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Pt. 24

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GIVEN BY

*Mrs Rosalie C Wells & John B Wells*







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# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION  
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

### S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

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### PART 24

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

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Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1946

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(19v.)

Mrs. Rosalie E. Waller John B. Waller  
April 21, 1954

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
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OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
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(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
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JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
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JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*  
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

## HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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HEARING  
PEARL HARBOR, EXHIBIT\_143, VOL. 3



## EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

EXHIBIT NO. 1 (NAVY, PACKET NO. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] DECEMBER 10, 1941.

Outside Div.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,  
*Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H.*

SIR: On Saturday, December 6, 1941 at 12:05 p. m. the Chief Inspector of Customs was notified by the Office of the Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, that a vessel was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor at 6:00 a.m. on December 7, 1941, which would require Customs formalities.

The Chief Inspector requested that the Office of the Captain of the Yard notify the Inspector's Office before 4:00 p. m. of the same day in the event of a change of arrival time.

As per this request Inspector Lynch, on duty in the Inspector's Office 12/6/41 from 12:00 noon to 4:00 p. m., was notified that the vessel was expected to dock at about 7:30 a. m., Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941. He in turn notified the Chief Inspector at his home at 3:55 p. m., and was instructed to inform Inspector Williams that the boarding detail (Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams) was to report for duty at 7:00 a. m., Sunday, December 7, 1941.

The two members of the boarding detail arrived at the Inspector's Office at 6:55 a. m., on the 7th, and proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor, arriving at the Office of the Yard Duty Officer, second floor of the Administration Building at about 7:20 a. m., where they were informed that the USS ANTARES was outside the entrance of the harbor and was expected to dock at about 8:30 a. m.

At 7:55 a. m., while awaiting the arrival of the USS ANTARES, several loud explosions were heard. The Yard Duty Officer telephoned immediately to ascertain where the firing was taking place. After a very short conversation he reported to another party by phone, "This is no drill, Sir.", and after replying "Aye, Aye, Sir.", turned to the Customs Officers and informed that Pearl Harbor was undergoing an [2] Air Raid by Japanese planes. These planes could be plainly seen flying low over the channel from the windows of the Yard Duty Officer's office.

The first raid lasted for about forty or fifty minutes after which there was a ten or fifteen minutes lull. Two more raids followed lasting twenty-five to thirty minutes each with a slight lull following.

The planes apparently broke formation in the vicinity of Aiea Heights and swept down over the Channel, the Naval Air Station and Hickam Field.

At the beginning of the attack very few antiaircraft guns were heard, although the number steadily increased until by 9:50 a. m., when the third wave came over the fire of antiaircraft guns, exploding bombs and the rattle of machine guns caused an almost incessant roar.

The Customs Officers remained at the Administration Building until the third lull, which occurred at about 10:15 a. m., at which time the Chief Inspector questioned the Captain of the Yard regarding the feasibility of leaving the Yard and returning to town as no customs duties could be performed under the circumstances.

Upon being advised that there was no reason for remaining inside the Yard, Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams left for Honolulu arriving at the Federal Building at approximately 10:45 a. m.

Respectfully,

(S) Andrew A. Buta,  
A. A. BUTA,  
*Chief Inspector of Customs.*  
(S) John D. Williams,  
JOHN D. WILLIAMS,  
*Inspector of Customs.*

HONOLULU, T. H., Jan. 7, 1942.  
Presented for information.

(S) Warde C. Hiberly,  
WARDE C. HIBERLY,  
*Acting Collector of Customs.*



## EXHIBIT No. 2 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 30, 1941.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS,  
*Chairman, Commission to Investigate the Facts  
and Circumstances connected with the  
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.*

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE: In your letter dated December 19, you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I "conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire". You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I "will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings."

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the [2] Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area.

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force [3] in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:

" \* \* \* We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened."

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning:

" \* \* \* today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores.

" \* \* \*

"In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific. [4] " \* \* \* our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself."



It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that [5] the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL.

---

EXHIBIT No. 3 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,  
Washington, D. C., January 16, 1942.

GENERAL FRANK MCCOY,

Room 2905, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCCOY: I am transmitting to you herewith, a resume of public opinion about the Commission to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor. As you will see this digest is based upon almost a thousand newspaper clippings from the American press, and also some material from the British and Canadian press and some short wave broadcasts from Germany and Italy.

I trust this is the type of report which Mr. Howe, the recorder of your commission, had in mind, and that it will prove useful for your purposes.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. LANGER,  
William L. Langer  
Director of Research.

Enclosure.

RESUME OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, JANUARY 7, 1941

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION—BRITISH EMPIRE SECTION—SPECIAL  
MEMORANDUM No. 30

RESUME OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

JANUARY 16, 1942.

To: Mr. William L. Langer

From: British Empire Section

Subject: Public Opinion on the Commission to Investigate the Attack at Pearl Harbor

The attached resume was prepared in response to the request of W. B. Howe, Recorder of Mr. Justice Roberts' Commission, as set forth in his letter of December 19 to Colonel Donovan.

Since this resume is for an outside agency, no attempt has been made to classify or stamp it. It contains nothing of a confidential nature.

The material in this resume is based upon a careful survey of nearly a thousand clippings from the American press through December 28, 1941. Of these, only 236 dealt directly with the Investigating Commission. After December 28 the newspaper press seems to have lost interest in the matter, though some references to it continue to appear in the weekly periodicals.

We surveyed also the Canadian newspaper press and the British press, so far as it was available. What we found is gathered together in a separate section.

We surveyed also all available reports of shortwave broadcasting to America on the subject, particularly from Italy and Germany, and our findings are gathered together in a section by themselves.

Fig. NOT LEGIBLE

#### SUMMARY

The opinion of the United States press, particularly as revealed in its editorial comment is generally favourable to the President's appointment of the commission to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. The promptness of the President's order as well as his choice of the personnel of the Commission is applauded, and there is evidence of a widespread feeling of relief that a Congressional investigation appears now to be unnecessary. The press devotes more thoughtful and varied comment to the duties and powers of the commission than to any other aspect of the matter. The prevalent opinion is that the commission should fix the responsibility for the disaster, though some editors are disposed to limit its duties to fact finding and some go so far as to ascribe to it the power of a court martial. There is some disposition to lay the blame for the disaster upon the unpreparedness of the government at Washington. Some papers insist that the American people should know the facts, but there is a preponderance of opinion that popular judgment should be suspended until the Commission has made its report. The removal of the commanding officers whose conduct is to be investigated is unanimously approved.

A partial survey of comment in the Canadian press reveals no direct comment on the investigating commission. The London *Times* of December 18 comments favorably on the membership of the board. No other mention has been found in the English papers which are available, and reactions from other parts of the Empire are not obtainable. German, Japanese and Italian short wave broadcasts adopt a tone of ridicule, implying that the investigating Commission was appointed to cover mistakes of Washington officials.

[i]

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#### II. Duties and powers of the Commission

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#### III. Probable findings of the Commission

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#### IV. Warning against prejudging the case

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#### [ii] VI. Need for speed

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*United States Magazines**United States Official dispatches*

[iii]

*The Foreign Press*

- I. Canadian
- II. British Press
- III. Australian Press
- IV. Other Parts of the Empire

*German, Italian, Japanese Shortwave Broadcasts*

## [1] RESUMÉ OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941

## UNITED STATES NEWSPAPERS

I. *Personnel*

The President's choice of personnel is much the most popular subject in editorial discussion of the investigating commission. 107 out of the 236 clippings, dated from December 16 to December 28, refer to the appointments. Of these, an overwhelming majority, 104, approve unconditionally.

Two of the three exceptions do not in fact disapprove. The first, an editorial in the *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941, feels that, even though Justice Roberts' appointment may be justified by the emergency, it violates the sanctity of the court. The second, an editorial in the *Daily News*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941, suggests additional members for the board. Only the *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyoming, December 27, 1941, expresses an openly derogatory opinion of associate Justice Roberts' appointment. These three editorials are quoted after typical examples from approving editorial comment.

[2] "There was general satisfaction with the composition of the board, not only in the War and Navy Departments, which helped select personnel, but in Congress."—Lyle C. Wilson, Staff correspondent *Times-Herald*, Wash., D. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The personnel of the board appointed by the President to investigate what happened at Pearl Harbor could not be improved upon. At its head is a justice of the Supreme Court. Its other members include only such men who, trained in the profession of arms, are equipped to understand the military problems posed by the treacherous surprise attack. This understanding has seemed to us a vitally important feature of any inquiry into the 'setback', both for the sake of the public's perspective and for that of the morale of our fighting forces . . . ." Editorial, *Herald Tribune*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"Headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, the Board has won unanimous approval in diplomatic, congressional, and service circles, which sees its membership as assurance against any perfunctory 'white wash' ".—Joseph C. Harrison, Staff correspondent, *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 17, 1941.

[3] "The President owes it to the country to see that the promised investigation is of the most thorough going sort, and the personnel of the board named practically insures this."—Editorial, *Recorder and Democrat*, Amsterdam, N. Y., Dec. 17, 1941.

"President Roosevelt's designation of a non-military man to be chairman of the investigating group was believed part of an intention to get all the facts from a civilian as well as a military point of view."—News item, *Herald Tribune*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"A Philadelphia lawyer, who as a Republican helped to jail the thieves who stole America's oil from the Elk Hills naval reserve in California during the administration of Warren Harding, is going to Hawaii in a few days to find why it was that the United States Navy took the worst naval beating of the war on December 7th.

"The man is Owen Josephus Roberts, now an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He wears a derby, carries a cane, looks tough, and defers to his wife, a Connecticut Yankee.

[4] "He was chosen to head the board of inquiry which is to examine the reasons why the United States army and navy failed at Hawaii in order to illustrate the political solidarity of the United States to the world and to the American people.



"Never before has any President ever chosen any Supreme Court justice for any such assignment."—Richard Rendell, Staff correspondent, *Times*, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The five-man board appointed by President Roosevelt to find out why the Army and Navy at Hawaii were not on the alert against the surprise attack can be depended upon to consider the question calmly, carefully, expertly and with a sense of responsibility to the country and the future efficiency of the armed services. Justice Roberts, who has familiarity with the Pearl Harbor defenses, enters the inquiry with obvious impartiality except to the national interest, and the military and naval men, three of them retired, who will serve with him are of a caliber which insures that no mistaken sense of loyalty to their branches of the service will affect their judgment and their decision. So the verdict, in all circumstances, can be awaited with confidence."—Editorial, *Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Ky., Dec. 18, 1941.

[5] "Appointment of Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, of the United States Supreme Court, as head of the board is especially noteworthy from the public viewpoint. If this important inquiry showed signs of paralysis because of emphasis on military detail or because of military rivalries and prejudices, Justice Roberts, by virtue of his judicial training and his demonstrated appreciation of the public welfare, would be equipped to revitalize it and furnish impetus for a constructive conclusion."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, who has been granted special leave from the Supreme Court to head the board, is a man who combines a prosecutor's ability with a judicial temperament. His presence at the head of the board assures a thorough and painstaking investigation of the disaster—neither a 'white wash' nor a persecution".—Editorial, *Enquirer*, Cincinnati, O., Dec. 18, 1941.

"From the viewpoint of public confidence, the appointment of Justice Roberts to head the board of inquiry into the Pearl Harbor debacle is perfect. The board contains otherwise technical [6] men of the army and navy. They will be useful and important as judges from their points of view. The disinterested judgment on which the nation will depend will be that of Justice Roberts. His appointment ends any suspicion that a whitewash may be contemplated."—Editorial, *News*, Miami, Fla., Dec. 19, 1941.

"Of one thing we may be sure, and that is that the inquiry which is to be conducted by Justice Roberts will be both penetrating and fair. Its judicial nature is assured by its presiding officer. The presence on it of experienced officers, guarantees that neither the technical aspects nor the interest of the armed forces will be slighted".—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

"The board of inquiry set up by President Roosevelt to look into the lack of alertness at Hawaii would in peace times be called brilliant. Since the task assigned it is grim and unpleasant, we prefer to call it completely competent. The nation may have perfect confidence that the judgment it renders will be just, without whitewash.

"It is headed by Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court. [7] the only civilian member, who is best remembered for his extraordinary work in investigating Teapot Dome. Justice Roberts, a Republican, was appointed by President Hoover. He owes nothing to the present administration.

"Senior among the military members is General McCoy, whose skill as a soldier and a diplomat probably has given him a standing unequalled in our time by any military man. He is familiar with the Pacific, was General Wood's aide, then President Theodore Roosevelt's, then President Taft's. Not only his own service, but his attachment to those three men familiarized him with Pacific and Far East problems.

"The navy is represented by Admirals Standley and Reeves, men with high records of service, and each retired prior to the succession of Mr. Knox to the navy secretaryship. The only active officer on the board is Brig. Gen. McNarney of the Air Corps, called on to provide the board the technical background of air tactics."—Editorial, *Star*, Rockford, Ill., December 20, 1941.

Variations from Pattern:

"There is this criticism to be made of the board we think: It contains only one air fighting man, Gen. McNarney, [8] Gen. McCoy and Admirals Standley and Reeves are old time land and sea fighters respectively—fine fighters in their time, but times have changed."

"Doesn't this board need heavier representation from the air fighting element of the armed services? We think it does."—Editorial, *News*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941.

"The appointment of Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court as chairman of the board investigating the surprise of the army and navy by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was certain to meet criticism on the ground that the sanctity of the court is violated when any of its members are called upon to perform other duties than those of the court itself. \* \* \* But if there are to be any exceptions, the present emergency seems to offer justification."—Editorial, *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941.

"President Roosevelt indulged in unconscious irony when he named Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts as head of the board to investigate army-navy delinquency at Pearl Harbor.

[9] "Sixteen years ago, as special prosecutor for the government in the Teapot Dome and Elk Hills cases, Mr. Roberts tried to send the late Edward L. Doheny to jail. Doheny put up the defense that he had built oil tanks and reservoirs at Pearl Harbor at the request of the Navy, which had persuaded the sentimental oil man that the United States was about to be attacked by Japan at any moment. Doheny's case, in short, was the 'yellow peril'. In fact, he summoned numerous naval officers to testify that then (1926) the United States was expecting an assault from Japan almost any day.

"Justice Roberts ridiculed the 'yellow peril' defense in the courtroom. He laughed at suggestions that Japan would ever dare to attack Hawaii, let alone the mainland. Mr. Roberts scoffed at the Doheny argument, which was based on the assumption that someday there would be a major war between Japan and the United States. Today Mr. Roberts is learning, perhaps, that he was all wrong 16 years ago, and that in this instance, the oil promoter was right."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., December 27, 1941.

## [10] II. Duties and Powers of the Commission

The most original and varied comments on the investigation are those addressed to the subject of duties and powers. Editorial opinion falls into three groups, (a) outlining the purpose of the commission, (b) outlining the area of the investigation, and (c) suggesting a method of procedure for the commission.

The 37 clippings which refer to the purpose of the commission see it (1) as a fact finding board (10 clippings); (2) as an agency for fixing responsibility for the disaster (17 clippings); or (3) as an instrument of punishment in the trial of the commanders who were at Hawaii on December 7th (7 clippings).

17 of the 25 clippings which discuss the area of the investigation, are concerned with specific details of the attack at Pearl Harbor. The other 8 imply that the board's investigation should also be turned on higher authorities in Washington who were indirectly responsible for the lack of alertness.

Only 3 clippings discuss the method of procedure which the board should follow. One suggests that what happened after the attack as well as what happened before it should be examined. The second advises that the board be given all the powers of a court martial in admitting oaths, etc. The third warns the investigators [11] against interfering with the progress of the war.

The total number of clippings concerned with duties and powers is 67—considerably fewer than the number which discussed personnel.

A. *Purpose*.—37 clippings discuss the purpose of the committee's investigations. These divide into three main subsections: (1) those that see the committee solely as a *factfinding agency*, (2) those that see it as an agency for fixing the responsibility, and (3) those that see it as an agency for collecting evidence leading to the punishment of those judged guilty of laxity.

(1) *Board as factfinding agency*.—10 clippings.

"The legitimate purpose of this inquiry cannot be vindictive. The general public is not in a sadistic mood toward responsible military officials because of the Pearl Harbor defeat. Thoughtful citizens regard this inquiry board as an instrument for prevention of mistakes in the future like those apparently made in the Pearl Harbor defense system. This, of course, means that any appearance of 'whitewashing' would cause the public to lose confidence in the board and possibly in our military establishment."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., December 18, 1941.

[12] "This board will understand, and the people will agree with them, that the most important thing now is not to 'break' some high officer in the army or navy, though this may be one result of the probe, but the important thing is to find out exactly what happened, and why, to the end that it shall not happen again.

"Not primarily revenge, though those who were negligent should be made to pay for their negligence, is the objective of the presidential board but to discover ways to make sure that whatever the weakness was it shall be immediately cured."—Editorial, *Post*, Houston, Texas, December 18, 1941.

"Finding should be determined judicially, dispassionately, expertly with all the facts at hand. They should have a value in outlining further military strategy; be a defense aid of the future."—Editorial, *Herald*, Miami, Fla., December 18, 1941.

"Mr. Justice Roberts and his associates are not going to Hawaii to hold a court-martial; they are seeking facts."—Editorial, *Times*, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

[13] "Courts of investigation or inquiry are regularly held by the Navy Department after each disaster, such as the loss of a submarine or the grounding of a ship in peacetime. Some courts are in no sense court-martials but are rather like grand juries. They merely study and present the facts brought out by the testimony. Of course, the data they uncover may later be used for courts-martial, but unless specifically ordered they do not make recommendations."—Editorial, *Journal*, Dayton, Ohio, December 22, 1941.

(2) *Board as responsibility fixing agency.*—18 clippings.

"The board of inquiry, which has no punitive powers, can be likened to an investigating grand jury. It could exonerate all officers concerned in the Pearl Harbor attacks from negligence charges, or it could turn in a report recommending official reprimands or court-martial trials for certain officers."—Headley Donovan, Staff Writer, *Post*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

"The public wants no scapegoats. It does expect that blame will be fixed, if any exists, no matter how high in scale of leadership and direction it runs. The purpose is not vindictiveness, but to eliminate incompetence from the service and replace it with competence for the future."—Editorial, *Pioneer Press*, St. Paul, Minn., December 18, 1941.

[14] "The Presidential Board of Inquiry will weigh those facts and others to determine full responsibility for the near-calamity of December 7 \* \* \*.

"This board is a blame-fixing board. Something happened which ought not to have happened, and responsibility for it is to be placed, if possible, upon certain individuals who failed, by reason of character, capacity or what-not, to meet the demands of the situation, before or after the fact."—Editorial, *Ledger*, Phila. Pa., December 18, 1941.

"The job that remains for the investigating committee is to lay the blame where it belongs and to remove suspicion from those who do not deserve it."—Editorial, *Call*, Allentown, Pa., December 18, 1941.

"The primary objective of the five-man board created by President Roosevelt to investigate why United States armed forces were not on the alert at Pearl Harbor should be the discovery of possible inefficiency among those in charge of defenses at the Hawaiian army and naval base.

"There should be no persecution or 'witch hunts'."—Editorial, *Register*, Mobile, Ala., December 18, 1941.

[15] "This is far from saying that a full investigation of the incident, with a direct indication of where the responsibility rests for the damage wrought, is not essential. Secretary Knox has said that 'the United States services were not on the alert against the surprise attack on Hawaii.' Though the American public to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, equally deceived by the diplomatic gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, it is imperative that they know who was asleep at the switch and why. For, whatever our national naivete respecting codes of honor in warfare, those in charge of our defense should have been prepared even for this abysmal display of trickery."—Editorial, *Dispatch-Herald*, Erie, Pa. December 18, 1941.

"The subject is being thoroughly explored by the joint board of inquiry, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, which has been assigned the task of ascertaining the blame for the Pearl Harbor tragedy."—Editorial, *Times Herald*, Washington, D. C., December 19, 1941.

"It should be kept in mind that this investigation of the surprise at Pearl Harbor, with a view to 'fixing responsibility,' has its major importance not from the standpoint of punishing anybody but rather from the standpoint of finding out where all the faults appeared, so that lessons of them all may be learned and so that those or others like them will not occur again."—Editorial, *Register*, Des Moines, Iowa. December 19, 1941.



"We believe we may look to this board of inquiry to provide an unprejudiced, a complete and a politically fearless account of the Pearl Harbor disaster and that we may accept the verdict as to responsibility for history."—Editorial, *Star*, Rockford, Ill. December 20, 1941.

(3) *Board as an instrument of punishment.* 7 clippings.

"The investigation ordered by the President is called for and if grievous misconduct is proved, it should be penalized."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn., December 16, 1941.

"The country, sorrowing for its dead, will look to the President's investigating board to place the responsibility for these derelictions, and to take proper disciplinary measures."—Editorial, *Vindicator*, Youngstown, Ohio. December 16, 1941.

[17] "The investigation which has been ordered shall place definite responsibility for that laxity. There should be no glossing over of weaknesses and errors. American morale will be aided and our fighting forces made more effective if the unpleasant truths are bared and stern punitive action taken, regardless of the rank affected."—Editorial, *Post*, Butte, Mont. December 16, 1941.

"It is to be presumed that the man or men found to be responsible for our fatal lack of alertness will be removed from command and that punishment will fit the crime—and inattentiveness, inefficiency and incompetence become crimes in time of war.

"The demand for swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness. The compulsion for discovering any guilty leaders springs largely from the principle of self-preservation, which requires that competent men be elevated and incompetent men be removed as the elemental condition of victory."—Editorial, *Star-Times*, St. Louis, Mo. December 17, 1941.

"The investigation mentioned by the Secretary is in progress. It is customary following any Navy or Army disaster. What it may reveal cannot be predicted. If there was carelessness, inattention to duty, culpable neglect, we may rest assured that it will be dis- [18] covered and properly exposed and punished."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Tampa, Fla. December 17, 1941.

"It appears that somebody was asleep at the switch in Hawaii. That is a military crime. In some more militaristic countries than ours, high officers have been shot for less \* \* \*

"We doubt that anybody will be shot for negligence at Pearl Harbor. But anybody who may be found guilty should be given no second chance. He or they should be retired immediately from the armed services, and without public sympathy or any kind words in extenuation."—Editorial, *News*, N. Y. C. December 18, 1941.

"The only investigation of Pearl Harbor that will do the slightest bit of good now is to expose pitilessly the elements of failure in such a way that those same elements will never again contribute to another failure. Scapegoats for past defeats win no future victories."—Editorial, *News*, Beloit, Wis. December 20, 1941.

[19] "The board of inquiry headed by Justice Roberts will, it is hoped, unearth the full story of Pearl Harbor so that adequate measures may be taken to place the blame and punishment, no matter how high the ramifications may reach. Anything less will not satisfy the people."—Editorial, *News-Tribune*, Rome, Ga., December 21, 1941.

B. *Area of Investigation.*—The 25 clippings which discuss the actual area of investigation fall into two classes: 1) 17 suggest what specific aspects of the disaster should be examined at Pearl Harbor and 2) 8 imply that the investigation should include also the higher authorities in Washington.

1. *The aspects of the disaster to be examined at Pearl Harbor*—"The President is appointing a special investigating board, and it will seek the harsh truth to these vital questions:

(a) Was there dereliction of duty prior to the attack?

(b) Was there error of military judgment which contributed to the surprise?

(c) Why was the Japanese 'fifth-column' espionage so successful in Hawaii, as Secretary Knox reports?"—Joseph G. Harrison, Staff correspondent, *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 16, 1941.

[20] "The investigation will disclose facts which are not set out in Secretary Knox's report. Just what was the nature of the deadly fifth-column activities? Why was the dawn patrol ineffective? How are we to account for the absence of a night patrol? By what wily means were the Japanese able to get their

submarines and aircraft carriers to the scene? Why the disparity between the dead and the injured, the former totaling 2729 and the latter 656, a sharp reversal of the usual experience?"—Editorial, *Herald*, Boston, Mass. December 16, 1941.

"Among the matters which the board is expected to investigate is whether warships were manned at the time of the attack and Army aviators were near their stations, whether mechanical devices capable of detecting approaching airplanes were in operation, how many anti-aircraft guns went into action when the Japanese planes appeared and whether naval vessels were equipped with anti-aircraft sighting devices.—News item, *N. Y. Times*, N. Y. C. December 17, 1941.

"In addition to its task of fixing direct responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, the board may be expected to follow through on the implications of two other statements by Secretary Knox: [21] First, that the attack came from several Japanese aircraft carriers, and second, that it was facilitated by fifth column work on a scale comparable to that in Norway. Why, the board must ask, and the American people will want to know, were these carriers not spotted by the regular naval aircraft patrol? And how was it possible for the Japanese to know every detail of the disposition of the ships at Pearl Harbor by the aid of fifth columnists in the islands? One would think that somewhere in the vast ramification of fifth column activity which must have preceded the attack, some inkling would have been discovered by the Army and Navy intelligence services or the civil and military authorities of the islands."—Editorial, *News*, Buffalo, N. Y. December 17, 1941.

"Yet something was wrong somewhere, and it is the government's purpose now to ascertain what precautions were lacking, to what extent fifth columnist activity contributed to Japanese timing and accuracy, and wherein the episode displayed basic weaknesses of defense."—Editorial, *Gazette*, Worcester, Mass. December 17, 1941.

[22] "The board must determine how far into American life the fifth column might have bored and also whether some of our high officers are capable of discharging their duties."—Editorial, *Plain Dealer*, Cleveland, Ohio. December 18, 1941.

"The task of the board of inquiry will be to determine whether there was any negligence on the part of Army, Navy or Air Corps officers that contributed to undue loss of life or damage of property."—Editorial, *Union*, Manchester, N. H. December 18, 1941.

"The inquiry should disclose wherein military laxity permitted a surprise attack and whether that situation involved any derelictions of duty. It should determine whether satisfactory measures have been taken to guard against a new attack. Finally, it should delve into reports of extensive fifth column activity in Hawaii and if the potentialities of that activity require special measures for the protection of mainland defense establishments."—Editorial, *Citizen*, Asheville, N. C. December 18, 1941.

"The presidential commission may be relied upon to discover whether or not the failure of the forces to be on the alert was the [23] result of misjudgment, of dereliction, or conceivably, of a diplomatic policy of avoiding offense to Japan until every possibility of a peaceful settlement had been exhausted."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn. December 18, 1941.

"The board of inquiry appointed by President Roosevelt will determine whether the Pearl Harbor attack was made possible by general incompetency of the commanding officers, a temporary relaxation of vigilance, or a chain of circumstances beyond the control of the officials in charge."—Editorial, *Gazette*, Reno, Nevada. December 18, 1941.

"It should be remembered that the inquiry must determine not only whether these commanders were fulfilling their duty, but whether they had equipment necessary to fulfill that duty."—Editorial, *Times*, Shreveport, La. December 19, 1941.

"The Presidential board that is now investigating the tragedy must attempt to determine how and why Japanese forces were able to make a surprise attack upon the fortress island of Oahu after apparently penetrating far-flung naval scouting lines and close-in reconnaissance by Army planes.

[24] "Certainly, the great loss of ships, planes and lives was largely due not to the fact that the surprise attack was accomplished but that we were not prepared for the attack at all. The following mistakes seem to have been made:

1. Our fighting services, particularly the Navy, definitely under-estimated Japan and were over-confident to the point of complacency, an attitude that was only a



reflection of the national psychology. In manoeuvres and war studies we had frequently reckoned with the possibility of a Japanese attack upon Midway and had deemed as quite practical carrier-based air attacks upon Japan—similar to the one launched by the Japanese upon Pearl Harbor. We had always contemplated the possibility, indeed the probability, that war with Japan would start by a surprise attack without benefit of a declaration, and we had Port Arthur, in the Russo-Japanese war, as a foreboding precedent. Yet we apparently felt so secure behind the barriers of distance that such an attack on Oahu was scarcely considered.

2. There was no unity of command in Hawaii. The admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet had headquarters both afloat and ashore, but his responsibility was the fleet. The admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii) had headquarters at Pearl Harbor, but his responsibility was Pearl Harbor and naval installations ashore in the Hawaiian Islands. The Army's air fields and fortifications were under command of the general commanding the Hawaiian Department. The board investigating the Pearl [25] Harbor tragedy will undoubtedly endeavor to ascertain whether there was adequate coordination or liaison between the commanders.

3. The Navy concentrated too many ships at Pearl Harbor at a time of tension.

4. Apparently the ships in port were not protected by torpedo nets.

5. Apparently much of our gasoline and oil storage in the islands was not underground, or at least was not sufficiently protected.

6. Our Army and Navy planes were jammed together in small areas—the Army's principally at Hickam and Wheeler fields; the Navy's principally at Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor.

"The full study of these and many other factors will undoubtedly be made by the competent investigating board."—Hanson W. Baldwin, Columnist, *N. Y. Times*, N. Y. C., December 21, 1941.

2. *Implications that the investigation should include the higher authorities in Washington*—"Our forces would have defended themselves more effectively had they been expecting an attack. But behind their lack of such knowledge was a native State Department totally and blindly unaware of Japan's true intentions."—Editorial, *Advertiser*, Montgomery, Ala., December 16, 1941.

[26] "It ought to be readily established whether or not the responsible Army and Navy officers in Hawaii were adequately informed, by Washington, of the imminence of danger of attack. If they had been given such information as to point to the imperative need for being on guard, then culpable negligence would be indicated. Were they less accurately advised by Washington, their responsibility would be less direct."—Editorial, *Sun*, Williamsport, Pa., December 17, 1941.

"Whether the apparent laxity was entirely confined to Pearl Harbor or whether it reflects defective policy on the part of the high command in Washington is a matter that ought to be settled conclusively by this formal inquiry."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., December 18, 1941.

"The President's inquiry . . . will show whether the disaster at Pearl Harbor can be blamed upon unpreparedness at Hawaii or whether Washington ought to assume some of the responsibility."—Editorial, *Sun*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941.

"In one respect the board appointed by the President is [27] inadequate for the job the nation expects. It can investigate in Hawaii but not in Washington. It can hardly be expected that a board appointed by the executive can investigate the departments of the executive government, particularly when a majority of its members are under the orders of these departments. Only the legislative branch of the government can do that with either propriety or success."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Chicago, Ill., December 18, 1941.

"The people at home demand a complete investigation, without making a 'goat' of any officer, or the 'whitewashing' of any man whose negligence or incompetency contributed to the loss of American lives, ships and planes. If the lack of alertness extended to the 'higher ups' in War and Navy Departments let the heads fall where found."—Editorial *Capital*, Topeka, Kansas, December 19, 1941.

"The responsibility is really pervasive; it involves our Navy department, our War department, our whole 'administration', indeed our whole nation. Bad as it now seems, we, including our experts, just didn't think the Japanese would attack without warning (though we should have), and in particular we didn't

think they would attack with such aggressive boldness as Hawaii, so far away. The real blame must be diffused."—Editorial, *Register*, Des Moines, Iowa, December 19, 1941.

[28] "The investigation committee named by President Roosevelt probably will look beyond the conduct of the officers who were upon the scene. Certainly this should be the case."—Editorial, *Times*, Gadsden, Ala., December 21, 1941.

"Possibly the Board of Inquiry . . . will lay the blame, or some of it, a good deal nearer than Honolulu. . . . A government engaged in negotiations with a country governed by a group of semi-civilized magnates should not neglect to warn its officers at an island outpost to be on the alert."—Editorial, *Times*, Louisville, Ky., December 22, 1941.

*C. Method of Procedure.*—

Only 3 clippings had suggestions for the actual procedure which the board should follow; all were brief.

"The board of inquiry will have to proceed under fire, so to speak, and its findings examined against the background of what happened after as well as before the surprise attack."—Editorial, *Herald*, Durham, N. C., December 17, 1941.

"The board will have full powers, we trust, to admit oaths and to require the attendance of witnesses, precisely as a naval board of inquiry or a naval court-martial would."—Editorial, *News-Leader*, Richmond, Va., December 17, 1941.

[29] "It is essential that any probe of what happened at Pearl Harbor be conducted in such a way as not to interfere with the conduct of the war, or effect the morale of other army and navy officials."—Editorial, *Enquirer*, Cincinnati, Ohio, December 18, 1941.

[30] *III. Probable Findings of the Commission*

There is little speculation on the probable findings of the investigating board. Of the 236 clippings which refer to the investigation, only six voice any ideas as to its results, and these suggest a wide range of possibilities.

"Perhaps an official investigation is in order to determine why the armed services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack. Perhaps such an investigation isn't in order. If one is made, then also there should be an investigation as to why the Japanese were able to establish such an effective fifth column in Hawaii. The activities of the subversives which made up that column are likely more responsible for the ability of the Japanese to launch this unexpected attack than any other thing."—Editorial, *Arizona Republic*, Phoenix, Ariz., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Aside from any laxity involved, there is also a question whether the report may not show that there were insufficient numbers of ships, planes, listening devices, scouting or patrol vessels, etc., and that these deficiencies were the result of shipment of large numbers of planes, particularly, and other defensive weapons, to other nations under lease-lend. That, of [31] course, is always a possibility. The probability seems to be, however, that the facilities at hand were simply not manned at the time of the attack."—Editorial, *Day*, New London, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Probably that investigation will blast the naval careers of not a few of our officers, perhaps some in high places."—Editorial, *Herald*, Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 18, 1941.

"While members of Congress have no desire to anticipate the findings and conclusions of the board named to investigate Japan's original attack on Hawaii, they are convinced that the basic answer will be 'too few planes'."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., Dec. 23, 1941.

"A correspondent thinks that 'our danger lies within' and that the conservative military mind is more dangerous than fifth columnists."—Editorial, *Post*, Milwaukee, Wisc., Dec. 24, 1941.

"Washington advices report that the Roberts' board of inquiry left Washington with a distinct prejudice against the [32] Hawaiian air, land and naval commanders, who were not alert when the Japs attacked on December 7th. The investigators' perusal of confidential reports convinced them that our Pearl Harbor defenders should be court-martialed."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., Dec. 27, 1941.

[33] *IV. Request that American Public Suspend Judgment*

34 editorials, dated December 16th to December 25th, warn the public against making judgments on the Pearl Harbor disaster until the investigating committee has had a chance to report. These warnings are very brief and almost identical in wording. For that reason, only a few typical statements have been quoted.

"Pending results of the investigation, speculation on the subject does no good and perhaps is injurious."—Editorial, *Press Telegram*, Long Beach, Calif., Dec. 16, 1941.

"The American people should not be prematurely harsh in their opinion, and we do not believe many of them have been. . . . If some cherished the delusion that peace was possible longer than others, the fact remains that all are awake now and facing a task so hard and terribly urgent that it leaves no time for blaming one another. . . . But the assurance now exists that exact justice will be meted out, and this assurance gives no room for self-righteous recriminations based on hindsight."—Editorial, *Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Ky., Dec. 18, 1941.

[34] "Both the President and Secretary Knox chose to await the results of a reliable inquiry board before attempting to allocate responsibility. The public cannot with justice do less."—Editorial, *Union*, Manchester, N. H., Dec. 18, 1941.

"It remains to be seen what the findings of the board will be, and until they are made public it would be well to suspend judgment of the individuals who have been relieved of their command." Editorial, *Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Until its (the board's) findings are made known, it is well, we think, to suspend any personal judgment and to avoid sweeping allegations of any kind going beyond Secretary Knox's declaration."—Editorial, *Age-Herald*, Birmingham, Ala., Dec. 19, 1941.

"Until all the facts are known it is the duty of every one to withhold judgment, confident that the commission the President has appointed will delve deeply, fearlessly and fairly, not alone to fix the blame but to make certain that whatever blunders cost us so dearly at Pearl Harbor will not be repeated."—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

[35] "Let the rest of us spend our energies fighting the war, not denouncing those actively at the front. Such denunciations are meat for the Axis propaganda sausage machines."—Editorial, *Journal-Transcript*, Peoria, Ill., Dec. 22, 1941.

#### [36] V. *The Commission as an Alternative to a Congressional Investigation*

Editorial opinion is unanimous in expressing relief that a congressional investigation has been called off, with the exception of one clipping from the Chicago Tribune, dated December 18, 1941. (See page 27.) The reasons given by the 25 clippings which deal with the subject are as follows:

(a) A congressional investigation would waste time and money since the President has already appointed a highly competent investigating commission.

(b) It would make secrecy in handling evidence impossible.

(c) It might be monopolized by publicity-seeking congressmen.

(d) It concerns a matter which, by rights, should be handled by the President.

"Congress, though impatient as we all are to know the truth, would do well to refrain from investigating on its own hook until the board set up by the President has had time to finish its labors and report. No good and but much confusion will result from having two simultaneous and independent investigations of the same matter. Moreover, ample experience proves that it is all but impossible for a Congressional committee to keep a secret—numbers make for leaks—and it is therefore certain that there are many details which responsible officers could reveal to a military court that they would be unwilling to confide to less sternly disciplined ears. For the present, at least, the conduct of the

[37] war is an executive function which can best be exercised by the Executive Department. Legislative inquiries may later become advisable, but right now it would be better for everybody to keep out from under the feet of those who must do the main job and do it in a hurry."—Editorial, *Sun*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"The Senate seems determined to investigate in parallel manner the Pearl Harbor affair, along with the investigation by the President.

"The investigation should be left with the President at this time, we believe.

"This is no hour for an airing of opposite views.

"It is a waste of time. . . .

"Senator Johnson of Colorado aptly said, when the matter of the investigation came up, that it should be left wholly to the President.

"In this we cannot help but agree. The country has confidence in the leadership of the President. He is our wartime chieftain.

"The investigation, carried on by the Senate, may well be of comfort to our enemies. No such hint of disunity should be allowed to exist."—Editorial, *Post*, Boston, Mass., Dec. 17, 1941.



[38] "What is not needed?"

"The House Committee on Naval Affairs is reported to have under consideration an investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to parallel the investigation to be made by President Roosevelt. In the Senate, Senator Vandenberg has already proposed broader action in the form of a suggestion for establishment of a committee similar to the 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' which functioned during the Civil War.

"The sort of thing is definitely not needed. Congress has important functions to perform and Congressional investigations of executive actions play an important part in the performance of these functions. But investigation of executive actions after the event is one thing and attempted Congressional supervision of executive action during the event is entirely a different thing.

"The 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' during the Civil War reflected no credit on Congress during that time. Nothing of that kind is wanted or needed now. Discipline of those responsible for admitted inefficiency at Pearl Harbor is clearly an executive function. Congressional investigation in anticipation of that action could only muddy the waters.

"This war cannot be operated successfully from the floors of the House and the Senate. Any efforts on the part of any members [39] of Congress to attempt anything of that sort should be nipped in the bud. We are not only fighting a war in which we need unity behind leadership at home. Also we are fighting it in a world in which dictators are waiting and listening for just such division and bickering in democratic government as that which this Vandenberg proposal would inevitably create.

"There will be little support in the country for this proposal in Congress. Indeed, it seems safe to predict that there will be little support for it in Congress itself."—Editorial, *News & Observer*, Raleigh, N. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"In Congress where there had been a minor and quickly squelched movement for an independent investigation, the purpose now is to delay any congressional inquiry at least until after the executive inquiry is completed."—U. P., *News*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Since the board is composed of able and distinguished men, this prompt move toward inquiry will postpone Congressional investigation and perhaps sidetrack it altogether. The latter would probably take months, and feature a lot of extraneous debate, [40] and arrive at no more satisfactory conclusion than the President's board can reach in a fortnight."—Editorial, *Telegraph Herald*, Dubuque, Iowa, Dec. 18, 1941.

"It may not, of course, be the only investigation; for a disturbed Congress wants to get its investigatory grip on this issue and it may do so yet. But at least the character and qualifications of the President's board pushes aside any questions that the lack of alertness in Hawaii will be whitewashed or, on the other hand, that it will become now the subject of a political fishing expedition by Congressmen on the make."—Editorial, *Virginia Pilot*, Norfolk, Virginia, Dec. 18, 1941.

"One can be doubly thankful that the inquiry was not entrusted to the tender mercies of a congressional committee. There are men on Capitol Hill who are only too eager to launch investigations on the familiar witch-hunting pattern. But this is not a time for promoting partisan politics or personal publicity. The public interest will be far better served by the type of inquiry which the President has instituted."—Editorial, *News*, Wilmington, Del., Dec. 18, 1941.

[41] "Congress has abandoned plans for separate legislative investigations in lieu of this official inquiry. This move is to be commended. Many revelations of the Pearl Harbor attack may produce military details valuable to the enemy. A board of experts is much better equipped to ferret out the real truth, assign the blame and maintain the necessary discipline regarding confidential disclosures. This task calls for experienced hands unhampered by partisan or political considerations."—Editorial, *Citizen*, Asheville, N. C., Dec. 18, 1941.

"In large measure the speed may be for the purpose of side-tracking a full-dress congressional inquiry into the situation. But if that is the case, the effect still can be gratifying. It can give the Congress reason to believe that it will not have to threaten an investigation every time it looks as if serious lapses have occurred, that it can depend on the high command to take stern action and take it quickly."—Editorial, *Register*, New Haven, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"In view of the character and intentions of the presidential board it seems hardly necessary for the House of Representatives to interfere with an investigation of its own. Such an [42] investigation would only make the job

of the executive more difficult and would result in more people knowing the details of the Pearl Harbor attack than is advisable for the security of the nation and its Pacific defenses. And generally speaking, the less interference by Congress in army and navy affairs, the better will the two forces be able to perform their jobs."—Editorial, *Register*, Mobile, Ala., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Here is a clear signal to Congress that for the time being at least it should keep its hands off. One notes that in each chamber certain elements, distinguished by their isolationist members, are itching to launch simultaneous inquiries of their own to serve as sounding boards for critics whose indignation over the setback at Hawaii is only matched by their previous obstruction of the whole defense effort. Happily the Senate leaders seem agreed that the President's investigation should forestall any similar action in their chamber. In the House, meanwhile, the pressure to set up a parallel investigation is still a threat. May we say to our Representatives that the less they attempt to run this war the closer will come victory?"—Editorial, *Herald Tribune*, N. Y. C. Dec. 17, 1941.

The same printed as an editorial in the *Dispatch-Herald*, Erie, Pennsylvania, December 18, 1941.

[43] "The worst thing that could happen, apart from the incident itself, would be to have it bandied about in a congressional investigation where speeches and smears would inevitably rear their heads and the quest for the truth would eventually be bogged down in a mass of oratory that completely obscured the issue."—Editorial, *Sun-Democrat*, Paducah, Ky., Dec. 19, 1941.

#### [44] VI. Need for Speed

Twenty-eight clippings mention the need for speed in dealing with the Pearl Harbor episode. In some cases comment is confined to an approving statement that "the President acted swiftly". Others go into more lengthy discourses on the need for conducting the investigation with dispatch in order not to minimize the value of the lesson to be learned. Interest in this subject ranged from the 16th to the 20th after which it was dropped completely.

"Acting with commendable promptness the government announces that a joint army-navy board will investigate the surprise 'stab-in-the-back' delivered by the Japanese against Pearl Harbor . . .

"Already both President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox have set an example for the investigation board in the swiftness with which they have acted. They realize that a long drawn-out or delayed inquiry will minimize the value of the lesson to be learned."—Editorial, *Journal*, Dayton, Ohio, Dec. 17, 1941.

"There is reason for quick action, too, in determination of the whole truth. We have a very tough chore ahead and [45] every delay only makes it tougher."—Editorial, *Monitor*, Concord, N. H., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The whole proceedings were given further quickening by the investigation order of President Roosevelt, whose determination to get to the bottom of it and let the chips fall where they may, was enthusiastically received by the people."—Editorial, *Tribune*, LaCrosse, Wis., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The president has acted quickly on the report of Secretary of Navy Knox and the board of inquiry must make quick and full investigation . . .

"We want no whitewashing, no procrastination."—Editorial, *Journal-Times*, Racine, Wis., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The demand for swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness . . .

"There is also the fact that, so long as it is suspected that the navy harbors incompetent admirals, the entire top group of officers is under a cloud of opprobrium and distrust. For this reason, it is probably a matter of utmost urgency to able [46] officers themselves that responsibility for Pearl Harbor be fixed as speedily as possible."—Editorial, *Star-Times*, St. Louis, Mo., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The President has acted with commendable promptness in appointing a five-man board to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7th. Anything less than an immediate, thorough-going inquiry would have laid the Chief Executive, as well as the Naval and Military authorities in Hawaii, open to the severest criticism."—Editorial, *Record*, Troy, N. Y., Dec. 18, 1941.

"There is a healthy appearance here of some fast action . . .

"At any rate the evidence to date of speedy and impartial inquiry into the facts and of remedial action no doubt will react well on the population as a whole."—Editorial, *Register*, New Haven, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The investigators, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, will have the confidence of the country and it is to be hoped that there will be no unnecessary

delay in performing [47] the task and making a full report to the country."—Editorial, *Journal*, Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

"A board of inquiry, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, is on its way to the islands where all the facts will be developed as rapidly as justice and fairness will permit."—Editorial, *Telegraph*, Macon, Ga., Dec. 20, 1941.

#### [48] VII. Demotion of Commanders

Editorial opinion is unanimous in approving the demotion of the commanders. Interest in this subject appears only on the 18th and 19th when 49 clippings discuss it.

In some cases, these statements do not bear directly upon the investigation, but they do indicate the extent to which the two are related in the minds of the public.

In general, the clippings fall into the following classes:

(A) 25 accept Secretary Stimson's statement that it was necessary to relieve the commanders of their responsibilities while they were involved in an investigation.

(B) 12 feel that it was wise to remove the commanders, guilty or not, in order to restore the public's confidence, and to show that both our government and our armed forces are ready for decisive action.

(C) 11 feel that Knox's report gives sufficient evidence to prove the commanders guilty, and to justify their immediate demotion.

(D) 1 feels that the demotion of the commanders was unavoidable but regrets the humiliation involved.

A. *Acceptance of Secretary Stimson's Reasons for Removing the Commanders.*—"As the inquiry starts, the Army and Navy have relieved of their posts the high military and naval officers in command of Hawaiian defenses at the time of the attack. Regardless of whether these men were guilty of negligence or are wholly innocent, this was the wisest thing to do. It would have been poor policy to leave [49] the responsibilities of command to officers facing the rigors and distractions of a formal investigation."—Editorial, *News*, Wilmington, Del., December 18, 1941.

"By relieving the responsible officers of duty before the investigation starts, furthermore, the administration has made certain that facts, not personalities, will be most important."—Editorial, *Repository*, Canton, Ohio, December 18, 1941.

"Obviously, they (the commanders) could not continue to execute their duties and at the same time remain available for the investigating commission. Without responsibility for the defense of Hawaii in the immediate future, these officers who were in command when the first attack was made, will be able to cooperate more fully with the investigators, and, if necessary, to prepare their own defense."—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., December 19, 1941.

"They were the officers responsible for the sea, land and air defenses of the islands and the conduct of those defenses is now the concern of a presidential board of investigation. It would not have been fair to them, to the men under their command or to the nation to retain them in their posts while their administrations [50] were under critical examination."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn., December 19, 1941.

B. *Approval of the demotion as a move to restore public confidence in the government and armed forces.*—"The promptness of the decision in Washington to make these drastic moves is a good omen for the conduct of the war, now and in the future. It must prove heartening to the entire country, and its effect upon the entire armed establishment will be invigorating."—Editorial, *Telegram*, Worcester, Mass., December 18, 1941.

"The forthright action of the War and Navy departments in completely revamping the Hawaiian command and that of the Pacific fleet, following immediately upon the President's appointment of a formal board of inquiry, serves to dissipate completely any lingering fear on the part of the American people that the Pearl Harbor affair would be 'whitewashed' or any incompetents retained in posts of command in any of the branches of the armed service."—Editorial, *Herald-Dispatch*, Huntington, West Virginia, December 18, 1941.

"The sudden shift of ranking officers in Hawaii should be beneficial to the armed forces and the American public. It re- [51] flects a determination to eliminate from posts of greatest responsibility those who may lack the capacity for such commands."—Editorial, *Star*, Muncie, Indiana, December 19, 1941.



"Removal of the three men in a way makes the penalty lighter than if just one had been singled out, and that perhaps is fair. But the nation as a whole could not have complete confidence without changes in responsible leadership in the Pacific."—Editorial, *Globe*, Joplin, Missouri. December 19, 1941.

"Without waiting for a report from the president's board of investigation, the administration has removed officers in command when Pearl Harbor was attacked and appointed their successors. To what extent they were responsible for what happened will not be known until the board of investigators finishes its work. But neither the administration nor the people felt that confidence could be sustained or stimulated by their retention."—Editorial, *Independent*, Massillon, Ohio. December 19, 1941.

"Secretary of War Stimson's statement on the changes in the fleet and Hawaiian commands—the most extensive statement made on this subject—cites as reasons 1) the 'unpreparedness' of December 7, [52] which the War Department as well as the Navy Department now officially admits; 2) the necessary 'reorganization of air defenses in the islands; and 3) the avoidance of the situation that would result if the officers were still responsible for the security of the islands at a time when they were 'under searching investigation.'

"All these reasons add up to the hard fact that officers in charge at a time of disaster rarely retain their posts. This is an old doctrine, held to generally by all governments and all nations and extending far back into military and naval history. It may involve injustice. But sometimes injustice can be corrected. The immediate need is the restoration of confidence, among officers and men and in the country itself; and this restoration of confidence begins nearly always from the installation of new commanders."—Editorial, *Virginian-Pilot*, Norfolk, Va. December 19, 1941.

C. *Approval of the demotion of the commanders on the evidence of Secretary Knox's report.*—"We know from Secretary Knox's statement that there was negligence. That is sufficient reason why both the commander of the fleet and the commander of the shore forces should have been relieved of their commands."—Editorial, *Times*, Watertown, N. Y. December 18, 1941.

[53] "The removal of the admiral, a lieutenant general, and a major general who were in command at Hawaii a week ago Sunday was to be expected. It is a military maxim that there is no excuse for surprise. The service regulations of both the army and navy require every officer to take adequate precautions for the security of his own force, regardless of orders or lack of orders from his superiors. The officers who have been removed evidently failed to obey this first military commandment."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Chicago, Ill., December 18, 1941.

"It may turn out that Admiral Kimmel and Generals Short and Martin had given the proper orders that should have insured alertness at Pearl Harbor. But even so they are responsible for the obvious lack of preparation. An officer's duty won't stop with giving orders. Even more important, his duty is to see they are carried out.

"It would be disquieting, indeed, to think that our main fleet and our most important outpost were to be continued in the hands of men responsible for the calamity of December 7."—Editorial, *Record*, Phila., Penna., December 19, 1941.

D. *Approval of the commanders' demotion with regret for the humiliation involved.*

[54] "We say the apparent necessity for such action will be regretted because any of us can understand and sympathize with the kind of humiliation such action entails for the officers concerned and for the services as well. Because despite the fact many of their fellow citizens will be constrained to withhold final judgment until after the President's investigating committee has made a full report, so far as the public generally is concerned, the high command in charge on that fateful Sunday of the Japanese attack is already damned for having been 'asleep at the switch'.

"There will be no disputing the position of the administration, however, that whatever the facts may have been, it would be inadvisable not to remove those men from their commands pending the inquiry scheduled."—Editorial, *Journal*, Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

#### [55] VIII. Publication of Evidence

14 clippings suggest the desirability of publishing the results of the investigation. Of these, 10 emphasize the American public's right to know the facts, while four recognize the possibility that it might be better to withhold them at least until some future date. Interest in this subject ranged from the 16th to the 19th after which there is no further mention of it.

A. *Public's right to know.*—"The findings should be given to the people. They are entitled to know the whole truth. And when the worst is known it will arouse the people of this nation to give of their energy, their wealth and all their resources, to the end that Japan and her Axis partners may pay in full for the crimes they are committing in their effort to destroy freedom and liberty throughout the world."—Editorial, *Herald*, Spartanburg, S. C., Dec. 16, 1941.

"Let us not confuse the immediate issues of the war by recriminations now, but let us bear in mind that Congress and the people have a right to know all the facts."—Editorial, *News*, Buffalo, N. Y., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The blame for the lack of necessary precaution should be determined because the American people are entitled to know [56] the facts.

"The secretary himself is involved, but whether open to any criticism will be, if such is the case, revealed by the testimony which should be available.

"The nation has a right to know what might have been done to soften the unexpected blow."—Editorial, *Journal-Times*, Racine, Wis., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Though the American public to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, equally deceived by the diplomatic gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, it is imperative that they know who was asleep at the switch and why. For, whatever our national naivete respecting codes of honor in warfare, those in charge of our defense should have been prepared even for this abysmal display of trickery."—Editorial, *Herald-Tribune*, N. Y. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"But whoever was to blame for it all, no matter how high their positions, that fact should be made known to the people of the U. S. who, after all, have seen vast destruction to their Navy and their planes, great loss of life of their sons and a sizable hole punched in the defenses of their liberties [57] and the independence of their country."—Editorial, *Grand Rapids*, Mich., Dec. 18, 1941.

B. *Recognition of need for secrecy.*—In commenting on Secretary Knox's statement that we are all entitled to know the facts, a Jackson, Miss., paper says:

"By 'all' we presume he means that the people also are entitled to this knowledge, and we believe that in due time it will be given to them."—Editorial, *Clarion-Ledger*, Jackson, Miss., Dec. 17, 1941.

"How much of the information gathered will be released to the public is a question of course; it may be that the inquiry will develop certain fundamental weaknesses in our defensive system that ought not to become public property."—Editorial, *Day*, New London, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Unless military necessity commands complete silence, it might be helpful for the people to know just how it was that fifth column activities made themselves manifest in Hawaii. Secretary Knox has revealed that the seditionists were active and effective, but he has not told the country just what it was [58] that those traitors did. Perhaps there are grave and sufficient reasons why this information should be withheld. If it would disserve the national interest for this information to be supplied, nothing more should ever be said about it. No American has any right to seek information whose disclosure might imperil the country."—Editorial, *Oklahoman*, Oklahoma City, Okla., Dec. 18, 1941.

"It is to be assumed that the investigation will be held behind closed doors and that the reasons for secret proceedings may also cause parts of the board's final report to the President as commander-in-chief to be held confidential. But on the broad issue of lack of alertness and responsibility for it, the public expects the board to be plain spoken—and it probably will be."—Editorial, *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., Dec. 18, 1941.

A survey of popular news magazines of varied editorial policy reveals little deviation from newspaper opinion. The *Nation* for December 20, 1941, expresses approval of the President's appointments, and hopes the commission will not pull its punches. The *Nation* for the following week and the *New Republic* for both December 22, and December 29, 1941, state that though definite blame cannot be laid as yet, it is possible that "Munich-minded" Washington officials are primarily responsible for the disaster. The Henry Luce publications, *Time* and *Life* both for December 29, 1941, make no statement of opinion except to praise Justice Owen J. Robert's chairman of the commission, and give a brief summary of his career.



The *National Week*, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1941, announces the appointment of the commission, adding that its scope of inquiry is broad enough to have a real bearing on future policies. By implication, the article goes on to suggest that the commission may disclose lack of co-ordination between jealous army and navy rivals as the real cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

[60] The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, December 25, 1941 makes no reference to the investigating commission, but gives the President a slightly two-edged compliment on his action in the Pearl Harbor affair. "The President apparently has not hesitated to deal vigorously with military dereliction or incompetence. On the contrary, he seems to have acted with dispatch, and so far as can be judged, with good sense. He should act with similar strength on other fronts."

The *New Masses*, December 30, 1941, approves the President's prompt action in appointing an investigating commission in the following terms: "The fact that our Commander-in-Chief has acted with such decision and speed will bolster popular morale and discipline. It will serve as a rebuke to those congressmen who were itching to make political capital out of the nation's defeat at Pearl Harbor."

Monthlies dated through January, 1942 including *Harpers, Fortune, Atlantic Monthly*, etc., went to press before the event so contained no comment. This is likewise true of those magazines such as the *Saturday Evening Post, Liberty*, and *Collier's* which are not concerned primarily with last minute news reports. No mention of the attack appeared in the *Financial Age*, December 22, 1941, or the *Financial World* of the same date.

[61] OFFICIAL UNITED STATES DISPATCHES

An examination of cable dispatches received at the State Department since the Pearl Harbor disaster reveals no pertinent data. No attempt has been made to explore the war or Navy Department data as it is assumed that it will be examined directly by Justice Roberts' Commission.

CANADIAN PRESS

A partial survey of the Canadian press reveals only one reference to the investigating commission which appears in the *Toronto Daily Star*, December 18, 1941 as follows:

"The United States has removed its three principal officers in the sea, land and air forces at Hawaii so that they may face an investigating tribunal. These men, if they offended at all offended by a sin of omission \* \* \* the British should remember that a disaster to Britain not less in seriousness than the disaster to the U. S. at Hawaii occurred off the coast of Malaya because of the deliberate, pre-meditated action of someone who terribly underrated air power.

"The American press thinks that the shake-up in the U. S. High Command indicates an intention to use air power freely to rectify the adverse situation in the Far East."

[62] No discussion of the subject has taken place in the Canadian Parliament which last met November 5, 1941.

BRITISH PRESS

This survey has been much limited by the fact that only the very few British newspapers which we received by air mail have been available for examination.

The only reference to the investigating commission found thus far appeared in the *London Times*, December 18, 1941, as follows:

"The membership of the board which will inquire into the Japanese attack on Hawaii is such as to deserve the fullest public confidence. Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, its chairman, is a man of keen and powerful mind; Major-General Frank McCoy will be remembered for his work in the Far East at the time of the Lytton Commission; Rear-Admiral William Standley has been Chief of Naval Operations; Rear-Admiral Joseph Reeves is a former Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Battle Fleet, and Brigadier-General McNarney is still on duty with the Army Air Force."

Official Reports of the latest House of Commons and House of Lords debates include no discussion of the Pearl Harbor attack nor of the President's appointment of the investigating commission.

[63]

AUSTRALIAN PRESS

No Australian newspapers are available as yet. We have, however, established contact with Mr. Alan S. Watt, Secretary of the Australian Legation who has been good enough to check through the cabled dispatches to the Legation from Australia. He reports that he finds no reflection of Australian opinion about the Pearl Harbor investigating commission to date.

## OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE

Newspapers are not available, and no reflections of opinion have come in from other parts of the Empire as yet.

## FOREIGN SHORTWAVE BROADCASTS

The shortwave broadcasts from Germany, Italy and Japan refer to the appointment of the investigating commission with their usual exaggerated ridicule.

The German radio asserts that the President, not the Army and Navy ought to be investigated, and adds that the impression made on the English was far from favorable. Broadcasts from Rome assert that the United States is receiving just reward for their ridicule of Japan. The investigation, according to the Italians, is simply an admission of incompetence and confusion.

[64] Japanese propaganda quotes German commentators as saying that through the investigation commission, Admiral Kimmel and General Martin are being punished for mistakes made by the Washington administration. "In other words, they are being sacrificed so that President Roosevelt and Colonel Knox will be able to escape from their responsibility for the Hawaiian disaster."

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

This survey was made from the 400 United States newspapers, which are reviewed daily by the Press Intelligence Division of the Office of Government Reports. 834 clippings discussed the Pearl Harbor disaster. Of these 236 refer to the investigating commission. 16 United States magazines and 6 Canadian newspapers have also been checked. The only foreign publications available were the London *Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the Official Reports of the Debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords. Foreign broadcasts were taken from transcripts made by the Federal Communications Commission, December 19-22, 1941.

## EXHIBIT No. 4 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

## THE TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII

25 Dillingham Building Annex, Telephone 3183

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Rev. PAUL B. WATERHOUSE  
*President*  
PAUL B. SANBORNE  
*Vice-President*

CHRIS J. BENNY  
*Executive Secretary*

HAROLD C. SMITH  
*Secretary*  
WILLIAM C. FURER  
*Treasurer*

HONOLULU HAWAII, Jan. 3, 1942.

HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS,  
*Chairman and Members of the Special Investigating Committee,*  
*Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu Hawaii.*

GENTLEMEN: The Temperance forces of America, Throughout the years, have consistently advocated sobriety both in industry and in the military and naval services. Failure to be guided in industry by rules of sobriety undeniably results in economic losses, but failure by the armed forces of the United States to observe a condition of strict alertness and sobriety at a time of unprecedented emergency might easily at such a time spell the humiliation of a Nation.

The timing of the enemy's treacherous blow for 7:55 on the first Sunday morning following pay day was no mere accident. It was based on the well known but grim and awful fact that we have only half a navy, half an army, on saturday night and sunday morning.

Literally thousands of our men of the services, both enlisted and commissioned, augmented by like thousands of defense workers were joined in a Saturday night whirlwind which, with ever increasing tempo, was bent upon making the approaching Christmas Holy Season, the worst and wettest ever seen in Hawaii. In the tragic act which befell us, the prophet of old might have visioned the hand of a wrathful God stretched forth to stay the impending desecration.

The American people everywhere are seriously asking for the truth about December seventh. The Temperance League of Hawaii is not asking that your Commission apply censure or criticism. Regret and grief already exist. But we earnestly beseech you to use the opportunity to impress upon the American public the seriousness of the present situation; to awaken them from a state of self-complacency and delusion into which they have been lulled by the press, by the movie and by the politician and above all to bring about a realization of the unpleasant yet inevitable fact that every ounce of material and every unit of energy must be devoted to the gigantic challenge of winning the war. This task cannot be accomplished when millions in money and men will continue to be used for a purpose other than the great challenge,—for a purpose which, in fact, will hinder and hamper the efforts of industry and the efficiency and alertness of our military and naval services.

In view of the gravity of the situation we believe it to be within the sphere of your duty and responsibility to urge that alcoholic liquor be immediately barred from both navy and army, and from all vital industries.

This request is prayerfully submitted for your serious consideration.

PAUL B. WATERHOUSE,  
*President.*  
CHRIS J. BENNY,  
*Executive Secretary.*

ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,  
*Sunday, January 4, 1942.*

Rev. PAUL B. WATERHOUSE,  
*President, The Temperance League of Hawaii,  
25 Dillingham Building Annex, Honolulu, Hawaii.*

DEAR MR. WATERHOUSE: Mr. Justice Roberts, Chairman of the Investigation Committee appointed by the President, and now in Honolulu, has directed me to acknowledge your courteous letter to him of January 3rd, also signed by Mr. Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary.

The Commission will hold hearings tomorrow, Monday, January 5th, in Room 300, in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, has asked me to invite you and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission tomorrow afternoon between two o'clock and four-thirty, in order that the Commission may have the benefit of your testimony about the statements of facts in your letter, and perhaps in somewhat more detail. At the same time there could be an opportunity to discuss your recommendations.

The exact time during the afternoon for your suggested appearance is for the moment somewhat in doubt, as the Commission will not learn until tomorrow morning what time Governor Poindexter will appear in answer to the Commission's invitation. I suggest, therefore, that you telephone me tomorrow morning at about eleven o'clock, so that a definite hour may be fixed.

I am assuming that you will be willing to accept this invitation. Should your engagements tomorrow afternoon interfere it can probably be made possible to receive you on the following day, although the Commission's time in Honolulu is necessarily limited.

I am enclosing a copy of this letter to Mr. Benny for his information.

Sincerely yours,

*Recorder of the Commission to Investigate the Circumstances of the  
Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.*



## EXHIBIT No. 5 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

No. 3772

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

*To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:*

I Certify That hereto annexed is a true copy of the document described below, which is in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States and is on file in The National Archives, to wit:

Executive order No. 8983, dated December 18, 1941.

In testimony whereof, I, Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States, have hereunto caused the Seal of The National Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Administrative Secretary of The National Archives, in the District of Columbia, this 24th day of December 1941.

[SEAL]

SOLON J. BUCK  
Archivist of the United States  
By THAD PAGE  
Administrative Secretary.

## EXECUTIVE ORDER

APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII.

Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following:

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;  
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;  
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;  
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;  
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D. C., will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D. C., and submit its report direct to the President of the United States.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure, [2] to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation, and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 18, 1941.

## EXHIBIT No. 6 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

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FROM: JAG WASH D. C.

TO: COM 14

STANLEY FOR LT COL BROWN X HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 259  
APPROVED TWENTY THREE DECEMBER

## H. J. Res. 259

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AT THE FIRST SESSION; BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY, THE THIRD DAY OF JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE

JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACK ON HAWAII, TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND THE PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, PAPERS, AND DOCUMENTS

Whereas on December 18, 1941, the President by Executive order appointed Owen J. Roberts, William H. Standley, Joseph M. Reeves, Frank R. McCoy, and Joseph T. McNarney a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That (a) the commission appointed by the President by Executive order, dated December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (in this Act called the "commission"), may, or by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may designate may, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions at any place within the United States or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States. The commission or any member of the commission when so authorized by the commission shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation by the commission. The commission or any member of the commission or any agent or agency designated by the commission for such purpose may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States at any designated place of hearing.

(b) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person under subsection (a), any district court of the United States or the United States courts of any Territory or possession, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the commission shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the commission, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

(c) Process and papers of the commission, its members, agent, or agency, may be served either upon the witness in person or by registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be proof of the same, and the return post-office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the commission, its members, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.

(d) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(e) All process of any court to which application may be made under this Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(f) The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the President, shall furnish the commission, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the commission.

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.*

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EXHIBIT No. 7 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
206 Dillingham Bldg.

HONOLULU, T. H., *January 9, 1942.*

Personal and Confidential

*Memorandum to*

Mr. Justice Roberts:

Mr. Hoover wishes me to inform you he has received information from a source heretofore reliable that during the time Admiral Richardson was in charge of the Navy at Pearl Harbor he refused to permit the fleet to anchor in Pearl Harbor on the ground that the Harbor was unsafe because it was not defensible if the fleet should be attacked there.

Admiral Richardson is reported to have required the fleet always to anchor in Lahaina Roads outside Pearl Harbor and to have advised the Navy Department that he would resist efforts to have him anchor the fleet in Pearl Harbor "at the risk of losing his command."

For your personal and confidential information, the following radiogram was sent to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and the Foreign Minister at Tokyo, December 6, 1941, by Kita, Japanese Consul General at Honolulu:

"On the evening of the fifth the BB Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. "Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB-9  
CL-3  
DD-17  
AM-3

"Ships in dock:

CL-4  
DD-2  
(CA and CB all gone)

"P. S. CB cannot be found in the fleet."

---

Memorandum to  
Mr. Justice Roberts

JANUARY 9, 1942.

Again for your confidential information, the letter symbols in the above message is the official naval code for their ships:

BB—battleships  
CL—light cruisers  
DD—destroyers  
AM—minesweepers  
CA—heavy cruisers  
CB—aircraft carriers

According to my information, the above information is correct and that these ships were actually docked or moored at Pearl Harbor on the sixth.

This office now has information from a Japanese taxi driver that he drove a member of the Japanese Consulate to Pearl Harbor Peninsula on December 6 to look at the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and the foregoing information was undoubtedly obtained by the Consulate member at that time. It is also now known that the same Consulate member, who came here March 27, 1941, has been engaged in espionage and reporting fleet movements to the Japanese Government since that time.

Again for your confidential information I am quoting a radiogram that was sent by Kita, the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, to the Foreign Minister at Tokyo. The date of this message is not known.

"1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further."

Any investigation under Clause 2 of the use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships would have necessarily had to be made in Pearl Harbor proper as no information could have been secured by visual observations from outside of the Harbor as the nets would not have been visible.

This leads me to the conclusion that from this and the accuracy of fleet movements previously reported the Japanese Government through its Consul General here has someone right inside Pearl Harbor who is furnishing this information and that visual verification of the information reported from the inside is made by Japanese Consular Agents from vantage points around Pearl Harbor merely as a check on the information furnished by their informant or informants on the inside.

I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you personally some phases of the situation out here, particularly some of the activities of the FBI in Japanese espionage matters, as well as the practical effects of the delimitation agreement.

Very sincerely,

R. L. SHIVERS,  
R. L. Shivers,  
*Special Agent in Charge.*

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## EXHIBIT No. 8 (NAVY PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

## DRUNKS TURNED OVER TO MP &amp; SP

To: *Military Police*

——— : Co. M 19th Inf. Sch. Brks.

Arrested at the Service Cafe at 9:30 PM 12-6-41 by Officer T Sato for being drunk, staggering

——— : Schofield Barracks

Arrested at Maunakea & Beretania Sts. at 12:35 AM 12-7-41 by Officer A Lee for being drunk

To: *Shore Patrol*

——— : S S Dobbin

Arrested at Nuuanu & Hotel Sts. at 11:45 PM 12-6-41 by Officer A Lee for being drunk

——— : Pearl Harbor

Arrested at Aala Park by Officer J C Lee at 12:30 AM 12-7-41

## ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL

1. ——— Lt., Naval Air Station PH was involved in a minor accident with ——— of 3450 Maunalei Ave. at about 8:30 PM 12-6-41 somewhere on Ala Wai Blvd. Both cars were going straight ahead, no violation indicated.

2. ——— of 251st. C. A. Camp Malakole was involved in a minor accident with ——— of Hawaiian Village at 2:30 PM 12-6-41 on Kam Highway near new Pearl Harbor Gate. ——— had been drinking and was trying to overtake ———'s car. ——— took off after accident and information broadcasted. No disposition available.

3. ——— of Co. D 298th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was involved in a \$275. accident with ——— of House S34 Waipahu at 9:50 PM, 12-6-41 on Kam Highway Honolulu side of Waipahu-Schofield junction and ——— was injured, receiving an abrasion to left ear, left elbow and back; taken to Waipahu Hospital and later discharged. ——— had been drinking, was trying to make a left turn and was on the wrong side of the road. Charged with Sec. 6.01 TC Report No. B-44182

4. ——— of Co. E, 19th. Inf. Scho. Bks. drove his car off the Kaukonahua Road cut-off at Haleiwa at 12:00 noon 12-6-41. Damages \$15. and none injured. ——— had been drinking and was charged with Sec. 6281 SL '41. Report No. B-44001

5. ———, Sgt. of Batt. C. 98th. C. A., Scho. Bks. drove off the road on Red Hill road about 4:30 AM 12-6-41 when his car skidded. \$125 damages, none injured. No disposition noted. No report number.

## ARRESTS AND COMPLAINTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL DECEMBER 6, 1941

1. ———, Co. A. 27th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was arrested at 12.47 AM for tampering with vehicle belonging to ——— parked at S32 Hauoli St. Charged with Attempted Malicious Conversion and defendant turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43865.

2. ——— of USS Cassin reported being struck by ——— of Hon. Rapid Transit Co. at Alapai and King St. at 1.02 AM when he attempted to stop a fight between Mrs. ———, his companion and ———. Desired no prosecution. Report No. B-43867.

3. ——— of USS Rigel, PH was arrested at 9:40 PM at Kalakaua & Kuhio Ave. for trying to start auto belonging to Detective ———. Referred to Shore Patrol for disposition. Report No. B-43976.

4. ——— 1Sth. Air Base, Hickam Field was found lying in the toilet in the rear of lobby of Army and Navy YMCA about 8:00 PM with cut on head. Treated by Dr. ——— for lacerated wound right post parietal scalp. Strong alcoholic breath. Subject did not know what happened to himself. Turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43986.

5. An unknown sailor was apprehended by the Emergency Hospital attendants for tampering with Emergency Hospital ambulance in front of Star Grill, 255



N. King St. 12-7-41 at 12:30 AM. Turned over to Shore Patrol for disposition before arrival of police officer, therefore, name unavailable. Report No. B-43984.

6. ——— of Naval Air Base was treated at Emergency Hospital for two inch wound on right side of face. He claimed to have been injured 12-7-41 about 2:26 AM when glass from windshield of auto he was riding flew back and cut his face when car sideswiped a City and County street sweeper. Report B-44033.

7. ——— 21st. Signal Co. Scho. Bks. claimed to have been short changed by taxi driver from the Shamrock Taxi, 12-7-41 at 1:45 AM. Gave taxi driver \$5. and didn't receive any change. Instructed to swear out a warrant but failed to do so. Report No. B-44035.

POLICE DEPARTMENT  
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU  
Honolulu, Hawaii

JANUARY 7, 1942.

HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS,  
*Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court,*  
*Honolulu, T. H.*

DEAR SIR: The attached is a report showing complaints and reports received by this Department on December 6, 1941, relative to Army and Navy personnel.

If there is anything further that we can do to assist you in any matter, kindly be assured that this Department is at your command.

Very truly yours,

W. A. GABRIELSON,  
W. A. Gabrielson,  
*Chief of Police.*

WAG:DL  
Encl

JANUARY 9, 1942.

MR. W. A. GABRIELSON,  
*Chief of Police, City and County of Honolulu,*  
*Honolulu, Hawaii.*

MY DEAR MR. GABRIELSON: Mr. Justice Roberts has asked me to acknowledge with his thanks your letter of January 7, 1942, enclosing a report showing complaints and reports received by your Department on December 6, 1941, relative to Army and Navy personnel.

Yours sincerely,

*Secretary, Commission to Investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor.*

EXHIBIT No. 9 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION  
Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941

Area	July 1, 1940	July 1, 1941
City of Honolulu.....	180,986	200,158
City and County of Honolulu (Exclusive of Honolulu City).....	79,899	110,345
City of Hilo.....	24,341	22,667
County of Hawaii (Exclusive of Hilo City).....	49,222	45,731
County of Kalawao.....	465	484
County of Kauai.....	35,956	33,479
County of Maui.....	55,785	52,495
Total.....	426,654	465,339

Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941—Continued

Race	July 1, 1940		July 1, 1941	
	Citizens	Noncitizens	Citizens	Noncitizens
Hawaiian.....	14,359	-----	14,246	----- = 14,246
Part Hawaiian.....	50,470	-----	52,445	----- = 52,445
Puerto Rican.....	8,322	-----	8,460	----- = 8,460
Caucasian.....	103,700	2,681	139,299	2,323 = 141,627
Chinese.....	24,245	4,589	24,886	4,351 = 29,237
Japanese.....	121,312	36,678	124,351	35,183 = 159,534
Korean.....	4,517	2,337	4,628	2,253 = 6,881
Filipino.....	17,109	35,498	18,050	34,010 = 52,060
All others.....	807	30	832	17 = 849
	344,841	81,813	387,197	78,142 = 465,339

Apr. 1, 1940, Census, T. of H., 423,330.

## EXHIBIT NO. 10 (NAVY, PACKET NO. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 16, 1941]

## ESCAPED ENEMY PILOT KILLED BY HAWAIIAN PAIR ON NIIHAU

## JAPANESE FLIER THREATENED TO KILL ISLANDERS

A desperate Japanese pilot, forced down on the small, peaceful island of Niihau, off Kauai, held the village at bay with machinegun and side arms before he was captured and killed by a six-foot Hawaiian and his wife who "got mad" when the enemy pilot shot the Hawaiian three times, according to a radio story broadcast by station KTOH, Kauai, last night.

Relating on of the most thrilling stories of the Pacific war, the narrator told how Benjamin Kanahale, powerful Niihau native, and his wife finally brought to bay the brutal invader who had threatened to kill everyone in sight.

## GIVEN LIBERTY OF ISLAND

It was reported that the plane had been forced down on Niihau following the Sunday, Dec. 7, raid on Pearl Harbor. Natives took the pilot's machinegun and side-arms from him and then gave him the liberty of the island. The pilot is said to have immediately contacted two Japanese residing on Niihau, Harada and Shintani, who on the Friday following the landing persuaded the natives to hand over the fire-arms including the machinegun. The three Japanese, it was reported, thereupon established an armed camp, each standing an eight hour watch to prevent anyone escaping to bring help from Kauai.

In spite of this a Hawaiian, named Hauila, stole away and with a group of cowboys rode 18 miles across the island through a hail of machinegun fire and managed to take off for Kauai in a whaleboat. They reached Waimea 10 hours later (Saturday morning) after rowing steadily through heavy seas.

## ARMY SQUAD DISPATCHED

Hauila's party contacted army authorities on Kauai and Lt. Jack Mizuba and a squad from the 299th Infantry returned in the whaleboat to Niihau.

In the meantime, it was learned, the enemy pilot had sent Shintani out to look for Hauila. Failing to locate his quarry, Shintani disappeared into the woods. The flier then asked Kanahale to aid him and the remaining Japanese, Harada, Kanahale, pretending to agree, set out with them in search of those who were missing. During the search, according to Kanahale, Harada became nervous and, obtaining a shotgun from the pilot, placed it against his stomach and fired. It missed and he fired again, the blast taking effect and killing him instantly.

SHOT BY PILOT

At this moment Kanahale jumped the pilot but the latter was too quick for him and shot him three times, once in the shoulder, again in the ribs and finally in the groin.

"Then I got mad," Kanahale said simply.

He seized the Japanese and tossed him bodily against a stone wall, knocking him unconscious. Kanahale's wife, who had been following the party, leaped in and finished off the pilot and crushing his skull with a rock, according to the report.

Harada's wife and Shintani were captured by Lt. Mizuha's squad and together with Kanahale and his wife were brought to Kauai Sunday.

EXHIBIT No. 11 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

OUTLINE OF PLAN FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION OF OAHU IN CASE OF BOMBARDMENT

MARCH 25, 1941

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<sup>1</sup>Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

Index to accompanying paper—Emergency organization for the city of Honolulu

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- Figure 2.
- Figure 3.
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- Figure 6.
- Pamphlet on Design of Bombproof Structures.

[1<sup>2</sup>]

## I. MISSION

Any plan for protective measures for the civilian population of Oahu must accomplish a two phase mission. It must first avert the panic and pandemonium that so often accompanies the early stages of civilian bombardment by providing for the comparative safety and adequate care of those civilians in the area which will certainly be subjected to bombardment. Secondly the safety and care must be provided in such a manner as to leave available and make available the greatest number of these civilians for gainful employment in the defense of the territory. The mission must be accomplished with the least effort on the part of the military immediately before and at the commencement of hostilities, and must result in the greatest possible assistance to the military as soon after the commencement of hostilities as possible.

## III. BRIEF PRESENTATION OF MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED

The following in brief are the measures that must be taken, from the standpoint of protecting the civilian population and making available a portion of that population to assist in the defense, to meet the situation under our discussion of the Enemy Force.

1. The government of the city of Honolulu must be organized for emergency. The plans for such an emergency organization must include steps to be taken in utilizing and augmenting the police and fire departments, steps to be taken for the protection and maintenance of the water supply, steps for protection, maintenance, and augmentation of the food supply, steps for protection and maintenance of other utilities and the measures to be taken to protect the securities and provide for the uninterrupted functioning of the [4] necessary financial establishments. Preparations must also be made for the protection of securities and records of the various Government agencies of the city.

2. An air raid warning and protection system must be organized for protecting the property in bombed areas and for the protection of personnel that must necessarily remain in or enter areas subjected to bombardment.

3. Preparation must be made for the evacuation of portions of the population from certain areas of Honolulu and with these preparations for their evacuation preparations must be made for their disposal so as to be available in the defense.

4. Finally there must be plans for the procurement and distribution of workers to carry out these protective measures as well as plans for the procurement and distribution of those workers that will be needed directly and indirectly in the defense of the territory.

In the paragraphs that follow these measures will be discussed in detail and the steps that have been and are being taken will be presented as well as those which must be taken in the future. Although these measures are discussed under four headings it must be remembered that all are more or less closely related and that there must necessarily be some overlapping and repetition especially in the consideration of the procurement and disposition of workers since these workers must be procured and distributed for the accomplishment of all measures.

## IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE CITY OF HONOLULU FOR EMERGENCY

### A. CITY GOVERNMENT

In July 1940, the Mayor of Honolulu appointed a General Committee for the purpose of initiating a study of an emergency disaster plan. On July 16, 1940 a sub-committee met and considered an agenda which covers the subject of disaster

<sup>2</sup> There are no pages 2 and 3.



in a very thorough manner; this agenda is attached hereto as Ex- [5] hibit 1. At present the activities of this committee are at a standstill. The committee considers that a full time secretary should be employed to carry on the work until the plan is worked out, but the city has not authorized funds for this purpose. In spite of its present inadequacy the organization exists and with assistance and advice from the military could form the nucleus of an initial emergency planning organization.

#### B. POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Honolulu Police Department has prepared a "Provisional Police Plan for Emergency Guard Division", the stated purpose of which is to provide personnel to protect all agencies, civil and military, essential to defense and not guarded by military forces. This plan, to take effect when directed by the Department Commander, organizes four police districts of the Island of Oahu into boats covered by a total of 776 special police officers. They should in this phase, cooperate with and be augmented by the police agencies of the towns, communities, and plantations.

The plans provide for the use of messing and housing facilities of the plantations. Equipment will consist of riot trucks with radio equipment, pickup trucks, and guns and ammunition, the latter to be furnished by the Army. The training of special officers who will be needed under this plan is already under way and is prescribed by a special police memorandum. There are also being conducted at the present time classes for key men of the public utilities companies with the idea that these men will be trained in anti-sabotage work and available to be sworn in as special officers when need arises. It is also contemplated that about 300 additional special policemen would be sworn in as company guards for the utilities.

The plan provides that the regular police force of approximately 250 men would be used in the city proper, with the force enlarged by some of the special officers now being trained.

#### C. FIRE DEPARTMENT

[6] The Fire Department of Honolulu consists of nine engine companies with hose wagons, and the personnel consists of approximately 150 men. There are two other engine companies, one at Waialua and one at Wiapahu. Reserve Equipment consists of only one old engine. The expansion of the department to meet unusual fires such as would be expected in air raids would be seriously handicapped because of the inability to obtain additional equipment within a reasonable time. It would be expected that additional efficiency would have to be gained by the utmost use of the available equipment and by increasing the personnel so that the present force, which carries no extra reliefs, would not be overworked. The plan calls for 300 additional men for this purpose.

#### D. FOOD SUPPLY

The official engaged in the preparation of emergency plans for the Police Department of Honolulu reports that the total supply of food available on Oahu at any time amounts to about 45 days supply. This official is considering a public campaign directed toward having individual families increase their personal supply of canned goods until it equals a two weeks supply. This official is planning a step in the right direction but it must be made a reality rather than a consideration and the requirements boosted to at least a month's supply. This matter is of concern to the American Red Cross Representatives and to the Chamber of Commerce, and is included in the subjects covered by the Mayor's committee.

Further action should be directed towards:

1. Increasing stores of canned goods not only in private homes but in warehouses and plantation stores. This has been suggested to the manager of the Oahu Sugar Company, who indicated that it was feasible for his plantation. This supply should be increased until in emergency with reduced rations the supply would last from 4 to 6 months.

2. Cooperation with local producers of food products for export, to the end that such production would be increased and utilized here. In [7] this respect the Oahu Sugar Company has shipped as many as 4,000 tons of potatoes

to the mainland in one year, and is experimenting with production of other foods.

3. Encouraging plantations which do not now raise food for export to plan for maximum production of food as soon as the emergency arises.

4. Securing the cooperation of towns and communities in planning for the initiation and operation of gardens by residents and by evacuees.

5. Planning to make available when needed such stores of seed as will be necessary to increase the production of foods.

#### E. WATER SUPPLY

The water supply of Honolulu, which is the most vital utility, comes from two sources:

(1) Two pumping stations (Kalihi and Waialae) which pump from underground sources, and three stations (Kalihi, Beretania, and Kaimuki) which pump from artesian wells having heads about ten feet higher than ground level at their locations.

(2) A number of springs and wells in the hills back of the city which supply some of the upper residential districts by gravity. This source constitutes about 15 to 20 per cent of the total supply.

The capacities of these stations are as follows:

	<i>Million gallons per day</i>
Kalihi, underground .....	14
Kalihi.....	14
Beretania.....	10
Kaimuki.....	10
Waialae, underground .....	4
 Total capacity.....	 52

At the present time these pumping stations are supplying only 18 million gallons per day. There are several small unimportant pumping plants which care for certain areas in times of drought. The only reservoirs in the system are some equalizing reservoirs. The whole system is interconnected, so that if one pumping plant is damaged, others can carry the load. If equalizing reservoirs are put out of Commission the work done by them can be done by the pumping stations. [8]

From the figures given above it may be seen that serious interference with the water supply by bombing would be improbable. The flow from the tunnels and springs will not be stopped easily by bombing, and they have a big advantage of being widely dispensed and inconspicuous targets. The least number of pumping stations which would have to be put out to reduce their capacity below 18 million gallon, would be three, and it would have to be both Kalihi stations and either Beretania or Kaimuki. Even then, the supply would be reduced only from 18 million gallons to 14 million gallons. The capacity of all firefighting equipment in the city is 13 million gallons per day, continuous operation. Under the reduction mentioned above, to 14 million gallons per day, there would be one million gallons per day left for the reduced population which would be sufficient for drinking and cooking. Sanitary use could be restricted to the periods in which all fire fighting equipment was not being used, and the city could thus manage with three of the largest pumping stations out of action. Emergency repairs would be planned to prevent any part of the system being out of order any longer than necessary.

#### F. OTHER UTILITIES

In general, the City Engineer, the Mutual Telephone Company, the Honolulu Gas Company, the Honolulu Rapid Transit, the Board of Harbor Commissioners, and the banks of Honolulu have made no preparation for emergency other than the training of key employees to meet sabotage. After consultation with these agencies, estimates have been made and will be given under Utilization of Workers, of the number of additional workers required by the utilities to [9] meet expected conditions.

An examination of the plans of the vaults of the two principal banks of the city disclosed that the vaults of one have overhead and side protection of 18 inches of reinforced concrete, and the protection of the others are doubtful because of the incompleteness of the plans. It is thought that all vault walls and ceilings of these two banks are 18 inches of reinforced concrete. This protection is not sufficient to resist bombs of the sizes which may be expected, and the banks should plan to increase their protection in accordance with antibombardment require-

ments if possible. These two banks carry on hand about five million dollars in cash, and it is stated that this amount is needed for money requirements of the city in normal operation. However in emergency conditions they could function with a reduced amount of cash.

If they feel they cannot afford to bombproof their vaults they should be required to construct depositories in secluded mountain areas, where natural bombproof cover can be utilized by tunneling, instead of construction costly artificial protection. Here they might have available in time of emergency a place of protection for their securities and that portion of the cash on hand not needed for their emergency functions. In a like manner preparations must be made to provide for the safety of securities and permanent public records for which the various governmental agencies of the city are responsible.

## V. AIR RAIDS PROTECTION SYSTEM

### A. BASIC PRINCIPLES

There are certain basic principles upon which the organization of an air raids protection system must be founded:

1. Decentralization: All activities, to protect the population from the effects of air bombardment must be decentralized.

2. Voluntary participation: In so far as possible all Executives, and workers of the air raids protection system must be volunteer workers. The cost of providing an organization to protect the populace is tremendous [10] and since it is the individual that receives the protection it must be in so far as practicable the individual that bears the cost.

3. Individual participation: Since the exact point of damage cannot be forecast and is equally liable to occur in any portion of the districts and divisions into which we propose to have the organization divided, it is essential that each inhabitant participate in the protective system.

### B. ORGANIZATION

The administration and organization of the air raids protective system in the Hawaiian Department will be a civilian function. The chief executive of the system will be appointed by the Governor of the Territory and will be allowed such assistants as are necessary.

A chart showing a typical formation of an air raids protection system is attached hereto as exhibit (2). Reference to this chart shows that a central agency for the control of the air raids protection system for the city of Honolulu is established directly under the control of the Mayor. This plan or modification of it would be applicable for the entire island. Under this central administrative unit are set up various Divisions on the island. In Honolulu these divisions correspond to the police districts, while in the outlying portions of the island they follow general geographic divisions which are indicated on Exhibit 3. In each division there are organized one or more protective districts, which in Honolulu correspond to the police beats of the city, and in outlying portions to geographical divisions such as towns, plantation camps, etc. Each of these districts is supervised by a district administration.

In the following paragraphs will be given certain duties for which the districts and divisions must be responsible and certain facilities for which they must provide, together with measures discussed under the headings: Personnel Control, Damage control, Structural Protection, and, Design of Air Raid Shelters. The latter have been so discussed for they are measures for which both divisions and districts are responsible and have been [11] grouped under these headings only to clarify presentation.

### C. DUTIES IN THE AIR RAIDS PROTECTION DISTRICTS

Each air raids protection district will have facilities and plans for the following.

(1) Doctor, nurse teams. These plans will provide not only for doctor, nurse teams at first-aid stations but also for mobile units with improvised ambulances for the treating of those people who cannot be taken to the first-aid stations.

(2) Rescue Squads. Personnel of these rescue squads will be taken from among people who are experienced in the construction industry if possible. It



is known that one of the greatest sources of danger is from injuries received from flying debris or collapsing buildings. The rescue squads must be prepared to rescue people trapped in buildings or whose shelters are buried under debris. Personnel of these squads must be trained in the construction business in order that they may know how to wreck damaged buildings without causing further damage.

(3) First-aid stations will be established for the prompt treatment of casualties from air bombardment in preparation for the evacuation of these casualties to previously selected hospitals.

(4) Collecting stations will be established for casuals, separated families and lost children. The establishment of these collecting stations and particularly to an information center in connection with them will do much to reduce possible panic from an air-raid.

(5) Emergency traffic control will be established by each air raid protection district to route traffic away from blocked streets, to establish one-way streets and to re-route traffic away from danger areas. In this emergency traffic control priorities must be given to the dispatch of emergency vehicles such as fire engines and ambulances.

(6) The district will exercise supervision over black-outs and other [12] passive anti-bombardment measures.

(7) Alarm signals. Districts will have facilities when notified of the imminence of an air raid to sound air raid alarms and also to sound all clear alarms after conclusion of the air raid. To avoid confusion the type of signal used for the air raid must be materially different from that used for the all clear.

(8) Special watchmen and guards must be provided in air raid districts to prevent looting.

#### D. DUTIES IN AIR RAID PROTECTIVE DIVISIONS

The organization in each air raids protection division will have facilities for the following.

(1) Prompt and easy communication from the division main office to each air raid district. Because of the probability of disruption of the normal facilities for communication, the communication system set up by the division will include emergency messenger service by motorcyclists or automobile messengers.

(2) Each division will establish emergency hospitalization centers. These centers will so far as possible be established in existing hospitals. The division will also establish ambulance facilities to collect air raid casualties from the district first-aid stations and rapidly move them to emergency hospital centers.

(3) In each division damage control organizations will be set up. These will act through liaison with the regularly established facilities such as the fire department, the police department and the maintenance systems of public utilities. The damage control officers in each division will upon receipt from an air raid district of a report of damage promptly report it to the maintenance agency responsible. The regularly constituted Fire department, the water system, and all major utilities. Personnel responsible for this liaison should be regularly employed personnel of the public utility or department with which liaison is established.

[13] (4) Each air division will maintain gas decontamination squads for the inspection and decontamination of areas in which gas is supposed to have been used. These decontamination squads will be provided with special tools and with protective clothing.

(5) Each air raid division will previously select and hold available an open area in the division to which the population may be evacuated in the event that their ordinary place of living is in danger from fire or other effects of the air bombardment. In considering these evacuation points, they should not be thought of as places to which the population will be evacuated to avoid an air raid. They should be considered, however, as safe places to which the population can be evacuated in the event their normal place of living is rendered unsafe. Each evacuation point shall be provided with air raid shelters, water supplies, toilet facilities, recreational facilities and other items necessary for the people who are brought to them from danger areas.

(6) Each air raid division will establish liaison with the police department on traffic control. In the event of blocking of any major highway or street a prompt report will be made to the police department that the traffic may be re-routed.



## E. DAMAGE CONTROL

It must be recognized that in an air raid with intensive bombardment the damage caused is such that the regularly constituted agencies of the civilian government such as the fire department, the police department and the maintenance forces of various utilities are unable to cope with the situation. For this reason the prompt cooperation of every inhabitant will be necessary to minimize and localize damage from aerial bombardment. Therefore, the damage control phase of the air raids protection system must be based on the following principles:

a. The regularly constituted fire department will be used for [14] major fires only.

b. The regularly constituted police department will be used for emergency traffic control and regular police work only.

c. Provision must be made for the prompt reporting to the water, gas, and fire companies of location of breaks in lines to permit by-passing these breaks.

d. Provisions must be made in each district and division for the reinforcement of the fire department in event of large fires.

e. Provisions must be made for a publicity system to warn the inhabitants of bad water, gassed areas, dangerous structures, live wires, and like hazards.

f. The problem of individual damage control is extremely important and every effort must be made by the individual which might result in not only saving his own property, but also localizing damage. Each individual residence or business should be required to provide themselves if able, and if unable should be provided with fire extinguishing apparatus, such as garden hoses with sprinkler attachments, hand pumps, extinguishers, buckets of sand, and instruments for the handling of incendiary bombs. They should in addition be provided with axes, wrecking bars, shovels, hammers, and saws for use if their buildings are damaged.

## F. PERSONNEL CONTROL

Provision must be made for the control of personnel in order to minimize the effect of disruption and panic of the inhabitants from an air raid. Checking to see that the provisions are made is a responsibility of both district and division. These provisions should include the following.

a. Identification tags. Each person should be required to wear suitable identification tags showing his name and address.

b. Clothing of small children should be marked with their name and address in such a way that the child's parents can be easily located.

c. An educational campaign should be carried on to teach the individual [15] inhabitants air raid discipline. This educational campaign should cover what to do when the air raid siren sounds, protective measures which can be taken in the individual home to minimize the damage from fire, instructions as to the location of the nearest first-aid station, instructions on how to report damage and instructions on where to go for information.

d. The use of the streets should be restricted and the general public should be prohibited from using them during or immediately after an air raid.

e. The use of the telephone should be restricted and the general public should be prohibited from using them during an air raid or for some time thereafter.

f. The public should be taught where the headquarters of each air raid district is and where the collecting points will be established for each air raid district, so that missing persons can be located.

g. Each household or individual business should be instructed as to the point to which it will go in the event of danger at its regular location. These instructions will cover the location of the evacuation area for their air raid district; the method of transmitting instructions for the evacuation; the routes from their home or ordinary place to the evacuation area and such special provisions as are applicable to each evacuation area.

## G. STRUCTURAL PROTECTION

The provision of structural protection will be based upon the following principles:

a. With the exception of certain areas which will be determine in advance, the civilian population will be provided with shelters at their regular place of residence or business.

b. Since it is economically impossible to provide bomb-proof shelters, the maximum shelter to be provided will be that which will give protection [16] against splinters and blast from a 500 lb. bomb falling about 50 feet from the shelter.

c. Stores, garages and similar businesses will provide shelters for their employees and customers.

d. Structural protection will be provided for the protection of vital installations, not personnel, such as telephone exchanges, power plants, gas works, transformer stations and other installations, the continued operation of which is essential.

f. Public shelters will be provided in parks, vacant lots and other locations in areas where large numbers of people congregate and where they will be away from their family or business type of shelter. Public shelters will also be provided in the evacuation area for each air raid protection division.

g. The cost of providing family shelters will be borne by the individuals. The cost of providing shelters in businesses will be borne by the business. Cost of providing public personnel shelters and the protection for vital installations will be borne by the community.

h. Each public or business air raid shelter will be provided with water storage, tools, first aid supplies, toilet facilities, reading matter, and other recreational facilities for the use of the people in the shelter. Individual shelters will be provided with such articles as the family desires, which include first aid supplies, water supplies, tools and recreational facilities for the use of the family while it is in the shelter.

#### H. CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN OF AIR RAID SHELTERS

In construction, design, and location of shelters the following principles will be followed:

a. The individual members of the population will be instructed on how to build air raid shelters and where to locate them through use of [17] Chamber of Commerce, other Civic organizations, and through a newspaper campaign using all the newspapers on the island. This campaign will consist of articles on how and where to build shelters, simple construction drawings, pictures of shelters, bill of materials, types of materials to use, and methods of building the shelter.

b. Local engineers and contractors will assist in the provision of air raid shelters. One of these will be appointed as a consultant in each air raid district and will be supervised by an executive in charge of air raid shelter construction in each division. The district consultants will be instructed by means of classes, pamphlets and other methods on their duties. The air raid shelter consultant in each district will be available to the inhabitants at districts for consultation. He will also inspect shelter location and make suggestions for the improvement of these shelters.

c. For shelters in stores, garages and similar businesses, civilian engineers competent to design will be selected. These civilian engineers will be given special instructions on the principles of design of air raid shelters and a list of approved engineers will be published for the information of business owners. Designs for shelters of this type will be approved by the city building department.

d. The public shelters in parks and in the evacuation areas will be designed by the city engineer and will be built through his office. Protection of installations such as telephone exchanges, power plants, etc., will be designed by the engineers of the companies concerned. They will be furnished with all available material to assist in these designs.

e. As in the control of air raid damage the enthusiastic participation by each individual will be necessary in the construction of air raid shelters. A competitive spirit in building these shelters should be aroused. Publicity campaigns should be arranged and prizes should be offered to the public for participation in the air raid shelter program, with suitable recognition for those individuals who solved their shelter program [18] in an outstanding manner. This publicity campaign can very well be handled by the Chamber of Commerce which has experience in similar campaigns. It will consist of slogans and other ideas similar to "Clean up Week", window decorations contests, etc., which are ordinarily handled by the Chamber of Commerce.

Information as to the structural requirements of air raid shelters will come from the office of the Department Engineer. It will be the duty of that office

to prepare this information in a form for instructing civilian engineers and for distribution to civilian agencies such as the Chamber of Commerce and other civic organizations and for publishing in a newspaper campaign for the individual members of the population.

As stated in paragraph 4, the air raids protection system is primarily a civilian organization and not military. However, the Department Commander will select an individual to whom the civilians can turn for encouragement, assistance, and advice.

## VI EVACUATION

### A. PERSONS TO BE EVACUATED

In general those persons who can serve the defense by remaining in Honolulu should remain and all others in danger areas should be removed. There will be two classes of evacuees; those who will voluntarily or with slight persuasion leave, and those who must be forced to leave. There will be in the first class the families of military and naval personnel, transients, and residents who are willing and able to go to the mainland, to other islands, or to rural areas and who are not needed in the defense. Persons who cannot be used in any manner in the defense and who are unwilling to leave Honolulu, and persons who are unwilling to leave Honolulu, but who can be used directly or indirectly in the defense constitute the second class. In addition to these, certain workers will be removed to sites near their defense work but their removal will be accomplished as part of the organization for defense and not as evacuation.

[19]

### B. AREAS TO BE EVACUATED

These may be determined by a consideration of possible enemy objectives and by foreseeing the effect of bombs landing in areas which may not be logical objectives but in which damage might be such as to produce unusual casualties and possible panic. Areas contiguous to possible objectives listed under Enemy Force, and overcrowded residential sections should be evacuated. These are shown cross-hatched in red on the attached map (Exhibit 4) and are marked from 1 to 4, according to priority.

### C. DISPOSAL OF EVACUEES

There are four possible destinations for persons removed from the danger areas; the mainland, other islands of the territory, rural districts of Oahu, and sparsely occupied districts of Honolulu. In the distribution of evacuees to these possible destinations the following plan should be followed.

The families of army and navy personnel plus transients and residents who would be a burden in the defense and who are willing and able to go should be evacuated to the mainland if time and facilities are available.

The remaining evacuees should be so distributed among other islands, rural Oahu, and sparsely occupied districts of Honolulu so that each area receive a just portion, due consideration being given their need for persons willing and able to assist in defensive work and their ability to provide for those who are unwilling or unable to assist in the defense.

It is to be noted the certain of those classed as unwilling to assist in the defense are those who are sympathetic with the enemy cause and would if properly guarded, stimulated by disciplinary measures, and supervised, be of assistance in the defense. These and others of the same caliber not from evacuated areas must be considered and provision made for their utilization in the plans for disposition of evacuees.

Since in any case the greater percentage of the evacuees, and in case of lack of facilities and time all of the evacuees must be sent to the last two [20] destinations mentioned above the plan which follows will cover evacuation only to those destinations other than the mainland.

Since recent warfare has shown that an enemy cannot be counted upon to refrain from bombing large gatherings of civilians simply because they are not engaged in military activity a certain amount of dispersion will be necessary in the disposal of evacuees especially on the island of Oahu. However once they are out of dangerous and congested areas of the city and have acquired the habit of adopting such simple expedients as digging narrow trenches or merely



assuming a prone position the magnitude of peril will be greatly reduced without elaborate plans for dispersion being necessary.

As the evacuation may last for some time, the principle requirements of an ordinary place of residence will be necessary at all of the proposed destinations.

In making dispositions so as to secure the approximate requisites of an ordinary residence the problem will be greatly facilitated if the evacuees are in a communal sense superimposed upon the existing communities. Such a disposition will call for the full utilization and augmentation of the facilities that exist in the sparsely occupied portions of Honolulu, in the small communities, and in the camps. For example, older and more trustworthy residents of the evacuated areas would double up with residents in sparsely inhabited residential areas of Honolulu. Shelter for others would be provided in schools, halls, unused plantation buildings, by doubling up families, by available surplus army tentage if necessary.

As a specific example, the possibilities in the use of plantation facilities for the housing of evacuees and for organizing units to produce foodstuffs may be judged by the information furnished by the manager of the Oahu Sugar Company. The manager estimated that the plantation would have no trouble in assimilating a number of evacuees equal to the present number of workers. These could be housed as follows:

	<i>Persons.</i>
3 Clubhouses.....	500
1 Skating rink.....	300
1096 Dwellings.....	<sup>1</sup> 2,200
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>3,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> (2 additional per house.)

[21] The water supply of the plantation comes from two sources, the Waihole tunnel through the Koolau Range and from eleven wells and pumping plants scattered within a radius of five miles from the plantation. The Waihole tunnel supplies an average of 28,000,000 gallons per day, and the pumping plants have a total capacity of about 100,000,000 gallons per day. It would be extremely unlikely that sufficient sources of water could be destroyed to cause shortage at the plantation. Sanitary facilities would have to be installed for the skating rink, but are otherwise available. In addition to housing facilities available, the plantation is engaged in the production of potatoes and other vegetables. This activity should be expanded so as to employ evacuees and furnish food for general use.

#### D. ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF EVACUEES

Using the figures furnished by the census officials, the 1940 population of the areas to be evacuated was found to be as follows:

Area 1.....	38,000
Area 2.....	21,300
Area 3.....	7,300
Area 4.....	19,400
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>86,000</b>

According to the United States Employment bureau, the percentage of the population of Honolulu which may be considered as gainfully employed is approximately 30%. In time of emergency this figure may run a little higher due to damage control and other organizations making their call for labor but for the purpose of estimating the number of evacuees we are on the safe side using 30% which would leave about 26,000 workers residing in the areas to be evacuated.

These workers would also have to be considered and provisions made for them. If they are not sent out of the city, they would be housed in relatively safe localities, and organized for the defense. In either case, they will be considered under the plan for housing workers described later. Deduction of the number of useful workers from the total leaves approximately [22] 60,000 persons who must be evacuated. Of these it is estimated that probably 5,000 will automatically evacuate through the removal of the dependents of service personnel and the departure of transients and residents who will go through their own volition, leaving about 5,000 to be subjected to forced evacuation.



## E. DISPOSITION OF ESTIMATED EVACUEES

The quartering of evacuees on Oahu must be considered in connection with the quartering of the emergency workers who will be used on defense construction and utility repair. The workers must have preference. The following facilities will be used for the purpose:

- (a) Doubling up in private homes.
- (b) Public buildings, particularly schools.
- (c) Plantation housing.
- (d) Army tentage.

(a) and (b) will be used for those persons evacuated to the outlying sections of Honolulu. (b) and (c) will be used for persons evacuated to rural Oahu and to the other islands. (b), (c), and (d) will be used for emergency workers. Using figures for school capacities and plantation populations (workers only), for 1938, the latest available, it is found that the capacities for schools outside of Honolulu totalled 42,483 pupils and the worker population of the plantations amounted to 44,625 workers. Considering that each plantation could take in a number of evacuees equal to its present number of workers, all evacuees outside of Honolulu could be provided for in this manner. If each school can house a number of persons equal to half the number of pupils being accommodated, about 22,000 persons can be housed in this manner. Although the plantations can probably care for evacuees more easily by expansion of their present facilities, and this method will be best suited to organization of workers in the production of necessary foods, it will perhaps be better not to burden them with the whole number of evacuees. Table II gives tentative lists of quotas for the various plantations and towns outside of Honolulu based upon [23] their capacities, location, and general suitability for the purpose. The information received from the Oahu Sugar Company has been considered with special application to other plantations. Table I gives tentative assignments of persons to buildings in Honolulu. All figures are exclusive of figures for quartering of workers as given in Table V and Table VI.

The general distribution of evacuees will be as follows:

Honolulu, outlying sections.....	20,000
Rural Oahu.....	11,400
Hawaii.....	10,600
Maui.....	6,500
Kaui.....	5,000
Molokai.....	800
Lauai.....	700
Total.....	55,000

## F. TRANSPORTATION

The transportation of persons from Honolulu to other islands of the Territory will require marine transportation, and the removal of the remainder of the evacuees to rural Oahu will require trucks and busses. There are available the following shipping:

- (a) Inter-Island Steamship Company—6 steamers, 5 barges, 1 tug.
- (b) Youngs Brother Company—6 barges, 3 tugs.
- (c) Army and Navy—tugs as available.
- (d) Other sources—possibly Matson and other steamships.

The capacity for emergency trips of the steamers of the Inter-Island Company as given by the Vice-President is given in Table IV, and the total is 4,200 persons. These steamers could make at least one trip per 24 hours. Young Brothers Company has used barges in transporting passengers between the islands and the president of the company estimates that if necessary 300 people could be carried on one barge 175' x 45', which would make 3,300 persons for the eleven barges available. More tugs than are available from Young [24] Brothers and Inter-Island S. S. Company, might be necessary, and these should be furnished by the Army and Navy. This equipment could carry 7,500 persons, and 30,000 evacuees could be removed in four days. Should transoceanic ships be available, the time of removal could be speeded, or the use of barges could be dispensed with.

For the transportation of persons on Oahu a report of the number of taxable vehicles for Oahu as of June 30, 1940 gives the following information:

Passenger vehicles-----	40,240
Trucks -----	6,404
Tractors & ton trucks-----	166
Busses -----	197
Patrons, hearses, & ambulances-----	17

It is reasonable to assume from these figures which do not include the tax exempt government vehicles that there would be sufficient transportation to move the evacuees in a reasonable length of time.

#### F. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVACUATION

A military agency designated by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would be responsible for the evacuation. To secure effective results it will be necessary to obtain cooperation of the civil government before and during the period of the emergency, and to have the civil organization carry out the plan under the Hawaiian Department. The civil government organization must be prepared to provide for:

1. Methods to be used to secure voluntary evacuation, such as radio, newspapers, etc.
2. Procurement of workers for operation of defense and evacuation plans.
3. Assignment of quotas of evacuees to various islands, communities, and plantations.
4. Assignment and transportation of individuals to destinations.
5. Arrangements with County Supervisors, town officials, and [25] plantation managers as to responsibility for definite numbers of persons in definite communities.
6. Civil police assistance in requiring evacuation.
7. Food supply.

[26] TABLE I—*Honolulu housing of evacuees*

	<i>Number</i>
University of Hawaii-----	1500
St. Louis College-----	1000
Punahou School-----	600
Roosevelt School-----	600
Kamehameha (new) -----	500
Kawananakoa -----	500
Iolani -----	500
Mary Knoll -----	400
Palolo -----	200
Manoa-----	200
Teachers College-----	150
Kalihi Ika -----	150
Mid-Pacific Institute -----	100
<b>Total -----</b>	<b>7800</b>
Doubling up in private homes-----	12,200
<b>Total -----</b>	<b>20,000</b>

[27] TABLE II.—*Rural Oahu housing of evacuees*

Plantations	Houses	Evacuees
California Packing Company.....	185	400
Ewa Plantation Company.....	792	720
Hawaiian Pineapple Company.....	683	300
Honolulu Plantation Company.....	606	.....
* Kaliuku Plantation Company.....	529	1200
Libby McNeill & Libby.....	200	400
Oahu Sugar Company.....	1096	3000
Waialua Agriculture Company.....	976	2100
Waianae Sugar Company.....	186	300
Wiamanalo Sugar Company.....	218	500
Total.....	.....	8920

\*To be supplied with Army or Navy tentage.

Towns	School Bldgs.	Evacuees
Ewa.....	18	360
Kahuku.....	12	240
Heeia.....	11	220
Hauula.....	8	160
Kaauwua.....	8	160
Kaneohe.....	5	100
Lale.....	9	180
Waialua.....	40	800
Waianae.....	13	260
Total.....	.....	2480
Grand Total.....	.....	11,400

[28] TABLE III.—*Outside Islands Housing of Evacuees*

ISLAND OF HAWAII

	Houses	Evacuees
Hakalau Plantation Company.....	369	630
Hamakua Mill Company.....	355	630
Hawaiian Sugar Company.....	525	900
Hilo Sugar Company.....	681	1,100
Honokaa Sugar Company.....	557	950
Honouliuli Sugar Company.....	266	460
Kaiaiki Sugar Company.....	198	340
Hutchinson Plantation Company.....	303	510
Kohala Sugar Company.....	703	1,200
Laupahoehoe Sugar Company.....	314	550
Olaa Sugar Company.....	624	1,060
Onomea Sugar Company.....	458	780
Paauhau Sugar Plantation Company.....	266	460
Pepeekeo Sugar Company.....	333	570
Waiakea Mill Company.....	266	460
Total.....	.....	10,600

TABLE III.—*Outside Islands Housing of Evacuees*—Continued

## ISLAND OF MAUI

	Houses	Evacuees
Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company.....	1, 545	2, 000
Kaeleku Sugar Company.....	245	320
Maui Agriculture Company.....	1, 213	1, 600
Pioneer Mill Company.....	1, 035	1, 340
Wailuku Sugar Company.....	419	540
Baldwin Packers.....	100	200
Maui Pineapple Company.....	195	400
Libby, McNeill & Libby.....	49	100
Total.....		6, 500

[29]

## ISLAND OF KAUAI

Grove Farm Ltd.....	333	390
Hawaiian Sugar Company.....	650	760
Kekaha Sugar Company.....	508	600
Kilauea Plantation Company.....	221	260
Kolea Sugar Company.....	378	450
Lihue Plantation Company.....	1092	1280
McBryde Plantation Company.....	756	890
Waima Sugar Company.....	77	100
Libby, McNeill & Libby.....	62	70
Hawaiian Canneries.....	42	50
Kauai Pineapple Company.....	115	150
Total.....		5, 000
California Packing Company.....	68	120
Molokai Ranch Company.....	(1)	80
Total.....		200
Hawaiian Pineapple Company.....	621	1, 300
Total.....		1, 300

<sup>1</sup> Hall.

NOTE.—No assignments are made to schools on the Island of Hawaii, Maui, Kauai, Molokai and Lanai as it is assumed that normal conditions will not be disrupted sufficiently to make schools available.

[30]

TABLE IV.—*Data on Inter-Island Ships*

	Gross tonnage	Length	Beam	State-rooms	Cabin passengers	Total passengers	Total passengers and crew	Emergency capacity
Haleakala.....	3679	360. 6'	46'	111	314	410	560	1000
Hualalai.....	3088	310'	48. 1'	73	210	432	503	1000
Waialeale.....	3092	310'	48. 1'	71	205	436	500	1000
Kilauea.....	1338	240. 6'	36. 1'	46	138	234	302	600
Humuula.....	961	210. 7'	38'	17	50	115	165	300
Hawaii.....	851	190'	36'	13	39	84	132	300

[31]

## VII. UTILIZATION OF WORKERS

## A. REQUIREMENTS

Upon the opening of hostilities a considerable number of workers will be needed in certain areas for:

(a) Construction of defense works.

(b) Increased activity in the operation of military and civil supply functions.

When bombing becomes intense and sustained additional workers will be needed for:



- (c) Repair of damage to military and naval installations.
- (d) Repair of damage to necessary civil installations.
- (e) An organization charged with evacuation of civilians, feeding and clothing of evacuees, air raid warnings, care of wounded, construction of shelter for civilians, private damage control, and salvage.

*Probable workers needed in emergency*

	Present	Additional	Total
Army and Navy.....		14,250	<sup>1</sup> 14,250
Police Department.....	250	900	1,150
Fire Department.....	150	300	450
Docks and Harbor.....	850	1,000	1,850
City Engineer.....	600	1,000	1,600
Water Works.....	250	200	450
Hawaiian Electric Company.....	900	1,000	1,900
Telephone Company.....	300	500	800
Gas Company.....	110	200	310
Emergency Evacuation and Air Raid Organization.....		500	500
Total.....	<sup>1</sup> 3,410	19,850	<sup>1</sup> 23,260

<sup>1</sup> Exclusive of present Army and Navy employment.

[32]

B. AVAILABILITY OF LABOR

With an estimate of almost 20,000 additional workers that will be needed for defense and civil activities it is pertinent to consider where they may be obtained. At the present time there is no great supply of unemployed labor in the Territory. In fact, it has been found necessary to bring many workers from the mainland to man the defense projects now in operation. Three sources of workers may be considered:

- (a) The Work Projects Administration.
- (b) Workers now employed whose services will not be needed once an emergency is in effect.
- (c) Workers who could be released from their normal employment and replaced by women.

With reference to the possible sources of labor listed above, the first source, W. P. A., labor can be used on defense without delay, but will result in little net gain. At the present time there are only 794 W. P. A., workers on Oahu, of which 624 are already working for the Army and Navy, leaving a possible net increase of 170. The bulk of the workers will have to be considered available only through the disruption of normal activities and elimination of unnecessary activities. The organization of the community for bombardment will thus have to provide for the department responsible for the utilization of manpower in defense.

C. DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR

The labor requirements have been broken down into localities in which labor units will be needed. It is proposed to locate the Navy Yard workers at Aiea, and if the Navy can not provide for them, to use plantation buildings. At Schofield Barracks workers will occupy barracks vacated by troops who will be in their field positions. In the plantation camps and towns, plantation and municipal facilities will be expanded to provide for the workers as they will be expanded to provide for non-effective [33]<sup>2</sup> evacuees. In the city of Honolulu it will be desirable, if not absolutely necessary, to quarter workers together so as to control them effectively and have them available for work when needed. Table VI gives a list of possible buildings in which these workers can be quartered.

<sup>2</sup> (Page 34 (table V) omitted in revision.)

[35] TABLE VI.—*Quartering of Emergency labor for Use in Honolulu*

	Men
1. Jefferson School.....	400
2. Ala Moana Park Pavilion.....	200
3. McKinley High School.....	2,000
4. R. L. Stevenson School.....	700
5. Army & Navy Y. M. C. A.....	150
6. Y. M. C. A.....	150
7. Farrington High School.....	1,000
8. Old Kamehameha Boys School.....	500
9. F. H. A. Homes.....	500
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>5,600</b>

[36] Specific and detailed instructions for various agencies and organizations recommended in this plan have been prepared and will accompany this paper. Sketches, diagrams, and maps containing information relative to other recommendations contained herein are being prepared at present and will be available.

A map is available giving the number and nationality of all persons, the number of houses, and plantation owners for the entire area between the Koolau range and the Waianae Mountains. This map was completed May 13, 1940, and will be of great value in the final detailed disposition of evacuees. It is recommended that the data on this map be secured for the remainder of the Island.

[1] **AGENDA FOR SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF**  
**ORGANIZATION OF SUB-COMMITTEE**

(A) The resolution of Supervisor A. S. Cleghorn Robertson proposed the formation of a committee to prepare a Major Emergency Disaster Plan, and to draft a bill to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors.

(B) At the meeting of the General Committee held at the Mayor's office on July 8, 1940, a motion by Mr. Cain was duly passed which read in part "to determine how much money, if any, would be needed and how much work would be involved".

(C) Mayor Crane's letter of July 16, 1940 appointing this sub-committee reads in part, "to study more fully the Emergency Disaster Plan".

The object of this committee must be deduced from the above and it is suggested that this committee assume as its object:

1. The determination of whether the creation of a Major Emergency Disaster Plan is necessary at this time; and
2. If the sub-committee shall have decided that such a plan should be developed to determine how much money if any should be provided by the supervisors to facilitate the development of such a plan; and
3. To report in outline the requirements of such an emergency plan.

**SCOPE OF EMERGENCY DISASTER PLAN**

*Emergency disasters for which preparation is required*

*Group I:* Fire; flood; tidal wave; earthquake; epidemics.

*Group II:* Sabotage during the period of strained relations; war with its attendant possibilities of; partial blockade; blockade; bombardment; bombing, landing of parachute troops; landing of major boats or troops.

*Phases under which plan must operate*

(A) *Normal conditions.*—During this period the plan must be prepared for the efficient handling of the disasters listed in Group I above.

(B) *Strained Relations.*—A condition of strained relations is considered to exist whenever it seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage in preparation for an attack on this Territory. During such a period the government of the city is conducted as in normal times and by the same officials [2] up until the time that the governor declares martial law. At this time the governor will take charge of the administration with the aid of the National

Guard, and the Emergency Disaster Plan should provide for the cooperation of our citizenship with the governor and the National Guard.

At the discretion of the governor the assistance of the federal forces, Army and Navy could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should be foreseen and provided for.

(C) On the inception of war the government of this Territory will presumably be taken over by the military authorities and the Emergency Disaster Plan should provide for cooperating with the military force so that as little burden as possible falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary in the field.

ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL COMMITTEE FOR PREPARING A MAJOR EMERGENCY DISASTER PLAN AND FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THAT PLAN UNDER THE THREE PHASES DESCRIBED ABOVE

*Precautions to be observed in appointing members to the general committee*

Inasmuch as this committee will be called upon to operate during a state of war every effort should be made to avoid appointing to the committee members of the Army and Navy Reserve or others who would be liable to be called for military service.

In the following a suggested organization of such a committee is submitted, and listed under the various sub-committees into which it is assumed that the general committee will be divided, are given suggested duties for these committees.

For administration purposes it is assumed that the Mayor and the regular city officials will administer the plan and they will be assisted in this:

1. By the general committee.
2. By the sub-committees each functioning in cooperation with the appropriate department of the city government.
3. That the force available to these various city departments will be augmented by enlisting in these services various qualified members of our citizenship.

*Organization of committee*

1. Chairman: Mayor.
2. Assistant Chairman: A lay member appointed by the Mayor.
3. Secretary: An assistant to the Mayor for the purpose of preparation and administration of the Emergency Disaster Plan.

4. Executive Committee: Chairman, vice-chairman, chairman of various sub-committees, secretary, staff representative of the General commanding the Hawaiian Department, and staff representative of the [3] Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. Sub-committees and respective responsibilities:
  - (a) *Law Enforcement*—Chairman: Chief of Police.

*Duties:*

1. Augmented patrol.
2. Maintenance and supervision of the prison and concentration camps.
3. Preparation and distribution of distinguishing marks of auxiliary forces.
4. Enforcement of special traffic regulations.
5. Enforcement of black-out regulations, and gas attack precautions.
6. Control of emergency alarm system.

- (b) *Relief Committee:* Chairman\_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: The local chapter of the Red Cross will, of course, be represented on this committee and will be utilized for relief during the first two phases referred to above and for its assistance during the third. It is suggested that the chairman of the local chapter be considered for the appointment of chairman of this committee. Associated with this committee should be the City and County doctor and, of course, the various relief agencies existing in the city. The assistance of the Territorial Department of Social Security should also be given consideration.

*Duties:*

1. Rationing of food.
2. Issuance of food cards.
3. Billeting.
4. Medical and surgical aid.
5. Financial assistance to individuals or families.
6. Identification of dead.
7. Reports of casualties.
8. Commandeering of administration and public buildings for relief purposes.



(c) *Damage Control Committee*—Chairman: Chief Engineer of the City & County Public Works.

*Duties:*

1. Fire protection.
2. General engineering service including :
  - a. Clearing of ruins.
  - b. Construction of additional defense works, bomb shelters, etc.
  - c. Repairs necessary to maintaining utility services.
  - [L] d. Distribution of water.
  - e. Sanitation.
  - f. Burial of dead.
  - g. Organization of transportation facilities.
  - h. Organization of communication facilities including boats, trucks, busses, railroad trains, taxi cabs, and private automobiles.

(d) *Procurement Division*: Chairman: City & County Purchasing Agent.

*Duties:*

1. Preparation and maintenance of food supplies.  
*Note:* This should include immediate action to increase to the utmost local growing of food supplies.
2. Increase in the quantities of food reserves held in warehouses and other places.
3. Maintenance of adequate fuel reserves.
4. Purchase of arms and ammunition for the use of auxiliary forces.
5. Purchase and maintenance of engineering supplies both for governmental use and the use of the utilities and essential industries.

(e) *Finance Committee*: Chairman: City & County Comptroller.

*Duties:*

1. Preparation of methods for controlling the expenditure of emergency funds.
2. Audit of expenditures.
3. Cooperation in financial matters with the Territory and Army and Navy authorities, Red Cross and others.
4. Preparation of emergency budgets.

(f) *Legislative Committee*: Chairman: City & County Attorney.

*Duties:*

1. Preparation of the necessary legislative enactments to provide for the following:
  - a. Empower the Mayor and Board of Supervisors to declare the existence of a state of emergency under which the following special powers become operative:
    - [5] 1. Suspension of habeas corpus to the degree necessary to prevent individual citizens from committing sabotage or of giving alien assistance to possible enemies.
    - b. Distribution under proper regulation of emergency funds for carrying out the various provisions of this plan.
    - c. Establishment of special courts to cooperate with the military courts after the declaration of martial law.
    - d. Abbreviated court procedure during any emergency.
    - e. Preparation of emergency labor laws.

(g) *Public Relations and Publicity*. Chairman: —.

*Duties:*

1. Establishment of headquarters office.
2. Publicity.
3. Preparation of manuals of instructions.
4. Public education.
5. Labor relations.
6. Enrollment of individuals of all societies for service groups.
7. Maintenance of community morale.

AMOUNT OF WORK INVOLVED AND SPECIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE NECESSARY

If the above suggested organization for Emergency Disaster Plan Committee is accepted as reasonable, and if the duties tentatively assigned to the various sub-committees are accepted as essential, it becomes apparent that the task for this committee in the preparation of such a plan is an enormous one and that its administration will make demands upon the City and County officials far beyond their present capacity so that additional assistance must be provided.



It is suggested that consideration be given to the appointment of a special assistant to the Mayor to serve as secretary of this committee and that necessary office space and office facilities together with the necessary clerical help, be provided. As a starting point it is suggested that a sum of \$5000 be appropriated to be expended during the next six months for the purpose of formulating the above plan.

July 19, 1940.

(At this point in the original exhibit there appears an Organization Chart, Anti-Bombardment Control, City of Honolulu, October 10, 1940. This chart is reproduced as Item No. 1 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission. Following the chart there appears a map of the City of Honolulu, T. H. reflecting areas of the city to be evacuated and open areas available for trench and shelter construction. This map is reproduced as Item No. 2 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission. A map of the Island of Oahu, T. H. is included as the next illustration in the exhibit. This map reflects the division of the island into Control Districts, and is reproduced as Item No. 3 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[1] EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION FOR THE CITY OF HONOLULU

Exhibit 2 of the general plan shows a proposed permanent and active organization for the City and County of Honolulu for anti-bombardment control. The organization should be accomplished through the Mayor's Committee on the Organization of Emergency Relief, already appointed, increasing the number of members, if necessary. The various divisions of the organization to be formed and planned through the appointment of the following sub-committees:

- a. General
- b. Housing of Evacuees
- c. Food Supply
- d. Transportation
- e. Labor
- f. Publicity and Information
- g. Engineering
- h. Medical Service
- i. Damage Control

That in setting up the organization and plan, the mayor and the various sub-committees maintain close cooperation with the governor of Hawaii, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and with all private corporations and individuals whose assistance will be needed to make the plan a success. Outlines for the various sub-committees are given on the following pages.

In general, the chairman of each sub-committee shall be the logical person to direct, in the emergency organization, the activities with which the sub-committee is concerned. Thus, the logical person to be chairman of the sub-committee on engineering and to become director of engineering in the organization is the city engineer. It is not intended that membership on sub-committees be restricted to those persons suggested in the outlines.

[2] Persons appointed in the organization and upon the committees should be public spirited citizens who have proven ability along the lines indicated, and who are willing to serve actively without pay.

[3] GENERAL COMMITTEE

*Chairman*

A public official or other citizen of sufficient executive ability to form the organization and to direct it in operation, under the mayor. He should become City Director in Anti-bombardment work.

*Members*

Citizens qualified to assist in general organization and operations of the plan. There should be at least one member from each of the three divisions of the city, and these should become division directors.

*Duties*

(a) To recommend to the Mayor the appointment of persons to all positions on the city, division, and district staffs.

(b) To instruct all other committees in their duties, and to coordinate their work.

(c) To maintain contact with the Governor of Hawaii and with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on all matters pertaining to the work of the organization.

(d) To compile all instructions to personnel of the organization, after the instructions have been prepared by the special sub-committees.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Governor of Hawaii.

(b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

(c) General cooperation with private corporations and individuals not specifically maintained by another committee.

*Information for the committee*

Chart showing proposed organization of the personnel engaged in antibombardment control is attached as guide in setting up the organization and appointing personnel.

[4]

## COMMITTEE ON HOUSING

*Chairman*

Territorial Director of Social Security.

*Members*

Representative of Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association.

“ “ “ Pineapple Company.

Member of Board of Supervisors.

Representative of certain plantations.

*Duties*

(a) To decide upon the number of persons who will be removed from Honolulu, and the localities to which they will be sent.

(b) To contact plantations, city and town officials, and Boards of supervisors of other islands to determine the numbers of persons who can be cared for at each locality.

(c) To draw detailed plans for the routing of persons from specific parts of the city to specific localities elsewhere.

(d) To plan for the Housing:

1st of labor at localities in which it is needed.

2nd of other evacuees.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Committee on Labor.

(b) Plantations.

(c) Officials of other cities and towns of Oahu.

(d) Boards of Supervisors of other islands.

*Information for committee*

(a) The Hawaiian Department Plan for the evacuation of dangerous areas in the city of Honolulu calls for the evacuation of about 55,000 persons. The Chapter on Evacuation, Tables I, II, and III of this plan outline a preliminary system of distribution of these persons. This distribution was based on the following sources of information:

1. Statements of the Manager of the Oahu Sugar Company as to what might be expected of that plantation.

[5] 2. A study of housing conditions on all plantations of Hawaii, made by Mr. Harry S. Bent, of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company.

3. Reports on capacities of schools of the Territory contained in the First Progress Report of the Territorial Planning Board.

(b) The chapter on Distribution of Workers, and Tables V and VI of the Department Plan give the labor requirements for the emergency and the distribution of the workers, which will have to be taken into consideration in housing. These figures were obtained from the agencies concerned.

(c) The Quartermaster of the Hawaiian Department may have on hand certain excess tentage which may be used for establishing camps where existing housing facilities cannot be used. The availability of these tents would depend upon military requirements at the time, and tentage should not be counted upon except in cases where it is necessary to house labor working on defense work, and where local housing cannot be obtained.

(d) Any plan for housing must count upon doubling up in private homes, both in Honolulu and elsewhere, and full information to the public as what must be done will be necessary.

[6]

## COMMITTEE ON FOOD SUPPLY

*Chairman*

Secretary of Chamber of Commerce.

*Members*

Representatives of largest wholesale grocers.

“ “ plantations.

American Red Cross Field Representative.

Representative of Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii.

*Duties*

(a) To plan to increase the available staple food supply of Oahu to at least three months, and if possible, to six months supply, by :

1. Increasing stocks in warehouses.

2. Increasing stocks in retail stores.

3. Encouraging all home owners to keep a supply of at least one month of canned goods and staples.

(b) Encourage development of the business of raising more vegetables for export, so that production can be diverted to local use when needed.

(c) Planning to provide a stock of seeds, so that additional truck gardens can be planted as soon as it is seen that they will be needed.

(d) Planning for the operation of emergency truck gardens under the supervision of plantations and towns. Labor to come from the evacuees.

(e) Plans for shipping to Oahu numbers of steers from cattle ranches on Hawaii. Steamers taking evacuees there could bring back cattle.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Committee on Labor.

(b) Committee on Housing.

(c) Plantations and cattle ranches.

*Information for committee*

(a) The manager of the Oahu Sugar Company Plantation has had experience in developing the growth of foodstuffs for export, [7] and can furnish valuable information on the subject. It is possible that other plantations may also have done work in this line.

(b) The Agricultural Extension Service of the University of Hawaii should be consulted.

(c) Mr. Thomas Walker, who has been working on the emergency plan of the police department has considered means of increasing supplies of food in households.

[8]

## COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

*Chairman*

Public official or citizen thoroughly familiar with transportation of all kinds in the Territory.

*Members*

Representatives of:

Inter-Island Steamship Company.

Honolulu Rapid Transit Company.

Matson Steamship Company.

Young Brothers Company.

Oahu Rail and Land Company.

Principal Taxicab Companies.

*Duties*

(a) To plan the transportation of evacuees from Honolulu to the localities determined by the committee on housing.

(b) To plan the transportation of food and other supplies to communities of evacuees.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Committee on Housing.

(b) All transportation agencies of the Islands.

*Information for the committee*

(a) Information on steamships, barges, tugs, trucks and busses is contained in the Chapter on Evacuation and Table IV of the Department Plan. The estimated emergency capacity of this transportation based on this information is as follows:

Inter-Island Steamship.....	4200
Barges and tugs.....	3300
Busses.....	3488
Trucks and trailers.....	1320

(b) Plans will include not only the original use of transportation for evacuation, but also secondary use in supplying the services [9] and the civil population.

(c) Oahu railroad will be preempted for military use and cannot be considered available.

## COMMITTEE ON LABOR

*Chairman*

Director of Territorial Employment Bureau.

*Members*

Representatives of plantations.

Contractors, and other employers of labor.

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

*Duties*

(a) To draw up a schedule of labor needs of

1. Army

2. Navy

3. Emergency Relief Organization.

4. Other departments of city government.

5. Developing additional food supply.

(b) To determine where the supply of labor will come from, including unemployed, those to be thrown out of work by the emergency, and those such as women and older children, who do not now work but who could be used to advantage.

(c) To provide a method of assigning all persons able to work to the localities and jobs for which they are best qualified.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Committee on Housing.

(b) All agencies who will need additional workers after the emergency starts.

(c) Present employers whose activities will decrease or cease when the emergency begins.

(d) Committee on engineering.

(e) Committee on food supply.

*Information for the committee*

(a) Labor requirements for emergency work are given in the [10] chapter on Distribution of labor and Table V of the Department Plan.

## COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION

*Chairman*

Superintendent of City Recreation Commission.

*Members*

Representatives of newspapers.

Representatives of radio stations.



*Duties*

(a) To plan the dissemination to the public at the proper times, by one or more suitable means of:

1. Instructions as to areas to be evacuated.
2. Procedure to be followed in evacuation.
3. Steps to be taken to secure individual protection in areas not evacuated, and in evacuated areas.
4. Information as to public shelters provided.
5. Nature of air raid and all clear signals.
6. Procedure to be followed upon sounding of air raid alarm.
7. Information as to street blocks and restricted areas.
8. Information on food supplies, water supply, and conservation of property.

(b) To prepare instructions for the guidance of personnel charged with publicity and information in the divisions and districts.

*Cooperation necessary*

- (a) All other committes
- (b) Newspapers
- (c) Radio Stations

## COMMITTEE ON ENGINEERING

*Chairman*

City Engineer.

*Members*

Engineer of Utilities Companies.  
Engineers from various parts of the city.

*Duties*

(a) To approve types of shelter to be constructed to meet various conditions, and inform the Committee on publicity so that they may be published.

[11] (b) To plan for the construction of public shelters where it is not practicable to require private owners to provide them.

(c) To plan for the increased maintenance and repair of utilities now operated by the city.

(d) To advise banks, the electric company, the gas company, and the board of water supply as to measures to be taken for protection and for repair of damages.

NOTE.—Plans for shelters to be furnished by the Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department.

(e) To furnish instructions as to salvage and damage control to the Committee on Publicity for publishing to the public.

(f) To prepare instructions for the engineering personnel of the divisions and districts.

*Cooperation necessary*

- (a) All utility companies.
- (b) Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department.
- (c) Committee on Publicity.
- (d) Committee on Labor.

*Information for the committee*

1. That the areas in which the bulk of the buildings are frame structures will burn must be planned from the outset. The areas where the buildings are of masonry, stone or brick will be even more hazardous than those that burn. In either area the civilians must be taught to abandon these traps of fire and falling debris for the shelter of open areas where they may simply lie down or seek refuge in rude splinter proofs and hastily constructed trenches.

Once taught the principle they will soon acquire the habit and as the raids are repeated they will themselves improve their rude shelters in these relatively open areas.

(a) It will not be economically possible to construct bombproof shelters for personnel. The following shelters should be planned:

[12] *Individual shelters for homes*

These should be dug in yards adjoining homes, and will be a trench three feet deep and wide enough to accommodate one person. The public will be notified that

these trenches must be dug by the individuals to use them as the city will not be able to furnish them. If time and materials permit trenches with overhead cover should be constructed in accordance with Fig. 1. Full publicity regarding the details of this shelter will be published in the newspapers.

*Open trench shelters in public parks*

These will be constructed under the supervision of the Engineering Director or his assistants, and will consist of continuous trenches about three feet deep and wide enough to accommodate one person. These will be constructed in parks and squares, shown on the overlay which is attached to exhibit 4 (Dept. Plan), as soon as possible after it is known that an air raid can be expected. Publicity will be given to the locations of these trenches by newspapers and radio.

*Covered trench shelters in public parks*

These are designed to furnish protection from splinters, and will be built as shown in Fig. 1. These should not be built until open trench shelter has been provided for all persons needing it. Open trenches can be improved to provide overhead splinterproof cover. It will not be possible to construct this type of shelter in some of the low elevation parks such as Ala Moana, because of the ground water. The shelters constructed will have to be adapted to ground conditions.

*Existing buildings changed to provide structural protection*

Some existing buildings can be improved by structural changes to provide splinter-proof shelter. This type of protection should be subject to proper supervision, and should not be built where there is danger of a heavy building crushing the shelter.

[13] (b) Attached is a paper on the design and construction of domestic air raid shelters taken largely from British sources and containing designs based on British experience. Drawings showing recommended construction are included.

(c) Banks will be notified that if they desire to leave their cash and securities in their buildings, that their vaults are not sufficiently strong to protect them against one thousand pound bombs which may be expected. If vaults are to be made safe against such bombs they should be reinforced against such bombs, they should be reinforced by at least 4 ft. 3 in. of the best special reinforced concrete on top and at least 2 ft. 6 in. of the same construction on the sides. This construction is shown in Fig. 2, attached.

An alternative to strengthening existing vaults would be to provide in advance vaults tunneled in rock of one of the valleys behind the city. Nuuanu Valley is recommended for this purpose. To secure sufficient protection tunnels would need to be driven for considerable length into the hill to have at least 20 feet of soft rock over the vault and a burster course of at least two feet of specially reinforced concrete (such as that shown in Fig 2) must be built on the ground surface above the shelter.

Such a tunnel would require considerable time for construction and would have to be provided for well in advance of the danger period. It would have considerable advantage in being located in a site which is unlikely to be bombed, while it is certain that the downtown bank buildings would be bombed.

COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL SERVICE

*Chairman*

A physician or surgeon of executive ability, qualified to become the medical director of the emergency organization.

*Members*

Representatives of city hospitals.

Representative physicians and surgeons from all sections of the city.

[14] *Duties*

(a) To plan for the establishment of aid stations and hospitalization in divisions and districts.

(b) To plan the field medical work and notify Committee on Publicity of the arrangements so that the public may be informed.

(c) To select and recommend for appointment doctors and nurses to serve in all divisions and districts.

(d) To plan the transfer of medical personnel to outlying districts where they may be needed by evacuees because of no local service being available.

(e) To draw up and distribute to the medical personnel of the divisions and districts instructions as to duties.

(f) To plan for the furnishing of ambulances at critical points.

(g) To prepare instructions for the guidance of medical personnel of the divisions and districts.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Committee on Publicity.

(b) City hospitals and physicians.

(c) Town and plantation hospitals and physicians.

COMMITTEE ON DAMAGE CONTROL

*Chairman*

Public official or citizen of executive ability, qualified to direct operations of damage control, including police and fire department work.

*Members*

Chief of Police.

Chief of Fire Department.

Engineer.

Traffic Director.

*Duties*

(a) To formulate plans under which fire department will work with augmented force to control damage by fire and explosion.

(b) To study plans already prepared by police department for emergency.

(c) To prepare instructions to be issued to public as to necessary steps for private damage control.

(d) To prepare instructions for the guidance of the personnel of the divisions and districts concerned with the damage control.

*Cooperation necessary*

(a) Police Department.

(b) Fire Department.

(c) Committee on Labor.

(d) Committee on Publicity.

(At this point in the original exhibit there appears a series of 12 architectural drawings which are plans for the construction of various types of air raid shelters. These drawings are reproduced as Items 4 through 16 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[1] DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF A. R. SHELTERS

DOMESTIC

I. GENERAL

*A. Responsibility*

The responsibility for the provision of domestic air raid shelters lies with the individual; he shall pay all costs in connection with the installation. Expert advice as to location and design will be furnished by the civil authorities upon call.

*B. Degree of protection*

1. The minimum of protection which will be afforded by domestic shelters is as follows:

a. Protection against the blast and fragmentation effect of a 500 lb. bomb falling at a distance of 50 feet.

b. Direct hit of a 5 lb. incendiary bomb.

c. Protection against military gasses.

2. Any degree of protection above the minimum may be obtained.

*C. Types of shelters*

1. Domestic shelters fall into two main classifications.

a. Surface shelters (those located entirely above ground).

b. Underground shelters (those partially and completely below original ground level).

2. When practicable, the full underground shelter is recommended because of the greater lateral protection given by the ground. The surface shelter should only be provided where subsurface conditions (rock, coral or subsurface water) make the provision of underground shelters economically impossible.

## II. DESIGN

*A. Basic considerations*

1. *Location.*— [2] a. In residential areas the air raid shelters should be installed within easy reach of the dwelling. Those shelters which are to serve two or more families should be centrally located. Where basements exist or where the dwelling is located on the side of a hill, a covered entrance is recommended.

b. In selecting sites for these shelters the following should be avoided:

(1) Proximity to heavy load bearing walls, columns, high chimneys, water tanks, etc.

(2) Proximity to gas and water mains.

2. *Lateral protection.*—a. In order to provide the protection required in I B above, the following minimum wall thicknesses shall govern in the case of surface and partially buried shelters:

(1) 1½" of mild steel plate

(2) 12" reinforced concrete

(3) 15" sound masonry

(4) 2' broken stone

(5) 3' earth or sand

b. For underground shelters, the wall thickness required will vary with the type of adjacent materials, being in all cases less than that specified in a (1), (2) and (3) above.

3. *Overhead cover.*—a. Surface shelters should have a minimum of—

(1) ¾" mild steel plate

(2) 5" reinforced concrete

(3) 9" of arched masonry

[3] b. For underground shelters these thicknesses may be reduced if sufficient natural overhead cover exists (3' minimum); in any event, the roof must have sufficient strength to support the dead load with adequate margins of safety.

4. *Entries and exits.*—a. The guiding principle is that there shall be enough entrances to allow all persons to reach their appointed places within shelters in five (5) minutes. This has, however, small application to domestic shelters.

b. Each shelter must have a minimum of two exits to eliminate the possibility of being trapped by a blocked passageway. Emergency exits need only be big enough to allow a man to squeeze out.

c. Wherever possible, ramps should replace stairs in passageways.

d. All entrances, unless barricaded with double doors should be placed at right angles to the direction of the shelter proper to reduce the danger from blast and fragmentation.

5. *Space requirements.*—a. The minimum headroom in all shelters is 6 feet. Shelters for less than 12 people or trench shelters open at both ends will provide a floor space of 4 square feet per person.

c. Shelters, other than those in b above will provide 6 square feet and 50 cu. ft. per person.

*B. Gas proofing*

Although there has been no evidence of any extended use of gas in the present European struggle, and gas protection is by inference of low [4] priority, it cannot be entirely disregarded.

1. In any shelter there should be a means of allowing passage into the structure by humans but not by gas.

a. A double set of doors will solve this problem, one to be shut before the other is opened. A bend in this airlock will help materially in preventing the splintering of two doors.

b. All doors and other openings should be airtight.



2. Some means of decontamination must be available. A solution is to place a box of sand and chloride of lime in the gaslock and require all persons to shift their feet through the mixture prior to entrance.

### C. Ventilation

If a shelter is entirely sealed for the duration of the raid by airtight doors some means of artificial ventilation will have to be provided, in this case, a filter device will be necessary to neutralize gasses or as an alternative, the inlet must be placed high enough (30') to be in the pure air zone. Generally however, it is recommended that while doors be made airtight (by means of rubber gaskets, etc.), they be left open until a gas attack is imminent and natural ventilation be relied on solely.

### D. Utilities

1. *Lighting.*—a. Lights should be provided in each shelter; if impractical to run extensions from main power lines, reliance can be placed on self-contained incandescent units or they may be carried as substitutes in the event of commercial power failure. Adequate lighting exerts a psychological factor which should not be overlooked.

b. It goes without saying, that every precaution should be taken that no stray light should be visible from the outside.

[5] 2. *Water supply.*—No water, other than drinking water carried in portable containers will be necessary.

3. *Lavatory facilities.*—In the case of the multi-family shelters, a septic tank is recommended. This can easily be partitioned off from the shelter proper.

4. *Tools.*—A number of tools such as picks, shovels, and crowbars should be kept in a shelter to be used in forcing a way out if the occupants are trapped.

## III. CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE

### A. Surface shelters

It is desired to reiterate that surface shelters are definitely inferior to underground shelters and should only be built when absolutely necessary.

1. *Concrete box.*—Figures 7 & 8 attached hereto show the recommended layout, and general construction details of this type of shelter.

a. Space requirements:

6 persons	4'6" x 6'6"
8 "	4'6" x 8'6"
10 "	4'6" x 10'6"
12 "	4'6" x 12'6"

b. Wall foundations should be at least 2' deep.

c. All walls and the roof should be adequately anchored, the one to the other.

d. As an alternative to the 5" ordinary reinforced concrete roof slab, the dovetail sheeting with  $\frac{1}{2}$ " of cover precast underneath may be used; in this case the sheeting acts both reinforcement for and preventive to excessive spalling [6] from the 4" of concrete cast in place above. Dovetail sheets are placed in 10' x 2' units; gauge in 24.

e. At least one foot of sandbagging is recommended as roof cover.

f. Emergency exits can be provided by forming an opening in one wall. Provide two  $\frac{1}{4}$ " steel plates, slightly larger than opening; one plate to bear on outside of wall, one on inside, attached by foot long bolts with wing nuts on inside plate. Intermediate space can be filled with broken stone, etc. Exit can be cleared rapidly by removing wing nuts.

2. *Reinforced Arch.*

This type of shelter is ordinarily installed underground or partially buried, but may with properly anchored footings be utilized as a surface shelter. For details, see B below.

### B. Underground shelters

1. *Trench type.*—Figure 1 illustrates a simple type of covered trench recommended by the British Home Office. Plate is self-explanatory.

a. Access trenches are at right angles to shelter proper and are provided at each end, extending in opposite directions.

b. Advisable spacing between adjacent trench shelters is 50'; they may be interconnected.

c. This shelter is not highly recommended; for a small difference in outlay and labor the arched shelter, offering more positive protection can be provided.

2. *Reinforced arch.*—There are several types of this shelter in use in England at present: brick, concrete, corrugated iron and a combination of the latter two. Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 show these types. In constructing this type [7] which is adaptable to surface, semi or full underground construction, the following recommendations may be followed.

a. Concrete floor and footings poured initially.

b. The dovetail sheeting is then placed in sections, assembled and then covered with high strength concrete.

c. Recommended mix for concrete cover is 1:2½:3½.

3. *Culvert shelter.*—Figure 4 shows tentative design of 6 man underground shelter designed in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

a. As an alternative to the emergency exit shown, a passageway similar to the entrance tunnel may be provided.

b. This design is particularly adapted to those residential districts on the heights of Honolulu.

4. *Concrete box shelters.*—Underground shelters of reinforced concrete construction may be designed to afford any degree of protection from the prescribed minimum to complete immunity. They will be expensive and are not recommended for general use. Figure 6 shows a Swiss design for concrete underground shelter; expert advice should be secured prior to initiation of construction on this scale.

#### IV. REFUGE ROOMS IN EXISTING DWELLINGS

If the time factor does not permit construction of external shelters, recourse must be made to any available space which can be arranged to provide some degree of protection.

Almost any room will serve as a refuge room if it is soundly constructed and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its windows should be as few and as small as possibly preferably facing a building or blank wall or a narrow street. If a ground floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open ground is chosen the windows should if possible be especially protected as covered below. The stronger the walls, floor and ceiling are the better. [8] Brick partition walls are better than lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling is better than a wooden one. An internal passage will form a very good refuge-room if it can be closed at both ends. A cellar or a basement is the best place for a refuge-room if it can be made reasonably gas-proof and if there is no likelihood of its becoming flooded by a burst water-main. Alternatively, any room on any floor below the top may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided.

a. Space required for rooms of normal height of 8' x 10'. An allowance of 20 sq. ft. of floor area for each person will enable those persons to remain in the room with complete safety for a continuous period of 12 hours without ventilation.

##### A. Gas proofing

No serious amount of gas will come into a room unless there are draughts or currents of air to carry it in, so any cracks or openings must be sealed up. In old houses especially, windows and doors may shut badly. There may be chinks underneath the window sills on the inside. There may be cracks in the ceiling.

1. Fill in all cracks and crevices with putty or a pulp made of sodden newspaper. Plaster paper over cracks in the walls or ceiling. Fill in the cracks between the floor boards and paste sheets of paper over the whole floor.

2. Fill in all cracks round the skirting boards, or where pipes pass through the walls. All trap-doors, skylights and hatches in the room should be sealed, and interior ventilators stopped up with rags or pasted over with thick paper. All ventilators in the outside walls of the house, including those below the floor level, should be stopped up with rags or paper.

3. Plug key-holes. Plug waste-pipes, or overflow pipes, in any basin or sink in your refuge-room. If you are doubtful whether a hole or a crack lets in air, play for safety, and seal it up.

4. The windows should be sealed so that draughts, or gas, cannot [9] come in. Wedge them firmly to keep them tightly fixed in their frames. Seal all round the frames with gummed strip or pasted paper, wherever there is a crack. Be ready to reseal the window openings if the glass gets broken. For this purpose have some stout materials to hang or fasten over them. Use a close-woven material or a blind, for instance, if it is large enough. Fasten it by

nailing it with thin strips of wood to the window frame all round, and then seal the edges with adhesive tape.

5. Doors to the refuge-room which need not be used should be sealed. Paper should be pasted firmly all around the cracks, especially at the foot of the door, and the key-hole plugged. Doors which have to be opened and closed should be sealed against gas. Nail a piece of wood, padded with felt, to the floor so that the door, when closed, presses tightly against it. Take care not to nail this piece of wood on the wrong side of the door so that it cannot be opened. Strips of felt may also be nailed round the inside of the door to exclude draughts. Fix a blanket outside the door if the door opens inwards, or inside the door if the door opens outwards, with strips of wood. The top of the blanket should be fixed to the top of the door frame. One side of the blanket should be fastened down the whole length of the door frame, on the side where the hinges are, by means of a strip of wood nailed to the frame. The other side of the blanket should be secured not more than two feet down, so that a flap is left free for going in and out. Arrange the blanket so that at least 12 inches trails on the floor to stop air from blowing underneath it. If the blanket is kept damp during an air raid, it will give better protection.

### *B. Structural protection*

1. *Protection of windows.*—If possible all windows should be barricaded with sand bags. Beyond this splinters of glass can be prevented from being blown into the room covering the inside of the window at least two thin sheets of one of the transparent or translucent non-inflamable materials now available; non-inflamable celluloid is also acceptable. Although cellulose varnish is the best adhesive, water glass or even ordinary type glue or varnish can be used to stick [10] the material to the glass. Failing anything better some fabric material such as linen from old pillow cases or mosquito netting or even stout paper may be pasted on the inside of the glass.

2. *Ceilings.*—If the refuge room is on the ground floor or in the basement the ceiling can be supported with wooden props as an additional protection. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright resting on a thick plank of the floor supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling at right angles to the ceiling. The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot driven in opposite ways. The wedges should not be driven too violently otherwise the ceiling may be lifted and damaged.

3. *Fire precautions.*—a. The attic or top floor should be cleared of all inflammable material, paper, litter, lumber, etc. to lessen the danger of fire and to prevent the fire from spreading.

b. If the materials are available the floor of the attic or top floor should be protected in one of the following ways.

(1) With sheets of corrugated iron or plain sheet iron, 22 gauge or thicker or asbestos wall board.

(2) With 2" of sand if the floor will bear the weight.

c. It is advisable to soak all woodwork in the attic or roof space with lime wash to delay its catching fire. A suitable mixture is 2 lbs. of slate lime, 1 oz. of common salt with 1 pt. of cold water.

## DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF AIR RAID SHELTERS

### PUBLIC

The term public shelters as used herein will be taken to mean, in [11] addition to those truly public, shelters for factories, large places of business and institutions.

#### I. GENERAL

##### *A. Responsibility*

It shall be a community responsibility to provide those shelters classed as truly public and the responsibility of the factories and businesses to provide shelters for their employees and customers.

##### *B. Degree of protection*

The minimum of protection to be afforded by public shelters will be:

a. Protection against the direct hit of a 50 lb. bomb.

b. Protection against military gasses.



*C. Types of shelters*

1. Public shelters fall into three main classifications.
  - a. External shelters partly and entirely underground.
  - b. Shelters within existing basements and specially reinforced refuge-rooms.
2. It is also possible to construct surface shelters although in general the increased cost will be such as to render this type of construction economically prohibitive.

## II. DESIGN

*A. Basic considerations*

1. *Location.*—The location of public shelters should be decided after a careful survey. It is conceivable that the warning period may be less than 5 minutes so that many people might be caught in the open during an air raid unless it be arranged so that no one would have more than a 3 or 4 minute walk to a shelter. Covered approaches where practicable would constitute an additional safeguard against being caught in the open during a raid.

2. *Lateral protection.*—a. All shelters not completely buried shall have the [12] equivalent wall thickness of 2' of reinforced concrete. In the case of wholly buried shelters the guiding principle shall be that the walls shall have sufficient thickness and reinforcing to support the total roof load, to withstand the static earth pressure, and the dynamic earth pressure in the case of the penetration and explosion of a near-by bomb.

## III. EXTERNAL SHELTERS

A. An external shelter should not ordinarily be for more than 50 persons unless provided with traverses or right angle bends as in trenches. The minimum area necessary for trench shelters and what is termed the tunnel form of shelter is  $3\frac{3}{4}$  sq. ft. of floor per person. For all other shelters it is 6 sq. ft. per person. There must be one emergency exit to each 50 persons. The minimum height is 6' x 6". In large shelters there shall be at least one entrance or exit for each 50 persons. All doors to exits and entrances should open inwards. Air raid shelter doors should fulfill the following points.

- a. They should be of fire resisting construction.
- b. They should be proof against splinter penetration.
- c. Should be capable of withstanding an equivalent static pressure of 10 lbs. per square inch for the whole of the area of the door and a suction pressure of twice this amount. They should be gas-tight and water-tight. They should open inward. They should be as small as convenient.

B. Shelters need not be gas-proof but must be so constructed as to be capable of being made gas-proof quickly in an emergency. External shelter should be near the usual place of occupation of the personnel for whom they are intended. External shelters should be at least half the height distance from tall buildings, chimneys, water towers, etc.

One of the most convenient and economical ways of constructing the external bombproof shelter is to use large diameter precast concrete tubes, laid [13] like a section of the sewer partially above the ground with a mound of earth over the top.

In spite of the provision of shelters in all centers of occupation and homes of the people, many will find themselves in the streets at the time of an air raid warning. For these the underground garage which may ultimately be found in practically every square would be reasonably safe refuge. This is a form of cut and cover structure with approaching ramps which would be provided in an emergency with gaslocks. The heavy concrete roofs supported on thick dividing walls automatically separates the interior of the shelter into cells of the size suitable for the accommodation of 50 people. Ventilation, lighting, water service and sewage installations should be independently installed in each of the shelters and emergency exits provided for each. The refuges must be so distributed that they can absorb within 10 minutes the floating population to be cared for. In order to render the cost of the work reasonably economic they should be preferably of a dual function so that they may serve some useful purpose at normal times.

## IV. SHELTERS WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURES

A. Excluding independent external shelters, multi-story steel-framed or reinforced concrete buildings are the most suitable types for shelter accomoda-



tions. They should, however, be of fire resisting construction, preferably with solid concrete floors, roofs and solid cross-walls or partitions and have a fair proportion of solids to voids in the external walls. In general below ground accommodation is best. It is highly desirable that such accommodations should not be lower than the water mains or sewers. When the walls are of sufficient thickness to afford lateral protection and the windows are of normal size, providing that effective gas proofing is possible, the ground floor of a building may be considered as suitable for a location of shelters. Shelter accommodations on upper floors should generally be not higher than the second floor, it should have a minimum cover of two floors and the roof of the building.

B. Basements should not be used as shelters if very heavy machinery is [14] situated on the floors above. If basements are to be used the following points should be considered.

- a. Strength of ground floor.
- b. Safeguarding against flooding.
- c. Protection of windows if any.
- d. Protection against gas.
- e. The number of persons the basement will hold.

The roofs of basements shelters should be designed for a live load of 300 lbs. per square foot of buildings with two complete floors, 400 lbs. per square foot for three or four floors, 500 lbs. per square foot if there are more than four floors. All windows should be sandbagged or heavily shuttered.

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## DESIGN OF BOMBPROOF STRUCTURES

(Tentative)

(Prepared jointly by the U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., and the Department Engineer Office, Fort Shafter, T. H.)

### [1] *I. Purpose of this pamphlet*

1. In ordinary practice, structural design consists of balancing forces or loads on one side and resistance or strength of materials on the other with proper margins of safety. The forces or loads to be withstood by the structure are carefully analyzed and estimated.

2. In design of bombproof structures, the same general approach would be ideal. Unfortunately, however, the analysis or estimate of the forces or loads on the structure immediately involves consideration of factors of which very little is known and on which there is no background of experience. Knowledge of the effect of existing weapons is limited and was obtained only through costly and elaborate experiments; new weapons are of course a closely guarded military secret, and an analysis or estimate of their probable effects is only limited by one's imagination. European military engineers in the past few years, however, have been giving the design of bombproof structures considerable attention, and results of their study have recently become available.

3. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to present for general information a brief statement of the known effects of bombs and to discuss the most efficient method of structurally resisting these effects. In an effort to keep the pamphlet brief, most of the analysis leading up to certain conclusions has been condensed or eliminated. The pamphlet is based in large part upon a very excellent publication of the British Home Office entitled "Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 5—Structural Defense," and all quotations are from this British handbook unless otherwise stated.

4. The decision to bombproof any structure and specifically the decision as to the type and weight of bomb it must resist must be based upon tactical considerations. For all except the lighter weight bombs, the structure requires such detailed planning as to preclude hasty construction in an emergency. The amount of concrete required to protect against the heavier weight bombs is very large and the structure will be very costly. This expense of construction makes it almost as necessary, in the interest of economy of funds and effort, to see that no structure is overprotected as it is necessary to insure that vital installations are adequately protected. Consideration must be given to the probability of hits and the importance of the structure as compared to others in the immediate vicinity. The size and number of bombs available to an

enemy are affected by the type of base from which he can reasonably be expected to operate; carrier based aviation cannot deliver either as powerful or as sustained an attack as land planes. Consideration should also be given to the practicability of protection of installations by duplication, dispersion, and camouflage; successful use of these methods might make an attack so unprofitable for an enemy that any losses he can inflict will not be worth the losses he would suffer. These are just a few of the factors involved; in any event, [2] determination by competent authority of the size of bomb to be resisted should precede design of any bombproof structure.

## II. General information and definitions

1. Bombs are classified by weight by purpose, and by strength of case. They are fused either for instantaneous or for delayed detonation.

2. *a.* When a bomb strikes, two sets of forces must be resisted. These are (1) *kinetic energy*, which is a function of velocity, angle of fall, and weight of bomb; and (2) *explosion*, which is a function of the amount and kind of explosive charge, tamping factor, and characteristics of the material penetrated. In the case of a hit on or near a structure, these main effects cause subsidiary effects which must be resisted.

*b. Kinetic energy.*—Subsidiary effects of the kinetic energy are dynamic load and penetration. The dynamic load is the true impact force. The penetrating effect is a function of the design and strength of the bomb case, and characteristics of the resisting material. Penetration is further subdivided into perforation and penetration; a material is perforated when the bomb passes completely through it and comes to rest under the material, and is penetrated when the bomb imbeds itself in the material without passing completely through the layer.

*c. Explosion.*—Subsidiary effects of the explosion force are true explosion, blast, and fragmentation. Explosion is the disintegrating or displacing force. Blast is a pressure wave set up in the medium struck or in the air; it is an inverse function of the distance from the point of explosion and results in both positive and negative pressures. Fragmentation is the projection outward at very high velocities of fragments of the bomb case.

3. Calculation of the exact striking or impact velocity under given conditions is a laborious process involving several empirical formulae. Density of air, wind conditions, ballistics coefficient, and other characteristics of the bomb are variables whose effect is difficult to evaluate and in the final analysis influence the ultimate velocity only slightly. The effect of air speed of plane at time of release is noticeable at lower altitude bombing but becomes negligible above 8000 feet. For all practical purposes, therefore, the impact velocity may be assumed to be a function of height of plane above ground.

In Table I attached are given the impact velocities for the bombs under consideration, dropped from heights of 10,000, 15,000 and 20,000 feet. Calculations were based on an air speed of 200 miles per hour; if the tabulated data are increased by not to exceed 2% for each 50 miles per hour increment above 200 miles per hour, the results obtained will err on the side of safety.

[3] 4. No shelter should be termed bombproof "if it stops short of protection against a bomb, with a delay fuse, that does not break up when striking a resisting target." It will be assumed herein that all bomb cases will be such that they will not break up against a resisting target, representative of the worst possible condition. We are concerned in this discussion with 50-, 100-, 250-, 600-, 1000-, 2000- and 4000-pound bombs, the explosive content of each of which represents at least 50% of the gross weight.

5. At the end of the World War, the "deep shelter" idea had been established. This consisted of constructing a concrete structure underground and covering it alternately with earth and crushed rock burster courses; an alternate is tunneling at a sufficient depth to insure immunity by reliance on undisturbed overhead cover to absorb the full effect of the bomb. The French and Swiss design their roof slabs to resist all forces and loads. The Italians and English employ a surface burster course designed to resist the total effect and separated from the structure proper by some other medium. As regards surface structures, there is but one method of securing protection, namely, to design the roof and walls to withstand total effect. "Conical and parabolic shelters have been built to a limited extent on the Continent," with the object of offering the least possible surface normal to angle of impact. The consensus of opinion now seems to favor the use of a concrete burster course designed to withstand the total effect

of a bomb, as the most practical solution; it is with this type of design that we are primarily concerned.

III. Kinetic energy

1. The first force that a structure must withstand when struck by a bomb is impact. A bomb striking a concrete or other target will perforate, penetrate short of perforation, or ricochet. If the bomb perforates the target prior to detonation, it will leave a comparatively neat hole of diameter approximately equal to that of projectile. If the bomb ricochets due to the angle of impact, there will be no noticeable effect other than the shock load necessary to deflect the bomb. If, however, the bomb penetrates to a certain depth prior to explosion, it will exert two definite effects on the structure:—(1) The retardation of the bomb from impact velocity to rest within the limits of penetration will impose a sudden load on the target; (2) The surface of the target sustaining impact will be damaged over a considerable area and a shallow, large diameter, "impact" crater will be formed.

2. In the case of a solidly supported slab, the force of impact is assumed to be transmitted to the supporting medium as a distributed load. According to the best theory yet advanced, the concentrated load at point of impact spreads out in a "cone of pressure," 90° at apex. When the slab [4] forms the roof of a structure, the force of impact develops tremendous, if incalculable, bending moments and shear. A rough approximation of the average retarding force can be obtained by dividing the kinetic energy of the bomb at impact by the depth of penetration. It is essential that this force be considered in the design of roof slabs if no burster course is provided.

3. One other result of impact on a roof slab is scabbing or spalling from the inner surface, the ultimate effect of which is to aid in penetration or perforation. The phenomenon is best explained as caused by the impact pressure wave transmitted through the slab in sufficient intensity to overcome cohesive resistance.

4. Many attempts have been made to determine an exact formula to express the depth to which a projectile will penetrate a given medium. Depth of penetration is known to be a function of velocity at impact, sectional density of bomb, angle of impact, resistance coefficient of material penetrated and strength and shape of casing. All empirical formulae developed to date consider these factors, but are difficult to evaluate. In the last analysis, the matter is one which can only be settled by actual experiment.

5. The following data are given in the British pamphlet for depth of penetration in a slab supported over the whole of its surface by a bomb with a delay fuse and of a sufficiently heavy case as to not break or deform during the penetration. The first three columns are from the Swiss Federal Commission and the last column is from an investigation by Bazant.

Weight of bomb	Mass concrete	Reinforced concrete	Specially reinforced concrete	Mass concrete and reinforced concrete
	S=2200 lbs per sq. in.	S=3200 lbs per sq. in.	S=5700 lbs per sq. in.	S=2800 lbs. per sq. in.
Pounds:				
110.....	2' 0"	1' 4"	10"	1' 2"
220.....	2' 0"	1' 4"	1' 0"	1' 3"
660.....	3' 0"	2' 0"	1' 6"	1' 10"
2200.....	-----	-----	-----	2' 7"
4000.....	-----	-----	-----	3' 4"

6. When these data are plotted on semi-logarithmic graph paper (Plate I) Bazant's figures form a regular curve, as do also the Swiss figures for specially reinforced concrete. As the data are undoubtedly based on different empirical formulae, checked by the results of actual bombing tests available to the investigators, with perhaps different bomb characteristic, impact velocity, etc. (none of which is given in the pamphlet except that Bazant [5] used an impact velocity of 820 feet per second, which corresponds roughly to an altitude of 14,000 feet), it can be seen that there is a reasonably close comparison between the Swiss figures and Bazant's. It is believed, however, that the strength of



Bazant's concrete (i. e., 2,800 pounds per square inch) has been given too low a value, and that it is actually a type of specially reinforced concrete. If similar theoretical curves be drawn for mass concrete and ordinary reinforced concrete using the Swiss figures as a starting basis and in general following Bazant's curve, the data may be accepted as reasonably sound for those two types of concrete. From these curves and specially reinforced concrete curve plotted from the Swiss figures, data for the weights of bombs considered in this pamphlet are taken to form Table 1 below:

TABLE 1

Weight	Mass concrete	Reinforced concrete	Specially reinforced concrete
	S=2200 lbs per sq. in.	S=3200 lbs per sq. in.	S=5700 lbs per sq. in.
Pounds			
50.....	1' 9"	1' 1"	0' 9"
100.....	1' 10"	1' 2"	0' 10"
250.....	2' 3"	1' 5"	1' 0"
600.....	2' 8"	1' 10"	1' 5"
1000.....	3' 5"	2' 3"	1' 9"
2000.....	4' 4"	3' 0"	2' 4"
4000.....	5' 7"	3' 10"	3' 0"

7. As far as known, there are no American data that cover the same ground, that is, penetration only of concrete by bombs.

#### IV. Explosion

1. The second set of forces that a structure must withstand when struck by a bomb, again assuming sufficient weight of case to prevent breaking up or deformation of the bomb, will be explosion. The main effects of this set of forces are true explosion or the disintegrating or displacing force and blast. True explosion varies with the charge, tamping factor, and strength of the disintegrated material. Blast causes essentially the same effects as impact:—sudden application of force causing shear and bending moment, failure in tension on inner surface and some spalling.

2. Bazant gives the following data for the thickness of concrete just perforated by explosion only:

[6] Weight of bomb	Thickness just perforated by explosion only	
	Mass concrete	Reinforced concrete
Pounds:		
110.....	2' 0"	1' 6"
220.....	2' 6"	1' 10"
660.....	3' 7"	2' 7"
2,200.....	5' 5"	4' 1"
4,000.....	6' 7"	4' 11"

If these data are plotted on logarithmic graph paper, the resulting curves will be straight lines as shown on Plate II. As Bazant gives his amounts only for *mass concrete* and *reinforced concrete*, it is believed that it might be advantageous to consider *specially reinforced concrete*, and a curve is drawn on the plate for specially reinforced concrete based on a comparison of the unit strengths. From these curves may be taken the thickness required to resist perforation by explosion of the bombs listed below:



TABLE 2

Weight of bomb	Thickness just perforated by explosion only		
	Mass concrete	Reinforced concrete	Specially reinforced concrete
	S=2200 lbs per sq. in.	S=3200 lbs per sq. in.	S=5700 lbs per sq. in.
Pounds:			
50.....	1' 6"	1' 1"	0' 10"
100.....	1' 11"	1' 5"	1' 2"
250.....	2' 8"	1' 11"	1' 6"
600.....	3' 7"	2' 7"	2' 1"
1000.....	4' 3"	3' 1"	2' 6"
2000.....	5' 4"	3' 10"	3' 1"
4000.....	6' 7"	4' 11"	4' 1"

3. As far as can be ascertained, there are no comparative American data except an isolated table wherein the blast effect on reinforced concrete wall is given as follows:

Type of bomb	Thickness of wall	Diameter of hole blasted
600-lb.	8.6 ft.	17.2 ft.
1100-lb.	10.4 ft.	20.8 ft.
2000-lb.	12.3 ft.	24.6 ft.

These data are not wholly experimental results but are based in part upon the demolition formula

$$R=1.22\sqrt[3]{\frac{N}{KC}}$$

- [7] R=Radius of rupture
- N=Number of pounds of T. N. T.
- K=Factor depending upon the material blasted.
- C=Factor depending upon location and tamping of charge.

4. It is believed that these results are too high since the value of C in the formula is taken as 2, which assumes partial tamping and intimate contact with the base of the wall. If a bomb dropped on a horizontal slab perforates the slab, and the explosion occurs while the bomb is in the media under the slab, the slab itself then acts as part of the tamping and the explosive effect downward on the structure will be tremendous. If, however, the bomb does not perforate, but merely penetrates the concrete to a certain depth, it probably will not be wedged in place as the impact force tends to form an impact crater. Thus in the case of either an instantaneous explosion or a delayed explosion after penetration (not perforation) there is a path of least resistance to the air. In these latter two cases, the value of C in the formula will be considerably greater than 2 as assumed above. Furthermore, it has been observed during tests with inert bombs that concrete targets which are not perforated cause the bomb to rebound after maximum penetration has occurred. If the delay action in the fuse is long enough to cover the time taken to penetrate and rebound, the explosion would not take place in intimate contact with the slab; in this connection Bazant states "the explosion of a bomb rebounding after impact and bursting in the air, produces no noticeable effect on the slab."

5. From the preceding discussion on explosion, the following cases are arranged in order of the probable resulting damage to a structure:

a. *Bomb perforates burster course, and explodes in medium between burster and structure.*—The burster course actually acts as tamping for the explosion, and the damaging effect of the explosion on the structure is tremendous. The burster is, therefore, worse than useless as it actually increases the explosive force.

b. No surface burster course provided, bomb penetrates dirt and other material above the structure and explodes somewhere above the structure.—Explosive effect is tremendous on the structure, but somewhat less than in Case "a." as some force is used in cratering. Case a. can approach the maximum effect of a camouflet.

c. Thickness of burster course just sufficient to withstand penetration; delay of bomb fuse adjusted so explosion takes place at instant of maximum penetration.—The explosion then takes place in intimate contact with concrete, and disintegrates the burster course over a considerable area. Explosive force and blast are transmitted to the structure through medium [8] separating the burster course and structure.

d. Thickness of burster course just sufficient to withstand penetration; bomb fused instantaneously or with sufficient delay to rebound.—Explosion has a free path to the air and no appreciable damage occurs.

e. Thickness of burster course sufficient to withstand maximum penetration plus additional thickness sufficient to withstand perforation by explosion.—Maximum attack occurs when delay of fuse is such that explosion takes place at instant of maximum penetration. Additional thickness of concrete however resists force of explosion. Some blast effect is transmitted through the slab; the amount of this which will react on the structure depends on characteristics and thickness of material between burster and structure. In any event, a structure with sufficient strength to support intervening material and the burster will probably be able to withstand this amount of blast effect.

#### V. The "Burster Course"

1. As stated in paragraph 5, Section II, this pamphlet is primarily concerned with a design employing a concrete burster course to withstand the total effect of the bomb. The term "burster course" is a misnomer; actually this layer of concrete is the main resisting part of the bombproof structure. The designation is used however to avoid introduction and definition of a new term.

2. The case for which the burster course should be designed is outlined in Section IV, paragraph 5c. above. The Swiss Federal Commission and the Metz (French) Committee assumed that, for roof slabs, the total required thickness was the sum of the thickness to resist penetration alone and the thickness to resist explosion alone. If this same assumption is made for a solidly supported burster course, it can only be criticized as over conservative for it is premised upon explosion occurring at the maximum limit of penetration with the projectile imbedded in the concrete; upon an angle of impact normal to the surface and with no deviation during penetration; upon a sufficiently strong casing to withstand impact stresses without deformation, and lastly upon a perfectly timed delay action fuse. Again, as before, the proper value can be accurately determined only after careful experimentation. The application of this assumption results in Table 3 below which shows theoretical thickness to withstand both impact and explosion:

[9]

TABLE 3

Weight of bomb	Mass concrete	Reinforced concrete	Specially reinforced concrete
	S=2200 lbs per sq. in.	S=3200 lbs per sq. in.	S=5700 lbs per sq. in.
Pounds:			
50.....	3' 3"	2' 2"	1' 7"
100.....	3' 9"	2' 7"	2' 0"
250.....	4' 11"	3' 4"	2' 6"
600.....	6' 3"	4' 5"	3' 6"
1000.....	7' 8"	5' 4"	4' 3"
2000.....	9' 8"	6' 10"	5' 5"
4000.....	12' 2"	8' 9"	7' 1"

3. The only comparative American data are for craters in solid rock described as granite porphyry. The results of bombing in this medium with delay action bombs, compare quite closely to the theoretically determined values listed in Table 3 for ordinary reinforced concrete.

4. The distance between burster course and roof of structure must be held above minimum allowances for various materials. This is not given directly

in the British pamphlet nor in any other paper available to this office. As a point of departure, however, it is believed that the maximum depth required in any material would be the depth to which the explosion will penetrate if the burster course is sufficient for penetration alone. The maximum depths for various materials are plotted as the curves of Plate III from empirical data extracted from the British pamphlet. The values so obtained exceed those computed by demolition formulae for tamped charges, indicating that if any error exists, it is on the side of safety. Table 4 herewith gives the results for the weights of bombs discussed in this pamphlet.

TABLE 4 •

Weight of bomb	Earth	Sand or gravel	Soft rock
Pounds:			
50.....	13' 0"	11' 2"	6' 10"
100.....	16' 6"	14' 0"	8' 8"
250.....	22' 6"	19' 0"	11' 11"
600.....	30' 4"	25' 9"	16' 0"
1,000.....	36' 2"	30' 9"	19' 4"
2,000.....	46' 0"	38' 6"	24' 6"
4,000.....	58' 2"	49' 0"	31' 0"

5. If the burster course is designed to withstand both penetration and explosion, the depth of supporting medium need be but 25% of the values given above, except that a minimum thickness of 3 feet will govern. Anything less than three feet will not be adequate for the absorption of the [10] impact shock and partial failure of the structure roof may result.

6. The ideal of overhead protection would be an arched burster course designed to resist total bomb effect and extended to prevent flank attack with no intervening material, save air, between the course and the structure below. Air is considered the optimum medium because it exerts the greatest dampening effect (exclusive of vacuum conditions) on the propagation of pressure waves and would consequently minimize impact loads on the structure proper. The enormous expense and the engineering difficulties attendant upon the construction of arched slabs of the required size and strength are prohibitive and make this solution impractical.

VI. Lateral Protection.

1. In order to protect the structure beneath from oblique attack by bombs, it is necessary that the burster course extend beyond the structure walls in all directions. The theoretical distance of extension should be not less than the radius of destruction of a bomb in the medium supporting the slab or surrounding the structure and preferably somewhat more. The radius of destruction or "effective radius" is defined as that of a sphere within the surface of which the explosion will completely shatter or displace all material. Calculation of this distance may proceed from the formula

$$R = 2.5 \sqrt[3]{\frac{C}{ab}}$$

Where C=Explosive content (lbs.)  
 a=Resistance coefficient of material penetrated  
 b=Coefficient of tamping  
 R=Radius in feet.

2. For preliminary purposes, the radius of destruction may be taken as equal to the depth of penetration of bombs in various materials. As stated under the discussion of impact, no exact formula has yet been derived for the determination of the depth of bomb penetration. Poncelet's formula, as modified by the Metz Committee,

$$S = K \cdot \frac{M}{d^2} \cdot f(V)$$

Where K=a constant  
 M=mass of projectile  
 d=diameter  
 V=impact velocity



gives the best approximation. Plate VI, as extracted from the British pamphlet, is based upon this formula, and gives the depth of penetration [11] as a function of impact velocity. To obtain the penetration of any bomb with a given impact velocity, the value obtained from the table is multiplied by the bomb's sectional density (weight in pounds of projectile divided by maximum cross sectional area in square inches).

3. As an illustration of the required overhang:—Assume an underground structure, protected by overhead layer of sand and gravel and surface burster course, is attacked by a 100-lb. bomb (sectional density of 278 lbs. per square inch) dropped from 14,000 feet. Impact velocity is determined to be 820 feet per second with a possible gravel penetration of 11'5", which can also be taken as the radius of destruction. To prevent the effect of explosion from reacting on the structure proper, the overhang must be at least 11'5".

(A diagram relating to Paragraph 3, *supra*, is reproduced as Item No. 17 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

4. This amount of overhang increases with the weight of bomb to be resisted. It is apparent that the cost of this extension of the burster course will be high. It is also apparent that many structures must have one face exposed. Theoretically it is possible to overhang the burster course over this exposed face by an elaborate arch construction; this, however, will be impracticable due to excessive expense and difficulties in construction. This exposed face must then be designed to withstand the total effect of an oblique attack by bombs. The line of fall will be almost parallel to the surface, and hence there will be no appreciable penetration. The worst force on the face will be the explosion of an instantaneously fused bomb, and the face will have to be designed to withstand this force. The data in Table 2 above for the thickness of concrete to resist penetration [12] by explosion is for a solidly supported slab; the exposed face will not be solidly supported, and will require some additional thickness and special reinforcement to resist the shear and bonding forces of the explosion. A concrete apron should extend beyond the exposed face as a burster course to prevent bombs from exploding under the floor level; it should not be integrally tied to the structure proper in order to avoid transmission of impact shocks. This extension should have sufficient thickness to withstand penetration, and should extend sufficiently far from the exposed face to insure that the force of explosion of a bomb striking just beyond the extension does not impose an irresistible load on the floor of the structure.

5. Another condition influences the determination of the necessary overhang. It is known that explosives can be exploded by sympathetic detonation from the explosion of other charges. The distance at which this occurs is a function of the medium through which the detonating wave passes, of the size of the charge and intensity of the initiating explosion and of the sensitivity of the charge which is sympathetically detonated. In ordinary soils and with ordinary explosives, this distance at which a sympathetic explosion may be induced by the explosion of a bomb charge may be greater than the radius of destruction discussed above. In a bombproofed magazine, the concrete walls, floor and ceiling will resist transmission of this detonating wave. A discussion of the determination of this minimum distance from consideration of the separate resistances of the surrounding medium and the concrete of the magazine is beyond the scope of this pamphlet. Unless this point is considered in the design of a magazine, it might be possible for the magazine to be destroyed through sympathetic detonation of its contents by the explosion of a bomb even though the design might insure against structural damage from the bomb explosion.

6. The path of a bomb penetrating earth is rarely a continuation of the regular curve of its fall through the air. It is deviated by local obstructions, and the total length of path can exceed the depth penetrated by as much as 30%. This path is often concave to the surface of the earth and may turn upward at the end. It is therefore evident that a bomb striking near the edge of the burster course might be deviated under the burster course and that the effective overhang would be decreased. This condition might be combatted by ending the burster course in a vertical or oblique curtain wall of relatively thin section and of a depth below the burster course determined by the size of bomb to be resisted.

#### VII. Underground shelters

1. If the structure can be located under the surface of the ground, the location should be investigated to determine characteristics of the ground material. If



the material is rock, it should be again further checked to see whether the rock is solid and if so the kind and strength of the rock; if not, whether it is fractured or weathered and the depth to which such fracturing or weathering has penetrated. If the overhead cover is good hard rock and the structure can be placed at a sufficient depth below the surface, a concrete burster course will be unnecessary. If, however, the rock is soft or not solid and the structure cannot be placed deep enough to obtain the minimum overhead cover required, the rock can be reinforced by addition [13] of a concrete burster course at the surface. In the case of dirt cover, the concrete burster course should be assumed to take all the necessary force from the bomb due to penetration and explosion. If the burster course is designed so light that the bomb penetrates completely before explosion, the burster course will act as an additional tamping to the charge, and the explosion will be directed downward, thereby probably causing more damage than if the burster course were not used at all.

2. Assuming that a surface burster course is necessary and the proper thickness determined from tables, it is particularly important that the design and construction procedure be carefully checked to ascertain that the unit strengths given in the tables are actually obtained.

3. The aggregate and cement should comply with proper specifications; the former should be as heavy as possible, since it has been found that light aggregate is less resistant. Continuous depositing will be of advantage; water/cement ratio should be kept to minimum requirements. Any decrease in workability can be offset by proper use of vibrators.

4. Burster course slabs should always be reinforced in three directions. Reinforcing steel should be placed in such a manner that the concrete will have the necessary unit strength in both tension and compression. It is highly important that a proportionate share of the steel be placed to resist shear. The bond strength between the steel and the concrete is very important. It has been found that a much lower allowable bond strength is necessary in bombproof design than in ordinary concrete design, and a large number of small bars should be used rather than the equivalent weight of larger sizes. On the subject of reinforcement, the British pamphlet states:

"The localised effect of a direct hit is to detach the concrete leaving the reinforcement bare and comparatively uninjured. This effect seems to be accentuated if the reinforcement is either of large cross section, as for example when old rails are used, or is laid in a plane along which a line cleavage can be formed, as for example when a close mesh reinforcement is laid in sheets. Some writers explain the detachment of the concrete from the steel as due to the difference in the speed with which a sound-wave travels in the two materials. The effect of a powerful vibration running through the steel ahead of that in the concrete is supposed to break down the adhesion between the two materials. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the area of surface contact between steel and concrete should be large compared with the cross-sectional area of the steel, and that as a working rule the diameter of reinforcing bars should not be more than 3/4 inch or less than 3/8 inch. The upper is considered to be too low and must give place to sizes determined by the ordinary code of practice."

5. In thick slabs, it is advisable to provide horizontal layers of [14] two-way reinforcement on 6" or 8" centers with the vertical distance between layers about 6" or 8". To counteract failure along a line of cleavage, vertical and diagonal reinforcement should be ample and securely tied into horizontal steel. As another means of overcoming the effect of vibratory wave detaching the steel from the concrete, bars of extra deformed type should be used.

6. Regular engineering formulae will apply to the design of the underground structure itself. The roof and walls should be designed to take care of, in addition to their own weight, the dead load of the overhead cover. As an added factor of safety, the design of the structure should provide for resistance against impact calculated as a distributed load, in conformity with "cone of pressure" theory. As a precaution against possible spalling from the underside of the roof, a close mesh layer of reinforcement may be provided or the ceiling may be steel plated. Roof spans should be kept as short as is consistent with storage or shelter requirements.

7. If the shelter is of the cut and cover variety, the back fill must have ample time to settle before the placing of the burster course. Likewise there should be no means of lateral displacement of the supporting medium afterwards. For if subsidence or sidewise movement does occur, the slab ceases to be solidly sup-

ported and its resistance to penetration and/or explosion is decreased. In the case of a shelter with an exposed face, it may be expedient to construct a retaining wall to prevent this; under no circumstances, however, should the foot of the retaining wall be connected to the structure below, for the transmission of the concussion shock through the concrete might result in partial or complete failure of the underground installation.

### VIII. Surface shelters

1. There will be many structures requiring varying degrees of protection which for any of several reasons cannot be placed underground. It can be assumed, from what has preceded, that for these installations protection can only be attained against direct hits of the lighter bombs. "A roof which could be relied upon to resist the attack of a heavy bomb ( $\geq 500\#$ ) implies a thickness of material so great that its mere weight, apart from the impact load, would require supports of impractical dimensions." The resort to conical or parabolic shelters is no solution as the difficulties of construction are greatly increased. The protection of surface shelters, then, has definite limitations.

2. In design of roof slabs, full cognizance must be taken of impact load, penetration and explosion. The necessary thickness to resist the latter two effects may be approximated from the foregoing tables. No definite procedure has been developed for determining proper design to resist the momentary impact load, save by converting the kinetic energy [15] at impact into an equivalent static force. This is not quite correct, since the effect is one of shock action and the load abruptly ceases. It is therefore possible that considerable deformation and yielding could be produced without resultant failure of the slab.

3. It is generally felt that in the case of multi-storied buildings resistance to perforation by total effect is not economically attainable; however, the effect of a high explosive bomb detonating after perforation of roof slab can be minimized by construction of steel girder or reinforced concrete framed buildings with non-load bearing wall panels. Destruction of one or more wall panels will not result in collapse of the structure and will reduce damage caused by falling debris. Experience in Spain and China has shown that the same weight and type of bomb which completely destroyed buildings with solid load bearing walls, damaged steel and concrete framed buildings to an amazingly small extent. Floors must be reinforced to support debris load from the higher stories. Since the angle of impact will vary from  $60^\circ$  to  $90^\circ$ , foundations are liable to flank attack and should be designed to give maximum load distribution, reducing the possibility that one chance hit will cause partial or complete collapse.

4. Structures which can be designed to resist perforation containing machinery or instruments easily damaged should be further protected by installation of a metal soffit below the ceiling proper to deflect spalls and scabs. Warehouses of inflammable supplies should be able to resist perforation by incendiary bombs.

5. Aside from protection against direct hits, surface structures must be designed to resist two other effects of bombs exploding in the open, namely (1) blast and (2) fragmentation.

6. The detonation of an H. E. bomb sets in motion a "shock wave" of positive pressure followed immediately by a rarefaction or negative pressure phase. As the wave strikes structures and rebounds, it exerts a force in each of two directions successively. It has been discovered that walls with equal lateral resistance to pressure and suction have failed in suction despite the fact that the intensity of the rarefaction phase is considerably less than the positive pressure phase (though of longer duration). There are several explanations of this seeming contradiction:—(1) The pressure wave weakens the walls and thereby accentuates the suction action; (2) The blast enforces translatory earth movement which acts on the foundations in a direct opposite to the suction, thereby forming an overturning couple.

7. External walls should be adequately reinforced against both lateral positive pressure and suction. They should be securely tied to cross walls. As mentioned previously, non-load bearing external walls are [16] preferred in order to minimize damage to the complete structure in event of wall failure.

9. The detonation of a bomb projects casing fragments with high velocity at all angles from horizontal up to  $60^\circ$ . These fragments attain velocities up to 7000 feet per second in a very short distance, and have an effective range of about 200 yards, at which penetration is appreciable. This visualizes detonation of the bomb on impact; for delay action bomb penetrating prior to exploding, the effective range is considerably less. Based on experimental results, the following table gives the thickness of material required for protection against fragments:

<i>Material</i>	<i>Thickness, inches</i>
Mild steel plate or plates of an aggregate thickness not less than-----	1½
Solid brickwork or masonry, not less than-----	13½
Reinforced concrete, not less than-----	12
Ordinary concrete, not less than-----	15
Earth or sand, not less than-----	30
Ballast, or broken stone, not less than-----	24

10. To a limited extent, fragments will cause detachment of spalls from the inner surfaces of walls and doors, although their minute size will make any possible damage relatively unimportant.

*IX. Conclusions*

1. It is desired to point out that the data which have been presented are for maximum conditions; thus for example Table 3, which gives required thickness of burster course to resist the total effect of bombs, is based upon the maximum penetrative effect and maximum explosive effect occurring consecutively. In actual practice with the bombs in use today, these two factors are mutually opposed. In order that penetration may be secured without deformation, the thickness of casing required greatly reduces the quantity of explosive which may be placed in the bomb; the same bomb in order to create the maximum explosive effect must be lightly cased, and in all probability will shatter on impact. The fact remains, however, that it is conceivable that casings may be developed for the H. E. projectiles in use which will permit maximum penetration without deformation at no reduction in explosive content and with no appreciable increase in total weight. This is an eventuality which must be foreseen, and structures designed accordingly.

2. The protection against bombardment of installations vital to the defense must be considered at the time of their construction. Any attempt to bombproof an existing building built according to commercial practice will, in nine cases out of ten, prove futile.

[17] 3. If bombproofing new structures is found impracticable, the alternatives of protection by dispersion and concealment still remain. Choice of proper location is of the greatest importance. Advantageous use of existing terrain features will eliminate many problems of the defense while increasing those of the attacker.

4. This pamphlet is purely introductory. The design of bombproofs must of necessity be based largely on theoretical considerations and intelligent guesswork; there is no opportunity to accumulate corroborative experience as there is in other types of engineering design. The subject offers a wide field for investigation and experimentation by those interested. Of the subject matter available to date, the British pamphlet, "Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 5," and Information Bulletin No. 39, Subject: "The Design of Air Raid Shelters," Office, Chief of Engineers, 15 January, 1940, are highly recommended.

*Table I—Impact velocities*

[Feet per second]

[18] Weight of Bomb	Altitude at release		
	10,000'	15,000'	20,000'
Pounds:			
50-----	745	850	925
100-----	765	875	950
250-----	775	885	960
600-----	805	925	1005
1000-----	810	935	1020
2000-----	800	925	1000
4000-----			

Air speed of plane at moment of release=200 mph.

(The last portion of this Exhibit consists of four plates illustrating by graphs (1) Penetration of Concrete Slab, (2) Thickness of Concrete Slab Just Perforated by Explosion, (3) Depth Penetrated by



Explosion on Surface of Various Materials, and (4) Approximate Depth of Penetration for Unit Sectional Density of Bomb, all of which refer to the action of falling bombs. These plates are reproduced as Items Nos. 18, 19, 20 and 21 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 12 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HONOLULU, T. H., *December 22, 1941.*

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probably emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, Mayor, City of Honolulu; C. R. Hemenway, President Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin; Walter F. Dillingham, President Oahu Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President Lewis Cooke, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, Oahu; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director Civilian Defense Oahu; John E. Russell, President Theo. H. Davies & Son; George V. Waterhouse, 2d Vice Pres. Bishop National Bank of Hawaii; Cyril F. Dawson, Ex. Vice Pres. Bishop Trust Co. Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive V. Pres. Hawaiian Sugar Planters; H. A. Walker, President American Factors, Ltd.; A. M. Lowrey, Treasurer American Factors, Ltd.; P. S. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edward R. T. Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

c.c. to General Walter C. Short.



WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT,  
Washington, January 15, 1942.

Memorandum for Brig. General Joseph T. McNarney, c/o Secretary of General Staff:

The attached letter with reference to Lieutenant General Walter C. Short is transmitted to you for the information of the Commission appointed by the President to investigate the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941 on Hawaii.

John W. Martyn,  
JOHN W. MARTYN,  
Administrative Assistant.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, January 5, 1942.

Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War.

Edwin M. Watson,  
EDWIN M. WATSON,  
Secretary to the President.

EXHIBIT No. 13 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D. C.

PRECIS OF TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S INVESTIGATING COMMISSION

STATEMENTS BY ADMIRAL H. R. STARK, U. S. N., CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; REAR ADMIRAL R. K. TURNER, U. S. N., DIRECTOR OF WAR PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND BY CAPTAIN T. H. WILKINSON, U. S. N., DIRECTOR, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

BRIEF OF ADMIRAL STARK'S TESTIMONY

In reply to a question by the Commission as to whether or not the Navy Department had been of opinion that war was impending with Japan, and had forwarded any warning to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Stark stated it had been his belief that war with Japan was imminent. He read several despatches which had been sent to both Army and Navy forces, after agreement between himself and General Marshall, and stated that the Secretaries of War and Navy and the President had approved the transmission of these messages. He read the messages referred to, which are slightly paraphrased as follows:

(a) Despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on July 25, 1941, to the Commanders in Chief, Pacific, Asiatic, and Atlantic Fleets, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District (Canal Zone), and the Special Naval Observer in London (Vice Admiral Ghormley).

