washington
August 24, 1941
Purple

1000 (Part 2 of 7) (To be handled in Government code.)

The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply disappointed that despite Japan's past pledges and her repeated representations concerning her activities and interests toward other countries, the United States Government is still harboring misunderstanding and fear. The Government of the United States refers to certain situations and measures which it considers harmful to the peaceful settlement of problems attending the Pacific war, and sees as on the basis solely of the fundamental conviction to which it has pledged itself. However, in such a world as we find today and in such an atmosphere of international confusion, it is exceedingly difficult to judge whether a certain incident in the course of the fighting, or, furthermore, dangerous to have that judgment necessarily upon the facts only. The Government of Japan cannot but point out her own judgment is to leading peace.

When a country's natural and peaceful progress is threatened with or when its right of existence is threatened from without, the country to take measures to cope with the threat or to resist is only its defense not only is inevitable, but also must be said to be a natural thing from the standpoint of maintaining peace. Therefore, criticizing such countermeasures of defensive measures, to weaken the cause and to correct the situation must be regarded as the greatest obstacle for a speedy establishment of peace.

ARMY 021475

SECRET

SECRET

From Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 28, 1941
 Purple

JCS

(Part 2 of 7)

We shall not consider at this time those things which have happened in the far past. However, if the matter is regarded in the light of recent incidents, we find that many newspaper articles and editorials in the United States have predicted that a British-American joint policy in the Far East would result in a threat to Japan and have hinted the formation of an anti-Japanese front by Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies. In the meantime, in conflict with the friendly conversations that were taking place at the time between Japan and the United States, the United States Government has expressed the intention of applying a continuous and unfriendly policy of pressure and has taken measures which might deprive Japan of the opportunity of obtaining the natural resources necessary to Japan. Although the United States considered some measures as having been taken in opposition to Japan's policy and motivation which the United States considered as harmful to her rights and to the principles she upholds, on the other hand, the Japanese Government believed that her action was governed by certain measures which she had taken to cope with circumstantial and political obstacles which affected her national requirements of self-sufficiency and defense.

It should not be forgotten that, as pointed out, what the government of one country considers as just proves to be exactly the opposite when regarded by another country, and that is often proven to be a cause for contention as well. Looking back upon past incidents, we find many cases in which the United States Government has

considered as general, there may have been some that had been
that she had overlooked the fact that they have been a source of
country because of the established facts relating to the
of national strength, and of the United States.

SECRET

From Tokyo
 Via Washington
 August 22, 1931
 Foreign

444 (Part 4 of 7) (To be included in Government code.)

Because of the fact that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have a firm attachment to peaceful aims, it seems to be difficult for them to believe that the peoples of other countries would feel that they are threatened by the United States. It should be firmly borne in mind that as long as this subject does not become a party to the position which my own country occupies that the United States (especially because of the scarcity of resources) cannot help but regard their relations with the United States as a defensive war. Japan believes that as everything peaceful happens can be obtained only by mutually understanding the position and the circumstances which affect the others, rather than by contradicting the individual acts of the others. From this standpoint, the Government of Japan is pleased with the fact that the United States announces the exchange of opinions regarding the policy and attitude which must form the basis of the understanding which is essential to a lasting and broad peace in the Pacific area.

21477

SECRET

Comm. 4/24/31 (4)

SECRET

From Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 22, 1942
 Urgent

JMS

(Part 5 of 7)

The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, as stated repeatedly in the past, had for their purpose hastening of the withdrawal of the Chinese troops which originated from the threat against Japan's right of withdrawal. They constituted also a policy which became, for reasons of expediency, inevitable for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific by coping with various threats which tended to disrupt that peace, and thereby to achieve an equitable supply of materials which were essential to the country. It was not the nature of merely making a threat. Therefore, should the China incident be settled or should a just peace be established in the Far East, the Government of Japan, as has always been, is willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In order that every bit of possible doubt may be wiped out, the Government of Japan reiterates here the statement she has repeated in the past—that her steps with regard to the joint defense of French Indo-China were not taken with the intention of making that area a base from which to advance by force into the neighboring areas. This statement made more above, we believe that Japan's attitude toward the situation is self-evident. Also, as regards Japanese-Chinese relations, the Government is to state clearly here that so long as the Chinese respects the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutral agreement, Japan will refrain from taking actions which are a threat to Japan. In accordance with the continuation to the spirit of this agreement, Japan will not engage in

ARMY

21478

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military action against that country. It is, therefore, an earnest desire on the part of the Japanese Government that the United States Government refrain from any action that would instill fear in the Japanese, or any nothing of the people in those countries which might fear a threat by the United States and Soviet-Russia acting jointly.

21478

SECRET

Form 1, 10/63 (2)

SECRET

From Tokyo
 To Washington
 August 20, 1942
 Purple

(Part 5 of 7) (To be handled as Government code.)

In order that we might do this, the Imperial Government is not inclined to exerting force toward the various countries adjacent to her.

The Government of the United States has given its regard to having said that these Imperial Ministers believe the Government of Japan and the United States have for their purpose the discovery of means for negotiations having to do with bringing about a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area as a means of drafting a program which will utilize national potential resources. In this regard the Government of Japan is unalterably in accord. Furthermore, the Government of the United States has made it clear that she will give no consideration to any proposals except those having to do with one of the original and purposes of other Japan or of the United States, or harmonious with the principles which have been observed by the United States in the past. This principle applied equally to the principles which the Government of Japan has adhered to its fundamental national policy.

The Imperial Government understands that the Government of the United States considers that the program being set of these two fundamental principles will not be in principle but desires that this is applicable to one of the main and, therefore, to that one part of the work being in the Pacific. In order that we might do this, the Imperial Government

SECRET

enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries economically, politically, militarily, from the point of view of natural resources or geographically shall assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages. It is natural and essential that, first of all, satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country, in a spirit of reciprocity, agreements should be made in relation to the areas adjacent to it. It is no less important in hastening the establishment of peace.

21479

ARMY H.F.

SECRET

SECRET

From Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 28, 1941
 Purple

#900

(Part 7 of 7)

To be handled in government code.

I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above are clear and concise. We believe that it is paramount for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific that the governments of Japan and the United States confer diplomatically and constructively together on problems great and small.

From this point of view it is my fervent belief that it would be highly significant for the leaders of both countries to meet together for an immediate conference. However, in order that such a conference can be conducted in the most friendly manner, I believe that it is essential to immediately quiet the impression that this step is due to pressure put upon the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States. The Japanese Government is convinced that the Government of the United States is in the main interested in the establishment of world peace and Japan has decided to reciprocate and in the light of the present international situation has decided to endorse the early institution of this conference.

21480

ARMY

SECRET

Date: 8/28/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 29, 1941
 Purple (CA)

#609

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my #503.

(A) For convenience's sake, in exchanging messages in the future on this question, please insert the paragraph numbers in the order used in the caption telegram.

1. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States" and repeating the content of recently received documents)
2. (The section beginning "The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges, etc.")
3. (The section beginning "The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, etc.")
4. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that, etc.")
5. (The section beginning "The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers, etc.")
6. (The section beginning "I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above, etc.")

(B) The following are explanations of the points in the caption telegram which need special attention:

- (1) Our opinions regarding this question were set forth briefly in response to those views which the United States Government freely submitted with the request that we do likewise.

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

We made our views clear, believing that by so doing we might find in due time points upon which the two parties can agree in a friendly spirit and that because of this the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would prove to be effective.

a - S.I.S. Nos. 21474-80 which give Japan's viewpoints with regard to American-Japanese negotiations.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/28/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 26, 1941
 Purple (ca)

509

(Part 2 of 3)

(2) With regard to Part 3^a, "should a just peace be established in the Far East." This means, for example, when the MANCHU regime has become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of routes used to aid that regime; when Japanese-Chinese relations have, on the whole, actually returned to normalcy; and when it is possible to secure efficiently and justly materials from French Indo-China, Japan will be willing to consider withdrawing her troops even if a complete settlement of the China incident has not been achieved. In other words, it was a statement made because of the desire to allow as much flexibility as possible when the conversations are to be begun.

(3) With regard to Part 5. (A)^b. "... which will be applicable to the whole world, etc." was inserted out of consideration of the fact that if the principles and desires expressed by the other side are applied merely within the Pacific area, we would suffer various restrictions within the East Asia sphere of co-prosperity in which we hope to establish a new order, while the United States, on the other hand, would not be bound by any pledge with regard to her relations with her adjacent areas. Since this would result in an arrangement which would be one-sided insofar as it affects Japan, I thought that the principle should be seen as may be applied to the entire world.

a - The parts referred to do not correspond to parts in the translated message; Part 3 mentioned above corresponds to Part 5 in the translated message, and Part 5 to Part 6.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/28/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

#609 (Part 3 of 3.)

(B) With regard to that section in which it is stated that countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages, we wish to point out the logical reasons for cooperation in the application of leadership to the end of bringing about steps for an equitable distribution of resources by those countries who are advantageously situated, and the passage has to do with the proposal by the United States with reference to equality of economic opportunity and treatment. In other words, it hints the idea that it is natural that Japan should assume peaceful economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

(C) As to the words to the effect that it is natural and essential that adjustments should be made in a spirit of reciprocity in relation to the areas adjacent, etc., the passage clarifies the fact that Japan is inevitably, as well as naturally, endeavoring to bring about peace on the basis of the principle of equality in her relation with Manchukuo and China; that is to say, on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness to the end of establishing the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. It also goes to show that the

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policy of adjacent countries each respecting the conditions peculiar to the other, is not a policy, as the United States alleges it to be, of securing a position superior to the others. This has many points in common with the American Monroe policy.

The passage in which appear the words "first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country" came from the idea of so-called (joint defense ?) which the United States Government referred to. This passage was given with the idea also of a joint defense in China in our mind.

In other words, (A), (B) and (C) were brought out as a precaution against the possibility of our being too narrowly restricted when the discussion takes place concerning the method by which the East Asia sphere of co-prosperity should be established.

ARMY

SECRET Trans. 8/28/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 28, 1941
 Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#752

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #748^a.

Today, the 28th, at 11:00 a.m. in accordance with your instructions, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present.) I gave him at that time your message as well as the English text of your #503^b. While the President was reading the message he flatteringly commended it. Having read it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with discrimination he smilingly and cynically said, "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince KONOYE, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French-Indo China occurred during Secretary HULL'S conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see that he was well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince KONOYE. The main thing that I am interested in is the saving of time. Hawaii is out of the question for according to the constitution the President must sign bills passed through the Houses of Congress within ten days and I cannot have the Vice-president do it for me."

a - Not available.

b - S.I.S.#21474-80 inclusive, English text message containing statement to be made to Roosevelt.

Trans. 8/30/41 (2)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From Washington (Mamura)
 to Tokyo
 August 28, 1941
 Purple (U)

752

(Part 2 of 2)

He explained that in this respect it is different with the Japanese Government in that the Japanese Government could appoint an acting minister and added that if it is going to be in Juneau, it would take three days to Seattle, and the round trip from that point on being ten days, if we had fourteen days in all, we would be able to do it, but it would be impossible if it is going to be in Hawaii, since it would take three weeks. I, therefore, told him that insofar as the Japanese Government is concerned, their chief object is to hold a conference, and question of the place of the conference is secondary. I promised that I would communicate the details to the government. I then said that we would like to have the earliest possible date set, whereupon the President replied that he did not object to having an early date set, but he did not give the immediate reply as to when.