"This is a despatch prepared jointly by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. You will deliver copies to the Commanding Generals in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama, and also to General Chaney in London. Admiral Ghormley will inform the British Chief of Naval Staff.

"On July 26th the United States will impose economic sanctions on Japan, which will embargo all trade, subject to modification through a licensing system for certain materials. Japanese funds and assets will be [2] frozen unless their transfer is licensed. Japanese merchant ships in United States ports will not be seized at this time, and our own merchant vessels for the time being will not be ordered to avoid Japanese ports. We do not expect an immediate hostile military reaction by Japan, but you are given this advice in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the Army to mobilize the Philippine Army in the near future. Keep this despatch secret except from your immediate subordinates."

(b) A despatch released by the Chief of Naval Operations on October 16, 1941, to the Commanders in Chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets:

"The fall of the Konoye Cabinet has created a grave situation. Should Konoye remain in power this resignation will cancel his previous mandate and his new mandate will not include reapproachment with the United States. Should a new cabinet be formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. Hostilities between the Soviet and Japan are a strong possibility. The United States and the United Kingdom are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation. Therefore, it is a possibility that Japan may attack these two Powers. Consequently, you will take due precautions, including preparatory deployments for war, but these should not disclose your strategic plan nor should they be so made as to be construed as provocation of Japan. Addresses will inform Army and naval district authorities of the contents of this despatch."

(c) On October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following despatch to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"As you know, the Army is now reenforcing the Philippines by air with longrange bombers. I consider it of great importance to continue this movement. For this reason take all practicable precautions to insure the safety of the flying fields at Midway Island and Wake Islands."

(d) On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and Atlantic Fleets, and the Commandants of the 11th (San Diego), 12th (San Francisco), 13th (Puget Sound), and the 15th (Canal Zone) Naval Districts and to Vice Admiral Ghormley in London. A paraphrased copy of the same despatch was sent to the Governor of Guam. This despatch read:

The present series of negotiations with Japan have very doubtful chance of a favorable outcome. When this fact is considered together with recent statements by members of the Japanese Government, and recent movements of [3] their naval and military forces, it is my opinion that there is a possibility of a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by Japan, including attack on the Philippines and Guam. The Chief of Staff concurs and asks you to inform appropriate Army officers. Treat this information with the utmost secrecy in order not to make worse a tense situation or precipitate action by Japan."

(e) On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations transmitted the following despatch to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and Atlantic Fleets, and Vice Admiral Ghormley in London:

"You are to consider this despatch as a war warning. Our conversations with Japanese officials regarding the stabilization of the Pacific are ended and we expect Japan to make an aggressive move within the next few days. The organization of Japanese naval task forces, and the numbers and equipment of the troops which they have assembled point toward an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Siam, the Kru Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Take appropriate defensive deployments in preparation for the execution of the tasks of our current joint war plan. Give a copy to officials of the districts and the Army. General Marshall is sending out a similar warning. Ghormley inform British. The Naval Districts on the continent and the authorities at Guam and Samoa have been directed by you to take measures against sabotage." (Note: Admiral Stark here invited attention to the fact that except for about 150 marines and 450 naval officers and ratings on naval district craft and ashore at Guam, that island had no defenses whatsoever. The war plan did not contemplated defense, but merely destruction of facilities which might be used by an enemy who captured the island.)

(f) On the same date, November 27, 1941, the War Department transmitted the following despatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: (Note: A similar despatch was sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.)

"For all practical purposes conversations with Japan have ended. There is however a minor possibility that these talks will be resumed. I cannot predict the future action of the Japanese, but hostile action by them is possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be averted, our Government desires that Japan commit the first overt act, but this policy should not be construed as confining you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Before hostile action by Japan may commence, I direct that you undertake reconnaissance and other measures deemed necessary although these should not be so

obvious as to alarm civilians nor to disclose your plans. [4] Report what measures you take. In the event of hostilities you will execute the current war plan tasks so far as they relate to Japan. The circulation of this very secret information should be limited."

(g) On the same date, November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commandants of all continental naval districts, the Caribbean, the Canal Zone, the Navy Yard, Washington, and Guam and Samoa, warnings concerning the critical state of the negotiations with Japan, and the imminent probability of the extension of military operations by Japan.

Admiral Stark also referred to other warnings concerning the destruction of codes by exposed Japanese and United States diplomatic officials and forces. He did not read these despatches, which later were presented by Captain Wilkinson. For the sake of continuity, the despatches which came to the knowledge of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, follows:

(a) On December 3, 1941, a priority despatch was sent to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the 14th (Hawaii) and 16th (Philippines) Naval Districts as follows:

"We have definite advices which must be believed that yesterday the Government of Japan sent categorical and urgent orders to its consular and diplomatic officials in Manila, Batavia, Singapore, Hong Kong, London, and Washington, to destroy at once all but one of their codes and also to burn important secret and confidential papers."<sup>1</sup>

(b) On December 4, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent this despatch to the Naval Station at Guam, with information to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts:

"Guam is directed to destroy all secret and confidential publications, codes, and correspondence with certain exceptions (which were listed). In the event of emergency, destroy the matter which is excepted."

(c) On December 6, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, with information to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the following despatch:

"Because of the situation of international affairs and the exposed position of the outlying islands which are under your command you may authorize them to destroy secret and confidential documents now, or under conditions of greater emergency [5] which may develop later. They should retain until the last minute only those codes required for the support of our current operations." (Note: Several other despatches were sent to other outlying naval attaches and forces, but the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not informed of this because these were not under his jurisdiction.)

Admiral Stark, in reply to questions, indicated that the despatches referring to attacks and expeditions against positions in the Far East, conveyed to the military officers of the Far East and the Pacific his and General Marshall's opinion that the Far East would be the locality where the major sustained Japanese effort would be initiated. While Hawaii was not specifically mentioned as a point of attack in these despatches, a number of letters had been sent out during the previous year concerning the defense of the Pacific Fleet and Pearl Harbor against sudden raids. The Navy generally had always kept in mind the surprise attack by Japan on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904, and always expected that war with Japan would be initiated without warning, while diplomatic negotiations were still in progress.

STATEMENT BY REAR ADMIRAL R. K. TURNER, U. S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, WAR PLANS DIVISION

Rear Admiral Turner stated that for several months there had been in the possession of the commanders of the naval operating forces and of army commanders War and Navy Department war plans which envisaged exactly the war in which the United States is now engaged. These plans had originated in agreements made between United States and British Commonwealth military officials. The Netherlands East Indies had participated in drawing up plans for the Far East Area. From these international plans, the Army and Navy had prepared joint plans, and then each Service had issued its own basic plan. The Commanders in Chief of the Fleets some months ago had, in turn, issued to their principal subordinates their own operation plans, and the operating forces of the entire Navy had been distributed between fleets, organized into task groups, and assigned

<sup>1</sup> SECRET—Suggest this not be mentioned in report.



tasks appropriate to the plans. As a part of the plan, the major portion of the Pacific Fleet was to base on Pearl Harbor.

There is a publication entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", which is considered an integral part of all Army and Navy Joint War Plans. This book clearly allocates responsibility to the two services for certain general fields of military effort. In each of these fields, one service [6] has primary responsibility, and is entitled to cooperation by the other service. The sub-division of responsibility relating to resistance to attack on the Fleet and Oahu is shown in the following verbatim extracts from "Joint Action", the numbers and letters referring to paragraphs of that publication. Intervening paragraphs, applicable to situations other than those at Pearl Harbor, are omitted.

"3. *Common mission of Army and Navy.* . . . Conjointly and in cooperation to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States in peace and in war."

"5. *General functions of the Army in peace and war.*

"(2) To defend the continental United States and its overseas possessions, to include the defense of all permanent naval bases."

"5. b. *Additional general functions of the Army in war.*

"(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases."

"6. a. *General functions of the Navy in peace and war.*

"(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States."

"6. b. *Additional general functions of the Navy in war.*

"(2) To gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States."

"19. *Coastal Frontier Defense.*

"b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory.

"c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are:

"(1) To provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct defense of the coast.

"(2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor defenses.

"d. In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain—

[7] "(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

"(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

"(3) A communication and intelligence system to include aircraft warning service among the elements of the land defenses, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

"(5) A system of underwater listening posts.

"e. The general function of the Navy in coastal frontier defense is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

"f. The specific functions of the Navy in coastal frontier defense are:

"(2) To conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

"(3) To support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

"g. In carrying out these functions the Navy will:

"(1) Provide and operate—

"(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

"(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Army.

"(c) Contact mines, nets, and booms, including the vessels necessary for their installations and maintenance.

"(d) Inshore patrols for the protection of minefields and underwater obstructions other than beach defenses; for the control and protection of shipping in passage through defensive sea areas; for the control of shipping in defensive coastal areas, and for the prevention of enemy mining and submarine operations.



[8] "(e) Underwater listening posts for naval use where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts.

"(2) Provide and maintain such fixed underwater obstructions as are component parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for their installations and maintenance.

"20. *General Functions (of Army and Navy Air Components).*

"a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy—. Under this policy:

"(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

"(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions."

"21. *Primary Functions.*

"a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

"b. These primary functions are:

"(1) The Army Air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

"(2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet."

"22. *Secondary Air Functions.*

"a. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

"(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

"b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

"(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein."

"23. *Provisions to minimize duplication.*

"a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily [9] designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to insure freedom of action of the fleet.

"b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers and other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shorebases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping, in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development."

For the purpose of defining what has been referred to as "coastal frontier", the following is quoted from "Joint Action":

"26. a. A *coastal frontier* is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include the part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all army forces and navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors."

The defense of the various coastal frontiers is, by various war plans, assigned to different "categories". The current war plan assigned to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier (Army and Navy) is "Defense Category D". A definition of this category is as follows:

"31. d. *Category D.*—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category the coastal frontier areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol,

inshore and offshore, than for Category C. will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas and maritime control areas will be established. In addition, an anti-aircraft gun and machine gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate a prompt reenforcement of the frontiers; [10] and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Longrange air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force."

Rear Admiral Turner stated that Admiral Stark desired him to bring out clearly the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as well as the entire Navy Department, had for a long time been very greatly concerned over the inadequacy of the defenses of the base at Pearl Harbor and the inadequacy of the naval patrol of nearby waters. Every effort, consistent with the requirements of other naval areas, and within the limitations of available funds and material priorities, had been made to correct deficiencies. The witness pointed out that, in his opinion, this matter of preparedness for attack had two aspects: First, the availability of proper and adequate defensive material; and second, the readiness of the personnel to use the material on hand, whether adequate or not.

The division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy is such that the Army provides all of the anti-aircraft weapons mounted on shore for the protection of fleet bases. In addition, the Navy has long recognized that the anti-aircraft batteries of ships in port must be ready for use during raids. The only naval anti-aircraft batteries on shore at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 were those of one marine defense battalion, being held in readiness there for expeditionary service.

The anti-aircraft defenses of the ships, while not as good as was desired, had been considerably improved in recent months.

The Chief of Naval Operations had issued directives early in 1940 concerning the nets, anti-motor boat booms, and fixed devices for detecting submarines attempting to enter the harbor. Plans had been made, work had progressed, and the nets, booms, and harbor control posts were in place and functioning. The numbers of small vessels and naval aircraft for offshore patrol were not great enough, solely because additional craft could not be obtained in time, in spite of continued efforts.

In February 1941, following the British torpedo attack on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, a study had been made in both Washington and Oahu as to whether it would be possible to employ anti-torpedo nets around the ships in Pearl Harbor. Several letters were exchanged on this subject. Anti-torpedo nets are very heavy, and once in place are difficult to move. Previous [11] experience had indicated that aircraft torpedoes had not been developed which would function in water less than seventy-five feet in depth. Because of the great interference in the movement of shipping around the restricted waters of Pearl Harbor, it had been decided not to employ anti-torpedo nets around the ships. A circular letter was sent out to the Commandants of all naval districts on February 17, 1941 on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles against torpedo plane attacks. However, developments during 1941 led the Department to the conclusion that aerial torpedoes could be made to operate in shallow water, and on June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a new circular letter modifying the letter of February 17th. This letter contained this statement:

"It may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other available vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack (airplane torpedo attack) if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo."

The problem of providing satisfactory torpedo nets inside of Pearl Harbor, such as would not unduly delay the entrance and departure of the Fleet, had not been solved prior to December 7, 1941.

During the latter portion of 1940 the Chief of Naval Operations became convinced of the following:

(a) The Army defenses of Pearl Harbor were inadequate.

(b) Cooperation between the Army and the Navy in Oahu, for the defense of the Fleet and for attack on an enemy at sea, could be improved.

After study of these two features in Washington and Oahu, the Secretary of the Navy on January 24, 1941 addressed the Secretary of War on the subject, with a view to obtaining improvement. The Secretary of War replied on February 7, 1941. Copies of these two letters are hereto attached.

As a result of this exchange, the Army put in process a program of reinforcement of the anti-aircraft defenses, but decided that balloon barrages and smoke screens were not practicable around Pearl Harbor, because they would interfere with our own air operations. The Navy concurred in this decision.

Agreement was reached between Army and Navy authorities in Oahu concerning improvement in cooperation between the Army and the Navy, and these authorities issued a joint plan on this subject on March 28, 1941. Instructions were issued by the Departments requiring these plans to be tested at frequent intervals through the use of appropriately designed training problems.

[12] Special security measures for the Pacific Fleet against sudden attack were put in effect in May, 1940. These plans were modified from time to time, chiefly as regards strengthening the provisions for the safety of ships at sea. Since the spring of 1941, except in emergency, the more important naval vessels in the Pacific Fleet have not been permitted to anchor anywhere in the Hawaiian Islands, except in Pearl Harbor, where it was considered that the Fleet would be safest from attack. The latest Fleet order on this subject is contained in "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2 CL-41 (Revised)" of October 14, 1941. A copy of this letter will be supplied if desired, but it should not be published. However, paragraph two of this revised letter, (approximately the same wording as in previous issues), is quoted as follows:

"2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

"(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two."

It may be stated that Admiral Stark had been advised assumption (a) governed measures for the security of the Fleet until approximately October, 1941. During that month, Admiral Stark was informed by the Commander in Chief that thereafter, assumption (b) would govern measures for security of the Fleet.

STATEMENT BY CAPTAIN T. S. WILKINSON, U. S. NAVY,  
DIRECTOR, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, including naval attaches and additional naval observers and consular shipping advisers who had been [13] maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of despatches had occurred between the intelligence organization in Washington and in the field. In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept fully advised as to developments.

From the evidence available the Navy had concluded in November that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack. The witness considered that both Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning despatches had been sent out.

The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity of the Naval and Military Intelligence Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In April, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a despatch indicating from past experience that the axis could be expected to initiate new activities on Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken in March, 1941, placing the Naval District Intelligence Organizations in an advanced state of readiness; coastal information sections were placed in an active status last May; District Intelligence Organizations were further extended in that month, and a complete state of readiness of the Intelligence Organization was directed last July.



## EXHIBIT No. 14 (NAVY PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
*Honolulu, T. H., January 5, 1942.*

Personal and confidential.

Memorandum to Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts.

Re available radio facilities for transmitting airplane bearings.

With reference to your inquiry relative to the available facilities on the island for the transmission of airplane bearings to planes at sea, it has been ascertained that the Army equipment is only of use for a distance of approximately ten miles.

The Federal Communications Commission facilities on the island are such as it is possible for them to operate at almost unlimited distances. It was ascertained that between December 10th and December 30, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission was requested on 18 or 19 occasions to advise planes at sea of their exact location. I am also informed that planes are in the habit of following the beam of the local commercial station, KGMB, when returning to the island. Of further interest in this respect, it has been reported that Japanese planes making the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, contained radio receivers that were tuned to the local commercial station KGU. The Army Signal Corps advised the Federal Communications Commission that upon returning to their carriers, these planes followed a frequency of 1500 kilocycles which was transmitted to them from the Japanese carriers.

With reference to the Navy facilities for advising airplanes of their exact location, I am informed that the Navy equipment is also very limited insofar as its effective distances are concerned.

With reference to the seaplane that recently made a forced landing at sea, Mr. LEE DAWSON of the Federal Communications Commission advised that a request was made of their stations by Hickam Field to transmit a bearing to this plane at approximately 6:00 p. m. The information was transmitted to Hickam Field, but for some unknown reason the plane was instructed to proceed in an exact opposite direction from the island. Mr. DAWSON stated that continued checks on this plane revealed that they were flying away from the island and that Hickam Field was again advised that the plane was flying in the wrong direction. For reasons unknown to him, the plane continued in this course until approximately 10 p. m. at which time the plane ran out of gas and was forced to land at sea.

Mr. DAWSON further advised that it has been the practice in the past for Hickam Field to make such requests of the Federal Communications Commission and following such times as the planes are located, the information is relayed back to Hickam Field where it is in turn relayed to the plane requesting its bearings.

Of possible interest to you and the Commission, Mr. DAWSON advised that he has collected all of the reports and information relative to the plane forced down at sea, which information will, of course, be available to you in the event that you desire it. Mr. DAWSON was not advised at the time of the interview of your interest in this matter.

Respectfully submitted.

M. E. Gurnea,  
 MYRON GURNEA,  
*Inspector, Federal Bureau of Investigation.*

MG:mma.

## EXHIBIT No. 15 (NAVY PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 15 consists of thirteen graphs prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, showing racial composition of population of the Territory of Hawaii, and related matters:

1. Racial Composition of the Territory of Hawaii
2. Japanese Activities in the Territory of Hawaii
3. Japanese Consular Organization in Hawaii
4. Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii
5. United Japanese Society of Honolulu



6. Major Foreign Controlled Japanese Corporations
  7. Alien Japanese Controlled Corporations in Hawaii
  8. *HOMPA HONEWANJI* Organization in the Territory of Hawaii
  9. *JODO-SHU* Organization in the Territory of Hawaii
  10. Overseas Japanese Central Society
  11. Communist Activities in the Territory of Hawaii
  12. German Activities in the Territory of Hawaii
  13. Italian Activities in the Territory of Hawaii
- The above listed graphs are reproduced as Items 22 through 34 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 1 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 1 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H. showing main military and naval establishments. This map is reproduced as Item No. 35 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 2 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 2 is a U. S. Navy Aviation Chart of the Hawaiian Islands showing the location of Mobile Aircraft Warning Service Radar Stations as of 7 December 1941 with sectors showing coverage to the electrical horizon. This chart is reproduced as Item No. 36 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 3 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] Op-12B-9-McC  
(SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1  
Serial 09112.

**SECRET**

JANUARY 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.

The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 100 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen addition 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new [3] radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, thus augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army gives consideration to the question of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX.

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: Cinc. U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com14. Op-22, Op-30

## EXHIBIT No. 4 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

*S-E-C-R-E-T*

SUMMARY OF REPORTS AND MESSAGES SENT TO THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS SINCE ATTACK OF PEARL HARBOR. THE ATTACK OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 0755 LOCAL TIME, DECEMBER 7, 1941

*7 December, 0800*

Following sent to all ships present Pearl Harbor :  
"Enemy air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill".

*7 December, 0811*

To CinC Asiatic, CinC Atlantic and Chief of Naval Operations :  
"Enemy air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

This message was ordered sent at same time as previous message but did not get on circuit until 11 minutes later.

*7 December, 0812*

Message to the Pacific Fleet; repeated to Chief of Naval Operations :  
"Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl Harbor."

*7 December, 0817*

To Compatwing-2 :  
"Locate enemy force."

*7 December, 0830*

To Commander Task Forces 12 and 8 :  
"Report position."

*7 December, 0842*

To all ships present, Pearl :  
"Japanese submarine in the harbor."

## TIMES OF FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE GCT

*8 December, 0450*

To the Chief of Naval Operations :

"In spite of security measures, surprise attack by Japanese damaged all battle-ships except MARYLAND. Moderate damage to TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA. ARIZONA total wreck. WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHOMA, CALIFORNIA, NEVADA seriously damaged. UTAH and OGLALA turned over. HONOLULU, HELENA, RALEIGH unfit for sea. VESTAL, CURTISS, damaged. SHAW, CASSIN, DOWNES complete loss. Airplane losses severe. Following remains: About 13 B-17, 9 B-18, 30 pursuit, 10 patrol planes, one patrol plane squadron at Midway. All available Army bombers requested to be sent Oahu. Following damage to enemy: Number of enemy aircraft destroyed. One enemy submarine sunk, probably two more. Now have 2 Carriers, 7 Heavy Cruisers, 3 Squadrons Destroyers and all available planes searching for enemy. Personnel behaving magnificently face of furious surprise attack. Personnel casualties heavy in OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA.

## EXHIBIT No. 5 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, February 17, 1941.

30C1-AJ  
(SC)N20-12  
Serial 010230

**CONFIDENTIAL**

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.  
The Commandant, Third Naval District.  
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.  
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.  
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

1. In previous correspondence the Commandant and Local Joint Planning Committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making studies of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the Districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and Local Joint Planning Committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the major fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get underway on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting.*

Copy to:

Cinc, Pacific  
Cinc, Atlantic  
Cinc, Asiatic  
C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Tiburon BuOrd  
C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Newport Op-12

"copy"



EXHIBIT No. 6 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

KIMMEL EXHIBIT 5 TO REPORT OF ACTION

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am forwarding to you the following information:

1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December, 1941:

Sqd.	In commission	Tot. avail. for flight	Location	Under rep.	Ready at base	In air
VP-11.....	12 PBY-5.....	12	Kaneohe.....	0	12	0
VP-12.....	12 PBY-5.....	11	Kaneohe.....	1	11	0
VP-14.....	12 PBY-5.....	10	Kaneohe.....	2	7	13
VP-21.....	12 PBY-3.....	11	Midway.....	1	4	7
VP-21.....	1 PBY-3 (spare).....	1	Pearl Harbor.....	1	0	0
VP-21.....	1 PBY-3.....	12	Pearl Harbor.....	2	12	0
VP-22.....	14 PBY-3.....	12	Pearl Harbor.....	1	11	0
VP-24.....	6 PBY-5.....	5	Pearl Harbor.....	1	1	4

RECAPITULATION

At Kaneohe.....	36	133		3	30	13
At Pearl.....	33	28		5	24	4
At Midway.....	12	11		1	4	7
Total.....	81	72		9	58	14

<sup>1</sup> 13 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan 9-1). 3 planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).

<sup>2</sup> 5 planes conducting search of sector 120°-170° radius 450 miles; departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130° from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes, additional planes, armed with 2 500-pound bombs each were on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about 2230 GCT, upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor, and searched sector 060° to 100° radius 400 miles. One plane was under repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was under overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

<sup>3</sup> Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. Submarine.

<sup>4</sup> All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

2. Material condition:

(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's; 27 were PBY-3's having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried to Hawaii, arriving on the following dates:

Squadron	No. planes	Arrival date
VP-11.....	12	28 Oct., 1941.
VP-24.....	6	28 Oct., 1941.
VP-12.....	12	8 Nov., 1941.
VP-23.....	12	23 Nov., 1941.
VP-14.....	12	23 Nov., 1941.

(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare parts. In addition, a program for installation of leak-proof tanks, armor, and modified engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.

(c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal

repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of its planes were approaching 18 months service and were due for overhaul.

(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol squadrons made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches impracticable. Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to experience numerous material failures which would place airplanes out of commission until spare parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and maintenance.

(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material and spare parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there were no replacements.

(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the job required. For the commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would require an effective daily search through 360° to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, adequate spare parts, and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations.

(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

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EXHIBIT No. 7 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[2] *S-E-C-R-E-T*

SUMMARY OF REPORTS AND MESSAGES

8 December, 0427

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Request you send earliest time salvage personnel and equipment plus large number mechanics and material, particularly structural steel and electric wiring. More details later."

8 December, 1015

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"First sign of enemy activities was report 'submarine in defense area' at about 0715 local. There was only few minutes warning of enemy aircraft approach which occurred at 0747. First attacks were against aircraft on ground at Pearl. Ewa, Kaneohe, Hickam and Wheeler and were so effective that none of these aircraft were immediately available with the exception of 10 patrol planes which were in the air. There appeared to be three separate attacks, ending about 0930. Enemy carriers were not sighted but indications were that at least one was North and one South of Oahu. Enemy bombing and torpedoing very effective and despite magnificent and courageous work by gun crews not more than a dozen enemy shot down. Following additional casualties ARIZONA blew up, most of her officers and men including Admiral Kidd lost. Floating drydock sunk. Total estimate of personnel casualties about 2800, with one-half dead. About 200 civilians in Honolulu killed in bombing of docking facilities. No damage from mines. Pearl Channel is useable. In addition to ship-based and carrier planes now have about 30 patrol planes, 13 Army bombers and 16 Army pursuits available. 4 Heavy cruisers, destroyers and LEXINGTON attempting to intercept Southern carrier from position East of Midway. ENTERPRISE and other light forces guarding against repetition of raid. Wake reports heavily damaged by 30 planes. Guam reported attack by aircraft."

9 December, 1049

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Summary for 8 December. All local times. Oahu not raided today. Black-out being carried out. Two enemy cruisers attacked Midway by gunfire evening of the seventh. Unverified report of renewed attack 1600 today. Two more air attacks Midway and Guam. Aircraft again bombed Wake and unable communicate Wake and Guam since 2130. No attack on Johnston. From radio intelligence—two enemy units, one a carrier, bearing 340°-750 miles from Pearl at 1600. Enemy submarines have been reported South of Oahu but have made no attacks. Own destroyer attacks made on them with unknown results. Enemy two-man submarine was destroyed—grounded off Bellow's Field and one officer captured. Indications were he had come from 100 miles off coast. Own forces are at sea to cut off enemy. Codes at Guam destroyed. My efforts devoted to location and destruction of the enemy forces and dispositions made with this in view."

10 December, 1016

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Nothing further today. There was reference to Aleutians as well as to Hawaiian and Midway areas on cipher cards from crashed enemy planes."

[3] 11 December, 0925

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Only new developments were as reported in Com-14 110400 supplemented by more air attacks on submarines reported by my 102359. No doubt ENTERPRISE scout bomber sunk a submarine."

12 December, 0934

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Some contacts South of Oahu with submarines today. Three were depth charged and one bombed. Oil slicks were observed in all cases and air bubbles in one. Heard distress signals from merchant vessels CUMEO and LAHAINA in Latitude 27-30 N., Longitude 148 W. There was no air attack on Midway yesterday."

13 December, 1003

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"No new developments. I am still attacking submarines and they appear to be less in number around Oahu. There are signs that submarines are proceeding toward the Coast from Northeast of Hawaiian areas. Also, some appear to be along Great Circle route. During the Midway attack of December seventh hits on cruisers and destroyers were plain."

14 December, 1007

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Aircraft has discovered four submarines this area today. Believe one damaged. Also one small submarine apparently entered the harbor and a depth charge destroyed it. There was a moonlight raid by four-engine seaplanes on Wake and a raid in daylight from 41 B-18 type bombers. Wake damaged several planes shot down two. One VMF of ours destroyed on ground, one had forced landing, leaving one. Two Marines were killed."

15 December, 0849

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Only new developments Hawaiian Area were submarine activities. In addition sinking reported by Com-14 unsuccessful moonlight attack was made on PYRO North of Oahu. CHEW was attacked by a second submarine while she was attacking one West of the Island. We are vigorously following up all contacts but no positive results can be claimed. With reference to the HOECH no signs of submarines prior or later by explosions."

15 December, 2302

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"There are three courses of action with reference to Wake:—(1) Strengthen with fighter planes and replenish ammunition. (2) Take off all personnel or

(3) Abandon defense battalion and workers, a total of about 1400. It will require at least two days to reinforce, replenish and take on board a [3] ship a portion of the defense workers. We can embark all personnel if evacuated in less than one day. If bad weather it will take an unpredictably longer time. We can supply ammunition sufficient about one month. I have decided to strengthen. We can evacuate about 700 civilian workmen and I am sending one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers and a destroyer squadron to accompany TANGIER carrying supplies and ammunition. She leaves today. I also contemplate an attack on Eastern Marshalls for diversion employing same size force as for Wake. This force sailed yesterday."

NOTE.—The Chief of Naval Operation replied to this despatch "Heartily concur."

16 December, 0937

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"There were no attacks by submarines around Oahu today but we had three contacts with no definite results. An enemy submarine fired shells into Kahului (Maui) and also Lahaina at dusk. There was a raid on Johnston Island by two ships about one hour after sunset. Sand Island not attacked. Only results now reported is fire on Johnston Island. Six large planes bombed Wake at night and 33 aircraft bombed at noon. Damage not yet available. An enemy submarine was reported off Wake."

17 December, 0938

To the Chief of Naval Operations:

"Little news today. There is an absence of definite submarine contacts. The bombardment at Kahului reported yesterday was by 5.5" gun from a submarine. There was no damage in this attack. Bombardment of Johnston was by two cruisers. No personnel were hurt—power house was destroyed."

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EXHIBIT No. 8 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] S-E-C-R-E-T

MESSAGES AND ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
PACIFIC FLEET, DECEMBER 7, 1941

In accordance with orders and doctrine issued in the Security Order of 14 October 1941, which provisions were in full effect on 7 December, it was not necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to issue numerous orders concerning the movements of the ships from the harbor to sea. Similarly the movements of the ships at sea were controlled by established doctrine. The orders which were issued on 7 December and which are set forth herein are, therefore, largely informatory and amplifying in character. Charts submitted in evidence before this Commission indicate the movements of surface and air forces, with their efforts to locate enemy vessels and bring them to action on December 7, 1941.

(1) 0800

From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations:  
Air raid on Pearl Harbor X. This is not a drill.

(2) 0816

From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations:  
Hostilities with Japan commenced with aid raid on Pearl X.  
NOTE.—Transmitted to Commanding General.

(3) 0817

From CinC to Compatwing-2:  
Locate enemy force.

(4) 0832

From CinC to all ships present Pearl:  
Japanese submarine in harbor.

(5) 0901

From CinC to Midway:  
Pearl Harbor bombed X No indication direction attack X Take off  
Attempt to locate and sink Japanese force X.



(6) 0902

From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12 and all ships Pacific Flt:  
Execute WPL 46 against Japan.

[2] (7) 0903

From CinC to Wake:  
Pearl bombed by Japanese X Be on alert.

(8) 0911

From CinC to all sector commanders Pearl:  
Do not fire on our planes coming in.

(9) 0920

From CinC to Comtaskforce One:  
Battleships remain in port until further orders X Send all destroyers to  
sea X Destroy enemy submarines X Follow them by own cruisers to join  
Halsey X.

(10) 0921

From CinC to Pacific Fleet:  
Reported that enemy ship has red dot on bottom of fuselage.

(11) 0950

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:  
Two enemy carriers reported thirty miles southwest Barbers Point.

(12) 1002

From CinCpac to all ships present:  
Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.

(13) 1013

From Commander in Chief to signal tower:  
Report the names of all ships which have left the harbor.

(14) 1015

From CinC to Comtaskforce One:  
Do not send any more cruisers to sea.

(15) 1015

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce (verbal) Comatwing-2 to Patwing-21:  
Search sector 000-030 Jap carrier.

[3] (16) 1018

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce 8, 12 and 3:  
Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching  
from Pearl X Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X Addressees  
operate as directed Comtaskforce Eight to intercept enemy X Composition  
enemy force unknown.

(17) 1030

From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12:  
Submarine reported ten miles south Barbers Point.

(18) 1040

From Commander in Chief to Commander Mine Squadron Two:  
Sweep south channel from West Loch to entrance for magnetic and moored  
mines X.

(19) 1042

From CinC to Commandant Navy Yard:  
California is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could  
save her X.

(20) 1046

From CinC to Comtaskforce Eight:  
DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers Point.

(21) 1046

From CinCpac to battleships present:  
Send pilots to Ford Island.

(22) 1105

From CinCpac to all ships:

Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south X.

(23) 1105

From CinCpac to all ships present info Comtaskforce Eight:

All ships departing Pearl organize as Task Force One undivided Comdesbatfor assume command report to Comtaskforce Eight.

[4] (24) 1141

(Verbal) From CinCpac to Combatfor for batships:

Prepare available BB planes for search and report to subbase when ready and number X 2 Calif planes on Ford Island probably ready.

(25) 1155

From CineCpac to all ships present:

All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable report to Comtaskforce One in Detroit X

(26) 11

From CinCpac to Minneapolis:

Use planes to search sectors 135 to 180 distance 150 miles from Pearl.

(27) 1158

From Commander in Chief to Comtaskforce 12, 3, 8:

Cancel Midway Marine flight.

(28) 1208

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

No confirmation position enemy carrier X Have searched arc two forty to three six zero but not thoroughly X Planes available Pearl can not conduct thorough search must depend on you X Nine Enterprise planes landed four now being used search to northeast.

(29) 1232

From CinCpac to all ships present Hawaiian area:

Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point attack.

(30) 1300

From CinCpac to Minneapolis:

What sector are your planes searching and to what distance.

[5] (31) 1324

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

Detroit Phoenix St. Louis New Orleans fourteen destroyers and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you also Minneapolis and four mine layers from operating areas send ships in to fuel as necessary.

(32) 1328

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

Your 2206 only nine arrived.

(33) 1329

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

No air attack here since about 0930.

(34) 1332

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight info Comtaskforce One and Three:

Radio bearing indicates Akagi bearing 180 from Pearl and another unit bearing 167.

(35) -----

From CinCpac to all ships present Hawaiian Area:

Enemy radio has been heard on 6581 kcs and 458 kcs.

(36) 1430

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

Your 2345 and 2239 approved probably enemy submarines off entrance.

(37) 1435

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight:

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy carriers may be both north and south of Oahu.

(38) 1530

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce 15.1:

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States Task Force 15.1 proceed direct San Francisco Task Force 15.5 proceed to Sydney.

[6] (39) 1700

(Verbal) From CinCpac to Compatwing Two:

Direct Midway planes search sector 070-190 to maximum distance possible and still land Johnston by sunset X. Objective Jap carrier.

(40) 1845

From CinCpac to Compatwing Two info Taskforce 8, 12:

Lexington group Taskforce 12 proceeding to intercept enemy carrier on assumption it departed for Jaluit from point 200 miles south Pearl at 1200 local today by 27 kts X. Desire guard against repetition today's raid X. Enterprise Taskforce 8 lat 20-45 long 150-15 X. Daylight tomorrow conduct air searches as follows 6 PBV median 220 to 700 miles to search outer limit 0900 X spacing 50 miles X. Patron 21 transfer from Midway to Johnston searching maximum area en route X. Maintain PBV now Johnston in readiness to take over tracking X. Direct VB planes join Enterprise sunrise X. Employ other aircraft Oahu including Army to search 360 degrees from Oahu distance 200 miles taking off 1 hour prior sunrise X. Hold other aircraft as striking group.

(41) 1902

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce One Eight Three and Twelve:

Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into two task groups X. First group concentrated Indochina area X. Second group plus three kongos unaccounted for X. Opnav opinion latter force or part attacked Pearl XX. Composition second group follows three or four CA two or four CV two desrons of two CL twenty eight DD one subron of nine dash twelve subs and fast transport force containing twenty-odd AP'S XX. First fleet less seaplane tenders and one desron may be in support according Opnav.

(42) 1917

From CinCpac to all ships present:

Reference Para G PacFlt Ltr 2CL-41 condition two effective X use maximum dispersal planes being serviced during night.

[7] (43) 2000

From CinCpac to Taskforce 8, 12, 3:

Do not attempt entrance heavy ships to Pearl during darkness.

(44) 2225

From CinCpac to Combasefor:

Place two battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson one to be alongside and one about one hundred feet out X. To be in place by 0530.

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Charts were offered in evidence before this Commission showing the air scouting operations instituted on 7 December in an attempt to locate enemy forces. These scouting operations were under the direct command of Commander Patrol Wing TWO, Rear Admiral Bellinger. They were instituted by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, some in accordance with prearranged doctrine and others in accordance with orders telephoned from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to Commander Patrol Wing TWO. Throughout the forenoon of 7 December information received by Commander Patrol Wing TWO was telephoned to headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and information received at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was promulgated to the Fleet and at the same time telephoned to Commander Patrol Wing TWO. The telephonic exchanges between the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and Commander Patrol Wing TWO were numerous, but in the exigency which existed they were not recorded. The Air Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain A. C. Davis, states that he himself did most of the telephoning to Commander Patrol Wing Two and that all orders to that officer issued by telephone were in accordance with verbal instructions which Captain Davis received from the Commander-in-Chief.

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## EXHIBIT No. 9 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

## UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/(0828)

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*S-E-C-R-E-T*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 26 May 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet.

*I. Personnel*

(a) *Stability*.—A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel*.—Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(d) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel*.—The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He [2] does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.



Lang range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limit the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,050 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.*—The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.*—It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal, and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

[3] (f) *Uniform.*—There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of the khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

## II. Aviation

(a) *Aviation Training.*—The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.*—The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR [4] for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes, and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.

(c) *Separate Air Force.*—This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrumham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (through this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrumham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air-striking force than other nations.

[5] The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

### III. Material, general.

(a) *Priorities.*—The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range anti-aircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operation is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those *sine qua non* needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes,

and modern close-range anti-aircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR equipment*.—Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

#### [6] IV. Communications

The need for establishment of confidential call signal is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

#### V. Operations

(a) *Fleet Operations*.—With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed *vital* interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based aid. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs," so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

[7] (b) *Fourteenth Naval District*.—The defense of the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and



RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine*.—The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 500 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support*.—Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

## VI. National policy

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intension to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.



*VII. Information*

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet [8] impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

*VIII. Public opinion*

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL

"copy"

## EXHIBIT No. 10 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FF12/

A4-3/QL/(13)

Serial 01646

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

*PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised)*

From: Commander-in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2 (13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.

- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

## Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) Continuous Patrols:

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) Intermittent Patrols:

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) Sortie and Entry:

(1) Reference (b) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[3] (D) *Operating Areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protocol anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) *Ships at Sea:*

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.



(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

- Priority 1 — BBs
- Priority 2 — CVs
- Priority 3 — CAs
- Priority 4 — CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to cooperate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[4] (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

*(F) Ships in Port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

*(G) Defense Against Air Attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan or this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.



(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above).

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) **ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN OPERATING AREA:**

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

*Ship Attacked.*

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[6] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[7] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NYS-10,

(1 - Asiatic, A1 - Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

Enclosure (A)

(Enclosure "A" to CINCPAC 2 CL-41 (Revised), dated May 30, 1941, is the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, showing air

defense sectors. The original exhibit contained two marked copies of this Plan and they are reproduced as Items Nos. 37 and 38, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (B)

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

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EXHIBIT No. 11 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Copy

5 JANUARY 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary is respectfully submitted:

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information was lacking in regard to the location or activity of a group, type or unit of the Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general review of the procedures and methods followed:

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted traffic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at sea. During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities. When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power, limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of original traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative to a

unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed it either by the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the originator.

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 November change the Japanese began using a "blanket broadcast" system in which no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher text.

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a relatively inactive status.

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the *simultaneous* location of *each* Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or submarines is not possible. Therefore, the location of Fleet Flagships and some subordinate units of the above types must be relied upon to establish the presumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.

[2] 5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the occasions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types were:

Type	Total days uncertain	Number of periods	Range of periods
Battleships.....	70.....	Seven.....	8-14 days.
Cruisers (1st Fleet).....	Nearly all.....	Almost continual absence of positive indications.	
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7).....	113.....	Eight.....	10-20 days.
CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty).....	63.....	Six.....	8-16 days.
Destroyers.....	Very indefinite.....	Seven.....	9-33 days.
Carriers.....	84.....	Eight.....	8-22 days.
(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is more typical.)			
Carriers (less Cardiv 2).....	134.....	Twelve.....	9-22 days.
(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941.)			

Respectfully submitted.

EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,  
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.  
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Certified to be a True Copy :

J. M. Lee,  
Comdr., U. S. Navy,  
Flag Secretary,  
Staff, CINCPAC-CINCPAC.

EXHIBIT No. 12 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

List of damage control officers of ships present 7 December 1941

Name of ship	On board ship	Damage control officer
Arizona.....	Yes.....	Lt. Cdr. S. G. Fuqua.
California.....	Yes.....	Lt. Cdr. M. N. Little.
Maryland.....	(?).....	Lt. Cdr. S. G. Davis.
Nevada.....	No (asst was on bd.).....	Lt. Cdr. G. C. Miller.
Oklahoma.....	Yes.....	Lt. Cdr. W. M. Hobby, Jr.
Pennsylvania.....	Yes.....	Lt. Cdr. J. E. Craig.
Tennessee.....	No (asst on board).....	Lt. Cdr. J. A. Ralph.
West Virginia.....	Yes.....	Lt. Cdr. J. S. Harper.

[Penned:] Brought in at same time with Commander Fuqua—Jan 2.



## EXHIBIT No. 13 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] Copy

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
SCOUTING FORCE

dar

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 26, 1941.

L9-3(8)/(50)

Serial 0106A

*Confidential*

From: Commander Scouting Force (Administration).

To: Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

Subject: Navy Yard Pearl Harbor Priority List.

Reference: (a) Comsecfor (Admin) Serial 0104A dated December 22, 1941.

1. The following priority list supersedes reference (a) and modifications thereto:

(1) Dry dock work on ships.

(a) HONOLULU in No. 1 dry-dock. Effect permanent repairs. Commandant recommend date of completion. (Continue salvage of CASSIN and DOWNES.)

(b) HELENA in No. 2 dry-dock. Effect repairs to make seaworthy. Ship to be made operative on engine room and boiler rooms which were not flooded. Restoration of flooded machinery spaces on not-to-delay basis. Commandants recommend date of completion.

(c) TRACY on Marine Railway—overhaul docking.

## NOTE:

Schedule RALEIGH for next in No. 1 Dry-dock.

Schedule WILLIAM WARD BURROWS for next in No. 2 Dry-dock for straightening of rudder.

Schedule NARWHAL (correction of oil leaks) and SHAW (installation of false bow) to follow BURROWS in No. 2 Dry-dock.

Schedule HULL tentatively for next on Railway to correct leaks in two after fuel oil tanks. Complete information not yet available.

Schedule TROUT to follow TRACY (or HULL, if docked) for propeller, underwater sound, and pitometer log work.

Schedule remainder of Mindiv ONE to follow TROUT.

(2) Any operating ship made available for any other purpose is also available for preliminary radar work on a not-to-delay basis; and, if directed by Cincpac, the ship is available for the installation of the specific radar designated. Decisions will depend upon the availability of radar material.

[2] (At present time, the installation of SD radar in TROUT and the substitution of one FC for FA radar on HONOLULU are involved.)

(3) LEXINGTON—restricted availability granted on arrival to repair main motor stator on not-to-delay basis.

(4) CRAVEN—restricted availability granted 20 December for repairs to #1 gun shield. Commandant recommend date of completion.

(5) HOPKINS—restricted availability granted 26 December to renew drain line in D fuel oil tanks. Date of completion 28 December.

(6) SELFRIDGE—restricted availability granted on arrival. Renew torpedo tube mounts. (Comdesbatfor mailgram 210143 Dec.)

(7) FARRAGUT—restricted availability granted on arrival. Renew torpedo tube mounts. (Comdesbatfor mailgram 210143 Dec.)

(8) HULL—restricted availability granted on arrival to correct leaks in two after fuel oil tanks, if this work is found to be beyond capacity of forces afloat but can be performed by Yard without dry-docking.

(9) PHOENIX—restricted availability granted 26 December for installation of 2-171 guns ex-HELENA. This and any other Yard work on not-to-delay basis.

(10) TROUT—restricted availability granted beginning 23 December for dry-docking and to install electric vapor compression stills. All other work on a not-to-delay basis. Commandant recommend date of completion.

(11) CURTISS—restricted availability granted beginning 20 December. Perform essential work to make seaworthy the damage to hangar, main and second decks, and to install radio. Current availability extends [3] through 27 December. All other work, from view of complete repairs, should be undertaken on a not-to-delay basis.

(12) McFARLAND, HULBERT—one at a time, restricted availability granted to install Y Gun or track for 7 depth charges on stern. Also install ballast and reduce height of masts.

(13) PRUITT, PREBLE, SICARD, TRACY—expedite completion of overhauls.

(14) SHAW—available for work connected with construction of false bow and with seaworthiness. Work should anticipate dry-docking tentatively scheduled above. Commandant recommend date of completion.

(15) NARWHAL—restricted availability granted beginning 26 December for Yard work preparatory to dry-docking for correction of oil leaks.

(16) RALEIGH—available for Yard work preparatory to dry-docking scheduled above.

(17) Yard assistance, connected with salvage, for damaged ships in the harbor, as requested by and coordinated by Commander Base Force.

(18) RIGEL—expedite completion of overhaul.

(19) ONTARIO—expedite completion of overhaul.

(20) RAIL—restricted availability granted beginning 21 December. Replace main engine cylinder. Commandant recommend date of completion.

[4] (21) SONOMA—restricted availability granted 23 December for installation of new main circulating pump casing. Commandant recommend date of completion.

/s/ R. S. McDOWELL,  
For M. C. ROBERTSON,  
Chief of Staff.

• Copy to:

Opnav.  
Cinpac.  
Combatfor.  
Comerubatfor.  
Combasefor.  
Comsubscfor.  
Comdesbatfor.  
Compatwing 2.  
Comtrainron 6.

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EXHIBIT No. 14 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] C-A1-1/ND14  
(01479)

TAH/GMA

*Confidential*

DECEMBER 26, 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Subject: Construction Program on Oahu—Prosecution of, under war conditions.

References:

(a) Budocks Conf. Desp. 181900, Dec. 1941.

(b) OinC Conf. Desp. 240600, Dec., 1941, to Budocks, info Com-12, RoinC Alameda.

1. In compliance with reference (a), it is the firm intention to proceed with the authorized Shore Establishment construction program on Oahu with all possible effort and speed. Stress will be placed upon the following classes of structures:

*Personnel structures* (except family quarters for officers and men).

NOTE: Low-cost housing units will be rushed to completion to serve as may be found practicable as workers' dormitories.

*Storage structures for all purposes*, especially fireproof construction.

*Ship and aircraft operation, maintenance and repair facilities.*

2. The highest possible immediate priority under this program will be given to:

Barracks, mess hall and galley, Receiving Station.

Bachelor Officers' Quarters, Navy Yard.

Low-cost Housing—1000 units, Area III, Pearl Harbor.

Bombproof communication centers and personnel structures at all authorized locations.

Underground fuel storage and terminal facilities.

Naval Hospital structures at Aiea.

Fleet Supply Depot storehouses, sheds, cold storage plant, quay walls and pier at Kuaehua.

Dry docks.

General and temporary storehouses, Navy Yard.

Industrial Department improvements.

Additional facilities at Ewa Flying Field.

Runways at Naval Air Station, Barbers Point.

[2] Enlargement of essential facilities at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, and at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

Magazines at Ammunition Depot, West Loch and Lualualei.

Magnetic Proving Ground, Beckoning Point.

Quays and pier, Net Depot and Section Base, Bishop Point.

Improvement of water supply, Navy Yard.

3. Operations on projects within the Navy Yard proper and at the Naval Air Stations, Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe, are suffering somewhat at the moment because of the necessary prohibition against utilizing local workers of Japanese extraction at these locations. Such employees are being utilized so far as possible on projects outside these areas, but the prevailing situation as to materials on these outside projects and the extent of such projects is limiting the number of workers which can be assigned.

4. The Bureau has been requested by despatch (reference (b)) to take such action as may be practicable and appropriate to expedite so far as possible the transportation from the west coast of workers, both skilled and unskilled, who have been and are being recruited by the contractors. Approximately 2000 additional workers from the mainland are urgently required for contract operations, some of whom have already arrived or are enroute. These are in addition to any workers who may be brought in from the outlying islands. The contemplated construction program for the outlying islands will be covered by separate correspondence.

C. C. BLOCH.

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EXHIBIT No. 15 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

Sr.

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No.

PW2/A16-3/(022)

JANUARY 16, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

(1) The Commander Scouting Force.

(2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 05323 to the commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol

Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected, of them. Considerably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming, both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Sumarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] Operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (Officer and enlisted, additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.



7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage-at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet war requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment [6] of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:

Comairscfor

Com. 14

HAS P. H., T. H.

Prosp. C. O., NAS Kaneohe.

Copy

UNITED STATES FLEET

SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 21, 1941.

A16-3/ (035)

*Confidential*

*First Endorsement to*

CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/

A16-3 (022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of

Pearl Harbor as the spearhead of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline and lubricating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS.

Copy to :

Comairsecofor Compatwing TWO.  
ComFOURTEEN.  
NAS, Pearl Harbor.  
prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe.

Copy

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Jan. 31, 1941.

A16-1/  
A4-1/VZ/(0178)

*Confidential*

*Second Endorsement to*  
CPW2 Conf. ltr. PW2/  
A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

4. Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and one aircraft carrier group.

[2] (c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammu-

dition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to:

Comscofor  
Comairscofor  
Compatwing-2  
Com-14  
NAS P. H.  
NAS Kaneohe

Copy

EXHIBIT No. 16 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[Penned:] *Adm. Halsey*

[stamped:] Confidential

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE  
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *January 1, 1942.*

SUMMARY OF ACTION 7 DECEMBER 1941

Planes available ENTERPRISE dawn December 7.

17 VB  
18 VS  
16 VF  
18 VT  
1 CEAG

About 0618 launched 18 VSB to search sector 045-134 for a distance of 150 miles then to proceed to Pearl Harbor. This group composes as follows:

1 CEAG  
13 VS  
4 VB

Remaining on board:

5 VS }  
13 VB } 3 inner air patrol.  
16 VF  
18 VT

About 1020 attack group of 15 VSB armed with 1,000 bomb each, was dispatched to a point 30 miles south of Barbers Point, due to reported enemy positions.

About 1055 6 VCS from cruisers launched to search sector 000-045 to distance of 150 miles to return to Pearl on completion of search. No reported contacts.

At 1345 9 VSB launched to cover sector 110 to 200 to a distance of 175 miles. One of the latter reported contact with surface vessels believed enemy to the southward of Oahu.

About 1649, based on this contact, an attack group of 18 VT and 4 VSB was launched—no contact. VSB smokers and VTB planes recovered after dark, the latter armed with torpedoes. The 6 VF planes proceeded to Pearl.

LOSSES

Morning scouting flight which proceeded to Pearl:

VB-6—  
6-B-3—Pilot, passenger, plane, missing.  
6-B-9—Pilot and passenger injured—plane at NAS Pearl for repair.  
VS-6—  
6-S-3—Pilot and passenger killed—plane crashed.  
[2] 6-S-15—Pilot, passenger, and plane missing.

- 6-S-9—Pilot parachuted—broken leg. Passenger killed, plane crashed.  
 6-S-4—Pilot parachuted—no injury. Passenger killed by gunfire—plane crashed.  
 6-S-14—Pilot, minor injuries. Passenger, hospitalized, wounded. Plane crashed.  
 6-S-16—Pilot and passenger—no injuries. Plane crashed Burns Field Kauai.

## DUSK ATTACK GROUP

- 6-F-1—Pilot died—hospital. Plane crashed and burned.  
 6-F-4—Pilot parachuted to safety—plane crashed.  
 6-F-15—Pilot killed, plane crashed.  
 6-F-18—Pilot parachuted, died. Plane crashed.  
 3-F-15—Pilot uninjured—plane at NAS Pearl for repair.

*Summary of losses*

Pilots killed:	
VF-6-----	3
VS-6-----	1
Pilots missing:	
VB-6-----	1
VS-6-----	1
Pilots injured:	
VS-6-----	2 (1 minor)
[3] Passengers killed:	
VS-6-----	3
Passengers missing:	
VB-6-----	1
VS-6-----	1
Passengers injured:	
VS-6-----	1

*Summary of plane losses*

Planes missing:	
VS-6-----	1
VB-6-----	1
Planes crashed:	
VS-6-----	5 (1 at Kauai, disposition unknown)
VF-6-----	4
Planes requiring repair:	
VB-6-----	1
VF-6-----	1

## EXHIBIT No. 17 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[Penned:] Halsey #1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 2 January 1942.

Memorandum for Admiral Standley.  
 Subject: Liberty—Hawaiian Area.

1. The hours during which liberty was granted in this area prior to 7 December 1941 was in accordance with paragraph 11 of Pacific Fleet Memorandum 6M-41, copy of which is attached.

2. The U. S. Navy Regulations article 1729 (10) specifies that not more than  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the crew need be kept on board while secured to a wharf and U. S. Pacific Fleet Regulations article 224 (b) states that liberty should be freely granted when conditions on shore permit and when it can be arranged without detriment to the ship's work. Consequently, in the ENTERPRISE it had been customary to grant three section liberty. However, in that Honolulu was not particularly well thought of as a liberty port, commissary records of the



ENTERPRISE indicate that 50% of the crew or over was normally present for meals during liberty hours.

W. F. HALSEY.

W. F. Halsey.

Attached are copies of two dispatches which apply to liberty after 7 December, 1941.

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinepac File No.  
A2-11/FF1-1(1)/  
QL(1)/P18/(397)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 4, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET MEMORANDUM 6M-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: PACIFIC FLEET and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
Subject: Shore Patrol and Liberty—Hawaiian Area.  
References:

- (a) Cincus ltr. QL(1)/P18/(2567) of 16 Aug. 1940.
- (b) Cincus ltr. P18-1/(3895) of 30 December 1940.
- (c) Cincus dispatch 032027 of September 1940.

1. References (a), (b), and (c) are hereby cancelled.
2. As long as the major portion of the Pacific Fleet continues to be based in the Hawaiian area, shore patrol and liberty shall be governed by the following:

SHORE PATROL

3. *Pearl Harbor—Honolulu.*—Commander Base Force administer the Fleet shore patrol and beach guard in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu.

4. The organization and facilities of the permanent shore patrol in the Fourteenth Naval District have been made available to the Pacific Fleet while based in the Hawaiian area. Commander J. P. Dix, U. S. Navy, Permanent Senior Shore Patrol Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, is available as Senior Patrol Officer for the Pacific Fleet Shore Patrol.

5. The members of the permanent Fleet Patrol, except those detailed in the Long Beach-San Pedro area, shall be assigned to duty with the Pearl Harbor-Honolulu Shore Patrol. Any time the services of any of these personnel are not required, the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed.

6. *Lahaina.*—Commander Base Force administer Fleet Shore Patrol and beach guard in Lahaina.

7. A permanent shore patrol is not required in Lahaina. The patrol need be maintained only during liberty hours. A beach guard shall be maintained during hours boats are scheduled to operate to and from landings.

8. *Other Ports, Hawaiian Islands.*—The organization and administration of the shore patrol and beach guards in other ports in the Hawaiian Islands shall be governed by Article 251(a), U. S. Fleet Regulations, 1940.

9. While every effort should be made to reduce to a minimum the requirements for personnel for patrol from ships engaged in exercises underway, all Fleet units are available for their proportionate share of patrol duty.

LIBERTY

10. *Pearl Harbor—Honolulu.*—All units of the Pacific Fleet are placed on the same liberty basis during the entire period the Fleet remains in the Hawaiian area. This includes all units normally based on Pearl Harbor, units not normally based on Pearl Harbor, and shore based units of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. It does not include the Fourteenth Naval District.

[2] Liberty may be granted as follows:

(a) Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class: Regular overnight liberty.

(b) All other enlisted men: From 1500 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, 1300 Wednesday, 1030 Saturdays, and 0800 Sundays and holidays, until 0100 the following morning.

(c) The following exceptions to (b) may be made:

(1) Men whose immediate relatives reside on Oahu may be granted regular overnight liberty.

(2) Special requests for overnight liberty by men having bona fide invitations necessitating this privilege may be granted.

(3) Units regularly assigned to the Hawaiian area that have normal working hours ending prior to 1500 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, may be granted liberty to commence at the end of the regular working day.

12. Liberty parties arriving at Navy Yard landings between 1600 and 1630 shall be kept at a minimum in order that congestion in the Navy Yard may be reduced.

13. Enlisted men while within the Navy Yard limits shall be instructed to proceed to and from authorized points quietly and without loitering.

#### ORGANIZED SHIP'S PARTIES ASHORE

14. (a) Ships holding organized parties ashore at other than the regularly designated recreation places, e. g. Fleet Camp at Nanakuli, Swimming Beach at Fort Weaver, etc., shall provide adequate patrol for these parties and inform the Senior Patrol Officer at least 24 hours in advance of the time, location and nature of the party. When outlying locations are utilized, such parties shall be in charge of an officer, commissioned or warrant, or a chief petty officer.

(b) Force Commanders are authorized to grant extensions of the liberty authorized in paragraph 11 to ships holding organized parties ashore subject to the provision that adequate transportation direct from the party to the ship is provided.

15. When the patrol is landed for the party the senior member shall immediately report to the Senior Patrol Officer and furnish him with a copy of his orders.

16. Parties attending entertainments or canteens in the Naval Reservation, Pearl Harbor, after sunset, must be under the charge of a petty officer, and be marched to and from the canteen or place of entertainment.

#### 17. Liberty at Lahaina.

(a) Liberty may commence as follows:

(1) On Sundays and holidays at 1000.

(2) On Wednesdays and Saturday at 1300.

(3) On other days at 1600.

(4) Supervised tours of Maui, or hiking parties at 0800.

(b) Expiration of liberty, other than Chief Petty Officers:

The senior officer present in each force shall divide the force so that liberty for one half expires at 1800 and the other half at 1900 daily. Liberty for chief petty officers expires at 2200.

Organized ship's parties—picnics, barbecues, etc. may be held ashore evenings. Liberty for these parties may be extended until 2300. Members of the parties must not be permitted to leave the group. Ships holding these parties must provide the necessary patrol and insure transportation between the dock and the location of the party.

[3] (c) Liberty is limited to:

(1) Wednesdays, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, 20% of the crew.

(2) Other days, 10% of the crew.

(3) Overnight liberty may be granted for enlisted men whose immediate relatives reside in Maui.

(4) When a limited portion of the Fleet is present in Lahaina the senior officer present may increase these percentages, giving due regard to the facilities for handling liberty parties at Mala Wharf.

(d) Boats:

(1) Units granting liberty to expire at 1900 shall not run boats to landing for liberty parties between 1715 and 1815.

(2) All types utilize omnibus boats for liberty parties as far as practicable.

(3) Except under unusual circumstances, stores should not be obtained from landing between 1600 and 2000 daily.

18. Liberty Other Ports, Hawaiian Islands.—Liberty in other ports in the Hawaiian Islands shall be prescribed by the senior officer present.

19. Instructions issued previously which conflict with those herein are cancelled.  
 20. Patrol orders now effective shall continue so until cancelled by the officers designated by this letter to administer patrol.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution:

List IV, Case 2, O.  
 ND11-ND14, ND11ac, NY10.  
 Senior Patrol Officer Long Beach (1).  
 Senior Patrol Officer Honolulu (15).  
 P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

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3146—M. I. N. Y. 4-14-37—100 M. sets of 9

U. S. FLEET

COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

Heading: 122135.

Restrictions on liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter complement of officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty may commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board ship at 1700.

From Cincpac.

Date: 13 Dec 41.

Action: All ships present Pearl Harbor.

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3146—M. I. N. Y. 4-14-37—100 M. sets of 9

U. S. FLEET

COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

Heading: \_\_\_\_\_.

All previous instructions regarding liberty Hawaiian area are hereby cancelled X Liberty may be granted for not more than one quarter your complement enlisted personnel in each twenty-four hour period provided all useful armament can be manned adequately at all times X Liberty may commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board at 1700 X Overnight liberty may be authorized for those members of one quarter personnel on liberty having bona fide families and homes ashore X In each case written authority by commanding officer with man's address carried by those so authorized X Personnel granted overnight liberty are not to be granted liberty prior to 1600 such liberty to expire 0700 on board X No liberty personnel will be permitted on streets during night X Short leave for officers shall be granted on same basis X

From: Cincpac.

Action: Com 14—All ships present Hawaiian area—Senior patrol officer HONO.

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EXH BIT No. 18 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

PW2/A16-3/  
 016

PATROL WING TWO,  
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

*Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 1942,*

Bt

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.

Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.

## 2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows:

- 24 April, 1941,
- 12 May, 1941,
- 13 May, 1941,
- 19 June, 1941,
- 10 July, 1941,
- 26 July, 1941,
- 1 August, 1941,
- 20 August, 1941,
- 5 September, 1941,
- 27 September, 1941,
- 13 October, 1941,
- 27 October, 1941,
- 12 November, 1941.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

## EXHIBIT NO. 19 (NAVY PACKET NO. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[File copy]

[Penned Notation:] Dec. 30 Adm. Pye: Introduced as a Typical Operations Program of Commander Task Force.

TASK FORCE ONE,  
 PACIFIC FLEET,  
 U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

A16-3/AUG/(0707)

*Confidential*

General Plan No. 6.

## TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) *Battleline (1.1)* Rear Admiral Anderson:
  - (1.1.2) Batdiv TWO (CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA).
  - (1.1.4) Batdiv FOUR (WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA) 4BB.
  - (1.1.8) Mindiv ONE 4DM.
- (b) *Right Flank (1.2)* Rear Admiral Leary:
  - (1.2.2) HONOLULU, PHOENIX 2CLH.
  - (1.2.3) Desron ONE less DALE, MONAGHAN 7DD.
- (c) *Left Flank (1.4)* Captain Bowman:
  - (1.4.2) ST. LOUIS, BOISE 2CLH.
  - (1.4.3) Desron THREE 9DD.
- (d) *Submarines (1.7)* Commander Edmunds:
  - (1.7.1) Subdiv SIXTY-ONE 3SS.
- (e) *Patrol Planes (1.9)* Lieutenant Commander Hughes:
  - (1.9.2) Patron TWENTY-TWO.
  - (1.9.3) Patron TWENTY-THREE 24VP.

1. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, serial 0713 of 5 May 1941. For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must be regarded as with own U. S. units. Should Commander Task Force ONE transmit the message "Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is a possibility of hostile action against the Task Force.

2. This force will exercise Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, 6, 7, 8 August in accordance with the General Plan herein.

- 3. (a) *Battleline,*
- (b) *Right Flank,*
- (c) *Left Flank,*
- (d) *Submarines,*
- (e) *Patrol Planes,* carry out exercises as listed below:

*Wednesday, 6 August—*

Forenoon—Sortie and Exercise 60B (Annex "A").

At 1815 Exercise 61B (Annex "B").



*Thursday, 7 August—*

- Forenoon—Exercise 62B (Annex "C")—Air Attacks.  
 Afternoon—Exercise 63B (Annex "D")—Fueling from tanker; SS-DD;  
 SS-VP, SS-VOS, VCS Exercises.  
 Night—Exercise 64B (Annex "E")—SS night attacks.

*Friday, 8 August—*

- Forenoon—Exercise 65B (Annex "F")—Torpedo plane and patrol bombing attack.  
 Completion Exercise 65B—Exercise 66B (Annex "G")—Zigzagging against submarines.

## (x) (1) Type Tactical Organization as follows:

- (a) *Battleships* (1.1) Rear Admiral Anderson:  
 (1.1.2) Batdiv TWO (CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA).  
 (1.1.4) Batdiv FOUR (WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA).  
 (b) *Light Cruisers* (1.3) Rear Admiral Leary:  
 (1.3.1) Crudiv NINE (HONOLULU, PHOENIX, ST. LOUIS, BOISE).  
 (c) *Destroyers* (1.4) Captain Bowman:  
 (1.4.1) Desron ONE less DALE, MONAGHAN.  
 (1.4.3) Desron THREE.  
 (d) *Submarines* (1.7) Commander Edmunds:  
 (1.7.1) Subdiv SIXTY-ONE.  
 (e) *Minecraft* (1.8) Commander Crowe:  
 (1.8.1) Mindiv ONE.  
 (f) *Patrol Planes* (1.9) Lieutenant Commander Hughes:  
 (1.9.2) Patron TWENTY-TWO.  
 (1.9.3) Patron TWENTY-THREE.

(2) In maneuvering to avoid air and submarine attacks, communication method outlined in paragraph 1140(c), Annex "K" should be used when suitable.

(3) Speed limitations (except Exercise 61B and 62B); Battleships, fifteen knots; formation speed, fourteen knots; Cruisers and Destroyers, twenty-four knots; formation speed, twenty-two knots.

(4) Use Tentative Light Force Doctrine, Annex "E" to Commander Task Force FIVE Operation Order No. THREE (Combatfor serial 0225) and the signals and meanings contained in paragraph 6310 of Annex "F" of that serial (these signals and meanings are also included in Annex "G" of General Plan No. 3).

(5) This plan effective at 1800, five August, Type Tactical Organization initially. Communication Plan effective when signalled upon completion of Sortie.

(6) Comply with safety precautions in Chapter V, USF 10 except as instructed in Annexes.

(7) Commander *Minecraft* make minecraft available for destroyer activities whenever exercises do not specify duties for *Minecraft*.

## 4. -----

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex "K".

(b) Use zone plus ten and one-half time.

(c) Commander Task Force ONE in CALIFORNIA with *Battleline*.

W. S. PYE,

*Vice Admiral,*

*Commander Task Force ONE.*

*Annexes:*

"A"—Exercise 60B.

"B"—Exercise 61B.

"C"—Exercise 62B—Air Attacks.

"D"—Exercise 63B—Fueling from tanker; SS-DD, SS-VP, SS-VOS, VCS Exercises.

"E"—Exercise 64B—SS Night Attacks.

"F"—Exercise 65B—Torpedo plane and patrol bombing attacks.

"G"—Exercise 66B—Zigzagging against submarines.

"H"—Cruising Dispositions.

"I"—Zigzag Plan No. 60.

"J"—Zigzag Plan No. 61.

"K"—Communication Plan No. 13.

*Distribution* (Basis List III, Case 2):

Cincpac (15)

Com 14 (15)

NAS Pearl (5)  
 Combasefor (20)  
 Comairbatfor (20)  
 Comscofor (25)  
 Comeruscofor (20)  
 Comdesbatfor (20)  
 Comsubron SIX (8)  
 Comsubron TWO (1)  
 Compatwing TWO (5)  
 Cominbatfor (9)  
 Combatships (53) for distribution to Task Group 1.1, less CALIFORNIA.  
 CALIFORNIA (5)  
 Comerubatfor (53) for distribution to Task Group 1.2.  
 Desron 3 (41) for distribution to Task Group 1.4.  
 Comsubdiv SIXTY-ONE (8) for distribution to Task Group 1.7.  
 Compatron TWENTY-THREE (4) for distribution to Task Group 1.9.

W. G. LUDLOW  
 H. S. COVINGTON,  
*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

ANNEX 'A' TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

*Confidential*

TASK FORCE ONE,  
 PACIFIC FLEET,  
 U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

*Exercise 60B—Wednesday Forenoon—6 August*

1. *Destroyers* calibrate rangefinders and operators until 1300 with Army range; one division may begin calibrating at 0800. Commander *Destroyers* make detailed arrangements with Major Dingeman, USA, prior 2 August.

2. *Battleships, Cruisers, Minecraft and Submarines* upon completion sortie, conduct exercise as follows:

Object: To train ship and aircraft personnel in detecting and reporting periscopes and submarines; to perfect procedure to act on the information.

Wednesday, 6 August, 1000-1430.

Type Commander (OCE) begin exercise when initial position reached. Cease exercise whenever sufficient drill has been obtained. Submarines will be available from 1000 to 1430.

Initial positions of submarines at 1000:

(a) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 158°-10' for *Minecraft*;

(b) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 158°-00' for *Battleships*;

(c) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 157°-50' for *Cruisers*.

Base Course for all units, 180° true.

Surface Type Commanders (Officers in Charge of Exercise) arrange and conduct exercises to familiarize maximum number of personnel with appearance of periscope of submarines operating near the surface under varying speeds; and with appearance of submarines from aircraft.

3. *Patrol Planes* exercise as directed by Commander *Patrol Planes*. Use submarine assigned to *Minecraft* for observation training, if desired.

4. Type Tactical Organization effective. Type Commanders desiring to communicate direct with submarines use 4155 kcs.

5. Upon completion of exercises all types proceed in accordance with instructions of respective Task Force Commanders for Exercise 61B. At 1730 assume Task Organization for Exercise 61B.

W. S. PYE,  
*Vice Admiral,*  
*Commander Task Force ONE.*

W. G. LUDLOW,  
 H. S. COVINGTON,  
*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

ANNEX "B" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE.

PACIFIC FLEET.

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

*Confidential*

*Exercise 61B—Wednesday Afternoon, Night—6 August*

Exercise 61B is a Minor Tactical Problem.

Purpose:

To improve tactical thought and operations.

To apply standard tactical instructions and doctrine.

1. The maneuver will commence at 1815, August 6, at which time the position, disposition, course, and damage of the opposing forces will closely approximate that of the forces concerned as of game time 1815, July 16, Chart and Tactical Manuever 2-41.
2. At 1815, August 6, all units are free to move as desired.

*Limiting speed*

	<i>In formation</i>	<i>Not in formation</i>
BBs-----	15 kts.	16 kts.
CLH -----	25 kts.	27 kts.
CLL -----	25 kts.	27 kts.
DDs and DLs-----	25 kts.	27 kts.
DMs -----	22 kts.	24 kts.
SS (Surface, Submerged)-----	Maximum	Maximum

3. At night submarines participating in this exercise will use running lights while operating on surface. No contacts or gun fire by enemy forces will be made on submarines unless the ship itself is actually seen.

4. All aircraft will be given full load of fuel prior to launching for this problem, but will be considered for the purposes of this exercise to have the same amount of fuel on board as allowed at commencement of Tactical and Chart Manuever 2-41. Any additional aircraft in this exercise will be considered having 100% fuel on board. Planes that consume all fuel, from a problem status, will be considered as out of action and will operate as directed in this order.

5. Planes operating in this problem will use running lights at night.

6. In order to simulate actual war conditions enemy ships will make no contact nor will they open fire until the plane itself is actually seen, except on information from RADAR.

7. Ship-based aircraft considered as lost at commencement of this problem, 1815, August 6, will remain on board. Shore-based aircraft in this status will remain at Pearl Harbor as well as 22-P-8 and 9 which are supposed to be at Hilo.

8. The Chief Umpire will be Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N. in U. S. S. CALIFORNIA.

9. USF 79 will govern the conduct of this problem with the following exceptions:

(1) RED and BLUE commanders will issue forms for umpires in their respective forces.

(2) Out of action ships proceed as follows:

(a) Turn on dimmed running lights.

(b) Clear other units in immediate vicinity.

(c) When clear, proceed south of Lat. 20°-40' N., then cruise on North and South Courses till daylight. Arrive in vicinity of Rendezvous for Exercise 62B, Lat. 20°-40' N., Long. 158°-20' W. at 0900, August 7.

(d) Aircraft put out of action will return to Pearl Harbor. Ships if concentrated, will recover out of action aircraft by direction of Type Commanders; otherwise at discretion of the Commanding Officers' on July 7 before 0900, or after completion Exercise 62B.

(3) During exercise make damage reports by radio only.

(4) Reports:

The following reports will be made out in duplicate by officers concerned, one copy to Commander Battle Force and one copy to Commander of Force (RED or BLUE).

(a) Flimsy (Use U. S. C. & G. Chart #4116).

(b) Narrative.

(c) Data on contacts, gun fire, torpedo fire, bombing, damage, landing and recovering aircraft.

(d) Comments and recommendations.

10. The Commanders of RED and BLUE will submit brief narrative and flimsy covering requirements of Art. 6530, USF 79 as soon as practicable after arrival of Task Force ONE in Pearl Harbor, on August 14, 1941.

11. Use U. S. C. & G Chart #4116 for track chart.

12. All officers concerned will familiarize themselves thoroughly with the conduct of Strategical and Tactical Exercises USF 79 prior to commencement of this exercise.

13. Comply with Safety Orders, Chapter V, USF 10.

14. At 0900, be in vicinity Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 158°-20' and assume Normal Tactical Organization.

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,  
Commander Task Force ONE.

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

ANNEX "C" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE,  
PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

*Confidential*

*Exercise 62B—Thursday Forenoon—7 August*

Purpose:

To test Cruising Disposition 6V against air attacks.

To exercise units in defense against air attacks.

To exercise aircraft (Airbatfor, Army Aircraft) in strafing, bombing, torpedo attacks.

1. At 0900, *Battleline* guide pass through point Latitude 20°-40' Longitude 158°-20', course 315°, speed 10.

At 1000, Task Force ONE less *Patrol Planes* and *Submarines* be formed in Cruising Disposition 6V, Fleet course and axis 315°, Fleet speed 12.

Have boiler power: Battleship, 19 knots; Cruisers, Destroyers, Minecraft 24 knots.

All battleships and cruisers tow targets for bombing.

Defend against strafing, bombing and torpedo aircraft. Make "V" on searchlight against aircraft when aircraft under fire.

Task Force ONE will not fly aircraft.

2. Aircraft, Battle Force and Army Aircraft will attack Task Force ONE Cruising Disposition and may strafe the towed targets with machine gun fire or bomb with miniature or water filled bombs.

3. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, will coordinate attacks of Aircraft, Battle Force and Army Aircraft; making necessary arrangements for communications. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, communicate with Commander Task Force ONE on 4205 kcs, using visual calls and normal cryptographic aids.

4. Comply with safety instructions in Chapter V, USF 10.

5. Assume Type Tactical Organization upon signal on completion of the Exercise.

6. *Patrol Planes* exercise as directed by Type Commander.

7. Reports:

From Commanders Aircraft—brief comment on plan of attack, number of planes, execution, strength and weakness of Cruising Disposition.

From Commanders Task Groups and Task Units: brief comment on fire control problem; lookouts: strength and weakness of Cruising Disposition; damage to ships and planes if USF 79 was applied.

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,  
Commander Task Force ONE.

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.



ANNEX "D" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE,  
PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

*Confidential*

*Exercise 63B—Thursday Afternoon—7 August*

1. One cruiser, one battleship, one destroyer, designated by Type Commanders, fuel in order named from *Tanker Number One* (KASKASKIA) initial position at 1230, Thursday, 7 August, Latitude 21°-00', Longitude 159°-00'. Destroyers screen cruiser and battleship during fueling.

2. One cruiser, one battleship, one destroyer, designated by Type Commanders, fuel in order named from *Tanker Number Two* (BRAZOS) initial position at 1230, Thursday, 7 August, Latitude 21°-08', Longitude 159°-00'. Destroyers screen cruiser and battleship during fueling.

Cruisers start exercise as soon as practicable after completion Exercise 62B.

Commander *Destroyers* assign two destroyers to each tanker to screen cruiser and battleship during fueling.

3. Communications for Tankers (Task Group 1.6) from 1200, 7 August, until completion of the Exercise will be in accordance with Annex "K".

4. Upon completion of fueling Task Group 1.6 proceed in accordance with instructions from Commander Base Force.

5. Remaining battleships and cruisers exercise as directed by Type Commanders in Areas V-8, V-9, V-10.

6. *Destroyers* less fueling units at 1330 or as soon as practicable after completion of Exercise 62B search and track submarines as follows:

For search and tracking Submarine Number One ( ) in Area C-10.

For search and tracking Submarine Number Two ( ) in Area C-11.

VCS, VOS, VP miniature bombing exercise, Submarine Number Three ( ) in Area C-9.

VCS, VOS from 1300-1400.

VP from 1400-1500.

At discretion of Type Commanders, aircraft exercise at delivering of messages to ships.

7. At 1800 assume Normal Tactical Organization.

8. At 1830 be formed in Cruising Disposition 6L. Fleet axis and course 180°, Fleet speed 12, guide in battleships passing through Latitude 21°-00', Longitude 158°-20' at that time.

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,  
Commander Task Force ONE.

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

ANNEX "E" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE,  
PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

*Confidential*

*Exercise 64B—Thursday Night—7 August*

Purpose:

To exercise submarines in night attack on a disposition.

To exercise cruising disposition in defense against night submarine attacks.

1. *Task Force ONE* less *Submarines* and *Patrol Planes* be in Cruising Disposition 6L at 1830. Fleet axis and course 180°, Fleet speed 12 knots, center pass through Latitude 21°-00', Longitude 158°-20'. Burn dimmed mast head and side lights. Do not maneuver except in emergency. Searchlights may be turned

on attacking destroyers and submarines on surface for not more than 30 seconds. Use RADAR. All ships install received on navigation bridge for reception of voice RADAR broadcasts on 3195 kcs. All ships plot RADAR reports and when plot shows an attacking ship within effective searchlight range, illuminate on the proper bearing to disclose the attacking ship. For this exercise only, in Cruising Disposition 6L, DD in station 4000, assign station 3000.

2. *Submarines* and *Minecraft* be in position 12 miles ahead of Task Force ONE Cruising Disposition at 1915. Attack Task Force ONE. Run darkened when attacking. Turn on running lights when clear of disposition or in an emergency. Submarines remain on surface.

3. Commander *Submarines* report when submarines and minecraft clear of Cruising Disposition.

Upon completion exercise, *Submarines* proceed toward normal operating area and be in position for Exercise 66B.

4. *Patrol Planes* at Pearl as directed by Commander *Patrol Planes*.

5. Reports: Comments and recommendations requested.

W. S. PYE,

*Vice Admiral,*

*Commander Task Force ONE.*

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

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ANNEX "F" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE.

PACIFIC FLEET,

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,

*Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.*

*Confidential*

*Exercise 65B—Friday Forenoon—8 August*

Purpose:

To train in attacking cruising disposition with horizontal bombers and torpedo planes.

To train in defending cruising disposition against bombs and torpedoes.

1. Task Force ONE less *Submarines* and *Patrol Planes* in Cruising Disposition 6V, in Normal Tactical Organization, defend against bombing and torpedo attacks. Use RADAR. All ships install receivers in ship and gunnery control stations for reception of voice RADAR broadcasts on Combat Air Patrol frequency.

2. Commander *Destroyers* (Commander Recovery Group) recover torpedoes. All destroyers join Recovery Group when torpedoes are fired, shifting from their Task Unit frequencies to 2530 kcs. Torpedoes will be returned to CURTISS upon next entering Pearl. In case a destroyer is not near a surfaced torpedo, *Minecraft* recover it. Upon completion recovery, Commander *Destroyers* proceed and carry out normal operating schedule.

*Cruisers* upon completion Exercise proceed and carry out normal operating schedule.

3. *Right Flank* and *Left Flank* aircraft assigned Combat Patrol (Flight No. 5) against horizontal bombers.

*Battleline* aircraft assigned Combat Patrol (Flight No. 5) against torpedo planes and smokers. Track and mark torpedoes.

Launch aircraft at 0500.

All battleships and cruisers tow targets for bombing.

4. *Patrol Planes* and Army aircraft bomb and torpedo Task Force ONE. *Patrol Planes* fire torpedoes. Commander *Patrol Planes* coordinate Army aircraft and *Patrol Plane* operations. Prior to practice furnish Commander *Destroyers* with numbers of torpedoes to be fired. Make arrangements for photographic planes.

5. Reports required: Photographs of torpedo tracks.

From ships:

- (a) Times of launching;
- (b) Times of crossing target line;
- (c) Range and bearing of torpedo planes when torpedoes are launched;
- (d) Sketch of tracks seen near each ship relative to ship.

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,

Commander Task Force ONE.

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

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ANNEX "G" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE,  
PACIFIC FLEET,

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July, 1941.

Confidential

*Exercise 66B—Friday Forenoon—8 August*

Purpose: To test zigzag plans against submerged submarines.

1. When Exercise 65B is completed, and planes recovered, Commander *Battleships* form two battleship divisions in column of divisions, interval 10 miles. Leading division, without inner anti-submarine screen; use Zigzag Plan No. 61. Rear Division, with inner anti-submarine screen of 4DM, use Zigzag Plan No. 60. Battleship distance 1000 yards. Base course, 330°. Initial position of leading Battleship Division is Latitude 19°-34', Longitude 156°-15' at 0820.

2. *Submarines* be in position at 0900 and attack Battleship Divisions in succession. Use sound only in attack on rear Battleship Division. Go to deep submergence at not less than 6000 yards from *Battleships*. Report when all submarines surfaced and proceed to normal operating area and carry out normal operating schedule.

3. Upon completion of exercise, Type Commanders proceed and carry out normal operating schedule.

4. Reports required: Comments from Battleship, Submarine, ship and division command. Battleships furnish Commander *Submarines* with three copies of courses and speeds during times of attacks.

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,

Commander Task Force ONE.

for W. G. LUDLOW,  
H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

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ANNEX "H" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE. GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE,  
PACIFIC FLEET,

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 1941.

Confidential

CRUISING DISPOSITION

*Information:*

The effective slant range of our five-inch anti-aircraft batteries is equivalent to a surface distance of 5000-6500 yards.

The composition of this Cruising Disposition is 4BB, 4CLH, 2DL, 14DD, and 4DM.

Only one RADAR installation is available.

*Assumptions:*

That enemy air attacks of all types will be encountered.

That enemy submarines may be encountered.

That enemy surface forces may be encountered.

1. The means available is sufficient to effectively counter any one form of attack at a time but is insufficient to counter all three forms if made simultaneously. In the many varied situations under which a Disposition cruises and with the limited means available, some risks will be accepted, and a disposition formed in accordance with the information available.

2. Against air and surface ships the RADAR, in favorable geographical locations, will be relied upon to a considerable extent. The RADAR gives an opportunity to take the offensive, a factor which will be taken advantage of.

*Cruising disposition 6V*

<i>Station</i>	<i>Unit</i>
1½ 090-----	Batdiv 4.
1½ 270-----	Batdiv. 2.
Inner A. S. Screen-----	Mindiv 1.
7000-----	2DD left, 1DD right.
7060-----	HONOLULU, 2DD, 1DL right.
7120-----	PHOENIX, 2DD right.
7180-----	2DD left, 1DD right.
7240-----	BOISE, 2DD left.
7300-----	ST. LOUIS, 2DD, 1DL left.
Sun Screen-----	2DD designated by Flank Commander nearest bearing of Sun. Sun screen floats with bearing of sun on Circle Eleven.

*Cruising disposition 6L*

<i>Station</i>	<i>Unit</i>
1 090-----	Batdiv 4, 2DM, 2DD right.
1 270-----	Batdiv 2, 2DM, 2DD left.
4060-----	HONOLULU, 1DL, 1DD right.
4120-----	PHOENIX, 2DD right.
4180-----	1DD right, 1DD left.
4240-----	BOISE, 2DD left.
4300-----	ST. LOUIS, 1DL, 1DD left.
4000-----	2 DD left.

*Cruising disposition 6VS*

<i>Station</i>	<i>Unit</i>
1 090-----	Batdiv 4.
1 270-----	Batdiv 2.
Battleline inner A. S. screen--	Mindiv 1.
6045-----	HONOLULU.
6120-----	PHOENIX, 2DD right.
7180-----	2DD left.
6240-----	BOISE, 1DD left.
6315-----	ST. LOUIS.

Sound screen in line on and normal to axis at Circle 5—5DD, 1DL left, 4DD, 1 DL right—distance between ships 2500 yards.

*Cruising disposition 6S*

<i>Station</i>	<i>Unit</i>
1 090-----	Patdiv 4.
1 270-----	Batdiv 2.
Battleline inner A. S. screen--	Mindiv 1.
5040-----	HONOLULU.
5090-----	1DD right.
3180-----	PHOENIX, BOISE, 1DD left.
5270-----	1DD left.
5320-----	ST. LOUIS.
Sound screen-----	11DD, 2DL.



4DD, 1DL left, 3DD, 1DL right, in line on and normal to axis at Circle 5; 2DD right, 2DD left inclined 150° right and left respectively from flank DDs in line; distance between ships 2500 yards.

*Special Instructions:*

1. In Cruising Dispositions 6V, 6VS, and 6S, Battleship distance one mile.
2. Sun screen will be stationed by Flank Commander nearest bearing of the sun. Screen will consist of 1DD in Cruising Disposition 6VS, and 2DD in Cruising Disposition 6V.
3. Commander *Battleline*, when situation suitable, maneuver *Battleline* in accordance with communication method outlined in Paragraph 1140 (c), Annex "K".

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,  
Commander Task Force ONE.

W. G. LUDLOW,  
for H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

(A portion of ANNEX "H" is a graph of air patrols as ordered for protection of the task force. This graph is reproduced as Item No. 39 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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ANNEX "I" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE. GENERAL PLAN No. 6

(Annex "I" is a diagram of Zigzag Plan No. 60 and is reproduced as Item No. 40 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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ANNEX "J" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE, GENERAL PLAN No. 6

(Annex "J" is a diagram of Zigzag Plan No. 61 and is reproduced as Item No. 41 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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ANNEX "K" TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE ONE GENERAL PLAN No. 6

TASK FORCE ONE.  
PACIFIC FLEET.  
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship.  
Pearl Harbor. T. H. \_\_\_\_\_.

*Confidential*

Communication Plan No. 13.

USF-70 effective except as modified herein.

Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders prepare own communication plans subject to the instructions contained in paragraph 2220 of this communication plan.

1120. (a) This plan effective upon signal after completion of sortie on 6 August 1941.

(b) Commander Task Force ONE General Plan No. 6 is effective at 1800 5 August 1941. From that time until Communication Plan No. 13 is placed into effect, communications in accordance with USF-70; Task Force ONE radio frequency plan; ships use visual calls; aircraft use normal radio calls; normal cryptographic aids plus CSP-696 and 697 effective.

(c) Upon completion of the tactical exercises, Communication Plan No. 13 will be placed out of effect by signal, after which communications will again be in accordance with the last sentence of subparagraph (b) above. NEVADA continue distress frequency guard duties until Task Force ONE returns to port.

1140. *Special Communication Purposes Sought in the Conduct of the Exercises.*—(a) Improvement in radio circuit discipline and efficiency. The order of answering and receiving for station is established as follows:

(1) For ships on a common circuit: In numerical order of their unenciphered visual call signs.

(2) For Task Group or Task Unit Commanders on a circuit: In numerical order of their unenciphered Task Group or Task Unit designations of the organization in effect.

(3) When Task Group and Task Unit Commanders are on a common circuit with ships, the individual ships shall answer or receipt first and then the Task Group and Task Unit Commanders.

The answer or receipt of a Task Group or Task Unit Commander shall be understood to include the flagship; that is, the flagship shall not make a separate answer or receipt.

(b) Test of methods of dissemination, of RADAR information when voice broadcast is used and the fleet's position may not be known to the enemy (see paragraph 1179 of this communication plan and Appendix 1 thereto).

(c) Test of emergency defense maneuvering of the battleline, by battleline commander, day or night, using voice on warning net frequency 3195 Kcs.; other station unit commanders in disposition intercepting this information and taking appropriate action to keep station. When the warning net frequency is to be thus employed, Commander Battleline will order the circuit manned, but in an emergency, battleships will man it as a matter of routine. Use of voice for this purpose is authorized.

1179. (a) RADAR contact reports will be broadcast by the CALIFORNIA, on 3195 Kcs., using one of the three methods described below, depending on the general situation and the need for security. Which method is in use will be readily apparent, although it may be signalled.

(b) *Plan No. 1.*—Use procedure of paragraph 1179, USF-70, except do not “repeat”. Originator will not be stated when only one RADAR is present or in use.

(c) *Plan No. 2.*—Use procedure of paragraph 1179, USF-70, except report distance and bearing in terms of “polar coordinates”, using circle spacing of one mile (see art. 915-920, FTP-188).

If axis is being rotated, use *new* fleet axis as reference for polar coordinates from the instant that the maneuver is executed.

Do not “repeat” reports; omit the word “warning”; originator will not be stated when only one RADAR is present or in use.

(d) *Plan No. 3.*—

“Special Purpose Code No. 1 (Appendix 1)

- (1) Authorized to be and shall be carried in aircraft.
- (2) Characters are broadcast using their phonetic equivalent.
- (3) A code group represents either bearing or distance depending on the order of broadcast; bearings true *from fleet center*—first; distance in *miles from the fleet center*—second.
- (4) “Spare” groups are provided for use as an amplifying after-thought.
- (5) Do not “repeat” transmissions.
- (6) Do not precede broadcast with the customary word “warning”.
- (7) Do not specify originator of report.
- (8) Do not mix plain language and code.
- (9) Make following temporary penciled entries to “spare” code groups in both the “encode” and “decode” sections:

<i>Spare Group No.</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
1-----	Aircraft.
2-----	Aircraft opening.
3-----	Aircraft closing.
4-----	Group of aircraft.
5-----	Group of aircraft opening.
6-----	Group of aircraft closing.
7-----	Surface ship.
8-----	Surface ship opening.
9-----	Surface ship closing.
10-----	Force previously reported.

*Example.*—Group of aircraft closing, bearing 020° True, distance 25 miles from fleet center. "YOKE BAKER (pause) SAIL HYPO (longer pause) NEGAT JIG".

2120. Condition 19 effective.

2211. (a) Task Force ONE radio frequency plan, Appendix "B" effective.

(b) In the anti-aircraft dispositions, the "SUN SCREEN" will not shift frequency.

(c) From 1200 7 August until completion of the fueling exercise, both tankers (Task Group 1.6) will guard the Task Group Commander's circuit.

2212. Not effective.

2216. As a matter of information, Cincpac serial 1565 of July 18, 1941, directed that this article be held in abeyance while the Pacific Fleet is divided into Task Forces. Task Force Commanders only are responsible for designating a guardship.

The NEVADA is designated as 500 Kcs. guardship, effective at zero hours minus two of sortie.

2220. *The following special instructions apply to Exercise 61B only:*

(a) Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders prepare and issue own communication plans.

(b) Interference and deception conducted in accordance with USF-70 is authorized.

(c) The published Task Force radio frequency plans, Appendix "B", USF-70, may be used if desired.

(d) *Radio Calls.*—Use CSP-776 for generating radio calls. "Setting number" to be used by each Task Force will be sent to Task Force Commanders by mail-gram.

(e) *Cryptographic Aids.*—Both Task Forces use List 1.

(f) *CSP-1023 and 1024.*—

Task Force 1 use prescribed date key tables.

Task Force 4 use key tables substituting July for August.

(g) Umpire communications are effective. See paragraphs 2820-2843 of this communication plan; if these instructions are not repeated in published communication plan, insure that reference is made to them.

(h) "Polar coordinate" method and "Special Purpose Code No. 1" may be used by Task Force 4, and will not be considered available to Task Force 1 for radio intelligence purposes.

(i) Commander Battle Force and Task Force Commanders will use visual calls and List I crypto aids on 4205 Kcs. during the exercise.

2400. Not effective. However, Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders may prescribe authenticators in Exercise 61B.

2500. (a) Radio call signs generated by CSP-776 and associated publications shall be used in all exercise traffic, except that on umpire circuits in Exercise 61B, visual calls will be used. Use local zone date for setting number. Settings change at midnight LZT.

(b) For Exercise 61B use setting as prescribed by Task Force Commanders.

2810. Effective except for Commander Out-of-Action detachments.

2820-2843 (inclusive). Umpire communications are effective only for Exercise 61B.

The following supplementary instructions are prescribed:

(1) Interpret paragraph 2825 (c) liberally, in order that umpire traffic may be expeditiously handled.

(2) Attention is invited to the fact that 3USM-41 changed paragraph 2824 (b) from 323 Kcs. to 544 Kcs.

(3) On umpire circuits use *visual* calls.

(4) Out-of-Action ships use visual calls and List I crypto aids on their assigned Task Force umpire frequency.

3120. (a) Condition 1 effective except during Exercise 61B.

(b) During Exercise 61B, as prescribed by Task Force Commander.

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41.

3310. Enter the following temporary call in the Visual Call Book on page 6:

• "F70 — SCREEN, SUN."

5200 and 5300. (a) CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed date-key tables will be used by Task Force ONE.

(b) In Exercise 61B, Task Force FOUR use date-key tables substituting July for August.

(c) In Exercise 64B, submarines use date-key tables substituting July for August.

6620. List 1 effective. Encrypted traffic of one force will not be decrypted by the opposing force.

7120. For Exercise 61B, 544 Kcs. is also in this status.

8000. Reports are not required. Constructive criticism and comments will be welcomed.

Appendix "1"—"Special Purpose Code No. 1" (issued separately and only to Task Force ONE and Cincpac).

W. S. PYE,  
Vice Admiral,  
Commander Task Force ONE.

H. S. Covington,  
H. S. COVINGTON,  
Lieutenant Commander,  
Flag Secretary.

[Notation:] H 16-3/Aug.

Appendix "I" to Annex "K", Combat for Serial 0707 of 30 July, 1941

Confidential

Encode  
Reg. No. 200

SPECIAL PURPOSE CODE No. 1

001 IH	046 JI	091 PY	136 BV	181 KU	226 UQ	271 PO	316 AG
002 ZF	047 YG	092 UE	137 JX	182 GI	227 WM	272 VV	317 YW
003 FA	048 HO	093 JS	138 LS	183 NU	228 RA	273 SG	318 JU
004 PV	049 UW	094 WH	139 XP	184 YR	229 ZQ	274 BI	319 CX
005 EM	050 GT	095 IZ	140 MD	185 OH	230 PK	275 MM	320 BN
006 FR	051 JD	096 LC	141 ND	186 QH	231 RN	276 SX	321 PU
007 UF	042 VP	097 WZ	142 YE	187 ZD	232 UT	277 WE	322 XL
008 YP	053 ZN	098 AB	143 BO	188 DD	233 ES	278 IA	323 KE
009 MI	054 OM	099 BA	144 CO	189 EN	234 GK	279 IS	324 KV
010 MZ	055 PE	100 FH	145 HV	190 JW	235 LX	280 QA	325 RG
011 SO	056 HH	101 JO	146 LN	191 NO	236 QU	281 RY	326 TM
012 UO	057 VY	102 XG	147 YM	192 ZK	237 VI	282 WS	327 XZ
013 YZ	058 ZZ	103 AR	148 CF	193 DV	238 GC	283 IN	328 KP
014 MU	059 OZ	104 AD	149 BQ	194 DF	239 EU	284 IC	329 KF
015 MI	060 ON	105 AU	150 CI	195 DX	240 GE	285 IO	330 KR
016 MW	061 PB	106 FN	151 JA	196 JZ	241 NA	286 QD	331 RJ
017 SS	062 HC	107 JL	152 LK	197 NL	242 QQ	287 RU	332 TG
018 FV	063 JG	108 LE	153 NF	198 QK	243 RP	288 SZ	333 PR
019 UA	064 VK	109 WU	154 YA	199 ZA	244 UB	289 VL	334 VV
020 YB	065 ZB	110 VC	155 WN	200 XU	245 YV	290 ZU	335 IW
021 WO	066 XV	111 ZV	156 BF	201 CU	246 EJ	291 GQ	336 IW
022 MA	067 OE	112 PI	157 BM	202 DB	247 EQ	292 GY	337 KC
023 MG	068 OK	113 PN	158 HN	203 JR	248 LR	293 NT	338 QZ
024 SF	069 TW	114 FC	159 HQ	204 JT	249 LT	294 NV	339 RB
025 SH	070 PP	115 PQ	160 PS	205 PT	250 PV	295 PX	340 PZ
026 UC	071 VM	116 WW	161 YC	206 ZC	251 VD	296 VN	341 WX
027 YD	072 VO	117 WY	162 UK	207 VU	252 XD	297 RI	342 ZI
028 BJ	073 BK	118 BL	163 CY	208 CZ	253 DA	298 UG	343 EO
029 EF	074 GU	119 GV	164 GW	209 GX	254 KA	299 KB	344 ME
030 MF	075 OI	120 OJ	165 PL	210 PM	255 FQ	300 JC	345 LB
031 NC	076 QF	121 RL	166 SV	211 IE	256 HT	301 JV	346 LV
032 NX	077 RD	122 SK	167 VE	212 FF	257 VG	302 VH	347 VJ
033 WY	078 WV	123 WR	168 WT	213 XW	258 YX	303 XY	348 YJ
034 YP	079 ZAV	124 ZX	169 ZY	214 AE	259 BR	304 DG	349 EV
035 LD	080 KG	125 MK	170 OO	215 AV	260 CK	305 DZ	350 GG
036 IQ	081 KT	126 MX	171 PC	216 AL	261 BY	306 DQ	351 IJ
037 KM	082 MQ	127 OV	172 HL	217 JQ	262 LQ	307 NR	352 QY
038 SB	083 TR	128 FB	173 HP	218 FD	263 HR	308 FE	353 HS
039 LU	084 NW	129 RC	174 SI	219 SJ	264 FG	309 IU	354 LW
040 NY	085 NZ	130 RE	175 RF	220 SL	265 SN	310 SM	355 FO
041 FP	086 JB	131 LA	176 NB	221 OE	266 RK	311 ST	356 SU
042 HD	087 HE	132 HF	177 HG	222 JAI	267 JN	312 LL	357 LM
043 NM	088 NN	133 QR	178 QS	223 QT	268 RV	313 RW	358 RX
044 TH	089 TI	134 TJ	179 TK	224 TL	269 UI	314 UJ	359 VS
045 VT	090 XB	135 XC	180 YH	225 YI	270 ZG	315 ZH	360 ZE



SPARE GROUPS (SG)

(1) AA	-----	(11) DC	-----
(2) ER	-----	(12) GZ	-----
(3) KD	-----	(13) MH	-----
(4) OL	-----	(14) HA	-----
(5) JK	-----	(15) LI	-----
(6) NJ	-----	(16) QO	-----
(7) RS	-----	(17) TD	-----
(8) UR	-----	(18) WC	-----
(9) XK	-----	(19) YO	-----
(10) ZM	-----	(20) UV	-----

See currently effective Communication Plan for instructions

Confidential

Decode

SPECIAL PURPOSE CODE NO. 1

AA 18G	EU 239	ID 035	LK 152	OJ 120	RG 325	UK 162	XL 322
AB 098	EV 349	IE 211	LL 312	OK 068	RI 297	UO 012	XP 139
AD 104	FA 003	IH 001	LM 357	OL 48G	RJ 331	UQ 226	XU 200
AE 214	FB 128	IJ 351	LN 146	OM 054	RK 266	UR 88G	XV 066
AG 316	FC 114	IN 283	LQ 262	ON 060	RL 121	UT 232	XW 213
AL 216	FD 218	IO 285	LR 248	OO 170	RN 231	UV 208G	XY 303
AR 103	FE 308	IQ 036	LS 138	OV 127	RP 243	UW 049	XZ 327
AU 105	FF 212	IS 279	LT 249	OZ 059	RS 78G	VC 110	YA 154
AW 215	FG 264	IW 336	LU 039	PB 061	RU 287	VD 251	YB 020
BA 099	FII 100	IZ 095	LV 346	PC 171	RV 268	VE 167	YC 161
BF 156	FN 106	JA 151	LW 354	PE 055	RW 313	VF 335	YD 027
B1 274	FO 355	JB 086	LX 235	PI 112	RX 358	VG 257	YE 142
BJ 028	FP 041	JC 300	MA 022	PK 230	RY 281	VH 302	YG 047
BK 073	FQ 255	JD 051	MD 140	PL 165	SB 038	VI 237	YH 180
BL 118	FR 006	JG 063	ME 344	PM 210	SF 024	VJ 347	YI 225
BM 157	FV 018	JI 046	MF 030	PN 113	SG 273	VK 064	YJ 348
BN 320	GC 238	JK 58G	MG 023	PO 271	SH 025	VL 289	YM 147
BO 143	GE 240	JL 107	MH 138G	PP 070	SI 174	VM 071	YO 198G
BQ 149	GG 350	JM 222	MI 009	PQ 115	SJ 219	VN 296	YP 008
BR 259	GI 182	JN 267	MJ 015	PR 333	SK 122	VO 072	YR 184
BS 136	GK 234	JO 101	MK 125	PS 160	SL 220	VP 052	YS 245
BY 261	GQ 291	JQ 217	MM 275	PT 205	SM 310	VS 359	YW 317
CF 148	GT 050	JR 203	MQ 082	PU 321	SN 265	VT 045	YX 258
CI 150	GU 074	JS 093	MU 014	PV 004	SO 011	VU 207	YY 034
CK 260	GV 119	JT 204	MW 016	PW 250	SS 017	VV 272	YZ 013
CO 144	GW 164	JU 318	MX 126	PX 295	ST 311	VY 057	ZA 199
CU 201	GX 209	JV 301	NZ 010	PY 091	SU 356	WC 188G	ZB 065
CX 319	GY 292	JW 190	NA 241	PZ 340	SV 166	WE 277	ZC 206
CY 163	GZ 128G	JX 137	NB 176	QA 280	SX 276	WH 094	ZD 187
CZ 208	HA 148G	JZ 196	NC 031	QD 286	SZ 288	WM 227	ZE 360
DA 253	HC 062	KA 254	ND 141	QE 221	TD 175G	WN 155	ZF 002
DB 202	HD 042	KB 299	NF 153	QF 076	TG 332	WO 021	ZG 270
DC 118G	HE 087	KC 337	NJ 68G	QH 186	TH 044	WP 033	ZH 315
DD 188	HF 132	KD 35G	NL 197	QK 198	TI 089	WQ 078	ZI 342
DF 194	HG 177	KE 323	NM 043	QO 168G	TJ 134	WR 123	ZK 192
DG 304	HI 056	KF 329	NN 088	QQ 242	TK 179	WS 282	ZL 108G
DO 306	HL 172	KG 080	NO 191	QR 133	TL 224	WT 168	ZN 053
DV 193	HN 158	KM 037	NR 307	QS 178	TM 326	WX 109	ZO 229
DX 195	HO 048	KP 328	NT 293	QT 223	TR 083	WV 334	ZU 290
DZ 305	HP 173	KR 330	NU 183	QU 236	TW 069	WW 116	ZV 111
EJ 246	HQ 159	KT 081	NV 294	QY 352	UA 019	WX 341	ZW 079
EM 005	IR 263	KU 181	NW 084	QZ 338	UB 244	WY 117	ZX 124
EN 189	HS 353	KV 324	NX 032	RA 228	UC 026	WZ 097	ZY 169
EO 343	HT 256	LA 131	NY 040	RB 339	UE 092	XB 090	ZZ 058
EP 029	IU 309	LB 345	NZ 085	RC 129	UF 007	XC 135	
EQ 247	HV 145	LC 096	OE 067	RD 077	UG 298	XD 252	
ER 28G	IA 278	LE 108	OH 185	RE 130	UI 269	XG 102	
ES 233	IC 284	LI 158G	OI 075	RF 175	UJ 314	XK 98G	

SPARE GROUPS (SG)

(1)	-----	(11)	-----
(2)	-----	(12)	-----
(3)	-----	(13)	-----
(4)	-----	(14)	-----
(5)	-----	(15)	-----
(6)	-----	(16)	-----
(7)	-----	(17)	-----
(8)	-----	(18)	-----
(9)	-----	(19)	-----
(10)	-----	(20)	-----

See currently effective Communication Plan for instructions

## Distribution (Basic List III, Case 2) :

Cincpac (15—Registered Nos. 1 to 15)  
 Combatships (35—Registered Nos. 16 to 50) for distribution to PENNSYLVANIA, WEST VIRGINIA and NEVADA.  
 CALIFORNIA (5—Registered Nos. 51 to 55).  
 Comcrubatfor (38—Registered Nos. 56 to 93) for distribution to Crudiv NINE, less HELENA.  
 Comdesron ONE (25—Registered Nos. 94 to 118) for distribution to Desron ONE, less DALE and MONAGHAN.  
 Comdesron THREE (31—Registered Nos. 119 to 149) for distribution to Desron THREE.  
 Comindiv ONE (13—Registered Nos. 150 to 162) for distribution to Mindiv ONE.  
 Comsubdiv 61 (8—Registered Nos. 163 to 170) for distribution to Subdiv 61.  
 Compatron 22 (13—Registered Nos. 171 to 183) for distribution to Patron 22.  
 Compatron 23 (13—Registered Nos. 184 to 196) for distribution to Patron 23.  
 Calif. 3—Reg. Nos. 197-199.<sup>1</sup>  
 File—Reg. Nos. 200, 201.<sup>1</sup>  
 Info Copy—No. 202.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Penned notation.

## EXHIBIT No. 20 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Hs

PATROL WING TWO.  
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 22, 1941.*

Memorandum to Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

In compliance with your telephone request this date the following is forwarded for your information.

I am on duty in the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and was given orders to report to the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE FORCE for temporary special duty. Upon the termination of this duty I was to return to duty in the Navy Department.

While at sea in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, attached to the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE FORCE staff, a dispatch was received from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, stating that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force had asked for my services and that it was therefore requested that my detachment to Washington be delayed for this duty. On arrival in Pearl Harbor I was given verbal orders by the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE FORCE to report to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

My orders and dispatch referred to are in the hands of the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE FORCE in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE.

W. E. G. TAYLOR,  
*Lt. Cdr., U. S. N. R.*

[Penned notation:] handed to me by Mr. Howe at Pearl Harbor 12/27/41 at 11 30 A M.—A J S

## EXHIBIT No. 21 (NAVY PACKET No. 2), ROBERTS COMMISSION

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
 District Intelligence Office  
 Sixth Floor, Young Hotel  
 Honolulu, Hawaii

JAN. 2, 1942.

Memorandum for the Commission.

Subject: Long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at Laui Kai, Kalama, and on island of Maui.

Subject message was received from the communication company and delivered via officer messenger to the office of Commander Rochefort on either December 4th or 5th 1941.

Decoding and translation were completed during night December 10th-11th, 1941.

I received a copy of the translation the forenoon of December 11th 1941.

Respectfully,

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
 Captain, U. S. Navy.

## EXHIBIT No. 22 (NAVY PACKET No. 2), ROBERTS COMMISSION

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Memorandum for Lieut-Comdr. Covington.

Attached hereto are copies of the Operation Orders for the combined inter Task Force tactical exercises held during the second quarter of the fiscal year.

A—Operation Order 29-41 was for the period 9/24-9/27, 1941.

B—Operation Order 31-41 was for the period 10/23-10/26, 1941.

C—Operation Order 37-41 was for the period 11/21-11/25, 1941.

A and C were held in areas to the northward of Oahu as shown by the positions in the exercises.

B was conducted to the southward of Oahu because it involved the actual firing of torpedoes and smooth water was required.

Particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2 and 5 of the "General" situation given in all Operation Orders.

Respectfully,

P. C. Crosley,  
 P. C. CROSLY,  
 Flag Secretary.

[Penned:] Hope this is what is desired.

JANUARY 2, 1942.

Memorandum for Major Allen

The Commission desires data from logs or other sources showing whether and upon what dates prior to December 7, 1941, the sea areas to the north of the Hawaiian Islands have been used for exercises.

Admiral Halsey believes Commander Covington may find this with Staff of C in C.

W. B. HOWE, Recorder.

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 11 September, 1941.

Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/FF12(1)/  
A16-3/SEPT/(12)  
Serial 01416  
Confidential

## Operation Order

No. 29-41

## TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Units listed in Annex "A".*

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders.
2. Units listed in Annex "A" conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN AREA during the period twenty-four to twenty-seven September, one nine four one.
3. (a) *Units listed in Annex "A"* underway in accordance with orders of Task Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with Annex "B". On completion resume scheduled operations.

(x)-----  
4. Train base at PEARL HARBOR. Tenders not otherwise assigned continue scheduled upkeep.

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Communications in accordance with Annex "C". Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in MARYLAND.

H. E. KIMMEL,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

*Annexes:*

"A"—Tactical Organizations and Related Details—Effective 24-27 September 1941.

"B"—U. S. Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. 8-41. Appendix No. "1"—Special Situation, BROWN, Exercise No. 182. Appendix No. "2"—Special Situation, GREEN, Exercise No. 182.

"C"—U. S. Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 8-41.

"D"—Special Cruising Dispositions.

"E"—Tentative Radar Doctrine.

[2] *Distribution:* (Basis, List III, Case 1)

- Opnav (7)
- N. W. C. (3)
- P. G. S. (3)
- Com FOURTEEN (10)
- CO NAS, Pearl Harbor (5)
- CO Subbase, Pearl Harbor (5)
- Combatfor (15)
- Comscofor (15)
- Comairscofor (10)
- OG, 2nd Marine Div. (5)
- Comdr, 2nd Marine Airwing (2)
- Combatships (75) for distribution to Batships.
- Comairbatfor (70) for distribution to Airbatfor.
- Comerubatfor (60) for distribution to Crubatfor.
- Comdesflot ONE (270) for distribution to Desbatfor.
- Cominbatfor (35) for distribution to Minbatfor.
- Comcrusecofor (80) for distribution to Cruscofor.
- Comsubcofor (200) for distribution to Subcofor.
- Combasesfor (205) for distribution to Basesfor.
- Compatwing ONE (25) for distribution to Patwing ONE.
- Compatwing TWO (30) for distribution to Patwing TWO.

P. C. Crosley,

P. C. CROSLLEY,

*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

9-11-41-(1340)



## [1] ANNEX "A" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship*Confidential*PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
11 September, 1941.TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RELATED DETAILS  
EFFECTIVE 24-27 SEPTEMBER 1941

## (a) Normal Tactical Organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet:

G4 *Task Force FOUR*, Admiral Kimmel.G4.9 *Battleline*, Vice Admiral Pye.

G4.9.1 Batdiv ONE less OKLAHOMA.

G4.9.2 Batdiv TWO less PENNSYLVANIA.

G4.9.4 Batdiv FOUR less COLORADO.

G4.9.5 Desron THREE less Desdiv FIVE.

G4.8 *Right Flank*, Rear Admiral Draemel.

G4.8.1 SALT LAKE CITY.

G4.8.2 DETROIT, Desron FOUR.

G4.7 *Center*, Rear Admiral Spruance.

G4.7.1 NORTHAMPTON.

G4.7.2 Desron SIX (Sound Screen).

G4.6 *Left Flank*, Rear Admiral Theobald.

G4.6.1 PENSACOLA.

G4.6.2 Desron ONE.

G4.1 *Air*, Vice Admiral Halsey.

G4.1.1 ENTERPRISE.

SARATOGA.

Desdiv FIVE (Plane Guards).

G4.1.2 CHESTER.

G4.2 *Shore-based Air*, Rear Admiral Bellinger.

G4.2.1 Patron FOURTEEN.

G4.2.2 Patron TWENTY-FOUR.

[2] G4.3 *Air Targets*, Commander Murphy.

Four Utwing Planes, Marx XIV sleeves.

G4.4 *Salvage*, Rear Admiral Calhoun.

Units designated by Combasefor.

(b) When on deployment, Center units join either Right or Left Flank, they will, upon execution of the deployment signal, assume new task unit designations appropriate to the Flank to be joined, cruisers final digit of task unit number 3, destroyers 4.

*Example:* Center joins Right Flank: Task Unit 4.7.1 becomes 4.8.3, Task Unit 4.7.2 becomes 4.8.4.

## (c) Air Patrol Assignments:

Flight THREE—Inner Air Patrol: Three single planes per watch, duration of watches—3½ hours, Battleline.

Flight TWO—Intermediate: Two two-plane sections per watch, duration of watches—3½ hours, Cruisers Center, Right, and Left. Commander Center, coordinate.

Flight FIVE—Combat: As directed by Commander Air.

Officers coordinating Inner and Intermediate Air Patrols will each, in addition, designate an anti-submarine striking unit of at least four planes, to be armed with depth charges and ready to be catapulted on submarine contact.

## (d) Type Tactical Organization of Task Force SEVEN, Pacific Fleet:

G7 *Task Force SEVEN*, Rear Admiral Furlong.G7.1 *Minecraft*

OGLALA, Mindiv ONE.

G7.2 *Submarines*

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE.

G7.3 *Patrol Planes*

Patrons TWENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE.

[3] (e) Organization for security in accordance with Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(1) In despatches and signals this plan will be referred to as Operation Plan AFIRM.

(2) If placed in effect in real emergency, this will be preceded by a plain language despatch: "Exercise conditions ended."

(3) If placed in effect for exercise purposes only, each despatch in connection therewith will be prefaced by the word "DRILL."

(4) *Organization*

G1 *Main Body*, Vice Admiral Pye.

Batdivs TWO, FOUR.

SARATOGA.

Desron ONE.

G2 *Striking Force*, Vice Admiral Halsey.

Batdiv ONE.

Crudiv FIVE.

ENTERPRISE.

Desrons FOUR, SIX.

G5 *Attack Force*, Captain Keleher.

Desron THREE.

G7 *LAHAINA Force*, Rear Admiral Furlong.

OGLALA.

Mindiv ONE.

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE.

Basic division into Task Forces instead of Task Groups is used to minimize radio frequency shifts by large numbers of ships. Except for Desron THREE, which becomes the Attack Force, all units will establish communications in accordance with the communication plans previously prescribed by their respective Task Force Commanders for Exercises Nos. 179 and 182.

(5) This plan is for use *only* during the Fleet Tactical period 24-27 September 1941.

[1] ANNEX "B" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
11 September, 1941.

Exercise Plan No. 8-41

PART I—GENERAL

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex.

2. The general objectives are: Training in war operations under realistically simulated war conditions; test and further development of doctrine and procedures and training in the preparation of quick estimates and plans. More specific objectives are designated in the various exercises. To provide command training for more flag officers, in some exercises the O. T. C. of the exercise task force is not the senior flag officer in the force.

3. Unless special exception is made in the individual exercise, the provisions of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise the Officers Conducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled operations. All aircraft, except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall be at their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise Officers Conducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes have returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises.

4. Speed limitations (unless otherwise prescribed): Battleships—16 knots; cruisers, destroyers (including converted destroyers), carriers—24 knots (except as required for operating aircraft); others—none.

5. *Special Instructions:* For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise opponents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions prescribed in USF-10. Should the Commander-in-Chief transmit the message "Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of hostile

action against the Fleet. Commander Task Force SEVEN on receipt of this despatch, will have all submarines surface, and report when [2] this is accomplished. All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

6. Surface ships indicate anti-aircraft fire by flashing V's on searchlight trained on target.

7. Each exercise implies a reasonably definite tactical situation. Commanding Officers are expected to maintain conditions of readiness and material conditions appropriate thereto, without signal. To preserve personnel physical capabilities, conditions must not be more severe than the constructive situation really merits.

[3] PART II—EXERCISES

• *Exercise No. 176*

(1800, 23 September to 1130, 24 September)

*Objects:*

- (1) To train submarines in patrol operations in hostile waters.
- (2) To train destroyers in submarine detection and attack.
- (3) To train in sortie against submarine opposition.

*Procedure:*

(a) Units of Task Force ONE except submarines, mincraft, and patrol planes organize in accordance with current security orders by dark, 23 September, at which time the Main Body and Striking Force must be south of latitude 20° 15' N. Remain south of this line until 0500, 24 September.

(b) Units of Task Force TWO organize for sortie at 1800, 23 September. Commander Task Force TWO station Offshore Patrol.

(c) OGLALA, Mindiv ONE, Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE, Patrons TWENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE, organize as Task Force SEVEN, Rear Admiral Furlong, Task Force Commander, at 1800, 23 September.

(d) Submarine Division TWENTY-TWO depart LAHAINA by routes north of latitude 20° 40' N. at 1800, 23 September; proceed and establish patrol off PEARL HARBOR entrance by daylight, 24 September. Attack heavy ships departing PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE depart LAHAINA by routes south of latitude 20° 40' N. at 1800, 23 September; proceed and establish patrol in Area V-13 by daylight, 24 September. Attack heavy ships of Task Force ONE.

(f) Destroyers of the Offshore and Inshore Patrols hunt and attack submarines attempting to establish patrol off PEARL HARBOR.

(g) Task Force ONE Attack Group Destroyers hunt and attack submarines attempting to establish patrol in Area V-13.

[4] (h) Task Force ONE (Main Body and Striking Force) proceed after 0500, 24 September to concentrate with Task Force TWO at reference point "A", latitude 21° 00' N., longitude 158° 30' W., at 1130. Pass through area V-13 en route. Defend against submarine attacks.

(i) Task Force TWO depart PEARL HARBOR against submarine opposition and proceed to concentrate with Task Force ONE. Submarine Division FORTY-TWO sortie last and proceed to LAHAINA on the surface. This division becomes a part of Task Force SEVEN upon completing sortie.

(j) All patrolling submarines surface by 1130 and proceed to LAHAINA on the surface.

(k) Task Force SEVEN, less submarines and patrol planes, proceed at 1800, 23 September, by route south of latitude 20° N. and west of longitude 159° W. to reference point "B", latitude 21° 30' N., longitude 159° W., to arrive by 1200, 24 September. OGLALA act as radio relay vessel for patrolling submarines. Commander Task Force SEVEN direct one section of patrol planes to locate Task Force ONE at daylight, 24 September, and coach submarines area V-13 to attack positions.

*Safety Precautions:* Submarines on patrol, destroyers of Task Force ONE Attack Group, the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, will darken ship from sunset to sunrise. While darkened, the speed of Patrol and Attack Group destroyers will be limited to ten knots, but sufficient reserve boiler power will be maintained for emergency backing. Running lights will be turned on by all units as necessary to avoid collision. For attacks during daylight, submarines will go to deep submergence when not less than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship,

and are subject to counter attack by anti-submarine screens and patrol destroyers.

*Damage:* During this exercise, damage will be *assessed* and *applied* by engaged submarines and destroyers. Out-of-action rendezvous for submarines is at LAHAINA, for destroyers at concentration rendezvous given above. Submarines declared out of action proceed via KALOHI Channel. Out-of-action ships burn running lights during darkness and answer challenges "OA" until arrived at rendezvous.

*Reports:*

- (a) From Offshore and Inshore Patrols, Task Force ONE Attack Group:  
 (1) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expenditures.  
 (2) Summary of damage.
- [5] (b) From Commanders Submarine Divisions TWENTY-TWO and SIXTY-ONE:  
 (1) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures.  
 (2) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other evasive action.  
 (3) Summary of damage.
- (c) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[6] *Exercise No. 177*

(1130 to 1600, 24 September)

*Object:*

Training in Fleet Tactics, including simulated Fleet engagement.

*Procedure:*

(a) At 1130, 24 September, Task Forces ONE and TWO, less submarines, patrol planes, and mincraft, assume normal tactical organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet, Form Cruising Disposition 4-V, course and axis 300°, speed 12 knots, by 1200, at which time guide in battleships pass through reference point "A", Latitude 21°00' North, Longitude 158°30' West, O. T. C. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in MARYLAND.

(b) At 1200, surface units of Task Force SEVEN, representing an enemy fleet comparable in overall strength to Task Force FOUR, pass through reference point "B", Latitude 21°30' North, Longitude 159°30' West, course and axis 120°, 13 knots. Patrol planes not engaged in exercise 176 will be utilized in lieu of carrier aircraft by Commander Task Force SEVEN. OGLALA represents a battleline of six NEW MEXICOS. Each light mine layer in an inner area represents one BROOKLYN plus one squadron of destroyers, each light mine layer in an outer area represents one PORTLAND plus one squadron of destroyers.

(c) Opposing fleets conduct approach and deployment. Engage on northerly courses.

*Safety Precautions:* In accordance with USF-10. Air and surface units of Task Force FOUR only may use smoke.

*Damage:* Do not assess or apply damage.

*Reports:* Comment and recommendation by Commander Task Force SEVEN and Task Group Commanders of Task Force FOUR.

Upon completion of this exercise, recover all ship-based aircraft without further orders. All shore-based aircraft return to Base.

[7] *Special Signals:* The following special signals will be used to direct light forces on the flanks in Fleet engagements:

(a) "LK"—"Light Forces will operate according to battle plan indicated:"

Plan 1—Tactical Offensive.

Plan 2—Tactical Defensive.

Plan 3—Divided—part tactical offensive, part tactical defensive.

Plan 4—Make normal deployment, nature of initial operations to be decided when tactical situation is more definitely known.

Plan 5—Tactical Offensive—Designated units prepare to make a preliminary attack.

NOTE.—If deployment is ordered before the order to attack is given, the designated units will take stations in the general vicinity of their normal deployment stations, but such as to facilitate the initiation of the attack.



Plan 6—Tactical Offensive—Light Forces in the Van prepare to make a Simultaneous Attack.

NOTE.—If deployment is ordered before the order to attack is given, the light forces in the van will take stations in the general vicinity of their normal deployment stations, but as near to the enemy light forces as possible without becoming engaged.

Plan 7—Divided—Light force units designated prepare to make simultaneous attack—Units of light forces not designated operate defensively, but, if practicable, during the attack of the offensive units, move into an Outer Area and prepare to attack enemy battleline with torpedoes.

Plan 8—Tactical Offensive; execute that form of attack most effective against enemy disposition as disclosed by information obtained.

Plan 9—Coordinate light force and air attacks.

[8] (b) "BE"—"Attack according to plan indicated:"

Plan 1—Preliminary Attack.

Plan 2—Simultaneous Attack.

(c) "SOPUS POSIT D"—"Distribute units in designated lettered flank areas; units to occupy each area are as prescribed by designating signals following each designated lettered area."

(d) "POSIT D"—"DESIG (letter)" may be added to indicate the AREA in a disposition which it is desired a unit or commander to occupy."

(e) "DUT"—LIMITS. Establish Inner and Outer \_\_\_\_\_ of AREA designated. Numerals preceding signal indicate INNER limit of area in thousands of yards; numerals following signal indicate OUTER limit.

NOTE.—The signal characters given above for the first two signals are those which are now assigned in the General Signal Book for the *basic meanings*. The signal characters for the third signal are recommended assignments since it is believed that this signal should be in the "POSIT" section. The signal characters of the last two signals are those which were temporarily assigned during a recent exercise. Appropriate signal characters must be chosen when entering the signals in their entirety in the SOPUS Section.

[9]

*Exercise No. 178*

(1600, 24 September to 0830, 25 September)

*Object:*

- (1) Training Destroyers and Cruisers in Night Search and Attack.
- (2) Training Fleet in repelling night cruiser and destroyer attacks.

*Attack Force:*

Task Force FIVE, Rear Admiral Draemel.

CHESTER, DETROIT

Desrons THREE, SIX

*Fleet:*

Task Force FOUR, Rear Admiral Anderson.

As listed in Annex "A" less Attack Force.

*Procedure:*

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 177, units assigned assume Task Organization of Task Force FIVE. Proceed via KAUAI CHANNEL to reference point "C", Latitude 22° 15' North, Longitude 157° 45' West, to arrive about 2000. Locate, track and attack Task FOUR. Complete all attacks by 0530 and rejoin Task Force FOUR promptly thereafter.

(b) Upon completion of aircraft recovery following Exercise No. 177, Task Force FOUR form as directed by Task Force Commander. Proceed northward through KAUAI CHANNEL to latitude about 22° 15' North, thence eastward. At 0600 be within 15 miles of reference point "D", Latitude 22° 15' North, Longitude 157° 15' West. Defend against cruiser and destroyer raids enroute.

(c) Both forces will maintain radio and radar silence from 1700 to 2000. Set radar watches at 2000. Radio silence may be broken by Task Force Commanders at discretion, after 2000.

(d) Neither Task Force Commander may issue any advance written directive for this exercise. "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" is effective within the Attack Force for this exercise.

[10] (e) The time from 0600 to 0830 is a period of preparation for Exercise No. 180. During this period the Fleet will be reformed on signal from the O. T. C. and at 0830 will pass through reference point "D", Latitude 22°15' North, Longitude 157°15' West, course and axis 270°, speed 14.

*Safety Precautions:* In accordance with USF-10 Smoke will not be used.

*Damage:* Assess and apply damage, except that speed will not be reduced below 15 knots for destroyers and 10 knots for heavy ships. Out of action ships burn running lights. Out of action rendezvous:

	<i>Latitude</i>	<i>Longitude</i>
Task Force FOUR-----	22°00'	157°15'
Task Force FIVE-----	22°30'	157°15'

*Reports:*

(1) From Task Force Commanders:

- (a) Brief description of operations.
- (b) Track chart, single pencil copy, scale of chart #5654.
- (c) Summary of damage.
- (d) Comments on "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack".

(2) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[11]

*Exercise No. 179*

(1600, 24 September to 1600, 26 September)

*Objects:*

- (1) Training in Submarine—Patrol Plane coordinated Operations.
- (2) Training in Strategic Mining.

*Forces Engaged:*

*Task Force SEVEN*, Rear Admiral Furlong.

OGLALA

Mindiv ONE

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE, FORTY-TWO

Patrons TWENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE

*Procedure:*

Detailed instructions for this period will be issued by Commander Task Force SEVEN. It is desired that the exercises include the following features:

(a) Coordinated submarine—patrol plane operations utilizing minecraft as target group.

(b) Planting a strategic minefield at night or under cover of assumed low visibility opposed by submarines and patrol planes.

*Reports:* Brief description of operations conducted, comment, recommendation from Task Force Commander.

*Doctrine:* "Submarine—Patrol Plane Tentative Doctrine" issued by Commander Scouting Force to Scouting Force and Task Force THREE is effective during this exercise period. Commander Scouting Force furnish copy to Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

[12]

*Exercise No. 180*

(0830 to 1130, 25 September)

*Object:*

Test of Fleet Anti-Aircraft Fire.

*Procedure:*

As given in Task Force ONE Exercise No. 90, enclosure (A) to Commander Battle Force serial 0436 of 9 May, 1941.

Task Group FOUR THREE make one formation bombing attack by 0930; thereafter make additional single or multiple attacks at discretion of Task Group Commander.

Ammunition allowance is four rounds per ship, remnants if available, otherwise from Commander-in-Chief's pool.

The Fleet will be formed in battle disposition for this exercise. Each station unit form column.

Target approaches should be made *approximately at right angles to the longer dimension of heavy ship formations* to permit the greatest practicable number of ships to fire without violating safety precautions.

No ship-based aircraft are to be launched during this exercise.

Target Group start return to Base at 1130.

[13]

*Exercise No. 181*

(1200 to 1630, 25 September)

*Object:*

Test of Fleet Defense against Air Observation and Attack.

*Procedure:*

(a) The Fleet (Units participating) will be organized as Task Force FOUR, in Cruising Disposition 4-V, and will be maneuvered by the O.T.C. Rear ship of each heavy ship station unit tow bombing target.

(b) The 1200 position of the Fleet Center will be signalled to Commander Shore-based Air in advance. Trackers may take off at 1130, and attack groups at discretion after 1200.

(c) Commander Shore-based Air have at least three attacks made during the exercise period. Each attack group will consist of at least three planes. Two groups may attack simultaneously. Miniature bomb attacks and machine gun strafing on towed targets, and simulated torpedo attacks are authorized. Undue advantage will not be taken by attack groups of the "radar shadow" of OAHU, inasmuch as proximity to the Naval Air Stations is maintained to facilitate the exercise. Smoke may be used by aircraft only.

(d) Commander Shore-based Air is authorized to arrange for Army participation in the attacks if the Army desires to take part. Inform Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, prior to 20 September whether or not the Army will participate and if so whether or not the Army bombers will have fighter support. In case of Army participation, advise the responsible Army Commander of the contents of Article 5213, USF-10.

*Damage:* Damage will be assessed by aircraft but not applied, except (1) if a single tracking plane is intercepted it will retire to a distance of 25 miles and descend to 500 feet before resuming tracking operations, (2) damaged combat patrols must return to the Fleet Center before being assigned a new mission.

*[14] Reports:*

(1) From Commander Air:

(a) List of targets tracked, interceptions ordered, interceptions successful.

(b) Comment and recommendation.

(2) From Radar Ships:

(a) Comment and recommendation.

(3) From Commander Shore-based Air:

(a) Time each attack was delivered, number of planes in attack group, altitude, course, speed, whether or not opposed, and if so the distance from bomb release point interception was accomplished.

(b) Comment and recommendation.

APPENDIX "1" TO ANNEX "B" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
11 September, 1941.Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/FF12(1)/  
A16-3/SEPT/(12)  
Serial 01417*Confidential*

DISTRIBUTED TO BROWN FORCE, EXERCISE NO. 182, ONLY

*Special situation*

1. At 0500, 26 September, BROWN Covering Force is in position Latitude 24° 00' North, Longitude 156° 00' West, in Cruising Disposition, course 230°, speed 12 knots.

2. At 0500, 26 September, BROWN O. T. C. receives following despatch from Chief of Naval Operations:

RADIO INTELLIGENCE INDICATES GREEN FORCE OF CONSIDERABLE SIZE HEADING FOR PEARL FROM POSITION WITHIN 30 MILES OF LATITUDE 26° 15' NORTH LONGITUDE 161° 00' WEST AT 1030 GCT 26 SEPTEMBER. INTERPOSE AND ENGAGE.

H. E. KIMMEL,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

Distribution: (Basis, List III, Case 1)

Opnav (7)

N. W. C. (3)

P. G. S. (3)

Comdr. BROWN (Combatfor) (140) for distribution to BROWN Force.

P. C. Crosley,

P. C. CROSLY,

*Lieutenant Commander,*

*Flag Secretary.*

9-11-41 (235)

APPENDIX "2" TO ANNEX "B" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
11 September, 1941.

Cinpac File No.  
A4-3/FF12(1)/  
A16-3/SEPT/(12)  
Serial 01418

*Confidential*

DISTRIBUTED TO GREEN FORCE, EXERCISE NO. 182, ONLY

*Special situation*

1. At 0500, 26 September, GREEN Raiding Force pass through position Latitude 25° 00' North, Longitude 160° 00' West, in Cruising Disposition, course 150°, speed 15 knots.

2. At 0500, 26 September, GREEN O. T. C. receives following despatch from his Navy Department:

RADIO INTELLIGENCE INDICATES BROWN FORCE CONTAINING BATTLESHIPS HEADING FOR KAUAI CHANNEL FROM POSITION WITHIN 30 MILES OF LATITUDE 25° 00' NORTH. LONGITUDE 155° 00' WEST AT 1030 GCT TWENTY SIXTH. INTERCEPT AND ENGAGE.

H. E. KIMMEL,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

Distribution: Basis, List III, Case 1)

Opnav (7)

N. W. C. (3)

P. G. S. (3)

Comdr. GREEN (Comairbatfor) (145) for distribution to GREEN Force.

P. C. Crosley,

P. C. CROSLY,

*Lieutenant Commander,*

*Flag Secretary.*

9-11-41 (240).



*Exercise No. 182*

(1630, 25 September to 1630, 26 September)

*Object:*

- (1) Tactical Training of Task Forces in Proximity to Hostile Forces of Comparable Strength.
- (2) Fleet Engagement.

## OPPOSING FORCES

*BROWN, Task Force ONE*

Vice Admiral Pye  
 4BB Batdivs TWO, FOUR  
 1CV SARATOGA  
 18DD Desrons ONE, THREE  
 24VPB Patrons TWENTY-TWO,  
 TWENTY-THREE

*GREEN, Task Force TWO*

Vice Admiral Halsey  
 2BB Datdiv ONE  
 1CV ENTERPRISE  
 18DD Desrons FOUR, SIX  
 4CA Crudiv FIVE  
 1CL DETROIT

*Limiting Speeds:* BROWN battleships 15 knots, GREEN battleships 18 knots, all cruisers and carriers 28 knots, all destroyers 32 knots. Formation and disposition limiting speeds are one knot less than the maximum speed of the slowest ship in company.

*Procedure:* Upon completion of Exercise No. 181, units listed assume normal tactical organizations of Task Forces ONE and TWO, respectively. Task Force Commander's conduct their forces to assigned initial points. Radio silence becomes effective for both forces from 1800 until broken by the Task Force Commander concerned. No unit of either force may be more than 20 miles from its own Fleet Center and no aircraft may be in the air prior to 0500, 26 September.

*General Situation.*

BROWN and GREEN are at war.

BROWN Covering Force, Task Force ONE, is proceeding from operations in the HAWAII-ALASKA-WEST COAST triangle to an advance base at PEARL HARBOR. The total available air force at PEARL HARBOR is two squadrons of patrol planes. Destroyers were fuelled on 24 September. No ships are damaged. All have 100% ammunition on board.

[16] GREEN Raiding Force, Task Force TWO, has been projected toward this area from the westward with orders to exploit contacts under favorable circumstances. Destroyers fuelled on 23 September. No ships are damaged. All have 100% ammunition on board.

Since 22 September, neither force has been able to operate aircraft because of unusually low visibility. Forecasts predict clearing by midnight, 25 September.

Intelligence reports have indicated to each force commander that contact is possible, but exact dispositions and positions are unknown.

*Special Situations.*

Initial positions and instructions are issued separately to BROWN and GREEN, Appendices "1" and "2", respectively, to this Exercise Plan.

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, will function as the Chief of Naval Operations for both sides, and may furnish additional information and instructions as the exercise proceeds.

*Damage:* Aircraft assess but do not apply damage. Surface craft assess damage, but *apply only that sustained after Fleet engagement commences.*

*Safety Precautions:* USE-10 is effective.

*Reports:*

- (1) From Task Force Commanders:
  - (a) Brief description of operations.
  - (b) Composite track charts, scale of chart #5654, from 0500 to engagement, and scale one-inch equals one mile during engagement. Single pencil copies only are required.
  - (c) Summary of Damage, divided to show condition of ships at start of engagement, and total at end thereof.

[17] (2) No umpire reports are desired. Task Force Commanders make Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, information addressee on operational despatches. This traffic will be sent on Task Force Commanders' circuit and will not be subject to interception nor direction finding.

*Special Signals:* Same as for Exercise No. 177.

*Procedure on Completion of Exercise No. 182:* Participating units retain organizations as Task Forces ONE and TWO. Reform on southerly courses. Recover all ship-based aircraft and direct shore-based aircraft to return to Base.

[18]

*Exercise No. 183*

(1630, 26 September to 0600, 27 September)

*Object:*

Test of Security Organization, more than one Task Force at Sea.

*Procedure:* This exercise is divided into two phases. During the first phase, all Fleet units will organize in accordance with security orders. During the second phase, certain units will assume an enemy status to add realism to the operation.

*PHASE I*

On signal, following completion of Exercise No. 182, all units assume security organization as given in subparagraph (e), of Annex "A", prepare to carry out general tasks assigned by U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41. Surface units of Task Force SEVEN screen submarine concentration while awaiting orders.

Instructions for initial movements of all forces based on constructive enemy dispositions and intentions will be issued by despatch. These will include contact reports of submarine activity off PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE, which the Attack Force will be directed to handle, and a carrier threat from the southwestward, which the Striking Force will be directed to intercept.

Activity of the Attack Force off PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE will replace the routine Offshore Patrol. This patrol will *not* be stationed until completion of this exercise at 0600, 27 September.

*PHASE II*

Upon receipt of signal to commence phase two:

(a) Task Force TWO assume enemy status. Proceed to area V-20 and launch dawn air attack on PEARL HARBOR, and/or Main Body. On completion resume normal operating status and proceed with scheduled work.

(b) Commander Task Force SEVEN direct Submarine Divisions TWENTY-TWO and SIXTY-ONE to assume enemy status, proceed and establish patrol in areas V-6, V-7, S-1, S-2 and U-3 west of longitude of MAKAPUU POINT. Upon entering any of these areas, submarines are subject to attack. Avoid destroyers and simulate [19] torpedo attack on heavy ships entering these areas. Submarine Division FORTY-TWO remain at LAHAINA until 0600, then assume normal operating status. OGLALA and Mine Division ONE proceed to PEARL for scheduled entry, but remain outside of submarine areas until after sunrise.

(c) Task Force FIVE proceed to submarine areas off PEARL ENTRANCE. Hunt and simulate attacks on submarines. Enter PEARL as directed by Commander Task Force ONE.

(d) Task Force ONE proceed to PEARL HARBOR for scheduled entry, but remain outside of submarine areas until after sunrise.

*Safety Precautions:* Submarines on patrol, destroyers of Task Force FIVE, and Inshore Patrols, will darken ship from sunset to sunrise. While darkened, the speed of Patrol and Attack Force destroyers will be limited to ten knots, but sufficient reserve boiler power will be maintained for emergency backing. Running lights will be turned on by all units as necessary to avoid collision. For attacks during daylight, submarines will go to deep submergence when not less than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship, and are subject to counter attack by anti-submarine screens and patrol destroyers.

*Damage:* Assess but do not apply damage.

*Reports:*

(1) From Inshore Patrols and Task Force FIVE destroyers:

- (a) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expenditures.
- (b) Summary of damage.

- (2) From Commanders Submarine Divisions TWENTY-TWO and SIXTY-ONE:  
 (a) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures.  
 (b) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other evasive action.  
 (c) Summary of damage.
- (3) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
- [1] *Confidential*

## ANNEX "C" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

September 11, 1941.

*Communication Plan 8-41*

USF-70 effective as modified herein. For exercise 182, Commander Task Force TWO (GREEN) make own communication plan.

1120. This plan effective 1130, September 24, 1941, (Zone plus 10½) until completion of Exercise 183.

1179. Radar aircraft contact reports in accordance with Annex "E".

1332. NPM Primary broadcasts are available and should be used by all Task Forces for strategical traffic and for tactical traffic when circuit conditions permit.

2120. Condition 19 effective.

2211. Task Force Commanders use Annex "B" to USF-70, except that Radar Net Frequency is 6600kcs., which frequency will be used by Combat Air Patrol. The published plans assigned to opposing Task Forces must be considered as unavailable for radio intelligence activities as are opposite Exercise Cryptographic Aids and despatches.

2212 & 2213. Not effective.

2216. Not effective; see paragraph 11, Appendix "B" to USF-70.

2410. Surface vessels and submarines use authenticators for intra-Task Force radio communications under conditions (c) and (d).

2510. Visual call signs, Part II, U. S. Navy Call Sign Book, shall be used on all exercise traffic. This includes aircraft.

2800. Not effective.

2120. Condition 1 effective.

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41.

5200 & 5300. CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed key tables shall be used by all Task Forces except that in the following exercises the indicated Task Forces shall use key tables made by substituting August for September:

Exercise 177—Surface units of Task Force SEVEN.

Exercise 178—Task Force FIVE.

Exercise 182—Task Force Two.

Exercise 183, Phase II—Task Forces TWO and SEVEN.

[2] 5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd days of the month (GCT) leave formation, circle to the right, and when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice; on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.



When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall train on the approaching aircraft a powerful search-light, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

[3] 6622. All Task Forces use List I, except in Exercise 182 Task Force TWO use List II.

7000. Interference and deception shall not be practiced unless specifically directed by Commander-in-Chief. In Exercise 182 interference and deception may be practiced subject to the usual safety precautions.

8000 Reports not required. Constructive criticism and comments are welcomed.

[1]

#### ANNEX "D"

To PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

11 September, 1941.

*Confidential*

#### SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITIONS

1. Special dispositions are prescribed in this Annex, effective during the period 24-27 September 1941. Comments and recommendations from command are invited.

2. Station assignments and sectors of radar search responsibility are given with each disposition. In the assignment of radar sectors, each ship will count its own position as the center of its sector, and obtain the true directions of the limiting radii by adding the given numbers to the Fleet axis. Count clockwise from first to second radius. Example: Axis 050, ship's station 6030, search sector 320 to 100. The center of the radar search sector is at 6030 and the sector extends from 010 true clockwise to 150 true.

3. In all of the special dispositions, the guide is in the van center battleship division. *All rotations of the Fleet axis will, however, be performed about the Fleet Center, the Guide maneuvering to conform.*

4. In all special cruising dispositions, station units are free to maneuver independently to avoid air attack. Heavy ship columns may increase distance to 1000 yards. When the entire disposition is *not* zigzagging in accordance with a common plan, battleship station unit commanders may employ the special zigzag prescribed for Task Force ONE Exercises 67B and 68B.

5. All deployments, day or night, are normal.

6. In special dispositions 4-L, 4-R, 4-V, be prepared to change front by the equiangular rate method.

#### CRUISING DISPOSITION 4-L

Cruising Disposition No. 4-L is a night or low visibility disposition, with the screens somewhat closer to the Fleet Center than normal to provide suitable density with the reduced number of screening ships available.

	Station assignments	Radar assignment
[2] <i>Battleline:</i>		
Batdiv ONE.....	2270.....	Trackers
Batdiv TWO.....	1000.....	Trackers
Batdiv FOUR.....	2090.....	Trackers
Destroyers.....	A/S Screen.....	
<i>Center</i>		
Cruiser.....	6000.....	Search, sector 260 to 100.
Destroyers (sections).....	6320, 6340, 6020, 6040.....	
<i>Right</i>		
Cruisers (sections).....	6060.....	Search, sector 320 to 190.
Destroyers (sections).....	5080, 5100, 5120, 5140, 5160.....	
<i>Left</i>		
Cruiser.....	6300.....	Search, sector 170 to 040.
Destroyers (Sections).....	5200, 5220, 5240, 5260, 5280.....	
<i>Air</i>		
Carriers.....	1180.....	Trackers
Cruiser.....	5180.....	Search, sector 080 to 280.
Plane Guards.....	A/S Screen.....	



[3]

READY DISPOSITION 4-R

Ready Disposition 4-R is a low visibility or night ready disposition for use in proximity to enemy forces of comparable strength. Station units are concentrated to facilitate handling during changes in course and/or axis, and to make possible rapid deployment. Dependence for protection against surprise destroyer and cruiser raids or air attack is placed in radar ships and the usual all around screens of typical cruising disposition are replaced by close screens on heavy units.

	Station assignment	Radar assignment
<i>Battleline</i>		
Batdiv ONE .....	2270 .....	Trackers.
Batdiv TWO .....	1000 .....	Trackers.
Batdiv FOUR .....	2090 .....	Trackers.
Destroyers .....	A/S Screen .....	
<i>Center</i>		
Cruiser .....	6000 .....	Search, sector 260 to 100.
Destroyers .....	5000 .....	
<i>Right</i>		
Cruisers .....	6060 .....	Search, sector 310 to 210.
Destroyers .....	5050 .....	
<i>Left</i>		
Cruiser .....	6300 .....	Search, sector 150 to 050.
Destroyers .....	5310 .....	
<i>Air</i>		
Carriers .....	1180 .....	Trackers.
Cruiser .....	2180 .....	Search, sector 090 to 270.
Destroyers .....	A/S Screen .....	

[4]

CRUISING DISPOSITION 4-V

Cruising Disposition No. 4-V is primarily for defense against aircraft. It is also suitable for use when both air and submarine attacks are probable.

	Station assignment	Radar assignment
<i>Battleline</i>		
Batdiv ONE .....	2270 .....	Trackers.
Batdiv TWO .....	1000 .....	Trackers.
Batdiv FOUR .....	2090 .....	Trackers.
Destroyers .....	Anti-torpedo plane screen .....	
<i>Center</i>		
Cruiser .....	6000 .....	Search, sector 280 to 080.
Destroyers (Sound Screen) .....	8320 to 8040 .....	
<i>Right</i>		
Cruisers .....	6050 .....	Search, sector 000 to 230.
Destroyers (Sections) .....	7050, 6090, 6125, 6160 .....	
<i>Left</i>		
Cruiser .....	6300 .....	Search, sector 130 to 000.
Destroyers (Sections) .....	6200, 6235, 6270, 7310 .....	
<i>Air</i> .....	1180, except when launching or recovering aircraft.	Trackers.

Sun Screen of one destroyer will be stationed by a flank commander on signal, station at limit of visual signalling distance, outside the screen, on the bearing of the sun.

[5] *Battle Disposition*

	Station assignment	Radar assignment
<i>Battleline</i>		
Battleships .....	0000 .....	Search—all around.
Destroyers .....	Screen until released then join van inner destroyers.	
<i>Van</i>		
Inner Destroyers .....	Circle 5 .....	
Inner Cruisers .....	Circle 6 .....	
Outer Destroyers .....	Circle 9 .....	
Outer Cruisers .....	Circle 10 .....	Search—all around.
<i>Rear</i>		
Inner Destroyers .....	Circle 6 .....	
Inner Cruisers .....	Circle 7 .....	Search—all around.
<i>Air</i> .....	Ten miles on disengaged side .....	Search—all around.

In the assignment of van and rear areas, the circle number given is the outer limit of the appropriate area.

[1] ANNEX "E" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 29-41

Confidential

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
11 September, 1941.

## TENTATIVE RADAR DOCTRINE

1. The number of radars installed in the Pacific Fleet has increased to the stage where a generally understood doctrine and standard procedure governing the tactical application of this equipment is essential. The tentative doctrine herein contained is effective from 23 September, 1941, until further orders. It is intended only to bridge the partially completed status of equipping the Fleet. Improvement in types and numbers available and ad interim experience will determine finally promulgated procedures.

2. Radars installed to date are all of the search or ship control type. Within certain technical limitations, radar may be expected to give accurate range and good beamings of surface units up to 20,000-30,000 yards and aircraft up to 50-75 miles (if altitude is sufficient to place the target plane above the radar's visual horizon. Equipment installed to date does not include automatic distinction between friendly and enemy aircraft or surface ships. Altitude of aircraft can only infrequently be determined with usable accuracy. Detection of submerged submarines, even with periscope exposed, is very doubtful. A submarine on the surface, due to small target area, will be detected at shorter ranges than surface craft, probably not over 10,000 yards. Experience to date indicates that no more than four or five radars of the same frequency can be used simultaneously in close proximity without intolerable interference.

3. To limit the number of radars simultaneously in use, those available in any disposition will be assigned to:

- (a) Search.
- (b) Track.

4. For all dispositions, sectors of radar search responsibility will be designated by the O. T. C. Where the assigned sector contains more than one radar ship, the task group or unit commander concerned will assign watches and enforce radar discipline to avoid interference. Radar ships assigned to search will normally be placed in the outer screen.

[2] 5. *Radar Control* is a function of the O. T. C., who will by signal or other directive:

- (a) Assign search sectors if other than a standard disposition is ordered.
- (b) Assign trackers if other than a standard disposition is ordered.
- (c) Maintain a continuous plot of radar information.
- (d) Designate radars to track surface targets. Assign a "Raid Number" to each target or target group.
- (e) Evaluate radar plot and broadcast appropriate warnings.

(f) The sequence of radar control reliefs is the same as the chain of tactical command, but any task group commander may be directed to assume control for exercise purposes. Relief radar controls will be prepared to take over at any time.

6. *Fighter Direction* is normally a function of Commander Air, who will:

- (a) Maintain a continuous plot of all radar information effecting air operations.
- (b) Launch combat patrols on order, or (unless specifically instructed to the contrary) without order when definite radar contact with enemy aircraft is reported. The number and disposition of combat patrols is at discretion of Commander Air, but the section designations of patrols launched will be communicated to control and relief control ships.
- (c) Designate radars to track enemy aircraft and/or own fighters. Assign a "Raid Number" to each enemy air attack group.
- (d) Issue standard instructions for combat patrols and special instructions as may be required in particular circumstances.
- (e) Direct interception of enemy aircraft by own fighters.

[3] (f) The sequence of Fighter Direction reliefs is:

- (1) Commander Air.
- (2) Carrier Division Commanders in order of seniority.

- (3) Carriers in order of seniority.
- (4) Air Task Group cruisers in order of seniority.
- (5) Battleship Division Commanders in order of seniority.

But any of the above may be directed to assume Fighter Direction for exercise purposes. Relief Fighter Directors will be prepared to take over at any time.

6. *Search radars* will:

- (a) Conduct continuous search of assigned sector at a rate of about 60 degrees per minute.
- (b) When a contact is made, determine and report range and bearing once per minute until the tracker ordered to take over this contact makes one report.
- (c) Maintain a plot of all contacts made.

7. *Track radars* will:

- (a) Track designated targets.
- (b) Maintain plot of targets tracked.
- (c) Make consecutive reports at one minute intervals until course and speed of target can be determined, then at three minute intervals unless the target is observed to change course or speed radically.
- (d) Continue to guard assigned target bearing when target disappears from the radar screen temporarily, as it will do at intervals if changing range and/or altitude.
- (e) Refer to each target by its assigned raid number.

8. *Communications*: Radar reports will be made in the following form to facilitate plotting:

- (a) Call of originating ship.
- [4] (b) Type and number of targets; that is, air or surface, one, few (2 to 10), many (over 10). Substitute Raid Number if same target has been previously reported.
- (c) True bearing from observing ship.
- (d) Distance in *thousands of yards* from observing ship.
- (e) Zone time of observation (not of transmission).
- (f) Additional pertinent information.

Examples:

(1) First report by a searcher: From Cast Two Nine—many aircraft—two one zero—eighty—at eleven fourteen—closing.

(2) Control ship's order to track: To Baker Four Four—track raid eight—two one nine—seventy-six.

(3) Tracker's report: From Baker Four Four—raid eight—two two one seventy—at eleven eighteen—altitude between ten and fourteen thousand.

9. *Radar Net*. The following communications will be handled on the Radar Net:

- (a) All orders from Radar Control or Fighter Director to radar ships.
- (b) All reports from radar ships.
- (c) All orders to Combat Patrols.
- (d) All reports from Combat Patrols.
- (e) Radar Control, Fighter Director, and their reliefs will guard this circuit.

10. *Warning Net*. The following communications will be handled on the Warning Net:

- (a) Broadcasts of evaluated radar reports.
- (b) Broadcasts of sight or sound contacts not originally made on the warning net.
- [5] (c) Orders to Intermediate and Inner Air patrols, if employed.
- (d) Reports from Intermediate and Inner Air Patrols.
- (e) All ships equipped to do so will guard this circuit.

11. Separate circuits are provided for Radar Net and Warning Net in order to handle the volume of traffic expected during major air activity against a large Fleet disposition. In smaller dispositions and during periods of minor air activity, these two communication circuits may be combined on a common frequency by the O. T. C. Traffic on both circuits will be broadcast without receipt or acknowledgment, except that aircraft units will acknowledge for receipt of orders.

12. *Visual*. During periods of radio silence all communications normally handled by Radar Net and Warning Net will be sent by visual, either in general signals or abbreviated plain language.

13. *Radar Plotting.*

(a) Radar plotting by Radar Control and Fighter Director will be in polar coordinates, origin at Fleet Center, radii in true bearings, distances in thousands of yards. Radar search and tracking ships will *report* bearing and distance from own ship, to avoid added "dead-time" which would be introduced if data were converted to origin at Fleet Center prior to broadcasting.

(b) Since the Fleet Center is normally in motion, the relative movement plotting system will be used. With aircraft cruising speeds ten to fifteen times Fleet speed, the relative plot will differ but little from a navigational or geographic plot for anti-aircraft work. In plotting surface ships, with speeds on the order of one or two times Fleet speed, the plot must be handled in relative movement to predict time and point of contact. The 20-inch mooring board (H. O. 2665) is considered the smallest satisfactory plotting sheet. It will be convenient to plot the Fleet disposition to scale on a pivoted overlay which can be rotated with the Fleet axis.

[6] (c) Time is the essence of successful radar use. The development by every prospective Radar Control and Fighter Director ship of standard plotting procedures to best utilize available information is absolutely necessary. Dead-time errors on the order of one minute are sufficient to cause a missed fighter interception, since aircraft moving in different directions at high speed may travel a relative distance greater than the range of visibility. Interceptors must be directed to a *predicted* meeting point.

(d) In transmitting orders from Radar Control to Combat Patrols:

(1) The sector-area method of interception will be used. Sectors will be 30 degrees each, origin at true north, designated alphabetically clockwise, commencing with Sector Afirm, 000 to 030. Distance will be designated in nautical miles from the Fleet Center.

(2) Combat Air Patrols will be designated by squadron number and section color, as Fighting Six Red (White, Blue, Black, Green, Yellow, Purple, Orange, Silver).

(3) The use of the following special terms is authorized for fighter direction:

Bandit—Enemy Aircraft.

Arrow—Make good track indicated from your present position.

Tally-ho—Interception successful.

Wilco—Will comply with your order or request.

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/FF12(1)/  
A16-3/OCT/(12)  
Serial 01601

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
7 October, 1941.

*Confidential*

Operation Order No. 31-41

## TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Units listed in Annex "A".*

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders.

2. Units listed in Annex "A" conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN AREA during the period twenty-three dash twenty-six October, one nine four one.

3. (a) Units listed in Annex "A" underway in accordance with orders of Task Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with Annex "B". On completion resume scheduled operations.

(x) -----  
4. Train base at PEARL HARBOR. Tenders not otherwise assigned continue scheduled upkeep.

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time.

Communications in accordance with Annex "C".

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in PENNSYLVANIA.

H. E. KIMMEL,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief.*



## ANNEXES:

- "A"—Tactical Organizations and Related Details—Effective 23-26 October 1941.  
 "B"—U. S. Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. 9-41.  
 "C"—U. S. Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 9-41.  
 "D"—Special Cruising Dispositions.  
 "E"—Tentative Radar Doctrine (Revised 6 October 1941).

## [2] DISTRIBUTION: (Basis, List III, Case 1)

Opanav (7)  
 N. W. C. (3)  
 P. G. S. (3)  
 Com FOURTEEN (10)  
 CO NAS, Pearl Harbor (5)  
 CO Subbase, Pearl Harbor (5)  
 Combatfor (15)  
 Comscofor (70) for distribution to Cruscofor of Task Force THREE.  
 Comairscofor (10)  
 CG, 2nd Marine Div. (5)  
 Comdr. 2nd Marine Airwing (2)  
 Combatships (75) for distribution to Batships.  
 Comairbatfor (70) for distribution to Airbatfor.  
 Comerubatfor (60) for distribution to Crubatfor.  
 Comdesbatfor (270) for distribution to Desbatfor.  
 Cominbatfor (35) for distribution to Minbatfor.  
 Comsubscfor (200) for distribution to Subscfor.  
 Combasefor (285) for distribution to Basefor.  
 Comerndiv FIVE (25) for distribution to Cruscofor of Task Force TWO.  
 Compatwing ONE (25) for distribution to Patwing ONE.  
 Compatwing TWO (30) for distribution to Patwing TWO.

P. C. CROSLY,

*Lieutenant Commander,  
 Flag Secretary.*

10-7-41-(1340)

## [1] ANNEX "A" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER NO. 31-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
 7 October 1941.

## TACTICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RELATED DETAILS—EFFECTIVE 23-26 OCTOBER 1941

(a) Normal Tactical Organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet:

G4 Task Force FOUR, Vice Admiral Halsey.

G4.5 *Battleline*, Rear Admiral Kidd.

G4.5.1 Batdiv ONE.

G4.5.2 BENHAM, McCALL, BLUE, RALPH TALBOT (A/S SCREEN).

G4.6 *Right Flank*, Rear Admiral Draemel.

G4.6.1 NORTHAMPTON, DETROIT.

G4.6.2 Desron SIX less BENHAM, McCALL, CRAVEN.

G4.7 *Center*, Rear Admiral Fletcher.

G4.7.1 MINNEAPOLIS.

G4.7.2 Desron FOUR less BLUE, RALPH TALBOT, MUGFORD, (SOUND SCREEN).

G4.8 *Left Flank*, Vice Admiral Brown.

G4.8.1 INDIANAPOLIS, PENSACOLA.

G4.8.2 Minron TWO less Mindiv SIX.

G4.9 *Air*, Vice Admiral Halsey.

G4.9.1 ENTERPRISE, LEXINGTON.

Desdiv NINE (PLANE GUARDS).

G4.9.2 LOUISVILLE.

G4.1 *Shore-based Air*, Rear Admiral Bellinger.

G4.1.1 Patron TWENTY-ONE (Planes available).

G4.1.2 Marine Air Group TWENTY-ONE.

- [2] G4.2 *Air Targets*, Commander Murphy.  
 Four (4) Utwing Planes, Mark XIV sleeves.
- G4.3 *Submarines*.  
 G4.3.1 Subdiv TWENTY-ONE less SALMON.  
 G4.3.2 Subdiv FORTY-TWO less NAUTILUS.  
 G4.3.3 Subdiv SIXTY-TWO (units available).  
 G4.3.4 DORSEY, ELLIOT.
- G4.4 *Salvage*, Rear Admiral Calhoun.  
 Units designated by Combasefor.
- G4.10 *Inshore Defense*, Lieutenant Commander Specht.  
 Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron ONE.

(b) When on deployment, Center units join either Right or Left Flank, they will, upon execution of the deployment signal, assume new task unit designations appropriate to the Flank to be joined, cruiser final digit of task unit number 3, destroyers—4.

*Example:* Center joins Right Flank: Task Unit 4.7.1 becomes 4.6.3, Task Unit 4.7.2 becomes 4.6.4.

(c) Air Patrol Assignments:

Flight THREE—Inner Air Patrol: Three single planes per watch, duration of watches—3½ hours, Battleline.

Flight TWO—Intermediate: Two two-plane sections per watch, duration of watches—3½ hours, Cruisers Center, Right and Left. Commander Center, coordinate.

Flight FIVE—Combat: As directed by Commander Air.

Officers coordinating Inner and Intermediate Air Patrols will each, in addition, designate an anti-submarine striking unit of at least four planes, to be armed with depth charges and ready to be catapulted on submarine contact.

[3] (d) Organization for security in accordance with Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41:

(1) In despatches and signals this plan will be referred to as Operation Plan GEORGE.

(2) If placed in effect in real emergency, this will be preceded by a plain language despatch: "Exercise Conditions Ended."

(3) If placed in effect for exercise purposes only, each despatch in connection therewith will be prefaced by the word "DRILL."

(4) *Organization:*

G4 *Task Force FOUR*, Vice Admiral Halsey.

G4.5 *Main Body*, Vice Admiral Halsey.

Batdiv ONE.

ENTERPRISE, DRAYTON, FLUSSER.

Crudiv SIX.

Minron TWO less Mindiv SIX.

Subdivs TWENTY-ONE, FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-TWO,  
 DORSEY, ELLIOT.

G4.6 *Striking Force*, Vice Admiral Brown.

Crudivs FOUR, FIVE.

LEXINGTON, LAMSON, MAHAN.

Desron FOUR.

G4.7 *Attack Force*, Captain Connally.

Desron SIX.

(5) All units establish communications initially on their respective task group frequencies when this plan is made effective.

(6) This plan is for use *only* during the Fleet Tactical Period: 23-26 October 1941.

[1]

## ANNEX "B"

TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER NO. 31-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

7 October 1941.

*Exercise Plan No. 9-41*

## PART I—GENERAL

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex.

2. The general objectives are: Training in war operations under realistically simulated war conditions; test and further development of doctrine and procedures and training in the preparation of quick estimates and plans. More specific objectives are designated in the various exercises. To provide command training for more flag officers, in some exercises the O. T. C. of the exercise task force is not the senior flag officer in the force.

3. Unless special exception is made in the individual exercise, the provisions of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise the Officers Conducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled operations. All aircraft, except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall be at their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise Officers Conducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes have returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises.

4. Speed limitations (unless otherwise prescribed): Battleships—16 knots; cruisers, destroyers (including converted destroyers), carriers—24 knots (except as required for operating aircraft); others—none.

5. *Special Instructions:* For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise opponents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions prescribed in USF-10. Should the Commander-in-Chief or O. T. C. transmit the message "Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of hostile action against the Fleet. Commander Task Group FOUR THREE, on receipt of this despatch, will have all submarines surface, and report when this is accomplished. All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

[2] 6. Surface ships indicate anti-aircraft fire by flashing V's on search-light trained on target.

7. Each exercise implies a reasonably definite tactical situation. Commanding Officers are expected to maintain conditions of readiness and material conditions appropriate thereto, without signal. To preserve personnel physical capabilities, conditions must not be more severe than the constructive situation really merits.

8. In exercises where simulated air bombing attacks are scheduled, rear ship of each heavy ship station unit tow bombing target. When targets are streamed, attacks on them by miniature or water filled bombs and machine gun strafing are authorized.

9. In case the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is not embarked in the Operating Areas, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, will function as the Officer Conducting the Exercises.

[3]

## PART II—EXERCISES

*Exercise No. 184*

(1800, 22 October to 1130, 23 October)

*Objects:*

- (1) To train submarines in patrol operations in hostile waters.
- (2) To train destroyers in submarine detection and attack.
- (3) To train in sortie against submarine opposition.

*Procedure:*

(a) Units of Task Force TWO, except submarines and patrol planes, organize in accordance with current security orders by dark, 22 October, at which time Main Body and Striking Force must be south of latitude 20° 15' North. Remain south of this line until 0500, 23 October.

(b) Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO depart LAHAINA at 1800, 22 October, proceed by routes north of latitude 20° 50' North and establish patrol in areas S-1 and S-2 at earliest practicable time. Attack heavy ships of Task Force THREE. Upon completion of sortie, surface and proceed to LAHAINA. Submarine Division FORTY-TWO remain at LAHAINA.

(c) Task Force TWO Attack Group destroyers proceed to and search areas S-1 and S-2 for submarines. This hunt replaces the normal Offshore Patrol.

(d) Task Force TWO (Main Body and Striking Force) proceed after 0500, 23 October to rendezvous with Task Force THREE at Reference Point "A", latitude 20° 40' North, longitude 158° 30' West at 1130. Defend against air attack.

(e) Patrol planes and Marine Air Group planes not engaged in routine search of areas and in Task Force THREE sortie air patrol, make one attack on Task Force TWO between 0500 and 1000. Upon completion of this attack, one section of patrol planes proceed to LAHAINA area, fuel from Submarine Division FORTY-TWO, and return to base.

(f) Task Force THREE sortie against submarine opposition and proceed to rendezvous with Task Force TWO at 1130, except submarines DORSEY and ELLIOT proceed to LAHAINA, submarines on the surface.

[4] (g) All patrolling submarines surface by 1130 and proceed to LAHAINA on the surface.

*Safety Precautions:* Submarines are in problem status after 1800, subject to hunting and counter attack. Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO, Task Force TWO Attack Group destroyers, and Inshore Patrol darken ship from sunset to sunrise. While darkened, and north of latitude 20°45' North, the speed of destroyers will be limited to 10 knots, but sufficient reserve boiler power will be maintained for emergency backing. Running lights will be turned on by all units as necessary to avoid collision. For night simulated depth charge attacks, destroyers will not press home the attack until the submarine has been illuminated and seen to dive, and will not pass directly over the submarine. Submarines when illuminated dive immediately to deep submergence and remain deep until well clear. For attacks during daylight, submarines will go to deep submergence when not less than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship, and are subject to counter attack by anti-submarine screens and patrol destroyers.

*Damage:* During this exercise, damage will be *assessed* and *applied* by engaged submarines and destroyers. Out-of-action rendezvous for submarines is at LAHAINA, for destroyers at concentration rendezvous given above. Submarines declared out of action proceed via KALOHI Channel. Out-of-action ships burn running lights during darkness and answer challenges "OA" until arrival at rendezvous.

*Reports:*

(a) From Commander Task Force TWO Attack Group:

- (1) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expenditures.
- (2) Summary of damage.

(b) From Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO:

- (1) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures.
- (2) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other evasion action.
- (3) Summary of damage.

(c) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.



[5]

*Exercise No. 185*

(1130 to 1530, 23 October)

*Object:*

Test of Fleet Anti-Aircraft Fire.

*Procedure:*

(a) At 1130, 23 October, Task Forces TWO and THREE assume the normal tactical organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet. Form Battle Disposition No. 3 (Article 1316, G. T. 1.), course 090°, axis 000°, speed 14 knots, by 1200, at which time guide in battleline pass through Reference Point "A", latitude 30°40' North, longitude 158°30' West, O. T. C. Vice Admiral Halsey in ENTERPRISE. Each station unit in the disposition be in column.

(b) Conduct test of Fleet anti-aircraft fire in accordance with Task Force ONE Exercise No. 90, enclosure (A) to Commander Battle Force serial 0436 of 9 May, 1941. Address reports to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

(c) Ammunition allowance is four rounds per ship, remnants if available, otherwise from Commander-in-Chief's pool.

(d) Task Group FOUR TWO make one formation bombing attack by 1300; thereafter make additional single or multiple attacks at discretion of Task Group Commander. Target approaches should be made *approximately at right angles to the longer dimension of heavy ship formations* to permit the greatest practicable number of ships to fire without violating safety precautions.

(e) No ship-based aircraft are to be launched during this exercise.

(f) The necessary public firing notice will be originated by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[6]

*Exercise No. 186*

(1800 to 2200, 23 October)

*Object:*

(1) Training in Night Submarine Attack.

(2) Training Battle Lookouts.

*Procedure:*

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 185, the Fleet will be formed in night cruising or ready disposition and at about 1800 proceed on southeasterly and southerly courses through area C-7 south of latitude 20° 40' North and area C-6, north of latitude 20° 00' North.

(b) Task Group FOUR THREE be on the surface in above areas by 1800, stations as designated by the Task Group Commander Attack Task Force FOUR.

(c) Submarines darken ship. Ships in the Fleet disposition burn dimmed running lights.

(d) Submarines will not submerge unless illuminated. Commander Task Group FOUR THREE designate at least four submarines to pass through the disposition on the surface, in order to exercise battle lookouts.

(e) No surface ship will illuminate a submarine continuously for more than two minutes, but the same submarine may be illuminated by other surface ships in succession. Keep searchlight beams off submarine bridges.

*Safety Precautions:*

(a) Any submarine submerging will go deep and not surface again until well clear of the disposition.

(b) During this exercise, surface ships will maneuver only on signal from the O. T. C. or in emergency to avoid collision.

(c) Submarines turn on running lights as necessary to avoid collision.

*Reports:* Comments and recommendations as desired.

Upon completion of this exercise:

(1) Submarines return on the surface, lighted, to the LAHAINA Area, and operate in regularly assigned submarine areas until [7] completion of Fleet Tactical Period at discretion of Task Group Commander. Additional patrol plane fueling exercises may be conducted by arrangement with Commander Task Group FOUR ONE.

(2) When directed, Task Force FOUR divide into opposing forces and proceed to stations for Exercise No. 187.

[8]

*Exercise No. 187*

(Daylight Period, 24 October)

**Object:** Training in Torpedo Plane Attack on Fleet Disposition.*Procedure:*

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, is directed to issue the detailed procedure for this exercise. It will include the firing of actual torpedoes by Torpedo Squadron SIX against the capital ships of the opposing Task Force. Commander Task Group FOUR TWO will furnish photographic services as requested. Areas C-1, C-2 and C-4 south of latitude 20° 00' North are assigned for this exercise.

[9]

*Exercise No. 188*

(1800, 24 October to 0600, 25 October)

**Object:**

- (1) Training Destroyers and Cruisers in Night Search and Attack.
- (2) Training Fleet in repelling night cruiser and destroyer attacks.

**Attack Force:***Task Force FIVE*, Rear Admiral Fletcher.

MINNEAPOLIS, LOUISVILLE

Desron SIX plus Desdiv NINE

One-Section Patrol Planes, designated by Commander Task Group  
FOUR ONE**Fleet:***Task Force FOUR*, Rear Admiral Kidd.

Surface Units of Task Force FOUR less Attack Force.

*Procedure:*

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 187, and when directed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Task Force Commanders assigned assume command of Task Forces FOUR and FIVE.

(b) The area for this exercise is a limiting ellipse, foci at Point X-ray, latitude 19° 30' North; longitude 156° 30' West; and Point Yoko, latitude 20° 30' North, longitude 158° 20' West; major axis 180 miles.

(c) At 1800, Task Force FOUR be within 15 miles of Point X-ray. Proceed to arrive at 0600 within 15 miles of Point Yoko. Defend against light force attacks en route.

(d) At 1800, Task Force FIVE may be at any point within the assigned area which is not less than 50 miles from Point X-ray. Patrol planes may be in contact with own, but not with enemy force at this time.

[10] Neither Task Force Commander may issue any advance written directive for this exercise, except that each may prescribe a tactical organization and Commander Task Force FOUR may prescribe a special cruising or ready disposition and assign units to stations in it. "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" is effective within the Attack Force for this exercise.

*Safety Precautions:*

U. S. F. 10 effective. Smoke will not be used. Patrol planes may use flare illumination.

*Damage:*

Assess and apply damage, except that speed will not be reduced below 15 knots for destroyers and 10 knots for heavy ships. Out of action ships burn running lights. Out of action rendezvous: 25 miles north Point Yoko.

**Reports:**

- (a) From Task Force Commanders:

- (1) Brief description of operations.
- (2) Track chart, single pencil copy, scale of chart #4102.
- (3) Summary of damage.
- (4) Comments on "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack".

- (b) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

{11}

*Exercise No. 189*

(0800 to 1800, 25 October)

*Object:*

- (1) Test of Fleet Defense against Air Observation and Attack.
- (2) Fueling Destroyers and Defense against Submarine Attack (Discretion of O. C. E.).

*Procedure:*

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 188, units engaged resume normal tactical organization of Task Force FOUR, O. T. C. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, in ENTERPRISE.

(b) The 0800 position of the Fleet Center will be signalled to Commander Shore-Based Air in Advance.

(c) Commander Shore-Based Air have at least three attacks made during this exercise period. Each attack group will consist of at least three planes. Two groups may attack simultaneously. Minature or water filled bomb attacks and machine gun strafing on towed targets, and simulated torpedo attacks are authorized. Undue advantage will not be taken by attack groups of the "radar shadow" of OAHU, inasmuch as proximity to the Naval Air Stations is maintained to facilitate the exercise. Smoke may be used by aircraft only.

(d) Commander Shore-Based Air is authorized to arrange for Army participation in the attacks if the Army desires to take part. Inform Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, prior to 18 October whether or not the Army will participate and if so whether or not the Army bombers will have fighter support. In case of Army participation, advise the responsible Army Commander of the contents of Article 5213, USF-10.

(e) Fueling of destroyers may be undertaken during this exercise at discretion of Task Force Commander.

(f) Submarines may be directed to make attacks during this exercise at discretion of Task Group Commander.

(g) During approximately half of the time allotted to test of Fleet Air Defense, Fighter Direction Control will be passed to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON.

[12] (h) Tentative Radar Doctrine, issued as Annex "E" hereto, is effective.

*Damage:* Will be assessed and applied by all Naval aircraft engaged. Shore-based Naval Aircraft, when adjudged out of action, will return to base without completing attack. Return will be made at minimum safe altitude until 40 miles from the Fleet Center, in order to clear radar screens of these "OA" aircraft. Damage is restored upon return to base, and these planes may participate in subsequent attacks. Combat patrols adjudged out of action will return immediately to the Fleet Center. Damage is restored as soon as they have landed on parent carrier, and these planes may be used for subsequent patrols.

*Reports:*

(a) From each Fighter Director Ship:

- (1) List of targets tracked, interceptions ordered, interceptions successful.
- (2) Comment and recommendation.

(b) From Radar Ships:

- (1) Comment and recommendation.

(c) From Commander Shore-Based Air:

- (1) Time each attack was delivered, number of planes in attack group, altitude, course, speed, whether or not opposed, and if so the distance from bomb release point interception was accomplished.
- (2) Comment and recommendation.

(1800, 25 October to End of Fleet Tactical Period)

*Object:*

- (1) Task Force Entry to Pearl Harbor.
- (2) Test of Motor Torpedo Boat Tactics.

*Procedure:*

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 189 and when directed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, all units resume the normal tactical organizations of Task Forces TWO and THREE.

(b) Task Force THREE proceed to position south of latitude 20° 30' North, and at discretion of Commander Task Force THREE resume normal operating status and go ahead with scheduled work, keeping clear of other units until Task Force TWO entry is completed.

(c) Task Force TWO operate north of latitude 20° 30' North. Enter operating area S-1 or S-2 at about one half hour before daylight, and simulate bombardment of OAHU Coast Defenses. Submarines returning from LAHAINA for entry to PEARL HARBOR will not pass west of longitude 157° 40' West until after sunrise.

(d) Task Force TWO establish routine Offshore Patrol.

(e) Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron ONE depart PEARL HARBOR at discretion. Make dawn attack on Main Body (simulate torpedo fire).

(f) Smoke will *not* be used.

(g) Upon completion of (c) and (e) above, Task Force TWO enter PEARL HARBOR as directed by Task Force Commander.

*Confidential*

[1]

ANNEX "C"

TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER 31-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

7 October, 1941.

Communication Plan

9-41

USF-70 effective as modified herein or by O. C. E. or Task Force Commanders.

1120. This plan effective 1130, October 23, 1941, (Zone plus 10½) until completion of Exercise 189.

1177. Effective.

1178. Effective.

1179. Radar aircraft contact reports in accordance with Annex "E".

1332. NPM Primary broadcasts are available and should be used by all Task Forces for strategical and tactical traffic when circuit conditions permit.

2120. Condition 19 effective.

2200. O. C. E. maintain Radio watch on Task Force Commander's circuit.

2211. Task Force Commanders use Annex "B" to USF-70, except that Combat Air Patrol use 6330 kcs., and Radar reports on 3195 kcs. The published plans assigned to opposing Task Forces must be considered as unavailable for radio intelligence activities as are opposite Exercise Cryptographic Aids and despatches.

2212 & 2213. Not effective.

2216. Not effective; see paragraph 11, Appendix "B" to USF-70.

2410. Surface vessels and submarines use authenticators for intra-Task Force radio communications under conditions (c) and (d).

2510. Visual call signs, Part II, U. S. Navy Call Sign Book, shall be used on all exercise traffic. This includes aircraft. For Exercise traffic other than transmissions on Warning Net and Fighter Net encipher calls in CSP-1161.

2800. Not effective.

3120. Condition 1 effective.

[2] 3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41.

5200 & 5300. CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed key tables shall be used by all Task Forces except that in the following exercises the indicated Task Force Components shall use key tables made by substituting September for October.

All Exercises—Submarines use Key Memo 3 K for day instead of CSP-1924.

Exercise 186—Task Group 4.3

Exercise 188—Task Force FIVE.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.



Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1,000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd days of the month (GCT) leave formation, circle to the right, and when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice; on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

[3] When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

6622. Omitting USF-73 and USF-93, all Task Forces use List II. In Exercise 188 Task Force FIVE use List I.

7000. Interference and deception shall not be practiced unless specifically directed by O. C. E.

8000. Reports not required. Constructive criticism and comments are welcomed.

[1] ANNEX "D"

TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 31-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
7 October 1941.

*Confidential*

SPECIAL CRUISING DISPOSITIONS

Special Cruising Dispositions as required will be provided by Exercise Task Force Commanders.

[1] ANNEX "E" TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 31-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
7 October, 1941.

*Confidential*

TENTATIVE RADAR DOCTRINE

(Revised 6 October, 1941)

1. The "Tentative Radar Doctrine" issued as Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Operation Order No. 29-41 is hereby cancelled. Destroy all copies. The revised doctrine contained herein is effective until further orders. Additional revisions may be expected as numbers and types of radars installed increase and experience indicates desirable changes.

2. Radars installed to date are all of the search or ship control type. Within certain technical limitations, radar may be expected to give accurate range and good bearings of surface units up to 20,000-30,000 yards and aircraft up to 50-75 miles (if altitude is sufficient to place the target plane above the radar's visual horizon). Under certain technical limitations, altitude of aircraft can be determined with usable accuracy. Details of the method have been promulgated to all radar ships by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. Detection of submerged submarines, even with periscope exposed, is very doubtful. A submarine on the surface, due to small target area, will be detected at shorter ranges than surface craft, probably not over 10,000 yards.

3. Experience to date indicates that no more than four or five radars of the same frequency can be used simultaneously in close proximity without intolerable interference.

4. For all dispositions, sectors of radar responsibility will be designated by the O. T. C.

5. (a) *Radar Control* is a function of the O. T. C., who will:

(1) Assign sectors of radar responsibility if other than a standard disposition is ordered.

(2) Maintain a continuous plot of warning net information.

[2] (3) Evaluate plots and transmit appropriate "Alerts" of impending *surface* or *submarine* attack.

(b) The sequence of radar control reliefs is the same as the chain of tactical command, but any task group commander may be directed to assume control for exercise purposes. Relief radar controls will be prepared to take over at any time.

6. *Radar Guard Ships.*

(a) *Assignments.*

(1) In each assigned sector of radar responsibility, there will be established a sector radar guard ship.

(2) When a sector of radar responsibility contains more than one radar ship, the senior task group or unit commander in the sector will assign watches, enforce radar discipline to minimize interference, and provide for immediate relief in case of casualty.

(3) Carriers will not normally be assigned as sector guard ships. See subparagraph 7 (a) (4) below.

(4) Radar guard ships will normally be stationed in or beyond the outer screen.

(b) *Duties.*

(1) Conduct continuous search of assigned sector.

(2) When a *new* contact is made, transmit an *initial* report.

(3) Track and plot each contact in own sector. When data obtained is sufficient to determine enemy intentions, transmit amplifying reports on which Fighter Director can base interception orders, and O. T. C. can base orders to the disposition. If possible, the amplifying reports will include number of enemy units, bearing and distance from Fleet center, course, speed, altitude, time. The first amplifying report should be made at the earliest practicable moment, even if the information is not entirely complete. Subsequent amplifying reports need be made only when changes in major variables (course, speed, altitude) occur.

[3] When a target enters the sector overlap between adjacent sector guard ships, the guard ship whose sector the target is leaving will notify the guard ship whose sector it is entering. The latter will notify the former when it has located the target and assumes responsibility for it, and the former will not relinquish the target until this notice is received.

(4) Notify sector commander in case of casualty or radar activity beyond own capacity to track and plot.

7. (a) *Fighter Direction* is normally a function of Commander Air, who will:

(1) Maintain a continuous plot of all radar information affecting air operations.

(2) Evaluate plots and transmit appropriate "Alerts" of impending *air* attack.

(3) Launch combat patrols on order, or (unless specifically instructed to the contrary) without order when definite radar contact with enemy aircraft is reported. The number and disposition of combat patrols is at discretion of Commander Air, but the section designations of patrols launched will be communicated to control, relief control and radar guard ships.

(4) Utilize own radar to best advantage to supplement information received from radar guard ships, transmit evaluated information from own radar when it is pertinent to the general tactical situation.

(5) Issue standard instructions for combat patrols and special instructions as may be required in particular circumstances.

(6) Direct interception of enemy aircraft by own fighters.

(7) Transmit completed interceptions.

[4] (b) The sequence of Fighter Direction reliefs is:

(1) Commander Air.

(2) Carrier Division Commanders in order of seniority.

(3) Carriers in order of seniority.

(4) Air Task Group, cruisers in order of seniority.

(5) Battleship Division Commanders in order of seniority.

Any of the above may be directed to assume Fighter Direction for exercise purposes. Relief Fighter Directors will be prepared to take over at any time.

8. *Communications.*

(a) *Warning Net.* In addition to traffic assigned to the warning net by U. S. F. 70, the following communications will be handled on this circuit:

(1) All reports by radar guard ships.

(2) Orders from O. T. C. or Fighter Director to radar ships.

(3) "Alerts" by Fighter Director with respect to air targets and by O. T. C. with respect to surface targets.

(4) Announcement by Fighter Director of Combat Patrols launched.

(b) *Fighter Net.* The following communications will be handled on this circuit:

(1) Orders to Combat Patrols.

(2) Reports from Combat Patrols.

(3) Orders from Fighter Director to carriers to launch or recover patrols.

(4) Reports from carriers relative to launching or recovering patrols, etc.

(To include section color designations.)

[5] (c) *Circuit Instructions.*

(1) Separate circuits are provided for Fighter Net and Warning Net in order to handle the volume of traffic expected during major air activity against a large Fleet disposition. In smaller dispositions and during periods of minor air activity, these two communication circuits may be combined on a common frequency by the O. T. C. Traffic on both circuits will be broadcast without receipt or acknowledgment, except that aircraft units will acknowledge for receipt of orders.

(2) Circuits will be manned as follows, available equipment permitting:

	Fighter Transmit	Net Receive	Warning Transmit	Net Receive
O. T. C. (Radar Control).....		X	X	X
Relief Radar Control.....		X	X	X
Fighter Director.....	X	X	X	X
Relief Fighter Director.....	X	X	X	X
Radar Guard.....		X	X	X
All others.....				X

(d) *Form of Radar Reports.* To facilitate plotting, radar reports will be made in the following form:

(1) Type and number of targets; that is, air or surface, *one, few* (2 to 10), *many* (over 10).

(2) True bearing *from Fleet Center.*

(3) Distance *in miles from Fleet Center.*

\*(4) Course, true.

\*(5) Speed, knots.

\*(6) Altitude (if approximate, use low, high, very high).

[6] \*(7) Zone time of above data.

(8) Additional pertinent information if any.

(9) Call of originating ship.

\*Items marked (\*) are not required in first contact reports. As many of them as can be determined without undue delay should be included in an amplifying report which is to be used as a basis for interception.

*Examples:*

First report by Radar Guard Ship:

Few bandits—two one zero—four six—Cast two nine.

Amplifying report by Radar Guard Ship:

Few bandits—one eight five—three zero—one one zero—one four zero—very high—eleven fourteen—circling fleet toward bearing of sun—Cast two nine.

(e) *Form of Fighter Direction Orders.*

(1) The sector-area method of interception will be used. Sectors will be 30 degrees each, origin at true north, designated alphabetically clockwise, commencing with Sector Afirm, 000° to 030°. Distance will be designated in nautical miles from the Fleet Center.

(2) Combat Air Patrols will be designated by squadron number and section color, as fighting Six Red (White, Blue, Black, Green, Yellow, Purple, Orange, Silver).

(3) The use of the following special terms is authorized for fighter direction:

Bandit—Enemy Aircraft.

Arrow—Make good track indicated from your present position.

Tally-ho—Interception successful.

Wilco—Will comply with your order or request.

[7] (f) *Visual.* During periods of radio silence all communications normally handled by Fighter Net and Warning Net will be sent by visual, either in general signals or abbreviated plain language. Established radio silence on either circuit will be broken only on order of the O. T. C.

9. *Radar Plotting.*

(a) Radar plotting by Radar Control (O. T. C.), Fighter Director, their reliefs, and Radar Guard Ships, will be in polar coordinates, origin at Fleet Center, radii in true bearings, distances in nautical miles.

(b) Since the Fleet Center is normally in motion, the relative movement plotting system will be used. With aircraft cruising speeds ten to fifteen times Fleet speed, the relative plot will differ but little from a navigational or geographic plot for anti-aircraft work. In plotting surface ships, with speeds on the order of one or two times Fleet speed, the plot must be handled in relative movement to predict time and point of contact. The 20-inch mooring board (H. O. 2665) is considered the smallest satisfactory plotting sheet. It will be convenient to plot the Fleet disposition to scale on a pivoted overlay which can be rotated with the Fleet axis.

(c) Time is the essence of successful radar use. The development by every prospective Radar Control, Fighter Director and Radar Guard Ship of standard plotting procedures to best utilize available information is absolutely necessary. Dead-time errors on the order of one minute are sufficient to cause a missed fighter interception, since aircraft moving in different directions at high speed may travel a relative distance greater than the range of visibility. Interceptions must be directed to a *predicted* meeting point.

10. *Security.*—For the present and until procedures are established, communications will continue in plain language. In a subsequent revision of this doctrine, suitable provisions for security will be incorporated.

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
5 November 1941.

Cinepac File No.  
A4-3/FF12(1)/  
A16-3/NOV/(12)  
Serial 01801  
*Confidential*

Operation Order No. 37-41

## TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Units Listed in Appendices ONE and TWO to Annex "A."*

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders.
2. This force will conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN AREA during the period twenty-one dash twenty-five November one nine four one.



3. (a) *Units Listed in Appendices ONE and TWO to Annex "A"* underway as directed by Task Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with Annex "A." Upon completion resume scheduled employment.

(x)-----

4. Logistic support at PEARL HARBOR. Tenders not assigned continue scheduled upkeep.

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Communications in accordance with Annex "B." Radar Doctrine issued as Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Operation Order three one dash four one is effective. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in PENNSYLVANIA.

H. E. KIMMEL,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief.*

ANNEXES:

"A"—Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. 10-41:

Appendix "1," Special Situation, WHITE (issued separately to WHITE Forces only).

Appendix "2," Special Situation, BLACK (issued separately to BLACK Forces only).

"B"—Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 10-41.

[2] *DISTRIBUTION:* (Basis, List III, Case 1)

- Opnav (10)
- N. W. C. (3)
- P. G. S. (3)
- Com FOURTEEN (10)
- CO NAS, Pearl Harbor (5)
- CO Subbase, Pearl Harbor (5)
- Combatfor (15)
- Comscofor (15)
- Comdesbatfor (10)
- Comairscofor (10)
- Cominbatfor (5)
- CG, 2nd Marine Div. (5)
- Comdr. 2nd Marine Airwing (2)

*FOR DISTRIBUTION TO PARTICIPATING UNITS:*

- Combatships (35)
- Comairbatfor (35)
- Comerubatfor (35)
- Comdesflot ONE (75)
- Comdesron FIVE (20)
- Comeruscofor (45)
- Combasefor (95)
- Compatwing TWO (25)
- Comdr. Marine Air Group TWENTY-ONE (5)
- CO OGLALA (5)

P. C. CROSLY,  
*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

11-5-41-(565)

[1] ANNEX "A"

To PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER No. 37-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
November 5, 1941.

*Exercise Plan No. 10-41*

PART I—GENERAL

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex.
2. The general objectives are: Training in war operations under realistically simulated war conditions; test and further development of doctrine and procedures and training in the preparation of quick estimates and plans.

3. Unless special exception is made in the individual exercise, the provisions of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise the Officers Conducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled operations. All aircraft except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall be at their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise Officers Conducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes have returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises.

4. No speed limitations are imposed during the actual conduct of exercises listed herein. While proceeding to stations for exercises, or during normal cruising, speed limits are: Battleships—15 knots; cruisers, carriers, destroyers—24 knots; others—none.

5. *Special Instructions:* For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise opponents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions prescribed in USF-10. Should the Commander-in-Chief or O. T. C. transmit the message "Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all [2] units to mean that exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of hostile action against the Fleet. Commander Task Force SEVEN, on receipt of this despatch, will have all submarines surface, and report when this is accomplished. All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

6. In case Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is not embarked in the operating areas, Commander Battle Force will function as the Officer Conducting the Exercises.

[3]

PART II—EXERCISES

*Exercise No. 191—Minor Problem*

(0600, November 21 to 0600, November 25)

Object: Training in overseas movement of valuable train vessels, conduct of covering and raiding operations.

1. *Opposing Forces*

(a) *WHITE*—Task Force ONE, Commander Battle Force.

*BLACK*—Task Force THREE, Commander Scouting Force.

(b) Units assigned to *WHITE* and *BLACK* are listed separately in Appendices 1 and 2 to this Annex. Forces involved are not identical with the regular exercise task forces of the corresponding numbers. This method was adopted deliberately to introduce an element of uncertainty for each opponent as to the exact composition of the enemy force.

(c) Upon receipt of this order, Commanders *WHITE* and *BLACK* will issue the necessary task organizations for their respective forces. The security organizations will be mutually exchanged between Commanders in sealed envelopes, to be opened in case exercise conditions are ended.

(d) Ships of each force will fly a square flag of its distinguishing color from the fore-stay throughout the exercise.

2. *Damage:* U. S. F. 79 is effective from the declaration of war between *WHITE* and *BLACK*. Task Force Commanders designate moving out of action rendezvous which will permit out of action ships to rejoin within four hours when damage is restored.

[4] 3. *Reports.*

(a) From *WHITE* and *BLACK* Commanders:

(1) Brief composite narrative.

(2) Track charts, single pencil copies, on transparent paper, Case I, scale of chart No. 4102 Extended, and Case III.

(3) Summary of damage.

(4) Summary of ammunition expenditures.

(b) From all units:

(1) Umpire reports, *despatch* and letter.

(c) All mail reports will be forwarded within forty-eight hours of return to port.

4. *General Situation:*

(a) *WHITE* and *BLACK* are Pacific powers with conflicting national policies. During a long period of international tension, relations have steadily

deteriorated. Active hostilities are imminent. Through commitments in the Atlantic, WHITE has been unable to muster full Naval strength in the Pacific. Due to undeclared but extensive hostilities with one Asiatic power, and tentative plans for expansion at the expense of another, BLACK has not been free to undertake major Fleet operations at a distance from the Asiatic continent.

(b) Both WHITE and BLACK have been making every effort to improve their outlying island bases in order to increase their strength in the Mid-Pacific.

(c) Several months previously, WHITE acquired title to Base X-Ray, an island in the actual position of OAHU, previously the property of an Atlantic power. From Base X-Ray the WHITE major Fleet Base in the Hawaiian Islands is assumed to be situated thirteen hundred miles bearing 350° and the BLACK major Fleet Base in the CAROLINE Group the same distance to the westward.

[5] (d) By November 1, 1941, WHITE has pushed construction at Base X-Ray to such an extent that about 70 short range landplanes can be operated day or night and 12 long range patrol seaplanes can be operated during daylight only. The patrol planes must moor; there are no beaching facilities. Fixed shore defenses consist of about 500 troops and four mobile 3" anti-aircraft guns. For purposes of this problem, the land-plane facilities described above are considered to be located at EWA Field and seaplane moorings in KANEOHE Bay. PEARL HARBOR is an anchorage only, possessing no supply, repair, nor defense installations.

(e) BLACK has not been able to project his chain of bases beyond the major base noted in (c) above.

(f) On November 10, BLACK learns through reliable radio intelligence that WHITE is about to execute a plan for major reinforcement of Base X-Ray by movement of troops, shore batteries, ammunition, supplies, and repair ships either from HAWAII 1300 miles to the northward of Base X-Ray, or from WHITE mainland ports (which are assumed to be in their present relative position to HAWAII), and is expected to cover this movement with a part of the Fleet Units from the HAWAIIAN Area.

(g) On November 10, WHITE learns from intelligence sources that Asiatic developments have probably immobilized the BLACK main Fleet for at least a month, but that at least one aircraft carrier, several cruisers, and several units of destroyers are missing from their normal bases.

5. *Special Situations* are furnished separately to WHITE and BLACK as Appendices 1 and 2 of this Annex.

6. This exercise will end at 0600, November 25, unless terminated earlier by signal from the Officer Conducting the Exercise. In either event, Task Force ONE establish Offshore Patrol by 2200, November 24, for auxiliaries to enter PEARL HARBOR commencing about 0700, November 25. Task Force ONE will maintain the Offshore Patrol until relieved by Task Force THREE at the end of Exercise No. 191. Units of Task Force ONE remaining at sea, proceed to operating areas for scheduled work as directed by Task Force Commander. Task Force THREE relieve the Offshore Patrol, and enter PEARL HARBOR as directed by the Task Force Commander.

7. If the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is embarked in the PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA enter ahead of auxiliaries, disembark Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and sortie when entry of Task Force THREE is completed, rejoining Task Force ONE as directed by Task Force Commander.

[1]

## ANNEX "B"

TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER 37-41

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.  
November 5, 1941.

Communication Plan  
10-41

USF-70 effective as modified herein or by Task Force Commanders.

1120. This plan is effective at 0000, November 21, 1941, (Zone plus 10½) until completion of Exercise 191.

1179. Make RADAR aircraft and surface ship contact reports in accordance with "Tentative Radar Doctrine" (Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Operation Order No. 31-41).

1332. Radio Honolulu (NPM) Primary Fox is available to WHITE (Task Force ONE) for exercise traffic. Non-problem traffic may be delivered to units of both Task Forces by Radio Honolulu.

2121. Task Force Commanders prescribe conditions of radio silence.

2211. Task Force Commanders prescribe own radio frequency plans.

2212 & 2213. Not effective.

2216. Task Force Commanders arrange guard for own Task Force.

2410. Use authenticators under conditions prescribed by Task Force Commanders.

2430. Use authenticators as prescribed in the instructions for CSP-795.

2431. Not effective.

2432. Place authenticators after suffix.

2434. Task Force Commanders prescribe instructions for aircraft authentication.

2500. Radio Call Signs shall be enciphered by CSP-1161. No opposing radio calls recovered by use of CSP-1161 may be used in radio intelligence or deception.

[2] 2810. The 4205 kc. series shall be guarded by the Chief Umpire, Task Force Commanders, and relay vessels for umpire traffic.

2820. Use 532 kc. for all umpire and out of action communications. If distances require use 4205 kc. series.

2843. Not effective.

3120. Task Force Commanders prescribe conditions of visual silence.

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41.

5210. BLACK and WHITE use currently effective recognition signals followed by /B or /W respectively, made by flashing light when practicable.

5230. Task Force Commanders prescribe approach procedure for recognition purposes.

5300. BLACK and WHITE use CSP-1024 as currently effective accompanying signal, whenever practicable, by /B or /W respectively, made by flashing light.

6622. Exercise cryptographic aids are available for exclusive assignment to participating exercise fleets as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE (WHITE) use List I

TASK FORCE TWO (BLACK) use List II

<i>Title</i>	<i>List I</i>	<i>List II</i>
Contact Pad.....	CSP-786	CSP-698
Contact Pad (decode section).....	CSP-787	CSP-699
ECM Exercise Cipher.....	CSP-812	CSP-814
Authenticator Cipher Cards.....	USF-52	USF-53
Mark III Strip Alphabet.....	USF-85	USF-86
Mark III Strip Key List.....	USF-87	USF-88
Tracking Code.....	USF-64	USF-65
Aircraft Signal Book.....	USF-66	USF-67

[3]

ANNEX "B"

TO PACIFIC FLEET OPERATION ORDER 37-41

*Confidential*

6623. The following cryptographic aids are available to both participating exercise fleets:

Radio Operators' Signal Cipher.....	CSP-795
Umpire Code.....	CSP-940
Aircraft Contact Pad Holders.....	CSP-680
ECM.....	CSP-691 etc.
Mark III Strip Device.....	CSP-688
Mark III Auxiliary Device.....	CSP-849
General Signal Book.....	CSP-734
SOPUS Signals.....	USF-80
Signal Vocabulary.....	CSP-412
Radio Call Sign Cipher No. 1.....	CSP-1161



7000. Interference and deception may be practiced as prescribed by Task Force Commanders except on following frequencies: 555, 500, 532, 4205s, and 4235s.

8000. Reports are not required. Constructive criticism and comments are welcomed.

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EXHIBIT No. 23 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
District Intelligence Office  
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel  
Honolulu, Hawaii

AJL/sc

7 JANUARY 1942.

From: The District Intelligence Officer.  
To: The President's Investigating Committee.

Enclosures:

- (A) Five copies of excerpts from letter from Chief of Naval Operations, dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa.
- (B) Five copies of a report dated 16 December 1941, Subject, Crash of enemy plane on Niihau, from Officer in Charge, Zone 4, to District Intelligence Officer.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith in accordance with your request made to Lieutenant (jg) George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R.

I. H. MAYFIELD,  
A. J. LOWREY,  
*By direction.*

---

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I. H. MAYFIELD,  
 A. J. LOWREY,  
*By direction.*

Copy

[1]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
 Branch Intelligence Office  
 Port Allen, Kauai, T. H.

CBB/bn  
 DECEMBER 16, 1941.

From: The Officer-in-Charge, Zone 4.

To: District Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Crash of Enemy Plane on Niihau.

Enclosure: Copy of Lieut. Jick Mizuha's report on same Subject, to Lt. Colonel Fitzgerald, Commanding Officer, Kauai Military District.

1. On Saturday, December 13, 1941, at 3:00 p. m., six Niihau Hawaiians, captained by Kekuhina Kaohelauii, landed at Waimea, Kauai, in a whale boat, to report to the Robinson family of Makaweli, Kauai, T. H., the crash of a Japanese plane on Niihau. The crew left Niihau that same day at 12:30 a. m., and rowed to Kauai, making the trip in about fifteen hours.

2. Lt. Colonel FitzGerald was notified and immediately organized an expedition squad of twelve armed soldiers from Company "M", 299th Infantry under the supervision of Lieut. Jack Mizuha of the same Company. The lighthouse tender "Kukui" fortunately was at Niihau extinguishing lighthouse lights. A dispatch was sent to have it return to Waimea, Kauai, immediately to take the above-named troops to Niihau.

3. The "Kukui", having about twelve armed men of its own and two machine guns, left Waimea at about six p. m. Saturday, December 13, 1941, and arrived at southwest point, Keanapuka, Niihau, as Nonopapa, the main landing, was too rough. The party of armed soldiers went ashore Sunday about 7:30 a. m., and had breakfast, then had to walk about ten miles to the Nonopapa village, where the plane crashed nearby, arriving there at 1:50 p. m.

4. When the troops reached the village and plane, they found that there was only one plane and one Japanese pilot, who had already been killed and buried. The plane had been burned by the pilot at three a. m. Saturday morning, December 13, 1941.

5. The description of the plane is as follows: The Japanese plane, burned by the pilot, had its fuselage burned, but the wings, tail, and engine were intact. It had a three-blade propeller which was bent. The plane was small, possibly twenty feet long, and twenty feet from wing tip to wing tip, but sturdy and made of metal, probably of magnesium and not aluminum. It was a fighter type with four 20 mm cannons, one in each wing, and two, either in the propeller hub and synchronized with the engine, or in the cockpit. Single engine, average size, possibly Curtiss-Wright engine, and had a G. E. generator, an American radio set (make unknown) which was damaged by the fire.

6. Rising sun insignia were on each wing tip, top and bottom. The number of the plane on the tail was B11-120. Both landing wheels were severely damaged.

7. The complete details of the entire episode of the crash, as explained to the officer-in-charge by Mr. Elmer Robinson and Benny Kanahale, now in Waimea, Kauai, Hospital, from December 7 to 14, inclusive, is explained herein. Please note that this report is more brief and concise than the enclosed report to the Army. Mr. Elmer Robinson stated that the picture given to this office was his compiled story of the various day-by-day incidents, and that the report made by Liput, Jack Mizuha included the remarks made by a large gathering of Hawaiians at a meeting held on Niihau, Sunday at 3 P. M. December 14, 1941. This meeting was conducted by Mr. Elmer Robinson, as he speaks Hawaiian fluently. Questions and answers were made in Hawaiian and translated into English.

8. Sunday between 1 and 2 p. m. December 7, 1941, at Niihau, various Hawaiian residents of the island saw two planes flying over Niihau. One crashed quite close to the Nonopana village and the other flew on west, past the island and presumably crashed in the sea. However, it was never seen again. Incidentally, the residents of the island had absolutely no means of communication with Kauai or elsewhere and were unaware of the United States being at war with Japan. Mr. Elmer Robinson wrote a letter about December 9, 1941, informing the Niihau population that the United States was at war, but unfortunately it was not delivered by a detailed sampan.

9. The single-seater fighter plane only had one Japanese pilot who was seized by the Hawaiians immediately after it crashed into a fence next to the village, and before the pilot could locate his pistol. Then Howard Kaleohano searched the plane and secured all the papers, map of Oahu, and pistol for safekeeping, to be turned over to the proper source ultimately.

10. The pilot surrendered before all the Hawaiians and remained peaceful and friendly and lived at the village and at first was not kept in custody, but was allowed to roam about unguarded. At first, when spoken to, he would reply in English writing, then later spoke English to the Hawaiians fluently. He was possibly educated in the mainland.

11. Then on Tuesday he was placed under guard of Harada and Shintani, and was sent to Kii, furthest northeast end of Niihau, in the hope that the pilot could be sent to Kauai by sampan or Robinson's whale boat that was stationed there in their boat house. As the sea was too rough, he was returned to the village and again another trip was made to Kii on Wednesday, but he was returned a second time on account of bad weather.

12. Thursday, Harada complained to the Hawaiians, stating that it was a mistake that the two Niihau Japanese were selected as guards for the pilot. They were then relieved of their duty, and later on in the day, Harada, the [3] citizen, asked a Hawaiian to have Shintani, the alien, come and see him, to discuss some matters, but Shintani wouldn't come.

13. Then on Friday Shintani had lunch with the Hawaiians. After the Hawaiians were through work, Shintani went to Howard Kaleohano's house at the village and asked for the papers. Howard was guarding the plane nearby. Howard Kaleohano obtained the map, then Shintani said "Not that, but the other papers", so he could burn and destroy them.

14. Then Shintani produced about \$200 in an attempt to bribe Howard Kaleohano. He refused the bribe at first, and more so after the money was offered for the papers. Then Shintani said excitedly that it was a matter of death or life, and insisted that Japan made him do this. After this, Shintani disappeared out of the picture entirely.

15. Friday night Harada and pilot broke into Shintani's house looking for the papers. As Shintani had joined the Hawaiians, they failed to secure the papers. Harada and the pilot then became furious, and seeing Shintani in the village later, chased him, but he got away. Then some of the Hawaiians were taken prisoners by Harada and the pilot and tied up—the other Hawaiians were away from the village. After Shintani left the village, the pilot asked Harada if he had another gun. Earlier in the day, Harada and the pilot had been to Kaleohano's house and presumably had found the pilot's pistol during Kaleohano's absence, but felt that each should have a weapon with which to control their Hawaiian prisoners. Then Harada took the pilot to the honey house which was close to the village, and got a shotgun and some cartridges.

16. About midnight the pilot attempted to send a message from his radio in the plane, in Japanese. A few of the Hawaiians heard him talking, but did



not hear a reply. The residents, knowing he had sent the message, were aware at this time that there was a war on and became alarmed, as they were afraid the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. The pilot burned his plane at 3 a. m. Saturday, December 13, 1941. At the same time, he burned Kalehano's house, hoping to destroy his map and papers which he thought were hidden there.

17. The Hawaiians at the village were well scattered. Some went to the top of the mountain with kerosene lamps and reflectors and attempted to signal Kauai. Some were at the beach, while some Hawaiians were riding from the mountains to Kii beach to prepare the whaleboat for a trip to Kauai. While the pilot was at the plane before burning it, the Hawaiian had the pilot's papers at the mountain top and later took them to Kii. Six strong Hawaiians left Kii in the whaleboat at 12:30 a. m. Saturday, December 13, 1941, for Kauai, arriving there about fifteen hours later, at Waimea, Kauai, at 3:00 p. m. They reported to the Robinsons at Makaweli, Kauai.

18. That night the Hawaiians on Niihau had a prayer meeting, then all left for the mountains to join the others who were already there. A few [4] stragglers were captured by the pilot and Harada who said they would be released if they told them where the papers were. They also had two machine guns with them which had been taken from the plane in the afternoon. Shintani never at any time had any firearms and was not implicated in the case except for attempting to bribe the Hawaiian as previously mentioned.

19. Saturday, December 13, 1941, at 10:00 a. m., Benny Kanabele attempted to grab the pilot's pistol but failed. Then Benny's wife who was next to him, grabbed the pistol and Harada pulled her away. Then the pilot, still having the pistol, shot Benny three times, in the right and left thighs and on his upper right side. All were flesh wounds.

20. Benny Kanabele then picked up the pilot bodily and dashed his head on a stone wall and killed him. Harada then shot himself in the abdomen twice and died soon afterward. The bodies were temporarily buried at Niihau away from the village.

21. The Kauai Army expedition party arrived as stated at 1:50 p. m. Sunday, December 14, 1941, at the village. They returned to Port Allen, Kauai, on the "Kukui" arriving about 7:30 a. m. Monday, December 15, 1941. Shintani, Mrs. Harada, and her child were brought back and were imprisoned under Colonel FitzGerald's control. Benny Kanabele, the wounded man, is now in the hospital at Waimea, Kauai.

C. B. BALDWIN,  
*Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.*

[1] REPORT OF EVENTS SINCE SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941 ON NIIHAU

The Japanese plane came down near Howard Kalehano's house on Sunday, 7 December, 1941, between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The plane was flying low about 75 yards from Kalehano's house, apparently out of gasoline, and tried to zoom up again when its undergear got caught in the fence wire, and the plane landed flat on the ground. It must have had its landing gear down, because both wheels were knocked off at the time the expedition party arrived at the plane. Howard Kalehano was at home at the time the plane came down, and he ran to it. He saw that it wasn't an American plane, and thought it strange. Upon reaching the cockpit, he saw this Japanese aviator with a pistol in his hand, trying to unstrap his safety belt. Kalehano immediately grabbed the pistol, taking it away from him, and pulled the aviator out of the cockpit. Kalehano searched him and took away from him some papers which included an Oahu map. At the time the aviator was in the cockpit, he immediately, perhaps unconsciously, thought of his papers and reached for his pocket, which put Kalehano wise to it, and as a result, Kalehano searched him outside. By this time the whole populace of Niihau had come to the plane and they decided to keep the aviator at Joseph Kele's house.

The aviator was fed at Kele's house, and was guarded there Sunday night. On Monday he was taken to Keeli, where they planned to send him to Kauai on the Robinson sampan, but it didn't come through. The aviator was brought back and on Tuesday he was again taken to Keeli, but the launch did not come in that day. He was kept at Keeli Tuesday night until Wednesday morning. They returned Wednesday afternoon, and took him to Yoshio Harada's house. Five men remained to stay on guard at Harada's house.



At the time the aviator was brought to Harada's house, Harada showed no signs of disloyalty, and took his regular turn at guarding the aviator.

On Sunday, when the plane first landed, Shintani, the alien Japanese, had a few words with the aviator, but there wasn't any lengthy conversation.

On Thursday Harada, the citizen Japanese, asked to have Shintani come down and have Shintani help guard the aviator, as he, Harada, didn't want the entire responsibility, being the only Japanese with the aviator, and he wanted both to share the responsibility.

John Kekuhina told Shintani to come down, but Shintani said he didn't want to go that night but would go the following day when his work would be down there near Harada's house. On Friday morning Kekuhina went to Paniau (the high mountain) to make a fire as a signal to Kauai. Shintani went on Friday to Harada's house and saw Harada and the aviator. The Hawaiians had no idea what went on among them as they did not understand the language. They do not know how much conversation took place. At a little after 1 o'clock in the afternoon on Friday, Kaleoao Keale was returning from work, and he saw Shintani with the two Japanese at [2] Harada's house, Shintani apparently eating his lunch at that time. About half an hour, Keale returned and Shintani was through with his lunch and had gone away. Shintani later told Keale that he had gone to his bee apiary to do his work. As far as Keale knows, Shintani didn't see the aviator or the Japanese again.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, Friday, 12 December 1941, Shintani came to Howard Kaleohano's house. Shintani woke Kaleohano up by pounding on the door. Shintani asked Kaleohano if he had the aviator's papers and he replied in the affirmative. Kaleohano showed him first the Oahu map. Shintani replied that it wasn't the Oahu map he wanted. It was the other papers he wanted. Kaleohano went for the other papers and got them out, and showed them to Shintani. Shintani asked for them but was refused. Shintani told him that it meant life and death to Shintani. Kaleohano refused to give the paper. Shintani asked again, "Wout you give them to me so that I can burn them." Kaleohano refused, saying it was against the law and both of them would be punished if the papers were destroyed. Shintani then offered money which was estimated by Kaleohano to be about \$200.00. Shintani was refused again. Shintani repeated again that it was life and death but did not say to whom. Shintani then disappears from the picture after this.

At about 5:30 Friday afternoon, the aviator and Harada, and a boy, Kalihilihi Niau, about 16 years of age came to Kaleohano's house. Harada was prodding the boy with a gun. Kalechano was in the outhouse (lavatory) at that time and hid from the Japanese. After looking for Kaleohano for a while, they left the house and went to the plane. It was at this time, it is presumed that the aviator recovered the pistol from Kaleohano's house. Kaleohano left the premises and met Kaahikili Kalimahuluhulu and explained to him the trouble, told him what was going on, and asked him for horses. At the same time another boy, Naalulu Kanabele gave him the horse and Kaleohano gave the alarm that the men were on the rampage. Before going to the mountains, Kaleohano returned to his house and hid the aviator's papers in another locality away from the house, with the exception of the Oahu map. He then went to another house and got a pair of shoes and went to the mountains. He got to Paniau at about 9 o'clock, where some other men had kerosene lamps with reflectors, signalling Kauai. They came on down after putting out the Kerosene lamps and went to Keei. At half past 12 Friday night, they left Keei and on Saturday afternoon at three o'clock they got to Waimea. The men who put out on the whale to come to Kauai to sound the alarm were Kekuhina Kaohelauii, commander of the boat, Howard Kaleohano, Akano Kaohelauii, Enoka Kaohelauii, Willy Kaohelauii, and Kahokuloa Kanahele.

Sometime on Friday afternoon the aviator asked to go out to the toilet at Harada's house. He asked the guard to go across the yard to the honey warehouse. Harada then went out of the house also. Hanaiki Niheu, the husband of the school-teacher was the guard at that time, and he followed the aviator across the yard, followed by Harada. Harada opened the honey warehouse, and they went in and got Harada's shotgun, and then turned upon the guard and had him at his mercy. The aviator had the shotgun in his hand. They went down to the next warehouse below, opened it and ordered Hanaiki into it and locked Hanaiki in it. The rest of the guards were not present as they were [3] on the committee arranging the work for the next day. They didn't see any of this.

Mrs. Niheu had been living over the hill from the ranch headquarters where the Haradas live. She was short of supplies and went down with her children, Keia, Lisa, Mele, and a little baby. They were returning to the village in a wagon, with Loisa riding the horse pulling the wagon. When they were past the upper side of the house on the hill road, Keia heard Harada calling, Harada ahead and the aviator following, running down the hill. Harada asked them to stop. Mrs. Niheu kept on going. Harada ran out and told them to stop the car. Harada stopped the wagon and commanded everybody to get down from the car, on threat of their lives. Harada held the gun at Mrs. Niheu's shoulders but didn't shoot. The two Japanese got into the wagon and called to Loisa who was told to stay on the horse, to drive fast with the wagon. They held the gun behind Uoisa. They came to the gate to Kaleohano's house and they left the cart there and went to Kalechano's house. They picked up the boy at the airplane, which they were prodding with the gun at the time Kaleohano saw them. This boy, Kalihilihi, had been guarding the plane in the absence of his father. By this time, all the people had the alarm, and they had left the houses and gone into hiding.

At the end of the village, the two Japanese captured Kalanapio Niiiau and they told him to call the other people. They came down through the village, and under duress, Niiiau was calling for the others. Kaahakila Kalimahuluhulu was at the house of his relatives trying to get them all out of way and got practically every one of them into shelter and he heard Niiiau calling and he thought Niiiau was calling for help. So Kalimahuluhulu answer the call. It was dark then, and when he went out to the road to meet them, Kalimahuluhulu was also seized as a captive. They tied Kalimahuluhulu's hands behind him, and with the two captives they came down through the town calling for the others. Nobody else came. They came to Joseph Kele's house, where Kalimahuluhulu saw a light which disappeared suddenly. No one could be found at Kele's house, so they ordered Niiiau and Kalimahuluhulu to go down to the gate where they had left the wagon. They were then ordered to go where the plane was. Both captives saw that they had taken the cartridges out and had piles them on the wing of the plane. The aviator went into the plane and they heard him run the radio. He put on his earphones and began calling in Japanese, but the captives did not hear any reply. They had a big pile of cartridges and Harada forced Niiiau to help him carry the cartridges to the wagon. Then when they came back again, the machine gun was taken out. Niiiau had to carry it down to the cart. Harada told Kalimahuluhulu to go to Keokia to tell Harada's wife that he won't be back tonight—that they were going to look for Kaleohano. Kalimahuluhulu instead of going there went to the beach and joined his family there. He got his wife to untie his hands and got Benny Nokaka Kanabele who was there to join him to recover the cartridges because Harada had told him that the cartridges were enough to kill off every man, woman, and child on the island. Harada and the aviator had gone off looking for the rest of [4] the people. So Kalimahuluhulu and Benny came up to the deserted wagon the machine gun was missing, but the cartridges were there. Kalimahuluhulu took one bunch and Benny took the other and took them down the beach and hid them.

Benny then went to take care of the family, went to get horses to hide his family. Benny told his family not to tell Harada about his whereabouts. Kalimahuluhulu and Kanabele's family were captured on Saturday morning. They said (the Japanese) that if they could catch Kaleohano, the rest of the people would be let off. If they couldn't, they would kill everybody else.

During Friday night, these two men burned the plane and Kaleohano's house about three o'clock in the morning. Then they went through the village and shot off the guns on Friday night.

The Japanese told the families to find Kaleohano. The aviator had recovered the pistol at that time from Kaleohano's house. Harada had the shotgun. The two Japanese started out looking. They said they would kill the two women and then they would kill themselves. Then afterwards they changed their idea and told Kalimahuluhulu's wife to go into the koa forest to find Kaleohano. She escaped in that fashion.

Benny Kanabele had been captured along with his family early in the morning. He was sent into the thickets looking for Kaleohano and came back and joined his wife who was held captive. That is when Mr. and Mrs. Kanabele finished off the aviator and Harada killed himself. (The complete story of this part of the story can be secured from Mr. and Mrs. Kanabele who were not questioned at Niihau, but were brought back to Kauai.) The guns were not recovered as they were hidden by the natives in the koa forest and could not be found by them.

Mr. Elmer Robinson left instructions with the natives to make a diligent search of the guns, and if recovered, would be turned over to him and then turned over to the military commander of the Kauai District.

The above story was repeated to the undersigned officer by Mr. Elmer Robinson who secured the story from the various natives in the village. Mr. Robinson secured the story in Hawaiian and translated it into English. The English version was taken down by this officer by stenographic notes.

Captain Eugene MacManus, harbormaster at Port Allen, was present during this entire hearing.

JACK H. MIZUHA,  
1st. Lt., 299th Infantry.

Copy

EXHIBIT No. 24 (NAVY PACKET No. 2), ROBERTS COMMISSION

file 7 index

Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Secret*

Memorandum for the Commission.

Subject: Fuze settings used by vessels at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

The minimum fuze set allowed in peacetime is 3.2 seconds. Fuze Pots are so arranged that this setting is the minimum obtainable without adjustments of the pot.

Methods of control of necessity vary over the range of possible control. This is apparent when it is realized that the range varied from 100 feet to 4500 yards approximately. It is believed that when all reports have been received and adjusted, that it will be found that the great majority of the guns fired were in local control due primarily to the multiple targets that were presented.

The horizontal bombing attacks came in 3 or 4 waves. The reported altitude of these attacks vary from 6,000 to 15,000 feet. The latter is believed to be the most nearly correct because observers in geographical positions that would allow them to estimate altitude, i. e., clear of smoke of burning oil, so estimated the altitude and because of the penetration of the armour piercing bombs. The horizontal bombers were taken under some fire, but since this attack was delivered after tremendous volumes of smoke from the oil fires had already covered the Ford Island Area, ships in this vicinity were generally unable to see these attacks developing. The smoke that obscured the horizontal bombers from the ships in close proximity to Ford Island did not obscure the ships themselves from the horizontal bombers. The fuze settings used by ships with director control is not known. Ships not equipped with director were in local control, using various fuze settings. One vessel reported its 3" 50 A. A. firing at horizontal bombers using 10-12 second per set fuzed projectiles which were "short and ineffective".

The appended photographs showing two separate horizontal bomber formations illustrate the "shorts" and the altitude of attack. The Fleet aerologist without knowledge of these photographs reported the lower fleecy clouds below the cumulus to be at around 11,000 to 12,000 feet.

Respectfully submitted.

Edwin Thomas Layton,  
EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,  
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5 JANUARY 1942.

(Two photographs are appended to Exhibit No. 24 which show bomber formations and illustrate "shorts" in anti-aircraft fire and the altitude of attacking planes at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. These photographs are reproduced as Items Nos. 42 and 43 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)



## EXHIBIT No. 25 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

C-A4-3/SS/ND14

(024)

*Confidential*

1 JANUARY, 1942.

Mr. WALTER BRUCE HOWE, Recorder of the Commission Inquiring into Incidents at Pearl Harbor, 7 December.

MY DEAR MR. HOWE: When I was before the commission, questions were asked me about the anti-torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, whether or not it was closed and whether or not it was possible for the enemy submarine to have followed some vessel in through the gate.

As I recall, I told the commission that the gate had been closed but that it had been opened to permit a garbage scow to pass in and that it might have been possible for the submarine to have followed this scow in. Since that time, I have ascertained that my statement before the commission was not entirely correct and I would like to revise it as follows:

"The procedure prior to December 7, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, only opening it when it was necessary for some vessel to pass through. It was opened at daylight, it being the idea that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel and other vessels in that vicinity would detect any submerged or partially submerged submarine. On December 7, 1941, the net was opened at 0458 for two sweepers to enter, these vessels having been out for the regular morning sweep. As far as can be ascertained, the net was kept open until 0840 when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted at 0745 by YT-153 near channel buoy No. 17, close to the coal dock. The time that the submarine passed the net is not known but it is probable that it passed in very close to 0700."

I request that you please bring this to the attention of the commission as the testimony which I gave before them was based on information which I then had but which now appears to be incorrect.

C. C. BLOCH,  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy*  
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

## EXHIBIT No. 26 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

*Confidential*

C-2295-5

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
MARINE DEFENSE FORCES,  
*Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 January 1942.*

*Status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force assigned to Fourteenth Naval District*

## 1. Distribution of personnel:

U. S. M. C.			Navy Medical	
Off.	Men		Off.	Men
MIDWAY				
0	1	-----3rd Defense Battalion-----	0	0
7	204	-----4th Defense Battalion-----	0	0
30	792	-----6th Defense Battalion-----	3	F 16
37	997	-----Total Midway-----	3	16



Status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force assigned to Fourteenth Naval District—Continued

1. Distribution of personnel :

U. S. M. C.			Navy Medical	
Off.	Men		Off.	Men
<b>PALMYRA</b>				
16	272	----- 1st Defense Battalion -----	1	8
2	110	----- 3rd Defense Battalion -----	0	0
1	69	----- 4th Defense Battalion -----	0	0
19	451		1	8
<b>JOHNSTON</b>				
9	197	----- 1st Defense Battalion -----	1	8
4	140	----- 3rd Defense Battalion -----	0	0
4	54	----- 4th Defense Battalion -----	0	0
17	391	----- Total Johnston -----	1	8
73	1,839	----- Total outlying bases -----	5	32
<b>OAHU</b>				
7	103	----- 1st Defense Battalion -----	2	6
33	558	----- 3rd Defense Battalion -----	3	18
22	418	----- 4th Defense Battalion -----	3	16
2	25	----- 6th Defense Battalion -----	0	0
64	1,107	----- Total Oahu -----	8	40
137	2,946	----- Total in district -----	13	72

2. a. Distribution of armament :

	Midway	Palmyra	Johnston	Oahu
7"/45 cal guns -----	4 (a)			
5"/51 cal guns -----	6	4	4	8 (b)
3" AA guns -----	12	8	8	11 (c)
Height Finders -----	3	2	2	2
Directors -----	4	2	2	3 (d)
3"/50 Navy guns -----	4 (e)			
.50 cal. AA MG -----	47	24	16	20 (f)
.30 cal. MG -----	36	38	16	24 (g)
Searchlight unit -----	6	4	4	3 (h)
Browning automatic rifles -----	29	16	24	42
SCR 268 -----	3		1	8 (i)
SCR 270 -----	2		1	1 (j)

NOTES

- (a) Two mounted; others being mounted.
- (b) Sights on 6 guns have not been modified for high speed target. This work has low priority at Ordnance. Fire control equipment for only 2 guns available.
- (c) Seven employed in defense of Pearl, three of which are replacement guns.
- (d) Two not modified. No parts on Oahu available for this work. One is an M-3—no spare parts available.
- (e) Being mounted.
- (f) Employed in defense of Pearl.
- (g) Not Defense Battalion weapons but on temporary loan for defense of Pearl.
- (h) One unit under repair.
- (i) Two to be shipped to Palmyra and one to Johnston when transportation is available. One loaned to Army.
- (j) In operation in Army net.

b. Deficiencies in armament and matériel for 4 Defense Battalions. The increase in deficiencies is due to loss of matériel at Wake. Request for matériel to fill deficiencies will be covered in separate correspondence.

- (1) Five Inch Matériel :
  - 2 guns
  - 4 sets of fire control

(2) Three Inch Antiaircraft Matériel: 3 batteries complete, less one director.

(3) Searchlight units—6.

(4) .50 caliber AA Machine Guns—13.

(5) .30 caliber Machine Gun—30.

3. a. Distribution of ammunition:

	Midway	Palmyra	Johnston	Oahu
7"/45 cal. rounds.....	900	0	0	700
5" common rounds.....	1568	900	860	5231
5" illuminating.....	104	100	100	129
3" Navy common Army gun.....	801	1020	380	10
3" AA (HE).....	21,520	5019	10538	24,480
3"/50 Navy Gun.....	4224	0	0	0
.50 cal. A P.....	763,951	102,150	220450	235,698
.50 cal. tracer.....	391,690	87,160	113350	244,398
.30 cal. A P and ball.....	2,119,840	635,500	506000	2,460,560
.30 cal. tracer.....	144,000	137,500	87,000	156,000
Grenades, hand.....	2250	100	750	3670
Signals, ground asstd.....	406	340	362	0

<sup>1</sup> 2500 rounds requisitioned December 26, 1941.

NOTE.—The following additional amounts required for 5 units of fire will be shipped when supplied and/or when transportation is available:

MIDWAY	PALMYRA	JOHNSTON
700 3" Navy common	6,000 3" H. E. AA	620 3" Navy common
50 5" illuminating	260,000 .50 cal. AP	20,000 .50 cal. AP
	93,000 .50 cal. tracer	7,000 .50 cal. tracer
	500,000 .30 cal. ball	
	5,000 .30 cal. tracer	
	650 grenades	

/s/ H. K. PICKETT,  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Commanding Marine Forces, 14th NavDist.

Copies to: CNO  
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MGC  
Comscofor  
Combasfor  
Chief of staff 14ND

CG, Haw Dept USA  
War Plans 14ND  
CO, 1st Def Bn  
CO, 3rd Def Bn  
CO, 4th Def Bn  
CO, 6th Def Bn

APPROVED:

/s/ C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant, 14th Naval District.

EXHIBIT NO. 27 (NAVY PACKET NO. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] SECRET

HISTORY OF ACTION OCCURRING AT PALMYRA ISLAND FROM DECEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 31, AS COMPARED FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE

December 7:

No Japanese attack on Palmyra. (There was no enemy activity at Palmyra until December 24, when the island was subjected to surface bombardment.)

On December 11 the commandant ordered the resident officer in charge at Palmyra to expedite grading on the runway and requested to know when 5,000 feet would be ready.

On December 12, Palmyra informed the commandant (0700) that a third alternate radio emergency station was available when necessary and specified transmitting frequencies.

A message filed from Palmyra at 0330 December 14 requested instructions for Inter-Island tugs, and also requested aviation gas and Diesel oil, etc., be reassigned Palmyra.

A message from the resident officer in charge, filed at 0600 December 14, informed the commandant that a runway 3,400 feet long and 500 feet wide was ready for use. The report said that station 34 plus 00 to 37 plus 30 was [2] filled and rough graded and would be read for use in three days. Five thousand feet with 300 foot width would be ready for use inside two weeks.

In a routine despatch filed to Pearl Harbor at 0545 December 17, the commandant was informed by the marine detachment at Palmyra of the following personnel requirements: 12 three inch, 10 machine guns, 42 five inch together with searchlight personnel.

Matériel requirements: one radar fire control, three searchlights, 25,000 sand bags, 200 reels of barbed wire and pickets; three inch, one junction box; six cable data, transmission; three static condenser coils, generator 50 micro farad. Five inch, eight pads, gas check; two complete sets for cast three firing; two lighting circuits, range finder; fifty bulbs, lighting circuits for guns; two part WZPADE sets rangekeeper, mark 2.

Ammunition requirements: Three inch, two units Navy common; five inch, 200 rounds illuminating. The foregoing was requested for immediate needs.

The commandant warned Palmyra in a message sent at 0111 December 18 to be on the alert against the possibility of an attack by two enemy light cruisers.

[3] Palmyra advised the commandant at 0730 that the Nisqually and Storm King (tugs) had not arrived.

At 0700 December 20, Palmyra informed the commandant the supply of aviation gasoline (100 octane) was 36,213 gallons. (ref. 22/2357.)

The resident officer in charge notified the commandant at 0800 December 21 that the land plane runway was rolled and ready for service from station 00 plus 00 to 37 plus 00. From station 37 plus 00 to 48 plus 00 the fill was completed to a 300 foot width.

The commandant's proposal for contract work at Palmyra (submitted in a summary to the Bureau of Yards and Docks filed at 2000 December 21) stated that in general the plan was the same as for Johnston (to provide living and storage facilities and to complete only the essential projects) except that a coral surface runway of 5,000 feet would be provided.

Palmyra notified the commandant at 0830 December 21 that the tugs Eleu and Maui with barges in tow departed for Christmas Island at 0330 GCT December 21.

The resident officer in charge, Palmyra, advised the commandant at 0810 December 21 regarding fuel oil and gasoline supplies.

[4] A message filed by the resident officer in charge at 2141 December 21 stated that mail delivery to Palmyra was essential in the interest of maintaining the morale of the contractors' employes.

Palmyra filed a report to the commandant at 0625 December 24 that the island was shelled by a submarine at 0500 GCT and there were no casualties. The submarine had fired six salvos and registered one hit on the dredge but no serious damage had resulted.

This information was passed by CINCPAC to the commanders of Task Forces 9, 4 and 13 at 0733. The commandant notified the chief of naval operations.

The commanding officer of the naval air station at Palmyra in a written report of the action stated that the submarine opened fire at 0455 GCT and was first sighted south east of the island on a bearing 110 degrees true from the water tower and about 3,000 yards off shore. The submarine fired six rounds from a gun estimated to be 3 inch, with the U. S. Engineer Department Dredge Sacramento, visible to the enemy between two small islands along the south reef, evidently used as a point of aim.

Apparently using a ladder spot, the submarine's first three salvos were short, the fourth a direct hit and [5] the remaining salvos over. The hit caused only minor damage, the shell striking a boat davit and after splintering, raking the dredge.

All of the island's batteries were in Condition 1 before the action. The submarine was sighted by the 5 inch control party on No. 3 island before firing commenced but due to darkness and low elevation of gun platforms, the pointers and trainers had great difficulty in picking up the target. The battery fired two star shells and 12 Navy Common 5 inch A. P. shells, and although no hits were observed the submarine was forced to dive.

The commanding officer reported that stations were manned expeditiously and without confusion by service personnel not on gun crews and civilian volunteer parties. The morale was excellent, he added.

Action was being taken to elevate gun platforms to improve the visibility of pointers and trainers, his report stated.

The resident officer in charge, Palmyra, in a message filed at 0200 December 25, requested information from Pearl Harbor regarding the availability of transportation for civilians who desire to leave the island, the status of compensation insurance covering cases due to war [6] conditions and the plan of the future program and work to be completed under the present revised conditions.

Information was also requested on the availability and shipping of materials and the availability of personnel replacements to complete the program.

Palmyra notified Pearl Harbor at 0310 December 26 that a two plane patrol had arrived at the station.

On December 26 the commandant sent a directive to a Palmyra to keep the minimum number of employes (not over 250) needed to complete structures and essential defense measures, operate mechanical equipment as well as the dredge and other plant. The island was to provide a 5,000 foot runway together with emergency defenses.

The commandant's message advised that information requested by despatch at 0200 December 25 should be received by letter shortly and specified evacuation was to include the nonessential trades and employes least skilled.

He directed the change of the construction program as required by existing conditions.

Palmyra reported the aviation gasoline supply on December 27 totaled 35,444 gallons (100 octane).

The resident officer in charge reported on December 28 that the runway was graded and rolled to station 35 plus 00 and filled and rough graded to station 48 plus 00, stating that this latter portion would be available for use [7] inside of six days.

Departure of a patrol plane from Palmyra for Pearl Harbor at 2115 GCT December 29 was reported by the station to the commander of Task Force 9.

Palmyra requested immediate shipment by air of battery cables for three inch guns, stating none could be located at the station. (Despatch filed at 2345 December 29).

On December 30 Palmyra informed the commander of Task Force 9 of the arrival of two patrol planes.

This same day the resident officer in charge filed a report of fuel oil and gasoline receipts and sales and in a later despatch requested that spare parts needed for operation of the tug Wiki be sent by the first available special transportation.

In despatches on December 31, the resident officer in charge requested that shipment of acetylene and oxygen on requisition be expedited, together with the remaining supply of dynamite and caps ordered and necessary to complete the central island channel dredging. The supply on hand consisted of four cases, it was stated.

A further request was made to arrange for a necessary supply of Diesel oil. A total of 550 barrels of Diesel oil, enough for five weeks, was given as the island's supply and [8] the total storage capacity was 4,600 barrels, according to the despatch.

The naval air station reported that its radar was in commission this date, addressing a despatch to this effect to the commander of Patrol Wing 2.

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EXHIBIT No. 28 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] *SECRET*

HISTORY OF ACTION OCCURRING AT JOHNSTON ISLAND FROM DECEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 31, AS COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE

*December 7:*

No Japanese attack was carried out against the Naval Air Station at Johnston Island on December 7.

Initial action against the island was a star shelling by a submarine on December 12, followed by other surface raids on December 15, 21 and 22.

On December 6, the commandant was advised by the station that 72,355 gallons of 100 octane gasoline were on hand and 5,567 gallons had been expended. Ninety two octane was the same, the report stated.



*December 8:*

No enemy attack reported on Johnston.

CINCPAC advised the station at 1141 December 8 that indications pointed to an attack there at daylight.

*December 9:*

Johnston reported to the commander of Task Force 12 and for information of the commandant that the island had not been bombed.

[2] Johnston advised that Plane 21 Prep One had departed for Pearl Harbor at 0150 GCT. The belief was expressed that this plane had originated the message: "At 0300 bombed Japanese cruiser and destroyer in latitude 1702 longitude 6804, course 040 and speed 20. At 0310 attacked by enemy aircraft. At 0326 bombed carrier 80 miles bearing 074 from Johnston."

Johnston notified the commander of Patrol Wing 2 that two J-1 and 5 left the island for Pearl Harbor at 0340 GCT.

*December 10:*

No enemy attack.

*December 11:*

The marine detachment sent a request to the commandant filed at 0800 December 11, for six .30 cal. machine guns, six .50 cal. machine guns, 10 automatic rifles, 150 steel helmets and gas masks, one searchlight less sound locator, and 15 binoculars.

Also requested were one captain and 45 enlisted men of the marine corps, one medical officer, one battery of 5 inch and one battery of 3 inch complete with personnel and ammunition.

[3] Information was received from Johnston at 0805 December 11 that 64,000 gallons of 100 octane aviation gasoline were on hand and that all bombs and ammunition were available for immediate use. It was stated that a night seadrome lighting set was installed and 2,000 feet of coral runway for land-planes would be ready and adequate for nine fighters or scout bombers on December 20.

*December 12:*

The Naval Air Station at Johnston informed the commandant in a message filed at 0535 December 12 that the total aviation gasoline stowage now available was 175,000 gallons, and that 111,000 gallons could be received. The station at this time requested .30 and .50 cal. link belt loading machines.

A communication (ref. despatch 7/2343) at 0620 December 12 specified radio buildings were separated by 250 feet, were repainted a coral color and were partially barricaded.

(Surface Raid 1 12 Dec. LCT.)

The first enemy activity at Johnston took place on the night of December 12 when a submarine fired about six star shells on the island from 8,000 yards off Sand Islet.

[4] In a letter from the commanding officer of the air station it was reported that the submarine went into action at 2115 (Zone plus 10½ hours), firing at intervals of about 30 seconds. The star shells burst into about six greenish balls which burned for about 15 seconds.

The Johnston 5 inch battery fired one star shell and although the illumination from the white star was excellent, nothing was sighted, the commanding officer said.

This shot from the shore battery apparently caused the enemy submarine to submerge believing that he had been sighted. There was no further attack, the report said.

It was recommended in the report that as soon as facilities at the station could support operation of land planes, at least six fighters be assigned to provide the close in security required to prevent the shoot and dive type of raids by submarines.

*December 13:*

On December 13, the commandant was informed by Johnston that a supply of 100 octane gasoline 37,520 gallons (ref. 22/2357 of September) was on hand.

In a directive filed to Johnston at 2315 December 13, the commandant specified that a force of [5] civilians be kept at the island as required to operate all of the power plants and continue with a program as follows: Complete gasoline tanks to a usable stage, including one tank for white gasoline; complete a

runway 2,500 feet in length and construct batchelor officers' quarters and the dispensary.

In addition, temporary magazines were to be constructed as necessary together with splinter proof shelters.

Also on the program were construction of an emergency sewage system and a salt water system, a power plant and distribution system and a radar installation.

A total of 270 civilian employees was estimated as necessary for the outlined work.

The commandant directed that all other employees be evacuated, removing the least skilled and nonessential trades first.

Materials from the Wake barge were to be used as necessary.

The commandant's communication advised that the Burrows could be expected to arrive early Monday (December 15). (Note: The William Ward Burrows with tow previously destined for Wake Island had been directed [6] to proceed to Johnston when about 425 miles east of Wake.)

*December 14:*

No report of enemy action.

*December 15:*

A report filed to the commandant at 0545 December 15 listed the 100 octane aviation gasoline supply at Johnston at 64,000 gallons. The 92 octane remained the same.

In a despatch filed at 0530 December 15, the resident officer-in-charge gave a report of oil and gasoline receipts, consumptions and supplies on hand.

The commandant reported to the Chief of Naval Operations at 0610 December 16 that Johnston was bombarded by two surface ships at 1851 LCT.

(Surface Raid 2 15 December LCT)

The William Ward Burrows informed the commandant the island was shelled at 0510 GCT from the northwest for half an hour. The Burrows' message said the ship apparently had cleared Johnston island without being detected and was cruising along the southern face of Novelty shoal, adding that she expected to return to Johnston as soon as practicable to assist. It was specified that if the [7] ship was detected she would attempt to cross Novelty shoal. Aboard were 77 civilian evacuees removed from Johnston on December 15, before the attack.

A complete report of the shelling was filed to Pearl Harbor at 0830 December 16 as follows: One cruiser or destroyer attacked from the northwest for 10 minutes, firing 10 salvos at a range of 9,000 yards—four guns ladder spot. The second salvo demolished the power house. There were no personnel casualties. Sand Island was not under attack.

The report added that one five inch gun was out of action due to failure of the counter recoil. It said that the Burrows apparently escaped to the southeast after safely delivering its tow.

Johnston reported to the commander of Task Force 4 and CINCPAC (and to the William Ward Burrows for information) in a message filed at 1030 December 16 that at dusk two ships, either destroyers or cruisers, were dimly sighted. Poor visibility and very high seas would have made enemy submarine gunnery difficult and the shooting was excellent, making it doubtful that a submarine attacked. The message advised the Burrows not to return to the island.

[8] A comprehensive report of the damage resulting from this surface attack was filed to the commandant from Johnston at 0110 December 17 as follows:

The enemy registered five hits on buildings, two of which were on the contractors. The power house was completely destroyed and the stills and boilers were badly damaged. With a loss of 20,000 gallons of fresh water, 50,000 gallons remain, enough for 25 days.

It was further stated that two hits on the permanent power house destroyed one generator and caused minor damage to the new boiler and to the power panel. The new still, which would be in operation within four days, would more than provide an adequate water supply, it was reported.

A hit registered on the new mess hall but caused no damage, passing through the building and leaving holes, accurate measurement of which together with large base fragments showed the shells were 5.5 inch caliber and indicated the attack was by light cruisers.

The reported stated that it was not understandable why the Japanese did not complete their job of [9] destruction inasmuch as they had a good range and the island was well lighted by a huge oil fire. It was probable that shots from Johnston shore batteries came close to their mark, the report added.

No attack had been made on Sand Island.

At 0713 December 17, a request was filed from the marine detachment commander for one recoil cylinder complete with piston and filling lube to recommission a 5 inch 51 caliber gun, mark 15.

CINCPAC informed the chief of Naval Operations in a communication at 0928 December 17 that the attack on Johnston was apparently by two light cruisers and had destroyed the power house but caused no casualties among personnel.

*December 17:*

No new attack by the enemy was reported at Johnston.

*December 18:*

CINCPAC in a message to the commander of Task Force 9 and addressed for information to ComTaskForce 4 and NAS Johnston, gave orders to send two patrol planes to Johnston Thursday (18th). These were to report to the [10] commanding officer at Johnston and were to be maintained at that station until further orders.

The commandant informed Johnston at 2055 December 18 that two PSP had been dispatched to that station and should arrive at 1300 LCT. Johnston advised that two patrol seaplanes under Lt. Drake arrived at 2300 GCT December 18.

(Johnston reported that a mud scow sighted adrift at lat. 1722, long. 16955 was apparently the one that departed under tow of Robin.)

Johnston notified the commandant that two PSP departed for Pearl Harbor under Lt. Drake at 0715 LCT, December 20.

At 0507 December 21, Johnston filed a report to the commander of Task Force 9 of arrival of two patrol planes under Lt. Christopher.

In a communication to the Bureau of Yards and Docks (filed at 2000 December 21) the commandant in a summary of a proposed revisal of work plans for Wake, Midway; Palmyra, Johnston and Samoa stated that the proposal for Johnston was to complete the essential projects and provide living and storage facilities, established a coral surface landplane runway of 2,500 feet length, modify other [11] projects as deemed necessary and reduce the contractors' forces 30 per cent, leaving 270 employes.

*December 22:*

(Surface raid 3 LCT 21 December.)

A report of enemy action filed by Johnston at 0800 December 22, informed the commandant that star shells were being fired over the island. A further report at 0921 stated that the enemy fired only star shells and ceased firing after the island's one good 5 inch gun had returned the fire. It was added that the action was probably from a submarine.

The marine detachment requested the commandant for 50 star shells and charges for 5 inch, stating there were only eight remaining.

*December 23:*

A message from Johnston at 0300 December 23 reported that two PSP under Ensign R. Brady arrived at the island at 1300 LCT.

(Surface raid 4 LCT 22 December.)

Johnston filed a report to CINCPAC and the commandant at 0520 December 23 that the island was shelled by a submarine at 0513.

The commandant, in a communication filed at 0635, asked Johnston how large a reinforcement could be taken [12] care of by the island with its present supply of food and water. The reply stated that there was an adequate food and water supply for 200, referring to the island's request of 0800 December 11, plus naval personnel.

Johnston's report of the submarine shelling (filed at 0805 December 23) said that only Sand island was shelled, and that the CAA homing tower had been destroyed but an emergency antenna provided full radiation. Only casualty mentioned was Sergeant James B. Zimmerman who received a contusion on the left shoulder.

A letter from the commanding officer of the air station under date of December 23 describes the shelling of Sand Islet on December 22 as follows:

"At 1843, or just as the ready duty plane had landed and secured to the buoy, a flash of gunfire appeared from outside the North reef. A large submarine was clearly visible. The shell landed about 100 yards over the center of Sand Islet. The second followed about 15 seconds later and was about 20 yards to the left of the far edge of the island. The third was short by about 100 yards. The



fourth struck the CAA homing tower at its base, and the tower fell. Several splinters were thrown against the CAA transmitter building but the six inch thick concrete slabs placed there for protection prevented any damage to [13] the transmitters inside. Several holes were cut through the walls above the slabs but the splinters went out through the roof.

"Sergeant James Bowen Zimmerman, USMC, who was occupying a Browning automatic rifle replacement on a small point of land near the tower was wounded in the left shoulder by a large piece of coral which was thrown by the exploding shell."

The report continued: "Two more shells from the submarine were overs. Just as the sixth was fired, our ready duty plane left the water.

"The 5 inch battery on Johnston fired 10 salvos with each gun at 7,000 yards range before the submarine submerged.

"The submarine submerged just after the plane took off."

#### *December 24:*

On December 24, Johnston notified the commander of Task Force 9 that two PSP under Ensign Brady had departed from the island for Pearl Harbor.

In a communication filed to Johnston at 1811 December 25, the commandant directed that the resident [14] officer in charge and facilities of the contractors' organization be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer for necessary defense and protection measures in the present emergency.

(The island's work program was to include shelters and protection around key structures, the commandant directed.)

It was pointed out that a concrete wall protection around buildings, as recommended by Johnston, was not satisfactory, and that sand bags would be more effective.

After taking care of emergency items, the contractors' force was to complete personnel buildings and services. Temporary storage for ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies, the runway, all essential items must be completed at the earliest possible date to permit the evacuation of civilian employes and make room for military personnel. The permanent bombproof shelter and communication center will not be built as originally planned, the communication advised. Scattered splinter proof shelters would be substituted as needed.

Later the commandant directed that Johnston [15] retain the least number of employes, the total not to exceed 200, to complete the essential defense structures including the runway to 2,500 feet length and to operate mechanical equipment. The least skilled and the nonessential trades would be evacuated first, and the military force would assist with unskilled labor as necessary after evacuation. The previous directive was cancelled. (Ref. 10714 Dec. 26-1640.)

A letter from Major Loomis, commanding the Marine detachment, on a report of the action of December 22, noted that a flash was seen on the last salvo from the shore battery. It was further reported that the following day one of the patrol planes spotted a submarine in a position which agreed with the plotted position of this last shot within three or four hundred yards. This letter written December 24, stated the possibility of having sunk the submarine but this could not be officially claimed until wreckage is found or positive proof is established. It was further reported that the bottom falls off very steeply from the point beneath the plotted position of this last shot.

The marine detachment at Johnston, in a communication filed at 1930 December 25, requested that one [16] searchlight and ten marines be added to the list of requirements for the station (Dec. 11, 0800). It is suggested that planes assigned to the station be used to ferry machine guns and gunners, the message stated.

The resident officer in charge notified the commandant at 2240 December 25 that the force of contractors' employes at Johnston totaled 307.

CINCPAC advised the chief of naval operations (0912 December 25) that a convoy would depart from Pearl Harbor on the 26th to deliver supplies and reinforcements to Johnston.

The Naval Air Station, Johnston, filed a despatch on December 30, stating the supply of 100 octane gasoline on hand December 27 totaled 56,977 gallons.

Another communication on December 30 was addressed to CINCPAC and the commandant in regard to authorization to the commander of Task Group 13.2 to remove 110 civilian employes in accordance with the commandant's evacuation plan filed at 1640 December 26.



## EXHIBIT NO. 29 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] SECRET

## HISTORY OF ACTION OCCURRING AT WAKE ISLAND FROM DECEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 22, AS COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE

*December 7:*

(Air Raid 1 0100 GCT 8 December)

In the first detailed report of the Japanese attack on Wake Island, December 7 (filed to Pearl Harbor at 0840 December 8), it was stated that 25 twin engine land planes attacked with 100 pound bombs incendiary cannon and machine guns at 0100 GCT.

The report of damages listed destruction of eight planes on the ground. The landing field was described as usable. An ample supply of aviation gasoline remained, it was said.

Casualties numbered 25 dead and 30 injured.

In an earlier report (received at Pearl Harbor at 2359 December 7) it was stated that seven marine planes were destroyed, that there were numerous casualties among the aviation personnel. It was further stated that gasoline was on fire at the Pan American Airways base and at the air field.

*December 8:*

A summary of logged messages between Wake Island and Northern Area Australia was received from [2] the Commercial Cable Company by Pearl Harbor on December 9 as follows, with time given as GCT:

(Air Raid 1.)

At 0120, December 8, Wake being bombed by 20 bombers. Many casualties. Help needed. Continuous SOS until 0155.

At 0321, heavy jamming of signals.

At 1000, Wake Island reported a continuing inability to contact Midway island. From 1406 to 1418 signals were jammed.

At 1729 from Wake Island it was reported there were only four planes left and many casualties.

*December 9:*

(Air Raid 2 0117 GCT 9 December.)

The log from the Commercial Cable Company stated at 0117 GCT, December 9, Wake Island just bombed by 20 bombers and planes departed.

A message filed to Pearl Harbor at 0112 December 9 from Wake, addressed to all ships and stations, reported the station bombed with incendiaries and that Camp 2 was ablaze.

Task Unit 7.2.4 reported Wake heavily bombed again at 0030. It was further reported that NCL (radio Wake) could not be contacted.

[3] (Air Raid 3 1900 GCT 9 December.)

The commander of Task Group 7.2 sent a communication to CINCPAC (filed to Pearl Harbor at 1029 December 10) stating that one enemy land plane attacked Wake at 1900 GCT December 9, followed by several planes five hours later. These attacks were opposed by anti-aircraft fire. Damage from the attacks was apparently not as severe as the previous day.

(Air Raid 4 2350 GCT 9 December.)

Wake reported what was termed the third raid in a despatch filed at 2359 December 9, stating that 26 bombers at 20,000 feet attacked at 2350 GCT December 9. Two were owned by fighters. Additional damage was described as slight and there were few casualties. Enemy submarines were sighted southwest of the island.

*December 10:*

(Surface raid.)

(Air Raid 5 2100 GCT 10 December.)

In a message from Wake at 0025 December 11, it was stated that the island had been shelled at dawn. One enemy light cruiser and one destroyer were sunk by shore batteries. The island received its fourth air raid at 2100 GCT December 10. Five bombers had been shot down to date, the report said.

It was reported from Wake via Army radio at 1500 December 10 that casualties among Pacific Naval Air Base Contractors' employees totaled 75, according

[4] to the foreman's estimate. Early evacuation of employees was suggested. Wake advised the Commandant of the district at 2145 December 10, that the island had been shelled at dawn by several light vessels and there were no casualties. One light cruiser and one destroyer were sunk and two transports with an escort of cruisers and destroyers were sighted to the southwest.

(Air Raid 6 2205 GCT 10 December.)

At 2350 December 10, Wake filed a report to the Commandant that an enemy air raid had started at 2205 GCT. Of 17 attacking bombers, two had been shot down by the anti-aircraft batteries. It was reported that no damage resulted from the attack. Three fighters remained in service.

#### *December 11:*

The Commandant reported to naval operations at 0400 December 11 that Wake had been bombed four times and shelled once since outbreak of war. Losses were nine marine planes. Three enemy planes had been destroyed.

The Commandant's message mentioned reports of the sinking of one enemy light cruiser and one destroyer, with several enemy light cruisers and destroyers with transports in the vicinity. It added that landing operations were possibly impending.

[5] This communication also reported that Midway had been under one bombardment on December 8 by cruisers or destroyers armed with six-inch guns and that one air raid had been carried out on December 11. Personnel casualties were described as not extensive.

Both Wake and Midway were still in communication and still resisting, the Commandant's report said.

(Air Raid 7 dawn 11 December.)

A communication filed from Wake to Pearl Harbor at 2035 December 11 stated that a single enemy four engine seaplane attacked at dawn and was brought down by marine fighter planes. A train vessel in convoy was reported severely punished. An attacking submarine was believed sunk by fighters at 0530 GCT December 11. The convoy was apparently headed on course 210 degrees.

CINCPAC was informed by Wake at 2230 that the Hulbert can operate two marine squadrons, that the only spares are in wrecked planes, and facilities exist for one patrol squadron and 125,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

#### *December 12:*

No enemy action reported at Wake.

First casualty list named 30 dead, including 26 (three of whom were officers) from Marine Aircraft Group 21 detachment; two from the defense battalion [6] detachment, and two from navy enlisted personnel. One additional navy enlisted dead was reported in a communication December 13

#### *December 13:*

(Air Raid 8 1630 GCT 13 December.)

Wake notified Pearl Harbor at 1915 December 13 that three Japanese bombers attacked the landing field at 1630 GCT in a moonlight raid and there was no damage. Later (at 2100) the raiders were described as four engine seaplanes. The food supply was listed at 48,000 rations (man days) and the aviation gasoline, 200,000 gallons.

Needs for five and three inch batteries, 50 cal. machine guns, and other required equipment were listed in messages this date.

A communication relayed from Wake through headquarters of the Hawaiian air force on December 14 said that the Army radio station reported about 2040 local time December 13 that the Navy and Pan American Airways radio installations had been destroyed. The Army radio was operating from a basement.

#### *December 14:*

(Air Raid 9 0000 GCT 14 December.)

A message filed by Wake to Pearl Harbor at 0220 December 14 reported an attack of 41 twin engine (B-18 type) planes at 0000 destroyed one fighter on the ground [7] and killed two marines, enlisted. Two of the bombers were shot down and several damaged by anti-aircraft fire.

A later report at 0715 stated that one fighter was out of action due to a forced landing, leaving one effective plane.

In a summary received at 2359, Wake reported that the first two air raids were made at low altitude and were very effective, causing much damage from incendiary bullets together with bombs.

Following plane formations remained at high altitude apparently due to regard for anti-aircraft fire and the fighters.

Numerous heavy bombs were dropped in a ladder pattern, but a slightly deflection error prevented more extensive damage, according to the summary report.

It was added that personnel were fairly well provided with shelters and that construction was underway on emplacement sand covered hangars. Water and fuel supplies remained exposed.

*December 15:*

A message filed from Wake at 0750 December 15 said that one submarine was reported sighted to the southwest of the island this morning, and that one [8] additional plane was now operating. (Two were now in service.)

(Air raid 10 0700 GCT 15 December.)

At 0815 Wake said that six seaplanes (four engine type) made a night attack at 0700 GCT, adding that no damage was ascertainable.

Earlier (at 0216) Wake reported that 300,000 sand bags were required. The commandant informed the bureau of aeronautics that 2,000,000 additional sand bags were needed immediately in the district. This communication was sent at 2114 December 15.

*December 16:*

(Air Raid 11 0215 GCT 16 December.)

Wake reported in a despatch filed to the Commandant at 0245 December 16 that the island was raided by 33 bombers at 0215 GCT. Extent of damage would be given later. At 0845 December 16 it was reported that fuel oil tanks were set on fire in the raid, and there were no casualties.

(Air Raid 12, 0650 GCT, 17 December.)

The commandant was informed by Wake in a communication received at 0901 December 17 that eight four-engine seaplanes attacked a half hour after sunset at 0650 GCT with bombs and machine guns, causing no damage.

[9] Damage by the earlier raids was listed as follows: The principle storehouse containing spare parts and construction material was burned. The machine shop, blacksmith shop and garage were destroyed. Also destroyed were 50 percent of the heavy dogging equipment, 50 percent of transportation including trucks, 80 percent of the Diesel oil supply and the majority of the dynamite supply.

*December 17:*

The commandant, in a communication sent to Wake at 0340 December 17, urged the desirability of continuing the channel dredging and asked for a report on the feasibility of this work under present conditions with existing equipment. He further requested an estimate on the date of completion of dredging from the mouth of the channel to the edge of the turning basin. Also asked if Arthur Foss (tug) had been seen.

The commanding general of the Hawaiian department in a communication to the commandant logged at 2314 December 17 requested the return to Oahu from Wake of one officer and the enlisted men of the Army on duty there in the air corps communication section, [10] stating that army radio equipment involved is available to the Navy's radio personnel, if it could be used.

A detailed view of the situation at Wake was given the commandant in a communication received at 0305 December 18.

The commanding officer reported that his only concern to date has been the island's defense and the preservation of life. He stated that his submitted reports have been from this viewpoint.

In connection with conditions affecting the completion of the channel dredging, he said that no night work could be accomplished because of the necessity of lights which would endanger security.

Because of heavy raids which come without warning, due to the fact that the station has no radar, daylight working hours are limited to six he reported.

Men who are working noisy equipment cannot be given sufficient warning. The equipment has been greatly reduced and there are no facilities for repair. Immediate replenishment of Diesel oil and dynamite supplies is required.

[11] It was added that the morale of civilian workers in general was very low. In view of present conditions no date of completion of the channel could be predicted.

The commanding officer pointed out that it was to be understood that relief from raids would improve the outlook. (The tug Arthur Foss was reported to have sailed on December 5.)



A further report received from Wake at 0310 December 18 said that all buildings on Peale Island had been heavily machine gunned and the walls and roofs were damaged but repairable.

Following is the summary:

Building One William was hit and the frame damaged, and new material was required for repairs. Building Three William was bombed and the frame damaged (Repairs could be made in the field). Building Eleven William was bombed and fire destroyed the structure and all the material in storage. Building Twelve William was bombed and the frame damaged. Building Fourteen William was bombed and the steel damaged.

[12] The report added that since the outbreak of war all of the contractors' organization has been required to assist with the military defense and salvage.

The commanding officer at Wake, in a despatch received at Pearl Harbor at 0324, reported that in addition to his despatch of December 13 (2245) the contractors' dead included approximately 15 unidentified (dead and missing) employes. He reiterated that the general morale was extremely low and suggested that evacuation of employes be considered in that a large number of them were not effective and required subsistence.

(Air Raid 12.)

CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch (0838 December 18) that eight large seaplanes bombed Wake last night. (This report stated there was less activity by the enemy in the Hawaiian Area, and listed an offensive submarine disposition.

*December 18:*

(Air Raid 13 2350 GCT 18 December.)

A message filed to the commandant at 2350 December 18 from Wake reported that the island was attacked by 27 bombers at 2350 GCT and details of the raid would be sent later.

[13] *December 19:*

At 2115 December 19, Wake filed a damage report to the commandant as follows:

The west wing of building No. 41 and buildings Nos. 43 and 44 were badly damaged by heavy bombs. Repair will require replacement of portions of the structural steel framing. Buildings Nos. 15 and 17 received slight damage to steel framing and considerable damage to the roofs and walls. The hull of the channel drill barge will require rebuilding, the report added.

CINCPAC addressed a message to all task force commanders at 1057 December 20 to the effect that the Triton reported at 2055 (today) that it was believed a Japanese submarine was within 25 miles of Wake, bearing south.

*December 20:*

(Air Raid 14 2150 GCT 20 December)

Wake informed the commandant and CINCPAC in a message filed at 2300 December 20 that the island was attacked by approximately one squadron of carrier operated dive bombers at 2150 GCT, and that details of the attack would be sent later. CINCPAC, at 2337, passed this information to commanders of Task Forces 11, 9, 8 and 4.

[14] *December 21:*

(Air Raid 15 0120 GCT 21 December.)

A communication filed by Wake at 0715 December 21 informed the commandant that 17 heavy bombers attacked at 0120 GCT. The damage from this and the preceding raid was summarized as follows: The 3-inch battery was struck, and one enlisted man (Sergeant John Alden E. Wright) was killed. The director was destroyed and only one 3-inch gun of the four gun battery remained effective.

The communication added that the power plant was damaged, more of the diesel oil was hit, and buildings and equipment destroyed. No more carrier planes had participated in the latter raid, it was indicated.

The commandant's summary to the Bureau of Yards and Docks regarding curtailment of contract work stated the proposed program for Wake was to stop all construction work and maintain only a sufficient contractors' force to operate essential mechanical equipment in addition to doing work of an emergency nature. It was estimated a force of 250 would be required to carry out this program.

[15] CINCPAC requested a report from Wake on the condition of the land-plane runways, specifying information regarding any change (Filed at 2145 December 21.)



*December 22:*

CINCPAC, in a message filed at 1619 December 22, informed Wake that Task Units 7.2.4. and 7.2.3. were returning to Pearl Harbor and that no friendly vessels should be in the vicinity of the island this day. He asked Wake to keep him informed.

(Air Raid 16 0120 GCT 22 December.)

At 0740 December 22, Wake reported to the commandant and CINCPAC that a combination of land and carrier based enemy planes attacked at 0120 GCT. Carrier bombers were accompanied by modern fighter planes, the report said, adding that the island's fighters engaged the enemy and Lt. Davidson was lost and Capt. Freuler was wounded. Several enemy planes were shot down. There was no further damage, the report said.

A later report (filed at 1445 December 22) from Wake stated that there was gunfire between ships to the northeast of the island. A message from Wake to Task Unit 7.2.3 (delivered at 1547) reported a submarine unit [16] in the vicinity of the island.

(Surface Raid 1550 GCT 22 December.)

At 1550 December 22 Wake informed the commandant and CINCPAC that the island was under gun fire and apparently a landing attempt was underway by the enemy.

At 1800 December 22, Wake reported that the enemy was on the island and that the issue was in doubt.

A report filed at 1952 advised that the enemy was on the island, that several ships and a transport were moving in and that two enemy destroyers were aground.

Personnel on Wake during the period of attacks has been totaled as follows: Of the First Marine Defense Battalion, 15 officers and 373 enlisted men, (these figures include one naval officer and six navy enlisted men); Marine Aircraft Group 21, 12 officers and 49 enlisted men (including one Navy enlisted man); Naval Air Station, six officers and 28 enlisted men; Patrol Wing, four officers and 30 enlisted men; [17] Contractors' employees, 1,146; Pan American Airways employees, one white and 42 Chamorros. Mr. H. P. Hevenor, of the Budget Bureau, was also on the island.

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EXHIBIT No. 30 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Wake Island, December 20, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commanding Officer, NAS Wake.  
To: Commandant, 14th Naval District.  
Subject: Report on conditions at Wake Island.

1. The first raid on Wake came just before noon, 8 December, 1941. Wake had four fighters in the air, and the battery was in condition one. Remaining eight fighters were on ground spotted about one hundred yards apart. They were being serviced with ammunition and bombs. A force of about twenty-seven two-engine landplanes glided out of low clouds directly over landing field and released a heavy load of light and a few heavy bombs. An extremely heavy and accurate strafing attack was carried on at the same time. Four planes received direct bomb hits and three others were set on fire. The eighth was struck several times but was later put into commission. Tents about the field were riddled. Two large gasoline tanks and a large number of filled drums were set on fire. Three officers and twenty-one men on the field were killed or received wounds from which they died. One fifteen hundred gal. gas truck was destroyed.

2. The formation continued over camp two, strafing this area. Immediately thereafter Pan Air was heavily bombed and machine gunned. The hotel burned and nearly all facilities were burned or wrecked. A large number of gasoline drums were fired. Five chamorro employees of Pan Air killed.

3. The Pan Air clipper, Captain Hamilton commanding, had been unloaded preparatory to use as a patrol plane. At about 1250 he took off for Midway with all Pan Air white personnel, and all passengers excepting Mr. H. P. Hevenor of the Bureau of the Budget, who remains and is well.

4. Immediately steps were undertaken to disperse personnel, distribute food and water supplies, and get aviation gasoline divided into small amounts. These measures have been continued to date, together with construction of open banked-

up plane emplacements and two covered hangars in which work can be done at night, though they are by no means bombproof.

5. The second raid occurred at 1130 9 December 1941, was delivered by about twenty-five planes from about eight thousand feet. The attack was concentrated on camp two and the Naval Air Station. The contractors' hospital, a number of barracks buildings, aerological building, construction material and spare parts storehouse, machine shop, garage and blacksmith shop, air [2] station storehouse filled with stores and advance base equipment, were destroyed. The radio station was riddled and a large part of the equipment destroyed. Many other buildings and a large percentage of equipment were damaged. Two bombers were shot down. Others believed damaged.

6. Two hospital units and a communications center were established in three empty magazines. Due to several near hits in raid of 19 December, these are being removed to dugouts in a less dangerous location. Five more service deaths occurred in second raid, and a number of civilian deaths. Some of those killed were wounded in hospital.

7. Later raids added to damage to buildings and equipment. Raid of 14 December destroyed one airplane on ground and killed two men. Otherwise raids since 9 December have produced no casualties and relatively little damage to defenses. However, there have been many heavy bombs which have fallen very close to objectives.

8. Our escape from more serious damage may be attributed to the effectiveness of AA fire and the heroic actions of fighter pilots, who have never failed to push home attacks against heavy fire. The performance of these pilots is deserving of all praise. They have attacked air and surface targets alike with equal abandon. That none has been shot down is a miracle. Their planes (two now remain) are full of bullet holes. Two forced landings, fortunately without injury to pilots, have occurred with loss of planes.

9. The AA battery has been fighting with only about fifty percent of necessary fire control equipment. Four guns are useless against aircraft. One four gun unit is actually being controlled by data received from another unit several miles distant.

10. Only 1 and 1/4 units anti-aircraft (3 inch ammunition) remain.

W. S. CUNNINGHAM.

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EXHIBIT No. 31 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION

NA41/S80(09)

PALMYRA ISLAND

DJW/Fe

*Confidential.*

From: Commanding Officer.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Action, report of.

Reference: (a) Article 712, U. S. Navy Regulations.

1. At 0455 GCT, 24 December, 1941, this station was fired on by an unidentified submarine. The submarine was first sighted S. E. of the island on bearing 110° (T) from the water tower, about 3,000 yards off shore, and fired six rounds from a gun estimated to be about 3". The U. S. E. D. Dredge SACRAMENTO was visible to the submarine between two small islands along the south reef, and was evidently used as a point of aim. Apparently a rising ladder spot was used and the fall of shot was not observed in time to concentrate fire. The first three salvos were short, the fourth a direct hit, the remaining salvos were overs. The hitting shell struck a boat davit, splintered, and raked the dredge, causing minor damage.

2. All batteries were in Condition I before the action. The submarine was sighted by the 5" control party on No. 3 Island before firing commenced, but pointers and trainers had great difficulty in picking up the target due to darkness and low elevation of gun platforms. Two (2) star shells and twelve (12) Navy Common 5' A. P. shells were fired by the battery. No hits were observed but the submarine was forced to dive.

3. Upon sounding of the alarm, stations were manned expeditiously and without confusion by service personnel not on gun crews and civilian volunteer parties. Morale was excellent.

4. Action is being taken to elevate gun platforms in order to improve visibility of pointers and trainers.

5. There were no casualties to personnel.

D. J. WELSH.

EXHIBIT No. 32 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] NA40/A9-8  
Ser. 0185

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Johnston Island, December 19, 1941.

*Confidential.*

From: The Commanding Officer.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Attack on Johnston Island.

1. The U. S. S. BURROWS arrived off Johnston Island on the afternoon of December 15th and anchored about three miles south of the turning basin at approximately 1500 in order to deliver her tow to this station and to evacuate civilian workmen.

2. Inasmuch as the Contractors had only two small tugs of about 100 horse power each, and a good sea was running, they experienced some difficulty in handling the heavy barge which was loaded with about 1400 tons of cargo.

3. Meanwhile the two Navy forty foot motor launches brought off the seventy-seven civilian workmen that were to be evacuated from Johnston Island.

4. The Commanding Officer went aboard the BURROWS and was surprised to learn that no naval escort had contacted that ship prior to her arrival at Johnston. It was anticipated that at least one destroyer would probably meet the BURROWS here and escort her to Pearl Harbor. This seemed to indicate one of two things: either all available combatant were at sea seeking contact with the enemy far to the Westward or our fleet was so badly battered that no ships could be spared away from Pearl Harbor for escort duty. Either assumption seemed to indicate that we could expect no supplies from Pearl Harbor for at least a month. Arrangements were therefore made with the BURROWS for the transfer of all available meat, fresh vegetables, welding oxygen, and some Marine Corps supplies such as sand bags.

5. Because the two small tugs were still struggling with the heavy barge and would probably be fortunate to bring it safely within the harbor by dark it was not feasible to effect the transfer of these supplies before morning. It was planned that the BURROWS should remain at anchor and a lighter would be brought alongside at dawn. The anchorage was considered relatively safe from submarines because that area is known to be studded with coral heads which is probably known to the enemy.

[2] 6. At 1850 (Johnston Island keeps Zone plus 10½ time) the tower sentry reported a flash to the northward. All hands went to General Quarters. The 5" and 3" batteries are manned continuously and therefore observed the initial flash. A radio striker was walking towards the radio shack and also saw the opening shots. He immediately informed the radio supervisor who sent out the initial message at 0520 GCT. Nothing could be seen with the naked eye except the flash of the gunfire. It was dusk and there was a small squall to the northward. Visibility to the southward was excellent. Johnston Island and the BURROWS stood out in good relief. Wind was from 070° T, 20 knots, Seas, force 7.

7. The flashes continued at intervals of about twenty seconds. Various observers reported the first shells as over or shorts. However, as no one observed both sides of the island at the same time, and no shorts or overs have been recovered to date, it appears reasonable to assume that the first shots were not hits. The third salvo, however, landed in the vicinity of the Contractors' power house. One shell passed through the upper part of the building and caused only a moderate amount of damage from splinters. The second, struck a pole outside the power house, exploded, and showered a 1200 gallon oil tank just outside of the power house. The tank went up in flames setting fire to the power house. Some splinters went into a 50,000 gallon fresh water tank which is located under the large water tower about 150 feet to the westward.

8. Two more shells struck the permanent power house at the eaves of the roof and about thirty feet apart. They showered the interior of the building with fragments, causing some damage to one new generator, the electric power panel and various piping. No fire was started.



9. The two power house operators immediately secured the boilers and ran from the building. One jumped into a manhole alongside the road. The burning oil soon spread and ran down the road. The operator who took shelter in the manhole was in a dangerous spot when the oil ran in the hole. He quickly climbed out and luckily escaped with only minor burns on his hands. The damage control crew arrived on the scene and fought the blaze with sand and salt water.

10. The fifth hit passed through the permanent mess hall without exploding and continued to a spot near the road where it exploded and left a small crater about one foot deep and two feet in diameter in the soft earth. This shell made a very clean entry hole that measured 5.5 inches in diameter. Its exit on the opposite bulkhead of the building was about 4.5 x 5 inches and very ragged. There were several other holes on each side of the exit hole about three inches long. The reason for the clean hole on one side is believed due to the shell passing through canex wall board. The exit was through wood which splintered and partially sprung back into place.

[3] 11. As observed from the Naval Air Station at Sand Islet, Johnston Island seemed doomed. The large oil fire was near the up-wind end and seemed in good position to sweep down the entire length of the island which lies with its long axis in the direction of the prevailing wind. The buildings and water tower were well illuminated by the blaze which rose to an estimated height of fifty feet.

12. Our five inch battery control personnel could not make out the enemy ships, but from the flashes of gunfire, estimated the range as 9,000 yards. The guns were laid in the general direction of the enemy flashes and fire was returned. Three rounds of star shell and seven of common were fired. One gun pointer "thought" he saw a dim object in his telescope. Nothing was sighted for certain. Shortly after our battery opened fire, the enemy ceased and never opened up again although he apparently had the correct range and the target was well illuminated.

13. The heavy black smoke from the oil fire further prevented the five inch battery, which is on the leeward end of the island, from seeing the enemy. The fire continued to burn for approximately forty-five minutes and was finally brought under control after leveling the contractors power house.

14. Soon after Johnston Island was afire the BURROWS got underway and stood to the southward.

15. Our three-inch AA battery director and height finder operators did pick up the enemy. The range was between 9,000 yards and 10,000 yards. There were at least two ships. It seemed that the attacking force consisted of surface craft, rather than a submarine. The operators were positive that one ship was larger than the other. It is possible that the ships were a light cruiser and a destroyer.

16. Several valuable lessons were learned from this experience. First, all wires should be underground if possible. The shell that exploded on the pole outside the Contractors power house severed the telephone connections between Johnston Island and the Naval Air Station Sand Islet. A boat had to be despatched from Sand Islet to Johnston to determine the extent of damage and casualties. On returning the dark, the boat struck a coral head and remained there until morning. It is noted that a 2300 volt power is strung on poles approximately half the length of the island. It is highly recommended that in future installations all power lines be run in trenches. Second, the instantaneous bursting shell does not make a large hole in the ground, therefore, if personnel are in shelters that are moderately well protected (two or three feet of sand overhead) it is probable that they will not suffer from this [4] type of attack. Third, unprotected oil and water tanks and power houses are extremely vulnerable. Inasmuch as these facilities are so important to outlying island bases, it is recommended that immediate steps be taken to protect all oil and water tanks and the power houses from shell splinters. A one foot thick reinforced concrete wall around these installations should be adequate. Fourth, the arrangement of the wooden structures at Johnston Island is dangerous from a fire standpoint, because they are arranged in a single line along the long axis of the island which corresponds to the prevailing wind direction. A fire well started on the up-wind end may clear all of these buildings. The hospital and B. O. Q. (Yet to be build) are on the downward end of the line. It is strongly recommended that instead of building the highly combustible hospital building, that a partially underground structure of bomb-proof construction be substituted in its place. This is considered vital for good morale. It would be damaging on morale to have sick or wounded men confined in a tinder-box hospital building while their



shipmates took refuge in bombproof shelters during an air raid. Fifth, it is believed that the high water tower was the point of aim which afforded the enemy such an excellent target. The five known hits are uniformly disposed about the target in deflection. His range error on these five hits would plot about 10 yards plus or minus from this tower. It is recommended that in future outlying island development that high water towers be eliminated, and replaced by pumping systems to supply water pressure. Sixth, it is believed that the outlying islands have little to fear from surface raiders. They apparently do not push home their attacks if opposition is encountered. This is substantiated by reports from the defense forces at Wake and Midway.

17. The Commanding Officer believes that this station may be subjected to other attacks in the near future, but believes that they will be from a carrier. The enemy planes apparently push home their attacks when they know that no fighter opposition is to be expected. Even if fighters are stationed here a determined enemy can get in an attack, if he will accept some losses. Therefore, it is recommended that bombproof personnel shelters and splinter protection for oil and water tanks and the power house have priority over any further wooden building construction. It is further recommended that the seaplane ramp on Johnston Island be constructed so that the Air Station may be moved to that island and services to patrol planes and land planes be coordinated, and the large 100,000 gallon gasoline stowage may be used by the patrol planes.

R. H. DALE.

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EXHIBIT No. 33 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

05—*Combat for.*

Orders issued  
since.

[1] *Confidential*

*Confidential*

Summary of new instructions, orders, and arrangements issued since 7 December, 1941, pertaining to the security of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet.

Summaries are arranged by dates and in chronological order. While such directives are believed to be complete in the case of type commanders concerned, there may be additional directives issued by the Commander-in-Chief which are not included in this particular file.

[2]

DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET

Cincpac confidential mailgram 100143 of December 1941. Re: Redistribution of available ammunition.

Cincpac mailgram 111310 of December 1941. Re: Forwarding of intelligence data (insignia, name plates, etc.) to Fleet Intelligence.

Cincpac despatch 122135 of December 1941. Re: Modification of liberty restrictions to permit  $\frac{1}{4}$  of complement of officers and men on liberty between 0900 and 1700 daily.

Cincpac confidential mailgram 131024 of December 1941. Re: Removal 4-5'' A. A. guns, etc., from CALIFORNIA for installation ashore.

Cincpac confidential letter serial 02025 of 13 December 1941. Re: Ships in port maintaining Condition "YOKE" or "ZED" and manning all A. A. batteries.

Cincpac confidential mailgram 160011 of December 1941. Re: Removal supply of paint except for necessary touching up, etc.

[3] Pacific Fleet confidential memo No. 9CM-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Maintenance of ships, Pacific Fleet.

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 18CL-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Responsibility of Force, Type, Task Force, Unit and Ship Commanders for conservation of fuel.

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 17CL-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Approach doctrine for friendly naval aircraft.

Pacific Fleet confidential notice No. 21CN-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Painting of naval ships.

Cincpac confidential mailgram 182243 of December 1941. Re: Modification of liberty restrictions to grant over-night liberty to officers and enlisted men with families ashore; not over  $\frac{1}{4}$  personnel to be absent during either daily liberty period or overnight liberty period.

Cincpac confidential letter serial 02084 of December 21, 1941. Re: Coordination of patrol aircraft with light forces in night search and attack.

Cincpac confidential serial 02079 of December 22, 1941. Re: Air patrol plan for sorties and entrance.

[4] Hickam Field memorandum of 21 December, 1941. Re: Conference between representatives of Comatwing TWO and Hawaiian Air Force on method of aircraft identification markings.

Cincpac confidential serial 02078 of 21 December, 1941. Re: Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense—Directives in regard thereto.

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 20CL-41 of 21 December 1941. Re: Condition of readiness requirements for Conditions I to IV, respectively.

Pacific Fleet confidential memorandum No. 10CM-41 of December 22, 1941. Re: Spotting location of mines dropped from enemy aircraft.

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 15CL-41 of December 22, 1941. Re: Initial berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor to facilitate delivery of fuel and ammunition, etc., and final berthing to expedite repairs, provide security, facilitate sortie, etc.

Cincpac confidential serial 02091, of December 22, 1941. Re: Instructions for Anti-submarine patrol by aircraft on day escort duty.

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 19CL-41 of 23 December 1941. Re: Supplementary Instructions for Escort Commanders and Commanding Officers of Escort Vessels.

[5] Pacific Fleet confidential notice No. 22CN-41 of December 23, 1941. Re: Control of anti-aircraft fire from ships in Pearl Harbor—"Open fire", "check fire", "cease fire" etc., orders to be sent by the Naval anti-aircraft artillery representative.

Cincpac confidential serial 02107 of December 24, 1941. Re: Stationing of salvage tugs outside the net, in the channel, whenever heavy ships enter or leave Pearl Harbor, to render assistance and prevent a damaged ship from grounding in such a manner as to block the channel.

Cincpac confidential serial 02115 of December 24, 1941. Re: Protection, by target rafts, of cruisers berthed in Pearl Harbor, in so far as equipment permits.

Cincpac confidential serial 02120 of 25 December 1941. Re: All reasonable assistance from radio, radar and lights to be given to aircraft returning to Oahu during darkness.

Cincpac conf. serial 02121 of 25 December, 1941. Re: Employment and modification of Motor Torpedo Boats.

Cincpac conf. serial 02132 of 26 December, 1941. Re: Unified Grid System for Location of Positions in Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.

Cincpac restricted serial 2981 of 28 December, 1941. Re: Surprise Attack. Sundays and Holidays.

[6] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

Combatfor confidential serial 01203 of 13 December 1941 (and Cincpac's endorsement thereto). Re: Suspension of steel plates from bottom of torpedo rafts for torpedo protection.

[7] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER AIRCRAFT

Comairbatfor confidential mailgram 121800 of December 1941. Re: Canopy covers on planes, etc., and take all necessary precautions to prevent reflection on surfaces.

Comairbatfor (Comtaskfor 8) visual despatch 161812 of December 1941. Re: Conditions of readiness in port.

[8] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER BATTLESHIPS

Combatships confidential memorandum No. 2 of 10 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation of various despatches on current subjects.

Combatships confidential mailgram 110230 of December 1941. Re: Manning complete A. A. batteries continuously by MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and PENNSYLVANIA.

Combatships confidential mailgram 110717 of December 1941. Re: School of motion picture instructions for training in plane identification.

Combatships confidential mailgram 110850 of December 1941. Re: Reorganiza-

tion of CALIFORNIA and NEVADA of A. A. defense groups of 450 per ship. Combatships confidential memorandum No. 4 of 13 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation of information on current subjects.

Combatships confidential mailgram 132005 of December 1941. Re: Repainting of ships with new formula and eliminate all bright or reflecting surfaces topside.

[9] Combatships confidential mailgram 140027 of December 1941. Re: Recommending use of 5''-51 caliber batteries against torpedo planes.

Combatships confidential mailgram 160132 of December 1941. Re: School for enemy plane identification.

Combatships confidential mailgram 162030 of December 1941. Re: Distribution of battleship boats upon ships going to sea.

Combatships confidential mailgram 162039 of December 1941. Re: Taking aboard planes and aviation personnel before going to sea.

Combatships confidential mailgram 170925 of December 1941. Re: Preventive precautions against underwater damage by liquid layers inside oil tanks.

Combatships confidential mailgram 180055 of December 1941. Re: Damaged battleships reduce number retained officers.

Combatships confidential memorandum No. 6 of 19 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation of information on current subjects.

[10] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER CRUISER, BATTLE FORCE

Comcrubatfor despatch 112120 of December 1941. Re: Recall of officers and enlisted personnel assigned Fleet Machine Gun School and Base Force Camera Party.

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01392 of 14 December 1941. Re: General notes on maintenance of readiness for action.

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01395 of 15 December 1941. Re: General directives on development of fighting power.

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01412 of 21 December 1941. Re: War readiness of batteries, ammunition and ammunition supplies.

Comcrubatfor confidential mailgram 210032 of December 1941. Re: Setting of condition of readiness 3 in anti-aircraft and machine gun batteries.

[11] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER DESTROYER BATTLE FORCE

Comdesbatfor confidential serial 01659 of 13 December 1941. Re: Condition of readiness of battery for destroyers and tenders.

Comdesbatfor despatch 0407 BT of 14 December 1941. Re: Handling of berth assignment by Comdesbatfor for all destroyers with view to developing maximum effective A. A. fire.

Comdesbatfor confidential mailgram 141913 of December 1941. Re: Alertness of destroyer commanders during sortie and entry.

Destroyer information bulletin No. 1 of 14 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation of information on current subjects.

Comdesbatfor confidential mailgram 152143 of December 1941. Re: Screening vessels accompanying entering ships as close to point Affirm as practicable.

Comdesbatfor confidential serial 01666 of 16 December 1941. Re: Comment on loss of submarine contacts.

Destroyer harbor information bulletin No. 2 of 19 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation of information on current subjects.

[12] Comdesbatfor confidential serial 01691 of December 23, 1941. Re: Naval base defense conditions prescribed for Destroyers and Destroyer Tenders.

[13] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

Cominbatfor letter FF12-6/L9-3 of December 7, 1941. Re: Completion of overhaul and repairs of Mine Division ONE at earliest possible date.

Cominbatfor confidential 1st End. FF12-6/A79(06) of December 12, 1941. Re: Additional Anti-aircraft Machine Guns for Mine Division ONE.

[14] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER BASE FORCE

Combasefor confidential mailgram 152100 of December 1941. Re: Limited provisions on board to maximum of six weeks' supply.

Combasefor restricted mailgram 200032 of December 1941. Re: Transfer of motor boats from damaged battleships to Com 14 for harbor patrol.



## [15] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER SUBMARINE SCOUTING FORCE

- Comsubscfor serial 1872 of 10 December 1941. Re: Dispersal of living quarters of command personnel to reduce hostile air raid casualties.
- Comsubscfor confidential serial 01088 of 13 December 1941. Re: Setting material conditions for ships in Pearl. (Cinepac confidential serial 02025 of 13 December.)
- Comsubscfor confidential serial 01091 of 15 December 1941. Re: Providing of submarines with double purpose guns with mixture of A. A. and common projectiles.
- Comsubscfor letter No. 24-41 (Revised), of 16 December 1941. Re: Detailed instructions on special internal security measures for all ships of Commander Submarine Scouting Force.
- Comsubscfor confidential serial 01103 of 19 December 1941. Re: Dispersal of submarines and tenders to lessen chances of damage from air raids.
- Comsubscfor confidential mailgram 200103 of December 1941. Re: Manning of machine guns and A. A. Batteries by U. S. S. PELIAS.
- Comsubscfor confidential letter No. 13-41 of 20 December 1941. Re: Destruction bill for preventing seizure and compromise of classified material in submarines operating in hostile waters or on hazardous duty.
- [16] Comsubscfor confidential serial 01108 of 22 December 1941. Re: Verbal directives for: (1) armed sentries ashore, (2) setting of command watch composed of senior submarine officers, (3) camouflage of submarines in Pearl, (4) escort of incoming and outbound submarines.

## [17] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER PATROL WING ONE

- Patwing One order No. 30-41 of November 22, 1941. Re: Internal Security—Watches and Duties.
- Compatwing One confidential file AS/(3) of December 9, 1941. Re: General Instructions for Security Watches.
- Compatwing One confidential letter AS(3) 0248, enclosure (C), of Dec. 23, 1941. Re: Itemized list of security measures taken by Commander Patrol Wing ONE and by Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., since December 7, 1941.

## [18] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO

- Naval base defense air force order 4-41 of 17 December 1941. Re: Security and readiness (material and operational) for aircraft based ashore.
- Security measures established by aircraft tenders at Hilo. (Undated). Re: General security measures for tenders moored at Hilo.
- Verbal instructions to naval shore-based aircraft. Re: Alertness of aircraft and daily schedules.
- [19] 1. Retain ships (BB, CV, and CA) in Pearl only long enough to fuel and prepare for sea. Keep ships at sea when ever practicable.
2. Use Pearl only as required because of necessity to fuel or for essential machinery overhaul.
3. AA guns manned at all times and at General Quarters. No main battery or 5"-51 magazines to be opened except by order of C. O.
4.  $\frac{3}{4}$  crew and officers on board.
5. Two hours notice for getting underway unless longer period authorized.
6. Use of nets and target rafts as torpedo protection.
7. Combined staffs of C-in-C and Combatfor.
8. Reorganized work of Staff and in watches for Tactical Section.
9. Increased space available for Staff work.
10. Issued policy re plane readiness after unity of command effective.
11. Installed AA Guns of badly damaged ships.
12. Organized communications with Army Intelligence Center and Harbor Control.
13. Concurred in disablement of Army outlying fields and preparing main field for instant demolition.
14. Assigned certain fleet units to Comdt. 14 for escort and patrol.



15. Made recommendations re depth of rafts.
16. Assigned all aircraft from ships in port to Combatwing Two.
17. Organized a task unit of 2 VP's for attack missions.
18. Reorganized communication facilities to provide more direct service between CincPac Tac., Combatwing Two, Com 14 and Army Int. Center.
19. Organized mine effective system for sorties and entries.
20. Dispersed submarine units so far as practicable.
21. Reassigned officer and enlisted personnel of inoperative ships.
22. Created salvage group for sorties and entries.
23. Provided uniform grid system for all control and intelligence stations and operating units.
24. Established censorship.
25. Appointed temporarily a more experienced Chief of Staff for Operations.
- [20] 26. Used planes to search to maximum of number and radius to return before dark. Many inexperienced pilots makes night return hazardous during blackout.
27. Gave Army additional radar equipment and personnel.
28. Made air organization more effective.
29. Wrote letter to Commanding General about beach patrol.
30. Organized supply parties for DD's at Merry Point.
31. Blackout.

(At this point in the original exhibit there is inserted a rough sketch map of Pearl Harbor showing a berthing plan for ships with names of ships berthed inserted on the map. This map is reproduced as Item No. 44 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

jb

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12(2)  
A16(1)/(96)  
Serial 2981

PEARL HARBOR, December 28, 1941.

*Restricted*

*Pacific Fleet Notice 45N-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: Pacific Fleet.  
Subject: Surprise Attack, Sundays and Holidays.

1. Regardless of directives previously issued on the subject, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is fully aware that the events of December 7, 1941, have caused all ships and stations of the Pacific Fleet to assume a constant state of readiness against surprise attack.

2. However, it should be especially noted that the Japanese and German tactics and psychology make Sundays and holidays likely days for attacks.

3. Therefore, Commanding Officers of all ships and stations of the Pacific Fleet are enjoined to be particularly vigilant on Sundays and holidays to guard against surprise attacks. Care should be taken in granting liberty and shore leave in accordance with existing instructions so that essential armament and ship stations can be manned and maintained in prescribed state of readiness.

W. S. PYE

*Distribution: (7CM-41)*

List II, Case 2, P, X.

ND11-ND14; EN3; NA11, 12, 13, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38; NB18;  
NY8-10; QA.

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16-3/AD/(11)  
Serial 02132

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 26, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Naval Base Defense Force

Subject: Unified Grid System for Location of Positions in Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.

Reference:

- (a) N. L. B. D. F. Order No. 1.
- (b) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter 16CL-41.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memorandum 10CM-41.

1. The subject system was furnished ships of the Pacific Fleet by reference (b). It will be noted that paragraph 3 of reference (b) limits the use of the chart to certain purposes. Paragraph 6 of reference (a) is not in accord with paragraph 3 of reference (b).

2. Reference (c) applies to ships in port where it will be difficult to use the system prescribed in reference (a).

3. It is, therefore, requested that paragraph 6 of reference (a) be modified to provide that reports be made as provided in paragraph 3 of reference (c).

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Chief of Staff for Operations.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No.  
A2-11/FF12  
H1-3/(12)  
Serial 01989

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 4, 1941.

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 16CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U. S. Army Position Grid—Hawaiian Area.

Enclosure: (A) Construction and Method of Use of U. S. Army Position Grid for Hawaiian Area.

1. The U. S. Army uses a "unified grid system" for designating positions. The part of this system covering the Hawaiian Area is described in enclosure (A).

2. Each unit of the Pacific Fleet is directed to delineate this system on a copy of U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is requesting the preparation of an overprint chart from the Hydrographer, but it will be some time before this will be ready for issue.

3. This chart is to be used only for identifying positions reported by the U. S. Army or in reporting positions direct to the Army. It is not to be used for purposes to which the Naval operating area chart is applicable.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (7CM-41)

List II, Case 2.

P. X. EN3, EN22, NA11, NA12, NA31, NA37,  
NB18, NB49, ND11-14, NY8-NY10.

Cincaf (10).

Cinclant (50).

P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

USS Penn.—113—12-4-41—1300.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/QL/  
A16-3/AS/  
Serial 02121

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commander Base Force.  
Subject: Motor Torpedo Boats—Employment and Modification of.

1. The employment of motor torpedo boats in harbor defense suggests certain modifications which may improve their usefulness. It is understood that 600-lb. depth charges are too heavy for the light construction of the boats when handled on the stern, and that the 300-lb. depth charge cannot be set to detonate in less than fifty feet of water.

2. Please investigate the possibilities of removing the two after torpedo tubes, replacing them with racks capable of carrying and releasing 300-lb. depth charges, and of modifying the depth charge pistol to permit detonation of the charge in thirty feet of water.

W. S. PYE.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/VZ/(95)  
Serial 02120

DA

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 25 December 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.  
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.  
Subject: Return of Aircraft to Oahu during Darkness—Use of Lights for.

1. Because of the extensive daily aircraft search now in effect, involving return to Oahu during darkness of numerous planes at approximately the same time, and because of the considerable period during which these planes have been flying in darkness prior to their arrival and the difficult problem in orientation imposed by the approach sector requirements, the Commander-in-Chief desires that planes returning during darkness be given all reasonable assistance from radio, radar and lights.

2. Commander Patrol Wing TWO is, accordingly, authorized to employ these types of assistance as may, in his opinion, be necessary either as a matter of routine or under special circumstances.

3. With respect to lights that are not under the direct control of Commander Patrol Wing TWO, the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District shall promptly comply with requests made by Commander Patrol Wing TWO. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall specify what lights are required, what time or times they shall be lighted and shall, further, inform the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District promptly when they are no longer needed and may be turned off.

4. Commander Patrol Wing TWO is requested, in exercising this authority, to keep the use of all lights to a reasonable minimum consistent with safety of aircraft.

W. S. PYE.

Copy to:

ComGenHawDept  
ComGenHawAirForce

P. C. CROSLY, *Flag Secretary.*

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
11/A16-3(S)/(01-Op)  
Serial 02115

(Es)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 24, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Berthing in Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 15CL-41, (File A2-11/FF12/H1-1/(12) Serial 02081 of 22 December 1941).

1. Paragraph 4 of reference (a) is quoted:

"Capital ships moored in berths exposed to air torpedo fire will be protected by target rafts at all times. Commander Base Force is hereby directed to make these target rafts available to the Harbor Control Officer for this purpose."

2. The Commander-in-Chief desires that in so far as equipment permits, Cruisers be protected by target rafts.

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
Chief of Staff for Operations.

*Distribution: (Special)*

Opnav (5)

Combatfor (5)

Comscofor (5)

Combasefor (5)

Comcruscofor (35) for distribution to Cruscofor.

Comcrubatfor (25) for distribution to Crubatfor.

P. C. Crosley

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

12-23-41-(150)

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A4-3/QL/(12)  
Serial 02107

Sn

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Dec. 24, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Commander Base Force.

Subject: Sortie and Entry to Pearl Harbor—Salvage Tugs.

1. Whenever heavy ships enter or leave Pearl Harbor, Commander Base Force will station salvage tugs (NAVAJO and SEMINOLE if available) in the channel outside the net, to render assistance and prevent a damaged ship from grounding in such a manner as to block the channel.

2. Whenever the Harbor Control Officer authorizes transit of the channel by a heavy ship or ships, he will inform Commander Base Force sufficiently in advance to permit carrying out this order.

3. "Heavy ship", in this order, means battleships, carriers, cruisers, and auxiliaries over 3000 tons or more than 300 feet in length.

W. S. PYE.

P. C. CROSLY, *Flag Secretary.*



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

[1] Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12/  
A16-3/CV/(11)  
Serial 02083

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 23, 1941.

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 19CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Supplementary Instructions for Escort Commanders and Commanding Officers of Escort Vessels.

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 12CL-41

1. Reference (a) contains instructions and information for the guidance of escort commanders and commanding officers of escort vessels. The instructions and information contained herein are supplementary to those of reference (a), which has six sections. This letter therefore starts with the seventh section.

(VII) *General Convoy Procedure.*

(71) It is to be expected that each ship of a convoy will have information as to:

- (a) Sortie and entrance plans (where applicable),
- (b) The formation, and disposition of ships in the convoy.
- (c) Convey speed,
- (d) Codes, and ciphers,
- (e) Procedure in reduced visibility,
- (f) Zig-zagging procedure and evasive course methods,
- (g) Action to take in case of separation or straggling from convoy (rendezvous),
- (h) Necessity of steaming completely darkened at night,
- (i) Dangers inherent in straggling, smoking, throwing refuse over the side,
- (j) Necessity of maintaining radio silence.
- (k) Emergency signals.

(72) Normally, convoys are to be expected to be formed on a broad front with four to five ships in column with:

- (a) Defensively armed and/or fast ships in outer columns or in the rear,
- (b) Ships in starboard or port columns according to destination (where applicable),
- (c) Heavy ships not stationed astern of lighter ones,
- (d) Valuable cargoes and oil tankers in inner columns,
- (e) Motor ships at rear of columns because of erratic station keeping.

[2] (73) (a) Certain vessels in convoy may be expected to hold the following publications, and to be instructed in their use:

- (1) Merchant Navy Code and Decode.
- (2) Recoding Tables for (1).
- (3) Merchant Ship War W/T Call Sign.
- (4) Mersigs.
- (5) Zig-zag diagrams (1940).
- (6) International Code of Signals.

(b) U. S. flag vessels in convoy are to be expected to hold such of the above as may have been issued plus:

- (1) U. S. Merchant Vessel Secret Call Signs (under preparation).
- (2) Merchant Ship Cipher.
- (3) F. T. P. 189 (which contains instructions to U. S. flag convoys).

(74) It is expected that during an attack by the enemy the convoy will carry out the Convoy Doctrine which requires that:

- (a) Convoy *will* scatter-----
  - (1) When attacked by raider.
  - (2) During night attacks, or thick weather, when strength of enemy unknown.

- (b) Convoy *will not* scatter---
  - (1) When attacked by submarines.
  - (2) When attacked by aircraft.

- (c) (1) During submarine attacks, or when submarines are known to be in the vicinity, the convoy will turn away from the sector presenting the greatest threat.
- (2) Ships in convoy are usually instructed not to open fire on a submarine at distances of over 6000 yards, but under that distance all ships that can bear will be ready to open fire if and when ordered.

(VIII) *Outline of Operation Order and Annexes Thereto.*

NOTE: All of the items following are not necessarily applicable to a particular operation. They are included as a check-off list in order that the Escort Commander may have some assurance that his instructions are complete.

(81) *The Operation Order.*

*Annex A firm—Communication Plan.*

Special Radio Calls, Surface Ships.

Special Radio Calls, Aircraft.

Special Visual Calls.

[3] *Annex Baker—Operating Doctrine and Instructions.*

(1) Command: Succession of command in case of loss of visual contact.

(2) Fog.

(3) Heavy ships leaving disposition, action of destroyers:

(a) Carrier.

(b) Other combatant ships.

(c) Convoy ships.

(4) Condition of Readiness.

(5) Dawn General Quarters.

(6) Destroyer Screen.

(a) Stationed by senior destroyer commander.

(b) Rotation in stations to equalize fuel consumption.

(c) Distance from Main Body, day, night, moonlight.

(d) Use of Sound gear.

(e) No fog signals.

(f) Filling gaps when destroyers leave station.

(7) Radar Plan.

(8) Boiler Power.

(9) Searchlight and starshell search.

(10) Pumping bilges.

(11) Position Reports and reference positions.

(12) Successive rendezvous or ships becoming separated.

(13) Fuel Reports.

(14) Weather and aerological reports.

(15) Aircraft operations.

(16) Man overboard.

(17) Ship torpedoed.

(18) Towing.

(19) Zig-zags.

(20) Changes of course while zig-zagging.

(21) Signalling.

(22) Lights.

(23) Standard rudder.

(24) Investigation of contacts.

[4] (25) Smoke candles, not to be used by cruiser aircraft before landing.

(26) Paravanes.

(27) Degaussing gear.

(28) Changes of course after dark.

(29) Use of whistle when changing course at night.

*Annex Cast—Contact Doctrine.*

(1) General.

(2) Submarine contact, action on:

(a) Convoy.

(b) Escorting cruisers.

(c) Carrier.

(d) Aircraft.

(e) Destroyers.

- (3) Surface raider contact, action on:  
Same as (a) to (e) above.
- (4) Aircraft contact, action on:  
Same as (a) to (e) above.
- (5) Low visibility contacts.
- (6) Use of smoke.

*Annex Dog*—Sortie Plan.

*Annex Easy*—Cruising dispositions.

*Annex Fox*—Entrance Plan.

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Chief of Staff for Operations.*

DISTRIBUTION: (5CM-41)

List I, Case 2: A; X;

EN3; EN4; FF9; ND11-14; ND11AC; NYS-10;

Cincaf A (Type Comdrs.); Cinclant A (Type Comdrs.)

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

USS Whit-12-23-41-1M

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA. Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12(2)/  
A16-3/AD/(01-Op)  
Serial 02095

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 23, 1941.*

*Confidential*

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice No. 22 CN-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Control of Anti-aircraft Fire from Ships in PEARL HARBOR.

Reference: (a) N. L. D. F. Order No. 2 of 11 December 1941.

1. Attention is invited to the following quotation from reference (a):  
"The Naval anti-aircraft artillery representative will control the fire of Naval Units and Ships in Pearl Harbor."

2. The control referred to is the "open fire," "check fire," "cease fire," etc., which orders will be sent direct to ships in Pearl Harbor from the Harbor Control Office on the Senior Officer Present Afloat common ASP-PEARL frequency.

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Chief of Staff for Operations.*

*Distribution:* (7CM-41)

List II, Case 1: P; X; ND11-14; NYS-10; NTS; NTSA(1).

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

sn

Cincpac File No.  
A4(1)/(12)  
Serial 02091

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 22, 1941.*

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Task Force FIFTEEN.

Subject: Instructions for Anti-Submarine Patrol by Aircraft on Day Escort Duty.

Enclosure: (A) Subject instructions.

1. Instructions for standard anti-submarine patrol by aircraft on day escort duty are forwarded herewith, enclosure (A), for distribution to ships of the Escort Force equipped with aircraft. These instructions are for use when only

one or two aircraft are available. When aircraft in greater numbers are available, the Inner and/or Intermediate Patrols described in U. S. F. 74 and 75 are to be used.

2. Copies of this correspondence are being furnished to battleships, cruisers, carriers, and patrol plane units which may furnish air escorts.

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Chief of Staff.*

*Distribution*

Comtaskfor FIFTEEN (25 for distribution)  
Battleships (3 each)  
Cruisers (4 each)  
Carriers (75 each)  
Comairsofor (5)  
Patwings (1 per plane)  
P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROL BY AIRCRAFT ON DAY ESCORT DUTY

*Confidential*

1. *Single aircraft*

(a) When a single aircraft is acting as air escort for a convoy or for one or more vessels in company by day, it is essential that as large an area as practicable be covered ahead and on the flanks of the surface units. An Inner Air Patrol by a single aircraft is not effective, and adds little to the security of the surface units, particularly if the convoy is also escorted by destroyers equipped with sound gear.

(b) Under the above circumstances the anti-submarine patrol will be flown by a single aircraft as shown in the accompanying diagram. It is imperative that tracks be accurately flown; otherwise the efficiency of the search is reduced. Also the time at which a plane reports contact will indicate at once its approximate position relative to the convoy, even though the plane be at the instant beyond sight contact. The plane having the last watch for the day should, whenever possible, make a brief search astern the last thing before leaving station.

2. *Two aircraft*

(a) When two aircraft operate simultaneously with a convoy, one will carry out the standard patrol, the second conduct search astern, covering an area from one beam of the convoy to the other between 10 and 20 mile radii.

3. Aircraft on anti-submarine escort duty will, if practicable, be armed with depth charges.

4. The accompanying diagram is scaled for speed of advance of convoy of eight knots. For greater speeds of advance, leg number 3 will be increased, so as to equal the distance made good by the convoy in one-half hour.

Enclosure (A).

(Enclosure A is a diagram of Standard Anti-Submarine Patrol for Single Aircraft on Escort Duty. This diagram is reproduced as Item No. 45 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

*Standard patrol for a single aircraft on escort duty*

<i>Leg No.</i>		<i>Miles</i>
1.	15 miles ahead of surface vessels.....	15
2.	15 miles at right angles to track of surface vessels to starboard.....	15
3.	4 miles ahead.....	4
4.	30 miles on reciprocal track to (2).....	30
5.	Back to surface vessels.....	20
6.	Brief search to 8 miles astern.....	16
		100

Repeat 1 to 6. Aircraft are to be flown so that the circuit is completed in one hour.



[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Sn

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12  
H1-1/(12)  
Serial 02081

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 22, 1941.

*Confidential**Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 15 CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Berthing in Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Cincpac rest. serial 2408 of 25 October 1941. (b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised).

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

2. Effective immediately, all berths in Pearl Harbor are placed under the jurisdiction of the Harbor Control Officer (Captain of the Yard) as the representative of Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District), who will assign berths to all ships present or entering by visual if practicable, or by radio if entry is to be made during darkness, consideration being given to the following:

(a) Initial berthing shall be such as to facilitate delivery of fuel, ammunition, provisions, and supplies.

(b) Final berthing shall be such as to:

(1) Expedite repairs.

(2) Provide best security by uniform distribution of anti-aircraft batteries.

(3) Facilitate sortie.

(4) Facilitate normal administration provided (1), (2) and (3) are not made ineffective thereby.

(c) Circumstances permitting, destroyers will be berthed initially at Merry Point for supplies and fueling. Before completion of fueling, the representative of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, will advise the Harbor Control Officer which destroyers should be berthed alongside tenders.

[27] 3. Within the limitations prescribed above, priority at berths at Submarine Base shall be given to units of Submarines, Scouting Force, and near the Naval Air Station to Aircraft, Scouting Force.

4. To facilitate patrol plane operations in the North Channel: (a) Berth X-10 will be left vacant, (b) Berth X-9 will be used only in emergency, and then by not more than one ship, (c) Berths on the North Channel side of Ford Island will contain not more than two ships abreast, and when two ships are abreast in any of these berths, boat booms on the channel side will be rigged in.

5. Capital ships moored in berths exposed to air torpedo fire will be protected by target rafts at all times. Commander Base Force is hereby directed to make these target rafts available to the Harbor Control Officer for this purpose.

W. S. PYE.

*Distribution (7CM-41)*

List II, Case 2.

P, X, NTS, NTSA (1), EN1-3,

ND11-16, NY8-10, NB49 (5).

Cinclant (50).

Cincac (25).

P. C. Crosley

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCPac File No.  
A2-11/FF12(1)  
F41/EF37/(01)  
Serial 02080

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 22, 1941.

*Confidential*

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 10 CM-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: PACIFIC FLEET.  
Subject: Mines Dropped by Aircraft.

1. In a recent air raid against the British, mines were dropped by Japanese planes. In the event of a future raid, it appears possible that mines may be dropped in this area. With a large number of "drops" occurring at or near the same time, it probably will be impossible to determine which "drops" exploded (bombs), and which did not (mines).

2. Each ship of the Pacific Fleet will detail observers to fix and record the position of each "drop". The position may be fixed by the position of the ship, giving bearing and distance of the "drop", and if possible, fix the line of the "drop" from the ship by ranging or lining up objects on shore.

3. Reports should be forwarded immediately in order that the area can be cleared at the earliest possible moment.

W. S. PYE.

Distribution: (7CM-41)

List II, Case 1:—

P; X; EN3; NDI-16; NYS-10; NB49;

Cincaf; Cinclant.

P. C. Crosley,

P. C. CROSLLEY,

*Flag Secretary.*

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

111

CinCPac File No.  
A2-11/FF12/  
A4-3/QL/(90)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 21 December 1941.

Serial 02086

*Confidential*

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 20 CL-41.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base—modification of Conditions of Readiness.  
References:

(a) Pacific Fleet conf. ltr. No. 2CL-41 (Revised).

(b) CinCPac conf. ltr. A16(1)/(11) Serial 02025 of Dec. 13, 1941.

1. Reference (a), paragraph (G) (6) (d) (7) is changed to read as follows:  
“(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Highest material condition compatible with required operations.

Condition II—Antiaircraft batteries fully manned on a watch basis in accordance with approved Type Organization (Condition III at sea). Material Condition YOKE or BAKER. Ammunition condition of readiness as prescribed by Type Commander.

Condition III—One-half the antiaircraft battery manned on a watch basis as prescribed by Type Commander. Material Condition YOKE or BAKER. Ammunition Condition of Readiness as prescribed by Type Commander.

The Senior Officer in nest or ships closely grouped will make adjustments in this condition of battery readiness, in order to insure best coverage of all practicable arcs of fire, and to reduce personnel on watch.

Condition IV—Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

NOTE.—Conditions of readiness or degrees of alertness of aircraft are those prescribed by the Naval Base Air Defense Commander in separate correspondence.

2. Reference (b) will be cancelled and this change will be in effect when the Base Defense Officer advises the Condition of Readiness and refers to this serial.

W. S. PYE.

Distribution: (7CM-41)

List II, Case 1; P, X, NB49

EN1, EN3, NA12, NB49, ND11-ND14,

NY8-10,

Asiatic, (25)

Atlantic (50)

P. C. CROSLY,

P. C. Crosley,

Flag Secretary.

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UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinC File No.

H12/NB/(01-Op)

Serial 02078

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 21, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandar Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Subject: Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense.

1. The Naval Base Defense Plans and orders require certain modifications to improve coordination between Army and Navy to: (a) permit full use of all weapons against hostile craft, and at the same time, (b) provide security of our own forces and friendly or neutral shipping from the fire of our own ships or shore batteries and from air attack by our own planes. To accomplish the above, it is essential that accurate information of our own forces be promptly disseminated.

2. To implement that which follows, the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier is hereby directed to arrange for the proclamation of a Maritime Control Area, to include all the sea area within a circle of radius 45 miles, center in latitude 21°-30' North, longitude 158°-00' West. He will require that no merchant shipping enter this area without his authority between the hours of local sunset and local sunrise. He will regulate entry into, movements within, and departure from the Maritime Coastal Area of all merchant shipping.

3. The Army Information Center is the central agency for the collection and dissemination of information. Filter Centers will supply information required from Naval Activities to the Army Information Center as follows:

4. AIR.

(a) *Search and Bombardment Aircraft.* Bomber Command (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) is designated Filter Center for information concerning all planes operating under his command, and those listed in (b) and (c) below. Bomber Command will be cognizent of the positions of all planes for which he acts as Filter Center and will, as required by circumstances, transmit this information to Information Center and the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) *Ship-based Aircraft.* To provide local control of flights of ship-based planes to and from ships at sea, instructions have been issued that such planes may not depart any airfield or naval air station in the Hawaiian Area, nor approach within 100 miles of Oahu without obtaining permission from Bomber

Command. Any plane taking off and turning back while still within 100 miles of Oahu must promptly report its action to Bomber Command. Prescribed approach and departure procedures must be observed.

(c) *Civilian Aircraft*, will be required by Bomber Command to obtain clearance from him for any flight in the Hawaiian Area.

#### 5. SURFACE CRAFT AND SUBMARINES.

(a) The Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (short title "Coastal Frontier") is designated as Filter Center for information concerning the movements, routes, etc., within a radius of 700 miles from Oahu, of all merchant shipping, Naval Transportation Service, vessels chartered or operated by the Army, convoys, escorts, and Coastal Frontier Forces, including Harbor Entrance and Offshore Patrols. Commander Base Force is directed to supply to Coastal Frontier up-to-date information concerning all naval auxiliaries and ocean escorts under his command. As required by circumstances, Coastal Frontier will transmit to Information Center and Bomber Command information concerning the shipping listed in this sub-paragraph. Information of movements within the 45-mile circle is of vital importance to Information Center in the offensive control of Coast Artillery. Information of movements within the 700-mile circle is of vital importance to Bomber Command in the offensive control of Search and Bombardment Aircraft.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief will act as Filter Center for naval combatant surface units, except those listed in sub-paragraph 5 (a) above, and submarines. He will supply information as required to Information Center, Bomber Command and Coastal Frontier on movements of these units within 700 miles of Oahu.

#### 6. Conditions for Offensive Action.

(a) As a further refinement, three conditions for offensive action are prescribed:

(1) *HOSTILE*. When it is definitely known that no friendly ships (aircraft) are in the area:

ALL BATTERIES SHOOT ON CONTACT.

(2) *FRIENDLY*. When it is definitely known that own ships (aircraft) are operating in the particular area:

POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION MUST BE MADE BEFORE OPENING FIRE.

(3) *DOUBTFUL*. Own forces at sea or aircraft in the air, positions or movements not definitely known, information incomplete or inconclusive:

WITHHOLD FIRE FOR CHALLENGE OR CHECK THROUGH INFORMATION AND FILTER CENTERS. SHOOT IF ENEMY CHARACTER IS PROBABLE.

(b) Different conditions may be prescribed for different types at the same time, as: Air Friendly, Submarine Hostile, Surface ships Doubtful.

(c) Different conditions may be prescribed for different sectors of the Maritime Coastal Area at the same time, as: Sector 120 to 240 Friendly, Sector 240 to 120 Hostile, or Sector 240 to 120 may be further characterized as Friendly to Air, Hostile to Submarines and Surface Craft.

(d) The condition to be in existence at any time will be prescribed for:

(1) *Air*—By Information Center.

(2) *Naval Combatant Surface Ships and Submarines*—By the Commander-in-Chief.

(3) *Other Surface Ships*—By Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

W. S. PYE.

Copy to:

Combasefor  
Comsubscofor  
Compatwing TWO  
ComGenHawDept.  
ComGenHawAir Force  
ComGen Air Raid Warning Service



HICKAM FIELD, T. H., 21 December 1941.

Subject: Conference on Aircraft Identification Markings.

To: Commander Pat Wing 2

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. At a conference held 21 December 1941 between Commander O'Beirne, Patrol Wing 2, and Major Moore, Hawaiian Air Force, the following method of aircraft identification marking was agreed upon and is herewith submitted for the approval of their Army and Navy Commanders:

a. Standard circles and stars will be placed on upper and lower side of right and left wings (for biplanes on top of right and left upper wing and on bottom of right and left lower wing). The centers of the star circles will be approximately one third the distance from the wing tip to the fuselage proper. The diameters of the circles will be equal to the full chord of the wing.

b. Standard circles and stars will be placed on each *side* of the fuselage between the trailing edge of the wing and the tail surfaces. Centers of the circles will be located to give maximum diameter to the circles.

c. Alternate red and white stripes parallel to the longitudinal axis of the plane will be painted on both sides of the *rudder* surface proper. Seven (7) red and six (6) white stripes will be evenly spaced between top and bottom of the rudder, widths and lengths of the stripes to be dependent on size of rudder.

O'BEIRNE,  
Lt. Commander, U. S. Navy.  
E. MOORE,  
Major, U. S. Army.

Enclosure: (A)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A16-3 (3)/(11)  
Serial 02079  
*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 22, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET (Carrying Aircraft).

Subject: Air Patrol Plan for Sortie and Entrance.

Enclosure: (A) Cincpac A16-3 (S)/(02055) of 18 December 1941.

1. The subject Air Patrol Plan No. 1 for Sortie and Entrance is considered more effective for heavy ships than other standard plans.

W. W. SMITH,  
Chief of Staff.

*Distribution* (7CM-41)

List II, Case 1.

CBF, BS, CL, CDBF, SF, CASF.

PW1, PW2, TTSP, CUW, MAG21.

EN11, NA12, NA37.

Special.

Comobswing (10)

Senav Obswing, NAS Pearl (10)

Senav Cruscowing, NAS Pearl (10)

ENTERPRISE (50)

LEXINGTON (50)

SARATOGA (50)

P. C. Crosley

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16-3 (S)/(02055)

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 18 December 1941.

*Air patrol plan for sortie and entrance No. 1**1. Air Patrol*

(a) The Inner Air Patrol will consist of six planes in two defensive lines of three each. Only the forward semi-circle will be patrolled.

(b) Stations to be patrolled are as follows:

Station	Location	Altitude
1	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 045° relative to base course distant 2000 yards from leading ship.....	800
2	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 000° relative to base course distant 2000 yards from leading ship.....	1200
3	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 315° relative to base course distant 2000 yards from leading ship.....	1000
4	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 045° relative to base course distant 5000 yards from leading ship.....	1000
5	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 000° relative to base course distant 5000 yards from leading ship.....	1200
6	Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 315° relative to base course distant 5000 yards from leading ship.....	800

2. The area covered by each of the inner line of patrolling planes will be an ellipse about 2 miles long and a half a mile wide; with the long axis normal to the line of bearing of the center of the ellipse. The area covered by each of the outer line of patrolling planes will be an ellipse covering the area between relative bearings 020° to 070° for station 4, between relative bearings 340° to 020° for station 5, and between relative bearings 290° to 340° for station 6. *Concentrate search efforts in a direction away from the sun.* Attack at once any submarine sighted.

(A diagram of the above described air patrol appears as a part of this communication. The diagram is reproduced as Item No. 46 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Rear Admiral,*  
*Chief of Staff for Operations,*  
*Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.*

H. S. COVINGTON,  
*Lieutenant Commander,*  
*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A16-3/(12)

Serial 02084

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 21, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

Subject: Light Forces in Night Search and Attack.

Reference:

(a) Comdesron Six ltr. A5-1/FC6 Serial 0199 of October 15, 1941.

(b) Comdesbatfor 1st End. A16-3 Serial 01451 of October 21, 1941.

(c) Combatfor 2nd End. A16-3/FF2/A5-1(13) Serial 01169 of December 1, 1941.

1. The changes proposed in "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" by references (a) and (b) are approved.

2. In addition, add the following article:

*Coordination with Patrol Aircraft*

1187. Specific instructions for coordinating the efforts of patrol aircraft with night search and attack operations of light surface forces have not been included in the foregoing. When patrol aircraft are available to the Attack Force Commander they may be used to replace or supplement search or tracking, to provide illumination, or to attack with bombs or torpedoes. The nature of the patrol aircraft operations must be decided by the Attack Force Commander, with full consideration for the capabilities of patrol aircraft under existing conditions of weather and visibility.

3. You are requested to have the amended "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" printed as U. S. Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletin No. 5-41 and delivered to the Commander-in-Chief for distribution. The form should be similar to that of other Fleet Tactical Bulletins of recent issue. Three thousand copies are required.

M. F. DRAEMEL,  
*Chief of Staff.*

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 182243

Destroy by burning

*Confidential Mailgram*

All previous instructions regarding liberty Hawaiian area are hereby cancelled X Liberty may be granted for not more than one quarter your complement enlisted personnel *in each 24 hour period* provided all useful armament can be manned adequately at all times X Liberty may commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board at 1700 X Overnight liberty may be authorized for those members of one quarter personnel on liberty having bona fide families and homes ashore X In each case written authority by commanding officer with man's address on pass must be carried by those so authorized X Personnel granted overnight liberty are not to be granted liberty prior to 1600 such liberty to expire 0700 on board X No liberty personnel will be permitted on streets during night X Shore leave for officers shall be granted on same basis.

DATE RECEIVED 19 DEC 41 (GCT)

/DC/F CWO

From: CINCPAC 182243

Action to: All ships present Hawaiian area Com Fourteen.

Info to: Sempatoff Honolulu.

FLAG SECRETARY

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FF12(1)

L9-5/(50)

Serial 02047

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 16, 1941.*

*Confidential*

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 9CM-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Maintenance of Ships, Pacific Fleet.

References:

(a) Cincpac Conf. ltr. L9-5/(50) Serial 01823 of November 10, 1941.

(b) C. N. O. Conf. ltr. Op-25-FIK(SC)L9-3 Serial 0139623 of September 11, 1941.

(c) Cincpac Conf. Desp. 160232 of December 1941.

(d) Pacific Fleet Regulations, 1941, Chapter IV.

1. Operating demands require that the present directives and facilities for maintenance be reviewed with a view to reducing upkeep and overhaul periods to the absolute minimum, and setting up the necessary administrative offices to insure that ships of all types returning to port get immediate action on any repairs which may be required.

## 2. The general outline of the plan contemplated is as follows:

(a) Each Type and Force Commander having ships in the Hawaiian Area will, where not already so organized, establish an administrative office in port provided with technical and clerical personnel to administer the material upkeep of his command. Each ship returning to Pearl Harbor to be boarded as soon as possible by a representative of the Type Commander, and her repair requirements determined and arranged for, by tender or repair ship if practicable, otherwise by restricted availability at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. The whole effort of all concerned to be directed toward the earliest practicable accomplishment of the repairs to make the ship an effective operating unit. Type Commanders having no tender or other repair facilities assigned directly under them, should locate their administrative offices with or adjacent to Commander Base Force, in order that the fullest use may be made of the repair ships assigned to the Base Force. Telephone communications are considered essential to the efficient discharge of duties of these administrative offices.

(b) It is contemplated that the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor will be utilized for the accomplishment of urgent repairs beyond the capacity of the forces afloat, and important military alterations which can be accomplished during short periods of restricted availability, and during short scheduled overhauls to be known as "Interim Overhauls." Work involving navy yard stays of one month or longer, excepting work which may be necessary to make ships seaworthy, will be undertaken at a mainland yard.

3. Based on the above, it is requested that the Type Commanders forward via Force Commanders recommendations regarding the following matters:

(a) Proposals regarding administrative offices where not already organized.

(b) Minimum safe ratios of upkeep to operating periods and general schedule proposed.

(c) Length of "interim" and "regular" navy yard overhauls and maximum acceptable intervals between these.

(d) List of ships requiring immediate assignment to an "interim" or "regular" navy yard overhaul before being considered an effective operating unit.

4. For the present and until further notice, ships will only be considered not available for operations due to the need for urgent repairs or logistic services. Type Commanders in Pearl, or in their absence, their administrative offices, or where neither of these is available in Pearl, then the Commanding Officers of the ships returning to port shall keep the Commander-in-Chief continuously advised of the availability for operations of ships in port both as to date and hour. Where derangements involving urgent repairs are involved give:

(a) Brief notation of the derangement.

(b) Estimated time, to correct, and activity undertaking work.

(c) Limitations in speed or armament until completion of repairs.

(d) Time required to get underway during repair period.

H. E. KIMMEL.

*Distribution* (7CM-41)

List II, Case 2, P. X.

EN3, EN6, EN28, ND11-ND14,

NYS-NY10, Cincaf, Cinclant.

P. C. Crosley

P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12(2)  
S19/(50)  
Serial 02050  
*Confidential*

dar

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 16, 1941.

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice No. 21CN-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Painting of Ships.

Reference:

- (a) Buships ltr. C-A10/S19-(4) (341-250)/C-EN28/A2-11 of October 15, 1941.
- (b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 15CN-41.
- (c) Buships ltr. C-S19-7(341) of October 20, 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Conf. ltr. S19/(50) Serial 01593 of October 6, 1941.

1. By reference (a), the Bureau of Ships distributed the first revision of Ship Camouflage Instructions (Ships 2), dated September 1, 1941.

2. New paint products, formula 5U and formula 5TM, are under manufacture, and initial shipments have reached Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, where they are in stock.

3. In accordance with paragraph 3 of reference (a), the following measures of revised Ships 2 are hereby placed in effect for ships of the Pacific Fleet:

(a) Surface ships, less carriers—Measure 11 except that "Navy Blue", formula 5-N will be used in place of "Sea Blue", formula 5-S. "Navy Blue", formula 5-N, is made from untinted white base, Formula 5-U, by the addition of 15 pints of tinting material, Formula 5-TM, to five gallons of base.

(b) Carriers—As in (a) above, excepting that flight decks shall continue to be painted in accordance with instructions issued by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

(c) Submarines—Measure 9.

4. Navy Blue formula 5-N has been specified instead of Sea Blue formula 5-S because preliminary observations indicate Sea Blue to be too light in color.

5. Inasmuch as supplies of new paint products in this area are still limited, application of Measure 11 is, for the present, restricted to those ships in need of complete repainting. Measure 5, false bow waves, and Type-Concealment Measures 6, 7 and 8 of old Ships 2 have proven valueless. Ships shall discontinue these, even before complete repainting is undertaken. Upon the new paint products becoming available in quantity, instructions will be promulgated covering the general application of Measure 11. Experimental measures now applied to the PORTER, FLUSSER, LAMSON, MAHAN and DRAYTON shall remain effective until repainting is required.

6. Instances of attempts to attain improved appearance, by adding varnish, linseed oil, or other ingredients not called for by the formula, or rubbing down exterior painted surfaces with linseed oil, have been noted. These practices produce glossy surfaces and increase specular reflection. They shall be discontinued.

W. W. SMITH, *Chief of Staff.*

Distribution (7CM-41)

List II, Case 2; P, X2, X8,  
EN3, EN7, ND11-14, NY8-10,  
NB49(5), Cincac(25), Cinclant(50).

P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A2-11/FF12/  
A6-3/A16-3/P/(20)  
Serial 02041  
*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 16, 1941.

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 17 CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: PACIFIC FLEET.  
Subject: Approach Doctrine for Friendly Naval Aircraft.

1. The following doctrine shall be followed when friendly Naval aircraft approach either units of the Fleet or to U. S. Navy outlying Island Bases. Separate procedure may be prescribed for approach to major bases as has already been done for the Island of Oahu. This doctrine only supplements the extracts from effective recognition and emergency identification signals and does not replace them.

(a) Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. and 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing of the sun when the sun is low.

(b) If ship or station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

(c) On seeing challenge the plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(1) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice; on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(2) *Night*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective cryptographic publications.

(d) *Day or night acknowledgement by surface unit*.—When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show *green* colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

2. In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T., or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day), from Fleet center.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (7CM-41)  
List II, Case 2; P, X,  
EN3, NA11, NA12, NA26,  
NA31, NA37, NB18, NB49,  
ND11-ND14, NYS-NY10.  
Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Area (25)  
Cinclant (50)  
Cincac (25)

P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

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PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 16, 1941.

CinCPac File  
A2-11/FF12  
JJ7/A5-7/(16)  
Serial 02043  
*Confidential*

*Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 18CL-41*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Excessive Fuel Consumption.

1. Reports reaching the Commander-in-Chief indicate excessive and alarming rates of fuel consumption in the various types of ships. In some instances a cruising radius of about half of that to be expected has been indicated. This is a matter of the gravest concern. Our theater of activity covers vast ocean areas. The logistic problems are difficult of solution at best. Improvement in engineering performance is essential, in order that this fleet may not suffer serious handicap in planning and in execution of operations of the greatest importance.

2. The Commander-in-Chief is well aware of the various considerations that lead to increased fuel consumption in war over that of peace. But giving due weight to those factors, he can not accept the poor performances which are far too prevalent.

3. Force, Type, Task Force, Unit and Ship Commanders each bear a heavy individual responsibility in bringing about prompt and marked improvement. The operating seniors in prescribing speed, boiler power, and reserve requirements must do so in accordance with the situation existing at the time. The type and ship commanders must make every effort to insure efficient plant operation in meeting the prescribed requirements.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (7CM-41)

List II, Case 2:

P, X2, EN3, EN2S.

/s/ P. C. CROSLY,

*Flag Secretary.*


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COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 160011

Confidential mailgram

Destroy by Burning

Remove at earliest opportunity all supplies of paint and ingredients except as necessary for outside touching up and striping and marking.

Date received: 16 Dec 41

From: CINCPAC 160011

TJ/F CWO

Action to: Pacflt

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCPac File No.

A16(1)/(11)

Serial 02025

*Confidential*

jb

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 13 December, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.

Commander Scouting Force.

Commander Base Force.

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

Commander Battleships, Battle Force.

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.  
 Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.  
 Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Patrol Wing TWO.  
 Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force.

Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED" will be taken but main battery personnel of battleships and cruisers and secondary battery personnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition watch stations until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery nor battleship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically ordered by the Commanding Officer.

2. Addresses are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed of the above by copies furnished herewith.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

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COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 131024

Destroy by Burning

Confidential Mailgram

Four five-inch twenty-five caliber AA guns and one mark one director mount removed from California are made available for installation ashore X necessary officers and men to assist installation and man this battery shall be detailed from California to report to fleet personnel pool officer for messing and berthing.  
 Date received: 13 Dec. 41  
 From: CINCPAC 131024  
 Action to: ComFourteen

Info to: Combatfor Combatships Combasefor NYD Pearl California Burod Op Nav  
 Comdgen Hawdept Fleet Personnel (Pool Office)

TJ/F CWO

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COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: Z F5L 122135 C8Q WING ZPQ GR 44 BT

Plain

Routine

Restrictions on liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter your complement officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty can commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board ship at 1700

TJ/F CWO

Date received: 12 Dec 31

From: Cincpac 122135

Action to: All ships present Pearl

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COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: Mailgram 111310

Plain

It is directed that all documents insignia name plates and equipment of intelligence value be forwarded as soon as possible after capture to fleet intelligence for examination evaluation and dissemination X A map case delivered thirty two



hours after the raid of seven December disclosed the position of the carrier and other information of importance which should have reached the Commander in Chief earlier X No souvenirs shall be permitted to be taken until captured documents material etc has been examined by fleet intelligence X Ships present Pearl morning of seven December submit mailgram report to Cincpac regarding time of attacks types number of planes direction altitude of attacks and other pertinent data such as torpedoes seen dropped bombs etc X

Date received: 12 Dec 41

From: Cincpac 111310

Action to: Pacific fleet

USS California—9—22—41—1 M.

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 100143

*Confidential Mailgram*

Destroyed by burning

Notify NAD Oahu and combasefor amount replacement ammunition required for all vessels each type stating time of delivery desired and whether shipment desired direct to dockside or by boat from Westloch X No more fifty caliber available for issue X Redistribute this ammunition among ship of type until arrival additional shipments expected this month.

Date received 11 Dec. 41.

From: Cincpac 100143

Action to: Type Comdrs.

Info to: Force Comdrs, NAD Oahu, Com Fourteen.

/DO/F CWO

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD

PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A., December 16, 1941.

C-S67/Radar/ND14

(01388)

*Confidential*

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Fleet Radar School in Hawaiian Area.

Reference:

(a) CincPac. conf. serial 01973 of December 1, 1941.

(b) CincPac. conf. serial 01982 of December 3, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following is submitted:

(a) The area between buildings 76 and 97 which are between the Coal Dock and Hickam Field fence is designated as the site for the Fleet Radar School.

(b) Funds are available and actual construction of a two-story school building 40 by 80 feet with two 85 foot towers and one 100 foot tower will be started prior to December 22, 1941, and is expected to be ready for occupation and installation of designated equipment by February 1, 1941.

(c) Personnel for this school can be accommodated at the Navy Yard Receiving Barracks.

(d) As the Marine Corps equipment is identical with that of the U. S. Army, a combined school for Army and Marine personnel in the Salt Lake area is already organized and being started this week.

(e) It is requested that a few personnel from the District and DesDiv EIGHTY be allowed to attend the Fleet Radar School.

C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to: BuShips

BuOrd

BuDocks

Com.N.Y.Pearl

ComBaseFor

BaseForSubCom.

dar

## UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*CinC File No.  
S81/(50)  
Serial 02048*1st Endorsement on Combatfor Serial 01203 dated December 13, 1941*  
*Confidential*PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *Dec. 16, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Base Force.

Subject: Suspension of Steel plates from bottom of target rafts for torpedo protection.

1. Forwarded, concurring. It is requested that immediate steps be taken to effect the recommendation contained in the basic letter.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Opnav  
Buships  
Buord  
NYdPH  
Combatfor  
Com 14

S81/(01203)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, BATTLE FORCE,  
SUBMARINE BASE.*Confidential**Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 13, 1941.*

From: Commander Battle Force.

To: Commander Base Force.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Suspension of Steel plates from bottom of torpedo rafts for torpedo protection.

1. Discussions have been held regarding the improvement in the torpedo defense offered by target rafts if portable plates are suspended from their bottoms. The target rafts without such plates have a draft of only 20 or 24 feet, whereas the aircraft torpedoes are apparently running at a depth of about 26 feet.

2. It appears entirely practicable to suspend steel plates about ½-inch thick all along the bottoms of these torpedo rafts so that the bottom of the plate will be about 35 feet below the water. Such plates can be suspended by reaving a wire rope through holes in each end of the plate and bringing one part up on each side of the raft to secure over the top of the raft. Such suspension is simple and would probably permit towing of the assembly without much if any difficulty. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain this additional protection.

W. S. PYE.

Copy to: Combasefor  
NYD Pearl

## U. S. FLEET

COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

Heading: 161812

3146—M. I. N. Y. 4-14-37—100 M. sets of 9

While in port maintain condition of readiness three as regards ship and fire control and in addition readiness of damage control organization for immediate counter flooding X

TOD: 1920.

From: Comtaskfor S. Visual XX.  
Action: Taskfor S.

Comairbatfor

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 121800.

*Confidential mailgram*

During war cruising use canopy covers on planes on deck steam with bridge and fire control platform windows down during day and moonlight X Take all necessary precautions to prevent reflection of sun and moon on surfaces X Use single plane scouting sections.

Date received 18 Dec. 41 (CCT)

/RW/F. CWO

From: Comairbatfor 121800.

Action to: Saratoga-Lexington.

Info to: Comcardiv 1, Cincpac, Combatfor, Comscofor.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

Date: 12/22/41.

Memorandum for Flag Sec. Combatfor.

Re: Your memo (urgent) of Dec. 22, 1941.

1. The Flag Secretary Comairbatfor is at sea.
2. Only the Material Staff, ABF, is based at Pearl.
3. I have received no information of any new instructions, orders, etc., promulgated by CABF since the Pearl Harbor raid.
4. I shall give your memo to the Flag Secretary when he returns.

Respy,

J. N. LYON,  
Comdr., U. S. N.

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Memorandum No. 6

BATTLESHIPS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. MARYLAND, Flagship

DECEMBER 19, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander Battleships, Battle Force.

To: Battleships, Battle Force, present.

Subject: Information—recap of.

1. The following dispatches which have been previously sent are quoted for information and guidance:

(a) From Combatships to NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA. 132303. "Submit list to Pooling Officer copy to Combatships of officers desired to retain for duty with ship, including officers necessary in A. A. defense groups and Salvage groups and essential to winding up affairs. Remaining officers will then be considered available for transfer."

(b) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 150554. "Medical Officers will immediately prepare skeleton health records where needed. Requisitions for emergency supplies from local sources will be submitted via Fleet Medical Officer."

(c) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area, Com 14. 150646. "Do not revoke ship warrants and appointments of any Marines transferred by reason of injuries or wounds in line of duty until further instructions Reference Marine Corps Manual 6-26 paragraph 3."

(d) From Seenav to Alnav. Alnav 157. 151700. "Alnav act August 18, 1941, providing additional pay enlisted men ten dollars per month remains in effect."

(e) From Combasefor to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 152100. (Paraphrase) "Provision stores on board will be limited to not more than a six week supply by all ships except Aircraft Carriers in accordance Cincpac directive."

(f) From Com 14 to All Ships Present Pearl Harbor. 152325. (Paraphrase) "Reports in connection with harbor patrol will be made by Harbor Patrol Boats directly and orally to nearest surface vessel which will transmit report by visual to Com 14."

(g) From Cincpac to Pacific Fleet. 160011. "Remove at earliest opportunity all supplies of paint and ingredients except as necessary for outside touching up and striping and marking."

[2] (h) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Pearl Harbor. 160016. "An opportunity is offered for transportation any dependent desiring first available evacuation to mainland. All dependents desiring such transportation register as soon as possible with transportation officers Navy Yard Pearl."

(i) From Combatships to TENNESSEE, MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA. 160132. "My 110717 school for enemy plane identification and motion picture instruction in use of open sight will convene Wednesday 17 December. Each action addressee send 24 men from gun crews off watch plus 2 lookouts off watch total 26 men per ship. Report Lieut. PITTARD at Fleet Recreation Center at 0930. Morning period 0930 to about 1100. Send same number 1330 from off watch crews. Afternoon period 1330 to 1500. Daily thereafter except Sunday send same number of men morning and afternoon periods from successive off watch sections. Other Type Commanders invited send A. A. personnel for instruction. Total number from all other types not to exceed 75 for any period of instruction. Each battleship send one A. A. Officer and other types send one A. A. Officer for each group of 25 men. Further details and explanation of scope of instruction by letter."

(j) From Combatships to Comobswing, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA. 162039. "Before going to sea ships will take on board all planes, aviation personnel and equipment complete. Ships inform Compatwing TWO of change in status when it occurs. Somobswing reassign personnel so that at least four qualified officer pilots and full complement of enlisted aviation personnel are assigned MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA."

(k) From Com. 14 to NAS Pearl, All Ships Present Pearl. 170235. (Paraphrase) "Hails from ships in the harbor and Naval Activities ashore will be answered as follows: "Harbor Patrol passing" by vessels of that patrol. All persons on watch during darkness should be given appropriate instructions."

(l) From Combatships to NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHOMA. 170315. "NEVADA, CALIFORNIA retain 500 men each, WEST VIRGINIA 50 men. All men in excess of above from these ships report Fleet Pooling Officer for assignment. OKLAHOMA direct men in security and salvage detail report Fleet Pooling Officer for assignment."

(m) From Combatships to MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA, COLORADO. 170925. "To provide protection against underwater damage [3] ships will maintain two liquid layers in side oil tanks either oil or water ballast. Order of emptying should be as follows: First—Empty all bottom tanks and do not fill with sea water. Next—Empty side tanks which constitute third layer of side protection and do not fill with sea water. Last—Empty any side tanks which make up the two liquid layers and fill with sea water as tanks are emptied."

(n) From Secnav to Alnav. Alnav 160. 171430. "December and future Log Books will include additional sheets N Nav 46 showing name and rates address of next of kin of each officer attached."

(o) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 172006. "No naval personnel shall be detailed as armed guard at Honolulu residences unless the Military Government states it is unable to furnish adequate protection for such places. When armed guards are assigned they should be ordered to that duty via the Shore Patrol Officer."

(p) From Combatships to Battleships present. 180055. "My 132303 damaged battleships reduce number retained officers as much as possible and progressively as their services can be spared to the Pooling Officer informing him and Combatships as additional officers become available for the pool."

(q) From Cincpac to Naval Shore Activities Hawaiian Area. All Ships Hawaiian Area. "Have officer and enlisted personnel received since December 6 without written orders from Fleet Pooling Officer report to that Officer at Receiving Barracks, Navy Yard."

W. S. ANDERSON.

*Distribution:*

List I, Case 2: BS.

List I, Case I: P1, CBF.

D. H. Johnston,

D. H. JOHNSTON,

*Lieutenant Commander, Flag Secretary.*



## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 180055

*Mailgram*

My 132303 damaged battleships reduce number retained officers as much as possible and progressively as their services can be spared to the pooling officer informing him and combatships as additional officers become available for the pool.

Date received: 19 Dec. 41 (GCT)

/RW/F CWO.

From: Combatships 180055

Action to: Batships batfor.

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor, pooling officer.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 170925

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

To provide protection against underwater damage ships will maintain two liquid layers in side oil tanks either oil or water ballast X Order of emptying should be as follows X First, empty all bottom tanks, and do not fill with sea water X Empty side tanks which constitute third layer of side protection and do not fill with sea water X Empty any side tanks which make up the two liquid layers and fill with sea water as tanks are emptied.

Date received: 17 Dec. 1941

/RW/F CWO

From Combatships 170925

Action to: MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA, COLORADO.

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 162039

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

Before going to sea ships will take on board all planes aviation personnel and equipment complete X Ships inform Compatwing Two of change in status when it occurs X Comobswing reassign personnel so that at least four qualified officer pilots and full complement of enlisted aviation personnel are assigned MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA.

Date received: 17 Dec. 41 (GCT)

OL/D CWO

Form: Combatships 162039

Action to: COMOBSWING, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA.

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor, Compatwing 2, Combatdiv 2, Comobson 1.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 162030

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

Battleships going to sea will take all boat personnel and only certain boats specified in my serial 0978 of 15 December X To give serviceable battleships required number of serviceable boats to take to sea transfer boats as follows X

WEST VIRGINIA one motor whaleboat to TENNESSEE

ARIZONA one forty foot motor launch to PENNSYLVANIA

OKLAHOMA one forty foot motor launch to MARYLAND X

All ships in port retain only boats really needed for self service X Turn over unneeded serviceable boats to base force pool which is in urgent need of boats and report action X All ships turn in damaged boats capable of salvage or repair to navy yard Pearl and invoice as final disposition X Crews of boats from damaged ships turned over to serviceable ships or turned into navy yard will report to fleet personnel pooling officer

Date received: 17 Dec. 41 (GCT)

OL/D CWO

From: Combatships 152030.

Action to: All battleships present Pearl Harbor.

Info to: Combasesfor, fleet pooling officer, Cincpac, Combatfor, NYD Pearl.

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 160132.

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

My 110717 school for enemy plane identification and motion picture instruction in use of open sight will convene Wednesday seventeen December X Each action Adeed send twenty four men from gun crews off watch plus two lookouts off watch total twenty six men per ship report Lt Pittard fleet recreation center at 0930 X Morning period 0930 to about 1100 X Send same number 1330 from off watch crews X

Afternoon period 1330 to 1500 X Daily thereafter except Sunday send same number of men morning and afternoon periods from successive off watch sections X Other type commanders invited send AA personnel for instruction total number from all other types not to exceed seventy five for any period of instruction X Each batships send one AA officer and other types send one AA officer for each group of twenty five men X Further details and explanation of scope of instruction by letter

Mailgram Date received: 16 Dec 41

TJ/F CWO

Form: Combatships 160132.

Action to: TENNESSEE, MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor, Comdesbatfor, Comairbatfor, Comcrubatfor, Cominbatfor, Comcrucefor, Comairsecofor, Comsubsecofor.

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 140027

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

Consider five inch fifty one battery could be effectively used against torpedo planes if projectile equipped with standard mechanical time fuze X With reference Buord letter double fox two dish one slant sail seventy eight paren two one six paren of June sixteenth one nine four one copy of which you received recommend results of tests be ascertained and if favorable fifty rounds per five inch fifty one caliber gun total five hundred rounds be supplied each BB also information when delivery can be effected X Above five hundred rounds would replace present mobilization supply of present five inch fifty one caliber

0555 LZT JV

JV/F CWO

Date received: 14 Dec '41

From: Combatships 140027.

Action to: Cincpac AC.

Info to: Combatfor, Combatdiv Two.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 132005

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

Paint ship with formula 5N Navy blue X 15 pints formula 5TM to 5 gallons formula 5U X Tops should be painted immediately X Remainder of ship from upper works down as soon as practicable X Paint decks and all canvas with temporary deck paint X 20 pints formula 5TM to 5 gallons formula 5U X *Eliminate all bright or reflecting surfaces topside X*

Date received 14 Dec 41

From: Combatships 132005.

Action to: TENNESSEE PENNSYLVANIA MARYLAND COLORADO.

Info to: Cinepac, Combatfor.

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

A3-2(1)/(0973)

BATTLESHIPS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. MARYLAND, Flagship

DECEMBER 13, 1941.

*Confidential*

Memorandum No. 4.

From: Commander Battleships, Battle Force.

To: Battleships, Battle Force, present.

Subject: Information—recap of.

1. The following recap of information is forwarded for information and guidance:

(a) From: Cinpac to all ships present: 122135 restrictions on liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter your complement officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all useful armament can be manned adequately X liberty can commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board ship at 1700.

(b) From: Cinpac to Pacific Fleet: 092030 the following busanda despatch is quoted for information and guidance of disbursing officers receiving personnel without pay accounts quote payment officers nurses and enlisted men from date loss of accounts authorized X back credits for periods prior such date not authorized X sworn certificate from each individual stating vessel or activity at which account last carried and names of allottees and amounts of allotments to each is required as pay roll voucher X disbursing officers taking up account forward to busanda via air mail if possible copy sworn statement showing new pay number and follow with confirmation copy in separate mail X instructions will follow relative submission claims for arrears of pay unquote.

(c) From: Combatships to Batships present: 110850 California and Nevada by order of Cinpac organize antiaircraft defense group of 450 men per ship with appropriate officers which personnel is not available for transfer X this group will stand continuous watch in three X Nevada antiaircraft personnel will be quartered and subsisted in Pennsylvania and California group in Maryland X by request of Combasefor California and Nevada also each organize from ships company experienced salvage group to assist baseforce in salvage of ship and equipage X this salvage group will consist of engineer and damage control officers carpenter gunner and fifty men including engineer and artificer ratings X this personnel must be familiar with all phases of damage control including location of fittings X California send 150 men to Tennessee for quarters and subsistence X California and Nevada send remaining personnel including salvage group to the receiving barracks for quarters and subsistence X personnel quartered and subsisted as herein ordered continue members of California and Nevada ships companies respectively for duty and work in those ships X California and Nevada personnel other than antiaircraft defense group and salvage group is subject to transfer as directed by C-in-C pooling officer.

(d) Paraphrase of despatch from Cinpac to Pacific Fleet, Com14: 112357 "uncompleted Bunav orders involving detachment officers from Pacific fleet ships and stations will not be executed X where relief has reported relief will report to pooling officer receiving barracks at first opportunity also officers detached awaiting transportation will report pooling officer X all transfers or-

dered for enlisted personnel suspended X those waiting transportation in Pearl report pooling officer.

[2] (e) Paraphrase of despatch from Cincpac to all ships present Hawaiian area: 121151 "forward Bunav one copy muster roll X my zero eight zero five four zero X Cincpac will forward combined report usual notification death injured and missing X information concerning next of kin where records are available should be furnished Bunav by each ship"

(f) From Cincpac to Pacific Fleet: 111310 it is directed that all documents insignia name plates and equipment of intelligence value be forwarded as soon as possible after capture to fleet intelligence for examination evaluation and dissemination X a map case delivered thirty two hours after the raid of seven december disclosed the position of the carrier and other information of importance which should have reached the commander in chief earlier X no souvenirs shall be permitted to be taken until captured document material etc has been examined by fleet intelligence X ships present pearl morning of seven december submit mailgram report to Cincpac regarding times of attacks types number of planes direction altitude of attacks and other pertinent data such as torpedoes seen dropped bombs etc.

(g) From: Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania info Cincpac: 112126 report to me as soon as possible number rounds replacement service ammunition all calibres necessary to fill to mobilization supply X report also amount fifty calibre on hand.

(h) From Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania California Nevada info Cincpac Combatfor 110230 Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania maintain complete antiaircraft battery manned continuously in four watches personnel permitting otherwise three watches X maintain material condition yoke ready to take zed with dispatch X California Nevada continuously man part of antiaircraft battery practicable with reduced personnel in four watches.

(i) From Secnav to alnav 072221 naval personnel including coast guard and marine corps will wear uniform at all times while on duty and when travelling by government conveyance X civilian clothing may be worn at home or during recreation or exercise or when travelling by other than government conveyance X district commandants may use discretion at prescribing clothing to be worn by intelligence personnel.

(j) From Secnav to alnav: 072336 place naval censorship in effect.

(k) From Combatships to Batships batfor: 121856 report number and type boats serviceable X number and type lost or damaged beyond repair X number and type needing repair and extent of damage X ships retain custody of own boats until otherwise directed.

(l) From Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania Nevada: 110717 a school of motion picture instruction for training in plane identification and local control with open sights for 5" AA guns is being established X lt g f pittard in charge ensign j stevens assistant both ex-Arizona X first instruction limited those men who have not had previous instruction use of open sights X pointers trainers and gun captains only will attend X school will be held at fleet recreation center and will commence in about a week X not more than 150 [3] men can be accommodated at a time X men from types other than BBs are invited not to exceed seventy five men for each school period X definite instructions as to date and time of starting school will be issued later.

(m) From Secnav to alnav: 092358 place in effect immediately instructions governing maritime and aerial warfare may nineteen forty one except as modified by supplementary instructions issued from time to time.

W. S. ANDERSON.

Destruction: (7CM-41)

List I, Case 2: BS.

List I, Case 1: P1, CBF.

D. H. Johnston,

D. H. JOHNSTON,

*Lieutenant Commander, Flag Secretary.*



## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 110850.

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

California and Nevada by order of Cincpac organize antiaircraft defense group of 450 men per ship with appropriate officers which personnel is not available for transfer X This group will stand continuous watch in three X Nevada antiaircraft personnel will be quartered and subsisted in Pennsylvania and California group in Maryland X By request of Combafefor California and Nevada also each organize from ships' company experienced salvage group to assist baseforce in salvage of ship and equipage X This salvage group will consist of engineer and damage control officers carpenter gunner and fifty men including engineer and artificer ratings X This personnel must be familiar with all phases of damage control including location of fittings X California send 150 men to Tennessee for quarters and subsistence X California and Nevada send remaining personnel including salvage group to the receiving barracks for quarters and subsistence X Personnel quartered and subsisted as herein ordered continue members of California and Nevada ships companies respectively for duty and work in those ships X California and Nevada personnel other than antiaircraft defense group and salvage group is subject to transfer as directed by C-in-C pooling officer.  
Date received: 11 Dec '41

JV/F CWO

From: Combatships 110850.

Action to: Batships present.

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor, Combafefor, Cinc pooling officer.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

*Confidential mailgram*

Heading: (110717

Destroy by burning

A school of motion picture instruction for training in plane identification and local control with open sights for 5" AA guns is being established X LT G. F. Pittard in charge Ensign J. Stevens assistant both ex-Arizona X First instruction limited those men who have not had previous instruction use of open sights X Pointers trainers and gun captains only will attend X School will be held at fleet recreation center and will commence in about a week X Not more than 150 men can be accommodated at a time X Men from types other than SBS are invited not to exceed seventy five men for each school period X Definite instructions as to date and time of starting school will be issued later.

Date received: 11 Dec '41. JV/F CWO From: Combatships 110717.

Action to: Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Nevada.

Info to: Cincpac, Combatfor.

USS California—9-22-41-1M.

## COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

*Confidential mailgram*

Heading: 110230

Destroy by burning

Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania maintain complete antiaircraft battery manned continuously in four watches personnel permitting otherwise three watches X Maintain material condition yoke ready to take zed with dispatch X California Nevada continuously man part of antiaircraft battery practicable with reduced personnel in four watches.

Date Received: 11 Dec. 41 (GCT). /DC/F CWO

From: Combatships 110230.

Action to: Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, California, Nevada.

Info to: Cincpac Combatfor.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET BATTLESHIPS, BATTLE FORCE  
U. S. S. MARYLAND, Flagship

December 10, 1941.

*Confidential*

Memoranda No. 2

From: Commander Battleships, Battle Force.

To: Battleships, Present.

Subject: Information—recap of.

1. The following despatches which have been previously sent are quoted for information and guidance:

From Cincpac—"To be posted on all bulletin boards of ships in harbor. Your conduct and action have been splendid. We took a blow yesterday. It will not be a short war. We will give many heavy blows to the Japanese. Carry on."

Ships provide containers and place trash and garbage on fleet landing; public works will remove containers.

From Cincpac—"Report names, rates and former ships of any survivors on board to Lt. Cdr. Nevins at Receiving Barracks, Navy Yard, by messenger."

From Comobswing to CBF, into CBS—"Request all ships operating planes from shore send all aviation personnel ashore with plane equipment and bedding." Passed to BBs for action.

From CBS to BBs present—"Take great care not to ignite oil on water. Keep hose ready also boat fire extinguishers. Keep oil washed away from ships and boats."

From CBS to BBs present—"Do not throw wood or trash overboard."

From Combasefor—"Ships docked in Navy Yard shall request replacement service ammunition from NAD Oahu for delivery direct by trucks. Ships berthed in stream or at Ford Island shall request ammunition from West Loch for delivery by boats which will be furnished by West Loch."

From Com14 to All Ships Present Hawaii—"Sunken enemy submarine located Lat two one two two zero five Long one five seven eight two seven. Marked by two cork buoys with USS YORKTOWN marked on." (The location is west side of North Channel near Buoy #5, at entrance to Middle Loch.)

From Cincpac to All Ships Present—"Resume transfer of patients according to previous directives and not to emergency activities."

From Combasefor to All Ships Present—"Send all diving equipment partial or complete, divers portable welding and cutting outfits and portable pumps with hose and connections that are not immediately required to pool in ARGONNE. Request for above equipment to be made on Combasefor."

From Cincpac to All Ships Present—"No test or warning shots will be fired from any automatic gun."

From Secnav to Alnav—"Place in effect immediately instructions governing maritime and aerial warfare 1941 except as modified by supplementary instructions issued from time to time.

From Combasefor to All Ships Present—"Paragraph one B and one E of Opnav restricted serial 904716 of 29 April 1941, not being complied with. All classes of outgoing U. S. Mail must be censored. Censorship stamp will be placed on lower left hand of address side and also facing slips of letter ties prepared by ship board mail clerks. Postage is required on all mail matter except when in accordance with paragraph 2 section 515 postal laws and regulations. No rank or designation shall appear on any mail matter."

W. S. ANDERSON.

Copy to: Cincpac.  
Combatfor.

D. H. Johnston,

D. H. JOHNSTON,

*Lieutenant Commander, Flag Secretary.*

*Mailgram*

*Confidential*

210032

Myser 0332 of March 26 X While in port set ammunition condition of readiness three in antiaircraft and machine gun batteries using one half one point one clips available loaded five rounds per clip X Take action prescribed Myser 01348 and para 4 Myser 01253 in order safeguard against deterioration one point one clip spring and antiaircraft time fuzes X Maintain condition of readiness three in accordance with annex A to crubatfor type instructions.

Flag Yeo —

Fm: Comcrubatfor

To: Crudiv 9

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE 90-Pn  
U. S. S. HONOLULU, Flagship

A16-3(1)/  
A5-1(1)/S78  
Serial 01412

DECEMBER 21, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.

To: Cruisers, Battle Force.

Subject: War Readiness of Batteries, Ammunition, and Ammunition Supply.

1. The following steps in the preparation for war of the various batteries and their ammunition supply have been compiled from recent Gunnery School recommendations, studies and tests of ammunition supply during the past ten months. They are itemized herewith for the guidance of personnel concerned:

*A. General*

(1) Provide canvas (or thin rubber) muzzle covers for all guns. See BuOrd Circular Letter A-325 of Nov. 24, 1941.

(2) Provide drinking water in magazines, handling rooms, and at gun stations. (Aluminum water breakers or thermos jugs are suggested).

(3) Provide long-sleeved aprons or loading jackets, and gloves where needed, for personnel in magazines and handling rooms. Arrange suitable stowage for this gear convenient to but outside magazine spaces. See personnel indoctrinated in use. (Battleships have reported sweat shirts well suited for this purpose, in place of jackets).

(4) Arrange for stowage of magazine battens clear of personnel as ammunition is removed from magazines.

(5) Place in effect war-time check-off lists for all batteries similar to that submitted in report of Light Cruiser 5-inch Antiaircraft and Broadside Gunnery School, 1941.

*B. Stowage and handling, 6'' and 5''/38 projectiles*

(1) Remove grommets of all projectiles stowed on base and in ready stowage or upper rows of bins. Substitute therefor a canvas strap interwoven between rotating bands of projectiles in each bay. Retain sufficient grommets to equip all projectiles in one shell-handling room; turn in remainder to nearest ammunition depot.

(2) Provide linoleum or cobbler's knives fitted with wrist lanyards to enable shell-passers to cut lashings and grommets as necessary.

(3) If sufficient personnel are available, station 9 men on shell-deck of 6''/47 caliber turrets and train them to rotate as hoistmen and shell-passers.

*C. Powder magazines and handling rooms*

(1) Provide rawhide maul, wire-cutters and sufficient tank wrenches each magazine; also pinch bar if considered necessary. (Handle of tank wrench should prove adequate for freeing tanks wedged in stowage).

(2) Provide putty knives or other suitable hand tools fitted with wrist lanyards to facilitate removal of cork spacers from 6''/47 caliber powder tanks.

(3) Provide canvas or muslin bags with frame to hold open for 6''/47 caliber tank tops and spacers, if desired. Bags to be stowed outside magazines except when in use.

(4) Mark tanks with suitable color scheme to indicate normal routing of ammunition in action.

(5) Prepare and post in each magazine schematic diagram showing normal routing in action, with order of opening tanks and order of removal of empties indicated thereon.

(6) Cut or remove wires on tank covers of all accessible powder tanks. Make routine check every two weeks to see tank covers set up tightly.

*D. Gun room, 6''/47 caliber turrets*

(1) Provide receptacles (bags or metal boxes) for primer protecting caps as they are removed from cartridges.

(2) Arrange for one or two men with wooden hoe or rake to clear empties from under the overhang of Turret III, BROOKLYN Class, in case 6-inch battery is engaged.

*E. Antiaircraft ready ammunition (5-inch and M. G.)*

(1) Unless action is imminent, take action prescribed paragraph 4 Comcrutbatfor serial 01253 of Oct. 31, 1941, to protect time fuzes.

(2) Load 1''.1/75 caliber ready ammunition five per clip unless action is imminent. Inspect 1''.1/75 ready clips frequently for evidence of weakened springs, and change clips monthly in order to minimize possibility of defective spring action.

(3) Inspect belted caliber .50 machine gun ammunition frequently for evidence of corrosion.

*F. When action is probable.*

(1) In setting Ammunition Condition of Readiness in 6''/47 caliber turrets, use most remote powder charges that are accessible, or charges that block aisles or scuttles essential to maintenance high rate of delivery of ammunition. If time and circumstances permit, remove tanks thus emptied from magazines, and stow in drill cartridge stowage.

(2) Loosen covers of all accessible powder tanks and set up hand tight.

*G. During lull in action, or after action is ended*

(1) In 6''/47 magazines, remove only those empty tanks necessary to permit access to other ammunition. Note that additional six-inch charges from adjacent magazines, if required for certain turrets, can be removed from tanks and passed via scuttles to magazine(s) where needed.

(2) Redistribute available ammunition as opportunity permits, taking into account the guns remaining in action.

2. Always make careful inspection of all replacement ammunition when received to ascertain the following:

(a) Kind of time fuze and color of tracer. (Containers may be incorrectly stenciled).

(b) Absence of cork particles or other foreign matter adhering to case that might cause the case to jam on loading, or prevent firing pin from making good contact with primer.

(c) Evidence of over-sized or damaged cases, or over-sized cork plugs that would result in a jam on loading. Cases that appear doubtful should be gauged as accurately as possible, or set aside. Note that Art. 972 (80), U. S. Navy Regulations permits fitting ammunition in guns by hand on order of the Commanding Officer, after firing pins have been removed and firing circuits disconnected. This should normally be resorted to only when the suitability of ammunition must be determined without delay, and no other means are available.

(d) Evidence of loose wind-shields on 6-inch projectiles, or damaged bour-relets and/or rotating bands; also loose cartridges, split cases or other defects in machine gun ammunition. All doubtful ammunition should be set aside to be returned to a depot if practicable, or in case of necessity, to be fired after all other ammunition is expended.

H. F. LEARY.

*Distribution:*

Addressstes (3 each)

Crudiv-8 (3 each)

DETROIT (3)

RALEIGH (3)

H. J. Martin,

H. J. MARTIN,

*Flag Secretary.*



A16-3/(O1395)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. HONOLULU, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 15, 1941.

From: Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.

To: CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE.

Subject: Development of Fighting Power.

Reference: (a) Comersucof conf. memo. A16-3 of December 11, 1941.

1. Reference (a) is quoted in part for information.

"3. Several 3' and 5' guns have recently jammed due to oversize cartridge cases. In time of war, with mass production, oversize cases will probably occur more frequently than in peace time. It is, therefore, essential that all cartridge cases be gauged before they are placed in ready boxes. Gauging a cartridge case is a relatively minor operation but it would be criminal negligence if a gun were put out of action—even temporarily—because of an undetected oversize case. If 3' gauges are not available, fit the cartridge in the gun.

"4. Reference (a) commented on the difficulty experienced in estimating target angle and speed in Advanced Day Battle Practice caused by the towing ship's searchlights trained on the firing ship. This use of searchlights in a day action is worthy of consideration. In a day light action, if at all possible, keep your searchlight trained on the enemy ship; it will hinder him in detecting your course changes.

"5. Remember not to leave a charge in a hot gun (See U. S. Fleet Confidential Notice 1USCN-41); unload through the muzzle.

"6. In a recent night attack problem, a heavy cruiser was surprised and illuminated by a light cruiser in the screen of the opposing force. The light cruiser had been sighted by lookouts on the five inch battery several minutes before the light cruiser illuminated, yet the lookout's report did not get through to the ship control station in time. Lookout report communications must be continually studied and improved in order that an effective and positive system be developed and maintained. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly. Lookout reports, no matter from what source, must get through to proper control stations immediately, distinctly, and correctly. It would be another case of gross negligence if vital information of the enemy were obtained by some one station in a ship and that information not made immediately available to proper authority. Establishing some system of lookout report communication system is not enough, continual drills and improvements are required to obtain the desired results.

"7. In recent night firings there has been too much delay in opening fire after the firing ship has been disclosed by firing star shells or by opening searchlight shutters. It is realized that in a target practice using one-half of the limited allowance the target should be illuminated sufficiently to provide an adequate point of aim. However, ships should not lose sight of the fact that in a night action, once a ship discloses itself, fire must be opened on the enemy (assuming that enemy character has been established) even if the point of aim is indistinct. Therefore, it is essential that batteries and searchlights be on the enemy bearing and that fire is commenced immediately after illumination of the target by the searchlights. If star shells are used, searchlights and batteries should open up with the firing of the first star shell spread, since firing of the spread discloses the direction of the ship to the enemy and illumination and fire by the enemy may be expected immediately. Bear in mind that the most effective star shell illumination can be nullified by the enemy by counter illumination with searchlights. Communication between ship control, fire control and searchlights must be quick and positive.

"8. Night action procedure (covered in separate letter).

"9. Fire control radars are now being installed in our ships. The capabilities of these instruments must be developed to the highest possible degree and, at the same time, their limitations must be known. Regardless of how proficient we become in the use of the radar, we must continue to develop and maintain our lookouts and optical rangefinders.

"10. CHICAGO (CA29) attained a rate of fire at ADBP (Protracted) of 2.68 s. p. g. p. m. for 42 salvos; during a considerable part of the practice the rate was over 3 s. p. g. p. m. She had three salvos in the air at all times and had 29 straddles in range; the first eighteen salvos were straddles. A rate of

fire of 3 s. p. m. can be maintained in these cruisers and should be the goal of all ships. It is not necessary to attempt to break speed records; a deliberate smooth and rhythmic procedure will automatically attain the desired speed.

"11. The A. A. creeping barrage developed by CHICAGO (see my serial 0885) of Sept. 17, 1941) is considered a most effective defense against multiple dive bombing, strafing, or torpedo attacks. Ships should instruct their 3" and 5" batteries in this method of fire. It is planned to have ships use this method of local control in AABP 'G' type firings whenever they can be arranged.

"12. I assume that ships will now be permitted an allowance of target ammunition to be used at the discretion of Commanding Officers. If at all practicable, we will continue to fire practices at towed high speed targets and sleeves. However, at times, towed targets will not be available. Ships should then, whenever possible, fire at improvised drift point-of-aim targets (see my serial 01152 of December 3, 1941), burst targets (see my serial 01109 of November 20, 1941) and balloons.

"13. HCTB, Chapter XIV, paragraph 1424, prescribes that, in Amcon I and II, the top row of the 5" ready boxes be filled with illuminating projectiles at night. At the discretion of Commanding Officers, only five illuminating projectile cartridges need be stowed in each ready box day and night. This will eliminate unnecessary shifting of ammunition. One hoist, however, should be filled with illuminating ammunition at night unless conditions indicate that star shells will not be used. Cartridges in fuze pots in Amcon I and II should be covered with the fuze pot covers when necessary to keep off direct sun rays and salt water spray.

"14. Concentrate on enemy ship and aircraft identification instruction.

"15. Now is the time when each officer and man must know and carry out his job. Personnel will continue to be the dominant factor in our gunnery. Work to establish a fighting spirit. We must conduct an offensive war and strike hard, fast and often."

J. CARY JONES,  
*Chief of Staff.*

Distribution:

Each addressee (5).

H. J. Martin

H. J. MARTIN,

*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

A16-3(1)/(01392)

CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE

50-RWB

U. S. S. HONOLULU, Flagship

DECEMBER 14, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.

To: Cruisers Battle Force.

Subject: Maintenance of Readiness for Action, Notes on.

1. The following notes on the maintenance of readiness for action in light cruisers are disseminated for guidance. Many of the points discussed have been brought out in previous correspondence and in critiques of damage control training battle problems. However, they are repeated herein for emphasis.

WATCHES

2. In port, the stationing of two Condition III watches simultaneously has been found advantageous. This puts all personnel, except those assigned to essential services, on a watch-and-watch basis. The complete anti-aircraft battery, augmented by spare .50 caliber and all Marine and landing force .30 caliber machine guns, are continuously manned.

3. At sea, Condition of Readiness II is usually maintained, with modifications as circumstances permit. The latter includes using main battery personnel for essential cleaning and services. If the situation permits setting Condition III in the batteries, the damage control organization should still be maintained essentially in Condition II. An adequate watch must be stationed in Central at all times with this station in continuous communication with damage control repair stations and with conning officers.

## WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY

4. Light cruisers are not provided with any defense against submarines except gunfire, ramming, evasion and maintenance of watertight integrity. Of these, the latter, maximum subdivision with watertight integrity, is most important.

5. Since danger from submarine and aircraft torpedoes is continuously present, closure of light cruisers must be maintained at better than Material Condition Baker or Yoke. Vessels should be continuously in Material Condition Afirm or Zed, or a modification thereof which will allow setting of complete Afirm or Zed in 30 seconds to 1 minute. The fittings to be considered for modification of material condition Afirm or Zed (i. e., opening during) are as follows:

## (a) Potable water:

(1) Drinking fountains—all fittings.

(2) Staterooms—all fittings.

(3) Washrooms—fittings to a minimum number of washrooms to accommodate personnel off watch. On 10,000-ton light cruisers, the forward officers' and crew's third deck washrooms should be kept continuously closed. All officers use one washroom. In general, the crew should be accommodated in after washrooms on the second deck or above.

(4) Galleys—all fittings.

(5) Scullery and pantries—all fittings when in use.

(6) Laundry—all fittings when conditions permit its use.

## (b) Salt water:

(1) Flushing and firemain—open flushing supply and drain valves only to the waterclosets in use. Open firemain riser cut-outs so weather deck fireplugs can be used for obtaining water for essential cleaning.

(2) Eductor valves—open as few as possible, e. g., for the scullery and sick bay.

## (c) Deck drain valves:

(1) All deck drain valves should be reclassified "X" and kept closed except when their use is necessary. In rough weather these drain valves cannot be opened on the third deck at all because water will back up. This is particularly so in the sick bay country of 10,000-ton light cruisers.

## (d) Ventilation:

(1) Air flushing, in accordance with bills recently approved, should be used continuously whenever conditions permit. Keep ventilation closed off from all spaces not used.

(2) Central and Plot in 10,000-ton cruisers can maintain their cooling and recirculating systems but will need air flushing twice each watch. OMAHA Class cruisers will probably require continuous air flushing in these spaces until an emergency arises.

(3) Gyro rooms, in the tropics, will usually need continuous ventilation to keep temperatures down and to make the rooms tenable for personnel.

6. Now, in order to make possible the quick opening and quick closing of fittings included above, such fittings should be indicated by large red arrows, preferably outlined by luminous paint. All hands must be instructed to close these fittings at once when the word is passed: "Emergency—set material condition Afirm (Zed)." Also, all personnel after closing all fittings should remain in the compartment wherever they may be. There should be absolutely no breaking of Material Condition Afirm (Zed) until the attack has been repulsed or a hit has been sustained. In the latter case, repair personnel must pass through tended doors to the scene of the hit.

7. Dog wrenches, as well as other wrenches, must be maintained in their installed holders. Men must not take such wrenches, e. g., pipe wrenches, from one side of a door to the other.

8. Care must be exercised by all personnel in the operation of quick closing doors to prevent undue wear. A stop should be provided on the knuckles of the operating gear on quick closing scuttles in order to prevent these from jamming when open.

9. Fore and aft traffic below the 2nd deck should be strictly limited. Reach lower deck compartments via scuttles rather than hatches wherever possible. Fore and aft traffic should be limited to 2nd deck and above. Use escape tubes, where fitted, for changing watches and thus save doors.



## MESSING

10. Potable water in portable drinking fountains, canteens or coffee pots, with paper cups, should be available at all stations. Trash cans should be available there for disposal of used cups and other trash.

11. All meals should be so arranged that not more than about 25% of officers and crew are in messing spaces at once. Sandwiches and coffee should be available to all hands throughout the night.

## BERTHING

12. At sea, no berthing on the first platform deck should be permitted as long as underwater attack may be probable. Spaces below the third deck should be kept closed at all times as far as practicable. With personnel on condition watches, there will be sufficient berthing space for the remainder of the crew on the third deck and above.

## COMFORT OF PERSONNEL

13. No smoking should be permitted below decks while the ship is in Condition Affirm or Zed. To do so quickly fouls the air.

14. If personnel below decks are well separated into various compartments during Condition Affirm or Zed and lie down there, they will perspire less and breathe more slowly so that the air will remain relatively pure for a longer period.

15. Soil buckets, together with toilet paper (and Patapar bags, if available), must be distributed to all stations and personnel must use them. Watertight integrity cannot be broken, during an emergency, to allow personnel to reach water closets.

## DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

16. Nervous tension, particularly in personnel below decks, will be greatly lessened if they are kept informed as to the situation within the ship and as to the enemy contacts. The general announcing system and fire control telephone can be used for this.

## CLEANLINESS OF THE SHIP

17. Off watch personnel and men stationed below decks, when no emergency exists, must be required to keep their parts of the ship clean. Particular attention must be given to water closets and washrooms which, after a series of emergencies, soon become dirty.

18. Fresh water must be conserved but men, particularly food handlers, must be watched to see that in the excitement they do not overlook opportunities for bathing. Especially, see that men are clean at meal times.

## MATERIAL ITEMS

19. All material items which are not essential to military efficiency should be removed as soon as practicable in accordance with Cincpac despatch 130931; Comerubatfor despatches 110254, 112338 and 122240; and approved strip and clear ship for action bills.

20. All fire fighting equipment must be complete and in excellent condition. This must be checked at once. Portable CO<sub>2</sub> fire extinguishers should be filled and distributed in compartments along the damage control deck. A coiled fire hose with nozzle should be distributed to compartments on the damage control deck as far as practicable. Provide also as many fog nozzles as are available or can be made.

21. Hand tools for repair parties should also be distributed along the damage control deck. Snippers for cutting locks must be included in these tools. At sea, at least, all compartments should be unlocked as far as it is safe to do so. Do not leave locks dangling as they will jam doors being closed hurriedly.

22. Each man should carry a flashlight and a pocket knife.

23. Protective clothing suits should be issued at once to all personnel having exposed battle stations and other personnel should be required to wear complete uniforms. These measures are necessary to reduce casualties due to flash burns. The protective suits will be more comfortable if laundered before they are worn.



24. Constantly check the high pressure air banks to see that they are charged. Instruct all personnel as to the high pressure air and gas ejection systems. Check Bristol valve settings.

25. Keep telephone repairmen on duty continuously. Do not assemble too many telephones in one compartment.

26. Glass airports may be unshipped and stowed below to reduce missile hazard.

27. Since lower deck airports have been blanked, it is necessary to rig two submersible pumps in series in order to remove water from a second platform or hold compartment and discharge it overboard. In some cases it will be possible to run the discharge to another compartment which is served by the main or secondary drainage systems.

DISTRIBUTION OF LIQUIDS

28. All voids and lower deck compartments should be sounded hourly until every man of repair parties is familiar with the locations of sounding tubes. Thereafter, one sounding per watch should be sufficient.

29. The prescribed "Conditioning and Sequence of Emptying Fuel Oil Tanks" should be followed at all times, except when changes may be necessary due to damage sustained.

30. The record of the condition of fuel oil, water, and void compartments should be kept corrected (to the minute) in Central Station.

Distribution:

H. F. LEARY.

- Each addressee (5) CO DETROIT (5)
- Comeruscofor (5) CO RALEIGH (5)
- Comerulant (5) CO MARBLEHEAD (5)

H. J. Martin

H. J. MARTIN,

*Flag Secretary,*

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COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: Z 0CF5 112120 CDIV9 Q 0F5 0F7 GR 16 BT

Recall all officers and enlisted personnel assigned fleet machine gun school and base force camera party.

Tor 2143

Date received 11 Dec. 41

TJ/F cwo

From: Comerubatfor 112120

Action to: Crudiv 9

Info to: Combatfor Combbasefor

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. HONOLULU, Flagship

*Confidential*

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

Memorandum for: Lieutenant Commander H. S. COVINGTON, USN, Flag Secretary, Commander Battle Force.

The enclosed documents have been issued by Commander Cruisers, Battle Force since 7 December and deal with the subject matter mentioned in your memorandum of 22 December:

1. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Serial 01392.
2. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Serial 01395.
3. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Serial 01412.
4. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Mailgram 210032.

Respectfully,

Robert L. Taylor.  
 ROBERT L. TAYLOR,  
*Acting Flag Secretary.*

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

## DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

File A16-1  
Serial 01691  
*Confidential*

U. S. S. WHITNEY, FLAGSHIP,  
% FLEET POST OFFICE,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
*December 23, 1941.*

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Destroyers, Battle Force.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base—Modifications of Conditions of Readiness.

## References:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 20CL-41, Serial 02086 of 21 December 1941.
- (b) Comdesbatfor Confidential Letter A16-1, Serial 01659 of 13 December 1941.
- (c) Comdesbatfor Confidential Letter S78, Serial 042 of December 19, 1940.
- (d) Destroyers, Battle Force, Confidential Letter No. 3-41, Serial 0797 of June 25, 1941.

1. In complying with the provisions of reference (a), the following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed for destroyers and destroyer tenders:

## CONDITION I

- (a) General Quarters.
- (b) Highest material condition compatible with required operations.
- (c) Ammunition Readiness Condition I (Reference (c)).

## CONDITION II

- (a) Anti-aircraft batteries manned on a watch basis as for Condition III at sea (Reference (d)).
- (b) Material Condition Baker.
- (c) For guns manned, Ammunition Readiness Condition I; for all other guns, Condition III (Reference (c)).

## CONDITION III

*Destroyer Leaders*

- (a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) other machine guns manned at all times.
- (b) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

*Destroyers*

- (a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times.
- (b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to 1½ hours after sunrise, the director shall be manned and operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun shall be manned.
- (c) Two machine gun crews on watch at all times.
- (d) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

*Tenders*

- (a) Machine guns manned at all times.
- (b) Material Condition "BAKER" insofar as is compatible with the discharge of tender functions.

*All Classes*

- (a) Material Condition "BAKER" (For destroyers).
- (b) Ammunition Readiness Condition I for guns manned; Condition III for all others (Reference (c)).

## CONDITION IV

- (a) Guns will be manned as directed by the Sector Commander.
- (b) Ammunition Readiness Condition I for guns manned.

2. Reference (b) is automatically cancelled and superceded by this letter when reference (a) is placed in effect.

W. M. FECHTELER,  
*Chief of Staff.*

*Distribution:*

List I, Case 3, DBF, P1, CBF, ND14.

FRED R. STICKNEY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

File A8  
Serial 01673  
Confidential

U. S. S. WHITNEY, Flagship,  
% FLEET POST OFFICE,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
December 19, 1941.

DESTROYER HARBOR INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 2

SUPERCEDES DESTROYER INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 1 SERIAL 01660 OF DECEMBER 14, 1941

1. *Liberty*—Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential despatch 182243 December is in effect.

Before granting any liberty it is *imperative* that you ascertain the degree of readiness for sea assigned your ship. Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, will endeavor to have this information available on your arrival; but it must be realized that this is not always practicable.

*Uniform*.—Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 132232 December is in effect:

“Uniform for personnel going on liberty officers service dress whites enlisted men undress whites afirm with neckerchief #X Aviation and submarine personnel may proceed to and from shore in khaki.”

2. *Material Condition of Ships in Pearl*.—Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Confidential Letter A16-1 Serial 01659 of December 13, 1941, is quoted in part:

“1. In complying with reference (a), ships of this command shall be governed by this directive.

“2. *Destroyer Leaders*.—(a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) .50 caliber machine guns manned at all times.

(b) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

“3. *Destroyers*.—(a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times.

(b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to 1½ hours after sunrise, the director shall be manned and operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun shall be manned.

(c) Two .50 caliber machine gun crews on watch at all times.

(d) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

“4. In selecting the guns to be manned consideration shall be given to the following:

(a) The sector in which berthed.

(b) Location of nearby ships and other interferences.

(c) When two or more ships are nested together, the effectiveness of the nest as a unit.”

3. *Water Compensation (Ballasting)*.—An undamaged destroyer with a reasonable amount of ammunition on board should get rid of all water ballast before entering port, regardless of the amount of fuel on board.

If you have water ballast in the ship after arrival in port, proceed as follows:

(a) *Slight contamination*—Pump overboard.

(b) *Heavy contamination*—Request services of an oil barge from Commander Base Force (Comtrainron 8) for transfer of oil sludge.

4. *Service for Supply of Fuel, Water, Ammunition, Depth Charges, Torpedoes, Lubricating Oil, Provisions, Clothing and Small Stores, and General Supplies*.—See Comtrainron 8, Base Force, letter LS/FF5/ (048) of December 11, 1941. A member of the Staff of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, is on duty at Merry Point.

5. *Armed Sentries*.—Numerous cases have been reported of sentries firing on our own small boats. Reasonable caution must be exercised and careful instructions should be given each armed sentry in security measures and in the proper use of arms.

6. *Maintenance of Communications*.—(a) All ships in harbor will maintain a continuous transmitter and receiver watch on 2562 Kc (CincPac Harbor Circuit). It is of paramount importance that arrangements be made for immediate internal routing of traffic received over this circuit. While within the limits of the harbor, ships proceeding to sea or entering port, will maintain watch on this circuit in addition to assigned tactical circuits.

*Delete* (b) All ships in harbor maintain an intercept on 900 Kc (General Warning Net).

(c) All ships guard normal "Fox" circuits individually or arrange for nest guard.

7. *Repairs.*—Upon arrival, each ship needing repairs should inform their tender by despatch or messenger. It is not necessary to submit repair requests, but when time permits a covering repair request should be submitted direct to the tender Repair Officer. In cases where major repairs are required which affect the material readiness of the ship Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, in WHITNEY, should be notified.

8. *Boats.*—If you need boats, ask for them. If they can be obtained you will get them.

9. *Boating in Harbor.*—When neon range lights for aircraft are lighted, boats burn dimmed running lights and a dim all around blue light. Keep clear of these ranges, and when necessary to cross them do so at right angles to the range and as rapidly as possible. Be on the alert for planes landing or taking off. At all other times between sunset and sunrise, boats run completely darkened. Have a man stationed forward as far as possible away from the engine noises to answer hails. Reduce boating at night to a minimum.

10. *Liberty Boats.*—Provided by tenders to destroyers berthed as follows:

WHITNEY—Berths X-2, 3, 8, 11, 12, 13.

DOBBIN—Berths X-14, 15, 18; D-5, 6, 9.

11. *Sound Gear.*—Tenders will make routine inspection of sound gear without request. However, if there is any known derangement make special request by signal or messenger.

12. *Visual Signalling in Harbor.*—Visual signals have poor security against observation by unauthorized persons ashore. Plain language visual signals and flag hoists concerning preparations for getting underway, getting underway, operations at sea, etc., shall not be transmitted except in emergency. Use messengers by boat.

13. *Suspicious Activities in Harbor.*—Report suspicious activities in the harbor direct to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Harbor Defense Officer) by messenger to nearest telephone, by visual signal by day, or by radio (2562 kes) at night. If the situation warrants, take direct action, informing Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

W. M. FECHTELER,

*Chief of Staff.*

Distribution:

List II; Case 2; DBF, M MS2, MS4, X2.

List II; Case 1, P1, CBF, CBS, CCBF, ND14.

Fred R. Stickney,

FRED R. STICNEY,

*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

S6S/A16-3

Serial 01666

U. S. S. WHITNEY, Flagship

% FLEET POST OFFICE.

PEARL HARBOR, T.H.

*December 16, 1941.*

*Confidential*

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Destroyers, Battle Force.

Subject: Submarine Contacts—Loss of.

1. The following comment received by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, is quoted:

"Many destroyers have made good contacts with enemy submarines near Pearl entrance—and destroyer captains have stated that as they make the approach, with almost perfect contact, and are within about 150 yards of the submarine and ready to attack, they lose contact quickly on one bow or the other indicating the enemy submarines are very maneuverable, probably small, and are well trained in eluding surface attacks."

2. The attention of all commanding officers is directed to the inherent limitations of the underwater sound echo ranging equipment, that in general contact may be lost during the approach, at a distance depending upon the depth of the submarine and the velocity gradient. For a submarine at 100 feet submergence and a normal velocity gradient, contact may normally be lost at about 200 yards.



3. The conclusions quoted in paragraph 1 to the effect that, because contact is lost within about 150 yards, the "enemy submarines are very maneuverable, probably small, and are well trained in eluding surface attacks" are not necessarily true in so far as they indicate the size of the submarine.

4. It is expected that enemy submarines of the type recently captured must operate at very shallow submergence and consequently contact may be maintained up to very short range. In the absence of positive information, however, the loss of contact at 150-250 yards is no criterion as to the type of submarine or its capabilities.

5. During an attack the loss of contact at 150-250 yards must not in itself be interpreted to mean that the attack will be ineffective. In the absence of other indication that the attack will be ineffective a normal barrage should be dropped.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

*Distribution:*

List II; Case 1, P1, BF, DBF, M,  
CMS2, CMD4, MD4, CMD5, MD5,  
CMD6, MD6.

ROGER B. TANEY (2 copies).

Fred R. Stickney,

FRED R. STICKNEY,

*Flag Secretary.*

Heading: 152143.

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE Destroy by burning.

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

*Confidential mailgram*

MYSER 01447 of October 20, 1941, subject Pearl Harbor sortie and entry X. For entry screening vessels accompany ships screened as close to point affirm as practicable instead of breaking off at point XRAY.

Ref: Comdesbatfor Ser-(01447)-Pearl Harbor sortie and entry.

Date received: 16 Dec 41

TJ/F CWO

From: Comdesbatfor 152143.

Action To: Pacflt.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. WHITNEY, Flagship,

% FLEET POST OFFICE,

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

December 14, 1941.

File AS

Serial 01660

*Confidential*

DESTROYER INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 1

1. *Liberty*—Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 122155 December is in effect:

"Restrictions of liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter your complement officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty can commence any hour after 0900 but expires on board at 1700."

You may grant liberty in accordance with the above, subject to the degree of readiness for sea assigned your ship.

*Uniform*—Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 132232 December is in effect:

"Uniform for personnel going on liberty officers service dress whites enlisted men undress whites affirm with neckerchief X Aviation and submarine personnel may proceed to and from shore in khaki."

2. *Material Condition of Ships in Pearl*—Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Confidential Letter A16-1 Serial 01659 of December 13, 1941, is in effect.

3. *Water Compensation (Ballasting)*—An undamaged destroyer with a reasonable amount of ammunition on board should get rid of all water ballast before entering port, regardless of the amount of fuel on board.

If you have water ballast in the ship after arrival in port, proceed as follows:

(a) *Slight contamination*—pump overboard.

(b) *Heavy contamination*—request services of an oil barge from Commander Base Force (Contrainron 8) for transfer of oil sludge.

4. *Services for Supply of Fuel, Water, Ammunition, Depth Charges, Torpedoes, Lubricating Oil, Provisions, Clothing and Small Stores and General Supplies*—See Contrainron 8, Base Force Letter LS/FF5/(048) of December 11, 1941. A copy is attached. A member of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Staff is on duty at Merry Point.

5. *Armed Sentries*—Numerous cases have been reported of sentries firing on our own small boats. Reasonable caution must be exercised and careful instructions should be given each armed sentry in security measures and in the proper use of arms.

6. *Maintenance of Communications*—

(a) All ships in harbor will maintain a continuous transmitter and receiver watch on 2562 Kc (CincPac Harbor Circuit). It is of paramount importance that arrangements be made for immediate internal routing of traffic received over this circuit. While within the limits of the harbor, ships proceeding to sea or entering port, will maintain watch on this circuit in addition to assigned tactical circuits.

(b) All ships in harbor maintain an intercept on 900 Kc (General Warning Net).

(c) All ships guard normal "Fox" circuits individually or arrange for nest guard.

7. *Repairs*—Upon arrival, each ship needing repairs should inform their tender by despatch or messenger. It is not necessary to submit repair requests, but when time permits a covering repair request should be submitted direct to the tender Repair Officer. In cases where major repairs are required which affect the material readiness of the ship Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, in WHITNEY, should be notified.

8. *Boats*—If you need boats, ask for them. If they can be obtained you will get them.

9. *Boating in Harbor*—When neon range lights for aircraft are lighted, boats burn dimmed running lights and a dim all around blue light. Keep clear of these ranges, and when necessary to cross them do so at right angles to the range and as rapidly as possible. Be on the alert for planes landing or taking off. At all other times between sunset and sunrise, boats run completely darkened. Have a man stationed forward as far as possible away from engine noises to answer hails.