The President added also that the recent meeting with KUROKAWA was to have taken place in ----- this year but had been postponed on account of the Balkan War and that the meeting was held after the Congress had approved of it. The conversation between the President and me was as given above. These conversations will be continued.

a - Part 1 of 2 not available.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/29/41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

753

Re my 752.

Since the time for the interview was announced by the White House, the Secretary of State immediately made public briefly the fact that I had delivered to him after the conference Premier HONOYAMA's message to the President, which was discussed by us. It was agreed that no reference should be made to the content of the message.

a - Part 2 of 2 available, being translated.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/28/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
29 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#510

As you have been advised by other messages concerning this matter, no information of the "leaders' conference" should be allowed to leak out until it is definitely settled upon. You should be perfectly well aware that such leaks may make it impossible to get some things done which otherwise would be well within the realm of possibility.

On the 28th, however, the Domei and other press dispatches, report that in an interview to the press you made references to Premier Konoye's message. (We suppressed those dispatches here). Hereafter will you please refrain from making any mention of this until you have communicated with this office.

Although we were able to suppress the above mentioned dispatches, in view of the channel through which they arrived, we are of the opinion that a fairly large group of people are now aware of the news. We are at present figuring out ways and means of making the best of the situation. In the meantime, will you take every precaution against any leakage of the contents of the message.

JD-1:

4863

(D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
 To : Washington.
 29 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#511

Regarding my message #510*

In view of our domestic situation and the delicate international situation, we had intended to keep this matter a strict secret for the time being. However, now that the matter has been made public in your area, we fear that there will be further misunderstanding if we should attempt to suppress or censor the news here. Being of the opinion that it would be best to publicly announce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the separate message, we did so at 2:30 p.m. on the 29th.

It should be superfluous to mention that because we must take into consideration our relations with Germany and Italy, and in view of the exceedingly complex domestic situation, there is such danger that the project will fail if information is allowed to leak out before a settlement is reached. Bear this in mind and take every precaution to guard against leaks. You should conduct your negotiations, as they were being conducted during your unofficial talks, in such a manner so as to avoid attracting any attention. (We do not feel that the contents of the discussion on the 28th should be made public at this time). Hereafter, will you please get in touch before you make any public statements. We realize, of course, that you may let an opportunity slip by by this delay, but please look upon such an occurrence as being unavoidable under the present circumstances.

With regard to the location at which the "Leaders' conference" should take place, we mentioned Hawaii after giving consideration to our dignity and also because early in the discussions the United States suggested Hawaii.

We do not insist upon Hawaii, but if it is not to take place there, we feel that we should avoid selecting a place which is a part of either nation, but select a spot on the high seas. Please discuss this matter along those lines.

With regard to maintenance of security, in view of the matter contained in your message #754**, will you please request the Americans to cooperate fully. (You are aware that our relations with Germany and Italy may be unfavorably affected by announcements made in the United States. It is quite possible that the United States proposed that the announcement be made to estrange Japan from Germany and Italy. We expect to have

JD-1:

(continued) (D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

* 486c

~~XXXXX~~

at least this muc cooperation from them).

With regard to the announcement made by us which was mentioned early in this message, we felt that time was of the utmost importance; we could not consult the C.S. first. Please explain this to them.

WD-1: 4868

**Not available.

21647

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
Date : 180 1941
(10-3)

755 (Ltr. 10-4 - parts 1, 2, 3 tr. dated 9-9-41)

4. I assume that Prince Konoye will
be via the usual route and that about ten days will be required en route.

5. The public statement will be made
jointly by the two heads of state. I believe that the best
time for this will be only after Prince Konoye's departure.

The Secretary of State agreed to dis-
cuss these points with the President. In general, it may be said
that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person.
There are indications that he is considering this matter from many
angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the
'Leaders' conference" will not materialize.

25

EXHIBIT NO. 125

N. Nav. 43
(Mar. 1907)

Page 330

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP <u>URICHT</u> .																			
AT <u>San Pedro de Macoris, D. R.</u> TO <u>San Pedro de Macoris, D. R.</u> 1907										Identification Number									
PASSAGE										(Day) (Date) (Month)									
ZONE DESCRIPTION <u>Caribbean Sea</u>										Commanding Officer <u>W. S. ...</u>									
Hour	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE				CLOUDS			SEA							
	Direction	Force	Height	At Sea	Air	Water	Wet Bulb	Wet Bulb	Base	Mean	Height	Direction	Force						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
200	1	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9877	77	75	80	bc	21
200	2	87.5	12.4	30.1	10	10	29.9847	77	75	81	bc	21
200	3	87.5	12.4	30.1	10	10	29.9878	78	74	81	bc	21
200	4	87.5	12.4	30.1	10	10	29.9878	78	75	80	bc	21
200	5	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	80	bc	21
200	6	87.5	12.4	30.1	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	7	87.5	12.4	30.1	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	8	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	9	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	10	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	11	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21
200	12	87.5	12.4	30.2	10	10	29.9878	78	75	81	bc	21

DRILLS AND EXERCISES			
1	2	3	4
1	Received	Expended	On hand
2	Distilled	Received	Expended
3	On hand	Received	Expended
4	On hand	Received	Expended
5	On hand	Received	Expended
6	On hand	Received	Expended
7	On hand	Received	Expended
8	On hand	Received	Expended
9	On hand	Received	Expended

CURRENT		BEFORE LEAVING PORT	
Set	Drift	Set	Drift
151	0.3 S.	151	0.3 S.

STANDARD MAG COMPASS		MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES	
Compass No.	Error	Maximum	Minimum
10019	0.20 E	20°	12°
10019	0.20 E	20°	12°

NUMBERED RUN DATA - SUMMARIZED				
Run No. (Serial)	Time to submerge	1	2	3
200	13	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	14	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	15	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	16	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	17	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	18	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	19	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	20	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	21	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	22	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	23	87.5	12.4	30.2
200	24	87.5	12.4	30.2

(Original (Hibon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

UNITED STATES SHIP

Thursday 7 November 1941

REMARKS

... darkened, 252° p.s.c.,
... boilers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6
... average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M.

[Handwritten signature]
... USA.

... Average steam, 200 lbs.,

[Handwritten signature]

... Chief Boatswain, USN.

... General quarters. 0845 Secured
... Secured from Gun-
... Note: Made
... normal.

[Handwritten signature]
... USN.

... 254° p.s.c.,
... Secured from Gunner Drills.

[Handwritten signature]
... USN.

... Second
... lower left
... admitted to
... Average

[Handwritten signature]
... USN.

... Description

[Handwritten signature]
... USN.

... true,
... Average

[Handwritten signature]
... USN.

Examined:

[Handwritten signature]
REINHOLD FALCO,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N. Navigator.

H. Surv. 40
Oct. 1911

Page 331

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP *Albatross*

N-1.
Classification Number

AT PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H.

TO Advance Base.

Spring 8 November 1911.
(Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION *Mirus II.*

C. G. ...

... deep commissioning.

Hour	"ALL BRASS" AVERAGE READING THERM	BY REYS		BY LOG		COTING OF C	GYRO Mag. Magnetic Declination	WIND DIRECTION FORCE	BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE			W. BATHY- THERMO- GRAPH	DEPTH			SEA		
		NATURAL MIRAS	THERM	NATURAL MIRAS	THERM				SEA LEVEL	ON DECK	AIR	WATER SURFACE	WATER AT 100 FATHOMS		WATER AT 200 FATHOMS	WATER AT 300 FATHOMS	WATER AT 400 FATHOMS	WATER AT 500 FATHOMS	WATER AT 600 FATHOMS	WATER AT 700 FATHOMS
1	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
2	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
3	87.3	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
4	87.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
5	87.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
6	87.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
7	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
8	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
9	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
10	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
11	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														
12	87	18.5	18.5	18.5	18.5	065														

200
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DRILLS AND EXERCISES

1. Latitude $19^{\circ}13'40''N$ 2. Longitude $156^{\circ}04'15''E$	Received Expended \$1273 On hand \$64758	Distances 1 2 3
1. Latitude $19^{\circ}13'30''N$ 2. Longitude $156^{\circ}04'30''E$	Distilled 1380 Received Expended \$2721 On hand \$20000	4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Latitude $19^{\circ}13'00''N$ 2. Longitude $156^{\circ}04'00''E$	BEFORE LEAVING PORT Draft fore'd Draft aft	
GYROCOMPASS IN USE Error	AFTER ENTERING PORT Draft fore'd Draft aft	
STANDARD MAG. COMPASS Compass No. 10 89 S. H. 254 Error 8 E Variation 7 E Deviation 1 E	MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES Maximum 25 Minimum 22	
	Normal	

200
200
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200
200

Hour	TEMPERATURE	WIND	SEA	DEPTH	SEA
13	8.5			065	
14	12.5			012	
15	13.3			097	
16	13.3			085	
17	13.1			125	
18				203	
19				271	
20				340	
21				244	
22				244	
23				244	
24				272	

SUBMERGED REEF DATA - SUBMARINES

Run No. (Serial)	Time to submerge	Greatest depth
1		
2		
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(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Naval Ordnance, etc.)

UNITED STATES SHIP

1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION: ALMS 11.

REMARKS

00-04 Steaming... [faded text]

Southwest
1001 C.B. [faded]

04-06 Steaming... [faded text]

[Signature]
1001 C.B. [faded]

08-12 171 to 200... [faded text]

[Signature]
1001 C.B. [faded]

11-11 [faded text]

Approved: [Signature]
Commander

Examined: *Ronald F. [Signature]*
Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

OF 131, 132.

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. Some words like "and", "the", "of" are faintly visible.]