10. *Sound Gear*—Tenders will make routine inspection of sound gear without request. However, if there is any known derangement make special request by signal or messenger.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

*Distribution:*

List II, Case 2, DBF, M, MS2, MS4, X2.

List II, Case 1, P1, CBF, CBS, CCBF.

Fred R. Stickney,

FRED R. STICKNEY,

*Flag Secretary.*

*Mailgram*

From: Comdesbatfor  
Action to: Pacific Fleet

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 14, 1941.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

*Confidential*

If not encrypted by originator do not transmit by radio without thorough paraphrasing and encrypting.

141913

MYSER 01447 of October 20, 1941, subject Pearl Harbor sortie and entry X Limited experience to date indicates necessity for minor variations to meet particular situations X Destroyer commanders be alert to take appropriate action X Submit recommendations in the premises to originator

Authenticated:

R. B. McCoy,

R. B. McCoy, Lt., U. S. N.

*Desbatfor Communication Officer.*

VISUAL

14 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Comdesbatfor  
To: Comdesflot ONE  
0407 BT

Comdesbatfor will handle berth assignments for all destroyers

(NOTE.—The policy regarding berthing of destroyers is as follows: No more than two destroyers at a buoy, except alongside tenders; berths assigned with a view to developing maximum effective anti-aircraft fire.)

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. WHITNEY, Flagship,  
%FLEET POST OFFICE,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
December 13, 1941.

File A16-1  
Serial 01659  
*Confidential*

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Destroyers, Battle Force.

Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.

Reference: (a) CinePac Conf. Ltr. A16(1)/(11) Serial 02025 of December 13, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) One (1) copy of reference (a).

1. In complying with reference (a), ships of this command shall be governed by this directive.

2. Destroyer Leaders.—(a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) .50 caliber machine guns manned at all times.

(b) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

3. Destroyers.—(a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times.

(b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to 1½ hours after sunrise, the director shall be manned and operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun shall be manned.

(c) Two .50 caliber machine gun crews on watch at all times.

(d) A fire control officer on watch at all times.

4. In selecting the guns to be manned consideration shall be given to the following:

(a) The sector in which berthed.

(b) Location of nearby ships and other interferences.

(c) When two or more ships are nested together, the effectiveness of the nest as a unit.

5. *Tenders*.—(a) Material Condition "BAKER" insofar as is compatible with the discharge of tender functions.

(b) .50 caliber machine guns manned at all times.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

Distribution:

List I, case 3, DBF.

Fred R. Stickney

FRED R. STICKNEY,

*Flag Secretary.*

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA Flagship

Cinepac File No.  
A16 (1)/(11)  
Serial 02025

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 13 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.

Commander Scouting Force.

Commander Base Force.

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

Commander Battle Ships, Battle Force.

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.  
 Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.  
 Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.  
 Commander Patrol Wing TWO.  
 Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force.

Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED" will be taken by main battery personnel of battleships and cruisers and secondary battery personnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition watch stations until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery nor battleship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically ordered by the Commanding Officer.

2. Addressees are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed of the above by copies furnished herewith.

H. E. KIMMEL

/S/ P. C. CROSLY,  
 Flag Secretary.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
 DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. WHITNEY, Flagship.  
 % FLEET POST OFFICE  
 PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 22, 1941.

Memorandum for: Flag Secretary, Combatfor.

Forwarded herewith in compliance with request contained in your memorandum of December 22, 1941, are the following listed copies of instructions regarding security ships of Desbatfor while in Pearl Harbor promulgated by Comdesbatfor since the attack on December 7, 1941.

(a) Comdesbatfor Serial 01659, December 13, 1941. Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.

(b) Comdesbatfor despatch to Comdesflot ONE, December 14, 1941 (See note thereon).

(c) Comdesbatfor Serial 01660, December 14, 1941. Subject: Destroyer Information Bulletin No. 1.

(d) Comdesbatfor Serial 01673, December 19, 1941. Subject: Destroyer Harbor Information No. 2.

Respectfully,

Fred R. Stickney.  
 FRED R. STICKNEY.  
 Flag Secretary.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
 MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 23, 1941.

Memorandum for: Flag Secretary, Staff of Commander Battle Force.

Reference: (a) Your memo of December 22, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Comindiv ONE conf. ltr. S79/(0310) of December 10, 1941 with end. thereto.

(B) Combinbatfor ltr. FF12-6/L9-3 of December 7, 1941.

1. In connection with your urgent memorandum, no special written instructions, additional to those issued prior to December 7, 1941, have been issued to Minecraft, BATTLE FORCE, relative to security, as none were found necessary. The fact that Mine Division TWO opened fire on enemy planes as soon as the first plane came in range, about 2 or 3 minutes after the first alarm, speaks for itself.

2. Enclosures (A) and (B) relative to security, only in a general way, are forwarded for information.

3. Many minor details connected with security in general of Minecraft Ships, Mine School, and the Mine Assembly Plant at West Loch have been arranged orally and in conference with interested officers in charge by Commander Mine



craft. The detail of 108 Minecraft personnel at West Loch Mine Assembly Plant have six (6) Lewis 30 caliber machine guns and about fifty (50) rifles and have been stationed to assist the marines in the defense of that place.

G. D. HULL,  
*Captain, U. S. Navy,*  
*Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.*

FF12-6/A79  
 (06)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 12, 1941.*

*First Endorsement to Comindiv ONE Conf. ltr. S79(0310) of 12-10-41.*

From: Commander Minecraft, BATTLE FORCE.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Via: Commander Battle Force.

Subject: Additional Anti-aircraft Machine guns for Mine Division ONE—request for.

1. Forwarded, recommending that the vessels of Mine Division ONE, as well as the ships of Mine Division TWO be equipped, as soon as possible, with their full allowance of anti-aircraft armament.

G. D. HULL, *Chief of Staff.*

S79/(0310)

JFC:les

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

MINE DIVISION ONE

U. S. S. PRUITT, Flagship

*Confidential*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 10, 1941.*

From: Commander Mine Division ONE.

To: Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

Subject: Additional A. A. Machine Guns for Mine Division ONE—request for.

1. All vessels of Mine Division ONE have only two caliber .50 A. A. Machine guns. This installation together with 3"/23 gun is entirely inadequate.

2. If additional caliber .50 A. A. machine guns become available through salvage, it is strongly recommended that ships of Mine Division ONE be given high priority in obtaining four or six additional caliber .50 guns per ship during the current overhaul. The additional guns to be mounted as in the HOVEY.

3. It is urged that this matter be taken up with higher authority afloat.

4. If 20 mm. guns should by any chance become available, it is recommended that six or eight such guns replace the caliber .50 guns requested in paragraph two above.

J. F. CROWE, jr.

FF12-6/L9-3/

23-jee

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 7, 1941.*

From: Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.

To: Commander Mine Division ONE.

Subject: Navy Yard Overhaul, Mine Division ONE.

1. Confirming verbal directions, it is desired that all equipment under repair in Mine Division ONE be completed and reassembled as quickly as possible, and the Division prepared for sea at the earliest possible date.

G. D. HULL, *Chief of Staff.*

Copy to: Combatfor.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
BASE FORCE  
U. S. S. ARGONNE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 22 December, 1941.

*Memorandum for Flag Secretary, Combatfor:*

1. In reply to your memorandum about new instructions, etc., regarding the security of Pearl Harbor, the following report is submitted:

(a) The officers attached to the Staff of Commander Base Force are standing four hour watches on the bridge of the ARGONNE with instructions to report ship movements, and other information to the Chief of Staff and the Admiral.

(b) The ARGONNE was directed to stay in Condition Two at all times.  
Respectfully,

Southwick.  
E. P. SOUTHWICK,  
*Flag Secretary.*

Thanks for your very kind note—can't tell you how much I appreciated your thoughtfulness.

O.

---

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE  
U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 200032

RESTRICTED

*Mailgram*

Upon verbal authority of CincPac ComBaseFor was directed to permanently transfer ten motor boats from damaged batship vessels to comfourteen for harbor patrol X ComBaseFor has transferred CombatDiv one barge one Oklahoma motor boat one California motor boat two West Virginia motor boats X Request five additional motor boats be made available from batships to fill number required X Crews not required

Date received 19 Dec. 41

/DC/F CWO

From: ComBaseFor 200032

Action to: ComBatShips

Info to: CincPac ComBatFor

---

COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE  
U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE

Heading: 152100

Destroy by burning

*Confidential mailgram*

In accordance with CincPac directive all ships except aircraft carriers will limit provision stores on board to not more than a six weeks supply

Date received: 16 Dec. 41

TJ/F CWO

From: ComBaseFor 152100

Action to: Asp Hawaiian area.

Info to: CinePac.

Refer to No. FF12-10/A8.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE Vd

Serial 01108

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 22 Dec. 1941.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To: The Commander Battle Force.

Subject: Security of Pearl Harbor and Ships of the Pacific Fleet—Instructions and Orders Issued since December 7, 1941.

Reference: (a) Memorandum of the Flag Secretary, Combatfor, dated December 22, 1941.

Enclosure:

(A) Comsubscofor conf ltr FF12-10/A16-3(4) Serial 01088 of December 13, 1941.

(B) Comsubscofor conf ltr FF12-10/S78 Serial 01091 of December 15, 1941.

(C) Comsubscofor conf ltr FF12-10/L9-1 Serial 01103 of December 19, 1941.

(D) Comsubscofor conf ltr FF12-10/A2-11(7)/A7-3 Serial 01105 of December 20, 1941.

(E) Comsubscofor restr ltr FF12-10/A2-11(7)/A8, Serial 1848 of December 16, 1941.

(F) Comsubscofor ltr FF12-10/N4 Serial 1872 of December 10, 1941.

(G) Comsubscofor conf mailgram 200103 of Dec.

1. Enclosures (A) to (G) inclusive are forwarded herewith in compliance with your request in reference (a).

2. In addition to the above written directives the Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, has verbally directed the following:

(a) Establishment of armed sentries in the Submarine Base and instruction of sentries.

(b) Establishment of sentries at the main entrance to the Administration Building, Submarine Base, and locking of all other entrances between sunset and sunrise.

(c) Setting of "Command Watch" composed of Chief of Staff, and Division Commanders of Submarine Divisions 42, 43, 61 and 62. Establishment of continuous coding watch. Establishment of Staff Duty Officer Watch. Establishment of continuous watch in the Flag Office.

(d) Camouflage of submarines in Pearl Harbor.

(e) Escort of incoming and outward bound submarines through harbor defense area and to within 100 miles of entrance to Pearl Harbor.

E. R. Swinburne,  
E. R. SWINBURNE,  
Flag Secretary.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

Bn

FF12-10/A2-11(7)/A7-3  
Serial-01105

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 20, 1941.

*Confidential*

SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE, CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 13-41

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To: Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Destruction Bill.

1. Submarines when assigned hazardous duty, i. e., when entering hostile waters where attack is likely, shall take necessary action to prevent loss or compromise of all secret and confidential matter and material. The destruction and final disposition of the respective items listed below will be governed by special circumstances and existing condition. Therefore, the time and place for such destruc-

tion must obviously be left to the discretion of the individual submarine commanding officer.

(a) Items to be landed prior to departure on hazardous duty :

- (1) Confidential files (letters, bulletins, etc.).
- (2) Qualification notebooks.
- (3) Unnecessary instruction books and pamphlets.
- (4) Unnecessary blue prints, ship's plans, etc.

(b) Upon arrival in hostile waters, *where salvage is possible*, destroy :

- (1) Unnecessary registered publications including FTP's, ORD's and CSP's.

(Retain those CSP's specifically assigned to submarines on hazardous duty).

(2) All remaining items under (a) not previously landed or destroyed.

(c) At abandon ship :

- (1) Destroy underwater sound equipment :

Receiver (QC and JK),

Polarizer (QC),

Driver (QC).

(Lower both sound heads).

- (2) Destroy T. D. C. and associated equipment.

(3) Destroy cipher unit in ECM 2. (Throw overboard, if possible).

(4) Destroy all remaining CSP's. (Throw overboard, if possible).

2. Squadron Commanders will insure that necessary demolition equipment has been furnished each ship prior to departure on war patrol or when engaged in hazardous duty and that personnel have been instructed in the use of the equipment.

T. WITHERS.

Distribution :

Pac. List 7CM-41, List I, Case 2 ;

P1. CSF, SSF. Special ; Comsubaf, com-  
sublant (5), Com 14, Is. Off. (2).

E. R. Swinburne,

E. R. SWINBURNE,

*Flag Secretary*

Outgoing Dispatch

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

Heading : 290103

*Confidential*

*Mailgram*

Information vessel man two fifty caliber machine guns at all times X Man all anti-aircraft batteries from one half hour before daylight to one half hour after daylight

From : Comsubcofor.

Date : 29 Dec.

to (for action) : Comsubron six.

To (for information) : Pelias.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

FF12-10/L9-1

Serial 01103

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

December 19, 1941.

*Confidential*

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To : The Commander Submarine Squadron Four.

The Commander Submarine Squadron Six.

Subject : Dispersal of submarines and tenders.

1. It is necessary to keep submarines and tender facilities dispersed as much as possible at berths to lessen the chance of damage to them during air raids.



2. The following is the maximum concentration of vessels which will be allowed without prior authority of Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
- (a) PELIAS (AS14) berthed at S-13 and FULTON (AS11) upon arrival at new quay wall as near the shore end of slip as possible.
  - (b) Submarines—One alongside each PELIAS and FULTON, one astern of each PELIAS and FULTON, one at berth S-2, one at S-6, one at S-9.
  - (c) Rescue Vessels—One at old quay wall, one at new quay wall.
  - (d) LITCHFIELD (DD336) and SEAGULL (AM30) at any berth.
3. Commander Submarine Squadron Four will control berthing to maintain this dispersal.

T. WITHERS.

Copy to:

Cinpac  
Com 14

E. R. SWINBURNE,  
*Flag Secretary.*

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

FF12-10/A2-11(7)/  
AS  
Serial 1848

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.  
December 16, 1941.

*Restricted*

SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE, LETTER NO. 24-41 (REVISED)

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To: Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Special Internal Security Measures.

Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40 (restricted)

(b) Submarines, Scouting Force, Letter No. 13-41.

1. The following special internal security measures are effective:

(a) *On all ships*

- (1) No personnel, including Army and Navy, but excluding regularly attached members of the crew, shall be admitted to any submarine at any time unless properly identified by an officer attached to the submarine, who shall ascertain that the person has some specific business on board.
- (2) Ships undergoing overhaul at a Navy Yard shall obtain from the Yard authorities a list of the workmen working on board. An officer shall inspect and check each workman coming on board, with this list, and shall also inspect any tool box, bag, or package the workman may be carrying.
- (3) The Officer of the Deck, Junior Officer of the Watch, Chief Master at Arms, and all petty officers on watch shall be armed with pistols at all times and supplied with adequate ammunition.
- (4) All officers shall be supplied with pistols and ammunition.

(b) *On all Submarines*

- (1) The provisions of Submarine Force Instructions concerning watch standing shall be modified to the extent that one commissioned officer Security Patrol shall be on board each submarine at all times. In view of the small number of officers attached to a submarine, he may also be the Duty Officer. These provisions are minimum requirements and shall be augmented by unit commanders or commanding officers to such an extent as may be necessary to insure security.
- (2) In addition to the regularly assigned men on watch, the Security Patrol shall be augmented by a watch consisting of one man of the rating of chief, first class, or second class petty officer qualified in submarines, standing a heel and toe watch at all times.
- (3) The Security Patrol shall make thorough inspections of vital parts of the ship at irregular intervals.

- (4) All security patrols shall be armed with pistols and carry ammunition and shall be instructed and trained in the use of the pistol, with particular attention to safety precautions. Attention is directed to reference (b). While in port, keep rifles, pistols and machine guns immediately available for use by personnel of regular watch. Unit commanders shall specify number of weapons and stowage arrangements.
- (5) The Security Patrol is maintained to detect sabotage, attempts at sabotage, subversive activities, and other unauthorized occurrences. In addition to definite, detailed, specific instructions which Squadron Commanders are hereby directed to issue for the various classes of submarines under their command, members of the Security Patrol shall be confidentially and thoroughly instructed in the following:
- (a) The importance of reporting disloyal actions on the part of any man at any time.
  - (b) The necessity for correcting any result of sabotage if it endangers the safety of the ship, bearing in mind the desirability of keeping all evidence to assist in apprehending the culprit. Force shall be used if the occasion demands, in order to apprehend the offender or to prevent damage or further damage.
  - (c) The necessity for repeated observation and knowledge of the position of valves, levers, locks, etc., to vital parts of the submarine to enable them to detect attempts at sabotage.
- (6) The enlisted Security Patrols shall have no additional duties while on watch as such and their inspections shall be in addition to those normally carried out in peacetime routine.
- (c) *On Rescue Vessels and Minesweepers*
- (1) The instructions enumerated above for submarines shall be applicable to rescue vessels and minesweepers except that warrant officers may be substituted for commissioned officers.
- (d) *On Destroyers*
- (1) Instructions for the "ALERT" Condition issued by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, shall be carried out.
- (e) *On Tenders*
- (1) Tenders shall carry out the instructions applicable to cruisers set forth in reference (a).
2. Submarines, Scouting Force, Letter No. 24-41 is superseded by this revision and should be destroyed.

T. WITHERS.

*Distribution:*

Pacific List 7CM-41

List I, Case 2: CSF; SSf less CSF; SSF (less SS10)

Atlantic List 11CM-41

List I, Case 2: SO

E. R. Swinburne,

E. R. SWINBURNE,

*Flag Secretary.*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

Serial 01091

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,

December 15, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To: The Commander Submarine Squadron Four.

The Commander Submarine Squadron Six.

Subject: Common VS Anti-aircraft Projectiles.

Reference: (a) Bulletin of Ordnance Information No. 3-41.

1. The allowance of service projectiles for submarines with double purpose guns has recently been changed. The removal of all anti-aircraft projectiles and replacement of this type with common projectiles was authorized. In view of the present critical ammunition situation in the Hawaiian Area, it is desired that submarines with double purpose guns retain on board the present allowance of common and anti-aircraft projectiles.

2. The Bureau of Ordnance conducted tests with 3" 50-caliber anti-aircraft ammunition which are described in paragraphs 44 and 45 of reference (a). Considering the type of target against which a submarine may expect to effectively use its gun and the fact that 3" 50-caliber anti-aircraft projectiles will usually give good explosive action against  $\frac{1}{4}$ " to  $\frac{3}{4}$ " plating, it is felt that the mixture of common and anti-aircraft projectiles may prove to be a desirable and effective ammunition allowance.

3. The anti-aircraft and common projectiles should be so arranged in the magazines that ammunition supplied to the gun will provide a mixture of both types. Submarines should be instructed to set the fuzes of anti-aircraft projectiles on "safe" when firing against surface targets.

E. R. SWINBURNE,  
*Flag Secretary.*

T. WITHERS.

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.  
To: Submarines, Scouting Force.  
Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.  
Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A16(1)/(11) Serial 02025 of December 13, 1941.  
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is furnished herewith for information and compliance.

C. W. STYER,  
*Chief of Staff.*

*Distribution:*  
List I, Case 2:  
SS4, SS6.

E. R. Swinburne,  
E. R. SWINBURNE,  
*Flag Secretary.*

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.  
A16(1)/(11)  
Serial 02025

jb

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 13, 1941.

*Confidential*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force.  
Commander Scouting Force.  
Commander Base Force.  
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.  
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.  
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.  
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.  
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.  
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.  
Commander Submarine, Scouting Force.  
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.  
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.  
Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force.

Subject: Material Condition of Ships in Pearl.

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED" will be taken but main battery personnel of battleships and cruisers and secondary battery personnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition watch stations until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery nor battleship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically ordered by the Commanding Officer.

2. Addressees are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed of the above by copies furnished herewith.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. C. Crosley,  
P. C. CROSLY,  
*Flag Secretary.*

Refer to No.  
FF12-10/N4

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE

Rs

Serial 1872

U. S. SUBMARINE BASE,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., 10 December 1941.*

From: The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Quarters, Bachelor Officers—Request for.

1. At present the facilities for quartering Submarine Division Commanders and officers of the Staff of Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, are entirely inadequate and, in addition, have the undesirable feature of being concentrated in one corridor of the submarine officer's quarters. Cots are being used by half of the officers. As officers are now disposed it is possible that a bomb hit or a surprise raid by saboteurs would dispose of the entire staff. As an extension of bachelor officers quarters now provided and to effect dispersion, houses in the Navy Housing Project in Makalapa area are requested as follows:

Chief of Staff and four (4) Division Commanders—One three bedroom and one (1) two bedroom house.

Seven Staff Officers—One (1) three bedroom and two (2) two bedroom houses.

T. WITHERS.

Note: Dispersal of Staff Officers.

Refer to No. AS/(3) 0248

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE  
PATROL WING ONE

Ca

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,  
NAVAL AIR STATION,  
*Kaneohe Bay, T. H., Dec. 23, 1941.*

*Confidential*

From: Commander Patrol Wing ONE.

To: Commander Battle Force.

Subject: Security Measures—Patrol Wing ONE at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H.

Enclosure:

(A) Copy Internal Security—Watches and Duties—Patrol Wing ONE Order 30-41.

(B) Copy General Instructions for Security Watches.

(C) Itemized list of Security Measures taken since December 7, 1941.

1. Enclosure (A) is a copy of the Security Measures placed into effect by Commander Patrol Wing ONE at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., soon after the Wing was organized at this station. The Staff Administrative Watch referred to in paragraph 2 (a) 1 of Enclosure (A) was placed in effect on November 20, 1941. Enclosure (B) is a copy of General Instructions for and posts assigned machine gun nests, and Security Watches, in Hangar—Beach area allocated to Patrol Wing ONE. These instructions were issued December 8, 1941 verbally and December 9, 1941 by written order. Enclosure (C) is a list of Security Measures taken by Commander Patrol Wing ONE and the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., since December 7, 1941.

K. MCGINNIS.

Copy to: CPW-2



Refer to No. AS/(3)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE  
PATROL WING ONE

Lln

*Confidential*

BY COMMANDER PATROL WING ONE

1. Establishment of an Armed Seaman Guard of 6S men to assist in the security of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., made necessary by the withdrawal of the major part of the US Army.
2. Establishment of machine gun nests along the seaplane ramp area on the bay to forestall any possible enemy landing in this area. (See Enclosure (B).)
3. Establishment of an air plotting and operations room with special telephones to vital areas for the rapid and positive control of plane operations.
4. Maintaining of all flight crews, for planes, in hangar during night so that they may be more ready for emergency take-off.
5. Establishment of machine gun nests in vicinity of squadron area other than those mentioned above, to afford some measure of defense against dive bombing and strafing attacks.
6. Maintenance of constant surveillance of the station proper from observation tower by one officer and four look-outs on a continuous watch.
7. Maintenance of a sizeable armed guard, sleeping locked in an important center such as armory, bombsight storage, magazines, disbursing office, etc., in addition to sentries guarding the buildings.

BY THE NAVAL AIR STATION, KANEOHE, T. H.

1. Establishment of security patrols—thirteen (13) two (2) man patrols to guard station against sabotage and surprise attack. This action made necessary by withdrawal of a large portion of Army forces.
2. Establishment of strategically located machine gun nests throughout the station.
3. Blocking of landing mat, at night, and manning of machine gun posts in its vicinity during the day to prevent enemy landing thereon.
4. Building of several concrete-steel air raid shelters, details of dug-outs and protected defense positions.
5. Camouflage painting of all buildings to blend in color with the natural surroundings.
6. Surfacing of areas to permit dispersal and camouflage of planes.
7. Beginning work on construction of revetments for planes.
8. Disbarring from access to the station all Japanese employees of government, families, or contractor.
9. Effective night black out.

AS/(3)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE  
PATROL WING ONE

*Confidential*

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Kaneohe Bay, T. H., December 9, 1941.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECURITY WATCHING

*Purpose*

1. The following watches will be stood daily by squadrons based at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, in order to afford security to the ramp area, buildings, and squadron equipment: from (1) internal sabotage, (2) unlawful entry into squadron areas, either from the Bay or from land.

## 2. Location of posts and equipment:

## Bay

Burned hangar	Ramp area—A & R	VP-11, VP-14	New hangar
2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG, 2 pistols (VP-11).	1 sentry (VP-12).....	2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG (VP-12)—1 sentry each.	2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG (VP-14).

3. *Personnel on Watch—Method of Watch Rotation.*—A watch shall consist of the following number of men, up and alert:

- (a) 1 security watch officer. (In charge.)
- (b) 2 P. O. watch Roving Patrol (supervise sentries under direction of security watch officer).
- (c) 1 sentry in A & R Bldg.
- (d) 1 sentry in VP-12 hangar.
- (e) 1 sentry in VP-14 hangar.
- (f) 2 men at each MG nest.

In addition to above personnel, a duty section of at least ten men shall be provided by each squadron and these men shall sleep in the squadron hangars and shall remain in the squadron area from sunset until sunrise. The purpose of these men is to provide a reserve to reinforce the men on watch in an emergency.

*Hours of watches:*

- (1) 1630-2130.
- (2) 2130-0130.
- (3) 0130-15 minutes after sunrise.

*Method of rotation:*

(a) Commencing with Patrol Squadron ELEVEN, Squadrons shall furnish personnel for the Petty Officers of the watch and Security Watch Officer in rotation. The first watch shall be assumed by Patrol Squadron ELEVEN, Squadrons moving up on successive days.

(b) *Patrol Squadron ELEVEN* shall provide personnel for the following posts from 15 minutes prior sunset to 15 minutes after sunrise:

1. M. G. nest in burned hangar.
2. Hangar sentry in own hangar.

*Patrol Squadron TWELVE:*

1. MG nest in own hangar.
2. Hangar sentry in A & R building.

*Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN:*

1. MG nest in unfinished hangar.
2. Sentry in own hangar.

*(c) Arming of sentries:*

1. Security Watch Officer—1 automatic pistol with 5 clips ammunition.
2. Petty Officer of the watch—do plus bayonet.
3. Hangar Sentries—1 pistol, 5 clips; 1 bayonet.
4. MG nests—1-30 caliber machine gun, 500 rounds ammunition.
5. Reserve Duty Sections—Thompson sub-machine guns, BAM and rifles plus suitable amounts of ammunition.

4. The purpose of the watch is as stated in paragraph one (1) above. If enemy opposition develops in such force as to overcome the resistance supplied by the personnel on watch and as augmented by other two duty sections, then personnel should give ground only as necessary while retiring to final rallying point on control Tower Hill.

5. Challenges and replies shall be prescribed by competent authority. All sentries will patrol their areas constantly.

K. MCGINNIS.

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE  
PATROL WING ONE

A2-11(24)/A8/(3)  
Serial No. 1569.

LIn

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,  
NAVAL AIR STATION,  
KANEHOE BAY, T. H.,  
November 22, 1941.

PATROL WING ONE ORDER NO. 30-41

From: Commander Patrol Wing ONE. (Commander Fleet Air Detachment)

To: Fleet Air Detachment.

Subject: Internal Security—Watches and Duties.

Reference:

(a) FAD, NAS, Kaneohe Bay, Order No. 23-41.

(b) PW-1 Order No. 28-41.

1. References (a) and (b) are hereby cancelled and superseded as hereafter directed.

2. The following watches shall be established as indicated:

(a) 1. Staff Administrative Watch—when so directed by Commander Patrol Wing ONE.

2. Staff Tactical Watch—when so directed by Commander Patrol Wing ONE.

3. Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer (Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Officer)—whenever two or more squadrons are based ashore.

4. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer—whenever one or more squadrons are based ashore.

5. Squadron Duty Officer.

6. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Officer—unless otherwise directed by the Senior Fleet Air Detachment Officer Present, one officer per Unit shall be on duty whenever one or more squadrons are based at the Fleet Air Detachment.

7. Shore Patrol.

8. Squadron Duty Sections.

9. Petty Officer of the Watch.

[2] 10. Security Watch Sentries.

11. Base Radio Watches.

12. Tower Watch Officer.

13. Tower Watch Petty Officer.

14. Armory Watch.

15. Office Watch.

(b) The duties associated with the foregoing watches are as prescribed below:

*1. Staff Administrative Watch*

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Staff Operations Officer there shall be on duty at all times, a line officer eligible to command, as prescribed by Commander Fleet Air Detachment.

(b) Duty hours when ship based or shore based.

1. When Commander Patrol Wing ONE and Staff are embarked in a tender this duty shall be continuous for twenty-four hours beginning at 0800 each day (0900 on Sundays and Holidays).

2. When Commander Patrol Wing ONE and Staff are based ashore this duty shall be continuous for twenty-four hours beginning at 0700 each day (0800 on Sundays and Holidays) and will be stood in the Wing Area during working hours. After working hours the officer having this duty will be on call, but may leave the Wing Area, keeping the Fleet Air Duty Officer and the Patrol Wing ONE Office apprised of his whereabouts, and remain where he may be reached by telephone. At no time, when away from the Wing Area, shall he be in a locality where he cannot return to the Wing Area within thirty minutes after being called. He shall remain within the confines of the Naval Air Station.

[3] (c) In the absence of Commander Patrol Wing ONE (and/or Commander Fleet Air Detachment), the officer having this duty will act for him in all matters, not pertaining to policy, referring any matters about which he is in doubt to the Staff Operations Officer or to the Senior Fleet Air Detachment Naval Aviator present.

### 2. Staff Tactical Watch

(a) During Tactical Exercises, or when prescribed, there shall be on duty at all times, in rotation as prescribed by the Staff Operations Officer, a line officer eligible to command, as prescribed by the Staff Operations Officer.

(b) The duties of the officer having this duty will be:

1. Keep a record of all patrol planes in the air with time of take off, track, and estimated time of return.
2. Keep a check on "plan" reports, reporting immediately to Commander Fleet Air Detachment if such report is not made within 30 minutes of time prescribed.
3. Keep a running narrative of all pertinent despatches received and sent.
4. Keep informed of local weather conditions and, if possible, of weather conditions in operating areas.
5. Plot on the proper chart the positions of any objectives reported by our forces, with all pertinent data.

### 3. Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer

(a) In a rotation, as prescribed by the Senior Naval Aviator eligible for this duty, excepting Commanding and Executive and Flight Officers, and as approved by the Staff Operations Officer, there shall be on duty at all times, a regular line officer eligible to command who is attached to an aircraft.

(NOTE.—Page 4 was missing from original exhibit and is not available.)

[5] (f) When night flying is to occur he shall:

1. See that necessary measures for the operation are initiated in a timely manner and that the Naval Air Station Officer-of-the-Day is provided with all pertinent information.
2. See that all preparations by both fleet and station personnel are completed prior to the time for commencing night operations.
3. Provide assistance and advice as requested by the Naval Air Station, particularly in regard to the establishment of any temporary lighting or communication facilities that may be necessary.
4. Request the Senior Officer Present Afloat to have all ships present turn on red truck lights during the period of operations except for operations occurring when these lights are regularly maintained.
5. Notify the plane guard vessel.
6. See that proper securing measures are carried out upon the completion or cancellation of flying, including notification to the plane guard vessel.

(g) He shall keep informed as to movements to and from the Fleet Air Detachment of fleet planes not based at the Fleet Air Detachment. He shall check all arrival and departure reports against each other to see that airplanes departing from or for the Fleet Air Detachment arrive at destination and shall also require duty officers to obtain releases from him for such departing planes and to report to him any planes which appear to be overdue.

(h) He shall require the tower duty officer to inform him of all ship movements in or out of the Harbor. He shall report same to Commander Patrol Wing ONE, and/or Commander Fleet Air Detachment, and to the Staff Operations Officer.

[6] (i) He shall inspect the meals and mess gear; and grant passes for early and late meals, giving proper notification to the Naval Air Station Officer-of-the-Day.

(j) Outside of working hours he shall keep informed of all messages sent and received and take necessary steps to insure that replies are sent as required below. Messages requiring answers will be answered in accordance with the following table. If for any reason data for reply is not available within the



periods specified, a despatch stating the reason for delay, and the time answer may be expected, will be forwarded to the originator.

(1) *Priority*: To be answered immediately. The reply should be ready to go in less than two hours.

(2) *Routine*: To be answered immediately if practicable. Messages received Saturday morning should be answered by noon that day if possible.

(3) *Deferred*: On working days deferred messages shall be answered by noon subsequent to the time of arrival. Messages received Saturday morning should be answered by noon that day if practicable. Answers to deferred messages dated on a Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday, unless some particular urgency is indicated, may be deferred until noon next working day. In cases where answers are not prepared by action addressees within the time limit specified, the communication officers will report the facts to the Command or Department concerned.

He shall refer to the Staff Duty Officer all despatches on which he is uncertain as to the proper action to be taken.

(k) After working hours he is authorized to release routine despatches and those regarding emergency reports.

[7] (l) He shall keep a rough log, entering such matters as affect units based at the Fleet Air Detachment, including official calls made or returned by Commander Patrol Wing ONE, or the Commander Fleet Air Detachment: arrivals and departures of units, etc. The log shall be presented to Patrol Wing ONE Operations Officer, or in his absence to the Commander Fleet Air Detachment, for inspection each forenoon, except Sundays and Holidays.

(m) He shall keep informed as to the present and prospective status of the weather, and shall disseminate pertinent aerological information through the unit commanders and the Tower Duty Officer.

(n) He shall require frequent rigid inspections of sentries and security measures by security watch officers outside of working hours. In this capacity he shall act as Senior Security Watch Officer, Fleet Air Detachment, and shall be responsible that prescribed security measures are strictly enforced.

(o) He shall require unit duty officers to report when their units cease flying for the day and also when the units are secured.

(p) Upon receipt of aircraft movement reports indicating pending arrival of Fleet Aircraft at the Fleet Air Detachment he shall take steps to insure that proper facilities are provided for their servicing and for the reception, transportation, berthing and messing of personnel. In the case of arriving officers of or above the rank of commander, the Duty Officer will personally receive them.

(q) He shall take steps to insure that special services such as early and late meals and boats, night flying lights, etc., requested by fleet units from the Air Stations are provided. Whenever practicable he shall arrange to combine requests of separate units in order to eliminate as far as possible duplications of services at approximately similar times.

(r) He shall require the duty sections and restricted men of all squadrons to be mustered at the times specified below, making an entry in the log as to the [8] result of each muster and report absentees in writing to the commanding officer concerned:

Restricted men muster at:

1. Ordinary working days: 1315, 1530, 2000
2. Full Holiday: 0730, 1000, 1300, 1630, 2000

Squadron Duty Sections as prescribed in paragraph 8, below.

(s) He shall cause all serious violations of flight rules that come to his attention or the attention of other duty officers to be reported in writing to the commanding officer concerned, and to the Commander Fleet Air Detachment, routing such reports via the Staff Operations Officer.

(t) In case of a crash, he shall take steps to insure that rescue and medical facilities are at once dispatched, that Commander Fleet Air Detachment is informed of the known facts and that the squadron concerned takes charge of salvage operations. He shall, for the latter purpose, ascertain immediately from the commanding officer of the unit concerned, or his representative, the re-

quirements in the way of boats or trucks for salvage and shall assist in meeting these requirements.

(u) He shall be entirely familiar with the measures in force for dispatching the ready duty tender and ready duty destroyer in case of crashes at sea.

(v) He shall maintain the following records and publications up to date in his office and shall turn them over to his relief; any shortage shall be reported immediately to the Patrol Wing ONE Staff Operations Officer:

1. One copy Patrol Wing ONE Instructions.
2. One copy Patrol Wing TWO Instructions.
3. One copy AirScoFor Instructions.
4. One copy AirScoFor Operating Manual.
5. One copy Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, Orders.
6. One copy N. A. S., Kaneohe, Air Operations Manual.
7. One copy Naval Air Station, Pearl, Regulations.
- [9] 8. One copy Naval Air Station, Pearl, Air Operations Manual.
9. One file of special orders and instructions to the Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer.

Duty Officer.

10. One file of Fleet Air Detachment and Patrol Wing ONE Orders.

11. Log.

12. Ready tender and ready destroyer lists with instructions for contacting and dispatching them.

13. One copy of Roster of Officers, 14th Naval District, Patrol Wing ONE, Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and a list of personnel attached to Fleet Air Detachment Units.

#### 4. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer

(a) To act as assistant to the Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer.

(b) To stand a continuous twenty-four hour watch from a daily detail of four chief petty officers, as prescribed by the Patrol Wing ONE Staff Operations Officer. (one chief petty officer or petty officer, first class, shall be detailed as permanent Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer and shall be on duty from the beginning to close of working hours).

(c) To stand watch in the Duty Officer's office, which he will not leave unless relieved by the Duty Officer.

(d) To be armed with an automatic pistol.

(e) To muster the restricted men in person in the Duty Office at the times specified in paragraph 3(r) above.

(f) He shall keep a quartermaster's notebook of all routine matters, receive schedules and incoming mail, file despatches and he shall keep himself informed at all times as to the location of the Duty Officer and shall report to him immediately any circumstance that requires his action.

[10] (g) A messenger of the watch will be supplied by the squadron furnishing the Duty Officer. He shall:

1. Wear undress whites, neckerchief, and band and pistol belt.

2. Watches shall be stood as follows:

1245 to 1600	0000 to 0400
1600 to 2000	0400 to 0800
2000 to 2400	0800 to 1245

3. He shall remain in the Duty Officer's office at all times except when required for messenger duty or absence for meals.

4. He shall answer the telephone, and police the office.

#### 5. Squadron Duty Officer

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadron commander, there shall be on duty at all times, an officer attached to each squadron, who shall be known as the Squadron Duty Officer.

(b) He shall perform such duties as are prescribed by his commanding officer in relation to his particular squadron.

(c) Whenever his squadron is not secured he will remain in the Fleet Air Detachment Area.

(d) Upon securing the squadron he will report the fact to the Duty Officer and will notify the Patrol Wing ONE Base Radio Station. While his squadron is secured, the Squadron Duty Officer will remain within telephone call and will keep the Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer and the Patrol Wing ONE Base Radio Station informed as to his whereabouts. At no time, when away from the Fleet Air Detachment Area, shall he be in a locality where he cannot return to his squadron area within thirty minutes after being called.

(c) When directed by his commanding officer, he may serve as Security Watch Officer for his squadron. [11] He shall inspect planes and hangar areas to ascertain that all security measures have been taken for the night prior to reporting the squadron secured to the Duty Officer.

(f) As a direct representative of the Squadron Commander, he shall be present for all launching and recovering of squadron planes, fueling and parking operations. He shall carry out the flight schedule and plan of the day, and shall keep the squadron area policed at all times.

(g) He shall maintain the squadron log in accordance with existing instructions.

(h) He shall make special arrangements for meals, obtain special dungaree and meal passes for men working overtime. He shall keep personnel in prescribed uniform.

(i) He shall ensure that flight and operation schedules, duty and watch bills, etc., are forwarded to arrive at their destination in time.

(j) He shall handle arrival and departure reports for planes in his squadron, and make necessary communication arrangements.

(k) He shall insure that sentries are alert and properly instructed in their duties and are familiar with the following:

1. Use of the pistol—safety precautions.
2. Limits of their post.
3. Proper challenging procedure.
4. Proper whistle signals.
5. Authorized personnel in area assigned.
6. Fire-alarm procedure.
7. Black-out procedure.
8. Defensive measures against landing parties.
9. Securing of planes and equipment.

#### 6. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Officer

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Senior Duty Officer, from a watch list promulgated by Commander [12] Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty, daily from the end of working hours until the beginning of working hours the next working day, three officers attached to Fleet Air Detachment Squadrons who shall be known as the Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Officers. One of these officers shall be continuously on duty from the close of working hours until the beginning of working hours the next day. When on duty he shall be up, alert, fully clothed and armed. He shall be charged under the Duty Officer for the proper performance of all sentries and the carrying out of all prescribed security measures in the squadron areas. Until properly relieved, he shall remain in the immediate vicinity of the squadron areas at all times. He shall keep the Duty Officer informed of his whereabouts. He shall sleep in his own squadron area.

(b) When practicable, and at the discretion of the respective squadron commanders, this duty may be combined with that of Squadron Duty Officer.

#### 7. Shore Patrol

(a) When, and as required, personnel of attached units shall be ordered to duty as Shore Patrol.

(b) Instructions for members of the Shore Patrol are issued by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or the Senior Officer Present.

#### 8. Squadron Duty Section

(a) Duty sections of at least one quarter of the enlisted personnel of each unit shall be maintained on board at all times for the purpose of standing required watches and for such additional work as may be required by routine operations or emergencies.

(b) They shall muster at the times listed below, in their own squadron areas:  
Working days—1250 (or 10 minutes prior securing) 1600, 2000 (bunk check).

Full Holidays—0830, 1300, 1630, 2000 (bunk check).

[13] Dungarees may be worn at first muster on working days and on half holidays. The uniform of the day will be required at all other musters.

(c) A petty officer, first class, will be designated by each squadron as Duty Section Leader. He will be charged with knowing the whereabouts of all the men in his duty section, and the squadron restricted men, after working hours. At 2000 (or 15 minutes after completion of the first movie showing), if so directed



by the Duty Officer he may conduct a bunk check of the duty section and restricted men, reporting the results to the Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer.

#### 9. *Petty Officer of the Security Watch*

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadrons, from a watch list promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty, daily from the end of working hours until the beginning of the next working day, a petty officer who shall be known as the Petty Officer of the Security Watch. Preparation of this list shall be a duty of the Senior Fleet Air Duty Officer. He shall be armed and supplied with a bicycle by his own squadron.

(b) He shall be charged with the following detailed duties:

1. To exercise supervision over all sentry posts within the Fleet Air Detachment Area.
2. To make an inspection of each sentry post twice hourly.
3. To challenge every person seen on his rounds and determine his authority for being within the Fleet Air Detachment Area.
4. To take any person, found on his rounds or turned over to him by a sentry, if not known to him to be authorized to be in the Area, and place him in the custody of the Duty Officer.
5. To report any infractions of their orders by sentries to the Security Watch Officer.
- [14] 6. To ascertain before going on watch what persons are authorized to be in the Fleet Air Detachment Area.
7. To relieve any sentry, if necessary, for a short period to answer a call of nature.
8. To call the watch reliefs one-half hour before changing the watch.
9. When directed by the Duty Officer, to change the required sentry watch order boards from "Working Hours" to "After Working Hours", or vice versa.

#### 10. *Security Watch Sentries*

(a) Squadron Commanders will assign competent personnel to man the Security Watch posts as directed by Commander Patrol Wing ONE. (See appended sketch for location and number of sentries.)

(b) They will be armed and equipped as prescribed by competent authority.

(c) They shall carry written instructions stating their duties while on watch.

#### 11. *Base Radio Watches*

(a) Squadron Commanders will assign competent personnel to man the Base Radio Station as directed by Commander Fleet Air Detachment.

#### 12. *Tower Watch Officer*

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Senior Duty Officer, from a watch list promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty daily, during regular flying hours, an officer who shall be known as the Tower Watch Officer.

(b) He shall be charged with the following duties:

1. To stand a continuous watch in the control tower during flying hours.

(An appended sketch for location and number of sentries referred to in Section 10-A, *supra*, is reproduced as Item No. 47 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

1. Assistant Security Watch Officer.
2. Petty Officer of the Security Watch (on bicycle—supervises all sentries).
3. Three Hangar Sentries.
4. Three Plane Sentries. (Number of sentries may be increased if planes are dispersed more widely.)
5. Ramp Patrol—on bicycle—patrols entire Seaplane Ramp.

[15] 2. To maintain constant observation on all planes flying within his range of vision.

3. To regulate air traffic in accordance with instructions issued by the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, and cause the appropriate signals to be displayed.

4. To report to the Duty Officer and to the Commanding Officer of the squadron involved, any violation by planes of air traffic rules. Such reports are to be routed via the Staff Operations Officer.

5. To report immediately to the Duty Officer and then to the Staff Operations Officer, any crash which is visible.

6. To be relieved only after receiving word from the Duty Officer that units basing at the Fleet Air Detachment have secured flying.



(c) During night flying and other flying outside the regular flying hours, the Senior Commanding Officer of squadrons participating will assign an officer, from a squadron engaged in these flights, to this duty.

#### 13. Tower Watch Petty Officer

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadrons, from a watch list promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty continuously, during regular flying hours a petty officer, who shall be known as the Tower Watch Petty Officer.

(b) He shall be charged with the following duties:

1. To stand a continuous watch in the tower during patrol plane flying hours.
2. To assist the Tower Watch Officer as directed.

[16] (c) During night flying and other flying outside the regular flying hours the Senior Commanding Officer of squadrons participating will assign sufficient petty officers, from squadrons engaged in these flights, to maintain this watch.

#### 14. Armory Watch

(a) When directed by competent authority, a watch will be maintained in each squadron armory, daily from the end of working hours until the beginning of the next working hours.

(b) This watch will be stood by personnel as directed with the following special duties:

1. To maintain the security of the squadron armory from unauthorized entry.
2. To remain in the armory at all times except to go to meals or answer calls of nature. When leaving the armory for these purposes he shall notify the nearest Security Sentry of his departure and shall expedite his return. He shall lock the armory whenever he leaves it for a period in excess of ten minutes and turn the keys thereto over to the Security Officer, obtaining them from that officer on his return.

(c) He shall be armed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol and ammunition.

#### 15. Office Watch

(a) A watch is to be maintained in the offices of each squadron and of Commander Patrol Wing ONE daily, from 1300 to 0700. This watch will be permitted to sleep on a cot in the office in the vicinity of the main safe.

(b) This watch shall be stood by competent personnel, thoroughly familiar with the office routine.

[17] (c) He shall receive routine mail, and promptly turn it over to the Squadron Duty Officer (Staff Duty Officer in the case of the Wing Office Watch), who shall initiate such action as he may deem necessary. Confidential mail shall be received and signed for by persons designated by their commanding officer.

(d) In case any unauthorized person enters an office the office watch will take him into custody and turn him over to the Duty Officer.

(e) Whenever an office is left unoccupied it will be locked, and the keys thereto will be turned in to the Duty Officer's office.

K. McGinnis,  
K. MCGINNIS,  
Commander, U. S. Navy.  
Commander Patrol Wing ONE.

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 22, 1941.

The following instructions were issued verbally on December 18, 1941, to all naval aircraft units based ashore:

#### ALERTNESS

#### *General Controlling Policies*

Maximum scattering and revetment protection to be employed as practicable for all planes.

Upkeep and maintenance to be handled as far as practicable with minimum interference with the *READINESS* schedule below.

Except when based ashore for more than a few days, only 50% of aircraft carrier planes to be subject to the requirements of the *READINESS* schedule.

#### *Schedule*

*From 30 minutes before sunrise to 0800 and from 1 hour before sunset to 30 minutes after sunset 1/3 Army pursuit and Navy fighters in air.*

All other Army and Navy planes, including pursuits and fighters and excepting searching planes, warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

*Between 0800 and 1 hour before sunset: 1/6 Army pursuit and Navy fighters in air. 1/6 Army pursuit and Navy fighters warmed up, manned and ready to take off. All other Army and Navy planes, including pursuits and fighters and excepting searching planes, to be on one hour's notice.*

*Between 1/2 hour after sunset and 30 minutes before sunrise: 1/4 planes on 1 hour's notice, 3/4 on 4 hour's notice.*

The following security measures were established by aircraft tenders at Hilo:

(a) Remain moored for each type of threat unless circumstances at the time indicate better security will be obtained by getting under way. Raise steam when and as threats develop and be prepared to slip mooring lines and leave on one boiler (15 minutes).

(b) Move merchant ships away from dock so that only navy ships will be moored there.

(c) Establish boat patrol.

(d) Request Army to guard docks. (Note: Also the merchant ship dock).

(e) Mount 30 caliber machine guns to sweep dock and provide sentries near ship in addition to Army sentries at head of dock.

(f) Cooperate fully with the Army in defense and other matters.

(g) Keep all civilians off dock unless on legitimate business and identity carefully established. Inspect all trucks for sabotage material.

(h) Obtain telephones for communication with the Army and car transportation for conferences, etc.

(i) Keep ships in Condition III security day and night and provide 4 inch gun crew with small arms.

(j) Follow Army (Hilo) air-raid and black-out operations and signals.

(k) Request Army to provide searchlight illumination of harbor if submarine enters. Navy to control.

PW2/TF9/AS/A16-3/

0839

*Confidential*

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,

TASK FORCE NINE, U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

*Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 17, 1941.*

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE ORDER 4-41 (TASK FORCE NINE)

Subject: Security and Readiness.

1. Conditions of readiness for each unit will be prescribed as indicated below:

#### MATERIAL READINESS

AFIRM-----	All aircraft ready.
BAKER-----	50% of aircraft ready.
CAST-----	25% of aircraft ready.
DOG-----	12½% of aircraft ready.
EASY-----	Not ready or not available.

#### OPERATIONAL READINESS

Times listed below are the maximum allowed for the first plane to get into the air fully equipped.

<i>Condition</i>	<i>Time</i>
1-----	10 minutes.
2-----	30 minutes.
3-----	1 hour.
4-----	2 hours.
5-----	4 hours

2. Unless otherwise specified, planes are considered "ready" if in following condition when launched:

- (a) Fueled and armed as directed.
- (b) All gear stowed and secured.
- (c) Guns ready and full ammunition allowance on board.
- (d) Fully equipped (codes, navigation gear, etc.),
- (e) Fully manned.

3. Naval and Marine Corps aircraft based on Pearl Harbor, Maui, Ewa and Kaneohe are attached to Naval Base Defense Air Force for the duration of their stay ashore.

4. At every base where aircraft may be located, a ready duty detail will be maintained at all times which will be prescribed in the manner indicated in paragraph 1. Unless otherwise directed, Condition BAKER ONE will obtain during daylight and CAST TWO during darkness for all units except carrier groups. In order to provide for necessary maintenance, rest and repairs while ashore, carrier groups, less fighting squadrons when otherwise directed, will maintain Condition CAST ONE plus CAST THREE during daylight and CAST THREE during darkness.

5. Upon arrival ashore, fighting squadrons will report to the Army Interceptor Command for duty and, unless otherwise directed, will report as available 50% of their numerical strength in order to provide for necessary maintenance, rest and repairs.

P. N. L. Bellinger,  
P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Distribution: CinCPac (10), Comiscofor (20), Comairsofor (25), Compatwing One (10), Patron 11 (5), Patron 12 (5), Patron 14 (5), Wright (3), Hulbert (2), Ballard (2), Avocet (1), Patron 21 (5), Patron 22 (5), Patron 23 (5), Patron 24 (5), Curtiss (3), Tangier (3), Thornton (2), McFarland (2), Swan (1), NAS PH TH (5), NAS Kaneohe Bay (5), NAS Midway (3), NAS Wake (3), NAS Johnston (3), NAS Palmyra (3), Comdt. 14 N. D. (15), Comairbatfor (10), Com. Gen., H. A. F. (5), 14th Pursuit Wing (10), 5th Bombardment Wing (25), ComUtWing (5), VJ-1 (5), VJ-2 (5), VJ-3 (5), VO-VCS Repair Unit (15), ComMarAirGroup 21 (10), Comtaskforce One (10), Comtaskforce Two (10), Comtaskforce Three (10), Comtaskforce Seven (3), Enterprise (3), SenAirGroup Comd. (3), VB-6 (3), VF-6 (3), VS-6 (3), VT-6 (3), Lexington (3), Group Comdr. (5), VB-2 (3), VF-2 (3), VS-2 (3), VT-2 (3), Saratoga (3), Group Comd. (5), VB-3 (3), VF-3 (3), VS-3 (3), VT-3 (3).

PATROL WING TWO.  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION, Wn  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 22, 1941.*

Memorandum for: Flag Secretary,  
Staff Commander Battle Force.

1. Your urgent memorandum of December 22, 1941, to Flag Secretary, Patrol Wing ONE was inadvertently opened by me. From its contents I deduced that it applied to Patrol Wing TWO as well, hence the enclosures. I conveyed the contents of the memorandum to the Duty Officer at Patrol Wing ONE by telephone and the answer will be returned by air guard mail tomorrow afternoon.

R. R. Ballinger,  
R. R. BALLINGER,  
*Flag Secretary.*

S-A16-3/ND14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

(006)

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND

NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

*Secret*

5 JANUARY, 1942.

*Memorandum:*

Subject: Measures of Security taken in Navy Yard, Fourteenth Naval District and Outlying Stations since December 7.

Doubled guards around Navy Yard, placed guards at Wahiawa, established patrol in Housing Area.

Offshore patrol stations.

Escort system put into effect.

Nets ordered closed at all times except when vessels are entering.

Light-indicator net placed inside Pearl Harbor net.

System of harbor patrol strengthened and PT boats with depth charges kept back of net for attack in case submarine gets through net.

Sonic buoys put down, detector loops laid.

Twenty-five small boats commandeered, conversion started. These vessels to carry depth charges, machine guns, for the purpose of close inshore patrol around the Island.

Guns removed from ships damaged being put in four batteries of four guns each at Hickam Field and Rifle Range.

Preparing air raid shelters for employees of the Navy Yard, residents of the Housing Areas, et cetera.

Camouflaged oil and water tanks, painted windows in shops black.

Preparing No. 2 dry dock to take an airplane carrier.

Expediting work on new hospital and medical supply depot.

Endeavoring to disperse stores by renting warehouses in town, moving limited amount of Navy oil from Navy Yard to town.

Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible.

Removed all American citizens of Japanese ancestry from laboring forces of various activities.

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to permit limited fishing activities under proper supervision.

Took over oil conservation in Territory.

Assisted in organizing cargo control, pooling trucks, stevedores, etc.

Expediting completion of ships under repair and overhaul.

Strengthening of garrisons at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. Endeavored to do same for Wake but could not do so.

Endeavoring to repair floating dry dock.

Expediting No. 3 dry dock.

Making preparations to establish joint operation center in tunnel at Aliamanu, designing and making estimates for joint operation buildings Army and Navy at Salt Lake.

Expediting Salt Lake. Expediting barracks.

Expediting underground fuel.

Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use of aircraft.

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.*

*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*



OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

S-A16-3/ND14  
(006)

5 January, 1941.

*Secret*  
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Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible.

Removed all American citizens of Japanese ancestry from laboring forces of various activities.

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to permit limited fishing activities under proper supervision.

Took over oil conservation in Territory.

Assisted in organizing cargo control, pooling trucks, stevedores, etc.

Expediting completion of ships under repair and overhaul.

Strengthening of garrisons at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. Endeavored to do same for Wake but could not do so.

Endeavoring to repair floating dry docks.

Expediting No. 3 dry dock.

Making preparations to establish joint operation center in tunnel at Aliamanu, designing and making estimates for joint operation buildings Army and Navy at Salt Lake.

Expediting Salt Lake. Expediting barracks.

Expediting underground fuel.

Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use of aircraft.

C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

5 JANUARY 1941.

S-A16-3/ND14

(006)

*Secret**Memorandum:*

Subject: Measures of Security taken in Navy Yard, Fourteenth Naval District and Outlying Stations since December 7.

Doubled guards around Navy Yard, placed guards at Wahiawa, established patrol in Housing Area.

Offshore patrol stations.

Escort system put into effect.

Nets ordered closed at all times except when vessels are entering.

Light-indicator net placed inside Pearl Harbor net.

System of harbor patrol strengthened and PT boats with depth charges kept back of net for attack in case submarine gets through net.

Sonic buoys put down, detector loops laid.

Twenty-five small boats commandeered, conversion started. These vessels to carry depth charges, machine guns, for the purpose of close inshore patrol around the Island.

Guns removed from ships damaged being put in four batteries of four guns each at Hickam Field and Rifle Range.

Preparing air raid shelters for employees of the Navy Yard, residents of the Housing Areas, et cetera.

Camouflaged oil and water tanks, painted windows in shops black.

Preparing No. 2 dry dock to take an airplane carrier.

Expediting work on new hospital and medical supply depot.

Endeavoring to disperse stores by renting warehouses in town, moving limited amount of Navy oil from Navy Yard to town.

Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible.

Removed all American citizens of Japanese ancestry from laboring forces of various activities.

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to permit limited fishing activities under proper supervision.

Took over oil conservation in Territory.

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Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use of aircraft.

C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

TMS/1

COMMANDANT, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

*Restricted*

To: Commandant, 14th Naval District (District Classified Files).  
From: Investigating Committee.  
Subject: Officer Messenger Mail—Receipt of.  
Reference: (a) Article 76 (4), (6), U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

1. Receipt of the below Identified Officer Messenger Mail for further delivery, or transhipment, is hereby acknowledged:

Identification Mark: ND14/0028. From: Com 14. To: Inves. Committee.

Received By\_\_\_\_\_

-----  
-----  
Date Received\_\_\_\_\_ Signature\_\_\_\_\_

Rank\_\_\_\_\_

778 S/M Base, P. H—12-4-41—500.

TSB/—

Confidential  
C—CS1/S76/ND14 (01425)

20 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.  
Subject: Enemy mine and bomb disposal squads, Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Mine and bomb disposal squads are being organized to care for the recovery or destruction of enemy bombs or mines dropped or planted within the Naval reservations of the Fourteenth Naval District.

2. The Navy bomb disposal squad will have charge of the recovery or destruction of bombs dropped or planted within the following areas:

- (a) Pearl Harbor
- (b) Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
- (c) Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
- (d) Naval Ammunition Depot, Lualualei
- (e) Honolulu Harbor (water areas only)

3. The Navy Mine Disposal Squad will have charge of the recovery or destruction of all mines dropped or planted within the Hawaiian area.

4. The Commanding Officer, Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities, Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, (Telephone 2114 and 2166), will have jurisdiction over all mine and bomb disposal squads of the Fourteenth Naval District.

5. It is requested that the Army authorities having jurisdiction over like activities cooperate with the above office in order that both Army and Naval authorities may be fully informed of and may inspect all types of enemy mines and bombs which may be recovered within the Hawaiian area. Accordingly, the Commanding Officer of the Naval unit has been instructed to inform the Army authorities of any mines or bombs, or any other explosive material which may be salvaged in the Naval reservations of this District.

C. C. BLOCH.

TSB/—

Confidential

C-S81/S76/MD14 (01430)

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac

C-S81/S76/ND14 (01431)

TB :mw :cl

Confidential

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,

To: The Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watchers are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

cc: CinCPac

C. C. BLOCH.

C-S81/S76/ND14 (01432)

TSB :mw :cl

Confidential

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,  
to The Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.



3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac

C-S81/S76/ND14 (01433)

TSB: mw: cl

*Confidential*

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

CC: CinCpac

*Confidential*

TSB/mw

C-S81/S76/ND14 (01434)

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District

To: The Commanding Officer, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

CC: CinCPac

*Confidential*

C-SS1/S76/ND14 (01435)

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District

To: The Inspector in Charge, of Ordnance, Naval Ammunition Depot, Lualualei, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

CC: CinCPac

*Confidential*

C-SS1/S76/MD14 (01429)

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately telephone the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office, Third Floor New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (telephone 2114 or 2166), whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

CC: CinCPac

*Confidential*

21 DECEMBER 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Port Captain, Honolulu, T. H.

Subject: Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of—

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation under your command.

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an alert.

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready to act.

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac

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CHAPLAIN'S OFFICE  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

From: CinCPac.  
Action: Cominron 2.

Mailed at: Officer Mess.  
Date: 11 Dec '41.

Info: Combasefor  
Com 14  
Comtrainron 6

110034

Until further orders take charge off shore patrol and motor torpedo boats coordinate with Com 14. Conduct magnetic sweep off entrance daily and arrange with Com 14 for sweeping channel and harbor.

FRANK REANIER, *Ens. USNR.*

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

C. B. MOMSEN/EHR

C-A3/FE10/ND14(01363)

Confidential

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.  
To: Commander Mine Squadron Two.  
Subject: Administration of Offshore Patrol and Escort Shlps.  
Reference: (a) CinCPac conf. mailgram 110034 of 11 Dec. 1941.  
(b) CinCPac conf. disp. 140357.

1. Reference (a) directs Commander Mine Squadron Two to take charge of Offshore Patrol and motor torpedo boats, coordinating their activities with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. Mine Squadron Two consists of thirteen DMS's plus four DM's temporarily assigned from Mine Division Two, plus twelve PT's, motor torpedo boats.

2. Normally four of the units of Mine Squadron Two will be in port undergoing overhaul, upkeep, etc. One of this group will be assigned to the duties of backing up the net. The Commanding Officer of this one should report to the Captain of the Yard who will issue orders to him direct.

3. Nine DMS's or DM's with sound apparatus will maintain offshore patrol line while the remaining four, including those without listening gear will back up the line.

4. By reference (b) the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet directed all task force commanders to make requests for escorts to Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. The Port Director is charged with clearing all requests for escorts and will request from Commander Mine Squadron Two the number of escorts required for each ship or convoy. The number of escorts required will be based upon the value of the ship, the value of cargo, or the number of ships to be escorted.

5. When the number of escorts withdrawn from the Offshore Patrol reaches four, further withdrawals will reduce the effectiveness of the Offshore Patrol, and additional demands for escort made upon Commandant Fourteenth Naval District (Port Director) will be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

6. Particular care will be given to the assignment of escorts to inter-island ships in order not to usurp an excessive number of the escorts available. It may be necessary to restrict sailings of inter-island craft.

7. The Inshore Patrol will maintain two destroyers with listening gear on patrol at the channel entrance. If Inshore Patrol vessels are not available, the Commander Inshore Patrol will make necessary details from the Offshore Patrol.

8. Mine Squadron Two, acting as Offshore Patrol, is assigned Call G4.5.

J. B. EARLE, *Chief of Staff.*

Copy to CinCPac.

Copy for Commander Derx.

17 DECEMBER 1941.

*Confidential*

Memorandum for: Major General H. T. Burgin, U. S. A.  
Headquarters Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command  
Fort DeRussy, T. H.

1. I am in receipt of your memorandum of 14 December and regret that an immediate reply was not prepared, but certain points had to be clarified before we could give the proper answers. I will discuss your suggestions in the order in which they were made.

(1) All U. S. submarines which enter the Oahu defense area, that is, the sea area within the range of the Coast Artillery guns, will be escorted by one or more destroyers and the Army will be notified of their presence. Any other submarine appearing in these waters is enemy.

(2) Number 2 is answered by the answer above.

(3) Number 3 is answered by the answer above.

(4) The Harbor Control Post is being notified by "Robert" of all radar surface contacts. The Harbor Control then reports back whether they are friendly, enemy, or unidentified. If unidentified and within the range of the searchlights, the H. C. A. C. are notified to sweep the area with searchlights for identification purposes. If the contact is enemy, H. C. A. C. will be informed immediately. In the near future Inshore Patrol vessels will be searching around the entire island and H. C. A. C. will be notified as to their locations.

(5) H. C. A. C. must consider that any submarine that appears within the range of the batteries that is unescorted is an enemy submarine.

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,*

*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND

NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

C-S67/RADAR/ND14(01420)

*Confidential*

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Commander Inshore Patrol.

Subject: Use of RADAR in waters adjacent to OAHU.

1. In order that a more specific coverage of RADAR plots may be made in waters adjacent to OAHU it is proposed to have ships of the Inshore Patrol and the Offshore Patrol investigate certain contacts that are adjacent to their patrol areas.

2. In the future when RADAR plots are received in waters within fifteen miles from Barbers Point or Diamond Head the Offshore Patrol will receive a message merely giving the plots of the contact in the AWS coordinates. The Commander Offshore Patrol will have to determine whether he can spare a ship to investigate this plot. The availability of ships for investigation will be known only to the Commander Offshore Patrol, and if he is able to make the investigation he will reply "Affirmative". If he is unable to make the investigation, he will reply "Negative". In the event that the reply is "Negative",



other patrol craft, sampans, aircraft, or DD's from other task forces may be assigned to that investigation.

J. B. EARLE,  
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:  
CinCPac  
Compatwing 2  
Sr. C. G. Officer  
Comdr. Offshore Patrol  
Comdr. Sampan Group  
Copy sent to Comdesdiv 80  
12/20/41

C-N20-8/ND14  
(01387)

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

-djw

*Confidential*

DECEMBER 16, 1941.

From: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
To: All Ships, Pacific Fleet. Hawaiian Department Headquarters—Fort Shafter, T. H.  
Subject: Sono Buoys—Installation of.

1. Fifteen (15) light gray, fifty gallon, barrel shaped buoys, with approximately one foot freeboard have been planted on an arc of radius approximately one mile between bearing 090° and 260° true from channel entrance buoy number one.

2. These 15 buoys are in groups of 3. The center buoy has an 8 foot antenna which has often been mistaken for a submarine periscope.

C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH.

Distribution:  
Addressees.  
CinCPac  
Coast Guard  
PT's  
PatWing TWO  
Inshore Patrol  
Capt. Yard

*Confidential*

Register No. \_\_\_\_\_

TELEPHONE AUTHENTICATOR GRID

TABLE (1)

M	Z	N	A	P
E	U	K	D	W
R	L	I	H	J
Q	V	C	T	G

TABLE (4)

I	K	Q	P	R
S	G	J	O	N
M	X	W	V	T
C	L	A	U	B

TABLE (7)

A	M	I	N	Z
J	L	O	D	B
T	R	G	U	F
C	H	E	X	K

TABLE (2)

P	N	D	O	E
J	H	K	B	F
S	M	A	X	L
Q	R	C	Z	T

TABLE (5)

P	G	E	C	J
D	L	F	O	B
Z	L	A	W	H
M	I	U	Q	K

TABLE (8)

Z	F	M	H	E
T	Q	X	W	O
U	S	W	C	P
G	J	I	A	R

TABLE (3)

E	D	S	R	H
W	G	O	I	A
Y	K	E	L	F
Q	N	Z	M	U

TABLE (6)

Q	J	D	L	E
K	M	H	A	S
T	R	Z	N	U
X	P	C	G	W

*Instructions for use*

The method of selecting a CHALLENGE and determining the correct REPLY is as follows:

Two letters, not on the same line or column, selected at random from the grid in use, constitute the CHALLENGE. The other two letters which complete a rectangle are the REPLY.

In transmitting the REPLY the first letter of the REPLY *must be* that letter which appears on the same line with the first letter received in the CHALLENGE.

## Example (Table 1):

A message is received in the proper form but the authenticity of the transmitting station is doubted. The receiving station immediately sends the CHALLENGE, "MJ". If the correct reply, "PR", is not immediately given by the talker, he is assumed to be an enemy. If the CHALLENGE had been given as "JM" in the above example, the correct REPLY would become "RP".

IF FURTHER AUTHENTICATION DESIRED THE CALLING NUMBER MAY BE CHECKED AND CALLED BACK.

W. E. Guitar  
W. E. GUITAR,  
Lt. Commander, USN.,  
*Asst. District Communication Officer, 14th Nav Dist.*

*Confidential*

C-A16-3/A4-3/QW/ND14 (01423)

HEADQUARTERS NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 20 December, 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE ORDER NO. 8

1. It may be expected that enemy radio will jam circuits used by the Harbor Control Post. A secondary means of getting certain vital information to the ships present is being established. The very essential orders to commence fire and cease fire will be duplicated by the signal tower in the Navy Yard.

2. During daylight when an air raid alarm is sounded or a condition of alert is announced, the emergency pennant will be hoisted by the signal tower. The orders to commence fire and cease fire will be given by radio as usual, but will be duplicated by the general signal ROGER, and NEGAT ROGER with the emergency pennant.

3. Lights have been installed on the mast of the signal tower so that they can be controlled from the Harbor Control Post. Three green lights in a vertical row six feet apart will be the signal to "commence fire"; three red lights on the same mast will be the signal to "cease fire."

J. B. Earle,  
J. B. EARLE,  
*Chief of Staff.*

## Distribution:

CinCPac: 750  
Inshore Patrol: 35  
Offshore Patrol: 50  
N. T. S.: 10  
Sr. Officer Coast Guard: 20  
Pearl Harbor Group: 30  
Compatwing Two: 20

HEADQUARTERS NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 17 December 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE ORDER No. 7

1. All indicators will be under the direct supervision of Lt. Comdr. Boyd. He will have charge of the Q Station material, detector loops, hydrophones, and other underwater defense equipment, and will supervise the Watch Officers.

2. The Q Station will be located in the old radio school at Fort Kamehameha. There will be stationed at the old Q Station two MTB's with depth charges. The Q Station Watch Officer will evaluate the information that he receives and will be the one to decide whether or not a submarine enters the channel. On a positive report to the MTB's on duty the MTB's will attack with depth charges without further orders. The Watch Officer will notify the Captain of the Yard immediately after notifying the MTB's.

3. The Captain of the Yard will have three MTB's on duty inside the net. These plus the destroyers backing up the net will stand by to attack.

4. There is an indicator loop inside the torpedo net and when this gets a positive reaction the Captain of the Yard will again be notified. The MTB will watch the submarine indicator net and should this show a positive reaction the MTB's will attack and destroy the submarine. Always be on the alert for more than one submarine.

J. B. Earle,  
J. B. EARLE,  
*Chief of Staff.*

Distribution :

All Task Groups  
Inshore Patrol 35  
Offshore Patrol 50  
Pearl Harbor Group 30  
Sr. C. G. Officer 2

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 16 December 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE ORDER No. 6

Subject : Line of division, Inshore Patrol-Pearl Harbor Group, in the Pearl Harbor Channel.

1. Beginning this date the waters of the Inshore Patrol will be extended to include the entrance channel, that is, the waters from the entrance buoys to the net.

2. The operation of the net and the control of the channel traffic will remain under the command of the Commander Pearl Harbor Group.

J. B. Earle  
J. B. EARLE  
*Chief of Staff.*

Distribution :

Inshore Patrol 35  
Offshore Patrol 50  
Pearl Harbor Group 30  
Sr. C. G. Officer 2  
O. O. Nas, Kaneohe 10

HEADQUARTERS NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 14 December, 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE ORDER No. 5

1. All ships entering and departing from PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU HARBOR will acquaint themselves with the swept channel, and use only this channel.

2. Vessels proceeding between PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU and vice versa will make passage from channel entrance to channel entrance outside of the 100 fathom curve.

C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH.

Distribution:

Inshore Patrol 35  
Offshore Patrol 50  
Sr. C. G. Officer 20  
Pearl Harbor Group 30  
N. T. S. 200  
CinCPac 750

*Confidential*

C-A16-3/A4-3/QW/ND14 (01365)

HEADQUARTERS NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 14 December 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE ORDER No. 4

The following code words and meanings will be used to transmit information from the Harbor Control to all ships PEARL. At 0000 local time each day a message will be sent by HCP giving a single number. This number will indicate the manner of matching the code for the next 24 hours. Thus if the signal given at 0000 is FIVE, move code word No. 5 opposite No. 1 message. All code words then match up with their corresponding messages, for that day. This order becomes effective 0000 19 December 1941.

J. B. Earle,  
J. B. EARLE,  
*Chief of Staff.*

Distribution:

All Ships of the Fleet 750  
Inshore Patrol 35  
Offshore Patrol 50  
N. T. S. 12

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Baseball</li> <li>2. Bobsled</li> <li>3. Desk light</li> <li>4. Fishrod</li> <li>5. Football</li> <li>6. Hayrake</li> <li>7. Lawnmower</li> <li>8. Man rope</li> <li>9. Nail hole</li> <li>10. Nugget</li> <li>11. Opener</li> <li>12. Paperweight</li> <li>13. Peephole</li> <li>14. Rat trap</li> <li>15. Rawhide</li> <li>16. Reptile</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. U. S. planes taking off.</li> <li>2. U. S. planes landing.</li> <li>3. No U. S. planes in the air.</li> <li>4. Enemy planes coming in.</li> <li>5. Check fire.</li> <li>6. Enemy submarine in harbor.</li> <li>7. Open fire.</li> <li>8. Enemy vessels off shore.</li> <li>9. Stop all boats in harbor—mines.</li> <li>10. Enemy submarine in channel.</li> <li>11. Cease fire.</li> </ol> |
|---|--|



- |                 |                  |
|-----------------|------------------|
| 17. Rope end    | 12. Resume fire. |
| 18. Sliderule   | 13.              |
| 19. Stepladder  | 14.              |
| 20. Telephone   |                  |
| 21. Typewriter  |                  |
| 22. Whale oil   |                  |
| 23. Wheelbarrow |                  |
| 24. Windmill    |                  |

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE  
(FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 13 December 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE ORDER NO. 3

1. All reports involving United States ships or aircraft must be reported by the term: "United States Cruiser" (Submarine, Airplane, etc.), not "Friendly" or "Our" or other broad terms. If the vessel is definitely not United States, it must be reported as "Unidentified" unless it is definitely known to be enemy or some other nationality.

2. Only four ways of reporting ships are to be used:

- (a) "United States"
- (b) "Unidentified"
- (c) "Enemy"
- (d) "British", "Dutch", etc.

J. B. Earle  
J. B. EARLE,  
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

- Inshore Patrol (35)
- Offshore Patrol (50)
- Sector \_\_\_\_\_ (300)
- Sta. Off. U. S. C. G. (20)
- P H Group (30)
- Marines (25)
- Patwing Two (2,000)

*Restricted*

14TH NAVAL DISTRICT, 11 December 1941.

*NLDF Order No. 2.*

Headquarters Hawaiian Department Field Order No. 2 is quoted herewith:

"1. The Commanding Officer, 53d Brigade (AA), will control fire of all Army and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery on OAHU. The Naval anti-aircraft artillery representative at the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center will control the fire of naval units and ships in Pearl Harbor. He will be furnished a direct line in the Army Cable System to Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District for this purpose. At night no anti-aircraft artillery unit will fire without the authority of the battalion or higher commander, unless it is individually attacked. During the day, no anti-aircraft artillery unit will fire without the authority of the senior battery officer present unless it is individually attacked.

"2. Anti-aircraft weapons of other than units described above, will remain out of action unless individually attacked. At such times, fire will be limited to enemy planes within five hundred (500) yards.

"3. Battery and company officers will explain to every man in their units the necessity for remaining cool and not firing on our own troops either in the air or on the ground, even though firing is heard in the vicinity.

"4. The necessity for the conservation of .50 caliber ammunition will be impressed on personnel manning these weapons.

"5. There is being manufactured locally as rapidly as possible improvised anti-aircraft .30 caliber machine gun mounts which will be issued to ground troops at the rate of twelve (12) per infantry company. Priority of issue to machine gun companies.

"6. Anti-aircraft machine gun firing, both .30 and .50 caliber, from field positions to test or warm-up machine guns is prohibited."

The Commander Naval Local Defense Force is in agreement with the above order and directs full cooperation by units of the Naval Local Defense Force. The Commander Local Defense Force will generally follow the fire control of Commanding Officer 53d Brigade (AA).

The Commander Naval Local Defense Force is in agreement with the above tinue warming up shots and test shots from machine guns.

C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,

Commander, Naval Local Defense Force.

J. B. EARLE, Chief of Staff.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 2 December 1941.

LOCAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE ORDER NO. 1

Subject: Unified Grid System for Location of Positions in the Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.

Enclosure:

- (A) Special Military Map "BB".
- (B) Figures 1 and 2 explaining system.

1. The unified grid system as used by the U. S. Army will be adopted for use of the Naval Local Base Defense Force.

2. *Basic square.*—A grided BASIC SQUARE measuring 900,000 yards West to East and 800,000 yards South to North (Figure 1 attached) is superimposed on the map of Oahu and vicinity with its center near the center of the Island. Each side of the BASIC SQUARE is divided into ranges numbered from 1 to 9 west-to-east and from 2 to 9 south-to-north. Each of the resulting seventy two squares, indicated by a two figure number, measures 100,000 yards on a side and is termed a REGION.

3. *Region.*—In the Special Map of Oahu and vicinity on which the grid system has been superimposed, that Island is included in REGION 55. Contiguous waters to a distance of approximately 20 miles are included in contiguous REGIONS, i. e. 44, 45, 46; 54, 56; 64, 65, 66.

4. *Areas.*—Each REGION (Figure 2 attached) is divided into ten ranges lettered from A to L from west to east, and into ten ranges, lettered from A to L from south to north. Each of the resulting one hundred squares measures 10,000 yards on a side and is termed an AREA. The letters E and I are omitted in lettering AREAS for communication reasons. Each AREA is designated by two letters, namely, the letter of the west-to-east range followed by the letter of the south-to-north range. Assuming that the REGION in Figure 2 is number 55 in BASIC SQUARE of Figure 1, then the point X in Area DC is located within 10,000 yards by the group 55 DC (Region 55, Area DC).

5. *Locations within areas.*—For the indication of locations within each AREA coordinates are used. By this system, any LOCALITY can be described within an AREA to within 1,000 yards; any POSITION to within 100 yards; and any POINT to within 10 yards. A LOCALITY within an AREA is designated to within 1,000 yards of two digits, the first the abscissa and the second the ordinate, each representing thousands of yards measured from the southwest corner of the AREA. Thus, again assuming that Figure 2 is REGION 55, X is located to within 1,000 yards by the group 55 DC 62. In like manner, a POSITION is designated to within 100 yards by two digits giving the abscissa and two giving the ordinate, each pair of digits representing hundreds of yards. Similarly six digits designate a POINT within an AREA to within 10 yards. Thus X is located to within 100 yards by 55 DC 6221, and to within 10 yards by 55 DC 625214, the first three digits being the abscissa and the last three the ordinate.

6. In the future the unified grid system will be used by the Inshore Patrol

and vessels in the defense sectors in reporting objects such as mines dropped from aircraft during air raids and at such other times as the system becomes applicable.

C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,  
Commander,  
Naval Base Defense Force.

*Distribution:*

CinCPac 2  
PatWing TWO 2  
Comdr. Sector 1 10  
Comdr. Sector 2 10  
Comdr. Sector 3 10  
Comdr. Sector 4 10  
Capt. of Yd. 10  
Inshore Patrol 10  
Comdr. Mine Defense Unit 2

(Enclosure (A) is a special Military Map "BB", showing a gridded basic square superimposed on a map of Oahu for location of positions in that area. This map is reproduced as Item No. 48 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

(Enclosure (B) consists of two figures explaining the unified grid system for location of positions. These figures are reproduced as Item No. 49 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 34 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] *Secret*

HISTORY OF ACTION OCCURRING AT MIDWAY ISLAND FROM DECEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 31, AS COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE

*December 7:*

A report from Midway addressed to CINCPAC and filed to Pearl Harbor at 1235 December 12, referring to Sunday's action, stated that it was indicated that shore batteries registered three 3 inch hits on an enemy destroyer and two 5 inch hits on an enemy cruiser. The message further stated that reports also indicated that two enemy cruisers and two enemy destroyers took part in the action.

At 0130 December 8 a message was filed to the district intelligence officer via cable from Midway stating that at 0110 things are fairly quiet now. The contractors' buildings are still burning. Raiders sent in about 15 incendiaries. There are two deaths and 12 casualties, the communication added.

CINCPAC, in a message filed at 1003 December 13, informed the Chief of Naval Operations that there were no new developments and that Midway claimed hits on a cruiser and a destroyer during the night of the 7th.

[2] *December 8:*

No enemy action reported at Midway.

The commander of Task Force 9 at 0135 December 8 sent an order to Midway for Patron 21 to fuel with 1,200 gallons, arm with two 500 pound bombs and search sector 190 degrees to 070 degrees to maximum distance possible and land at Johnston by sunset, with Japanese carriers the objective.

At 1030 December 8 Midway reported that shell fragments from the bombardment indicated that 6 inch guns fired on the island. The report stated the Philippine clipper captain had sighted two ships, either destroyers or cruisers, proceeding at high speed on course 240 T. 40 miles from the island at 1045 GCT December 8. (Note: Capt. Hamilton of the Philippine Clipper, interviewed by the District Intelligence Office after his arrival in Honolulu December 8, is said to have reported sighting the wakes of two vessels 35 miles from Midway at 1110

GCT December 8. No explanation is offered for the discrepancy between this time and the time (1045) reported from Midway nor for the discrepancy between the time the Midway despatch was shown filed (1030) and the time the clipper captain was said by this despatch to have sighted the two ships.)

[3] Midway reported to the commandant at 1359 December 8 that the Philippine clipper had departed for Honolulu.

*December 9:*

Midway reported to the commandant at 0450 December 9 that radar bearings showed three and possibly four fair targets circling four to seven miles distant. The island reported the targets could not be sighted.

*December 10:*

At 0313 December 12 a communication was filed from CINCPAC to Midway asking if the island was bombed by aircraft yesterday the 10th and if so, to report the details. A negative reply was received at 0401.

A message filed to Midway from CINCPAC at 2038 December 10 had advised that an enemy carrier might be north of Midway in position for a plane attack on the afternoon of the 10th or at daylight on the 11th. The message urged Midway to be fully prepared to resist with all means and to disperse personnel and equipment not needed for defense.

The commandant notified CINCPAC at 0100 December 11 that the Midway cable operator told Honolulu, "Air raid on. See you later," at about zero hours the 11th.

[4] *December 11:*

Midway informed CINCPAC at 2035 December 11 that all material of patrol wing 2 was intact. The island estimated that one squadron of patrol planes could be operated for 30 days, but that 5,000 spark plugs were needed.

In an earlier communication (filed at 1930 December 11) Midway addressed the following information to CINCPAC:

The station had material and facilities to maintain 18 marine planes (SBD-1), three SB-2U and one F4F for six weeks.

Supplies were 700,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, 50 drums of 1120 oil, and 150 drums of 1100 oil. The patrol plane report was to follow, the communication added.

At 2315 December 11, Midway informed CINCPAC that on hand were 294 Mark 1—3 one hundred pound bombs; 66 Mark 13—1 one thousand pound bombs; 148 Mark 12 and 56 Mark 9 five hundred pound bombs; 48 depth charges; 157,000 rounds of .50 cal. and 379,000 rounds of .30 cal.

The commandant reported to the Chief of Naval Operations December 11 a summary of enemy action at Midway [5] including one bombardment on the Sth (6 inch CLS or DDS) and one air raid today. Personnel casualties were stated not extensive.

*December 12:*

No enemy action reported at Midway.

*December 13:*

No enemy action reported at Midway.

The commandant was advised by Midway at 2345 December 13 that the aviation gasoline supply including that of Pan American Airways totaled 707,000 gallons.

*December 14:*

No enemy action reported.

*December 15:*

No enemy action reported.

At 0815 Midway sent radar reports to the commandant.

A request for information on friendly ships in the vicinity, in order to evaluate radar readings was filed by Midway to the commandant at 0915 December 15.

*December 16:*

In a message filed at 0035 December 16, CINCPAC informed Midway of an order to Marine Aircraft Group 21 to [6] fly and base marine squadron 231 there, departing from Pearl Harbor at daylight Tuesday (16th). Patrol Wing 2 was to provide a patrol plane escort. The NAS Midway was to assure readiness of



revetments and communications from the radar to Eastern Island. (This message was also addressed to the commander of the air group, the commander of Task Force 9 and, for information, to commanders Task Forces 11 and 16.)

A routine despatch from Midway to CINCPAC listed ammunition expended since the last report as: 57 rounds of 5 inch, 90 rounds of 3 inch AA, 13 rounds 3 inch common, 9,000 rounds of .50 caliber, and 4,000 rounds of .30 caliber.

At 0145 CINCPAC was advised by Midway that the man-days food supply included: Contractors', 150,000; Navy, 30,000, and marine, 50,000 with only 30,000 man-days of yeast.

At 0645 CINCPAC received a cabled request from Midway for fire fighting equipment (ref. 15/0645).

CINCPAC received a cabled communication filed at 0715 stating the need for 200 rifles, 100 pistols, 20 automatic rifles, 1,000 hand grenades and the necessary accessories to include 15,000 rounds for pistol and 50,000 rounds for rifle.

[7] A cable filed to CINCPAC at 0930 requested spare parts to insure operation of the radar, listing the necessary material.

At 1502 December 16 CINCPAC informed Midway that radio bearings indicated the presence of an enemy carrier in the vicinity of the island.

CINCPAC advised Midway in a communication filed at 2357 December 16 that on receipt of information this morning by cable that an air raid was underway. The VM5 en route was recalled. It was stated that this was one of a number of alarming reports received during the past ten days through the cable company. The order was given to take appropriate action.

#### *December 17:*

Midway stated an urgent need for a search type radar (SCR 270-B) in a message filed to the marine quartermaster at Pearl Harbor at 0530 December 17.

#### *December 18:*

At 2340 December 18 a message was filed by Pearl Harbor to Mare Island (addressed for information to the Bureau of Ships and Midway) stating that it was imperative that material be sent to Pearl Harbor immediately. (Ref. [8] BUSHIPS 25 1904 conference of October regarding azimuth indicators for the outlying islands.)

#### *December 19:*

At 2010 December 19 Midway notified Wake (and informed the commandant and the commander of Task Force 9) that one PSP had departed from Midway for Wake at 1820 GCT.

Midway filed a communication at 1110 December 19, addressed to the commandant, stating that with planes arriving there, it was absolutely essential for the island to know the disposition of forces in its area in order to prevent bombing of friendly forces.

The communication added that it was also essential that proper recognition signals between aircraft and surface craft be issued the station, and that a communication plan should be sent from Task Force 4. It was requested that units of United States forces be instructed to remain a minimum of 14,000 yards outside the reef during the hours of darkness to prevent their being fired upon from shore. The intention was expressed to fire on all targets inside this distance. It was further requested that the station be advised when this warning was issued and receipted for.

In a message at 2355 December 19, CINCPAC, referring to his communication of 2357 the 16th, advised Midway that the [9] cable operator there again reported an air raid at 2042 (Midway's time) yesterday. Acknowledgment was requested and was received from Midway at 0350 December 20.

Midway reported the arrival of one PSP at 0345 GCT in a communication filed to the commander of Patrol Wing 2 (info. Wake and Com 14) at 0455 December 21.

In his summary of contract work required curtailed under the present situation, the commandant specified to the Bureau of Yards and Docks that at Midway it was intended to eliminate projects which would require a long time for completion to a usable stage. Examples given were the dredging of the breakwater and waterfront work. He proposed to stop work temporarily on the submarine base buildings and modify other projects to suit the immediate needs. He also expressed the intention to reduce the contractors' force 50 per cent, to a total of 770 workers.

*December 23:*

CINCPAC addressed a communication to Midway at 0323 December 23 (and for information to Com 14, Task Force 17 and Task Force 8) stating that the Japanese had carried out a landing attack at Wake (today) and no communications had been received from the island since 1952 GCT. It was added that Task Force 8 comprising a [10] carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers would cover Midway during the operations of Task Force 17.

At 0657 December 23, the commander of Task Forces 11, 17, 9, 7 and 14) that it was proposed to start a search at 1800 GCT December 23 of sector 180-360 degrees True, radius 220 miles, from a position bearing 305 miles from Point Dog.

At 0839 December 23, CINCPAC filed the following orders to the commander of Task Force 14 (addressed for information to the commanders of Task Forces 11 and 8, and to the commandant): Enroute to Pearl Harbor, marine fighting squadron 221 will be flown off to base at Midway December 25. The Tangier with an escort of two destroyers will be detached to arrive at Midway December 26 to disembark the personnel and material of the squadron together with other available cargo that may be needed at Midway. On completion of this assignment the Tangier and her escort will return to Pearl Harbor. The naval air station at Midway was ordered to clear the Wright before the arrival.

CINCPAC advised the commanders of Task Forces 8 and 17 (info CTF's 4, 7, 9, 11 and 14) at 1549 December 23 that the Triton reported having been trailed by anti-submarine units about 800 miles bearing 258 T. from Midway.

*[11] December 24:*

The Chief of Naval Operations was informed by CINCPAC (communication filed at 0957 December 24) that since both submarines previously assigned to the Wake area had been withdrawn because of material casualties, the Pompano was being sent to patrol and would arrive on December 26.

This communication also stated that VMF 221 would land at Midway on December 25, and included a summary of the submarine attacks at Johnston and Palmyra.

*December 25:*

The commanding general of the Hawaiian department, in a communication to the commandant at 0400 December 25, requested that the army communication personnel at Midway be transported, preferably by plane, to Oahu and stated the air corps equipment would be placed at the disposal of the navy when the army detachment departed.

The commandant notified Midway that this evacuation was authorized by the first available transportation and that the equipment could be retained for use on the island, if desired.

A message sent by CINCPAC to the Wright at 1152 December 25 stated the urgency of providing a continuous [12] patrol and observation of the entire beachline at Midway during darkness. The Wright was authorized and directed to remove from the Tangier 12 .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns with five units of ammunition, and marine personnel of the 5 inch group and machine gun group totaling three officers and 78 men for this observation force. The tangier was to be available to evacuate workmen in accordance with the commandant's instructions. (Ref. 10680.)

*December 26:*

At 0837 December 26, CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations that the marine fighting squadron 221 was now at Midway.

The commander of Task Force 17 filed a communication to CINCPAC at 0300 December 26 stating the force and the USCG Walnut would depart for Pearl Harbor at 2000 GCT.

*December 27:*

In a despatch filed by Midway at 2350 December 27 (addressed to CINCPAC and, for information, to the commandant) it was stated that the senior marine aviator present had specified that proper defense of the island required two [13] squadrons of patrol planes and three more fighter squadrons. This was concurred in by the commanding officer of the station, the communication said.

Midway notified the commandant that the aviation gasoline supply on December 27 totaled 698,000 gallons.

December 28:

On December 28, Midway informed the commandant that gun calibration tests at the station were scheduled daily from 0700 to 0730 and between 1500 and 1530 LCT. It was requested that a warning be issued to this effect.

A letter report by the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station at Midway gave a description of the action of December 7 as follows:

1. Enemy ships attacked this station at 2130, Midway time, 7 December 1941, firing shells from the westward, out of range of the shore batteries. At 2135 ships opened fire from the southward. The attack lasted about thirty minutes. Hostile ships estimated as two cruisers and two destroyers.

2. *Marine Casualties:*

Killed:

First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, USMC

Private first class Elmer R. Morrell

[14] Wounded:

Pl. Sgt. William A. Barbour, serious

Corp. Harold R. Hazelwood, not serious

Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge, not serious

*Navy Casualties:*

Killed:

Ensign Donald J. Kraker, USNR

Tuttle, Ralph E., F.2c, USN

Wounded:

Ballauf, Charles, ACNM, USN, serious

Baltusnik, John, CRM, USN, serious

Truitt, M. D., Ensign, USN, not serious

Barnes, Jesse R., AMM2c, USN, not serious

Maudlin, G. L., RM1c, USN, not serious

Marini, D. L., MM2c, USN, not serious

Mitchell, D. B., Sea1c, USN, not serious

Felton, H. E. Sea1c, USN, not serious

Schooley, F. S., MM1c, USN, not serious

3. *Marine Material Damage:*

One searchlight badly damaged and one .50 caliber machine gun destroyed on hangar.

4. *Navy Material Damage:*

(1) SEAPLANE HANGAR. Hit by six 6" shells roof completely burned, but structure fairly [15] well preserved. Lean-tos intact except for shrapnel damage. Sprinkler system out of commission due to severed feeder pipes. 75 percent of stores in hangar lost. One plane completely demolished in hangar. One badly damaged due to shrapnel, but repairable.

(2) TORPEDO AND BOMB SIGHT BUILDING. One shell exploded inside destroying one corner of building. Also shrapnel damage.

(3) POWER HOUSE. No damage inside. Operation continues. Three or four 6" shells hit walls and roof. Also hit by shell ricocheting from laundry roof.

(4) PARACHUTE LOFT AND UTILITY BUILDING. One shell hit, shrapnel damage to part of the upper roof structure.

(5) LAUNDRY BUILDING. One 5" shell ricocheted off roof. No interior damage except wood splinters.

(6) NEW (UNFINISHED) RADIO TRANSMITTER BUILDING. Six or seven 3" shells hit concrete walls. Three penetrated. Only minor damage.

[16] 5. *Pan American Airways System Direction Finder Damage:*

Six out of eight direction finder masts hit. Cannot function. One small building remains intact; the other damaged considerably by one shell hit and shrapnel. Apparently 3" shell fire.

6. Shells were apparently 6, 5 and 3" and were incendiary and H. E. No enemy planes attacked.

7. *Ammunition expended:*

Machine Gun group:

.30 cal. approximately 450 rounds

.50 cal. approximately 100 rounds

.50 cal. 4,250 rounds lost in hangar fire

5" group: 9 rounds

3" group: 13 rounds Navy Common



8. *Damage to enemy:*

One 3'' battery Navy Common,

Three hits on a destroyer, two in superstructure, one in forecandle area near water line.

One 5'' battery,

Two hits on a cruiser near water line forward. Smoke poured out from this ship, action [17] was broken off and a withdrawal to a point fifteen miles to the southwest was covered by a smoke screen. The other ships rendezvoused at this point and remained in that area for about two hours.

9. The conduct of all hands, both service and civilian personnel was of the highest order.

## EXHIBITS No. 35 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION

MIDWAY ISLAND

NA38/A16-3

*Confidential*

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Action of 7 December 1941.

1. Enemy ships attack this station at 2130, Midway time, 7 December 1941, firing shells from the westward, out of range of the shore batteries. At 2135 ships opened fire from the southward. The attack lasted about thirty minutes. Hostile ships estimated as two cruisers and two destroyers.

2. *Marine Casualties.*—Killed: First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, U. S. M. C.; Private first class Elmer R. Morrell. Wounded: Pl. Sgt. William A. Barbour, serious; Corp. Harold R. Hazelwood, not serious; Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge, not serious.

*Navy Casualties.*—Killed: Ensign Donald J. Kraker, U. S. N. R., Tuttle, Ralph E., F. 2c, U. S. N. Wounded: Ballauf, Charles, ACMM, U. S. N., serious; Baltusnik, John, CRM, U. S. N., serious; Truitt, M. D., Ensign, U. S. N., not serious; Barnes, Jesse R., AMM2c, U. S. N., not serious; Maudlin, G. L., RM1c, U. S. N., not serious; Marini, D. L., MM2c, U. S. N., not serious; Mitchell, D. B., Sea. 1c U. S. N., not serious; Pelton, H. B., Sea. 1c, U. S. N., not serious; Schooley, F. S., MM1c, U. S. N., not serious.

3. *Marine Materiel Damage.*—One searchlight badly damaged and one .50 caliber machine gun destroyed on hangar.

4. *Navy Materiel Damage.*—(1) SEAPLANE HANGAR. Hit by six 6'' shells. Roof completely burned, but structure fairly well preserved. Lean-tos intact except for shrapnel damage. Sprinkler system out of commission due to severed feeder pipes. 75 percent of stores in hangar lost. One plane completely demolished in hangar. One badly damaged due to shrapnel, but repairable.

(2) TORPEDO AND BOMB SIGHT BUILDING. One shell exploded inside destroying one corner of building. Also shrapnel damage.

(3) POWER HOUSE. No damage inside. Operation continues. Three or four 6'' shells hit walls and roof. Also hit by shell ricocheting from laundry roof.

(4) PARACHUTE LOFT AND UTILITY BUILDING. One shell hit, shrapnel damage to part of the upper roof structure.

(5) LAUNDRY BUILDING. One 5'' shell ricocheted off roof. No interior damage except wood splinters.

(6) NEW (UNFINISHED) RADIO TRANSMITTER BUILDING. Six or seven 3'' shells hit concrete walls. Three penetrated. Only minor damage.

5. *Pan American Airways System Direction Finder Damage.*—Six out of eight direction finder masts hit. Cannot function. One small building remains intact, the other damaged considerably by one shell hit and shrapnel. Apparently 3'' shell fire.

6. Shells were apparently 6, 5, and 3'' and were incendiary and H. E. No enemy planes attacked.



7. *Ammunition expended.*—Machine gun group:

.30 cal. approximately 450 rounds.  
 .50 cal. approximately 100 rounds.  
 .50 cal., 4,250 rounds lost in hangar fire.

5" group: 9 rounds.

3" group: 13 rounds Navy common.

8. *Damage to enemy.*—One 3" battery Navy Common.

Three hits on a destroyer, two in superstructure, one in forecastle area near water line.

One 5" battery.

Two hits on a cruiser near water line forward. Smoke poured out from this ship, action was broken off and a withdrawal to a point fifteen miles to the southwest was covered by a smoke screen. The other ships rendezvoused at this point and remained in that area for about 2 hours.

9. The conduct of all hands, both service and civilian personnel, was of the highest order.

C. T. SIMAR.

Copy to: Com 14

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 EXHIBIT No. 36 (NAVY PACKET No. 2), ROBERTS COMMISSION

## UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH DEFENSE BATTALION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, MIDWAY ISLANDS

*Confidential*

DECEMBER 12, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer, Defense Garrison.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Via: Senior Officer Present.

Subject: Report of action on night of 7 December, 1941.

1. At 2130 on 7 December, 1941, two unidentified vessels opened fire on Sand Island from the southwest, out of range of shore batteries. Initial fire was short, falling in the lagoon. Fire was raised, falling in lagoon and on beach near "A" battery and the radio towers. Fire was again raised, clearing the dunes and hitting the hangar, setting it on fire. The tarpaper roof of the hangar burned freely lighting up the hangar area and silhouetting objects between firing ships and hangar.

2. At 2150 two ships approached south side of southwest end of Sand Island from the southwest. These ships were travelling at high speed. The leading ship was a destroyer while the trailing ship was identified as a light cruiser. The leading ship was illuminated by searchlight and fire opened by shore batteries at 2155 at 4500 yards. "D" battery, firing 13 rounds of Navy common shell with director control, scored three observed hits on leading ship; two on superstructure, putting the forward gun out of action, and one near water line, forward. Only two guns on "D" battery could bear on target. "B" battery firing 9 rounds of 5" Navy A. P. from Eastern Island scored two observed hits on starboard side of trailing ship near water line, forward. The only searchlight that could effectively bear, illuminated the leading ship and was fired on by trailing ship and put out of action by shell fragments. Some of the overs from this firing landed in Par Air radio direction finder area. Searchlight was in action only three to four minutes. The Japanese flag was seen flying from the leading ship. Leading ship opened fire on hangar when illuminated and continued firing until forward gun was put out of action. Both ships were struck almost immediately by 3" and 5" shells and .50 caliber machine gun fire. They broke off the action by changing course from northeast to south, four shots were fired at Eastern Island. Black smoke was seen to emit from hole in side of trailing ship when it was hit by 5" shells. .50 caliber machine gun fire hit superstructure. Fire by Sand Island battery was opened at 4500 yards. Ships turned at 3500 yards.

3. An analysis of the action causes me to arrive at the following conclusions as to the Japanese method of attack:

a. *Facts*.—There was a bright moon. All the new construction was white and glistened in the moonlight. The many windows in the hangar reflected moonlight. The reef stood out clearly. Both islands and all ships present were darkened. Buoy lights were out. Troops were at their stations and other personnel were dispersed.

b. *Tactics*.—It appears that two ships laid off to the west of FRIGATE out of range of shore batteries, and opened fire while two other ships laid off to the southwest and spotted the firing of the first two ships onto the island. As soon as the hangar was well afire the ships to the west ceased firing while the two ships to the southwest started a run from southwest to northwest to close the range and run east parallel to the reef using the burning hangar as a target. The first salvos from these ships fell short striking the new laundry and the new power house. It seems that the ships were surprised to be illuminated and fired upon from the southeast coast of Sand Island and Eastern Island at the same time. Men on the leading ship were seen to scurry for cover when shore batteries and .50 caliber machine guns opened fire. The Japanese took full advantage of the moon for spotting and approach. The reflection of the moon on white buildings, window glass and white squares on water tanks must have been visible for miles at sea. The sand looked like snow and the breakers on the reef clearly outlines the island area. It was an ideal night for such an attack. Since the attack, steps have been taken to repaint and camouflage fuel tanks, water tanks, light roofs, buildings, etc.

4. After the action was broken off the Radar reports indicated that several vessels rendezvoused about ten miles south of Sand Island. They remained in that vicinity for about two hours, all but two ships left. Greenish yellow glows on the horizon to the south were observed during the night as late as 0028 December 8, 1941.

5. *Enemy Material*.—Fragments and duds found indicate that H. E. projectiles with nose fuze were employed. None of the projectiles burst in the air; all bursts were on impact. Several duds were found on West beach.

6. The conduct of the personnel of this battalion was highly satisfactory. All hands proceeded about their duties in a cool, calm and businesslike manner. There were several outstanding instances of coolness, high sense of duty, and bravery. First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, Battery Commander of Battery "H", after having received wounds that fractured both legs and pelvis, when "H" Battery CP in the second deck of the new power house was hit, refused to be evacuated before his men who were wounded by the same shell. He died from loss of blood. Corporal (CP) Harold R. Hazelwood, switchboard operator for Battery "H" CP, received a compound fracture of the left leg when struck by shell fragments of projectile that burst in CP. In spite of his wounds and the shock he suffered, he immediately set up the CP switchboard again and reestablished communications. Corporal (CP) Dale L. Peters, who was checking on communications in the hangar tower was blown through a window; he recovered his senses and started down the tower. In his dazed condition he opened the wrong door and fell about 14 feet on top of some men who broke his fall. He again recovered his bearings and assisted in removing large aerial bombs from the burning hangar. These are only a few of the outstanding cases.

7. *Personnel casualties*—

a. Killed: 1st Lt. George H. Cannon, Private first Class Elmer R. Morrell.

b. Seriously wounded: Platoon Sergeant William A. Barbour, Corporal (CP) Harold R. Hazelwood.

c. Shell shocked: Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge.

8. *Materiel damage (U. S. Marine Corps)*.—a. A shell exploded immediately below and in front of a SL, the fragments smashing the glass door, lamp head, operating and feed mechanism, trunion arm and ventilating motor, piercing the mirror in numerous places and cutting two tires. Also a cable of another SL was cut by shell fire. No damage to positions.

b. One .50 caliber machine gun complete with mount and cradle was destroyed when the roof of the Naval Air Station hangar on which it was emplaced, burned, dropping the gun to the deck beneath. 4250 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition at the gun position was exploded by the fire.

/s/ H. D. SHANNON.

## 1st Endorsement

*Confidential*

12 DEC., 1941.

Naval Air Station, Midway Islands.

From: The Senior Officer Present.

To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Report of action on night of 7 December, 1941.

1. Forwarded.

/s/ C. T. SIMARD.

## EXHIBIT No. 37 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] District Public Works Officer

Pearl Harbor, T. H.

MIDWAY ISLAND, 17 December, 1941.

823

*Confidential*

PUBLIC WORKS OFFICE

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

PEARL HARBOR, U. S. A.

From: Senior Officer in Charge, Contracts NOy-3550 &amp; NOy-4173, Midway Island.

To: Officer in Charge, Contracts NOy-3550 &amp; NOy-4173, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Subject: Miscellaneous Comments, covering period 1 December 1941, to 17 December, 1941.

## PERIOD 1 DECEMBER, 1941 TO 7 DECEMBER, 1941

1. Construction was proceeding as usual, but was fast approaching a stagnation point because of lack of material and locations for approved structures. The last cargo ship brought little of consequence so far as construction work was concerned, and that was lost by subsequent fire in the hangar. The last cargo ship, mentioned above, left here the evening of 6 December, 1941, with fuel barge "E" in tow.

2. During this period the U. S. C. & G. S. survey ship left for another assignment, after having made a good hydrographic survey of our channel, anchorage area and south reef, and determinations of our latitude and longitude. They checked our triangulation points and base line system very closely.

3. Also during this period the Coast Guard Lighthouse ship was in our waters, assisting in setting out our navigational aids. The two (2) large entrance buoys had been set, and numerous resettings accomplished. The gas lamp in the Coast Guard Lighthouse had been in process of removal and replacement.

4. Also, during this first week of December, the one remaining Pilot and the Benson were dredging in the entrance channel and turning basin, in order to eliminate the high spots as shown by the Geodetic Survey soundings. Some of the material so dredged was found suitable for aggregate, fortunately.

[2] 5. Several temporary buildings were started in connection with the construction work here, as per our recent correspondence, and the construction on Eastern Island special facilities was well under way.

## PERIOD 7 DECEMBER, 1941, TO 17 DECEMBER, 1941

1. The entire outlook for Midway has changed. The shelling from Seacraft started about 9:30 PM, in the evening of 7 December 1941, a most gorgeous moonlit night, and lasted about one hour. This shelling, insofar as construction work was concerned resulted in:

(a) A severe fire in the hangar which burned practically the entire roof, and charred or watersoaked beyond usability, about forty (40) percent of the cargo stored in that building, and buckled the member of four (4) interior trusses in the south half of the hangar. The leanto sections were undamaged, and fortunately, Contractors' personnel sleeping in the north leanto were not hit by shellfire. The structural damage appears to be about 25 percent.



(b) A puncture of the 200,000 gallon salt water tank near the middle of the vertical height, by one shell of approximately 6" diameter.

(c) Direct hits to the parachute loft and maintenance building, which caused some damage to structure and broke most of the glass in the south-westerly sides.

(d) A hole in the roof of the new laundry caused by a ricochette shot or by shrapnel.

(e) Two (2) direct hits to the power house, which did no structural damage; in fact one shell was prevented from bursting by the resistance of the concrete in a three-way corner between flue, sidewall & roof, on the southwest.

(f) Direct hits to the partially completed communication center, which left gaping holes in the side walls and structure, but did not materially damage the conduit system therein.

(g) The complete destruction of the Pan-American direction finder and beam.

[3] 2. The shelling and subsequent frequent alarm whistles, have to a large extent undermined the morale of the Contractors' organization. Loud and boisterous language of the "second guessers" has poured out for my benefit, concerning the assininity of the way this station was planned and managed during the construction period so far, and that certain parties will certainly be told off when the time came. The consequence has been that there has been a division of effort which is not conducive to a wholesome situation. It is my opinion that with few exceptions, should construction proceed, the top personnel of the Contractors' organization should be replaced, and that with the exception of volunteers, no present personnel in any grade be retained, and as a matter of fact, the sooner some changes are made, the better for the situation here.

3. During the period since the shelling, we have of course ceased construction work on the station facilities as such, and have been busily engaged in defense work. The following things have been done and are in the process of doing:

(a) Dugouts constructed at all defense positions for Marine forces, and adequate shelters for communication center, for Commanding Officers' headquarters, and for some other personnel. Many of the dugouts for other personnel are temporary, and are being replaced with permanent type which will be more protection and which will not enganger, the health of the camp, which has thus far remained surprisingly good.

(b) All buildings and tanks painted gray.

(c) All window glass sprayed with lamp black and oil to prevent glare.

(d) Radar Building completely enclosed in a sandfilled crib. As it was, it made a beautiful target, entirely unprotected.

(e) New magazines have been covered with sand, and used for dispersion of food supplies and other essential materials, and for hospital and personnel shelters. More could be used.

(f) All range markers and similar items are removed.

(g) Many channel markers have been removed and temporarily replaced with bamboo markers. The buoy in Wells Harbor has been sunk.

[4] (h) C. A. A. light removed and placed on one of the tanks in the Marine Area, for a challenging and identifying signal.

(i) Water-still placed in operation at Eastern Island, (150, Contractors' personnel assigned to Major Benson there).

(j) Civilian defense corps organized to aid in maintenance and supplying guard and sentry service during continued blackout. The fire brigade is carrying on as a well organized group.

(k) Construction of a new 3" anti-aircraft battery at the waterfront to replace the present battery near the aviation gas tanks. (This is a major operation, ordered by the Commanding Officer).

(l) Beginning construction for the position for 7" guns, which came on last cargo vessel. (Ordered by Marines.)

(m) A temporary ramp for seaplane service is being constructed at Eastern Island, and temporary gassing facilities are being made. An operating area has been marked out northerly from Eastern Island.

(n) A sand blanket has been placed on all roofs.

(o) Independent sources of power supplied to all cold storage units.

(p) Many other items of maintenance and operation and preparation for emergency, with respect to utilities, phone service and general communications have been accomplished. Supplies of all sorts have been dispersed as widely as possible.



4. In doing the above things we have used of construction materials some 5,000 sacks of cement, all of our heavy timber, much of Wolmanized tongue and groove building lumber, a large part of our plywood (much of which burned in the hangar), all our stock of steel plate, most of the available bolt stock, and practically the entire stock of electrical wire and supplies and a great deal of the available sheet piling. When the defense work required by the Marines, NAS and Contractors is accomplished, there will be practically no supply of construction material left. Of the remainder, a complete inventory will be made.

[5] 5. It is obvious, I think, that continued construction here is now impossible, and until a continued source and delivery of supplies is assured, no attempt should be made to continue. Until such a time, then, the personnel here is 75 percent too great for any practical use. Also, until such a time in the future, (after the present defense work is accomplished), there is no need of any Civil Engineering Corps Construction Personnel, which might be used to advantage elsewhere than in routine maintenance work. One ensign could handle the routine with a civilian volunteer staff of operators.

6. It has also been demonstrated that the conspicuous color scheme, combustible roofing material, quantity and type of windows, and inflammable construction types, are inconsistent with defensability. For example:

As planned, the permanent telephone switchboard would have been in a frame structure. Also, the Commissary and Cold Storage Building is of light Transite and fireproof construction generally, except for the wood-base mopped-tar roof.

Reinforced concrete and steel construction types are very definitely indicated. For roofs, corrugated iron seems to be our answer; in fact there would have been very little cargo damaged in the hangar had there been this type of roof. A revision of ideas concerning construction here would seem to me to be entirely in order, to be consistent with defense and future use of these Islands, whatever that may be in the light of this present situation.

7. It is also apparent that overhead storage of water, fuel oil or gasoline is no value. High water tanks furnish a fine means of locating us, and above ground tanks generally make fine targets. We have estimated that it would take over 500,000 sand bags to give us any protection for the fuel tanks, and at that, only for protection against shapnel, not against direct hit or sabotage. It is the opinion of the Marine Unit that the ground cover over the aviation gas tanks is inadequate.

8. The above remarks are given for information concerning the situation here in light of the recent attack. It is hoped that I may be given the opportunity to discuss all of these matters with you at the earliest possible moment before continuance plans are perfected.

PAUL F. KEIM.

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EXHIBIT No. 38 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

REPORT OF ARMY-NAVY BOARD

31 October 1941

[1] In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas for all purposes for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 1941 and frequently thereafter until final recommendations were submitted. Present were:

Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.

Read Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.

Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A.

Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.

1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy aviation activities, the available training areas, the present congestion of aircraft areas, the expected expansion of aircraft of both services in the near future with the attending operational difficulties which such expansion would produce.

2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem which confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was available as to the total number of airplanes of both services for which operating facilities

should be made available. The following lists show the number of airplanes which were considered.

NAVY	
14th Naval District Aircraft:	
Patrol planes.....	84
VSO seaplanes.....	48
Fleet Aircraft:	
Airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).....	750
Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes:	
Seaplanes (approximately).....	75
Patrol Wings One and Two:	
Patrol Planes.....	98
Marine Aircraft Groups:	-
Airplanes.....	162
Utility Aircraft:	
Airplanes (various types).....	88
Total.....	1,305

ARMY	
54 Group Program:	
Combat Airplanes	
B-17.....	170
A-20-A.....	27
P-40.....	163
P-38.....	163
C-47.....	20
[2] Present Assignment:	
Combat Airplanes:	
B-17.....	12
P-40.....	104
A-20-A.....	12
O-47.....	13
Obsolete Airplanes:	
B-18.....	30
P-36.....	50
P-26.....	17
Total.....	781

#### OAHU

##### Air Fields Available:

    Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.

    Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.

Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers (commercial), Barbers Point, Keehi Lagoon (commercial, under construction).

#### OUTLYING ISLANDS—HAWAIIAN ARCHIPELAGO

Army: Barking Sands, Kauai; Burns Field, Kauai (commercial, too small for bombardment airplanes); Morse Field, Hawaii; Hillo, Hawaii (Municipal Airport); Lanai (under construction); Homestead Field, Molokai (used jointly Army-Navy and commercial.)

Navy: Maui (Navy and commercial); Hilo (temporary facilities patrol planes):

3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation was summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:

a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. With the imminent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft operating from Oahu, the congestion of air space for training and the shortage of suitable sites for air bases on Oahu must be recognized as becoming serious problems. Lack of suitable harbor and deck facilities in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu precludes the development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, since it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their parent vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island for the development of additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air groups. Carrier aircraft.

when based [3] on shore, must, on account of the nature of their functions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness and not definitely fixed or attached to any shore base. Nevertheless, there must be provided on shore suitable and adequate facilities for the basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely and specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore bases be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of training may be maintained. These shore bases must necessarily be located on the island of Oahu where transportation facilities are available between bases and berths of parent vessels both for transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness. In addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be available not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku Point. There is a landing strip and a dive-bombing target on this area that is continually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection with training operations. If this area is given over to the Army for construction of an air base, its loss will be strongly felt even now, when congestion on Oahu is but a portion of that of the future, and adjustments must be made not only for loss of the existing landing strip and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to proceed.

c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base." The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of Army Forces and Navy District Forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and continued in effective operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of Fleet units and which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian Area, should be based on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.

4. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all sites on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary fields where practicable; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will defeat operating effectiveness. In planning the above developments, due consideration should be given to providing adequate dispersion.

e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base sites on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their maximum practicable capacities. In order to carry out estimated requirements, these developments should precede or at least proceed with any further developments on Oahu. This may not be entirely practicable of accomplishment, but every effort should be made to do so. A fair-sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are subordinated to and coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should be adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more difficult problem to arise at a later date.

[4] f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is insufficient space on the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft involved, even in current plans, to base thereon at the same time. As both services are basing their requirements on the part they are expected to play in national defense, it follows that final decision as to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various alternatives on over-all national defense.

4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.



(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation.

b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of ascertaining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air fields from which pursuit aviation operates, in the performance of this mission, be situated on the Island of Oahu. Under no other condition could there be assurance that enemy aircraft could be intercepted before they reached their bomb release line. The minimum requirements of pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of airplanes at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now permanently located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at times offer an obstacle to their continuous operation. To insure that at least one group of pursuit aviation may operate without being hampered by weather conditions, it should be located at approximately sea level elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected as having the necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, removing all pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which prevails over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to the establishment of grounds targets, in its immediate vicinity, which are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This still leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The nearest point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of Molokai where one gunnery range has been established.

c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A-20-A airplanes which form the support command to assist the ground forces of the Hawaiian Department in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. These airplanes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the ground troops which they serve, both for training and to facilitate their employment in time of war. The home for the support command is established at Bellows Field.

d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182 heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy bombardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the Island of Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of Hickam Field, their home station, to such an extent that provisions must be made for the training of approximately one-half of this force from outlying fields on other islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago.

[5] e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other islands in this group entails changing the defense plans for these islands that security for these bases may be established. This would require a decided increase in the number of ground troops or such a dispersion of available forces as to destroy their effectiveness. This cannot be done except at enormous expense of time and money. For this reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the large quantities of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations must be placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu. Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. While the training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas distant from the Pearl Harbor area, it would be practically impossible to control this force in time of actual hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands. Radio is the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to interference to furnish a positive medium of control. A positive means of communication is a prime requisite for successful air operations. It must be in being and constantly used prior to the beginning of hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment aviation must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft defense, i. e., pursuit aviation, anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is manifestly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the protection of the Interceptor Command.

f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the transports furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is being conducted. Sup-



ply and maintenance facilities also require the same protection from the ground and air as is required for grounded bombardment aviation.

g. In case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with their carriers attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation as might be left behind and for all Army aviation participating in the defense of these islands. Therefore, the problem which confronts this board is to find a site, which would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation training for both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be developed to increase these facilities.

h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with the exception of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be available for air fields is either so occupied, projects are underway for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence in the air created by the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such development. The site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will accommodate two 5000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handicap to the use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the congestion of the air over this part of the island. It would also remove from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch area is the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed. The principal objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it would be as a station for Army pursuits aviation. The use of this site by the Navy would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval aviation on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point, Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from [6] these stations would be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traffic regulations which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of airplanes of the two services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area is advantageously located for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels of the carrier groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all carrier-based Naval aviation.

i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-based aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to sufficient air and ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the fact that air units in Hawaii will, within the next few months, be reinforced with pursuit and bombardment aircraft for which bases must be available now, while the additional carriers anticipated for this area will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to three years.

j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three years should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and employment of the Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they may be required for immediate use against hostile threat.

k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier groups to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy facilities and those Navy projects which are now under development.

5. *Conclusions:* That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to the fact that—

a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the War Department.

b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the Navy Department.

c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the estimated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy.

6. *Joint recommendations*—a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development of an important strategical base, the board recommends:

(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as an air base.

(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy representa-

tives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for temporary use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent of availability of this base to the Navy as well as the extent of the availability to the Navy of all other Army air bases on the Island of Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority as the solution of this problem transcends the prerogatives of this board.

b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under construction.

[7] c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be expanded or developed to maximum practicable capacities and that such developments have the same high priority as any development proposed for the Island of Oahu.

d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be developed to maximum practicable capacities at the same time avoiding the creation of an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu.

e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to operating areas be placed in force—adjustments which may become necessary, from time to time, to be accomplished by conference between local representatives.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,  
Senior Naval Member.

F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. A.,  
Senior Army Member.

*Confidential*

17 War

Washn DC 210P Oct 2 1941

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department Ft Shafter TH

One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department instructed commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September Twenty six to confer with you and submit joint recommendations covering allocation aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian area stop This has War Department approval stop Navy radio stated further joint recommendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to confer on this latter matter but will be guided by instructions to you in General Marshalls letter of August nineteen.

ADAMS  
156P/2.

EXHIBIT No. 39 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Cincpac File No.  
A16-3/(02088)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Dec. 21, 1941.

*Secret*

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of action of 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Cincpac secret letter L11-1 (1) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
- (C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships.
- (D) Disposition of own forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "*Enemy Air Raid—Not Drill.*" Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes.

3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the planes remaining.

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for the magnificent behaviour of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented herewith by enclosure (C).

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining missing narratives have been received.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Cincpac File No.  
A16-3/(05)/  
Serial 02100

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 23, 1941.

*1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/(02088) dated December 21, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Report of action of 7 December 1941.

1. Forwarded.

W. S. PYE



Cincpac File No.  
A16-3/(02088)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

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Via : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject : Report of action of 7 December 1941.

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Cincpac File No.

The attached report (enclosure (A)) is compiled from the narrative reports received from each ship listed in the second column, in addition to the incoming and outgoing messages of the Commander-in-Chief's file and a few intelligence reports.

This is only a partial report as individual ship's reports are still being received. The report contains a few inaccuracies which when time permits, will be checked and verified and a corrected report submitted to the Department.

[1] NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OCCURING DURING JAPANESE AIR RAID ON  
DECEMBER 7, 1941

- 0618 On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, (Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELIOT, FANNING, BENHAM, GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were returning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vicinity Wake Island. From position approximately 215 miles West of Pearl routing scouting flight launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector through 045-135° for distance 150 miles. Thence planes to proceed to Pearl. Three planes also launched to establish inner air patrol.
- 0630 ANTARES Arrived off Pearl Harbor, from Canton and Palmyro with 500 tons steel barge in tow. Sighted suspicious object 1500 yds. on std. quarter. Appeared to be small submarine but could not positively identify it. Accordingly notified inshore patrol ship, WARD to investigate it.
- 0633 ANTARES Observed Navy Patrol plane circle and drop 2 smoke pots near object.
- 0645 ANTARES Observed WARD commence firing for 2 minutes. Patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charged object which disappeared.
- 0700 VP Squadron 24 Had four of the six PBY5 planes depart Pearl Harbor for scheduled training exercise in operating area C-5. One of the remaining two planes was out of commission for structural changes; the other in standby status for ready duty.
- [2] 0700 Plane 14P-1 sank enemy sub. 1 mile off P. H. entrance. FORCES UNDER COMMAND OF PATWING TWO (COMTASKFOR 9) disposed as follows:  
Patron 21—Midway: Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohoe; Patron 21, 22, 23, 24, Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute from P. H. for Midway. Condition of readiness B-5. (50% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Specific duty assignments required 6 planes from Patron 14, 24, and 12 to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. Total number of planes ready for flight or in the air in 4 hours or less: 72. At time first bomb dropped 14 patrol aircraft were in the air (7 on search from Midway), 58 ready for flight in 4 hours or less. Nine undergoing repairs.
- [3] 0735 PATRON 21 Patwing 2 staff duty officer received and decoded message 14P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor.
- 0740 PATRON 21 Staff duty officer C-C informed by CPW2 of patrol plane sinking report. Patwing 2 proceeded to draft a search plan.
- [4] 0715 KEOSANQUA Began to receive tow from ANTARES.
- 0726 HELM Underway from berth X-7 for deperring buoys at West Loch. All hands at special sea detail stations. Both boats manned and in the water with instructions to follow the ship to West Loch. All magnetic compasses and chronometers had been left in the BLUE preparatory to deperring.
- 0743 Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl. Received message from plane #7 of VP14 to CTF 3 that plane had sunk one enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.

- 0745 AVOCET Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.
- TUCKER Nested alongside WHITNEY. 5" gun #3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 cal. machine guns fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.
- PATRON 11 Two planes in hangar—4 planes at south end of hangar—6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns manned in a plane being removed from the hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned and guns moved to a safer position. Set up 2 machine gun nests near south end of hangar. Damage received: 7 planes burned; one wrecked; and four damaged but can be repaired. All hangar, office equipment, and stores destroyed.
- [5] 0745 PATRON 12 Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned machine guns in planes, mounted machine guns in pits and used rifles. Observed second wave of horizontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses—8 PBV-5's—planes completely destroyed, two severely damaged; two moderately damaged, all hangar, office equipment and stores destroyed.
- 0750 TRACY Moored port side to Berth 15, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, undergoing overhaul. PREBLE and CUMMINGS moored to starboard in that order. Ship totally disabled with main auxiliary machinery boilers and gun batteries dismantled.
- 0750 TAUTOG Observed enemy three plane formation of dive bombers over Aiea fleet landing on southwest course. Enemy character not discovered until bombs were dropped.
- 0750 CALIFORNIA Sounded general quarters and set condition Zed. Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieutenant was S. O. P. on board and made preparations for getting underway.
- 0750 CASSIN'S Commanding Officer observed about 100 feet away from starboard side of dry dock #1 at altitude of 100 feet and airplane with large red disks on bottom of wings. Sounded general quarters and made attempts to locate ammunition; part of 5" guns under overhaul. .50 calibre machine guns were unlimbered.
- [6] 0750 PATRON 21 Drafting of CPW2 search plan completed.
- 0750 OKLAHOMA (0750 or 0753) struck by 3 torpedoes on port side frames 25, 35-40 and 115. Ship heeled to port 45° meanwhile A. A. batteries manned and G. Q. executed. Rapid heeling of ship and oil and water on decks rendered service to guns ineffective.
- 0750 CURTIS Moored in berth X-22, condition X-RAY. Number 3 boiler steaming. Ship at G. Q. Ship straffed by fighter planes. Observed bomb hit on VP hangar at NAS. UTAH, RALEIGH and RICHMOND attacked by torpedoes.
- [7] 0750 PYRO Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard noise of low flying aircraft and explosion in Navy Yard area. Observed two low wing monoplane about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was observed to be Japanese. Sounded General Quarters and prepared to get underway.
- 0752 AVOCET Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 3" A. A. battery. Hit Japanese plane which had just turned away after torpedoing CALIFORNIA. Plane burst into flames and crashed near Naval Hospital. Fired 144 rounds 3"/50 cal. and 1750 rounds .30 cal.
- 0753 PRUITT Reports 10 planes flying low, 200 feet, bombed Ford Island and blew up hangar.
- 0753 TERN Notified of attack and made preparation for getting underway.
- 0753 TRACY Observed BBs attacked from astern by about 10 dive bombers. Torpedo planes at about 100 feet approached from Easterly direction attacking BBs. O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BBs (10 planes and Ford Is. from North). Attack followed by horizontal and dive bombers on same objective plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed close enough to observe that it was a single engine by-plane probably type 94.
- 0754 GAMBLE Heard explosions on Ford Island.

- [8] 0755 BAGLEY Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs to starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in action over Hickam Field. They were believed at that time to be Army bombers. Shortly after this time enemy plane approached from the direction of Merry Point at about 30-40 feet altitude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOMA and retired. Opened up with forward machine guns on attacking plane. Machine gun fire bagged 8th plane, it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded in bank 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in channel. Continued machine gunning enemy planes. 3 planes believed to have been shot down by BAGLEY.
- BOBOLINK Observed about 12 dive bombers centering their attack south hangars of Ford Island.
- BREESE Moored in berth D-3, Middle Loch, in nest with division order of ships from starboard U. S. S. RAMSAY, BREESE, MONTGOMERY, and GAMBLE.
- Observed bombing of old hangar on Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters, set Condition "A", and made preparations for getting underway. Sent boats to landing to pick up men.
- CACHALOT Moored at Berth # 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing scheduled overhaul.
- CASTOR Sounded general quarters. Ship berthed at Merry Point.
- CONYNGHAM Heading north moored starboard side to WHITNEY at berth X-8. REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELFRIDGE outboard. Ship undergoing routine tender overhaul, receiving power from tender. Noted large fire on Ford Island and observed horizontal and dive bombing planes attacking. Sounded General Quarters.
- DEWEY Observed UTAH to be torpedoed and to list rapidly. DEWEY at nest, DesDiv ONE, with PHELPS alongside port side DOBBIN at X-2 under overhaul.
- [9] 0755 DOLPHIN Moored portside to Pier 4, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Japanese aircraft delivered dive bomb and torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.
- HELM Turned into West Loch channel and headed up toward deperming buoys.
- HENLEY Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to quarters for muster at 0755, General Alarm was sounded instead of gas alarm as customary. Observed first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew proceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm sounded the second time. Set material condition AFIRM. Made preparations for getting underway. Opened fire on light bomber, altitude about 17,000 feet apparently steady on Northerly course; approaching from seaward and passing over Ford Island.
- HONOLULU Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard, Pearl with U.S.S. ST. LOUIS alongside starboard side. Planes were seen diving on HICKAM FIELD. At the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen approaching over fleet landing. Sounded general quarters and passed word "Enemy Air Raid". Ship prepared to get underway. A.A. batteries came into action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber and 30 caliber M.G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes attacking the BB's. From this time until raid ended 30 caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A.A. guns fired at every available target. Service ammunition expended 2,800 rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250 rounds of 5"/25 caliber.
- 12 two-seat low wing monoplanes flying low from Southeast dropped one torpedo at each battleship. Saw two planes destroyed.
- 18 low-wing dive bombers from Southeast. All bombed Hickam Field.
- MinDiv ONE Undergoing scheduled overhaul, moored in repair base. Guns and ammunition removed. Crews, except the watch on board, living in Navy Yard receiving barracks.
- [10] 0755 MinDiv ONE Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. Men were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, and CUMMINGS, to assist in manning A.A. Guns and handle ammunition. Meanwhile receiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to assist in fighting fires or handling ammunition. These men reported to PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the Yard. Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30 caliber MG's were reassembled and remounted and ammunition was obtained from



NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO and Marine Barracks. These guns were used against the enemy making the later attacks. No ship of division suffered damage.

**PATTERSON** Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned. Opened fire with main and 50 caliber batteries. The **PATTERSON** considered that at least one enemy plane was shot down. The plane claimed by **PATTERSON** was one observed diving on **CURTISS** approaching from ahead at about 400 ft. altitude. Plane was seen to fall apart at same time shot was fired by #2 gun.

**PHOENIX** First attacking plane sighted from Signal Bridge attacking from north of Ford Island. Plane had all guns firing. Passed over stern of Raleigh and proceeded toward Ford Island Control Tower and dropped bomb.

**PREBLE** On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul at berth Z-15 with no ammunition on board and the engineering plant dismantled. First attack on battleships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes were in low horizontal flight when observed and attacked from eastward. Enemy planes approached battleships to close range before releasing torpedoes.

**RALEIGH** Commanding Officer felt dull explosion and looking out airport observed water boiling amidships. Received report that Japanese were attacking fleet. Sounded general quarters.

Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand power. Doctor was directed to report to **SOLACE**. [11] Damage repair party was sent to capsized **UTAH** to cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to send pontoon and a lighter alongside from **BALTIMORE** to **RALEIGH**. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as an outrigger. Torpedoes, minus warheads were pushed overboard and beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Both anchors let go.

**RAMAPO** O. O. D. observed Japanese dive bomber come in close and drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with A.A. Guns (3"/). Motor Torpedo Boats on board also opened fire with machine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive bombers strafing, torpedo planes, dive bombers bombing, horizontal planes bombing. Our personnel reported 3" shell hit plane. No losses in personnel and no material damage.

**RAMSAY** Moored at berth D-3 observed bomb land on western end of Ford Island.

**REID** Observed unidentified plane attacking Ford Island.

**SOLACE** Received report of air raid, closed all watertight doors and ports, called away rescue parties; prepared hospital facilities and sent 2 motor launches with rescue parties to **ARIZONA**.

**SUMNER** Was moored to the new dock at the southern end of the Submarine Base, port side to, bow to eastward. Armament is four 3" 23 caliber A.A. guns, four 50 caliber machine guns, and one 5" 51 caliber broadside.

**SWAN** Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Railway, boiler upkeep. Observed bomb dropped on South ramp of Fleet Air Base.

**TAUTOG** Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of **OAHU** railroad tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes were dropped from about 50 feet after submarine base pier was passed. Fourth plane in line and plane near end of line were shot down by this ship and **HULBERT** before torpedoes were dropped.

[12] 0755 A Japanese plane flew from North to South over a fish pond adjacent to water front resident of Lt. R. B. Black, U. S. N. R. on the East shore of Pearl City Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun fire was directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish pond, and a single fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen to run rapidly along the breakwater. This material is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots were directing fire at individuals (civilians) at a considerable distance from any military objectives.

0755 **VESTAL** Sounded General Quarters. Manned A. A. battery, 3" A. A. and 5" broadside and .30 cal. M. G.

**VIREO** Moored inboard at Coal Dock (seaward end) with **TURKEY**, **BOBOLINK**, and **RAIL**, outboard.



**WIDGEON** No remarks except machine gun and rifle fire used against enemy. No losses or damage.

**WEST VIRGINIA** Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull of W. Va. Apparently forward and on port side. Ship began to list rapidly to port. Another third heavy shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught on fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20° list on ship to port. Central station directed to counterflood. The following last explosion flashed a flame about 15 feet high occurred forward on **ARIZONA**. A second flash occurred on the **ARIZONA** higher than the foretop. Burning debris rained on Quarter Deck of W. Va. After the 2 **ARIZONA** explosions the W. Va. began to right itself when a large fire broke out amidships. Word received from central station to abandon ship. A wall of flame advancing toward the W. Va. and **TENNESSEE** from the **ARIZONA**. W. Va. personnel began to abandon ship as fire had grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of W. Va. had been flooded. W. Va. personnel report to **TENNESSEE**. Remaining survivors ashore and elsewhere sent back to W. Va. to fight fire. Fire on W. Va. extinguished Monday afternoon.

[13] 07:56 **BOBOLINK** Ready duty status, moored at next end, of coal docks with **VIREO** and **TURKEY** inboard, **RAIL** outboard. Informed by gangway watch that Japanese planes were bombing us. Sounded General Quarters.

**GAMBLE** Wave of about 50 Japanese planes attacked Battleships and Naval Air Station, Ford Island, planes flying at low altitudes about 500 feet over Battleships from direction of Diamond Head, about 700 feet over Ford Island. Five successive waves of the attack of about 10 planes each.

MinDiv TWO Went to General Quarters and set Condition "A".

**THORNTON** Reports attack by Japanese Aircraft commenced; General Alarm was sounded and all hands went to Air Defense Stations. **THORNTON** moored port side to dock at Berth S-1, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Stations manned were as follows: Control, Machine Gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. Machine Guns, 3 .30 Cal. Lewis Machine Guns, 3 .30 Browning automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. Springfield rifles.

0757 Ensign Chiles of **JARVIS** called Lieut. Ford and said "Someone is bombing".

**BREESE** Opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns.

**CONYNGHAM** Observed Torpedo planes attacking **RALEIGH**, **UTAH** and **DETROIT** from the West.

**DEWEY** Sounded General Quarters.

**HELENA** Moored at 1010 Dock, Berth 2, portside to Dock, **OGALALA** alongside starboard side. Reported observed planes over Ford Island, 14,000 ft. altitude. Signalman on bridge with previous duty on Asiatic Station identified planes immediately. General Alarm sounded and service ammunition broke out.

**HULL GENERAL QUARTERS.** Prepared to get underway.

[14] 0757 **NEW ORLEANS** Moored at Berth 16, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing Engine Repairs, receiving power and light from Dock. Sighted Enemy planes dive bombing Ford Island; sounded General Quarters.

0757 **PENNSYLVANIA** In Dry Dock #1. 3 Propeller Shafts removed. Destroyers **CASSIN** and **DOWNES** in Dock ahead of **PENNSYLVANIA**. Floating Dock West of new dry dock adjoining **PENNSYLVANIA** occupied by **SHAW**. Cruiser **HELENA** and **OGALALA** at Berth B-2 (**PENNSYLVANIA** normal berth). **CALIFORNIA** in F-3, **MARYLAND** in F-4 inboard, **OKLAHOMA** outboard: Berth F-6, **TENNESSEE** inboard **WEST VIRGINIA** outboard, **F7 ARIZONA**, **F8 NEVADA**. Machine Guns in foremast manned and condition watch of A. A. personnel available. Ship receiving steam, water and power from yard. Heard explosions on end of Ford Island and realized an Air Raid in progress after 2nd explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by General Quarters. Set Condition **YOKE**.

0757 **SUMNER** Signal watch and Quartermaster on Bridge sighted ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard. Observed two explosions in Navy Yard. Sounded Alarm.

- 0757 TREVER Mine Division FOUR moored at Buoys D-7 bows toward Pearl City, in order from North: TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE, and PERRY. Sounded General Quarters at time when first bomb was dropped by Japanese on North side of Ford Island.
- 0757 WASMUTH WASMUTH reports first Japanese planes attacked. Went to General Quarters at once with all guns in action within 3 minutes. However, as ship was inside nest of four, only two after guns could bear. Made all preparations for getting underway.
- [15] 0757 PATRON 21 First Bomb dropped near VP-22 Hangar. Message order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H. X THIS IS NOT DRILL" (a similar message was sent by CinCpac).
- [16] 0757 ZANE ZANE moored bow and stern to nest with Mine Division FOUR at buoys D-7; order from port to starboard: TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE and PERRY. First call to standby colors sounded. Signalmen on watch observed single Japanese plane drop bomb from about 10000 feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from Northward. Sounded General Quarters; manned A. A. battery. Commenced firing with A. A. battery at all planes passing within reasonable distances. Made all preparations to get underway.
- 0758 ANTARES ANTARES heard explosion in Pearl Harbor and observed Japanese planes delivering attack.
- 0758 BAGLEY BAGLEY observed Torpedo Plane come in from direction of Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua Island, 30 or 40 feet altitude, headed for OKLAHOMA. About 2 or 3 hundred yards from OKLAHOMA, plane dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships, sounded General Quarters and commenced firing. Hit fourth plane coming in which was seen to crash in channel off Officers' Club landing. Machine gun fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing torpedo to drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Number one machine gun downed plane in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane hit by BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers HONOLULU and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY. Plane went out of control, dropped its torpedo and seemed to hit L-head Crane in Navy Yard. This was about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by BAGLEY came over dock but was downed with a short burst. Torpedo dropped in lumber pile and plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard side, nose directly up into air and spun into crash losing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought down by BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of attack and after torpedo attack. This plane was shot down by 5" gun and those from other ships.
- [17] 0758 CUMMINGS CUMMINGS observed enemy planes making torpedo attack on Battleships moored to East side of Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters.
- 0758 GAMBLE Went to General Quarters, opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns on planes passing over nest at about 800 feet altitude. Set Material Condition Affirm except for certain protected Ammunition Passages.
- 0758 JARVIS General Quarters sounded on JARVIS.
- 0758 HULBERT HULBERT sounded General Quarters. Torpedo plane sighted heading West over East Lock preparing to launch torpedo against Battleship off Ford Island. HULBERT reports bringing down 1 Japanese Torpedo Plane by .50 cal. A. A. fire from Berth S-3, Submarine Base.
- 0758 HULL Gangway watch opened fire with .45 caliber pistol on two (2) planes crossing bow within 50 yards.
- 0758 MUGFORD Moored Port side to the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, Berth No. 6, Navy Yard. U. S. S. JARVIS moored Port side to MUGFORD. Attack started. Japanese planes dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs struck the sea plane landing ramp followed by explosions near hangers. Several Japanese planes came in low from Southwest and released torpedoes which struck OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy torpedo planes came in continuously from same direction and fired torpedoes at the Battleships.
- 0759 REID REID went to General Quarters.
- 0758 RIGEL Ford Island attack by 10 dive bombers from North at 10,000 feet.

- [18] 0758 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japanese). Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on stern on fire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair I. Smoke so thick, cannot see. Repair I have men standby magazine flood, Turret III. All boats on fire. Fire in Maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop seems to be out. WEST VIRGINIA's quarterdeck and planes on fire. Fire on Turret III. Could not get morphine out of doctor's room because it was unsafe; men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe open. D-310 excessively hot—investigate. Squadron of planes diving on Navy Yard. Repair I, unit 3, abandoned station—too hot. Fire on topside seems to be under control. D-310-A is all right. Set Condition ZED in lower handling room of Turret III. OKLAHOMA seems to be capsizing, CALIFORNIA down by the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has pretty bad fire below Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon after attack began; one hit (bomb) on face of Turret II, and bomb hit on top of Turret III, penetrating.
- 0758 THORNTON THORNTON commenced firing with .50 cal. machine gun battery followed immediately by .30 cal. machine guns and .30 cal. rifles.
- 0759 GAMBLE GAMBLE opened fire with 3"/23 cal. AA guns, firing as planes came within range, fuses set 3 to 8 secs.
- 0759 HELM First enemy plane sighted in shallow dive over Ford Island, headed Northwest. Observed first bomb hit on hangar at southwest end of Ford Island. Called crew to General Quarters. Opened magazines and got ammunition to guns.
- 0759 JARVIS Lieut. Ford and Lieut. Johnson of JARVIS reach bridge. Jap torpedo planes coming in at 30 to 60 second intervals, approaching from Merry Point direction and attacking BBs.
- [19] 0759 SUMNER Observed torpedo planes approach over S. E. Loch attacking BBs, circling Ford Island and flying off to south west.
- 0759 WHITNEY Observed air raid attack by Japanese air force and explosions on Ford Island, WHITNEY moored bow and stern to buoys X-8 and X-8x, 6 fathoms of water, supplying steam, electricity, fresh and flush-water to CONNYNGHAM, REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELFRIDGE, moored alongside to port.
- 0759 PELIAS PELIAS reports 9 dive bombers attacked out of direction of sun the Battleships. One broke off and dive bombed PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0800 ——— Two officers from ship hiking in back of Aiea witnessed attack. They stated later that 3 separate flights of planes appeared at 3 levels; low, medium and high from the north.
- 0800 VIREO C. O. VIREO heard an explosion. Immediately Japanese planes were seen, and General Quarters sounded.
- 0800 ANTARES ANTARES under machine gun fire. Topside hit by machine gun bullets, bomb and shell fragments. Being unarmed no offensive tactics were possible. In order to avoid placing ship and personnel in jeopardy, authority was requested to enter Honolulu Harbor.
- 0800 COMINBATFOR Cominraft in OGLALA observed enemy bomb fall seaward and Ford Island; no damage. The next bomb caused fires near waters. Flames flared up from structures southend of island. Next bomb fell alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1 eastside of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between fifty and 100 feet of water, dropping 3 torpedoes or mines in channel on line between OGLALA and seaward end of Ford Island. [20] Torpedo hit OGLALA and HELENA simultaneously. These ships were moored abreast of B-2 of ten ten dock OGLALA outboard. Both ships opened fire with A. A. battery. OGLALA signalled C-C possibility that mines had been dropped. Two contract tugs were hailed to haul OGLALA aft of HELENA. Submersible pumps for OGLALA were obtained from HELENA, but could not be used as no power was available. Observed one Jap plane shot down. Planes were strafing as well as bombing. Observed 4 battleships hit with bombs, fires broke out, and one battleship turned over. Enemy planes appeared to fly in groups of 6 to 10. NEVADA underway to clear channel, but apparently was struck by torpedo or mine. A minute later 2 bombs fell only one hit in the NEVADA. On 2nd attack observed bomb dropped on fwd part of PENNSYLVANIA in dry-dock. Flames appeared from two destroyers in the same dock. Observed another Jap plane fall in water. Observed



- bomb fall close to destroyers in floating dry-dock. Destroyer later caught on fire.
- 0800 VP-21 CPW2 search plan transmitted by radio and telephone. Experienced difficulty in communicating with Kanehoe.
- [21] 0800 CASSIN CASSIN saw another plane come down to about 75 feet on parallel course drydock #1. Plane dropped torpedo aimed at CALIFORNIA at range 200 yards.
- 0800 CASTOR CASTOR 3' A. A. and 30 cal. machine guns commenced firing against enemy torpedo planes, low and close aboard, and against dive bombers. Observed one enemy torpedo plane at about 500 to 700 yards range and 500 ft. altitude due aft of ship and heading across to Ford Island with parts of fuselage shot away. Plane grounded either on Ford Island or beyond. Removed covered lighter alongside with 450 serial depth charges.
- 0800 DOLPHIN Machine guns and rifles manned and fired at enemy aircraft which were flying very low. Ready identification could be made by the large red balls on each wing. Report received plane had been shot down and dove into channel off pier 5.
- 0800 BLUE UTAH torpedoed. General alarm was sounded, and word passed throughout the ship to man battle stations and prepare to get underway immediately.
- 0800 RIGEL RIGEL vicinity #1 dry dock and ten ten dock strafed and bombed by 13 dive bombers from South. Altitude 600 to 100 feet.
- 0800 WHITNEY WHITNEY sounded general quarters. First plane passed over ship low altitude, strafing with machine guns.
- 0800 HELM Torpedo planes sighted approaching from direction of Barber's Point. They passed over West Loch channel and dropped torpedoes either in North Channel or across the Island. Targets for these planes appeared to be ships in berths F-9 to F-13. The planes came in low, and several strafed the ship. All bullets missed the ship by a few feet. No fire was opened, since the forward machine guns, which could bear, were covered with preservative grease and had to be cleaned before they could fire.
- [22] 0800 HEIM Backed engines and commenced maneuvering ship out of West Loch channel to head for entrance.
- 0800 JARVIS Ensign Greene OOD of JARVIS reported on bridge. Prior to this he had been directing activities around the quarterdeck. He was told to go to the after firing battery. Ensign Chiles was actively organizing the forward battery without orders. Ensign Fleece already on the director. Orders given to open fire.
- 0800 MUGFORD Commenced assembly of engineering plant which had been placed out of commission for yard overhaul. Connected fuel oil hose to yard line. 8,000 gallons total on board.
- 0800 PHOENIX Bombing attack on BBs. Plane markings, varied U. S. swastikas, and rising sun painted on fuselage.
- 0800 RALEIGH Opened fire with AA battery of 3'/50 cal. 1.1' and .50 cal. guns. Ship started to heel to port and received report that torpedo had struck #2 fireroom. #1 and 2 firerooms and forward engine-room completely flooded. Fire in #3 went out. Directed counter-flooding. As it appeared that ship would capsize, orders were given to jettison topside.
- 0800 RALEIGH Both planes successfully hoisted out by hand. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsize UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent signal to send pontoons and lighter from alongside BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as outrigger. Torpedoes minus warheads were beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids, and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Anchors were let go.
- [23] 0801 UTAH Attacked by torpedo plane and bombing plane. Sounded General Quarters. Received severe underwater hit frame 84, portside. Followed by another hit which caused ship to list 15°. Passed word "all hands on deck". Not possible to repel attack as all ammunition was in magazines and secured. 5' and 1.1 guns covered with steel housing; .50 and .30 caliber machine guns dismounted and stowed below decks. Ship covered with two layers 6 by 12 timbers. Above conditions necessitated by UTAH being used by ships as bombing target during current operations. Received bomb explosion in port aircastle.



- [24] 0801 PRUITT Reported OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA attacked from southerly direction. Number of torpedo planes attacked from southeast.
- 0801 NEVADA Observed enemy air attack. Sounded general quarters. Two machine guns forward and two aft had been already on continuous watch under the alert program.
- 0801 MUGFORD Sounded General Quarters.
- 0801 SUMNER Saw dense smoke rising behind Kuaahuai Peninsula believed from ARIZONA, blazing oil floating down from line of BBs. Opened fire—#3 gun manned and commenced firing four minutes after the attack on Navy Yard was observed, and before any other gun in the vicinity had commenced firing. Made direct hit on and destroyed torpedo plane making approach on BBs.
- 0801 HELENA Opened fire. Hit by torpedo, range 500 yds., starboard side, approximately frame 75, 18 feet below water line. Four near misses from bombs received and one strafing attack with little damage. Issued gas masks and protective clothing. Once gun opposition was in full swing, Japanese plans were noted to turn away from gunfire or keep at respectable altitude.
- 0802 DEWEY Four .50 caliber machine guns fired at planes attacking battleships and Ford Island.
- 0802 TREVER Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns.
- [25] 0802 NEVADA Opened fire with machine guns on enemy planes approaching on port beam. One plane brought down 100 yards off NEVADA's port quarter; one plane dropped torpedo which struck the NEVADA on port bow.
- 0802 PENNA. Attack by Torpedo planes from west and south, about 12 or 15. PENNA. reported as first ship opening fire on plane. After release of torpedoes three planes came in low from port beam strafing PENNA., though not affected. Bearing of torpedo attack and one enemy plane observed to burst into flame 2000 yds on stbd bow. Dive bombing attacks and torpedo attacks on Pearl Harbor, and dive bombing attacks on Hickam Field.
- 0803 CUMMINGS After Machine guns opened fire on Japanese Torpedo planes.
- 0803 CALIFORNIA Opened fire with machine guns and ready guns, on torpedo planes.
- 0803 SWAN Opened fire with 3" A. A. guns. All sea valves and hatches closed and commenced placing boilers in commission. Observed one direct hit with 3" gun—plane crashed beyond drydock area. No material damage suffered.
- 0803 CACHELOT Enemy planes passed within range and arc of guns. Opened up with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns.
- 0803 NEVADA NEVADA opened fire with 5" A. A. Members of crew claim both broadside scored direct hit on torpedo plane which disintegrated in midair.
- [26] 0804 JARVIS Machine guns opened fire.
- 0804 WHITNEY Commenced firing with .50 cal. AA guns. Received signal to get underway.
- 0805 MUGFORD Opened fire with 50 caliber MG's. Shot down Japanese plane, altitude 800 feet on the stbd quarter, passing aft on stbd hand. This plane had fired a torpedo at the U.S.S. OGLALA.
- 0805 TRACY Observed torpedo planes coming in from easterly direction and launching torpedoes at BBs at Ford Is. At first attack ship closed up as much as possible and broke out fighting equipment.
- 0805 NEW ORLEANS Sighted enemy torpedo planes on port quarter, flying low across stern. Rifle fire and pistol fire opened from fantail as first planes flew by to launch torpedoes at battleships. Manned 1.1 battery and machine guns aft in time to fire at three or four enemy planes.
- 0805 VESTAL Struck by two bombs. VESTAL moored to port side of ARIZONA B-F7. One bomb struck stbd side fr. 44. Penetrated 3 decks, exploding in GSK stores, cutting fire main and electric cables in crew space. Hold set on fire and wrecked. Another bomb struck at fr. 110 on port side, passed through the ships and fuel oil tank. Bomb explosion forward damaged practically all stores. Heat of explosion necessitated flooding fwd magazines. Material damaged consisted of 3 life rafts, 6 mooring lines, one gangway, port lenses and windows broken.

- 0805 VESTAL Opened fire, and shortly after A. A. breach jammed, blast from ARIZONA cleared gun station, killing one man. Fired with machine guns on enemy planes until they were withdrawn.
- [27] Fired at torpedo plane which was seen to burst into flame and disappear over Ford Island. Following personnel damage was done: 9 dead, 7 missing, 19 in hospital.
- 0805 RIGEL BBs attacked from altitude 125 feet from southeast by 12 torpedo planes, 300 to 500 yard range.
- 0805 HELM Opened fire with after machine guns at planes over main channel, followed shortly by forward machine guns firing at passing torpedo planes.
- 0805 HULL #4 machine gun opened fire.
- 0805 CURTISS Firing with 5'' local control and .50 caliber machine guns. Lighted off boilers 1, 2 and 4.
- 0805 UTAH Listed about 40° to port. Attacking planes strafed crew as ship was abandoned.
- [28] 0805 SUMNER Torpedo plane passed close aboard within 100 yards of SUMNER, stern on West course, altitude 75'. Leveled off for launching torpedo at BB. Struck by direct hit from Sumner's #3 A. A. gun, range 300 yards. Plane disintegrated in smoke and sank in fragments. Torpedo believed sunk without exploding.
- 0805 JARVIS 5'' opened fire. #3 gun believed to be the first 5'' gun in harbor to open fire.
- 0805 BREESE Opened fire with 3'' A. A. guns.
- 0805 RAMSAY Sounded general quarters and opened fire with .50 cal. and 3'' guns. RAMSAY liberty party returning in MONTGOMERY boat was strafed by torpedo planes which were observed to fire 3 torpedoes into UTAH and RALEIGH.
- 0805 GAMBLE Mounted and commenced firing with .30 cal. machine guns on galley deck house.
- 0805 BLUE Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns on Japanese planes diving on ships in harbor.
- 0805 CASSIN Observed HELENA open fire followed by PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0805 CALIFORNIA Reported two torpedoes struck port side, frame 100, making 40 ft. long hole extending from first seam below armor belt to bilge keel.
- 0806 PHOENIX Made radio signal to ships of sector four "prepare to get underway".
- 0806 PRUITT Observed Jap bomber shot down. ARIZONA listed sharply, smoke and flames.
- 0806 BOBOLINK and TURKEY commenced firing. Directed other boats in next to tie up to destroyer buoys adjacent to battle rafts in order to disperse.
- 0807 BLUE Opened fire with 5''/38 caliber guns on Japanese planes. The engine room was ordered immediately to light off No. 2 boiler (#1 already steaming) and made all preparations for getting underway. Repair party cleared the ship for action, and made all preparations for slipping quickly from the mooring.
- 0807 HELM Opened fire with 5'' battery. Not hits observed.
- 0807 HULL #1 5''/38 cal. opened fire.
- [29] 0808 CURTISS Sent Engine Room emergency underway signal.
- [30] 0807 PHOENIX One plane burning in water at end of pipe-line astern of berth F-8.
- 0808 CUMMINGS Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard from southerly direction.
- 0808 CONYNGHAM Opened fire with 5'' gun and machine guns on attacking planes.
- 0808 MUGFORD U. S. S. OKLAHOMA had capsized. W. VA. listed heavily to port, ARIZONA blew up.
- 0809 WHITNEY Making preparations for getting underway. Supplies issued to destroyers alongside.
- 0809 HULL #5 gun, 5''/38 cal. opened fire, followed by guns #2, #3, and #4.
- 0810 THORNTON First dive bombing attack ended.
- 0810 CUMMINGS Commenced preparation for getting underway in accordance general signal. Opened fire main battery on dive bombers over BBs.

- 0810 Enemy aircraft bomb struck hangar and aircraft parking space adjacent to VP-24 parking area. Ready plane suffered a severed wing spar. Plane was then machine gunned and caught fire. Fire was extinguished and plane has been repaired and is in service. Plane undergoing structural changes not damaged and is now operating. Personnel present mounted machine guns in available planes and opened fire on attacking planes. One low-winged biplane flying from across hangar 54 on course about 250 lost both wings.
- 0810 NEW ORLEANS All batteries NEW ORLEANS except 8" battery in action. Area around berths 14-19 incl. subjected to dive bombing attack by approximately ten enemy planes. Attack turned away by combined fire of HONOLULU and NEW ORLEANS. Observed three bombs drop: one falling ahead of and another falling astern of the RIGEL. These failed to explode. Third bomb landed midway between RIGEL and NEW ORLEANS exploding and causing damage from flying fragments. During raid yard power failed or was cut off leaving vessel in darkness without power except auxiliary battery power. Heavy drain of machinery raising steam for getting underway exhausted auxiliary batteries so much that lighting was very dim and of practically no use. All work in engineering spaces, magazines and ammunition passageways conducted by flashlight. Hoists and guns worked by hand with consequent reduction of volume of fire. AA directors were off ship.
- [31] 0810 UTAH Listed 80° to port mooring lines parting and two minutes later ship capsized. Ship abandoned.
- 0810 UTAH Capsized. Salvage operations undertaken immediately in order to rescue entrapped personnel. 32 men thus rescued. Estimated number of torpedoes to hit ship about 5; no bombs were observed to have hit.
- [32] 0810 PHOENIX mg battery opened fire on attacking planes.
- 0810 DEWEY Guns 1-2-3 and 5 5", no power on ship.
- 0810 HELM Fire from port machine gun hit plane approaching from South. Plane observed to veer sharply, catch on fire and crash behind trees near Hickam Field. Damage to enemy: 1 plane shot down by machine gun fire.
- 0810 CASSIN Observed Japanese plane crash over tree near hospital. Five high altitude, 12,000 ft. bombers passed overhead from forward aft and dropped large bombs.
- 0810 PRUITT Observed OKLAHOMA roll over.
- 0810 GAMBLE Commenced making preparations to get underway. Lighted off four boilers.
- 0810 CALIFORNIA Opened fire with 5" guns on dive bombers.
- 0810 W. VIRGINIA Commanding Officer, Captain M. S. Bennion mortally wounded.
- 0810 WHITNEY Set condition affirm. Commenced firing with 3" A. A. guns.
- 0810 JARVIS Counted 6 or 7 torpedoes in OKLAHOMA. NEVADA, WEST VIRGINIA, and ARIZONA also torpedoed. Apparently ARIZONA forward magazine exploded. Noted OGLALA torpedoed alongside HELLENA at 10-10 dock.
- 0810 REID Opened fire with after machine guns.
- 0810 WHITNEY No material or personnel damage.
- 0810 PELIAS Reports formation of high altitude planes came in from S. W. attacking battleships and Ford Island followed by another wave from the same direction. Torpedo planes were small and carried only one bomb. Dive bombers also small and carried but one bomb.
- 0810 RAIL At coal docks nested with 4 minesweepers. Opened fire with 3" A. A. 15 minutes after first bomb dropped on Pearl. Opened fire with .30 machine guns, rifles and pistols 20 minutes after first attack. A string of 20 bombs fell in channel astern. Shrapnel fell throughout ship. No material or personnel damage.
- 0812 MUGFORD OGLALA listing to port. Attack started again. Heavy A. A. fire.
- 0812 OUTGOING Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl.
- 0812 CONECTOR FOUR: Sector 4 Prepare to get underway.
- 0812 HULL All machine guns plus two automatic rifles on the bridge and one on after deck, firing.



- [33] 0812 RIGEL Torpedo planes attacked from S. E. at 500 feet and attacked BBs from altitude 125 feet, range 300 to 500 yards.
- 0812 Task Force 8 received message from CinC Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor defenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were received that it was realized hostilities with Japan had begun. TF-8 operated in area South Kaula Rock for air attack should enemy be located North or South of Oahu. No authentic information available regarding location. Maintained combat and inner air patrols.
- 0812 SICARD Undergoing overhaul in Navy Yard stbd side to PRUITT Berth 18. Shp totally disabled as to main and auxiliary machinery and gun battery. Observed Squadron of Japanese planes coming in from Southwest, diving from 5,000 feet on Ford Island.
- 0813 CONYNGHAM Observed attacking plane shot down by fire from nest. Plane crashed near CURTISS.
- 0813 HELM Passed gate vessel.
- 0815 Aircraft in flight informed hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl. VP-24 directed to search sector 240-280 for carriers. Ten miles south of Barbers Point plane 24VP-4 sighted unidentified submarine near force consisting of INDIANAPOLIS and 4 destroyers. Submarine made crash dive and spot marked by float lights. Completed search through 200 miles and returned to Pearl.
- 0815 PENNA Reports NEVADA underway and about on PENNA stbd qtr. Distance about 600 yards when dive bombing attack observed approaching PENNA on port bow. 10 or 15 planes coming in succession just before reaching PENNA 2/3 planes appeared to swerve to left. Number of them dropping bombs at the NEV. 1 dive bomber dropped bomb on SHAW in floating dry-dock and set it on fire. NEV observed to slowly swing around head to port broadside to channel, on fire forward.
- 0815 VIREO Observed 2nd Group of enemy planes fly toward Hickam Field. VIREO opened fire expending 22 rounds 3" A. A. Ammunition.
- 0815 RIGEL Undergoing major repairs and conversion at Navy Yard. No motive power available. All power etc. from yard. Air attack began. As this vessel had no armament no offensive action could be taken. Accordingly rescue work was commenced on WEST VIRGINIA personnel. About 100 men (in track of burning oil) had been blown into the water. These were rescued first. The torpedo bombing and machine gun. [34] assaults on the WEST VIRGINIA continued while the rescue operations progressed. One rescue boat was struck by bomb and sunk. Crew thrown into water. Moored B-13 Navy Yard undergoing major repairs. Services from Navy Yard.
- 0815 SICARD Set condition of readiness "AFFIRM". 2 fire parties were formed fore and aft.
- 0815 MUGFORD Shot down one enemy plane bearing astern making approach on battleship at altitude 20 feet off water. Plane crashed on Ford Island aflame, torpedo not launched.
- 0815 PHOENIX A. A. battery opened fire.
- 0815 CASSIN Observed another group of 5 high altitude bombers passed overhead and let loose bombs.
- 0815 PRUITT Observed 12 bombing planes in close "V" formation bombed (horizontal attack) from 10,000 feet from Southwest.
- 0815 JARVIS All guns and machine guns of JARVIS in action. MUGFORD noted to be delivering high volume of fire.
- 0815 SUMNER Checked fire.
- 0817 CINCPAC Directed Compatwing TWO locate enemy force.
- 0817 HELM Sighted conning tower of submarine to right of channel, Northward of buoy #1. Gave orders to open fire, pointer fire, but submarine submerged before guns could get on.
- 0818 CONYNGHAM Opened fire with remaining 5" guns at horizontal bombers passing overhead in direction of Schofield Barracks.
- 0820 TRACY Sent men to CUMMINGS to assist batteries and approximate 15 men to PENNA to fight fires.



- 0820 HELM Opened fire on submarine off Tripod Reef; no hits observed. Submarine appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef, and in line of breakers. Stearing motor short circuited—bridge lost steering control.
- [35] 0820 SICARD Was manned. 2 .30 cal. M. G. s. Bombers began to attack ships at 1010 dock and battleships in vicinity of Ford Island. SICARD hits were observed on planes but no apparent damage was done.
- 0820 VESTAL Observed torpedo pass astern and hit ARIZONA. Simultaneously ARIZONA received bomb hit followed by her forward magazine exploding. Latter started fires aft and amidship of VESTAL. Shortly after that, ARIZ observed to be settling and fuel oil between VESTAL and ARIZ ignited.
- 0820 PYRO Opened fire on planes.
- 0820 MUGFORD Opened fire with 5''/38 battery.
- 0820 SUMNER Ship ready for getting underway. Members of broadside gun crew and available engineers were armed with rifles and BAR's and stationed in upper works to act as snipers.
- 0820 CALIFORNIA Torpedo struck port side, frame 47, making an irregular hole 27 x 32 ft., the top of which is 6 ft. below bottom of armor belt.
- 0820 SOLACE Reports boat loads of casualties began to arrive. By this time all hospital supplies and facilities had been prepared for maximum service.
- 0820 NEVADA Attack slackened.
- 0820 REID Opened fire with after 5''/38 caliber on high altitude and dive bombers.
- 0820 WHITNEY Observed Japanese plane fall in flames north channel vicinity X-5.
- 0820 CUMMINGS Lull in air attack; ceased firing. Lack of DC power prevented use of director. Sound powered telephones and local control used.
- 0820 HULBERT Claims share in bringing down a bomber.
- 0821 HELM Observed torpedo pass close under stern on a northerly course.
- 0825 TRACY Ready to open fire with 3 .30 caliber.
- 0825 MUGFORD Signal received that parachutists or wrecked pilots were landing in Hickam Field.
- 0825 CALIFORNIA Opened fire on horizontal bombers at 10,000 ft. with 5'' guns.
- 0825 BREESE Received signal to get underway but being inside nest could not do so.
- [36] 0825 Outgoing To COMTASKGR 12 & COMTASKGR 8: Report position.
- 0825 SUMNER Opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard Dry Dock. These planes approached from cloud bank in Southeast. Heard terrific explosion in Navy Yard—vicinity of Dry Dock followed by dense cloud of smoke. Dive bomber passed 300 yards from SUMNER and DD's HULBERT and THORNTON, tail of plane ignited. Plane turned southward and disappeared over Halawa district. Observed six horizontal bombers approaching from southeast at 8,000 feet. Planes circled and approached Ford Island from Southwest and dropped bombs over DD's. Planes then circled to Southeast. One plane left it's formation, turned towards Navy Yard loosing altitude rapidly, passed SUMNER at 400 feet altitude range 500 yards; was fired on by SUMNER. When over center Southeast Loch, plane began smoking and was lost in thick smoke over Navy Yard. It was a two-seater monoplane, gunner in rear seat protected by shield, orange disc on side just abaft rear cockpit.
- 0825 CURTISS Attacked by bombers.
- 0826 Planes crossing low ahead of nest to Northeast were taken under fire by CONYNGHAM and nest. One burst into flames and exploded in clump of trees in Aiea Heights.
- 0826 BREESE Received report submarine was in harbor.
- 0827 SICARD Cease firing, expended 300 rounds .30 cal. M. G. ammunition.
- 0830 PENNSY Lighted fires under #4 boiler.
- 0830 CONYNGHAM Reports another plane diving toward Ford Island from Northeast shot down by combined fire of the nest.

- 0830 PENNA Reports about 5 high bombing attacks obs. to have passed over PENNA. one from port bow one from ahead one from ahead to stbd 2 from astern. Altitude about 2000 feet.
- 0830 VIREO Brought down one enemy plane which landed in vicinity of Hickam Field. 400 rounds of .30 cal. M. G. ammunition expended. One personnel casualty to PRICE, Radioman, on telephone watch astern of vessel. PRICE returned to duty 10 December. No damage to vessel. Made ready to get underway.
- 0830 VESTAL Prepared to get underway.
- 0830 MUGFORD Five enemy planes in V formation passed directly overhead, making horizontal bombing attack.
- [37] 0830 SUMNER Checked fire.
- 0830 RIGEL 15 Heavy bombers in 3-V formations 8 to 10 thousand feet from S. E. bombed BB's.
- 0830 WHITNEY Issued ammunition and ordnance stores to destroyers alongside. Secured steam to destroyers.
- 0830 HELM Fired at enemy plane with forward machine guns. May have hit plane.
- 0830 NEVADA Heavy bombing attack received.
- 0830 HULL Two Vee's high level bombers (10,000 feet) directly overhead seen intermittently through the clouds. Opened fire with all guns. Formations broke up and dropped their bombs in cane field.
- 0830 CALIFORNIA Opened fire on Dive bombers with 75" and forward machine guns; shot down one enemy dive bomber which crashed in flames.
- 0830 BREESE Sighted conning towers of two submarines in North channel but could not open fire because of interior berth. Observed MONAGHAN proceed down channel at full speed to ram leading submarine which had just fired torpedo at U. S. S. CURTIS but missed. U. S. S. MONAGHAN dropped 2 depth charges and submarine, about 250 ton type arose upside down and sank.
- 0830 ZANE Sighted strange submarine 200 yards astern of MEDUSA moored in K-23. Guns would not bear as ZANE was inboard ship.
- 0830 CASSIN Received signal from PENNSYLVANIA, Senior destroyer officer report on board.
- 0830 HENLEY Underway from buoy X-11. Large bomb struck water 150 yards from port bow. Received signal "submarine in harbor". MACDONOUGH directly ahead made depth charge attack and cleared at high speed. HENLEY was third ship in sortie. After rounding Hospital Point, subjected to strafing attack by light bomber, coming up from astern and showing five distinct sources of machine gun fire from plane as plane passed ship. It was seen to crash offshore in a few minutes. Another light bomber approached from starboard at 2,000 feet and was taken under fire with another destroyer. Close burst forces plane to dive and it crashed into sea.
- 0830 DOWNES Open fire with 5-inch. on blocks. DOWNES struck on after deck house by bombs.
- 0830 RIGFL Captain returned on board. Bomb struck astern and midway between piers 13 & 14. 150 small holes were blown into port quarter RIGEL. Above waterline.
- [38] 0835 CURTIS Ready to get underway. Sighted submarine periscope on starboard quarter, distance 700 yards. Opened fire on submarine.
- [39] 0830 REID First group of enemy planes taken under fire of REID with forward 5" and .50 caliber machine guns.
- 0830 Outgoing To NPL RDO SAN DIEGO & NPM RDO WAILUPE: 1 must have instantaneous relay for my dispatches.
- 0830 COM-14 To NAS Pearl: Hostile Japanese air attack X Hickam Field bombed X stay clear this area as long as gas permits X keep in contact this station.
- 0832 CALIFORNIA Reported one enemy plane shot down over Ford Island.
- 0832 SICARD Observed 4 flights horizontal bombers attacking battleships, followed by 8 torpedo bombers. OKLAHOMA struck by several torpedoes, took heavy list to Stbd and capsized. ARIZONA struck by torpedoes and heavy bomb.
- 0832 PYRO Observed enemy planes crash and burst into flame towards Barbers Point. Pilots bailed out. Observed damage to ship which consisted of broken steam line; repaired by ship's force.

- 0835 SICARD Sent working party 20 men to CUMMINGS to handle ammunition, and 4 gunner's mates to NEW ORLEANS to assist her battery. 10 men previously detailed to PENNSYLVANIA to assist damage control.
- 0835 BOBOLINK Moved out of next and to first buoy. Observed Japanese plane crash near Hickam Field. Believe it result of minesweeper firing.
- 0835 PREBLE Reports first phase of attack completed.
- 0836 COM-14 To Ships present: Send boats to Ford Island.
- 0838 MUGFORD W. V. burning. ARIZONA on fire. Tugs trying to pull overturned OKLA clear. U. S. S. VESTAL clearing NEVADA.
- 0840 CALIFORNIA Shaken by 4 near bomb hits and splintered considerably by fragments.
- [40] 0840 CURTISS Submarine surfaced and fired one torpedo up North Channel toward destroyers. Conning tower hit twice by gun #3.
- 0843 CURTIS Ceased firing on submarine and observed MONAGHAN drop 2 depth charges. Air bubbles and slick appeared.
- [41] 0840 CUMMINGS Opened fire to repel straffing attack. Glide bomber observed to veer away from ship with smoke trailing, passed over new boiler shop and disappeared in smoke.
- 0840 JARVIS Noted NEVADA underway and standing out. Dive bombed, hit several times and beached. SHAW hit and caught on fire in drydock. Two destroyers in drydock with PENNSYLVANIA hit.
- 0840 TREVER Ready for getting underway. TREVER could not clear because other ships astern were clearing buoys D-3 and D-4. Enemy plane brought down vicinity of Pearl City. Second plane brought down 200 yards off Beckoning Point.
- 0842 MUGFORD U. S. S. VESTAL clear of NEVADA.
- 0845 PHOENIX Ship ready to get underway.
- 0845 SICARD Observed attack broken off.
- 0845 VESTAL Observed ARIZONA quarterdeck awash. With no steering gear VESTAL got underway while tug pulled her bow away from ARIZONA. Starting to list to Stbd VESTAL was maneuvered into position with South end of McGrews Point bearing 30° distance 910 yds.
- 0845 MUGFORD Executed signal to get underway to Task Forces One and Two. Tugs pulled OGLALA clear of HELENA.
- 0845 CALIFORNIA Commander Stone, executive officer, arrived and assumed command of CALIFORNIA. Combatfor returned on board.
- 0845 CACHALOT Dive bomb and straffing attacks made by enemy.
- 0845 HULL Second Attack. All attacks except one was broken up. One formation of three planes continued on. Two of these were shot down; one by USS DOBBIN and one by the next of ships. Two bombs landed astern of next, close to side of DOBBIN.
- 0845 CASTOR Ready to get underway.
- 0847 BLUE Underway upon execution of signal to get underway from berth X-7. Maintained fire on enemy planes with main battery and machine guns while steaming out of harbor. Four planes fired on with main battery were later seen to go down in smoke. It is claimed that two of these planes were definitely shot down by this vessel. One was seen to crash in field on Waipio Pena., and the second crashed into crane on stern of USS CURTISS. Two planes that dove over the ship were fired on by the .50 caliber machine guns. It is claimed that one of these planes, seen to crash near Pan American Dock, was shot down by this vessel.
- [42] 0850 MUGFORD W. VA. listed heavily to port.
- 0850 ZANE Reports MONAGHAN approached and depth charged submarine. Enemy plane brought down flying over nest, struck deperming station.
- 0850 SUMNER Dispatched ship's boats to Ford Island to assist in hauling ammunition.
- 0850 DOWNES Hit again by bombs and set on fire. Abandoned ship.
- 0850 COMDESFLOT 1 To DESPLOT 1: Desdiv TWO establish Offshore patrol.
- 0851 MUGFORD Executed signal to get underway and sortie according to plan E-S.
- 0851 COM-14 To Cincpac. Submarine reported in Pearl Harbor for Sector Comdrs.
- 0854 MUGFORD Attack started again from North.
- 0855 CONYNGHAM Fired at plane straffing ahead and astern.



- 0855-1017 Underway from Buoy D-3 Middle Loch RAMSEY, BREESE, GAMBLE, and MONTGOMERY. Opened fire with AA.
- 0855 MUGFORD NEVADA underway. Dense smoke over Ford Island. A tanker was towed clear of Ford Island.
- 0855 PRUITT Observed about 10 planes made high altitude horizontal bombing.
- 0855 WHITNEY Observed second air attack by Japanese bombing planes.
- 0855 USS RALPH TALBOT Was moored bow to southward to buoy X-11 with Patterson to port and HENLEY to starboard.
- 0855 RAMSAY Underway proceeding out of harbor. Believe RAMSAY is responsible for shooting down plane with .50 cal. Assumed anti-submarine patrol on clearing channel.
- 0857 CTF 2 To all ships: Enemy submarine in North Channel.
- [43] 0859 UNKNOWN To Cinepac: Ten aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor from Southwest.
- 0900 TRACY Reports high altitude bombers passed overhead in several waves. One bomb fell in slip between stern of RIGEL and CUMMINGS at Berth 15.
- 0900 MUGFORD Attack started again from the South. Army planes taking off from HICKAM FIELD.
- 0900 RIGEL Executive Officer returned on board. Traffic congestion delayed all hands. The one exception to all hands was Lt. H. E. Morgan who did not return until 0800 next morning. Lt. Morgan's behavior is being investigated.
- 0900 SICARD Observed dive bombers from S. E. attack ships moored to Navy Yard docks, followed by waves of dive and horizontal bombers on ships at Ford Island and docks.
- 0900 OGLALA Approaching 40° list to port. Ordered all hands abandon ship. Only gun crews and Cominbatfor remained.
- 0900 PHOENIX Formation of 11 planes passed over fleet on heading 070. Approximate altitude 10,000 feet. Planes appeared to be painted silver. Expended fifty rounds of 5". No apparent damage to planes.  
There were two flights of this nature. Time of second cannot be approximated. Expended fifty rounds of 5".
- 0900 HONOLULU Enemy bomber sighted flying directly towards this ship from direction Merry Point with an altitude of 1,000 feet. Was seen to swerve to its left, pass over the Navy Yard, smoking, losing altitude and appeared to crash near Naval Hospital. This plane was under the fire of several ships, including the port 5" and machine gun batteries of the HONOLULU. Damage to enemy observed, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21, Submarine Base, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21 BB. (Note: Damage listed above is at unknown times.)
- 0900 TAUTOG Observed planes approaching in direction Hickam Field high in southwest and mostly obscured by clouds. App. 18 planes turned left over Hickam Field and made dive bombing attacks on ships in yard. Dive appeared slow and bombs released were very low. One plane observed out of control in flames. Scattered enemy planes observed until 1130. Most dive bombers appeared to drop two bombs each.
- [44] 0900 CALIFORNIA One bomb, possibly 15" projectile with tail vanes, struck CALIFORNIA abreast casemate one, frame 59, penetrated to second deck and exploded rupturing forward and after bulkheads of A-611 and overhead into A-705. Armored hatch to machine shop badly sprung and couldn't be closed, resulting in serious fire.
- 0900 BREESE Projectile from BREESE 3" AA battery struck dive bomber which had just attacked CURTISS. Forward section of plane with motor landed on North side of Waipio Peninsula.
- 0900 RALPH TALBOT Underway. While enroute to entrance expended 150 rounds 5"/38 cal. and 1500 rounds .50 cal. Observed two planes crash and another start to smoke badly. Two enemy planes dove low over bridge and was hit by our .50 cal. machine guns. Plane crashed along shore Pearl City abeam of us. Used after 5" guns to fire on plane attacking CURTISS.
- 0900 DEWEY Second wave attack started by light bombers lasting 10 minutes under fire by DEWEY throughout attack.
- 0900 PATTERSON Underway and stood out of harbor. No damage sustained by PATTERSON.



- 0900 SOLACE Ship underway and shifted from Berth X4 to Berth X13. No material or personnel damage to ship proper.
- 0900 BOBOLINK Observed suspicious sign of Japanese submarine and signalled to destroyers, but signal apparently not seen.
- 0900 BOBOLINK Observed three flights of high altitude bombers approaching from due south to north. 7 planes in each flight, altitude about 17,000 feet. One flight dropped bombs on Hickam, second flight passed directly over coal docks and dropped bombs further up in yard; third flight passed over West Loch, one plane dropping bombs near entrance while others maintained course and dropped them beyond Ford Island.
- 0900 RALEIGH Dive bomber attack came in which was met with warm reception. One bomb hit ship a glancing blow going through carpenter shop and oil tank, piercing the skin below water line and finally detonating on bottom of harbor. Plane machine gunned ship also. Steam raised in 3 and 4 firerooms and pumps started. Five bombing planes under fire were observed to crash close aboard.
- 0900 HONOLULU 5 high altitude bombers, 12 to 15,000 feet appeared. 5 high altitude bombers from South, 12 to 15,000 feet. All bombed Pearl Harbor and Ford Island Area.
- 0900 RIGEL 15 dive bombers 6 to 10 thousand feet from N. attacked DDs and NEVADA.
- [45] 0900 SOLACE Got underway and shifted from berth X-4, near DOBBIN and destroyers to berth X-13 in the clear. Made boat trips to WEST VIRGINIA to bring back casualties.
- 0900 DOBBIN Fired upon enemy plane headed astern of ship. Plane crashed upon trees in Navy Yard.
- 0900 OGLALA Capsized alongside 10-10 dock.
- 0900-0915 PHOENIX Dive bombing attack on ships berth northern side of Ford Island. Attack was made at about 30° angle, opposed with AA and MG batteries. Expended 20 rounds of 5". One plane disintegrated by DD fire.
- 0900-0930 PHOENIX Effected periodic fire on planes delivering low-level bombing attack on navy yard and ships berth there.
- 0901 CUMMINGS Observed twelve scattered planes over Ford Island; air raid resumed. Opened fire with main battery on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard industrial section.
- 0902 MUGFORD Formation of planes sighted to South. Decks of ARIZONA and W. VA. level with water. Dense smoke pouring from NEVADA.
- 0903 DOLPHIN Reports another attack from higher altitude.
- 0903 Outgoing To MIDWAY: Pearl Harbor bombed no indication direction attack take off attempt locate Japanese Forces.
- 0903 Outgoing To WAKE: Pearl bombed by Japanese be on alert.
- [46] 0905 CURTISS Obs. 1 of 3 planes pulling out of dive was hit by CURTISS and crashed into #1 crane. Tank exploded and plane burned on Boat Deck.
- [47] NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OCCURRING DURING JAPANESE AIR RAID ON 7 DECEMBER
- 0905 SUMNER Fired on wave of dive bombers approaching Navy Yard. Dive bombers also attacked HICKAM FIELD and BB. No hits, when firing on latter planes. Observed light dive bomber with conspicuous red tail zig-zag over Navy Yard as if observing casualties at end of phase.
- 0905 TRACY Attack by approximately 10 dive bombers from direction of the sun, which indicated drydock as objective. Group of 6, 3, and 9 planes observed at altitude of 8 to 10,000 feet. Bomb seen to fall between berths 13 and 15 in slip. TRACY gig damaged by fragmentation; no casualties.
- 0905 PREBLE Observed about 30 dive bombers make second attack in twin-motored monoplane. Observed one bomb fall in slip 25 yards on starboard quarter. Observed a bomb fall astern of HONOLULU in berth B-21. Observed numerous bombs fall in vicinity of drydock area.
- 0905 WHITNEY Observed one Japanese plane fall down in flames on hilltop, bearing northeast, true.
- 0906 PENNSYLVANIA The second attack coming in slightly on port bow dropped bombs on ships in drydock. One heavy bomb hit the destroyer DOWNES in dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA, and one hit dock approximately abreast frame 20 while one hit the boat deck of the PENNSYLV-

- VANIA a few feet abaft gun #7. This bomb passed through boat deck and detonated in #5 gun #9 casemate. Fifth bomb believed to have struck water outside of dock. Observed plane crash in hospital grounds. Observers claim to have destroyed six enemy planes. Consider two hit by PENNSYLVANIA.
- [48] 0906 MUGFORD Japanese planes diving on Ford Island from south-east. NEVADA standing down south channel.
- 0907 PRUITT Observed straffing and light bombing attack, plus heavy horizontal bombing attack from about 10,000 feet made on ships and Ford Island. One bomb hit close to stern of RIGEL.
- 0907 PENNSYLVANIA Bomb hit on dock and cut yard power, subsequently power on the ship was taken from storage batteries, meanwhile, firemain pressure cut off.
- 0907 OUTGOING ALL HANDS: Cease firing on B17's attempting to land at Hickam.
- 0908 CONYNGHAM Reports one plane attacking on starboard bow shot down by nest and crashed in Pearl City.
- 0908 Com 14 to ASP Do not fire on our planes coming in.
- 0908 NEVADA Attack slackened.
- 0909 MUGFORD Bomb dropped some 400 yards on MUGFORD port bow. Ship in repair basin hit.
- [49] 0910 PERRY Mine Division FOUR underway at intervals and stood out to take off shore patrol duty.
- 0910 SecNav to Alnav Execute WPL FORTY SIX against Japan.
- 0910 Dive bombers attacked ships at Pier 19; bombs fell in water ahead and astern within 25 yds. of CUMMINGS.
- 0910 DOBBIN Attacked by 3 enemy planes. 3 bombs dropped—all near misses. Fragments struck stern of ship injuring #4 3" AA gun crew. 3 killed, 2 injured. Damage: small holes through decks, bulkheads, booms, #1 MWB hull damaged beyond repair.
- 0910 BLUE Passed channel entrance buoys, and set course 120 true. Proceeded to sector three to patrol station.
- 0910 RIGEL 10 to 12 dive bombers from S. attacked ships in Repair Basin with bombs and mach. guns.
- 0910 PHOENIX Second bombing attack on BB. Expended sixty rounds of 5". After planes came out of dive and turned towards berth C-6, planes were brought under fire of MG battery.
- 0910 VESTAL Anchored in 35' of water. Soundings and draft readings showed ship settling at and listing to stbd. Draft aft increased to 27', list 6½°. C O. VESTAL decided to ground ship.
- [50] 0912 CURTISS Reports group of planes under heavy fire attacked. During attack one bomb hit stern mooring buoy. 1 fell short, one over, one hit ship starboard side of boat deck, passed through Carpenter Shop and Radio Repair Shop, entered Hangar and detonated on Main Deck. Explosion destroyed bulk heads, deck, etc., within radius of 30 feet. Equipment destroyed in Hangar, Handling Room etc. One plane shot down 1000 yards on port bow and 1 500 yards on port beam. Another plane shot on port beam landing in water off Pan-Air dock. One plane reported crashed in cane field astern and one forward of ship.
- [51] 0910 CONYNGHAM Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching from ahead and from direction of Schofield.
- 0910 THORNTON Second wave dive bombing attack commenced and ended at 0917. Throughout the entire period there was horizontal bombing in various Pearl Harbor areas.
- 0911 MUGFORD Horizontal Japanese bombers passed overhead.
- 0912 PYRO Observed dive bombers approach from port bow, altitude 5,000 feet and release bombs. Bombs landed on concrete dock 12' from ship's side amidships. Penetrated dock exploding underneath and jarring ship.
- 0912 MUGFORD Heavy black smoke coming from SHAW in floating drydock.
- 0913 MUGFORD NEVADA stopped south side of south channel.
- 0913 PREBLE Attack completed. No damage. No casualties sustained by this ship.
- 0915 Large explosion on DOWNES.

- [52] 0915 HELM Small enemy fighter approached ship from astern in medium glide and dropped two bombs, which exploded in water about 50 yards off port bow and 20 yards of starboard bow. After machine guns opened fire but did not hit plane. Shock shorted relay to steering (which had just been repaired) and damaged gyro rotor. Choke coils, tubes and resistors in sound gear burned out, echo ranging inoperative. Seams below waterline on starboard side forward sprung. A-15, A-301, A-401, and A-402 flooded. These compartments closed off and pumped out during afternoon. FS smoke generators jumped track, breaking air line connection.
- 0915 Captain Bunkley returned to CALIFORNIA and assumed command.
- 0915 NEVADA 5" AA battery fired on enemy planes to eastward. NEVADA suffered at least 6 bomb hits and one torpedo hit.
- 0915 MUGFORD Thick black smoke coming from drydock.
- 0915 TRACY Commanding Officer returned aboard and found 2 .50 cal. mach. guns mounted and ready. 2 dive bombers attacked out of the sun. 1 plane pulling out over sub. base and flying low over building 155 crashed in flames in vicinity of hospital point after salvo by CUMMINGS. Plane appeared to be a type 95 dive bomber, planes appeared to be at about 3,000 feet to seaward of Hickam, were 18 planes in formation type V.
- [53] 0917 PRUITT Observed low flying pursuit planes strafing with machine gun fire on ships moored in the vicinity of Berth 18. Observers on this ship believe many high altitude horizontal bombs either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area where they could not be observed. An indeterminate number of fighters took part in the raid, with approximately 30 bombers. Approaches were made on a steady course and all horizontal bombing was made in close formation at about 10,000 feet. The four cruisers and light minelayers in the Navy Yard were strafed several times by low flying planes but not a single bomb appeared to have been aimed at those ships. Small caliber fire of minelayers brought down one Japanese plane.
- 0917 BREESE Cleared nest and proceeded down channel.
- 0920 CUMMINGS fired on a light bomber. Plane observed smoking heavily as it flew out of sight to southwestward.
- 0920 HONOLULU Observed low winged dive bombers from South to Southeast, 400 feet pullout. Two bombers bombed industrial and drydock areas. One bomb, (clearly visible on its descent, 250 lbs), passed through edge of concrete dock, angle of descent 45°, and exploded underwater between ship and dock.
- 0920 Damage to HONOLULU: Oil tanks various, decks bulged in magazines, various leaks sprung and decks slightly fucked, power lease to turret #2 grounded, turret #1 partially grounded, mercury thrown out of gyros, fore and aft, rangefinders, main battery deranged fore and aft.
- [54] 0920 More Japanese planes from northwest.
- 0920 CONYNGHAM Opend fire on plane diving from port side of nest. No personnel or material damage.
- 0920 PENNSYLVANIA Flooding of drydock commenced. Both destroyers heavily on fire. Fire being transmitted to fire on water and dock which set fire to paint on starboard side of PENNSYLVANIA. No hose available for fighting fire on DOWNES, Available hose being used on CASSIN.
- 0921 Outgoing ALL HANDS: Reported that enemy ships have red dot on bottom of fuselage.
- 0921 Outgoing COMBATFOR: To ALL SHIPS PRESENT: Get underway immediately.
- 0923 MUGFORD PATTERSON standing out.
- 0923 Outgoing COMBATFOR TO COMCRUBATFOR: Cruisers proceed as soon as possible.
- Landline Send over boats to capsized battleship.
- [55] 0924 Received COMSUBSCOFOR TO COMSUBDIV 43: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE be prepared to attack on information furnished later.
- 0924 Received Com 14: All planes approaching from Fox George and Easy.
- 9025 CALIFORNIA plane 205 capsized and sunk while being removed to avoid gasoline fire hazard.



- 0925 WASMUTH Reports second phase of attack as glide bombers and torpedo planes approached from westerly direction. Scored hits on several planes and shot down one plane which crashed on Waipio Peninsula near Middle Loch. This plane should be credited to James Patrick Hannon, seaman first, class, U. S. Navy.
- 0925 GAMBLE One Japanese plane shot down by AA fire, falling in water on port beam about 1,000 yards away from ship. Believed shot down by ROBERTS, W. L., BM-2c, USS GAMBLE port machine gunner (#2 machine gun) .50 cal., and JOOS, H. W., GM-3c., USS GAMBLE (#1 machine gun) starboard.
- 0925 MUGFORD White smoke pouring from amidship on ARIZONA.
- [56] 0926 Outgoing CTF 1: Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to sea and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.
- Unknown Fire at will.
- 0927 Received COM 14: Aircraft coming from Barbers Point 20 or 30 miles. Flash: Enemy planes appear to be massing around Easy. Enemy planes coming from Wheller Field.
- 0927 CURTISS After engine room out of commission and evacuated.
- 0927 Received RDO SANFRANCISCO to AS: USAT CYNTHIA OLSEN sent distress reports enemy submarine Lat. 33 R 42 N Long 145 R 29 W.
- 0928 MUGFORD Shot down enemy plane after it pulled out from dive on port bow. Altitude 200 feet. With forward 50 caliber M. G. The plane was a dive bomber.
- 0928 Received COMAIRBATFOR TO CINCPAC: 220P planes to arrive Pearl about 0820.
- 0930 MUGFORD OGLALA going over to port. Personnel abandoned ship and getting on dock.
- [57] 0930 Received COMSUBSCOFOR TO THRESHER, GUDGEON & LITCHFIELD: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE x remain in present position x report position.
- 0930 Received CURTISS TO CINCPAC: Unable to sortie because of damage. After OGLALA sank her crew were pooled out and sent to various units of the Fleet to assist ships in maintaining their batteries.
- 0930 GAMBLE Got underway and cleared mooring buoy. Reports Division commenced getting underway. U. S. S. BREESE underway.
- 0930 Enemy planes strafed CASTOR and NEOSHO. Detailed men to handle NEOSHO lines astern of CASTOR.
- 0930 TREVER Underway, standing out of entrance. Observed PERRY fire at submarine and MONAGHAN raming and dropping depth charge.
- 0930 TENNESSEE Observed enemy planes coming in on port beam. WEST VIRGINIA gangway still burning.
- 0930 HELM Shifted steering motor power to diesel generator; regained bridge control of steering.
- [58] 0930 CALIFORNIA Fire broke out on main deck, starboard side of "F" Division compartment and casemates 3, 5, and 7.
- 0930 BREESE Lookout reported periscope off Coal Docks but could not be observed from bridge, or picked up by supersonics.
- 0930 DOBBIN Reports attacks appeared to have been discontinued.
- 0930 WHITNEY Reports second air attack completed.
- 0930 PENNSYLVANIA Explosions on destroyers commenced, in floating dry-dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0932 WASMUTH Underway following TREVER on orders from Lt. Comdr. L. M. LeHardy, CO ZANE and S. O. P. Mindiv 4.
- 0933 Received COM 14: Flash: planes coming in from George.
- 0935 Received RALEIGH TO CINCPAC: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded x damage under control at present x unable to get underway.
- [59] 0935 Received CHICAGO TO CRUSCOFOR: Japanese submarines reported inside and outside Pearl.
- 0935 Received ARMY HDQTRS: Flash: Fishing boat 1 mile off Manakuli.
- 0936 Received CPW2 TO CPW 1: We are being attacked by 15 Japanese planes.
- 0936 CURTISS Fire under control.
- 0937 WASMUTH Lieut. J. W. Leverton, Jr., USN, Executive Officer, reported aboard and relieved Lt. (jg) J. R. Grey, USN, who had been in command until this time.



- 0937 Received ARMY HDQTRS REPORTS: Friendly aircraft coming from toward Barbers Point 20 or 30 planes.
- 0937 GAMBLE Japanese planes attacked near main channel entrance.
- 0937 MUGFORD Explosion on destroyer ahead of the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA in drydock.
- 0938 MUGFORD Japanese subs reported inside and outside of Pearl Harbor.
- [60] 0940 WASMUTH Lt. Comdr. D. M. Agnew, USN, CO USSS TREVER reported aboard. Proceeded out of Pearl Harbor and took up patrol off entrance.
- 0940 BAGLEY Ship underway from dock. Material Damage: Broken windows and light globes and glasses on reduction gears causing loss of lubricating oil. Personnel damage: 4 men slightly injured.
- 0940 TENNESSEE Reports wounded being removed from the WEST VIRGINIA. OKLAHOMA upside down. Bow blown away on ARIZONA. Destroyers getting underway on other side of Ford Island. Fire either on ARGONNE or dock. Air attack coming in on starboard bow. WEST VIRGINIA on fire from turret 1 to bow. Flames up as high as foretop. Fire on port quarter (oil on water).
- 0940 BAGLEY Underway from dock and proceeded around north side Ford Island under belief that other channel was blocked. Because of defective bilge keel, ship was ordered to patrol off shore area and did not accompany Task Force 8. No damage to ship.
- 0940 NEVADA Grounded off Hospital Point.
- 0941 PENNSYLVANIA Observed warheads on DOWNES explode covering area with debris. Section of torpedo tube, weighing about 1,000 lbs. landed on PENNSYLVANIA forecastle. Fire brought under control before serious damage resulted. CASSIN rolled over on DOWNES. It was noted by everyone participating in action that after an hour or more heavy thirst was experienced requiring considerable drinking water. This confirms the necessity of having water at all battle stations.
- [61] 0942 BREESE Cleared channel entrance with degaussing gear cut in and took station as offshore patrol in section 3.
- 0942 Received COM 14 to ASP & NAVSHORE ACTIVITIES: brief concentrations reported 25 miles south by south east of Barbers Point x not definite.
- 0942 MUGFORD BAGLEY underway.
- 0943 TERN Underway from alongside dock to pick up survivors in harbor. Received 47 survivors.
- 0945 DEWEY Third wave of attack started by dive bombers. DOBBIN and Desdiv One were target with 3 or 4 planes attacking. One bomb hit close aboard starboard quarter and one hit water between HULL and DEWEY astern. No damage. Guns 1 and 2 firing when not blanked by DOBBIN. It is believed that Desdiv ONE destroyed two planes. Ammunition expended; 76 rounds 5", 1300 rounds .50 cal.
- 0945 CACHALOT Joined in fire against enemy bombers. No damage received. Nearest enemy bomb dropped 20' off starboard quarter and did not explode. Nearest torpedo passed 100 yards astern.
- 0945 MUGFORD OGLALA capsized to port.
- 0946 MUGFORD Japanese planes in from SW low.
- [62] 0947 MUGFORD HONOLULU underway.
- 0948 TENNESSEE Observed planes coming in on starboard bow; did not know whether enemy or friendly. Ship will not get underway until further orders. Engineering Department, stand by. Destroyer, from Navy Yard, getting underway. Unidentified ship in Pearl Harbor down by stern.
- 0950 VESTAL Grounded.
- 0950 BLUE Good sound contact on submarine. Maneuvered to attack and dropped four depth charges. Regained sound contact on same submarine. Dropped two depth charges. Investigated and observed large oil slick and air bubbles rising to surface. It is felt that this submarine was definitely sunk. Obtained third contact on a submarine that was apparently headed for ST. LOUIS, which was at the time heading out on course approximately 150 true, at high speed. Two depth charges dropped, and upon return noticed large oil slick on surface. It is claimed that one, and possibly two, submarines were sunk.

- 0950 Outgoing Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Barbars Point. (Sent to CTF 8).
- 0951 TENNESSEE Reports lighter alongside starboard beam on fire (ammunition lighter, top blown out, can see no ammunition on it.).
- [63] 0951 Received COM 14 to ASP: Two planes seen dropping heavy charges off harbor entrance which did not explode; think they are mines.
- 0952 Outgoing Battleships remain in part probable channel mined.
- 0954 TENNESSEE. Observed bow of MARYLAND ON fire.
- 0954 Received SOPA SAN DIGEO to ASP HAWAIIAN AREA: Los Angeles Harbor Air Defense Plan Number One effective.
- Unknown SIGNAL TOWER The following ships have left Pearl Harbor: DALE, ST. LOUIS, HENLEY, PHELPS, RAMSEY, WASMUTH, PATTERSON, MONTGOMERY.
- 0955 GAMBLE Temporarily anchored, astern of USS MEDUSA.
- 0955 TENNESSE Still playing fire hose on ammunition lighter. Fire seems to under control.
- 0955 MUGFORD Commenced receiving fuel oil from the yard line. PERRY AND GAMBLE standing out.
- [64] 0956 TENNESSEE Observed SOLACE GETTING underway.
- 0957 MUGFORD CALIFORNIA listing to port.
- [65] 0958 MUGFORD BB's order to remain in port.
- 0958 TENNESSEE Observed fire on bow of MARYLAND. Was under control. Superstructure on WEST VIRGINIA on fire—4 or 5 men trapped, trying to escape by crane. Fire (oil on water) at stern of TENNESSEE was out. Fire very close to D-310-M.
- 1000 CUMMINGS Opened fire to repel horizontal bombing attack from the southward. One horizontal bomber observed to lose its wing. CUMMINGS gun captain #4 claimed a hit.
- 1000 WHITNEY WHITNEY reports REID and SELFRIDGE underway.
- 1002 CALIFORNIA Oil fire on surface of water enveloped ship starting many fires, particularly intense one on forecastle. Captain Bunkley, with approval of Commander Battle Force ordered ship to be abandoned temporarily due to enveloping oil fire on surface of water.
- 1002 TENNESSEE Flood D-310-M (D-306-M and D-312-M also flooded, not isolated).
- 1003 MUGFORD Japanese planes reported dropping mines in channel.
- [66] 1005 GAMBLE Underway proceeding out of channel.
- 1005 FT. SHAFTER Some heavy bombs dropped at entrance of Pearl Harbor did not explode. Think they are mines.
- 1005 SOPA SAN DIEGO To ASP SAN DIEGO: San Diego Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE effective.
- 1005 MUGFORD U. S. S. SHAW in floating dry-dock exploded. Main engines and two boilers of MUGFORD ready to get underway.
- 1008 TENNESSEE Observed ARIZONA aflame all over.
- 1010 UNKNOWN To RDO WAILUPE: This vessel and 4 DM in Southwest S2 two enemy carriers in sight. (Rec'd by phone).
- 1010 REID REID got underway on 4 boilers. No damage or casualties.
- 1010 PHOENIX Got underway, but returned to Berth C-6 on receiving orders not to sortie.
- 1010 SUMMER Fired two rounds at bomber on port beam, altitude 8,000—no hits. Also fired 50 caliber machine guns, two and four.
- [67] 1010 TENNESSEE Observed planes approaching from starboard beam; did not come in.
- 1011 CPW 2 To DEWT: Report CPW 2 for duty.
- 1013 MUGFORD U. S. S. SCHLEY and ALLEN ready to get underway.
- UNKNOWN VP-24 To CPW 2: Eight men of war Lat. 21.10 Long 160. 16 course 090 degrees.
- UNKNOWN USCG 400 To CG RDO STATION: Report immediately to Commander Honolulu Base.
- 1014 Com 14 Was Luahalei NAD damaged.
- 1015 CTF 9 To COMPATRON 21: Search Sector 000 to 300 Japanese Carriers.
- 1015 GAMBLE Shifted .30 cal. A. A. machine guns to top of pilot house on fire control platform.
- 1018 CINCPAC To CTF 8, 12. 3: Search from Pearl very limited account mix-umum twelve VP searching X Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X Addressees operate as directed Com Task Force 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force unknown.

- [68] 1018 CTF 8 Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity.
- 1020 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports ARIZONA looks as if she is on the bottom. Word passed for the 5th division to lay aft to relieve fire party.
- 1020 Cinpac To CTF One: Do not send any more cruisers to Sea.
- 1020 CTG 1.9 To ALL Air Coms Patwing 1 & 2. Observe approach Doctrine when near Oahu.
- 1020 MUGFORD U. S. S. JARVIS cleared starboard side.
- 1020 Attack group of 15 VSB's with 1,000 lb. bombs each dispatched to position 30 miles south Barber's Point where numerous reports had been received of enemy carriers and other forces; no contact. CinC informed Comtaskfor EIGHT depended on Pearl Harbor for scouting information. This in order maintain carrier striking group in readiness.
- 1021 GAMBLE Cleared channel entrance. Eight depth charges were armed and the ship commenced offshore and anti-submarine patrol off Pearl Harbor entrance.
- 1022 MUGFORD Navy MT's standing out.
- [69] 1023 WASMUTH Dropped one depth charge on suspicious Water, setting 200 feet, results negative.
- 1023 MUGFORD Floating Dry Dock Sinking.
- 1024 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports Torpedo boats leaving harbor.
- 1027 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports people coming from WEST VIRGINIA on board TENNESSEE by way of a five inch gun.
- 1027 MUGFORD A transport and CUMMINGS underway standing out.
- 1028 NAS PEARL To CTF 8: Your 2023 Affirmative. (Ref: Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity).
- 1028 PENNSYLVANIA Power on ship taken on two generators.
- 1030 CASTOR CASTOR Transferred ammunition to NEOSHO for use of that vessel.
- 1030 ARMY HDQTS Two enemy coming in 30 miles south of Affirm 2S.
- [70] 1030 HENLEY Visual signal from TREVER reported the HENLEY'S captain and executive officer on board that vessel.
- 1030 BLUE Upon completion of attacks, BLUE screened ST. LOUIS.
- 1030 SICARD SICARD observed attack break off. Mustered crew, no injuries or casualties.
- 1030 PHOENIX Got underway and started out north of channel. Received message from TENNESSEE from CINCPAC "Do not Sortie". Turned around in channel and started back to berth C-6. On receipts of orders from Comcrubatfor proceeded via south channel and completed sortie and joined Comtaskfor ONE.
- 1030 MUGFORD Fuel oil barge moored starboard quarter.
- 1030 PENNSYLVANIA Sent motor launches to West Loch for more ammunition.
- 1031 UNKNOWN This vessel and 4 DM in southwest S2 NO enemy carriers in sight.
- [71] 1032 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE observes ARIZONA abandoning ship. Repair II report all C&R soundings normal. Repair IV report all soundings normal. Pull circuit L28 at aft. Distribution Board. Mr. Teague says hatches cannot be opened from inside wardroom country—too hot.
- 1032 SIGNAL TOWER To CINCPAC: These ships underway but have not cleared the entrance yet: DETROIT — JARVIS — PERRY — NEW ORLEANS — GAMBLE — CHEW.
- 1033 COMBATSHIPS Be ready to repel repeated air attacks.
- 1033 CTF3, CTF8 To ASP; Submarines reported 10 miles south Barber's Point.
- 1033 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE 6° down by stern from flooding of D-306, D-312-M.
- 1036 TENNESSEE Unit 2, Repair I, combatting fire in W. R. Country. Dead man forward of conning tower, sent stretcher party.
- 1036 WASMUTH Dropped second depth charge on suspicious water, setting 200 feet, bearing 217°, distance 3.4 miles from Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. Brought up large quantities of oil, but no wreckage.
- 1040 YUNE 8 bearing (BILATERAL) 357° or 178° T from HEEIA. YUNE 8 is Comcardivs (AKAGI).



- [72] 1040 Condesron 3 Underway accordance signal from tower, and oral orders. Joined antisub patrol operating off entrance. Made two sound contacts; dropped 3 and 2 depth charges. Oil observed on water but no conclusive evidence of submarine loss.
- 1040 COMBASEFOR To Cominron 2: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.
- 1040 MUGFORD Commenced receiving fuel from oil barge in addition to oil from yard line.
- 1040 TRACY TRACY reported CUMMINGS underway after returning all TRACY men. 10 men sent to help fight fire in CALIFORNIA.
- 1042 Combatfor To Cap't NYD: The CALIFORNIA is on fire inside. Probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.
- 1045 DOWNES Fire on CASSIN brought under control.
- 1046 COMBATSHIPS To BATSHIPS IN COMPANY: All battleships sent pilots and aviation personnel to Ford Island immediately.
- 1046 CTFS DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barber's Point.
- [73] 1048 TENNESSEE To CINCPAC: TENNESSEE 30% damage CALIFORNIA has been sunk. Doubtful—checking.
- 1050 TERN Proceeded to put out fire on USS ARIZONA. Shifted over to WEST VIRGINIA by orders from MARYLAND.
- 1051 CPW1 To Plane 2 VP14: Search sector 310 to 320. Take due caution. Unknown CTFS To CINCPAC: CINCPAC 2012 Acknowledge.
- 1053 MINNEAPOLIS To CINCPAC: MINNEAPOLIS center area VICTOR ONE.
- 1055 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: Am depending on Pearl for scouting information.
- 1055 CTF 8 CTF 8 launched six VOS to search sector 030-045° to 150 miles.
- 1055 SUMNER Fired two rounds 3" at plane dead ahead, altitude 8,000. No hits. Fired all 50 caliber.
- [74] 1056 MUGFORD Japanese planes attaching from North. (Note: These are apparently friendly planes).
- 1058 MUGFORD Numerous explosions from WEST VIRGINIA and ARIZONA.
- 1058 TENNESSEE Observed Naval Air Station planes in air.
- 1058 PATRON 23 To CPW ONE: Investigating suspicious vessel 21 00, 150 50.
- 1100 TRACY Japanese have definitely withdrawn.
- 1100 COM 14 TO NAS PEARL, CPW2: Hawaiian Air Force contemplates moving headquarters. MUX lines will be kept in commission.
- UNKNOWN COMBASEFOR, COMINRON TWO to COM 14: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.
- 1100 TENNESSEE Repair II told to open drain valve and core valve in GSK, Valves to Sick Bay. Enemy plane coming in on bow. All hands not engaged in fighting fire, seek cover.
- [75] 1100 HELM Sound listening watch heard screws on starboard quarter. Ship circled for attack but lost control. No depth charges dropped.
- 1100 SICARD Observed horizontal bombing attack.
- 1100 MUGFORD Fire appeared to be under control on NEVADA.
- 1103 TENNESSEE Observed destroyer putting to sea (other side of Ford Island). Gasoline stowage filled with CO<sub>2</sub>.
- 1103 VP23 #11 To CPW2: Ships investigated 2 subs unknown nationality course 271 submerged on my approach.
- 1105 NAS Kaneohe To CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.
- 1105 To ASP, Info CTFS: All ships departing Pearl organize as TASKFORCE ONE UNDIVIDED Comdesbatfor assume command report CTF 8.
- 1105 To ASP this Circuit: Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from South.
- [76] 1108 BREESE Received reports Motor Torpedo Boat sighted periscope.
- 1108 ST. LOUIS To CINCPAC: Formed attack group ST. LOUIS, LAMSON, PHELPS, I am proceeding to locate ENEMY.
- 1108 CPW 2 To PATRON 23: Empty tanker no guns showing identity unknown lat. 21 00 Long. 259 59.
- 1110 NYD OPERATIONS To CINCPAC: NYD Operations reports another air raid expected within twenty minutes.
- 1110 SICARD Observed horizontal diving attack completed.
- 1115 NORTHAMPTON Two NORTHAMPTON planes launched to conduct search 150 miles to the north.



- 1115 BREESE BREESE dropped 2 depth charges on spot indicated with no apparent results. Bearings: Barber's Point 297° (t), and Hickam Tower 357° (t).
- 1118 NAS Kaneohe Bay to CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.
- [77] 1121 TENNESSEE 2° list to port.
- 1121 TENNESSEE To CINCPAC: Damage 00% to TENNESSEE: West Virginia sunk. Note: Correction WEST VIRGINIA for CALIFORNIA. Correction 00% instead of 30% for TENNESSEE.
- 1125 SUMNER Fired four rounds 3'' at plane crossing ahead from starboard, altitude 6,000 feet, no hits. Fired 50 caliber machine guns No. 1 and 2.
- 1125 CPW 2 To VP 14 #1, VP14 #3: STAY OUT.
- 1130 WHITNEY Received orders to remained at anchor.
- 1130 HENLEY Picked up captain and executive officer from TREVER. No losses or damage experienced by HENLEY.
- 1130 PATRON 24, CPW 2 to CPW 2, CTF 3: Eight men of war Lat. 21 10, Long. 160 16, course 090 degrees.
- 1130 TENNESSEE Bridge steering telegraph out (being repaired). Sending planes from Hickam Field.
- [78] 1132 MUGFORD Horizontal bombers approaching from port (Jap.)
- 1132 ST. LOUIS To COMDESRON 1: What is your position?
- 1133 SICARD Observed another horizontal bombing raid.
- 1135 SICARD Observed bombers withdrawn. No material damaged and no personnel casualties.
- 1135 SUMNER Fired 11 rounds 3'' at formation of five bombers crossing ahead from port—no hits. Fired all machine guns.
- 1135 CSD 43 To Comsubcofor: Point 21 54—Point 56 12.
- 1135 TENNESSEE Sighted two planes bearing 270°.
- 1135 BREESE Picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity. Dropped 2 depth charges and oil slick with debris appeared, 2nd attack was made with 4 deep-set charges to make certain but no additional results appeared. Meanwhile destroyers in vicinity dropped additional charges.
- [79] 1135 NORTHAMPTON Approximately 15 miles west of Kauai. Section attacked by enemy single seat monoplane, engagement lasting about 20 minutes. Enemy plane made total of seven attacks diving from above or to the side of the scouting section. On all diving attacks presented and exceptionally good target as he squashed down toward the section. Apparent enemy speed 275 miles or better. Enemy plane broke out in smoke and departed. Search continued until completed.
- 1136 MUGFORD U. S. Navy planes taking off from Ford Island.
- 1136 Tennessee Observed light cruiser putting out to sea. Turning engines over to keep fire on water away from ship.
- 1137 COMBATSHIPS To CTF1: MINNEAPOLIS 2 DMs center southern boundary VICTOR ONE Course 105 speed 15/UKX CAB6.
- 1139 CTF 9 To VP24 Planes #1, #2, #4, #5, #11, CPW2: Search to 200 miles.
- 1139 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: TF8 flying colors bearing 184 distance 22 from Kaula Rock at 1115.
- 1140 MUGFORD Japanese Planes on starboard beam.
- [80] 1140 RDO Waiupe To all stations this circuit: Guam attacked
- 1140 DESBATFOR To CTF8: Int posit desig zero george eight.
- 1140 NORTHAMPTON NORTHAMPTON plane engaged enemy fighter. This was not known to Comtaskfor 8 until 8 December.
- 1141 COMBATFOR To COMBATSHIPS: Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when ready and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes at Ford Island probably ready.
- 1142 COM 14 To CINCPAC: Submarine due south Aloha Tower 4 miles has been bombed. Surface covered with oil slick.
- 1144 COMBASEFOR To COMINRON 2: Designate two DMs sweep approaches to Pearl magnetic mines.
- 1145 COMCRUBATFOR To CINCPAC: Have no ships in sector 4.
- 1146 ANTARES moored to B-5A Honolulu.
- [81] 1146 PATWING To Unknown: Enemy troops landing on north shore. Blue coveralls with red emblems.
- 1150 COM 14 To CINCPAC: Parachutists are landing at Barber's Point.
- 1152 CPW 1 To Cinpac, CPW2: 3 planes security patrol patrol 14 are searching assigned sector. All planes have depth charges aboard.

- 1153 COMCARDIV 1 To Cinpac: SARATOGA ready depart San Diego 0900 tomorrow Mondaym escorting ships so far as known have not been designated. Request instructions.
- 1155 To ASP: All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable x report CTF 1 in DETROIT.
- 1156 TENNESSEE Observed Army fortresses in the air. Believe enemy planes and submarines lying in channel.
- 1159 MUGFORD The end of period during which ship maintained 50 caliber and 5" fire.
- [82] 1200 Location of Forces 1200, 7 December 1941: T. F. 8 ENTERPRISE, 21-30, 160-55; T. F. 12 LEXINGTON, 23-50, 171-15; Subdiv 43 (3SS), 80 Miles East, coming ready; GUDGEON C-5, Ready; T. F. 1 and 2 less 8 in Pearl; T. F. 3 less 12, areas; Task F 3 rendezvousing with MINNEAPOLIS and 20Ms southern boundary VI Course 105.
- 1200 GWIN To Comdesbatfor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON and PHELPS. I am proceeding to South to locate and attack enemy carrier.
- 1200 BOBOLINK Received orders from Combasefor to sweep Pearl Harbor with TURKEY.
- 1200 ST. LOUIS To Comerusefor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON and PHELPS. I am proceeding south to locate and attack enemy carrier.
- 1201 Compatwing To Compatron 24: Have search for assign sector 300 miles am returning.
- 1202 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: Your 2100 refers Task Force 8 with 13 ships x request all units be notified.
- 1204 GAMBLE Established sound contact with submarine and dropped three depth charges. Position bearing 168 T from Diamond Head light, distance 2.5 miles.
- [83] 1205 MUGFORD Discontinued fueling. 115000 gallons on board.
- 1205 Comdesbatfor To Comdesflot ONE: About nine thirty witnessed MANAGHAN sink enemy submarine by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of work.
- 1205 SIGNAL TOWER About 0930 witnessed MONAGHAN sink enemy sub. by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of work. Believe RALEIGH accounted for three planes.
- 1205 Com 11 To KENNISON: Submarine reported twenty miles bearing 235 from Pt. Loma investigate.
- 1205 Com 14 All lights extinguished except control lights.
- 1209 MUGFORD. Oil barge cleared starboard side.
- 1209 COMBATSHIPS To CINCPAC: Design cast design king baker jib.
- 1209 COMBATSHIPS To Cruisers and Destroyers: Sortie in accordance until plan indicated.
- 1210 TENNESSEE Draft of ship (internal): Fwd, 34'6"; Aft, 35'10 1/4"; Mean 35'4 1/2". Enemy transport reported 40 miles off Barber's Point. Parachute troops landing on Barber's Point (later proved false). After Battle Dressing Station send stretcher party to left gun, turret III, and remove casualties. Three planes on starboard beam coming this way (do not know whether enemy or not) Said planes flying low; apparently, turning away. Organize a crew of about 30 men to relieve men of Turret IV who are fighting fire on water.
- 1213 SOLACE To Com 14: Expedite your boat all tannic acid, tannic acid jelly, picric acid, tetanus anti-toxin, gas gangreen combined serum, morphine sulphate, morphine syretts, sutures, needles, hypo needles and adhesive tape can be spared.
- [84] 1214 MUGFORD Underway. Standing out in channel.
- 1215 HELM Rejoined DETROIT. Ceased patrolling.
- 1217 CTF 9 To PW 24,23,19: Search to 300 miles.
- 1221 RDO WAILUPE To all stations: Nine unidentified aircraft over Guam.
- 1225 BOBOLINK Moored alongside coal dock to take wire aboard.
- 1228 CINCPAC To ASP Hawaiian Area: If NPM fox goes out guard harbor circuit.
- 1228 Combatships To Cinpac: PENNSYLVANIA Dive bomb hit starboard side frame 86 drydock now flooded. MARYLAND magazines flooded. TENNESSEE fire in wardroom country. OKLAHOMA capsized. WEST VIRGINIA sunk but upright. CALIFORNIA down by the head and heavy list to port—probably on bottom. ARIZONA sunk. NEVADA beached off Hospital Point.

- Unknown CPW 2 To VP23: Search to 200 miles any instructions.
- 1229 SIGNAL TOWER THORNTON is underway and standing up.
- 1230 CURTISS To Cincpac. Unable to sortie because of damage.
- 1230 MUGFORD Japanese plane crashed on beach of HICKAM FIELD.  
(Note: It is believed the ship observed this at this time; (wreckage), not that the crash occurred at this time.
- [85] 1216 SIGNAL TOWER These ships have cleared Pearl Harbor Channel: DALE HANLEY, PATTERSON, PHOENIX, WASMUTH, RAMSAY, ST. LOUIS, DETROIT, MONTGOMERY, WORDEN, CUMMINGS.
- 1219 Combatships To Com 14 Serious oil fire alongside W. Va. menaces TENNESSEE and MARYLAND send fire boats.
- 1223 CTF 8 To Cincpac: 21 VSB from ENTERPRISE should have landed Ford Island about 0830. Request information.
- 1223 RDO Wallupe To ASP: Air alarm standby.
- 1230 TENNESSEE Secure all fresh water, except galley and drinking.
- 1230 ——— While GAMBLE conducting depth charge attack off Diamond Head, received three despatches from Cinc addressed to ASP. Ships ordered to attack transports reported four miles off Barber's Point. All vessels having departed Pearl Harbor organized as Task Force ONE to report to CTF 8 clearing harbor and to report position, composition, and speed. GAMBLE continued with depth charge attack until contact was lost then proceeded to Barber's Point where no transports were found. Continued westward.
- 1232 CINCPAC To ASP: Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point. Attack.
- 1235 CTF 12 To CTF 3 & 8: Cancel Midway Marine flight.
- [86] 1240 MU'' HE SARA HAHO on 4780 BRG 186 (Believed Submarine).
- 1240 MU'' HE SARA HAHO on 4580 BRG 181 (Believed Submarine).
- 1300 KANURE Appears to be O.T.C. on 6581 BRG. 183.
- 1300 SISO On 7033 BRG 167½.
- 1300 KASO Seems to be Task Force Commander.
- 1300 KANURE is probably Commander in the Air.
- [87] 1235 CTF 12 To Cincpac: Is Midway flight cancelled.
- 1235 MUGFORD Passed entrance to channel. Four 50 cal. and four 5''/38 cal guns during the entire period 0809 to 1159 whenever any planes came within range and bearing maintained fire.
- 1235 COMBATSHIPS To Combatfor: Combatship in Maryland.
- 1235 RALEIGH To Cincpac: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded. Damage under control at present. Unable to get underway.
- 1244 Plane 12 VP23 Two CPW2: Approaching 300 able to search more gas 400 25 I request instructions.
- 1245 TENNESSEE Planes on port bow (do not know whether enemy or not).
- 1246 — CALIFORNIA sinking fast, stern underwater. Close all topside hatches, as turrets will be fired. (Did not). Gun four port reported Hoist #22, 5''/51, in B-510 was damaged. Power can be sent up, but is slowed. Draft os ship, FWD: 34'9''. Magazine temperature of Turret I—84°.
- 1246 WP OFF. 14ND High altitude bombing attack coming in over Diamond Head.
- Unknown Cincpac To Rdo San Diego: Receive me on 26.1, transmit on 30.6 (cable to Navy radio San Diego) Via Globe.
- 1247 CURTISS To CPW2: All of our transmitters are out.
- 1247 Combatships To COLORADO: If vessels are not longer in service will furnish men and officers to ships in service to man complete anti-aircraft batteries for continuous watch.
- [88] 1248 Combasefor To Cominron TWO: Designate two DMS sweep approach to Pearl magnetic mines.
- 1255 GAMBLE Proceeded on course 270T at 20 knots to join friendly forces upon receipt of orders from Cincpac.
- 1300 ST. LOUIS To Comdesbatfor: ST. LOUIS, BLUE, LAMSON, PHELPS posit Lat 20.51 Long 158, course 275, speed 25K.
- Unknown Cincpac To CTF 8: Your 2206 Only nine arrived.
- [89] 1256 MTB SQUAD Out guarding 3445 voice sqdn. Comdrs. PT20, PT22, PT23, PT24. At dock guarding 3445 voice PT21. On dock at crane no power PT26, Pt28. Aboard RAMAPO underway PT27, Pt29, Pt30, PT42.



- 1258 Com 14 Four Japanese transports off Barbers Point.
- 1300 RALEIGH Reports tugs SUNNADIN and AVOCET came alongside and furnished light and power. One torpedo ran between bow of RALEIGH and stern of DETROIT, and apparently sank in shoal water at Ford Island without exploding. The following planes were destroyed, in which it is considered the RALEIGH contributed:
1. Bomber flying over stern stbd to port crashed on deck of CURTISS.
  2. Plane flew over bow from stbd to port and crashed near Pearl City.
  3. Plan flying north on our stbd beam crashed in water between DOBBIN and BALTIMORE.
  4. Plane off our stern flying over Air Station was hit by 3" shell and blown to pieces in air.
  5. Plane flying across our stern had tail blown off and fell over Pearl City.
- 1300 Comdesbatfor Own DD reports no enemy vessels off Barbers Point.
- 1300 CTF1 At 1300 join DETROIT course 210 speed 18 from point 51. (Action to ST. LOUIS)
- 1300 RAMSAY Jap ship four miles from Barbers Point. Two sampans further out. Parachute troops landing on North Shore. (Reported by VJ plane.)
- 1301 CPW 2 Search sector 220 to 230. Return. (Action to 12-VP-23)
- Unknown Comtrainron 8 ANTARES docked pier five afirm, Honolulu. Struck by several machine gun bullets but no damage to material or personnel.
- [90] 1302 Cinpac To CTF8: Radio bearings indicate AKAGI bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167°.
- 1303 CPW 2 To comsoron 6: Reported Jap rendezvous 223° 90 miles from Ford Island. Searcd to 200 miles sector 225 to 215.
- 1305 NAS Kaneohe Captured enemy chart has marked positions bearing 223 distant 90 miles from Pearl Harbor.
- 1309 Signal Tower DETROIT and PHOENIX are near Barbers Point. Signal Tower sees no transports.
- 1310 Combasefor To comtrainron 6; Com 14, Cominron 2: Sweep channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and Moored mines.
- 1312 HULPERT Army reports that four enemy transports off Barbers Point.
- 1312 ST LOUIS Am proceeding with three destroyers to attack Barbers Point. Speed two five position lat. 21-57 long 150-03.
- 1313 Combatships To NAS Pearl: for Capt. Bode CALIFORNIA urgently needs AA ammunition.
- 1317 Rdo Wakeup Signals intercepted and bearing true north believed to be enemy carrier by character of transmission.
- [91] 1319 FRANK By phone: Enemy sampan about to land at Naval ammunition Depot.
- FRANK Enemy landing party off shore Nanakul. Friendly planes firing at them.
- FRANK Op-1 Southeast enemy and friendly planes in dogfight.
- 1322 ——— Enemy naval attack coming in towards Barbers Point. Present position nine miles.
- 1322 Opnav To Mardet Tientsin, Com 15, Mardet AM Emb, Peiping Astnavatt Shanghai, Rdo Wake, Navatt Chungking, Johnston Is, Rdo Guam, Palmyra, Com 16, Rdo Tutuila, HOPKINS: This confirms air raid by Japan on Oahu at 1800 today followed by declaration of war by Japan against US and Great Britain.
- 1323 HELENA To Comerubatfor: Due contamination feed water cannot maintain underway status longer than 8 hours. During this time speed limited to 10 kts. Ready this condition on one hour notice F power for fire control limited to two diesel generators. View condition and to effect repairs recommend letting fires under all boilers die out.
- 1324 CTF8: UPSN Junction Task Force One and Eight. Propose send Crudiv FIVE to Pearl for fuel.
- 1328 MINNEAPOLIS Your 072234 (CincPacs) complying. Ref. # 12-299 Use plane to search sector 135 to 180 distance 154 miles from Pearl.
- CINCPAC To CTF8: DETROIT, PHOENIX, ST LOUIS, NEW ORLEANS fourteen destroyers and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you. Also MINNEAPOLIS and four minelayers ordered join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel.



- [92] 1330 ——— BOBOLINK's orders to sweep channel changed to sweeping approaches to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor. Arriving off Pearl it appeared all ships there were engaged in sweeping.
- 1331 CTF1 To Cincpac: Task Force ONE proceeding off Barbers Point Notify Army.
- 1333 CPW 1 To CPW 2: Request instructions for dawn patrol upon their return.
- 1337 CTF 3 To CTF2: My force INDIANAPOLIS and 5 DMs INDIANAPOLIS proceeding from JOHNSTON Island course 054 speed 25. Dog Mike Sail directed proceed Pearl for fuel and rejoin later.
- 1340 TENNESSEE Plane coming in on starboard beam. (Proved to be friendly).
- 1345 ——— CTF8 launched 9VSB's to cover sector 110-200T to 175 miles. One of latter reported contact with surface forces believed enemy including a carrier in position Lat 20-32 Long 158-16 and cruiser Lat 20-32 Long 158-40. Scout reported being attacked by VF's. No further radio contact established with scout. Scout landed later at Kaneohe, reports believed to have been in error.
- 1348 VIREO Received orders to report to Combasefor thence to West Loch to bring up 5'', 3'' and .50 M. G. Ammunition for CALIFORNIA.
- [93] 1330 Reports—7632 kcs (M) following calls: SIME; SISC: DASCHO: SUREMO, SAMORE, Sends following type of ... 095.45 085.42
- 1337 Bearing on SISC 170 S5
- 1341 Bearing on SAMORE 165
- 1344 Reports following mag . . . KISC to SIME Nr. 1 SIME 354. 56
- 1345 Reports SOSC Good bearing 7632 (M) 337.
- [94] 1351 Reports SISC calling SAMORE. S5 bearing 337. Very loud signal
- 1353 Reports bearing SAMEMU bearing 337.  
Following bearings: 7632 kcs (M) 0036—SUSU S5 340—7632 (M) 0040—SIME 336  
Following bearings: 7632 (M) 0054—bearing SISC 338 S.5—7050 (M) 0055—bearing SISC 338.5 S.5
- 1410 KANURE KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR 10 MINUTES"  
KANURE at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE FUEL"  
Someone on 7033 at 1247 said "HAVE NOT BE OPPOSED"  
SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM "SISC" at 1250  
"WHAT IS YOUR COURSE".  
RUS18 and YUNES believed to be Commander Carrier  
SUT12 believed to be a Carrier.  
SISORE is either another Comdr in the Air or Comdr Transport Group 1.  
SISO is Boss of SISORE.  
No further bearings of radio intelligence of the Striking Force until following day 8 December 1941.  
TRANSMISSION:
- 1450 SIME 010.01 I—HA°NKIARIYA  
ANSWER:  
2 HA°NKIARI  
BEARINGS—SAREMU 338 S. 4 on 7632 kcs (M)
- [95] 1410 WASMUTH rigges twin ship moored minesweep with USS ZANE, 400 fathoms of wire between ships, depressors at 5 fathoms, no floats. At 1547 entered Pearl Harbor entrance channel and sweep up channel to gate vessel, where wire parted. At 1620 anchored off Coal Dock and retrieved sweep gear. At 1628 underway. At 1635 the Captain returned aboard, Lieutenant Commander Agnew, USN, left and joined TREVER. Returned off harbor entrance and resumed patrol in company with Mindiv 4.
- 1412 GAMBLE Sighted sampan bearing 32° T.
- 1415 TENNESSEE Set condition ZED from Turret III, second deck, aft. Repair I, Unit 2, leading out fire hose to play water on WEST VIRGINIA. Received report that one of our destroyers sank jap submarine.
- 1426 BOBOLINK Passed sweep wire to TURKEY and commenced sweeping off Honolulu Harbor.

- 1435 GAMBLE Slowed to investigate but did not search, sampan position approximately 4 miles south of Barbers Point.
- 1455 VIREO While waiting for arrival of ammunition, towed ammunition lighter with 14" powder away from dock to decrease menace to explosion. Delivered ammunition to ARGONNE.
- 1500 TENNESSEE Report states that Wake Island had been bombed by 30 bombers. Ens. Kable still alive, Hudgeell dead; also Miller and Adams.
- [96] MIDWAY 1600 Via commercial Cable . . . . . "on 7073 — — — — — SISO 246 . . . . . Fair — — — — — SIME 245 Poor NAS Midway." Plane language: SASO V SAREMU #3 . . . . . A FU'KUMA YORI 150 to "30 MAIRU NEN 200 1115 . . . . .
- [97] 1505 DEWEY Underway and standing out of harbor.
- 1550 BOBOLINK Received orders from Commander Base Force to report 1010 dock immediately.
- 1551 TENNESSEE Repair 4—All outboard voids normal. All soundings normal. Received report that PENNSYLVANIA had been hit while in drydock. No. 2 machine gun repaired and in commission again.
- 1552 ——— CTF 12 given orders by CTF 8 to intercept and destroy possible enemy carriers operating south coast of Oahu. It was assumed after attacks enemy carriers would withdraw via Jaulit.
- 1628 GAMBLE Sighted smoke bomb off port bow.
- 1628 TENNESSEE Open up wardroom country and sleepy hollow. Fire on WEST VIRGINIA seems to be under control. Repair I cut off # 32 vent system; smoke coming down.
- 1630 ——— Task Force ONE just ordered by CTF 8 proceed and attack.
- 1631 GAMBLE Reports submarine surfaced.
- 1632 GAMBLE Fired one shot 4' gun and missed, short and to the left. Submarine displayed U. S. colors, and ceased firing. Submarine submerged and fired recognition red smoke bomb.
- [98] 1640 BOBOLINK While off dock 1010, received orders to assist NEVADA. Orders changed to go alongside CALIFORNIA.
- 1642 ——— Attack group of 16 VF, 18 VTB's and 4 VSB smokers launched by Comtaskforce EIGHT with no results. (VTB planes armed with torpedoes recovered after dark.) Six VF planes proceeded Pearl mistaken for unfriendly and four shot down.
- 1647 GAMBLE Proceeded West.
- 1647 TENNESSEE Told forward battle dressing station to send doctor and stretcher party to WEST VIRGINIA bridge to get Captain. Ship astern (ARIZONA) blew up. Two planes bearing 350°.
- 1655 WHITNEY Reports CASE left from alongside.
- 1659 TENNESSEE Engines ahead 1/3. Repairs 2 and 4;—send 2 rescue breathers each, and spare oxygen bottles to starboard side of WEST VIRGINIA quarterdeck.
- 1703 TENNESSEE Word received to stop main engines. Delivered 6 gas masks to WEST VIRGINIA.
- 1705 WHITNEY Reports TUCKER left from alongside.
- 1730 BOBOLINK Moored alongside WIDGEON next to CALIFORNIA for salvage purposes.
- [99] 1732 GAMBLE Sighted ENTERPRISE and exchanged calls. Instructed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to join ENTERPRISE.
- 1736 ——— Comairbatfor ordered GAMBLE to join that vessel as part of AS Screen.
- 1740 BOBOLINK Commenced pumping to continue through the night.
- 1744 GAMBLE Joined ENTERPRISE and took station as third ship with two other plane guard destroyers.
- 1755 PELIAS Moored at Berths S-11 and 12, Submarine Base, reports first attack was indicated by sound of machine gun fire directed at single engine Jap torpedo plane flying low over ship's bow. The plane launched a torpedo at ARIZONA which soon later burst into flames.
- 1755 TENNESSEE Plane bearing 345. Plane signalled with red light; did not understand meaning of signal.
- 1800 PENNSYLVANIA Reports complete replacement of ammunition effected.
- 1823 TENNESSEE Observed plane bearing about 300.
- 1833 TENNESSEE Plane bearing about 345 (Running lights on; believed friendly).

- [100] 1835 TENNESSEE Plane on port beam; running lights on.  
 1837 TENNESSEE Plane coming in from dead ahead; bright lights on it.  
 1838 TENNESSEE Plane bearing about 245.  
 1855 TENNESSEE ENTERPRISE planes approaching Oahu.  
 1900 TENNESSEE Plane bearing from dead ahead; running lights burning.  
 1953 TENNESSEE Word passed over loudspeaker "All men having hammocks in port hammock nettings remove them, and stow same inboard."  
 2100 TRACY Reports friendly planes with running lights were by AA batteries, but TRACY did not fire.  
 2100 TRACY Moored alongside CALIFORNIA and commenced salvage work.  
 2100 SICARD Observed 3 lighted planes, altitude 5000 approaching FORD ISLAND from South NEW ORLEANS Challenged without success and opened. Other ships followed too. SICARD checked fire considering planes were friendly. Other ships continued firing.  
 2110 VIREO Observed AA fire opened and planes shot down. Aviator fell astern of VIREO, was rescued and identified from ENTERPRISE. Dispatch was sent to inform control that ENTERPRISE planes were in air.

[1] Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,  
 L11-(1)/(50) (02019) U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 12, 1941.

*Secret*  
 From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
 Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.  
 References:

- (a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
- (b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
- (c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.

1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This amplified reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:

(a) *Battleships.*

ARIZONA sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.

CALIFORNIA sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft torpedoes; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

NEVADA damaged by heavy bombs, possible mine in the channel and aircraft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

OKLAHOMA capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.

PENNSYLVANIA slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been completed and ship is ready for service.

[2] MARYLAND damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss. Ship was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and is expected to be fully ready for service 13 December.

TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 2 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the ARIZONA fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the TENNESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.



*WEST VIRGINIA* sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

(b) *Cruisers*

*HELENA* damaged by bomb hit from frame 30, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 50 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine rooms flooded. Ship is now in drydock #2, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

*HONOLULU* damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side. Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock #1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully effective by 16 December.

[3] *RALEIGH* damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the *RALEIGH* following completion of the *HONOLULU* to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

(c) *Destroyers*

*CASSIN* and *DOWNES* damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of *PENNSYLVANIA*. Bomb hit *DOWNES* exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. *CASSIN* was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on *DOWNES*. *DOWNES* appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs to *CASSIN* will be forwarded later.

*SHAW* hit by bomb while docking on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will be forwarded later.

(d) *Auxiliary vessels.*

*OGLALA* sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ten dock at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded at a later date.

*UTAH* damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

*CURTISS* damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which destroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are [4] proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one amidships crane by 15 December.

*VESTAL* damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor, is undertaking repairs with own repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.

2. It is believed that the sinking of the *OKLAHOMA*, *NEVADA*, *CALIFORNIA* and *WEST VIRGINIA* is in large part due to the ships having been in condition *XRAY*. Had time been available to set condition *ZED* before receiving damage, progressive flooding might have been avoided.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:  
Buships  
Buord



[1] Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 21, 1941.

Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

Ship	Damage incurred and cause	Repairs proceeding and proposed
ARIZONA.....	Sunk at berth. Aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs exploding forward magazines.	Propose caisson the ship and make recommendation thereafter.
CALIFORNIA.....	Sunk at berth. Two or more aircraft torpedoes and one large bomb hit amidships causing fire. Part of A. A. battery still manned and available.	Propose caisson ships, repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Tow.)
MARYLAND.....	Bomb hit frame 14, penetrated and exploded, holing shell, decks and bulkheads forward of fr. 24.	NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Decks, bulkheads to be completed at NYPS.
NEVADA.....	Heavy bombs, aircraft torpedoes and possibly a mine in echannel. Beached across from Hospital Pt. A. A. batteries still manned and available.	Propose float ship (caisson may not be required), repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Tow.)
OKLAHOMA.....	Capsized at berth. Three or more aircraft torpedoes.	Propose right and float ship, (caisson may not be required) repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Tow.)
PENNSYLVANIA.....	Bomb hit starboard side boat deck.	Repairs completed.
TENNESSEE.....	One heavy bomb (dud) through turret top. One medium bomb aft cracked 14" gun. Fire aft 2nd deck due to heat from ARIZONA. Electrical circuits 2nd deck aft damaged by fire.	NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy and habitable. NYPS complete habilitation, renew 14" gun, and watertight integrity.
[2] WEST VIRGINIA.....	Sunk at berth. Four aircraft torpedoes and one heavy bomb hit. Considerable damage by fire.	Propose caisson ship. Repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Tow.)
HELENA.....	Forward fire and engine rooms flooded by aircraft torpedo. Some machinery badly damaged.	NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Propose return to NYMI for complete repairs. (On two shafts).
HONOLULU.....	Bomb. Near miss frame 40, port. Flooded five magazines and handling room II turret. Damaged electrical circuits in flooded spaces.	NYPH proceeding with complete repairs.
RALEIGH.....	One aircraft torpedo, and small bomb (dud) which penetrated three decks and ship's side aft. Forward engine room and forward firerooms flooded and damaged.	NYPH to make repairs to make seaworthy when HONOLULU is undocked. Propose return to NYMI (on 2 shafts) for complete repairs.
CASSIN.....	Drydock No. 1 ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedo warheads and causing serious fire. CASSIN knocked off blocks and fell over on DOWNES.	Propose upright, patch and float out CASSIN for possible repairs to return to full or limited service. Further recommendations later.
DOWNES.....		
SHAW.....	Bombed while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating dock badly damaged by fire.	Propose float and reconstruct forward part—return to mainland yard for complete repairs, possibly under own power.
OGLALA.....	Sunk by aircraft torpedo and possibly near miss by bomb.	Salvage doubtful. Recommendation later.
UTAH.....	Capsized and sunk by aircraft torpedoes.	Recommendations re salvage and repairs later.
[3] CURTISS.....	Enemy plane out of control flew into crane mast. One bomb exploded in hangar space. All radio equipment destroyed. Ship entirely seaworthy.	NYPH, replace radio and effect necessary repairs to hangar space.
VESTAL.....	Bomb hit aft, holing shell. Beached.	Repairs proceeding by own repair force. May not require docking.

[1] Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 20, 1941.

## (a) Disposition of task forces

## TASK FORCE ONE

Batdivs 2 and 4 (less COLORADO)-----	5	BB
Crudiv 9 (less BOISE)-----	4	CL
Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK)-----	17	DD
RALEIGH-----	1	OCL
OGLALA-----	1	OCM
Mindiv 1 (overhaul)-----	4	DM

*Disposition:* In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.

## TASK FORCE TWO

Batdiv 1-----	3	BB
Crudiv 5 (less PENSACOLA)-----	3	CA
Desrons 4 and 6-----	18	DD
DETROIT-----	1	OCL
ENTERPRISE-----	1	CV
Mindiv 2-----	4	DM

*Disposition:* At sea as Task Force EIGHT. In Port.

ENTERPRISE-----	Batdiv 1
Desron 6-----	Desron 4
Crudiv 5-----	DETROIT
	Mindiv 2

Position of Task Force EIGHT: 200 miles west of Pearl standing to eastward returning from landing VMP at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.

## TASK FORCE THREE

Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE)-----	7	CA
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10)-----	5	DD
Minron 2-----	13	DM
LEXINGTON-----	1	CV

[2] *Disposition:* At sea as Task Force TWELVE

## LEXINGTON

Crudiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA  
Desron 5 less Desdiv 10

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine VMSE's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats. MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea S. W. of Oahu—normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

## TASK FORCE SEVEN

At Midway-----	2	SS
At Wake-----	2	SS
At Mare Island-----	5	SS
At San Diego-----	4	SS
En route to Pearl-----	4	SS
At Pearl-----	5	SS
PELIAS-----	1	AS

TASK FORCE NINE

VP-21—At Midway. 7 searching 120-170 450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice	11
VP-11—4 hours notice	12
VP-12—30 minutes notice	6
4 hours notice	5
VP-14—In air (with depth charges)	3
30 minutes notice	3
4 hours notice	4
VP-22—4 hours notice	12
VP-23—4 hours notice	11
VP-24—4 in air conducting tactics with SS	4
on 30 minutes notice	1
	72
Overhauling	9
	81

[3] TANGIER—In port.  
 CURTISS—In port.  
 McFARLAND  
 HULBERT  
 THORNTON

All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage to the planes prevented.

MARINE PLANES

VMF 221—Wake	
VMSB 231—Enroute Midway LEXINGTON	
VMSB 232—Ewa 4 hours notice	18
VMJ 252—Ewa	2

BASE FORCE

ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.

Aircraft of Base Force

VJ-1— 9 J2F	Pearl
9 JRS	Pearl
VJ-2—10 J2F	Pearl
4 PBV-1	(2 at Johnston)
VJ-3— 1 J2V	Pearl
4 JRB	At Maui
1 JRF	
2 BT	

In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port and the submarine tender PELIAS.

The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.

(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on 15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. [4] This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
- (c) A combination of both.

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor, in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port. At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5"/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the Fleet would be operating during the day.

Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating with submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and recognition. They searched the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual [5] contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday morning.

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800, followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl" at 0812.

The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.

(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

The 4 PBY's operating with the submarines started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.

No plane in those areas searched saw anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief advised Task Force THREE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued as soon as enemy was located.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers



were in sight. This was later corrected to say the message should have been NOT in sight.

[6] In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223—90 miles from Pearl Harbor." These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat west by south of Pearl. At 1020, 15 VSB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7 PBV's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

Army—2 B-17  
         2 A-20A  
         3 B-18  
         3 B-17 095-165, 300 miles  
 Navy—4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles  
         2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles  
         3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles  
         4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

*Battleship & Cruiser Planes*

        6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles  
         9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles  
         6 J2F in westward sector

[7] The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jaluit, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jaluit.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes, shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in his area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible, too, that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.

[8] (h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows:

Task Force TWELVE— 18-30 N  
                                   168-40 W  
 Task Force EIGHT—128-50 N  
                                   158-50 W  
 Task Force ONE— 20-32 N  
                                   159-45 W

Task Force TWELVE was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a southeasterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston Island triangle was completely covered.

In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200 miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to seaward because of the small number of available planes.

(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.

#### *9 December*

On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S. S. W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150 mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.

After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.

Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.

[9] Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

300-010 500 miles 10 VP  
 010-060 300 miles 10 B-18  
 060-210 200 miles 18 VSO  
 210-030 300 miles 6 VJ  
                   and in the afternoon  
 330-020 4 Army B-20

The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.

EXHIBIT No 40.—(NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941

BATTLESHIPS

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
NEVADA.....	1477	75	No (enroute to ship).....	F. W. Scanland.
WEST VIRGINIA.....	1543	83	Yes (killed).....	M. S. Bennion.
MARYLAND.....	1548	75	Yes.....	D. C. Godwin.
CALIFORNIA.....	1548	75	No (enroute to ship).....	J. W. Bunkley.
ARIZONA.....	1507	81	Yes (killed).....	F. Valkenburgh.
TENNESSEE.....	1544	81	No (enroute to ship).....	C. E. Reordan.
PENNSYLVANIA (overhaul).....	1507	113	Yes.....	C. M. Cooke, Jr.
OKLAHOMA.....	1477	75	Yes.....	H. D. Bode.

	Marine enlisted	Officers
M. B. PH.....	472	13
MB NAS PH.....	100	2
Depot Supplies PH.....	34	2
N. A. Depot.....	166	3
6th Defense Bn.....	800	30

CRUISERS—HEAVY

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
NEW ORLEANS.....	914	41	No.....	Good.
SAN FRANCISCO.....			Yes.....	D. J. Callaghan.

CRUISERS—LIGHT

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
HELENA.....	981	41	Yes.....	R. H. English.
PHOENIX.....	975	41	Yes.....	
RALEIGH.....	623	0	Yes.....	R. B. Simons.
HONOLULU.....	975	41	Yes.....	H. Dodd.
SACRAMENTO.....	157			
ST. LOUIS.....	981	41	Yes.....	G. A. Rood.

DESTROYERS

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
HULL.....	150		Yes.....	R. F. Stout.
CASSIN.....			Yes.....	D. F. J. Shea.
HENLEY.....			No (enroute to ship).....	R. H. Smith.
BLUE.....			No (enroute to ship).....	H. N. Williams.
PATTERSON.....			No (enroute to ship).....	F. R. Walker.
DEWEY.....			Yes.....	A. J. Detzer.
BAGLEY.....			No (enroute to ship).....	G. A. Sinclair.
RALPH TALBOT.....			Yes.....	Ralph Earle, Jr.
JARVIS.....			No (enroute to ship).....	J. E. Topper.
REID.....			Yes.....	H. F. Pullen.
MUGFORD.....			Yes.....	E. W. Young.
HELM (being depermed).....			Yes.....	C. E. Carroll.
CASTOR.....			Yes.....	H. J. Wright.
HULBERT (in drydock).....			Yes.....	J. M. Lane.
DOWNES.....			No (enroute to ship).....	W. R. Thayer.
CONYNGHAM.....			Yes.....	H. C. Daniels.
MONAGHAN.....			Yes.....	W. P. Burford.
WASHMUTH.....			Yes.....	J. L. Willfong.
HENLEY.....			No (aboard TREV-OR).	R. H. Smith.
THORNTON.....			No.....	W. F. Kline.

# 1610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941—Continued*

## SUBMARINES

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
TAUTOG.....	54		No (enroute to ship)..	J. H. Willingham, Jr.
NARWHAL.....			No (enroute to ship)	C. W. Wilkins.
DOLPHIN.....			No (enroute to ship)	G. B. Rainer.
CACHALOT.....			Yes.....	W. N. Christensen.

## SUBMARINE TENDER

PELIAS.....	612		Yes.....	W. Wakefield.
WIDGEON.....			Yes.....	J. A. Flemiken.

## REPAIR SHIP

MEDUSA.....	720		Yes.....	A. E. Schrader.
VESTAL.....			Yes.....	C. Young.

## SUPPLY SHIP

ANTARES.....	193		Yes.....	L. C. Grannis.
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## HOSPITAL SHIP

SOLACE.....	390		No (enroute to ship)..	B. Perlman.
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## MINE LAYERS

OGLALA.....	320		No (enroute to ship)..	E. P. Speight.
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## OILER

RAMAPO.....	173		Yes.....	D. Curry, Jr.
NEOSHO.....	160		Yes.....	J. S. Phillips.

## DESTROYER TENDERS

WHITNEY.....	660		Yes.....	N. M. Pigman.
DOBBIN.....	660		Yes.....	H. E. Paddock.
RIGEL.....	557		No (enroute ship).....	R. Dudley.

## AIRPLANE TENDERS

AVOCET.....	63		Yes.....	W. C. Johnson, Jr.
SWAN (Under repairs).....			Yes.....	F. E. Hall.

## MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARY

SUMNER.....	206		Yes.....	I. W. Truitt.
UTAH.....	576	14	No (on authorized shore leave).	J. M. Steele.
PYRO.....	200		Yes.....	N. Vytacil.

## SEAPLANE TENDER

CURTISS.....	572		No (enroute to ship)..	H. S. Kendall.
--------------	-----	--	------------------------	----------------



Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941—Continued

MINE SWEEPERS

Name of ship	Navy	Marines	Captain on board	Name of captain
BOBOLINK.....	66	.....	Yes.....	J. L. Foley.
VIREO (upkeep).....		.....	Yes.....	F. J. Ilsemann.
TURKEY.....		.....	No (enroute to ship).....	T. F. Fowler.
TERN.....		.....	Yes.....	W. B. Pendleton.

OCEAN GOING TUG

ONTARIO.....	53	.....	Yes.....	F. C. Mayer.
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CARGO SHIP

CASTOR.....	183	.....	Yes.....	H. J. Wright.
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SEAPLANE TENDER (DESTROYER)

HULBERT.....	114	.....	Yes.....	J. M. Lane.
THORNTON.....		.....	No (enroute to ship).....	W. F. Kline.

MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON

MTB SQUADRON ONE.....	86	.....	No (enroute to boats).....	W. C. Specht.
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LIGHT MINE LAYERS

TRACY (undergoing overhaul).....		.....	No (enroute to ship).....	G. R. Phelan.
PRUITT (undergoing overhaul).....		.....	No (enroute to ship).....	E. W. Herron.
RAMSAY.....	132	.....	Yes.....	G. C. Simms.
TREVER.....		.....	Yes.....	D. M. Agnew.
MONTGOMERY.....		.....	Yes.....	R. A. Guthrie.
GAMBLE.....		.....	Yes.....	D. A. Crandell.
ZANE.....		.....	Yes.....	L. M. LeHardy.
BREESE.....		.....	Yes.....	H. F. Stout.
PREBLE.....		.....	Yes.....	H. D. Johnston.
SICARD (undergoing overhaul).....		.....	No (enroute ship).....	W. C. Schultz.

The following Flag and Commanding Officers were killed in action on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor:

U. S. S. *ARIZONA*: Rear Admiral Isaac C. KIDD, USN—Dead.

Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, USN—Missing.

U. S. S. *WEST VIRGINIA*: Captain Mervyn S. BENNION, USN—Dead.



# 1612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## EXHIBIT No. 41 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

ON20/A9-7/

DECEMBER 17, 1941.

*Daily report of offenses committed ashore on Saturday, December 6, 1941.*

Name <sup>1</sup> and rate	Ship	Offense	Remarks
ARRESTED BY SHORE PATROL			
-----, S2c-----	BLUE-----	Dis. ord. conduct-----	Arrested 0020. Report made. Returned via SP wagon.
-----, EM3c-----	OGLALA-----	Dis. ord. conduct-----	Arrested 0020. Do.
-----, S2c-----	ARIZONA-----	Drunkenness-----	Arrested 2020. Do.
-----, F1c-----	RIGEL-----	AOL-----	Arrested 0210. Do.
-----, S2c-----	SUMNER-----	AOL-----	Arrested 0220. Do.
-----, Y3c-----	BLUE-----	AOL-----	Arrested 0220. Do.
-----, MM2c-----	BLUE-----	AOL-----	Arrested 0220. Do.
-----, S2c-----	RIGEL-----	AOL-----	Arrested 0210. Do.

ARRESTED BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES—NONE

CASES PENDING—PREVIOUSLY REPORTED—NONE

<sup>1</sup>Names omitted.

/s/ A. E. FREED,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Senior Patrol Officer.

Orig: Combasefor.  
Copy: Cincpac  
Combatfor  
Comscofor  
Com 14

Certified to be a true copy.

HUNTER ROBINSON,  
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

No. 41

SHORE PATROL HEADQUARTERS  
Honolulu, T. H., December 17, 1941.

ON20/P16-4/nhn  
(2910)

Daily report of offenses committed ashore on Sunday, December 7

Name <sup>1</sup> and rate	Ship	Offense	Remarks
ARRESTED BY SHORE PATROL			
_____, Mattlc.....	HONOLULU.....	Disor. cond.....	Arrested 0030. Report made.
_____, Mattlc.....	N. ORLEANS.....	Drunk.....	Returned via SP wagon.
_____, Mattlc.....	N. ORLEANS.....	Affray; A&B; drunk.....	Arrested 0030. Do.
_____, Sea2c.....	CALIFORNIA.....	Affray; A&B; drunk.....	Arrested 0030. Do.
_____, SM3c.....	AYLWIN.....	Possession of another man's liberty card; breaking arrest.	Arrested 0045. Do.
_____, Flc.....	TAUTOG.....	AOL.....	Arrested 0245. Do.
_____, Flc.....	PHELPS.....	AOL; improp. uniform.....	Arrested 0425. Do.
_____, Flc.....	PHELPS.....	AOL; tampered liberty card.....	Arrested 0455. Do.
_____, AMM1c.....	NAS, PH.....	AOL.....	Arrested 0455. Do.
ARRESTED BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES			
_____, RM3c.....	NAS, PH.....	AOL due to previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor.	Arrested 1830. Do.
_____, RM3c.....	VJ-I, PH.....	AOL.....	Arrested 0345. Do.
_____, S1c.....	NAS, PH.....	AOL.....	Arrested 0345. Do.

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

ACTION TAKEN BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES

The above named men were released to the Navy for disposition. They were returned to their station via shore patrol wagon.

CASES PENDING—PREVIOUSLY REPORTED—NONE.

A. E. FREED,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Senior Patrol Officer.

Orig: Combasfor  
Copy: Cincpac  
Combatfor  
Comcofor  
Com 14

SHORE PATROL HEADQUARTERS,  
Honolulu, T. H., December 17, 1941.

ON20/P16-4/nhn  
(2910)

Daily report of offenses committed ashore on Monday, December 8, 1941

Name <sup>1</sup> and Rate	Ship	Offense	Remarks
ARRESTED BY SHORE PATROL			
_____, Sgt.....	MARBRKS, PH.....	AOL due to previous indulgence in alcoholic liquor.	Arrested 0300. Report made. Returned via SP wagon.
_____, Sealc.....	NAS, PH.....	AWOL.....	Arrested 2115. Do.
_____, Sealc.....	NAS, PH.....	AWOL.....	Arrested 2115. Do.

ARRESTED BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES—NONE  
CASES PENDING—PREVIOUSLY REPORTED—NONE

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

A. E. FREED,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Senior Patrol Officer.

Orig: Combasfor  
Copy: Cincpac  
Combatfor  
Comscofor  
Com 14

OLD NAVAL STATION, HONOLULU, T. H.,  
Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Commander A. E. Freed, U. S. Navy----- Senior Patrol Officer

## OFFICERS HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

Lieut-Comdr. H. R. Robinson, USNR-----	Patrol Executive Officer
Lieut-Comdr. D. C. Johnson, USN-----	Beach Guard Officer
Lieutenant L. Roedel, USN-----	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieutenant W. H. Cheney, jr., USN-----	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieutenant E. H. Morris, USNR-----	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieutenant R. M. Nixon, USN-----	Beach Guard Officer
Lieutenant A. L. Benedict, jr., USNR-----	Beach Guard Officer
Lieut. (jg) P. C. Gail, USNR-----	Patrol Watch Officer
Captain W. A. Maguire, (ChC), USN-----	Patrol Chaplain
Lieutenant C. H. Coggins, (MC), USN-----	Patrol Medical Officer
Lieut (jg) P. J. Ritchie, (MC), USN-----	Patrol Medical Officer
Ensign W. S. Seward, SC-V(P), USNR-----	Patrol Disbursing Officer

## ENLISTED PERSONNEL, HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

Same as December 5, 1941.

0000-0600, December 6, 1941.

0020 Secured temporary patrol.

0020 "-----",<sup>1</sup> Sea2c, USS BLUE, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with DISORDERLY CONDUCT; Patrol Report No. 2032.

0020 "-----", EM3c, USS OGLALA, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with DISORDERLY CONDUCT; Patrol Report No. 2038.

0200 Patrol Watch Officer made routine tour of downtown area.

0600-1200, December 6, 1941.

0900 Mustered Headquarters Detachment—no unauthorized absentees.

1000 "-----", WT2c, USS PREBLE, completed duty with Headquarters Detachment. Transferred to Naval Hospital, P. H., for treatment, diagnosis Du (Angina, Vincent's).

1100 Senior Patrol Officer made inspection of Old Naval Station and Shore Patrol personnel.

1200-1800, December 6, 1941.

1230 Temporary patrol reported—mustered and posted in accordance with attached watch list. 69 temporary patrol.

1300 Special patrol of eight men reported for duty at football game at Honolulu Stadium.

1340 Lieutenant "-----", USN, USS WEST VIRGINIA, reported for duty with Headquarters Detachment.

1745 Special patrol at Honolulu Stadium secured.

1800-2400, December 6, 1941.

1900 "-----", MM2c, USS PREBLE, reported for duty with Headquarters Detachment. Detailed to duty as a post patrolman.

2020 "-----", Sea2c, USS ARIZONA, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with DRUNKENNESS; Patrol Report No. 2040.

Made routine inspection of all posts and areas during watch.

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.



Minor Offenses <sup>1</sup>

<i>Absence over Leave</i>		<i>Time</i>	
"-----"	F1c—RIGEL-----	0210	PR # M2037
"-----"	Sea2c—SUMNER-----	0220	PR # M2036
"-----"	Y3c—BLUE-----	0220	PR # M2035
"-----"	MM2c—BLUE-----	0220	PR # M2034
"-----"	Sea2c—RIGEL-----	0210	PR # M2033
<i>Staggerers</i>		<i>Time</i>	
"-----"	PhM3c—NAVHOSP, PH-----	0030	# 7350
"-----"	MM1c—MARYLAND-----	0030	# 7351
"-----"	PhM2c—NAVHOSP, PH-----	0030	# 7352
"-----"	CCStd—ZANE-----	0030	# 7353
"-----"	GM3c—HELENA-----	0045	# 7354
"-----"	AM1c—DETROIT-----	0815	# 7357
"-----"	Cpl—MARBRKS, PH-----	1645	# 7358
"-----"	Sea2c—PELIS-----	1615	# 7359
"-----"	Sea1c—PYRO-----	1615	# 7360
"-----"	MM1c—MARYLAND-----	1900	# 7361
"-----"	Matt1c—MEDUSA-----	1930	# 7362
"-----"	BM2c—PRUITT-----	1905	# 7363
"-----"	Sea1c—W. VIRGINIA-----	1940	# 7364
"-----"	Sea2c—ARIZONA-----	2020	# 7365
"-----"	Sea1c—PHOENIX-----	2130	# 7366
"-----"	RM2c—JARVIS-----	2130	# 7367
"-----"	SM3c—W. VIRGINIA-----	2200	# 7368
"-----"	SF2c—PYRO-----	2145	# 7369
"-----"	F2c—ARIZONA-----	2145	# 7370
"-----"	SK2c—MARYLAND-----	2200	# 7371
"-----"	Pvt.—MARBRKS, PH-----	2230	# 7372
"-----"	Sea1c—PHOENIX-----	2200	# 7373
"-----"	Sea2c—MARYLAND-----	2230	# 7374
"-----"	BM2c—ALLEN-----	2245	# 7375
"-----"	Sea1c—RAMAMPO-----	2245	# 7376
"-----"	HA2c—Mobile Hosp. Aiea-----		# 7377
"-----"	Matt2c—OKLAHOMA-----	2305	# 7378
"-----"	Sea2c—HELM-----	2245	# 7379
"-----"	Sea2c—RALEIGH-----	2215	# 7380
"-----"	F2c—MARYLAND-----	2305	# 7381
"-----"	Y1c—W. VIRGINIA-----	2330	# 7382
"-----"	MM1c—CALIFORNIA-----	2330	# 7383
"-----"	BM2c—MARYLAND-----	2330	# 7384
"-----"	SK1c—WASMUTH-----	2300	# 7385
"-----"	MM1c—THORNTON-----	2315	# 7386
"-----"	OC2c—JARVIS-----	2300	# 7387
"-----"	Pfc.—MARBRKS, PH-----	2345	# 7388
"-----"	CEM—R. TALBOT-----	2330	# 7389
"-----"	GM3c—MARYLAND-----	2345	# 7390
"-----"	Cox—OKLAHOMA-----	2400	# 7391

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

	<i>Serious offenses</i>	<i>Minor offenses</i>
For 6 December 1941-----	3	45
For December 1941-----	37	202
For 1941-----	2, 967	10, 502
Prophylaxis Treatments: 8.		
First Aid Treatments: 5.		

A. E. FREED,  
 Commander, U. S. Navy,  
 Senior Patrol Officer.

## OLD NAVAL STATION

HONOLULU, T. H.

Sunday, December 7, 1941.

Commander A. E. Freed, U. S. Navy----- Senior Patrol Officer.

## OFFICERS HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

Lieut-Comdr. H. R. Robinson, USNR-----	Patrol Executive Officer.
Lieut-Comdr. D. C. Johnson, USN-----	Beach Guard Officer.
Lieutenant L. Roedel, USN-----	Patrol Watch Officer.
Lieutenant W. H. Cheney, Jr., USN-----	Patrol Watch Officer.
Lieutenant E. H. Morris, USNR-----	Patrol Watch Officer.
Lieutenant A. L. Benedict, Jr., USN-----	Beach Guard Officer.
Lieutenant R. M. Nixon, USN-----	Beach Guard Officer.
Lieut. (jg) P. C. Gail, USNR-----	Patrol Watch Officer.
Captain W. A. Maguire, (ChC), USN-----	Patrol Chaplain.
Lieutenant C. H. Coggins, (MC), USN-----	Patrol Medical Officer.
Lieut. (jg) P. J. Ritchie, (MC), USN-----	Patrol Medical Officer.
Ensign W. S. Seward, SC-V(P), USNR-----	Patrol Disbursing Officer.

## ENLISTED PERSONNEL, HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

Same as December 6, 1941.

0000-0600, December 7, 1941.

0015 Secured temporary patrol.

0030 -----, <sup>1</sup> Matt1c, USS HONOLULU, was arrested by Shore Patrol charged with DISORDERLY CONDUCT; DRUNKENNESS; Patrol Report No. 2041.

0030 -----, Matt2c, USS NEW ORLEANS, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with AFFRAY; ASSAULT AND BATTERY; DRUNKENNESS; Patrol Report No. 2042.

0030 -----, Matt1c, USS NEW ORLEANS, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with AFFRAY; ASSAULT AND BATTERY; DRUNKENNESS; Patrol Report No. 2043.

0045 -----, Sea2c, USS CALIFORNIA, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with POSSESSION OF ANOTHER MAN'S LIBERTY CARD; BREAKING ARREST; Patrol Report No. 2044.

0215 -----, Sealc, NAS, Kaneohe Bay, was arrested by Civil Police, charged with MALICIOUS CONVERSION; Patrol Report No. 2039.

0300 Lieutenant Commander Doir C. Johnson, USN, USS WEST VIRGINIA, completed duty with Headquarters Detachment.

0410 Patrol Watch Officer made routine tour of down town area.

0600-1200, December 7, 1941.

0845 BEACH GUARD notified Old Naval Station that Pearl Harbor was undergoing surprise attack by Japanese Forces. All Shore Patrol personnel were ordered to report to Old Naval Station immediately.

0900 The Senior Patrol Officer took charge at Old Naval Station. All Shore Patrol were directed to round up Navy personnel and supervise their transportation to Pearl Harbor. One officer and ten men were ordered to report to the Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Department, for emergency duty with civil police. Marine sentry post at Pier No. 5(a) was doubled. Double Naval and Marine sentries were posted about the Station.

0900 ----- Y1c, USS CALIFORNIA, attached to Battle Force Chaplain, reported for duty with Headquarters Detachment.

0900 FELNER, Theodore H., CTC, USS INDIANAPOLIS, reported for duty with Headquarters Detachment. FELNER is Admiral's car driver, Commander Scouting Force.

1000 Lieutenant Arthur L. Benedict, Jr., USN, USS TENNESSEE, completed duty with Headquarters Detachment.

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

- 1000 Lieutenant R. M. Nixon, USN, USS WEST VIRGINIA, completed duty with Headquarters Detachment.
- 1100 Despatched a Bus to Aloa Park to transport Civil Workers to Ammunition Depot, Lua-lualei. Shore Patrol Detail was posted at Oahu Rail Road Depot to assist in loading of Navy Yard workmen returning to Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
- 1100 A flight of five (5) enemy planes came over the station from a southerly direction. Two light bombs, of 50 to 75 pounds, were dropped, one in the vicinity of Fort Armstrong and one near the floating dry-dock at the foot of Kakaako Street, on the Waikiki side of Old Naval Station. Damage at Fort Armstrong is not known. Black smoke rose for about 15 minutes from the vicinity of the dry-dock. The damage is believed to have been slight. The planes were flying at a high altitude, at least 6000 feet. No casualties to personnel or material occurred at the Old Naval Station as a result of this enemy action.

1200-1800, December 7, 1941.

- 1215 Mrs. Gastuland, wife of Navy Lieutenant at 1234 So. Beretania, St., telephoned that Japanese was creating a disturbance in the vicinity of her home. Investigated and found no trace of trouble reported.
- 1215 Despatched one officer and 6 men with two trucks to secure arms and ammunition from Commander Base Force.
- 1300 Returned all temporary patrolmen to Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
- 1445 Ammunition Party returned with 68 rifles .30 caliber, 7 automatic pistols .45 caliber together with 7 cases of rifle ammunition and 5 cases of pistol ammunition.
- 1500 REEDY, Henry C., QM1c, USS CALIFORNIA, temporary patrolman, returned to Old Naval Station from Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, remained on duty with Shore Patrol.
- 1600 Established Old Naval Station on War Basis, arrangements for emergency quarters of all Shore Patrol at Old Naval Station. Arranged to furnish 1/3 of the Shore Patrol in each of three eight hour watches daily in cooperation with Civil Police.
- 1745 Blacked-out Old Naval Station.

1800-2400, December 7, 1941.

- 1830 ——— AMM1c, NAS, PH, was arrested by Shore Patrol charged with ABSENT OVER LEAVE DUE TO PREVIOUS INDULGENCE IN ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR; Patrol Report No. 2054.
- 1900 ——— CGM, Reported to Navy Shore Patrol. ——— was unable to return to his ship (USS OKLAHOMA), and was retained on Shore Patrol Duty pending further instructions.
- 1900 ——— CBM, USSS MC FARLAND, reported to Navy Shore Patrol, ——— was unable to return to his ship, and was retained on Shore Patrol Duty pending further instructions.

*Minor Offenses*<sup>1</sup>

<i>Absent over Leave</i>	<i>Time</i>	
———, SM3c—AYLWIN-----	.0245	PR #M2046
———, Sea1c—NAS, PH-----	.0345	PR #M2052
———, RM3c—VJ-1, NAS, PH-----	.0345	PR #M2051
———, RM3c—NAS, PH-----	.0345	PR #M2050
———, F1c—TAUTOG-----	.0425	PR #M2047
———, F1c—PHELPS-----	.0445	PR #M2049
———, F1c—PHELPS-----	.0445	PR #M2048
<i>Staggerers</i>		
———, CTM—DOBBIN-----	.0030	# 7392
———, Sea1c—W. VIRGINIA-----	.0030	# 7393
———, F2c—ST. LOUIS-----	.0030	# 7394
———, Sea2c—NEVADA-----	.0045	# 7395
———, F1c—CURTISS-----	.0030	# 7396
———, CWT—PHELPS-----	.0105	# 7397
———, GM3c—ARIZONA-----	.0030	# 7398
———, BM2c—NEVADA-----	.0030	# 7399

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

Minor Offenses—Continued

<i>Staggerers</i>	<i>Time</i>	
_____, Sea1c—CURTISS_____	0015	#7400
_____, GEM—NAVHOSP, PH_____	0145	#7801
_____, Sea2c—BAGLEY_____	0145	#7802
_____, WT2c—SEC. BASE, HICK_____	0030	#7803
_____, Cpl—MARBRKS, PH_____	0200	#7804
_____, Cpl—MARBRKS, PH_____	0010	#7805
_____, Pfc—NAS, PH_____	0030	#7806
_____, Cox—SCHLEY_____	0520	#7807
_____, Cpl—MARBRKS, PH_____	0100	#7808

	<i>Serious offenses</i>	<i>Minor offenses</i>
For 7 December 1941_____	6	24
For December 1941_____	43	226
For 1941_____	2, 973	10, 526

Prophylaxis Treatments: 0.  
First Aid Treatment: 3.

A. E. FREED,  
Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Senior Patrol Officer.

OLD NAVAL STATION, HONOLULU, T. H.,  
Monday, December 8, 1941.

Commander A. E. Freed, U. S. Navy\_\_\_\_\_ Senior Patrol Officer

OFFICERS HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

Lieut-Comdr. H. R. Robinson, USNR_____	Patrol Executive Officer
Lieutenant L. Roedel, USN_____	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieutenant W. H. Cheney, jr., USN_____	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieutenant E. H. Morris, USNR_____	Patrol Watch Officer
Lieut (jg) P. C. Gail, USNR_____	Patrol Watch Officer
Captain W. A. Maguire, (ChC), USN_____	Patrol Chaplain
Lieutenant C. H. Coggins, (MC), USN_____	Patrol Medical Officer
Lieut (jg) P. J. Ritchie, (MC), USN_____	Patrol Medical Officer
Ensign W. S. Seward, SC-V(P), USNR_____	Patrol Disbursing Officer

ENLISTED PERSONNEL, HEADQUARTERS

Same as December 7, 1941.  
0000-0600, December 8, 1941.

0000 Posted watch—Second Section.

0300 \_\_\_\_\_, <sup>1</sup>Sgt, MARINE BARRACKS, P. H., was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with ABSENT OVER LEAVE DUE TO PREVIOUS INDULGENCE IN ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR; Patrol Report No. 2055.

0600-1200, December 8, 1941.

0800 Posted watch—Third Section.

0900 \_\_\_\_\_, MM2c, USS BREESE reported to Shore Patrol from emergency leave, retained on duty with Shore Patrol.

1015 \_\_\_\_\_, WT2c, USS PREBLE, reported to Shore Patrol after being released from treatment at Naval Hospital, P. H., \_\_\_\_\_ retained on duty with Shore Patrol.

1200-1800, December 8, 1941.

1600 Posted watch—First Section.

1900 \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, USS DOBBIN, reported to the Shore Patrol, unable to return to his ship. \_\_\_\_\_ was retained on duty with Shore Patrol.

2115 \_\_\_\_\_, Sea1c, NAS, PH, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE; Patrol Report No. 2056.

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.



2115 \_\_\_\_\_, Sea1c, NAS, PH, was arrested by Shore Patrol, charged with ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE; Patrol Report No. 2057.

MINOR OFFENSES—None.

	<i>Serious offenses</i>	<i>Minor offenses</i>
For 8 December 1941-----	3	0
For December 1941-----	46	226
For 1941-----	2, 976	10, 526

Prophylaxis Treatments: 0<sup>2</sup>  
First Aid Treatments: 1.

A. E. FREED,  
*Commander, U. S. Navy,*  
*Senior Patrol Officer.*

EXHIBIT No. 42 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

*List of shore patrol reports of offenses committed by commissioned officer personnel of the Fleet, 1 April-18 December 1941*

Name and rank <sup>1</sup>	Ship	Offense	Remarks	Date
_____, Ens., USN...	DAVIS.....	Mal. Conversion.....	Appropriating for own use 1 Dodge express truck. Had been drinking but passed intoxication test.	12 April
_____, Lt., USN...	Snbron-4	Attempted Suicide...	Slashing left wrist with razor blade.	5 June
_____, Lieut. Comdr, USN	JARVIS.....	Drunkenness.....	Dressed in sloppy civilian shirt, trousers and no hat.	14 June
_____	ENTERPRISE..	Scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals. Under the influence of intoxicating liquor.	Running around a beach hotel in the nude.	28 June
_____, Lieut., USN.	DOBBIN.....	Operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.		19 Sept.

OFFENSES COMMITTED BY RESERVE OFFICER PERSONNEL

_____, Lt. (jg), USNR.	DAVIS.....	Drunkenness.....	Passing out on counter in a restaurant.	1 June
_____, Lieut., USNR	SIRIUS.....	Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.	Bathing in the nude...	17 June
_____, Lieut. (jg), USNR.	RICHMOND...	Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Under the influence of intoxicating liquor.	Disorderly conduct in a cafe.	29 June
_____, Ensign, USNR	ENTERPRISE..	Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Drunkenness.	Breaking a glass in a bar. Slapping a barmaid on the buttocks.	23 August
_____, Ensign, USNR.	SARATOGA...	Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Drunkenness.	Violation of Section 6140, Rules & Laws of Hawaii. Annoying a female.	5 Oct.
_____, Ensign, USNR.	CHESTER.....	Under the influence of intoxicating liquor.	Striking a pedestrian while driving an automobile.	24 Nov.
_____, Lieut., USNR.	DOBBIN.....	Disorderly person. Drunk. Disrespectful language and deportment to shore patrol officer.	Attempting to force his way into an automobile for passage.	30 Nov.
_____, Ensign, USNR.	OGLALA.....	Drunkenness. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.	Disorderly conduct on a public street; using improper language and wearing improper uniform.	18 Dec.

<sup>1</sup> Names omitted.

## EXHIBIT No. 43 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 43 consists of copies of radar plots furnished the Commission by Admiral Bellinger which will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 50, 51, 52, and 53, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

## EXHIBIT No. 44 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 44 consists of photographs taken during the attack at Kaneohe Bay and thereafter, indicating damage done at the field. These photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 54 through 84, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission. The identifying data with respect to each item follows.)

- Item 54. KNOE 122, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Pulling partially burned plane from center of fire area
- Item 54. KNOE 121, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Salvage attempts prior to bombing
- Item 55. KNOE 120, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Attempt to salvage one plane after first attack. Plane later sunk by second machine-gun attack
- Item 57. KNOE 119, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Rescue operations after first attack and before bombing
- Item 58. KNOE 118, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Attempt at salvage after machine-gun attack at Kaneohe, December 7, 1941, by Japanese
- Item 59. KNOE 117, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Salvage and rescue operations prior to bombing
- Item 60. KNOE 116, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. PBY-5 on fire from machine-gun attack
- Item 61. KNOE 115, December 7, 1941, United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Salvage of planes prior to bombing of December 7, 1941, by Japanese
- Item 62. KNOE 114, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Burning planes after first attack
- Item 63. KNOE 113, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Planes burning prior to bombing but after attack by fighters with incendiary machine-gun fire
- Item 64. KNOE 123, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Smoldering planes immediately prior to bombing
- Item 65. KNOE 124, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Burning planes after first attack
- Item 66. KNOE 125, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Bluejacket killed during attack by Japanese, December 7, 1941
- Item 67. KNOE 126, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Hastily constructed machine-gun nest after attack by Japanese, December 7, 1941

- Item 68. KNOE 127, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Hangar burning after bombing
- Item 69. KNOE 128, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Burning hangar after bombing attack
- Item 70. KNOE 129, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Effect of bombing
- Item 71. KNOE 130, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Hangar and planes after bombing attack, December 7, 1941
- Item 72. KNOE 131, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Hangar burning after bombing attack, December 7, 1941
- Item 73. KNOE 132, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Bomb crater on apron
- Item 74. KNOE 133, December 7, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Result of bomb landing just inside the hangar door in attack by Japanese, December 7, 1941
- Item 75. KNOE 134, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Station fire truck suffered almost direct hit by bomb
- Item 76. KNOE 135, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. PBY's after bombing attack
- Item 77. KNOE 136, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Planes being repaired after bombing and fire, December 7, 1941
- Item 78, KNOE 137, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Hangar after bombing attack and subsequent fire
- Item 79, KNOE 138, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Preparing graves for mass burial at Kaneohe of 15 officers and men who perished in bombing attack, December 7, 1941
- Item 80, KNOE 139, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Funeral services for 15 officers and men at Kaneohe, December 8, 1941, who perished during bombing by Japanese, December 7, 1941
- Item 81, KNOE 140, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Firing volley over bodies of 15 officers and men who perished in attack on Kaneohe by Japanese, December 7, 1941
- Item 82, KNOE 141, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Funeral for 15 officers and men at Kaneohe, December 8, 1941. Died in attack on Kaneohe by Japanese, December 7, 1941
- Item 83, KNOE 142, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Funeral for Japanese lieutenant who crashed on Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, during bombing attack. Thought to have been damaged by friendly plane in battle over Honolulu and made Kaneohe before fire in plane caused crash
- Item 84, KNOE 143, December 8, 1941. United States Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H. Taps for 15 officers and men killed in bombing attack on Kaneohe, December 7, 1941
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## EXHIBIT No. 45 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

*Mailgram*

From: (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District). Naval Base Defense Officer

Date: 7 March 1941

Mailed At: Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Time: 1010

Action to: CinCPac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & type commanders, Com-  
patwing 2, dist. Mar. officer, Capt. Yard, C. O.'s dist activities & units as per  
distribution list of C. B. D. O. operation plan No. 1-41 with annexes A, B,  
C, D & E.

*Confidential*

In accordance CinCPac confidential memorandum 1CM-41 of 25 February 1941  
naval base defense officer's operation plan No. 1-41 serial ND14 (0164) of 27  
February 1941 together with annexes A, B, C, D, and E effective at 1800 March  
10. Reference annex B Defense Air Force assume readiness condition three  
less bombs and ComPatWing TWO order scattering as necessary. Annex D  
harbor control post assume readiness condition three.

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.*

*Commander Naval Base Defense Force*

*(Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist).*

## HEADQUARTERS,

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,

*Pearl Harbor, T. H., 27 February 1941.*

File

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)

*Confidential*

Operation Plan No. 1-41

## TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)

*Destroyer Patrol* (2 DD)

Outer—1 DD

Inner—1 DD

Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)

Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)

A/B Boom

Mine Sweepers—Magnetic (KEOSAUQUA, YS-86) Anchored (Mine  
Force and Base Force Detail)

- (b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commander Patrol Wing Tw). In conjunction  
with Army.

- (c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer). In conjunction with  
Army.

- (d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer). In conjunction with  
Army.

1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No.  
CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1  
CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal  
Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be estab-  
lished as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order  
to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval  
Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to  
coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills;  
to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.



*Assumptions.*

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

(3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effect in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "B".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense.* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

(x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E". (2) Use zone plus ten and one half time. (3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH,  
*Naval Base Defense Officer,*  
*(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).*

*Annexes:*

- A. Inshore Patrol Plan
- B. Base Defense Air Force Plan
- C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan
- D. Harbor Control Post Plan
- E. Communication Plan.

Distribution—complete with Annexes.

- CinCPAC (10)
- CG HD (20)
- Dist. Marine Officer 14ND
- Operations Officer 14ND
- Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND

Distribution-complete with Annexes—Continued

Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL  
 District Intelligence Officer 14ND  
 NTS 14ND (10)  
 CO NAS PHTH (5)  
 CO SUBBASE PHTH (5)  
 COMAIRSCOFOR (8)  
 CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)  
 COMBATFOR (15)  
 COMSCOFOR (15)  
 Combatships (17)  
 COMCRUBATFOR (25)  
 COMAIRBATFOR (50)  
 COMDESBATFOR (165)  
 COMINBATFOR (20)  
 COMCRUSCOFOR (25)  
 COMSUBSCOFOR (40)  
 COMPATWINGTWO (20)  
 COMBASEFOR (75)  
 COMDR. 2ND. MAR AIR GRP (10)  
 COMDESDIV 80 (05)

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*Mailgram*

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H. 280001 June 1941.

Action to:

Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders and Type Commanders  
 Compatwing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer Capt. yard, C. O.'s Dist. Activities and  
 Units as per distribution list of N. B. D. O. Operation plan No. 1-41 with  
 annexes A, B, C, D, and E.

Information:

Cincpac  
 Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

*Confidential*

In accordance with paragraph (X) of naval base defense officer operation plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of annex A (I. S. P. No. A-1-41 dated 25 June 1941) is issued in replacement of annex A dated 3 March 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,*  
*Commander Naval Base Defense Force*  
*(Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

J. W. Bays,  
 J. W. BAYS,  
*Aide to Commandant.*

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[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14  
 (0563)

*Confidential*

ANNEX "A," REVISED, TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN NO. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS,  
 NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

*Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A-1-41*

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol:* Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEX, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line:* Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol*: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEY.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer*: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combbasefor.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat

(2) *East Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat

(4) *West Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat

(d) *A/B Boom*: Lieut. Spear. Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft*:

(1) NAMEC Division: Lieut. Comdr. C. D. Hine, D-O, USNR REEDBIRD, CON-DOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBILL.

(2) YS-86: C. O. Towing Vessel.

KEOSANQUA and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1-41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)", are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*."

"The *OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (OAHU D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:

KEAHI POINT	-----	Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI	-----	Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION	}-----	Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
KAHUKU POINT		

"The *Outer Harbor Area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries". (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONOLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"The *Harbor Channel Area* is the water area which lies between the *Outer Harbor Area* and the *Inner Harbor Area*, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor".

"The *Inner Harbor Area* is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor".

[3] 2. This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D.C.A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2760 kcs. (2792 in peace time).

Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D.C.A.) as ordered.

(Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys.

Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised).

Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness:

Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. -

(If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) *A/B Boom* to be maintained and operated at present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(e) *Minecraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operations, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant, Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, "Clear" to mean "The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed".

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of available vessels:

(a) (1) *Picket Line*.

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol*.

(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6-40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base Defense Communication Plan, Annex E.

Use zone time plus ten and one half.

Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

G. B. Woolley,

G. B. WOOLLEY.

Commander, U. S. N. (Ret).

Commander Inshore Patrol.

Fourteenth Naval District.

J. W. Bays,

J. W. BAYS,

*Aide to Commandant.*

Distribution:

Same as Basic Plan.



[1] File A-16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0563)

*Confidential*

HEADQUARTERS,  
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
26 June, 1941.

## ADDENDUM I TO ANNEX "A" (REVISED)

*I.S.P. No. A-1-41 of Naval Base Defense Plan No. 1-41*

## SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR HARBOR PATROLS

1. In carrying out the provisions of Annex "A" (Revised) to Naval Base Defense Plan No. 1-41, patrols will be guided by the special instructions contained herein. These instructions are in addition to and amplification of the tasks specified in Annex "A" (Revised) to Naval Base Defense Plan No. 1-41. Exercise caution, firmness and courtesy, being governed by dictates of good judgment. Recourse to use of arms will be had only as last resort in real emergency, when all other methods fail.

(a) *Outer harbor patrol*.—Maintain continuous submarine listening watch. In case evidence of a submerged submarine is obtained, maintain contact and report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Com. 14ND). Take no offensive action until directed, unless submarine enters the Prohibited Area (Defensive Sea Area, General Order No. 118).

While on station man one main battery gun and depth charge control, maintaining depth charges and live ammunition ready for use.

Darken ship at night.

Guard against surreptitious mine laying.

If ordered or requested, precede, within the limits of their patrol area, own large ships approaching or leaving mineable waters.

Report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Com. 14ND) when ship is on station.

(b) *Harbor channel patrol*.—Enforce General Order No. 118.

Board and inspect all incoming craft except those definitely identified as U. S. Government craft.

Prevent the entry of other than authorized small craft.

In case unauthorized persons, vessels or small craft, are apprehended in the PEARL HARBOR Defensive Sea Area, follow procedure laid down in District [2] Order No. 17-41 (revised) dated 11 June 1941.

(c) *Inner harbor patrol*.—

(1) *Dry Dock Channel Patrol*. The area between FORD ISLAND and the Navy Yard, bounded on the south-west by a line across the channel between lighted buoys "21" and "24" located to the south of FORD ISLAND and on the northeast by a line between MAKUNI ISLAND and the mouth of HALAWA CREEK.

(2) *East Loch Patrol*. The area to the northward of that assigned Dry Dock Channel Patrol and of East Loch down to a line between PENINSULA POINT and the north end of FORD ISLAND.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*. The area covered by Middle Loch and the channel area bounded by a line joining PENINSULA POINT and the north end of FORD ISLAND, a line joining channel buoys "21" and "24", and a line joining channel buoys "17" and "18".

(4) *West Loch Patrol*.—The area of the main ship channel south of a line joining channel buoys "17" and "18" to the Anti-Coastal Motor Boat Boom in vicinity of BISHOP POINT with particular attention to entrance to West Loch.

Patrol the above defined areas from 1800 to 0600 daily.

Enforce General Order No. 118.

In case unauthorized persons or small craft are apprehended by patrols, follow procedure laid down in District Order No. 17-41 (revised) dated 11 June, 1941.

Each boat of patrol will be in charge of an officer and will carry an armed guard, three Very's pistols with white stars, semaphore flags and signal flashlights or blinker tube.

G. B. Woolley,  
G. B. WOOLLEY,  
Commander,  
Commander Inshore Patrol,  
Fourteenth Naval District.

*Mailgram*

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).  
Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H., 150001 August 1941.

Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & Type Commanders  
Compawing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer Capt. Yard, C. O.'s Dist. Activities & Units as  
per distribution list of N. B. D. O. operation plan No. 1-41 with annexes A,  
B, C, D, & E.

Information: Cincpac Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

*Confidential*

Referring Comcincpac Conf. Serial 01221 of August 8, 1941. The following  
change to annex "A", revised, of naval base defense force operating plan No.  
1-41 is issued as change No. 1.

Change paragraph 3 (a) (3) as follows:

(1) Line four—delete word 'immediately' and substitute therefore 'on  
one (1) hours notice'.

(2) End of paragraph—delete all after 'maintain the following condition of  
readiness:' and substitute therefor 'if in port, ready to get underway on one  
(1) hours notice. If at sea, maintain ability to reach Pearl Harbor channel  
entrance buoys within one (1) hour.'

C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander Naval Base Defense  
Force (Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

*Mailgram*

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).  
Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H., 200001 August 1941.

Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & Type Commanders  
Compawing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer Capt. Yard, C. O.'s dist. activities & units as per  
distribution lists of N. B. D. O. operation plan No 1-41 with annexes A, B,  
C, D, & E.

Information: Cincpac Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

*Confidential*

Referring naval base defense force operating plan No. 1-41. The following  
change to annex "A" revised, of reference plan, is issued as change No. 2.

Change paragraph 3 (a) (1) as follows:

(1) Line eight (8)—delete '2760' and substitute therefor '2670'.

(2) Lines eight (8) and nine (9)—delete all within parenthesis.

C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander Naval Base Defense  
Force (Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

*Mailgram*

From: Naval base defense officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H., 120001 April 1941.

Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & Type Commanders  
Compawing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer, Capt. Yard, C. O.'s Dist. Activities & Units as per  
distribution list of N. B. D. O. Operation Plan No. 1-41 with annexes A, B, C, D,  
& E.

Information: Cincpac Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

*Confidential*

In accordance with paragraph (X) of Naval Base Defense Officer Operation  
Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of Annex Baker (Naval Base Defense  
Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replace-  
ment of Annex Baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander Naval Base Defense Force  
(Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS, *Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,  
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

*Confidential*

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO.  
1-41 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941

*Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.*

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.  
Shore-based VO - VS units.  
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.  
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.  
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.  
Army bombardment squadrons.  
Army reconnaissance squadrons.  
Navy Utility squadrons.

- (b) Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commander)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.  
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.  
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information:*

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action; addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

*Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as needed and necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.*—(b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1041. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)*

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base Defense Force.*

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS, *Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

[1]

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)

*Fort Shafter, T. H., March 31, 1941.*

*Confidential*

COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,

COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO,

NAVAL AIR STATION, *Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

#### ADDENDUM I TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

##### *I. Summary of the Situation*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

##### *II. Survey of Opposing Strengths*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being



periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

### III. Possible Enemy Action

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The advantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

### IV. Action open to us

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.
2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

#### V. Decisions

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] \*2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))*: The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)*: The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft).

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,  
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,  
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

APRIL 9, 1941.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

*Confidential*

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

*Conditions of Readiness and Readiness Reports*

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
  2. All types—30 minutes.
  3. All types—one hour.
  4. All types—two hours.
  5. All types—four hours.
2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.
3. Readiness reports:
- (a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:
    - (1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
    - (2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
  - (b) These reports shall state:
    - (1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.
    - (2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.



(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

*Task Organizations:*

(a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.

(b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.

1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1-41 and OCABF-38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".

2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defense of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive:* Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) *Group Five:* Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five:* Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition, except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five: Command Post:* To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,  
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,  
(Commandant, 14th Naval District).

File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0164)

*Confidential*

Operation Plan No. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS,  
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 5 March 1941.

ANNEX "D"

TASK ORGANIZATION\*

(a) Harbor Control Post, District Operations Officer.

1. *Information.*—As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Army observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security

measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Harbor Control Post.*

(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections: Harbor Control Post to

Hqtrs. Haw'n Dept., FT. SHAFTER  
 Hqtrs. HSCAB, FT. DERUSSY  
 Command Post, FT. KAMEHAMEHA  
 Command Post, HICKAM FIELD  
 Commander Patrol Wing TWO  
 SOPE (if at dock)  
 Navy Yard Signal Tower  
 Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E" and be prepared to direct Power House as to signal to be used (See paragraph 6000, *Special Signals*).

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officers, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.

Condition II Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

Note: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 50S; after working hours on Honolulu 75148.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

H. B. Knowles  
 H. B. KNOWLES,  
 Commander, U. S. Navy,  
 District Operations Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,  
 Naval Base Defense Officer,  
 (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).

Distribution:

In accordance with  
 Distribution List of  
 Operating Plan No. 1-41

J. W. Bays

J. W. BAYS,

Lieutenant, Aide to the Commandant.

[1] Confidential

## ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41 (MODIFICATION No. 1)

## COMMUNICATION PLAN—JULY 19, 1941

This plan supersedes Annex Easy to Operation Plan

No. 1-41.

1100 *General*.—In order that Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, may coordinate the defense, it is necessary that he have a means for instantly communicating with every vessel and shore activity of the district and with responsible senior officers present in Pearl Harbor.

1111 The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade maintains an Army Anti-aircraft information Service centered at A. A. A. Brigade Headquarters, Fort Shafter, which broadcasts information of enemy aircraft by voice on 900 kc. This information is also vital to all activities including Fleet units present in Pearl Harbor. In order to simplify communications and avoid multiplicity of circuits, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), will establish a Fox series on 900 kc. using radio telegraph with a modulated CW Transmitter. These transmissions can be copied on an ordinary broadcast receiver which even small vessels should be able to provide. For the present only the SOPE and Sector commanders are required to guard this frequency. All other vessels should guard this frequency as practicable, especially those having anti-aircraft batteries.

1112 The destroyer patrol will use the Joint Army and Navy Inshore Patrol frequency of 2550 kc. The commander of the Pearl Harbor Groupment probably will have a radio station on this circuit which will normally receive only.

1113 Information of hostile or potentially hostile forces acquired by Fleet forces in operating areas must be reported to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), promptly. This can most easily be done on the Ship-Shore frequency (355 kc).

1120 This modification effective upon receipt.

1130 Use zone plus 10 and  $\frac{1}{2}$  time.

[2] 1150 *Radio silence*.—There will be no restriction upon the use of circuits set up herein, prior to an ALERT, except in case of an emergency. During an ALERT or an emergency, radio silence will be maintained except for contact reports, amplifying reports and tactical orders, instructions or reports.

1170 *Contact reports* made by units under this command will be addressed to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), call sign W2X. Fleet units operating outside Pearl Harbor will include Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), as an information addressee. Evaluated information will be placed on Army and Navy joint teletype or wire loops, and if desirable on Local Fox method circuit. All contact reports concerning hostile aircraft or carriers within 250 miles of Oahu will be made in plain language. Contact reports of enemy surface or submarine forces within 50 miles of Oahu will be made in abbreviated plain language. (See USF 70, Article 1178).

1180 Visual signalling by day will be by searchlight, Flag Hoist or Semaphore. At night use blinker tube if practicable. Ships should refrain from using searchlights at night except in emergencies. Visual signalling prohibited during Blackout.

2430 *Authenticators* will be used when challenge is made by receiving station. All contact reports will be challenged. Units directly under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), including Destroyer Patrol will use SOI No. 27-7 (joint) of December 16, 1940. Fleet units should use these grids when communicating with shore radio stations of Army and Navy. Copies of SOI 27-7 (Joint) herewith.

2500 *Radio call signs*.—Units operating directly under command of Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), will use call signs provided in Signal Operating Instruction (SOI No. 43-8 (Joint)) effective April 1, 1940. Same call will be used for Visual and Radio. Copies of SOI No. 43-8 (Joint) herewith.

*Destroyer Patrol—*

Inner D D Patrol-----	H5F
(Inshore Patrol Station # 1)	.
Outer D D Patrol-----	J5Y
(Inshore Patrol Station # 1)	



The following calls from SOI No. 43-S are assigned. All stations enter under NAVY on Page 5.

- [3] ALL SWEEPERS..... V5Z
- Sweeper No. 1 (magnetic)..... W1Y
- Sweeper No. 2 (Anchored)..... W7P
- Sweeper No. 3 (Anchored)..... X2Q

5000 *Destroyer patrol*.—(a) When patrol is on station, patrol commander report assumption of patrol to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO) information to patrol being relieved. Relieved unit will then secure on patrol frequency.

(b) Guard effective Fox schedules when so ordered. Normally, Wallupe guards Fox schedules for destroyer patrol.

(c) Destroyer patrol will use CSP-1023 and CSP-1024.

6600 *Cryptographic aids*.—The following cryptographic aids are authorized for Joint Army and Navy use:

For Use Among	Contact Code	Aircraft Code	General Cipher	D/F Code
All stations less aircraft.....	CSP 680..... CSP 696..... CSP 697.....	..... ..... .....	CSP 642..... CSP 645..... CSP <sup>1</sup> 732..... CSP <sup>1</sup> 733.....	USF 64
Aircraft (plus air ground communications)....	CSP 680..... CSP 696..... CSP 697.....	USF 66..... ..... .....	..... ..... .....	USF 66

<sup>1</sup> Army Short Title—"SIG NOG"

NOTE.—By special arrangement, Basdefairfor and Hawaiian Air Force are authorized to use CSP-740 when operating jointly.

7000 *Harbor Patrol*.—Very pistol signals will be employed by Harbor Patrol (Motor Boats) as follows:

- (1) General Alarm.....One White Star (may be repeated at intervals)
- [4] (2) Require Assistance.....Two White Stars (repeated at intervals until certain it has been observed)
- (3) All clear.....One White Star Followed by Two White Stars Simultaneously

8000 *Special Signals*—

(1) *Air Raid Alarms*:

*Signal*—

*Meaning*—

- (a) *Yard Whistle*.....Prepare for Air Raid
- 1 long blast 30 sec.....If at night, Black Out
- Internal 25 sec.....(See Blackout procedure)
- 1 Short Blast 5 sec.....(14th ND Order No. 22-40)

This signal to be repeated by one ship in each sector (PACFLT Conf. letter 2 CL-41) as designated by Sector Commander.

(b) *Street Lights* (at night)

- (1) Flashed 3 times.....Prepare for Air Raid (Simultaneous with start of whistle signal).
- (2) Remain dark 5 sec.....Blackout
- (3) Lighted for 10 sec.
- (4) Extinguished.

(c) *Signal Tower*

Appropriate Emergency.....Be prepared for attack  
hoist (day only).....by enemy aircraft

*Radio Circuits*

Transmit on 900 and 355 kc "AIR RAID"  
in plain English (Number and type of  
Urgent Precedence planes will be given if possible)

[5] (d) *Telephone*

- Yard duty officer
- Notify NAD Lualualei—phone 954
- Notify Radio Lualualei—phone 976
- Notify Old Naval Station—phone 449



(2) All Clear Signals

Signal

Meaning

- (a) **Yard Whistle:** 3 long blasts ----- All clear
- (b) **Street Lights:**  
Turned on as first long whistle blast is sounded ----- All clear
- (c) **Signal Tower:**  
Same signal as (1) (c) under negative ----- All clear
- (d) **Radio Circuits:** The all clear signals will be followed by a despatch on all circuits "All Clear". CAUTION: Radio despatch must not be relied upon unless confirmed by other methods.

8000 Drills.—(a) When drills are held they will be preceded by a despatch "Prepare for air raid drill".

(b) All despatches and orders in conduct of drills will be preceded by word "drill".

(c) The all clear signal terminating a drill will be followed by despatch "Air Raid Drill Completed". This message will be transmitted on all air raid circuits.

(d) CAUTION—Radio despatch terminating drill or actual raid must not be relied upon less confirmed by other methods.

Frequency—Plan

	2550 Kc	4205s, 4170s, 3965Kc, 3785Kc	5540Kc, 1080 Kc	355 Kc	PP Teletype	1p MIL. Loop	1p Adm. Loop	Visual	Fax Phone	L.L. Telegraph	900 Kc	Radio Telephone 2902 Kc
COMMANDANT 14th Nav Dist (NBDO).....	*R	*R	*R	*R		X	X	X	X	X	R	X
COMINSHORPAT.....	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	R	X
RADIO WALLUPE.....					X	X	X		X		R	
OCHD (SHAFTER).....		R			X	X	X		X		R	
HAF (SHAFTER).....					X	X	X		X		R	
PH GROUPMENT FT. KAM.....	X				R	X	X		X		R	X
HSCAB.....						X	X		X		R	
COM AA DEF.....								X			R	
INSHOREPAT.....	X							X			R	#X
BOOMPAT.....								X			R	
HARPAT.....								X			R	
A/CBOOM.....								X	X		R	
MINESWEEPERS.....	X							X			R	
COMBASDEF AIRFOR COM. PATWING-2 NAS PEARL HARBOR.....		X	X		X	X			X	X	R	
RASDEF AIRFOR.....		X							X	X	R	
AAA BRIGADE SHAFTER.....					X				X	X	R	
COMBASFOR.....								X	X	X	R	
ASP PEARL.....								X			**R	R
SECTOR COMDRS.....								X			R	R
SOPE.....											R	
OUTLYING AIR BASES.....			X									
UNITS AT SEA.....				X								
PURSUIT WING.....					X							
2nd MAR AIR GRP.....					X							
CINC.....							X					
SIGNAL TOWER NYd PEARL.....						X	X	X	X			

\*Upon completion District Communication Center NBDO will set intercept watch when situation warrants.

X—Send and Receive.

R—Receive only.

\*\*—If practicable.

#—Ships having equipment. 6455Kc—Joint Army/Navy Air (voice).

NBDO has direct magneto phone lines to: Patwing-2; G3-Shafter; Ft. Kam; Hickam Field; HSCAB; Signal Tower; Powerhouse.

Confidential

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS  
VERIFICATION GRIDS No. 27-7 (JOINT)

14th Naval District,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.  
9 December 1940.

Hawaiian Department,  
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.  
9 December 1940.

Effective 0001, 16 December 1940.

Destroy previous issue No. 27-6 and supplement

## 1. Verification Code.

a. All radio stations receiving messages from another radio station must be prepared to challenge or obtain verification as to the authenticity of the transmitting station.

b. Inasmuch as the present verification system becomes unsafe after a few challenges and replies have been intercepted it is necessary to restrict the use of this grid system to challenges when in an emergency situation the station receiving a message, for some reason actually suspects the authenticity of the transmitting station. The verification system should be used in training exercises but not more than once in 24 hours by each station.

c. The transmission of ZWA in joint Army Navy Radio Operations during an actual emergency will be challenged.

d. The method of verification is as follows: Two letters, not on the same line or column, will be selected at random from the daily grid by the receiving station and sent as a challenge. The original transmitting station will take the other two letters which complete the rectangle, the first letter being on the same line as the first letter of the challenge, and reply to the challenge. *EXAMPLE*:—AB receives a message from EF on the first day of the month. If the message has been received without error but AB for some reason suspects the authenticity of the station AB will select a group at random from the first day grid such as DY. AB will then transmit "R II DY II K". If EF is the authentic station the available grid will disclose that or complete the diagonal, EF will therefore reply "OV VA". If AB transmits: "R II YD II K" the reply on the date in question would be: "VO VA".

## 2. Verification grids.

a. The following grids are effective each month of the year at 0001 for the date specified:

1ST	2ND	3RD	4TH	5TH
S W L R K	K H O S L	N M U X K	E F Z W G	B P Y, A Q
N V B F Y	W N Q D B	P B A L I	A X P M B	F U W O S
T E P C U	U Z A V C	O Y T Q S	N I L K U	X C G L N
X D I G O	P E Y X G	C V D H R	Y T O Q S	D Z M K I
Q Z A H M	J T M R F	E Z F W G	V H D R C	H R T D V
6TH	7TH	8TH	9TH	10TH
E Q F B N	P D O M U	W Q A Y I	C Z A L S	M L X H A
V P K A Y	X A F G S	O L R V F	B V W E G	L Q Y C R
X Z U C D	B V E H W	P B T S M	D K I O M	W K Z N S
L S I H O	Z Y I C L	U Z X E K	P F Q U H	V D B P G
R W M T G	N T Q K R	C H N G D	N X Y R T	E F T O U
11TH	12TH	13TH	14TH	15TH
O G R N Q	D K H X B	E M G K A	A U Y Q H	A O H X Z
K F B X Y	P O E U F	D N Y C F	O R C S X	N R V K C
M A D T W	A T Q S Y	P I B X T	Z P F D W	Y E J L T
I E C H S	M R C Z I	V Q S R U	V I K M L	P D Q U M
P L V U Z	V W N G L	O Z L H W	N T B G E	G B W S F
16TH	17TH	18TH	19TH	20TH
T C E F P	Z S V T X	P N Y V U	X R P F V	D M V L U
O U Z R N	M F O G Q	T K O C Z	Q Y Z I O	S N I Q T
L Q W M V	B D W C Y	I L S B E	H C W D B	O R F A E
H Y D A X	H P E I U	X R Q H D	T N E M U	Y W B X Z
B S K I G	N A K L R	A F W G M	L G A S K	H K C G P

21ST	22ND	23RD	24TH	25TH
L Z U K V	I X F U W	B D C T W	O B P N U	P O B W L
R H A O G	M Y L N T	G L R Z U	W H E R C	M E Z Y G
Q D M T P	D G Z O H	K N X I M	T G K Z F	X C K V U
X C S E W	S K P R V	Q Y V H F	S D V X Q	D A F H N
B I F N Y	Q A C E B	P S O E A	Y M I L A	T Q R I S
26TH	27TH	28TH	29TH	30TH
N E A Z W	O I D F V	A H Q I Y	S F A T R	U A G K X
R V X Y Q	P Y T U E	U Z V R N	O Y D H K	P Z T M I
C H L G B	N C G A S	F C D E B	G X E M W	R Y L B H
T M D I F	X R H W K	W S G K P	U N I V P	V S W D C
K U S O P	Z L Q M B	T X L M O	C Q Z B L	O F E Q N
		31ST		
		S M Q Y P		
		E U L A K		
		V T X F R		
		W H B Z O		
		D G I N C		

b. Only such grids will be furnished as are necessary for a single flight or mission.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General HERRON:

J. W. LEWIS,  
*Captain, U. S. N.,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

PHILIP HAYES,  
*Colonel, General Staff Corps,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

Official:

R. C. THROCKMORTON,  
*Lt. Col., General Staff Corps,*  
*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3*

Checked by:  
 W. E. GUITAR,  
*Lt. Comdr., U. S. N.*

Restricted

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS  
 RADIO CALL SIGNS (No. 43-8 JOINT)  
 Effective April 1, 1941  
 (Destroy all previous copies)

14th Naval District,  
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Hawaiian Department,  
 Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following call signs for tactical Radio Stations and Nets and no others will be used in the Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District unless changed by this or higher Headquarters.

Station or net	Call	Station or net	Call
Hawaiian Department.....	DH9	299th Inf. Net Call.....	1RG
Hawaiian Department Net.....	5CP	1st Bn. 299th Inf.....	AK9
Hawaiian Division Hdqts.....	3 DV	2nd Bn. 299th Inf.....	K98
Hawaiian Division Net.....	L7W	3rd Bn. 299th Inf.....	5FP
21st Brigade Hdqts.....	2 FC	22nd Brigade Hdqts.....	CU7
21st Brigade Net.....	EU7	22nd Brigade Net.....	SK5
19th Inf. Hdqtrs.....	5 DK	27th Inf. Hdqtrs.....	0Q1
19th Inf. Net.....	B8S	27th Inf. Net.....	2TC
1st Bn. 19th Inf.....	7FU	1st Bn. 27th Inf.....	W73
2nd Bn. 19th Inf.....	XC2	2nd Bn. 27th Inf.....	GC2
3rd Bn. 19th Inf.....	HQ1	3rd Bn. 27th Inf.....	7IW
19th Inf. Motor.....		Scout Car.....	8XB
Patrol & O. P. Net.....	1TQ	35th Inf. Hdqts.....	PW7
Patrol or O. P. #1.....	MK5	35th Inf. Net.....	7VW
Patrol or O. P. #2.....	W76	1st Bn. 35th Inf.....	YX5
Patrol or O. P. #3.....	7QW	2nd Bn. 35th Inf.....	1XQ
21st Inf. Hdqts.....	TQ1	3rd Bn. 35th Inf.....	LQ1
21st Inf. Net.....	2UC	35th Inf. Motor.....	
1st Bn. 21st Inf.....	SW7	Patrol & O. P. Net.....	C24
2nd Bn. 21st Inf.....	RB8	Patrol or O. P. #1.....	FK5
3rd Bn. 21st Inf.....	SQB	Patrol or O. P. #2.....	JB3
21st Inf. Motor.....		Patrol or O. P. #3.....	5LK
Patrol and O. P. Net.....	U78	298th Inf. Hdqtrs.....	1NG
Patrol or O. P. #1.....	7NU	298th Inf. Net.....	6UN
Patrol or O. P. #2.....	1HQ	1st Bn. 298th Inf.....	G15
Patrol or O. P. #3.....	K56	2nd Bn. 298th Inf.....	1OG
Scout Car.....	5CK	3rd Bn. 298th Inf.....	5ZP
299th Inf. Hdqts.....	WN6	11th Field Art. Brigade Hdqtrs.....	7YW

1642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Station or net	Call	Station or net	Call
22nd Brigade Net—Continued		Division Radio School	MM4
11th Field Art. Brigade Net	DW7	Division Radio School	TZ2
8th Field Aer. Hdqts.	7KU	Division Radio School	Y53
5th Field Art. Net	C29	USAT Cochrane	XG1
1st Bn. 8th F. A. Hdq.	8PB	USAT Tug 91	6LN
1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	U75	USAT Krautoff	IFG
1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7EU	USAT Frank	SM4
1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	QU7	Aircraft Warning Co.	RQ1
1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	8VB	" " "	VF7
2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Hdqt.	BQ1	" " "	ZU7
2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	5BK	" " "	D88
2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7OW	" " "	2IC
2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	2FC	" " "	7CU
2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7WVW	" " "	6QN
11th Field Art. Hdqts.	BC2	" " "	6LI
11th Field Art. Net	OC2	" " "	8GB
11th F. A. Liaison	7PU	" " "	7MU
11th F. A.	2AC	" " "	3XV
1st Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	EB8	" " "	1EG
1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	B83	" " "	UQ1
1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	8HB	" " "	JP7
1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	1DQ	Hq. Haw. Air Force Com'd	XL3
1st Bn. 11th F. A.	Q14	Grnd Station	AF7
2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	MU7	Net	3FL
2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	JQ1	Hd. Sqdrn. H. A. F. plane	R52
2nd Bn. 11th F. A.	W72	18th Bomb Wing Com'd	VH1
2nd Bn. 11th F. A.	KU7	Grnd Station	WG1
2nd Bn. 11th F. A.	2ZC	18th Wing Bomb WG. Net	3RX
13th Field Art. Hqs.	2NC	Hdq. & Hdq. Sq. 18th B. Wg. Plane	AV3A
13th Field Art. Net	LC2		AV3B
1st Bn. 13th F. A., Hdq.	B87	5th Bom. Grp. Com'd	U22
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	7GU	" " Ground	5WR
1st Bn. 13th F. A.	8YB	" " Net	KH9
1st Bn. 13th F. A.	Q88	Hdq. Sqdr 5th Grp Com'd	3MX
1st Bn. 13th F. A.	VQ1	Sqd. Flight Comdr. A	ZP5
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Hdq.	DK5	plane No. 1	LV3A
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	5JK	To plane No. 5 incl.	LV3B
2nd Bn. 13th F. A.	Q19	LV3A, LV3B, LV3C, LV3D, LV3F	LV3F
2nd Bn. 13th F. A.	AB8	Omit additional letter E on all Army plane	
2nd Bn. 13th F. A.	2WC	calls as above	
11th Tank Co. Comd. Car Hq.	TK5	4th Rec. Sqdr. Com'd	9JH
Net	C25	Ground	LJ9
1st Plat. Comm Car	7RU	Net	EH1
2nd Plat. Comm Car	U77	Flight Comdr A	M46
3rd Plat. Comm Car	1BQ	" " B	50R
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Hq.	DR5	Flight Comdr C	OJ9
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Net	9XK	Plane No. 1	YV3A
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Hdq 15 CA	KP5	To plane 8 incl.	YV3I
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Net	9GK	23 Bomb. Sqdr. Comd	3BV
Ahuia Grp Hdq inactive	YM4	Ground	ZX3
Ewa Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 55 CA	4LM	Net	UJ9
Kamameha Grp inactive	9SK	Flight Comdr. A	CP5
Puu O Huluh Gr Hq 1st Bn. 41CA	VK9	" " B	H13
Puu O Huluh Gr. Net	JK9	" " C	5RP
A Bty. 41 CA	5PP	Plane No. 1	VZ2A
Bty. Closson B Bty. 15 CA	FM4	To plane No. 8 incl.	VZ2I
Barrette Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 15 CA	2XZ	31 Bom. Sqdrn. Com'd	V39
Barrette Grp Net	LZ2	Ground	MX3
Bty. Williston A bty 15 CA	2JZ	" " Net	IV3
Bty. Hatch C Bty 15th CA	G14	Flight Comdr A	9QK
Honolulu Grpmt Hq. 16 CA	6VN	" " B	QH1
Honolulu Grpmt. Net	PN6	" " C	3JV
Diamond Hd. Hdq. 16 CA	X41	Plane No. 1	3NXA
Leahi Grp Hq. inactive	BZ2	To plane No. 8 incl.	3NXI
Punchbowl Grp. Hq. inactive	9PK	72 Bom. Sqdr. Com'd	1KH
Ulu-pau Grp. Hd. D bty 16CA	6IN	" " Ground	TH9
North Shore Grpmt Hq. 2nd Bn. 55CA	RZ2	31 Bom. Sqdr. Net	3EX
North Shore Grpmt Net	M41	" " Flight Comdr. A	1TG
Haleiwa Grp. inactive	IM4	" " B	3TV
Kahuku Grp inactive	Z21	" " C	5LR
Bty. 41 CA	GP5	Plane No. 1	KX3A
Provisional AA Brig Hq 64 CA	BG1	To plane No. 8 incl.	KX3I
Provisional AA Brig Net	6SN	11 Bomb. Group Com'd	90J
AA Gun Grpmt. Hq. 64 CA	QP5	" " Ground	XJ9
AA Gun Grpmt. Net	DN6	" " Net	1YH
North Grp 1st Bn. 64 CA	6YN	Hd. Sqdr. 11 B. Grp. Com'd	DM4
South Grp 2nd Bn. 64 CA	G19	Plane No. 1	OV3A
East Grp Dia Hd Grp 16 CA	X41	To plane No. 5 incl.	OV3F
West Grp C bty. 15 CA	G14	50th Rec. Sqdr. Comd.	3GX
Schofield AA Comd. Hdq. 251 CA	CM4	" " Ground	RK9
Schofield AA Comd Net	P55	" " Net	9DH
Schof. Gun Grp 1st Bn. 251CA	5EP	Flight Comdr. A	YZ2
Searchlight Grp	5KP	" " B	WJ9
A. W. Grp 2nd Bn. 251 CA	1MG	" " C	51R
Dept. Radio School Net	HZ2	Plane No. 1	V31A
Dept. Radio School	2TZ	To plane No. 8 incl.	V31I
Dept. Radio School	4DM		



Station or net	Call	Station or net	Call
14th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.....	1VH	78th Pur. Sqdr. Comd.....	HK9
Ground.....	WR5	" " Ground.....	GJ9
Net.....	MH9	" " Net.....	YH9
Flight Comdr. A.....	ZM4	Flight Comdr. A.....	KM4
" " B.....	GX3	" " B.....	6WM
" " C.....	9J	" " C.....	SN6
Plane No. 1.....	3KXA	Plane No. 1.....	162A
To Plane No. 8 incl.....	3KXI	To plane No. 13.....	162N
26th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.....	QK9	44th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	9MJ
Ground.....	AH1	" " Ground.....	T99
" " Net.....	TV3	" " Net.....	9GZ
Flight Comdr. A.....	PK9	Flight Comdr. A.....	ZZ9
" " B.....	3FX	" " B.....	S82
" " C.....	J95	" " C.....	EF7
Plane No. 1.....	RV3A	Plane No. 1.....	6JIA
To plane No. 8 incl.....	RV3I	To plane No. 13.....	6JIN
42 Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.....	HI7	86 Obsv. Sqdr. Com'd.....	5YR
Ground.....	CX3	" " Ground.....	PR5
Net.....	HV3	" " Net.....	J99
Flight Comdr. A.....	6AN	Flight Comdr. A.....	T94
" " B.....	1PH	Plane No. 1.....	KI6A
" " C.....	H96	To plane No. 13.....	KI6N
42 Bomb. Sqdr. plane No. 1.....	3CXA	58 Bomb. Sqdr. (1) Com'd.....	BL3
To plane No. 8 incl.....	3CXI	" " Ground.....	7HF
Hdq. 14th Pursuit Wg. Com'd.....	3ZX	" " Net.....	9FJ
" " Ground.....	2HZ	58 Bomb. Sqdr. flight Comd A.....	JT9
" " Net.....	9AJ	Flight Com'd B.....	F73
Hdq. Sqdrn. 14 P. Wg. plane No. 1.....	9CH	" " C.....	9MZ
Plane No. 2.....	9TJ	Plane No. 1.....	8WSA
15 Pur. Grp. Com'd.....	X37	To plane No. 13.....	8WSN
15th Pur. Grp. Ground.....	1QH	19 Trans. Sqdr. Command.....	X35
Net.....	9ZJ	" " Ground.....	9EJ
Hdg. Sq. 15th Pur. Grp. Com'd.....	H18	" " Net.....	5SR
Plane No. 1.....	HH1A	Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	9RZ
To plane No. 5 incl.....	HH1F	Plane No. 1.....	80SA
45th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	H91	To plane No. 13.....	80SN
" " Ground.....	JH1	Target Sqdrn. Com'd.....	BJ9
" " Net.....	9NJ	" " Ground.....	AT9
Flight Comdr. A.....	R56	" " Net.....	QF7
" " B.....	1XH	Flight Comdr. A.....	VT9
" " C.....	9UJ	Plane No. 1.....	XR5A
Plane No. 1.....	3MLA	To plane No. 6.....	XR5G
To plane No. 13.....	3MLN	17th A. B. Group Command.....	CH9
46th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	EX3	Ground.....	PH1
" " Ground.....	J94	Net.....	QX3
" " Net.....	9WJ	18 A. B. Sqdr. Flt. Comdr.....	9DT
Flight Comdr. A.....	X38	18 A. B. Sqdr. plane No. 1.....	JV3A
" " B.....	5VR	To plane No. 4.....	JV3D
" " C.....	9RJ	22 Mat. Sqdrn. Flight Comdr.....	M79
Plane No. 1.....	WL3A	Plane No. 1.....	3ALA
To plane No. 13 incl.....	WL3N	Plane No. 2.....	3ALB
47th Pur. Sqdr. Command.....	DI6	Plane No. 3.....	3ALC
Ground.....	3WL	23 Mat. Sqdrn. Flight Comr.....	PF7
Net.....	UT9	Plane No. 1.....	X88A
Flight Comdr. A.....	UL3	Plane No. 2.....	X88B
" " B.....	3ZL	Plane No. 3.....	X88C
" " C.....	LL3	18 Air Base Group Com'd.....	FV3
Plane No. 1.....	3NLA	" " Ground.....	9BH
To plane No. 13 incl.....	3NLN	" " Net.....	H92
18th Pur. Group Com'd.....	4JM	17 A. B. Sqdr. Flight Comdr.....	8SS
Ground.....	3PX	Plane No. 1.....	8ASA
Net.....	3HV	Plane No. 2.....	8ASB
Hdq. Sqdr. 18 P. Grp Comm'd.....	F77	Plane No. 3.....	8ASC
Plane No. 1.....	BV3A	Plane No. 4.....	8ASD
To plane No. 5.....	BV3F	24 Mat. Sqd. Flight Comdr.....	FT9
6th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd.....	LG1	Plane No. 1.....	6BIA
" " Ground.....	RH1	Plane No. 2.....	6BIB
" " Net.....	FH9	Plane No. 3.....	6BIC
Flight Commdr. A.....	4BM	25 Mat. Sqd. Flight Comdr.....	3EL
" " B.....	M42	Plane No. 1.....	CI6A
" " C.....	FZ2	Plane No. 2.....	CI6B
Plane No. 1.....	OL3A	Plane No. 3.....	CI6C
To plane No. 13.....	OL3N	Haw. Air Depot.....	BT9
19th Pur. Sqd. Com'd.....	K97	Plane No. 1.....	YI6A
" " Ground.....	SR5	Plane No. 2.....	YI6B
" " Net.....	1GH	Plane No. 3.....	YI6C
Flight Comdr. A.....	5GP	Crash Boat Gen. Westover.....	UG1
" " B.....	1AG	Bellows Field Ground.....	7GF
" " C.....	5MP	14th Naval District.....	
Plane No. 1.....	FI6A		
To plane No. 13.....	FI6N		

<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>	<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com 14.....	W2X	Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com 14—Continued	
Com. Haw-Naval Def. Force.....	B2A	Comdr Inshore Patrol—Continued	
Naval Def. Force coll.....	E1N	Station No. 23.....	B4G
Wailupe Radio Station.....	E3L	24.....	E6R
All Stations this Circuit.....	E2A	25.....	H4D
U. S. S. Keosangua.....	H1L	Com. Naval Air Station.....	J6N
U. S. S. Sunnadin.....	J4M	Naval Air Radio Station.....	N5Y
U. S. S. Ward.....	N3L	Crash Boat No. 1.....	R8Z
U. S. S. Schley.....	N8F	All Naval Air Station Planes	S4X
U. S. S. Chew.....	R6K	Air Station Plane No. 1.....	U2N
U. S. S. Allen.....	R9Q	Plane No. 2.....	V3Q
Comdesdiv 80.....	U1P	Plane No. 3.....	W4F
Desdiv 80.....	U9J	Plane No. 7.....	X1P
Com. Mine Craft.....	N3D	Plane No. 8.....	Z5Y
Mine Craft.....	R1Q	Plane No. 9.....	B1L
Oglala (F).....	S8B	Plane No. 10.....	E1G
Com. Mine Div. 1.....	V6L	Com. Pat Wing 2.....	H3A
Mine Div. 1 (coll).....	W5C	Com. Pat Wing (Admin).....	J7Z
Pruitt (F).....	X7J	Senior Patron Comdr. Pat Wg. 2.....	R7M
Preble.....	Z9Q	All Squadron Comdrs. Pat Wg. 2.....	U4X
Sicard.....	B6M	Pat Wing 2 (coll).....	J6K
Tracy.....	E7T	Wright.....	N9C
Com. Mine Div. 2.....	H7O	Wm. B. Preston.....	R2U
Mine Div 2 (coll).....	J9P	Childs.....	S9G
Tanager (F).....	N7B	Swan.....	U1L
Quail.....	R9L	Plane XPBS-1.....	V1P
Lark.....	S5V	Com. Patron 21.....	W1B
Whipoorwill.....	U4M	Patron 21 (coll).....	X2O
All Mine Sweepers.....	V5Z	Com. Div. 1 Patron 21.....	Z1A
Mine Sweeper No. 1 (Mag).....	W1Y	Com. Div. 2 Patron 21.....	B9D
Mine Sweeper No. 2 (Anch).....	W7P	Base Station Patron 21.....	E1O
Mine Sweeper No. 3 (Anch).....	X2Q	Any Plane Patron 21.....	H1B
Comdr. Sub. Force.....	V2J	21-P-1.....	J4P
Sub. Force (coll).....	W7D	21-P-2.....	N3M
Litchfield (F).....	X2G	21-P-3.....	R1Z
Com. Subron No. 4.....	Z2F	21-P-4.....	S7R
Subron 4 (coll).....	B5C	21-P-5.....	U5F
Sub. Base Radio Station.....	E8J	21-P-6.....	V9C
Seagull.....	H4K	21-P-7.....	W9L
Widgeon.....	J7O	21-P-8.....	Z8F
Com. Sub. Div. 7.....	N4P	21-P-9.....	E4L
Sub. Div. 7 (coll).....	R6A	21-P-10.....	J3U
S18.....	S3T	21-P-11.....	R3D
S-23 (F).....	U1D	21-P-12.....	U7R
S-34.....	V4N	21-P-13.....	W2G
S-75.....	W7W	21-P-14.....	Z4H
Com. Sub. Div. 12.....	X3L	21-P-15.....	B8Z
Sub. Div. 12 (coll).....	Z5N	Com. Patron 22.....	J5Q
Argonaut.....	B9K	Patron 22 (coll).....	R5L
Dolphin.....	E59	Com. Div. 1 Patron 22.....	U7B
Narwhal.....	H3J	Com. Div. 2 Patron 22.....	W2M
Nautilus (F).....	J1B	Base Station Patron 22.....	Z9S
Com. Sub. Div. 13.....	N1J	Any Plane Patron 22.....	E7Y
Sub. Div. 13 (coll).....	R3W	22-P-1.....	J1X
Shark (F).....	S1C	22-P-2.....	R2G
Cachalot.....	U3K	22-P-3.....	U3Y
Cuttlefish.....	V8F	22-P-4.....	W1L
Plunger.....	W9M	22-P-5.....	Z1C
Pollack.....	X5T	22-P-6.....	E9Q
Pompano.....	Z6R	22-P-7.....	J9T
Comdr. Offshore Patrol.....	X8Q	22-P-8.....	R9B
Offshore Patrol (coll).....	Z7W	22-P-9.....	U8V
Comdr. Inshore Patrol.....	B3Q	22-P-10.....	W7N
Inshore Patrol (coll).....	W8O	22-P-11.....	Z8O
Station No. 1.....	H5F	22-P-12.....	E6X
Station No. 2.....	J5Y	22-P-13.....	J2G
3.....	N8A	22-P-14.....	R5O
4.....	R78	22-P-15.....	S5K
5.....	S4N	Com. Patron 23.....	W3A
6.....	U3G	Patron 23 (coll).....	Z7C
7.....	V1C	Com. Div. 1 Patron 23.....	E5K
8.....	W6R	Com. Div. 2 Patron 23.....	J3L
9.....	X4D	Base Station " 23.....	R4C
10.....	Z3X	Any plane Patron 23.....	U5W
11.....	B1C	23-P-1.....	W6J
12.....	E2P	23-P-2.....	Z6G
13.....	H2X	23-P-3.....	E8O
14.....	J2Y	23-P-4.....	J7D
15.....	N2L	23-P-5.....	R6T
16.....	R4V	23-P-6.....	U9O
17.....	S6Q	23-P-7.....	W4Y
18.....	U6A	23-P-8.....	Z2M
19.....	V5G	23-P-9.....	E4B
20.....	W3P	23-P-10.....	J8S
21.....	X7V	23-P-11.....	R3N
22.....	Z8J	23-P-12.....	U5Z

<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com 14—Continued	
Com Patron 23—Continued	
23-P-13.....	WSB
23-P-14.....	Z4L
23-P-15.....	B3R
Com. Patron 24.....	E9C
Patron 24.....	H8B
Com. Div. 1 Patron 24.....	N7X
Com. Div. 2 Patron 24.....	S3P
Base Station " 24.....	V9M
Any Plane Patron 24.....	X9B
24-P-1.....	Z5P
24-P-2.....	R2Z
24-P-3.....	H8M
24-P-4.....	J8II
24-P-5.....	N9J
24-P-6.....	R8W
24-P-7.....	S8U
24-P-8.....	UST
24-P-9.....	X6U
24-P-10.....	B7M
24-P-11.....	H3S
24-P-12.....	N1Y
24-P-13.....	S6O
24-P-14.....	V4Y
24-P-15.....	X8L
Com. Patron 25.....	E4Z
Patron 25 (coll).....	H2G
Com. Div. 1 Patron 25.....	N8T
Com. Div. 2 Patron 25.....	S7F
Base Station " 25.....	V7W
Any Plane Patron 25.....	X4K
25-P-1.....	B4L
25-P-2.....	H5T
25-P-3.....	N2G
25-P-4.....	S2W
25-P-5.....	V2A
25-P-6.....	X1Z
25-P-7.....	B8Y
25-P-8.....	H9Z
25-P-9.....	M9V
25-P-10.....	S9Y
25-P-11.....	V8A
25-P-12.....	X7K
25-P-13.....	B5N
25-P-14.....	H6C
25-P-15.....	N4K
Com. Patron 26.....	U6D
Patron 26 (coll).....	V4K
Com. Div. 1 Patron 26.....	X6B
Com. Div. 2 Patron 26.....	B6X
Base Station Patron 26.....	H6L
Any Plane Patron 26.....	N5T
26-P-1.....	S6G
26-P-2.....	V8X
26-P-3.....	X3Y
26-P-4.....	B6F
26-P-5.....	H9N
26-P-6.....	N2X

<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com 14—Continued	
Com Patron 26—Continued	
26-P-7.....	S4D
26-P-8.....	V3F
26-P-9.....	X3A
26-P-10.....	B2N
26-P-11.....	H7Y
26-P-12.....	N6R
26-P-13.....	S2Z
26-P-14.....	V6R
26-P-15.....	X5F
Com. 2nd Marine Air Grp.....	X5M
VMF2 (Marairgrp).....	X9N
Com. VMF-2.....	X9N
" Plane No. 1.....	X9N1
2.....	X9N2
3.....	X9N3
4.....	X9N4
5.....	X9N5
6.....	X9N6
7.....	X9N7
8.....	X9N8
9.....	X9N9
10.....	X9N10
11.....	X9N11
12.....	X9N12
VMB-2 (2nd Marairgrp).....	Z3D
Com. VMB-2.....	Z3DØ
Com. Plane No. 1.....	Z3D1
Com. Plane No. 2.....	Z3D2
3.....	Z3D3
4.....	Z3D4
5.....	Z3D5
6.....	Z3D6
7.....	Z3D7
8.....	Z3D8
9.....	Z3D9
10.....	Z3D10
11.....	Z3D11
12.....	Z3D12
Fleet Air Detachment Shore Based at NAS Pearl Harbor Will use only Navy Calls.....	
Coast Guard.....	E5Z
CGC Knkui.....	B79
Coast Guard Hdqts.....	J8A
C. Guard Radio Station.....	N6C
Reliance.....	E3M
Taney.....	H5P
Tiger.....	R7Y
U. S. C. G. 400.....	S1L
U. S. C. G. 403.....	U2B
U. S. C. G. 838.....	V7T
U. S. C. G. A B27.....	W5Q
All C. G. Vessels.....	H1X
PAA Radio Station Oahu.....	H8U
" " Canton Is.....	J4A
" " Midway.....	J7K
" " Wake.....	

ADDITIONS

<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>
USS McFarland.....	R2U
USS Thornton.....	S9G
USS Curtiss.....	R3K
USS Hulbert.....	B8P
USS Avocet.....	E5N
USS Tangier.....	H8R
Comdr Div 1, VP 27.....	W3G
Comdr Div. 2, VP 27.....	V2G
Base Station, VP 27.....	U4B
Any Plane, VP 27.....	J5O
Patrol Sqdrn 27 (collective).....	J5P
Comdr Patron 27.....	J5PØ
27-P-1.....	J5P1
27-P-2.....	J5P2

<i>Station or net</i>	<i>Call</i>
27-P-3.....	J5P3
27-P-4.....	J5P4
27-P-5.....	J5P5
27-P-6.....	J5P6
27-P-7.....	J5P7
27-P-8.....	J5P8
27-P-9.....	J5P9
27-P-10.....	J5P10
27-P-11.....	J5P11
27-P-12.....	J5P12
27-P-13.....	J5P13
27-P-14.....	J5P14
27-P-15.....	J5P15

2. The Following calls are allocated to units indicated. They may be assigned by the unit Commander, but when assigned, report will be made at once to the Department Signal Officer.

Department:	MP5	Hawaiian Air Force:	EY3
-----	9HK	-----	HF7
-----	K93	-----	L35
-----	2DZ	-----	I72
-----	Z24	-----	M16
Navy:		-----	OG1
-----	Z3K	-----	RF7
-----	Z6C	-----	UV3
Division:		-----	VV3
-----	ZK5	-----	WS8
-----	2RC	-----	ZI6
-----	8KB	-----	IHH
-----	7ZU	-----	1IG
-----	YQ1	-----	18H
-----	P57	-----	1UG
-----	9KK	-----	1ZG
-----	2BZ	-----	3IL
-----	TM4	-----	3MX
-----	9YK	-----	4CM
H. S. C. A. B.:		-----	5AR
-----	QA1	-----	5NP
-----	EK9	-----	5QR
-----	XN6	-----	6DI
-----	JZ2	-----	6CI
-----	AZ2	-----	6ON
-----	7SW	-----	7KF
-----	CK5	-----	7QF
		-----	7YF
		-----	8LS
		-----	8QS

3. Call signs for Radio Sets, types SCR-194 and SCR-195, will be designated by the Commanding Officer of the units using such sets.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General SHORT:

J. W. LEWIS,  
*Captain, U. S. N.,*  
*Chief of Staff*

PHILIP HAYES,  
*Colonel, General Staff Corps,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

OFFICIAL:  
 R. C. THROCKMORTON,  
*Lt. Col., General Staff Corps,*  
*Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.*

ADDENDUM I TO ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41 (MODIFICATION No. 1)  
*Communication Plan—July 19, 1941*

*Confidential*

AUGUST 4, 1941.

1111. The Army system of transmitting information of enemy aircraft by voice on 900 kcs. is as follows:

Ten fixed Coast Artillery observation posts on Oahu are numbered and located at:

- |                      |                                   |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|
| No. 1. Diamond Head  | No. 6. Panena Point               |
| No. 2. Makapuu Point | No. 7. Kaena Point                |
| No. 3. Ulupau Head   | No. 8. Puo-o-Hulu (near Nanakuli) |
| No. 4. Laie          | No. 9. Barbers Point              |
| No. 5. Kahuku        | No. 10. Ahua Point                |

Those voice messages over 900 kcs. are from experience necessarily brief and include:

1. Observation post number of reporting station: "OP (1 to 10)".
2. Bearing from observation station: "N, NE, etc., to NW", or, "overhead".
3. Course of plane: "N, NE, etc., to NW."
4. Number of planes: "Single, few, many, or number (if quickly determined)."
5. Approximate altitude: "High, medium, or low."

Roy W. M. Graham,  
 ROY W. M. GRAHAM,  
*Commander, U. S. Navy,*  
*District Communication Officer.*



## EXHIBIT No. 46 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

*Confidential*

## COORDINATION OF FBI, ONI AND MID

5 JUNE 1940.

I. It is agreed that in conformity with the directive contained in the President's memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, responsibility for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities will be delimited as indicated hereafter. Responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the responsible agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippine Islands. FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—

(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

(b) Developments affecting vital utilities.

(c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems.

(d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

III. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War, or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of a designated group or set of circumstances.

FBI to keep MID and ONI informed of important developments.

IV. MID will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and the Philippine Islands.

MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.

V. ONI will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa.

ONI to inform FBI and MID of important developments.

VI. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength, and organization of all civilian groups designed to combat "Fifth Column" activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organization and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

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EXCERPTS FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS LETTER DATED MARCH 15, 1941, TO  
COMMANDANTS OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS, GOVERNOR OF GUAM, GOVERNOR OF  
SAMOA

*Confidential*

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage and Subversive Activities.

"1. The delimitation agreement of June 5, 1940, transmitted with reference (a), was modified at a conference on July 29, 1940 between the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, so far as subject-named investigations are concerned.

"2. The following is a transcript of the notes of the conference on the subject matter:

Mr. Hoover opened a discussion concerning the handling and coverage of Japanese activities. He stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence has done

far more in this field than has any other agency heretofore. Admiral Anderson stated that the Navy has made some check on Japanese activities and has gone into some things which could only be done upon their aggrandized interpretation of Naval interest. He stated that the Navy Department does not want the full responsibility for the checking of the Japanese because of a lack of personnel, etc. Admiral Anderson furnished the conference with the background of Commander McCollom and pointed out that the Commander had resided in Japan, knows the Japanese language and has excellent Japanese contacts. Admiral Anderson agreed to make Commander McCollom and the Far Eastern Division of the Navy Department available for consultation and advice to the FBI at any time it was necessary or desirable. It was agreed that the Navy would continue to check Japanese activities in the same manner as in the past and that the FBI would take all possible steps to assimilate information concerning Japanese activities and to expand its own operations in this field.'

"3. The investigations of Japanese by the Naval Intelligence Service will be coordinated with those undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

DECEMBER 12, 1940.

*Confidential*

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE ARMY AND THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OF THE NAVY

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies, recommend as follows:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Corps Area Military Intelligence Officers, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the three agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least once per week, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subjects necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the three agencies at all times should insure that there is no duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all three agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military and Naval Intelligence Services in connection with background and a knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military and Naval Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the Directors of the three intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

2. The above instructions should not in any way be construed as abrogating the delimitation agreement previously promulgated, but as amplifying and clarifying this agreement.

## EXHIBIT NO. 47 (NAVY PACKET NO. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Secret

## 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT

## CONTROL POST WATCH OFFICER'S LOG

[1] WAR DIARY

## FOURTEENTH DISTRICT NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE

- 0654 U. S. S. WARD transmitted the following message to Com 14: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the Defensive Sea Area."
- 0712 Message decoded and delivered to Duty Officer, Lt. Comdr. Kaminski.
- 0713 Duty Officer notified Chief of Staff, who notified Commandant.
- 0715 Duty Officer notified Commander-in-Chief's Duty Officer.
- 0718 Duty Officer notified Commander Momsen, War Plans Officer.
- 0720 Duty Officer notified Ensign Logan to report for duty.
- 0725 Commander Momsen called Duty Officer and had ready duty destroyer ordered to proceed as soon as possible to the assistance of the WARD.
- 0735 Honolulu gate ordered closed.
- 0740 Commander Momsen arrived, checked on ready duty destroyer and Pearl Harbor gate.
- 0745 Received message from WARD: "We sighted and captured sampan. We are escorting sampan into Honolulu. Please notify Coast Guard to relieve us of sampan."
- 0755 Japanese air attack noted—torpedo planes, dive bombing planes—coming in from various directions. Notified Commandant.
- 0803 In the middle of this attack, the Commandant, Rear-Admiral Bloch, arrived and took charge.
- 0805 Rear-Admiral Bloch issued following orders: "Close all Navy Yard gates to traffic. Have Captain of the Yard detail fire parties. Notify Marines to make all men available to assist in fighting fires. Notify Marines to bring in from Salt Lake Camp all available Marines. Notify Yard to flood drydock. Make arrangements for civilian workmen to be rounded up and brought to the Yard to assist in damage control. Notify hospital to establish emergency measures for caring for killed and wounded."
- [1a] 0830 Received request from ARGONNE to send assistance to care for casualties. Notified Captain of the Yard to send available motor vehicles.
- 0840 Another attack by the Japanese planes which was met by heavy anti-aircraft fire from defense positions and ships present. Received various reports of ships sinking in the harbor. Japanese plane attack seemed to be dispersed by anti-aircraft fire.
- 0920 Japanese planes dive-bombed Marine barracks. Repulsed by heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Yard.
- 0922 Power faded and went off for a short period of time.
- 0922 Received report that #1 drydock was being flooded.
- 0927 Observed air attack over Naval Air Station.
- 0927 Dive-bomber attacked Administration Building. Repulsed by anti-aircraft fire.
- 0935 Heavy explosion observed in direction of #1 drydock.
- 1006 Heavy explosion observed in the harbor in the direction of Ford Island.
- 1110 Heavy explosion observed in the direction of #1 drydock.
- 1125 Anti-aircraft fire opened up but no enemy planes were observed.
- 1135 Two planes flying about 500 yards off were fired upon by anti-aircraft fire. Believed to be own planes.
- 1140 Received report that parachute troops were landing at Barbers Point.
- 1145 Received report that troops were landing on North Shore, and that two aircraft carriers were observed 40 miles South of Barbers Point.
- 1248 Received report that four Japanese transports were observed off Barbers Point.
- 1313 Received report that a landing was being made at Nanakuli Beach.



[1b] 1452 Received report that five transports were sighted off Lualualei discharging troops in small craft. At this point checks on the above obviously false reports began to come in, and the aircraft warning circuit was temporarily cut out in order to eliminate confusion since it was then believed that enemy agents were making false broadcasts.

1600 Notified all activities that there would be a blackout at sunset and that certain activities engaged in damage control efforts would be permitted to work with limited lights, such lights to be controlled so that they would be extinguished immediately upon an air raid alarm.

Sunset Executed blackout.

2100 Received notice that ENTERPRISE planes would be coming in from sea to land. Notified all ships present and Army anti-aircraft units. This notice was sent out several times because of the anxiety of Commander Pat Wing Two about these planes.

It was reported Anti-aircraft batteries, starting with the PENNSYLVANIA, opened fire without orders on planes coming in. All ships in the harbor and anti-aircraft batteries joined in the barrage. Planes were identified as ENTERPRISE planes, and orders were given to cease fire, but it took several minutes to stop this barrage. It was believed that some of the ENTERPRISE planes were destroyed, but an accurate report was not received.

0500 Received reports of morning flights that would take off, and notified ships present, Army and other units of this fact.

0700 Received information that some flights would return for refueling.

[2] 12-8-41

0915 *From D. O. Coast Guard.* The tender KUKUI found a plane down off Barber's Point—no personnel aboard. Told CG to bring her in to Honolulu. Later reported as U. S. plane.

0926 KUKUI pursuing sampan with wounded men on board, sending another vessel to help her.

0928 Get Colonel Picket and request a marine guard to relieve the engineers now guarding the radio station at Wahiawa. *Given to marines.*

0930 Int. Center. Bellows Field says they have the man from a one man submarine 30' long and 4' wide on reef off Bellows Field, oil slick.

0938 Int. Center. 1 wing obs. plane BB type coming in from Barber's Point as if to land apparently on Ford Island . . . *Plane has landed.*  
CinCPAC says Inshore Patrol and Task Force 8 SW of Barber's Point. *Army advised.*

Does Army want a Naval officer in each O P? *Yes—being done.*

0940 Signal Tower—4 heavy cruisers 12 mi. off Barber's Point.

*Army and CinCpac advised.*

0940 Ewa Field being told not to fire on any seaplanes.

Enemy submarine off N. Shore off Haleiwa Point.

*Reported to Army and CinCpac who says it is an enemy.*

8 MTB's coming in also at 1100

1210 Signal tower reports heavy gunfire on windward side of the island.

1227 MIDWAY reports loss of 2 planes and a hangar.

1229 CinCpac advises we have no submarines north of Kaneohe—Compatwing TWO advised.

[3] 1838 Yard Duty Officer reports by phone that the south channel is now clear.

1841 YNg17 asks if a large vessel is standing out.

1850 CinCpac advises they are sending a ship to investigate the strange vessel reported 20 miles away—tell Army not to shoot.

1858 Wailupe reports she is in radio comm. with JOHNSTON, PALMYRA, GUAM, CAVITE, SAMOA and MIDWAY, but *not* with WAKE.

1920 Com Task Force 7 to Comdesdiv 6, LITCHFIELD, GUDGEON, Subdiv 43:  
LITCHFIELD make daylight contact and remain in company SS action aadee, escorting by night on surface to Pearl X rendezvous with two destroyers Desdiv 6 in lat 20-54 long 157-56 at 0630 LCT Dec 9 Tuesday X Enter Pearl at exactly 0930 X Avoid Penguin Bank X Keep darkened

1995 G-3 reports white green red lights approaching the beach at Waiialua. Told them (Lt. Gurr) to use their searchlights and investigate.



- 1998 DDs ELLET and BINGHAM moving over to Bishop Point.  
 2001 Plane without any lights high toward Ford Island from Merry Point, cut his motor—Reported by a Supply Officer at Merry Point. Plane dropped something in the water. (Garbled.)  
 2018 Tanker alongside now. Task Force 8. ENTERPRISE and 3 cruisers sortie bet. 1200 and 0130.  
*Cincpac 090711*  
 2029 Wailupe is now in communication with GUAM. Yard workman #1020. 5 badges by that no.  
 2035 Coast Guard KUNKI proceeding to Molokai to extinguish a light.  
 2048 Lt. Comdr. Hartung, Flag Lt. MARYLAND—Combatships Yard workman 1020, etc. etc., told him to call Yard D. O.  
 [4] 2050 Verified by Lt. Burr. AWS. ~~Kanakakai~~ *Kuanakakai* on MOLOKAI—Homestead airfield—Japanese troops landing.  
 2103 Two patrol planes coming in from SW—friendly.  
 2105 ENTERPRISE will sweep to the Eastward within 5 miles of Diamond Head—then go around island fairly close in.  
 2110 *To Army*. Barking Sands Kauai planes overhead.  
 2122 Marine sentry on beckoning point sending up flair—sent Marine guard via Ass't Capt. Yard boat.  
 2135 Task Force 8 Sortie info to G-3 and Yard Capt.  
 2152 G-3 called re cane fire in Ewa field—confirmed by signal tower as a normal fire. Capt. of Yard has been notified and steps being taken.  
 2202 Cincpac has (TFI) surface force 50 mi. off Kahuku—sent to G-3.  
 2204 Cincpac to A S PEARL, go to general qtrs at 0530. Two V 1 and 5 arr. PEARL from JOHNSTON expects to arrive at 0110 LCT.  
 2230 One of these is making a search and will get in about 0430.  
 2234 Fort Kam reports that Fort Weaver's investigation of glider reports is negative.  
 2240 Fire at West Loch is not in immediate danger and is separated from vital sections by green cane which will not burn.  
 2247 Glider troops reported by Major Aaron landing on salt flats near Fort Weaver, they are firing on them. Confirmation reports.  
 2248 Aircraft reported 60 miles west of Waianae by Radar.  
 [5] 2244 This from Melbourne, Australia. At 2330 GCT on 8th gun fire was heard East of NUKUNONO. Grade Cast 2. U. S. Cruiser PENSACOLA with convoy of 8 vessels was in vicinity.  
 2300 Notified Ewa Field of glider attack on Fort Weaver.  
 2314 Many planes coming fast SW of Kauai.  
 2317 Radio from JOHNSTON. This island not bombed.  
 2315 Report from Capt. Johnson, USMC (in chg 251st C. P. at Coal Docks) that glider troops reports are in error. Firing was at an orange flare.  
 2333 Task Force 8 Sortie set back 4 hours—Capt. Yard, G-3 and Info. center notified.  
 2335 Gate vessel hears planes, can't see them, coming from the direction of PEARL HARBOR.  
 2338 In Army code from MIDWAY  
     1. Landing has commenced.  
     2. Air support urgently needed.  
     (Given to Cincpac and Chief of Staff)  
 2345 Cincpac instructs Task Force 12 proceed toward PEARL and destroy enemy forces in their vicinity—planes searching, etc.  
 2342 Forts Weaver and Kam report that glider troops reports were in error, caused by confusion over PBY landing.
- MID-0600 12-9-41*
- 0140 Report checked re plane seen by sentry—call rechecked—worker nearby verified statement of sentry—heard small arm firing as plane veered back to side of road in Hospital area.  
 0158 Patwing—2. Reports friendly plane landing at Hickam Field. Expecting another plane to land 0250 at Pearl Harbor  
     Marine Corps Oper. Office  
 [6] 0245 Police report fire in Ewa—believe caused by saboteurs.  
 0255 Army air raid service reported unidentified vessel about 10 mi. off Kahuku Pt.—to Eastward. Army will drop flares and investigate.

- 0320 From SOPA S. D. to ASP S. D.  
San Pedro Control Post—  
Three unidentified planes 8 mi. S. W. Point Feinui headed S.  
8 unidentified bombers 70 miles E. of South headed San Diego.
- 0345 One #3 previously reported will take off at 0345 (broadcast)
- 0402 Information center reports submarine 260° T. Kaena Pt. Army will investigate. Information Center.
- 0412 Sentry on Post #6 reported steady machine gun firing heard from Post 64 situated just S. E. of Aiea Sugar Mills—firing estimated to be about 2 mi. to S. E. of this post.
- 0445 Sortie CRUDIV 5 DESRON 6
- 0900 WAKE heavily bombed.
- 0507 Information—reports two friendly (PBYs) planes arriving from JOHNS-  
TON landing at PEARL—daylight.
- 0520 Flights #1-2-3 took off—Wheeler—Hickam
- 0522 Utility wing reports planes flying high over MOLOKAI
- 0553 ENTERPRISE cleared.
- 0600 SALT LAKE CITY—last vessel out.

0600-

- 0619 Reported seven sea planes and one land plane [7] over MOLOKAI.  
They have sounded air raid alarms.
- 0621 About 20 Army bombers will be returning Hickam any time from now on.  
This message to all ships—all friendly.
- 0652 REDBIRD and CROSSBILL entered
- 0656 Reported 4 submerged submarines sighted 10 miles south of Diamond  
Head running along at periscope depth. Patwing 2 sending ten utility  
planes to operate in that area.
- 0705 10 additional planes taken off from PEARL immediately—friendly.
- 0709 Compawing 2 reports two friendly submarines off Kaena Pt.
- 0710 10 utility planes that just took off are returning immediately.
- 0715 At about 1000 the ANTARES will proceed from HONOLULU to PEARL.
- 0729 Information Center reports following message:  
One vessel off Kaena about 5 miles (could be sampan)  
“ “ North “ “ same distance  
“ “ 20 mi. North of Waialua  
“ “ North of Kahuku Point about 8 mi.  
“ “ South East of Kahuku Point 8 mi.
- 0726 From Information Center—Cinpac  
Submarines reported off Kaena Pt. Confirmed—are enemy.

NOTE.—reports on locations of 5 vessels were received by various RFD stations.

- 0725 CHANDLER and HOVEY entered.
- 0801 DORSEY entered
- 0802 ELLIOT “ } Channel entrance
- 0803 SOUTHARD “ }
- [8] 0805 One sub. reported 100 mi. S.W. of Barber's Pt. Cinpac advises  
enemy—Army and Patwing advised.
- 0828 2DD—LITCHFIELD, and 4 own SS entering.
- 0848 4 miles away from entrance—headed out
- 0974 Bombers taking off from PEARL at 0916 to attack sub. lying off harbor  
using depth charges.
- 0912 Patwing has planes 35 mi. S. E. of Kahuku Pt. proceeding to OAHU.
- 0924 Coast Guard reported ready to proceed around Island to bring in sampans.
- 0926 Planes coming in from the South—20 mi.—friendly.
- 0937 ANTARES leaving pier at HONOLULU HARBOR for PEARL.
- 0926 PW 2 reports one patrol plane taking off to bomb s/m.
- 0931 PLUNGER entered
- 0932 POLLACK “
- 0934 POMPANO “
- 0936 Submarine (name unknown)
- 0943 LITCHFIELD entered.
- 0944 Reports 18 VSS arriving from South about 10:00
- 0948 To Asp: 18 VO's arriving about 1000
- 0950 LITCHFIELD and 4 submarines in past Gate Vessel.

- 0951 One V5 with engine trouble—friendly—coming straight in bearing 255 by Point.
- 0952 Gray two stack steamer off Hilina Pali due south Kilauea not moving—received from Army.
- [9] 0955 Sig. tower reported P. T. boats 21 and 25 went on somewhere around 0943. P. T. boats 20 and 23 came in with submarines about 0936.
- 1155 C. G. requests:  
 5—30 cal. machine guns  
 15—Springfield rifles  
 15—45 cal. pistols  
 with ammunition for all. To be delivered to pier #4, but C. G. will send out if we can't deliver.
- 1214 HULL and DEWEY have cleared the channel.
- 1225 WARDEN and FARRAGUT cleared.
- 1240 Friendly planes will take off from PEARL 1250 and 1300—planes take off from Hickam at 1300 friendly.
- 1250 Friendly 1 p 17 landing at Hickam at 1310.
- 1255 One of our destroyers is dropping depth charges off Ahua Point.
- 1256 One Navy divebomber taking off from Hickam will land at Fort Island.
- 1300 PHELPS cleared harbor at 1240.
- 1302 1 B 18 will take off from P. B. at 1300 course 244 for 45 minutes then course 064 for 45 minutes then 065 for 45 min. then return.
- 1319 At about 1335 one Army B-18 will spiral down at high alt. directly over Hickam Field using regular approach procedure.
- 1322 Cancel above time. At about 1345 instead of 1335.
- 1324 CGC 403 en route HONOLULU around OAHU by way of BARBER'S POINT and KAINI to search for sampans.
- 1355 1430 one Navy Amphibian single motor leaving KANEOHE for homestead field on MOLOKAI will arrive home- [10] stead 30 min. later, then return to KANEOHE.

## 1400-2000

- 1430 Army intercepted message via 3590 KCs call sign 970—Please send help—position S. E. of OAHU—radio bearing 224° reciprocal.
- 1515 Patwing 2 sent 2 V. O. and target boat to assist plane down 25 mi. S. E. of Diamond Head.
- 1625 To all ships—planes approaching OAHU from South and SW—are friendly planes.
- 1600 Unidentified planes reported approaching OAHU from NW about 25 mi. dist.
- 1602 6—B17 took off to search north of KAHUKU.
- 1604 Air raid sounded. Received report unidentified plane coming in from N. W.—25 miles distant. Information message sent out that approaching plane may be friendly—all hands remain on alert.
- 1625 To all ships—planes approaching from South and SW are friendly.
- 1735 Secured from air raid.
- 1736 Three P. B. Y. over BARBERS POINT.
- 1740 To all ships: Do not fire—approaching seaplanes are friendly.
- 1800 Target boat 8 mi. from Harbor entrance—action taken.
- 1844 Request from S. F. for tin hats—none available. Will call in the morning.
- 1852 WAKE ISLAND. Third raid 2350 GCT ninth. 26 bombers at 20,000—two downed by fighters—additional damage slight—few casualties—enemy subs. sighted S. W. off Island.
- [11] 1914 Report CAVITE bombed—damage extensive.
- 2030 Army transport FRANCK will stop at MOLOKAI on way to MAUI tomorrow—time given later.
- 2130 Army observation post at KOLEKOLE reported a blinker in Naval Ammunition Reservation at LUALUALEI, also a blinker at sea apparently replying.  
 Investigation made and seems that a truck was sent to some nearby woods to pick up a crew of men installing some radio equipment. The truck used a blinker to contact the crew and this to be the reason for a blinker from LUALUALEI.  
 Unable to establish any reason for blinker at sea.
- 2257 Two vessels 15 mi. North of KAHUKU POINT probably friendly.
- 2350 Receiving ship reported Marine squad not reported to man machine gun. Marine barrack was called and squad sent to R. ship at 0023.



Wed. 12-10-41

- 0012 Have intercepted steamship AUSING flying Australian flag on course South from HONOLULU. Now escorting same back to HONOLULU.
- 0016 Message from Fort Kam. Ship showing light. Position 55 Hypo Baker 34—5 miles from Kewalo Basin. Machine gun fire on vessel from Basin friendly.
- 0032 WARD to Com 14—dropped 4 depth charges 3 miles So. from entrance buoy; no identification or call letters.
- 0350 Comtask 12 to Cincpac: DUE CONGESTION FLIGHT AND HANGAR DECKS LEXINGTON REPORTS UNABLE MAKE NECESSARY CHECKS BY PLANES X AUTHORITY REQUESTED LAUNCH MARINE SQUADRONS AT ZERO EIGHT THIRTY TOMORROW TO FLY TO EWA X WILL ADVISE POSITION OF LAUNCHING LATER.
- [12] 0400 Informed marine and Army activities of contemplated flights at dawn.
- 0420 Army information service reported Radar indicating plane approach from South. Air alarm sounded.
- 0425 Sent out report that plane may be friendly.
- 0500 Sounded all clear.
- 0540 Hickam Field planes started taking off.
- 0541 All activities informed—there are no enemy planes in the air.
- 0550 Two mine sweeps leaving PEARL HARBOR. Report Capt. of the Yard office.
- 0605 Coast Guard informs—TAUSSIG accompanied by Cutter will enter HONOLULU HARBOR 0645.
- 0638 Report from channel "Q" station sound of letter "M".
- 0714 Comtaskfor—LEXINGTON has launched inner anti-submarine and combat patrol.
- 0719 Following ships cleared—MONAGHAN 0612—HOVEY 0625—CHANDLER 0630—SOUTHARD 0642—DORSEY 0642—LONG 0650—ELLIOT 0655—CROSSBILL 0710. Following entered CHEW 0654—MCDONOUGH 0711.
- 0727 Patrol plane taking off one coming to replace it—friendly.
- 0755 6 friendly planes taking off from PEARL.
- 0846 G-2 reports 12 ships on horizon North of Bellows Field—Cincpac reports these are friendly.
- 0914 Inf. Center reports 11 vessels bearing 250 dist. 10 miles from KOKO HEAD 1 VP from KANEHOE to PEARL at 0930 friendly.
- [13] Following ships entered—  
0849 LAMBERTON—0903 CASE—0904 TUCKER—0905 SELFRIDGE  
0907 BAYLEY—0909 BOGGS—0912 CONYNGHAM
- 1000 Two patrol planes not camouflaged will depart PEARL about 1010 out between entrance and BARBERS POINT.
- 1245 Coast Guard reports: Coast MILLER and NAEMEI entering HONOLULU HARBOR.
- 1246 All VO—VA have returned to bases (Compat-2)
- 1252 Coast Guard reports 1 sampan S. E. off MOKAPU LT. Escorted by 2 destroyers. Inf. Center.
- 1330 4 planes J 2 F taking off immediately 045 direct dist. 150 mi. out. Patwing 2.
- 1505 4 amphibian coming in to KANEHOE for gas.
- 1425 Air Raid WAKE ISLAND.
- 1538 Army report—H. D. of P. H.  
Ewa—Lt. Simpson found parachute belonging to Lt. (jg) Rawie, U. S. N. apr. pos. 1½ mi. sta. B ½ way BARBERS PT.
- 1555 From Patwing 2—Two submarines reported moving north about 5 mi. offshore at 0153 vicinity KAILUA South Kona, Island of HAWAII. Action taken.
- 1635 Confiscated sompan loaded with about 1 ton fish—manned by four Japanese—fish unloaded and placed in cold storage by Supply Dept. Four fishermen turned over to local F. B. I.
- 1825 Friendly planes landing between 1835 and 1900.
- 1959 Army plane landed at Hickam, fuel exhausted.
- 2010 Two planes landed—friendly.
- [14] 2210 Patwing 2 reports all planes in.



- 2125 Army turning on all available search lights trying to locate lost planes.  
 2240 Army turned on all available lights at BARBERS PT. Lost plane.  
 2245 Army OP's (2) reports heavy gun fire at sea about 25 miles west of BARBERS POINT, (45 KF, 45 KD) cannot see gun flashes.  
 2307 Last army plane has landed.  
 2310 Homing frequency secured.  
 2328 Inf. Center reports two planes flying high over KAENA POINT. Investigating.  
 2330 Inf. Center has opened fire on these planes—this does not constitute an air raid alarm. (Reported to Cincpac.)  
 2334 Inf. Center reports they are firing on the two planes but do not put much faith in it as they cannot pick them up on the Radar screen.  
 2343 Aircraft contact 15 miles due west of point George by Radar).  
 2355 Signal tower reports flashing light on new dock.

*MID-6 12-11-41*

- 1800 WARD dropped 6 bombs on contact bearing 188°-2.8 mi. from # 1 buoy—surface water shows definite oil slick.  
 Reported to Cincpac, Chief of Staff.  
 0020 All Radar contacts lost on aircraft previously reported by Army Inf. Center.  
 0200 Duty Officer Naval Air Station reported there will be delay in arrival of plane from WAKE ISLAND.  
 [15] 0255 Received message from Radio Elect. (Regain) U. S. S. NEW ORLEANS: INTERCEPTED JAP TRANSMISSIONS ON 3500 KC AND SHIP ANSWERING TO THESE ABOUT 2 KC HIGHER.  
 0430 Informed Port Director (NTS)—Japanese subs operating to the North of OAHU (PORTLAND and CYNTHIA OLSEN approaching Honolulu).  
 0446 Information center reports unidentified ship about 6 mi. N. KAHUKU PT.—No information available on any friendly ships operating in this area. Referred to army for action.  
 0500 Information Center reports that the unidentified vessel off N. KAHUKU has moved out 20 miles off shore.  
 0500 Information Center reports:  
     7 planes will take off at 0515 from Wheeler  
     9 planes will take off at 0520 to circle over Hickam between 0530 and 0630 at 5000 ft.  
 0515 Information Center reports planes heard over LUALUALEI. Asked for confirmation.  
 0520 Confirmed 7 from Wheeler Field, 5 from Hickham. Additional planes will leave at 0530.  
 0530 From Hickam and Pearl about 36 planes will take off at 0600—activities notified.  
 0530 Report from Information Center indicates ship reported 20 mi. off N. KAHUKU has disappeared from locality.  
 0540 Report from Information Center indicates—total of 22 planes in the air.  
 0550 Patwing reports nothing sighted off N. KAHUKU. Planes made search in arc of 160°.  
 0600 Information Center reports vessel sighted 16 mi. to East of MOKAPU.  
 [16] 0600 Patwing 2 reports the following planes taking off: 12 VPs, 12 VOs and VS's, 6 B 18's, 6 Jr's.  
 0625 3 j 2 F's proceeding through valley KAENA POINT to investigate sub.  
 0700 Friendly planes are returning to Wheeler Field.  
 0753 One friendly plane approaching from Diamond Head.

*Thursday, 11 December 1941*

- [17] 0826 Flight #1 is landing.  
 0935 Friendly seaplanes flying over Diamond Head toward Pearl.  
 0940 CHANDLER reports that she has sighted a periscope near the entrance to Pearl.  
 0943 HOPKINS sighted periscope off Barbers Point Buoy and developing contact.  
 0943 CHANDLER coming in full speed and is slowing down for harbor gate.  
 0945 COCKATOO sighted periscope Barbers Point.  
 0951 From Comdr. Offshore Patrol making contact. Suggest plane be sent for assistance off Barbers Point.

- 0959 Both submarines have turned back and are coming in.  
 1009 Coast Guard reported sighted submarine off harbor entrance heading toward Diamond Head.  
 1118 From A. F. Hilo reports Army plane calling Mayday on 4495.  
 1131 SOS from Army plane was 220° from Hickam. Cannot make station. Send help.  
 1141 Bearing of Army plane from Lualualei 025-035 has sighted on islands.  
 1149 BREESE proceeding to help Army plane.  
 1150 CinCPac. Three planes crashing into sea 30° bearing from Honolulu 20 to 30 miles. Rush assistance.  
 1151 Fifteen minutes ago Kilauea reported bearing on plane SCC 355°.

*6:00 PM, 11 December 1941*

- 1220 CHANDLER reports to Com14: "Oil results 145 yards, 130° from point of attack."  
 1240 Fort De Russy reports an unidentified freighter at 65 A.A.—35 at 1200 listing badly—about 30 miles SW of Oahu.  
 1240 Cable office received word from MIDWAY at 0722 Thursday—"Attack alarm."  
 1310 Honolulu Coast Guard reports SS LAHAINA sending out SOS pos. L 27-30N, Lat. 148-02W.  
 [18] 1315 Fort De Russy: Reports freighter previously reported 30 miles SW of Oahu seems to be O. K. Destroyer on patrol investigate. Confirmed.  
 1325 Army observation post #3 reports four stack destroyer in sinking condition.  
 1330 CHEW to Com 14: Made definite contact with enemy submarine at range 6600—released 6 charges—sub rose to surface on second charge.  
 1400 Re-investigation alleged sinking of four stack destroyer. Report found to be false. (Checked by Army Observation Post #3). (Lt. Cd. USN at this post.)  
 1425 Pan-American launch that was painted red and white is now painted gray. (From Captain of Yard)  
 1437 To Com Minron 2: Signal sent—"Your designation is task group 4.5."  
 1438 Commander Daniels reports that XAMC Div has returned to its base and is working on its acoustic gear.  
 1502 The WARD has cleared the channel.  
 1545 LONG sighted torpedo wake, turned from, and dropped depth charges pos. 235 Diamond Head, 5 miles, produced oil slick. Reported Cinpat.  
 1655 Submarine sighted 180 (T) Bishop Pt. Bombed by planes of PatWing 2. Oil slick.  
 1800 PatWing has 2 flights out. #12 and 20—10 planes.  
 1821 Friendly patrol planes returning from 1815—2000.  
 1940 Planes returning from Wheeler to Hickam.  
 2115 Naval Air Station O. D. reported ships at entrance to middle loch shot at crash boat No. 2 at 1845.  
 2147 Naval Air Station O. D. is to send 50 foot motor launch from landing A to landing C Ford Island at 2145.  
 2150 Two friendly planes coming in from North have running lights—one from any direction running lights—side lights being turned on to guide them in.  
 [19] 2225 Army turned on lights from Barbers Pt.—Kaena to Kahuku searching for missing plane.  
 2300 Friendly plane approaching over Fort Wheeler.  
 2350 Lights in Administration went out. A flare or red rocket appeared between the Marine barracks and Red Hill just as the lights went out. Power house reports normal breakdown.

*Friday, 12 December 1941*

- 0050 Signal tower reported red flashing light between Fort Kam and gate vessel. No confirmation.  
 0030 Lt. Sholbrook reports from the submarine base gate that while he was at Makalapa radio station the Marine guard was fired on from the East (2-4 shots) about 0020.  
 Reported to Capt of Yard Office.

- 0125 Report from harbor listening post—noises picked up by #3 sono-buoy.  
0205 Signal Tower reported search lights turned on near Barbers Point. Confirmation PatWing 2. Friendly planes coming in for landing.
- 0250 Lights restored in Administration Building.  
0252 PatWing 2 reports unidentified planes in the air in vicinity. All stations placed on alert.  
0250 Information Center repeated above report.  
0310 Army released all AA batteries to fire on anything in the air. No friendly planes in the air. (Information Center)
- 0330 Naval Air Station sounded general quarters.  
0335 Office Naval Intelligence reports that five red rockets were observed being fired between town and Pearl Harbor. Observed from roof of Young Hotel.
- 0420 Secured from air raid station.  
0545 Army Pursuit out.  
[20] 0605 THORNTON under way. Out 0655.  
0617 BOGGS under way. Out 0700.  
0640 Plane forced down—in need of assistance.  
0650 THORNTON to rescue.  
0706 DALE under way—out 0745.  
0823 (Intercepted) Ship bearing 122. Distance 142 miles is enemy sub.  
0826 One PBV 0830 P. H. going out Pos. 122 142 miles.  
0830 One Naval aux. leaving Honolulu Harbor escorted by two destroyers for P. H. "Jupiter"
- 0842 CROSSBILL entered.  
0843 ASH cleared.  
0858 Inter-island plane leaving John Rogers airport at 0930. Est. time of arrival at Burns Field at Kauai at 1035. Leaving Burns Field at 1130 arr. John Rogers at 1250.
- 0852 Can you claim any vessels off Pt. George (*Error*) about 5 miles SW.  
0854 (CinC) checked—claim *NONE*. INFO C. ADVISED.  
0900 Patrol plane patrolling in sector off Pt. George (*Error*—RELAY). Directed to investigate vessels 5 mi. SW of POINT GEORGE.
- 0912 Can you claim 2 ships 4 miles North of Point Baker?  
0914 Vessels are friendly off Pt. Baker.  
0900 FOSS #11 enter PEARL.  
0915 CROSSBILL out.  
0950 TIGER from Honolulu to Pearl to take on ammunition.  
1000 Intercept—Info. to PatWing 2: Plane down 40 Kate transmitting MO's on 5275 KCs.
- [21] 1027 Coast Guard TIGER entered.  
KEOSANQUA standing down channel with degaussing equipment in tow.  
1030 Merchantman standing out of Honolulu (Jupiter).  
1041 From Info: One T. R. plane CLV Hickam at 1100 arr. Burns Field 1231. Lv. Burns, Kauai at 1300—arr. Hickam at 1430.  
1058 SS JUPITER entered channel.  
DORSEY, ELLIOT searching for reported enemy sub—entrance to Pearl—delayed until 1730.
- 1114 From channel cont. stn.: JUPITER and destroyer passed through buoy.  
1120 (HCP rec'd). Sampan off Mahukona Point adrift. Needs help at once. Coast Guard—Inshore Pat.—PatWing 2 advised.  
1135 CinCPac dispatching two destroyers to the aid of sampan.  
1202 Channel clear.  
1230 From Commander Offshore to Com 14: BREESE, RAMSEY gained contact between Oahu and Molokai. BREESE dropped 7 depth charges.  
1247 BREESE and RAMSEY still investigating. Have directed Trevor Convoy to return to harbor.  
1300 0900 Guard from Capt. Port Detail placed on Norwegian steamer ROSEVILLE to prevent sabotage.  
1300 CONDOR in.  
1320 Channel Control Station: Hear noises sounding like fathometer near number 4 buoy.  
1335 Ft. DeRussy reports 4 subs off Koko Head 1316—submerged.  
1334 BREESE and RAMSEY still investigating. Have directed Trevor Convoy to return to harbor.  
1335 From Offshore Patrol: No further contact since BREESE depth charges attack.



- [22] 1345 From Dept. 3: Subs as reported were observed 3 mi. off Hanauma Bay headed toward Diamond Head.
- 1400 TIGER cleared.
- 1429 From HOVEY: Am escorting British merchantman off Koko Head to Honolulu.
- 1432 Pan-American Clipper sighted sub at 1800 CCT course 20 on surface full speed ahead. 25-40N-146-40W.
- 1445 Pearl Harbor gate in operation.
- 1446 From Channel Control Station: Hear noises resembling fathometer near number 4 buoy. No vessel within range.
- 1500 From Commander Offshore Patrol: Am making sound search off Koko Head with 4 ships. Planes have not indicated contact. Will make one more search and resume offshore patrol.
- 1530 Army plans to fire 16 rounds from their batteries on North Shore at 1600.
- 1537 From Chanel Station: Buoy 4 transmitting sound similar to depth finder.
- 1540 86 squadron—reports small boat seemingly a mine sweeper about 5 mi. NW of west tip of Molokai. Course approx. 120° (T) medium speed—reported to I. S. P. Do not claim.
- 1555 Info: 6 P40's one flight and 5 P40's Wheeler to Ewa. Will take off 1600.
- 1835 PatWing 2 requested Army to turn on searchlights to assist Navy planes home.
- 1854 Army orders—All groups resume fire—there are no friendly planes in air.
- 1855 Robert informs PatWing 2: There are no friendly planes in air and will fire at anything. Harbor Control request not to broadcast on air.
- 1912 Capt. of Yard advises that some screen lights will be used on Tennessee tonight in connection with repair work.
- [23] 2005 Robert reports planes visual and Radar standing toward Kaneohe.
- 2005 Army and Navy units told to stand by. No raid sounded. This report by Robert.
- 2007 Army fire control group just ordered searchlights to go into action. Search north.
- 2009 Robert reports 1 plane of original 5 sighted 9 mi. south of Kaawa.
- 2038 Plane reported by Radar 73° from 10 miles off south of Kaawa.
- 2045 Shafter reports flare or plane 235° from Shafter 25 miles out.
- 2050 Robert reports plot on Radar screen about 7 miles off Kaneohe Bay.
- 2058 Coast Art. Post confirms report of plane at Kaneohe.
- 2130 Kaawa turned on searchlight on water to search.
- 2150 Robert reports searchlight has picked up nothing, Coast Artillery post have reported nothing and Radar shows nothing.

*Saturday, 13 December, 1941*

- 0028 O. P. 11 reports red flares due E. off Barbers Point.
- 0241 Waianae observers report hearing gunfire about 40 miles at sea.
- 0242 Robert reported ship with running lights on off Ahua Pt. shining lights on shore near Ft. Kam.
- 0247 Gunfire off Waianae is getting heavier.
- 0248 Ship is 8 or 9 miles out. Going away from Pearl. Still unidentified.
- 0249 Observers at Waianae do not hear gunfire any more.
- 0250 Vessel off Ahua Pt. is off shore patrol (from Robert).
- [24] 0304 To Robert: Do you release all targets.
- 0305 Targets all released.
- 0306 One plane reported flying low west of Main Gate.
- 0307 Inshore Patrol coming in all the way to the net to search.
- 0320 Gunfire off Waianae is being heard again.
- 0323 One DD searching area from net to vicinity Hospital Pt. One DD searching from net to harbor entrance. This operation will be carried on until daylight.
- 0328 From RDF Station: Navy report may be plane 12 mi. SE Pearl Harbor. 170° (T)
- 0337 Report on plane came from Pvt. ERSKINE stationed with machine gun by the channel entrance in the hospital area. He was on his toes. He saw a green light high in the air. Disappeared into the clouds. Heard sound of a motor. He passed the word.



- 0437 Pvt. Barrow, Pvt. Duncan report seeing white flare over Wheeler Field at 3:15. At 2 o'clock saw white light on Waianae range. On for 5 minutes, off for 10 minutes, on for 4 more minutes.
- | 0505 | <i>Flight</i> | <i>Out</i> | <i>In</i> | <i>Type</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|------|---------------|------------|-----------|-------------|----------------|
|      | No. 8-----    | 1145       | 1500      | 4 VSO       | 075-270        |
|      | No. 9-----    | 0900       | 1145      | 3 J2F       | 075-270        |
|      | No. 10-----   | 1500       | sunset    | 4 VSO       | 075-270        |
|      | No. 11-----   | 0630       | 1200      | 2 PBY       | Kona Coast     |
- 0508 Wheeler Field will launch 6 pursuits at 0540. Ewa 11 pursuits.
- 0509 Friendly ship at sea will launch 4 planes before sunrise. (SOC)
- 0540 3 friendly destroyers entering Pearl about 0600. Friendly steamer entering Honolulu about 0600.
- 0602 Planes taking off from Pearl. Flights 1 to 7.
- 0610 1 friendly submarine with escort will arrive Pearl at 0830. 6 friendly submarines with escort will arrive Pearl at 0830. Both will enter.
- [25] 0618 No. 11 0630 1200 2 PBY's Kona Coast.
- 0635 Will all friendly submarines entering Pearl this morning be on surface?
- 0639 All friendly submarines entering Pearl at 0830 will be on the surface.
- 0645 1 or 2 VS to take off from Pearl immediately to go for enemy sub. 1 mile SE Mokapu Point. Return 0830.
- 0646 1 friendly PBY return Pearl at 0738 from NW. Engine trouble.
- 0702 1 submarine sighted 1 mile east of Mokapu light.
- 0706 The BOGGS escorting the ADMIRAL CHASE off Barbers Point to Honolulu.
- 0715 At 0800 ASTORIA and DRAYTON entering Pearl. At 0800 DORSEY and ELLIOT will enter Pearl.  
At 0845 Desron five entering Pearl.
- 0734 1 friendly plane returning to Pearl due to engine trouble.
- 0743 Forts Weaver and Barrette will fire 2 rounds each 16'' December 13th beginning at 1000. Fort Kam estimates they should be through by noon.  
The point of aim is 55 BD 19, Lat. 21-23-15N  
Long. 158-20-45 W, 11 miles 197° from Kaena Point.
- [26] 0824 Ft. Ruger reports one sub unidentified 1½ miles S. E. of Ulupau Head and 2 destroyers apparently searching.
- 0918 To A. S. P.—Be on lookout for submarine suspected to be in harbor.
- 0940 From Comdesbatfor: Request all boating in harbor be stopped.
- 0941 Signal tower—0600—No contact—searching vicinity—awaiting instructions.
- 0945 From Lt. Elliott, Pearl Harbor Groupment at 1005 Weaver and Barrett will fire major at Point near 55 BD 29—approximate time of completion 1040.
- 0945 From Fort DeRussy: Randolph will fire 14 inch battery about 1000 approximate point of impact 10 miles South of Hickam Field, exact coordinates 55-GA78.
1034. From Comdesbatfor: stop boating in harbor not being complied with—stop boating immediately.  
From G-3; 86 observation squadron are making daily search for subs in channel between Oahu and Molokai. Especially watchful near Oahu.
- 1103 From HCP—To Commander Inshore Patrol: Oil slick dissipated—buoy working believed to be dissipating coil of wire.
- 1103 From WRIGHT—Suspicious oil slick coming up 100 ft. on our starboard bow.
- 1039 From Comdesbatfor—To Cincpac: Water too shallow for effective echo ranging. Listening useless if sub is now lying on bottom waiting for activities subside. Complete sweep and sounding by small boats suggested.
- 1049 From Commander Offshore Patrol to Channel Control Station: Action addressee 131941 SOUTHARD only sonic equipped ship offshore patrol available. Will report Comdesdiv 7.
1132. From PatWing 2 to A. S. P.: They are going to have planes patrolling Pearl Harbor, loaded with depth charges. If charges are dropped, planes are not to be fired on.

- [27] 1210 From USS PLUNGER to Harbor Patrol (sent on to PatWing 2): Submarine boat has made contact with submarine between buoys 12 and 14.
- 1222 From PLUNGER (relayed to PatWing 2): Small boat has made contact with submarine 200 yards astern of SOLACE.
- 1223 Harbor Control to Robert: Lt. Cooper has a white sampan and is leaving Honolulu for Pearl Harbor at 1245 (LCT).
- 1233 From Patwing 2: 72 friendly planes arriving Pearl Harbor immediately. (Sent to A. S. P.) Will probably be 1315 before all have arrived.
- 1235 From TREVOR to Commander Offshore Patrol: About 16 unidentified planes approaching from Diamond Head.
- 1243 NAVAJO ordered to proceed on duty assigned at 1230.
- 1315 From PatWing 2: 10 biplanes will—probably no procedure signals.
- 1330 29 takes off 1330 from Hickam—6-B18 sector 100 to 160. Return sunset. 30 out 1330 Ewa 12 FB 2 U3 search sector 340 to 100 200 mi. return sunset.
- 1339 New bearing carrier from Diam. 2 17° (T) range 25,000.
- 1350 Pan Clipper departs Pearl 1500.
- 1400 From CinCPac to Task Force 12: Do not enter Pearl. Proceed south until further orders.
- 1405 Flight 2 delayed until 1400.
- 1406 From Pan American—Clipper departs at 1530.
- 1414 Flight 31 leaves 1530—1 Pan Am. clipper from PH to coast fly along south coast Oahu.
- 1420 Flight 29 and 30 delayed until 1450.
- 1422 From PatWing 2: Slick at buoy 21 report negative.
- [28] 1355 From Comdesbatfor to CincPac: My 0001. It is reported that propeller noises ceased on explosion of depth charge. Small boats dragging area near buoy 8.
- 1410 From DeRussy: Airplane carrier proceeding southward. Not coming in. Accompanied by cruisers and destroyers.
- 1445 10 cruiser planes patrolling harbor until 1415 for Task Force 12. From Fleet landing: Word immediately upon suspension of operation.
- 1458 From Robert: Do you have any info. on freighter and destroyer off Waianae?
- 1459 From Robert: Freighter and destroyer are U. S.
- 1510 Flight 32-1515-14 SBD PH in a southwesterly direction for patrol.
- 1512 Flight 11 is in.
- 1500 From Commander Offshore Patrol to Com 14: WASMUTH attacked on sound contact bearing 210 (T) distance 2 miles from Aloha Tower. First attack brought up oil. Second attack made on apparent wake.
- 1444 From Comdesbatfor to Com 14: Resume normal traffic except area West Ford Island.
- 1520 From G-2: Jap plane shot down at Fort Kam. Sunday had radio tuned to 4185 KC. Believed to be command frequency for planes.
- 1526 Flight 32 delayed until 1530. Take off direct—not procedure.
- 1531 From S 3 Shafter—Submarine surfacing in area 55 CB 35.
- 1545 From PatWing 2—Sending 2—J2Fs over Kam to investigate sub.
- 1547 From Patwing 2—Flights 9 and 2 are in.
- 1555 Matson freighter sighted in 38 Ruth—Course 053 sp. 10.
- [29] 1540 From Wailupe to Com 14: FCC reports Jap. bearing 70° and reciprocal 250 on 4250 as previously reported by Palmyra.
- 1610 PatWing 2: Flight 4 is in.
- 1623 From PatWing 2: Flights 23 and 27 are in.
- 1625 From PatWing 2: Flight 28 is in.
- 1630 From PatWing 2: Do we have any DDs dropping depth charges between points D and E.
- 1635 From PatWing 2: Do you have any large ships between D and E in the channel.
- 1640 From PatWing 2: Flight 34 returned.
- 1652 PatWing 2 to Robert: Flight 35—1 transport amphibian. Enroute MAUI to PEARL HARBOR. Estimated time of arrival 1710.
- 1658 Flights 29-33 are out, flights 14-17 are in.
- 1702 PatWing 2 to H. Com. Flight 35 is in.
- 1708 Flight 32 is in.

- 1714 Flight 32 will be in at sunset. 1708 report not correct.
- 1720 LEXINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO and PORTLAND entered in order named at 1640.
- 1723 Army G-3 reported Japanese plane landed near crater on Niihau with damaged landing gear. Pilot defending or defended himself with machine guns aided by local aliens.
- 1730 All units assume condition of readiness one.
- 1736 Ensign Kelley relieved THE Watch.
- 1748 Flight 24 is in.
- 1750 3 PBY's of patrols 3 and 5 are out.
- 1751 Flight 30 is in.
- 1752 Flight 33 is in.
- 1753 35 Helen 69 is probably one of our own patrol planes.
- [30] 1754 Flight 34 is in.
- 1756 Flight 3 is in.
- 1757 Flight 5 is in.
- 1758 Flights in air: flight 31. A clipper to the mainland.
- 1800 There are no planes in the air—from PatWing 2.
- 1801 All units BELLOWS FIELD assumed condition I of readiness—from Robert.
- 1807 PatWing 2—from Robert: testing.
- 1809 At 1725 one sampan sighted one mile east from John Rodgers airport two persons aboard.
- 1811 PatWing 2 from Robert: Can you identify plane flying east of KAHALA.
- 1811 Plane flying east of KAHALA cannot be identified.
- 1815 Plane at 35 Gertrude 51 from.
- 1816 Plane above is now over KANEOHE.
- 1817 Plane reported above was found to be a star.
- 1822 From Harbor Patrol to PatWing 2: One U. S. boat leaving from Ford Island to return pilots to two cruisers in PEARL HARBOR.
- 1840 34 Helen 77 is the location of unidentified object, probably enemy sub. From Robert.
- 1845 34-Helen 77 still shows. From Robert.
- 1846 35-Helen 32—unidentified surface craft. Can you identify? From Robert.
- 1847 35-Helen-32 is U. S. vessel. From Harbor Control to Robert.
- 1854 Robert from Harbor Control: Lights coming on now.
- [31] 1901 Section base light, boat shop, deck below D. O.'s room, west wing of Administration Building near P. O. 4 flashes; marine railway work in sub lights shows; building 90 F. end near commissary lot of light. From Captain of Yard.
- 1903 At 1855 channel west of Ford Isle reported clear for traffic by Captain of the Yard's office.
- 1905 TIME CHECK—WATCH IS 15 SECONDS FAST.
- 1915 34 Helen 77 has disappeared.
- 1917 34 Helen 93. Can you identify? From Robert.
- 1918 Robert from Harbor Control: Affirm—U. S. ships.
- 1921 Harbor Control from Yard Duty.
- 1927 34 Helen 94. Can you identify? From Robert.
- 1929 Robert from Harbor Control: Affirm. U. S. Ships.
- 1933 Flashing light bears 271° from new dry dock. CinCPac to Robert.
- 1946 Harbor Control from Robert: Are two U. S. ships to enter PEARL tomorrow at 0800?
- 1947 Robert from Harbor Control: Negative. We have no information of such.
- 1942 35 Helen 21 Can you identify? From Robert.
- 1943 Robert from Harbor Control: Affirm. U. S. Offshore Patrol.
- 1945 35 Helen 42.
- 1947 Green blinker lite west of WAIPAHAU between NNW and NW of mid loch channel. From AIEA.
- 2000 Periscope sighted by lookout on old BALTIMORE moving through water 30 yards on port side.
- 2006 34 Helen 94 Can you identify?
- 2007 35 Helen 86? Unidentified. Army searchlights turned on.
- 2009 35 Helen 63? U. S. vessel.
- [32] 2014 34 Helen 90? U. S. vessel.

2017 34 Helen 76? Unidentified. Army will play searchlights on same.  
 2020 34 Helen 77? Two more vessels plotted north of the above.  
 2022 34 Helen 44?  
 2026 35 Helen 24? U. S. vessel.  
 2028 34 Helen 55? Unidentified.  
 2034 35 Helen 105? Unidentified.  
 2039 34 Helen 76? Unidentified.  
 2040 36 Helen 01? Unidentified.  
 2041 36 Helen 05? Unidentified.  
 2042 34 Helen 61? U. S. vessel.  
 2043 34 Helen 66? Unidentified.  
 2044 34 Helen 64? Unidentified.  
 2045 35 Helen 98? Unidentified.  
 2046 34 Helen 61? U. S. vessel.  
 2050 34 Helen 64? Unidentified.  
 2058 35 Helen 72? U. S. vessel.  
 2102 34 Helen 92? U. S. vessel.  
 2106 35 Helen 06? U. S. vessel.  
 2111 34 Helen 66? Unidentified.  
 2112 34 Irene 29? Unidentified.  
 2115 35 Helen 21 U. S. vessel.  
 2116 F. & E. dist. about six mile?  
 2124 Admiral Furlong Ph. 2169 in sub. base sleeping quarters.  
 [33] 2125 35 Helen 41 U. S. vessel.  
 2133 34 Helen 74? U. S. vessel.  
 2138 34 Helen 65? Unidentified.  
 2147 34 Helen 63? Unidentified.  
 2147 34 Helen 64? Unidentified.  
 2147 34 Helen 65? Unidentified.  
 2153 35 Helen 88 Unidentified.  
 2155 35 Irene 19?  
 2205 34 Helen 09 Unidentified.  
 2205 35 Irene 29 Unidentified.  
 2205 35 Irene 39 Unidentified.  
 2207 34 Helen 90 U. S. vessel.  
 2209 34 Helen 93 U. S. vessel.  
 2210 35 Helen 61 U. S. vessel.  
 2212 35 Irene 49 U. S. vessel.  
 2214 35 Helen 88 Unidentified.  
 2215 35 Helen 34 U. S. vessel.  
 2217 35 Irene 19 U. S. vessel.  
 2219 35 Helen 88 2 vessels—unidentified.  
 2218 34 Helen 93 U. S. vessel.  
 2223 35 Helen 64  
 2228 G-4 Colonel Wyman—"running at Canton has been blocked" From Robert.  
 2228 35 Helen 15 U. S. vessel.  
 2229 34 Helen 81 U. S. vessel.  
 [34] 2234 34 Helen 91 U. S. vessel.  
 2234 34 Helen 92 U. S. vessel.  
 2242 Unidentified surf vessel around Pt. no longer picked up by Radar.  
 2244 35 Helen 77 Unidentified.  
 2244 35 Helen 87 Unidentified.  
 2244 Army will open fire on above.  
 2246 35 Helen 63 U. S. vessel.  
 2252 35 Helen 00 U. S. vessel.  
 2252 35 Helen 11 U. S. vessel.  
 2252 35 Helen 12 U. S. vessel.  
 2311 PatWing 2: Have you planes in air? Negat. From Robert.  
 2317 Contacts at West of Easy.  
 2317 34 Helen 57 Unidentified.  
 2317 34 Helen 65 Unidentified.  
 2317 34 Helen 67 Unidentified.  
 2326 34 Helen 54 U. S. ship.  
 2337 34 Helen 73 U. S. ship.