Edward Tamm

[Faint handwritten signature]

[Faint handwritten signature]

[Faint handwritten signature]

Ronald Fusco
 [Faint typed text below signature]

8-22-41

145

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

(Name)

(Identification Number)

AT
FROM

TO

(Day) (Year)

(Month) 1941

U. S. Navy Commanding

WIND	WAVE	SEA	TEMPERATURE	WIND		WAVE	SEA	TEMPERATURE	WIND	WAVE	SEA	TEMPERATURE
				Direction	Force							

CLOUDS			SEA	
TYPE	HEIGHT	AMOUNT	WINDS	SWELL

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Time	Description	Remarks
0800	Deck Drill	
0900	Boat Drill	
1000	Gun Drill	
1100	Lifeboat Drill	
1200	Breakfast	
1300	Deck Drill	
1400	Boat Drill	
1500	Gun Drill	
1600	Lifeboat Drill	
1700	Dinner	
1800	Deck Drill	
1900	Boat Drill	
2000	Gun Drill	
2100	Lifeboat Drill	
2200	Deck Drill	
2300	Boat Drill	
2400	Gun Drill	
2500	Lifeboat Drill	
2600	Deck Drill	
2700	Boat Drill	
2800	Gun Drill	
2900	Lifeboat Drill	
3000	Deck Drill	
3100	Boat Drill	
3200	Gun Drill	
3300	Lifeboat Drill	
3400	Deck Drill	
3500	Boat Drill	
3600	Gun Drill	
3700	Lifeboat Drill	
3800	Deck Drill	
3900	Boat Drill	
4000	Gun Drill	
4100	Lifeboat Drill	
4200	Deck Drill	
4300	Boat Drill	
4400	Gun Drill	
4500	Lifeboat Drill	
4600	Deck Drill	
4700	Boat Drill	
4800	Gun Drill	
4900	Lifeboat Drill	
5000	Deck Drill	
5100	Boat Drill	
5200	Gun Drill	
5300	Lifeboat Drill	
5400	Deck Drill	
5500	Boat Drill	
5600	Gun Drill	
5700	Lifeboat Drill	
5800	Deck Drill	
5900	Boat Drill	
6000	Gun Drill	
6100	Lifeboat Drill	
6200	Deck Drill	
6300	Boat Drill	
6400	Gun Drill	
6500	Lifeboat Drill	
6600	Deck Drill	
6700	Boat Drill	
6800	Gun Drill	
6900	Lifeboat Drill	
7000	Deck Drill	
7100	Boat Drill	
7200	Gun Drill	
7300	Lifeboat Drill	
7400	Deck Drill	
7500	Boat Drill	
7600	Gun Drill	
7700	Lifeboat Drill	
7800	Deck Drill	
7900	Boat Drill	
8000	Gun Drill	
8100	Lifeboat Drill	
8200	Deck Drill	
8300	Boat Drill	
8400	Gun Drill	
8500	Lifeboat Drill	
8600	Deck Drill	
8700	Boat Drill	
8800	Gun Drill	
8900	Lifeboat Drill	
9000	Deck Drill	
9100	Boat Drill	
9200	Gun Drill	
9300	Lifeboat Drill	
9400	Deck Drill	
9500	Boat Drill	
9600	Gun Drill	
9700	Lifeboat Drill	
9800	Deck Drill	
9900	Boat Drill	
10000	Gun Drill	

Morning	Afternoon

Remarks: [Faint handwritten notes and entries in the log's main body]

N. Nav. 43
(Mar. 1909)

Page 333

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP													(Name)		(Identification Number)			
AT PASSAGE			TO			Date		19		Commanding								
ZONE DESCRIPTION																		
HOOR	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE	WIND	WAVE
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DRILLS AND EXERCISES	
1. Latitude	Received
2. Longitude	Expended
3. Latitude	Detained
4. Longitude	Received
5. Latitude	Expended
6. Longitude	Detained
7. Current	Set
8. Current	Drift
9. Error	Before LEAVING PORT
10. Error	After ENTERING PORT
11. Error	Draft fore
12. Error	Draft aft
13. Error	Draft fore
14. Error	Draft aft
15. Error	Draft fore
16. Error	Draft aft
17. Error	Draft fore
18. Error	Draft aft
19. Error	Draft fore
20. Error	Draft aft
21. Error	Draft fore
22. Error	Draft aft
23. Error	Draft fore
24. Error	Draft aft

STANDARD MAG COMPASS	
Compass No.	
S. H.	
Error	
Variation	
Deviation	

MAGNINE TEMPERATURES	
Maximum	
Minimum	

SOUNDING RUN DATA (SERIALS)	
Run No. (Serial)	
Time to submerge	
Great depth	

Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly.

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

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U. S. NAVY

JAN 31 1942

317

LOG BOOK

OF THE

U. S. S. _____

SECURE

Rate,

COMMANDED BY

_____, Commander,

U. S. Navy,

_____,

Division,

Attached to

_____,

Squadron,

_____,

Fleet,

Commencing

DECEMBER 1,

1941,

at

AT SEA

and ending

DECEMBER 31,

1941,

at

PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

1937

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U.S.S. *ALBATROSS*.

continued

by *C. W. WEBER*, Commander, U.S.N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from December 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941.

NAME	RANK	DATE OF REPORT	REMARKS	DUTIES
WEBER, Carlos A.	Commander, USN	6/30/41		Executive Officer.
KIEFER, Dixie	Commander, USN	10/7/41	(1) 10/11/41 (2) 10/11/41 (3) 10/11/41 * 10/11/41 Group 2.1 Wake Island.	Executive Officer.
KEENE, Campbell	Commander, USN	10/10/41		Air Officer.
FRISCO, Leonard	Lieut. Comdr. RN-V(9) USN	11/1/41		Navigator.
SANFORD, John R.	Lieut. Comdr.	4/3/40		Gunner, Officer.
LUCAS, Percy S.	Lieutenant C-V(8) USN	10/11/41		Communication Off.
WEBER, Robert L.	Lieutenant D-2, USN	1/21/41		First Lieut.
HAGEN, Edwin C.	Lieutenant (jg) D-7(8), USN	6/5/41		First Div. Off.
HOWE, Scott	Lieutenant (jg) D-2, USN	9/24/41		Second Div. Off.
PICKETT, James H.	Ensign D-V(8) USN	4/20/41		Signal Officer.
FINZ, Robert J.	Ensign D-V(8) USN	4/20/41	Undergoing treatment at Wake Island.	Asst. Gunnery Off.
PERE, John	Ensign E-V(8) USN	6/30/41		"A" Div. Officer.
FRISCOFF, Paul H.	Ensign E-V(8) USN	6/30/41		"A" Div. Officer.
GREEN, Maurice P.	Ensign E-V(8) USN	6/30/41		"B" Div. Officer.
HAROLDSON, John C.	Ensign E-V(8) USN	10/10/41		"C" Div. Officer.
WAGNER, Hugo C.G.	Lieut. Comdr. (SC) USN	8/18/41		Senior Med. Off.
KELLY, Robert A.	Lieut. Comdr. (jg) (DC-V(8), USN	8/18/41		Junior Med. Off.
FRASZ, Edward H.	Lieutenant (jg) (DC-V(8), USN	8/18/41		Dental Officer.
HARRIS, Charles I.	Lt. (jg) (SC) USN	6/3/41		Supply Officer.
KULH, Frederick W.	Lt. (jg) (SC) USN	3/21/41		Dispensing Off.
BALDWIN, Ervin L.	Ensign (SC) V(8), USN	10/10/41		Asst. Supply Off.
PARR, Charles B.	C.P.O., USN	3/30/41		Ship's Mess'n.
EBNER, Alphonse M.	Gunner, USN	10/10/41		Torpedo Officer.
SALT, Julius S.	Gunner, USN	1/1/41		Asst. to Gun. Off.
McKILVEY, Carlton A.	C.P.O., USN	12/1/41		Radio Officer.
ACHOFF, John H.	Machinist, USN	10/13/39		Asst. Officer.
MERRITT, Carl N.	Machinist, USN	11/20/40		Asst. Officer.
BERAN, Adolph H.	Carpenter, USN	12/20/41		Ship's Carpenter.
KARLS, Orvil S.	C.P.O., USN	4/18/41		Asst. to Sup. Off.
HOLTSLANDER, Herman, S.	C.P.O., USN	10/2/40		Asst. to Sup. Off.

Examined and found to be correct.

Ronald J. ...
 Lieut. Comdr.
 USN

Navigator

NSO 4
 No. 4
 Log

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

Name: *USS Albatross*
 (Identification Number)
 Date: *19* 19*41*
 (Day) (Month)
 Commanding Officer: *J. S. ...*

AT *...* TO *...*

TIME	WIND	WAVE	SEA	TEMPERATURE	WEATHER	CLOUDS				SEA	
						FORM	MOVING FROM	AMOUNT	VELOCITY	COMPUTER	DEPTH
01											
02											
03											
04											
05											
06											
07											
08											
09											
10											
11											
12											
13											
14											
15											
16											
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19											
20											
21											
22											
23											
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29											
30											

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

TIME	DESCRIPTION	DRILLS AND EXERCISES	
		Morning	Afternoon
01			
02			
03			
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07			
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By: *...*
 Date: *...*

N. Nav. 43
(Mar 1931)

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UNITED STATES SHIP

Tuesday 6 December 1911

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

00-04 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

R. J. [Name], [Rank], [Station]

04-00 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

C. S. [Name], Chief Boatswain, [Station]

08-12 Steaming as before. Note: Daily inspection of all magazines and S.P. magazines; conditions normal. 0255 Hold quarters for muster followed by physical drill; no absentees. 0305 Set material condition "X". 0305 3rd in material condition "X". 0335 Set material condition "Y". 0347 3rd in material condition "Y". 0353 Scanned General Quarters. Set material condition "Z". 0353 All General Quarters stations manned. 1000 Material condition "Z" set. 1009 Secured from General Quarters in accordance with gunnery drills. 1010 Regret Dr. gunnery drills. 1040 Signal two (2) "Z" lines torn. 1050 true, on a parallel opposite course, distance twelve (12) miles, height two thousand (2000) feet. Average speed, 12.5 knots, average steam, 190 lbs., average fuel, 12.5 tons, average water, 12.5 tons, average oil, 12.5 tons, average coal, 12.5 tons, average provisions, 12.5 tons, average stores, 12.5 tons, average ammunition, 12.5 tons, average other, 12.5 tons, average total, 12.5 tons.

A. [Name], Gunner, [Station]

14-18 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

J. S. [Name], Gunner, [Station]

16-18 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

F. S. [Name], Lieut., [Station]

19-20 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

A. L. [Name], Lieut., [Station]

20-4 Steaming as before. Average speed 12.5 knots. Average steam 190 lbs. Average fuel 12.5 tons. Average water 12.5 tons. Average oil 12.5 tons. Average coal 12.5 tons. Average provisions 12.5 tons. Average stores 12.5 tons. Average ammunition 12.5 tons. Average other 12.5 tons. Average total 12.5 tons.

E. S. [Name], Lieut., [Station]

Approved:

Examined:

[Signature]

[Signature]

U.S.N. Navigator

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Form 40
Rev. 1917

Eng

UNITED STATES SHIP *Albatross*

Dec 19 1914

ZONE DESCRIPTION REMARKS

00-04 Steaming as before. 1100 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.
Standard 3, 10 knots.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

04-08 Steaming as before. 1600 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

08-12 Steaming as before. 0100 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94. Exercise at Gun-bury drills. 0900 Crossed International Date Line. 1100 Crossed International Date Line. Latitude 20° 30' north. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94. Made daily observations of all objects in sight.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

12-16 Steaming as before. 1000 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

16-18 Steaming as before. 1700 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

18-20 Steaming as before. 1100 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94. Change of direction to 050° at 1100. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

20-24 Steaming as before. 1915 lights of S.I. Average speed, 13.0 kts., average R.A.S., 94.

Approved
S. C. WIER, Commanding Officer

Approved:

S. C. WIER,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined

Examined
F. A. Y. Navigator

3356

ADDITIONAL SHEET.

H. S. ...

... 1941.

CONF.

18-20 ...

[Handwritten signature]
... FARR, Chief ...

21-24 ...

[Handwritten signature]
... SMITH, ...