*Sunday, 14 December, 1941*

- [35] 0000 From Capt. Yard Office: Flares from Beckoning Point apparently originated from contractor's barge a little way off shore.
- 0006 From Capt. Yard Office: Two cruisers standing out.
- 0009 From Capt. Yard Office: Report on cruisers was erroneous.
- 0040 Motor launch left West Loch with 4 depth charges. Left section base with working party and officer passed through gate to deliver to motor torpedo boats, TPs and Q Pearl Harbor.
- 0054 From Cincpac: TALBOT will be coming in during night from NE. Will stop and search for small enemy ss between Mokapu and Koko Head from daylight until noon.
- 1315 From Info Center: Do we have any boats in Haleiwa area?
- 1322 From HELENA: from 330 to 000 bonfire and searchlights.
- 1335 From PatWing 2 to Info Center: Starting at daylight, 2 four stack DDs will search North and South Coasts.
- 1300 From DeRussy: Target reported 8000 yards NW Kaena Point.
- 1305 Cincpac checking LONG's position to see if it could be target reported.
- 0238 From Info. Center: Check on vessel in 34 Gertrude 43.
- 0240 From Info. Center: Another report on vessel puts it 5 miles offshore between Mokapu and Waimanalo.
- 0244 Reported to Info. Center that vessel between Mokapu and Waimanalo is a U. S. vessel.
- 0304 From Info Center: Vessel now 7 miles west of George.
- 0315 From PatWing 2: Plane reported over Pearl, blinking lights.
- 0330 From Signal Tower to Operations: "Small boat (probably P. T.) dropped depth charge in North Channel near buoy x22.
- 0332 From PatWing 2: Felt an explosion. Understand that PT boats are dropping depth charges west of Ford Island.
- 0346 Yard craft advised of 0330 entry.
- [36] 0348 2 PBY's arriving from coast approximately 0400.
- 0351 From PatWing 2: Information on PBY's arriving Pearl at 0400 is erroneous.
- 0409 From Info. Center: Planes take off Wheeler at 0530 and return 0645. One squadron to Easy at 10,000 feet and one squadron to Dog at 10,000 feet.
- 0445 From PatWing 2: Request permission for boats in dry dock channel to use running lights during take off of 0515 planes.
- 0451 From DeRussy: Ship 10½ miles off Uluau Head.
- 0449 MTB dropped depth charge in Middle Loch.
- 0452 From Kaneohe: Very yellow searchlight bearing 062 from Mokapu, distance 10 miles.
- 0502 From Info. Center: We have a plot coming close ashore south of Baker. Could that be the TALBOT.
- 0504 From Info: Ship now plots in 35 Helen 58½—should be in Kaneohe Bay.
- 0505 Instructed Kaneohe to turn on searchlights.
- 0505 From PatWing 2: 2 PBY's will fly direct to Barbers Pt. to search for sub. at 0515.
- 0517 From PatWing 2: Motor Torpedo Boats in drydock channel interfering with take-off of PBY's.
- 0518 Motor TBs told to clear dry dock channel.
- 0522 From Info: What has been done about the report in Kaneohe Bay?
- 0523 From Kaneohe: Having trouble with searchlights.
- 0523 Info informed of searchlight trouble in Kaneohe.
- 0525 From PatWing 2: There is a DD in drydock channel. Either have it moved, or have it turn on its lights.
- DD notified.
- [37] 0545 From Info: Communications have quit with Kaneohe searchlights.
- 0546 From Kaneohe: Searchlights not on, but dredge believed to be only thing in harbor.
- 0600 From Cincpac (orig. from Trevor). TREVOR standing by torpedoed merchant freighter; bearing 043°t, distant 29 miles from Mokapu Point. Name HOEGH.
- From Cincpac (relayed to Patwing 2 at 0608): Pyro attacked but not damaged. Position at time (0350) 85 miles, bearing 334°(t) from Barbers Point.

- 0614 Flight 8 in the air.  
 0626 Plane 80 mi., 050° from Oahu.  
 0628 From PatWing 2 and Robert: 0626 plane is 4 engine (PB2Y) patrol plane, expected arrived at Pearl Harbor at 0635. Sent to A. S. P. at 0631.  
 0643 0600 Freighter (above) sank. (Norwegian). From PatWing 2 to Robert.  
 0730 After 1000 expect arrival of planes in groups of two or more from seaward approach east. Suggest opportunity for tracking be utilized.  
 0731 PatWing 2 to all stations: PatWing 2 now using call of *Patrick*.  
 0740 From Automatic Weapons: United States ships conducting test hops Wheeler Field 0800-0900.  
 0741 S3 reports submarine, location 55 CD 72. Relayed to Inshore Patrol and *Patrick*.  
 0752 Signal Tower reports HOPKINS cleared channel standing out.  
 0756 *Patrick* to Robert: 1 PBY on special mission going out at 0800 to sea and SW flight 20.  
 0758 1 PBY left Johnston Island at 0700 for Pearl Harbor, as flight 19, plane #1 P 24. Ferry trip. Return at 1430.  
 0807 From Army Automatic Weapons: At 0800 all units assume condition of readiness III. at 1630 condition I. In interval, one-fourth of command assume condition IV.  
 [33] 0824 Signal Tower Info Cincpac: (Air base and *Patrick* notified) At 0755 report. Notify air base large amounts of logs and wreckage on water making it dangerous for planes to take off.  
 0827 34 Helen 50. From Robert to *Patrick*: Identify—identified.  
 0830 From Signal Tower at 0813: WARDEN and DEWEY entered channel.  
 0905 Judd (Yeo) at G3, calling for G2; request information identify of cruiser 1½ miles off Waianae.  
 0909 Flight 10 is in.  
 0911 From Kauai via G3 (Judd): Submarine reported headed inshore, came about, and headed seaward again at 0830. (Notified *Patrick* and Off-shore Patrol). Location: Off Nawiliwili.  
 0922 Harbor Control granted REGULUS permission to enter Honolulu.  
 0925 From Signal Tower: South of the beacon that is located on beach east of channel there are two or three black objects in the water. One of them has what seems like a stick protruding from it. It is possible that they could be small submarines and should be investigated.  
 0932 From Signal Tower: U. S. merchant steamer steaming into Honolulu, distance six (6) or seven (7) miles. (G3, DeRussy, Robert, *Patrick*)  
 0958 From Port Director, Honolulu: Norwegian steamer HOEGH, enroute San Francisco to Manila sank. Crew carried into Honolulu and turned over to O. N. I. there. First impression of ship's officers is that ship sank due to internal explosions and not to torpedoes.  
 1003 From TANEY: Dropped 5 depth charges on good contact bearing 208° (t), 3 mi. off Honolulu Harbor entrance. Results unknown.  
 1018 Flight 18 returned.  
 1021 REGULUS in Harbor.  
 1023 Flight 23 is in.  
 1025 From *Patrick*: 33 Irene 05 investigate vessel.  
 [39] 1034 Flights 26 and 27 in.  
 1030 From Comdr. Derox: U. S. AT "*I. L. HUNT*" position report at 1915 GCT: 19-15N; 159-46W. (Report to be checked by Comdr. Derox).  
 1040 Plane over objects reported at 0925 reports them to be 3 white drums; located in 100 feet of water ¾ miles east of channel entrance buoys, SxW of Ahua Beacon. Vertical spar on center drum.  
 1055 Section base will assume investigation of drums.  
 1100 Flight 25 is in.  
 1100 Vessel 33 Irene 05 identified as U. S. by Navy Liaison (DeRussy). *Patrick* notified.  
 1127 Vessel at 34 Helen 83 identified as U. S. vessel. *Patrick* notified.  
 1142 From G3. 20 unidentified planes flying toward Oahu over Lanai. All markings not clearly visible. Picked up by civilian police radio from Molokai. Requested information from *Patrick* and Robert.  
 1144 To comdr. Inshore Patrol from Harbor Control: The ELVIDA and NIP-PON MARU movement of: Proceed to Tuna Packers, Kewalo Basin, tomorrow, Dec. 15, 1941, at any time after 0630, earlier the better. Do not shoot.

- 1200 15 planes from Lanai—flight 28.  
 1202 Flight 5 is in.  
 1211 Flight 33—14 SBD's. Take off at 1200. Will patrol around harbor entrance, then will patrol in 40 mile circle about the ship.  
 1216 Army is checking stations failing to report above planes.  
 1219 Flight 32 is in.  
 1221 34 planes off Mokapu flying NE. Can you identify? Robert to Patrick. U. S. planes.  
 1223 36 planes approaching Oahu from SW.  
 [40] 1225 34 Irene S9?  
 1232 Planes circling over Ft. Shafter. Can you identify? From Robert to Patrick.  
 1241 34 Helen 12 is trip 6.  
 1243 Flight 34 one PB2Y-2. Pearl to Kaneohe, one mi. offshore in 25 min. after take-off. Take-off to follow.  
 1245 35 Helen 40 from Robert. U. S. planes.  
 1244 32 Gertrude 99. NE course. U. S. planes.  
 1255 35 Irene 08.  
 1301 36 aircraft coming in from SW. VS-VT.  
 1308 33 Helen 58 claimed by Patrick.  
 1310 34 Irene 33. Patrick claimed.  
 1312 34 Irene 24. Patrick claimed.  
 1315 Flight 35-1330-6 JRS Pearl sector 020-080 search and return 1730. #36-1330-6 J2F Pearl sector 080-140. Search and return 1730.  
 1325 Flight 28 is in.  
 1327 Flight 29 is in.  
 1327 34 Helen 85. Aircraft U. S.  
 1333 2 large flights coming in from SW.  
 1337 Above identified as 12 aircraft to Pt. Baker.  
 1338 35 Irene 84. Many planes? Claimed by Patrick.  
 1338 36 Irene 06.  
 1339 Smoke bomb sighted 2 miles off Harbor Entrance, and west.  
 1344 Flight 37 43 planes 1400 UF VSB-VT from KA proceed out approach east thence to point 230° 70 miles from Easy. Will not return.  
 [41] 1405 Flight 20 is in.  
 1410 LEXINGTON and NEOSHO standing out.  
 1414 Flight 33 14 SBs 30 mile radius around above ships.  
 1417 35 Gertrude 53 claimed by Patrick.  
 1419 Submarine sighted Baker 4 to be logged later.  
 1420 Enemy submarine bearing 290° from Berth C3.  
 1434 Dispatch two PT boats to net immediately as required. Msg received.  
 1422 Plane is diving and firing upon two yellow marker buoys bearing 110° 4.5 miles from Barbers Point Light. From WARD to Inshore Patrol.  
 1423 P.T. boat dropped one depth charge on North side of the Baltimore.  
 1443 34 Helen 93 from SW—Patrick claims.  
 34 Helen 91 U. S. vessel  
 35 Helen 15 U. S. vessel  
 35 Helen 25 U. S. vessel  
 35 Helen 44 U. S. vessel  
 34 Irene 45 U. S. vessel  
 34 Helen 50 U. S. vessel  
 1447 35 Irene 47 U. S. vessel  
 1450 34 Helen 77 U. S. vessel  
 1451 3 planes taking off relieving planes in flight #17 OSZ-U for Inshore Patrol.  
 1500 34 Irene 49 U. S. vessel  
 1500 34 Irene 68 U. S. vessel  
 1500 34 Irene 89 U. S. vessel  
 1500 35 Irene 47 U. S. vessel  
 [42] 1500 3 surface vessels sighted off Point George are U. S. vessels.  
 1510 2 surface vessels sighted off Point George are U. S. vessels.  
 1519 Flight 7 is in.  
 1527 Flight 15 is in.  
 1529 Flight 16 is in.  
 1535 Flight 6 and 21 are in.  
 1542 #39 1600 one navy fighter Kaneohe to Pearl F2A3.  
 1545 Flights 14 and 19 in.







- 2140 Robert reports same positions on 3 vessels. Vessels seem relatively stationary. Also that 35 Helen 96 has been steady 2 hours.
- 2200 PatWing 2 sent out flight schedule for tomorrow morning.
- 2115 From CINCUS: Are any small boats allowed in harbor?
- 2116 CINCUS informed that there have been a few boat trips and that permission was obtained for these.
- 2358 Coast artillery is checking 34 Helen 78.

*Monday, 15 December, 1941*

- 0030 34 Helen 52 is reported a U. S. vessel (Robert)
- [45] 0056 U. S. S. PRAIRIE reported back on station.
- 0125 Robert requested identity of 34 Gertrude 55 (U. S.).
- 0138 Robert reported only one surface vessel in 34 Gertrude.
- 0142 Signal Tower reported 2 white lights flashed just left of the NEVADA.
- 0154 Robert reported two plots (34 Gertrude 55, 34 Gertrude 75). Which can we identify?
- 0157 Robert requested identity of 35 Helen 63 (U. S.).
- 0158 Robert asked CinCPac to identify 34 Gertrude 64, 34 Gertrude 75
- 0203 Robert requested identity of 35 Helen 35 (U. S.).
- 0210 Robert requested identity of 35 Helen 32 (U. S.).
- 0234 To Robert: One bright white light was just seen (by P. H. Signal Tower) in vicinity Red Hill for about 30 seconds, then disappeared.
- 0240 Ship on the horizon due south of Signal Tower. Put on a searchlight for a fraction of a minute. (From Signal Tower).
- 0312 Robert requested identity of vessel in 34 Gertrude 33 (Yes)
- 0346 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Gertrude 29 (Yes)
- 0404 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Gertrude 33 (Yes)
- 0406 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Irene 5-10 (Yes).
- 0408 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Irene 5-10 (Yes)
- 0410 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 8-8 (Yes)
- 0413 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 2-5 (Yes)
- 0414 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 5-3 (Yes)
- 0417 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 1-2 (Yes)
- 0417 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 3-2 (Yes)
- [46] 0420 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 2-3.
- 0434 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 6-1.
- 0501 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 1-5.
- 0502 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 0-4.
- 0503 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 2-4.
- 0504 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 6-1.
- 0505 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 4-1. (Yes)
- 0508 Robert requested identity of vessel in 35 Helen 1-2.
- 0546 Received information from G3 that an unidentified light had been sighted 20 miles off Kaloa Beach, Kauai. Information given to PatWing 2.
- 0617 Robert requested identity of 33 Irene 8-9, 34 Helen 1-2.
- 0700 Robert reported E-17 will take off at Hickam.
- 0702 Robert reported there will be blasting at Bellows Field at 1100.
- 0711 Robert reported that 12 Marine fighters will land in Pearl Harbor in about 15 minutes.
- 0720 Robert reported "Negative" on light 20 miles south of Kauai.
- 0732 Flight #8 is in.
- 0735 Robert reports 6 bombers to take off from Wheeler at 0745.
- 0755 From Signal Tower: CL and CV off Barbers Point.
- 0820 MONTGOMERY relieved WARD as channel entrance patrol.
- 0826 Signal Tower: MUGFORD under way for Marine Railway.
- 0830 Signal Tower: CUMMINGS and REID entered channel.
- [47] 0834 Signal Tower: Six (6) unidentified planes bearing 320° (T), 5 miles from RAMAPO—Circling: Patrick identifies as U. S. Army.
- 0843 Signal Tower: ZANE is under way. Cleared channel at 0855.
- 0901 MONTGOMERY: Torpedo wake sighted 500 yds west of channel entrance buoys headed toward channel.
- 0902 Signal tower: SELFRIDGE entered harbor.
- 0904 Signal tower: SARATOGA entered harbor.
- 0911 MINNEAPOLIS entered. (From Signal Tower).

- 0913 Signal Tower: SARATOGA passing gate. CUMMINGS moored 0911 at X-18.
- 0921 Signal Tower: CONYNGHAM entered. REID to X-18.
- 0923 CHEW to Com 14: Have investigated torpedo wakes headed toward channel. No contact.  
Signal Tower: TUCKER entered.
- 0940 Patrick: Entire SARATOGA group has landed.
- 0941 Patrick: Flights 7 and 9 are in.
- 0944 Signal Tower: Ship, unidentified, off Barbers Point, on horizon. Appearance of transport or cargo ship.
- 0949 Signal Tower: HENLEY entered.
- 0955 Diamond Head Obs.: 1 U. S. plane down in 55 GC 36 at 0948.
- 1001 Signal Tower: BLUE entered.
- 1007 Signal Tower: LONG moored in ZANE's berth.
- 1012 Signal Tower: HELM entered.
- 1013 Signal Tower: SARATOGA moored.
- 1014 Signal Tower: RAMAPO under way.
- 1018 Com Offshore Pat. to Com 14: Request bearing on 0944 entry.
- [48] 1020 Signal Tower: CASE entered with MINNEAPOLIS at 0911 and moored at X-14.
- 1026 Signal Tower: RALPH TALBOT and PATTERSON entered.
- 1027 Signal Tower: JARVIS entered. MINNEAPOLIS moored at C-3.
- 1032 Signal Tower: LITCHFIELD moored at Submarine Base.
- 1035 From Lt. Thomas, at G-2, 298th Infantry NR 5 ROP 1 COF: Sight Naval ship over horizon off Lanikai Point. Reference Mokolua Is. Reported by Pvt. De Mellon. Army not satisfied as to identity. Requests investigation.
- 1045 Signal Tower: HENLEY moored M-2. TUCKER moored X-13.
- 1046 Flight 17 in.
- 1053 Flight 15 in.
- 1056 Signal Tower: CASTOR under way, WARD under way, BLUE moored X-15.
- 1109 Op. 3, at Mokapu Pt. Unable to sight ship (Ref: 1035 entry.)
- 1108 Signal Tower: TREVOR under way. BAGLEY moored M-3. CONYNGHAM moored X-14.
- 1109 Flight 14 in.
- 1112 Signal Tower: HELM moored M-2. RAMAPO alongside SARATOGA.
- 1113 Patrick: Flight 19 between 1120-1130.
- 1114 Flight 4 in.
- 1125 Signal Tower: TREVOR moored alongside SUMNER at Sub. Base.
- 1126 Signal Tower: RALPH TALBOT to M-4.
- 1134 Signal Tower: WARD moored to X-5. PATTERSON moored to M-3
- 1136 Flight 16 in.
- 1140 CASTOR cleared channel.
- [49] 1147 Flight 20 in.
- 1150 Signal Tower: JARVIS moored to M-3.
- 1203 Flight 19 in.
- 1210 Capt. of Yard Office from Q station: propeller noises near channel buoy #5. No vessels in sight. (Investigate).
- 1240 Flight 18 in at 1225.
- 1245 Flight 23 will go out at 1530.
- 1258 Flight 5 in.
- 1316 Flight 3 in.
- 1334 Flights 10 and 22 are in.
- 1344 From ComCru Div 6: Did you hear air raid alarm. Answered negative.
- 1410 From Pat: 1 J2F will fly direct P. H. to Kaneohe at 1415 flight 26. Fighters Ewa to P. H. direct flight 25.
- 1418 CHEW to Com 14: Sound contact made. Six (6) depth charges dropped, 2800 yards, bearing 335° (T) from entrance buoys. Results unknown.
- 1441 From Pat: Flight 27—18 VMs Ewa to Hickam direct—remain overnight.
- 1458 From Pat: Flight 28—1 PB2Y at 1600 Kaneohe to West Coast. Will not return.
- 1506 General Burgin: Hawaiian Coast Artillery will conduct firing by guns of medium caliber on North, South and East shores between 1000 and 1500 Tuesday, 16 December (1941). Request this information be disseminated Naval authorities.

- 1507 Patrick: flight 29—1 JRB will depart Pearl Harbor for Maui.  
 1515 Patrick: flight 30 at 1515, 2 J2F Pearl to Entrance buoys—anti-submarine patrol out 1 hour.  
 Flight 23 will be split: 2 PBY's off at 1515; 2 VOD's off at 1530—return sunset—Patrol Pearl and channel.
- 1517 Flight 26 in.  
 [50] 1518 CinCPac: SAN FRANCISCO will whistle and siren immediately.  
 1609 Flight 31—1615—1 J2F Pearl Harbor to Ewa and return. ETA 1700.  
 1610 Flight #11 is in.  
 1616 Flight 32 1630 are VNIS Ewa for Hickam ETA 1645. Change flight #27 to 17 planes.
- 1634 PORTER, FLUSSER and MAHAN cleared Pearl Harbor.  
 1634 CUMMINGS is standing out.  
 1635 Flights 27 and 32 are in.  
 1643 From WAPELO—one of our lookouts reports that he has seen the wake of a periscope directly opposite the Ft. Weaver Dock. Patrick notified.  
 1647 From 24th Division: Investigate spherical buoy 400 or 500 yards South of Keana Point.  
 1659 #33—1 J2F 1700—Pearl Harbor—Kaena Pt. direct point.  
 1705 Flight 33 cancelled.  
 1709 NACHEZ and TANGIERS cleared the harbor.  
 1710 Flight 29 is in at Maui.  
 1738 Ewa field reports strong carrier wave strength 5 on 1220-1230 KCs.  
 1806 Flight #1 has returned.  
 1813 Flight #2 has returned.  
 1817 Signal tower reports 1 plane 12 or 13 miles south of signal tower with running lights on. Patrick notified.  
 1826 All flights are in except one plane in #23, from Patrick.  
 1826 Sound contact made on two different subs in SE corner restricted area. Total 12 depth charges from CHEW to Comdesdiv 80.
- [51] 1833 To Robert: Turn searchlights on 35 Gertrude 26 and open fire if it is a submarine.
- 1842 All planes are in.  
 1852 From Johnston Island: "Being attacked by surface vessels."  
 1847 Police radio reports Lahaina, Maui shelled at 1722 this date by submarine for 10 minutes, fired 10 shots submerged and headed south.  
 1857 Johnston Island being shelled by two surface vessels. Johnston Island ablaze. From Johnston Island.  
 2045 From G-2: "Contemplated Japanese uprising among Jap. sympathizers tonight. Be especially alert."  
 2051 Aircraft plot at 34 Gertrude 92—not claimed.  
 2053 Aircraft plot at 35 Gertrude 05—not claimed.  
 2118 All aircraft plots disappeared.  
 2128 From G-2: Sub observed at 1930 off Kauhako Bay at 1943. Seen off Kuholu Rock. Kona reports blinking lights East of Keaweakeheka.  
 2136 From Bellows Field: Mosquito sub fleet approaching shore—will investigate and make report.  
 2140 Report of mosquito sub. fleet investigated by Major Stewart of Bellows. Findings: incompetent sentry made report.  
 2200 One red flare from Kuakua Island and one from B-12 to D10.  
 2237 Observing post #7 reports a ship 6000 yds. due North of Kaena Point.  
 2304 From Homestead Field, Molokai. Large freighter sighted over horizon stamping towards Oahu.  
 2358 From Pat: Am sending a boat to landing C at 2400.  
 Note: Robert reports a vessel claimed by no U. S. forces followed during night and disappeared at 34 Gertrude 95 about 2240.

*Tuesday, December 16, 1941*

- [52] 0109 From Patrick: Big flash observed by 4 sentries. Seemed to be between Hangar 6 and Barbers Point. Could have been out to sea.  
 0135 From Patrick: Flash may have come from the NEVADA.  
 0255 From Signal Tower: One red flare seen off Ford Island.  
 0257 From Signal Tower: One red flare seen shot from Magazine Island toward Sub. Base.



- 0302 From Patrick: Hickam Tower reports a ship leaving Honolulu Harbor.  
 0316 From Patrick: Boat leaving for landing C.  
 0330 Informed Patrick there are no ships moving in Honolulu Harbor, and that there is a blue light on at concentration camp on Sand Island.  
 0349 Notified Patrick that 2 U. S. vessels are getting under way at 0400.  
 0436 Robert: Ship in 35 Gertrude 38 not identified. Also, 35 Gertrude 39 at 0355 were not identified.  
 0440 From Robert: 8 Army pursuit planes will circle east edge P. H. at 0530. Alt. 1000'.  
 0505 From Robert: Unable to pick up 35 Gertrude 38 again.  
 0515 From TANEY: Loom of very quick very bright light flashed apparently from general vicinity of Waikiki or inland. Notified Robert.  
 0518 From Signal Tower: Bright flashes over Koko—resembles gun fire. Robert asked to investigate.  
 0530 From Robert: 5 white flares off Koko Head.  
 0536 From Robert: Hickam reports white flares continually off Diamond Head.  
 0654 From Signal Tower: PERRY standing in.  
 0656 From Signal Tower: WADSMUTH standing in.  
 [53] 0700 From Signal Tower: BOGGS standing in.  
 0707 Flight 18 is in.  
 0711 SOUTHARD standing in. Moored B 22.  
 0726 Flights 14 and 15 are in.  
 0745 KAULA standing in. Moored at 0932.  
 0747 Asked Patrick if patrol over harbor—ans. NEGAT.  
 0818 1 PBY left P. H. at 0800.  
 0820 From LONG: Have been relieved at XP by PERRY. Am proceeding to buoy.  
 0826 Patrick reported flight #21 1 TBD from Pearl Harbor to circle. Return 0845.  
 0840 DeRussy reported that an American freighter STEELMAKER is approaching Honolulu from South and now is in 55 HB 12.  
 0848 Flight #1 has returned and landed.  
 0853 Flight #22 at 0900 1 030 from Pearl Harbor for altitude hop to determine weather E. T. A. 1100.  
 0858 Flight #2 is in.  
 0900 Wheeler Field will exercise at dive bombing until 1400.  
 0901 Flight #21 in.  
 0904 American Freighter STEELMAKER in at 0845. From CinCPac.  
 0902 Robert wants to identify: 35 Helen 23, 34 Helen 93. U. S.  
 0914 From LONG to Com 14: "LONG relieved by PERRY."  
 0925 To Patrick and Robert: Wreckage of HOEGH washed ashore on NE shore of Oahu.  
 From G-2 21st Inf. 800 yds. South Makahoa Pt. N. E. shore Oahu. Wreckage of ship seen at daybreak. Large amount of lumber washed ashore. Life preserver Hough.  
 [54] Life preserver drifted ashore. Lifeboat ashore with numerous 50 and 30 calibre machine gun holes.  
 0930 Flight #16 in.  
 0944 HOVEY relieved the MONTGOMERY at 1944 in Western area.  
 1006 Flight 6 is in.  
 The following ships cleared at times indicated:  
 CONYNGHAM 0847  
 CASE 0849  
 TUCKER 0851  
 BAGLEY 0953  
 PATTERSON 0958  
 SELFRIDGE 1000  
 JARVIS 1002  
 RALPH TALBOT 1005  
 The U. S. S. CHEW moored at X-ray 5 at 0849.  
 The KAULA moored at Baker 3 at 0932.  
 10 The U. S. S. GRIDLEY moored at  
 1012 The U. S. S. HELM cleared at 1012.  
 1019 U. S. S. HENLEY stood out.  
 1023 U. S. S. BLUE stood out.  
 1025 U. S. S. MUGFORD stood out.



- 1102 Flight #22 is in.  
 1105 U. S. S. CRAVEN moored at x14.  
 1105 U. S. S. GRIDLEY moored at x13.  
 1110 U. S. S. ASTORIA cleared.  
 1115 U. S. S. SAN FRANCISCO cleared at 1115. Notified DeRussy and Inshore Patrol.  
 1125 U. S. S. MINNEAPOLIS cleared.  
 1135 Flight 10 is in.  
 1155 HUMUULA moored at Pier 17 in Honolulu.  
 [55] 1205 U. S. S. SONOMA moored at Coal Dock.  
 1205 Flight 23 in.  
 1206 Flight 5 in.  
 1220 From Robert: Two subs sighted 8 miles north of Anuoto going south. Action—Patrick is taking action.  
 1224 From Robert: Two subs sighted 2 miles off Punaluu.  
 1235 About 1045 the 86th Observation Squadron spotted two oil spots area 65 AK.  
 1236 Flight #11 is in.  
 1243 Flight #25 is in.  
 1245 Patrick is taking action on 2 subs. off Punaluu.  
 1248 From ——— To: Commander Inshore Patrol.  
 1248 Dark double object moving East on or near beach one mile East of Barbers Point at noon.  
 1250 Flight 17 in.  
 1251 Flight 24 in.  
 1255 Flight 7 in.  
 1300 U. S. S. SARATOGA standing out of P. H.  
 1304 Two merchant men standing out of P. H.  
 1315 Navy plane arriving from Maui to Lanai to Maui stop Request clearance immediately expedite. To Information Center. Sender unknown. Action Patrick reported one plane from flight 4 returning motor trouble ETA 1415.  
 1323 Originator S-3: Army will fire medium calibre guns between 0830 and 1000 December 17 at Pupakea, Waianae, and Waialua. Notified Robert and Patrick.  
 1330 Flight 10 in.  
 1335 Flight 19 in.  
 [56] 1340 CinCPac reported. A vessel just over the horizon off Waianae cannot be seen but it is making smoke. Action. Notified Patrick for action.  
 1336 Robert requested identity of 35 Gertrude 15; 34 Gertrude 76; 34 Gertrude 65. All three in our patrol area.  
 1400 Smoking vessel off Waianae headed toward Barbers Point.  
 1436 Flight 29 is in.  
 1440 Flight 33 is in.  
 1446 Origin Col. Powell. Sub patrol 86 squad which were patrolling between Oahu and Molokai will not include Maui commencing this P. M. perhaps, but sure tomorrow. Two ships or more. To Patrick, info. Robert.  
 1503 Patrick reported that the smoke off Waianae was a destroyer.  
 1508 Robert reported one of his pilots sighted a sub submerge off NE corner of Kahoolawe. Action. Patrick notified.  
 1518 Flight 28 in.  
 1508 Flight 34 in.  
 1500 Army completed firing practice.  
 1530 Patrick reported 2 planes sent in investigate submergin sub at Kahoolawe.  
 1533 Flights 30 and 31 in.  
 FANNING entered at 1542; DUNLAP at 1545; LOUISVILLE at 1550.  
 1611 Flight "Kitty"—S—P36's from Ewa at 1645, to 30,000 ft. practice gunnery return Ewa at 1745. Flight 39.  
 1620 Ship movements as received: Standing in: 1509 BALCH, 1522 ENTERPRISE, 1511 SALT LAKE CITY, 1526 NORTHAMPTON (moored at 1555).  
 Standing in: 1537 CHESTER, 1545 DUNLAP, 1550 MCCALL, 1556 CUMMINGS, 1615 REID, 1605 ELLIOT, 1623 TUCKER.

- 1632 Flight 40—1 PBY depart 1640 P. H. for Kaneohe via Diamond Head arrive 1720.  
 [57] 1632 MAURY standing in.
- 1649 BENHAM and CONYNGHAM standing in.
- 1650 LAMBERTON entered.
- 1700 KUKUI is in.
- 1703 BENHAM moored. X-18.
- 1705 From Port Director, Honolulu: MAKUELE departing Honolulu for Maui (Kahului).
- 1723 Moorings BALCH X-11, SALT LAKE CITY C-3, ENTERPRISE F-9, NORTHAMPTON and CHESTER C-2. FANNING at 1542 at X-15. DUNLAP moored at at X-18. LOUISVILLE at at C-3. McCALL at X-11. CUMMINGS at X-2. ELLIOT at X-18.
- 1728 Permission obtained from CinCPac to send two (2) sampans, properly identified, Kauai to Niihau leaving 0800 on
- 1730 Flight 3 is in.
- 1734 Flights 12 and 13 are in; 36, 38, 40, 35
- 1746 Flight 20 is in, 8, 9, are in.
- 1805 From N. A. S.: two Maryann's to ENTERPRISE at F-9. One 50 ft. M. L. from landing A to landing C.
- 1818 Flight 39 landed at Ewa at sunset.
- 1819 Signal Tower: Flare opposite and beyond Ford Island. Landing beacon lighted.
- 1823 NARWHAL under way.
- 1824 From Patrick: One plane (U. S.) will land Pearl Harbor from SW landing lights on.
- 1826 Signal Tower: Lights at Wheeler Field, planes in sight.
- 1833 BALCH to M-3, McCALL to M-4.
- 1839 MAURY and GRIDLEY under way.
- [58] 1840 From Patrick: All flights are now in.
- 1845 DOBBIN, MAURY, and GRIDLEY swept channel with twenty-four inch searchlights.
- 1851 South Channel being swept by twelve-inch searchlight.
- 1914 DUNLAP under way.
- 1916 Signal Tower: Faint lights from building 9.
- 1923 MAURY moored M-4.  
 NARWHAL moored B-16.
- 1944 DUNLAP moored M-3.
- 1949 Station B—Fire at Ewa Field.
- 1950 Signal Tower: Fire at Ewa Field.
- 1959 Ewa Field reports fire is north of flying field; Ewa plantation fire department on scene of fire.
- 2008 FANNING moored M-4.
- 2020 BENHAM under way.  
 ELLIOT to M-3.
- 2041 BENHAM to M-3.
- 2053 Flares reported; investigation: Construction.
- 2054 Lt. Rodey, Op 10, gunfire, 5 major calibre shots, on horizon south of Dog. Also reported by nearby AA battery.
- 2056 Robert: repeated appearances and disappearances of 36 Gertrude 10; WARD: Dropped 8 depth charges on excellent contact.  
 36 Gertrude 10 again.
- 2123 Harbor Control: Sent 1 DD to investigate 36 Gertrude 10.
- 2133 Signal Tower: Large SL off Koko Head, trained seaward.
- [59] 2150 Robert: Unable to identify the following:  
     35 Helen 68  
     35 Helen 79  
     35 Helen 89  
     35 Helen 95  
     35 Helen 96  
     36 Gertrude 10
- 2217 Signal Tower: Two lights near floating dry-dock, on shore; possibly working parties.
- 2235 Signal Tower: Shots and (reported) very light at Merry Point and Fleet Landing.
- 2239 OP 10: Report 2 flares in Pearl Harbor

- 2252 Capt. of Yard's Office: Dropped depth charge near #3 entrance buoy—did not explode.
- 2252 Robert: Identify 2 plots at 35 Helen 97. *No.*
- 2257 Robert: Identify 35 Helen 69 moved from 35 Helen 68. *No.*
- 2329 From ComPatWing one, Comm. Officer via Patrick: Garbled English or very poor Japanese being broadcast on 9638.5 KCs.
- 2332 Robert came up on 9638.5—reception: dance band. Believe it is mainland station.

*Wednesday, December 17, 1941*

- [60] 0010 From Patrick: Sending boat to "C" landing in 15 minutes.
- 0017 Plot 34 Helen 03 unidentified.
- 0036 34 Helen 03 disappeared.
- 0123 36 Gertrude 29 unidentified.
- 0138 36 Gertrude 29 disappeared.
- 0216 Flight of miscellaneous aircraft expected from Coast at 0631. Pursuit escort will be sent out to bring flight 11x over point east.
- 0223 Above numbered flight #17.
- 0230 From: Commander Offshort Patrol  
To: Com 14  
Your 0811 search results negative.  
Ref: Surface contacts 55L C94 and 65 BF 29 investigate.
- 0239 35 Helen 45 unidentified.
- 0242 35 Helen 53 unidentified.
- 0310 35 Helen 45 U.S. ships  
35 Helen 53 U.S. ships
- 0530 2 U.S. planes leaving at 0540. Many U.S. planes leaving at 0600 and 0615. To all ships in harbor.
- 0555 Pan-American clipper arriving camouflaged from Mainland at 0705. To all ships in harbor.
- 0600 LONG cleared entrance. WASMUTH shifted berths.
- 0611 Unidentified Aircraft circling near Diamond Head. Army interceptors searching for same. From Robert.
- 0700 ALLEN standing in.
- 0733 HOPKINS standing in.
- 0740 From Patrick: Marine air unit at Ewa is in the air. Takeoff 0728.
- 0741 Planes *practice* dive bombing Wheeler.
- [61] 0755 Flight 18 is in.
- 0802 Flight 15 is in.
- 0802 Flight 20 has started.
- 0829 From Robert: More practice dive bombing at Wheeler commencing in 5 minutes.
- 0844 Flight 17 is in.
- 0854 Flight 8 has started.
- 0910 From Robert: There will be blasting at Bellows Field at 1130.
- 0910 Patrick reports 2 PBY's leaving at 0915 to relieve 2 PBY's in flight 1 who are following enemy tanker.
- 0918 Flight 7 is in.
- 0940 Flight 9 is in.
- 1020 Flight 25 has taken off.
- 1025 Flight 20 is in.
- 1045 Flight 21 is in.
- 1050 From Robert: Army pursuits investigating 34 Gertrude 65 found nothing. Robert can no longer get Radar reports there.
- 1102 Flight 25 is in.
- 1105 Flights 23 and 24 are in.
- 1111 TALBOT cleared channel.
- 1120 From Robert: Hickam Field will be blasting near dry dock from 1500 until dark.
- 1147 Flight 27 is in.
- 1145 From Robert: Practice air raid alarm in Honolulu at 1200 and at 1500 or 1530.
- [62] 1145 From Robert: Message about blasting at Hickam in error. Blasting will be in Navy Yard near Hickam Field.
- 1208 From Robert: Ship in 38 Helen 47—course 120°—15-20 knots. (Notified we have a vessel there, but not of that speed).

- 1220 From Robert: Bellows Field Observation plane reports sighting small oil sludge off Maui Coast (38 Irene 15). Circled several times but found nothing.
- 1225 COCKATOO stood in.
- 1235 Flight 4 is in.
- 1245 REEDBIRD stood in at 1216 and moored.
- 1245 PERRY under way.
- 1255 COCKATOO moored at net depot.
- 1305 PERRY moored at D6.
- 1310 Notified Robert and Patrick and CinCPac—KUKUI leaving Honolulu at 1300, will be off Pearl Entrance at 1415 to plant buoys in area.
- 1312 WHITNEY under way.
- 1325 From Robert: Identify 34 Helen 39—Notified Robert we believe it to be previously reported ship in 38 Helen 47.
- 1330 From Patrick: 1 PBV direct to Pearl bringing in crash survivors.
- 1345 MEDUSA under way.  
KUKUI standing in.  
WHITNEY moored at X12.
- 1350 Flight 26 is in.
- 1405 HOPKINS under way.
- 1410 From radio Wahiawa: 14 miles SW Pt. Kumukahi—report sub sighted Kalapana area at 0200.
- 1412 MEDUSA moored F12.
- [63] 1421 WATERS stood in.
- 1430 From WADSMUTH (ready DD)—sonic equipment out of order—repair in 10 minutes.
- 1430 HOPKINS moored D6.
- 1437 KUKUI anchored in south channel.
- 1438 KAULA under way.
- 1442 Flight 14 is in.
- 1440 From G3—HAF unable contact Christmas Island since 1100. Can Navy. Notified Navy has nothing on Xmas Island.
- 1446 KAULA moored. B9.
- 1445 Homestead Field sighted destroyer in 36 Helen 80. Not identified.
- 1420 From Patrick: Flight 34 (1 PBV Hilo to PH) has turned back to investigate sub at Kalapana.  
From Capt. Yard—MTB dropped depth charge yesterday PM. 300 lb. bearing 153° (T) from buoy C-3-200 yards, which did not fire. Inshore Patrol reports it is to be counter mined.
- 1511 WATERS moored D5.
- 1515 From Robert: 8 pursuits are leaving Wheeler to investigate unidentified planes in 35 Irene 59.
- 1520 From Patrick: 2 patrol planes will take off P. H. at 1730 for all night operations between Oahu and Molokai and half way up east coast Oahu. Drop flares, and perhaps bombs. Notify all posts.  
Action—
- 1531 GT 142 standing in.
- 1544 From Patrick: Flights #31 and #10 in.
- 1550 From Coast Guard: Comdr. Gelly requested that his vessel the KUSKUSI remain in Pearl if it cannot get to Honolulu before dark. Action—Capt. Yard asked to keep it in Pearl.  
1555 MIKIMIKI cleared.
- [64] 1558 RAMAPO under way 1624. Shifted to M-4.
- 1610 Flight 36 in.
- 1610 BOGGS under way—1632 cleared.
- 1612 From Major Horner, Dept. Headquarters: The Army is going to use blue lights during the night while working on the airport on the island of Lanai. Action. Notified Robert and Patrick.
- 1632 LOUISVILLE under way—Robert, Patrick, DeRussy.
- 1648 Flight 32 in.
- 1648 Flight 38 cancelled.
- 1658 U. S. S. WRIGHT shifting to berth M-2. Moored 1747.
- 1703 MIKIMIKI and 2 barges in at Honolulu.
- 1708 KUKUI moored in Pearl.
- 1722 Flight 6 is in; LOUISVILLE moored C3.



- 1723 Robert requests identity of 34 Gertrude 95 vessel.  
 1734 Flight 39 in.  
 1735 Flight 11 completed.  
 1752 Robert requests identity of 35 Helen 77. (No)  
 1752 Robert requests identity of 35 Helen 98 (No)  
 1802 Robert requests identity of 34 Helen 91 (U. S.)  
 1820 Robert requests identity of 35 Helen 25 (U. S.)  
 1820 Robert requests identity of 35 Helen 44 (U. S.)  
 1845 Fort Kam—Major called reporting 3 destroyers off Barbers Point (U. S.)  
 1858 Harbor Defense will fire 2 rounds 155 MM at 1000 Thursday 18th from  
 Ulupau Head (Mokapu Pen—Kaneohe).  
 [65] Action notified Kaneohe, Patrick, Robert, CinCPac)  
 1903 Robert requests identity of 35 Gertrude 62 (No)  
 All Army and Navy flights except #37 are in.  
 1923 G-3 reports ship showing two lights at Laniloa Pt. (78° true, 1280 mils T.),  
 1400 yards offshore and moving north following shore at 1850. Told to  
 fire at 1910 on clearance from Navy. (Comdr. Momsen present.)  
 1940 From Lt. Kennedy: G-2: Light bearing 015° from Mokapu Head observed  
 at 1836. Est. range 10,000 yards. A yellow blinking light.  
 1943 Army did not fire on lights at Laniloa Pt. Light went out just before  
 commence fire. Reported by Army in this office.  
 1955 From Hickam Field: Local radio listener picked up on 1621 band the follow-  
 ing message: Large Jap. air fleet flying toward Hawaii from SW signed  
 Fitzgerald.  
 2000 Robert requested identity of  
     34 Helen 95 }  
     35 Helen 03 } U. S.  
     35 Helen 13 }  
 2003 Robert: Anderson reporting Kalaupapa reports boat one mile off shore  
 flashing light. 3 flashes observed about 1 mile east of Kalaupapa Pali  
 trail, top of cliff, observed about 7:24 P. M.  
 2022 Robert reports: O. P. Station reported gun fire south of Barbers Point out  
 at sea.  
 WARD dropped 8 depth charges.  
 2023 From WARD: Dropped 8 charges on excellent sonic contact bearing 231  
 degrees 3.2 miles from NR 1 entrance buoy.  
 2033 Robert requested identity of 34 Helen 73 (U. S.)  
 2043 N. A. S. sending boat to ramp 5 South eastern end of island to investigate  
 former report on long dark object there.  
 2044 Patrick and Robert informed that the report of Jap air fleet by Fitzgerald  
 is false.  
 [66] 2044 Lt. Nelson from G-3 called about notifications of false Jap. report.  
 Action. He would notify all stations.  
 2045 Robert reports that he will go into normal conditlons at 2100. Securing  
 from alert.  
 2107 Robert requested identity of 34 Helen 74 (U. S.).  
 2118 Robert: Two observers reported searchlights at sea at 8 P. M. SE of Ninini  
 Point, Kauai—signed Fitzgerald.  
 2143 To Robert for Info: Signal Tower in Pearl reports fire in Aiea which ap-  
 pears to be spreading.  
 2145 Robert requests identity of 34 Helen 73 (U. S.)  
 2155 #2 buoy gave indications of peeping sounds. Inshore Patrol notified.  
 2205 Signal Tower reported that the fire in the hills of Aiea is out.  
 2205 From CHEW: White light in hills bearing 040 from Ahua—Notified G-3.  
 From CHEW: Light showing on beach near channel. Notified G-3.  
 From CHEW: Fires in hills back of Honolulu apparently signal. Notified  
 G-3.  
 2248 Q reported peeps from #2 buoy last heard at 1026. Not audible now.  
 Inshore Patrol notified.  
 2300 From DeRussy: 6 white lights showing near Navy Ammunition depot at  
 Luahualei. G-3 notified. Marines are now investigating.  
 2340 Gave Robert field artillery notice for 12-19-41, 0900 to 1500. Also to  
 Patrick, CinCPac, Kaneohe, and G-3.

[67]

Thursday, 18 December, 1941

- 0030 To Robert: Will not claim 36 Helen 03 in answer to request.
- 0206 From DOBBIN to Com 14: White light apparently along railroad, bearing 077 from berth X14. Light has been burning since 2100 Wednesday evening and has limited arc of visibility.
- 0212 Investigation of 0206 light report: Welding in progress.
- 0235 Robert: Request claim of 37 Gertrude 33, surface. No.
- 0301 Robert relayed the above unfinished report.
- 0358 Robert: 37 Gertrude 33 can no longer be picked up by Robert.
- 0425 Patrick has 5 fighters ready on 1 hour's notice. To be on the alert at 0530.
- 0427 CHEW to Com 14: Darkened ship inside Diamond Head, believed to be TANEY. Does not answer identification (challenge). Am investigating.
- 0432 Robert: Will you identify 2 ships at 35 Helen 87 and one at 35 Helen 84.  
Ans: No.
- 0457 Patrick dispatched the two patrolling PBY's to investigate 35 Helen 87 and 35 Helen 84.
- 0458 Robert: request claim of 34 Gertrude 21. Ans.: No. Signal Tower: Four or five flashes, apparently gunfire, sighted beyond Diamond Head.
- 0508 Major Smith of C. A. Brigade reports: no artillery fire off Diamond Head.
- 0516 To Robert: Between 0600 and 0630 a number of planes will take off from Pearl Harbor. Landing field lights will be turned on about 0545.
- 0518 Robert: 34 Gertrude 21 has now moved to 34 Gertrude 31, and 35 Helen 84 and 35 Helen 87 now appear to be at 35 Helen 76.
- 0519 Signal Tower: Large number about 20, flares reported sighted beyond Diamond Head.
- [68] 0521 Robert: 2 PBY's will land at Pearl Harbor at 0645.
- 0523 Robert: 35 Helen 87 still present. 35 Helen 84 moved to 35 Helen 76.
- 0531 Signal Tower: Diamond Head flashes moving to left as seen from the tower.
- 0535 From Patrick: Alert fighters will take off immediately from Wheeler and orbit over E.
- 0539 To Signal Tower from Harbor Control: Secure reports on flashes (this group only) off Diamond Head. Planes dropping flares.
- 0542 Signal Tower: Large white lights to north. Identified as Army trucks movements.
- 0545 Patrick: 12 Army fighters over N. A. S.
- 0555 Robert: Plots now at 35 Helen 77 and 35 Helen 87, 34 Gertrude 22, all unidentified.
- 0557 Fighters ordered by Robert to remain on ground (Fighters had not taken off by 0557).
- 0600 Flight #13, 2 PBY's now on patrol Pearl to NE Oahu, return Pearl at 0645 or upon completion of mission.
- 0606 Patrick: From land plane tower communications, intercepted.
- 0613 Patrick: Two utility planes took off from Maui to conduct a search around Maui.
- 0618 Patrick: China Clipper due in at 0830.
- 0619 Signal Tower: PERRY under way.
- 0630 Patrick: 2 B18's failed to take off from Bellows—will take off at 0700. 1-1317 failed to take off from Hickam—will take off at 0635.
- 0632 Flight 6 is out.
- 0633 Flight 3 is out.
- [69] 0643 China Clipper in at 0930 instead of 0830.
- 0646 Signal Tower: REEDBIRD and COCKATOO cleared channel standing out.
- 0706 Flights: 10, 11, 12 are out.
- 0712 Robert: request claim on 34 Helen 49. No.
0714. Signal Tower: BREESE entered channel.
- 0723 Signal Tower: Garbage barge cleared channel.
- 0724 Patrick: Inshore Patrol will investigate 34 Helen 49, and 34 Gertrude 30.
- 0730 Patrick reported Diamond Head flashes 0458 and 0519 to be flares dropped by anti-submarine planes.
- 0735 Signal Tower: BREESE moored at Coal Dock.
- 0737 Flight #8 will be delayed until 0740.
- 0740 Signal Tower: SEMINOLE and NAVAJO are under way.
- 0745 BREESE shifted berths to XP1
- 0746 TAUTOG under way.

- 0746 NAVAJO moored at K1  
 0800 Unidentified aircraft at 37-Gertrude-56  
 0807 Flight 13 completed. From Pat.  
 0809 Fighters at Luke Field are in readiness. Five fighters.  
 0810 Unidentified Air. 36-Gertrude-44.  
 0814 WASMUTH under way.  
 0815 Air at 36-Gertrude-10. SW unid.  
 0817 35-Irene-89 Surf.? Claimed.  
 0817 34-Gertrude-43 N. Air.? Not claimed.  
 [70] 0819 SOUTHARD moored at 13-3.  
 0819 6 P26's taking off from Wheeler will probably practice dive-bombing.  
 0826 #18 0830 1 SOC Pearl local to Ewa practice ETA. 1130.  
 0824 #19 0900 1 OS202 Pearl aerology return 1100 Dist. 25 miles south Mokapu  
 15,000 ft.  
 0834 #20 6P26 Wheeler 0830 Practice Dive 0900.  
 0835 34-Irene-88 SW Air? Patrick claims.  
 0837 34-Helen-41 Air? Patrick claims.  
 0837 34-Helen-48 Air? Patrick claims.  
 0838 WASMUTH cleared the channel.  
 0838 PELIAS under way.  
 0844 34 Helen 41 Air? Patrick claims.  
 0845 #21 0900 1 Rd Pearl local ETA 1000.  
 0845 #22 0900 1 F2A Pearl Local ETA 1030.  
 0845 #23 0900 1 JRS Pearl to Maui and return EVA 1130.  
 0847 Gate vessel reports heavy strain on net no reason for action. To Captain  
 of Yard.  
 0857 KUKUI anchored off F12.  
 0859 #24 0915 5 VF. 1VTB, 6 VSB Pearl to between Ford and Ewa ETA  
 1015. Practical landings.  
 0901 LITCHFIELD under way.  
 0905 Clipper 0920.  
 0906 TAUTOG under way.  
 0906 PELIAS moored sub base.  
 [71] 0906 From Patrick: Own 2PBV's were not the planes dropping flares  
 at 0400.  
 0916 NARWHAL under way to B15.  
 0916 POMPANO under way.  
 0917 Flight #8 completed.  
 0924 34 Helen 48 surf.? U. S. ship.  
 0928 1 B17 landed at Hickam.  
 0927 TAUTAG moored Sub Base.  
 0920 NARWHAL moored B15.  
 0932 3 SF escorted by 3 TBD leaving Pearl. Action. CinCPac. Robert, Patrick,  
 DER, G-3.  
 0933 34 Helen 55 Surf.  
 0937 #16 and #24 completed.  
 0940 #26-1000-5 VF from Pearl local Pearl to Ewa EVA Pearl. 1100.  
 0932 TUCKER cleared at 0932.  
 0944 Clipper landed at 0935.  
 0947 POMPANO cleared 0947.  
 LITCHFIELD " 0944.  
 CASE " 0940.  
 0955 #22 completed.  
 0955 #27-1030 1 F2A Pearl Local Pearl to Ewa Pract. Land. Return 1200.  
 0955 DD off Kolo Hbr., Molokai headed West? Action: CinCPac to check.  
 1012 #21 completed.  
 1013 MCFARLAND expects arrival off entrance. 1720 Action: Patrick, Robert,  
 Capt of Yard.  
 [72] 1013 35 Helen 73? U. S. vessel.  
 1016 SOUTHARD clear at 1016.  
 1016 CinCPac says DD at Molokai "probably friendly".  
 1023 #28 1100 1 VJ from Pearl test out east return 1215.  
 1025 GAMBLE entered.  
 1025 #29 1945 12VF U. S. Pearl local landings local EVA 1200  
 #30 1200 12 VF U. S. same 1430  
 1026 2 P36's local at Ewa.

- 1026 #06 completed.  
 1039 #20 completed.  
 1042 MAHAN entered (Com. tug).  
 1046 35 Helen 46?  
 1005 1 aircraft took off from Maui NE shore search. From Patrick.  
 1047 34 Gertrude 56 Patrick does not claim.  
 1050 Flight #19 completed.  
 1058 #33 take off 1 B18—1100 from Hickam Maui 1200 lv. Maui 1430 Ar. Hickam 1500. May not return if ordered otherwise.  
 1100 Lt. Cunningham lvs. Maui 1015, arr. Hickam 1110.  
 1104 1 plane LFT SNJ3 Ewa for Wheeler.  
 1104 #31 1115 2SED 1 Ewa to Pearl, arr. 1125.  
 1104 #32 1130 - fight. 1 scout. 1 bomb. Kaneohe to Pearl EVA 1150.  
 1111 Flight #3 completed. 6 B17's.  
 1115 2 DD's entered 1 tug left. PORTER MAHAN.  
 1120 #34 1300 1 JRF Pearl to Maui arr. 1430 return via Ewa 1530 ETA 1610.  
 1129 FM. Bellows B18 pilot sighted oil slick Lat. 17-21, 156-10. Dropped 1 bomb and slick increased in size about 5 times.  
 [73] 1131 1 aircraft lv. Maui for Molokai at 1100 arr. 1120. Ret. Maui 1320.  
 1130 FLUSSER and LAMSON entered.  
 1130 #17 in 1053.  
 1140 ETA on #23 changed to 1115.  
 1141 OP 7 DD 1 sub.sf. going in B51.  
 1142 Flight #26 completed.  
 1140 Blasting at Hickam at 1200.  
 1148 #35 1300 transport Maui to Pearl app. east. 1345.  
 1153 #36-1210-1 SNJ Pearl to Ewa. Not camouflaged. 1½ foot red band around wings and fusilage. Plane painted silver. ETA. 1225. Ewa.  
 1206 #37 1230—10 S 2 U 2 Pearl Kaneohe guard mail around coastline around Diamond Head ETA 1330.  
 #38 1220 1 VJ Pearl Hilo, carry parts. No ETA.  
 #39 1315 9 VO's Pearl sector 090-180 200 miles out and back sunset.  
 1210 #32 completed.  
 #27 completed.  
 1217 #2 completed.  
 1218 Navy radio: Navy will con. Obs. flights South Oahu begin 1200.  
 1218 Flight #11 will not return.  
 Flight #12 will return sunset.  
 1221 Flight #28 completed.  
 1222 Flight #29 completed.  
 1234 Flight #36 will not return.  
 1239 1 DM MONTGOMERY entered.  
 1240 #40 1300 1 RD 3 from Pearl. Circle at 2000 ETA 1500.  
 [74] 1244 #41 1330 3 Scout. Bomb., 1 TDB. Pearl. Landings at Pearl ETA 1430.  
 1250 Obs. from Diamond Head reports DD dropping charges off Pearl entrance. Action: Patrick, Robert, CinCPac. DD CHEW.  
 1300 Gate vessel confirmed above report.  
 1304 Flight #7 completed.  
 1310 26' sampan PIKO No. 32A323 will proceed from Ala Moana Yacht Basin to Pearl about 1400 today. White, red trim cabin and mast. Lt. Louis, U.S.N. in uniform will be on board. Sampan will skirt shore line.  
 1315 Flight #41 cancelled.  
 1325 Flight #15.  
 1325 A.O.P. 7 Dest. near PH U. S. vessels.  
 1328 #41 11BY at "C" ETA later.  
 1335 Sampan EBBTIDE left Kewalo Basin 1230 arrive Pearl 1430.  
 1323 From: CHEW to: Com 14: Made good sound connection on small sub. bearing 150° 33000 yards ent. buoys. Dropped 8 charges. Results unknown.  
 1343 1 aircraft Maui test 1400-1430 local  
 #39 return Eng. trouble 1415.  
 1355 #35 is in.



- 1355 #42 1415 1 VOS Pearl 170-180. 200 miles. Return JUNJR.  
 1415 Sub almost submerged reported 8 pr 10 miles due north of Ilio Point, West Molokai. Course unknown. Sighted by Mrs. Gamble flying Oahu to Kalaupapa 1015. Hickam transport here now searching. Boyum. From Homestead.
- 1425 #43 1500 Clipper Pearl to Mainland. Diamond Head departure.  
 1426 Sampan AMERICA MARU leave Honolulu for Pearl 1500 Navy crew.  
 1427 33-Helen-42 Aircraft unidentified.  
 1442 #43 delayed until 1600.  
 [75] 1445 CASE and TUCKER entered.  
 1450 35-Helen-56 unidentified.  
 35-Irene-76 unidentified. Claimed by Patrick.
- 1451 #18 is completed.  
 1452 #36 is completed.  
 #12 11'BY from N. 1600  
 1424 #30, #31, #25 completed.  
 1543 KUKUI stood out.  
 1541 From ComAirBatFor: Clipper coming in soon.  
 1545 Flight 43 taken off.  
 1559 Flight 34 is in.  
 1604 Flight 40 is in.  
 1622 From ComMinDiv 4: Sub in vicinity entrance Pearl.  
 Action—Inshore Patrol notified. Also gate vessel, Chief of Staff, Captain of Yard, Port Director, CinCPac, and MTB's.
- 1645 From Patrick: All planes in at Kaneohe.  
 1448 Flights 41 and 9 in.  
 1451 From Robert: Ships, apparently 2 DD's and 2 transports in 34 Helen 48. Robert notified we have 5 DM's there but no transports.
- 1659 MACFARLAND entered.  
 1700 Flight 33 is in.  
 1702 From Signal Tower: CHEW is flying "emergency unit" in harbor.  
 1706 From Signal Tower: A PT boat just dropped a depth charge off entrance.  
 1706 From Robert: Plot previously in 34 Gertrude 86 now in 34 Gertrude 96. Action—Patrick asked to investigate.
- 1717 Flight 42 is in.  
 [76] 1718 From Patrick: Cannot investigate 34 Gertrude 98. Too far out to reach before sundown.
- 1723 Notified Robert we have 2 destroyers and 2 transports in 34 Helen 48 instead of the 5 DM's.
- 1730 Flight 5 is in.  
 1732 From Robert: unlighted buoy sighted 300 yds. bearing 220° from Diamond Head. Action—Notified that it is our channel buoy.
- 1741 Flight 46 is in.  
 1744 Flight 45 is in.  
 1753 Flight 10 is in.  
 1758 Flight 14 staying at Hilo for night.  
 1807 Flight 39 is in.  
 1809 ELLIOTT standing out.  
 1815 From TENNESSEE. Japanese radio signal previously reported now making transmission on numerals 13950 code—Combat Intelligence notified.
- 1822 From Signal Tower: Red glow behind Diamond Head. Action—Robert notified.  
 1827 Robert reports fire on beach east of Diamond Head.  
 1730 From Army: Plane movement will take place tonight from Honolulu NW through Lualualei. Action—Lualualei advised at 1830.
- 1832 MACFARLAND moored Sub. Base.  
 1845 From Robert: The fire bears 265° T from Koko Head.  
 1935 From Robert: We have relocated the surface vessel which we notified you about before sundown. It is now in 34 Gertrude 87. Action—None, too far to investigate.
- 1955 From Robert: Reference plot at 34 Gertrude 87—The controller has noticed an unusually large no. of unidentified radar plots 320° from point affirm, 5-10 miles out, around dawn and dusk for the last 5 days.

- [77] 2020 From Robert: Investigate  
                                   35 Helen 22 unidentified.  
                                   "    "    74        "  
                                   "    "    86        "  
                                   "    "    97 (2 vessels) unidentified.
- 2025 From Robert: Vessel unidentified now moved in to 34 Gertrude 95. Not claimed by CinCPac or us. Action—Army told to illuminate.
- 2040 From Robert—Authority granted sampan to make trip to Niihau Saturday, December 20, and return. Also weekly trip same place each Wednesday. Will display large American flag.
- 2042 From Combat Int.: Air attack on Midway. Action: Chief of Staff notified.
- 2045 35 Helen 32 identified by us.
- 2112 From Robert—34 Gertrude 95 disappeared.
- 2115 From Robert: Investigate 35 Helen 65 unidentified.
- 2122 Notified Robert we are sending a vessel to investigate 35 Helen 74.
- 2130 From Robert—35 Gertrude 71—unidentified.
- 2152 From Robert—It is possible that 35 Helen 74, 35 Helen 97, 35 Helen 84 and 35 Helen 65 are erroneous reports. They may be "back echoes" on the radar.
- 2230 From Robert—Have checked with another station and only unverified plot they could verify was 35 Helen 97 and 35 Helen 65.
- 2310 From Robert: Plot in 35 Helen 65 now shows 3 ships. Also a plot in 35 Helen 64.  
 Action—sending vessel to investigate.
- 2355 Robert requested identity in  
           34 Helen 76 U. S.  
           35 Helen 15-25 U. S.  
           35 Helen 35 U. S.  
           35 Helen 44 U. S.  
           35 Helen 14 U. S.  
           34 Helen 14 question.
- Friday, 19 December, 1941.*
- [78] 0012 G-2 reported a small boat proceeding Laeoka Point to Mokapu, 100 yds. off shore. E company is investigating.
- 0030 Robert requested identification of  
           34 Helen 14 question  
           35 Helen 52 U. S.  
           33 Helen 95 question  
           35 Helen 44 U. S.
- 0110 To Robert, Patrick, Navy Liaison DeRussy: U. S. sampan will leave Kewalo Basin, Honolulu, Friday 19th between 1000-1200 en route Pearl. Exact time departure will be notified later.
- 0118 To Robert:  
           33 Helen 95 Not identified  
           34 Helen 14 Not identified
- 0129 From Robert: Plots 33 Helen 95  
                                   34 Helen 14 Have Disappeared.
- 0138 Robert requested identity of 35 Helen 83—question  
 New plot 35 Helen 72—question  
 0200 New plot 35 Helen 63 U. S.
- 0310 Combat requested further information on a report of Submarine between Molokai and Lanai at 0555 GCT—None.
- 0314 Plot 34 Helen 68—question.
- 0402 Patrick reported boat leaving for pier C.
- 0403 Plot 34 Helen 68 disappeared.
- 0408 Plot 35 Helen 43 appears to have a plane circling overhead.  
 Robert reported—Army and Navy have no planes up.
- 0420 From TANEY—Two small searchlights from location west of Honolulu Harbor have been directed seaward for long period 2330. Suggest they be turned off. Action G-3.
- 0501 Honolulu Coast Guard Radio Station lookout (Diamond Head) reports plane flying Ewa past Diamond Head has single orange running light. 0440. Notified Patrick, Robert.

- 0505 Signal Tower reported flashes that resembled gunfire past Koko Head.  
Action—informed CinCPac and Inshore Patrol.
- [79] 0520 The plane which was "reported" seen off Diamond Head was "actually" seen and heard by the Coast Guard lookout.
- 0605 U. S. S. ALLEN under way.
- 0606 Flights #8 and #1 in the air.
- 0618 Telephone call from District Intelligence reported 4 small planes flying very high toward Honolulu. Action: Patrick, Robert, CinCPac notified.
- 0619 Robert reported that the Army claims those 4 small planes. Patrick, CinCPac notified.
- 0625 U. S. S. HOPKINS under way.
- 0627 U. S. S. DENT under way.
- 0642 U. S. S. ALLEN cleared Pearl. DeRussy, Inshore, Combat Int. all notified.
- 0644 U. S. S. RAMSAY entered Pearl.
- 0648 U. S. S. COCKATOO and U. S. S. REEDBIRD cleared. DeRussy, Inshore Patrol.
- 0700 U. S. S. DENT cleared PH. DeRussy, Inshore Patrol:
- 0702 U. S. S. HOPKINS cleared Pearl. DeRussy, Inshore Patrol.
- 0712 To DeRussy The (Procyon) vessel on line 8 has been delayed 2 hours.
- 0718 Patrick reported a fire near landing east 1000 yards from floating dry dock. Investigation showed trash being burned by Contractors. Capt. Yard's Office notified.
- 0722 From ComOutshorePatrol, To Com 14: Your 191700 negative: Com Inshore Patrol is notified.
- 08-12 Communications with all stations checked.
- 0800 WARD entered channel.
- 0802 CinCPac communication still poor. Too much line.
- 0804 Signal Tower: LAMSON cleared channel.
- 0813 Signal Tower: MAHAN cleared.
- [80] Signal Tower: ELLET cleared.
- 0821 Signal Tower: FANNING and BALCH cleared.
- 0830 Capt. of Yard's Office: Philippine Clipper will arrive Pearl City at 0930.  
Signal Tower: MCCALL cleared.
- 0835 Signal Tower: DUNLAP cleared.  
Flight 16 in, Flight 2 out.
- 0838 Signal Tower: BENHAM cleared at 0832.
- 0843 Signal Tower: GRIDLEY cleared.
- 0849 Signal Tower: MAURY cleared.
- 0854 Signal Tower: CRAVEN cleared.
- 0856 Signal Tower: FLUSSER cleared.
- 0905 Signal Tower: LITCHEFIELD cleared.  
Pearl City reports Philippine clipper delayed until 1100.
- 0908 Signal Tower: TALBOT entered.
- 0911 Flight 17 in.
- 0915 Robert: 9 bombers from east landed at Hickam.
- 0920 Flight 15 in. Flight 10 out.
- 0925 Flight 12 took off 30 minutes late.
- 0934 G-3 Major Warner: Unidentified plane sighted north of Niihau head west.  
Old sing-motored type. Pilot (reporting) unable to follow plane.  
Reported above plane as friendly.
- 0940 U. S. ship escorted 90 miles south of Pearl.
- 0945 Flight 20 out. Captain of Yard's Office requests identify of following plane:  
Reported by Honolulu radio station on Diamond Head: Single motored yellow wings, green body, headed toward Koko Head. Relayed to Patrick.
- [81] 0959 Signal Tower: NORTHAMPTON cleared.
- 1010 SALT LAKE CITY cleared. REID cleared.
- 1015 CUMMINGS and ENTERPRISE stood out.  
ENTERPRISE cleared at 1020.
- 1023 ETA on clipper 1040.  
MATILDA FOSS en route Honolulu arr. 1130.  
MAPE en route Pearl from Honolulu arr. 1800.  
PROCYON arr. 1045.  
SCOTT depart Pearl for Honolulu 1030.  
COOLIDGE depart 1100.
- 1025 Clipper sighted over Honolulu coming in.

- 1037 Signal Tower: District cleared.  
 1040 Robert requests claim of 34 Irene 99. *No.*  
 1043 Robert: 4 P-40's took off Haleiwa to patrol *E* to *C* until 1055.  
 1045 H. C. P. to Coast Guard: Reference—identification of yellow wing mono-plane: John Rogers Airport leases to Board of Health 1—single motor, high wing monoplane, yellow wings, blue fuselage.  
 1055 G-2: Unidentified submarine 252° (T) 7500 yards from Kahuku Point. 1045 first sighted.  
 1100 Flight 1 is in.  
 1105 Flight 12 is in.  
 1109 Robert: via Army plane: Surface vessel 20 miles 250° (T) from Kaena Point.  
 1111 Flights 19, and 21 are in.  
 1118 Flight 11 out, will not return.  
 1125 G-2: Army will fire on 12/20/41, 75 M. M. Leo Kealohi Bay. 0830-0900 and Waileu Bay 1100-1200—165 MM. for distance of 6 miles.  
 1131 G-3. Report from Navy Liaison: All civilian planes are grounded by C. A. A. Supervisor except that of Mrs. Gamble who has permission from the Governor to operate one plane in transport of supplies to Molokai—no night flying permitted. All other planes have vital parts removed.  
 [82] 1143 H. C. P. to DeRussy, Patrick and Robert: LAKE FRANCIS will depart Honolulu 1230, escorted.  
 1154 Lt. Porteus reports: Submarine seen from Kahuku Point by one observer, only for short time. Not sighted since.  
 1200 H. C. P. to CinCPac, Robert, and Patrick for information. DETROIT fired guns while lying off Honolulu.  
 1205 Signal Tower: DETROIT fired second salvo. PROCYON entered.  
 1223 Patrick: Inner Patrol, 2J10 plane, landed and reported having sighted a submarine bearing 148° (T) from Ford Island tower, just off entrance buoys. (P. H. Channel). Due to faulty radio communication report did not reach Patrick until pilot landed. Patrick dispatched a PBY to locate submarine and bomb source.  
 1225 Signal Tower: PROCYON passed buoy 18.  
 1237 Flight 7 is in.  
 1245 CHICAGO entered.  
 1248 Signal Tower: White smoke in vicinity of Wheeler Field.  
 1250 Signal Tower: PROCYON moored to K-3.  
 1250 Flight 26 out.  
 1255 H. C. P. to DeRussy, Patrick and Robert: 1 U. S. tanker departs from Honolulu with escort at 1300.  
 1312 Port Director, Honolulu: RAMAPO cleared channel (Honolulu) at 1310.  
 1317 Patrick: Clipper will take off 1400 Eastbound.  
 1320 Signal Tower: MAHAN, FLUSSER, and LAMSON entered.  
 1323 Flight 20 in.  
 1327 Flights 26, 27, and 28 went out on time.  
 1335 NEVADA: 8 dive bombers and puffs of smoke off Barbers Point. Patrick and Robert asked to investigate. Result: planes are U. S. Army P-36's.  
 [83] 1340 Signal Tower: PERRY cleared.  
 1403 Robert: Identify 34 Helen 37 Ans: *No.*  
 1404 H. C. P. Relayed to Patrick: From Post S-4, Hickam Field, a report from Burns Field on Kauai as follows: 1 Navy plane, with damaged landing gear and wing here requiring repairs. Has been here (at Burns Field) for several days.  
 1412 Flight 2 is in.  
 1414 Robert: Orig.: Aerological Officer: Daily there will be released from NAS, Ford Island, at 0300 and from Pan-American Airways at 1930 a test balloon with small light attached.  
 1420 Flight 8 is in.  
 1432 From Com14 to Combatships: Your 200026—seven (7) Army planes took off from Ewa at 1315 and flew over general area Pearl about 1345 at high altitude. (Ref. 200026: from Combatships: Bombing attacks in three flights sighted flying at 6 to 10 thousand feet. One flight of them flew directly over battleships at about 1345. Were these friendly planes?)  
 1443 Flight #22 completed.  
 1450 Patrick: Clipper took off at 1450, eastbound.  
 1452 Signal Tower: 2 merchantmen.





- 1915 All planes have landed.
- 1920 Army air raid signal is as follows: 1 long blast on siren  
All clear is: 1 short blast  
Same as Honolulu signals.  
(Changed;) Air Raid, short blasts for 2 minutes; secure, 1 long blast.
- [86] 1931 Robert: "Nothing 'friendly' in the air."
- 1937 From G-3: The Yacht *7 Seas* at KAILI KII must now move to NAPOOPOO  
KALAKAKUA to escape gale.
- 1951 35 Helen 24
- 1955 Rowboat has just shoved off from Aiea showing no lights.  
Action: Captain of the Yard notified 2042-X10 report 2120 no results.
- 2005 35 Helen 33, 34, 35 U. S. vessel.
- 2035 Robert: Cleared board. New plots to follow.
- 2042 35 Helen 11 US ship  
35 Helen 04, 05 (15) US ship  
34 Helen 93, 94 US ships  
35 Helen 44, 65 US  
34 Helen 75 US  
34 Helen 54, 53 US
- 2051 Small boat seen by Signal Tower between C-3 and C-4 using searchlight.  
Action: Captain of the Yard notified.  
Results: PT boat searching for item 1955.  
35 Helen 04, 05 Still unidentified.  
35 Helen 43, 45, 55, 64, 83, 75. U. S.  
35 Helen 76, 23 U. S.
- 2122 All plots on board listed above.
- 2136 Robert: Cleared board. New plots:  
35 Helen 11, 24, 14, 05, 04, 65 U. S.  
34 Helen 93, 94 (2) U. S.  
35 Helen 45, 34 U. S.  
34 Helen 74 U. S.
- 2151 100 in D-5 is shining searchlight on Clipper landing from Signal Tower.  
Action: Capt. of Yard: Waters reports 3 shots fired in direction of Clipper  
Landing. Searchlight was then turned on to investigate.  
35 Helen 44  
35 Helen 15
- 2223 Reddish white light seen 10-25 miles west of Fox. Not picked up by  
RADAR. Infantry men on tower near Point Fox happened to see same.  
Same occurrence last night at 2100.  
Action: Figured to be Planet Mars setting at A2. 250°
- [87] 2245 Robert: Cleared board.  
34 Helen 75, 94 U. S.  
35 Helen 04, 15, 16, 11, 24, 44 U. S.  
35 Helen 23, 06 U. S.  
35 Helen 26 U. S.  
35 Helen 15 U. S.  
35 Helen 34 U. S.
- 2336 Robert: Cleared board.  
35 Helen 24 (-2), 23, 35, 33, 43  
34 Helen 95, 94 (-2)  
35 Helen 05  
34 Helen 65  
35 Helen 26

## CONTACTS BY PLANES

- [88] 1. 1057—Sub. 252°—7500 yard. Kahuku. No action.
2. 1109—Surface ship 250° 20 miles Point G.
3. 1130 Sub. L20-24 W. Long. 156-45W.
4. 1157 Off Honolulu HC reported that US Cruiser fired several shots.
5. 0910 Sub. off Pearl Entrance.
6. 1325 SS MEMPHIS CITY speed 10.
7. 1325 Convoy—10 miles So. Barbers Point.
8. 1417 SS SEARCH 35 Gert.
9. 1507 SS MAPELA 35 Gert.
10. 1017 Cargo Ship L24-30N. Long. 156-15W Sp. 15
11. 1509 Life Boat under sail L19-15N Long. 159-00 SxSW 145 miles. USS  
DRAYTON will investigate; ordered by CinCPac.

- [89] *Saturday, 20 December, 1941*
- 0000 To Robert, Patrick, CinCPac, DeRussy, G-3: Negat Baker Dog Fox, Order Number four execute Ten repeat Ten.
- 0014 To Robert, Patrick, DeRussy, G-3: Last message did not concern you.
- 0115 From Robert: 35 Helen 76 unidentified  
35 Helen 87 unidentified  
Action—Robert told to illuminate 35 Helen 76 and 35 Helen 87.
- 0120 From Patrick: Please arrange for an escort to meet Army courier at main gate and take him to landing C. We are sending a small boat to landing C.
- 0155 From Robert; Searchlights were turned on. Nothing found. Plots 35 Helen 76 and 35 Helen 87 have disappeared.
- 0305 From Robert: New setup on board.  
34 Helen 85 U. S.  
34 Helen 92 U. S.  
34 Helen 95 U. S.  
35 Helen 13 U. S.  
35 Helen 24 U. S.  
35 Helen 44 U. S.
- 0420 From CHEW—Steady white visible light near Diamond Head.  
Action—Robert told to investigate.
- 0428 From Robert: OP 1 can see no light around Diamond Head.
- 0448 From Robert: 38 Gertrude 19—unidentified.
- 0508 From Robert—last plot has now moved to 38 Florence 00.
- 0520 From Maui—Unidentified ship 50 miles North of Maui (38 Florence 00).  
Action—Robert will have one of the B18's in the patrol investigate at 0550.
- 0630 From Robert: One destroyer and one sub off Barbers Point.  
Action—Patrick notified, may be U. S.
- 0632 Notified Patrick and Robert and CinCPac that it is a U. S. sub.
- 0639 From Robert—Plot still at 38 Florence 00.
- 0640 GAMBLE stood out.
- [90] 0653 From Robert: Sub has disappeared. OP 9 now reports 1 small boat and 10 cruisers 3 miles south of Barbers Point. There is no Navy Liaison Officer at OP9.
- 0658 CROSSBILL and BREESE stood out. Chandler stood in.
- 0704 From Robert: OP9 now reports the vessels off Barb. to be 4 stack destroyers. The small boat is a surface vessel, and could not be a sub.
- 0725 From Robert: OP9 now reports 14 four stack DD, S to SE, distance 1 to 3 miles from Barbers Point.
- 0729 ALLEN stood in.
- 0732 WARD stood out.
- 0735 From Robert—OP9 reports there are no Navy personnel attached to the post.
- 0737 From Robert: OP9 reports there have been no Navy personnel attached there in the past. All observers are trained for A. A.
- 0749 HOVEY entered Pearl.
- 0754 From Patrick: Plane reported Negative on report of boat and 10 cruisers 3 miles south of Barbers Point.
- 0807 DENT entered Pearl.
- 0813 Flight #8 is in.
- 0819 ZANE entered Pearl.
- 0852 Robert reported 8 Army pursuits to fly over Pearl at 1000 ft.
- 0900 After 1700 Friday the 19th Lt. Ginn at Diamond Head observed a DD drop a depth charge ahead of the U. S. S. WRIGHT. This morning the same officer observed a large oil slick at approx. the same position that the charge had been dropped. Position 6700 yds. bearing 270° from top of Diamond Head 150 fathoms.
- 0918 Flight 10 is in.
- 0928 C. G. Cutter RELIANCE is in.
- 0929 Signal Tower reports a merchantman escorted by 2 DD's coming this way. Estimated distance 10 miles.
- [91] 0940 Signal Tower reports 1 merchantman escorted by 2 DD's headed for Pearl SSW 10 miles.  
Also one merchantman escorted by 1 DD headed for Pearl SSW 15 miles.  
Action—Patrick, DeRussy, Combat Intelligence.
- 0952 Flight one results "negative".

## 1866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0957 Robert questioned plot 32 Clara 68—Not identified.
- 0958 Robert reported that B-18 investigating 38 Florence 00 has made no report. They assume "negative" results.
- 1015 G-2 reports and directs us to disregard the report at 0520 about a vessel in 38 Florence 00.
- 1019 Harbor Control identified one merchant convoy—Patrick and Robert. Will notify Patrick and Robert on the other one.
- 1027 Officer reported that XYP 161 (sampan) will leave Kewalo Basin for Pearl at 1045. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy notified. Also combat intelligence.
- 1031 Flight 12 is in.
- 1033 Patrick reports 1 P36 taking off at Ewa for 15 minute flight.
- 1100 Robert: Plot 38 Florence 00 reappeared, must be a large craft to be detected at so great a distance.
- 1113 Flight 14 in.
- 1118 Robert reported that Army Patrol flight has been told to investigate 38 Florence 00. This flight will come in at 1430 with information.
- 1125 Robert reported no information on plot 38 Florence 00. Harbor Control recommended a special investigation to Robert.
- 1128 Flight 16 is in.
- 1133 Robert: Army is going to send up 3 aircraft type A-20 from Wheeler to investigate the plot 38 Florence 00.
- 1145 WILLIAM WARD BURROWS entered Pearl.
- 1200 Station 7 at Kaena Point reported a small boat 26,000 SW 155° traveling SW. This was confirmed and the vessel is now submerged. Info Patrick, Robert, Combat Intelligence.
- [92] 1202 Major Lesser 82—completed firing on North Coast this morning, between 1100-1200.
- 1203 SHLEY #9 is in.
- 1212 SHLEY cleared Pearl. Notified Robert, Patrick, DeRussy.
- 1215 DeRussy reported sub. and DD off Kaena Point 14,000 yds. U. S. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy G-3 notified.
- 1221 Flight 2 is in.
- 1235 XYP 161 is leaving Kewalo Basin now for Pearl. Robert, Patrick, DeRussy notified.
- 1235 CONDOR and CROSSBILL entered Pearl.
- 1247 CHEW entered Pearl. Moored B-6 at 1330.
- 1258 Robert requested identity of 36 Helen 55. Not identified.
- 1325 Flight #22 in.
- 1330 Robert requests info on 35 Helen 65. Just off Koko Head. Cannot be identified but it is right close to land.
- 1335 Flight 21 is in.
- 1338 Robert: 36 Gertrude 54 is not identified.
- 1340 Flight 18 in reports "neg" on 38 Florence 00.
- 1407 Flight 17 in.
- 1422 Robert: We cannot identify 34 Gertrude 43.
- 1425 To Patrick and Robert: Clipper delayed ½ hour.
- 1448 Patrick reports one plane from Johnston Island has landed.
- 1450 Clipper took off.
- 1458 DRAYTON entered Pearl.
- 1520 FLUSSER cleared—Robert, Patrick, DeRussy, Combat.
- 1522 Flight 3 is in.
- [93] 1524 TUCKER cleared. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy, Combat Intell.
- 1525 CASE cleared. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy, Combat Intell.
- 1525 Flight 25 is in.
- 1530 NAVAJO cleared. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy.
- 1531 Robert: Message from Homestead Field, Molokai. 2 subs; one submerged, were sighted 4 or 5 miles due north off Momo Beach. Identity unknown. Action. Combat Intelligence.
- 1540 CONYNGHAM and SEMINOLE cleared.
- 1545 Robert: claim 35 Helen 92: Ans.: No
- 1547 Tested communications: All clear, Cincpac very faint.
- 1548 Signal Tower: MARYLAND under way.
- 1558 Signal Tower: TROUT entered 1546. LITCHFIELD entered 1554. Flight 15 is in, Flight 26 to rescue Army fighter.



- 1559 Patrick: Maui planes: 1425 off Kalaupapa, Molokai. 1 freighter with small boat out between it and sunken freighter; ¼ mile offshore.
- 1600 Signal Tower: TENNESSEE under way.
- 1607 One DD of Inshore Patrol dropped 1 depth charge 1 mile SE of Harbor entrance buoys
- 1608 Robert: Identify 34 Helen 37, and 34 Helen 36. Answer: No.
- 1614 Robert: Identify 35 Irene 65. Answer: No.
- 1621 Robert: Cincpac identified 34 Helen 36, 34 Helen 37, and 35 Helen 92.
- 1622 Robert: 35 Irene 65 unidentified—has moved 1 mile toward Oahu.
- 1627 Signal Tower: PENNSYLVANIA under way.
- 1628 Signal Tower: ORTOLAN moored at Sub. Base.
- 1642 Signal Tower: 1 BB cleared harbor.
- [94] 1644 Flight 11 is in.
- 1655 Signal Tower: 1 DD cleared.
- 1657 Signal Tower: TROUT moored at Sub. Base.
- 1700 Robert: Board cleared.  
Plots 35 Helen 30, 33, 44 and 22.  
Signal Tower: LITCHFIELD moored at Sub. Base.
- 1708 Signal Tower: L BB cleared.
- 1711 Plots added: 35 Helen 20.  
Unidentified: 35 Helen 20, and 30.
- 1715 Signal Tower: SEMINOLE entered channel.
- 1717 Signal Tower: NAVAJO entered.  
35 Helen 20 and 30 identified by H. C. P.
- 1720 Flight 26 is in. No Army fighter sighted.  
Flight 6 is in, also 7.  
Information: from H. C. P. (to Patrick, Robert, Cincpac, ComInshore Patrol, Com Offshore Patrol and Combat Intelligence;) Army test firing for 21 December, 0900-0930; 1-75 MM. battery to 1500 yds. offshore at Wailua Bay and at Pamaula Station.
- 1800 Flight 20 is in.
- 1807 Signal Tower: Seminole moored F-4 at 1745. NAVAJO moored F-4 at 1758.
- 1809 Flight 19 is in.
- 1815 H. C. P. 5 B17's took off from Hickam Field at 1800. Patrick, Robert, Cincpac nor Harbor Control Post knew anything about it. Captain Reynolds sighted planes in the air at 1820. Patrick obtained information on planes and made them flight 28.
- 1835 Signal Tower: DENT under way 1734—cleared 1820.  
WATERS under way 1739—cleared 1823.
- 1838 New plots: 34 Helen 68 H. C. P. No.  
35 Helen 43 H. C. P. yes, U. S.
- 1841 New plots: 34 Helen 62 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.
- [95] 1842 Lt. Seibert, Marine Staff Duty Officer, Marine Hdqtrs. reported that Sgt. Griffen, in charge of guard at pier 31A Honolulu, was approached by an unidentified civilian worker wearing a defense identification badge, who informed the Sgt. that an attempt would be made tonight to sabotage that area. G-3, Navy Intelligence notified.
- 1846 34 Helen 52 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
35 Helen 21 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
35 Helen 33 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.
- 1900 34 Helen 41 H. C. P. No (see 1913 entry.)  
34 Helen 93 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
34 Helen 95 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.
- 1903 Automatic weapons Marine sentry at Pearl Harbor Coal Dock: Tug from dredge there is heading for NEVADA dredge. Master knows nothing about it, did not order its going. H. C. P. notified Capt. of Yard's Office and Harbor Security at Section Base.
- 1910 35 Helen 04 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.
- 1913 34 Helen 41 moved to 34 Helen 30. H. C. P. No  
Signal Tower: Hickam Field sweeping with searchlight. Plane with lights approaching Hickam from the east.
- 1917 Tug to NEVADA has been identified—situation cleared up.
- 1923 Robert: Can hear air raid siren there. Requests information on probable practice air raid tonight. All stations reported no knowledge of same.

- 1927 35 Helen 34 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
 35 Helen 23 H. C. P. Yes U. S.  
 34 Helen 74 H. C. P. Yes U. S.
- 1932 Robert: No air raid practice scheduled anywhere. Siren heard being investigated.
- 1938 Robert: From A Battery 64: red light sighted off entrance buoy (Pear Harbor). Correction.
- 1941 35 Irene 39 H. C. P. Will observe further.  
 35 Helen 23 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
 Robert received report Navy was responsible for air raid alarm. Cincpac and H. C. P. both deny responsibility for and hearing of same.
- [96] 1943 Plots: 34 Helen 30  
 34 Helen 74  
 34 Helen 95  
 34 Helen 93 U. S.  
 35 Helen 04  
 35 Helen 23  
 35 Helen 34  
 35 Irene 39
- } 2109: see 2108 entry below.
- 1950 From G-2: A light located ashore twice swept the Island of Mokulua, off Lanikai, Oahu, at 1945. Was not an Army light. Notified Robert, Navy Intelligence, Cincpac and Patrick.
- 1953 36 Helen 76 H. C. P.: No  
 25 Irene 39 now 35 Irene 48 H. C. P.: Yes. U. S.  
 33 Irene 89  
 35 Helen 41 H. C. P.: Yes, U. S.  
 33 Irene 77 appears to be the former 33 Irene 89. Cincpac identifies at 2020.
- 2013 Flight 28 is in.
- 2020 36 Helen 65 H. C. P.: No. *Cincpac No.*
- 2054 35 Helen 23 H. C. P. Yes, U. S.  
 36 Helen 06 Cincpac. Yes.
- 2108 Robert reports he has no unidentified plots on board.  
 35 Helen 34 U. S. (H. C. P.)
- 2114 Army claims 1950 G2 light report to have been one of its field batteries.
- 2125 Section Base reported sound of aircraft motors; investigation showed Hickam Field warming up planes. Section Base and Patrick notified.
- 2128 35 Helen 55—H. C. P.: Yes, U. S.
- 2125 A definite attempt was made at sabotage in vicinity of new dry dock (Hospital tennis courts) by starting a fire. Guards saw man lighting burlap. Two guards fire at man climbing steel fence, presumably Hickam Field fence. Capt. of Yard Office, Hickam Field and Marine Duty Officer notified.
- 2140 G-2: Red light sighted 10 miles west of Kahe. On for 3 minutes. Informed Cincpac and Inshore Patrol.  
 35 Helen 34 H. C. P.: U. S.  
 43 H. C. P.: U. S.
- [97] 2219 From Robert: Warn all pilots: Macadam striy only—reat *only*—safe for landing at Homestead. End.  
 Cincpac and Patrick notified.  
 34 Helen 93 H. C. P.: U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 H. C. P.: U. S.  
 35 Helen 42 H. C. P.: U. S.  
 2253 35 Helen 45 U. D. (H. C. P.)  
 2258 34 Helen 31 H. C. P. No. Cincpac Yes.
- 2325 G-3: Firing order for 21 December: 1 75 MM battery from Paumalu Station 1500 yards offshore between 0900-0930.  
 1-75 MM battery from Waialua Bay 1500 yards offshore between 0880-0900.  
 35 Helen 14, 52, and 34 H. C. P.: All U. S.
- 2328 Memorandum originated by Robert: Use of "ship" applying to aircraft and/or surface craft is taboo. Henceforth: for aircraft: aircraft, airplane, or plane. For surface ships: surface ship or small boat.

Sunday, December 21, 1941

- [98] 0008 34 Gertrude 74 Unidentified surface craft  
 0026 34 Gertrude 47 Unidentified  
 0026 35 Helen 33 U. S. ship  
 0034 Board cleared by Robert  
 34 Gertrude 47 unidentified and should be enemy  
 35 Helen 34 U. S. surface ship  
 35 Helen 33 U. S. surface ship  
 35 Helen 52 U. S. surface ship  
 0040 From: RDO San Francisco  
 To: All Nav. ships Pac. waters: Known enemy subs operating vicinity  
 Blunts Reef and Santa Cruz during afternoon twenty December.  
 Action: logged.  
 0043 From: Com 14 To: Offshore Patrol; Inshore Patrol: NBDF order  
 number four execute number two repeat two.  
 0054 35 Helen 40 Patrol.  
 0055 34 Gertrude 47 Still unidentified plotted at L 21°-39'-21'' N. 158°-18'-  
 30'' W.  
 Cincpac, CombatInt, N. T. S. could not claim. Offshore Patrol sent dis-  
 patch for info. Army searching area with lights and have 8'' railway  
 battery at Kawaiiloa on alert. Infantry alerted in area.  
 0130 Robert cleared the board.  
 34 Gertrude 47 unidentified  
 34 Helen 42 U. S.  
 0131 35 Gertrude 95 appeared and disappeared, at 0115.  
 0136 Red flare at Fort Kam, from: Signal Tower.  
 Action: Army investigated. Results negative.  
 0159 Clear Board  
 0159 34 Gertrude 47 unidentified  
 34 Helen 74 U. S.  
 34 Helen 83 U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 U. S.  
 [99] 0159 35 Helen 22 U. S.  
 35 Helen 33 U. S.  
 35 Helen 43 U. S.  
 35 Helen 63 U. S.  
 0212 34 Helen 94 U. S.  
 0214 35 Helen 25 U. S.  
 0216 35 Helen 04 U. S.  
 0216 35 Helen 23 U. S.  
 0230 From Patrick: Aerology is taking a night sounding using a ballon with  
 a light on same.  
 0237 34 Gertrude 47 Robert cleared board.  
 34 Helen 74 U. S.  
 34 Helen 94 U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 U. S.  
 35 Helen 41 U. S.  
 35 Helen 63 U. S.  
 0257 Signal Tower reports red light flashing between Hospital Pt. and Nevada.  
 Action: Gate vessel, Cap. Yard, Section Base says green and blue  
 flashes also seen near coal dock, intervals five minutes. Signal Tower  
 further reports one red flash vicinity Barbers Point. *Further action.*  
 0321 From: RDO Federal Bldg.  
 To: Rob., Pat., Cincpac  
 Via: Harbor Cont.  
 Following from DUNCAN FCC. Punchbowl Station reports station 10790  
 Kcs. sending series victors followed by call sign next repeat next fol-  
 lowed by more series of victors. Bearing fifteen degrees true.  
 0338 Board cleared at Robert.  
 34 Gertrude 47 Disappeared and suspected to be false plot since other  
 Radars could not show same plot.  
 0341 34 Helen 55 U. S.  
 34 Helen 65 U. S.  
 34 Helen 85 U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 U. S.  
 35 Helen 12 U. S.  
 35 Helen 51 U. S.

- [100] 35 Helen 63 U. S.  
 35 Helen 64 U. S.  
 0400 There will be 2 BT 1 52 F  
 Operating from Maui Lanai  
 0400 Molokai most of today. From Pat.  
 34 Helen 66  
 34 Helen 84  
 0403 From Cinepac: The call "nert" referred to in item 0321 is that of a ship  
 not operating in this ocean. Action: Combat Int. notified.  
 0415 Signal Tower reports bright white light flashing several times on moun-  
 tain in line with NEVADA. Action: Army  
 0422 Signal Tower: Red flare seen at West Loch Pt. Action: Talked to Gate  
 Vessel which saw nothing. Army checked. Board cleared.  
 0436 34 Helen 85 U. S.  
 35 Helen 33 U. S.  
 35 Helen 51 U. S.  
 35 Helen 63 U. S.  
 35 Helen 64 U. S.  
 0435 Lt. Collins. Cinepac: Reports people on reservoir behind Makalapala  
 Radio Station signalling with blue lights. Action: Capt. Yard. Be-  
 lieved to be sentries. Cinepac notified.  
 0500 32 Florence 33 Aircraft unclaimed by Patrick.  
 0508 Flight #13 is off  
 0521 35 Helen 34 U. S.  
 38 Edith 35 Planes coming in Claimed by Army.  
 36 Gertrude 97 Planes coming in Claimed by Army.  
 0550 Army has planes circling "B", "E", and "F".  
 0605 Flight #2 is off.  
 0609 1 DD under way.  
 0615 #14—0730—1 PBV Kaneohe purpose meet #1 0930.  
 #15 0630 1 JF2 Kaneohe 2 circle around Bay.  
 ETA 0700.
- [101] 0616 1 DD under way  
 0619 Flight #3 and flight #10 off.  
 0619 1 DD cleared the channel.  
 0621 Flight #6 is off  
 0621 Flight #4 is off  
 0622 35 Helen 94 may be tug MICHE.  
 0623 1 DD cleared.  
 0625 #16 PAA clipper Dest. Pearl ETA 0930.  
 0639 1 DD cleared.  
 0642 Flight #3 in the air  
 0643 4 P36's took off from Ewa.  
 0645 2 sweeps cleared.  
 0658 1 DD entered.  
 0700 Flight #15 completed.  
 Flight #14 will proceed 15 7020 Mi. South Mokapu Pt.  
 0717 Pursuits from Cast to Dog will circle over Dog.  
 0736 Communications checked and found O. K.  
 0740 Flight #14 is in the air.  
 0740 34 Irene 28?
- ARCHIE P. KELLEY, *Ensign, U. S. N.*
- 0755 From Pat.: One of our planes has sighted a suspicious vessel in 37 Helen 91.  
 0759 From Pat.: 37 Helen 91 is a U. S. lighthouse vessel.  
 0808 From Robert: 35 Helen 83 U. S. ship.  
 0825 From Robert 35 Helen 91 U. S. vessel.  
 [102] 0830 From Robert: 6 marines sighted in a boat in lat. 19-28 N.  
 Long. 158-55 W. They fired a flare, and boat has a sail.  
 0850 From Robert: 34 Gertrude 57 unidentified.  
 0905 GREBE is under way.  
 0914 From Pat.: There may be 2 additional planes with the Pan. Am. Clipper.  
 0925 BOBOLINK is under way.  
 0930 Flight 1 is in.  
 0930 From Robert—4 P40's going out from Wheeler to Pt. B to see if plane  
 coming in is Clipper.  
 0935 Flight 16 is in.



- 0936 Fight 2 is in.  
 0955 BOBOLINK tied up alongside NEVADA; RAIL got under way.  
 0955 Flight 14 is completed.  
 0958 From Signal Tower: Heavy white smoke east of Barbers Pt. Action—Robert told to investigate.  
 1007 From Robert No smoke visible by Barbers Pt.  
 1008 From Robert 37 Florence 48 unidentified.  
 1023 RAIL moored B20. ONTARIO is under way.  
 1025 Flight 11 is in.  
 1027 ONTARIO moored B18.  
 1040 Flight 19 is in.  
 1040 ONTARIO shifted to berth B20.  
 1055 Flight 17 is in. Flight 6 is in.  
 1128 Flight 22 is in.  
 1128 From Comdr. Momsen: Army will provide air protection for Task Force unloading in Honolulu Harbor. G-3 has been notified. Action: Notified Patrick.
- [103] 1135 From Robert Dec. 22, 1 battery 63rd Field Artillery.  
 1142 WADSMUTH standing out.  
 1146 From Robert 2 vessels sighted 18 mi. NE Kaneohe—U. S. ships.  
 1149 LONG shifting berths.  
 1158 Flight 21 is in.  
 1212 Flight 25 is in.  
 1224 Flight 7 is in.  
 1232 From Pat.: Mr. Craig has no information on plane going out to drop supplies to lifeboat.  
 1245 From Pat.: Plane will leave with provisions for small boat in 10 mins.  
 1250 From Robert: Niihau patrol reports a sampan ½ mi. offshore, 1½ mi. west of MAKAHUENA Pt., Kauai. 2 men not flying any identification. Action: Notified Pat. and Cincpac.
- 1235 From Robert: Small freighter headed west off Kolo, Molokai—U. S. ship.  
 1300 From Robert 31 Helen 01 (2 vessels) unidentified.  
 1314 Flight 12 is in.  
 1315 From Robert 36 Gert 70—unidentified.  
 1325 From Robert The surface convoy will arrive from coast at Honolulu at 1700—PBYS will be on anti-sub. patrol, and 1 squadron pursuits will be ordered off at 1500 to intercept convoy and act as fighter escort.
- 1337 From Robert: Sound air raid alarm. Unidentified planes 35 Irene 37.  
 1343 Flight 27 in.  
 1340 Unidentified planes now 35 Helen 60—speed 200 MPH.
- [104] 1344 Fighters taking off from Hickam.  
 1345 From.—Planes staying on ground until definite information.  
 1346 From Signal Tower: 6 planes from due S. look like bombers. Told Pat.  
 1347 From Signal Tower: They are behind clouds and SW.  
 1350 From Robert—Now 30—45 mi. out, in direction between "D" and "C".  
 1354 From Patrick—10 patrol planes taking off Kaneohe. Proceed 20 mi. north A and remain.
- 1401 Flight 28 is in.  
 1412 From Patrick—9 PBY's taking off for PM search in 5 min.  
 1413 All clear from Robert. Action—sounded "all clear" signal.  
 1350 From Cincpac: All ships prepare to get under way.  
 1405 From Patrick: 6 VOS's will be landing at PH in 5 mins.  
 1418 From Patrick: The 10 PBY's will not leave Kaneohe.  
 1420 From Robert: reason for air raid alarm was the B17 approaching Hickam. It did not seem to be making correct approach, and looked like several planes on the Radar. Picked up 120 miles out.
- 1420 From Robert: At 1315 a plane sighted freighter 175 mi. bearing 155° from Oahu—course 150°—unidentified.  
 1441 From Patrick: Flight 10 is in.  
 1440 From Robert—35 Gertrude 71 U. S. ship.  
 1500 From Robert—38 Gertrude 19 unidentified.  
 1520 From Robert—A freighter has stood out of Honolulu Harbor; also the convoy is South of Diamond Head approaching Honolulu Harbor.
- [105] 1525 Notified Robert, Patrick and DeRussy, and Combat Int. U. S. Coast Guard Cutter will leave Honolulu Harbor for sea at 1600.





- 0532 Gate vessel reports two flashes, one bearing 100° and one 210° from Gate vessel. Sent to G-3
- 0542 Robert: 32 Kate 04 H. C. P.: U. S.
- 0603 Signal Tower: DORSEY entered.  
35 Helen 24 H. C. P.: U. S.  
35 Helen 32 H. C. P.: U. S.
- 0604 Flight 1 is out.  
35 Helen 43. H. C. P.: U. S.
- 0620 Flights 5, 7, and 10 are out. Also 8.
- 0623 0600 Clipper position 23° 55' N, 154° 55' W.
- 0625 Clipper to Com 14: at 1643 GCT—sighted 3 subs and 3 cruisers. Sent to Patrick.
- 0636 H. C. P. To PanAir: Please send following to Clipper: "Reference your message, concentrated or dispersed?" N. T. S. informed. Patrick informed.
- 0641 Signal Tower: ETA clipper is 0658.
- 0652 Signal Tower: CROSSBILL and CONDOR cleared.
- 0705 Robert: 34 Helen 22 Request observation.  
[111] 0710 By direction of Cincpac: Following message sent to Clipper via Pan-American: "What was course of ships reported." Patrick.
- 0714 To Robert and Patrick: ETA of clipper 0730.
- 0725 Calif. Clipper landed.
- 0730 34 Helen 22 to 34 Irene 97.  
flight 13 completed.
- 0739 Patrick: from pane: unidentified large sampan at 0615 at 34 Helen 57  
C130° S 10 H. C. P.: U. S.  
34 Florence 15 Cincpac: U. S.  
35 Helen 22 H. C. P.: U. S.  
35 Helen 61 H. C. P.: U. S.  
35 Helen 83 H. C. P.: U. S.  
35 Irene 48 Disappeared.
- M. M. HODGES, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- 0748 34 Helen 91 U. S.
- 0748 Patrick: c/ flight #6 0800 ETA 1130.
- 0754 35 Helen 71 U. S.
- 0751 1 DD cleared, 1 tug cleared, 1 DD entered
- 0800 #18 0815 1 PBY prep to Pt. 20 mi. 220° from Barbers Pt.  
0845 return Pearl, practice landing ETA 1030.
- 0802 #19 0815 1 JRF love to Maui Transportation 0915, return 1030.
- 0806 35 Helen 60 Robert: U. S. Vessel H. C. P.
- 0807 #16 2 B18 1 at 0805 2nd at 0830. Change #16 to read as above.
- 0830 Pat. ship REP 40 Opal 87 C080 S09 Ship has negat flag. Inter-island freighter.
- 0824 0845 1 A 20 William to Harry
- 0821 34 Helen 94 HCP U. S.
- 0829 #20 0900 1 J2F Love test flight 10 20 mis. 180° from Barbers ETA 1000.
- [112] 0837 #21 0900 1 0820 Love Mokapu 7 miles south climb to 15,000  
for aerolog. data 1045 App. cast.
- 0900 #22 0900 1 J2F Kansas local flight test ETA 0930.
- 0900 35 Irene 29 Unidentified.  
#23 1 B18 lv. Harry 0930 Maui ETA 1030.
- 0910 Flight #16 is completed.
- 0910 Flight #23 was cancelled.
- 0930 Flight #22 is completed.
- 0928 HULBERT freighter course true 080.  
L 18-20 155-10 appears friendly.
- 0930 2 tugs entering Pearl state they have permission.  
From SCHLEY To: Com 14.
- 0932 Flight #17 is completed.
- 0936 Flight #1 is completed.  
0923 1 DD entered.
- 0948 Robert: Can you identify small boats off Kaneohe Bay?  
HCP: Unidentified.
- 1000 #24 1010 1 0820 Love test over Barbers. ETA 1040.
- 1016 #25 1045 1 SBD 1 Eric over Erica. 5000 at 1130.



- 1009 From: ComOffshorePat. To: Com 14.  
Sub contact 3 miles off Diamond Head 210° Suggest plane be sent to assist BREESE and WASMUTH.  
Action: Patrick, Robert, Cinpac, DeRussy, Inshore Patrol; Patrick dispatched plane.
- 0947 CONDOR entered.
- 1015 #26 1025 1 SBD Love invest. sub ETA 1200
- 1016 #10 completed.
- 1020 #18 completed.
- 1022 #20 completed.
- 1030 #27 1140 4 J2F Luke to Maui 2 will remain and 2 leave Maui 1300 ETA 1400.
- [113] 1036 Flight #21 completed.
- 1055 Flight #15 completed.
- 1100 Investigate 023° Dist. 375 miles 1035. 40 Quincy 53 suspicious vessels. From Patrick. Patrol plane reports that above are U. S. vessels.
- 1100 Investigating susp. vessels 085° dist. 381 miles from Patrick patrol plane. Action: Combat Int. advises that U. S. freighter is in that vicinity.
- 1123 REID entered.
- 1127 Flight #25 completed.
- 1127 1 DD entered.
- 1130 1 A-20 lv. Harry to Fox 1130.
- 1137 Flight no. 6 completed.
- 1155 #28 1200 same as #18 ETA 1400
- 1200 Signal tower from TALBOT request investigate air bubbles alongside this vessel at D-5  
Action: Capt. Yard is investigating despatching tug #129.  
All activities informed.
- 1201 Flight #24 is completed.
- 1201 Flight #3 took off.
- 1217 #29 1240 1 Eagle from prep to king. Guard mail ETA 1345.
- 1219 #30 1225 1 Hippo prep to search lifeboat ETA sunset.
- 1220 #31 1230 1 VJ king local ETA 1330.
- 1221 Flight 2 is in.
- 1232 32 1240 1 trans from Prep to Mike ETA 1500.
- 1238 Amphib hi-wing mono 2 motor is description of flight 32.
- 1239 Flight 30 in air.
- 1242 #33 1315 1 SBD, 1 SB2U, 1 SNJ Eric over Eric below 5000 ETA Eric 1545.
- [114] 1259 34 Irene 59 U. S. ship.
- 1309 Plane at Maui reports 1 DD off leper colony at Molokai headed SE five miles out. 1 mine sweep towing barge 3 miles off Makapuu headed West. From Robert.
- 1314 Action: DD identified as escort vessel Minesweep unidentified (see 1338)
- 1316 Flight 26 completed.
- 1326 #34 1430 1 friend captain from prep regular departure no ETA.
- 1331 Flight 11 completed.
- 1338 Item 1314, Minesweep a U. S. vessel.
- 1340 Pat. W. tower reports parachute over Ford Island.  
Action: Found to be aerological balloon.
- 1351 Flight #29 completed.
- 1350 Results on flight 26—negative.
- 1402 34 Helen 48 unidentified.
- 1404 #35 1430 1 JRB prep to mike. Remain mike 1520.
- 1404 #36 1430 2 hippos king purp. test ETA king 1530.
- 1407 #37 1430 1 oken prep to pre, Eric, back to prep test 1515.
- 1409 #27 completed.
- 1410 34 Helen 48 unidentified.
- 1416 The Army will shift several sampans in the vicinity of Kealakakua Bay in Northerly direction between the hours of 1500 and 1900. Vessels will display white flag for identification. From Com Hawaii. Action: Pat, Rob., Cinpac, CombatInt.
- 1431 Flight 35 is in the air.
- 1436 Flight 12 completed.
- 1436 Flight 6 completed at 1130.
- [115] 1445 Flight 28 completed.

- 1454 Flight 4 is in the air.  
 1454 Unidentified flight coming in towards point A 34 Florence 74. Fighters alerted at "A".  
 1455 Flight 32 completed.  
 1456 Flight 37 cancelled.  
 1509 #38 1520 1 hippo prep local familiarization ETA 1620.  
 1510 Sampan #161 left Kewalo Basin for Pearl. All activities notified, plus Coast Guard.  
 1516 #38 cancelled.  
 1517 Flight 36 completed.  
 4 planes flight 7 have given plans 1420, 1443, 1500, 1450, 1455 ETA 1520, 1543, 1600, 1550, 1555.  
 1522 1 tug and tow entered Pearl.  
 1530 Flight 3 completed.  
 1539 Flight 33, 30 completed.  
 1557 34 Irene 99 cannot yet be identified.  
 1605 At 1608 1 Army plane will take off for Eric.

ARCHIE P. KELLEY. *Ensign, U. S. N.*

- 1623 Flight 8 is in.  
 1642 Notified Robert and Patrick. XYP 161 leaving section base for patrol at 1700. Barbers to Kaena Point.  
 1651 Flight 14 is in.  
 1657 From Robert 1 047 taking off from Ewa going direct to Wheeler.  
 1710 Flight 7 is in.  
 1739 From Patrick: Two PBY's in air—will arrive 1830.  
 [116] 1740 From Robert: Army has one bomber up—arriving from Hilo in 5 mins.  
 1745 One plane from flight 4 missing.  
 1757 From Patrick: Missing plane from flight 4 is in.  
 1800 From Patrick: Patrol sighted a wing tip float about 1 mile off Barbers Point at 1600. We lost an SOC off Kam yesterday and it may be from that.  
 Action: Notified Inshore Patrol.  
 1815 From Signal Tower: Shop next to Marine Barracks and Dispensary is lighted.  
 Action—Notified Capt. Yard Office.  
 1826 From Patrick: 1 PBY of flight 39 landing.  
 1840 From Marine Barracks—lights are necessary for important operations.  
 1842 From Robert—Army reports bomber in from Hilo.  
 1842 From Capt. Yard Office—Pigeon with message found in dry cock #2. Officer sent from Intelligence to recover it.  
 1915 From Patrick: All planes are in.  
 Action: Notified all ships present—Inshore and Offshore Patrol.  
 1952 From Ens. Kelley—White light flashing at Sub Base due West of diving tower—Action: Notified Capt. Yard Office.  
 2032 From Capt. Yard Office—Gunner Rutherford reports from West Loch that a steady white light is visible near Waipahu Mill—He is sending a boat to investigate.  
 2035 From Signal Tower: WIDGEON near NEVADA has turned a 12" light on and is searching near hospital pt.  
 2055 From NEW ORLEANS—Bright light bearing 320 (T) from berth C4, 16,000 yd. has been in same position since 1800. Action—referred to Army.  
 2120 From SACRAMENTO: Enemy sub off our stern. Action: notified Cincpac, Capt. Yard.  
 [117] 2122 From Signal Tower: SACRAMENTO or ALLEN have 12" search-light on.  
 2128 From Signal Tower: Blinker signals seen in YFD2. Action—notified Capt. Yard.  
 2135 From Patrick: Officer messenger leaving in 10 min. will be at landing C in 20 mins.  
 2137 From SACRAMENTO—Cancel message about sub. Action: Notified Cincpac and Capt. Yard Office.  
 2144 From Capt. Yard—NEVADA investigating floating life preserver.

- 2145 From ComInshore Patrol—Heavy detonation reported vicinity Diamond Head. ComInPat asked advice from ComOffshore Pat.
- 2203 From Wailupe Radio Station—Have been fired on by snipers using tracer bullets for 1 hour. Request aid from Army. Action: Notified Robert, G3 and Pat.
- 2218 From G-3: Men from 25th Div. investigating Wailupe.
- 2250 From West Loch—Bright light near Schofield burning since 1900. Would be a good range light for anything approaching. Action—Notified Robert.
- 2256 From Signal Tower—LOUISVILLE sweeping channel near Magazine Island with searchlight. Action—notified Capt. Yard.
- 2315 From Robert—New serup on board.
  - 34 Helen 62 U. S. ship
  - 35 Helen 11 U. S. ship
  - 35 Helen 63 U. S. ship
  - 35 Helen 85 U. S. ship
- 2336 From Robert: G-2 reports the bright light is near Wheeler, and is for engineers working there.
- 2348 From Capt. Yard—VESTAL was using searchlight to investigate boat.

J. W. OLDFIELD *Ensign, U. S. N.*

*Tuesday, December 23, 1941*

- [118] 0024 From Patrick: bright light in the middle of Pearl City or beyond. Viewed from SW area of Ford Island Reported by Duty Officer. Action—given to Army.
- 0035 To Robert—There will be firing at Puuloa Fleet Machine Gun Range 0900-1100 December 23, 1941.  
From Kanai: Request that destroyer be despatched Waimea-Kanai to apprehend a vessel which appears to be lying off that Port every night showing a blue light.

FITZGERALD CO. C & HD.

- 0023 Action: Suggested to G-3 that Maui sampan be used—to Patrick.
- 0024 Robert 34 Helen 55 unidentified.  
34 Helen 47 unidentified.  
Requesting ComOffshorePatrol to investigate.
- 0129 Robert 37 Edith 25 unidentified.
- 0210 Patrick—sending boat to landing C now.
- 0250 Robert 35 Helen 15 U. S.  
35 Helen 26 U. S.  
35 Helen 24 U. S.  
35 Helen 23 U. S.  
35 Helen 22 U. S.  
35 Helen 33 U. S.  
35 Helen 64 3 plots Offshore Patrol.  
34 Helen 76 U. S.  
34 Helen 47 Being investigated offshore.  
37 Edith 25 unidentified.  
36 Edith 85 unidentified.
- 0305 35 Helen 84 Offshore Patrol.
- 0308
- [119] 0350 Army will fire Laie Bay 0700-1300 Dec. 23, 1941. Max ordinate about 11,000 ft. Patrick and Robert.
- 0515 Robert asked if there were any sailfish near. He had dubious plots (flickers) and thought that they might be carrier planes.
- 0550 Robert 34 Gertrude 41 unidentified.
- 0600 Patrick 34 Gertrude 31 investigate.
- 0605 Patrick: We have a junket between George and Easy in connection with the plot to be investigated.
- 0618 ComOffshore Patrol—reported Negative on investigation of plots 35 Helen 64, and 35 Helen 84. Notified Robert.
- 0628 From Robert: All ships Combat planes returning to Hickam.
- 0630 LAMBERTON DD: CROSSBILL, REEDBIRD, CONDOR, leaving Pearl. Pat, Robert, DeRussy.

- 0730 Robert 34 Gertrude 31 disappeared.  
0735 Flight #11 is in.
- E. S. KORB, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- 0752 Flight 1 is in.  
0753 From DIO Honolulu: FCC picks up strong Japanese signal on 7280 KC from 21°20' N and 156°30' W. (26 miles N of Kahului, Maui). CinCPac and Communications advised.
- 0758 Ships cleared as follows: 0628 CONDOR; 0639 REEDBIRD; 0643 CROSS-BILL; 0650 LAMBERTON; 0740 CHEW. At 0750 WARD entered.
- 0812 Flight 14 is out.  
0819 Robert 35 Helen 63 H. C. P.: U. S.  
0827 35 Helen 33 H. C. P.: U. S.  
0828 34 Helen 95 H. C. P.: U. S.  
[120] 0830 Flight A-4 is out.  
0848 Flight 7 is out.  
0851 Flight 16 is out.  
0589 Flight 18 cancelled; San Francisco questioned Very lights noticed ashore during the past night.
- 0906 Robert: 38 Florence 01 H. C. P.: No.  
0918 Flights 2, 5, 12, 13, 15, 17 are out. 17 has landed at Ewa.  
0926 Flights A-1, A-2, A-3, A-5 are out.  
0939 Flight 20 is out.  
0947 From Aloha Tower via Patrick: An unidentified plane fell into water off Honolulu entrance channel.
- 0949 Robert: Plane (crashed) is a B-17. Notified Coast Guard; CG reports CG Cutter standing by at crash scene. Patrick informed. Patrick sending seaplane to scene.
- 1000 To Robert and Patrick (Rec'd by HCP from TANAY). Plane crew has been removed by a DD.
- 1005 Signal Tower: to CG Cutter: Requesting name of pilot and crew and plane type.  
Flight 22 is out, 6 and 19 are in.
- 1010 Flights A-6 and A-7 are out.  
1012 Signal Tower: Crashed plane is B-17, pilot's name not known (To Robert and Patrick, CombatIntell.)  
1015 Cincpac. Life boat is at 33 Kate 68 today.  
1017 Flights A-3 and A-4 are in.  
1024 Signal Tower: WATERS cleared.  
1026 TANAY: Plane being taken into Honolulu. Robert and Patrick notified.  
1032 Flight 24 is in.  
[21] 1043 Signal Tower: DENT cleared 1032, TALBOT 1035, LOUISVILLE 1042.
- 1045 TANAY: sent in a request for destination for delivery of plane being towed. Hickam notified. Q Station suspects movement of object through gate. Check being made.
- 1052 Flights 15 and 26 are in.  
1057 Robert: 34 Helen 62 HCP: No  
1102 Robert: check reveals 34 Helen 62 to be planes circling and not surface plot.
- 1104 Signal Tower: from Hickam to CGC: plane destination Hickam.  
Robert 34 Helen 83 HCP: U. S.  
OP 8—Visual station reports 34 Helen 83 to be a surfaced submarine.
- 1110 Flight 12 is in.  
OP 8—Sees sub. far out and no DD's.  
OP 9 sees 5 DD's and no sub.  
HCP has requested coordination of OP 8 and OP 9 reports.  
Cincpac claims 34 Helen 83, to be U. S.
- 1130 Flight 16 is in. 29 and 28 is out. Belay used on flight 28, still delayed.  
1136 Robert: 34 Helen 95 OP claims it to be a small boat. HCP: U. S.  
1138 Signal Tower: SOUTHARD, CROSSBILL and CONDOR entered at 1130.  
1139 Flight 29 is in.  
1142 Cominron 2 sent down to 34 Helen 83 to investigate submarine reported.  
1147 Flight 8 is out.  
1150 TANAY taking plane into channel, crew to Hickam, and returning to its station.  
1155 Flight 32 is out, flight 13 is in.



- 1200 Cincpac requested target rafts to be placed alongside cruisers moored at C-4 and C-5. Relayed to Capt. of Yard.
- [122] 1201 CRAVEN will hold fire drill at once.
- 1203 Signal Tower: SOUTHARD moored at coal dock.
- 1208 Flight 32 is in.
- 1221 Signal Tower: Tug and tow entering Pearl. MEDUSA to X-23.
- 1223 Robert: four plots at 34 Helen 39 HCP: U. S.
- 1229 Flight 35 is out, flight 28 is out.
- 1240 Flight 31 is out.
- 1242 MCFARLAND under way, also LONG.  
Robert 34 Helen 70 H. C. P. Planes but no surface vessel.  
34 Helen 38 disappeared.
- 1250 Flight 5 is in.  
Expect arrival of U. S. ships at Pearl at 1330.  
34 Helen 06  
34 Helen 23  
34 Helen 71, moved to 72  
34 Irene 79 } HCP No
- 1305 Flight 23 out. Signal Tower: LONG cleared.  
34 Irene 06 HCP No.
- 1307 Flight 38 is out. 27 and 33 is in, 20 in.
- 1305 Signal Tower: MACFARLAND moored F-4  
ELLIOTT entered.  
35 Irene 99 HCP No  
34 Helen 23 Cincpac: US  
35 Irene 48 headed No. Patrick: U. S.
- 1324 Flight 41 is out.  
Signal Tower: Tug and tow entered.  
Robert reported that several of the 1250 plots disappeared to reappear again raising possibility of submarines surfacing and submerging. Cincpac reports no submarines in that area.
- 1330 Robert requests identity of four surface vessels 20 mi. NW of Haleiwa.  
HCP requests Patrick have PBY patrol nearby investigate. Patrick will do so and report.
- [123] 1340 Signal Tower: CHANDLER under way.  
Flight 34 is in.  
Signal Tower: 2 YG's entered channel.  
Flight 21 is in.
- 1352 Flight 14 is in.  
Signal Tower: CHANDLER cleared.
- 1404 Robert: 34 Helen 11 HCP No.
- 1406 Robert: the following plots are so far unidentified:  
34 Helen 06  
34 Helen 11  
34 Helen 72  
34 Helen 82  
34 Helen 27  
34 Irene 79  
35 Irene 99  
Patrick to send planes to investigate.
- 1421 Robert: 35 Helen 53 landing Hickam. ASP notified.
- 1425 Robert has now these unidentified plots:  
34 Helen 11  
34 Helen 27  
34 Helen 72  
34 Helen 82  
35 Irene 99
- 1433 Signal Tower: SONOMA under way.
- 1441 Signal Tower: Tug with barge in tow approaching channel entrance.
- 1447 Flight 9 is out.  
Flight 40 off at 1430.  
Flight 44 is off (Patrick belayed report) and flight 28 is in.
- 1456 Robert  
35 Irene 49 HCP: No.  
35 Helen 77 HCP: No suggest.  
Robert check with OP nearby.

- 1501 Robert: to Robert, Patrick, Cincpac, DeRussy: Henceforth effective now, Harbor Control Post to be known as "Henry" and so addressed by telephone.  
Flight 36 is out. Robert: Flights A-8, A-9 are in.
- [124] 1510 Robert: 35 Helen 45 Henry: U. S.  
OP 1 reports 3 US DD off Diamond Head. Agrees with 35 Helen 45.
- 1512 Henry requested report on flight 25, Pearl to lifeboat. Patrick reports plane still out. No further information.
- 1513 Signal Tower: PERRY under way.
- 1518 Signal Tower: TERN under way, and tug standing in with barge is the HERCULES.
- 1523 Signal Tower: ELLIOTT under way.
- 1528 Signal Tower: PERRY moored, coal dock.
- 1530 Henry to Robert, Cincpac, Patrick, G3, DeRussey: U. S. vessels to enter Pearl Harbor at 1600.
- 1535 Signal Tower: LITCHFIELD entering with
- 1538 Flight 38 is in. Robert flights A-1, A-2 have 5 planes out at last report 1510.
- 1545 Flight 8 is in.
- M. M. HODGES.  
*Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- 1555 Flight 25 completed.
- 1600 Robert 35 Irene 17
- 1614 34 Helen 11, 27, 46, 66  
34 Irene 99  
35 Irene 17, 99  
35 Helen 67, 78, all unidentified
- 1615 Sub on surface between here and Mani. Action: unidentified. Further action: U. S.
- 1620 #44 completed.
- 1624 Flight #24 completed.
- 1625 XYP 161 and XYP 166 leaving section base at 1645 to proceed to operating areas between Barbers Point and Kaena Point [125] during night will return Pearl at daylight. From Henry to Robert, Cincpac, Patrick, G-3.
- 1637 Sub sighted 315° 10 miles from Kolo Point, Hawali. GRENADIER is due to rendezvous at approximately this point tomorrow morning. Could be ahead of schedule. From Pat. to Robert.
- 1635 LITCHFIELD standing out.
- 1636 REED cleared.
- 1638 Flight 3 completed.
- 1640 All flight 2 except 2 are in.
- 1641 CUNNINGHAM cleared.
- 1642 34 Helen 28 unidentified.  
34 Irene 99 "
- 1643 LITCHFIELD cleared.
- 1655 35 Helen 86 unidentified.  
35 Helen 78 unidentified.
- 1703 Flight 37 completed.
- 1710 1 "Codfish" cleared.
- 1715 Flight 31 completed.
- 1719 35 Helen 78 still unidentified.
- 1720 Flight 39 and 43 completed.
- 1721 Flight 35 completed.
- 1722 23 completed.
- 1722 Cancel 40.
- 1730 Small sampan moored to buoy about 1/8 miles off Waimea Bay. Action: From Yard Duty Officer: SCHLEY reports sono buoys at entrance are missing. Action: Notified Lt. Cdr. Boyd.
- [126] 1736 Flight 28 is completed.
- 1739 36 Helen 13 unidentified.
- 1750 Flight 4 completed.
- 1754 Flight 9 completed.
- 1755 Coast Guard reports sub off buoy 3 Honolulu. Action: G-3, Pat., Cincpac. NTS, Capt. Yard—*False Report.*
- 1755 Capt. Yard: Gate is closed.
- 1759 Flight 36 completed.

- 1800 U. S. artillery will fire trial shots tomorrow, 24 December from Paumalu Station 1700 yards seaward at Max. ordinate of 10,000 feet 0830-0900.
- 1803 Sub off buoy 3 is hostile.
- 1803 Robert: unidentified vessel at 21°-07' 157°-29' between Oahu and Molokai.
- 1811 From Aloha Tower: Today's sheet line 8 1755.
- 1817 Flight 10 completed.
- 1834 Patrick reports light at Wheeler Field. Action: Robert phoned Wheeler.
- 1834 Lights blinking between Kaena Point and Bar.
- 1835 Urgent from Palmyra: Shelled by surface ships. Palmyra to Com 14. Action: Rob., Pat., Cincpac, G-3.
- 1843 Board cleared:  
34 Helen 92 U. S.  
35 Helen 16 (2 ships) U. S.  
33 U. S.  
36 Helen 75 ?  
35 Helen 11 U. S.
- 1853 All U. S. planes are on the ground.
- 1902 35 Irene 09 unidentified.  
34 Irene 97 unidentified.
- [127] 1924 Coast Guard reports: RELIANCE search negative.
- 1930 Fort Kam: Group of planes came in from West, circled Honolulu and went out again.
- 1934 Fort Kam further reports that planes are still heard distinctly. OP-10 hears nothing. from Robert.
- 1943 Action: Fort Kam reports sub chasers warming up sound like planes; Robert reports tractors on Hickam sound like planes.
- 2027 34 Helen 18 U. S.
- 2036 34 Helen 27 U. S.
- 2038 G-2 reports lights flashed on and off due North of Kanaha Bay. Appears to be searchlight pointed at sky on and off twice. Action: G2.
- 2100 Robert cleared board
- 2110 35 Helen 78 Unidentified (Offshore, Pat. investigating)
- 2110 35 Helen 04 U. S. vessel
- 2115 The CGC RELIANCE has been ordered to remain on station to search for six marines in sailboat.  
Action: Rob., Pat., Cincpac, CombatInt., G-3, DeRussy.
- 2115 34 Helen 44  
34 Helen 37 (2)  
35 Helen 34
- 2137 From Yard Duty Officer: Tug was sent to investigate object off O. C. landing reported by Asst. Manager Officer's Club. Tug struck heavy submerged object while backing down and search was discontinued. Operator was quite certain object struck was not a submerged log.
- 2205 Cincpac identified 35 Helen 87.
- 2207 35 Helen 87 is unidentified (Cincpac based its identity on a false assumption).
- 2216 34 Helen 53 ? U. S.
- [128] 2217 Pat. reports lights in Pearl City Channel. Action:
- 2218 Board cleared:  
34 Helen 93 U. S.  
34 Helen 38 ?
- 2241 35 Helen 87 are now two echoes.
- 2301 Air Intelligence: Large gathering of cars at Pearl City Peninsula Point. Action: Pat, Robert, G-3, Results: Yard workers
- 2306 Robert reports flashing light at Kaena Pt. on land.
- 2307 35 Helen 78  
35 Helen 77  
87  
86  
35 Helen 54  
35 Helen 64
- 2310 Red flare directly off Kaena Point.  
From Robert.  
Action:

- 2320 Robert cleared board.  
 35 Helen 77, 78  
 34 Helen 95 U. S.  
 34 Helen 93 U. S.  
 34 Helen 84 U. S.
- 2315 Lookout at Point M reports searchlight over NE horizon.  
 Action: G-2, Combat Int., Cdr. Momsen, Cincpac.  
 35 Helen 75 U. S.  
 35 Helen 44 U. S.
- 2400 G3 Hilo—unidentified craft may be sub operating off Honaunau.  
 ARCHIE P. KELLEY.

[129]

*Wednesday, December 24, 1941*

- 0000 To all ships present: Execute number five repeat number five.
- 0010 To Robert, Cincpas, Patrick: Report of sub off Honaunau believed to be in error.
- 0021 From Robert: Board cleared—New plots:  
 35 Helen 34 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 73 " "  
 35 Helen 88 " "  
 35 Helen 75 U. S. ship  
 34 Helen 87 " "  
 34 Gertrude 52 " "  
 35 Helen 24 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 14 " "
- 0045 From Signal Tower: Minesweeper or DD tied up at coal dock is sweeping a 12" light toward Waipio Point.
- 0056 From Robert  
 35 Helen 55, U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 78  
 35 Helen 70 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 65 " "  
 35 Helen 23 (2) " "  
 35 Helen 64 " "  
 35 Helen 63 (2) " "  
 35 Helen 13 " "  
 35 Helen 26 " "
- 0120 To Robert, Patrick, Cincpac—Enemy sub reported in Lat. 15°-30' N, Long. 160° W, 370 mi. bearing 198° (T) from PH at 2130.
- 0142 From Robert—OP 8, 10, 12 report heavy firing south of Oahu.
- 0145 From Robert—OP 10 reports surface craft south of Oahu headed west, moving rapidly.
- 0151 From SCHLEY: Dropped 8 depth charges south Ahua point on good sound contact—No evidence of results.
- 0158 From Robert—OP 10 reports vessel entering PH.
- 0201 From Robert—OP 10 reports low flat boat approaching entrance.  
 Action—Notified Inshore Pat. Notified P. T.
- [130] 0205 From Robert—Board cleared—New plots  
 35 Helen 25 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 88  
 35 Helen 45 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 44 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 55 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 24 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 14 U. S. ship  
 34 Helen 84 U. S. ship  
 34 Helen 34
- 0230 From Fort Kam: Very suspicious looking craft just off shore.
- 0235 From Q station: PT boat leaving to investigate craft off Kam.
- 0237 From Patrick: Plane from dawn patrol will investigate sub contact lat. 15°-30', long. 160 W.



- 0238 From Robert—Range to craft off OP 10 now 1000 yards.  
 35 Helen 15 U. S. ship  
 35 Helen 25 " "  
 35 Helen 54 " "  
 35 Helen 64 " "  
 34 Helen 86 " "  
 35 Gertrude 32  
 35 Helen 77  
 35 Helen 78
- 0330 From Gate vessel: PT boat thoroughly searched area from Ahua Point outward. Found nothing.
- 0343 From Cincpac: Very important that Pearl and Honolulu Channels be thoroughly swept for mines 24 Dec. A. M. Inshore Patrol notified.
- 0443 From Patrick: Boat leaving to light Pearl city and dry dock channel buoys.
- 0530 From Robert: 35 Helen 97 unidentified
- 0547 From Patrick: A plane from dawn patrol will investigate 35 Helen 97.
- 0550 Flight 4 is out.
- 0615 WARD under way.
- [131] 0627 From Patrick: Appears to be a fire in Navy Yard by YFD 2.
- 0630 From Robert—35 Helen 94 unidentified.  
 Action—Told Pat to investigate.
- 0635 HOPKINS stood in.
- 0637 CONDOR stood out.
- 0646 CROSSBILL stood out.
- 0647 BREESE stood in.
- 0703 HOPKINS moored at coal dock.
- 0710 From Patrick: Results flight 13 are negative.
- 0710 Flight 13 is in.
- 0725 Flight 17 is in.
- 0725 From Robert 33 Florence 91 claimed by Cincpac.
- 0730 BREESE moored Xray 1.

J. A. OLDFIELD,  
*Ensign, U. S. N.*

- 0801 BOGGS cleared Pearl.
- 0845 From Herman D. I. O. Navy should thoroughly investigate Kahoolawe Island. Smugglers' Cove. Presents good harbor for enemy operations.
- 0850 DD DRAYTON cleared—Signal Tower
- 0901 DD THORNTON cleared—Signal Tower
- 0947 DOLPHIN cleared Pearl—Signal Tower.
- 0851 DRAYTON cleared—DeRussy notified
- 0901 THORNTON cleared. " "
- 0903 MCFARLAND cleared " "
- 0906 SUMNER cleared " "
- 0925 DORSEY cleared " "
- [132] Patrick reports "Negative" on investigation of Marines adrift in life boat—from Army bomber.
- 0945 Robert 34 Gertrude 31 unidentified.
- 0948 Robert Point George reports sighting 6 vessels in 34 Gertrude 31 U. S.
- 0950 Coast Guard recalled Cutter RELIANCE which was in search of Marines adrift in small boat.
- 1025 Patrick reported—Plane reports 3 enemy subs bearing 271° T. 465 distance. Inshore—Offshore—Cincpac.
- 1030 Flight 15 is in.
- 1045 Flight 25 is in.
- 1114 Robert 35 Gertrude 50 unidentified—1109 CG identified it.
- 1121 Tug and three barges were sighted where subs were reported. From Patrick. Notified Cincpac.
- 1125 Flight 7 is in.
- 1128 Flight 20 is in.
- 1129 CROSSBILL entered Pearl.
- 1135 Flight 27 is in.
- 1135 Flight 26 is in.
- 1140 Robert requests info on Wednesday campan trip Kauai to Niihau.
- 1145 Robert reported that his controller got info on Coast Guard Cutter in 35 Gertrude 50 from OP-3. Authorized

- 1152 Convoy 6 miles south of Barbers Point. HCAC reported.  
 1155 RAMSAY ENTERED Pearl.  
 1214 Flight 24 is in.  
 [133] 1215 Flight 6 is in.  
 1225 Robert reports at 1220 6 ships from SE in convoy.  
 1235 Flight 29 is in.  
 1332 HARRIS entered Pearl.  
 1330 ALDEBARAN entered Pearl.  
 1330 RAMSAY cleared Pearl.  
 1345 SABINE entered Pearl. Hickam Dock 1403.  
 1350 Flight 32 is in.  
 1352 PHOENIX entered Pearl. Moored 1435. Cast-3.  
 1353 Flight 40 is in.  
 1354 Flight 37 is in.  
 1400 Inquiries were made regarding smoke in the Yard. It was reported that a smoke making device was being operated.  
 1357 CUSHING entered Pearl.  
 1358 PERKINS entered.  
 1401 Flight #10 is in.  
 1405 LITCHFIELD entered Pearl.  
 1411 Submarine entered Pearl (Grayling)  
 1415 G-3  
 1415 Freighter and DD off Kaunakakai. U. S. from G-3.  
 1420 Patrick reported—from S-3 Kauai 8 Small DD's between Niihau and Kauai; 8 miles off Kauai; course 330. Came over administration net—Burns Field.  
 1425 Major Stewart of the 86th; one plane still circling them. Are now reported as subs. One plane came in to deliver message.  
 [134] 1424 WASMUTH entered Pearl.  
 1430 Army to take off from Hickam. 3 A-20's will fly direct to location of subs, disregarding departure procedure.  
 1443 Flight 41 will go directly to Niihau and will not use departure or approach procedure.  
 1454 Flight 33 is in.  
 1458 CUSHING moored at M-3.  
 1500 Flight 28 is in.  
 1518 Flight 8 is in.  
 1520 Patrick reported. Plane reports mine layer in 36 Quicy 96 Cinepac notified.  
 1540 Flight 31 is in.
- E. S. KORB,  
*Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- 1555 Robert: 35 Helen 44 Henry: U. S.  
 1556 Flight 37 is in.  
 Robert: 8 submarines reported off Kauai now identified as being whales.  
 1558 Robert: 35 Irene 29 Henry: No  
 1604 Robert: Freighter, flying U. S. flag, and 1 DD off Waianae, Oahu, going south. Henry: U. S.  
 1611 G-3—Report of air raid on Kauai picked up by commercial radio at Fort Kamehameha so far unconfirmed at Henry. 35 Irene 55 Henry: No.  
 1617 36 Helen 01 Henry: No.  
 1619 Lt. Col. Dingeman: reported air raid alarm being sounded at Hickam; Patrick: also picked up radio air raid on Kauai after which radio shut off.  
 1621 Patrick: Kauai sounded "all clear" signal.  
 [135] New plot 34 Irene 93 RELIAN<sup>CE</sup>? }  
           35 Irene 55 1 DD } From Patrick  
           36 Helen 01 1 sub. }  
 Henry does not identify.
- 1625 Flight 42 is in.  
 1637 34 Helen 94 Henry: No.  
 1632 Signal Tower: 8 planes approaching Wheeler Field from direction of Waianae. Request Patrick to identify. Also Robert.  
 1635 Signal Tower: Planes appear to be P40's and are now circling Wheeler. (To Robert and Wheeler).  
 1637 Patrick: From Wheeler: 8 P40's just took off from Wheeler. 35 Helen 35 Henry: U. S.  
 1645 To Patrick and Robert. Kam and DeRussy: 1 sampan departing Pearl at 1700

- 1648 Check with Cincpac on 1 submarine at 36 Helen 01. Cincpac: No. Further check.
- 1651 Signal Tower: Cargo ship off Barbers Point making good speed.
- 1656 Signal Tower: Tug and barge leaving Honolulu for Kahoolawe. To Robert and Patrick.  
Signal Tower: 1 DD going to meet cargo ship.
- 1700 Cargo ship (34 Helen 94) identified by Combat Intel. as U. S.
- 1733 Flights 38, 39, and 41 are in.  
35 Helen 34 Henry: U. S.
- 1742 Flight 9 is in. 11 is in.
- 1743 Comdr. Ramsay at Patrick: Barbers Point light to burn until all planes are in (about 2130-2200). Patrick will execute extinguishing light.
- 1753 To Patrick and Henry: ASP Pearl are being instructed to assume Base Defense Condition of Readiness two (2).
- [136] 1800 Flights out are 1, 2, 5, 12, and 21. Navy; and A-5, A-7 and A-9, Army.
- 1817 Flights A-5, A-7 and A-9 are in. All Army flights are in.
- 1819 Five (5) of the B17's (of flight 5) have not landed.
- 1830 35 Gertrude 28 Combat Intel: U. S.
- 1845 Combat Intelligence:  
33-36 Florence—nothing.  
33-36 Gertrude—C. G. C. at 35 Gertrude  
35 Helen 55 KALAE and barge en route Pearl—Kahoolawe.  
34 Irene—Coast Guard (C. G.)
- 1858 Flight 12 is in.  
Cruiser in Pearl: 2 white lights in horizontal line bearing 325° (T), 14,000 yards distant from drydock no. 1. to G-3.  
Robert did not submit plots after board was cleared at 1800.
- 1903 Board cleared: only plot is identified (see 1830 above) at 35 Gertrude 28. G-3 reports light in vicinity of Kaneohe Bay. Patrick: All Kaneohe planes are not in. PatWing 1 using beacon to aid planes returning.
- 1920 Section Base—plane coming in from SE with running lights on. Flew over Ft. Weaver toward Barbers Pt.
- 1921 Patrick—unidentified; possibly a lost U. S. plane.
- 1923 Plane above landed on Ford Island; second plane circling Hickam. SCHLEY: Steamer off entrance requests entry. Report from a reliable observer at Elks' Club, Waikiki, that a plane carrying (showing) no lights hit the water at 1855, 3000 to 4000 yards offshore. Preceding report from Lt. Danhoff, telephone 95020.
- 1928 Barbers Point light now operating (from Robert to Patrick.) Signal tower: Plane circling Hickam landed. Other planes coming in from SE and SW running lights on.
- 1933 Flight 2 is in.
- 1943 Signal Tower: HERCULES entered (steamer of 1923 entry). Hawaiian Dept. Air Force: A large number of unidentified planes approaching Oahu.  
35 Helen 43 Henry: U. S.
- [137] 1945 From DeRussy duplicate of 1943 plane report. G-2 reports:  
From Molokai: Planes approaching Oahu.  
34 Helen 95 Henry: U. S.
- 2000 Signal Tower: Beacon at Ford Island lighted.
- 2024 35 Helen 42 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 44 Henry: U. S.
- 2025 Section Base: Plane from South, running lights; Patrick: U. S.
- 2030 35 Gertrude 33 Henry No
- 2053 Patrick: At present, 5 planes are still out. Flight 5 is in. All, except flight 1, are in.
- 2112 DeRussy: One P-39 to fly over and around Oahu on 25 and 26 December, for identification purposes.
- 2120 35 Helen 62 Henry: No Cincpac: No  
Offshore patrol to investigate  
35 Helen 41 Henry: U. S.  
36 Edith 09  
36 Edith 95 } Henry: No  
37 Gertrude 99 }
- 2126 Signal Tower—Barbers Point light off at 2125 (To Patrick and Robert.)  
Section Base: planes 1 each from SE, S and SW.

- 2155 Patrick: Flight 1 is in—all planes are in.  
       " : Car to landing "C" at 2205.  
 Patrick to Robert: Light at Barbers Point may now be turned off.
- 2200 Duty Officer, C.G.: Cutter investigating plane down returned after cruising up and down coast, ½ to 4 miles offshore with negative results.
- 34 Helen 94 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 13 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 62 Henry, being investigated  
 35 Helen 53 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 54 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 74 Henry: request check.
- 2245 Rec'd check: 35 Helen 74.  
 [138] 2255 35 Helen 74 believed to be a fixed echo—removed from board.
- 2315 35 Helen 63 Ship investigating.  
 Yard V.I.O.: Man on Hospital Point believes he saw a 2-man submarine moving past that point.  
 To Cincpac, Capt. of the Yard, Gate Vessel.  
 35 Helen 63 moored to 35 Helen 73.  
 35 Helen 62 has disappeared.  
 35 Helen 73 Henry: U. S.

M. M. HODGES,  
*Ensign, U. S. Navy.*

*Thursday, December 25, 1941*

- [139] 0010 Robert cleared board.
- 0013 35 Helen 63 U. S. to doubtful  
 0015 35 Helen 13 U. S.  
 0015 34 Helen 93 U. S.  
 0016 35 Helen 34 U. S.  
 0017 35 Helen 64 U. S.  
 0020 35 Irene 05 U. S.  
 0113 Robert cleared board.  
 0113 35 Helen 33 U. S.  
 0116 35 Helen 64 U. S.  
 0125 35 Helen 62 U. S.  
 0125 35 Helen 75 Doubtful.  
 0126 35 Helen 55 U. S.  
 0128 Signal tower reports black object aft of Drydock 1 inside net boom by B-1.  
 Action: Naval Int., Combat Int., Capt. Yd.
- 0145 Signal Tower reports above believed to be piling.
- 0200 35 Helen 73 U. S.  
 0205 35 Helen 34 U. S.  
 0205 35 Helen 24 U. S.  
 0210 35 Helen 75 Still shows—given to Offshore Patrol for action.  
 0215 34 Helen 76 U. S.
- 0100 G-2 reports, Kanai reports 1 red and 1 green light signalling at sea between Niihau and Kauai.  
 Action: Nav. Int. Combat Int., Cincpac, Coast Guard, Pat.
- [140] 0230 Robert cleared board.
- 34 Helen 93 U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 U. S.  
 35 Helen 33 U. S.  
 35 Helen 30 U. S.  
 35 Helen 24 U. S.  
 35 Helen 02 U. S.  
 35 Helen 75 ? Being investigated  
 34 Helen 92 U. S.  
 34 Helen 55 U. S.  
 34 Helen 46 U. S.
- 0240 34 Helen 37 ?  
 0241 35 Helen 54 U. S.  
 0248 35 Helen 62, 63 U. S.  
 0249 35 Helen 32, 44 U. S.  
 0248 34 Gertrude 31  
 0254 34 Helen 27, 37, 46, 55.



- 0250 From Section Base: Plane sighted on line from Bishops Point to Hickam Field. Action: Pat., Rob., Cincpac.  
Results: Pat says "plane" was sounding balloon released from Ford.
- 0300 35 Helen 75 still shows.
- 0315 34 Helen 91 U. S.
- 0315 34 Helen 83 U. S.
- 0316 34 Helen 27, 37, 46, 55 Still appear.
- 0316 34 Gertrude 31 Still appear.
- 0317 Henry will investigate 34 Helen 46.
- 0322 34 Helen 85 U. S.
- 0337 Robert says 35 Helen 75 is a back-echo from a mountain.
- 0400 Robert cleared board.
- 0401 35 Helen 64 U. S.
- 0401 54 U. S.
- 0401 16 U. S.
- [141] 0402 34 Helen 75 U. S.
- 0402 34 Helen 45
- 0402 34 Helen 66
- 0404 34 Helen 47
- 0405 34 Helen 36
- 0412 34 Gertrude 50
- 0414 34 Helen 36  
37  
47  
45  
66
- 0417 35 Helen 33
- 0512 Board cleared.  
35 Helen 45 U. S.  
35 Helen 26 U. S.  
35 Helen 64 U. S.  
34 Helen 45  
56  
26  
38  
48
- 0520 Signal Tower: SOLACE in berth Xray 8 has large searchlight on.
- 0525 35 Helen 33  
34 Helen 59  
34 Gertrude 50 U. S.
- 0528 Cap Yard: NAS will turn on approach lights at 0545.
- 0529 35 Helen 93
- 0600 Board cleared
- 0601 Flight 8 is in the air.
- 0604 34 Gertrude 23 unidentified  
50 U. S.  
34 Helen 69 U. S.  
44 ?  
53 ?
- [142] 0605 Flight 4 is in the air.  
34 Helen 54 ?  
35 Helen 01 U. S.
- 0623 Four B17 took off from Hickam: From Rob.
- 0623 34 Helen 81 U. S.
- 0632 Flight 2 is in the air.
- 0640 Q station reports: What appears to be an empty oil drum  
½ mile south of Keahi Point:  
Action: Inshore Pat., Capyard.
- 0640 1 DD entered.
- 0645 Flight 8 is in the air.
- 0647 Cincpac: Barbers Point light was turned off at 2025 last night.  
Action: Chief of Staff.
- 0702 Flight #1 is in.
- 0703 Flight #3 completed.
- 0707 PRYON cleared.
- 0710 36 Helen 07 unidentified

- 0655 Sampan sighted bearing 230° distance 40 mi. Cn060 Sp 10 knots. Headed for Action on sampan: Pat, Rob, Cincpac, Coast Guard will send DD to investigate.
- 0720 33 Irene 77, unidentified
- 0721 34 Irene 91 U. S.
- 0720 1 DD entered.
- 0728 33 Helen 94
- 0737 OP did sight sampan 1½ miles off Easy. From Robert.
- 0741 34 Helen 64
- 0748 34 Helen 30 U. S.
- ARCHIE P. KELLEY,  
*Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- [143] 0805 ELLIOTT stood out. Notified DeRussy.
- 0812 From Robert: Freighter in 35 Helen 97 has flush deck, one funnel and 2 masts.
- 0818 From Robert: freighter has well deck instead of flush deck.
- 0819 Flight 17 is in.
- 0825 HOPKINS moored B12.
- 0826 From TANEY: Dropped 6 depth charges—positions 4.5 mles bearing 176 from Aloha tower on sound contact. Results unknown. Action: Notified Cincpac, Robert, Patrick.
- 0842 To Patrick: G2 has reported a boat ashore at Nawiliwili, Kauai sending up flares. Plane investigate.
- 0850 Tug MIKIMIKI with tow stood in.
- 0853 From Signal Tower—freighter standing around Diamond Head.
- 0854 MAHAN stood in.
- 0810 From Cincpac—Whaleboat bearing 232° dist. 241 mi. Action: see 1020 entry.
- 0904 Flight 18 is in.
- 0925 Flights 4 and 22 in.
- 0927 MAHAN moored B3.
- 0937 SOLACE under way.
- 0942 From Robert—34 Helen 22 unidentified. Action—Patrick told to investigate.
- 0950 From Patrick—34 Helen 22 is probably the sampan previously in 33 Irene. It will be investigated.
- 1000 SOLACE moored X3.
- 1015 From Signal Tower: Observed 4 carrier pigeons land in trees next to house back of berth C 5 at 0920. At 1000, 2 more landed at same place. Action: Combat Int. and Capt. Yard notified.
- 1015 From Robert: Board is cleared.  
35 Helen 87 unidentified  
35 Helen 75 U. S. ship  
35 Helen 54 U. S. ship  
34 Helen 62 U. S. ship  
34 Helen 91 U. S. ship
- [144] 1020 TIGER has departed for position of whaleboat. If morning flight of December 26 sights whaleboat, a special plane will be immediately set by Pat to coach TIGER on. Notified Cincpac, Robert, Pat.
- 1045 Flight 23 is in.
- 1050 Flight 19 is in.
- 1050 From Robert—OP 2 reports 2 vessels SE, 50,000 yards.
- 1025 REEDBIRD stood in.
- 1050 From Robert—34 Gertrude 44 unidentified  
34 Irene 99 “  
35 Helen 89 “
- 1059 From Robert—34 Gertrude 44 has disappeared.
- 1105 From Patrick—1 bomber will land at Hickam at 1115.
- 1110 NARWHAL under way. Shifted berth.
- 1120 Flight 20 and 21 in.
- 1117 BREESE under way. Shifted berth.
- 1128 TERN under way. Shifted berth.
- 1132 LAMBERTON under way. Shifted berth.
- 1132 MATILDA FOSS entered with tow.
- 1135 From Robert—4 pursuits leaving Hickam to investigate unidentified plots.



- 1836 Robert 35 Helen 81 disappeared.  
 1850 Signal Tower reports blinking light in shop yard.  
 1853 Naval Air Station will have a boat in the Harbor and a Very pistol on Ramp 4.  
 1855 Patrick. Kaneohe pilot reports bright light 10 mi. South of Kahuku Point.  
 1857 SABINE moored to M3 shows white light.  
 1900 Flight 26 is in.  
 1901 Patrick reports bright light at Kahuku Point is on the beach.  
 1927 Flight 14 is in.  
 1945 Army will fire off North Shore at Kawela Bay 0900 to 1000 26 December. To Patrick and Robert.  
 1950 Flight #2 is in.  
 1955 Robert 34 Helen 33 unidentified.  
 2004 Robert 35 Irene 29.  
 2005 Flight #9 is in.  
 2024 Patrick reported: pilot reports small boat in Lat. 21°-43'; 159-12 W. When first sighted sail was up. Then it was hauled down. Made motions in the water indicating that they needed it. Note was dropped telling them to hold arms horizontal if they were in distress. All 10 men held arms horizontal. First sighted at 1625, left them at 1650. Reported to Coast Guard.  
 2050 Flight #10 is in.  
 2100 To Robert and Patrick—Flashing lights apparently dots and dashes reported from two sources. Reliability a on hills back of Makalapa Housing project. Lights can be seen from contractor's office on Kuahua Island. From OW to Co.  
 [148] 2100 Signal tower reports search light in vicinity of Hickam or Ft. Kam. Reported 24" light broken out by 53rd Brigade. Notified Robert.  
 2115 Patrick—Barbers Point and all others as for Patrick may be put out.  
 2119 Ordered Coast Guard to put out Barbers Point light.  
 2120 All Army and Navy flights are in. Notified all ships.  
 2122 Robert report schedule of balloons  
     0300 from Ford Island  
     0700 Pan American  
     1100 Ewa  
     1700 Pan American  
     2330 Hickam (light)  
 2150 34 Gertude 99 unidentified Robert  
 2205 Machine Gun reported warming up—shooting tracer bullets back of central tool building. Too close to the U. S. S. HONOLULU. From HONOLULU. Notified Capt. Yard.  
 2305 Cleared the board at Robert:  
     35 Helen 33 U. S.  
     35 Helen 72 Disappeared, doubtful, being investigated.  
     35 Helen 43 U. S.

1118 Robert—35 Helen 83—disappeared, doubtful, being investigated.

E. S. KORB,  
*Ensign, U. S. N.*

[149] *Friday, December 26, 1941*

- 0006 34 Helen 94 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 05 Henry: U. S.  
 0010 35 Helen 13 Henry: U. S.  
 35 Helen 24 Henry: U. S.  
 Executed number 11 for NBDF-4 Rob. & Pat.  
 0010 0007: From G-3: between 2320-2340 an object is from 300 yards offshore moving south towards Barber's Point—has surfaced 10 times, 20 feet long with no projection on coning tower. G-3 asked to verify.  
 0100 Batting "A" (Affirm): submarine sighted 35 Helen 34. Offshore patrol given the plot. G-3 notified.  
 0118 35 Helen 77 Henry: unidentified.  
 35 " 14 Henry: friendly.  
 35 " 34 " "  
 35 " 44 " "  
 35 " 64 " "  
 34 " 94 " "  
 0200 Patrick requests clearance for boat from landing A to landing C and return. Granted.



- 0209 35 Helen 62 Henry: friendly.  
35 Helen 77 Henry: still.  
Unidentified. Offshore patrol to investigate. Notified Port Director.
- 0234 35 Helen 96 Henry: offshore Patrol going to 35 Helen 77. Requested any contacts (radar) between Diamond and Koko Heads.  
Offshore reports negative 35 Helen 34: submarine.
- 0318 35 Helen 64 Henry: friendly.
- 0324 35th Inf: Heavy firing to south of Ewa. Signalled Tower 3 neither sees nor hears any firing.  
Station "A": Heavy rumbling toward Pearl
- 0334 35 Helen 04 Henry: friendly
- 0343 CHEW: Dropped 12 depth charges off Pearl
- 0400 35 Helen 86 Henry: friendly  
35 Helen 96 " "
- 0423 35 Helen 78 Henry requested board be cleared and new plots given for area 35 Helen 50 to 36 Helen in 35 Helen.
- [150] 0438 35 Helen 33 Henry: Friendly.  
34 " 37 }  
34 " 45 } Henry: Unidentified. Offshore Patrol to investi-  
34 " 46 } gate.
- 0446 36 Helen 16 Henry: Unidentified.
- 0449 Pan American: Expect arrival 0630-0700.
- 0515 The following have disappeared: (0450)  
35 Helen 73, 78, 86 and 96.
- 0527 35 Helen 05 Henry: U. S.  
34 Gertrude 30 Henry: Unidentified.  
34 Gertrude 40 Henry: Unidentified.
- 0534 34 Gertrude 30, and 40 CinCPac: Unidentified.  
34 Gertrude 41 Henry: Request O. P. check.  
O. P. reports nothing visible.
- 0538 To Patrick: /U. S. Sampan patrolling 2 miles offshore between Kaena and Barbers Points.  
33 Helen 55 Henry: Unidentified.  
CinCPac Unidentified
- 0543 Cancel flight #3.  
Requested Patrick investigate the six plots appearing between Kaena and Barber's Points.
- 0551 To Combat and CinCPac  
To Patrick and Robert: 1 oiler and 1 DD depart Pearl for Honolulu at 0630, arrive 0700. 1 oiler and 1 DD depart Honolulu for Pearl at 0700 arrive 0800.
- 0616 Flight 4 is out.
- 0623 Robert: Board cleared. Plots remaining:  
34 Gertrude 41 Henry: Unidentified.  
35 Helen 72 Henry: Unidentified.  
Request OP check 37 Gertrude 41 again.
- 0625 35 Helen 83 } Henry: Unidentified.  
35 Helen 84 }  
Flight 2 is out, 1 plane remaining in flight 1.
- 0630 Flight 16 is out.
- 0631 OP8 at Fox: 4 ships south of Fox.
- [151] 0636 OP 7 at George: 3DD's 8 mi. SE of George.
- 0640 Offshore Patrol: Negative report on 35 Helen 83 and 84.
- 0643 Sig Tower: Clipper has landed; flight 12 is in. REEDBIRD and CON-DOR cleared.
- 0657 Flight 1 out, 16 in.
- 0658 Patrick: sampans 34 Helen 75 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 54 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 13 Henry: U. S.
- CHEW: At 0250 made submarine contact on sound in Pearl restricted area, western half. Small submarine believed there. Followed contact to 3 miles south of buoys at Pearl channel. 0302 dropped six charges; 2 did not explode and only contact noted except two reported prior this.

- 0805 From Robert: 1 P-39 will take off from Hickam at 0820 for 20 minutes test flight.
- 0810 Life boat reported 262° 75 miles at 0710 21-Gertrude-157 from Pat.  
Action: Coast Guard, Robert.
- 0815 Flight 19 0825 6 VPB Pearl-Kaneohe ETA 0900.
- 0820 34 Helen 53 Unidentified  
55 " "  
35 Helen 33 U. S.
- 0742 1 Tanker left Pearl for Honolulu.
- 0806 Platte stood out of Honolulu
- 0825 Pat: Flight 19 cancel departure & ETA
- 0828 34 Helen 66 Unidentified.
- 0839 Craven will test whistle and siren at 1000.
- 0835 Platte entered Pearl
- 0850 Army OP at Kahuku Pt sighted ship at 0815 due north proceeding west about 15,000 yards off shore. Looks like commercial ship damaged, bow high, stern low.  
Action: Robert, CinCPac, Pat. DeRuss, Coast Guard; Pat sending plane to investigate. Henry has no ship available.
- [152] 0901 34 Helen 92 U. S.
- 0910 MAHAN & LAMSON cleared.
- 0913 Sub 2 miles off point A going east on surface from Robert.  
Action: Combat Int., CinCPac.
- 0917 Army taking action against sub.
- 0922 DD sighted 34 Gertrude 95
- 0924 1 unidentified tug 2 unidentified barges 272° Dist. 240, Course 090 speed 10.  
Action: U. S. Commanders
- 0930 PRESTON & SMITH cleared.  
NAVEJO stood out
- 0932 From seacoast O. P. friendly destroyer 2000 yards from point Kahuku.  
No action.
- 0938 35 Helen 31 U. S.  
35 Irene 49 U. S.
- 0940 Robert 34 Helen 84 U. S.
- 0946 34 Helen 73 U. S.  
1-318-Bellows for Hilo 1530
- 0958 34 Helen 73 U. S.  
34 Helen 83 U. S.  
35 Irene 68 Unidentified
- 1014 St. Louis cleared
- 1015 35 Irene 49 U. S.  
35 Irene 68 Unidentified
- 1016 Sig. Tower reports freighter coming up due south.  
SEMINOLE and LITCHFIELD cleared.
- 1020 TAUTOG cleared.
- 1035 SEMINOLE and REEDBIRD entered
- 1047 35
- 1045 ALLEN cleared
- 1050 80 planes *rumored* to be coming from Maui.  
Action: None from Robert.
- [153] 1052 35 Irene 45 Unidentified
- 1053 From Patrick 2 PBY's from flight 17 are down and lost.  
Action: CinCPac, Combat, Pat is sending search planes.
- 1106 35 Irene 85 Unidentified.
- 1107 Planes are down bearing 155° from Oahu. Patrick may be 150 to 300 miles down from center of Oahu.  
Action: DORSEY and ALLEN sent to search
- 1110 From ComOffShore Pat to DORSEY: SEARCH FOR LOST PLANES ON BEARING 155° FROM OAHU.
- 1118 34 Irene 99 U. S.
- 1121 Robert: 3 transports and four DD's off coast.  
Action: U. S. Ships
- 1136 From Patrick: Searched area off Kaena Point 10 miles bearing 225° from Kaena Point reported two subs and 1 torpedo.  
Results: Negative. About 0743 torpedo fired in general direction of coast. 2 subs in vicinity. Later search disclosed nothing.  
Action: COMBATINT., COAST GUARD, ROBERT, PAT, CINCPAC.

- 1147 Firing data for 27 Dec. 0900-1000.  
155 mm. five rounds 1500 yards to seaward off Waimea Bay  
From 6.-3
- 1220 35 Helen 88 U. S. Vessel  
1220 Flight 22 completed.  
1220 Henry asked Robert for a replot of all plots in 34 and 35 Irene.  
1231 35 Helen 33 U. S.  
35 Irene 89 U. S.
- 1235 From Pat: Results of search for ship in distress (item 0850) negative.  
35 Helen 97 U. S.
- 1245 DD ALLEN recalled by CinCPac  
36 Helen 27 (3) U. S.
- 1330 34 Irene 88 U. S.  
1332 Flight 34 is completed.  
1348 34 Helen 83 (34 Helen 91)  
1350 CHEW: Dropped 8 charges on sound contact.  
Action: CombatIntel.
- [154] 1355 36 Gertrude 33 U. S.  
1359 Flight 23 completed.
- 1406 Robert: O. P. Ship 10 miles NW HYPO Haleiwa Landing Field.  
1415 At 1500 1 U. S. Sampan will depart from Honolulu for Pearl.  
ROB. PAT CINCPAC
- 1420 O. P. 2 mi. NW KAENA Tanker heading south  
Action: PAT, ROB.

## FALSE REPORT

- 1420 { Col. HOPPAUGH: Plane 11V17 down at sea 100 miles from Oahu.  
Posit 20-35 N, 159° 30' W Plane leaking. Can stay afloat if weather  
does not get worse.  
Action: PAT, ROB, CINCPAC, COMBAT INT.
- 1429 To Pat: IS THAT YOUR PLANE? YES BUT THE POSIT DOESN'T  
CHECK
- 1430 34 Gertrude 32 A DD not a tanker. U. S.  
1500 MATHILDA FOSS with tow stood out.  
34 Gertrude 41 51 (31 disappeared believed back echo)  
From Capt of Yd: Authorize tug HERCULES depart Pearl 1515.
- 1500 34 Helen 47 U. S.  
1517 NEVADA and Barbers Point lights will be turned on tonight for landing  
lights. From Patrick.  
Action: Capt of the Yd.
- 1519 HERCULES cleared.  
1526 Robert cleared board.  
1540 35 Helen 15 U. S.  
35 Irene 48 unidentified.

ARCHIE P KELLEY, *Ensign U. S. Navy.*

- 1550 Plot in 35 Irene has disappeared.  
1552 Flight 33 is in.  
1553 Flight 27 is in.  
1605 CACHALOT moved at sub base  
1607 XYP 155 entered channel.  
1612 Flight 30 is in.  
1615 Flight 37 is in.  
[155] 1618 Notified Robt. Pat. CinCPac, De Russey, Combat Int. and Coast  
Guard XYP161 and XYP166 will depart Section Base 1700 for operating  
area.
- 1625 Flight 8 is in.  
1626 Flight 40 is in.  
1620 From Port Director MATILDA FOSS arrived Honolulu. MIKIMIKI and  
HAMAKUA Honolulu towards Pearl.  
1645 From Robert 34 Helen 27 unidentified.  
34 Helen 36 unidentified.
- 1700 XYP161 and XYP166 proceeded out on duty assigned.  
1708 MIKIMIKI and HAMAKUA stood in.  
From Robert 34 Helen 26 doubtful.  
From Pat. One army and one navy plane circling plane down in Lat  
17-25 N, Long 156-38 W. HULBERT near there.

- 1725 From Pat. Two planes are investigating surface craft in 34 Helen 26, 27 and 36.
- 1720 From Robt 34 Helen 57 doubtful.  
34 Helen 58 doubtful.
- 1735 From Pat. Planes investigating 34 Helen 26, 27 and 36 report negative.
- 1744 From D. O. Hickam B18 sunk at Hickam Field must be raised morning of 27th.  
Action: Informed by Lt. Tuttle that he will contact Hickam and arrange to raise plane. (Wt 20 tons, depth 12 ft of water)
- 1736 MIKHALA and MIKIMIKI moored B7.
- 1745 From Robert 34 Helen 05 doubtful.  
From Pat. One plane down in L 17-25, Long 156-38, HULBERT standing by. The other is bearing 250°-20 mi. from the first DORSEY standing by.
- 1600 From Pat: One of our planes at 1725 sighted small boat with 11 seamen, bearing 257 dist. 150 mi. Lat 20-53, Long. 160-40. Pilot will make full report when he lands.
- 1613 Flight 15 is in.
- 1830 Flight 39 is in.
- 1852 Flight 7 is in.
- 1905 From Robert. 34 Gertrude 22 doubtful.
- [156] 1913 From Pat: DD139 reports unknown aircraft over Diamond Head.
- 1914 Flight 2 is in.
- 1928 Flight 9 is cancelled  
Flight 10 is in.  
From Robert: 35 Irene 44 doubtful  
35 " 55 "  
35 " 37 "
- 1935 Flight 11 is canceled
- 1936 From Robert: 34 Gertrude 22 disappeared 10 minutes ago.
- 1938 Flight 38 is in.
- 1946 Flight 28 is in.
- 1947 From Robert: One B17 is missing. It left at 0630 to patrol sector 120°-127°.
- 2006 From Robert: 35 Helen 73 doubtful  
35 Helen 74 doubtful
- 2010 From Robert: Do you have any ships bearing 80° dist. 100 mi. from here that could search for bomber.  
Action: Told Offshore Pat DD's to assist.
- 2049 From Robert: All searchlights on island are being lit to assist bomber in.  
Action: Notified Combat Int, All ships present.
- 2119 From Pat: HULBERT has one plane in tow. DORSEY still proceeding to 2nd plane, and a plane is still circling it.
- 2138 Notified DDs to quit search for B17.  
From Robert: Plane lost now believed to be 200 mi. west of Barbers Point.  
Recall your DDs
- 2142 From Robert: Can you have inshore patrol listen for bomber's MOs on 6355 KC?  
Action: Notified patrol.
- 2150 To Coast Guard: Two boats drifting in the following positions:  
1—L 20-53N Long. 160-40W course 20° sp2½Kn.  
2—L21-20N, Long. 159-20W. Despatch TIGER that she proceed to 31 Helen 05 at her best speed to pass midway between these positions in AM Planes will be sent to assist.
- 2154 From Robert: Do you have any vessels NE of the Island 100 mi.?  
Action: Notified Robert we have none there.
- [157] 2244 From Com Offshore Pat Following intercept from plane quote on a course Wheeler beacon flying 230 degrees low on gas any information for you get now.  
From ComOffshore Pat We hear MO's on specified frequency. Will forward any further reports.
- 2315 From Section Base. Power off radio transmitter and receiver.
- 2323 From Duty Int. Officer. Army plane will go down 80 mi. S of Kauai
- 2327 From Robert: Do you have any vessels in vicinity of 80 mi. S of Kauai  
Action: Notified we do not.
- 2335 From Robert: Plane trying to follow Kauai beacon in.
- 2338 From Robert: Try to send vessel to 31 Helen 74.  
Action: Told we will send a DD which is now 75 mi. from that position.
- 2343 Plane making forced landing L 21-05 N. L 159-45 W.
- 2400 To all Ships Present NBDF order No. 4 execute No. 13 repeat No. 13



Saturday, December 27, 1941

- [158] 0015 O. N. I. reports via Capt. Yard, no power between Waipio to Lualualei, Hickam and Red Hill. Town and main transfer circle junction. Communication interrupted. Marine Guard has been doubled. Sabotage is suspected. Chief of Staff notified.
- 0025 G-3 reports: Radio beacon at Port Allen, Kauai: plane bearing 193 from beacon dist. 50 miles.
- 0028 Patrick requested Barbers Point and NEVADA truck light be put out. Cincpac and Coast Guard.
- 0030 Robert: leaving Kauai beacon on all night.
- 0035 Robert: one B17 taking off at Bellows Field at 0100 in search of lost air-plane. ETA 0430.
- 0035 Flight 26 is in and flight 28 is in.  
Flights 10 and 17 are still out.  
For information only: at 2150 Dec. 26th, to Coast Guard.  
Two boats drifting in the following positions: (1) Lat. 20-53 N Long. 160-40 W Course 20° sp. 2½ kn. (2) Lat. 21-20 N Long 159-20 W.  
Dispatched TIGER to 31 Helen 05 at her best speed to position midway between these positions in AM. Planes will assist. Two PBY's down and one B-17 down in ocean.
- 0045 Barbers Point light out.  
Signal Tower: Big flares, one at sub base and one at Pearl City. Patrick did not know what they were.
- 0107 O.O.W. questioned Pan-American on flares. Their guards say that it was in direction of Wheeler Field. Cincpac and G-2, Robert, Patrick. Transformers are being blown up.
- 0114 Robert requests check on power from various stations.
- 0115 Boom shack back in again on auxiliary power.
- 0118 Robert—section base at Bishop Point having power trouble.
- 0135 Lt. Hays, Hickam Field, reports pounding on pipes sounds like dots and dashes. Sounds appear to be coming from Hickam Gate or Navy Yard Gate.
- 0140 Power back at Waipio and Lualualei. Investigation still going on.
- [159] 0143 From Hickam, Lt. Hays, Sounds appear to be coming from 500 yards from their water tower toward the channel. Notified Capt. Yard.
- 0144 Fort Kam. Very definite info. that the transformer at Hickam was sabotaged. Haw. Electric on the job.
- 0146 Capt. Yard reported that a Marine was sent to investigate flare near Sub. Base. Guards established info. that flare came from center of officers housing area.
- 0147 Power back on at Q station.
- 0215 Navy Yard is supplying power to Hickam and Kam. Power trouble was due to insulator trouble outside Hickam. Robert notified.
- 0220 DORSEY in company with second plane that was forced down.
- 0325 Capt. Yard—flares being dropped over Wheeler. Notified Robert. Robert reported no flares over Wheeler.
- 0330 Robert—sweep of board:
  - 34 Helen 43 friendly
  - 35 Helen 33 friendly
  - 34 Helen 45 friendly
  - 34 Helen 55 friendly
  - 34 Helen 65 friendly
  - 34 Helen 76 friendly
  - 35 Helen 33 friendly
  - 35 Helen 43 friendly
  - 35 Helen 85 friendly
  - 35 Helen 41 friendly
  - 35 Helen 23 friendly
  - 33 Irene 72 friendly
- 0402 Robert—O.P. reports OP surface vessel 4 miles off and West of "Fox" blinking. Perhaps blinker tube. XPY 161 in that vicinity.
- 0415 Capt. Yard—flares being dropped a little North of West of Oahu. Robert notified.

- 0420 Robert—battery reports—3500 mils from Armstrong a red flare. The answer one yellow flare about 0320. O.O.W. believed it to be Army searching plane B-17.
- [160] 0443 "Allen" has been following flares for one hour.
- 0503 Flares off Diamond Head. Signal Tower notified. Robert to confirm with lookouts.
- 0508 Robert—OP 2 reports firing 4 miles west of Fort Ruger—small arms.
- 0509 Robert—Elephant taking off from "Box" at 0530.
- 0515 Firing proved to be Rapid Transit Busses getting under way. Notified Robert.
- 0517 Col. Fitzgerald of Kauai reports submarine Waimea, Kauai.
- 0518 Robert—same message from G-3.
- 0521 Patrick to send plane "direct" to Kauai to investigate submarines at daybreak.
- 0530 Patrick to send 2 planes directly over the island—take off 0545. (Flight 14 to investigate subs.)
- 0540 Lights on in channel for take off of planes.
- 0545 Robert—B-17 took off from Bellows to relieve plane searching.
- 0555 Robert—Request info. whether ship reported sighted off Nawiliwili and now moving toward Kekaha is friendly. Fitzgerald, Kauai. Affirm.
- 0600 From Allen: Picked up 12 survivors SS MANINI torpedoed Wednesday 17th. One insane, one injured, and proceeding Honolulu.
- 0635 Robert—OP 8 reports 12 ships on horizon south of point Fox—friendly.
- 0640 Robert observers note vessel North of G and South of G. North doubtful, south friendly.
- Last report of B-17 Robert.  
 at 2340 from Wahiawa 259°  
 at 2340 from Punch Bowl 262°  
 approx. posit. Lat. 21°-20  
 159°-40
- Plane was on Kauai beam when it went down.
- [161] \$650 Flight 15 is in.
- 0701 ZANE has entered.
- 0710 Beginning 0730 Army will have P-40's (8 of them) taking off at 15 min. intervals on test hop from Hickam.
- 0710 Patrick: Plane reports enemy sub submerged bearing 010 dist. 22 miles from Maunawai. UPB took off to drop depth charges, to fly direct.
- 0715 2 sampans at 55 DB 12 are firing toward shore—Reported U. S. is practicing dropping depth charge. Reported by Army Officer Ebbey.
- 0728 Patrick: One large sub and 3 little subs sighted off Waimea. One Hippo sent with depth charges. Location same as last contact.
- 0745 Lambertson cleared.
- E. S. KORB, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- 0747 MONTGOMERY cleared.
- 0755 Signal Tower: Seven planes due south of channel. Patrick—U. S. 34 Helen 07. Henry: U. S.
- 0807 Flight 13 is in. Hostile submarine off channel entrance. To: Patrick, Robert, Combat.
- 0814 To Robert: No submarines (friendly) between East and Easy.
- 0823 35 Helen 62. Henry: U. S. Patrick: from patrol plane: submarine sighted 008°, 145 mi. from center of Oahu. C 360° periscope, submerged. Signal Tower: 1 carrier 45 miles south of channel entrance.
- 0830 TURKEY cleared.
- 0833 Flight 22 is out. 34 Helen 71 Henry: U. S.
- 0845 NAVAJO cleared. CG 517 Honolulu to Pearl will depart 0910. DeRussy, Patrick, Robert.
- [162] 0854 Flight 5 is out.
- 0905 LEXINGTON moored, INDIANAPOLIS entered.
- 0905 Flight 8 is in.
- 0908 CHICAGO entered.
- 0915 PORTLAND entered.
- TIGER ordered to search for 2nd MANINI whaleboat vicinity Niihau. Search also being made for B-17. Henry requested information as it is received from any source.
- Robert: 6 PNY's searching for whaleboat and B-17.
- Correction: 6 B-18's are searching.

- 0924 Plane off Waimea: at time group 1930; searching. Nothing sighted yet.
- 0931 Patrick: Reports 2 buoys 150 feet apart, 1 mile straight out, ½ mile toward Barbers Point from Channel Entrance buoys. Inshore Patrol will investigate.
- 0954 NEOSHO stood in.  
34 Gertrude 47. Henry: U. S.
- 0955 To Robert: Best estimate on MANINI whaleboat 32 Helen 02.
- 0958 SEMINOLE entered. TURKEY. Patrick:
- 1003 B-17 (without bombs): submarine at 1000 10 miles south of Niihau. Tug and 2 barges 20 miles 20 SW from that position. 3 patrol bombers (PB) being sent to bomb submarine. Cincpac via Robert, Patrick. Submarine is hostile, go ahead.
- 1004 CHICAGO moored at C-2.
- 1018 Flight 14 is in.
- 1025 To Robert and Patrick: 2 U. S. DD's will proceed to Mokapu Point and head northward. 34 Helen 48 2DD Henry: U. S.
- 1014 MACDONOUGH entered, 1018 MONEHAN, 1024 WARDEN. Patrick to Robert: Total of 18 fighters on 30 minutes notice if necessary. 9 will continually be on 2 hours readiness, the other 9 will also be used if called.
- [163] 1038 Flight 4 is in.
- 1041 Patrick: one army plane circling lifeboat. Position 21°-00 N, 160°00'W, 255°, 118 mi. from center of Oahu.
- 1044 Flight 29 out.
- 1047 Robert: Submarine sighted by Army Patrol: C270 S 10kns., 274°, 125 miles from Oahu Center. Henry: hostile.
- 1053 Patrick to Robert: only 9 planes of flight of 18 are materially ready. Pilot and planes on 30 minutes notice.
- 1056 Robert: from Army Patrol (1047 report). Investigating suspicious surface craft at 270°, 130 miles from Oahu center.
- 1057 Patrick: Plane circling lifeboat coming up on 2670 KC to communicate with TIGER. TIGER proceeding to position given.
- 1108 Flight 25 is in.  
To Robert and Patrick: CACHALOT will proceed Sub. Base to West Loch, submerge and conduct sound operations.
- 1109 Requested course, speed and description of suspicious vessel sighted (1056).
- 1120 From plane at lifeboat via Patrick: Small friendly boat at 21-30 N 159°-40 W.
- 1140 Flights 4, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27 and 28 are completed (in). Signal Tower: Commercial tug with pontoon entered.
- 1142 Patrick: from CAA: Request Port Allen radio beam be turned off. Turned over to Communications.
- 1150 To Patrick, Robert, DeRussy: Tug and tow en route Honolulu to Pearl.
- 1155 At 1125 from Robert: First 2 DD's off Kauai headed south, changed to 1 DD and 1 freighted. Henry: U. S.
- 1210 Clipper leaves dock 1300—off at 1310. To Combat, Robert, and Patrick. Robert: From Lt. Boozer on Maui-Molokai patrol: sighted at 1110, 1 DD, 5 mi. south of Laau Pt. on Molokai, C90°S 20. Henry 1 DD en route to Hillo; U. S.
- [164] 35 Gertrude 25 Henry: U. S.
- 36 Helen 05
- 35 Helen 80 Henry: unidentified
- 1240 Tug and tow from Honolulu entered.
- 1245 35 Helen 80 disappeared.  
Robert: Submarine 274°, 125 miles from Oahu, and surface vessel at 270°, 130 miles from Oahu are IDENTICAL.
- 36 Helen 05 moved 1 mile eastward. Henry: unidentified.
- 1252 Patrick; Lifeboat at 21-00—160-00 bearing 255, 118 miles, 18 footer, dark gray, 15 ft. mast, becalmed. 12 men. CG says TIGER in immediate vicinity. Plane being relieved by flight 34.
- 1258 Plot at 35 Irene 67 moved 3 miles from 76 to 67 now at 35 Irene 68. Henry: unidentified.
- 1305 Flights 32, 37, and 40 are out. 5 is in.  
36 Helen 05 disappeared.  
Flight.

- 1313 35 Helen 86 Henry: unidentified  
35 Helen 79 " "
- 1315 Clipper off at 1314.
- 1317 35 Helen 64 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 34 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 33 Henry: U. S.  
34 Irene 58 Henry: unidentified.
- 1331 Flights 38 and 36 are in. 31 and 41 out.
- 1339 36 Helen 27 Henry: unidentified.  
35 Gertrude 58 Cincpac: U. S.  
Flight 33 is in.  
35 Gertrude 69 Henry: unidentified Cincpac: U. S.  
36 Gertrude 50 moved to 50
- 1345 35 Irene 16  
34 Helen 59 } did not reappear on board.  
36 Gertrude 93 }
- 1400 Robert: Firing 28 December, 0900-1000 into Waimea Bay, 75 mm howitzer. Heights 1500 feet.  
Waialua Bay, 155 mm howitzer. 3000 feet. To Patrick, Combat, Cincpac, Inshore and Offshore Patrol.
- [165] 1413 35 Irene 56 Henry: unidentified.
- 1425 36 Helen 06 Henry: unidentified.  
35 Helen 63 Henry: U. S.  
35 Irene 56 to 35 Irene 35.
- 1430 Flight 43 is out.  
35 Irene 58 3 ships }  
36 Helen 06 } Henry: unidentified.  
36 Helen 17 }  
35 Helen 95 }  
35 Irene 35 }
- 1440 Flights 29 and 37 are in.
- 1443 From G-2—Hostile submarine which broached the surface off Apua Pt., Hawaii, at 1248 and head SE. Robert, Patrick, Cincpac, Combat Intell. Patrick to send flight 46.  
35 Helen 42 Henry: U. S.  
35 Helen 52 Henry: U. S.
- 1451 Flight 30 is in.
- 1459 Flight 44 is out.
- 1505 Board cleared. Plots:  
34 Helen 18 (1) Henry: unidentified  
35 Helen 45 (2) Henry: U. S.
- 1508 Flight 39 is in, 20 is in.
- 1512 35 Helen 40 Henry: U. S.
- 1515 G-2: From 24th Div.: Two boats off Waimea Bay; headed toward Kahuku. To Patrick and Robert. Henry: unidentified; Inshore Patrol.
- 1517 XYP 155 and 166 depart Pearl 1700. Will patrol between Kaena and Barbers Points during the night returning Pearl at daylight. 166 between Barbers Point and Waianae; 155 between Waianae and Kaena Point. Too: Robert, Patrick, Cincpac, Combat Intell.
- 1535 35 Helen 33 Helen: U. S.  
35 Helen 22 Helen: U. S.  
35 Irene 16 Henry: unidentified.
- M. M. HODGES, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*
- [166] 1550 Lt. Comdr. Mundsay wished to identify 1 DD 10 miles NE of Hawaii heading SE from Patrick: Action: U. S. vessel.
- 1556 Two unidentified boats on horizon off Waimea Bay. Originally sighted heading direct Kahuku Point. At 1540 changed direction now heading towards Kaena Point. From G-2, Action: Rob., Pat.
- 1557 Robert: at 1540 the Army sighted a lifeboat at L 21-03, 160-26 Action: Coast Guard.
- 1603 Mathilda Foss cleared.
- 1613 Henry asked Robert if they could confirm the rumor that Hickam planes sighted unidentified aircraft this morning. Action: Negative
- 1618 Coast Guard Cutter TIGER has the missing whaleboat and is bringing it to Honolulu.  
From: Patrick. Action: Combat Int., ComInshorePat.



- 1620 Henry asked Pat. for info. on missing bomber. Results: negative.  
 1623 XYP166 and 155 departed Pearl for Operating Area.  
 1628 From Robert: OP at hypo: two subs to North at surface, one with smoke  
 and the other alongside to assist.  
 34 Gertrude 73. Urgent  
 Action: Cincpac: sending 2 DD's to investigate.  
 Patrick: sending plane to investigate.
- 1634 In regard to radio interference reported by Navy, Army reports that it  
 may be submarine 3 miles North and West of George.  
 1635 Robert reports large plane circling subs. reported above.  
 1636 Army code line reports two DD's rushing out to contact the above subs.  
 Action: Robert, Pat, Cincpac.  
 1640 Cincpac: The two subs above are enemy subs. New plot on subs. 34  
 Gertrude 74.
- 1645 Flight 48 1 PBY from King investigate subs.  
 [167] 1645 3 P-40's from Wheeler took off to attack subs. 3 will follow.  
 1641 Allen stood in.  
 1648 Patrick requested that Army coordinates be used instead of geographical  
 positions.
- 1653 Submarines are heading North toward sea. Robert.  
 1658 Subs are heading East. Robert.  
 1701 Patrick: Large scattered oil sludge found on surface at 242° 75 miles  
 from origin, also several bits of wood debris. Creech.  
 Action: Pat., Rob., Cincpac.
- 1712 Robert: O.P. reported (1) what they thought was a sub. Plane dropped  
 1 bomb. puff of smoke appeared, second ship appeared. (2) 1st ship  
 appears to be a sub-chaser (3) 2nd ship appears a sub. Many planes  
 appeared.
- 1718 Robert: "Army knows nothing about the destroyer ALLEN and its search  
 for the B17 that was down last night". Relay to Lt. Comdr. Chillings-  
 worth.
- 1724 34 Helen 83 U.S.  
 1735 Patrick: Will you turn on Barber's Point light?  
 1810 D.O. Coast Guard: Relay message from TIGER: Lifeboat picked up  
 by TIGER contains 13 survivors from S. S. PRUSA.
- 1810 34 Helen 43 U.S.  
 1825 Robert cleared the board of all surface plots.  
 1848 35 Helen 43 U.S.  
 1850 WASMUTH cleared.  
 1855 From: XYP 166 To: Com14: We are having engine trouble. Request  
 permission to enter harbor.
- 1904 34 Gertrude 44 U.S.  
 1906 35 Florence 00 U.S.  
 1915 Patrick reported flashing light on WEST VIRGINIA.  
 [168] Action: ARGONNE reports no work at night. However, there may  
 be a security patrol.
- 1925 From Robert: Searchlight reports 3 vessels 3 to 4 miles from Barbers  
 Point. 2 appear to be submarines.  
 34 Helen 85 is the plot.  
 Action: U. S.
- 1938 From Cincpac: Two DD's are operating NW of Oahu during the night  
 close in.
1946. O. P. 34 Helen 76 2 vessels, 1 moving slowing West, the other stationary.  
 Point Easy. U. S.
1956. All U. S. Planes are down.  
 1957 Patrick requested Barbers Point Light be doused.  
 Action: Coast Guard was asked to turn it off.
- 2005 Patrick and Robert were notified that two U. S. sampans would be oper-  
 ating between sunset and sunrise from Barbers Point to Kaena Point.
- 2026 Henry cleared board.  
 2034 35 Helen 32 U. S.  
 35 Helen 03 U. S.
- 2100 From ComScoFor To: A. S. P.  
 I have assumed duty of senior officer present embarked and command of  
 sector one.
- 2137 35 Helen 34 U. S. Robert cleared board.

- 2200 35 Helen 13 U. S.  
 2207 34 Helen 09 U. S.  
 2215 34 Gertrude 41 U. S.  
 2224 33 Helen 99 U. S.  
 2225 Robert cleared the board.  
 2230 34 Helen 94 U. S.  
 2233 35 Helen 04 U. S.  
 [169] 2234 35 Helen 54 U. S.  
 2235 35 Helen 24 U. S.  
 2237 35 Helen 15 U. S.  
 2246 34 Helen 37 (2) Doubtful—Offshore Patrol to investigate.  
 2306 34 Florence 91 (2) 1 mi. apart U. S.  
 2311 From O. P. number 4: in 34 Florence 71 flashes are seen, gun flashes L22-01. 158-10, others seen slightly to north of latter position. No gun reports are heard. Action: G-2, G-3.  
 2321 34 Gertrude 69 (2) friendly. Gun flashes seen at the above area. Station.  
 2336 Off Point "A" sees gun flashes, also.  
 2341 35 Edith 22 aircraft (?) South  
 35 Florence 09 "
- ARCHIE P. KELLEY, *Ensign, U. S. N.*
- 2352 From Robert—If 35 Florence 09 is a surf. vessel, can you identify it?  
 Notified affirm.
- Sunday, December 28, 1941*
- [179] 0003 From Robert. 35 Florence 09 has disappeared.  
 0012 From Robert. There are still flashes north of Kaena Pt.  
 0100 From G-2: Tug and barge sighted afternoon of 27th off SW coast of Kahoolawe anchored in small bay.  
 Action—Notified that the KALAE is in that vicinity.  
 0100 From Robert—36 Edith 24—doubtful.  
 0253 From Robert—Flashes still continue, and one of the RDF stations between Kahuku Pt. and Kaena Pt. can hear heavy calibre gun fire at sea.  
 0258 From Robert—35 Helen 22 friendly  
                   35 Helen 24 "  
                   35 Helen 14 "
- 0315 From Robert—35 Gertrude 57 friendly  
                   35 Gertrude 55 friendly  
                   34 Gertrude 35 friendly
- 0507 Notified Signal Tower—Channel lights will be on prior 0530.  
 0533 From Robert—35 Helen 73 doubtful.  
 0602 From Robert—35 Helen 42 "  
                   35 Helen 72 "  
 0615 From Robert—36 Helen 29 "
- 0616 From G-3—Sampan sighted 55 FB 91. Action—Notified friendly.  
 0645 TREVOR stood in.  
 0650 BOGGS stood in.  
 0655 Flight 12 is in.  
 0700 From Patrick: A plane sighted a tug ARTHUR FOSS and 2 barges bearing 256° dist. 40 miles.  
 0703 From Patrick: Enemy sub sighted bearing 024 dist. 23 mi.  
 Action: notified Inshore Patrol.  
 0833 Patrick reported: A ship's boat under sail reported 20 Helen 91—sighted at 0830.
- [171] 0710 From Patrick: 1 PBV with depth charges being sent from Kaneohe to track. Sub bearing 0.  
 0718 From Robert: 15 Helen 73 doubtful  
 Notified Robert, Patrick, Cincpac, Combat Intell.  
 0730 From G-3 IP report—friendly DD's heading in direction of Kaena Point from NW and a destroyer 4 miles off headed for Waimea Bay.  
 0741 From Coast Guard—TIGER returned at 0700.  
 0742 From Section Base—XYP 155 is in—other sampan has engine trouble.  
 0745 From Robert 34 Helen 33 doubtful.  
                   Army firing 28th December 0800-1000 Waimea Bay 75 mm highest trajectory 1500 ft. Wailua Bay trajectory 3000 feet, 155 mm.  
 Notified Patrick, Robert, Combat Int.
- 0756 Patrick reported PBV dropped depth charges on submarines—flight 14.  
 0805 Robert from 0810 to 0825 a P-40 will test over Hickam Field.