C. ...
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[Handwritten initials]
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UNITED STATES SHIP

December 19 41

REMARKS

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23

2826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. Navy, 48 (Rev. 1918)

338

Page

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

(Name)

(Classification Number)

AT
PASSAGE

TO

(Day) (Year)

(Month) 19

ZONE DESCRIPTION

U. S. Navy, Commanding

Hour	ALL READING AVERAGE IN GROUP FROM	BY REVS.		BY LOG		Course (P. C.) Gyro Mag. (Indicate hand)	WIND		BAROMETER		TEMPERATURE			WATER AT SURFACE	CLOUDS			SEA	
		NAUTICAL MILES	TENTHS	NAUTICAL MILES	TENTHS		DIRECTION	FORCE	HEADING (TOWARD)	READING AT TIME	Dir. Div.	AIR WET BULB	WATER AT SURFACE		FEET	MOVING FROM	AMOUNT	VELOCITY	CHARACTER
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
12																			
1																			
2																			
3																			
4																			
5																			
6																			
7																			
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ST.
 # Latitude
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 # Longitude

Received
 Expended
 On hand
 Distilled
 Received
 Expended
 On hand

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

Current: Set
 Drift
 GYROCOMPASS IN USE
 Error
 STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
 Compass No.
 S. B.
 Error
 Variation
 Deviation

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
 Draft for'd
 Draft aft
 AFTER ENTERING PORT
 Draft for'd
 Draft aft
 MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
 Maximum
 Minimum

Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13																								
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21																								
22																								
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24																								

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

Run No. (Serial)	Time to submerge	Greatest depth
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

N. Nav. 48
(Rev. 1929)

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP

19

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

W. J. Smith
W. J. Smith
W. J. Smith
W. J. Smith
W. J. Smith
W. J. Smith

Approved:

W. J. Smith

Examined:

Ronald F. ...

C. S. N. Navigator

8 Nov 41

100 330

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

(Name) (Identification Number)

AT PASSAGE TO (Day) (Date) (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION U. S. Navy, Commanding

TIME	WIND	BAROMETER	TEMPERATURE			WEATHER BY SYMBOL	CLOUDS				SEA	
			WIND	WIND	WIND		FORM	MOTION	AMOUNT	HEIGHT	COMBINATION	SWELL
10												
11												
12												
13												
14												
15												
16												
17												
18												
19												
20												
21												
22												
23												
24												

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

REMARKS	RECEIVED	EXPENDED	ON HAND	MORNING		AFTERNOON	
				1	2	3	4
Before LEAVING PORT							
After ENTERING PORT							
MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES							
Maximum							
Minimum							

PERFORMANCE DATA - REMARKS

Run No. (Serial)	Time to surface	Greatest depth

W. No. 68
(Mar. 1902)

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP USS BATSailed 8 December, 1911ZONE DESCRIPTION Plus 11.

REMARKS

0 to 4 Steaming singly with ship darkened, under 100° true and 090° $00'$ p.s.c., s/s 38 R.P.M., (12.5 knots), on course 111° true. (PRO. 111° true, and 100° p.s.c. 0000 Set ship's clock back one (1) hour. Zone Description Plus (4) Eleven. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 37.

J. H. Smith

J. H. SMITH, Ensign, U.S.N.

0 to 8 Steaming as before. 0100 Lighted ship. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 37.4.

R. J. King

R. J. KING, Ensign, U.S.N.

0 to 12 Steaming as before. 0800 c/o to 100° true and 090° $00'$ p.s.c., and 0900 p.s.c. 0215 All quarters inspected and Captain's inspection; no absentees. Made daily inspection of all machinery and S.P. samples; conditions normal. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 37.1.

C. E. Clark

C. E. CLARK, Chief Mate, U.S.N.

12 to 15 Steaming as before. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 36.23.

A. M. Eber

A. M. EBER, Turner, U.S.N.

16 to 18 Steaming as before. 1731 Durand's M. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 36.7.

J. S. Smith

J. S. SMITH, Turner, U.S.N.

18 to 20 Steaming as before. 1915 Lighted lights under #3 boiler. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 36.5.

R. L. Eber

R. L. EBER, Lieut., U.S.N.

20 to 24 Steaming as before. 2000 c/o to 100° true and 090° $00'$ p.s.c., and 09230' p.s.c. 2057 Lifted safety valve by hand on #3 boiler at 100 lbs. pressure. 2130 Cut in #3 boiler in on main auxiliary lines. 2155 Secured #1 boiler. 2323 Sighted vessel bearing one point abaft port beam running without light on course 111° true, 300° true, distance four (4) miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 36.1.

R. L. Eber

R. L. EBER, Lieut., U.S.N.

Approved:

R. L. Eber
C. E. EBER,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

Howard Jones
HOWARD JONES,
Lieut. Commr., U.S.N., Navigator.
U.S.N.

7, Nov. 49
(Mar. 1950)

UNITED STATES SHIP

19

ZONE DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

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Leonard Fisher

[Handwritten signature]

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[Handwritten signature]

Approved:

[Handwritten signature]

Examined:

Leonard Fisher

U. S. N. Navigator

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 125 is a map reflecting the Disposition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec. 1941 and particularly the location of the USS *Wright* on 27 November and 7 December, 1941. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 33 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to proceedings of the Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 126

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1941.

General Order No. 143

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this order organized into:

The United States Fleet, comprising:
 (a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
 (b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
 (c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;
 The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
 Special Task Forces,
 Special Duty Ships,
 The Naval Transportation Service,
 Naval District Craft.

The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the foregoing will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders or in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.

4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.

5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as possible, the type commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

[2] 6. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.

7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders. Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and "Naval Local Defense Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval Coastal Fron-

tiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Commandants of Naval Districts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.

9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are performing.

10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the naval district or station to which assigned. They consist of such naval craft and floating equipment of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense Force."

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY REGULATIONS SETTING FORTH THE GENERAL DUTIES OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

"(1) The commander in chief shall take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle. (Navy Regs. Article 687.)

"(2) He is responsible for the indoctrination, drill, training, and efficient administration and operation of the fleet and the coordination of its various units in strategic and tactical employment.

"(3) He shall make recommendations to the Navy Department as to the composition and organization of the fleet and as to all matters pertaining to its military efficiency and control. He shall submit schedules of employment and cruising itineraries to the department in accordance with its instructions."

"The commander in chief shall carry out all drills and exercises in accordance with the customs of the service, the instructions of the department, and the drill books and other publications of a similar nature. This shall be done in such manner as will most conduce to maintaining the fleet in constant readiness for war in all its phases." (Navy Regs. Article 692.)

"(3) He shall also be governed by the following rules:

"(a) He has the sole right to correspond directly with the Navy Department concerning any official matter connected with the fleet.

"(b) He shall keep the Secretary of the Navy fully informed of the movements of the fleet. These general reports shall not be considered as taking the place of separate letters on separate subjects." (Navy Regs. Art. 699.)

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof is illegal.

"The right to self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined." (Navy Regs. Article 723.)

"The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet is vested with authority to exercise control of the operations of fleet aircraft units from naval air stations, to allocate among units of the fleet the services, facilities, equipment, and spaces made available to the fleet, and to establish priorities with respect to repair and overhaul of aircraft of the fleet." (Navy Regs. Article 1554.)

RESTRICTED

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS—STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET—1941

A2-12(05)
Serial 1525

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 14, 1941.

The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, while both commands are administered jointly.

The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby superseded and all copies should be destroyed.

W. W. SMITH,
Captain U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.

Approved:

H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

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U. S. PACIFIC FLEET STAFF INSTRUCTIONS, 1941

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STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941—DISTRIBUTION LIST

<i>Command</i>	<i>No. Copies</i>
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet	40
Opuav	10
Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet	5
Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet	5
Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	5
Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet	5
Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each)	6
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet	1
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet	1
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force Pacific Fleet	2
Compatwing Two	1
Commander Mine Squadron THREE	1
Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet	2
Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force	5
Commandants 11th, 12th & 14th Naval Districts (each 2)	2
Fleet Flagship	5
Fleet Personnel Officer	1
Total	107
Spares	40
Grand total	147

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1]

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION I—COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTY

111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each column; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified:

Commander-in-Chief—00

- Chief of Staff—01.
 Assistant Chief of Staff—02.
 Personal Aides—01, 05, 15.
 Staff Duty Officer—14.
 (a) *Operations*
 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.
 Estimates, Plans, Orders, Instructions. 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.
 Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.
 Schedules, Training, Exercises, Reports of Exercises. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90, 95.
 Tactics. 11, 12, 13, 15.
 Anchorage, Anchoring, Getting Underway, Operating Areas. 11, 12, 13, 15.
 Joint Army and Navy Operations. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86.
 Ship and Airplane Movements, 11, 12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50, 90.
 Navigation. 12.
 Logistics. 50, 12, 90, 95.
 Intelligence. 11, 25.
 Marine Corps matters. 86.
 Landing Force. 86.
 Mobilization plans. 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
 Joint Army and Navy Operations. 16, 17, 18, 86, 11.
 Logistic Readiness for War. 16, 17, 18, 19, 50, 86, 90, 95.
 Radio and Sound (Signal Equipment). 18, 20, 50, 22, 15.
 Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.
 (d) *Maintenance*
 50, 90, 95.
 Overhauls, Docking. 50.
 Repairs, Alterations. 50, 90, 95.
 Technical Services. 50, 18, 20, 90, 95.
 Bureau of Ships Activities. 50.
 Navigation. 50, 12.
 Bureau of Ordnance. 90, 95.
 Aviation. 95
 Aerological. 96.
 Mines, Chemical Equipment. 90.
 Base Hospitals. 75.
 Athletics and Recreation. 15, 96.
 Requisitions, Surveys, Ship's Service. 50.
 Landing Force and Parades. 86, 15, 90.
 Annual Report. 05.
 (Assisted by each member of the Staff.)
 Intelligence. 25, 26, 20, 05.
 Censorship. 25, 26, 05, 20.
 Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.
 Aerological and Personnel. 96.
 Security. 21.
 Medical (Sanitation, etc.) and Religious Activities. 75.
 Public Relations. 27, 25, 26, 05.
 Damage Control. 50, 90, 75.
 Base Hospitals. 75.
 Customs and Agricultural Inspection Liaison. 75, 96.
 (c) *War Plans*
 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
 Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19.
 Guard Duty, Uniforms, Calls, Celebrations, Ceremonies, Band, Boats, Official Cars. 15.
 Characteristic Cards. 50, 18, 90, 95.
 Chemical Warfare and Mines. 90.
 Base Hospital. 11, 75.
 (b) *Administration*
 01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75, 90, 95, 96.
 Correspondence Files, Records, Legal Matters, Flag Allotment and Office, Print Shop, Flag Personnel. 05.
 Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.
 Secret and Confidential Registered Publications. 20, 21, 33.
 Guard Duty, Uniforms, Calls, Celebrations, Ceremonies, Band, Boats, Official Cars. 15.
 Characteristic Cards. 50, 18, 90, 95.
 Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19.
 War Plans
 Damage Control. 50, 90, 75.
 Base Hospitals. 75.
 Customs and Agricultural Inspection Liaison. 75, 96.
 (c) *War Plans*
 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
 Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19.
 Base Hospitals. 75.
 Aviation. 95
 Aerological. 96.
 Mines, Chemical Equipment. 90.
 Base Hospitals. 75.

NOTE: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II.

Cognizance and Duty

114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers attached to the Staff:

01—Chief of Staff.	23—Assistant Communication Officer.
02—Assistant Chief of Staff.	24—Assistant Communication Officer.
05—Flag Secretary.	25—Intelligence Officer.
11—Operations Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.
12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	27—Public Relations.
13—2nd. Assistant Operations Officer.	30—Assistant Communication Officer.
14—Staff Duty Officer.	31 to 43—Communication Duty and Coding Officers.
15—Flag Lieutenant.	50—Maintenance Officer.
16—War Plans Officer.	75—Medical Officer.
17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	86—Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer).
18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	90—Gunnery Officer.
19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.
20—Communications Officer.	96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.
21—Communications Security Officer.	
22—Radio Officer.	