- 0818 Observer at Pahoehee, reports 5 ships due West of Waianae, estimated distance 30 miles.
- 0833 Patrick reported—ship's boat under sail reported in 26 Helen 91 sighted at 0820 (18 men in it)
- 0840 33 Helen 86—doubtful—0844 disappeared.
- 0948 From Patrick—suspicious vessel bearing 254° dist. 200 miles. Patrick investigated.
- 0903 From Robert—Bomber reported—sighted wake believed to be a submarine Lat 18°55' N, Long. 156°10' W. Reported to Robert as hostile.
- 0921 Flight 20 is in.
- 0924 Signal tower—one tanker and DD—friendly sighted off Pearl—notified Robert, Patrick, DeRussy.
- [172] 0850 35 Irene 29—Investigating.
- 0924 35 Irene 29 disappeared.
- 0930 Flight #4 is in.
- 1028 From Robert—Army reports 3 subs. Lat. 20°35' N, Long. 159°40' W. They are going to bomb them.
- 1035 Flight 25 is completed.
- 1037 NECHES entered Pearl.
- 1038 Flight 18 is in.
- 1039 Flight 14 is in.
- 1040 From Robert—Army to send up 3 A-20 to help bomb subs—from Wheeler.
- 1042 HELM entered Pearl.
- 1045 From Robert: Army reports vessel in Lat. 20°30' N, Long. 162°16' W. sighted 1030. Army will investigate—bomber.
- 1048 From Robert—Army reports 9 vessels in area Lat. 20-30; Long. 126-16 W, all friendly. G-3, Shafter and S-3.
- 1100 Flight 19 is in.
- 1108 Flight 13 is in.
- 1110 Flight 15 is in.
- 1114 Flight 10 is in.
- 1120 To Robert, Cincpac, Patrick—Army reports smoke on water Lat. 21-12, Long. 158-13 8 mi. dist. bearing 223° from Barbers Point.
- 1122 Cancel flight 29.
- 1133 Flight 22 in.
- 1137 TACOMA which left Wake Dec. 6 for Honolulu is off Pearl awaiting instructions. Robert, Patrick, Capt. Yard, Cincpac.
- [173] 1209 Flight 17 is in.
- 1210 Flight 23 is in.
- 1220 Flight 28 is in.
- 1225 Flight 5 is in.
- 1251 Flights 8 and 16 are in.
- 1304 The Army is operating a sampan flying the American flag with an American crew inspecting the coast of the Island of Hawaii. Boat will operate during daylight hours only. Inshore Pat., Offshore Pat., Combat Intell., Patrick, Robert, Cincpac.
- 1310 Flight 21 is in.
- 1336 Submarine reported 1 mile off Kahuku going west—friendly DD. From Robert.
- 1338 GREBE cleared 1330. DeRussy, Robert, Patrick, Cincpac.
- 1343 Flight 33 is in.
- 1348 Flight 32 is in.
- 1349 ALWYN entered.
- 1445 35 Helen 71 disappeared.
- 1504 Flight 26 is in.
- 1508 Flight 34 is in.
- 1516 Flight 35 is in.
- 1525 One DD cleared Pearl Harbor. DeRussy, Patrick, Robert, Cincpac.
- 1537 To Robert, Patrick. We will have two U. S. sampans operating between Barbers Point and Kaena Point all night. Cincpac, Combat Intell., Inshore, Offshore, DeRussy.
- 1540 Flight 31 is in.
- 1546 Flights 36 and 39 are in.
- [174] 1558 Flight 37 is out.
- 1600 NEOSHO cleared.

- 1602 Flight 41 is out.  
Escort A-3 is ready.
- 1611 CURTIS cleared.
- 1613 SEMINOLE cleared.
- 1621 BOBOLINK cleared.
- 1626 Flight 41 is in.
- 1643 SEMINOLE entered.
- 1650 1 MTB has entered.  
36 Helen 40 Henry: unidentified.  
36 Helen 22 Henry: “
- 1653 Flight 38 is in.
- 1700 BOBOLINK entered.
- 1710 Flight 37 is in.  
Patrick will investigate 1650 plots.  
34 Helen 84 Henry: U. S. friendly.  
35 Irene 66 Henry: doubtful, but thought to be friendly.  
35 Helen 12 Henry: U. S. friendly.
- 1727 Planes of flight 2 will be coming in for ensuing 45 minutes. Planes of flight 1 will land in about 1 hour.
- 1732 35 Irene 19 } Henry: any of several ships in that area. Cannot posi-  
35 Helen 14 } tively identify.
- 1737 Flight 3 is in.
- 1748 36 Helen 22 }  
36 Helen 40 } Disappeared from the board.
- 1748 Flight 7 is in.
- 1754 Patrick investigated 35 Helen 72—Negative.
- 1756 All flights from Bellows have landed.  
[175] 1808 Flights 30 and 40 are in.
- 1810 Patrick: lost plane 316° to 324° from center of Island.  
Lost plane procedure being followed.  
Bearings are from Task force 9.  
Robert requests plane go to 10,000 feet. Both R. D. F.
- 1830 Intercept: Com 16 to OpNav: Corregidor, P. I., being heavily bombed.
- 1832 Planes reported 1825 as landing. 4 pursuits at Hickam and 4 at Wheeler are now reported coming in showing running lights.
- 1848 Signal Tower: red flare fired from Ford Island between F-3 and F-4. To Patrick requesting information.
- 1905 34 Irene 56 believed to be lost plane returning. All plots are in line heading for Oahu.
- 1935 Robert: OP 9 reports sounds of gunfire (heavy) SE of Barbers Point. Wheeler Field reports sound of heavy gunfire S. of Barbers Point. Gate Vessel heard 6 detonations at 1934. Station B, and Ft. Weaver both report detonations.
- 1945 Robert: There are no unidentified surface plots on the board.
- 1950 Lost plane has sighted the Island (presumably Oahu).  
34 Helen 08 Request check.  
34 Helen 93 Henry: Friend.
- 1955 CHEW: dropped 8 large size depth charges on excellent contact 2 miles bearing 205 from entrance buoys. To Patrick, Robert, Cinepac.
- 2000 Patrick requests Robert turn on Kaena Pt. light for 15 minutes.  
34 Helen 08 did not reappear. Request board be cleared and new plots be given.  
34 Helen 59 Henry: Friend.  
Robert: Lights on to assist planes: Barbers Pt.: one halfway Barbers Pt. to Kaena, Kaena Pt., and one 5 mi. East of Kaena.
- 2019 ComOffshore Patrol reports “negative” on 34 Helen 08.
- 2051 35 Helen 44 Henry: friend.  
35 Helen 23 Henry: friend.  
35 Helen 13 Henry: friend.  
35 Helen 33 Henry: friend.  
35 Helen 26 Henry: friend.  
35 Helen 76 Henry: friend.
- [176] 2104 Flight 1 is in.



- 2106 From Ensign Perkins, Operations Office, Naval Air Station, Pearl: Following flares observed at 2030 (reported on teletype at 2102): Red flare at Aiea Landing, yellow flare at Ft. Weaver, white flare at Barbers Point. Released by Lt. Van Cleave from DIO, Honolulu. Signal Tower saw none. Ft. Weaver observer saw Ft. Weaver flare.
- 2114 True bearing of plane 010 to 015 from Oahu center. Pan Air reports bearing 083—believed by Robert to be correct. 010-015 in error.
- 2120 Signal Tower: Car near sub-base showing 1 white and one blue light.
- 2125 Car to landing "C" right away for officer messenger from Patrick.
- 2155 Robert listening to broadcast on 7305 KC. Sounds like Russian or garbled dialect—not English.
- 35 Helen 83 Henry, Offshore Pat to investigate
- 35 Helen 33 Henry: friendly.
- 2210 Flight 2 is in. SUNADIN to drydock. Lost plane reported interference from Japanese station attempting to jam circuit. Pan Air gave bearings of 300° and 120°, station believed to be on Oahu. 6970 KC.
- 35 Helen 40 Henry; unidentified.
- 35 Helen 34 Henry: friendly.
- From Capt. Grey (Army): Reported an Army plane pilot sighted 9 unidentified surface vessels at 20° 30' N, 162° 20' W. Circled over and noticed two strange planes. One headed toward him. He reported dropping 4-600 lb. bombs.
- 35 Helen 12 Henry: friend.
- 35 Helen 23 Henry: friend.
- 2249 Tuesday: 30 December, 1941, between 0900-1100 2 40 mm guns will fire sand filled shells 2500 yards off Kahana and Laie Bays from quadrupod and Pupuhea. Map. Ordinate 25,000 ft. 12 rounds warn all planes. Robert to Patrick, Henry and Cinpac.
- 35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly.
- 2300 SUNADIN to B-9.
- [177] 2305 Robin to move up alongside Tucker.
- Board cleared—new plots.
- 34 Helen 93 Henry: friendly.
- 35 Helen 24 Henry: friendly.
- 35 Helen 16 Henry: friendly.
- 34 Helen 93 Henry: friendly.
- 35 Helen 12 Henry: friendly.
- 35 Helen 23 Henry: friendly.
- 35 Helen 3.5-3 " friendly.
- 35 " 73 went to investigate 35 Helen 83.
- 2335 Board cleared. New plots.
- 34 Helen 93 friendly.
- 35 Helen 24 friendly.
- 35 Helen 73 friendly.
- 35 Helen 83 Being investigated.
- 2348 Observation balloon lighted, released from Hickam Field.

M. M. HODGES, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*

*Monday, December 29, 1941*

- [178] 0000 Tested communications with Robert, Patrick, and CinCPac—OK Henry to Patrick—"Execute one, repeat one."
- 0012 From Hawaii via G-3: Army search of Hawaii beaches and shore installations reveal no enemy activity.
- 0020 35 Helen 42 (F) Robert cleared the board.
- 0021 35 Helen 85 Friendly.
- 35 Helen 94 Friendly.
- 0029 35 Helen 73 Friendly.
- 35 Helen 76 Friendly.
- 0031 35 Helen 55 Friendly.
- 0034 35 Helen 63 (2) Friendly.
- 0036 35 Helen 35 (2) Friendly.
- 0039 35 Helen 14 Friendly.

- 0040 35 Helen 12 (2).  
Robin moored at YFD 2.
0050. Robert: Tuesday, Dec. 30 0900-1100 2 40 mm. will fire sand filled shells 2500 yds. toward Laie Bay. Some quadrupod and zupuku maximum ordinate 25,000 ft. Warn all planes.
- 0105 35 Helen 83 Friendly.  
35 Helen 78 Doubtful.
- 0116 Henry requested Robert to clear the board.
- 0117 Robert cleared the board.  
35 Helen 65 Offshore Patrol investigating.  
35 Helen 54 Offshore Patrol investigating.  
35 Helen 76 (2) Offshore Patrol investigating.
- [179] 0117 35 Helen 55 Offshore Patrol investigating.  
64 Offshore Patrol investigating.  
63 Offshore Patrol investigating.  
35 Helen 41 Friendly.  
12 Friendly.
- 0129 From Combat Int: Can you verify report of time bomb at main gate  
Action: Main gate reports false.
- 0135 35 Helen 34 Friendly.  
65 Doubtful.
- 0140 Patrick: Flares referred to in item 2106, Dec. 28 log may be flares dropped by planes lost in landing.  
35 Helen 21 Friendly.  
35 Helen 67 Doubtful.
- 0228 Patrick: sounding balloon will be released from Ford at 0230.
- 0245 Signal tower reports sounding balloon rising from Ford.  
Signal tower reports two red lights flashing at dog berths. Action: Reported to Captain of the Yard.
- 0255 35 Helen 60 Friendly (Probably DD 348).
- 0256 Robert cleared the board.  
35 Helen 88 Friendly.  
35 Helen 67 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 75 (2) Doubtful.  
35 Helen 64 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 51 Doubtful. Doubtful except for one vessel which is known to be friendly.  
35 Helen 22 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 76 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 63 Friendly.  
35 Helen 65 Doubtful.
- [180] 0256 35 Helen 53 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 13 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 62 Doubtful.
- 0400 Robert cleared the board.
- 0405 35 Helen 02 Friendly.
- 0415 35 Helen 63 Doubtful.
- 0420 35 Helen 71 Doubtful.  
Bad plot, removed from board.  
35 Helen 55 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 63 Doubtful.  
34 Helen 47 Doubtful.  
35 Helen 33 Friendly.  
34 Helen 37 Friendly.
- 0510 Friendly.
- 0511 Doubtful.  
34 Helen 39 Doubtful.  
34 Helen 49 Doubtful.
- 0530 Captain of Yard: Patrick will turn on channel lights at 0545 and patrol debris at 0530  
Robert cleared board.
- 0535 34 Helen 55.  
33 Kate 65 Doubtful.  
34 Helen 37 Doubtful.
- 0546 35 Helen 51.  
34 Helen 47 Doubtful.

- [181] 0546 34 Gertrude 30 Doubtful.  
 0547 Unable to pick up 33 Kate 65.  
 0612 35 Helen 61 Doubtful.  
 0615 Patrick: Flights 13, 4, 8 in the air.  
 0625 34 Gertrude 30 Doubtful.  
 0642 1 submerged sub. 156 degrees, 10 mi. Diamond Head  
 1 DD 2 miles West—From Patrick.  
 Action: Reported to Comdr. Inshore Patrol. Also Patrick is sending a  
 VPB to investigate.  
 0648 1 DD standing in.  
 0658 Flight #14 completed.  
 0701 Long entered.  
 0711 Robert: Starting 0730-0900 six pursuits will take off from Hickam for  
 15 minute flights over Hickam.  
 0730 Robert: All Army pursuits of dawn patrol have been directed to land  
 immediately.  
 0750 33 Helen 94 Doubtful.

ARCHIE P. KELLEY, *Ensign.*

- 0800 From Robert: 33 Helen 94 was an aircraft.  
 0820 CROSSBILL stood out.  
 0836 From Robert: Board cleared  
 33 Helen 94 (2) U. S.  
 34 Helen 74 U. S.  
 35 Helen 15 U. S.  
 35 Helen 63 U. S.  
 35 Irene 98 Doubtful.  
 0845 Flight 16 is in.  
 0850 Flight 15 is in.  
 0904 DALE stood out.  
 [182] 0907 From Patrick: Plane investigating sub. 10 mi. off Diamond Head  
 found only small oil slick and some garbage  
 0922 1 DD stood out  
 0924 1 DD stood out  
 0930 1 DD stood out  
 0931 Flight 25 is in  
 0933 Flight 22 is in  
 From Robert: 35 Irene 98 has disappeared  
 0935 Flight 26 is in  
 0935 From Robert: 35 Helen 00 U. S.  
 0955 Flight 4 is in  
 1000 Flight 17 is in  
 1015 1 Cruiser stood out  
 1018 1 Cruiser stood out  
 1028 1 DMS stood out  
 1100 Flight 19 is in  
 1102 Flight 20 is in  
 1103 Flight 27 is in  
 1105 Flight 23 is in  
 1107 Flight 8 is in  
 1113 1 Carrier stood out  
 1118 Flights 21 and 24 are in  
 From Offshore Patrol: Large number of unidentified planes bearing 150  
 degrees from Kaunakakai  
 Action: Patrick identified as planes from SARATOGA  
 [183] 1215 From Robert: 35 Helen 95 Doubtful  
 1230 From Robert: Plot at 35 Helen 95 now 3 vessels  
 1235 Flight 31 is in  
 1237 Flight 28 is in  
 1249 Flight 18 is in  
 1252 Flight 33 is in  
 1253 From Robert: Plot at 35 Helen 95 still 3 vessels and also seen visually by  
 RDF station Koko Head.  
 Action: Friendly

- 1300 1 Carrier entered  
From Patrick: We had two sub. contacts this morning. (1) 0745 bearing 093 degrees, 122 mi.; lost contact—additional planes sent out—no results. (2) 0840 bearing 034 degrees, 200 mi.; lost contact immediately—nothing sent out.
- 1301 From San Francisco: Periscope sighted Lat. 21-10 Long. 57-56 at 1235  
Action: Notified Inshore Patrol, CinCPac, Patrick, Robert
- 1307 1 Cruiser stood in  
Flight 13 is in
- 1311 1 Cruiser entered
- 1332 Flight 36 is in
- 1340 From Robert: 34 Helen 03 Doubtful
- 1357 Flight 32 is in
- 1400 Flight 43 is in  
From Robert: 35 Helen 72 Friendly  
33 Helen 91 Doubtful  
34 Irene 28 Friendly
- [184] 1400 From Robert: 35 Helen 12 Friendly  
35 Helen 41 Friendly  
34 Helen 75 Friendly  
34 Helen 03 Doubtful  
35 Irene 18 Friendly  
34 Irene 73 Friendly
- 1413 Flight 35 is in
- 1428 Flight 42 is in
- 1430 Flight 41 is in  
From Patrick: HULBERT reports that the PBY she had in tow took off and will arrive Pearl at 1630  
Action: Notified Combat Int.
- 1440 From Robert: 33 Helen 72  
33 Helen 51  
33 Helen 27  
33 Irene 48 Friendly
- 1451 Flight 38 is in
- 1453 Flight 39 is in
- 1505 From Robert: 34 Irene 38 Friendly  
34 Irene 47 Friendly  
33 Irene 35 Friendly
- 1525 Flight 45 is in
- 1526 Flight 6 is in
- 1528 Flight 37 is in
- 1500 From Robert: A practice for searchlights in Schofield Haluiva area to see if they are properly placed to work with pursuits will be held night of Dec. 29th-30th. Bomber command will have an A-20 forty miles north of
- [185] 1500 From Robert: A practice for searchlights in Schofield Haleiva area to see if they are properly placed to work with pursuits will be held night of Dec. 29th-30th. Bomber command will have an A-20 forty miles north of Hypo at 10,000' alt. or below clouds at 2100, Dec. 29. It will fly at the above alt. from Hypo to Schofield and Pearl. Will be called off if there is an air raid, or if weather is poor.  
Action: Notified Patrick, CinCPac, Combat Int.
- 1540 Flights 39, 40, 46, 48 are in.
- 1545 From Robert: 34 Helen 80 Friendly  
35 Irene 28 Doubtful
- 1601 From Robert: Plot 35 Irene 28 disappeared
- 1630 Flight 51 is in.
- 1644 To Robert, Patrick: The launch Laia is authorized to carry food supplies, enemy aliens etc. between the islands of Lanai, Molokai, and Maui, provided it is manned by an American crew, flies the American flag, and submits an operating schedule. It must also operate during daylight hours. From G-3 Col. Paul: Ref. Capt. Earle, Comdr. Geisel
- 1645 Flight 47 is in.
- 1646 Capt. Enfield is sending Mr. Nichols from Dept. signal service who is coming to test voice radio at harbor control. From G-3.
- 1647 From Robert: The Navy will test proof 5'' AA battery at Hickam 1000-1100 Jan. 2, 1942. Inert slugs will be used.



- 1710 Two sampans are leaving Pearl Harbor (1700) Notified CinCPac, Robert, Patrick, DeRussy, Combat, Inshore, Offshore.
- 1715 Robert: 36 Helen 25 Doubtful
- 1722 36 Helen 25 Disappeared
- 1728 From Captain of the Yard's Office: Light in channel and Ford Island beacon being turned on. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac
- 1730 One DD cleared Pearl. Robert, Patrick, CinCPac, DeRussy  
From Robert: 34 Helen 33 Doubtful
- 1731 Flight 49 is in.
- [186] 1740 Flight 3 is in.
- 1741 Patrick: Operations officer requests that we get the following lights turned on:
1. Diamond Head
  2. Kahuku
  3. Kaena
  4. Barbers Point
  5. Nevada Truck light
- Notified Coast Guard and Signal Tower  
Chief Pay Clerk Carroll to message at C. G.
- 1742 From Robert: 34 Helen 33 *Disappeared*
- 1804 Flight 7 is in
- 1815 Kahuku has no light. Kaena Pt. has an unattended light; at present there is no way to turn it on. Diamond Head light is on. Barbers Point light is on and the Nevada truck light is on. Reported by the Coast Guard CP.  
Clerk Carroll from Coast Guard.  
Passed on to Patrick.
- 1818 From Robert 35 Helen 74 Friendly  
35 Helen 64 Friendly  
35 Helen 97 Doubtful
- 1900 Robert: 35 Helen 84 Very fast Doubtful
- 1912 From XPY 166 To Com 14  
34 Helen 95 Investigate submarine with underwater sound detection.
- 2014 Robert: 33 Helen 97 Doubtful
- 2054 Robert: 33 Helen 97 Doubtful
- 2120 Robert: 34 Helen 46 Doubtful
- 2128 From Patrick: Turn out the lights at Barbers Point and Diamond Head.  
Notified Coast Guard, CP Clerk Carroll
- 2129 From Robert: Points A. H. G. reported flashes far out and to the North
- 2144 Robert: Turn out all lights
- 2145 Flight 2 is in
- [187] 2145 All Army and Navy planes are in  
All planes are in. CinCPac, Combat Int.
- 2200 From S-3 H. C. A. C. has taken readings on flashes in north by requiring all stations to take readings on center. By rough triangulations nearest flash about 75 miles north of Oahu and farthest flash about 125 miles north of Oahu.
- 2215 From Robert: 33 Helen 97 } still there, off shore notified. investigating  
34 Helen 46 }
- 2226 From Robert: 35 Helen 84 *Doubtful*
- From Robert: 34 Gertrude 52 *Doubtful*
- 2240 From Robert: 35 Helen 84 *Doubtful*
- 2250 From Robert 35 Helen 83 *Doubtful*  
35 Helen 74 *Doubtful*
- 2303 From Robert: 34 Helen 34 *Doubtful*
- 2322 From Robert: 34 Gertrude 53 *Disappeared*
- 2330 From Robert: Complete check up:  
33 Helen 97 Unidentified, doubt  
34 Helen 34 *Doubtful*  
34 Helen 64 *Doubtful*  
35 Helen 26 Friendly  
35 Helen 33 Friendly  
35 Helen 83 *Doubtful*
- 2330 33 Helen 97 *Disappeared*, believed an echo
- 2355 Robert: 34 Helen 46 Results negative from Offshore Patrol.

E. S. KORB,  
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

[188]

Tuesday, December 30 1941

- 0012 Board cleared, 35 Helen 76 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 63 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 45 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 54 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 14 Henry: Friendly
- 0030 34 Helen 28 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 82 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 44 Henry: Friendly
- 0045 For Com. Offshore Patrol: Investigate 35 Helen 76, 63, and 82 and 34  
 Helen 28  
 Robert notified: 34 Helen 28 received negative.
- 0100 35 Helen 76 moved to 75 Investigate  
 34 Helen 28 moved to 29 Doubtful
- 0120 34 Gertrude 34 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 84 Henry: Doubtful  
 34 Gertrude 32 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 75 back to 76 Investigate  
 35 Helen 82 incorrect report; 35 Helen 84
- 0128 34 Gertrude 34 Disappeared  
 34 Gertrude 32 Disappeared
- 0130 G-2: Flashing light 20 miles off Ulupau
- 0136 34 Helen 29 Disappeared
- 0152 34 Helen 39 Disappeared at 0154
- 0200 34 Helen 29 Henry: Doubtful  
 moved to 34 Helen 38 at 0208  
 At 0150 Diamond Head reported unidentified surface vessel near Koko  
 Head at 55 LC. 50 Visibility poor, could not make her out. At  
 0220 Diamond Head and Makapuu Pt. both reported unidentified  
 vessel at 55 LC. 45, heading north. Asked G-2 to have observation  
 posts keep vessel in sight until light enough to investigate with  
 planes. Moving away from ship investigating 35 Helen 84
- 0235 34 Helen 38 moving inshore disappeared at 0240
- 0254 34 Helen 34 Henry:
- [189] 0300 Board cleared  
 New plots 34 Helen 85 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 15 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 38 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 26 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 45 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 55 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 63 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 75 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 76 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 84 Henry: Doubtful  
 34 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly
- 0344 35 Helen 76 change to Friendly, Montgomery  
 35 Helen 63 change to Doubtful  
 Montgomery will investigate 35 Helen 63, 35 Helen 75, and 35 Helen 84
- 0400 Board cleared. New plots:  
 Period 0420 to 0430  
 34 Helen 34 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 73 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 75 Henry: Being investigated  
 34 Helen 46 Corrected to 34 Helen 26  
 34 Helen 29 Henry: Doubtful  
 34 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 85 Henry: Friendly

- 34 Helen 39 Henry: Doubtful
- 35 Helen 15
- 35 Helen 45
- 35 Helen 55
- 35 Helen 63
- 35 Helen 75 } All doubtful except possibly 35 Helen 73. We have Mont-
- 35 Helen 75 } gomery investigating this area.
- 35 Helen 76
- 35 Helen 74
- 35 Helen 84
- 35 Helen 93
- 0500 Board cleared. New plots:
- 0505 33 Helen 96 Henry: Friendly
- 34 Helen 27 at 0513, error see 0513
- 34 Helen 57
- 35 Helen 74 Henry: Friendly
- 34 Helen 47 Henry: Friendly
- [190] 0505 35 Helen 65 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 13 Henry: Friendly
- 0513 34 Helen 29 Henry: Unidentified
- 0515 Gate vessel reports via Captain of Yard: Flashing white light at Waikiki.  
Called Aloha Tower to verify.  
Flight 8 will be 8 to 10 minutes late
- 35 Helen 65 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 13 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 53 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 04 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 84 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 93 Henry: Unidentified
- 0530 Requested Patrick early morning patrols investigate surface plots between  
35 Helen 44 and 36 Helen 04. Willco.
- 0535 Flight 8 is out
- 35 Helen 84 Disappeared
- 35 Helen 93 Disappeared
- 0545 Patrick: No ships off Diamond Head. 1 plane
- 0554 Patrick: 1 DD off Diamond Head, 2nd plane  
Board cleared: 35 Helen 73 Henry: Unidentified  
35 Helen 75 Henry: Unidentified
- 0600 Flight 4 is out
- 0607 35 Helen 84 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 65 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 63 Henry: Doubtful
- Correct 35 Helen 63 to 35 Helen 53 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 34 (2) Henry: Friendly
- 0617 Bobolink cleared
- 35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly
- 34 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly
- 0621 Reedbird cleared
- [191] 0632 Cockatoo cleared
- 0634 Flight 15 is out, also 1
- 0640 Chandler entered
- 35 Helen 63 Henry: Friendly
- 0650 Condor cleared at 0624
- 0655 Flight 2 is out. Mugford shifted berth
- 0700 Board cleared. Plots:
- 35 Helen 88 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 63 Henry: Unidentified
- 0706 Robert, via G-3 from S. C. C. reports a submarine Lat. 21 degrees 15.6  
minutes N; Long. 158 degrees 10 minutes W, 15 miles off Barbers Point,  
not escorted. Henry: Hostile
- 35 Helen 82 Henry: unidentified

- 0713 Patrick to send patrol plane against 0706 submarine, which was creating radio interference—coming on the air and signing off in Japanese.
- 0723 Hercules cleared  
 35 Helen 88 moved to 78 Henry: Unidentified  
 35 Helen 82 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 74 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 63 Now identified, friendly
- M. M. HODGES,  
*Ensign, USN.*
- 0750 XYP 155 and XYP 161 moored Pearl
- 0823 Robert: Lat. 21-40 Long. 158-15  
 FCC is taking bearings on Jap station at this location.
- 0825 35 Helen 62 Friendly  
 One minesweeper cleared
- 0829 Robert: Long. 158-16 Lat. 21-34 Jap station
- 0832 H. A. M. G-2 reports Sub. 6 mi. off George (Kaena) Point 21-40, 158-15  
 Action: Pat sending a plane  
 Results: Negative
- [192] 0846 Army reports that FCC made the assumption that radio contact above was a sub and that no visual contact has been made.
- 0925 1 submarine standing out
- 0927 35 Helen 42 Friendly
- 0930 34 Helen 42  
 35 Helen 81 Friendly
- 0948 Robert: Will patrol be extended to point Hypo?  
 Action: Affirmative beginning tonight
- 0958 Harris underway
- 1000 Robert cleared the board  
 Two friendly transport ships and one freighter leaving Honolulu
- 1004 1 DD cleared
- 1025 34 Gertrude 55 Unidentified  
 Action: Pat has plane investigating
- 1036 *Garfield* cleared Honolulu
- 1043 Harris cleared from Pearl
- 1045 1 Tug cleared
- 1107 Robert: 2 DD and 1 SS sighted south of Easy 2½ miles offshore.  
 Action: Henry claims
- 1120 1 Tug entered
- 1141 34 Irene 90 Doubtful  
 Action: CinCPac claims is Task Force 17
- 1203 From Robert: 86th Squadron will make all reports in C. S. P. system from this time forward.
- 1205 34 Irene 89 Friendly
- 1230 34 Helen 24 Friendly  
 34 Helen 13 Friendly
- 1235 35 Irene 19 Friendly
- [193] 1236 35 Irene 39 (2) Friendly
- 1238 35 Irene 49 (1) Friendly
- 1240 From CinCPac: Lt. Rooney of CinCPac Staff and Comdr. Parry of Combatfor staff will visit the set up at Robert and Henry
- 1242 Results of investigation of item 0832: negative
- 1243 Robert: From K. P. Berquist Major Air Corps. In accordance with verbal arrangements, a mission will be conducted this date for determining the feasibility of employing pursuit as night fighters in conjunction with the coordinating use of A. A. searchlights. A B-18 without lights will pass over island of Oahu at 8000 feet at approx. 2100 route "H", "W", "D", approaching from a distance of 40 miles out. RDF station will plot course of bomber and controller will attempt to illuminate the target, by means of AA searchlights when it comes to their range. 2 P-40's with lights on are over Hypo at 12,000 and one over Wileai at 12,000 will attack bomber as it comes into their sector. The B-18 and P-40's and searchlights through the A. A. liaison officers will be controlled by the controller who may, if he desires, ask for another run by the B18 in the reverse direction. The liaison officer from coast artillery Maj. Berlinger will observe the exercise from the B-18 *Full report to include recommendation for future action will be submitted to this office from all concerned.*



- 1318 37 Edith 07 Small surface craft. Friendly  
 33 Helen 90 Friendly  
 35 Irene 56 Friendly  
 35 Irene 92 Friendly
- 1328 35 Irene 56 seems to have planes flying over it for a distance of 15 miles.  
 Friendly
- 1433 34 Helen 65 Friendly  
 34 Helen 76 Friendly
- 1457 Wright entered Pearl  
 1502 1 DD entered Pearl  
 1545 Pat Wing 2 request lights "Easy", "George", "Kahuku" "Makapu" Diamond  
 Head, USS Nevada at sunset.
- 1548 WRIGHT moored X23  
 [194] 1600 TERN underway
- 1606 SEMINOLE moored B4  
 1614 Flight 40 is in  
 1615 PORTER moored B3
- 1620 From Pat: We want you to turn on Barbers Point, Makapuu, and Diamond  
 Head lights and lights on NEVADA turned on at sunset.
- 1625 ROBIN stood in; TERN moored
- 1628 Requested Coast Guard to have Barbers Point, Makapuu and Diamond  
 Head lights on at sunset
- 1637 Flight 51 is in  
 1648 Flight 9 is in  
 1650 ROBIN moored  
 Informed Pat and Robert, Combat, CinCPac, CISP, COSP, DeRussy:  
 YYP 166, 155 and 157 will depart Section Base for operating areas at  
 1700. YYP 166 will patrol from Kaena Point to Haleiwa. YYP 155  
 will patrol from Waianae to Kaena Point. YYP 157 will patrol from  
 Waianae to Barbers Point. All will return after daylight.
- 1656 Flight 18 is in.  
 From Robert: 34 Helen 81 Doubtful  
 35 Helen 96 Doubtful  
 34 Helen 90 Doubtful
- 1715 Flights 47 and 49 are in  
 1732 Flight 17 is in
- 1720 From Coast Guard: WALNUT is 100 mi. offshore and would like to enter  
 harbor tonight.  
 Action: Notified CG to tell WALNUT to stay 40 mi. offshore and enter  
 tomorrow morning.
- 1743 LITCHFIELD stood in.  
 1752 Flight 7 is in.  
 [195] 1810 From Patrick: There are 2 dredges in drydock channel. They  
 will interfere with plane take-offs in the morning.
- 1814 LITCHFIELD moored.  
 1820 TRITON moored
- 1900 From Robert: 35 Helen 41 Doubtful  
 Action: Com Offshore Patrol sent DD to investigate.
- 1945 From Robert: 35 Helen 41 has disappeared
- 2000 From Robert: 35 Helen 96 Hostile  
 35 Helen 97 Hostile
- 2012 From Robert: 35 Helen 97 has moved to 35 Helen 87
- 2015 Army told to fire on 35 Helen 87 and 35 Helen 96
- 2040 From Robert: Plots are now in. 35 Helen 87 and 35 Helen 76
- 2053 From Robert: A new plot at 35 Helen 75 in addition to the other two.  
 Hostile
- 2055 From Robert: 35 Helen 51 Friendly  
 35 Helen 83 Hostile
- 2100 From Army: OPS unable to see anything off Koko Head or Makapuu
- 2150 From Robert: All army planes in.  
 From Robert: Cleared board  
 35 Helen 64 Doubtful  
 35 Helen 35 Friendly  
 35 Helen 34 (2 vessels) Friendly  
 35 Helen 25 Friendly  
 35 Helen 63 Doubtful

- 35 Irene 22 Doubtful  
34 Helen 94 Friendly
- 2205 From Patrick: A plane reports a flashing white navigational light at Ninini Point, Kawai  
From Robert: 35 Helen 54 Doubtful  
35 Helen 85 (2 vessels) Doubtful  
35 Helen 86 Doubtful
- [196] 2215 From Patrick: All planes in—lights can be turned out  
Action: Notified CG and all ships present.
- 2225 From Robert: 34 Gertrude 31 Doubtful  
34 Gertrude 42 Doubtful  
34 Helen 49 Doubtful  
Action: Sampans told to investigate.
- 2255 From Robert: 35 Helen 61 Doubtful  
35 Helen 26 Friendly
- 2327 From Robert: 35 Helen 73 Doubtful

J. C. OLDFIELD, *Ens. U. S. Navy.*

- 2230 From Fed. Com. Com.: Unidentified station 7295 KC from Punchbowl 252 degrees Long. 156-50 Lat. 21-40  
Action: Notified Combat Int. and CinCPac.
- 2345 From Coast Guard, Diamond Head. Coast Guard just received a radio report that Hilo was being shelled. G-3 reported that a submarine was shelling Hilo and that the fire was being returned by the 55th coast artillery at Hilo. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, Combat Intel.

E. C. KORB.

[197] *Wednesday, December 31, 1941*

- Coast Guard at Diamond Head reported that Hilo was being shelled. G-3 confirmed saying that the 55th Coast Artillery was returning the fire.
- 0001 From Radio Wahiawa  
To RDO NYD Pearl—RDO CinCPac  
Following Recd. 500 Kcs. from KMZA  
Hilo being shelled.
- 0006 Coast Guard Radio reported shelling stopped now.
- 0020 Robert cleared the board.  
35 Helen 97 Doubtful  
35 Helen 82 Doubtful  
35 Helen 43 Friendly  
35 Helen 44 Friendly  
35 Helen 23 Friendly  
35 Helen 34 Friendly  
35 Helen 33 Friendly
- 0050 From CinCPac: 35 Helen 97 Friendly  
35 Helen 82 Friendly
- 0125 From Patrick: At 0615 the position of EDWARD will be 32 Kate 51. Will launch air craft for inner air patrol.
- 0145 Robert cleared the board  
35 Helen 44 friendly  
35 Helen 24 friendly  
35 Helen 74 friendly  
34 Helen 68 friendly  
35 Helen 34 friendly
- 0225 From Robert: LIHUE under enemy fire. Shell fire short of NAWILIWILI pier. Cane field back of Nawiliwili on fire. 2010 Col. Fitzgerald on Kauai. Notified CinCPac.
- 0254 From Robert: Unidentified vessel fired toward NOWILIWILI. No damage, no casualties. Signed Col. Fitzgerald.
- 0317 Signal tower reports unshielded white light on the range behind Wheeler. Robert notified.
- 0450 From Major Lester—G-2 Enemy submarine fired 8 rounds of 4-inch shells off Alia Pt. One shot hit the pier. Only slight damage. U. S. S. HULBERT fired one round.
- [198] 0535 Robert: 33 Gertrude 92 Doubtful
- 0637 REEDBIRD, CONDOR, and CROSSBILL cleared Pearl Harbor.  
One DD underway

- 0650 BREEZE entered Pearl  
Coast and Geo. Survey Ship WALNUT arrived at Honolulu
- 0655 One DD cleared Pearl Harbor. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, Inshore, Offshore,  
DeRussy
- 0703 Flight 16 is in.
- 0715 Patrick: Does Navy know anything about a 75-ft. S Coast of Kahoolawee.  
No! ask Robert. Combat Intl. reports it might be the Kalae.
- 0734 CinCPac: Boat with 10 men in it near Kahoolawee. Patrick reports Army  
plane sighted it, is standing by.
- 0740 Robert: 75-ft. seagoing fishing boat anchored off S. W. coast of Kahoolawee  
at 0700. Ten men on a barge on the beach.
- 0819 35 Helen 92 Doubtful, check
- 0822 Signal Tower: CA CHICAGO standing in over horizon.
- 0825 Barge on S. W. coast of Kahoolawe has been there since Dec. 25, 1941,  
to be there for 10 days. In use by Army engineers: Robert, Patrick,  
CinCPac, Combat Intel.  
35 Helen 41 Friendly  
35 Helen 94 Doubtful
- 0846 Patrick: Enemy submarine 2200, 20 miles from Oahu. Patrick sending  
plane to bomb. Reporting plane continuing search.
- 0850 Patrick: Plane report at 284 degrees, 117 mi. from center Oahu, large  
oil slick.
- 0900 1 CA (same 0822) entered.
- 0905 1 DD entered
- [199] 0910 Patrick and Robert, CinCPac: 1 submarine with 2 escorts off  
Honolulu en route Pearl. Belay submarine; 1 whaler with 2  
escorts etc.
- 0911 Flight 26 is out at 0850.  
35 Helen 63 Friendly
- 0920 Plane informed carrier of oil slick and is continuing search.
- 0922 35 Helen 92 disappeared when plane approached over area.  
36 Helen 13 Doubtful  
36 Helen 23 Doubtful  
Patrick to investigate.
- 0925 Flight 25 is in.
- 0929 35 Helen 94 to 35 Helen 96  
33 Irene 23 CinCPac: Friendly
- 0933 Flights 18 and 20 are in  
36 Helen 23 has disappeared  
36 Helen 13 has disappeared
- 0946 Plane to search anyway.
- 0953 Flights 22 and 28 are in  
ASTORIA is underway.  
Robert:  
Firing from Kaneohe at 0900—1000 has been delayed until 1400.
- 0958 Flight 30 is in, also 4
- 1000 Board cleared: New plots  
35 Helen 96 Patrick to investigate  
33 Helen 84 Change to doubtful.
- 1010 Robert Patrick, CAC, CinCPac  
35 Helen 96 to 35 Helen 97 Henry: Friendly
- [200] 1010 35 Helen 96 CinCPac: Friendly
- 1020 34 Irene 16 2 CinCPac: Friendly  
33 Irene 56 CinCPac: Friendly  
33 Irene 23 CinCPac: Friendly
- 1025 Flights 18 and 28 are off again.
- 1029 35 Irene 09
- 1035 Flight 24 is in.
- 1040 Several surface ships departed Pearl  
35 Irene 09 to 34 Irene 96 Henry: Doubtful
- 1053 34 Irene 96 CinCPac: Friendly  
34 Irene 18 Henry: Possibly identifiable. Check with CinCPac.
- 1054 Flight 18 is in. 36 is out.  
33 Helen 84 to 33 Helen 82 CinCPac: Friendly  
33 Helen 77 Henry: Doubtful

- 1102 To Combat Intel., Robert, CinCPac, Patrick: 1 Tug en route Honolulu to Pearl
- 1125 33 Helen 77 to 33 Helen 78 Henry: Doubtful  
Moving slowly northward Patrick to investigate.
- 1130 Flight 17 is in.
- 1137 Flight 39 is in, 27 is in.
- 1140 Several ships entered Pearl  
Visual plot 35 Helen 95—1 US DD Robert  
Flight 34 is in.
- 1150 35 Helen 96, 36 Helen 23, 36 Helen 13, were investigated by plane with negative results.  
34 Helen 54 Will watch for movement  
34 Helen 65 Will watch for movement
- 1211 Flight 32 is in.
- [201] 1211 NIAGARA entered.
- 1215 Board cleared: New plots.  
34 Helen 53 Henry: Doubtful  
35 Helen 95 Henry: Doubtful.
- 1220 lane in 34 Gertrude 17 reports no surface craft in vicinity  
34 Helen 34 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Helen 73 Henry: Friendly
- 1230 G-2 298th Inf. reports either a BB or a CA off Bellows Field. Identified: U. S. Friendly
- 1230 Patrick: Sumbarine sighted at Lat. 27-30 N, Long. 156-30 at 1215 Army bomber dropped bombs on it.  
Results unknown.
- 1236 Flights 14, 23, 29 and 31 are in.  
ComUtron 3:  
Plane report: Kalae, tuna boat, anchored in Smugglers Cove, Kahoolawe, flying US flag over red flag, white men aboard. Army Engineers.
- 1246 Flights, 13, 14, 19, 21, and 41 are in  
34 Helen 41 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Helen 36 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Helen 55 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Irene 78 Henry: Doubtful  
Flight 5 is in.  
34 Helen 90 Henry: Doubtful
- 1305 34 Irene 99 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Irene 78 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Irene 56 Henry: Doubtful  
34 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly
- 1335 Board cleared: New plots: none.
- 1344 16th C. A. Lt. Hayward of 18th Wing, Strange vessel near Diamond Head  
Submarine and 1 surface craft
- 1353 From OP: 2 DD, S. W. 1 mile, 2 DD S. 2 mi.
- 1355 Robert: All US DD's.  
Robert: Delay submarine report
- [202] 1355 Flight 43 is in.
- 1358 Diamond Head observers report no suspicious vessels in sight.
- 1400 34 Helen 72 Henry: Friendly  
35 Helen 44 Henry: Friendly  
Flight 50 is in.
- 1408 33 Irene 97 Henry: Friendly
- 1410 Flights 26 and 49 are in  
35 Helen 54 Henry: Friendly
- 1428 To DeRussy, CinCPac, Robert, and Patrick: One Army self-propelled dredge en route Kaneohe to Honolulu  
Flight 46 is in.
- 1440 Flight 44 sighted by Koko Head and Diamond Head.
- 1505 Captain of Yard's office: A blasting charge will be set off at drydock #4 at 1530. To CinePac, Robert, Patrick, and Combat.
- 1508 Flight 44 is in. Also 47



- 1523 Flight 6 is in.  
 XYP-155 will depart Section Base at 1600 Will patrol during the night between Kaena Pt. and Haleiwa.  
 XYP-157 and XYP-161 will depart Section Base at 1700 for operating areas.  
 XYP-157 from Waianae to Kaena Pt.  
 XYP-161 from Barbers Pt. to Waianae.  
 All will start return to Section Base after daylight.  
 To Robert, Patrick, CinCPac, Inshore and Offshore Pat. and DeRussy.
- 1521 Flight 57 is in, also 48, 40, and 45, 38, 37, 36, 35, 33  
 M. M. HODGES, *Ensign, U. S. N.*
- 1550 Flights 42 and 52 completed.  
 1551 Last plane in flight 55 is off.  
 1555 1 tug cleared Pearl for Honolulu  
 [203] 1600 Robert: At 1930 2 bombers, first will start at 1930 from Dog over Affirm, Hypo, William, Pearl to Dog, Diamond Head and back to Dog. ETA Dog 2052.  
 2nd bomber leaves at 2005 from Dog over Diamond Head, Easy, Fox, George, Hypo, Affirm, Baker, Diamond Head, then Dog. Land at Dog 2112  
 12 pursuits in the searchlight practice.  
 Action: Army Liaison
- 1605 Friendly sampan departed Pearl for Kaena.  
 1614 Robert cleared board.  
 36 Helen 25 Friendly
- 1615 Flight 28 completed  
 1645 35 Helen 60 Friendly
- 1656 XYP-161 and XYP-157 will leave for their patrolling area at 1700  
 1714 Army bomber is investigating suspicious vessel at 000 degrees, 50 miles from Affirm. From Robert
- 1723 Action: Henry to Robert: If above vessel is a cargo vessel it is friendly.  
 Robert: it is a cargo vessel C220 degrees S 15  
 From Combat Int: Vessel is the PENNANT
- 1733 Henry to Patrick: What lights are you using tonight?  
 1744 4—P-36's are making a reconnaissance at Ewa and Ford Island. From Robert.
- 1800 Patrick: Large oil slick 240 degrees 135 mi. from origin—nothing in the vicinity.
- 1801 Robert: Army using landing lights at William (Wheeler)  
 1809 35 Helen 70 Friendly  
 Robert: O. P. sighted 1 DD north of point Baker (Kaneohe) Friendly
- 1816 Signal Tower reports white flashing light in house  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile east of Aihea R. R. station.  
 Action: Army liaison reported to G-2. 24th Infantry was sent to investigate.
- [204] 1855 Pat to Henry: Please turn on Barbers Point light.  
 Action: Relayed to Coast Guard Duty Officer.
- 1935 Henry to Robert: Have any small craft been sighted off Wailupe point?  
 Robert: No, except for two DD's (Friendly)
- 2000 Robert cleared the board.  
 35 Helen 76 to 86 Friendly
- 2035 35 Helen 96 Friendly  
 2041 35 Helen 12 Friendly  
 2049 35 Helen 74 Friendly  
 2105 35 Helen 77 (2) Friendly  
 2106 34 Helen 56 Friendly  
 2104 Patrick: All Navy flights are in.  
 2115 Henry asked Coast Guard to douse Barbers Pt. Light.  
 2148 36 Helen 16 Friendly  
 2152 All U. S. planes on the ground.  
 2200 Robert cleared the board.  
 2211 34 Helen 76 Friendly  
 36 Helen 19 Friendly  
 2212 34 Helen 47 Doubtful  
 2215 34 Helen 48 Doubtful

- 2216 Robert: 25th Division will hold searchlight practice on 2 January between 1830 and 1930 at Wailua Bay. Will hold communication open so that in emergency lights may be turned off immediately.
- 2239 From HCAC Small boat 1000 yards south of Wailupe Pond. Is not a DD Notified at 2236 craft is hostile. Action: Army liaison. Results: Field artillery illuminated and sub submerged.
- [205] 2240 36 Helen 37 Friendly
- 2320 34 Gertrude 84 Doubtful  
35 Helen 32 Friendly  
35 Helen 33 Friendly  
34 Gertrude 32 Doubtful

A. P. KELLEY,  
Ens. U. S. N.

[206] *Thursday, January 1, 1942*

- 0000 To Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, ASP: Number for today is four.
- 0018 From G2—one unidentified plane at 34 Gertrude 11  
Robert informed us it was one of the A-20's coming in early.
- 0035 From Robert: 34 Helen 27 (2 vessels)  
34 Helen 28  
34 Helen 38
- We have an offshore pat. DD in this direction. One is therefore friendly.
- 0046 From Robert: Hickam Field thinks there is an air raid alarm—we are trying to calm them down.
- 0121 From Robert: cleared board.  
35 Helen 05 Friendly  
35 Helen 15 Friendly  
35 Helen 13 Friendly  
35 Helen 35 Friendly  
35 Helen 54 (2) Friendly  
34 Helen 94 Friendly
- 0127 From Robert: All A-20's are now in.  
Action: Notified ASP, ISP, and OSP and Combat Int. that all friendly planes are in.
- 0150 From Robert: 34 Helen 27 }  
34 Helen 28 } same as before  
32 Helen 38 }  
32 Florence 53 Doubtful
- 0205 From Robert: Army reports one plane flying low over Barking Sands, Kauai, headed for Oahu.
- 0300 From Robert: 34 Helen 92 Doubtful  
Action: Offshore Patrol told to investigate.  
To Robert: 34 Helen 92 has been investigated and is friendly.
- 0310 From Gate Vessel: Firing to west of Ft. Weaver, and red rockets to southward.
- From Robert 34 Gertrude 41 Friendly  
35 Helen 85 Friendly
- 0322 From Patrick: 5 red flares seen from Ford Island dock.
- [207] 0326 From Robert: 34 Helen 20 Doubtful
- 0342 From Robert: 35 Helen 54 (2 vessels) Friendly
- 0433 From Robert: 35 Helen 35 (2 vessels) Friendly
- 0439 From Robert: 35 Helen 14 (2 vessels) Friendly
- 0447 From Robert: 34 Helen 93 Friendly
- 0507 From Captain of the Yard: Ford Island is sending out a boat to light buoys.
- 0523 From Robert: 36 Helen 03 Friendly
- 0525 From CinCPac: Did air raid warning sound in the yard?  
Action: Notified CinCPac, Patrick, Robert that a destroyer sounded its whistle for about 1 min. at Merry Pt., but there has been no air raid alarm.
- 0555 Notified 53AA brigade and Marine Corps AA, Pearl Harbor that ballistic data is as follows: 10,000'—density 100.5—wind 2 knots, 303 degrees; 15000 ft.—density 100.6—wind 5 knots, 318 degrees.
- 0600 From Robert: Cleared board  
35 Helen 83 Friendly  
34 Gertrude 55 Friendly

- 0620 To Robert: See if OP at George can see 34 Gertrude 55 visually.  
 0636 MONTGOMERY stood in.  
 0643 REEDBIRD, CROSSBILL and CONDOR stood out.  
 0641 ELLET stood in.  
 0654 Flight 17 is in.  
 0655 FARRAGUT stood out.  
 0723 PORTLAND stood out.  
 0724 PHELPS stood out  
 CHANDLER stood out.  
 0727 SEMINOLE stood out.  
 0745 DORSEY stood out.
- J. C. OLDFIELD, *Ensign, U. S. N.*
- [208] 0846 From Robert: 35 Irene 84 Doubtful.  
 0850 From Robert: 36 Helen 12 Doubtful.  
                   36 Helen 23 Doubtful.  
                   36 Helen 49 Doubtful.  
                   35 Irene 84 Disappeared.  
                   36 Irene 33 Doubtful.  
 0900 From Robert: 35 Helen 96 Friendly.  
                   36 Helen 49 Disappeared.  
 0906 34 Gertrude 54 Doubtful.  
 0915 To Robert, Patrick: Please inform Henry in event Dutch registry ship  
 JAPARA is sighted today enroute Oahu by aircraft on search 1 Jan.  
 No description available except it is a motor vessel, speed about 15  
 knots.  
 0920 Flight 27 is in.  
 0928 Clipper is expected. Time indefinite.  
 0930 Flights 4, 21, 17 are in.  
 0940 Three masted vessel, 2 funnels, 8 miles off Laea, head S. W. Received  
 from Army, being checked.  
 0945 Robert: 34 Gertrude 54 Doubtful.  
                   35 Helen 96 Friendly.  
 0946 Flight 22 is in.  
 0948 34 Gertrude 55 Disappeared.  
 To Robert: At 35 Gertrude 54 sighted unknown freighter. Robert could  
 not pick it up. Report came from Army Lt. Jaeger in this office.  
 To Robert: 35 Helen 96 Friendly.  
 0950 To Robert: 35 Gertrude 54 Nothing there according to observers.  
 1015 Flight 20 is in.  
 1030 Small freighter sighted 33 Gertrude 82, headed East, Robert. from Robert  
 Pat wing investigating.  
 1031 Flight 36 is in.  
 [209] 1035 From Patrick from 18th Wing: Barking Sands, Kauai, request  
 all planes flying over Barking Sands during dark hours maintain altitude  
 of 3,000 to 5,000 ft.  
 1047 From Robert: 34 Helen 46 submarine sighted. CinCPac, Combat,  
 ENEMY.  
 1048 From Robert: 34 Helen 46 Sub disappeared, but there is a destroyer  
 there.  
 1049 From Robert: No mistake, sub was there and submerged.  
 1050 Flight 18 is in.  
 1100 Patrick reported plane sighted vessel at 1045. Lat. 29-41 Long. 150-40.  
 1104 Flight 34 is in.  
 1110 Flight 28 is in.  
 1112 SS MALAMA ordered to stop by unidentified plane. Lat: 26-39 S Long:  
 151-24 W. From Com office via British Sta., Suva. To Robert, Patrick,  
 CinCPac, Combat.  
 1115 From Patrick: 1105 investigating vessel, Lat. 28-00 N Long 150-00 W.  
 1120 Flights 24 and 10 are in.  
 1137 Flight 19 is in.  
 1138 JAPARA is off Honolulu.  
 1145 To Patrick: We have no definite info of vessel in Lat. 29-40; Long. 150-40  
 W, but it may be the PENNANT which is overdue.  
 1148 Flight 31 is in.  
 1145 To Robert: 34 Irene 30 Doubtful—plane.

- 1148 To Robert and Patrick: One friendly transport, W BURROWS leaving Honolulu for Pearl.
- 1151 Flights 32 and 38 are in.
- 1155 From Robert: Plane sent to investigate vessel off Kaena Point was unable to locate the vessel.
- 1205 From Patrick: Clipper is expected in at 1530.
- [210] 1205 Patrick reports: Lat. 29-40, Long. 150-40 friendly vessel.
- 1210 Flight 39 is in.
- 1214 Flight 37 is in.
- To Robert: 34 Helen 58 Doubtful  
35 Helen 01 Friendly
- From Robert: 34 Helen 58 moved to 34 Helen 66; sighted as a freighter, perhaps the PENNANT. Combat. Intel, Signal Tower requested to contact visually.
- 1230 To Robert, Patrick: SS PENNANT is arriving according to schedule. SS JAPARA is still *not* located. Combat Intel.
- Flight 23 is in.  
Flight 29 is in.
- 1233 Robert cleared the board.
- 35 Helen 14 (2 vessels)  
35 Helen 25  
35 Helen 34  
35 Helen 35  
35 Helen 33  
35 Helen 83 (2 vessels)  
35 Helen 76  
35 Irene 99  
36 Helen 44  
35 Irene 38  
36 Irene 15 (3 vessels)
- 1243 From Patrick: Vessel off Kaena Point is not hostile.
- 1245 From CG to Patrick, Robert: Army transport just left Honolulu.
- 1250 From Patrick: Report on vessel off Kaena Point is "NEGATIVE".
- 1251 Flight 41 is in.
- 1300 Patrick reports: Lighthouse tender is reported off Kaena Point.
- 1310 From Capt. Yard's office: Tug STORM KING to leave Pearl at 1320 for Honolulu
- G-2 reports sub 1 mi. off Waimea Bay. Patrick, Robert not.  
Report NOT Confirmed.
- [211] 1318 Flight 13 is in.
- 1340 Tug cleared Pearl. Patrick, Robert, DeRussy.
- 1345 Flight 50 is in.
- 1400 G-3 Hilo
- Submarine reported off HONOMU 18 miles north of Hilo at 1235. It was headed south. Contacted by local Navy signed "Burton".
- 1405 Robert: 4-stack destroyer sighted 2 miles off "Fox", friendly.
- 1409 Flight 30 is in.
- 1412 PENNANT moored to K-3
- 1433 To Robert: 34 Irene 99 CinCPac claimed doubtful.
- 1445 From Robert: O. P. reports 11 ships, 3-5 miles off point "E" to SE cruisers and destroyers. Combat.
- 1450 Sampan 156 is enroute from Kewalo Basin to Pearl Harbor.
- 1500 Flight 48 is in.
- 1514 Henry reports 35 Irene 49 Doubtful.
- 1515 Robert believes that there are 3 destroyers, 7 cruisers, 1 battleship off "E".
- 1520 CinCPac sending a plane to investigate the 11 vessels.
- 1520 Tug HERCULES returning Honolulu from Pearl reported striking a submerged object which felt as if it were round, and rolled off of it. Location reported with 2 bears; dredge in Kalihi entrance to Kiehi Lagoon bears 001 degrees true. Aloha Tower bears 56 degrees True. Nine fathoms of water. (The best position from above: Lat. 21-17-25 N Long. 157-54-08 W.)
- 1522 6 planes of flight flying directly over island from Kaneohe to Pearl.
- 1524 Flight 49 is in.
- 1540 Flight 40 is in.  
Flight 42 and 54 are in.



- [212] 1545 Flights 56, 58, and 44 are in.
- 1550 Flight 47 is in.
- 1545 Robert cleared board.
- 35 Helen 96 Doubtful
- 35 Helen 95 Doubtful
- 35 Helen 84 Doubtful
- 35 Helen 99 Doubtful
- 35 Helen 89 Doubtful
- 35 Irene 49 Doubtful
- 34 Irene 99 Doubtful
- 34 Helen 11 Doubtful
- 34 Helen 59 Doubtful

E. S. KORB, *Ensign, U. S. Navy.*

- 1600 XYP-161 will depart from Section Base at 1600. Will patrol during the night from Kaena Point to Haleiwa. XYP-166 will depart Section Base at 1700. Will patrol during the night Barbers Point to Kaena Point. Both will start return to Section Base after daylight. To DeRussy, Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, Offshore and Inshore Patrol.
- 1603 Clipper landed at Pearl City—PanAm
- 1604 Flight 62 is completed.
- 36 Irene 19 (2) Henry: Doubtful
- 36 Irene 09 Henry: Unidentified
- 36 Irene 27 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Irene 99 Henry: Unidentified
- 34 Helen 85 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Irene 66 Henry: Doubtful
- 1635 Robert: Army flights 1 thru 7 inc. are completed. All transports flights are in.
- 1653 35 Helen 83 }  
 35 Helen 92 }  
 35 Helen 93 }  
 36 Helen 01 }  
 36 Helen 03 }  
 36 Helen 10 }  
 36 Helen 20 } Henry: Unidentified. Question plots  
 36 Helen 21 }  
 35 Irene 99 }  
 36 Irene 08 }  
 36 Irene 18 }  
 36 Irene 19 }  
 36 Irene 29 }
- 1653 36 Irene 38 } Henry: Unidentified. Question plots.  
 34 Helen 16 }  
 34 Helen 85 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Irene 09 Henry: Unidentified.
- 1657 Patrick requested to investigate. Request board be cleared.
- 1701 Flights 45 and 59 are in.
- 1703 ROBIN cleared. Board cleared. New plots coming.
- 1710 XYP-166 left for duty assigned. To Combat. Intel. CinCPac, Robert, Patrick, Inshore and Offshore Patrols, DeRussy.
- 1720 35 Helen 75 }  
 35 Helen 62 } Henry: Unidentified.  
 35 Helen 63 }  
 35 Irene 99 }  
 35 Irene 18 }  
 35 Irene 37 }  
 35 Irene 38 } Henry: Unidentified.  
 36 Irene 17 }  
 34 Helen 16 }  
 36 Irene 16 }
- 1723 Turned on channel lights.
- 1734 Robert: A second station swept 36 Helen 00 with no results.
- 1738 From Aloha Tower: Tug and barge scheduled to leave Honolulu at 1730 has been cancelled.
- 1741 Flight 2 is in.

- 1750 Flight 55 is in. Only 1, 7, 15, and 51 are still out.  
 1754 Board cleared. New plots  
 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly.
- 1756 Received report from Lt. Parks of Pat Wing 2: 0745 at 28-00 N and 150-00 W and at 1105 at 20-40 N and 150-40 W sighted a grey merchant vessel flying Dutch flag.  
 Second position is correct, first (0745) believed to be in error. Ship JAPARA.
- 1829 Flight 7 is in, also 15.  
 1835 Informed signal tower: 24 foot motorboat will leave  
 [214] 1835 Sub Base for landing "A"  
 Flight 1 is in.
- 1842 All Army planes have landed.  
 1912 All Army and Navy planes are in. However, no arrival (Hilo) report received on flight 51, due in at 1630.  
 35 Helen 92 Henry: Doubtful.
- 1915 Patrick is finished with channel lights tonight.  
 To be turned off.  
 35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly
- 1934 35 Helen 83 Henry: Friendly.  
 1953 35 Helen 92 to 35 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly  
 1958 To Signal Tower: Boat going "A" to "C" and return.  
 2005 Board cleared. Plots:  
 35 Helen 85 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 53 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 26 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 33 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 64 Henry: Check visually
- 2014 35 Helen 22 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 24 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 62 Henry: unidentified
- 2042 Army Obs. Tower at channel entrance reports 5 heavy rumbling sounds due south of channel entrance.  
 2047 OP. at Diamond Head and at Ahua Point report sounds of heavy firing S. W. of stations. Estimated distance 30 miles.
- 2100 Board cleared: 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 44 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 24 Henry: Friendly
- 2105 CinCPac: bearing at 1900 from Lualualei 120 degrees and at 2000 148 degrees (T), hostile submarine,  
 [215] 2105 making 15 knots would be 15 to 20 miles SSE of Diamond Head at 2000 Patrick, Robert, Combat Intel.
- 2110 OP's no longer hear gunfire.  
 Robert: Firing was 3 shots in close succession.  
 35 Helen 35 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 24 Henry: Friendly
- 2133 Patrick: Received arrival report on flight 51.  
 It has landed.
- 2142 35 Helen 16 }  
 35 Helen 43 } Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 15 }  
 35 Helen 32 }
- 2215 35 Helen 62 Disappeared.  
 2215 35 Helen 85 Disappeared.  
 2230 34 Helen 54 Henry: Unidentified  
 34 Helen 53 Henry: Unidentified
- 2250 34 Helen 47 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly  
 Robert: Mistake in plotting: 34 Helen 53 and 54 should be 34 Helen 93 and 94  
 34 Helen 94 Henry: Friendly  
 34 Helen 65 Henry: Friendly

- 2305 Signal Tower: Hickam Field released a lighted aerological balloon.
- 35 Helen 64 Henry: Unidentified
- 35 Helen 14 Henry: Friendly
- 35 Helen 93 Henry: Unidentified.
- 35 Helen 64 to 35 Helen 63 Henry: Unidentified.

M. M. HODGES,  
Ensign, USN.

[2116]

Friday, January 2, 1942

- 0000 Robert cleared the board.
- 0008 35 Helen 73 Doubtful. Action: Comoffshorepat.
- 35 Helen 86 Doubtful. Action: Comoffshorepat.
- 35 Helen 32 Friendly
- 35 Helen 34 Friendly
- 0021 35 Helen 33 Friendly
- 35 Helen 10 Friendly
- 35 Helen 54 Friendly
- 0047 34 Helen 94 Friendly
- 0106 Robert cleared the board
- 45 Helen 94 Friendly
- 34 Helen 53 Friendly
- 35 Helen 73 Doubtful. Affirm 54: Results negative
- 35 Helen 86 Doubtful. Affirm 55
- 0115 36 Helen 16 Friendly
- 0207 Signal tower reports bright white light near HONOLULU at number one drydock. Action: Notified Captain of Yard.
- 0214 Robert cleared the board.
- 0215 34 Helen 93 Friendly
- 35 Helen 74 Doubtful, action pending.
- 36 Helen 97 Friendly
- 36 Helen 98 Friendly
- 35 Helen 86 Doubtful, action pending.
- 0221 35 Helen 14 Friendly
- From Comoffshorepat
- To: 14th Nav.
- 35 Helen 73 results negative.
- 0235 35 Helen 73 Still doubtful
- 35 Helen 32 Friendly
- 35 Helen 23 Friendly
- 35 Helen 65 Friendly
- 0236 From Tignal Tower: Sounding balloon rising from Pearl City
- 0244 35 Helen 63 Friendly
- 35 Helen 83 Friendly
- 35 Helen 86 Still doubtful.
- [217] 0253 Signal Tower reports 2 white lights behind the DOBBIN
- Action: Informed Captain of the Yard.
- 0300 Lights reported by Signal Tower to be showing from barrack windows at Patrick.
- 0314 Robert cleared the board.
- 0315 35 Helen 22 Friendly
- 35 Helen 61 Friendly
- 35 Helen 74 (several) Doubtful (This plot had already been investigated. Results: negative)
- 35 Helen 14 Friendly
- 35 Helen 32 Friendly
- 35 Helen 43 Friendly
- 35 Helen 05 Friendly
- 0322 35 Helen 87 Doubtful (See Affirm 55 item 0106)
- 34 Helen 92 Friendly
- 34 Helen 18 Friendly
- 34 Helen 72 (4)
- 0413 Robert cleared the board

- 0414 34 Helen 39 Doubtful  
 35 Helen 23 Friendly  
 35 Helen 34 Friendly  
 35 Helen 74 Doubtful  
 35 Helen 86 Doubtful (Bad plot)  
 35 Helen 14 Friendly  
 35 Helen 05 Friendly
- 0355 F. C. C. reports Jap radio picked up and checked 200 to 250 miles S. W. of Oahu  
 Action: Patrick, Robert, CinCPac
- 0515 34 Gertrude 20 Doubtful (Pat will check at 0600)  
 35 Helen 03 Friendly  
 35 Helen 23 Friendly  
 35 Helen 25 Friendly  
 35 Helen 35 Friendly  
 35 Helen 33 Friendly  
 35 Helen 43 Friendly  
 35 Helen 74 Friendly  
 35 Helen 12 Friendly
- [218] 0521 From Captain Yard: Air station will turn on drydock lights for morning takeoff.
- 0535 Signal tower reports small fire over NEVADA bow.  
 0536 Signal tower reports above fire is out.  
 0605 35 Helen 92 Doubtful  
 0628 Flight 1 is in the air.  
 0637 35 Helen 61 Doubtful  
 0659 35 Helen 83 Friendly  
 35 Helen 62 (2) (Disappeared 0700)  
 0708 35 Helen 73 Friendly  
 0719 34 Helen 82 Friendly  
 0720 Signal Tower reports fire burning at Aihea, may be trash fire.  
 Action: Captain of Yard.  
 0725 PAA Clipper landed.  
 0731 35 Helen 21 Friendly  
 0732 Signal Tower reports heavy smoke on beach over X-H  
 0734 Patrick: Radar plot 251 degrees, 10 miles from Kaena  
 Results: negative.  
 0735 I DD entered.
- A. P. KELLEY.
- 0752 From Robert: 35 Irene 10 Friendly (CinCPac)  
 34 Helen 56 Friendly
- 0807 WASMUTH entered  
 0812 PERRY stood out  
 0830 ZANE stood in; TERN stood out  
 0839 XYP 161 and XYP 166 entered and moored at section base.  
 [219] 0915 From Pat: About 1420 yesterday, one of our pilots sighted a sub, Lat. 19-15 N, Long 158-15 W. Sub immediately dived to about 150', but plane trailed it for 2 hrs. and dropped float lights. It was a large sub and all members of plane's crew saw the sub and the wake.
- 0920 Flight 4 is in.  
 0930 From Hickam—Firing scheduled for AA battery at Hickam this AM is cancelled. CinCPac notified.  
 Action—Notified ASP, CISP, COSP
- 1009 Flight 32 is in.  
 1010 Flight 24 is in.  
 From Robert 34 Helen 65 Friendly  
 34 Helen 91 Friendly  
 34 Helen 93 Friendly  
 35 Helen 62 OP checking visually  
 35 Irene 35 Told Pat to check  
 35 Irene 96 Told Pat to check
- 1022 Flight 27 is in.  
 1010 ALLEN stood out  
 1030 From Robert: The two plots in 35 Irene have disappeared.  
 1042 From Robert: 33 Gertrude 95 Doubtful  
 Action: Pat told to investigate.



- 1047 From Robert: 33 Gertrude 95 has disappeared  
 1103 Flights 25 and 29 are in.  
 1122 Flights 22 and 23 are in.  
 1120 From SCHLEY: at 1010 dropped 8 charges on contact and plane smoke  
 flares 2.3 miles, 176 degrees from entrance. No results evident.  
 Notified Patrick, CISP, COSP  
 1125 Flight 26 is in.  
 From Robert: visual contact 34 Helen 57 appears to be small boat.  
 1128 From Robert: 35 Helen 51 has disappeared  
 1130 Flight 17 is in.  
 1120 From WARD: Dropped 9 depth charges at 1023 on sub contact.  
 [220] 1120 From WARD: Dropped 9 depth charges at 1023 on sub contact  
 bearing 195 degrees, 3.2 miles from entrance buoys.  
 Results: Unknown.  
 Notified Patrick, CISP, COSP  
 1140 Flight 16 is in.  
 1145 Flights 28 and 35 are in.  
 1159 SUMNER stood in.  
 1215 From Robert: 34 Helen 65 (2 vessels)  
 1202 MACFARLAND stood in.  
 1207 THORNTON stood in.  
 1217 Flight 20 is in.  
 1240 Flight 5 is in.  
 1255 STORMKING entered with tow.  
 1340 To Robert, Patrick: The Pan Am Clipper will depart at 1430  
 1354 Flights 41 and 34 are in.  
 1345 From Robert: 36 Helen 00 Doubtful  
 1410 Flight 43 is in.  
 1415 From Robert: 36 Helen 00 was false report, should have been 35 Helen 00—  
 Friendly  
 [221] 1421 From Robert: 34 Irene 77 Doubtful  
 1425 To Robert, Patrick: There will be experimental MG firing at Fort Kam  
 between 1400 and 1600 today.  
 1430 Flight 15 is in.  
 1442 STORMKING stood out.  
 1445 Flights 44, 46, and 50 are in.  
 1430 To CinCPac, Patrick, Robert: Enemy sub bearing 142 degrees T, dist. 20-40  
 miles, RDF bearing on radio transmission.  
 Action: Patrick sending plane out.  
 1450 Flight 52 is in.  
 To Captain Yard, CinCPac, DeRussy, CISP, COSP, ASP, Patrick, Robert,  
 G2, G3—Test firing Hickam Field 1315 to 1530, Jan. 3. Range 8,000 to  
 10,000 yd. Danger area 130 degrees-139 degrees, distance 16,500 yd. from  
 Hickam Tower. Max. ordinate, 20,000'  
 1500 From Robert: 34 Irene 77 Disappeared  
 1516 Flight 31 is in.  
 1530 Flight 6 is in.  
 1532 PORTER stood out  
 1536 Flight 36 is in.  
 1542 Flights 45 and 53 in.  
 1550 Flight 30 is in.  
 1540 TERN entered Pearl.  
 1558 Sampan 161 leaving for operating area.  
 1600 XYP166 will depart Section base at 1600. Will patrol Kaena Point to  
 Haleiwa during the night. XYP156 and XYP157 will depart section  
 base at 1700; XYP 156 will patrol Barber's Point to Wainae during the  
 night. XYP157 will patrol Waianae to Kaena Point during the night.  
 All will start return to section base after daylight. To Robert, Patrick,  
 CinCPac.  
 [222] 1605 Flight 21 is in.  
 1606 One friendly passenger ship leaving Honolulu for sea. Patrick, Robert,  
 CinCPac notified.  
 1620 Flight 57 is in.  
 1621 Flight 54 is in.

J. C. OLDFIELD.

- 1622 Flight 55 is in.  
Flight 48 is in.
- 1555 Robert: 35 Helen 71 Doubtful, 1630 *disappeared*.
- 1638 Flight 59 is in.
- 1644 Sampan 156 left for operating area.  
Flight 58 is in.
- 1656 Sampan XYP157 left for operating area.
- 1714 Patrick reports "negative" on flight 56 in search of sub. off Koko Head (1430 contact)  
Also report on 34 Irene 77 *negative*
- 1721 Flight 3 is in.
- 1725 One friendly tug and barge left Honolulu at 1730 headed east. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac.
- 1730 Flight 60 is in.
- 1735 Flights 56 and 51 are in.
- 1803 Flight 61 is in.
- 1810 Flight 42 is in.
- 1811 Flight 7 is in.
- 1814 Flight 14 is in.
- 1820 Patrick reported to Robert: Plane bearing 306 degrees, dist. 105 picked up an unidentified transmitter the same frequency as KGMB bearing 10 degrees higher than KGMB.
- [223] 1830 Wailua Bay will hold searchlight drill for one hour.
- 1840 Robert: 4 A-20's coming from over Molokai to Wheeler now. Signal Tower, Combat.
- 1850 Patrick requested lights on at Barbers Point, Diamond Head, Makapuu right away. Coast Guard notified.
- 1910 From Combat: Japanese submarine bearing 199 from Lualualei. Distance unknown. Robert reported plot 34 Irene 48. 1915 plane 21P1 sighted S. S. Lat. 19-32, Long. 158-02. Dropped charge close to Stb. bow. SS turned sharply to R. and submerged. Believed to be SS noted at 1430.
- 1925 From Robert: Fitzgerald observers reported sighting submarine surface at 1920 off Hanamaulu (east coast of Kauai) CinCPac, Combat Intel.
- 1940 Dutch plane landing in Pearl. Sighted by Signal Tower.
- 1945 Flight 9 is in.
- 2000 A-20 taking off from Wheeler to investigate sub off Hanamaulu.
- 2005 Two Dutch planes landed in Pearl Harbor channel. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, Combat Intel.
- 2010 Combat Intel. reports sub close aboard bearing 250 degrees from Lualualei. Robert, CinCPac acknowledged.
- 2015 Robert: 34 Helen 65 Doubtful. Could be Jap sub just reported.
- 2017 Four P-40 took off from Hickam.
- 2045 Robert: Waianae reported seeing a flare and then picked up an echo at 34 Helen 38.
- 2050 Sub bearing 204 from Lualualei same one that was bearing 199. From Combat Intel.
- 2100 At 1725 plane in position Lat. 22-35W. Long. 159-30N picked up unidentified transmission, same frequency and 10 degrees to right of KGMB. Solid key transmission, quite distinct, very strong, distinct from KGMB. Could be heard from KGMB. From Patrick.
- 2110 From Robert: 34 Irene 16 *Disappeared*
- 2118 G-2 reported a red flare lasting 10 min. sighted at 2015.
- [224] 2118 Bore 247 dist. 4,000 yds. from Kamehameha. Patrick, Robert.
- 2105 Robert cleared the board:  
34 Irene 16 Being investigated  
34 Helen 40 Friendly  
34 Helen 73 Friendly  
34 Helen 65 Friendly  
35 Helen 15 Friendly  
35 Helen 41 Friendly  
35 Helen 40 Friendly  
35 Irene 28 Doubtful
- 2130 Robert: 35 Irene 28 *Disappeared*.  
35 Helen 92 Friendly

- 2136 Patrick reported that there were no Dutch planes landed in Pearl.  
 2138 Robert : 34 Irene 49 Friendly  
 2143 Robert : B-18 landed.  
 2148 Signal Tower reported flare over Pearl City. Army claimed it.  
 2159 Robert : 34 Irene 48 Friendly  
 2202 Patrick reports : Police on Maui report red flare and sound of explosion off Kahahuloa off Maui at 1830. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac.  
 2220 Robert question flights which were over Maui at 1830. They saw no flares, heard no explosion, did see blinking lights.  
 2230 All friendly planes are on the ground. Combat, CinCPac, Robert, Patrick, CinCPac.  
 2234 Plane which investigated submarine contact reports negative.  
 2235 Robert : 35 Helen 60 Friendly  
                   35 Helen 23 Friendly  
                   35 Helen 84 Doubtful  
 2250 CinCPac requests that testing of 5 AA battery be done on January 4th instead of the 3rd. Same hours. Patrick, Robert, CinCPac, Combat, G3, Inshore, Offshore.  
 2315 Coast Artillery Command reports a fire on the crater, reported by AT-LANTA. 2056 was in posit. 1000 yd. SE swim pool.  
 [225] 2315 One A-20 taking off from Hickam will land at Wheeler in 5 or 6 minutes.  
 2315 Flashes and gunshot believed seen and heard in that vicinity just preceding the appearance of fire. The fire was extinguished at about 2150.  
 2335 One A-20 landed at Wheeler. There are no friendly planes in the air.

E. S. KORB,  
*Ensign, U. S. Navy.*

[226] *Saturday, January 3, 1942*

- 0000 Executed NBD Order 4-A (at 2345 Jan. 2, 1942.) Number 7 repeat 7.  
 0010 Received from RDF crossplot of enemy submarine at 34 Helen 16 Patrick sending plane at 0030. Offshore Patrol will not investigate. Plane off at 0035.  
 0015 Board cleared. Plots:  
           35 Helen 85 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 73 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 63 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 44 Henry: Friendly  
           35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly  
           35 Helen 33 Henry: Friendly  
           35 Helen 32 Henry: Friendly  
           35 Helen 15 Henry: Friendly  
           34 Helen 94 Henry: Friendly  
           36 Gertrude 02 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 14 Henry: Friendly  
 0104 Patrick: One B17 arriving 0130 from westward. To ASP, In- and Off-shore Pat.  
 0108 Robert: Cleared board.  
           35 Helen 95 Henry: Doubtful  
 0125 Combat: RDF at Lualualei enemy submarine now on bearing 280 from that station. Army G-2 reports second sub. off Lahue, Kauai. Appears to be working up Kauai channel. Patrick, Combat Intel., Robert, CinCPac.  
           35 Helen 75 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 23 Henry: Friendly  
           35 Helen 22 Henry: Friendly  
 0148 Signal Tower: Sighted 2 flares 4 miles off entrance. Plane, B-17, landing at Hickam. Combat, Patrick, Robert.  
 0157 Signal Tower: 1 shot fired (sounded like .45) opposite Cafeteria. Marine sentry investigating.  
 0206 Board cleared  
 [227] 0206 Board cleared  
           35 Helen 95 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 31 Henry: Doubtful  
           35 Helen 75 Henry: Doubtful

- 0235 35 Helen 96 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 13 Henry: Doubtful
- 0307 "Q" station: Noises, appearing through listening watch at buoy "D"  
 34 Helen 93 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 91 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 92 Henry: Doubtful
- 0345 Requested Offshore Patrol investigate area around 35 Helen 95. Robert, Patrick.
- 0356 35 Helen 83 Henry: Doubtful
- 0357 Requested board be cleared.
- 0358 Board cleared.  
 36 Helen 17 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 75 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly
- 0420 35 Helen 53 Henry: Friendly  
 36 Helen 18 Henry: Doubtful  
 "Q" station: No vibrations since 0325.
- 0500 35 Helen 24 Henry: Friendly
- 0520 Board cleared.  
 36 Helen 05 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 84 Henry: Friendly  
 64 Henry: Doubtful  
 Patrick: Sampan LAHUA will depart Mahaweli for Nawiliwili Bay, Kauai at sunrise.
- 0545 35 Helen 14 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 34 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 44 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 43 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 92 Henry: Doubtful
- [228] 0600 Board cleared  
 35 Helen 96 Henry: Doubtful  
 35 Helen 83 Henry: Doubtful
- 0610 Flight 4 is out.
- 0636 Flight 2 is out.
- 0640 Signal Tower: 2 DMS standing out  
 REEDBIRD cleared
- 0642 Flight 1 is out, also 10
- 0653 ROBIN entered  
 35 Helen 96 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 06 Henry: Friendly  
 35 Helen 83 Henry: Doubtful
- 0658 GAMBLE entered
- 0703 Flight 23 is completed  
 CHEW cleared  
 RAMSAY entered
- 0727 Flight 14 is in.
- 0730 XYP's 157, 166, and 156 have returned to Section Base.
- 0734 Patrick: Flight 14 reported observation results negative.  
 M. M. HODGES, *Ensign, U. S. N.*
- 0742 34 Irene 64 Doubtful
- 0750 Flight 9 completed
- 0816 Flights 20, 21, and 22 are completed
- 0828 Tug STORMKING entered
- 0837 Robert: Hilo: Gunfire at sea off Honaunau at 0745.
- 0839 Flight Number 27 completed.
- [230] 1150 A. A. weather data was given to 53rd Brigade and A. A. Group
- 1215 Patrick: At entrance buoy Kewalo Channel, plane reported bubbles rising and dropped marker. Action: Coast Guard found a sewer at this position with bubbles rising from it.
- 1219 LAMPSON and MAHAN standing in.
- 1225 35 Irene 86 Friendly
- 1232 Patrick: at 1050 Army bombed sub at Lat. 21-02 N, Long. 156-25 W.
- 1238 35 Helen 91 Friendly



- 1248 35 Irene 67 Friendly  
From Cominshorepat  
To: Comdesdiv 80; SCHLEY  
Two greenish objects resembling mines with white tops almost awash  
200 feet apart, 4 feet long, 2 feet in diameter reported by plane position  
Lat. 21-17, 158-02. Verify.
- 1255 Robert: Army reports that a B-18 bombed a submarine at 1235 L. Z. T.  
Position Lat. 21-15, Long 156-48
- 1259 34 Irene 99 Friendly  
1323 1 DD cleared.  
1331 34 Irene 46 Friendly  
1341 1 Tanker cleared  
1356 35 Helen 33 Friendly  
1414 NEW ORLEANS cleared  
1419 36 Helen 08  
1430 The cruiser HELENA blew her whistle for a period of about one minute  
in one continuous blast.
- 1430 Patrick: Results of Army bombing of the two submarines above are, in  
substance: plane dropped one smoke bomb over first sub, then dropped  
one 300 lb. bomb from 2000 feet. Oil appeared, but no debris. Plane  
sighted
- [231] 1430 2nd sub on way back to base and dropped a 300 lb. bomb from 2000  
feet. This bomb overshot, but oil appeared on the surface. Pilot says  
that more subs were in this area. Patrick sent four B-18's to investigate.  
All subs referred to were two-man subs.
- 1455 Robert: The test firing of 5" naval guns at Hickam Field will be delayed  
until January 4th.
- 1459 DD MONAHAN entered.  
1506 1 DD, the DEWEY entered.  
1504 McDONOUGH entered.  
1507 WORDEN entered.  
1511 35 IRENE 57 Friendly.  
1512 PAA clipper took off.  
1521 To Patrick, Robert: at 1600 a 500# blasting charge at New Dry Dock.  
1535 Flight 49 completed.
- A. P. KELLEY, *Ensign.*
- 1647 From Patrick: We desire the following lights turned on from sunset until  
all planes are in: Makapuu, Diamond Head, Barbers Point.  
Action: Notified Coast Guard.
- 1602 From Signal Tower: One sub and escort 5 mi. SE of channel buoys.  
1607 Flight 45 is in.  
1609 From Signal Tower: Instead of sub. DMS has target in tow.  
1615 Flights 18, 19, and 56 in.  
1625 From Robert: 35 Irene 44 Friendly.  
1630 From Patrick: A B-17 bombed 2 submerged subs at 1320 in Lat. 23-30,  
Results unknown.  
Action: Notified Port Director, Combat, CinCPac.
- [232] 1630 From Patrick: "The plane sent out at 0930 to search 012 degrees  
for 210 mi., sighted a submerged object bearing 019 degrees, 180 mi. It  
was 150 yd. long and a waterspout appeared. No action: believed to be  
whale."
- 1643 SEMINOLE stood in.  
1652 Flights 55 and 57 in.  
1700 Flight 12 is in.  
1700 From Pat: A B-17 reports—sub sighted Lat. 21-15, Long. 156-10, dropped  
3 bombs, oil slick appeared.  
Action: Notified Port Director, Combat, CinCPac.
- 1640 From Transpacific Telephone Co.: Report hearing a series of AR AR then  
silence from San Francisco. Combat interprets it to mean air raid.  
1715 Flight 44 is in.  
1718 To Patrick, Robert: The army is holding searchlight drill tonight from  
1900 to 2000 from Kaena Point to Laie Bay.
- 1730 From Robert: 34 Helen 32 Doubtful.  
36 Helen 36 Has disappeared.

- 1745 From Robert: HAF reports a sub off Honolulu Harbor with 3 DD's following it.  
Action: Notified CinCPac, Combat.
- 1750 Flight 7 is in.
- 1751 From Robert: 35 Helen 95 Friendly.
- 1754 Flight 46 is in.
- 1755 Flight 3 is in.
- 1748 ELLIOT stood out.
- 1755 NECHES stood out.
- 1800 JARVIS stood out.
- [233] 1820 From Signal Tower: Light burning in vicinity of Aiea.  
Action: Notified Army.
- 1800 From Patrick: A PBV contacted enemy sub, bearing 200 degrees, 315 mi.
- 1810 Enemy sub: Two low wing monoplane seen flying over Ford Island at 12,000' and then out to sea. Robert claimed these planes.  
Sub at 1738 bearing 200 degrees, 315 mi.  
Action: Notified Combat, Port Director.
- 1850 From Robert: 36 Helen 16 Friendly  
35 Helen 83 Doubtful
- 1630 From Patrick: At 1520 a B-17 sighted 2 subs Lat. 23-30, Long. 157-10  
No results evident.
- 1700 From Patrick: At 1545 a B-17 sighted 1 sub bearing 033 degrees, dist. 185 mi. lost contact.
- 1700 From Patrick: At 1630 a B-18 sighted 1 sub Lat. 21-15, Long. 156-10, bombed it, and an oil slick appeared.  
Action: These 3 contacts given to Combat and Port Director.
- 1855 From Robert: 35 Irene 29 Doubtful  
Action: Patrol told to investigate.
- 1910 From Robert: 35 Helen 81 Doubtful  
35 Helen 21 Friendly  
From Robert: 35 Helen 81 Has disappeared  
35 Helen 83 moved to 94.
- 1921 From Patrick: A plane reports much driftwood or lumber at Lat. 17-51, Long 161-44.  
Action: Notified Combat.
- 1926 From Combat: A ship sailed for Canton, and should now be about 60 mi. SE of Lat. 17-51, Long. 161-44
- 1940 From Robert: 36 Helen 37 Friendly
- 1947 From Robert: 36 Helen 04 Friendly  
35 Irene 29 Doubtful  
34 Helen 43 Doubtful (investigating)
- [234] 1955 Flight 2 is in.
- 1954 From XYP-157: Machine gun fire 34 Helen 68.
- 2015 To Robert: Sampan movements Jan. 3-4  
XYP-157 Kaena Point to Haleiwa. Take patrol after army searchlight drill 2000.  
XYP-155 Barbers Point to Waianae  
XYP-161 Waianae to Kaena.
- 2015 From Combat: RDF bearing on sub at location Lat. 20-30, Long. 159-10
- 2025 From Robert: Visual plot at 34 Helen 49—flashing white light (friendly)
- 2025 From Robert: 34 Helen 64 Friendly  
35 Helen 87 Doubtful  
34 Helen 48 Friendly  
34 Helen 84 Friendly
- 2034 To Patrick: Ft. Kam reports plane down at 34 Helen 39 and another plane circling it.  
[False]
- 2035 From 25th Div. at Nanakuli Beach—Reported firing MG at one of our sampans. Col. Lesser is taking action to see that this does not happen again. Sampans were outside MG range.
- 2036 From Patrick: We have only 2 planes up and we are in contact with both.
- 2046 To Robert and Patrick: Ft. Kam reports that plane down was a boat.
- 2046 To Robert and Patrick: Searchlight drill completed.
- 2047 From Robert: 34 Helen 76 Friendly  
34 Helen 38 Friendly  
34 Gertrude 40 Friendly  
34 Helen 24 Friendly

- 2056 From Patrick: Flashing white light bearing 290 degrees from seaplane tower, 1 mile in from beach.
- 2105 From Patrick: Small boat bearing 240 degrees from Barbers Point close to beach
- [235] 2115 From Captain Yard: Small boat operating in East Loch NW of Kahua Island. Capt. Yard sending boat to investigate.
- 2124 From Com Offshore Pat. Made sight and sound contact at 34 Helen 43. Attacked, continuing search.
- 2128 From Patrick: Small boat going to Sub Base. Will not take over 30 min.
- 2130 From Robert: Board cleared.  
35 Helen 77 Doubtful  
36 Gertrude 11 Doubtful
- 2150 All friendly planes in. Channel lights being turned out by Patrick. C. G. told to turn out coast lights.
- 2200 From CG—Barbers Point light is out.
- 2220 From Com Des Div 80: XYP will enter channel about 2230 with wounded men.  
Notify gate vessel.  
Action: Notified Robert, Patrick Gate vessel.
- 2230 From Robert: 36 Helen 03 Doubtful
- 2236 From CG: Makapuu and Diamond Head lights are off.  
From Com Des Div. 80: XYP entering channel.
- 2250 From Patrick: Our RDF has picked up Jap transmission on 6355 Kcs. bearing 080 or 265  
Action: Notified CinCPac we have an unidentified plot at 36 Gertrude 03
- 1100 From Robert: Board is cleared.
- 1105 From Patrick: Jap transmission still coming in on 6355 Kcs. bearing 110.
- 1108 From Robert: 35 Helen 93 Doubtful
- 1118 From Robert: 35 Helen 93 has disappeared and another at 35 Helen 90 (Doubtful)
- 1120 From Hickam: Sending up a lighted aerological balloon.  
Notified Robert, Patrick.

J. C. OLDFIELD, *Ens. U. S. N.*

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EXHIBIT No. 48 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 48 is a chart of Pearl Harbor showing the location of various units of the fleet which will be found reproduced as Item No. 85, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 49 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Secret

[1] REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preponderance of the American Naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in



which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.

A general warwarning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful [2] estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.

The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack. One small two man submarine penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it breached in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the Curtis and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of [3] that vessel and those of the Destroyer Monaghan. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford Island.

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately a half hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had occurred in the recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch received the report and weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless [4] when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance therefore of both branches of the services is chiefly upon three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from the Control Officer to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a. m., when they were closed officially. However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no



thought of enemy approach. At least a half hour before the attack was made this Officer's Radar indicator showed a concentration of planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should have been reported to Headquarters. The Officer there, a Second Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from that carrier. No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air attack into a Japanese disaster.

The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. [5] I have seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Commander-in-chief.

The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December.

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position [6] for firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50 caliber machine guns.

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last assault.

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found themselves without [7] sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received in Oahu is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere between one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model O-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American built equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of explosive and incendiary 20 millimeter ammunition was a material factor in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were of an old type and used Whithead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this in mind, it was found that the Armor [8] piercing bombs employed were 15 inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail vanes.

In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in the future.

At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of the Arizona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.

Many of the Officers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below decks aboard the Oklahoma and the Utah, both of which capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in progress, twenty six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout the engagement [9] by both service people and civilians with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Block) were adequate and were efficiently carried out.

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 December, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of a few days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The Nevada can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific coast for a year's overhaul. The West Virginia can be raised in three months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul. The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined now. The Arizona is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The Colorado was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.



There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The Detroit put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San Francisco are now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on December 20th. The Helena was badly damaged and may require a new engine. [10] She will be ready to go to the Pacific coast for overhaul December 31st. The Raleigh was flooded throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific coast for overhaul on January 15th.

There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the Downes were in the same drydock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed for the Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the Pennsylvania from any damage. The destroyer Shaw was in the floating drydock at the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged, and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.

The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The airplane tender Curtis, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th. The Vestal, one of the ships of the train, which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah, which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted [11] they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of apprehension of any attack at all, and neither Army nor Navy were in a position of readiness because of this feeling.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth column before the attack, provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl Harbor, exact location of all defenses, gun [12] power and numerous other details. Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted, and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway.

The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into the water from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by fires on other ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard while the heaviest

fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued them and went to sea.

The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore.

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is imperative. I recommend that the Solace should be loaded with these convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort.

[13] The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity of the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force.

[14] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 December, no enemy air plane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in which huge quantities of oil are stores. This was one of many indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy approach.

#### SALVAGE OPERATIONS

The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of the most important pieces of defense work now under way. Its magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities in man power and materiel that will further its expeditious progress, including top priorities for materiel and high speed transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii.

The Navy is fortunate that Lieut. Comdr. Lemuel Curtis, who is an officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in [15] the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. M. Steels, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled.

I am proposing to send to Pearl Harbor a large force of partially trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of the S. S. Lurline of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for returning to the United States the families of Officers and men who should be evacuated because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for the transfer of materiel for the salvage operation can be used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii.

Lieut. Comdr. Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia, and Oklahoma.



## REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS

The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor. A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for the reason that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station [16] resulted in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy Yard would assign work to them on destroyers, small vessels and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it.

## INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS

Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th Naval District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safeguard their commands so far as possible. This included all available information about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval District who could not attend this meeting.

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.

[17] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning on November 27th, but a *special* war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air attack.

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December 7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information Center by an unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as such by the Navy until *two days* after the attack.

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught them *all* completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in position it was some time before their anti-aircraft fire became effective.

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships.

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in successively less damage.

[18] (8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval station *very* badly damaged and resulted in the practical immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu.

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese.

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangars of the type used on all four stations are a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for storage purposes in possible attack areas.

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible.

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation.

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and [19] will place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time.

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lessen the concentration of vessels at one harbor.

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the usefulness and availability of the Naval station must be restudied. Its air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor.

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and pressing home their operation. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory.

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EXHIBIT No. 50 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

EXCERPTS FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS LETTER DATED MARCH 15, 1941 TO COMMANDANTS OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS, GOVERNOR OF GUAM, GOVERNOR OF SAMOA

*Confidential*

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage and Subversive Activities.

"1. The delimitation agreement of June 5, 1940, transmitted with reference (a), was modified at a conference on July 29, 1940 between the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, so far as subject-named investigations are concerned.

"2. The following is a transcript of the notes of the conference on the subject matter:

"Mr. Hoover opened a discussion concerning the handling and coverage of Japanese activities. He stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence has done far more in this field than has any other agency heretofore. Admiral Anderson stated that the Navy has made some check on Japanese activities and has gone into some things which could only be done upon their aggrandized interpretation of Naval interest. He stated that the Navy Department does not want the full responsibility for the checking of the Japanese because of a lack of personnel, etc. Admiral Anderson furnished the conference with the background of Commander McCollom and pointed out that the Commander had resided in Japan, knows the Japanese language and has excellent Japanese contacts. Admiral Anderson agreed to make Commander McCollom and

the Far Eastern Division of the Navy Department available for consultation and advise to the FBI at any time it was necessary or desirable. It was agreed that the Navy would continue to check Japanese activities in the same manner as in the past and that the FBI would take all possible steps to assimilate information concerning Japanese activities and to expand its own operations in this field.

"3. The investigations of Japanese by the Naval Intelligence Service will be coordinated with those undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

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EXHIBIT No. 51 (NAVY PACKET No. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

HONOLULU, T. H., January 5, 1942.

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

To: President's Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

Subject: Recommendation for Revision of the transcript of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29.

1. On page 530 of the transcript to the record there appears a statement "Admiral Kimmel read from a statement". It is requested that this statement be included in toto at this point, to face page 530. The statement that was read follows:

"In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received from Patrol Wing TWO and the Task Forces which were operating at sea. The Staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full information and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be assembled.

It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose as a result of the attack rather than to concentrate on the preparation of reports of what had occurred.

The reports are still coming in from individual ships and I understand the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling these reports which will be submitted in due course and from them a much more effective reconstruction of events can be made."

On page 531 there appears a statement "Admiral Kimmel read from a report". It is requested that this should be amplified to include the statement that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/(02088). The subject: "Report of the Action of 7 December 1941" Copy of this report appended marked Kimmel exhibit number —."

On pages 533, 534, and 535, it is stated that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report entitled 'Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid, December 7, 1941'. The following additions should be made:

"This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel exhibit number —."

On page 537, the statement appears that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report entitled 'Disposition of Task Forces on December 7' ". There should be added at this point the statement that this report was enclosure (D) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088) and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number —."

My written statement of 17 pages which I read at the hearing on 27 December, together with such interpolations as may have been made in the reading thereof has been omitted from the transcript. It is requested that this statement, together with all interpolations that may have been made be included, beginning



on page 538 of the transcript. The insertion of this statement is considered absolutely essential for the completeness of my recorded testimony.

*On page 546 and page 547* I request that it be made clear that the letter referred to was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and that all the quoted matter on these pages were a part of the same letter.

*On page 548*, 7th line from the bottom—the word “investigation” should be changed to “recommendation”.

*On page 549*—It is requested that the following be eliminated beginning with line 2, “In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir,” and the following inserted in its place “I have some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir”.

14th line from the bottom, add:—This is my exhibit 15 and should be appended as part of the record as Kimmel exhibit number 4 and so referred to at this point.

*On page 550*, line 10 from the bottom—It is requested that this security order, my exhibit number 16, be appended to the record as Kimmel exhibit number — and that a note to that effect be made at this point.

*On page 551*—The order of October 14, 1941, “Kimmel exhibit number 2,” should be inserted at this point in its entirety as Kimmel exhibit —. This is numbered exhibit 16 in Admiral Kimmel’s folder.

*On page 552*, line 1—The words “exhibit 18” should be deleted as they are not germane at this point.

*On page 553*, line 7—Delete the words “Exhibit 19” which are not germane at this point.

*On page 556* it is noted that following paragraph 4 of the joint air agreement the authentication is omitted. This authentication is: “Approved 21 March 1941, signed C. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department”.

*On page 556-O*, line 2 from the bottom—before the word “Pearl” insert the words “the defense of”.

*On page 558*, line 1—there should be put a period after “practically” and the remainder of the sentence deleted.

*On page 561*, line 18—change to read “We had not sufficient air force to maintain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force left to go after the enemy when we found him”.

*On page 562* reference is made to Kimmel exhibit 3, to be included in the testimony. This has already been quoted in extenso in the transcript beginning on page 556 and extending to page 556-O through pages 556-A—556-N, and concludes on page 556-O.

*On page 567* at the bottom of the page add: “This is included as my exhibit number 9”, which I request be appended as Kimmel exhibit number — and be so referred to at this point.

*On page 571*, line 9—delete the words “I think” and substitute the word “for”.

*On page 571*, lines 12 and 13—delete the words “which were” and the words, and they”.

On line 16 substitute “80%” for “99%” and in line 18 substitute “90%” for “99%”.

Line 21—change to read: “It appears that almost all the ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm”.

Line 11 from the bottom—change to read: “We had all guns fully manned, in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm”.

The remainder of the paragraph to stand as it is.

*On page 572*, line 18—change to read: “Some of them didn’t even think about reporting the time they opened fire”. “This is a special report in answer to a specific questionnaire.”

*On page 573*, line 7—delete the words “no matter whether we had the same men or not”.

Line 12 add: “Except that two .50 caliber guns were completely manned”.

*On page 575*, line 7—change “Unav” to “Bunav”.

*On page 577*, line 10 from the bottom—delete the words “they also made another”.

Line 9 from the bottom should read: “They were to make the daily search until further orders”.



- Line 8 from the bottom—delete the words “and because we only had that one patrol squadron there”. Begin a new sentence with “We”.
- On page 578, line 8—change the word “They” to “We”.
- On page 602, line 13 from the bottom—change to read:—“It is the same subject”, etc.
- On page 604, line 14—change “landed” to launched”.
- On page 607, line 8—change to read “to cover that circuit around Oahu continuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a surprise air attack”.
- Line 14, change to read: “We would have to run a patrol”,
- Line 18—following “but” eliminate “to do anything but” and substitute “doing anything other than what”.
- On page 611, line 5—change “decks” to “docks”; eliminate “the bridges” and substitute “board”.
- On page 612, line 1, add: “We delayed the sortie of heavy ships due to the report that mines had been dropped in the channel”.
- Line 2—eliminate the the word “them” and substitute “the cruisers”.
- Line 3—change to read: “By that time the mine report was discounted and she went out”.
- On page 612, line 8—change to read: “Batdiv 1, consisting of three ships, came in on the third; Batdiv 2 and 4, consisting of five ships, came in some days before that”.
- On page 614, line 3 from the bottom—change the word “agreement” to “schedule”.
- Line 11 from the bottom—change to read: “and they were due to come in, Task Force One on 23 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 December”
- Line 4 from the bottom—after the word “had” insert the words “more than”.
- On page 615, line 8—change to read “I think that Task Force Three was out in its entirety” and eliminate the words “I think the Task Force was out at Midway in its entirety”.
- Line 16 et seq.—change to read: “Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, with the information service that we now know the Japanese had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our ships had been at sea the Japanese would have held off for another chance and tried another time”.
- On page 616, line 2—after the word “embarked” add “American passengers”.
- Line 2 after the word “we” change the word “have” to “had”.
- Line 3 after “believe” change “it” to “American passengers”.
- Line 4 after the word “sea” put a period.
- On page 618, line 2 from the bottom—change “have 4” to “had 12”.
- On page 619, line 10 from the bottom—add: “From Pearl Harbor”.
- On page 622, line 2—put a period after “this”. Remainder of paragraph 1 to read “We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for this submarine to have passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have made was reported to me but I have not checked it”.
- On page 623, line 5 from the bottom—eliminate the words “it is in this report” and substitute therefor “there was an intelligence report some time ago, as I remember it”, etc.
- On page 624, line 4 from the bottom—place a period after “report” and substitute “then the air raid started” for “that an air raid started”.
- On page 625, line 3—eliminate the paragraph and substitute therefor:—“No, sir” “I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was reported to me was that a destroyer had depth bombed a submarine”.
- On page 626, line 11—eliminate the words “and of the board” and substitute therefor the words “that bore”.
- Line 13—eliminate “twenty-ninth” and substitute “twenty-seventh”.
- On page 627, line 10 from the bottom—after “175” insert the word “patrol”.
- On page 628, line 7, eliminate the words “planes for defense” and substitute therefor the words “plans for advance”.
- On page 631, line 2 from the bottom—change “no” to “yes”.

On page 633, line 6 from the bottom—eliminate the word “difficult” and substitute the word “duty”.

On page 636, line 3 from the bottom—after the word “very” insert the word “good”.

On page 639, line 10 from the bottom—add:—“When I received the air raid warning at about 7:50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the Fleet in Pearl Harbor”.

On page 664, in order to clarify the record it is suggested that the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, dated February 17, 1941, number Op-30 C 1-AJ(SC) N20-12 serial 010230 be inserted in the record at this point.

On page 665, line 15—after “recovered” insert the words “one of”.

On page 665, line 17—eliminate the word “Whitehead” and substitute the word “wide”.

On page 666, line 7—eliminate the words “there was one torpedo by the RALEIGH and I got that and examined it, but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head”.

Reason: This statement does not make sense and is not essential testimony.

On page 672, line 5 from the bottom—eliminate the words “leave that out”.

On page 692, line 2—eliminate the word “first”.

After “out” in the 3rd line delete “nothing whatever stayed at this end” and substitute therefor: “About every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out”.

On page 692, line 15 from the bottom—eliminate the sentence “A whole lot of the stuff is we lack experience”.

Also “General McCoy in questioning the Army Commander the other day” Admiral Kimmel will you cut that out, that’s all right, I don’t—I’d rather not say”.

In connection with the discussion which appears on page 694 I did not bring out a fact which was well known to me and that is that my headquarters furnished the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with a copy of our operating schedule which showed the ships which would be in port during any given period and also the ships which were at sea and the general areas in which the ships were operating.

On page 697, line 13—change the word “motored” to “motive”.

Line 12 from the bottom—change to read “over and above the extended overhaul period which occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months”.

On page 700, line 4—change “battle” to “battleship”.

Line 11 from the bottom—change to read “only by having double crews for each plane and by having new planes coming in very rapidly”.

On page 701, last line—change “personally” to “permanently”.

On page 705, 6th line from the bottom—change to read “I think there were five battleship captains—I can get you a list of them for the record”.

On page 707, line 4 from the bottom—change the word “deck” to “board”.

On page 709, line 12 from the bottom—after the word “would” put in the word “not”.

On page 710, line 10—after the word “that” put in the word “way”.

On page 712, lines 9 and 10 from the bottom—change the word “Koonce” to “Coontz”.

On page 713, line 11—eliminate the words “Chief of Staff” and substitute the words “Commander-in-Chief and his Staff”.

On page 715, line 4 from the bottom—change second “director” to “chief”.

On page 716, line 5—eliminate “that” and the comma following.

On page 718, line 8—eliminate the word “familiar” and substitute therefor “friendly”.

On page 727, line 14 from the bottom—delete the word “and” before “catch”.

On page 728, line 8—change the word “release” to “relief”.

Line 10 from the bottom—eliminate the words “of known weight” and substitute “and supplies”.

On page 731, line 7—change “twenty-fourth” to “twenty-seventh”.

On page 732—Admiral Theobald’s answer at bottom of page—strike out entire answer and substitute therefor:—

“You asked for this paper this morning. It shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief”.

H. E. KIMMEL.

## ROBERTS COMMISSION EXHIBITS

(Separate Packet)

1. Report of Secretary of the Navy Knox to the President after his investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. This Exhibit is identical with Exhibit 49, Navy Packet 2, of this Commission.

2. 16 volumes of transcript of testimony and one volume annex of changes desired by Admiral Kimmel to be made a part of the record of the Commission.

3. Minutes of the Commission.

4. A statement by the Commission's Recorder of material delivered to the Navy.

5. A statement of the Commission's Recorder of material delivered to the Army.

## EXHIBIT 1 (NAVY, SEPARATE PACKET) ROBERTS COMMISSION

This exhibit is the report made by Secretary of the Navy Knox to the President after the Secretary had made his investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which investigation took place prior to the investigation by the Roberts Commission. It is identical with Exhibit 49, Navy Packet No. 2, of the Roberts Commission.

## EXHIBIT 2 (NAVY, SEPARATE PACKET) ROBERTS COMMISSION

This exhibit consists of 16 volumes of the original testimony given before the Commission, and one volume (Annex) containing Admiral Kimmel's testimony as corrected. This material has been printed as the transcript of testimony before the Commission.

## EXHIBIT 3 (NAVY, SEPARATE PACKET) ROBERTS COMMISSION

This exhibit consists of the minutes of the Roberts Commission, which have been printed in these proceedings.

## EXHIBIT No. 4 (SEPARATE PACKET) ROBERTS COMMISSION

COMMISSION APPOINTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER OF DECEMBER 18, 1941, TO ASCERTAIN AND REPORT THE FACTS RELATING TO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES UPON THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

(1) There are 16 volumes of the original testimony given before the Commission, and one volume (Annex) containing Admiral Kimmel's testimony as corrected. These volumes consist of one volume each dated December 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 1941, January 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 19, 1942, and one volume (Annex) not dated. On the dates not specifically mentioned no testimony was taken by the Commission; hence there is no volume for the unspecified dates. The first page of each volume shows whose testimony is recorded in that volume and the page on which such testimony starts.

(2) Exhibits and documents received from Navy organizations.

(3) Miscellaneous exhibits and documents received from non-service organizations.

(4) Copy of the Commission's minutes.

WALTER BRUCE HOWE, *Recorder.*

JANUARY 24, 1942.

## EXHIBIT No. 5 (SEPARATE PACKET) ROBERTS COMMISSION

COMMISSION APPOINTED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER OF DECEMBER 18, 1941, TO ASCERTAIN AND REPORT THE FACTS RELATING TO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES UPON THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

(1) There are 16 volumes of the original testimony given before the Commission, and one volume (Annex) containing Admiral Kimmel's testimony as corrected. These volumes consist of one volume each dated December 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 1941, January 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 19, 1942, and one volume (Annex) not dated. On the dates not specifically mentioned no testimony was taken by the Commission; hence there is no volume for the unspecified dates. The first page of each volume shows whose testimony is recorded in that volume and the page on which such testimony starts.

- (2) One package of exhibits and documents received from Army organizations.
- (3) Shorthand notes of testimony taken.
- (4) Copy of the Commission's minutes.

WALTER BRUCE HOWE, *Recorder.*

JANUARY 24, 1942.

Documents delivered to the Army.

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EXHIBIT No. 1 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD

Office of the Commanding Officer

Wheeler Field, T. H.

23 DECEMBER 1941.

Memorandum:

TO: Executive Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with your telephone request, there are inclosed herewith three vertical photographs one each of Wheeler Field, Haleiwa Field and Bellows Field. Attached hereto is the Aircraft status as of 0745, 7 December 1941 showing squadron assignment.

2. On the attached photographs there is noted the parking areas assigned to the various squadrons at this field. The parking areas at Haleiwa and Bellows are as noted on the photographs for these fields. It may safely be assumed that the airplanes noted as in the attached report were parked in the open as indicated on the photographs. A small number of the planes noted as in, plus those in first echelon maintenance may be assumed to have been within the hangars. The planes noted as being in second and fourth echelon maintenance may be assumed to have been parked in the Base Engineering Area.

3. The attached plan showing progress of bunker construction shows the status of bunkers as of before the raid. All were available except those noted on the plan as being unavailable.

C. A. KENGLA,  
Captain, Air Corps, S-4.

5 Incls—

- Incl. #1 to #3—  
Vertical Photographs
- Incl. #4—Aircraft status as  
of 0745, 7 Dec. 1941.
- Incl. #5—Plan for Bunker  
Construction.

(Inclosures 1, 2, and 3 of the foregoing memorandum are three vertical photographs one each of Wheeler Field, Haleiwa Field, and Bellows Field which will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 86, 87, and 88, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)



[1] HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD

Wheeler Field, T. H.

14 DECEMBER 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Status.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. The following is the aircraft status as of 0745, 7 December 1941 WF:

Type	A. C. No.	Asgd Sq #	Status					
			In	Out				
				1	2	3	4	Survey
P-40C	41-13329	19		X				
	41-13330	19	X					
	41-13336	19	X					
	41-13328	44	X					
	41-13331	44					X	
	41-13332	44	X					
	41-13337	44	X					
	41-13340	44	X					
	41-13344	44	X					
	41-13367	44	X					
	41-13349	47	X					
	41-13366	47		X				
	41-13334	5						X
	Total			9	2			1
P-40B	41-5211	6	X					
	41-5212	6		X				
	41-5213	6	X					
	41-5214	6		X				
	41-5215	6		X				
	41-5217	6	X					
	41-5219	6	X					
	41-5220	6	X					
	41-5221	6	X					
	41-5222	6					X	
	41-5223	6	X					
	41-5224	6					X	
	41-5225	6	X					
	41-5232	6	X					
	41-5291	6		X				
	41-5299	6	X					
	41-5216	19	X					
	41-5218	19	X					
	41-5227	19		X				
	41-5234	19		X				
	41-5241	19	X					
	41-5245	19	X					
	41-5247	19		X				
	41-5294	19	X					
	41-5295	19	X					
	41-5301	19	X					
	41-5304	19	X					
	41-13303	19	X					
	41-13367	19	X					
	41-13308	19		X				
	41-13310	19	X					
	41-5206	44	X					
	41-5207	44	X					
	41-5208	44	X					
	41-5209	44	X					
	41-13315	44	X					
41-13319	44	X						
41-13320	44					X		
Total forwarded			27	8			3	
[2] P-40B balance forwarded			27	8			3	
	41-13322	44			X			
	41-13323	44	X					
	41-5239	78		X				
	41-5243	78	X					
	41-5244	78	X					
	41-5246	78	X					
	41-5248	78					X	
	41-5249	78					X	
	41-5250	78					X	
	41-5251	78	X					

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Type	A. C. No.	Asgd Sq #	Status					
			In	Out				
				1	2	3	4	Survey
P-40B balance forwarded.....	41-5252	78	X					
	41-5253	78					X	
	41-5254	78	X					
	41-5257	78	X					
	41-13302	78	X					
	41-13305	78		X				
	41-13312	78	X					
	41-13321	78		X				
	41-5226	73	X					
	41-5228	73	X					
	41-5229	73	X					
	41-5230	73	X					
	41-5231	73	X					
	41-5233	73		X				
	41-5235	73	X					
	41-5236	73	X					
	41-5237	73					X	
	41-5242	73	X					
	41-13297	73		X				
	41-13299	73			X			
	41-13300	73	X					
	41-13304	47		X				
	41-5293	47	X					
	41-5298	45	X					
	41-5210	47		X				
	41-5286	45	X					
	41-13305	46	X					
	41-13306	46	X					
	41-5239	46	X					
	41-5255	46		X				
	41-5303	46		X				
	41-13313	47	X					
	41-13314	47	X					
	41-13316	47		X				
	41-13318	47	X					
	41-13317	47		X				
	41-13324	47		X				
	41-13325	47		X				
	41-13326	47		X				
Total.....			55	22	2		8	
P-36A.....	38-27	45	X					
	38-36	Hq 15 PG		X				
	38-55	46	X					
	38-108	S						X
	38-133	45		X				
	38-149	45		X				
	38-78	45		X				
	38-11	46		X				
	38-15	S						X
	38-21	46	X					
	38-22	45	X					
	38-31	45		X				
	38-45	45		X				
	38-59	Hq 15PG-S						X
Total forwarded.....			4	7				3
[5] P-36A balance forwarded.....	38-63	45	4	7				3
	38-70	S		X				X
	38-124	46	X					
	38-167	45		X				
	38-102	45	X					
	38-110	45	X					
	38-2	45		X				
	38-32	46	X					
	38-57	46		X				
	38-76	46		X				
	38-82	46	X					
	38-83	S						X
	38-86	46	X					
	38-109	46	X					
	38-118	46	X					
	38-121	46		X				
	38-169	46	X					
	38-171	46	X					
	38-145	46		X				

Type	A. C. No.	Asgd Sq #	Status						
			In	Out					
				1	2	3	4	Survey	
P-36A balance forwarded	38-73	45	X						
	38-90	46	X						
	38-92	46	X						
	38-93	46	X						
	38-98	46		X					
	38-111	46		X					
	38-125	46		X					
	38-128	47	X						
	38-160	47		X					
	38-161	45	X						
	38-176	45		X					
Total			20	19					5
P-26A	33-88	17AB	X						
	33-34	44	X						
	33-37	78	X						
	33-39	78	X						
	33-68	44	X						
	33-80	78		X					
	33-85	46	X						
	33-86	6	X						
Total			7	1					
P-26B	33-180	6		X					
	33-182	73	X						
	33-183	47	X						
	33-184	44		X					
	33-192	44	X						
	33-203	47		X					
Total			3	3					
B-18	36-325	17AB	X						
B-12	33-258	45		X					
	33-266	47	X						
	33-267	45		X					
Total			1	2					
AT-6	40-2097	Hq 18PG		X					
	40-2099	do	X						
	40-2100	Hq 15PG	X						
	40-2101	Hq 15PG	X						
Total			3	1					
[4] OA-9	38-558	Hq 18PG	X						
	38-569	Hq 15PG	X						
	38-575	Hq 18PG	X						
Total			3						
O-47B	39-85	17AB	X						
A-12A	33-229	46	X						
	33-256	17AB	X						
Total			2						
OA-8	37-370	17AB	X						
BT-2BI	31-79	45-S							X
	31-112	46-S							X
Total									2

Legend:

In: In commission.

Out:

1 Local Squadron Repair.

2 Major Repair or Overhaul (Base Engr).

3 Depot Repair (Outside help).

4 Waiting Parts.

WM J. FLOOD,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Commanding.

(The remaining portion of this exhibit consists of a progress map relating to bunker construction, Wheeler Field, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 89, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 1A (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 1a is a secret "OPN Map Annex 1 to accompany FO1 Fixed Installations", Island of Oahu, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 90, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 2 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 2 is a secret map of "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941—Antiaircraft Dispositions", which will be found reproduced as Item No. 91, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 3 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 3 is a map showing military reservations of the Island of Oahu, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 92, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 4 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 4 is a Special Military Map "AA" of the Hawaiian Islands, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 93, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 5 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS HICKAM FIELD, T. H.,  
22 December 1941.

Subject: Record of operations.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. .

1. Pursuant to radio Hq Hawn Air Force 22 December 1941, the following report is submitted.

2. The undersigned was in command of Bellows Field, September 1, 1941, to October 27, 1941. During this period a ground defense plan for Bellows Field was formulated and approval of same was not given by HHD until after departure from Bellows Field.

3. The undersigned assumed command of Hickam Field 27 October 1941, pursuant to General Orders No. 68, HHD, 27 October 1941, and Special Orders No. 269, HHD, 27 October 1941 (see inclosure No. 1). The duties of an Air Base Commander are as set forth in these General Orders.

4. *a. Friday*, 21 November 1941, General Martin approved the using of the instructors, administrative personnel, and students of the Hickam Field Branch, Hawaiian Air Force Technical School for ground defense training. These troops were to be used to constitute the ground defense forces as required by Standing Operating Procedure, HHD, dated 5 November 1941, (received at Hickam Field 12 November 1941).

*b.* The strength of the ground defense force was some 18 officers and 482 enlisted men.

*c.* The dispositions had been previously coordinated with the supporting unit commanders. No field order to place these troop dispositions into effect had been prepared prior to the alert, however, the situation map was sufficient to readily put these men into prepared positions.

*d.* The positions were constantly improved during the period of the alert. During this period that portion of the Aqua System not inclosed by man-proof fence was inclosed by a single apron barbed wire intanglement. Work had been started upon a man-proof fence separating the hangar from the barracks-warehouse area.



5. At 3:55 PM, 27 November 1941, the alert was sounded pursuant to radio instructions from Hq Haw Dept, which stated that Alert No. 1 was to be placed into effect immediately. Alert No. 1, under the Standing Operating Procedure, Haw Dept, 5 November 1941, states that this alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

Incl 1—GO 68 HHD, dated 27 October 1941

W. E. FARTHING,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Commanding.

\* Incl 2—Photostatic Map showing disposition of the Ground Defense Units referred to in Paragraph 4 c, above.

GENERAL ORDERS  
No. 68

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 27 October 1941.

Sub-Division of Command-----	Paragraph	1
Division of Duties, Wing and Post Commanders-----		2
Assumption of Command-----		3
Miscellaneous Instructions-----		4

1. *Sub-Division of Command.*

Reference General Orders 33, this headquarters, dated 16 June 1941, as amended by G. O. #43, HHD, 24 July 1941, the following instructions are published, effective this date.

a. The Tactical Command of the Air Force organizations, in this Department, including instruction, tactical efficiency and preparation for war service, is vested basically in the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and through him to the Wing Commanders. Wing Commanders are charged with this responsibility for all units under their jurisdiction.

b. The Non-Tactical Command (Posts) will be commanded separately and apart from the tactical command by designated Post Commanders. (See attached List of Units.)

2. *Duties of Commanders.*

a. Wing Commanders. The Wing Commanders' duties are primarily tactical. They are charged with the command, administration, supervision, coordination, direction and inspection of all combat units, assigned or attached to their wings. They will not act as station, post or base commanders, but are stationed at their present bases for domiciliary purposes only.

b. Post Commanders. Post Commanders are charged with the duties of Commanding Officers of Posts, Camps and Stations as prescribed in AR 210-10. Post Commanders will give primary consideration to furnishing every possible service and assistance to the tactical units.

3. *Assumption of Command.*

a. During the temporary absence of the Wing Commander from command, the senior flying officer present for duty in the wing or Post shall assume command of the wing.

b. During the temporary absence of the Post Commander the senior flying officer not on duty with the tactical command shall assume command of the post.

4. *Miscellaneous Instructions.*

a. The provisions of G. O. #33, HHD, dated 16 June 1941, which are in conflict are hereby rescinded.

b. The provisions of letter AG 320.2 (12-17-40) M-A-M, dated 11 January 1941, subject: "Station Complement Activities and Agencies," and letter AG 320.2 (2-15-41) M (Ret) M-A, dated 25 February 1941, subject: "Station Complements for 1940-1941 Military Program," where applicable, will govern.  
(AG 323.372)

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

[OFFICIAL COPY: Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.]

PHILIP HAYES,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,  
Adjutant General.

1768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

LIST OF UNITS, HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

TACTICAL

NON-TACTICAL

*Commanding General—Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.*

Hq & Hq Sq Hawaiian Air Force  
 19th Transport Sq AC  
 Tow Target Detachment AC  
 5th Chemical Company Service (Avn)  
 53d Signal Maintenance Co (Avn)  
 328th Signal Aviation Company Provisional Maintenance Command  
 Hawaiian Air Depot

*Commanding General—18th Bomb Wing, Hickam Field, T. H.*

Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing AC  
 Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Group (H) AC  
 23d Bomb Sq (H) AC  
 31st Bomb Sq (H) AC  
 72d Bomb Sq (H) AC  
 4th Reconnaissance Sq (H) AC  
 Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H) AC  
 26th Bomb Sq (H) AC  
 42d Bomb Sq (H) AC  
 50th Reconnaissance Sq (H) AC  
 58th Bomb Sq (1) AC  
 481st Ord Co Avn (B)  
 324th Signal Co Air Wing  
 482d Ord Co Avn (B)  
 Sig Section Hq 18th Bomb Wing

*Commanding General 14th Pursuit Wing, Wheeler Field, T. H.*

Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wg AC  
 Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F) AC  
 45th Pur Sq (F) AC  
 46th Pur Sq (F) AC  
 47th Pur Sq (F) AC  
 Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Gp (Int) AC  
 6th Pur Sq (Int) AC  
 19th Pur Sq (Int) AC  
 44th Pur Sq (Int) AC  
 72d Pur Sq (Int) AC  
 78th Pur Sq Int AC  
 307th Signal Co Air Wing  
 674th Ordnance Co Avn (P)  
 696th Ordnance Co Avn (P)  
 Sig Section Hq 14th Pur Wing  
 73d Pur Sq (Int) AC

*Commanding Officer—Bellows Field, T. H.*

Air Support Command  
 86th Observation Sq (C & D) AC

*Commanding Officer, Hickam Field, T. H.*

Hq & Hq Sq 17th Air Base Gp. (R) AC  
 18th Air Base Sq AC  
 22d Matériel Sq AC  
 23d Matériel Sq AC  
 AC Det Communications, Hawaii, H. F.  
 AC Det Weather, Hawaii, H. F.  
 12th Signal Platoon (AB)  
 Det Quartermaster Corps, Hawaii, H. F.  
 13th Quartermaster Co (Tk)  
 39th Quartermaster Co (L/M) (less Det W. F.)  
 740th Ord Co Avn (AB)  
 Station Complement Det attached 740th Ord Co Avn (AB)  
 Det Finance Department, H. F.  
 Det Medical Corps, H. F.

*Commanding Officer, Wheeler Field,*

Hq & Hq Sq 17th Air Base Gp (R) AC  
 17th Air Base Sq AC  
 24th Matériel Sq AC  
 25th Matériel Sq AC  
 45th Signal Platoon (AB)  
 Det Quartermaster Corps, Hawaii, W. F.  
 14th Quartermaster Co (Tk)  
 Det 39th Quartermaster Co (L/M)  
 741st Ord Co Avn (AB)  
 Station Complement Det attached to 741st Ord Co Avn (AB)  
 Det Finance Department, W. F.  
 Det Medical Corps, W. F.

*Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.*

Hq Det Bellows Field  
 Det Finance Dept., B. F.  
 Haw Air Force, Casual Detachment  
 Quartermaster Detachment  
 Det Medical

SPECIAL ORDERS }  
 No. 269 }

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
 Fort Shafter, T. H., 27 October 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

EXTRACT

9. Paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, Special Orders 263, this headquarters, es, are revoked.

10. Lieutenant Colonel LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON (0-11313), Air Corps, Wheeler Field, T. H., is relieved from further assignment and duty at that station, is assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, T. H. and Air Support Command, will proceed thereto and will assume command. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. FD 1441 P 1-06, 15-06, A 0410-2; QM 1500 P 58-07 A 0525-2.

11. Colonel WILLIAM J. FLOOD (0-9858), Air Corps, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H., is relieved from further assignment and duty at that station, is assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Wheeler Field, T. H., will proceed thereto and will assume command. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. FD 1441 P 1-06, 15-06 A 0410-2; QM 1500 P 58-07, A 0525-2.

12. Colonel WILLIAM E. FARTHING (0-7122), Air Corps, Bellows Field, T. H., is relieved from further assignment and duty at that station, is assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Hickam Field, T. H., will proceed thereto and will assume command. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. FD 1441 P 1-06, 15-06 A 0410-2; QM 1500 P 58-07 A 0525-2.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

PHILIP HAYES,  
 Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
 Chief of Staff.

[OFFICIAL COPY: Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.]

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
 Colonel, Adjutant General's Department, Adjutant General.

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 5 is a map showing ground defenses at Hickam Field. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 94, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

EXHIBIT No. 6 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 6 is a chart of Hickam Field showing the disposition of aircraft at the time of the attack. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 95, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

EXHIBIT No. 7 (ARMY), ROBERTS COMMISSION

[SECRET]

[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

[a] *Table of Contents*

Statement Major General Walter C. Short. Pp. 1-50 incl. Exhibits A-1R (incl.)

	Page	Exhibit
1. Paraphrased Radio, 16 Oct. 41 from Chief Naval Operations.....	1.....	"A"
2. W. D. Radio 472, 27 Nov. 41, from General Marshall.....	1.....	"B"
3. Hawaiian Department Alerted 27 Nov. 41.....	2.....	
4. Alerts (Extracts from Standing Operating Procedure).....	2-10 incl.....	"C"
5. Reasons for Calling Alert No. 1.....	10-13 incl.....	

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[a]

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	Page	Exhibit
6. Extract from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan".....	11-12 incl.	"D"
7. Annex #7 from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan".....	12	"E"
8. 28 Nov. 41 Radio Reply to W. D. Radio 472 (Gen. Marshall 27 Nov. 41).....	11	"F"
9. W. D. Radio 482, 28 Nov. 41, "Sabotage".....	13-14 incl.	"G"
10. Extract from MID-SC30-45 "Subversive Activities".....	14	"H"
11. 29 Nov. 41 Radio to W. D. (Steps Taken to Prevent Sabotage).....	14-15 incl.	"I"
12. Events Transpiring from 27 Nov. 41 to 6 Dec. 41.....	15-24 incl.	"J-S" Incl.
a. Order for Detector Operation.....	15-16 incl.	"J"
b. Conferences With Navy.....	16-17 incl.	"K-L"
c. Certificate "No Navy Request for Long Range Reconnaissance".....	17	"K"
d. Certificate "Statement Made by Naval Staff Officer".....	17	"L"
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f. W. D. Radio 465, 26 Nov. 41 (Re B-24 Photo Mission).....	18	"M"
g. 5 Dec. 41 Radio to Chief Air Corps (Re B-24 Photo Mission).....	18-19 incl.	"N"
h. Unarmed B-17 Flight from U. S. Arrive Oahu During 7 Dec. Attack.....	19	"O"
i. RCA Radio (Commercial) from General Marshall "Japanese Ultimatum".....	20-21 incl.	"P"
j. W. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41, Requesting Time RCA Radio Received.....	20	"Q"
k. Radio Reply to W. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41 "Time Received".....	20-21	"R"
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m. Aircraft Warning Service Operation 7 Dec. 41.....	21-24 incl.	"S"
13. Action at Time of Attack, 7 Dec. 41.....	24-26 incl.	"S-U" Incl.
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b. Anti-Aircraft Artillery.....	25	"S"
c. Hawaii Air Force.....	25	"T-U" incl.
d. 24th Division.....	25	
e. 25th Division.....	25-26 incl.	
f. Medical Teams and Civilian Relief Committees.....	26	
14. Martial Law Declared 8 Dec. 41.....	26-27 incl.	
15. Efforts to Improve Defenses of Hawaii Islands.....	27-42 incl.	
a. Letter to Gen. Marshall Outlining Deficiencies Found.....	28 par. 1	"V"
b. Request for Funds for Dispersion Aircraft.....	28-29 par. 2	"W"
c. Request for Underground Maintenance Hawn. Air Depot.....	29 par. 3	"X"
d. Request for Fortification and Camouflage Funds.....	29 par. 4	"Y"
e. Request for Funds for Camouflaging air Fields.....	30 par. 5	"Z"
f. Request for Funds for Roads, Trails.....	30 par. 6	"1-A"
g. Request for Additional Air Ports.....	30-32 incl. par. 7	"1-B"
h. Request for Funds for Kaneohe Bay Defenses.....	32-33 incl. par. 8	"1-C"
i. Request for Funds for Improvement Landing Strips Wheeler Field.....	33 par. 9	"1-D"
j. Request for Priorities on Aircraft Warning Stations.....	33 par. 10	"1-E"
k. Request for Honolulu Office Production Manager.....	34 par. 11	"1-F"
l. Request for \$1,000,000 Fund for Stocking Reserve Supplies.....	34-35 incl. par. 12	"1-G"
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n. Request for Increase in Engineer Strength.....	36 par. 14	"1-I"
o. Request for Increase in Coast Artillery Strength.....	36-37 incl. par. 15	"1-J"
p. Request for Increase in Infantry and Artillery Strength.....	36-37 incl. par. 15	"1-J"
q. Request for Increase in Air Corps Strength.....	38-40 incl. par. 16	"1-K"
r. Request for Reorganization Hawn. Division and an Increase in Initial War Garrison.....	40-41 incl. par. 17	"1-L"
s. Request Activation of A. A. Artillery Brigade.....	41 par. 18	"1-M"
t. Request Information 37 MM Guns.....	42 par. 19	"1-N"
u. Standing Operating Procedure.....	42 par. 20	"1-C"
16. Efforts to Better Prepare Civilian Community for Defense.....	43-45 incl.	"1-C, 1-Q" Incl.
a. Army Day Speech, 6 April 41 to Honolulu Chamber of Commerce.....	43	"1-O"
b. Production and Storage of Food.....	43-44 incl.	"1-P"
c. Organization of Doctors and Nurses.....	44	
d. Organization of Auxiliary Police and Fire Force.....	44	
e. Evacuation Camps and Air Raid Shelters.....	45	"1-Q"
f. M-Day Bill.....	45	
17. Letters from Civilian Reference Efforts to Improvement of Civilian Defense.....	45-47 incl.	"1-R"
a. Unsolicited Letter to President, United States.....	45-46 incl.	"1-R"
b. Unsolicited Letter from Major Disaster Council, Honolulu.....	47	"1-R"
c. Unsolicited Letter from Gov. Poindexter.....	47a	"1-R"
18. Conclusions.....	48-50 incl.	



[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941—Exhibit "A":

Note for commanding general Hawaiian department:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities *you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x.*

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M., November 27th—Exhibit "B":

"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH:

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as *not* comma repeat *not* comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL,  
116P/27.

[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the Chief of Staff, Alert #1 was ordered by telephone and put into effect at once. Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.—Exhibit "C":

"SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph f (8) below.

14. **ALERT NO. 1.** a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned

sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below.

Command and Fire Control Cable System.

Railway and Highway Bridges.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAI'AU Generating Plant.

Telephone Exchanges at WAIPA'U, WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from TOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.

[3.] Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPA'HULU.

(4) the 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and anti-aircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders.

*g.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the Air Corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

*h.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

*i.* The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

*j.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations.

[4] 15. ALERT NO. 2. *a.* This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

*b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

*c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

*d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned

sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1.

Command and Fire Control Cable System.

Railway and Highway Bridges.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAI'AU Generating Plant.

Telephone exchanges at WAIPA'U, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[5] (6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 l below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and anti-aircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and anti-aircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

[6] (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing X TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.



(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).

*i.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

*l.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above.

16. ALERT NO. 3. *a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

*b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

*c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

*d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240 mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field [8] Artillery will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.



(9) Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

- (1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
- (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
- (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

*g.* G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) Food administration.

[9] (2) A Labor Procurement Service.

*h.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

*i.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

*l.* STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the SCHOFIELD Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and [10] Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELD Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

*m.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is

anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above."

Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands with no threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1, the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn.

My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprising, were as follows:

1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in Hawaii.

2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack.

3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and of Army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training.

These three reasons will be discussed in detail:

1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too much dispersion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two different types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more probable [11] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially desirable as man-proof fencing and flood-lights had not as yet been provided for the fields. \$240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the authorization of \$102,000.00 was made on July 11th and \$91,975.00 on August 12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priorities, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and installed prior to December 7th.

2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting information as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District"—Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The following quotation makes this evident:

EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"—Exhibit "D":

"3. *METHOD OF COORDINATION.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

\* \* \* \* \*  
 18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

\* \* \* \* \*  
 i. Distant reconnaissance.

\* \* \* \* \*  
 21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-approved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the annexes, Nos. 1 to VII of latter remain effective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of this plan."

[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as follows—Exhibit "E":

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission".

These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, report to him upon and the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th.

3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command. When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on any orderly training. With the number of new men in the command it is highly important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of the Hawaiian Air Force on November 27th due to the fact that they had been given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17 planes from the mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November 27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes that were expected at an early date in this Department. With only six (6) B-17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force make the maximum use of these planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any considerable period would prevent him from carrying out the ferrying mission that had been assigned to him.

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I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff of November 27th—Exhibit "F":

"CHIEF OF STAFF,  
War Department,  
Washington, D. C.:

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

SHORT".



Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following reply from The Adjutant General—Exhibit "G":  
 "Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH:

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of [14] War Department Paren See paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop *This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized Stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.*

ADAMS".

This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive activities.

Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention, constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary publicity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more publicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population.

If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities.

In my radiogram of November 29th I replied to the radiogram of the War Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I was taking to prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that I had obtained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken—Exhibit "I":

"The ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
 War Department,  
 Washington, D. C.:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth Comma Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department Paren Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren And military establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection [15] of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants Comma Telephone exchanges and highway bridges Comma This headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides Comma In effect Comma That the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence Comma Invasion Comma Insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage Comma And lawless violence in connection therewith Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection Comma At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Honolulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT"



## EVENTS TRANSPIRING FROM NOVEMBER 27TH TO DECEMBER 6TH

From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on duty during this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A. M., December 7th. Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11:00 A. M. except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, states as follows—Exhibit "J":

Subject: Detector Operation.  
To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions [16] to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

(Signed) W. H. Murphy,  
W. H. MURPHY,  
Lt. Col., Sig. C.

During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as follows:

November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accompanied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force.

December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the islands of Midway and Wake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island by the army.

December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island.

At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers so located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the employment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant reconnaissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese carriers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance—Exhibit "K."

HICKAM FIELD, T. H., 20 December 1941.

I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

(Signed) Jas. A. Mollison,  
JAS. A. MOLLISON,  
Lt. Col., A. C.,  
H. A. F. C/S.

To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not known.

At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows—Exhibit "L":

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral KIMMEL: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?

Captain McMORRIS: I should say *none* Admiral—.

(Signed) JAMES A. MOLLISON,  
Lt. Col., A. C.

[18] December 5th one B-24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "M":

"COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Ft. Shafter, TH.:

Four six five Twenty sixth.

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop it is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B\*dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS.

The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instructions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not the subject of a probably attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the possibility of being attacked by the Japanese.

After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram was sent—Exhibit "N":

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,  
Washington, D. C.:

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours Stop One of B twenty fours [19] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date shortly following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories Stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available Stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam field Stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic Signed MARTIN HAF 141.

SHORT

In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve B-17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time). None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmoline and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit "O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

Later in the morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by *commercial radio*—Exhibit "P":

[20] "Hawn Dept.,  
Fl. Shafter, T. H.:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL".

The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deciphered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable.

When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the time of that conversation



On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "Q":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

*Five four nine ninth* please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff officer received.

COTTON, *Acting*".

The following reply was made by this Headquarters—Exhibit "R":

[21] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HQ Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT.

Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action that followed.

About 7:15 A. M. a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until after the attack at 8:00.

After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was closed at 7:00 A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further practice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following affidavits—

Exhibit "8":

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

*Territory of Hawaii, ss:*

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received [22] by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. Sunday, to December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opna that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opna about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH,



who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.  
Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.  
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal  
Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) ADAM R. HUGGINS,  
2nd Lt., Signal Corps,  
Summary Court.

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,

ss:

*Territory of Hawaii,*

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H., and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockhard at the Opana station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald,  
JOSEPH P. McDONALD,  
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,  
ADAM R. HUGGINS,  
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,  
Summary Court.

STATEMENT OF LIFUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was one South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing

planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station [24] for radio direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C., Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler,  
KERMIT A. TYLER,  
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probability, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor.

#### ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK

At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9:00 a second attack was made, and a third about 11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect.

*Antiaircraft Artillery:* All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M. At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire.

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o'clock raid. The first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00 noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S").

[25] *Hawaiian Air Force:* During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M. the serviceable bombers took off on a mission under naval control.

Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was as follow:

Pursuit planes in commission	-----	80	
Pursuit planes out of commission	-----	69	
Reconnaissance planes in commission	-----	6	
Reconnaissance planes out of commission	-----	7	
Bombers in commission	-----	39	
Bombers out of commission	-----	33	
Damaged in Raid:			
Pursuit planes	-----	88	
Reconnaissance planes	-----	6	
Bombers	-----	34	
Status as of December 20th, 1941:			
		<i>In commission</i>	<i>Reparable locally</i>
Pursuit planes	-----	61	22
Reconnaissance	-----	6	2
Bombers <sup>1</sup>	-----	50	13

<sup>1</sup> Includes 29 bombers from mainland.

#### Exhibit "T"

A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at twenty-nine (29).

Exhibit "U"

24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 A. M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A. M. the Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by 5:00 P. M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

25th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A. M. It also started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A. M., and completed movement to position by 4:00 P. M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26] standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was brought out very clearly.

At 9:00 A. M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompleted underground Interceptor Command Post.

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:

Japanese.....	370
Germans.....	98
Italians.....	14
Total.....	482

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam Field.

Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander to assume the responsibility as Military Governor.

December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the 9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and civilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construction of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city.

Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action was taken:

1. Courts were closed.
2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the work of their offices.
- [27] 3. An Advisory Committee headed by Governor Poindexter was appointed.
4. A Military Commission and Provost Court were appointed.
5. The sale of intoxicating liquors, beer and wine was prohibited.

[28] EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, February 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and the action taken by the War Department. Each item is supported by exhibits.

1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to the Chief of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and



recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these points were:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy,
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft,
- (3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense,
- (4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery,
- (5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights,
- (6) Roads and trails,
- (7) Necessary bombproof construction,
- (8) Increase in the number of engineer troops.

A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V".

2. On February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Department, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombardment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in the amount of \$1,565,600.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings. This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind., AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of \$1,358,000.00 [29] would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency Authority granted.—Exhibit "W".

3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Field would be extremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the approval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and requested funds in the amount of \$3,480,650.00. This correspondence was indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the island.—Exhibit "X".

4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds.—A letter was submitted to the War Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confidential radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects", in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by 1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, September 14, 1941, again recommending an immediate allotment of \$125,000.00 for field fortification and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject: "Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material", which recapitulated the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of \$1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "Y".



5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this Department was brought to the War Department's attention in letter File Engr. 000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: "Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field". This letter stated, "There is definite need for camouflage treatment on all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment had been undertaken at any airfield in this Department." This proposal was finally approved in 3rd Ind., file AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G from the Adjutant General's Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount of \$56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose. The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects "Camouflage of Defense Installations". This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, Adjutant General's Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its effectiveness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.—Exhibit "Z".

6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of \$1,370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads, railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only \$350,000.00 had been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1A".

7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department's attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [31] schedule:

(1) Bellows Field.....	April 5, 1941
(2) Barking Sands.....	May 2, 1941
(3) Hilo Airport.....	May 2, 1941
(4) Homestead Field.....	May 2, 1941
(5) Morse Field.....	May 2, 1941
(6) Haleiwa.....	May 22, 1941
(7) Burns Field.....	May 22, 1941
(8) Lanai.....	May 22, 1941
(9) Parker Ranch.....	June 2, 1941
(10) Kipapa.....	May 14, 1941

At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started. In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need of an additional airdrome on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a 5000' runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to complete this runway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now a useable base, but all construction which [32] has been done to make this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1B".

8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381. This letter informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility

for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this headquarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14, 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20 Kaneohe Bay project, subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay", which recommended both additional personnel and additional armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General's Office, file AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This indorsement also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated. The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be allotted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be made available for the construction at Kaneohe Bay and also that \$117,256.00 be made available for the completion of the project for [33] construction of railroad gun positions. At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit "1C".

9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was brought to the War Department's attention by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the adequacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that \$25,000.00 had been requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this landing strip. Some improvements had been made utilizing troop labor of the 804th Engineers; however, due to the lack of funds these improvements were limited and did not adequately solve the problem.—Exhibit "1D".

10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impossibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaala station, for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June 26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced to an A-1-c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters 29 September, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending the allotment of these additional funds, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with construction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original fixed stations were in operation.—Exhibit "1E".

[34] 11. The entire construction program in this Department has been delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are ordinarily purchased as an "over the counter" transaction. From a study of the the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant

that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priorities and Preference Ratings," July 3, 1941. This letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this difficulty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "1F".

12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally requested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12, which recommended that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Department, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution of the problem by the allotment of \$500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essential materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the \$500,000.00 was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneche Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials other than lumber had been accumulated.—Exhibit "IG".

13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity with which the arrangements were completed.—Exhibit "1H".

NOVEMBER 27, 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,  
*Headquarters Hawaiian Department,*  
*Office of the Department Commander,*  
*Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ H. H. ARNOLD,  
 Major General, U. S. A.,  
 Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

[36] 14. Increase in Engineer Troops:  
*February 10, 1941.*—TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being sent and it was not possible to aid in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested. On 19 Feb. 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here. 1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng. Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive



in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service) requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Department issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion. The troops for the 304th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941. Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated until 17 October 1941. It had not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "1 I".

15. Increase in Coast Artillery Troops:

*February 18, 1941.*—Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regiments CA Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery); one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064 enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700 enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2 (2-18-41) (56) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented with a total of 276 officers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March 1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "1J").

*June 1941:*

- (1) AA fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men.
- (2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men
- (3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17 officers, 359 enlisted men)

[37] *November 1941:*

- (1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion—(48 officers, 885 enlisted men).
- (2) Battery H 97 CA (4 officers, 134 enlisted men).
- (3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men).

*March 1941:*

- (1) AA fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men).
- (2) 3 Battalion. 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M 3 Battalion, 98 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men).

*February 25th, 1941.*—Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit 1J) requesting increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to 1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit 1J) 1st indorsement file 320.2/57.

*February 25th, 1941.*—Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit 1J) requesting following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department:

- (1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit 1J) be given priority.
- (2) That 11th F. A. be organized under T/O dated November 1 1940.
- (3) One Tank Battalion.
- (4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields.
- (5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/O November 1 1940.

- (6) That 11th F. A. Brig. (less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under T/O November 1, 1940.

TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (58) (Exhibit 1J) that CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately, that reinforcements for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved; and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded file 320.2/70. On July 15 letter from TAG file 320.2/82m (Exhibit 1J) activated the following units:

- [38] 97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions, and Batteries F and G.

98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band), Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C, D, F, G and H.

16. Increase in Air Corps Strength:

*April 9th, 1941.*—Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3-5-41) (61) (Exhibit 1K) directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3, 1941 (Exhibit 1K) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 "Reorganization of Forces in Hawaiian Department" (Exhibit 1K).



April 24th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) subject "Air Base Group" requesting:

- (1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station
- (2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group
- (3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups
- (4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized.

By second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2 (4-24-41) (94) (Exhibit 1K):

(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in abeyance pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG, file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) request was made for two additional material squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio, file 320.2/100 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Headquarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio No. 380 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very difficult. In answer, Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c (Exhibit 1K) stating [39] not favorably considered because it would exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit 1K) from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Headquarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to be furnished by the Department.

On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit 1K) was received asking:

- (1) What are total AC personnel requirements.
- (2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC.
- (3) Number AB groups needed and their locations.

On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit 1K) answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following:

- (1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku)
- (2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize these groups.

(3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit 1K) consisting of 27 officers, 220 enlisted men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Phillipine Islands.

(4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men).

(5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists)

(6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4 officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands, Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii.

(7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons—(1) Lanai (under construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted).

On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit 1 K) requesting immediate assignment.

- (1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF
- (2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of enlisted men for employment does not help.

[40] (3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot maintenance. Becoming acute.

(4) Must have personnel and material at once. No personnel available here for activation of units.

On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit 1K) from TAG stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that group not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war garrison?

On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit 1K) to TAG—Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups.

On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit 1K). On November 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. 1K) was sent to TAG requesting Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands. Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a (exhibit 1K) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department.

17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th, 1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit 1L) requesting that two triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter; also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4-25-41) (37) (exhibit 1L). TAG returned this letter without action.

May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit 1L) stating that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning Service.

[41] June 5th, 1941.—Letter was written to TAG, file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) subject "War Garrison for Initial War Operations" stating

(1) That Table I, (Exhibit 1L) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425.  
(2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneohe Bay, Airfields, beaches and provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops.

(3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneohe Bay as follows: 1 Regiment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.); 1 Battalion C. A. 155 guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A. 12" Barbette guns.

(4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approximately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12" Barbette guns . . . total 11,279.

(5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

(6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisons each of outlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be within war garrison strength.

On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit 1L file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) TAG said

(1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429 and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional Battery, 1 Battery CA.

(2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is disapproved.

(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available.

18. May 2nd, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit 1M) subject "Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade" requesting authority to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig. and the Intelligence Battery, 53rd CA Brig. about June 1, 1941.

June 12, 1941.—First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41) (38) (exhibit 1M) gives authority to activate.

[42] 19. November 6, 1941.—Radio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121 (exhibit 1N) stated that 6-37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941 funds be sent? Reply not yet received.

20. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE. Before February 7, 1941, Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. 1W (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing

Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning (the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid took place on December 7, 1941.

#### EFFORTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE

[43] ¶ Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of prime importance:

1. Production and storage of food.
2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit "10".)

*Production and storage of food:* As a result of my talk and support by the papers and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers increased about 20% during the first month.

For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment of acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pineapples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled upon telegraphic advice.—Exhibit "1P".

On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meeting was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor's Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in this [44] manner instead of having each plantation make purchases.

The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six months. The cost of these items was estimated to be \$2,500,000 for human consumption and \$900,000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was taken up with the War Department.

Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that the President has made an allotment for food production.

*Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded:* The Medical Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actually functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were organized. They started reporting at 9:00 A. M. December 7th, and by 9:30 all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists, etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was operating at 8:45 A. M.

After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Honolulu \$200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th.

Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of these have actually been equipped and operated since December 7th.



*Organization of auxiliary police force:* The organization of an auxiliary police force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immediately after the raid.

Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization.

[45] *Evacuation and shelters:* Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps, for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of public utilities. A request for \$2,800,000 for construction of these camps and shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor Poindexter. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th. Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii for this purpose.—Exhibit "1Q"

#### M-DAY BILL

At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill. The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police work immediately following the attack on December 7th.

#### LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN DEFENSE

The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "1R"

HONOLULU, T. H., December 22, 1941.

The PRESIDENT, *The White House, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- [46] cision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very vest respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu



Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty; Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

C. C. to General Walter C. Short.

[47]

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu

HONOLULU, HAWAII, *December 20, 1941.*

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Fort Shafter.*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker,  
T. G. S. WALKER,

*Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu.*

[47a]

SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

Executive Chambers

HONOLULU

23 DECEMBER 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H.*

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief

Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941.

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian [47b] defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food*: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned foods. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the [47c] preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS A TRUE COPY.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. B. POINDEXTER,  
Governor of Hawaii.

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Captain, Infantry.

[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department.

I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have done over the past ten months.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. The radiogram from the War Department thru CINCUS fleet UCS of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex # 7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

[49] During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.



I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

[57a]

[Exhibit A]

[57] copy

[SECRET]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

[Paraphrase]

## NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU QUOTE:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x

CBO CRJ	DATE 16 OCT 41	SERIAL NO. 10-340
ORIGINATOR	ACTION	
OPNAV	CINCLANT	INFORMATION
	CINCPAC	
	CINCAF	

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.



[Exhibit B]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P1 WAR PRTY

WASHN DC 611 PM Nov 27 1941

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

True Copy

MARSHALL

O. M. Cutler

O M CUTLER

116P/27

*Lt Col Infantry*

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 5M.

[Exhibit C]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

*Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.*

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure

To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July 1941.

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,

*Colonel, A. G. D.,*

*Adjutant General.*

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

*Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.*

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By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop,  
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

RESTRICTED

[a]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T H, 5 November 1941.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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[1]

SECTION I--GENERAL

1. *PURPOSE.*—The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 159, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

2. *UNIT PROCEDURES.*—Conforming to the Department Procedure, sub-

ordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

3. **SHORT TITLE.**—"SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. **DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.**—Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. **FORWARD ECHELON.**—

Commanding General and Aides  
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5)  
Secretary to General Staff  
Engineer Officer  
Signal Officer  
Chemical Officer  
Ordnance Officer  
Surgeon  
Headquarters Commandant  
Provost Marshal.

b. **REAR ECHELON.**—

G-1  
G-5  
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. **TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.**—See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground  
b. Position to be held lightly  
c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them

d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. **SECURITY.**—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

7. **LIAISON.**—a. **OFFICERS.**—During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

[2] 24th Infantry Division  
25th Infantry Division  
Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command  
Hawaiian Air Force  
86th Observation Squadron  
Each Department Reserve Unit.

b. **UNITS.**—Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

8. **ORDERS.**—a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. **MOVEMENT.**—a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in

bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).

d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25-10, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized.

e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.

f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one-way* secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

[3] g. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. **ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.**—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

11. **INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.**—All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.

12. **GUIDES.**—a. In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.

#### SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below.

14. **ALERT NO. 1.**—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

[4] (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned



sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

- Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below
- Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
- Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
- Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
- Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
- WAIAU Generating Plant
- Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHAU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE
- Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.
- Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA
- Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.
- (4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
- (5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 *j* below.
- e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:
  - (1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.
  - (2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.
  - (3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
  - (4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
- f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
  - (1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
  - (2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 *g* below.
- g.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:
  - Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.
  - h.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:
    - (1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
    - (2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
  - [5] (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
- i.* The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.
- j.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 *d* (3) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.
- 15. *ALERT NO. 2.*—*a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
  - b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
  - c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.
  - d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
    - (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
    - (2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.
    - (3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
    - (4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned

sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 *h* (2) below  
 Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1  
 Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2  
 Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS  
 Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA  
 WAI'AU Generating Plant  
 Telephone exchanges at WAIPA'U, WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANE'OHIE

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[6] (6) Place 240mm. howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 *e* below.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 *l* below.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

*g.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

*h.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).

*i.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

[8] *1.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

16. *ALERT NO. 3.—a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

*b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 *a*) will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 *b*) will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

*c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

*d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

[9] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *1* (2) below.



(10) Protect all seacoast and [antiaircraft armament, [searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

- (1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
- (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
- (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
- (4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
- (5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.
- (6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 *e* (8).
- (7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

*g.* G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) A Food Administration.

(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

*h.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

*i.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

[10] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *L* (2) below.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

*l.* STATION COMPLEMENTS.—

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

*m.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above. Instructions will be issued.



## SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

*a.* MATERIAL READINESS.—

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

[1] B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

*b.* DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

## SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

## 19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.—

*a.* Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEHOE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

*b.* Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEHOE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

*c.* Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

*d.* Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

*e.* Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

## 20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.—

*a.* NAVY.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[12] (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

(g) See paragraph 20 *c* below.

## b. ARMY.—

(1) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) *86th Observation Squadron.*—

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"—see 20 b (1) above.

[13] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of long-range artillery fire.

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(4) *Each Infantry Division.*—

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report *enemy front lines* and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report location of *cwn front lines*. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South Sector.

(5) *Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.*—

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formation.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY.

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage to use of chemical agents.

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) *District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts.*—Report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation.

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group.

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) *Department Signal Office.*—

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately, should be taken.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) *Transmission of G-2 Information.*—

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

21. *MEASURES FOR HANDLING.*—

a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports.

c. MAPS.—Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. *REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.*—

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. *THE DEPARTMENT G-2* will:



a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and adhered to.

c. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Department Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

#### 24. G-2 FORMS.—

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see page 2, Inclosure No. 5.

#### SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. SUPPLY (See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).—

##### a. SUPPLY AREAS.—

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9—91.0)—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying islands.

b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations); including QMC class II and IV:

Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONOLULU.

(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and G-4, H. H. D.

(4) A standard menu ration is established or Alert No. 3.

##### c. CLASS III SUPPLIES.—

(1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers *filled*. Replenishment will be made in the following manner:

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area.

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the supply [17] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.

(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.

(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.

(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.



(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air Corps Station.

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.

(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the District Commanders.

d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps).—

(1) *Medical Supply*:

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(2) *Signal Supply* (except Signal Corps aircraft radio):

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(3) *Signal Supply*—aircraft radio only:

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.

(4) *Chemical Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) *Engineer Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at DP's to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.

(6) *Water Supply*: Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY OF HONOLULU water systems.

(7) *Air Corps Supply*: All supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD and WHEELER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of services announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

(8) *Ordnance Supply* (other than ammunition Class V).—

Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES:

(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (See (3) below).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)

(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.

Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.

Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.

Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

26. **EVACUATION.**—

a. **PERSONNEL:**

(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area west of the line: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL—EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hospital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [19] Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.

(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.

(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOWS FIELD to Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.

(d) Air fields on outlying islands, by vehicle to local hospital or by air to Tripler General Hospital or Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be arranged by the responsible commanders for each field.

(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.

(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquarters to each District Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.

b. **ANIMALS:**

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals.

c. **SALVAGE:** To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services indicated.

d. **PRISONERS OF WAR.**—

(1) Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEHOE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures—Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. **TRAFFIC.**—

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

28. **MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.**—

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [20] consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into

position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. E. Donegan,  
WM. E. DONEGAN,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff. G-3.

Inclosures:

- No. 1—Map, Communications Installations.
- No. 2—Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
- No. 3—Map, Electric Installations.
- No. 4—Estimate of Enemy Situation.
- No. 5—Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
- No. 6—Allowances of Ammunition.
- No. 7—Unit of Fire.
- No. 8—Load of Aircraft Ammunition.

Inclosure No. 1

(Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2, *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 96 and 97, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 2

RAILROAD BRIDGES

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W. of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0'	16'
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	448'
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5'	98'

Inclosure No. 2—Continued  
RAILROAD BRIDGES—Continued

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22. 0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11. 0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22. 0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20. 0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30. 0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75. 0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115. 0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107. 0'	443'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55. 0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13. 0'	112'

HIGHWAY BRIDGES—PRIORITY

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream	01. 95-84. 12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98. 4 -87. 8
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 46-95. 68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 37-96. 75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Heleliwa	87. 98-07. 98
74	Kam Highway over Waiamea R., Waimea	92. 82-13. 52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95. 27-98. 92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93. 72-96. 96
13	Kam Highway over Opaoula (Twin Bridges) at Waialua	87. 78-06. 33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32. 45-70. 22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Thompson Corner	86. 00-04. 57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 12-05. 76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 52-06. 20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keeki Lagoon	11. 76-76. 55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay	14. 34-03. 25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97. 79-95. 34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu	98. 56-82. 46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06. 82-30. 30
109	Kam Highway at Heels fish pond	21. 04-89. 11

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3, *supra*, is a map showing electric installations, Island of Oahu. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 98, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 4

Title  
Place  
Date and hour

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).

b. Enemy land operations.

- (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
- (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.

- (b) (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
- (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Chief of section.



Inclosure No. 5

From: (Date and hour)  
 To: (Date and hour)  
 Issuing unit  
 Place  
 Date and hour of issue

PERIODIC REPORTS

No. -----

Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
  - a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).—Location and nature.
  - b. Defensive organization.—Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
  - c. Units in contact.—Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
  - d. Artillery.—Location and calibers.
  - e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.—Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
  - f. Supply and evacuation establishments.—Location and nature.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
  - a. General summary—action of enemy forces as a whole.
  - b. Operations of component elements.
    - (1) Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
    - (2) Enemy Land Operations.
      - (a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
      - (b) Operations of Land Components.
        1. Antiaircraft artillery.
        2. Antitank units.
        3. Armored forces.
        4. Artillery.
        5. Aviation, combat.
        6. Aviation, observation.
        7. Parachute Troops.
        8. Cavalry.
        9. Chemical warfare.
        10. Engineers.
        11. Infantry.
        12. Tanks.
        13. Administrative elements.
  - c. Sabotage.
  - d. Miscellaneous.—Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in *b* above.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.
  - a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
  - b. Morale.
  - c. Supply and equipment.
  - d. Terrain not under our control.
  - e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
  - f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
  - g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

1816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Form G

INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS

A form for

Periodic Intelligence Report

for

Air Combat Units

(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)

Periodic Intelligence Report

From: (Date and hour)  
 To: (Date and hour)  
 Issuing unit  
 Place of issue  
 Date and hour of issue

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.—(Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.—(Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.—(Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.—(Additions or changes giving serial number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS.—(Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.—(Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—(list in priority of their probable adoption or, if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.—(Any items not covered by above.)

NOTE.—Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.

Inclosure No. 6.

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon				
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total	
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903.....	CA.....	25	140	20	185	
	Eng.....		40		40	
	FA.....		32	8	40	
	Inf.....	16	112	32	160	
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40	
	QM.....		40		40	
	Sig.....		25		25	
	Others.....	30	105	15	150	
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1.....	Eng.....	48	80	24	152	
	Inf.....	24	162	46	232	
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40	
	Ord.....		64	16	80	
	Sig.....		40		40	
	MP.....		48		48	
	Others.....	30	105	15	150	
	CWS.....		460	120	580	
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	CA.....	60	560	60	680	
	FA.....	960		240	1200	
	Inf.....	60	992	120	1,172	
	Ord.....		240	60	300	
	QM.....	30	30	20	80	
	Others.....	150	525	75	750	
	Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4)	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf.....	500	3,500	1,000	5,000	
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC (M1917A1)	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	4,800		1,200	6,000	
	CA.....	7,200		1,800	9,000	
	(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.).....	3,600		900	4,500	
	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000	
	Inf.....	675	4,725	1,350	6,750	
	Others.....	600	2,100	300	3,000	
Pistol, cal. .45.....	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf.....		28		28	
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.....		21		21	

Inclosure No. 6—Continued

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	Sig. (motorcycles).....		340		340
	Sig. (other than motorcycles).....		250		250
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)....	MP.....		440	110	550
	Others.....		240	60	300
	CA.....	5,760		1,440	7,200
	(AW Bn.).....				
	CA (except AW Bn.).....	2,880		720	3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	Others.....	2,880		720	3,600
	FA.....	600		150	750
	Inf.....	960		240	1,200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	1,568		392	1,900
Shotgun.....	All.....				25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....	Inf.....				150
	Inf.....				25
Signals, ground (asstd.).....	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.).....				5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.).....				30
Lights, Very signal (assorted).....	All.....				24
37mm gun, M1916.....				240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3).....	FA.....	200			200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft.....	Inf.....	180		20	200
	CA.....	180			1,800
	Inf.....			1,620	1,800
60mm Mortar.....	Inf.....			120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar.....	Inf.....		Light	132	150
			Heavy	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D.....	All.....				#459
75mm gun, Antitank.....	FA.....				#144
105mm How.....	FA.....				#205
155mm How.....	FA.....				#117
3" AA mobile.....	CA.....	15		285	300
90mm AA mobile.....	CA.....	12		238	250
3" AA fixed.....	CA.....			300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1.....	All.....			100	100
240mm How. M1918.....	FA.....			60	60
8" Ry. Gun.....	CA.....	85			85

FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY

3" gun, M1903.....			505	505
6" gun.....	1,000			1,000
8" gun.....	350		200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage).....	335			335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage).....	275			275
12" Mortar.....	300			300
14" gun.....	280			280
16" gun.....	250			250

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made. # Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

Inclosure No. 7.

UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903.....	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle).....	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle).....	600		150		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1).....	600	2,100	300		3,000
Pistol, cal. .45.....		20			20
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....		160	40		200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	720		180		900

1818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Inclosure No. 7—Continued

UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT—Continued

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries)	1,920		480		2,400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)	960		240		1,200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)					150
Projector, signal ground (assorted)					25
Pistol, Vevy, MkIII					24
37mm gun, M1916				120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3	84			36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft	60			540	600
60mm Mortar				400	400
81mm Mortar			Light	234	300
			Heavy	66	
3" Trench Mortar					300
75mm Field Gun			Super	36	300
			Normal	150	
			Reduced	114	
75mm gun, antitank	111			39	150
105mm How				225	225
155mm How. M1918				150	150
3" AA gun, mobile	15			285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile	12			238	250
3" AA gun, fixed				300	300
155mm gun, M1918 MI	112			38	150
240mm How. M1918				60	60
8" Ry Gun	85				85
4" Chemical Mortar					200
4.2" Chemical Mortar					200

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.  
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Inclosure No. 8

LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE

Type airplane	Bombers			Pursuit			OBS. (C&D)
	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	
Item							1-engine (O-47)
Ctg. AP Cal 30							
Ctg. ball Cal 30	480	1,280	1,920	1,600	400	800	640
Ctg. tr Cal 30	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#	600	1,600	2,400	2,000	500	1,000	800
Ctg. AP Cal 50	60			20	10		
Ctg. ball Cal 50	900			300	150		
Ctg. tr Cal 50	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#	1,200			400	200		
BOMBS							
Bomb frag. 30# and			40			10	
Bomb Demo. 100# or	20	32	12				
Bomb Demo. 300# or	14	14	4				
Bomb Demo. 500-600# or	8	6	2				
Bomb Demo. 1,000-1,100# or	6	4	1				
Bomb Demo. 2,000#	4	2					
PYROTECHNICS							
Bomb Photoflash	14	14					14
Flare M26 <sup>1</sup>	3	3	1				1
Flare M9	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift	10	7					

<sup>1</sup> For Reconnaissance squadrons only.

<sup>2</sup> Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.



[CORRECTED COPY]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE) added to SOP\*HD.)

To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27 and 9f, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below:

“27. *Traffic:* The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

“9. *f.* Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others. *Standard blackout light or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.* On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.”

2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance of all troops in this Department:

Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE), SOP HD.

(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with the following exceptions:

- a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions.
- b. In case of accidents or other emergencies.

(2) Route markers are authorized for tactical or convoy movements.

(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force.

(4) Only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Moss Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent.

(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a distance of not to exceed 100 feet.

(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal.

(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will be arrested promptly.

(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honolulu:

School Street	Nuuanu Avenue
Lusitania Street	Alapai Street between Lusitania and
Beretania Street	Beretania
King Street	Iwilei Road between King and railroad
Waialae Street	tracks
Dillingham Boulevard	Queen Street on mauka side between
Middle Street	Iwilei Road and Fort Street

(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the following:

a. Military vehicles on a military mission.

b. Civilian police cars.

c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal. All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military) or until ALL CLEAR is given.

(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their personnel are informed of the above contents.

(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed.  
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,  
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500 for file w/SOP.

[CORRECTED COPY]

(Please destroy all previous copies)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Forward Echelon,  
0500 17 December 1941.

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 f and 9 h (tentative) SOP-HD)

To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP-HD and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Reference letter, HHD, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP-HD is further corrected as follows:

a. "9. f. Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders, will be:

"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or *approved modifications* with tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or,

"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights or *approved modifications* on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others.

"(3) Standard blackout lights or *approved modifications* are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.

"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall have modified lights conforming to the following specifications:

"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air."

b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows:

"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications" using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail light shielded or painted all blue."

c. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (5) deleted.

d. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal."

2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP-HD (see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941).

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

J. LAWTON COLLINS,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. Donegan  
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,  
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph 11b, c, d, e and f (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting paragraph a and adding paragraphs b, c, d, e and f.

"11. Installations and Alarm System.—a. All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith."

b. (1) A general Air Raid Alarm will be started by sounding a long blast on the siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication with the Navy Detail at the Aloha Tower.

(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups. Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient.

(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose except in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals.

- (a) Siren on Aloha Tower.
- (b) Stewart type Klaxon Horn.
- (c) Ambulance sirens.
- (d) Fire truck sirens.
- (e) Police sirens.
- (f) All other sirens not covered above.

c. The "Recall from Air Raid Alarm" or "All Clear Signal" will be relayed by the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower, on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The signal will be "broken short blasts" repeated until relayed by adjacent units.

d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and "All Clear" instructions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communication nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU.

e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft.

f. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the District Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. Donegan,  
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,  
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., 500 for file w/SOP.

[Exhibit D]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
Fort Shafter, T. H.  
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.  
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

[Extract]

\* \* \* \* \*

3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation

and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

\* \* \* \* \*  
18. Navy. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

\* \* \* \* \*  
i. Distant reconnaissance.  
\* \* \* \* \*

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) Walter C. Short  
WALTER C. SHORT  
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding,  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH  
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commandant,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

True Extract Copy:

O. M. Cutler  
O. M. CUTLER  
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit E]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 March 1941.

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS:—To be included as a part of Annex No. VII, HCF-39, (14-ND-JCD 13) RCT, Joint Security Measures for the protection of the PACIFIC FLEET and PEARL HARBOR BASE, (now in preparation).

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for



the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

Approved: 21 March, 1941

(sgd) C. C. Bloch  
 C. C. BLOCH  
*Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy*  
*Commandant*

(sgd) Walter C. Short  
 WALTER C. SHORT  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding*

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

True Copy: O. M. Cutler  
 O. M. CUTLER  
*Lt. Col., Infantry*

[Exhibit F]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF OF STAFF

*War Department, Washington DC*

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

SHORT

Enc sec by  
 Lt Jos Engelbertz SC  
 5:40 P 27 Nov 41

True copy  
 O. M. Cutler  
 O M CUTLER,  
*Lt Col Infantry*

[Exhibit G]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

-----  
 Signature and Title

114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY

WASHN, D. C., 842P Nov 28, 1941.

*C G Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS

True copy  
 O. M. Cutler  
 O. M. CUTLER  
*Lt col Infantry*

[Exhibit H]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

[Extract—MID—SR 30—45]

3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. a. (1) By direction of the President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investigation of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of subversive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred to as the F. B. I.

(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection may be obtained without duplication of effort.

b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

True Extract Copy

O. M. Cutler

O. M. CUTLER,

*Lt. Col., Infantry*

[Exhibit I]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

-----  
(date)

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority

/sgd/Thomas H. Green,  
THOMAS H. GREEN,  
*Lt. Col. J. A. G. D.,*  
*Department Judge Advocate.*

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
*War Department, Washington, D. C.*

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection

comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which permits The Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

SHORT

Enc Sec by  
 LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC  
 Lt Jos Engelbertz SC  
 2:45 P 29 Nov 41  
 True copy  
 O. M. Cutler,  
 O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt Col Infantry*

[Exhibit J]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
 OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

*Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December, 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Sig.  
 Subject: Detector Operation.  
 To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY,  
*Lt. Col., Sig C.*

True Copy:  
 O. M. Cutler,  
 O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col., Infantry.*

[Exhibit K]

SECRET

HICKAM FIELD, T. H.  
*20 December 1941.*

AFFIDAVIT

I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

JAS. A. MOLLISON,  
*Lt. Col., A. C.,  
 H. A. F. C/S.*

True Copy:  
 O. M. Cutler  
 O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col., Infantry*

[Exhibit L]

## CERTIFICATE

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu.

Captain McMorris: I should say *none* Admiral.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,  
*Lieut. Colonel, A. C.*

True Copy:

O. M. Cutler,  
O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col., Infantry*

[Exhibit M]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

RCA 831 US GOVT

WASHINGTON, DC *Nov 26 1941* L149P

COMMANDING GENERAL,  
*Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, TH.*  
*Four six five twenty sixth*

Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshal Group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moeresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake Comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moeresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval operations Comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS

Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941.

True copy:

O. M. Cutler,  
O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col., Infantry.*

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465—26th



[Exhibit N]

(Copy)

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

## MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

/s/ CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D.

Approved for Transmission:

/s/ O. M. McDole,  
Major A. G. D.,  
Asst. Adjutant General.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,  
Washington, D. C.

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C

SHORT.

Enc sec by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41

A True Copy

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2d Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit O]

20 DECEMBER 1941.

CERTIFICATE

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission, with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed during the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time).

Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gasoline to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammunition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition.

The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50 cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,  
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy

O. M. Cutler,  
O. M. CUTLER,  
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit P]

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

1549Ws Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P  
C G*Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH*

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941

Code Message No. 529 7th

True Copy

O. M. Cutler,  
O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col. Infantry.*

[Exhibit Q]

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P 3 war L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent

WASHINGTON DC 219P Dec 9 1941.

C G

*Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH*

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received

COLTON  
*Acting.*

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941

True Copy

O M Cutler  
O M CUTLER  
*Lt Col Infantry.*

[Exhibit R]

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren stop. Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5).

[Exhibit S]

SECRET

Copy

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

*Territory of Hawaii, ss:*

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers. Further the deponent sayeth not.

/s/ GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,  
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,  
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

/s/ ADAM R. HUGGINS,  
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,  
Summary Court.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

*Territory of Hawaii, ss:*

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed

excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

JOSEPH P. McDONALD,  
*Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGGINS,  
*2nd Lieut., Signal Corps.*  
*Summary Court.*

True copy:

O. M. CUTLER,  
O. M. Cutler,  
*Lt. Col., Infantry*

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was on South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(s) Kermit A. Tyler,  
KERMIT A. TYLER,  
*1st Lieut., Air Corps.*

True copy.

O. M. Cutler,  
O. M. CUTLER,  
*Lt. Col. Infantry.*



HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),  
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.

To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O. P., N. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.

2. a. *Battery Weaver*. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).

Alerted 0810  
Ready to fire 0813  
Engaged enemy at 0814  
Amm. fired: 407—.30 Cal. ball.  
117—.30 Cal. A. P.  
53—.30 Cal. Tracer.  
12—Pistol.

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

*Battery G 97th*, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.

Alerted at 0810  
Ready to fire 0830  
Engaged enemy 0830  
Fired 30 rds—3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball  
Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40 A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead—Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.

(Basic: Ltr., Hq. 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec. 1941".)

*Battery F 97th*, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H.

Alerted 0755, and moved to battery position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.  
Ready to fire 0855  
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920  
Amm. fired: 27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.  
Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.  
Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

*Battery G 64th*, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.  
Ready to fire 1030  
Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030  
Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.

*Battery H 64th*, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.

Alerted 0830  
Ready to fire 1145  
Engaged Enemy 2100  
Amm. fired: 40 rds—.50 Cal. ball.  
40 rds—.50 Cal. A. P.  
30 rds—.50 Cal. Tracer

*Marine detachments*: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.

Alerted 0800  
Ready to fire 0810  
Engaged Enemy 0810  
Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.  
Approximately 450 rds of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much

shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. *98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.*

Alerted at 0800

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.

*1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA)*, was in position and ready for action at the following time:

B—98: 0955

D—98: 1000

C—98: 1030

*Battery M 64th*, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

*2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA)*. This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:

F—98: 1315

G—98: 1315

H—98: 1330

c. *Camp Malakole 251st C. A. (AA)*. All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

*1st Battalion 251st C. A. (AA)*, was in position and ready for action as follows:

B—251: at West Loch, 1145

C—251: Ewa Beach, 1145

D—251: South of Ewa, 1145

*2nd Battalion 251st C. A. (AA)*, was in position as follows:

E—251: Navy Yard

F—251: Navy Recreation Area

G—251: Tank Farm

H—251: Navy Yard

At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

d. *Fort Kamehameha*. Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

e. *Sand Island*. The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. *Fort Shafter*.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3,000 .30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—1000 .30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:

B—64: at Aiea, 1000

C—64: at Aliamanu, 1030

D—64: South of Aliamanu, 1100

F—64: at Pearl City, 1105

G—64: See Par. 2 a, above.

H—64: See Par. 2 a, above.

I—64: at Aliamanu

K—64: at Hickam Field

L—64: at Hickam Field.

M—64: See Par. 2 b, above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:

3", 23 rds.

.50 Cal., 2361 rds.

.30 Cal., 2821 rds.

g. *Fort Barrette*. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2254.

4. *Ammunition.* Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Alhamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

C. K. Wing  
C. K. WING,

*Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding.*

[Exhibit T]

*Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before attack*

HICKAM FIELD

Name	Total	Out	In
A-20 A	13	7	6
B-17 D	12	6	6
B-18	32	12	20
B-12 A	2	2	0
O-47 B	1	1	0
BT 2 BR	2	0	2
BT-2 CR	1	0	1
C-33	2	0	2
A-12	3	1	2
P-26 A	2	2	0
P-26 B	1	1	0
B-24	1	1	0
	72	33	39

BELLOWS FIELD

O-47 B	10	6	4
O-49	3	1	2

WHEELER FIELD

P40 C	13		4	9	
P40 B	57	100	32	55	64
P 36 A		44	21		20
P 26A		14	1	4	7-10
P 26B		6	3		3
B 18		1	0		1
B 12		3	2		1
AT 6		4	1		3
OA 9		3	0		3
O 47B		1	0		1
A 12A		2	0		2
OA 8		1	0		1
BT 2		2	2		0

Type	Damaged in raid	Percent of damage
<b>HICKAM FIELD:</b>		
A-20	2	18
B-17	10	40
B-18	21	65
B-24	1	100
<b>WHEELER FIELD:</b>		
P-40	67	65
P-36	21	55
<b>BELLOWS FIELD:</b>		
O-47	4	40
O-49	2	66

JAMES A. MOLLISON  
*Lt. Col. A. C.*

A true copy  
Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
*2nd Lt. F. A.*

## Aircraft status as of 1800, 20 December 1941

	B-17	B-18	A-20	P-40	P-36	O-47
In Commission.....	31	9	10	40	21	5
1st Echelon.....	6	5		2	3	2
2nd Echelon.....				3		
3rd Echelon.....	2			8	6	
Total.....	139	14	10	53	30	7

12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0600-7 Dec.

129 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dec. inclusive.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,  
Lt. Col. A. C.

A true copy

Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit U]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,  
Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO LIEUT COL. KENDALL J. FIELDER.

The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications are being received daily:

Time	Source	Details	Remarks	Total
0800-1000	6 officers from emergency landing field at Haleiwa.	Accounted for 10 planes.....	Some of these may appear in other reports.	10
	CO Mil District of Kauai.	1 plane crashed off North shore, 1 wrecked on Niihau.	Verified.....	2
	Civilian report.....	1 plane crashed in Gulch, rear Aiea Hgts.	Verified.....	1
	Group of officers on fishing trip.	3 planes crashing in Honolulu Harbor.	Verified.....	3
0940	Capt. Ebby, "B" Btry 55th C. A. C.	2 planes destroyed by machine-gun fire.	Verified.....	2
0922-1130	Btry "F", 55 CAC.....	2 planes.....	0922 report not verified, 1130 rpt verfd.	2
0805	251st C. A. C.....	1 plane, 200 yds. off Malikoli.....	Verified.....	1
1020	Btry "H" 97th CAC.....	1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi. SW Ft. Barrette.	Verified.....	1
0855	98th C. A. C.....	1 plane shot down near Wahiawa.	Verified.....	1
0830	Hq. Btry 15th CAC.....	1 plane crashed in Ord shops at Ft. Kam.	Verified.....	1
1100	35th Infantry.....	Observed 1 plane crash in sea SW Barbers Pt.	Verified.....	1
	27th Infantry.....	Observed 1 plane crash in cane field nr Aiea.	Not verfd.....	1
	298th Inf.....	1 plane shot down over Bellows Fld, fell in sea.	Verified.....	1
	24th Division.....	1 plane down at Brody Camp #4:1 nr Kaawa.	Verified.....	2
	Haw. Air Force.....	1 plane at Ft Weaver 1 at Wheeler Field, 1 at Hickam Field, 1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Barrette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1 shot down back of Naval Hospital.	2 doubtful.....	7
	Navy.....	1 plane by AA at Beckoning Pt, 1 on deck of a ship.	Verified.....	2
	Total.....			38

The Navy reports are not available.



T. H. DAVIES,  
Lt. Col., Inf, Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplications it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C., A. C. of S., G-2.

[Exhibit V]

[SECRET]

A true copy  
Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
2nd Lt. F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Office of the Department Commander,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941

In reply refer to  
Engr. 660

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,  
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
- (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
- (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
- (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
- (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
- (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
- (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

*Cooperation with the Navy.* A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of [2] instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

*Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.* Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

*Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense.* The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-O 4-11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile (less searchlight battery)) T. O. 4-15.

[3] Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery matériel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

*Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.* There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

*Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.* The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

*Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.* With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary for the defense of the island.

[4] There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

*Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.* Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should

be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

*Increase in the number of Engineer Troops.* The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

*Cooperation with the Navy.*

Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached, Inclosure No. 1 AG 354.2/JAX-(pencil)

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

[5] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft.* Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3,

*Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery.* Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55 copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

*North Shore Railroad Connection.* Letter, HHD Engr. 662.7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

*Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights.* a. Beach defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940." 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par 1c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

*Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails.*

Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

*Bombproofing of vital installations.* Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached)

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.

[6] 5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.

6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.



7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.

8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.

9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

*Increase in number of Engineer Troops.*—Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941,

subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, Commanding.*

19 Incls.

[Exhibit W]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Engineer 452.

**SECRET**

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the outlying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate from Oahu due to the limited time and radius of operation without refueling.

2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation. Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Department in connection with that Department's activities on its new air base in the Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent letter.

3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pursuit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and it will be necessary to provide protection by means of bunkers in the vicinity of existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to submit cost estimates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at \$1,200.00 each for pursuit planes, \$8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and \$15,000.00 each for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi strips and accessories.

4. This protection should be provided for 142 single engine pursuit ships and 121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes is \$315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is \$1,250,000.00. The total for the two types is \$1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of this protection.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

A true copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieut. F. A.*



[SECRET]

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.  
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind

ACW/mme

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., March 3, 1941. To the Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Adjutant General.*

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

2nd Ind

(12)

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C., March 5, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication. It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the next supplemental bill.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,  
*Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,*  
*Executive, Building, & Grounds Div.*

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieut. F. A.*

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)—38

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

3rd Ind.

3-N

Office, C. of E., April 1, 1942.

To the Adjutant General.

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombardment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs. It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories.

2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed.

3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of \$1,000,000 be made at this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of construction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

For the Chief of Engineers:

WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS,  
*Lieut. Col., Corps of Engineers,*  
*Executive Assistant.*

2 Incls:

Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41;  
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
*2nd lieut F. A.*

Via Air Mail

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.  
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 31, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visualized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time.

2. In locating these revetments, "battle stations" of airplanes should be visualized in view of present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. Revetments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent to airdromes.

3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles, provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated.

4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters for plane crews.

5. Funds, in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of this project as finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in estimates for funds now being prepared.

By order of the Secretary of War:

*Major General, The Adjutant General.*

Incls. w/d

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Engr. 452

5th Ind

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.*Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.*

1. Adjutants in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane crews and maintenance personnel.

2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows:

a. Personnel shelters 5' x 9' @ \$635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes, bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop labor.....	\$53, 975. 00
b. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ \$1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters, 5' by 9' @ \$635.00 to be constructed at locations other than Wheeler.....	\$155, 975. 00
c. 13 Lt. Bombardment bunkers @ \$8,000 and 8 personnel shelters 5' x 13' @ \$800.00.....	\$114, 400. 00
d. 70 four-engine bombardment bunkers @ \$15,000 and 70 personnel shelters 5' x 17' @ \$925.00.....	1, 050, 000. 00
Total.....	\$1, 374, 350. 00

3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at Bellows Field. These for A-20-A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the 4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable. This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam.

4. Since the figure of \$1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of \$1,358,000.00 mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included

in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this purpose.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

A True Copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieut. F. A.*

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.  
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G 6th Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *September 22, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Plans for revetments proposed in the preceding correspondence are approved.
2. Funds in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of revetments in the Hawaiian Department have been included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942.
3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Division, Corps of Engineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army Air Forces, upon completion.
4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for the construction of the required revetments.

By order of the Secretary of War:

*Major General The Adjutant General.*

A True Copy:  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
*F. A. 2nd Lieut.,*

[Exhibit X]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Engr. 600.96 SECRET

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The provision of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft by the Hawaiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force during an attack on Oahu.

2. At present all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are crowded into a small area at Hickham Field. This area is located close to the entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during blackouts. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camouflage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the Depot would be put of of action.

3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued maintenance facilities for the Air Force and the only logical solution is to provide bombproof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bombproofed protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B-17 type airplane and for two B-17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with required space for all subassembly overhaul and repair represents the minimum space required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this structure and estimates its cost at \$3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will offer no construction difficulties. Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet underground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack.

4. It is recommended that one underground repair depot of the type shown on inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in

the amount of \$3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets)  
2 Estimate  
3 Location Drawing

A True Copy:  
Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieut., F. A.*

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.  
AG 600.12 (9-10-41) NC-G 1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *October 27, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided.

2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk.

3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb-splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consideration will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General, The Adjutant General.*

3 Incls n/c  
A True Copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieut., F. A.*

[Exhibit Y]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., October 28, 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Engr. 400.312

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters:

a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject: "Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recommending that \$306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement, AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M-WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters was advised that the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective installations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods."

b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Request for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allotment of \$56,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field.

c. Letter to the Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that \$29,000 be allotted for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, 27 June 1941, approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date.



Radio from the Chief of Engineer 10 October 1941 advises that \$29,000 for camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Advisory Committee.

[2] d. Letter of The Adjutant General, Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," recommending that an initial allotment of \$1,565,600 be made for the construction of bunkers for the dispersion and protection of aircraft. 4th Indorsement AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E, 31 May 1941, granted authority for the construction of revetments for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes, and stated that funds in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of the project after receipt of revised estimates would be included in estimates for funds being prepared. 5th Indorsement Engr. 452, 31 July 1941, submitted a revised figure of \$1,374,350, and recommended that it be adopted instead of the \$1,358,000. 6th Indorsement, AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, 22 September 1941, approved plans for revetments, and advised funds in amount of \$1,358,000 for completion of revetments in department were included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943, funds expected to become available about January 1, 1942.

e. Letter from the Adjutant General, AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, 13 August 1941, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects," and 1st Indorsement thereon, AG 121/1, 14 September 1941, recommending the immediate allotment of \$125,000 for necessary materials and tools for the construction of field fortifications. This indorsement was followed up by radio 25 September 1941, recommending immediate favorable action on allotment of \$125,000 for execution of field fortifications and camouflage projects. War Department radio, 29 September 1941, advised request was not favorably considered, confirmed by 1st Indorsement War Department 14 September 1941.

f. Letter to the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject: "Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under Project 5, which requested \$50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office, Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only \$5,000 was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of \$50,000 requested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construction project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated for this purpose."

[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their accomplishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question. All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be constructed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on and organize private land.

3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project. These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all approaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged Bunker protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be protected by machine gun emplacements and fencing.

4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Salvage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local timbers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality.

5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to construct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor

funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be constructed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities. These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows:

*a. The Air Corps requirements.* The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where enemy planes might land. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts would be made to capture existing airfields. To prevent this, protected machine gun positions must be placed to guard the sensitive points on each airfield, and [4] mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea-borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition works.

*b. Coast Artillery requirements.* The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft guns protecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery cannot maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating personnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack, and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers. Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations, and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun.

*c. Infantry requirements.* The Infantry divisions will occupy beach positions, very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances. Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placed on private property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance.

6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions.

[5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of \$1,455,542 be made immediately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training activities.

8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands.

WALTER C. SHORT,

*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.)

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

*2nd. Lt., F. A.*

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

10 WAR TG 61 WD

WASHN, D. C., 252P Aug. 12, 1941.

CG

*Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

31 12th

AGMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject reallocation of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further information follows by mail

ADAMS

1017A

A True Copy

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit Z]

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Engr. 000.91

Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at any air field in this department.

2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates of costs and recommendations.

3. In reporting on this proposed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows:

"The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers. The plan generally calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads and irrigation ditches."

"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation."

"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged that the work be expedited."

"While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being completed."

"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved."

[2] 4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office in the amount of \$56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars, and warning apron at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incorporated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

1 Incl: Plan

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.



[3] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.  
 AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/gt-1712.  
 WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. C., July 29, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation.  
 By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Carl Robinson.  
 Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.  
 A True Copy  
 Edward Von Geldern  
 EDWARD VON GELDERN  
 2nd Lt., F. A.

[4] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.  
 600.1 (Wheeler Fld) 71 2nd Ind. 6-C  
 WAR DEPARTMENT,  
 OFFICE, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,  
 Washington, D. C., September 16, 1941.

To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii has received careful consideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the following comments are offered only to supplement and should not invalidate decisions made on the spot by officers with intimate knowledge of local conditions.

2. Specific comments on Part I:

*a. Bunkers.*—The bunkers do not appear in the best arrangement to give maximum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving alignment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V-112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed, they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the slope.

*b. Landing Field.*—The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more conspicuous by sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V-109-916-N-18). The same technique may be useful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin. The dark areas of the reproduced gully should not be used for taxiing and warming up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect.

[5] *c. Hangar Line.*

(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homogeneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads, dummy or real, were built between the two areas.

(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes a reference point when detected.

(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactory; maintenance will be required and should not be neglected.

(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shadows of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted, or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline. Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help materially against the bombers' approach.



(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down with a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment suggested.

3. Specific comments on Part II.

a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the material to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Concrete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company, which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava, are not more easily procurable.

[6] 4. It is recommended that:

a. That the plan of camouflage be approved.

b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and technical details to expedite the work.

c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion of the work, including photographs of intermediate the final stages. It is suggested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler Field from four directions.

d. That the amount of \$56,210.00 be allotted to the Department Commander, Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company.

For the Acting Chief of Engineers:

[s] HOMER SAINT-GAUDENS,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineer,  
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section.

1 Incl  
Sub. 1.

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[7] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

AG 007.5 (7-12-41)MC-G. 3rd Ind. WR-1712.  
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 28, 1941.  
To Chief of Engineers.

1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic correspondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction.

2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of \$56,210 in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl. n/c/

D. R. VAN SICKLER,  
Adjutant General.

Copy to:

Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind.  
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic ltr. 7-12-41,  
together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

27 FEB 1941.

Engr. 000.91

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installations cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial

photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombardment is of the utmost importance.

2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed seacoast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost estimates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative costs:

Installation	Armament	Inclosure No.	Cost
Ft. DERUSSY:			
Battery Randolph.....	2-14" (Disappearing).....	Incl. No. 1.....	} \$6,000.00
Battery Dudley.....	2-6" (Disappearing).....	Incl. No. 1.....	
Ft. KAMEHAMEHA:			
Battery Closson.....	2 12" (Barbette).....	Incl. No. 2.....	6,000.00
Battery Selfridge.....	2-12" (Disappearing).....	Incl. No. 3.....	5,000.00
Battery Jackson.....	2-6" (Disappearing).....	Incl. No. 3.....	1,500.00
Ft. RUGER:			
Battery Adams.....	2-8" (Barbette).....	Incl. No. 4.....	2,000.00
Ft. BARRETTE:			
Battery Hatch.....	2-16" (Barbette).....	Incl. No. 5.....	8,500.00
Total cost.....			\$29,000.00

The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of trees and shrubbery.

3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of \$29,000.00 be allotted this department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, Commanding.*

Incls. 1-5: Aerial Photos

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

AG 007.5 (2-27-41) M

1st Ind.

ACW/1f1

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
*March 13, 1941.*

To: The Chief of Engineers.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

*Adjutant General.*

5 Incls. n/c

C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3

2nd Ind.

6-E

OFFICE, C. OF E., *May 28, 1941.*

To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY.

1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installations by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adjutant General, in this connection.

2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries.

3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and

Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be made available at the earliest practicable date.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,  
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Fortification Section.*

5 Incls.—n/c

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

618.3/45-B

3rd Ind.

5

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,  
*June 12, 1941.*

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive. The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemating of these batteries.

2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates.

3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

JOE D. MOSS,  
*Major, C. A. C.,  
Acting Executive.*

5 Incls—No change.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department.

AG 007.5 (2-27-41)MC-E

4th Ind.

BSA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
*June 27, 1941.*

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Closson, Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. Funds to the amount of \$29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable date.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

5 Incls. w/d.

5th Ind.  
 HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
 FT. SHAFTER, T. H.,  
 July 24, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft. DeRussey, T. H.

1. To note and return to this headquarters.
2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the execution of this work when funds are received.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

O. M. McDole,  
 Major, A. G. G.,  
 Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
 EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
 2nd Lt., F. A.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations.")

000.91 6th Ind.  
 HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussy, T. H., July 29, 1941—To CG Haw. Dept.  
 Noted.

FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,  
 Major General, U. S. Army,  
 Commanding.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
 EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
 2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1A]

[1]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
 OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
 Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February, 1941.

Engr. 611

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940, covering the recommendations for the revision of the military Roads and Trails Program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program was not complete and additional roads and trails were under consideration.

2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following additional improvements are necessary:

a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost \$33,550.00. Construction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wiliwilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the existing road to the main crest of Koolaupoko Ridge area.

b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at \$12,720.00. This project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communication between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa-Pupukea trail.

c. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries to the main ridge of the Koolau along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails:

(1) Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost.....	\$35, 100. 00
(2) Kawailoa trail, 24,000 feet.....	22, 750. 00
(3) Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet.....	45, 750. 00
(4) Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet.....	28, 650. 00



d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project — (copy illegible — f a 10' class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Palailai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire control stations manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road is 8,700 feet and estimated cost \$10,000.00.

e. Iunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need for an alternate route to the Manauhua Defense Area is extremely important, particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Falehua road to hostile observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a 10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of \$136,500.00.

f. Radial Ridge roads, Manauhua area. This project calls for the construction of three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauhua as shown on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is \$84,900.00.

3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November 1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclosure No. 1 hereto.