[3] 115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who may be absent for any reason:

<i>Primary Duty</i>	<i>Relief</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
01—Chief of Staff.	02—Assistant Chief of Staff.	(02 is same as 11.)
05—Flag Secretary.	25—Intelligence Officer.	16—Relieves if available, otherwise 12 relieves 11.
11—Operations Officer.	16—War Plans Officer.	20—Relieves for visual communications.
12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	
13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	
15—Flag Lieutenant and Athletic Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	
16—War Plans Officer.	17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
20—Communication Officer.	22—Radio Officer.	
21—Communication Security Officer.	30—Assistant Communication Officer.	
22—Radio Officer.	20—Communication Officer.	
23—Assistant Communication Officer.	24—Assistant Communication Officer.	
24—Assistant Communication Officer.	23—Assistant Communication Officer.	
25—Intelligence Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	
26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	25—Intelligence Officer.	
27—Public Relations Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	Senior CWO.
30—Assistant Communication Officer.	31—Assistant Communication Officer.	
31 to 43, inclusive—Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board.		
50—Maintenance Officer.	13—Assistant Operations Officer.	
75—Medical Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	
86—Marine Officer.	05—Flag Secretary; (and Gunnery Officer for Landing Force etc.)	War Plans Section by 16, 17, 18, 19.
90—Gunnery Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 12.
95—Aviation Officer.	90—Gunnery Officer.	Assisted by 96.
96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 05 for personnel.

SECTION II—INDIVIDUAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTIES

200. *CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.*

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785-786.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

[4] (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.

(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.

(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.

(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.

201. *ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF—02—See Operations Officer (11).*

202. *FLAG SECRETARY—05—Personal Aide.*

(a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.

(b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.

(c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected therewith.

(d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current instructions and properly distributed.

(e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent or overdue communications.

(f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.

(g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet.

(h) Printing.

(i) Legal and disciplinary matters.

(j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:

(1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.

(2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action only.

(3) Receipts and tracers.

(4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.

(5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel.

(k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.

(l) War Diary.

203. *Operations officer—11—(Assistant Chief of Staff 02).*

(a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in his absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".

(b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment activities.

(c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for revision of same.

(d) Prepares problems and exercises.

(e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.

[5] (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, and plans and movement orders.

(g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises.

(h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation plans.

(i) Navy Relief Force.

(j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.

204. *First assistant operations officer—12.*

(a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational equipment, charts, etc.

(b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Officer.

(c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans Section.

(d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.

(e) Commander-in-Chief's Night Order Book.

205. *Second assistant operations officer—13.*

(a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.

(b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system for vessels of the Fleet.

(c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.

205A. *Staff duty officer—14.*

(See paragraph 226).

206. *Flag Lieutenant—15—Personal Aide.*

(a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency of Fleet signalling operations and material.

(b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer based ashore.

(c) Boarding officer.

(d) Has cognizance of:

(1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.

(2) Entertainments.

(3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.

(4) Uniform.

(5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.

(6) Military and Medical Guard Duties.

(7) Band or orchestra.

(e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.

(f) Maintains flag combat bill.

(g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.

(h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.

207. *War Plans Officer—16.*

(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

(c) Member of Schedule Board.

(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

[6] (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters,—via District Commandant if appropriate.

(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

208. *Assistant War Plans—17.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

(1) Fleet estimates and plans.

(2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts.

(3) Liaison with Army on War Plans matters.

(4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.

209. *Assistant War Plans—18.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

(1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Naval Districts.

(2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.

(3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War Plans has an interest.

(4) Logistic studies and data.

210. *Assistant War Plans—19.*

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:

- (1) Office administration and correspondence.
- (2) Compilation and assembly of data.
- (3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.

Fleet Marine Officer—86. (See paragraph 222.)

211. *Fleet Communication Officer—20.*

- (a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.
 - (b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.
 - (c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic operations and with war plans.
 - (d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.
 - (e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
 - (f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
 - (g) Supervises activities ashore of communications stations when manned by Fleet personnel.
 - (h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies.
 - (i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material.
- [7] (j) Responsible for registered publications.
- (k) Supervises communication watch officers.
- (l) Cryptographic and radio security, with "21".

212. *Communication Security Officer—21.*

- (a) Assist Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of Fleet flagship:
 - (1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.
 - (2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate commanders.
 - (3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.
 - (4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.
 - (5) Recommendations for improvement of cryptographic aids.
 - (6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of cryptographic aids.
 - (7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communications.
- (c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.
- (d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library. Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "By direction".
- (e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confidential correspondence.

(g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.

213. *Fleet Radio Officer—22.*

- (a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.
- (c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.
- (d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material installations of the Fleet.
- (e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.
- (f) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.
- (g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.
- (h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet.
- (i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.

214. *Intelligence Officer—25.*

- (a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
- (b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).
- (c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
- (d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
- (e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
- (f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

[8] (g) **Evaluates Intelligence Information** received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

(h) In charge of censorship.

(i) Internal Security of ships.

(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. *Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.*

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

(a) **Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.**

(b) **Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.**

(c) **Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.**

(d) **Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.**

216. *Public Relations Officer—27.*

(a) **Liaison officer with the Press.**

(b) **Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.**

(c) **Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.**

(d) **Maintains photographic file.**

(e) **Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.**

(f) **Cognizance of Staff library.**

(g) **Motion Picture Officer.**

(h) **Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of Navigation.**

(i) **In charge of Staff photographer.**

(j) **Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press release for visitors, visits, social activities, athletics; and other recreational subjects.**

(k) **Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.**

(l) **Propaganda in time of war.**

(m) **When directed assists "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in intelligence matters as necessary.**

(n) **Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.**

(o) **Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.**

217. *Assistant Communication officer—30.*

(a) **In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as directed.**

(b) **Is in charge of internal distribution and conduct of Flag rapid communications within the Flagship.**

(c) **Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, routine operations, files, forms, and publications.**

(d) **Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding Watch Officers.**

[9] (e) **Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing, custody, and dispatch of secret mail.**

(f) **Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office and communication spaces.**

218. *Communication Watch Officers—31, 32, 33, 34.*

(a) **Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the provisions of the Communication Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer.**

(b) **A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.**

(c) **Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure. In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned coding board duties at a battle station.**

(d) **One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-registered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.**

(e) **One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Registered Publications which he shall keep corrected.**

219. Coding Board Officers—35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40).

(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use and become proficient in their proper use.

(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Cryptographic Security.

(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer watches when required.

(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correction, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.

(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding Board functions, as directed.

220. Fleet Engineer And Maintenance Officer—50.

(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.

(b) Engineering performances.

(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.

(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.

(e) Tests and upkeep of material.

(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing instructions.

(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections.

(h) Damage Control.

(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys.

[10] (j) Ship's Service store activities.

(k) Training of engineering personnel.

(l) Member of Schedule Board.

(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules.

(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics.

(o) Supply Department matters.

(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans.

(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships cognizance).

(r) Degaussing.

221. Fleet Medical Officer—75.

(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet.

(b) Prepares a periodic Fleet Medical News Letter.

(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.

(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases as may not be otherwise provided for.

(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.

(f) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health regulations.

(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.

(h) Has cognizance of religious activities.

(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

222. Fleet Marine Officer—86.

(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Force.

(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions, Defense Battalions, and Detachments.

(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:

(1) Plans for amphibious operations.

(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.

(3) Demolition and related operations.

(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army.)

(5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.

223. Fleet Gunnery Officer—90.

(a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep of the armament of the Fleet.

(b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the armament of the Fleet.

(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.

[11] (d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.

(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.

(f) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery.

(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer regarding tactical aspects:

(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.

(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.

(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.

(4) Chemical warfare service—Material and training of personnel. (In collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).

(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of the Fleet.

(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of liaison with Army.

(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.

(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.

(l) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to "Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnery Instructions" and other ordnance, gunnery and fire control publications.

(m) Makes recommendations on designs of news ships (Bureau of Ordnance cognizance).

(n) Member of Schedule Board.

(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.

(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.

(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).

224. *Fleet Aviation Officer—95.*

(a) Advises with reference to:

(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:

(A) Material.

(B) Personnel.

(C) Gunnery and Bombing.

(D) Radio.

(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities.

(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.

(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports thereon.

(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.

(6) Naval air operating policy.

(b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.

(c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.

(d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.

(e) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.

(f) Member of Schedule Board.

(g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters.

[12] 225. *Fleet Aerological and Personnel Officer—96.*

(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.

(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in matters concerning:

(1) Equipment.

(2) Personnel.

(3) Weather information required.

(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:

(1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports.

(2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.

(3) Aerological research.

(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological personnel.

(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with orders for for Fleet Problems and Tactics.

(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic information pertaining to gunnery.

(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorological facilities.

(h) In charge of all matters relating to:

(1) Orders for officers and enlisted personnel.

(2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.

(3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.

(4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.

(5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorsements for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depending upon the rank of officer requesting leave.

(6) Examinations and promotions.

(7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.

(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.

(j) Shore Patrol.

(k) Liberty for the Fleet.

226. *Staff Duty Officer—14.*

(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is established.

(b) The officer having the day's duty shall:

(1) Receive routine reports.

(2) Act on routine matters.

(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as possible.

(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The procedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instructions.

(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff boats in absence of Flag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff Duty boats.

[13] (6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship.

(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visiting men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.

(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.

(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is not on board.

(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept informed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed promptly upon their return to the ship of all important matters that occur during their absence; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of all ship movements observed by the signal watch.

(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be taken.

(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea when regular watches are set.

(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in-Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which may arise.

(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action as may be necessary. Instructions should be obtained by the most expeditious manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully informed of the situation.

(f) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.

(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following:

- (1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.
- (2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.
- (3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission.

(h) Assignment of Berths.

Requests for berths are received occasionally by the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart is kept in the Operations Office, together with a copy of current instructions. See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assignments.

(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an adverse reflection on the Fleet.

(j) Leave—Relief for Day's Duty.

(1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on duty, illness or leave.

(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."

(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff Duty Officer of the arrangements made.

Sea Watches

(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet flagship is underway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.

(1) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in whatever disposition or formation the Fleet is at the time; whatever land or lights are in sight; whether either are likely to be seen; and of all other particulars which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the formation out of danger.

(1) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circumstances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer. **ACT FIRST, REPORT AFTERWARDS.** Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required—otherwise those officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will be required and the reasons therefore.

(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, vessels, or wrecks sighted; all changes of weather or shifts of wind; all signals made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all occurrences worthy of notice.

(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer having the day's Staff duty.

(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.

(p) RECORD OF EVENTS: A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial and submarine activity, weather information, etc. THE RECORD OF EVENTS will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be kept in Flag Plot, until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch.) At 0800 each day the three copies of the RECORD OF EVENTS covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following distribution: one copy to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations Officer.)

(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the right of way.

[15] (r) When fog closes in:

(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.

(2) Order fog buoys streamed.

(3) Order fog searchlights manned.

(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter—2RL—41 summarized briefly as follows:

(a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the formation.

(b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain bearings from shore radio direction finder stations, and radio bearings of ships in company.

(c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.

(d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress frequency).

(e) Provided Radio restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language followed by International Code: visibility conditions, names of ships in company, position, and time of origin GCT. If other ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and exchange information.

227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12).

228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to preclude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.

[16]

SECTION III—BATTLE STATIONS

300. The Combat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only.

[17]

SECTION IV—FLAG OFFICE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is:

Chief Yeoman.....	3
Yeoman 1st class.....	4
Yeoman 2nd class.....	5
Yeoman 3rd class.....	6
Total	18

Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows:

1 Yeoman—In general charge.

1 Yeoman—Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.

1 Yeoman—Flag Secretary and Division Officer.

3 Yeomen—Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.

2 Yeomen—War Plans Officers.

2 Yeomen—Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.

1 Yeoman—Intelligence Officer.

1 Yeoman—Aviation Officer.

- 1 Yeoman—Gunnery Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Aerological Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Files and Correspondence Classification.
- 1 Yeoman—Outgoing Mail Desk.
- 1 Yeoman—Communication Office.

These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc.

402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer. One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.

403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance, he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the routine of the office.

404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office supplies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care that expenditures are kept within requirements.

405. *Routine Duty.*

(a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop are as follows:

Daily	-----	0800 to 1600
Half Holidays	-----	0800 to 1130

(b) *Handling of work outside regular office hours.*—Routine work outside of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section. There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.

(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.

[18] 406 *Handling of mail upon arrival in port.* The taking up and distribution of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job. All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail received. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.

407. *Liberty and Leave.*

(a) Liberty and leave for the flag office personnel will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.

(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secretary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Executive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.

408. *Cleanliness of Offices.*

(a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800, and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday.

(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the

daily schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the inspecting officers.

409. Flag Office Duty Section.

(a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a competent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours:

Daily -----	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 1300
	1600 to 2200
Half Holidays-----	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 2200
Whole Holidays-----	0730 to 2200

(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular working hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:

(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.

(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call; however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc.

[19] (3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following hours:

Daily-----	1600 to 0800
Half-holidays-----	1200 to 0800
Holidays-----	0800 to 0800

This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours. The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at any time.

(c) *Handling of mail and correspondence.* Before going on liberty the incoming and outgoing mail yeomen will inform the senior duty yeoman of any special instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be:—To watch for special correspondence expected in the incoming mail—to see that certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and file yeoman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Officer with minimum delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. On board ship, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Office overnight, distributing it immediately after 0800 the following working day. In offices ashore, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers desks.

(d) *Security of Flag Offices.* The duty section will stand watch in the main flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any urgent reason, it is desired to keep offices open after 2200, permission should be requested from the Staff Duty Officer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded. Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff personnel, or locked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty, the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting

a note on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as possible.

(e) *Visitors to flag offices.* No general visitors will be permitted. Other than flag personnel admitted by senior duty yeoman, only officers and men on duty, or persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices outside of working hours.

(f) *Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms.* Waste paper baskets in Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff's Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the following times:

Regular working days-----	1500
Half and Whole Holidays-----	1115

[20] 410. *Security of Classified Matter.* All personnel of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the security of classified matter.

(a) *Offices, Print Shop, Multilith Shop, Flag Plot, Officers' Staterooms.* Flag personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. *Attended, as employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by unauthorized persons, or that it is under lock.*

(b) *Trash and waste.* Will be removed from flag activities and burned at times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag offices, flag plot, print or multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out in 409 (f). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(c) *Keys.* The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag office key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their possession.

(d) *Files, Lockers, Storerooms.* Access to the flag storeroom by other than regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secretary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.

(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.

(f) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classified matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.

[21]

SECTION V—HANDLING OF CORRESPONDENCE

501. (a) *Incoming Mail,* is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.

(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Communication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked "SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be obtained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET"

mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose, and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer at the first opportunity.

(c) Incoming personal mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's return to the ship.

(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.

502. *Urgent Correspondence.* When URGENT correspondence is received on board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer, a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeoman are not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No correspondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the correspondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag.

503. *Routine Correspondence.*

(a) *Incoming Mail Yeoman.* Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with subparagraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered U. S. mail by receiving officers.)

Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.

Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under separate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.

Passes correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAILGRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Communication office without being taken up on routing slips.

After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and delivers mail to Chief Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form. This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will show:

- [22] Date of receipt.
 Office of origin.
 File and serial number of office of origin.
 Date of correspondence.
 Subject.
 Circus file number of jacket in which permanently filed.
 Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.

(b) *File Yeoman.* Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505).

(c) *Chief Yeoman in Charge.* Routes correspondence.

(d) *Flag Secretary.* Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing where required.

(e) *Tracer Yeoman.* Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing basket of the Flag Secretary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of delivery to first officer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspondence (except URGENT—see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing.

Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in the office.

(f) *Yeoman Concerned.* Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as directed.

When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspondence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Action correspondence to the assigned relief officer.

(g) *Officer concerned.* In general, papers will pass from one officer to another via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.

Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.

Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers checked for information.

Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.

Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports, etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when needed.

A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they have in their possession.

(h) *Yeoman Concerned.* Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed (See Article 504).

[23] Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty—delivering routed correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.

Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other than a letter or endorsement.

(i) *Tracer Yeoman.* Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence on which routing is incomplete.

Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.

The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into three classes:

(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.

(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional correspondence.

(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming correspondence attached.

When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space provided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman. However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.

When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Commander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman.

504. *Outgoing Mail.*

(a) *General:* Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of correspondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.

The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in the upper left hand corner.

Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of correspondence.

(b) Correspondence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:

(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.

(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic correspondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.

(3) In preparing a letter, the originator shall:

Indicate the distribution, acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeoman or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number.

[24] Ascertain that there is a:

(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the incoming correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom.)

(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of correspondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all officers. After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.

(C) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the correspondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.

(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number immediately following the file number.

(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following order: Original and copies for information addresses: file copy (green); information copy (yellow); pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator (indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated by pencil diagonal mark).

(c) *Correspondence to be printed.* Four copies shall be typed, original on green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy and one pink copy. The word "PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBUTION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a printing order.

(d) *Correspondence to be mimeographed.* In order to reduce the amount of typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus, and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10).)

(e) *Multiple Address Letters.* Multiple address letters are those addressed to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be made on green paper, and one onion copy shall be made for each addressee. These onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the correspondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed. All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is kept as the file copy.

(f) *When a letter is required to be rewritten,* the pink copy shall be removed from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally prepared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of letters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made and

rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspondence files unless retention in the files is indicated.

(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeoman in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile returning to him the pink copy.

[25] (h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief, the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer signing:

<i>Signed by</i>	—	<i>Signature Typewritten</i>
Chief of Staff	—	NAME Chief of Staff
Operations Officer when Chief of Staff is absent	—	NAME Acting Chief of Staff
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (Authentication of multiple address letters).	—	NAME Flag Secretary (or Acting Flag Secretary)
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (for single address letters).	—	NAME Flag Lieutenant by direction

(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.

(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman.

(2) *Tracer Yeoman.* Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulating through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(3) *Chief Yeoman in Charge.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

(4) *Flag Secretary.* Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent orders or instructions.

Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorsements directing action. Signs single address letters.

Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing.

(5) *Tracer Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of Flag Secretary.

Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pink.

Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing.

(6) *Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman.* Removes correspondence from Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials or signature.

Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers to Tracer Desk.

(7) *Tracer Yeoman.* When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff, places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Commander-in-Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.

(8) *Flag Secretary.* Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

[26] *Tracer Yeoman.* When correspondence has been signed by the Commander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

Makes daily check on pink copies where letters are outstanding.

(10) *Outgoing Mail Yeoman.* Insures that correspondence is complete; enclosures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b)); initialed by Flag Secretary; signed; that there are sufficient copies for all action and information addressees; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so marked; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.

Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action.

Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and all copies; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and initials file copy.

Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other correspondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each register number is used.

Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags.

Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent when several of the vessels under their command are present with the Commander-in-Chief.

Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribution and number of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.

Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and considered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the printing order to the originating officer, who shall, if he approves for printing, initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing correspondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely attached thereto, shall be sent to file.

NOTE: The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum.

A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Commander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled in the same manner as other "Information" copies.

[27] When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secretary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution; stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum; sends file copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached thereto.

Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc.

Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the correspondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).

Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.

Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regulations. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming registered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are made to the Commandant's Office.

At the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:

- (1) Serial number of letter.
- (2) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed.

- (3) To whom sent.
- (4) Date of letter.
- (5) Subject.

The above date shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note "Mailed on -----" shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed.

Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.

When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman).

Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(11) *Tracer Yeoman.* Takes appropriate action being governed by the preceding provisions of this Article.

(12) *File Yeoman.* Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1.

505. **FILE NUMBERS.** The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all correspondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assigning file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for each new number so assigned.

506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspondence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number will be used. The originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each [28] January 1st. and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFIDENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".

506.1 The File Yeoman shall:

Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action has been taken; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.

Prepare correspondence for file, retained spare copies in the spare copy file when action is so indicated on routing sheet.

File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants for filing correspondence of a lower classification.

Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.

Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.

Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding Correspondence.

507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed on white paper.

508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

509. **FILING OF PRINTED MATTER.** Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled file for ready reference in addition to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.

None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. Whenever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.

510. **WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE.** On Tuesdays of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an officer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such officer showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A notation will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of correspondence in his possession on that date.

511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the Flag Secretary with a report of the search.

512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary.

[29] SECTION VI—CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE

601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the following:

(a) All correspondence classified as **CONFIDENTIAL** will have the word "**CONFIDENTIAL**" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under file number, of each sheet.

(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue paper and are plainly marked "**CONFIDENTIAL**".

(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known as "the **CONFIDENTIAL** files".

(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "**CONFIDENTIAL**". Confidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.

602. **SECRET** correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) *Stowage and Handling.*

(1) **SECRET** correspondence files shall be kept in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer; except correspondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the Fleet Security Officer.

(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of the personal custody of staff officers at any time.

(b) *Incoming Mail.*

(1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his authorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence to the Staff Duty Officer.

(2) Incoming mail marked **SECRET** will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.

(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer, shall log all incoming **SECRET** correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.

(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the **SECRET** correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all **SECRET** correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having authorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.

(c) *Outgoing Mail.*

(1) An officer desiring to originate a **SECRET** letter shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman authorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for initialling and signature.

(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.

[30] (3) **SECRET** correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article 76 (4), U. S. Navy Regulations.

(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.

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SECTION VII—LIBRARIES

701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publications required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.

The office library consists of various books and pamphlets, such as:—Annual Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions as to their disposition.

Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to that number.

The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of the library.

702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction, although some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in bookcases in the Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Relations Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander-in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Commander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.

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SECTION VIII—RAPID COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET*Part A—General*801. *Drafting of Despatches.*

(a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch be made without the consent of the originating officer.

(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the message typed by his own yeoman, or duty yeoman. After it has been initialed by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and supervise the transmission of the despatch.

(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted and supervise its transmission.

(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be released by other members of the Staff.

(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of originating, information and releasing officers.

802. *Security of Communications.*

(a) Visual methods or landline will be used for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. *The use of radio for transmission of administrative despatches shall be kept at a minimum.*

(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mailgrams should be used particularly

for transmission of despatches to information addressees when it is desirable that their radio calls do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.

803. *Distribution of Despatches.*

(a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Communication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originating officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two information copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff.

(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative despatches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted for in the same manner as registered publications.

[33] (c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made for distribution to appropriate boards.

804. *Routing and Delivery of Despatches. (Internal)*

(a) Correct and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer.

(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter will accept responsibility for the message or whether it should be held for the action officer.

(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing the designated action officer of the action taken.

805. *Movement Reports.*

(a) The movement report sheets and cards will be corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer.

(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.

806. *Fleet Coding Board.*

(a) The fleet coding board will consist of four officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Flagship.

(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as directed by the Fleet Communication Officer.

(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organization and training of the fleet coding board.

807. *Shutting Down Transmitters.*

Except in case of emergency, permission for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.

[34] *Part B—Instructions for Communication Personnel*

808. *Administrative Communication Organization.*

(a) The following stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main radio room;
- (2) Signal bridge;
- (3) Main communication station;
- (4) Flag communication office;
- (5) Coding room.

(b) The communication watch will normally consist of:

- (1) Communication Watch Officer
- (2) Coding Board Officer
- (3) Communication Supervisor
- (4) Communication Yeoman
- (5) Communication Orderly
- (6) Radio Supervisor
- (7) Signal Supervisor
- (8) Radio Operators
- (9) Signalmen

(c) The communication watch officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions, and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(d) The coding board officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief communication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office during working hours. The second relief communication watch officer will stand watch from 0800 until after lunch. The first relief communication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(f) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication supervisors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively.

(i) Communication Yeoman. Communication yeomen will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged by the Senior Communication Yeoman and approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

[35] (j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge. Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(k) Watches prescribed in the preceding articles will not be exchanged without permission of the officers concerned.

809. *Tactical Communication Organization.*

(a) The following Stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main Radio Room;
- (2) Signal Bridge
- (3) Main Communication Station;
- (4) Flag Communication Office
- (5) Flag Bridge Radio Station;
- (6) Flag Bridge Communication Office;
- (7) Coding Room.

(b) The communication watch normally consists of:

- (1) Communication watch officer;
- (2) Coding board officer;
- (3) Two communication yeomen;
- (4) Two communication orderlies;
- (5) Communication Supervisor;
- (6) Radio Supervisor;
- (7) Signal Supervisor;
- (8) Radio Operators;
- (9) Signalmen;
- (10) Additional members of coding board as necessary.

(c) Communication watch officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation requires.

(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the situation requires.

(e) The Chief Radioman assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.

(f) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.

(g) Communication yeomen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.

(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge.

810. *Duties of Communication Watch Officer.*

(a) The communication watch officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all communication personnel.

[36] (c) The communication watch officer is responsible for complete and rapid internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing traffic.

(d) The communication watch officer is responsible for the handling of encrypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.

(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the communication channels required by the organization.

811. *Duties of Coding Board Officers.*

(a) The coding board officer is in charge of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room.

(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.

(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for cryptographic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic aids, publications and devices in the coding room.

812. *Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers.*

Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be considered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must:

(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Communication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions;

(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book and Signal Vocabulary;

(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff Organization;

(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant of the Fleet Flagship;

(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication and cryptographic security and their application.

813. *Routing of Despatches.*

(a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this knowledge to each despatch.

(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Admiral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for disposition.

(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of Staff shall be the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further

delivery. When the Chief of Staff is not available despatches may be shown to the action officer prior to final approval of the routing.

(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship. Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addressed to, but which are of interest to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communication office for internal distribution.

[37] 814. *Delivery of despatches.*

(a) The communication watch officer will be responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between 0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communication watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer immediately.

(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by 0900 daily.

(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.

815. *Emergencies.*

(a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an emergency is the primary consideration.

(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let the system delay action.

(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and retain them on watch as long as required.

(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any unusual occurrence.

816. *Encrypted Despatches.*

(a) If time permits, the encryption of each outgoing encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.

817. *Intercepted Traffic.*

Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information."

818. *Radio Logs.*

Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413-1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for intercepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascertain that circuit discipline is being maintained.

819. *Transmitting and Receiving Data.*

Transmitting and receiving data will be recorded by the radio operator or signalman as indicated below:

Radio

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) Frequency
- (3) Operator's sign.

Visual

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) System
- (3) Signalman's sign.

[38] *Communication Files.*

(a) **General File.** The general file includes one copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except despatches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified, mailgrams (other than restricted) shall be filed in the classified files and a tickler filed in the general file.

(b) **Shore station Schedule Files.** A copy of each message received by I or F method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.

(c) **Movement Report File.** A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.

(d) **Flag Files.** The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or written up for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.

(e) **Alnav File.** A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in order of alnav number.

(f) **Fleet File.** A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this file in order of fleet number.

(g) **Classified Files.** Translations of classified despatches shall be placed in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.

(h) **Tactical Translation Files.** The tactical translation files contain one copy of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order of date time groups.

821. *Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:*(a) **Outgoing Circuit**

Front cover.....	General File
First copy.....	Station File
Second copy.....	Flag File
Third copy.....	Originator
Back copy.....	Ship

(b) **Outgoing Administrative**

Front cover.....	General File
First copy.....	Flag File
Second copy.....	Originator
Third copy.....	Admiral
Fourth copy.....	Chief of Staff
Fifth copy.....	Operations Officer
Sixth copy.....	Flag Secretary
Seventh copy.....	Staff Duty Officer
Eighth copy.....	Communication Officer
Ninth copy.....	Station File
Back cover.....	Ship

(c) **Outgoing Tactical**

Front cover.....	Translation File
First copy.....	Flag Plot
Second copy.....	Flag Plot
Back cover.....	Coding Board

(d) **Outgoing Umpire**

Front cover.....	Translation File
First copy.....	Umpire
Back cover.....	Coding Board

[39] (e) **Incoming Circuit**

Front cover.....	General File
First copy.....	Spare copy
Second copy.....	Advance action
Back copy.....	Check copy

(f) Incoming Administrative

Front cover-----	Flag File
First copy-----	Action
Second copy-----	Admiral
Third copy-----	Chief of Staff
Fourth copy-----	Operations Officer
Fifth copy-----	Flag Secretary
Sixth copy-----	Staff Duty Officer
Seventh copy-----	Information
Eighth copy-----	Information
Back cover-----	Communication Officer

(g) Incoming Tactical

Front cover-----	Translation File
First copy-----	Flag Plot
Second copy-----	Flag Plot
Back copy-----	Coding Board

(h) Incoming Contact Report

Front cover-----	Translation File
First copy-----	Flag Plot
Second copy-----	Flag Plot
Back cover-----	Ship

(i) Incoming Umpire

Front cover-----	Translation File
First copy-----	Umpire
Back cover-----	Coding Board

[40] SECTION IX—REGISTERED AND OTHER SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS

901. The Communications Security Officer is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.

902. A Communication Watch Officer, designated as Registered Publications Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential publications. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.

903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered publication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual, which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar manner.

904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns, each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory.

905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized stowages.

906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publications in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.

907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered publications, except for: (a) communication office safes; (b) War Plans safe; (c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.

908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combinations of all safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another officer.

909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members of the staff correct their own publications; but even though they do so, their work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible for their being corrected.

910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes especially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered Publication Officer.

[41] SECTION X—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLAG AND SHIP

A—Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship

1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation.

1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, verbally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or position.

1003. When, for any reason, the movements of the flagship are no longer to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which he is expected to act independently.

1004. When in position, the commanding officer is responsible for the station keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate.

B—Honors

1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer.

C—Personnel

1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The Admiral desires you-----Etc."

1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Junior Division Officers will be the Communication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.

1008. Leave and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407 (a)). The flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining to flag personnel:

(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.

(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).

(c) Disciplinary matters.

(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.

1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster of flag personnel:

(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quarters with the flagship.

(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's marine detachment.

1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills and general quarters, Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.

[42] 1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compartments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats; the signal force, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Bridge and Flag Conning Tower.

1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. Enlisted men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will not stand ship cruising watches.

1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur, signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and Orchestra if assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.

1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing regulations and instructions.

D—Routine Reports

1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to promulgate the following instructions:

(a) *At Anchor*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as follows:

- (a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
- (b) Ship's Movements.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) Display of storm signals.
- (e) All occurrences worthy of notice.

(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls, shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lieutenant to the Staff Duty Officer.

(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required in attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside.

(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes, and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.

[43] (5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken.

(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Officer, prior to 0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.

(b) *Underway* (1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge:

- (a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and discolored water.
- (b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) All occurrences worthy of notice.

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff Duty.

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff Duty Officer on watch.

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.

EXHIBIT NO. 127

Confidential.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,
Dec. 18, 1941.

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Subject: Procurement of Long Range Bombing Landplanes for Patrol Wing Two.

1. Commander Patrol Wing Two has expressed an urgent need for long range landplane bombers, for use initially as patrolling aircraft covering the approaches to Oahu. Further uses of these planes in long range photographic reconnaissance and in offense are many. He has stated further that he has temporarily under his command from the Army a squadron of B-17 airplanes for such operations in conjunction with his VPB's and that for purposes of liaison, indoctrination and familiarization, he is assigning Naval Aviators to those aircraft as second pilots on their joint patrol missions.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force concurs in the request of Commander Patrol Wing Two and strongly recommends the immediate transfer from Lend Lease or other source of 15 B-17 (Boeing) or B-24 (Consolidated) bombers for this purpose and that an increase in that number in the future, as circumstances and experience may dictate, be considered. With the high speed of these aircraft, the additional area covered during daylight hours on a search adds immeasurably to security. Particularly is this true during the shorter days in winter.

3. Germane to this recommendation is the highly desirable possibility of the early establishment of patrol plane operating facilities at Magdalena Bay, Baja California, from which could be covered effectively the southwest approaches to the United States in conjunction with the patrol being conducted from San Diego. Provision of a squadron of subject landplane bombers in the Hawaiian area might serve to release for operation at Magdalena Bay, one of the three Patrol Squadrons to be equipped presently at Alameda.

4. In view of the current situation, this is being forwarded direct. The approval or comment of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is requested.

J. S. McCAIN.

Copy to: CinCpac, Comscofor, Compatwing 2.

Secret—No. 18

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,
Hickam Field, T. H., 22 December, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Memorandum to Roberts Commission:

1. Since my arrival I have issued orders or instructions for security and employment of the Hawaiian Air Force as follows:

- a. Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.
- b. Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.
- c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

d. Mover obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the air-
plane congestion at Hickam Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion at
Hickam Field.

f. Directed that all planes be camouflaged. Those arriving from the mainland
to be painted immediately upon arrival.

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui
and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

"1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset
1/3 Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.

"All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes
warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"2. Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

"All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes
on one hours notice.

"3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise 1/4 planes on one (1)
hours notice, 3/4 on four (4) hours notice."

i. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of
areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical
operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major com-
manders.

j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the
Department Commander within twenty four hours revised plans for the employ-
ment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well underway for the
use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.

l. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking
force of minimum of 18 b-17's available at all times.

m. Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification
be arranged.

(S) C. L. Tinker

C. L. TINKER,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

[1] F1
Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,

NAVAL AIR STATION,

San Diego, California, Dec. 24, 1941.

From: Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Subject: Procurement of Four-Engine Land Planes—Request for.

1. Contract 78903 dated 19 November 1940, is for the delivery of 200 PB2Y-3
airplanes. A supplementary contract 78903 dated 30 June 1941, is for the de-
livery of 54 airplanes, presumably PB2Y-4's. The progress report on this con-
tract submitted by the Inspector of Naval Aircraft, San Diego, for the period
ending 30 November 1941, estimates the delivery of the airplanes in quantity
in October 1942. These estimated delivery dates are extremely disappointing
as four-engine airplanes are urgently required. Experiences with Consolidated
Aircraft, would indicate that this October 1942 delivery date will not be antici-
pated.

2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force believes that a part of our patrol air-
craft should be long range land plane types. So long as there are prepared
fields from which these planes may operate, the advantages to be derived from
their operation are numerous. Among them are:

(a) Greater ease and celerity in handling and servicing after flight (a
big item when number and fatigue of beach crews is considered).

(b) Quicker to get off on a mission.

(c) Cover larger area in daylight search.

(d) Higher speed and ceiling permits of long range photographic reconnaissance of enemy defended positions with infinitely less hazard.

(e) Greater striking power, particularly in a torpedo attack.

[2] Need for this type has been keenly felt in the last two weeks. The sea-plane, however, still must be used from advanced bases in areas where no landing field exists.

3. A comparison of the performance of the B-24-D, and the PB2Y-3 airplane, which information has been obtained from the specifications, is tabulated below as a matter of interest :

<i>B-24-D</i>	<i>PB2Y-3</i>
Performance @ 41,000# V max @ 25,000 ft. with military power—316 MPH.	Performance @ 66,000# V max @ 20,000 ft.—236 MPH.
Operating speed @ 25,000 ft.—220 MPH.	
Service ceiling—34,000 ft.	Service ceiling—22,300 ft.
Service ceiling any two engines—19,000 feet.	
Range at operational speed carrying 8 1,000# bombs—2,000 miles.	Range at combat load carrying 4 1,000# bombs—2,370 miles.
Bomb Load :	Bomb Load :
4—2,000 lb. or	8—1,000 lb. or
8—1,000 lb. or	8—500 lb.
8—500 lb. or	In addition 4 1,000 lb. bombs can be carried on external tanks.
12—300 lb. or	
20—100 lb.	
Armament :	Armament :
1 .50 cal. Nose gun and 500 rounds	1 .50 cal. bow gun and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. top guns (twin mount) and 800 rounds.	2 .50 cal. side waist and 800 rounds.
2 .50 cal. bottom guns (twin mount) and 600 rounds.	1 .50 cal. tunnel and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. tail guns (twin mount) and 1,000 rounds.	1 .50 cal. upper waist and 400 rounds.
Total—7 .50 caliber—2,900 rounds ammunition.	2 .50 cal. tail (twin mount) and 800 rounds.
	Total—7 .50 caliber—2,800 rounds ammunition.

[3] 4. This command has been informed by Consolidated Aircraft officials that the B-24-D is now in production, and will be produced in increasing number. Further the B-24-D is a less expensive plane and lends itself to production better than the PB2Y type.

5. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force recommends that negotiations be undertaken with the Army Air Corps to obtain a total of sixty B-24-D airplanes at the earliest opportunity. Whether or not the PB2Y-3 contract could be reduced by that number would depend on the course of events.

/s/ J. S. McCain

Copy to:
CinCus
Comscofor

From: CINCPAC
Date: 4 January 1942.
For: Coderoom 1210
Decoded by: Graydon
Paraphrased by: Graydon

5385 K/C
COMINCH
PPPPP

OPNAV
COMAIRSCOFOR
COMPATWING 13

041001 CR0442

Your 011145. Comairscofor 312013. Fully agree. However the necessary detachment patron 22 and nonavailability additional patrol planes from mainland for at least several months makes situation here very critical. Total patrol planes 68, Army heavy bombers 44. Impossible satisfactorily meet simultaneous requirements for effective daily research reasonable air striking force material maintenance and personnel fitness. Best possible results being obtained but

searches far from positive and air striking force too small. Replacement 17 PBY-3 planes here by Army B-24 planes would make vital improvement in situation for both search and striking. Attention this connection invited comairsec for serial 0755 of December 18 with which CINCPAC heartily concurs. Subject fully covered in separate correspondence being forwarded airmail. Crews can be spared from here for taking over and ferrying B-24's. With background patrol plane qualification this can be quickly accomplished. Urgently recommend favorable consideration and immediate initiation action.

Distribution Action COMINCH WAROP 20CP

Record 11 OPD 12 38 NAVAIDE 16 Personal
Top Secret

From: CINCPAC
Date: 5 January 1942.
Decoded by: Canning
Paraphrased by: Reiss

COMINCH
PPPPPPPP
OPNAV

050547 CR0804

Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theatre even though temporary for other projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft carrier and other forms of attack. Retention of Oahu is by no means assured with present available forces. Navy patrol wings should be increased to 144 planes composed of both seaplane and landplane types for maintenance effective search. Carrier squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full allowance of spares to insure maximum effective seaborne striking force. To maintain even present daily search imposes greater load on material and personnel than can be much longer continued. See my 041001. See Commanding General Hawaiian Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which CINCPAC strongly concurs. ComdGenHaw Detp informed by mail.

Distribution

COMINCH. Action

Record Copy—11 12 38 OPDO NAVAIDE 16 Personal

CINCPAC WAROP File 20OF File

WAROPS Secret
Top Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 128

JUNE 4th, 1941.

Air Mail

The Honorable The ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

(Attention: Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General.)

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which you asked my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same matter.

Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning these matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, I think that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these cases have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate prosecution, and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.

In a conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain I. M. Mayfield represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and Colonel M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Captain Mayfield stated that it was the opinion of the Admiral that prosecution should be instituted immediately against these Japanese Sub-Consular Agents and that it should be handled in a routine manner so as to cause as little disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is charged with the internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detrimental to the general plans of the Army and would probably have a bad effect on work already done. It is also the Commanding General's opinion that the majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the United States and that prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents would only tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the loyalty of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of the law if they are loyal to the United States.

It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or other Departments of the Government. I think it has been clearly developed from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous influence on the Japanese population in the Territory and all evidence indicates the fact that they are the sources of information for the Consul and the Agents through whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory.

I think that if we ever hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo from the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it should be begun immediately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction.

During the conference with the Army and Navy and other conferences that I have had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is impossible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in the Territory would have to such a step, but it is my opinion that the good that would be done would far outweigh any evil that might result.

No further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from you.

Respectfully,

AMT:JB

ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr.,
*United States Attorney,
District of Hawaii.*

A true copy. Attest:

/S/ THOMAS C. HART,
*Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.*

Exhibit 32 (2).

WENDELL BERGE
Assistant Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Re: Co 800.01B11 Registration—Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable The SECRETARY of STATE.

SIR: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated June 11, 1941, in the above-entitled matter, in reply to our letter of April 10, 1941. It is understood that you have also received a number of investigative reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning Japanese consular officers in Hawaii.

The Criminal Division has concluded from the investigative reports that these individuals have acted as agents of the Japanese Government. It appears that the Japanese Government requires detailed reports concerning the lives and activities of all persons in Hawaii whom it considers as Japanese citizens. However, the Japanese Government seems unwilling to employ the necessary consular staff to carry out this program. To accomplish its purpose, it appoints numerous Japanese citizens in Hawaii as agents to aid in this work. While these agents receive no compensation from the Japanese Government, they are commissioned to act, and apparently can only act, with the consent of the Japanese

Government; their activities are for the benefit of the Japanese Government; and their work is in furtherance of matters required by the Japanese Government.

Apparently none of these agents have been notified to the Secretary of State, but there remains the question of whether or not they are "diplomatic or consular officers or attaches". It is the view of the Criminal Division that they cannot be so considered and that they have, therefore, violated Section 233 of Title 22 of the United States Code.

It is noted that you have inquired of the Japanese Embassy to ascertain whether forms have been forwarded by the Embassy to the Department of State with regard to all Japanese Government officials on whose behalf exemption is claimed from the provisions of the Act approved June 15, 1917, and certain other acts, and that you will advise us further in this matter when an answer is received from the Japanese Embassy.

The United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii has recommended that prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible date against these agents for violation of said Section 233, if said prosecutions do not conflict with any policy of the Department of State or other Department. He states that the good that would be done in restricting the enormous Japanese influence in Hawaii would far outweigh any evil that might result.

It will be greatly appreciated if you will advise us as soon as possible whether or not the Department of State considers these agents as "diplomatic or consular officers or attaches" and of any statement the Department of State may be pleased to make with reference to the contemplated prosecutions.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General,

WENDELL BERGE,
Assistant Attorney General.

JUNE 26, 1941

In reply refer to
Co 800.01B11 Registration—Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable ROBERT H. JACKSON,
Attorney General.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Berge's letter of June 13, 1941 in regard to the matter entitled "Yoshio Koike—Registration Act".

With reference to the inquiry concerning the status of Koike and other individuals whose names have been set forth in reports received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are said to be performing certain services on behalf of the Japanese Government in Hawaii, I may say that while this Department has no information concerning the personal status of these individuals with reference to the Japanese Government, they are not considered to have the status of diplomatic or consular officers or attaches who are accredited to this Government and, accordingly, the Department perceives no objection to the contemplated prosecution of these individuals for violation of the provisions of Title VIII of the Act of June 15, 1917 (Title 22, United States Code, section 233).

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON,
Assistant Secretary.

CR Co:EDK:MJY PR LE FE PA/H A-B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
August 13, 1941.

JWB
PA/H
MMH

In reference to the attached file, 800.01B11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/8, you may note that:

Under date June 26, 1941, the Department wrote to the Attorney General, in reference to reports received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the performing of certain services in Hawaii on behalf of the Japanese

Government, stated that the Department perceives no objection to prosecution of the persons concerned for violation of the provisions of the Act of 1917 requiring the notification to the Department of agents of foreign governments.

The Secretary of War, in a letter of July 25, 1941, to the Attorney General on the same subject, expressed opposition to the proposed prosecutions and strongly recommended that a warning be issued to any unregistered Japanese Consular agents.

A copy of the July 25 letter of the Secretary of War was supplied to this Department by the Department of Justice under cover of a letter of August 4, 1941, which states that the enclosure is being transmitted to this Department for its "information". The Department of Justice does not indicate what is to be its decision in the matter of the proposed prosecutions; but the fact that the objections of the Secretary of War are communicated to the Department gives rise to the inference that the Department of Justice is not at present contemplating proceeding with the prosecutions.

800.01Z11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/S
FE: Coville: MBW

WENDELL BERGE
Assistant Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, August 4, 1941.

Re: Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii, Your File Co. 800.01B11—Registration, Koike, Yoshio

The Honorable, the SECRETARY OF STATE:

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated June 26, 1941, concerning the prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii under Section 233 of Title 22, United States Code.

There is inclosed herewith for your information a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 25, 1941, from the Secretary of War, concerning this matter.

Respectfully,

/s/ WENDELL BERGE,
Assistant Attorney General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 25, 1941.

The Honorable The ATTORNEY GENERAL.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941 on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.

A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese consular agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding General's campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

1 Inclosure: Paraphrase of Radiogram.

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 9:58,
JULY 22, 1941

Hawaii, filed July 21, 1941.

We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

In my opinion fair play demands that warnings be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few individuals. It is impracticable to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps.

SHORT.

27



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