1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road, 10' Class B .....	\$8,900
2. Fort Roger Roads, 10' Class B .....	4,000
3. Barbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail, 3L Trail .....	1,000
4. Maili Marker 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail .....	6,000
5. Maililili 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail .....	1,400
6. Eaena Point 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail .....	1,000
7. Wailoa Point 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail .....	1,000
8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net, Class A .....	133,000
9. North Shore RR Connection, R. R. ....	250,000
10. Improvement Wakiua Pupukea Road, 10' Class A & B .....	216,000
11. Waimoa-Pupukea Road, 10' Class B .....	35,000
12. Alternate RR Schofield-Wahiua Bypass, R. R. ....	70,000
13. Connection-Leiuhua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks (rail only) R. R. ....	48,600
14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield 25' Class A .....	33,000
15. Feeder Roads Wahiua Pupukea Road, Improvement .....	111,800
16. Eabuku 155-mm Position Road, 10' Class B .....	9,500
17. Rabuku CP Trail, CP Trail .....	2,100
18. Kepuhi CP Trail, CP Trail .....	8,000
19. Koolau Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	20,000
20. Wiliwilimoa Road, Improvement .....	17,900
21. Wiliwilimi Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	15,650
22. Poamoho Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	35,100
23. Pupukoa-Mabuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	12,720
24. Hawaiian Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	22,750
25. Schofield-Wahiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	45,750
26. Waiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail .....	28,650
27. Pau Palailai CP Road, 10' Class B .....	10,000
28. Eunia-Palahua Road, 10' Class B .....	135,500
29. Ridge Roads, Mamamam Area, 10' Class B .....	34,900

1,370,020

4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement (AG 611 Hawaii) (3-31-38) (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939, on War Department letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38) Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject: "Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department". It is further recommended that the sum of \$1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon as possible to permit early completion of this program.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General,  
Commanding.

1 Incl: Map

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41)M

1st Ind.

AGW/ric

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,

February 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611 (Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7.

By order of the Secretary of War:

---

*Adjutant General.*

1 Incl. a/c

C. of E., March 12, 1941.—

To: The Chief of Coast Artillery.

1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611 Hawaiian Department (11-8-40)M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized Federal Highway Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be submitted covering Items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper.

2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost appears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended.

3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: "Construction of North Shore Railroad Connection" file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41)M; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of \$230,000 be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The item referred to is included in this paper as item 9.

For the Chief of Engineers:

[S] George Mayo,  
GEORGE MAYO,  
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.

611/45A-10

3rd Ind.

5.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,  
March 15, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in the 2nd Indorsement are concurred in.

2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd Indorsement, \$300,000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects).

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

[S] E. T. BLOOD,  
Colonel, C. A. C., Executive.

1 Incl. n/c

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
2nd Lt. F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M-WPD 4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A.G.C.,  
April 1, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements.

2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in paragraph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorse-

ment, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiian Department", AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) H-WPD.

3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Maintenance and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943" (Engr. 121.2, Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The breakdown requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program.

By order of the Secretary of War:

*Major General, The Adjutant General.*

Incl. w/d

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt. F. A.

*Proposed program, tactical items*

Priority			Type		Estimated cost by troop constr.
Old	Rec.		Present	Rec.	
25	1a	Schofield-Waikana	Pack Trail	Motor Trail	\$170,000
28	b	Kunia-Palehua	Motor Trail	10' WB Macadam	75,000
23	c	Pupukea-Black Junction	Pack Trail	Improve	12,720
32	d	Peanoho Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	10,000
20	e	Williwilui Road	Dirt Road	10' Class B	17,900
21	f	Williwilui Trail	Foot Trail	Pack Trail	10,000
1	2a	Fort Weaver-155mm Gun Positions.	None	10' Class B	8,900
2	b	Fort Ruger Roads	None	10' Class B	4,000
3	c	Barbers Point East SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
4	d	Maili Marker SL Route	None	SL Trail	6,000
5	e	Maililili SL Route	None	SL Trail	6,600
8	3a	Barbers Point Road Net Paving	Coral Roads	Paved Motor Roads	75,000
10	b	Wahiawa-Pupukea Paving	Motor Trail	10' Class A & B	200,000
6	c	Koera Point SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
7	d	Wailea Point SL Route	None	SL Trail	1,000
17	e	Fahuhu CP Route	None	CP Trail	2,100
11	4a	Wainea Pupukea	Foot Trail	10' Class B	45,000
None	4	Alternate Crossing S. Faloraun Gulch.	Raised Ford	Bridge	6,000
14	5a	Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield Barracks.		22' Class A	33,000
20	b	Manauhua Ridge Route	Motor Trail	Water Bound Macadam	74,900
19	c	Koolau Ridge Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	} 111,800
24	d	Kaiwailon Trail	Foot Trail	Improve	
26	e	Waiawa Route	Foot Trail	Improve	
15a	6a	Haleiwa-Opacula Approach Road	Dirt Road	Improve	
15b	b	Fawalloe-Anahulu " "	Dirt Road	Improve	
15c	c	Ashley Station " "	Dirt Road	Improve	
18	d	Kopubi OP Route	Foot Trail	Improve	} 9,300
16	7a	Kahuku-155mm Gun Positions	Dirt Road	10' Class A	
27	b	Fua Palailai OP Route	Foot Trail	10' Class B	
		Total			\$901,020

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt. F. A.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 May 1941.*

To: The adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) M-VPD; Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiian Department.

b. AG 660 (4-19-41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund, Fiscal Year 1942.

c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above).

2. a. Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference a was approved by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following:

(1) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated portion of \$446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the construction of the road and trail items in the approved program.

(2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved program.

b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following:

(1) Recommendation that \$446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the Wahiana cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road.

(2) Revised estimates for the railroad items and reduced estimates for the road and trails portions of the program by the \$70,400.00 made available on December 7, 1940.

(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1-19 inclusive, with the additional items, 20-29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted revised estimates in the amount of \$951,020.00 for the road and trail items and \$298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, \$1,249,620.00 supersedes estimate of \$1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith.

[8] 3. Reference b informed this headquarters that regular estimates for Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include \$300,000.00 for the construction of the railroad items and \$50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds will cover the construction of the railroads (\$298,600.00) and will reduce the required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to \$901,020.00.

4. a. Reference c submitted estimates in the amount of \$286,000.00 for the upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this department, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the necessity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing non-availability of the former.

b. The breakdown of the \$286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program, which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically, maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as inclosure No. 1 is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program. This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by \$34,000.00.

c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of \$100,000.00 of the \$286,000.00. This \$100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved augmentation program.



[9] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in the funds still required for the construction of the approved augmentation program, \$1,249,620.00 or \$901,020.00 if the \$350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is made available and the funds, totaling \$252,000.00, required for maintenance: the \$1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and the \$252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction.

6. It is recommended:

a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3) and 4, above, funds in the amount of \$901,020.00 for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates to supplement the \$350,000 expected to be released.

(b) That the revised estimates in the amount of \$252,000.00 be substituted for the \$236,000.00 now included in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and repair of military roads and trails and that \$100,000.00 of this amount be released to this department during FY 1942.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1 Incl: Revised estimate.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., P. A.

[10] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC

6th Ind.

21-H/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 9, 1941.

To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl. n/o  
611/45-A-10

7th Ind.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Adjutant General. 3.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,  
June 12, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been taken with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading "FY 1942" was intended to read "Fy 1943".

2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 b of 5th indorsement, preliminary estimates for FY 1943 do not now include a specific item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11—Alteration, maintenance and repair of fortifications—is \$225,000. Fy 1942 estimates for Project 11 total \$173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to maintenance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for estimating these funds for FY 1941 included specifically \$59,000 as applicable to road maintenance.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

LEONARD L. DAVIS,  
Lt. Col., C. A. C.,  
Assistant.

1 Inclosure  
(Dup. w/d).

A true copy

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt. F. A.

[11] C. of E. 611 (Hawaii).  
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program Hawaiian Department.

8th Ind.

6-E

OFFICE, C. OF E.,  
July 1, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. Reference paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the \$901,020 required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity.

2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorsement are concurred in.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.

CG of OCCA

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[12] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.  
AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K 9th Ind. EGA  
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 18, 1941.  
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Funds in the amount of \$300,000 for railroads and \$50,000 for roads and trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of \$900,000 have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared.

2. General maintenance funds to the amount of \$173,710 are now available from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general maintenance funds to the amount of \$223,000 have been included in preliminary estimates, FY 1943.

3. An additional amount of \$140,000 will be included at the first opportunity in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads and trails in your department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1B]

Via "Clipper"  
Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12

\_\_\_\_\_  
COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April '41

[EXTRACT]

Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, The Adjutant General's office, file AC 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment Squadron at Bellows Field.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway from about 2800' to 3400' and widening from 150' to 300'. The new runway is 5000' long and 300' wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a paved taxi strip and parking strip 300' wide and 2200' long with a servicing mat 300' x 600' adjacent to the taxi strip. All runways, servicing mats and taxi strips will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control tower and an aqua-gasoling system of 600,000 gallon capacity. The necessary tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installations include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000'' machine gun ranges, and roads and sidewalks.

\* \* \* \* \*

7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving the runways in particular should be expedited. The District Engineer has informed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very near future, it will not be much longer available.

\* \* \* \* \*

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls:

- No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs
- 2 Layout Map\*
- 3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates

\*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1)

No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major Fleming, 5 April 1941.

Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41

Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing Project, Hawaiian Department

2nd Ind. (12-P3)

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1941

To: The Quartermaster General.

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 1.c. of basic communication which indicates that funds in the amount of \$990,769 will be included in future estimates for the projects at Wheeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph 2.a,b, and c of basic communication.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

FRANK M. KENNEDY  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division

Copied from Project Letter B-1

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded

with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses, recreation buildings, mess halls, officers' quarters and other structures. Complete utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization type.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying conditions by the grading of two runways 5000' by 500' and the paving of a 200' strip on each runway for a length of 5000', the construction of a servicing mat and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds now available to him; in this storage nine of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily converted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000' ranges and man-proof fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about \$150,000. As it is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ % of building costs as directed in Chief Signal officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs.

5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total required to complete the installation is \$1,772,220.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized and that funds in amount of \$1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to initiate this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls: #1—Bldg tabulation  
#2—Layout drawing  
#3—Cost Estimate

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.



[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men.

3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$670,140 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates  
#2 Layout map

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941*

In reply refer to:

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 560 (3-7-41)M-G-M, 14 March 1941, Subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men from Wheeler Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt. F. A.*

[2] 5. There is inclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$407,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

1 Incl: Cost Estimates.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN  
*2nd Lt. F. A.*

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.*

Engr. 600.12

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other buildings have been and are being built by the WPA. Additional buildings and improvements are necessary; I believe that the requirements of training preclude any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. These additional buildings will all be of mobilization type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities should be provided.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet. Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Necessary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved. A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be installed; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this dust affects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving.

5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ percent of building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct costs of the job.



6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

2. Incls: #1—Layout Map  
#2—Cost Estimates

A true copy  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt. F. A.*

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline distance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at Wheeler Field.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations. These will include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse for oil storage will be provided.

4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installations. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided.

5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized as outlined above and that funds in the amount of \$450,000 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu for this construction.

1 Incl: Cost Estimate

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

A true copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2d Lt. F. A.*

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.  
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC

RPM/agb-1712

1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 27, 1941.*  
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:

For remark and recommendation.  
By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Adjutant General.*

1 Incl. n/c



2nd Ind.

(9)

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C., May 31, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.  
Approval recommended.  
For the Chief of the Air Corps:

[S] Edward P. Curtis,  
EDWARD P. CURTIS,  
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

1 Incl. n/c  
A True Copy:  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian Dept. H", to AGO, 5/22/41)

3rd Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., June 10, 1941.  
To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.
2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary in the future.
3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office.
4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of \$450,000 be approved for allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the inclosed estimate.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,  
Major, Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosure: Sub 1  
A True Copy:  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.  
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D

4th Ind.

RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 25, 1941.

To: Chief of Air Corps.

1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication.
2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the accomplishment of this project, in the amount of \$450,000, as recommended in basic communication.
3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably considered as these funds are required for other purposes.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,  
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.—n/c  
Copies to:

- Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1. 6-10-41, to TAG.
- Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic ltr., Engr. 600.12, 5-22-41, to TAG, w/ys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds.

A true copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,In reply refer to:  
Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12

22 May 1941.

Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men.

3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction. These buildings have been tabulated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a complete system of utilities is recommended.

4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½% of the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of \$636,163.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.1 Incl: Cost Estimates  
A true copy:Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt. F. A.HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of

training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the Island of Lanai. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map, scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: "Construction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai" file Engr. 686 dated 16 May 1941.

3. It is proposed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000' runways 300' wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later conversion to the aqua system will be installed.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, therefore, will be 41 officers and 323 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is \$1,990,000.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 2 be authorized.

c. That funds in the amount of \$1,990,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates.

A True Copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

AG 580 (5-22-41)MC

1st Ind.

RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN*:

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

2 Incls. n/c

\_\_\_\_\_  
Adjutant General.

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550-22), 6-10-41, Subject: Estimates for the Construction of Airports for Hawaiian Air Force.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

EDWARD P. CURTIS,  
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

2 Incls. n/c  
A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) S3  
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

3d Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., June 16, 1941.

To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.
2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H.
3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of \$1,990,000 be approved for allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings, utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools Reserve), approved April 5, 1941.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,  
Major, Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosures: Subs 1-2  
A true Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H.  
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-G

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., August 8, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of the site referred to in basic communication.
2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that "Theatre Operations Type of Construction" be substituted for the "mobilization type" requested.
3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates.  
By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c  
A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut. F. A.



[1]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed as Inclosure No. 1.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoline, using 6 of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Department Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land and the location of the three 5000-foot runways.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [2] 206 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is \$1,992,600.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the acquisition of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be authorized.

c. That funds in amount of \$1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls:

- #1 Map
- #2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41
- #3 Estimated Costs

A True Copy

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lieut. F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the planes stationed there

2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious consideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to interference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another location at Kahuku was discarded because of its proximity to the beach. A third on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Hawaiian Air Force because of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions. A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikalua Gulches and west of the Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome on the island of Oahu. There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing the location of this field.

3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the 15th Pursuit Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with mobilization type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient for the needs of those three stations and it will be impossible to transfer any of the existing authorization to this new field.

4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private quarters and also because of the tremendous housing shortage on Oahu, it is believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers. Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also estimated that there will be 135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison. Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is recommended that the War Department secure from the Federal Building Administration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at this field.

5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width of 200 feet; the paving of taxi strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'. A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection of airplanes against hostile bombardment will be installed as part of the airport and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline with the aqua system. In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized.

6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools, supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries, etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an antiaircraft regiment as

part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the 40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250 acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane land will cost \$30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land \$25.00 per acre per year, or a total annual rental of \$8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land will cost about \$1,000 and the pineapple land about \$500.00 per acre; a total cost of about \$270,000.

7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be constructed with cost figures and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of \$4,668,950 not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a yearly rental of \$8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at \$4,938,950.

[3] 8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be approved and that funds in the amount of \$4,668,950 be allotted for construction if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satisfactory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of \$270,000 be made available.

(s) WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

2 Incls:

#1 Map

#2 Tabulation

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE OF RADIO FROM T A G:

Fifteenth Pursuit Airbase at Kipapa is disapproved<sup>7</sup> Stop<sup>8</sup> Base is to be located at Kahuku Stop Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to General Short covers this subject.

ULIO.

True copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[Exhibit 1C]

[1]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.*

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96

Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this department and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department.

2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department. In order to save time, however, we're submitting recommendations without waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general by Mr. Letts.

3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two 16-inch gun batteries, Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery, Battery Closson at Fort Kame-



hameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer and Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is inclosed a chart showing the fields of fire of these batteries after the protection is installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line. The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrificed by the casemating is well in the field covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arrangement this area is in part covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns.

[2] 4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in particular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941. The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recommendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield protection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the impossibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate.

6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneche Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381, in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming responsibility for the defense of the Kaneche Bay Area. It is believed that the growing military and naval importance of Kaneche Bay area makes it essential that a major calibre seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufacture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range gun batteries similar to Battery Closson on the mainland where the need for them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement in the Kaneche Bay area.

7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of overhead cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields.

b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be authorized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates.

c. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery [3] Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneohe Bay area.

(s) Walter C. Short  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1 Incl: Chart (Orig of Incl No. 1 is on file at H S C A B)

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.



HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.

[1]

In reply refer to:

AG 381/20

Kaneohe Bay Project.

*Secret*

Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:—

A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41) MC-E, HD Engr 600.96, with 4 indorsements.

B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941.

2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in the 4th indorsement to reference A. In considering this study, reference should be made to a similar study which was submitted as an enclosure to 1st indorsement, reference B.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Base (Incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions:

a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 AA searchlights recommended in paragraph 6a. should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound locators. The severe limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmospheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of hostile aerial targets.

b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the seacoast personnel, as recommended in paragraph 6d. (2) by one battalion (TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/O 4-71, Nov 1/40), less band and one battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the defenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the Harbor Defense Regiment.

[2] 4. It is recommended:

a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows:

(1) Armament:

(a) Seacoast:

2 155 mm Gun Batteries (latest type).

2 6" Fixed Gun Batteries (2 guns each).

1 16" Long Range Casemated Gun Battery of 2 guns on Barbette Carriages.

(b) Antiaircraft:

3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries.

3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each.

48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns.

15 AA searchlights together with a minimum of 6 SCR 268 sets and 9 M2 sound locators.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Seacoast Artillery:

1 Battalion Coast Artillery (TD), 155 mm guns, (T, O 4-35, Nov 1/40).

1 Regiment Coast Artillery (HD), type B, less band and one battalion. (T/O 4-71, Nov 1/40).

(b) Antiaircraft Artillery:

1 Regiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun battalion, (T/O 4-111, Nov 1/40).

b. That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Department, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned positions in other parts of the island, thereby weakening the defense in other areas.

(1) Considering only personnel now present and available:

- 1 155 mm Gun Battery.
- 1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
- 1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
- 2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
- 1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

(2) Assuming that personnel under paragraph 4 a (2) (a) above will be made available at an early date and using armament now available in War Reserve, the defense can be organized as shown below. Under this plan no movement of armament from present assigned positions is required:

- 2 155 mm Gun Batteries
- 1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
- 1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
- 2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
- 1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

[3] e. That the increase in personnel and in major items of armament recommended in paragraphs 6 a and b, reference B, insofar as they relate to the Coast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 a. above.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1-Incl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1] Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaiian Department.

AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-E

3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 30, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to:

- a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3-13-41) N-WPD, subject: Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
- b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941.
- c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area are approved:

- a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kamehameha to Mokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by you in reference c subject to local coordination of site with the Navy.
- b. Installation of two batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to be selected by you.

3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set:

a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their allotted strengths:

(1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section, supply platoon (T/O 4-32) and battalion section, medical detachment (T/O 4-31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment.

(2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganization of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three [2] 37mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (AA) (12 guns).

b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/O 4-47) from personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.

4. Guns and fire control equipment for the battalion of 155 mm guns and the 8'' railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Department priorities.

5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 a. above will be dispatched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941. The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate forecast can be made at this time.

6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased garrison be made the subject of separate correspondence.

7. Ultimate approval of one 8'' seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16'' battery recommended by you, and of two 6'' seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable. The 8'' seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6'' seacoast guns not before December, 1942.

8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay Area the plan submitted by reference c for the installation of the 8'' railway battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary installation of the 8'' railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be constructed by field fortification methods and materials.

9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6'' BC guns, and one battery of two 8'' BC guns, all shielded type.

[3] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 a (2) above, is contemplated.

11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian Department by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is not contemplated at this time.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(s) E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls:

#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C. of E. 662B (Oahu), August 26, 1941.

#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillery, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45-F-1, July 23, 1941. (added)

Original Incl. #1 w/d)

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.  
[SECRET]

Paraphrase

Radio 320—13th

SEPTEMBER 13, 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds needed to erect positions in Kaneohe Bay area as para four B paren two paren letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay Paragraph Due added costs of materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year Stop Estimates prepared by district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above

amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars be contained in pending appropriation bill.

SHORT.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., P. A.

[SECRET]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 18 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 662/4 x 662/7

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:

a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941.

b Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated 22 July 1941.

c. Secret letter HHD to TAG 31 July 1941, Subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay", file AG 381/20.

2. Reference a. directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament requirements for the defense of Kaneohe Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to reference a. requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose:

3 Batteries of 155-mm guns.

1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment

3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted by reference b. recommended that the following armament be provided:

Two 155-mm gun batteries

Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each

One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette carriages.

[2] 4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made immediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference b. authorized the following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun battery.

One Harbor Defense Battery.

Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile artillery:

Three 155-mm gun batteries.

One 8-inch railway gun battery.

The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map, Inclosure No. 1.

5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger Adams on Black Point.



6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following:
- (1) 4 Panama mounts.
  - (2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position.
  - (3) 4 gun bunkers.
  - (4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters.
  - (5) 2 splinterproof propellant shelters for 150 charges each.
  - (6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each.
  - (7) 1 splinterproof plotting room.
  - (8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position.
  - (9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations.

Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this command, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract.

[3] 7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns including the acquisition of land has been estimated at \$93,630.00. The cost of the transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement similar to that of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at \$121,635. These estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is a tabular breakdown of these cost figures.

8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, for construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

2 Incls.

- (1) Map
- (2) Breakdown

A True copy.

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[Exhibit 1D]

[SECRET]

27 AUGUST 1941.

Deslege Brown  
1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs.  
Assistant Department Engineer.

To: The Adjutant General,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Reurad agmo fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible Stop Main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lieutenant, F. A.*

Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

(12-E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C., August 25, 1941.

To The Adjutant General *THRU* Chief of Engineers.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941.

2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communication, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation.

3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute minimum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility, if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at both ends of the runway in question.

4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N-8 runway, or of the proposed new N-8 runway, because of quarters built at that end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly ends sufficiently to insure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized.

5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary, providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled. If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the runway, or the spur relocated.

6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations, and that his new estimates be made accordingly.

7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however, will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div.

Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41

cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

For information only

This is not an authorization

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt. F. A.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER,  
ROOM 3441, MUNITIONS BUILDING,  
Washington, D. C.

56 WTJ 125 WD

*Ft Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27*

THE AG

*Washington DC.*

Reurad agno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation stop reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing stop strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

305 AM

SHORT.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

## IMMEDIATE ACTION

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington.

1st Ind.

AG 580.82-Wheeler  
Field (8-27-41) NO

JJF 1r

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1941—To the Chief of the Air Corps.  
In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] JOHN B. COOLEY,  
Adjutant General.

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

(12-E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. A request has been made this date that \$25,000.00 be included in the funds estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be used for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field.

3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the 2nd Indorsement referred to above.

By order of the Chief of the Air Corps.

FRANK M. KENNEDY,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Building & Grounds Division.

Incl. Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1E]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941.

## MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is routine.

ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,  
Major, Corps of Engineers,  
Assistant Department Engineer.

A true copy

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Washington, D. C

Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This contract is the one for furnishing all materias for cableway to Kaala aircraft Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is

strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to a dash one dash B

[S] SHORT.

ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC-715P June 10 1941

## HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

75 War EM 61 WD

WASHN DC. 740P June 26 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.  
904 26th

Agme reurad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this priority be unsatisfactory

ADAMS.

616P

True Copy  
Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1]

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

SIG 676.3

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7-5-41) MC-E, 8 July 1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments." A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the AWs project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the following paragraphs.

*Locations* a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude 22°13'50", longitude 159°23'54". There is no change in the base camp at Kauai which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed and mobile stations.

b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit.

c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed station in the vicinity of Pahoa at latitude 19°26'50" and longitude 154°57'5", and by a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at latitude 19°30'30", longitude 155°41'40". A base camp similar to that on Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that station and the mobile unit.

d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for Mt. Kaala.



(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manawahua is to be replaced by a fixed station.

(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient [2] stations to emplace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increase in the number of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655-19.182).

(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the consideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former Pali location.

(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the provision of units in reserve against the possibility of failure of one of the primary stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been considered for their employment are the Pali location discussed above, on the high ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the coast.

(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various command posts into an air defense command post.

(7) No base camps are being provided for the stations on Oahu as the personnel will be housed in construction already approved for the Signal Area, Fort Shafter. The same construction, however, will be built at the Manawahua and Opana fixed stations as is now approved for Kaala.

2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq'Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 May 1941, to the letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling \$75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii, this sum can be reduced by \$2,296.00 to \$72,985.84. The allocation of additional stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These additional communication facilities are summarized as follows:

a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four satellite stations at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu.

Total cost..... \$55,000

b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure.

Total cost..... \$12,000

c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this is economically feasible.

Total cost..... \$39,000

[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice.

Total cost..... \$18,000

e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the added stations on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equipment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to the detector unit at Pahoa.

Total cost..... \$10,900

1880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge.

Total cost..... \$10,463.67  
 Total Sig funds..... 145,400.00

3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however, that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned board proceedings.

4. Funds in the amount of \$890,804 have been made available to the Dist. Engr, Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand required to complete the revised projects.

Item No.	Description	Oahu Mana- wahua	Opana	Makapuu	Kauai Kilauea	Hawaii Pahoa	Kabuku
1	Cost of Site.....	\$2,000	\$2,000		\$2,000	\$7,500	\$500
2	Clearing.....	300	200			300	
3	Grading.....	2,700	800	\$500	500	700	200
4	Right of Way-Access Road.....	500	500		500	1,800	200
5	Road Constr.....	58,470	28,000	5,700	24,800	9,000	3,000
6	Bldg. Constr.....	26,260	29,250	11,965	12,300	74,720	12,070
7	Fuel Storage.....	1,900	1,900			2,700	
8	Water Supply.....	2,970	4,400	200	2,000	9,000	1,000
[4] 9	Sewage Disposal.....	900	1,000	1,000	500	2,970	500
10	Man Proof Fence.....	2,000	2,000			3,000	
		98,000	70,050	19,365	42,600	111,690	17,470

	Oahu	Kauai	Hawaii
Subtotals by Islands.....	\$187,415	\$42,600	\$129,160
Funds now available from superseded sites.....	76,735	12,600	36,217
Supplemental funds required.....	110,680	30,000	98,943

Total..... \$233,623

Mobilization of Personnel and Plant at 3%..... 7,010

Total direct costs..... 240,633

Contingencies, Contractors Fee, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Insurance at 15%..... 36,100

Engineering, Surveys, Inspection and Auditing at 18%..... 19,250

General Office Overhead at 8%..... 19,250

Grand Total Engineer funds..... 315,233

5. Secret radiogram No 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited.

6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of \$315,233 for engineer construction, and \$218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of leased wire facilities, total \$533,633, to be included in pending appropriation bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised project.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
 Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

True Copy.  
 Edward von Geldern,  
 EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
 2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit 1F]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., July 3, 1941.*

[7]

Via Clipper Airmail  
Engr. 523.07

Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of securing shipping space priorities for this company was discussed. A copy of this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investigation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable.

2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War Department. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or contracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities information is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are issued.

3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which difficulty has already been encountered:

a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even thou it had taken all action necessary.

[2] b. Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities instructions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, priorities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials which are to be incorporated in defense installations.

c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now becoming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts demand electric power and unless the company's local stocks are maintained it will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of \$1,000.00, some plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from local stocks.



d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as government bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great difficulty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this material.

4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to set up an office in this department to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected the Department Engineer's office as the section in which this control can best be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a preliminary outline of the duties of this section:

a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on priorities can be promptly filled.

b. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters.

c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions.

5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects are placed in priority classification A-1-b. There is no similar blanket coverage for devents projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service project is the most important single project in the department, and under the general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned to it would be A 1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high. If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects, and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects which were considered absolutely essential.

6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a government contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we, through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential.

[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. The establishment of a blanket priority for Hawaiian defense projects as has been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this headquarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance.

b. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential to the defense program.

c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive proper priorities in shipping space.



It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs *a* and *b* above and this headquarters advised by radio of the War Departments' attitude.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr 523.07 4 Jun 1941

Record copy Engineers

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw  
(8-18-41)

1st Indorsement

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE,  
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD,  
WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,  
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.)

1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short:

2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, established the preference rating A-1-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases, not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.

3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army and Bureaus and Offices of the Navy", which explains the procedure covering the issuance of project rating orders to Army and Navy construction projects outside of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragraph 7 *b*.

4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugurated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan may be of value to some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your consideration.

5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission. That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision to establish a liaison agency has not been made.

For the Priorities Committee:

ROBT. G. COOK,  
*Major, Ordnance, USA.*

1 Incl. no change.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON

Via Air Mail  
AG 523 Priority  
(7-7-41) MB

2nd Ind.

JAU

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *August 26, 1941.*  
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.  
By order of the Secretary of War:

*Brigadier General,*  
*Acting The Adjutant General.*

1 Incl. n/c.

A True Copy.

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

14 AUGUST 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero [seven subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becoming more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited.

SHORT.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
Engr. 523.07

Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter from this headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114.14-18-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41).

2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region includes this Territory, to make themselves known to local Federal officials and business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional office difficult.

3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the establishment of a local office of the Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request I concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941 to the Governor is inclosed for your information.

4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establishment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to include the Priorities Division, initially, with provision for adding representatives of other divisions later, if required.

(s) WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

2 Incls: (1) Cy of ltr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of ltr to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board  
(10-23-41) MB 1st Ind

IG/mm-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
October 31, 1941.

To: The Under Secretary of War.

2 Incls. No change.

A true copy.

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

2d Indorsement

18-C-32 RGC/amw  
(11-13-41)

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE  
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,  
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, War Dept., Washington, D. C.)

1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information will be forwarded when received.

For the Priorities Committee:

(/s/) ROBT. G. COOK,  
Major, Ordnance, USA.

2 Incls. No change.

3rd Ind.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board (10-23-41) MB

IG:wc-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
November 17, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(/s/) E. L. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c.

A true copy.

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1 G]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., July 28, 1941.*

VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL

Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The delay in securing necessary materials for our construction program has become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties may lengthen this time.

2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies:

a. The District Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large projects; one the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized, the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the mainland.

b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials. These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays.

3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of \$1,000,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these projects were approved and utilize the materials.

4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious that if there is any lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the cost to the Government will be increased. I therefore strongly recommend that the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00, and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit him to stock materials in addition to lumber.

(s) Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept.

1st Ind.

ET/rm

(7-28-41) MO

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO,  
*August 1, 1941.*

To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Adjutant General.*

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*



400.31 (Honolulu) 335.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

2nd Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E.,  
August 7, 1941.

To The Adjutant General (Through The Quartermaster General.)

It is recommended that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be authorized for the purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program, (Air Corps), Items *a* & *b*, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final resort, the sum of \$1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air Depot, (Brookley Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case, reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construction in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program.

For the Chief of Engineers:

(s) John R. Hardin,  
JOHN R. HARDIN,  
Major, Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Construction Section.

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

20 AUGUST 1941.

FRED W. HERMAN,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Assistant Dept. Engineer.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars has been received which can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to constructing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense contracts

SHORT

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

QM 411.1 C-P  
(Hawaiian Dept.)

3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C., August 21, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The Quartermaster Corps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in Hawaii in the amount of \$600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a revolving fund in an amount not to exceed \$500,000.00 be authorized. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster Corps can be made available.

For the Quartermaster General:

(s) L. R. Groves,  
L. R. GROVES,  
Colonel, Q. M. C.,  
Assistant.

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials—Hawaiian Department  
AG 600.12 Haw. Dept.  
(7-28-41) MO-D

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO,

*September 27, 1941.*

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to meet requirements for War Department approved projects for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay. The materials used from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds of projects for which used as soon as such funds become available to local constructing agencies.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941.*

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)

Major General R. C. Moore

*Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department,  
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR DICK:

The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is becoming more and more critical. On many items a delay of between three and four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot be made for six months.

In a conference with Colonel Hannum, Division Engineer in San Francisco, when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of Engineers with a strong letter to the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allotment of \$1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials other than lumber.

I am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September 13 are inclosed for ready reference.

Very sincerely.

WALTER C. SHORT  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

2 Incls: Cy. ltr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Washington, September 29, 1941.*

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.*

DEAR WALTER:

I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving funds in connection with construction in Hawaii.

Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds. However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation from which the Quartermaster General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for construction.

The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War Department to your official request of July 28, 1941.

The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of \$1,100,000 made to your District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these funds available to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of materials, except for the projects to which the funds apply.

I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you outline will be greatly relieved.

Sincerely yours.

[S] R. C. Moore,  
R. C. MOORE,  
*Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff.*

A true copy,  
Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[Exhibit 1 H]

[SECRET]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
*Washington, November 27, 1941.*

Air Mail via Clipper  
Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,  
*Headquarters Hawaiian Department,  
Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely,

[S] H. H. ARNOLD,  
*Major General, U. S. A.,  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.*

A true copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[Exhibit 11]

Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers.  
AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C 3rd Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *February 10, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available to increase further the strength of this regiment.

2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Battalion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941.

3. As previously advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer Company (Avn) for your Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*

12-22-41

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941.*

In reply refer to:

Engr. 322.03

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940, which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment (Aviation) less one battalion, and to letter, Engr. 210 x220.03, 1 November 1940, which recommended an increase in the strength of the Third Engineers, and to letter, Engr. 322.03, 5 February 1941, recommending a redesignation in the Third Engineers from a combat regiment, Division, to a combat regiment, Corps.

2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor would be available. It has been necessary with the various agencies involved in defense construction to import skilled labor from the mainland. A recent increase in the defense contracts of the Navy will now necessitate the importation of unskilled labor as well. This development now makes it impossible to assume that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previous estimates of the minimum force of Engineers necessary be revised upwards.

3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (Aviation) be furnished this Department as an integral part of the Hawaiian Air Force and that a regiment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished this department as Department Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment of Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General Service Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command posts and communication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied.

4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of Engineers (Aviation) (T. O. 5-411) and one regiment of Engineers, General Service, (T. O. 5-21) be authorized for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment be furnished as soon as possible.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General,*  
*Commanding.*

Record copy: Engineers.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*

12-22-41.



Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department.  
AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
May 15, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. *a.* The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/O 5-171, November 1, 1940, less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4-8-41) M-C, radio April 9, 1941).

*b.* The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from the Continental United States.

*c.* Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so that they can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel will be dispatched in November.

*d.* The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of personnel in your department.

2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) is allotted a full quota of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

*a.* The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers.

*b.* Changes in the distribution of three-year men in engineer units in connection with the organization of the 34th Engineers.

4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately.

6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of enlisted personnel will be made separately.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

3 Inclosures—

Incl. 1.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., Third Corps Area.

Incl. 2.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation.

Incl. 3.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to The Quartermaster General.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, June 18, 1941.

AG 320.2  
(6-5-41) MR-M-C

Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force).

To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Extract

1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th

Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate).

\* \* \* \* \*  
By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS  
*Major General,*  
*The Adjutant General.*

A True Copy:  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, May 28, 1941.*

AG 320.2 (5-28-41)MC-C-M  
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.  
To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area.

The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41)MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, and May 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-18-41)MC-C-M, subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is rescinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the two letters mentioned above will follow this communication.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Adjutant General.*

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Department, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation;  
The Chief of Staff, GHQ  
The Chief of Chaplains  
The Chief of Coast Artillery  
The Chief of the Air Corps  
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service  
The Chief of Engineers  
The Chief of Ordnance  
The Chief Signal Officer  
The Quartermaster General; and  
The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, June 23, 1941.*

AG 320.2 (6-16-41) MC-C-M  
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department.  
To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and the New York Port of Embarkation;  
The Quartermaster General.

Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, and The Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, same subject, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-23-41) MC-M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-24-41) MC, and May 27,

1941, AG 320.2 (5-26-41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

Copies Furnished:

Chief of Staff, GHQ  
The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E  
The Chief of Chaplains  
The Chief of Coast Artillery  
The Chief of the Air Corps  
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service  
The Chief of Engineers  
The Chief of Ordnance  
The Chief Signal Officer  
The Chief of Finance  
The Surgeon General

A True Copy:

L. W. Truman,  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-21-41) MC-C

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,

*May 21, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the practicability of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 additional selectees in excess of the existing quota.

2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads, protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action appears necessary or desirable at this time.

3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in separate correspondence.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941.*

In reply refer to:

AG 381

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127, including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engineers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees.

2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal

was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached, states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even if such authority existed, he is opposed to providing additional manpower at the expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already absorbed all available labor.

3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules.

4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of existing units in the Hawaiian Department.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

2 Incls.

1. Letter to Governor, T. H.
2. Letter from Governor, T. H.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1J]

[1]

[SECRET]

18 FEBRUARY 1941.

AG 320.2/55

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 1941, with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against a surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as inclosure to letter TAG to HHD, 7 February 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," file AG 381 (1-24-41) M.

B. Letter HHD to TAG, 5 September 1940, subject: "Additional Antiaircraft Troops for the Hawaiian Department", file 320.2/49.

C. Letter TAG to HHD, 27 September 1940, subject: War Reinforcements, Hawaiian Department", file 320.2 (9/27/40) M-WPD, with 1st and 2nd Indorsements thereon.

2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need, as expressed in Reference A, for adequate provision for the best defense which can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison of Oahu be placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically mentioned in Reference A, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to anti-aircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the anti-aircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense considered essential are discussed below.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery.

a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries, five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns, seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns, and two hundred (200) cal. .50 AA machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and

[2] forty five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries, no 37 mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in anti-aircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated



equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute to this Department), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators.

b. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the existing garrison of the following antiaircraft artillery personnel:

2 Regiments Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) T/O 4-11.

1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) T/O 4-15.

Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3) 37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now inactive, and to bring to war strength the active elements of this regiment.

c. In paragraph 10 a of 2nd Indorsement of Reference C, the War Department provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of antiaircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a reasonably effective antiaircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements from the mainland could affect the situation. With the increasingly critical international situation at this time, it is urgently recommended that all war reinforcements of antiaircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforcements described above, together with the existing shortages in antiaircraft artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay.

#### 4. Harbor Defense Artillery.

The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6f, of the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only one 16-inch battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulupau Group can be manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and antiaircraft missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun batteries, the one 14-inch battery, one of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the three mortar batteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six of the twelve 155mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/O 4-31W) is required to fully man the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained continuously.

5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that:

(a) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially war strength by the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements:

(1) Two Regiments CA (AA) Mobile, T/O 4-11.

(2) One Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery), T/O 4-15.

(3) One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4-31W.

(4) Individual antiaircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91 officers and 2064 enlisted men.

(5) Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men.

b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved antiaircraft artillery projects, as set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable.

WALTER C SHORT,  
Lieutenant General,  
Commanding.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41.

[7]

[SECRET]

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.  
 AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
 May 10, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March, 1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows:

a. June, 1941:

- (1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men.
- (2) 62 officers and 1,329 enlisted men required to activate the following units in the Department:

98th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under T/O 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E (Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/O 4-115, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

b. November, 1941:

(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), and basic privates, under T/O 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/O 4-17, November 1, 1940.

(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49 enlisted men.

[2] c. March, 1942:

(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men.

(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Artillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/O 4-125, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

2. Cadres for the new units will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you.

3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii.

4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of personnel in the Department.

5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

a. The actual dates on which various units are activated.

b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in connection with activation of new units.

c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the Department including allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this report to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and distribution of the last increment of AA filler replacements

[3] 7. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of Change in Status Reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for enlisted personnel will be made separately.

9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favorably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available.

The antiaircraft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

3 inclosures—Added.

Incl. 1—Copy of Ltr., 5/10/41.

AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-N, to C. G., Third Corps Area.

Incl. 2—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to C. G.s,  
N. Y. & San Fran. Ports of Emb.

Incl. 3—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to The  
Quartermaster General.

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San  
Francisco Ports of Embarkation:

The Chief of Staff, GHQ;

The Chief of Chaplains;

The Chief of Coast Artillery;

The Chief of the Air Corps;

The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;

The Chief of Engineers;

The Chief of Ordnance;

The Chief Signal Officer;

The Quartermaster General;

The Surgeon General; and

The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41

[1]

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/57

25 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Increase of enlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National  
Guard (California).

To: The Adjutant General.

1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941, the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation made in January 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas garrisons will be limited to those procured within the overseas department itself and that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the continental United States to overseas departments.

2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the situation here is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case which deserves further consideration. The facts are:

The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty outside of the continental limits of the United States;

This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted men;

The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of 469 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to be inducted in March will undoubtedly be composed of approximately the same ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%;

The selective service trainees are of varied mixture, such as Japanese, Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures;

Any assignment of the selective service trainees to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) would result in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being assigned to a white organization, which is contrary to War Department policy, as stated in War Department Letter AG 291.21 (10/9/40) M-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject: "War Department Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph g;

The Colonel, Commanding the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), states that because of the feeling in California against orientals, any assignment of selective service

trainees from this Department to 'his command would cause dissension, and lessen the efficiency of his command fully 50 percent.

[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the Regular Army troops here.

All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in the selective service draft.

3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that it will be contrary to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) to increase its strength.

4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not believe the present War Department policy, as stated in WD Radiogram, January 17, 1941; i. e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Department.

5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Corps Area.

(sgd) Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Cap. Inf.  
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).

AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C

1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
March 8, 1941. ESA

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered.

2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities.

3. If trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time, it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic training would require approximately three months making them fully available about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be available to the regiment for a maximum of two months.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41



[1]  
AG 320.2/58

[SECRET]

25 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 February 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", file AG 320.2 (1-17-41)P(C):

B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P.

C. Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55.

D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer Troops", file Engr. 322.03.

2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference C and D, hold priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are requested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in which they are listed.

a. In accordance with Reference A, authority is requested to organize the 11th Field Artillery under WD T/O 6-41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Department, Tables of Organization with units organized and maintained at war strength, as follows:

- (1) 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/O 6-41, January 3, 1939.
- (2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-42, January 3, 1939.
- (3) 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-45, December 7, 1938.
- (4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-46. January 7, 1938.
- (5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-47. December 7, 1938.

b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the necessary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department. The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability of a mobile reserve having the characteristics of light tanks of [2] great tactical importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) organized under Standard WD, T/O 7-8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of Light Tanks, requested herein.

c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD, T/O 7-55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organization of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required of Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields. It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police personnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating under its Dispersion Plan.

d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/O No. 7, dated November 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized under Standard WD, T/O 7-11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruiting Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG 221 (8-7-40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Reference A, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material authorized by current standard, War Department Tables of Organization.

e. That the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery) be organized under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforcements be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allowances for Field Artillery, No. 6-1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable to the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery).

3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for

changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard WD, Tables of Organization.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General,  
Commanding.*

A true copy:  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41.

[SECRET]

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.

1st Ind.

AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
WVC  
*April 11, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised in the near future of the action taken thereon.

2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police Companies to the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing Military Police Companies for this purpose.

3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter, February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of component elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) W. V. Carter,  
W. V. CARTER,  
*Brigadier General,  
Acting The Adjutant General.*

A true copy:  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1K]

[SECRET]

AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD

ACW/1ff  
APRIL 9, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, December 15, 1939, AG 676.3 (12-15-39) M-WPD, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department", to subsequent communications on the same subject; to letter G-2/183-316, February 12, 1941, subject: "Final Report of Commanding General, Air Defense Command"; and to letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, subject: "Defense Plans, Continental United States".

2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your department for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i. e., charging your senior air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peace-

time organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services and of Interceptor pursuit aviation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,  
*Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-23-41.

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/61

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 May, 1941.*

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air Defense Command and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret letter, this headquarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department."

For the Commanding General:

CARL GROSSE,  
*Major, A. G. D.,*  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*  
L. W. Truman,

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[SECRET]

(IG-24)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 24 April 1941.*

In reply refer to: 320.2

Subject: Air Base Group.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., (thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.).

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to have the War Department authorized the creation of a separate Air Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H.

3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redistribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recommended:

a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/O 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H., be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single).

b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for Bellows Field, T. H.

c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

F. L. MARTIN,  
*Major General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

SUBJECT: Air Base Group  
AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C

2nd Ind.

RPM/ihw-1217  
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
*June 26, 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Troop Unit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squadrons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air base group for station with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending decision on the new station.

3. It is desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. B. VAN SICKLE,  
*Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/94

3rd Ind.

OMM/ajk

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 22 July 1941.*

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two additional material squadrons be stationed at Bellows Field. Construction to care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction at Bellows Field, T. H."

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDOLE,  
*Major, A. G. D.,*  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

7 AUGUST 1941.

CHENNEY L. BERTHOLF,  
*Lt. Co., A. G. D.,*  
*Adjutant General*

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a headquarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the above Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields Stop First two grade personnel available locally Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows by airmail Stop Request radio reply signed Martin.

SHORT.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

Confidential  
380-22

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field Stop Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is becoming difficult Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen Signed Martin

SHORT.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41



Confidential  
From  
6 War WD

Washington, D. C., Sept. 27, 1941.

C G, *Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.*  
172-27th

The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison strength now allotted Hawaii Stop The Adjutant General has been requested to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August fifteen same subject A one dash seven.

ARNOLD.  
316P/27.

Decoded by Lt Jos. Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, September 27, 1941.

AG 320.2 (8 15 41)  
MR-M-AAF

Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date.

2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached inclosure.

3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now available in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian Air Force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(S) OTTO THUSON,  
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. Copies furnished:

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force

Chief of Staff, GHQ.

Chief of the Army Air Forces

Chief of the Air Corps

Divisions of the War Department General Staff.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

56 WAR RC WD

Washington, D. C., 554P, AGU 30, 1941.

C G *Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

Seven Nine Thirtieth Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August Seven reference hqrs Bellows Field reulst April Twenty-four Stop Desired that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept query two what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required for Hawaiian Dept.

ULIO.  
352P.

Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41.

9 September 1941.

[S] CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col. AGD  
Adjutant General.

272-9

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon Air Corps enlisted personnel now in department sufficient to organize these units Stop One heavy bombardment squadron consisting of twenty seven officers and two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve enlisted one Dental Corps comma Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers thirty six enlisted one Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army Air Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps, arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifth forty one

SHORT.

EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C., 1146A Sept. 9, 1941.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

126 WAR EM WD

Washington, D. C. 731 P Oct 17, 1941.

C. G., HAWN DEPT Ft. Shafter T. H.

17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila P I for permanent station to be designated by him

ADAMS,  
1101P.

Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

8 NOVEMBER 1941.

CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D., Adjutant General.

786-6th

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,  
Washington, D. C.

Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible Stop Discharge

of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma resulting in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a standpoint of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation of these groups signed Martin

SHORT.

ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

59 WAR MC WD

Washington, D. C., 748P Nov. 15, 1941.

C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four zero two fifteenth. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period. This matter is now under advisement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your department period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will this increase in Air Force personnel come within the authorized war garrison strength now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold.

ADAMS,  
120A/15/16.

Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

18 NOVEMBER 1941.

WM E DONEGAN,  
Lt. Col. G. S. C.  
A. C. of S., G-3

889—19th

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

Reference your four zero two fifteenth of November fifteenth increase of Air Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End

SHORT.

Enc sec. by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, November 18, 1941.

AG 320.2 (11-1-41)

MR-M-AAF

Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units.

To: Commanding Generals,  
Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal,  
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments,  
Newfoundland Base Command and  
U. S. Forces in Far East  
Chief of Army Air Forces.

1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest practicable date by the Department commanders concerned:

Unit	Source of Personnel	Station of Activation	Permanent station
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, (Regional Control).	Existing units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
5th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
6th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Caribbean Defense Command.	P. C. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Albrook Field, Panama, Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
7th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Haw. Dept.	Haw. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Hickam Field, Haw., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.

2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication.

3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander.

4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective Department commanders.

5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far East.

6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station.

7. The following units are redesignated as indicated:

OLD DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philippine Islands.	5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Squadron, Communications, Caribbean.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Panama.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional Control).



8. Assignment of units:

Caribbean Air Forces:

6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.

6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.

Far East Air Force:

5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.

All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.

All Weather detachments in the Far East Area.

Hawaiian Department Air Force:

7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control with Squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.

7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.

Newfoundland Base Command:

8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.

All communications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.

All Weather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Communications squadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Airways stations.

10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the Department commander concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] OTTO JOHNSON,  
*Adjutant General.*

Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General Staff. 1 Incl.

A true copy:

L. W. Truman,

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*

12-22-41.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

873-18

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved

into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recommended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed Martin

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*

12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

144 WAR WE

*Washington, D. C., 219A, Nov. 26 1941.*

COMMANDING GENERAL,

*Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.*

455-25th

Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawaiian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent to that department Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three

ADAMS,  
*730A/25/26/1PM.*

Decoded by Lt. Jos. Engelbertz SC, 3:15 P, 26 Nov 41.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*

12-22-41

[Exhibit 1L]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

*Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941.*

In reply refer to:

AG 230.3/37

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58.

B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744-18th and reply thereto, HHD to TAG 22 April 1941. AG 325/18-18a.

C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645-18, dated 18 April 1941, in connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in Department Surgeon Office.

2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Triangular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70, dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested in my References A, C, and D, and requested reinforcements to organize a Reconnaissance Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph d, Reference A, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department, Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference A. A summary of the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as Inclosure No. 1.

3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows:

a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate sectors.

b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organization, command, staff and tactical unity.

c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, constitutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Division in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the Department Commander.

d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the Department Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the air and coast defenses are knocked out.

#### 4. National Guard and Selectee Units.

a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions.

b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference B.

c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense missions on the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a Department reserve unit on Oahu.

d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular Divisions it will forestall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments.

#### 5. Station Compliments.

##### a. Schofield Barracks,

(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the net minimum requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian (Square) Division.

##### b. Fort Shafter.

(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be eliminated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter.

c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the following reasons:

(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing (Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated complement of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists.

(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station and no necessity for Station Complements is considered except for Fort Shafter, as noted above.

6. After preparation of this letter, your 1st Indorsement to our reference A was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available for reference in the War Department, under the following conditions:

a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to provide the reinforcements requested.

b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available per-

sonnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of your paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference A.

7. Organization of Air Defense Command.

a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Command to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute the Air Defense Command as follows:

- (a) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
- (a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force.
- (b) 18th Bombardment Wing.
- (c) Air Defense Command.
  1. Aircraft Warning Service.
  2. 14th Pursuit Wing.
  3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillery under the control of the Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the antiaircraft artillery reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Department, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received.

c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly adaptable to this theater and will best meet the needs for defense against attacks from the air.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

3 Incl.

- #1—Summary of Proposed Reorganization
- #2—Station Complement, Schofield Barracks.
- #3—Station Complement, Fort Shafter.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC-C

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,  
July 29, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MC-E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.

2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic communication is being returned without action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Major General.*  
*The Adjutant General.*

3 incls. n/c

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41



[SECRET]

17 WVY MX 109

Wahn D. C. 610A May 29 41.

CG

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connection with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand officers and men stop It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction

ADAMS.  
657A

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41

5 June 1941.

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:
  - A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 May 1941, 837-29th.
  - B. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 25 April, 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.37/37.
2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith, shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I, par. 7, HDP-40.
3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units:
  - a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength.
  - b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, and the recently authorized 34th Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.).
  - c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strengths.
  - d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries.
  - e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project.
  - f. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown in par. 7 HDP-40, and with many units entirely eliminated.
4. (a) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret letter WD to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.", file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-NPD, and provision of a suitable mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison of approximately 59,000 troops.
  - b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment.
  - c. The defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this mission will include the following:
    - 1 Regiment Infantry.
    - 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn.
    - 1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery.
    - 1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less one gun battalion).
    - 1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns.
  - d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments will be furnished, one to replace the 299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light

tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith.

e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately 70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland, not now shown in Table I herewith:

2 Infantry Regiments, T/O 7-11 Nov. 1, 1940.....	6,898
1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/O 6-41 Nov. 1, 1940.....	1,733
1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/O 4-111 Nov. 1, 1940.....	1,797
1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/O 4-35 Nov. 1, 1940.....	694
1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/O 4-67 Nov. 1, 1940.....	157
Total.....	11,279

5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures 1 and 2 of reference B in which it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men.

7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1-Incl.—Table I.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.  
AG 320.2 (8-5-41)MC-E 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 22, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to 57,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun Bn, band and basies).....	T/O 4-111	11-1-40....	1,590
1 Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun btry.....	T/O 4-35	11-1-40....	694
1 Btry CA.....	T/O 4-67	11-1-40....	157
Total.....			2,441

is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP-40 will be amended accordingly.

2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication

to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690 authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available in connection with other requirements.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Signed) E. S. ADAMS,  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls;  
#1—N/c.  
#2—Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added)  
A true copy:  
L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
<b>a. Department Headquarters:</b>							
Gen & Spec Staff Sections			144	30		152	326
Hq Sp Troops			7			41	48
Hq Company			3			59	62
MP Co Haw Dept.	7-7	11- 1-40	5			170	175
QM Co (Car)	10-87P	11- 1-40	2			70	72
<b>Total Dept HQ</b>			<b>161</b>	<b>30</b>		<b>492</b>	<b>683</b>
<b>b. North Sector Division (Triangular).</b>							
Div Hq	70	11- 1-40					
Hq & MP Co	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Reconn Troop	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Div Sig Co	Sp		4		Omitted	114	116
19th & 21st Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4,660	4,868
299th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E and WD radio.		10-12-40					
		5-11-41	65			1,577	1,642
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2,563	2,685
Engr Bn	5-75	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-40	16			296	312
<b>Total Div</b>			<b>501</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>10,505</b>	<b>11,011</b>
Attached Med			43			380	423
Attached Chap			11				11
<b>Aggregate</b>			<b>555</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>10,885</b>	<b>11,445</b>
<b>c. South Sector Division (Triangular).</b>							
Div Hq	70	11- 1-40					
Hq & MP Co	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Recon Troop	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Div Sig Co	Sp		4		Omitted	114	118
27th & 35th Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4,660	4,868
298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E & Radio.		10-12-40					
		5-11-41	50			1,308	1,358
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2,563	2,685
Engr Bn	5-78	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-10	16			296	312 SS
<b>Total Div</b>			<b>486</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>10,236</b>	<b>10,727 SS</b>
Attached Med			43			380	423 SS
Attached Chap			11				11 SS
<b>Aggregate</b>			<b>540</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>10,616</b>	<b>11,161 SS</b>
<b>d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force:</b>							
Hq & Hq Sq HAF	1-10-1	8- 1-39	70			336	406 SS
18th Bomb Wing							SS
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135 SS
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Grp (Hv)	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253 SS
23d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1 41	37			217	254 SS
31st Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254 SS
72d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254 SS

## Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
<b>d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force—Continued.</b>							
4th Recon Sq (Hv).....	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (Hv).....	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253
14th Bomb Sq (Hv).....	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
16th Bomb Sq (Hv).....	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
42d Bomb Sq (Hv).....	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
50th Recon Sq (Hv).....	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
19th Transport Sq.....	1-355	8- 1-39	40			182	222
17th Air Base.....	1-411	6- 7-40	40			682	722
Haw Air Depot.....			18				18
Total.....			531			3,546	4,077
Attached Med.....			17			95	112
Attached Chap.....			1				1
Service Units:							
53d Sig Maint Co.....	11-227	12- 1-40	3			44	47
324th Sig Co (Air Wg).....	11-247	12- 1-40	3			71	74
328th Sig Co (Avn).....	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
Sig Sections (HAF).....			2			7	9
Sig Sections 18th Wing.....			2			2	4
12th Sig Plat (Air Base).....	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
Ord Sect Hq HAF.....			3			10	13
740th Ord Co Avn (AB).....	9-167	12-16-40	5			38	41
481st Ord Co Amm (Bomb).....	9-157	12-16-40	5			125	128
482nd Ord Co Avn (Bomb).....	9-157	12-16-40	5			123	128
QM Sec Hq HAF & 18th Wing.....						4	4
13th QM Co (Truck).....	10-57	11- 1-40	3			70	73
259th QM Co (AB).....	10-357	4-18-40	3			102	157
39th QM Co (LM).....	10-27	11- 1-40	2			60	62
Total attached.....			56			841	897
<b>e. 14th Pursuit Wing &amp; Attached Units:</b>							
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wing.....	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135
Hq & Hq Sq 18h Pur Grp (I).....	1-12	6- 1-41	23			209	232
6th Pur Sq (I).....	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
19th Pur Sq (I).....	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
78th Pur Sq (I).....	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
44th Pur Sq (I).....	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Grp (F).....	1-12	6- 1-41	13			122	135
45th Pur Sq (F).....	1-12	6- 1-41	33			279	312
46th Pur Sq (F).....	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
47th Pur Sq (F).....	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
86th Obs Sq.....	0-255	1- 1-41	21			137	158
58th Bomb Sq.....	1-135	8- 1-39	25			196	221
18th Air Base Grp.....	(Tentative 1-441)	6- 7-40	30			499	529
Total.....			364			2,926	3,290
Attached Med.....			17			84	101
Attached Chap.....			1				1
Service Units:							
Sig Sed 14th Wing.....			2			2	4
307th Sig Co (Air Wing).....	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
45th Sig Plat (AB).....	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
258th QM Bn (AB).....	10-357	4-18-40	2			102	118
14th QM Co (Truck).....	10-57	10- 1-40	3			70	73
741st Ord Co (AB) (Avn).....	9-167	12-16-40	3			38	41
674th Ord Co AVN (Pur).....	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
696th Ord Co AVN (Pur).....	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
Total Attached.....			40			498	538
Total Hawaiian Air Force (Air Units).....			895			6,472	7,367
Total Hawaiian Air Force & Attached Units.....			991			7,811	8,802
<b>f. Harbor Defense Troops:</b>							
Hq & Hq Btry HSCAB.....	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
15th CA (HD) (Less 1 gun btry).....	4-41	11- 1-40	46	1		1,122	1,169
16th CA (HD) (Less 2 gun btry).....	4-71	11- 1-40	42	1		969	1,012



Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
<b>f. Harbor Defense Troops—Con.</b>							
41st CA (RY) (Less 1 gun bn) (Less Bd).	4-41	11- 1-40	49			1, 108	1, 157
55th CA (TD) (Less bd)	4-31	11- 1-40	67			1, 678	1, 745
Nth CA (TD) (Less Hq & CTn 2d & 3d Bns & Btrys D, E, & F, SL Btry & Band).	4-31	11- 1-40	37			800	837
Total Harbor Defense			251	2		5, 752	6, 005
<b>Attached Med:</b>							
16th CA			6			37	43
15th CA			6			37	43
41st CA			6			35	41
55th CA			7			46	53
Nth CA			4			26	30
Attached Chaplains			5				5
Total Attached			34			181	215
Total Harbor Defense & Attached Troops.			285	2		5, 933	6, 220
<b>g. Anti-aircraft Artillery:</b>							
Hq & Hq Btry AA Brig.	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
Intelligence Btry AA Brig Spec.	4-08	1- 1-39	4			134	138
64th CA (AA) (Rein)	4-11 & 4-13	11- 1-40 W Date 12-12-38	97			2, 451	2, 549
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	69	1		1, 807	1, 877
97th CA AA (less Band (SL) and one (1) 37mm Btry and basics in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1, 979	2, 066
98th CA AA (Less Band (S1) and one (1) 37mm Btry and basics in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1, 979	2, 066
Total AA Coast Artillery			354	2		8, 425	8, 781
<b>Attached Medical:</b>							
64th CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
Xth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			48	56
Yth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			49	56
Attached Chaplains	4-11	11- 1-40	6				6
Total Attached			32			180	212
Total AA & Attached			386	2		8, 605	8, 993
<b>h. Department Troops:</b>							
11th Tank Co	17-57	11-15-40	5			106	111
Xth Tank Bn (Less 1 Co)	17-55	11-15-40	26			406	432
11th Ordnance Co	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
Haw Div Pack Train	Sp		3			82	85
Co A 1st Sep Chem Bn	3-17	11- 1-40	2			168	170
Total			42			902	944
<b>i. Chemical Warfare Service</b>							
Chemical Depot & filling Plant	Sp		3			32	35
<b>j. Engineer Corps:</b>							
34th Engrs (Less Band & Basics).	5-171	11- 1-40	39			1, 090	1, 129
Attached Med & Chap	5-171	11- 1-40	7			35	43
804th Engr Bn Avn	5-435	4-22-40	21			625	646
Engr Depot	Spec		5			51	56
Total Engrs			65			1, 766	1, 831
Total Engrs plus attached Med & Chap			72			1, 802	1, 874
<b>k. Ordnance Department:</b>							
Ordnance Depot	Spec		12			92	104
61st Ord Co (Amm)	9-17	11- 1-40	2			50	52
62nd Ord Co (MM)	3-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
63rd Ord Co (MM)	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146

## Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T O	Date	Mobilization strength					
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total	
<b>k. Ordnance Department—Con.</b>								
74th Ord Co Depot	9-18	11- 1-40	6			180	186	
Ordnance Personnel Attached to Units			6				6	
Total Ordnance Department			38			602	640	
<b>l. Finance Department:</b>								
Finance Officer USA Hon			3			10	13	
Mis Fin Est			8			38	46	
Total Finance Department			11			48	59	
<b>m. Quartermaster Department:</b>								
QM Depot			24	2		212	236	
QM Det Scho Bks			15	2		227	244	
QM Det (Ex Scho)			15	1		300	316	
Co B 90th QM Bn (HY M)	10-47	11- 1-40	3			224	227	
32nd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189	
33rd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189	
15th QM Co Truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113	
16th QM Co truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113	
72nd QM Co (Bakery)	10-147	11- 1-40	5			158	163	
Co A 395th QM Bn (Port)			4			186	200	
School, Bakers & Cooks			1			121	122	
Total QM			81	5		1,928	2,014	
Attached Med QM Depot			1			15	16	
Total QMC and Attached			82	5		1,943	2,028	
<b>n. Signal Corps:</b>								
Signal Co (Depot) (Less Dets)	11-107		2			60	62	
9th Sig Serv Co	Spec		3			230	233	
2nd Sig Co. (Det)	Spec		1			30	31	
Xth Sig Bn	11-15	11- 1-40	20			542	562	
Aircraft Warning Co	11-157	11- 1-40	12			357	369	
Total Signal Corps			38			1,219	1,257	
Attached Medical			3			11	14	
Total Sig Corps & Attached Units			41			1,230	1,271	
<b>o. Hospitalization Forces:</b>								
Tripler Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693	
Scho Bks Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693	
Vet Gen Hosp			2			8	10	
Haw Med Depot			4			31	35	
School Farriers & Horseshoers						6	6	
2 Gen Hosps	8-507	7-25-40	146		240	1000	1386	
5th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93	
9th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93	
Total Med Corps			304		480	2225	3009	
<b>p. Districts Hawaiian Department:</b>								
OAHU District Hq (Dept Ser Comd)			25	1		2	28	
HAWAII District Hq			12			19	31	
MAUI District Hq			12			5	17	
KAUAI District Hq			5			2	7	
Total (Less Dets 299th Inf)			54	1		28	83	
<b>Recapitulation:</b>								
Department Headquarters			161	30		492	683	
Beach & Land Defense			1137	10		22403	23550	
Hawaiian Air Force			991			7811	8802	
Harbor Defenses			285	2		5933	6220	
Anti-Aircraft Artillery			386	2		8305	8993	
Service Organizations			247	5		5657	5911	
Hospitalization Forces			304		480	2225	3009	
Service Command			54	1		28	83	
Total			3565	50	480	53114	57241	

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,  
*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1M]

2 MAY 1941

AG 320.3/38

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C.

## 1. References:

A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941.

B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941.

C. Letter CO, RECAB to CG, Reun. Dept, dated 16 April 1941, subject: "Constitution and Activation of Antiaircraft Intelligence Battery," forwarded to the War Department by 1st. Indorsement dated 21 April 1941, file RECAB 320.3, JHD 320.3/36.

D. Letter FED to TMG, subject "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", dated 25 April 1941, file 320.3/37.

E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26-41 M (Ret) M-C. ---D 320.2 straight Misc.

2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of the Antiaircraft Artillery Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organization of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assignments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D) this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore.

3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Department will be organized as follows:

53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.).

Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53rd CA Brigade (RefH.).

Intel. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4-08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C &amp; R).

64th C. A. (AA)

251st. C. A. (AA)

"Teh" CA (AA) semi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A)

"Eth" Rs, AA gun, semi mobile (less searchlight battery and one gun Battery) (Ref. A); to be expanded into the "8th" Regt. upon arrival of the remainder of the reinforcements (Ref. B)

## 4. Accordingly it is recommended that:

a. Authority be granted to activate the Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4-10-1, 1. Nov. 40) and the Intel. Btry. 53d. CA Brigade (T/O 4-06 (c) New), on or about 1 June 1941.

b. A brigadier General be assigned to this Department to command the 53d CA Brigade.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

AC 340.2 (5-2-41)

MR-O

1st. Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 12, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast Artillery Brigade, within the recently authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by 1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this time.

2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing

the allotment to units of grades and ratings of your present allotment, Coast Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office.

3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Department.

4. Table of Organization 4-06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is being reproduced and distributed.

By order of Secretary of War:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Major General,  
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1 N]

DOO 320.2/141  
W A GARRON COL ORD DEPT  
759-6th  
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,  
*Washington D C*

Attention invited to fact that there are six each activated thirty seven MM AA bttrys at present in Haw Dept comma that present plans contemplate six additional of this type battery by March nineteen forty two comma and that only twenty guns are on hand Period Radio information therefore requested as to which and in what quantities we may expect the one hundred each thirty seven MM AA guns listed as under procurement from by nineteen forty one funds in 00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron.

SHORT.

ENC TIEMAN

Nov. 6, 1941

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

*Capt. Inf.*  
12-22-41

[Exhibit 10]

TALK GIVEN BY GENERAL SHORT TO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON ARMY DAY

GENTLEMEN:

I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day. Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the opportunity of discussing some of our plans which will demand close and active cooperation on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil government.

You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled, or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the oldest adult, of our nation.

I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National Defense. The following items are of prime importance:

(a) Production and storage of food.

(b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.



(c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.

(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries.

These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture.

All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most easily grown in this soil and climate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes, string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Shortage of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perishable items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and wholesale merchant's shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important.

Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March 19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plentiful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any individual or organization.

It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved and feed stored.

In the general defense measures for these islands there is no civilian effort of higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supply for all the people in time of emergency.

The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital importance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control, would be to take measures to insure that civilian agencies, expanded as required, continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency. It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equipment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing buildings. Staffs of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate duty.

Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classified, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly located to the extent at least of the porches, dayrooms, etc., should be listed by each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Preparations of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross.

The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose.

Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications,

docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations, are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give, some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this committee, some of my ideas on this subject.

There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the plans which are being formulated and discussed by the Mayor of that city for the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recreation centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recreational center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. These might properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a source of fresh water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility. Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had considerable experience in the construction and laying out of such installations as many such recreational camps already exist on the Mainland. You yourselves have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii.

Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the habit of such excursions to adequate and well planned camps would accomplish a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required in the future.

In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women, children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar camps for the use of the families of Army personnel should such an occasion ever demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recreation centers by all of our personnel.

I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem confronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and loss of life might result.

I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as important defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans. They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat, but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to complete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time.

My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must

understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together. Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the future.

I thank you.

[1] [Exhibit 1P]

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT IN CONNECTION WITH PREPAREDNESS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION TO MEET A FOOD EMERGENCY IN HAWAII.

- Item No. 1 Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facilities for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage, he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost support. (See Inclosure No. 1).
- 21 Mar 41
- Item No. 2 Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii, stating serious problem of food supply under emergency conditions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2).
- 4 Apr 41
- Item No. 3 Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4 April 41, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3).
- 12 May 41
- Item No. 4 1st Indorsement to Gen. Short's letter of 4 April 41, from War Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown potatoes, providing price does not exceed 2½¢ per pound. (See Inclosure No. 4).
- 2 May 41

[2]

- Item No. 6. Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton:
- 5 May 41
1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7, Lt. General Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing additional food supplies for use during a possible emergency.
  2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase additional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk to as much as \$800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have purchased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means that the retailers' stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly.
  3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer purchases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manufacturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above normal.
  4. Wholesalers generally support the report of the retailers with regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesalers.
  5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfactory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu.
- Note. The direct result of Gen. Short's public address of 7 April 1941 was to increase the supply of food in storage in Hawaii from 20 to 35%.



[3]

Item No. 7 In a published statement prior to a general meeting of agriculturists thru-out the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short said, "All efforts to increase local food production are steps toward increased security for Hawaii".  
16 June 41

Item No. 8 At an address to the University Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short stated:  
13 Aug 41

"Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian population during an emergency. I regard this project of local food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii."

"So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essential items. It will look after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production on military reservations to supply its needs—so far as is practicable.

"I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods—cattle, dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption. This support includes farm machinery which is important for large-scale crop production."—(From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug 41)

Item No. 9 Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating the War, Navy and State Departments and the Budget Bureau were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached).  
16 Sept 41

For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued support, see Inclosure No. 6.

[4]

Item No. 10 The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands as well, setting up acreage and crops allocations to plantations, both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide, fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops sufficient to sustain the entire population for six months.  
23 Oct 41

This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary priority allocations of shipping space required. (See Incl. No. 7.)

Item No. 11 Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for reconsideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes up. (See Inclosure No. 8.)  
3 Dec 41

Item No. 12 Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply. (See Inclosure No. 9.)  
3 Dec 41

Item No. 13 Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm machinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.)  
14 Dec 41

[5]

Item No. 14 WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipment of Food for Civilian Population".  
17 Dec 41

In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii, first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment follow-



ing week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indicated by the radios of Gen. Short and of the Governor.  
(See Inclosure No. 11).

As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11) from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was received, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve Supply to Hawaii.

While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. for the refrigerated storage.

When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept.

At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be ready in the very near future.

The Civilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National Office of Civilian Defense.

Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge the impetus of Gen. Short's consistent urging of plans to implement the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of plans set up by the Army.

Enclosure No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941.*

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,

*Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.*

MY DEAR GOVERNOR POINDEXTER: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken to date and am in full concurrence therewith.

I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However, the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this problem as it is relatively of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by me and have my utmost support.

With kindest personal regards,  
Sincerely,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

## Enclosure No. 2

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941.*

Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in Hawaii.

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self-supporting.

Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil population would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution of this problem becomes a mission of this Department.

In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable.

In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters, to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto of 26 August 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W.D. -OQMG, July 5, 1938; and to related correspondence over the past four years.

2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and April of this year at an average cost of \$.025 per pound. Mainland-grown potatoes were delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of \$.018 per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of \$.007 per pound, or approximately \$13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed that this differential would hold good as an average throughout any year until growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less. Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii. This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished [2] only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of production. Sugar planters—who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely willing to go along on this project and break even.

3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over 1940.

4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period that the requirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout the entire year.

5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the purpose at the time of the offering.

(Sgd) Walter C. Short,  
WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 3.

R. S. BAMBERGER,  
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General,

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington D.C.

Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice

SHORT

Enclosure No. 4

AG 432 Hawaiian  
Dept. (4-4-41) M-D

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *May 2, 1941.*

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided the contract price shall not exceed 2½¢ per pound.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Sgd) E. S. ADAMS,  
*Major General,  
The Adjutant General.*

Enclosure No. 5

Poindexter  
Warner*September 16, 1941.*

Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather lukewarm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii Period. Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views and wire me this information.

DELEGATE KING.

Enclosure No. 6

Honorable SAMUEL WILDER KING,  
*Delegate to Congress,  
604 House Office Building,  
Washington, D. C.*

*September 17, 1941.*

In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the Territory which formed the basis for the original surplus food program Period. Commanding general endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first Period. Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period. Opinion of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty second Period. Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn Period. Your suggestion that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter.

WARNER (Poindexter).

H. H. WARNER,  
*Director Agricultural Extension Service  
University of Hawaii and  
U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating*

Enclosure No. 8

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
AO430

Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii.  
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should

be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be presented.

2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency, and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed.

3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

1 Incl—

Let. Gov. of Hawaii re  
food storage dated  
12-3-41.

Enclosure No. 9

DECEMBER 3, 1941.

AG-430

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,  
*Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.*

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates the necessity of advancing certain plans for the care and protection of the civil population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between the Islands and the mainland.

I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced this view on appropriate occasions.

I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again advanced at this time.

In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association transmitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that organization:

"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic foods stored here against an emergency."

Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including the Army representative present.

"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Department supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration this program.

"Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring quicker action."

It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production, can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here, and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as to amounts of food currently in Hawaii.

This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand.

It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands.

For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory



might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the time element involved in assembling the figures.

May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any assistance in the present emergency.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Copy of this let. furnished War Department

Enclosure No. 10

[Radiogram]

14 December 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
War Department,  
Washington, D. C.

Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential foods on hand for two hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current consumption Stop Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions are most serious deficiencies Stop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle equal to one hundred fifty two days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory are on hand Stop Important that this reserve be maintained by no more than normal slaughter Stop Food store inventories on outlying islands being taken Stop Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory Stop Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month Stop It is expected that commercial firms will place orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian population providing there is an allocation of shipping made available Stop It is essential that allocation for this shipping space be made immediately Stop In addition shipments of seven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed Stop Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars equal to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed Stop Letter will follow showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage Stop Requisition has been already communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope Department of Interior and Delegate King Stop Orders have been placed for seed comma insecticides comma fertilizer comma and agricultural implements through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco Stop Forty thousand weight tons and fifty five thousand ship tons of shipping required for these items Stop This must be shipped immediately Stop Request War Department obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly shipments.

SHORT.

Enclosure No. 11.

[Radiogram]

Washn D. C. 403 A Dec 17 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment following week period Every effort will be made to provide critical items indicated in URAD and that of Governor.

ADAMS.

[Exhibit 1Q]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941.*

In reply refer to:  
Via "Clipper" Air Mail  
Engr. 383

Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as the Governor's representative in this matter.

2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5-35) which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances between shelters and latrines, mess hall, baths, and wash rooms. See typical layout plan inclosed herewith Incl. No. 1).

a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms, streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed communal area will be observed.

b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish. It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available. If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with something to stand on.

[2] c. Canec, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and probably sleepers supporting flooring will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized iron, if obtainable.

d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of canec, plywood, and standard lengths of lumber.

e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74, FM 5-35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24" on centers (See Incl. No. 6).

f. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5).

(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8'. Standard double bunks (Fig. 71, FM-5-35) will be placed 8' apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of canec so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift canec partitions to give any length room desired.

(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Otherwise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps. Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the order named as far as available materials will permit.

g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indicated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground. Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into deep slopes.

h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be

built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other buildings will be available for those purposes.

i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans.

[3] 1. Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small articles of furniture such as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be encouraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that subsequent to evacuation a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp comfort.

3. a. Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For locations see Incl. 7.

(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units such as stores, post offices, churches, etc.

(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation.

(3) Placing a large percentage of evacuees near areas suitable for growing vegetables.

(4) Securing dispersion.

b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages.

In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall, latrine, bath house, and wash house to permit increasing the number of occupants in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories.

Plantation villages in the higher altitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches. The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions.

These camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles.

The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl. 7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections.

The following advantages are characteristic of these units:

(1) Provide a high degree of dispersion.

(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection.

(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production.

(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to prevent communal discord.

(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which will facilitate government.

(6) Utilize existing installations.

[4] c. 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be located at Wahiawa, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and south of the North Fork of Wahiawa Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following advantages:

(1) Will be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with roads.

(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available.

(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.

(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food production.

d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area.

e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of about 13 miles from Honolulu.

4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms.

b. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu (Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected.

c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which can shelter from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be substituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient quantities. When practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing



protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations. Inclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on conditions.

[5] d. The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at \$100.00 per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from \$1,000 to \$1,500. No estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials. Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the available funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as possible.

e. It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should be borne by the individual.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

13 Incls:

- Incl. #1 Layout plan
- #2-5 Sketches
- #6 Fig. 74
- #7 Map
- #8 Map of Hono.
- #9-12 Drawings
- #13 Radio, 4 July 41

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,  
EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*

[SECRET]

5 ND DJ 243 Govt REP

ZPN 1 Radio, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4 0128 1941.

Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short,

*Fort Shafter, TH Oahu*

Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote rearletter June twenty reference number three eight one War Department considering whether problem lies purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency period. In latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for program of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In conference with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias committee I was requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evacuation period Am advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case character and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with copy direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Department of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate Sam King.

TOD,  
1628  
610A/4

A true copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,  
Edward von Geldern,  
*2nd Lt., F. A.*



[Exhibit 1R]

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu.

There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this, if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands without further delay.

Yours very truly,

FRANK E. MIDKIFF.

A true copy:

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,  
ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,  
Major, G. S. C.,  
Asst. to G-4.

HONOLULU, T. H., December 22, 1941.

The PRESIDENT,

*The White House, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Assn.; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank

E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

c. c. to General Walter C. Short.

A true copy:

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,  
ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,  
Major, G. S. C.  
Asst. to G-4.

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL  
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, ISLAND OF OAHU,  
*Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941.*

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Fort Shafter*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT,

Please allow me express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical Committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minutes notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realizes the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be Prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker  
T. G. S. WALKER, *Director,*  
*Civilian Defense,*  
*Island of Oahu.*

True Copy

O. M. Cutler  
O. M. CUTLER  
*Lt. Col. Infantry*

[1] [SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII]  
TERRITORY OF HAWAII,  
Executive Chambers,  
*Honolulu, 23 December 1941.*

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H.*

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of

disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food:* Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [2] December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. W. POINDEXTER,  
Governor of Hawaii.

This is a True Copy.

L. W. Truman

L. W. TRUMAN,

Captain, Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF A. C. OF S., G-4  
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

EXHIBIT No. 8 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 23 December 1941.*

Subject: Records requested in telegram dated 22 December 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in telegram AF 130, dated 22 December 1941, the following information is submitted:

a. A diary and other records of all units from 0001 15 November 1941.

(1) During the period 15 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, normal training was conducted in accordance with the schedules attached as inclosure number one.

(2) Activities on 7 December 1941 are covered in report attached as inclosure number two.

(3) During the period 8 December 1941 to 13 December 1941, the 14th Pursuit Wing was kept in condition A-1 daily during the periods 0530-0800 and 1600-1830 and condition A-2 during the remainder of the 24 hours daily. Training of new pilots was conducted between 0800 and 1600 daily.

(4) During the period 14 December 1941 to 19 December 1941 the following schedule was followed:

(a) 0530-0800:

Condition A-1: All squadrons less one.

Condition A-5: One squadron.

(b) 0800-1600:

Condition A-1: One squadron.

Condition A-2: All squadrons less two. (Training flights were conducted.)

Condition A-5: One squadron.

(c) 1600-1830:

Same as dawn period.

(d) 1830-0530:

Condition A-2: All squadrons less one.

Condition A-5: One squadron.

(5) During the period 19 December 1941 to 21 December 1941 the following schedule was adhered to:

(a) 0530-800 and 1700-1830:

One third on patrol.

Two thirds on Operational Readiness No. 1.

(b) 0800-1700:

One sixth on patrol.

One sixth on Operational Readiness No. 1.

Two thirds on Operational Readiness No. 3.

(c) 1830-0530:

One fourth on Operational Readiness No. 3.

Three fourths on Operational Readiness No. 5.

(6) From 21 December 1941 to present date, the schedule followed is in accordance with inclosure number three, attached. Condition of readiness specified therein correspond as follows:

Alert (4 min.)—Operational Readiness No. 1.

Readiness (30 min.)—Operational Readiness No. 2.

Unavailable—Operational Readiness No. 5.

b. The copies of all field orders and instructions for maneuvers, disposition, or field fortifications, carrying out instructions and alerts ordered by Department Headquarters, for the period 0001 1 February 1941 to 0730 7 December 1941.

(1) Orders for flights each Thursday, over Pearl Harbor, to acquaint the Navy with types of Army airplanes.

(2) Joint maneuvers with Navy 26 February 1941.

(3) Joint maneuvers with Navy 3, 4, and 5 March 1941.

(4) Alert procedure 3 March 1941.

(5) Joint Army, Navy, and Marine exercise 24 March 1941.

(6) Pursuit protection of bombardment 25 March 1941.



- (7) Aircraft identification procedure 19 May 1941.
- (8) Department maneuvers 12 May 1941 to 24 May 1941.
- (9) During Department maneuvers construction was started on 125 bunkers for pursuit airplanes. Completed about 1 September 1941.
- (10) 25 July 1941 to 30 July 1941—alert No. 2.
- (11) 13 October 1941 Joint Army & Navy exercise.
- (12) 27 October 1941 Joint Army & Navy exercise.
- (13) 10 November 1941 alert drill.
- (14) 12 November 1941 Joint Army & Navy exercise.
- (15) 27 November 1941 alert No. 1 with instructions that airplanes would not be dispersed and training continue under condition E-5.
- (16) Field Orders—Naval Security 24 April 1941 to 3 September 1941.
- (17) On October 15th, in accordance with SO No. 256, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, the undersigned, with Lt. Colonel C. A. Powell, Department Signal Officer and Major A. W. Meehan, G-3 of H. A. F., were sent to the mainland to observe the maneuvers of the 2nd Interceptor Command held at Seattle 28 October 1941 to 2 November 1941, for the purpose of studying the Interceptor Command set-up and adapting that set-up to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

This board returned to Honolulu, T. H., 3 December 1941.

On 27 October 1941 General Orders No. 68, HHD, were published, separating the Base Command of Wheeler Field from the 14th Pursuit Wing. Previous to this the Base and Wing had been commanded by the Commanding General, 14th Wing. Due to a shortage of personnel, Wing Staff Officers performed many duties for the Base establishment. The records of the two functions were integral.

The attack on December 7th arrived before the complete separation of the Base and Wing had been effected and has added to the difficulties of furnishing the documentary evidence called for.

H. C. Davidson,  
H. C. DAVIDSON,  
*Brigadier General, Air Corps,*  
*Commanding.*

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EXHIBIT No. 9 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION  
REPORT OF GROUND DEFENSE OFFICER  
March 15, 1941 to October 1, 1941

Appointed ground defense officer, and ordered to establish ground defense unit consisting of 50 men, 25 from 58th Bombardment Squadron, and 25 from 86th Observation Squadron, this unit was formed and drilled for ten (10) days by Infantry N. C. O.'s. Positions were assigned each group, and were manned upon being alerted. The drilling of this unit continued throughout the year in anti-aircraft firing, defense against ground attack, and anti-sabotage. 58th Bombardment ordered away. 25 men from Base Detachment took over 58th Bombardment area due to the shortage of personnel. 50 men were the maximum strength of the ground defense unit.

Upon being alerted planes were dispersed, and additional interior guard placed around the planes. All guards were directly under the ground defense officer.

During the last regular maneuver, anti-sabotage problems were held.

Issued gas masks, and drilled all men in the use of same.

Relieved from ground defense, October 1, 1941.

E. L. Duggan,  
E. L. DUGGAN,  
*2nd Lieut., Air Corps.*

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

SUMMARY OF GROUND DEFENSE ACTIVITIES IN THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1941 TO  
DECEMBER 7, 1941

a. Captain Edward F. Kent, 21st Infantry, was ordered on detached service at Bellows Field effective October 1, 1941 as "Infantry Representative with The Air Force". At that time, there was already organized a force of one sergeant, four corporals, and twenty (20) privates and the same number from men on

detached service at Bellows Field known as the Base Detachment. The Tentative Department Standing Operating Procedure in effect on that date directed the Hawaiian Air Force to "protect all vital installations on air fields and bases" when an alert was ordered, in addition to other requirements. The most serious form of alert required the Hawaiian Air Force, among other missions, to "on Oahu, defend all air fields against sabotage, air and ground attacks. Training Memorandum No. 3, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, dated 4 August 1941 prescribed the manner in which this mission would be accomplished.

Plans were prepared for the employment of the Ground Defense Unit. The Ground Defense Unit was trained two hours per week, principally in the use of the rifle and cal. .30 machine gun, including firing of these weapons. There was no allowance of ammunition cooperation of organizations on the post.

A plan was prepared for the maximum defense of the field. This plan carried a request for additional weapons and a considerable list of engineer, signal, chemical, and ordnance materials to carry out the plan, including barbed wire for entanglements, materials for plungerproof pillboxes, and a manproof fence around the perimeter of the field. The general plan was approved by the post commander on the 17th Day of October, but he requested changes in the wording of the accompanying estimate of the situation and explanatory matter. It was not until the 18th of November that the plan was forwarded from the post to the Hawaiian Air Force.

On the 27th of November the Ground Defense Unit was alerted and manned their positions. As these men were kept from their regular duties, it was deemed advisable to increase the Base Guard to a sufficient number to protect vital installations on the post, and to return the Ground Defense Unit to normal duties and training. This was done on the 1st of December. This alert was ordered as an anti-sabotage alert, with "no threat from without".

There was no change in the form of alert ordered until the base was under enemy fire.

Around the 1st of December, although there is no record of the date, the Department Air Officer telephoned and requested that this base requisition about half of a day of fire of ammunition. A requisition was prepared, but the ammunition had not been received at the time of attack.

b. The following documents were received previous to 7 December 1941:

1. Ltr HAF Subject Alert No. 1, dated 2 December 1941, ordered vital installation be protected against sabotage, and that normal training activities be continued.

Edward F. Kent,  
EDWARD F. KENT,  
*Captain, Infantry,*  
*Ground Defense Officer.*

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EXHIBIT No. 10 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS BELLOW FIELD,  
WAIMANALO, T. H., 23 December 1941.

Subject: Report in compliance with Radio from CG, Hawaiian Department, RE: Records of Operations by all units from 0001, 15 November 1941 to 0730, 7 December 1941, and Field Orders or Instructions for Alert Procedure.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with subject radio the following documents are on file in this headquarters as listed below:

a. Letter HHD, Ft. Shafter, T. H., Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, File AG 329.3/37b, To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., dated 5 June 1941. SECRET.

b. Letter Haw. Air Force, Subject: Aerial Reconnaissance Functions of the Army Air Forces in Conjunction with Coastal Frontier Defense, dated 30 October 1941, (Inclosure—Letter WD AGO, Subject, same as above, File 580.81 (10-13-41) MC-G-M, dated October 24, 1941. SECRET.

c. US Pacific Fleet Battale Force, U. S. S. California, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H., Subject: Operating Areas—Hawaiian Area, dated 10 November 1941. CONFIDENTIAL.

d. Copy #10, Minutes of meeting of the Information Center on 24 November. Purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully

operative on a war-time bases, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment might be needed to do so. Attendance was by both Army and Navy. SECRET. (Received from Wheeler Field.)

e. Haw. Air Force, Subject: Alert No. 1, dated 2 December 1941. RESTRICTED.

2. Documents listed above are either Confidential or Secret as indicated, one copy is available, only.

3. Alert Called on 27 November 1941 at approximately 1520 by telephone placed this station on Alert No. 1. Post duties were carried on in normal manner. Ground Defense assumed their duties under the direction of the Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.

4. Reports from the Commanding Officer, 86th Observation Squadron, (C & D), A. C., are attached hereto.

5. Reports from the Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, are attached hereto.

6. Reports for the 44th Pursuit Squadron, A. C., which was at this station undergoing training in gunnery, are not available, as this squadron has returned to Wheeler Field with all records.

Subject: Report of Records of Operations, from Bellows Field, 23 Dec. 1941.

LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON,  
Leonard D. Weddington,  
*Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps,*  
*Commanding.*

2 Incls:

- #1—Report of 86th Obsn. Sq.,
- #2—Report of Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field.

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EXHIBIT No. 11 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

EIGHTY-SIXTH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,

*Bellows Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

Subject: Report in Compliance With Radio From CG, Hawaiian Department, RE: Records of Operations by All Units From 0001. 15 November 1941 to 0730, 7 December 1941, and Field Orders or Instructions for Alert Procedure.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Thru: Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.

1. There is herewith enclosed all data available at this date regarding operations and instructions received or given by the 86th Obsn Sq (C&D) AC which is available this headquarters this date.

For Major STEWART:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sq (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

Incl:

1. Letter, "Flight Opns of the 86th Obsn Sq (C&D) AC during the period 15 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, inclusive" with Incls: 21 cys Con Opns Orders and 1 cy Code Symbols.

2. Letter, "Receipt of Classified Documents".

3. Statement, "Action Taken During Alert Called 27 Nove 1941".

4. Training Memorandum #6, Hq 86th Obsn Sq (C&D) AC, Bellows Field, T. H., 6 October 1941, RE: "Training Schedule".

/JPT/gc

## EIGHTY-SIXTH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&amp;D) AC,

*Bellows Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

Subject: Flight Operations of the 86th Obsn Sq (C&amp;D) AC during the period 15 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, inclusive.

To: Commanding General Hawaiian Department, Thru: Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.

1. There are attached the consolidated operations orders for the period 15 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, inclusive.

2. Also attached is a list of code symbols for indicating the type of missions flown.

For Major STEWART:

Jay P. Thomas,

JAY P. THOMAS,

*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sq (C&D),**Operations Officer.*

Incl:

21-Consolidated Operations Orders

1-Copy Code Symbols

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTY-SIXTH  
OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,*Bellows Field, T. H., 15 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order

Number 119

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&amp;D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----, the following flights are ordered for 15 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs
3	Capt Stewart	Capt Baker	Arnold	0440	N45	:50	0
3	Capt Stewart	Capt Baker	Arnold	0530	45	1:25	1
3	Lt Shibley	Lt Shields	Barney	0810	28	1:35	1
3	Lt Shields	Lt Shibley	Thun	1000	28	1:35	1
3	Lt Allen	Manganaro	Gallagher	1230	43	1:50	1
4	Lt Thompson	Lt Groneweg	Cullen	0430	N45	1:00	0
4	Lt Thompson	Lt Groneweg	Cullen	0530	45	1:30	1
4	Lt Hayward	Lt Renison	Arellano	0815	28	1:30	1
4	Lt Renison	Lt Hayward	Arellano	1000	28	1:30	1
4	Lt Renison	Claypool	Heavner	1230	43	2:00	1
6	Lt Lewis	Lt Bridwell	Welch	0440	N45	:50	0
6	Lt Lewis	Lt Bridwell	Welch	0530	45	1:30	2
6	Lt Ring	Lt Samuels	Cole	0815	28	1:30	1
6	Lt Ring	Anderson	French	1000	35	1:10	2
6	Lt Shibley	Strickland	Hurwitz	1220	43	2:05	1
7	Lt Thomas, WB	Lt Perkins	Rock	0430	N45	1:15	0
7	Lt Thomas, WB	Lt Perkins	Rock	0545	45	1:15	2
7	Lt Wisecarver	Forrest	Szablak	0815	33	1:30	1
7	Lt Thompson	Hill	Wagner	1000	22	1:30	1
7	Lt Shields	Stapes	Nichols	1230	43	2:00	1
10	Lt Thomas, JP	Franklin		0430	N45	1:00	0
10	Lt Thomas, JP	Franklin		0530	45	1:30	1
10	Lt Lewis	Lennon	Lt Perkins	0820	4	1:05	2
10	Lt Thomas, JP	Lt Barker	Addleman	1015	21	1:15	1
10	Lt Willis	Allen	Cullen	1215	43	2:15	1
12	Lt Wright	Lt Grismore	Manganaro	0430	N45	1:00	0
12	Lt Wright	Lt Grismore	Manganaro	0530	45	1:25	2
12	Major Rich	Povis	Edwards	0815	14	1:05	1
12	Lt Wolfe	Lt Walker	Schoch	1000	22	1:30	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., ----- 19-----

CON OPNS Order  
Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated-----,  
the following flights are ordered for-----:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs
12	Lt. Hanson.....	Strause.....	Arnold.....	1230	43	2:05	1
20	Lt. Hanson.....	Charpentier.....	.....	0430	N45	1:00	4
20	Lt. Hanson.....	Charpentier.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	4
20	Lt. Tully.....	.....	.....	0730	35	:25	1
20	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Tully.....	.....	0820	35	:25	1
20	Lt. Ripley.....	Lt. Righetti.....	.....	0845	35	1:10	1
20	Lt. Thrall.....	Bailey.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	3.
21	Lt. Willis.....	Fry.....	.....	0430	N45	1:00	8
21	Lt. Willis.....	Fry.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	4
21	Lt. Rathbun.....	Lt. Castro.....	.....	0815	35	1:30	3
21	Lt. Tully.....	Lt. Lambert.....	.....	1000	35	1:10	2
21	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Turner.....	.....	1145	9	:35	1
21	Lt. Turner.....	.....	.....	1230	35	:30	1
22	Lt. Pitts.....	Strause.....	.....	0430	N45	1:00	8
22	Lt. Pitts.....	Strause.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	15
22	Lt. Sullivan.....	Lt. Anderson.....	.....	0815	35	1:30	4
22	Lt. Turner.....	Lt. Booth.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 16 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order  
Number 120

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated-----,  
the following flights are ordered for 16 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt. Shields.....	Manganaro.....	Thun.....	1420	43	1:40	1
4	Lt. Renison.....	Claypool.....	Heavner.....	1420	43	1:40	1
6	Lt. Shibley.....	Strickland.....	Beretsky.....	1415	43	1:45	1
7	Lt. Allen.....	Lt. Shields.....	Cullen.....	0900	35	1:00	1
7	Lt. Allen.....	Stapes.....	Niehols.....	1420	43	1:40	1
10	Lt. Willis.....	Allen.....	Cullen.....	1415	43	1:45	1
12	Lt. Hanson.....	Strause.....	Arnold.....	1415	43	1:45	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer

# 1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 17 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order  
Number 121

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----, the following flights are ordered for 17 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
4	Lt. Shields	Henry	Cornelius	1440	N45	1:35	0
4	Lt. Shields	Henry	Cornelius	0615	45	:30	1
4	Lt. Sullivan	Lt. Pitts	Cullen	0910	28	1:00	1
4	Lt. Turner	Lt. Hayward	Downing	1030	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Sussdorff	Lt. Thrall	Wagner (navy)	1300	35	:15	1
4	Lt. Sussdorff	Lt. Thrall		1315	28	1:15	1
4	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Sullivan	Anderson	1540	35	:25	1
4	Lt. Sullivan	Anderson		1620	35	:15	1
6	Lt. Thrall	Conway	Collier	0430	N45	1:15	0
6	Lt. Thrall	Conway	Collier	0545	45	1:00	1
7	Lt. Lewis	Fitzgerald	Tessman	0440	N45	1:05	0
7	Lt. Lewis	Fitzgerald	Tessman	0545	45	1:00	1
7	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Renison		0815	35	:45	2
7	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Turner		0945	28	:30	1
7	Lt. Tully	Lt. Ripley	Bailey	1030	28	1:30	1
7	Lt. Allen	Lt. Fatheree (navy)		1130	9	:20	1
7	Lt. Allen			1150	9	:10	1
7	Lt. Ring	Lt. Samuels	Burrow	1300	28	1:30	1
10	Lt. Shibley	French	Addleman	0430	N45	:20	0
12	Lt. Rathbun	Downing	Harmon	0430	N45	1:15	0
12	Lt. Rathbun	Downing	Harmon	0545	45	1:00	1
12	Lt. Rathbun	Harmon		0545	35	:15	1
12	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Rathbun	Harmon	0700	9	:15	1
12	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Tully	Shoach	0915	28	:15	1
20	Lt. Thomas, JP	Lt. Ring		0500	N35	:30	1
20	Lt. Thomas, JP	Lt. Ring		0600	35	:30	1
20	Lt. Wolfe	Nachbar		0900	35	1:10	3
20	Lt. Ripley	Bailey		1300	35	1:30	5
21	Lt. Wright	Lt. Metcalfe		0915	35	1:20	3

By order of the Squadron Commander:

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., -----19-----

CON OPNS Order  
Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----, the following flights are ordered for -----:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger	Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
21	Lt. Thomas, WB	Lt. Ruiz			1035	35	1:00	1
21	Lt. Renison	Lt. Booth			1300	35	1:20	1
22	Lt. Samuels	Thomas			0430	N45	1:15	0
22	Lt. Samuels	Thomas			0545	45	1:15	3
22	Lt. Samuels	Weiner (AC)			0700	35	:15	1
22	Lt. Hanson	Lt. Pickard			0915	35	1:10	1
22	Lt. Thrall	Lt. Righetti			1030	35	1:00	1
22	Lt. Pitts	Lt. Harshbarger			1300	35	1:30	8

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 18 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order  
 Number 122

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No.-----Headquarters 86th  
 Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated-----  
 the following flights are ordered for 18 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs
3	Capt. Stewart.....	Lennon.....	Fitzgerald.....	0530	21	1:20	1
4	Lt. Turner.....	Thun.....	White.....	0530	22	1:30	5
4	Lt. Wright.....	Lt. Perkins.....	Isaacowitz.....	0830	30-G-12	2:25	1
4	Capt. Stewart.....	Capt. Baker.....	Lt. Perkins.....	1300	21	1:40	2
6	Lt. Tully.....	Mignerey.....	Johnson.....	0530	22	1:30	3
6	Lt. Rathbun.....	Lt. Ripley.....	Nemzer.....	0815	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Thomas, JP.....	Capt. McCarroll.....	Wagner.....	1000	35	1:30	2
6	Lt. Allen.....	Lt. Bridwell.....	Mathis.....	1300	22	1:55	2
12	Lt. Sussdorff.....	Cota.....	Barney.....	0530	21	1:30	3
12	Lt. Sullivan.....	Lt. Schneiderman.....	.....	0730	35	:20	1
12	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Sullivan.....	.....	0800	9	:20	1
12	Lt. Samuels.....	Lt. Grismore.....	Lt. Lambert.....	0820	30-G-6	2:10	1
12	Lt. Thomas, JP.....	Lt. Lambert.....	Lt. Grismore.....	1300	22	2:20	3
21	Lt. Vierth.....	Allen.....	.....	0530	45	1:45	8
21	Major Rich.....	Smith, CA.....	.....	0830	14	1:00	1
21	Lt. Wolfe.....	Nichols.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Lewis.....	Lt. Messerschmitt.....	.....	1300	35	2:00	2
22	Lt. Hayward.....	Riley.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	15
22	Lt. Wisecarver.....	Anderson.....	.....	0815	35	1:10	2
22	Lt. Shields.....	Steily.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	10
22	Lt. Thomas, WB.....	Lt. Groneweg.....	.....	1300	35	2:30	3

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
 Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
 Operations Officer.*

# 1942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 19 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order  
 Number 123

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for 19 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt. Allen			0945	31T	1:05	2
3	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Ripley	Nichols	1220	9	:20	1
3	Lt. Ripley	Nichols		1240	35	:30	1
6	Lt. Allen	Bailey	Isaacowitz	0530	45	1:30	1
6	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Renison	0730	0730	35	:20	1
6	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Renison	0755	9	:20	1
6	Lt. Lewis	Lennon	0820	0820	35	:20	1
6	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Col. Welch	Capt. Rich	0855	35	:55	1
6	Lt. Lewis	Lennon		0955	35	:15	1
6	Lt. Wrigley	Lt. Castro	Stein	1015	35	1:10	1
12	Lt. Thomas, JP	Fitzgerald	McBriarty	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt. Thompson	Capt. Baker	Lt. Bridwell	0815	9	1:25	2
21	Lt. Ripley	Crites		0530	N45	:15	0
21	Lt. Ripley	Crites		0545	45	1:15	7
21	Lt. Ripley	Stely		0830	35	1:30	6
22	Lt. Wisecarver	Cerillo		0530	N45	:15	1
22	Lt. Wisecarver	Cerillo		0545	45	1:15	7
22	Lt. Col. Weddington	Strause		0905	14	:55	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 21 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order

Number 124 1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_  
 the following flights are ordered for 21 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Pitts	Fitzgerald	0525	N45	:20	0
3	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Pitts	Fitzgerald	0545	45	1:15	1
3	Lt. Renison	McBriarty	Barney	0815	35	1:30	1
3	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Wright	Frank	1000	28	1:30	1
3	Lt. Wolfe	Lt. Grismore	Lt. Lambert	1300	35	1:05	2
6	Lt. Tully	Lt. Hanson	Thun	0530	45	1:30	1
6	Lt. Wolfe	Isaacowitz	Stein	0815	33	1:30	1
6	Lt. Lewis	Cota	Lennon	1000	5	1:20	1
6	Lt. Wisecarver	Lt. Turner	Goldberg	1300	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Renison	Doyle	1545	35	:20	1
6	Lt. Renison	Doyle		1610	35	:25	1
12	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Sullivan	Burgess	0530	N45	:30	0
12	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Sullivan	Burgess	0600	45	1:00	1
12	Lt. Wisecarver	Lt. Thomas, WB	Kolom	0815	28	1:30	1
12	Lt. Pitts	Lt. Thompson	Back	1000	28	1:30	3
12	Lt. Vierth	Lt. Ripley	Sutton	1300	28	1:30	1
21	Lt. Ring	Lt. Hayward		0530	45	1:30	2
21	Lt. Sullivan	Lt. Groneweg		0815	35	:50	2
21	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Sussdorff		1305	35	:40	2
22	Lt. Willis	Wood		0530	45	1:30	1
22	Lt. Thrall	Capt. McCarroll		1000	35	1:10	2
22	Lt. Thrall	Nichols		1300	35	1:35	3

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D)*  
*Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas.  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

1944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 22 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order Number 125

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&I), Bellows Field, T. H., dated ----- the following flights are ordered for 22 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt. Allen	Claypool	Bailey	0545	45	1:15	1
4	Lt. Allen	Capt. McCarroll	Roy	0830	31T	1:10	2
4	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Ring	Brown	1030	28	1:00	1
4	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Tully	Niehols	1155	9	:20	1
4	Lt. Tully	Niehols		1220	35	:25	1
6	Lt. Hayward	Capt. Kent	Schriber	0530	45	1:30	1
6	Lt. Ripley	Breaux		0730	35	:25	1
6	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Ripley	Breaux	0800	9	:25	1
6	Lt. Sussdorff	Lt. Hanson	Barney	0830	28	1:15	1
6	Lt. Tully	Smith, C. A.	Donnelly	1000	33	1:30	1
12	Lt. Wolfe	Arnold	Martel	0545	45	1:15	1
12	Lt. Vierth	Lt. Devine	Zaharevitz	0815	35	:45	2
12	Lt. Vierth			0840	35	:20	2
12	Lt. Pitts	Lt. Wolfe	Carpenter	1030	28	1:30	1
21	Lt. Wisecarver	Fitzgerald		0530	45	1:30	7
21	Lt. Sullivan	Lt. Thrall		0815	35	1:30	5
21	Lt. Rathbun	Schoch		0950	35	1:40	7
21	Lt. Allen	Meenan		1130	45	2:05	2
22	Lt. Vjerth	White		0530	45	1:30	6
22	Lt. Ring	Neufeld		0815	35	1:30	4
22	Lt. Hayward	Sorenson		1000	35	1:30	2
22	Lt. Thomas, J. P.	Claypool		1135	45	2:10	3
22	Lt. Thomas, J. P.	Lt. Toole (46th Pur.)		1315	45	:15	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
**JAY P. THOMAS,**  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
**JAY P. THOMAS,**  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 24 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order Number 126

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No.----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C & D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated-----, the following flights are ordered for 24 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs
3	Lt. Lewis.....	Thun.....	Lennon.....	0815	5	1:45	1
3	Lt. Vierth.....	Lt. Samuels.....	.....	1000	28	1:30	1
3	Capt. Stewart.....	Quisenberry.....	.....	1135	9	:20	1
3	Capt. Stewart.....	.....	.....	1155	9	:15	1
4	Lt. Thomas, J. P.....	Fitzgerald.....	Naylor.....	0530	45	1:30	1
4	Lt. Wright.....	Lt. Grismore.....	Lt. Perkins.....	0815	2-G-6	2:30	1
4	Lt. Hayward.....	Lt. Hanson.....	White.....	1050	28	:45	1
6	Lt. Renison.....	Manganaro.....	Caroner.....	0535	45	1:25	1
6	Lt. Sussdorff.....	Lt. Willis.....	Doyle.....	0815	28	:45	1
6	Lt. Sussdorff.....	Lt. Willis.....	Doyle.....	1025	35	:45	1
12	Lt. Wisecarver.....	Mignerey.....	Stadelman.....	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt. Ritts.....	.....	Mander.....	0740	35	:20	1
12	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Pitts.....	Mander.....	0810	9	:25	1
12	Lt. Thrall.....	Lt. Ring.....	Gardner.....	0845	28	1:00	1
12	Lt. Pitts.....	York.....	Mathis.....	1010	35	1:20	9
21	Lt. Tully.....	Stely.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	5
21	Lt. Thomas, W. B.....	Lt. Righetti.....	.....	0815	35	1:15	2
21	Lt. Tully.....	Lt. Walker.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	1
22	Lt. Wolfe.....	Burt.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	2
22	Lt. Thompson.....	Campbell.....	.....	0825	35	1:20	19
22	Lt. Ring.....	Anderson.....	.....	1000	35	1:15	2

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C & D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C & D),  
Operations Officer.

1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C & D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 25 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order Number 127

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C & D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for 25 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Capt. Stewart.....	Lt. Boozer.....	Fitzgerald.....	0530	21	1:30	2
3	Lt. Rathbun.....	Rock.....	.....	0730	35	:20	1
3	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Rathbun.....	Rock.....	0755	28	1:00	1
3	Lt. Hayward.....	Lt. Rathbun.....	Gallagher.....	0900	28	:50	1
3	Lt. Wright.....	Lt. Lambert.....	Lt. Groneweg.....	1000	5G6	1:30	1
3	Lt. Allen.....	Lt. Grismore.....	Ireland.....	1315	21	1:30	* 1
3	Lt. Allen.....	.....	.....	1515	9	:20	1
3	Lt. Allen.....	Lt. Lewis.....	.....	1540	9	:25	1
4	Lt. Sullivan.....	Downing.....	O'Kelly.....	0530	45	:30	0
4	Lt. Sullivan.....	Downing.....	O'Kelly.....	0900	22	1:00	2
4	Lt. Hanson.....	Lt. Thrall.....	Mignerey.....	0815	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Samuels.....	Lt. Anton.....	Schans.....	1000	35	1:30	1
4	Capt. Stewart.....	Capt. Baker.....	Lt. Bridwell.....	1315	17	1:30	1
6	Lt. Sussdorf.....	Naylor.....	Breckman.....	0530	22	1:20	1
6	Lt. Allen.....	Forrest.....	.....	0745	31T	:15	1
6	Lt. Allen.....	Capt. McCarroll.....	.....	1030	31T	:20	1
6	Lt. Thomas, W. B.....	Lt. Perkins.....	Glass.....	1315	22	1:30	1
12	Lt. Tully.....	Isaacowitz.....	Cerillo.....	0520	35	:30	0
12	Lt. Tully.....	Isaacowitz.....	Cerillo.....	0600	22	1:00	2
12	Lt. Thomas, J. P.....	.....	.....	0750	31T	:10	2
12	Lt. Turner.....	Tyrrell.....	White.....	0815	33	1:30	1
12	Lt. Wolfe.....	Lt. Perkins.....	Lt. Grismore.....	1000	30G12	1:30	1
12	Lt. Thomas, J. P.....	Lt. Lambert.....	Lt. Groneweg.....	1315	17	1:20	1
21	Lt. Ring.....	Wood.....	.....	0530	45	1:00	8
21	Lt. Thomas, W. B.....	Lt. Bridwell.....	.....	0950	35	:55	2
21	Lt. Renison.....	Lt. Anton.....	.....	0815	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Samuels.....	Lennon.....	.....	1300	35	1:00	2
22	Lt. Willis.....	Smith, C. A.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	9
22	Lt. Pitts.....	Greger.....	.....	0815	35	1:30	25

By order of the Squadron Commander:

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C & D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_\_

CON OPNS Order Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C & D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for \_\_\_\_\_:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
22	Lt. Tully.....	Downing.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	8
22	Lt. Turner.....	Claypool.....	.....	1300	35	1:30	6

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Licut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Licut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 26 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order Number 128

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for 26 November 1941 :

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs
3	Lt Allen	Fitzgerald	Campbell	0530	45	1:30	1
3	Lt Lewis	Thun	Lennon	0830	4	2:30	1
4	Lt Ripley	Singles	Bell	0530	45	1:30	1
4	Lt Renison			0730	35	:15	1
4	Lt Col Weddington	Lt Renison		0750	9	:15	1
4	Lt Hayward	Donnelly	Dandrea	0840	35	1:05	1
4	Lt Thompson	Capt Kent	Herzog	1000	28	1:30	3
4	Lt Col Weddington	Lt Hanson	Rhodes	1145	28	:45	1
4	Lt Hanson	Rhodes		1230	35	:30	1
6	Lt Allen	Lt Wisecarver	Cullen	0945	31T	:20	1
6	Lt Tully	Lt Wisecarver	Stefle	1015	28	1:15	1
12	Lt Ring	Forrest	Wishard	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt Thomas, WB	Lt Bridwell	Anton	0815	2G6	1:45	1
12	Lt Willis	Hayes	Vanriper	1000	33	1:30	1
21	Lt Turner	Henry		0530	45	1:30	2
21	Lt Hanson	Nichols		0805	35	1:45	10
21	Capt Stewart	Lt Thrall		0955	35	:15	1
21	Lt Thrall	Rogers		1015	35	1:20	10
22	Lt Samuels	Riley, JF		0530	45	1:30	1
22	Lt Whittington	Guertin		0900	35	:45	4
22	Lt Sullivan	Lt Boozer		1000	35	1:30	12

By order of the Squadron Commander :

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
 Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL :

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
 Operations Officer.*

1948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 27 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order Number 120

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 27 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To—	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt Thomas, J. P.	Claypool	Ireland	0530	45	1:30	2
3	Lt Shields	Lt Rathbun	White	0810	28	1:35	1
3	Lt Ripley	Lt Thomas, W. B.	Halferty	1000	28	1:30	1
3	Capt Stewart	Lt Bridwell	Capt Baker	1310	17	1:35	2
3	Lt Tully	Ireland	Richter	1500	N35	:35	4
4	Lt Turner	Martel	Cota	0530	45	1:30	2
4	Lt Lewis	Thun	Cannon	0830	4	:45	1
4	Lt Turner	Lt Thrall	Tipton	1000	28	1:30	1
4	Lt Allen	Lt Boozer	Lt Grismore	1310	17	1:40	2
4	Lt Renison	Desimone	Rose	1500	N35	:45	4
6	Lt Wisecarver	Mignerey	Isaacowitz	0530	45	1:30	2
6	Lt Thompson	Lt Thomas, J. P.	Singleton	0815	28	1:20	1
6	Lt Sullivan	Lt Hayward	Sikorski	1000	28	1:30	2
6	Lt Thomas, J. P.	Lt Groneweg	Lt Lambert	1315	17	1:45	2
6	Lt Shields	Doyle	Cullen	1500	N35	:45	1
12	Lt Wolfe	Thun	Wishard	0530	45	1:30	2
12	Capt Stewart	Lt Perkins		0730	9	1:30	2
12	Lt Pitts	Lt Whittington	Shea	1015	28	1:15	1
12	Capt Stewart			1135	9	:40	2
12	Lt Thomas, W. B.	Lt Perkins	Schoch	1315	17	1:35	2
12	Lt Pitts	Gallagher	Schoch	1500	N35	2:30	2
21	Lt Renison	Bailey		0530	45	1:30	6
21	Lt Allen	Lt Groneweg		0730	35	1:40	2
21	Lt Tully	Lt Hanson		1030	35	:50	2
21	Lt Lewis	Sampson		1310	35	:40	2
21	Maj Rieh	Goldberg		1740	N35	2:10	1
22	Lt Thompson	Lennon		0530	45	1:30	4
22	Lt Whittington	Cole		0815	35	:30	1
22	Lt Whittington			0850	35	1:00	1
22	Lt Wright	Rock		1000	35	1:00	2
22	Lt Whittington	Claypool		1300	35	1:30	3
22	Lt Willis	Smith, C. A.		1500	N35	2:15	2

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 28 November 1941.*

CON OPNS Order Number 130:

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----  
 the following flights are ordered for 28 November 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt Rathbun			0730	35	:20	1
3	Lt Col Weddington	Lt Rathbun		0755	28	1:05	1
3	Lt Whittington	Lt Ripley	White	0900	28	:50	1
3	Lt Willis	Lt Vierth	Glass	1000	28	1:30	1
3	Lt Thrall	Lt Pitts	Horton	1300	28	1:00	1
3	Lt Thomas, J.P.	Claypool	York	1400	35	:40	1
4	Lt Renison	Lt Hanson	Barney	0815	28	1:35	1
4	Lt Hayward	Lt Renison	Gingerich	1000	28	1:30	2
4	Lt Hanson	Lt Wolfe	Gingerich	1300	28	1:30	1
6	Lt Turner	Lt Shields	Forrest	0815	28	1:30	2
6	Lt Allen	Forrest		1300	31T	:35	1
6	Lt Col Weddington	Lt Ripley	Cullen	1400	9	:20	1
6	Lt Ripley	Cullen		1420	35	:20	1
12	Lt Sullivan	Lt Thrall	Arellano	0820	28	1:30	1
12	Lt Samuels	Lt Wisecarver		1000	35	:20	1
12	Lt Samuels	Lt Wisecarver	Cole	1020	28	1:10	2
12	Lt Wisecarver	Lt Shields	Schock	1300	28	1:00	1
20	Lt Allen	Lt Watson		1455	35	:50	1
21	Lt Tully	Fry		0815	35	2:15	3
21	Lt Sullivan	Anderson		1300	35	:55	2
22	Lt Thompson	Capt McCarroll		0830	35	1:05	2

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*

1950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 29 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order Number 131 :

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 29 November 1941 :

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Lt Lewis.....	Burt.....	Havnen.....	0530	N45	:15	0
3	Lt Lewis.....	Burt.....	Havnen.....	0545	45	1:15	1
3	Lt Thomas, JP.....	Povis.....	Levin.....	0815	21	1:30	2
3	Lt Thomas, JP.....	Capt Baker.....	.....	1000	17	1:30	1
4	Lt Thomas, WB.....	Welch.....	Holsten.....	0530	N45	:15	0
4	Lt Thomas, WB.....	Welch.....	Holsten.....	0545	45	1:15	1
4	Lt Sullivan.....	Roy.....	.....	0740	35	:15	1
4	Lt Col Weddington.....	Lt Sullivan.....	Roy.....	0755	28	:50	1
4	Lt Lewis.....	Thun.....	Lennon.....	0855	5	:35	1
4	Lt Lewis.....	Thun.....	Lennon.....	1030	35	:30	1
4	Lt Thomas, WB.....	Lt Able.....	Lt Haines.....	1100	35	:40	1
6	Lt Rathbun.....	Bell.....	Ireland.....	0530	45	1:30	1
6	Lt Renison.....	D'Andrea.....	Mander.....	0815	22	1:30	2
6	Lt Hayward.....	Lt Boozer.....	Lt Wright.....	1000	17	1:30	1
6	Lt Thomas, JP.....	Schans.....	Caney.....	1225	9	1:25	2
12	Lt Wolfe.....	Gardner.....	Breckman.....	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt Ripley.....	Barney.....	Stehle.....	0815	22	1:30	2
12	Lt Vierth.....	Lt Groneweg.....	Schans.....	1000	17	1:30	1
12	Lt Col Weddington.....	Lt Vierth.....	Doyle.....	1155	28	:35	1
12	Lt Vierth.....	Doyle.....	.....	1220	35	:20	1
20	Lt Shields.....	Henry.....	.....	0530	N45	:15	3
20	Lt Shields.....	Henry.....	.....	0545	45	1:15	15
20	Lt Samuels.....	Downing.....	.....	0815	35	1:30	1
20	Lt Thompson.....	Povis.....	.....	0950	35	1:30	5
21	Lt Thrall.....	Fry.....	.....	0530	45	1:30	7
21	Lt Wright.....	Hills.....	.....	0815	35	1:35	1
21	Lt Whittington.....	Hills.....	.....	1000	35	1:30	1

By order of the Squadron Commander :

JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL :

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 30 November 1941.

CON OPNS Order Number 132.

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 30 November 1941 :

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
20	Lt. Allen.....	.....	.....	0915	35	:35	1
20	Lt. Allen.....	Lt. Brady.....	.....	1010	35	:50	1
20	Lt. Allen.....	.....	.....	1105	35	:40	1

By order of the Squadron Commander :

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL :

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 1 December 1941.*

CON OPNS Order Number 133.

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
 the following flights are ordered for 1 December 1941 :

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
3	Capt. Stewart.....	Capt. Kent.....	York.....	0530	21	1:30	2
3	Lt. Wisecarver.....	-----	-----	0730	35	:30	1
3	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Wisecarver.....	-----	0805	9	:20	1
3	Lt. Vierth.....	Lt. Wolfe.....	Tyrell.....	0825	28	1:25	1
3	Lt. Thomas, W.....	Stein.....	Frank.....	0950	21	1:30	1
3	Lt. Willis.....	Lt. Ripley.....	Cerillo.....	1300	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Sullivan.....	Anderson.....	Lennon.....	0530	45	1:30	2
4	Lt. Willis.....	Roy.....	Rhodes.....	0815	22	1:30	1
4	Lt. Samuels.....	McBriarty.....	Roy.....	1000	22	1:15	1
4	Lt. Shields.....	Lt. Ring.....	Burt.....	1300	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Samuels.....	Fitzgibbon.....	Forrest.....	0530	45	1:30	2
6	Lt. Hanson.....	Cullen.....	Forrest.....	0815	22	1:30	1
12	Lt. Ring.....	Ballaro.....	Rock.....	0530	45	1:30	2
12	Lt. Lewis.....	Singles.....	Langley.....	0815	21	1:30	1
12	Lt. Thrall.....	Lt. Sullivan.....	Gardner.....	1000	28	1:30	1
12	Lt. Whittington.....	Lt. Samuels.....	Tyrell.....	1300	28	1:30	1
12	Lt. Col. Weddington.....	Lt. Tully.....	Lt. Buttery.....	1405	28	:25	1
12	Lt. Tully.....	-----	-----	1635	35	:25	1
20	Lt. Pitts.....	Riley, R.....	-----	0845	31T	:15	1
20	Lt. Pitts.....	Riley, R.....	-----	0900	35	:30	15
20	Lt. Wolfe.....	Rogers.....	-----	1000	35	1:30	2
20	Lt. Wisecarver.....	Langley.....	-----	1300	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Hanson.....	Dodd.....	-----	0515	45	1:45	15
21	Lt. Wright.....	Stapes.....	-----	0845	35	1:00	1
21	Lt. Tully.....	Lt. Cuvillier.....	-----	1000	35	1:30	3
21	Lt. Wright.....	Thun.....	-----	1300	35	1:35	1

By order of the Squadron Commander :

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D).*  
*Operations Officer.*

OFFICIAL :

Jay P. Thomas,  
 JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),*  
*Operations Officer.*

1952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 2 December 1941.

Con Opns Order Number 134

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----, the following flights are ordered for 2 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
1	Lt. Allen	Capt. McCarroll	Lt. Thomas, JP	0820	31T	:40	1
1	Lt. Allen	Capt. McCarroll		0900	31T	1:00	1
1	Lt. Thomas, W		Fitzgibbon	1100	35	:20	1
1	Lt. Thomas, W	Lt. Thomas, J	Fitzgibbon	1120	35	:20	1
1	Lt. Robinson	Lt. Sullivan	Fitzgibbon	1300	28	1:30	2
3	Lt. Allen	Thun	Mignery	0530	45	1:30	1
3	Lt. Robinson	Ireland	McBriarty	0815	28	1:30	1
3	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Shields	Naylor	1000	28	1:30	2
3	Lt. Rathbun	Lt. Wolfe	Stadelman	1500	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Renison	Redburn	Cerillo	0530	45	1:30	1
4	Lt. Vierth	Lt. Turner	Creger	0810	28	1:40	1
4	Lt. Ring	Lt. Tully	Downing	1000	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Pitts	Lt. Ring	Naylor	1300	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Ripley	McBriarty	Cullen	0530	15	1:30	1
6	Lt. Wright			0725	35	:35	1
6	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Wright	Lt. Buttery	0805	9	:20	1
6	Lt. Thrall	Lt. Rathbun	Weiner	0845	28	1:00	1
6	Lt. Wolfe	Lt. Vierth	Rollo	1000	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Thomas, JP	Lt. Allen	Rollo	1400	35	1:05	2
12	Lt. Turner	Burgess	Stadelman	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt. Thomas, WB	Lt. Bridwell	Lt. Lambert	0815	2G6	2:10	1
12	Lt. Samuels	Lt. Wright	Singleton	1030	28	1:00	1
12	Lt. Tully	Lt. Hayward	McBriarty	1300	28	1:30	1
20	Lt. Willis	Gardner		0530	45	1:30	7
20	Lt. shields	Charpentier		0815	35	1:30	4
20	Lt. Sullivan	Meenan		1000	35	1:45	2
20	Lt. Thrall	Stapes		1300	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Vierth	Martel		0530	45	1:30	8

By order of the Squadron Commander:

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H. ----- 19-----

Con Opns Order Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ---- Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----, the following flights are ordered for -----:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
21	Lt Ripley	Pettet		0815	35	1:30	1
21	Lt Rathbun	Guthrie		1000	35	1:30	4
21	Lt Renison	Siconolfi		1300	35	1:30	5

By order of the Squadron Commander:

JAY P. THOMAS,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut. 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 3 December 1941.

Con Opns Order Number 135

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for 3 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
1	Lt. Thomas, JP	Bailey	Campbell	0530	45	1:30	1
1	Lt. Sussdorff	Lt. Pitts		0815	28	1:30	4
1	Lt. Robinson	Lt. Samuels	Cota	1000	28	1:30	1
3	Lt. Pitts	McBriarty	Crites	0530	45	1:30	4
3	Lt. Wisecarver	Lt. Vierth	Singleton	0815	28	1:30	1
3	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Rathbun	Singleton	1000	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Turner	Taxis	Stadelman	0530	45	1:30	1
4	Lt. Lewis	Thun	Lennon	0830	5G7	1:20	1
4	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Wolfe	Desimone	1000	28	1:30	2
6	Lt. Ripley	Cota		0530	45	1:30	1
6	Lt. Sullivan	Lt. Boozer	Wood	0815	28	1:30	2
6	Lt. Hanson	Lt. Thrall	Palmer	1000	28	1:30	2
12	Lt. Wisecarver	Downing	Burt	0530	45	1:30	1
12	Lt. Samuels	Lt. Tully	Cole	0815	35	:15	1
12	Lt. Samules	Lt. Tully		0830	28	1:15	1
12	Lt. Allen	Roek		0950	35	:25	1
12	Lt. Allen			1015	35	:15	1
12	Lt. Allen	Cole		1030	35	:25	1
12	Lt. Allen	Roek	Cole	1110	35	:30	1
20	Lt. Sussdorff	Singleton		0530	45	1:30	1
20	Lt. Shields	Strickland		0815	35	1:30	6
20	Lt. Sullivan	Breaux		1000	35	:55	1
20	Lt. Sullivan			1055	35	:20	1
20	Lt. Col. Weddington	Lt. Sullivan		1120	9	:50	2
21	Lt. Whittington	Naylor		0530	45	1:30	1
21	Lt. Rathbun	Riley, RJ		0815	35	1:30	8
21	Lt. Renison	Haddow		1000	35	1:30	5

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut. 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 4 December 1941.

Con Opns Order Number 136

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for 4 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
1	Lt. Lewis	Downing	Ireland	0430	N45	1:15	0
1	Lt. Lewis	Downing	Ireland	0545	45	1:15	1
1	Lt. Turner	Lt. Thomas, JP		0815	28	1:00	1
1	Lt. Sussdorff	Lt. Thomas, JP	Buonomo	0920	28	1:00	1
1	Lt. Rathbun	Lt. Thomas, JP	Buonomo	1020	28	1:00	1
1	Lt. Hayward	Lt. Thomas, JP		1300	28	1:00	1
3	Lt. Shields	McBriarty	Wood	0430	N45	1:15	0
3	Lt. Shields	McBriarty	Wood	0545	45	1:15	1
3	Lt. Shields	Lt. Allen	Gallagher	0815	28	:45	1
3	Lt. Ripley	Lt. Allen		0910	28	1:00	1
3	Lt. Vierth	Lt. Allen		1020	28	1:00	1
3	Lt. Samuels			1120	35	:20	1
3	Lt. Samuels	Lt. Bridwell	Langley	1140	35	:30	1
3	Lt. Wiseearver	Lt. Robinson		1300	28	1:30	1
4	Lt. Thrall	Campbell	Gardner	0430	N45	1:15	0
4	Lt. Thrall	Campbell	Gardner	0545	45	1:20	1
4	Lt. Renison	Lt. Lewis	Allen	0815	28	1:00	1
4	Lt. Pitts	Lt. Lewis	Rhodes	0920	28	:55	1
4	Lt. Tully	Lt. Lewis	Gearhart	1020	28	1:10	1
4	Lt. Wolfe	Capt. Stewart	Isaacowitz	1300	28	1:10	1
4	Lt. Wolfe		Isaacowitz	1410	35	:20	1
6	Lt. Wright	Isaacowitz		0530	N45	:25	0
6	Lt. Wright	Isaacowitz		0555	45	1:10	1
6	Lt. Whittington	Lt. Bridwell	Langley	0800	35	:30	1
6	Lt. Whittington			0835	35	:20	1
6	Lt. Whittington	Lt. Ring	Cullen	0900	28	:45	1
6	Lt. Willis	Lt. Hanson	Naylor	1000	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Thompson	Lt. Rathbun	Cerillo	1300	28	1:30	3
6	Lt. Thomas, WB	Lt. Phillips		1525	35	:20	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_\_

CON OPNS Order Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. \_\_\_\_\_ Headquarters 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated \_\_\_\_\_, the following flights are ordered for \_\_\_\_\_:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
6	Lt. Thomas, WB	Clements	Petherbridge	1545	35	:45	1
12	Lt. Ring	Thun	Cerillo	0430	N45	1:15	0
12	Lt. Ring	Thun	Cerillo	0545	45	1:15	1
12	Lt. Robinson	Lt. Wright	Schock	0815	28	1:15	1
12	Lt. Samuels	Lt. Thrall	Cota	1000	28	:15	1
20	Lt. Robinson	Naylor		0430	N45	1:15	0
20	Lt. Robinson	Naylor		0545	45	1:15	7
20	Lt. Thrall	Breaux		0810	35	1:30	1
20	Lt. Turner	Downing		1000	35	1:30	1
20	Lt. Ring	Fitzgerald		1200	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Sullivan	Fitzgerald		0430	N45	1:15	0
21	Lt. Sullivan	Fitzgerald		0545	45	1:15	1
21	Lt. Hanson	Lt. Cuvillier		0815	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Renison	Singleton		1900	35	1:30	5
21	Lt. Pitts	Gardner		1300	35	1:30	15

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:  
Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 5 December 1941.

CON OPNS Order  
Number 137

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 5 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
1	Capt. Stewart		Kessler	0430	N45	1:15	5
1	Capt. Stewart		Kessler	0545	45	1:15	1
1	Lt. Ripley	Clements	Petherbridge	0720	35	:30	1
1	Lt. Ripley			0745	35	:30	1
1	Lt. Samuels	Capt. Stewart	Stadelman	0830	28	1:00	1
1	Lt. Hanson	Capt. Stewart	Campbell	0930	28	1:00	1
1	Lt. Willis	Lt. Grismore	Lt. Blackford	1030	35	:30	1
1	Lt. Thomas, J	Lt. Grismore	Lt. Blackford	1330	35	:40	1
3	Lt. Ripley	Goldberg		0430	N45	1:15	5
3	Lt. Ripley	Goldberg		0545	45	1:15	2
3	Lt. Ring	Lt. Thomas, J	Wasson	0815	28	1:15	1
3	Lt. Sullivan	Lt. Thomas, J	Wasson	0940	28	1:05	1
3	Lt. Whittington	Lt. Ripley	Buonomo	1100	28	:45	1
3	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Thomas, J	Lt. Wisecarver	1305	35	:20	1
3	Lt. Wisecarver	Lt. Lewis	Lt. Willis	1335	28	:55	1
3	Lt. Ripley			1530	35	:30	1
3	Lt. Ripley	Petherbridge	VanValkeburgh	1610	35	:25	1
4	Lt. Wolfe	Smith		0430	N45	1:15	5
4	Lt. Wolfe	Smith		0545	45	1:15	2
4	Lt. Lewis	Thun	Lennon	0820	5G7	1:25	5
4	Lt. Thompson	Povis	Downing	1000	35	1:05	2
4	Lt. Robinson	Lt. Thomas, WB	Cerillo	1300	28	1:30	1
6	Lt. Rathbun	Redburn		0430	N45	1:00	5
6	Lt. Rathbun	Redburn		0530	45	1:30	2
6	Lt. Wright	Lt. Thomas, WB	Lt. Boozer	0815	30G8	1:30	1
6	Lt. Rathbun	Lt. Cuvillier	Hale	1030	28	1:00	1
6	Lt. Thrall	Capt. Stewart	Downing	1300	28	1:00	1
6	Lt. Thrall	Downing		1400	35	:30	5

By order of the Squadron Commander:

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, H. H., ----- 19-----

CON OPNS Order  
Number

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th  
Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for -----:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldgs.
20	Lt. Sussdorff	Cullen		0505	N45	:40	1
20	Lt. Sussdorff	Cullen		0545	45	1:15	1
20	Lt. Vierth	Capt. McCarroll		0815	35	1:30	3
20	Lt. Ring	Redburn		1000	35	1:30	20
20	Lt. Samuels	Hollingsworth		1300	35	1:30	1
21	Lt. Hayward	Manganaro		0430	N45	1:15	3
21	Lt. Hayward	Manganaro		0545	45	1:15	4
21	Lt. Wisecarver	Brown		0815	35	1:30	4
21	Lt. Pitts	Hollingsworth		1000	35	1:30	10
21	Lt. Ripley	Buonomo		1300	35	1:30	6

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut. 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D).  
Operations Officer.

# 1956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 6 December 1941.

CON OPNS Order  
Number 138

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters  
86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 6 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger observer	Passenger gunner	Time to	Mission	Total time	No. of ldfs.
1	Lt. Thomas, JP	Lt. Schneiderman	Barney	0430	N45	1:15	1
1	Lt. Thomas, JP	Lt. Schneiderman	Barney	0545	45	1:15	1
3	Lt. Hanson	Isaacowitz	White	0430	N45	1:15	0
3	Lt. Hanson	Isaacowitz	White	0545	45	1:15	1
4	Lt. Whittington	Cerillo	Taylor	0430	N45	1:15	0
4	Lt. Whittington	Cerillo	Taylor	0545	45	1:15	1
6	Lt. Wisecarver	Fitzgerald	Corum	0430	N45	1:15	0
6	Lt. Wisecarver	Fitzgerald	Corum	0545	45	1:15	1
20	Lt. Samuels	Bowers	Corum	0430	N45	1:15	0
20	Lt. Samuels	Bowers	Corum	0545	45	1:15	1
21	Lt. Willis	Wood	Corum	0430	N45	1:15	0
21	Lt. Willis	Wood	Corum	0545	45	1:15	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 7 December 1941.

CON OPNS Order  
Number 139

1. In compliance with Weekly Training Schedule No. ----- Headquarters 86th  
Obsn Sqdn (C&D), Bellows Field, T. H., dated -----,  
the following flights are ordered for 7 December 1941:

Plane No.	Pilot	Passenger Observer	Passenger Gunner	Time To	Mission	Total Time	No. of Ldfs
1	Capt. Stewart	Buonomo	McBriarty	0950	45	:35	1
4	Lt. Robinson	Forrest	Glass	1030	45	2:30	2
4	Lt. Ring	Taxis	Gardner	1500	45	2:30	1
6	Lt. Rathbun	Redburn	McBriarty	1500	45	2:15	1
6	Lt. Sullivan	Henry	Cerillo	1045	45	2:15	1

By order of the Squadron Commander:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sqdn (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

## CODE SYMBOLS FOR INDICATING TYPE OF MISSION FLOWN

## SPECIFIC MISSION CODE SYMBOLS

- 1—Acrobatic.
- 2—Adjustment, Artillery.
- 3—Adjustment, Smoke Puff.
- 4—Aerial Photography, Pin Point or Oblique.
- 6—Aerial Photography, Reconnaissance Strip
- 7—Air Navigation, Celestial.
- 8—Air Navigation, Dead Reckoning.
- 9—Air Navigation, Pilotage.
- 10—Air Navigation, Radio.
- 12—Bombing, Camera Obscura.
- 13—Bombing, Ground Target.
- 14—Check or Transition Flight to Demonstrate or Determine Pilot Proficiency  
(Rated Pilots Only).
- 15—Combat, Individual.
- 16—Communication, Drop and Pick-up Messages.
- 17—Communication, Radio.
- 18—Communication, Visual.
- 19—Contact Mission.
- 20—Flight for the Purpose of Practice Parachute Jump.
- 21—Formation, Element, Flight or Formation Leader.
- 22—Formation, Wing Position.
- 23—Gunnery, Aerial Target.
- 24—Gunnery, Camera Gun.
- 25—Gunnery, Ground Target.
- 26—Instruction or Practice in Aircraft Piloting. (Students and Flying Instructors at A. C. T. C.)
- 27—Instrument Flying, Instructors Only.
- 28—Instrument Flying, Pilot Only.
- 29—Instrument Flying, Safety Observers Only.
- 30—Liaison Mission.
- 31—Miscellaneous Flight, Not Otherwise Listed.
- 32—Performance Flight, Formation.
- 33—Performance Flight, Individual.
- 34—Practice Flight to Maintain Pilot and/or Observer Proficiency.
- 35—Reconnaissance Flight.
- 36—Smoke Screen.
- 37—Spraying Gass or Liquid.
- 38—Study and Observation by Flight Surgeons.
- 39—Training Aircraft Ground Crews.
- 40—Towing Target or Tracking Mission.
- 41—Strange Field Landings.
- 42—Test of Aircraft, Prior to Acceptance by the Government.
- 43—Unit Navigation in Formation.
- 44—Unit Navigation, Airplanes at Intervals.
- 45—Unit Navigation, Search and Patrol.
- 46—Pilot on Gunnery, Bombing, Photo, etc., Missions Where Other Members of the  
Combat Crew Operate or Carry on Tactical Functions.
- 47—Flying Time of Individuals of the Combat Crew Personnel, Except Pilot,  
When They Do Not Operate or Carry on Tactical Functions.
- 48—All Flying Carried Out Under Unit Combat Exercises.

## PURPOSE MISSION CODE SYMBOLS

- G—In Cooperation or Coordination With Arms or Services of the Army Other Than the Air Corps.
- M—Special Manuevers, Exercises, etc., Ordered by the War Department, Commanding General, G. H. Q. Air Force, etc.
- T—Experimental or Routine Tests of Equipment.
- U—Cooperation or Coordination With U. S. Agencies Other Than Army.
- Z—Coordination or Cooperation With Civilian Agencies.

## AUXILIARY MISSION CODE SYMBOLS

- (1) Antiaircraft.
- (2) Other Branches, Combined.
- (3) Cavalry.
- (4) Civilian Conservation Corps.
- (5) Corps of Engineers.
- (6) Field Artillery.
- (7) Coast Artillery.
- (8) Infantry.
- (9) Navy.
- (10) Ordnance.
- (11) Quartermaster Corps.
- (12) Signal Corps.

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EIGHTY SIXTH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

Subject: Receipt of Classified Documents.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Thru: Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.

1. This squadron was furnished the following classified documents relative to Alert Procedures and Field Orders during the period 1 February 1941 to 0730 7 December 1941:

- a. Copy #13, OHD-38 (Revised to include, 10 May 1941).
- b. Field Orders No 1 NS, Hq Hawaiian Air Force, Dec No 46, no date, with Annexes Nos 1, 2, and 3.
- c. Letter, "Field Orders No 1 NS", Hq Hawaiian Air Force, dated 24 April 1941, with those items listed in par 1b, above, attached.
- d. Field Orders No 1-DM, Hawaiian Air Force, dated 12 May 1941, 0100, Doc No 91, with Annex #1, included.
- e. Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, Hq Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941.
- f. Telephone or teletype messages, verbal instructions, or order from units under Hawaiian Department or Hawaiian Air Force, in effect for maneuvers held during period mentioned, are not included.

For Major STEWART:

Jay P. Thomas  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sq (C&D),  
Operations Officer.*

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EIGHTY SIXTH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

## STATEMENT

Action Taken During Alert Called 27 November 1941:

At 1525, 27 November 1941, received telephone call from Hq Bellows Field placing squadron on alert No 1, see par 14, Standing Operating Procedure, Hq Hawaiian Dept, dated 5 November 1941. Accordingly this squadron carried on its normal training. Those enlisted men assigned to Ground Defense (25) assumed their duties as outlined in Par 14 f (1) SOP, HHD, dated 5 November 1941, under the direction of the Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, T. H.

Jay P. Thomas  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
*1st Lieut., 86th Obsn Sq (C&D),  
Operations Officer.*



HEADQUARTERS 86TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (C&D) AC

*Bellows Field, T. H., 6 October 1941.*

Training Memorandum Number 6.

1. To obtain a maximum degree of combat efficiency and utilize all available time for training in order that all Pilots of this squadron will become proficient in the performance of flying navigation, aerial gunnery, and observation missions, the following tentative schedule is drawn as a direction for current and future instruction.

2. The training will be divided between training in flying the various types of observation missions necessary for efficient tactical functioning of this squadron and fulfilling the minimum flying requirements required by the War Department: and training in the subjects which will insure efficient conduct as an aerial observer.

3. Training as observer will include the following:

a. Flying:

	<i>Approximate hours</i>
(1) Reconnaissance:	
Day -----	15
Night -----	5
(2) Photography -----	8
(3) Artillery Adjustment (including smoke puff adjustments) -----	10
(4) Infantry missions -----	5
(5) Search Missions -----	4
(6) Aerial Gunnery -----	3
	<hr/>
Total:	50 hours

b. Ground School:

(1) Customs of the Service -----	1¼
(2) Efficiency Report -----	1¼
(3) Interior Guard Duty -----	1¼
(4) Engineering -----	7½
(a) Life Raft & Bilge Pump (1¼)	
(b) Propellers (1¼)	
(c) Hydraulic System and Brakes (1¼)	
(d) Electrical & Ignition System (1¼)	
(e) Engine (1¼)	
(f) Preflight: Mooring equipment, flight envelopes, etc. (1¼)	
(5) Communications -----	6¼
Description and operation of O-74B radio Equipment:	
(a) Receivers (1¼)	
(b) Transmitters-Theory (1¼)	
(c) Transmitters-Practical (1¼)	
(d) S. O. I. File (1¼)	
(e) A. G. Liaison & Fire Control Code (1¼)	
(6) Armament -----	7¼
(a) 45 Caliber (1¼)	
(b) Ground M. G. 50 Cal. (1¼)	
(c) Ground M. G. 30 Cal. (1¼)	
(d) Flares and aux. equip. (1¼)	
(e) Fixed Gun (¼)	
(f) Flexible Gun (1¼)	
(g) Sighting gun & M-2 sight-theory (1¼)	
(h) Sighting gun & M-2 sight-practical (1¼)	

1960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

	<i>Approximate hours</i>
b. Ground School—Continued.	
(7) Squadron Departments.....	16¼
(a) Personnel-Adjutant (Tables of Org., sub-allt., ranks, ratings, etc.)	
(b) Personnel Supply (1¼)	
(c) Technical Supply (1¼)	
(d) Mess Management (1¼)	
(e) Armament (1¼)	
(f) Engineering (3¾)	
(1) Form 41 (1¼)	
(2) Organization, maintenance echelons (1¼)	
(3) Unsatisfactory reports, etc. (1¼)	
(g) Radio (1¼)	
(h) Operations (1¼)	
(i) Photographic (2½)	
(1) Org'n of Section (1¼)	
(2) Visit to Laboratory (1¼)	
(j) Squadron Organization (1¼)	
(8) Photograph (Theory).....	12½
(a) Cameras, scale, focal lengths, etc.	
(b) Types of missions: Pin point, stereopairs, obliques, reconnaissance strips, mosaics	
(c) Miscellaneous	
(9) Miscellaneous .....	1¼
Aircraft Accident Classification Committee (1¼)	
Total ground school hours.....	55
4. Training as pilot will include the following:	
a. Transition in O-47B.....	4
b. Transition in O-49.....	3
c. Strange Field Landings.....	2
d. Reconnaissance.....	10
e. Unit Navigation.....	6
f. Formation.....	10
g. Liaison Missions.....	3
h. Gunnery.....	4
i. Night Flying.....	4
j. Performance.....	3
k. Puff Target Adjustment.....	4
l. Instrument.....	7
m. Photography.....	3
Total.....	63 hours
5. Summary:	
During the 12 weeks training each transition pilot will receive the following minimum number of hours:	
(1) As Observer.....	50
(2) As Pilot.....	63
Total flying hours.....	113

For Captain STEWART:

(s) Jay P. Thomas,  
JAY P. THOMAS,  
1st Lieut., 86 Obsn Sq (C&D),  
Operations Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 12 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWS FIELD,  
Watmanalo, T. H., 22 December 1941.

Memorandum To: Major Landry, G-3, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. Inclosed is a layout map of Bellows Field showing in black the position of six (6) O-47's and two (2) O-49's and eleven (11) P-40's before the first attack. The position of six (6) O-47's and two (2) O-49's after the first attack and prior to the second attack is indicated in red. The eleven (11) P-40's which were dis-

persed after the first attack and prior to the second attack are not indicated, but they were dispersed in the area inclosed in the red line as indicated on the map.

2. At the time of the attack there were no bunkers at Bellows Field.

C. K. Rich,  
C. K. RICH,  
*Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps,*  
*Executive.*

1 Incl. General Plan, Bellows Field.

(The layout map or general plan of Bellows Field accompanying the above memorandum will be found reproduced as Item No. 99, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

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EXHIBIT No. 13 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWES FIELD,  
*Waimanalo, T. H., 22 December 1941.*

On the morning of December 7 the Officer of the Day who had been designated as the officer in charge of ground defense for the day received a call from Hickam Field warning of the attack. He verified that call by a call back to Hickam Field and notified key personnel on the post. The ground defense non-commissioned officers reported the ground defense units to the armament store-rooms where their weapons were located. The reserve of the main guard which was also charged with the mission of ground defense, assembled by the runway and deployed for anti-aircraft fire.

By the time the attack had started, rifles and ammunition had been issued to approximately 100 men. The machine gunners were not able to mount their weapons for anti-aircraft fire by the time of the attack, so the only fire delivered was from calibre 30 rifles and aircraft machine guns from plane in the dispersion area.

Machine guns were set up as soon as the attack had ceased, but as there was no resumption of the attack, the gunners did not go into action except with their individual rifles. Trucks were dispatched for additional ammunition and for additional machine guns. Aircraft machine guns from plans not in commission were set up on improvised mounts. Fifty calibre aircraft machine guns from a B-17 which had been wrecked on the field immediately preceding the attack were set up for anti-aircraft fire. The outpost of the guard was doubled and the home guards contacted for help in defending vital installations just off the post such as the water source tunnel and the reservoir leading into the post. These home guards were furnished rifles and ammunition from Bellows Field.

Rifles, ammunition, and gas masks were issued to all personnel on the field. Construction was immediately started on bomb shelter trenches with a trenching machine. Sand bags were secured from the Waimanalo Sugar Company and installations and emplacements were protected by sand bags. Approximately one million feet of barbed wire was delivered to this field together with pickets and barbed wire entanglements were erected around vital installations. Activities were notified to quarter personnel at their place of duty, thus clearing the barracks. Activities and sections were also instructed to provide for their own local security.

On the 8th of December the ground defense was reorganized with the post divided into three sectors, a sector commander and a sector executive being designated for each sector. Duties and responsibilities of the sector commanders were put out in orders verbally on the 8th and confirmed in writing on the 11th. An out post system was continued with the main guard taking over the duties of the outpost and guards around vital installations were strengthened.

[2] On December 15 the ground defense was reinforced by one gun battery of the 98th Coast Artillery and one automatic weapons battery from the 251st Coast Artillery and three searchlights. These units occupied positions immediately. Due to the fact that the area to be protected had been increased by the arrival of additional squadrons on the post, the guns manned by Air Corps personnel were not relieved.

On Thursday, the 18th, a rifle company from the 35th Infantry with a machine gun platoon attached arrived on the field. This company took over the outpost and installations guard and took over nine machine guns that had

previously been manned by Air Corps personnel, thereby relieving approximately 77 men from the Air Corps to normal duties.

On December 21, one battalion of the 34th Infantry arrived at this field. The battalion headquarters, one rifle company, and the heavy weapons company are expected to remain at this field. The other two rifle companies are expected to move to a new station shortly. No Air Corps personnel will be required for guard duty, guard of vital installations, or ground defense when this unit is ready for combat. However, battle stations have been assigned certain Air Corps personnel to bolster the ground defense in the event of a raid or attack.

Edward F. Kent  
EDWARD F. KENT,  
*Captain, Infantry,*  
*Ground Defense Officer.*

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EXHIBIT NO. 14 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWS FIELD,  
Waimanalo, T. H., 22 December 1941

Memorandum To: Major Landry, G-3, Hawaiian Air Force.

Since Colonel Rich made out the inclosed report with map, we had another phone call to include action taken on orders given by the responsible parties for security since that time. The dispersion into the area mentioned by Colonel Rich between the first attack and second attack was automatic, the airplane crews having begun this automatically. At that time the area shown in red was the only available space on this field for dispersion. Later in that day, Mr. Lynch, the Area Engineer, remarked that by working 24 hours a day he could have the runway shown in overlay number 1 and taxi strip to this parking area ready for almost any airplane to use by Friday, the 12th of December.

However, our work went along better than expected, and it was reported as ready, although narrow at one end, on the 11th. On that date the 58th Squadron and 72nd Squadron landed with their airplanes. However, it was necessary to park them all in the same area that had been used before. Note that the 44th Squadron with its P-40's had cleared the field before this time and moved back to Wheeler Field. Steps were immediately taken to find dispersal areas that could be used within the shortest length of time. Lieutenant Buttery of the 804th Engineers arrived on the morning of the 12th and said that he had orders to start building bunkers; that he had the lay-out plan to start working and detailed plans for bunkers. He was given verbal instructions to contact the commanding officer of the 58th Squadron and the 72nd Squadron Commander and go over the ground and pick bunker positions that could be used.

They went over the areas marked "A", "B", and "C" on overlay number 2 and decided that this was the most logical location and could be fixed up more quickly. The base commander told the area engineer to locate the spots that had been suggested and put in a light coral runway so the airplanes could be taxied to these positions, the idea being to get them dispersed quickly, then as the bunker work progressed, one airplane at a time could be moved out for this work. The area marked "E" on overlay number 2 was not immediately considered as being available because of the height of the cut between it and the runway, and it did not look as practical to try to taxi airplanes over it.

Lieutenant Buttery wanted to go to work immediately on bunkers and said that he had the detailed plan and in his opinion he could get bunkers built much faster in the sand in area "D". He was told by the base [2] commander that that would be all right; however, that I believed that the area "A" was more important and as soon as the taxiways were ready in area "A", I would like for him to build the bunkers in there first. During the time from the 12th until today he has built three bunkers, none of which are usable because it will take quite a bit of coral to make taxiways to get to them, and although they are set to engineer plane, I believe the airplanes will have to be towed either in or out of the bunkers.

The work on the taxiways in area "A" and area "B" was progressing under the direction of the Area Engineer when he got orders on the 14th to put black top surface on that runway. This black top surface would bottle up air-



planes in Area "A" and "B" so the work there was stopped temporarily. On the 17th he got instructions that he could stay off of runway B, leaving it available for operation and making our planned dispersion area usable.

On the night of the 17th, however, he wrote a letter to the District Engineer stating that he would not take the responsibility of trying to clear the runway of his heavy machinery in time in case of forced landing. On the 19th he got another order to get back on runway "B" and put on the black top. However, General Tinker was out that day and said he would look into this, and at 3:00 p. m. that afternoon of the 19th, he got the final order about leaving runway "B" free for use and working on runway "A". Area "C" it was found was quite sandy and it was impractical without lots of coral to make it usable for dispersion, so it was decided to cut through the coral a short distance for a taxiway into area "E". During this time the areas marked on the side of runway "B" on overlay number 3 are usable.

The area marked "X" on overlay #3 has good natural camouflage and is at present used for two gas trucks parked on opposite sides of the area under trees. The entire shoulder area one hundred feet wide on each side of the runway is now available for dispersion, and planes are spotted in all places marked with a red "X". None of these planes are closer than approximately 100 yards of each other, and no planes except for quick maintenance, taxi into the first area near the buildings except in changing crews or loading. Should we have more planes at any time, the other areas are available and the area "A" on overlay #3 can be easily made available for lighter planes. Instructions have been given that airplanes will not be parked closer than 100 yards, and then, where possible, not in a line.

Gas trucks are dispersed during the day, but we have a barbed wire inclosure where they are put after dark for protection against sabotage with the crews available, however, to move them out to dispersal positions at daylight or in case of attack. The place marked where bridge is out on map is being considered for repair and dispersal plan in area beyond for future use.

Leonard D. Weddington,  
LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON,  
*Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps,*  
*Commanding.*

3 Incls. Overlays #1, 2. & 3. File of written ground defense orders.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWS FIELD,  
Waimanalo, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure during current Alert.

To : All Personnel.

1. **ALARM SIGNALS:** a. The post of Bellows Field is divided into Sectors with a Sector Commander in charge for the security of each Sector. Each Sector will have a Klaxon to alert the post and will be controlled by the Sector personnel. The Sector Commander will take necessary steps to insure against the sounding of false alarms, but will be responsible that the alarm is promptly given when the danger is verified.

b. The Klaxon signals will be as follows:

- (1) Air attack, Long blast of Klaxon.
- (2) Ground attack, Series of short blasts of klaxon.
- (3) Chemical attack, Two long blasts then two short blasts.
- (4) All clear signal, Three long blasts then three short blasts, and three long blasts.

2. **BLACKOUT DISCIPLINE:** All commanding officers will take immediate steps to impress upon all personnel that the showing of any light or the striking of any match may have serious consequences not only to themselves but may endanger the entire command. The showing of lights not only may be visible to an enemy observer, but also causes unnecessary alarms. The blackout discipline must be improved at once.

3. **CAMOUFLAGE:** All machine gun emplacements, guard posts and lookout posts must be camouflaged. Use of all natural covering will be utilized and will be disturbed as little as possible. Within all the means available, activities will make every effort to deceive both ground or air observers as to the nature and location of our installations.

4. **PASS WORD:** *a.* The pass word will be changed daily. It will normally be telephoned to all activities at 4:00 P. M. daily. Should the password not be received by any organization or activity, a messenger will be sent to the Ground Defense Officer to obtain it. The password will not be given over the phone to anyone asking for it.

*b.* Use of Password—The person challenging will call the first word of the password; the person challenged will call the second word of the password. For example the pass word "Always Faithful" may be used. The Sentry sights an unidentified person and challenges "Halt always", the party, if friendly, should answer, "Faithful".

5. **UNNECESSARY FIRING:** *a.* Every effort will be made to instruct all personnel in the use of their weapons to prevent purely accidental discharges. [2] Night firing by guards posted for sentry duty causes the alerting of the entire command, and may result in needless casualties. All men on guard with rifles will have fixed bayonets. The bayonet is the primary weapon for night work. Guards should not fire at suspicious objects, but should remain hidden and challenge the suspicious person. A bayonet thrust is more dependable than the relatively ineffective fire in the dark.

*b.* There will be no experimental or instruction firing of any weapons except between 1:00 P. M. and 1:30 P. M., daily at the sea-end of the runway. This firing will be kept to a bare minimum in order to conserve ammunition. This is not to be construed as a blanket authorization for firing of this nature. A responsible officer will be posted there daily.

6. **BOMB AND STRAFFING PROTECTION FROM ENEMY PLANES:** A deep, narrow trench is the best protection from bombing and strafing from attacking airplanes. All personnel should be entrenched. Commanding officers should take steps to see that all personnel are instructed to prepare fox-holes, trenches, or sand bag emplacements.

7. **HEADLIGHTS ON ALL CARS:** All cars that move at night will be equipped with blue headlights. All lights will be painted with the special blue paint or blue cellophane paper.

8. **CLEANING OF ALL ORDNANCE:** All weapons will be cleaned and oiled daily to prevent rust. All weapons will be cleaned as soon as possible after firing of the weapon.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel WEDDINGTON:

Albert D. Cummings,  
ALBERT D. CUMMINGS,  
*1st Lieut., A. G. D.,*  
Adjutant.

OFFICE OF THE GROUND DEFENSE OFFICER,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., December 11, 1941.*

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR DECONTAMINATION

##### 1. *Mustard Gas or Liquid*

*a.* For the decontamination of areas gassed with mustard, a mixture of one (1) part of chloride of lime to three parts of sand or earth is to be used. This should be thoroughly mixed, as plain chloride of lime reacts violently when in contact with mustard, not only causing flame, but driving off a high concentration of mustard vapor. For the decontamination of any such areas, bags of lime and piles of sand are being placed in strategic positions. Care must be taken that the bags of lime are not opened until such time as they are to be used as lime loses its chlorine when exposed to air or moisture.

*b. Equipment:* In the decontamination of equipment, chloride of lime is more easily applied in liquid form with rags or swabs. The proportion for liquid should be one (1) part chloride of lime to one (1) part water.

*c. Skin and Body:* One part of chloride of lime to two parts of water applied profusely with rags. Do not allow to remain on the skin for more than five minutes as it may cause severe irritation.

##### 2. *Protective Clothing*

Until such time as protective clothing becomes available, improvisations will be made with raincoats, rubber-boots, rubber gloves, and any other such clothing that will serve the purpose.

**3. Report of Gassed Areas and Equipment**

A report of all contaminated areas will be made to the office of the Ground Defense Officer, after all gas attacks.

**4. Responsibility for Decontamination**

Until such time as protective clothing is secured and a decontamination squad organized, the officer in charge of the activity or areas gassed will be responsible for its decontamination.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel WEDDINGTON:

Albert D. Cummings,  
ALBERT D. CUMMINGS,  
1st Lieut., A. G. D., Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS, BELLOWS FIELD,  
BELLOWS FIELD, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Subject: Procedure in Case of Failure of Gun to Fire

To: All Personnel.

The procedure prescribed in immediate action for the reduction of stoppages given herein is based on the frequency with which the various types of stoppages occur. Execution of this procedure by the gunner will enable him to remedy the majority of stoppages immediately without attempting to analyze the cause. Spare parts and other equipment to keep the guns in action are being distributed as soon as received.

IMMEDIATE ACTION

*Gun Fails to Fire—Pull bolt to rear, release it, and attempt to fire.*

*Gun Still Fails to Fire.*—Tap the cover, jerk the bolt to the right. Pull the bolt to the rear and release it, at the same time with the left hand under the receiver feel for the ejected round.

*If the cartridge is ejected.—Attempt to fire. Gun still fails to fire.—Change the bolt.*

*If there is no ejection.*—Raise the cover, remove the first round from the belt, and look or feel for a cartridge in the gun.

*If the cartridge is in the gun remove it, reload, relay and fire. Not in gun, reload, relay and fire.*

NOTE 1. If the procedure outlined above does not place the gun in action, the gunner must inspect the feed mechanism and the working parts of the gun to include inspecting the chamber for a ruptured cartridge case to locate and reduce the stoppage.

2. If the bolt stops just short of home, frequently it can be pushed full forward and firing can be continued without application of immediate action. *Caution:* Release the trigger before pushing the bolt forward.

3. Stoppages caused by defective feed mechanism can sometimes be remedied temporarily by having an assistant pull the bolt to the right with just sufficient force to assist the feed mechanism in positioning the leading round.

4. If no ruptured cartridge extractor is available, a ruptured cartridge may be removed by oiling the nose of the bullet, putting sand on it, putting in the T slot and letting the bolt forward. Withdraw, then clean chamber.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel WEDDINGTON:

Albert D. Cummings,  
ALBERT D. CUMMINGS,  
1st Lieut., A. G. D., Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWS FIELD,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Subject: Ground Defense Plan.

To: All concerned.

GENERAL PLAN: The post of Bellows Field has been divided into three sectors for defense. The sectors are designated as follows:

(a) BEACH SECTOR

Sector Commander: Capt. Kelly.

Sector executive: Lt. Adams.

CP—Casual Detachment orderly room.

On the south, this sector begins at the junction of the drainage ditch with the



beach, thence along the drainage ditch to bridge, thence along road to landing mat, thence diagonally to where new runway ends at sea.

(b) **DIXIE SECTOR**

Sector commander: Capt. Short.

Sector executive: Lt. Simons.

CP—Post Exchange.

This sector is generally the southern part of the field, but the term "south sector" will not be used to avoid confusion with the larger area. On the north, beginning at the junction of drainage ditch and the beach, thence along ditch to bridge, along road to road leading to Headquarters Hill, thence straight inland to western end of Headquarters Hill, thence to Kalaniana'ole Highway in a diagonal line midway between Utilities buildings and Air Corps Supply.

(c) **YANKEE SECTOR**

Sector commander: Lt. Chalmers.

Sector Executive: Lt. King.

CP—Utilities building.

This sector is generally the northern part of the field. It is bounded by the reservation boundary and the boundaries of the other sectors given above.

**IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE SECTORS, THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE ESTABLISHED:**

(a) **OUTPOST**

Outpost commander: Lt. Joyce.

(b) **RESERVE**

Reserve commander: Sgt. Housewright.

(c) **COMMAND POST.**

Ground defense officer: Capt. Kent.

Ground defense adjutant: Lt. Devine.

Command post Sgt. Major: Sgt. Gaines.

(d) **OP**

OP commander: Sgt. Maskil.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel WEDDINGTON:

Albert D. Cummings,  
ALBERT D. CUMMINGS,  
1st Lieut., A. G. D., Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWS FIELD,  
Bellows Field, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Subject: Responsibility of Sector Commanders.

To: All Concerned.

1. All defensive weapons and installations in the sectors assigned, regardless of the organization that originally installed the weapons, are the responsibility of the sector commander. He will work out a system of coordinated fires that will protect the field from attacks from the air, ground, or by parachute in his sector. Personnel of the 298th Infantry are not subject to orders, from Bellows Field personnel normally. Their commanding officers should be contacted to work out coordination where necessary.

2. Sector commanders will have their CPs manned on a twenty-four hour basis.

3. Sector commanders will maintain a local reserve. All permanent organizations must cooperate to the fullest extent with the sector commanders. Organizations must not change the assignment of men manning weapons without permission of the sector commander. It is realized that friction may result from the conflict of authority, but all concerned must remember that this step is taken in the interests of better coordination of the ground defenses. The mission of the ground defense is to keep the tactical organizations in the air. We have the means to do this if it can be coordinated by better teamwork.

4. All personnel assigned to weapons will operate under the direct orders of the Ground Defense Officer, and the sector Commanders.

Sector Commanders will submit a list of the defense personnel in their sectors to the Ground Defense Officer.

5. Sector commanders will coordinate with each other and with the Ground Defense officer to insure supporting fires at sector boundaries.

6. All ground defense commanders will furnish the Ground Defense officer detailed plans of their dispositions, plans for meeting ground attack from any direction, recommendations for plans to support other sectors in the event of attack. Plans will show primary positions, supplementary positions, and alternate positions.



7. A transportation allotment will be published at a later date as a supplement to this order. In the meantime, sector commanders will improvise a transportation set-up using non-military vehicles.

8. All concerned must bear in mind that we must organize for a protracted campaign. Personnel must rest to a maximum extent. Matériel must be cared for. Gasoline must be conserved. Weapons must be cleaned and oiled daily. Sector commanders will organize a system of inspection to insure that this is done.

9. Sector commanders will take steps to instruct their personnel in the use and care of weapons, with emphasis on keeping the weapons in action.

10. Sector commanders will prepare a set of standing orders for each position.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel WEDDINGTON :

Albert D. Cummings,  
ALBERT D. CUMMINGS,  
*1st Lieut., A. G. D., Adjutant.*

OFFICE OF THE GROUND DEFENSE OFFICER,  
*Bellows Field, T. H., December 12, 1941.*

*Practice Gas Alarm—Today*

There will be a practice Gas Alarm at three (3:00) P. M. today. All personnel will be notified of this immediately by the Officers in charge of the various activities and Squadrons.

This drill will be held in order to familiarize troops with the use of the Gas Mask and to call attention to those men who have not as yet acquired masks.

Men without masks will be ordered to draw them immediately.

Attention of all men will be drawn to the Gas Alarm signal as set forth in Standing Operating Procedure, Hqs Bellows Field, dated December 9/41.

The Officer in charge of each activity will read this and sign below.

By order of Col. WEDDINGTON.

E. F. Kent,  
E. F. KENT,  
*Captain, Infantry,*  
*Ground Defense Officer.*

- 86th Operations\_\_\_\_\_
- 86th Orderly Room\_\_\_\_\_
- 72nd Bomb Oper\_\_\_\_\_
- 72nd Bomb Orderly\_\_\_\_\_
- 58th Bomb Oper\_\_\_\_\_
- 58th Bomb Orderly\_\_\_\_\_
- Casual Detachment\_\_\_\_\_
- Hqs Detachment\_\_\_\_\_
- Post Exchange\_\_\_\_\_
- Transportation\_\_\_\_\_
- Quartermaster\_\_\_\_\_
- Utilities\_\_\_\_\_
- Air Corps Supply\_\_\_\_\_
- Finance\_\_\_\_\_
- Dispensary\_\_\_\_\_
- Post Hqs\_\_\_\_\_

(The maps and overlays referred to in the Memorandum dated 22 December 1941, *supra*, prepared by Lt. Col. Leonard D. Weddington, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 100, 101, 102, 103, and 104, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commissions.)



## EXHIBIT No. 15 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 23 December 1941.

Memorandum to: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. In accordance with your instructions, there is forwarded herewith information as to the arrangements made, Orders issued, and verbal action, since December 7th, for the proper protection of this Depot. This information includes the letter to the Chief of the Air Corps forwarding Diary of Events and Production Report, which in part concerns Depot safety; Depot Memoranda Numbers 64 and 66; Depot Information Bulletins Numbers 41, 43, 44, 49, and 51; a letter to the Commanding Officer, Maintenance Command, requesting additional guards; Special Orders issued to Hawaiian Air Depot Guards; Gas Warning Bulletin; letter to Commanding Officer, Maintenance Command, regarding bomb shelters; and Air Raid Warning Notice. Also inclosed is sketch showing location of aircraft in the Depot for repair, and assigned to this Depot.

Leland C. Hurd,  
LELAND C. HURD,  
*Lt. Col., Air Corps, Commanding.*

Incls.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 16 December 1941.

Subject: Production Report, Diary of Events, and Present Status.  
To: Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of Production Report for the period 7 December to 13 December 1941, and Diary of Events for the period 7 December to 15 December 1941. Copy of this letter, together with the Diary of Events, is being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Chief, Air Service Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. The Production Report was previously forwarded to these offices. Following is the present status of subjects covered:

a. Production: 100%.

b. Supply: 100%, insofar as available material will permit.

c. Personnel:

(1) Morale—excellent.

(2) Attendance—Normal percentage of employees on duty.

(3) Working Hours—At present we are working 7 days a week, 8 hours a day. Working lights are now permitted but must be kept to a minimum. Eight hours a day, 7 days a week, is practically all any individual can work in Hawaii.

(4) Employment—No employees hired during the period 7 December to 13 December 1941, except those that were well-known to Depot personnel. On 15 December 1941 we hired 13 Mechanics, Helpers, etc., and will continue to employ additional personnel as rapidly as possible. The business of some commercial concerns in Honolulu is being curtailed and their employees will become available to Governmental activities. The Civil Service Commission and the Territorial Employment Bureau are giving every assistance possible in recruiting additional personnel.

(5) Pay of Employees—Employees will be paid as usual.

d. Sanitation: Normal.

e. Subsistence: Employees are obtaining sufficient food in town for their families. Breakfast and dinner are being served at the Depot to those employees who are unable to eat at home. Lunch is being served to all employees. The Depot is being furnished all food required by the U. S. Army Commissary.

f. Transportation: All Depot transportation has been accounted for. Gasoline is being rationed for all privately owned vehicles. The Depot has obtained sufficient ration cards for all personnel using their automobiles for transportation to and from work.

g. Shelters: Permanent shelters have been requested. Temporary shelters have been constructed.

h. Gas masks: Have been distributed to all employees.

i. Mail: Censorship of personal mail has been established.

j. Evacuation: Information concerning the evacuation of dependents of Military personnel assigned to this Depot has been forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in compliance with his instructions.

k. Housing: All personnel have been evacuated from the Hickam Field Housing Project, except some male employees occupying their quarters while their families have been evacuated to Honolulu. The protection of the Project has been taken over by the Commanding Officer, Hickam Field, from the Hawaiian Housing Authority, at the request of the Hawaiian Housing Authority. Information is not available at this time as to when personnel will be permitted to return to their quarters.

l. New Buildings: Construction of new buildings has been temporarily halted as contractors are working on shelters for the civil populace of the Island of Oahu. Action has been initiated for the immediate completion of the new Test Block (50% completed at present), and an extension of four additional test cells, and the Quartermaster Warehouse (foundation already laid).

LELAND C. HURD,

*Lt. Col., Air Corps Commanding.*

Incls: 2.

1—Production Report.

2—Diary of Events.

cc—Chief, Air Service Command, Wright Field.

cc—Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT—JOURNAL OF EVENTS AND PRODUCTION REPORT

7 December 1941

8:00 A. M.: Surprise air raid occurred during which direct hits were registered on Aero Repair Docks. Dock hangars are a total loss as a result of the bombing and subsequent fire. Civilian mechanics temporarily quartered in tent opposite Depot Headquarters, being uninjured, immediately entered shop buildings in an effort to confine the fire. Raid ended at approximately 8:15 A. M.

8:20 A. M.: Engineering officers and some civilian employees having arrived at Depot Headquarters, immediate steps were taken to fight the fire raging in the repair docks. Project "A" equipment in building #33 was immediately checked and found to be safe.

8:55 A. M.: While the above operations were in progress, additional enemy planes arrived in a second raid of greater intensity and duration than the first. It was necessary for Depot personnel to rapidly evacuate the Depot area and seek shelter as best they could in adjacent areas. During this attack one hit was registered on the partially completed Engine Repair Building, additional hits were made on the repair docks, and two bombs severed the main power feeder cable to the Engineering Shops. The temporary buildings located on the warm-up apron suffered only from concussion, while the new main shop building, the equipment repair building, the new steam plant, and the partially completed armament buildings suffered only minor damage. The second raid ended at approximately 9:25 A. M.

9:30 A. M.: Efforts were immediately resumed to restrict the fire to the repair docks and thus save the attached main shop building. Preliminary investigation had already indicated that the engineering office together with all records therein was destroyed by fire.

Noon: By noon approximately 100 Depot employees had arrived on the scene. These worked furiously all day under the direction of Depot officers, fighting fire and evacuating supplies and equipment. A 4,000-gallon gasoline tank truck was filled with salt water at Bishop's Point, and this was used in connection with a new fire engine pumper from the Depot Transportation Section to extinguish the blaze and thereby save the new main shop building.

Additional crews removed a large number of new gasoline trucks and trailers, pumpers, hoists, and other vehicles from the Depot area. These were dispersed under whatever cover was available and in the open in the officers' quarters area.

Diesel-powered auxiliary power plants were pulled out of the main shop building and dispersed on the Post.

A crew was immediately organized, which began moving undamaged engines, propellers, wheels, and gas tanks out of the Supply warehouses to dispersed areas as a precaution against further raids.

Another crew began assembling portable refueling pumps for servicing aircraft from drums.



The Depot OA-4 airplane, only slightly damaged, was taxied to a dispersed position on Hickam Field.

The above-mentioned operations were continued until approximately 8:00 P. M., at which time it became evident that blackout conditions precluded successful accomplishment of any further tasks. The fire in the main shop building had been extinguished by about 7:00 P. M. and the big tank truck was reserviced with water before the last employees were released for the night.

Some time during the day a field kitchen was set up in a temporary mess hall near the Depot, and some of the Depot employees assisted in maintaining this unit throughout the night.

*8 December 1941*

Approximately all of the male employees of the Engineering Department reported for duty on schedule this date.

They were assembled by units and sections and addressed by the Engineering Officer, first on precautions to be taken in case of air raids and then on the projected reconstruction program.

At this time a system of air raid wardens was set up which has been in constant use ever since.

The general reconstruction plan announced by the Engineering Officer involved each unit and section working under its own respective head to salvage whatever equipment appeared useful and to move this equipment into its proper location in the main shop building. Rubble was moved toward the apron in front of the repair docks for disposal.

It was immediately decided to utilize partially wrecked aircraft in their existing form as replacement parts for airplanes in use or airplanes that could readily be put into use. With this idea in mind, the remains of all the aircraft stored in the repair docks were turned over to tactical units when called for.

*Actual production work was begun by the Depot on this date.*—Wings, control surfaces, engines, propellers, parts, and equipment of various types which were only slightly damaged were immediately repaired and placed in service. A moderate amount of welding work was done for various organizations throughout the day.

Work was begun on cleaning and repairing shop equipment and on repairing transportation and hoisting units.

A crew working under the Shop Superintendent was organized to repair, service and place in operation the large number of gasoline trucks and trailers which had recently arrived by boat. Two of these trucks and four trailers were delivered to Bellows Field on this day.

Skilled mechanics of all classes were dispatched where needed to assist tactical personnel in making urgent repairs to aircraft and engines in order to place the maximum possible number of aircraft in the air in the minimum possible time. A large crew of mechanics was immediately allocated to the repair of self-sealing fuel tanks. Another crew continued to set up and service refueling pumps for distribution to dispersed aircraft.

Toward the end of the day, a preliminary survey revealed the following condition of Engineering supplies and equipment:

Engineering administrative office, drafting unit, blueprint and specification files were a total loss.

The Base Parachute Section, which had been located above the Engineering office, was a total loss.

The Overhaul and Assembly Sections of the Engine Repair Branch were a total loss. Test equipment, particularly in the carburetor and ignition units, was almost completely destroyed. Some of the engines undergoing assembly were only partially damaged and these have been or are being repaired.

Aero Repair Branch equipment was 75% destroyed, as were aircraft undergoing repair work in this branch.

The Sheet Metal Section suffered only about a 30% loss of equipment, but units being repaired in this section were more severely damaged. Those that could be repaired were immediately completed and put into service.

The welding unit received only slight damage to the gas welding components as did the electric welding equipment. The heat treat furnaces were practically unharmed.

The Plant Maintenance Section suffered complete loss of its electrical



unit together with test equipment, but only a small amount of damage was done to woodworking and plumbing equipment.

Machine tools located in the Machine Shop were only about 10% destroyed. The remainder were damaged to varying degrees, but most of the damage occurred to the electric power units as a result of fire. Test equipment in the Machine Shop and in the landing gear and hydraulic units was approximately 20% destroyed.

The Propeller Shop sustained approximately 50% loss in propellers and equipment.

The engine disassembly and cleaning units, the Refinishing Section, the self-sealing tank repair unit, the sandblast, the plating unit, and the reclamation unit, being located in temporary structures on the warm-up apron in front of the hangers, were subjected to only slight concussion effects, a few stray projectiles and bits of shrapnel.

The Armament Section, the Radio Repair Section, the Instrument Section, and the Fabric and Parachute Sections had already occupied the new equipment repair building and thus were unhurt.

Hand tool losses throughout the shop amounted to approximately 80%.

The Depot Restaurant was completely destroyed by fire.

As soon as it was determined that no damage had been done to the primary and secondary power distribution system in the new shop building outside of the two bomb hits on the exterior cable, work was immediately begun to repair this feeder and thus provide power throughout the new shop buildings. Work was also initiated to provide power for the partially completed engine repair building with a view toward installing this activity in its permanent place. Engine overhaul was temporarily assigned floor space in the main shop building adjacent to the projected plant maintenance area.

[5]

9 December 1941

Clean-up work was continued this date with all the remaining equipment being removed from the repair docks except the grinding unit. The present condition and location of this equipment made it appear desirable to operate it in its present location.

New machinery, which had been stored in the center aisle of the new main shop building, was uncrated as needed and set up in its permanent location. Cleaning and repairing of old equipment was continued with great success. Considerable work was done in receiving and inspection and repairing, where possible, all types of equipment turned in by tactical units from among wrecked aircraft and equipment. Further cleaning and repair work was accomplished on engines, accessories, etc., salvaged from our own shop.

Additional wings, control surfaces, instruments, propellers, engines, accessories, were delivered this date. Several special radio installations of a major nature were completed by the radio section. Limited air and power were made available to certain portions of the shop by means of auxiliary portable equipment. All available hand tools were purchased in Honolulu and delivered to the Depot.

Approximately fifty mechanics were on continuous duty assisting and directing emergency repairs to aircraft in dispersed areas. Additional mechanics were sent to outlying areas, including Bellows Field, Wheeler Field, and the Naval Air Station.

The Navy was furnished some saws and files for use in torpedo repair work and arrangements were made to do considerable heat treating for the Navy as soon as power became available for our furnaces.

10 December 1941

Deliveries this date included three Ailerons for B-18 airplanes, one right P-26 Wing, one right OA-9 Wing, one B-18 Elevator, one P-40B right Wing, one P-26 Rudder, one B-18 Spring, one Vacuum Pump Casting for truck, one lathe control Handle, two Bucking Bars, one 31 cu. ft. Air Compressor, one Power Unit at Plating Shop, and various other units of which there is no record.

A large number of both old and new machines were installed in all branches of the Engineering Department.

Twenty skilled mechanics were sent to Wheeler Field to aid in immediate repair work on aircraft at this Station. Approximately fifty employees continued on duty at Hickam Field outside the Depot.

[6] Repair work was continued on the gasoline servicing trucks and trailers. Three tractors and six trailers were delivered this date.

Arrangements were made for Engine Repair carburetion and ignition work to be accomplished at the Naval Air Station shops on Ford Island because of the complete lack of test equipment in these units.

Large scale requisitioning and buying was conducted in town by both Engineering and Supply personnel in an effort to obtain vitally needed supplies and equipment.

*11 December 1941*

Approximately fifteen Engine Repair men were dispatched to the Naval Air Station with two truckloads of engine accessories to be repaired. A continuous flow of materials is maintained to and from this group.

Provisions were made for feeding all needy employees three meals per day in cases where it was impracticable or impossible to eat elsewhere. Gasoline servicing facilities had already been obtained at the Post Exchange Service Station with each employee allowed only enough gasoline for traveling to and from work.

Approximately the same number of mechanics continued to function at Wheeler, Hickam and Bellows Fields, with additional ones being employed at John Rogers Airport and elsewhere.

Production reached major proportions in all branches of the shops as exemplified by the following:

*Hydraulic Accessories Unit*

Repaired 2 trucks; hydraulic air brake valves; 1 air hose; brakes on truck  
Delivered 2 ea. B1A Vacuum Pump

2 ea. B2A Vacuum Pump

4 ea. Gal Pump, Hydraulic oil

2 ea. B3 Vacuum Pump

1 ea. F10 Fuel Pump, engine driven

8 ea. 203 PC Pump, hydraulic, engine driven

10 ea. 203DA Pump, hydraulic, engine driven.

4 ea. Gun Charging Hands, P-40B

2 ea. Brake Pedal Assy., P-40B

1 ea. Control Stick Assy., P-40B

2 ea. Valve, relief, double, P-40B

1 ea. Reservoir, hydraulic oil, P-40B

1 ea. Bracket, hydraulic hand pump, P-40B

1 ea. Shaft Assy. (part of control stick), P-40B

Miscellaneous Brackets—1 ea. Primer Pump, single engine, P-40B

[7] b  
*Landing Gear Unit*

P-36 and P-40 parts prepared for Wheeler Field

Landing Gear Assembly installed in B-18 airplane, #36-288, at Hangar 17

Air compressors serviced

Checked air tires, etc., on U. S. Army gasoline trucks and trailers

Repairs on B-18 brakes

Ovehauled oleo struts

Cleaned parts and tool in Landing Gear Unit

*Aircraft Electrical Unit*

Men repaired electrical test equipment. Some of the men were at the squadron hangars repairing airplanes.

*Engine Repair Branch*

Turned in to Supply: 2 ea. Engine, R-1820-45

2 ea. Engine, R-2600-11

*Instrument Repair Section*

Returned the following to service:

1 ea. Altimeter

3 ea. Ampmeter

- 4 ea. Clock
- 10 ea. Compass
- 2 ea. Gage, de-icing
- 4 ea. Gage, fuel pressure
- 1 ea. Gage, hydraulic
- 4 ea. Gage, oil pressure
- 3 ea. Gage, suction
- 5 ea. Gage, thermometer
- 6 ea. Gage, Unit, engine
- 2 ea. Generator, tachometer
- 18 ea. Indicator, airspeed
- 3 ea. Indicator, bank and turn
- 2 ea. Indicator, electric oil gage
- 1 ea. Indicator, flight
- 7 ea. Indicator, tachometer
- 12 ea. Indicator, turn
- 7 ea. Indicator, manifold pressure
- 4 ea. Octant
- 23 ea. Transmitter, B-17
- 3 ea. Tube Assembly, airspeed
- [8] 2 ea. Voltmeter
- 5 ea. Watch
- 28 ea. Regulator, oxygen
- 4 ea. Tank Gage, P-40
- 4 ea. Tank Gage, P-36

## Refinishing Section

## Turned in to Supply :

- 1 ea. Wing, L. H., P-40B (painted)
- 1 ea. Wing, L. H., P-26A (painted)
- 1 ea. Aileron, L. H., P-26A (painted)
- 1 ea. Wing, R. H., P-26A (painted)
- 1 ea. Aileron, R. H., P-26A (painted)
- 2 ea. Aileron, L. H., P-36A (doped and painted)
- 1 ea. Aileron, L. H., P-40 (doped and painted)
- 2 ea. Engine Mount, A-20A (painted)

## Sheet Metal Section

## Work completed :

- 1 ea. Wing, L. H., P-40B
- 1 ea. Wing, L. H., P-26A
- 1 ea. Wing, R. H., P-26A
- 3 ea. Aileron, L. H., P-40B
- 1 ea. Tail Cone, B-18
- 2 ea. Engine Mount, A-20A
- 2 ea. Elbow, durallumin, for gas trucks
- 10 ea. Tank, bomb bay fuel (80% complete)
- 1 ea. Harness, ignition, R-1820-45 engine
- 4 ea. Exhaust Stack, P-26A
- 4 ea. Shovel Teeth (cut)
- 1 ea. Steel Plate (cut at metal storage)
- 1 ea. Tubing Clamp (manufacture)
- 1 ea. Cover, Allison engine carburetor cover (welded)
- 6 ea. Exhaust Brackets, C-33 (75% complete)
- 2 ea. Tank, hydraulic control reserve, B-18 #4006771-7
- 1 ea. Tank, oil, B-17, #55-4725-2 (70% complete)
- 3 ea. Tank, 091, B-17 (15% complete)
- 2 ea. Tank, oil, P-40B (minor work 99% complete)
- 2 ea. Gas Truck Lines (tested)
- 8 ea. Conduit Assy., flexible, style A, 34 x 12'' (95% complete)
- Tubing made for two pilot tubes (50% complete)
- [9] 3 ea. Exhaust Stack, B-18
- 3 ea. Exhaust Stack, B-18
- 3 ea. Engine Exhaust Stack (repaired)
- 1 ea. Oil Regulator Scoop, B-18 (50% complete)

1 ea. Engine Ring Cowl, B-18 (50% complete)  
 Removed rudder and elevator cable

#### Machine Shop Section

Regrooved 9 ea. Piston for Engine Repair Branch  
 Reborned 1 ea. Pulley for vacuum pump testing bench  
 Replaced bearing on 1 ea. 5-HP electric motor  
 Drilled 4 ea. 11/16'' holes in welding jig for Sheet Metal Section  
 Repaired broken air line  
 Drilled 20 ea. 5/8'' holes on plate for Propeller Shop  
 Installed complete:  
 2 ea. Lathe, engine, 10''  
 1 ea. Lathe, turret, 1'' cap.  
 1 ea. Grinder, pedestal type, 12''  
 2 ea. Drill Press, radial  
 1 ea. Machine, engraving, complete

#### Repaired:

2 ea. Air Hose Coupling for Sheet Metal Section  
 1 ea. Air Gun for Sheet Metal Section

Drilled 5 ea. Vises for Sheet Metal Section

Manufactured 2 ea. oil rings for electric motor

Repair work on gasoline servicing trucks and trailers was continued. Five tractors, eight 4000-gallon trailers, two 2000-gallon trailers, and one 600-gallon oil truck were delivered this date.

12 December 1941

Power was made available to all sections of the plant at 10:00 A. M. this date. Production has reached approximately the following proportions based upon conditions before the first raid:

Administration Section.....	100%
Plant Maintenance Section.....	100%
Armament Section.....	100%
Engine Repair Branch.....	50%
Aero Repair Branch.....	200%
Sheet Metal Section.....	50%
[10] Machine Shop Section.....	30%
Fabric and Parachute Section.....	200%
Instrument Repair Section.....	50%
Refinishing Section.....	100%

It is expected that with the resumption of power, production of the entire plant will exceed previous levels within the next week.

Three tractors, six trailers, and three auto-car tractors are being delivered today. Work on the remaining six tractors and five trailers will be completed tomorrow, 13 December.

As soon as emergency repairs to airplanes, engines, and equipment are completed, work will begin on taking more permanent corrective action. Installation of all machinery and equipment in its final assigned location in the new shop buildings is proceeding as rapidly as is practicable without interfering with tactical needs, which, obviously, will always have highest priority.

H. A. SHEPARD,  
 1st Lt., Air Corps,  
 Asst. Engineering Officer.

12 December 1941

[1]

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
 Hickam Field, T. H., 15 December 1941.

Diary of events, morale, strength of employee personnel, and behavior of Depot personnel during the period 7 to 15 December 1941.

I—Sunday, 7 December 1941—Depot installations bombed by Japanese warplanes on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. Clocks in offices at Depot headquarters stopped at 8:05, indicating that the initial attack occurred at that time. Engineering building badly damaged and H. A. D. restaurant a total loss. Supply buildings untouched except for scattered machine gun bullets, shrapnel, and flying debris. Depot headquarters not damaged.



A.—All Army officers connected with the Depot on the post at the time of the first attack or shortly thereafter. Guards on duty around buildings. Depot Officer of the Day on duty at Depot Headquarters. After the first attack, all officers reported at Headquarters to assist in fire fighting, salvaging material, and to help in any other way possible. Approximately 100 civilian employees reported for duty after the first raid and many were engaged in fire fighting when the second raid occurred at about 9:00 a. m. Mr. Phillip W. Eldred, purchasing clerk for Depot Supply, was machine gunned to death while on his way to the Depot during the raid. Outside of a few minor wounds, this was the only casualty suffered by the Depot personnel. Most of Sunday afternoon spent in removing engines, propellers and other material from Supply buildings so they would be safe in case the buildings were bombed. Wild rumors going around. Telephones and lights out of order.

II—*Monday, 8 December 1941*—Approximately 1072 Depot employees reported for duty. All officers present. All personnel in high spirits at the opportunity to work and return to a semblance of "normalcy". Under the direction of the Depot Commanding Officer groups organized for different forms of work, some cleaning up debris, some salvaging material, others carrying on routine office work and assisting in any way possible. First Aid station for treating minor wounds set up at Depot Headquarters. Issuing of supplies for airplanes begun—surprising little damage found to have been done to machine tools by the bomb blasts. Some ready to put into operation Monday afternoon. A false air raid alarm at about 3:40 p. m.—wild rumors subsiding. One telephone operating in Headquarters. Water system being out of order, temporary sanitary trenches dug in open area south of "clearing." Sandwiches and coffee distributed among employees and soldiers by two nurses from hospital. Rumors of water supply having been poisoned—no one allowed to drink it.

[2] III—*Tuesday, 9 December 1941*—Tension and shock of the raid not so evident among the personnel. Everybody in jovial mood. Morale excellent. Almost 1100 employees reported for duty. Temporary messes established in garage building for employees. More machine tools made ready for operation. Debris much less in evidence. Water pressure returning; sanitation much improved thereby. No food yet except sandwiches and coffee; no actual want, however. Growing optimism concerning little damage done to machinery by the bombing. Water supply found not poisoned. Steel tank sections set up as temporary raid shelters. Telephone service still erratic. All officers show signs of lack of rest.

IV—*Wednesday 10 December 1941*—Mess established for employees in building T-6. Engineering Section ready to operate as soon as power turned on. Morale excellent. Everybody working cheerfully and gladly—have the feeling of "Veterans." No complaints about the blackout, or housing inconveniences. A determined spirit evident among all personnel—more than ever they mean to "Keep 'em Flying!" Sanitation in good condition. Water supply adequate and normal. Plenty of food in mess hall at building T-6. Clearing up of debris progressing satisfactorily. First Aid section still operating at Depot Headquarters. Air raid warden system established. Raid shelters still of a temporary nature, but satisfactory. Depot Headquarters informed that the engineers would handle construction of permanent raid shelters.

V—*Thursday, 11 December 1941*—Sanitary conditions excellent. Food getting better and better organization for its distribution. Shops operating at full speed again. Air raid alarm system in effect, but no shelters yet. Lt. Zuerner, Depot Provost Marshal, injured in automobile accident and taken to Tripler General Hospital—not serious. Action promised on construction of air raid shelters. Because of lack of room, too much concentration of machine shop and offices.

VI—*Friday, 12 December 1941*—Food supply for employees better organized. Shops operating at full speed. However, still too much concentration. First Aid station operating at Headquarters with three nurses in attendance. Purchasing for Depot Supplies done mostly by personal contact. Telephone service still unsatisfactory—one in Headquarters, none in purchasing offices. Personnel in good spirits. No air raid alarms since Monday afternoon, 8 December.

VII—*Saturday, 13 December 1941*—Meals for employees at Building T-6 being served satisfactorily. Getting better organization. Work started on air raid shelter at Depot Headquarters. 1022 employees present for work. Gasoline ration cards being issued to personnel. Telephone service still poor—messengers being used.

VIII—*Sunday, 14 December 1941*—Approximately 950 employees present for work. They came voluntarily and by their own insistence. Those absent were

taking care of personal business or family matters. Morale excellent. Work progressing on air raid shelters.

PAUL H. HARRISON,  
2nd Lt., Air Corps,  
Assistant Adjutant,  
Hawaiian Air Depot.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Memorandum Number 64.

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, has ordered that civilian employees will not remove firearms from this Post. All cars will be inspected by the Guards at the Gate this afternoon. Civilians should not attempt to conceal their weapons and remove them from this Post.

2. Violation of this order may carry a serious penalty.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Rex Estudillo,  
REX ESTUDILLO,  
1st Lt., Air Corps,  
Adjutant.

Official:  
Rex Estudillo,  
REX ESTUDILLO,  
1st Lt., Air Corps,  
Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 11 December 1941.

Memorandum (Number 66.)

1. Any Employee eating in the Depot Mess who willfully wastes food, fails to conduct himself properly, or does not assist in keeping the tables, floors, etc., neat and clean, will be barred from the Mess.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Rex Estudillo,  
REX ESTUDILLO,  
1st Lt., Air Corps,  
Adjutant.

Official:  
Rex Estudillo,  
REX ESTUDILLO,  
1st Lt., Air Corps,  
Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Information Bulletin Number 41.

1. All residents of Hawaii are now subject to military law. For the information of all concerned, the following Articles of War are quoted:

"ART. 79. CAPTURED PROPERTY TO BE SECURED FOR PUBLIC SERVICE.—All public property taken from the enemy is the property of the United States and shall be secured for the service of the United States, and any person subject to military law who neglects to secure such property or is guilty of wrongful appropriation thereof shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

"ART. 80. DEALING IN CAPTURED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY.—Any person subject to military law who buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or to any other person directly or indirectly connected with himself, or who fails whenever such property comes into his possession or custody or within his control to give notice thereof to the proper authority and to turn over such property to the proper authority without delay, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a court-martial, military commission, or other military tribunal may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties.

"ART. 83. MILITARY PROPERTY—WILLFUL OR NEGLIGENT LOSS, DAMAGE OR WRONGFUL DISPOSITION.—Any person subject to military law who

willfully, or through neglect, suffers to be lost, spoiled, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of, any military property belonging to the United States shall make good the loss or damage and suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct."

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Rex Estudillo,  
 REX ESTUDILLO,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps,*  
 Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 12 December 1941.*

Information Bulletin Number 43.

1. It is often necessary for the F. B. I., Military Intelligence, Civil Service, and other Governmental agencies to investigate Government Departments and individuals in the Governmental Service. The investigation conducted by these Departments does not mean that the individual or department being investigated is under suspicion.

2. It is desired to bring to the attention of all Depot personnel the fact that at the time each employee was appointed his citizenship, post record, etc., were investigated, and that there are no present or former employees who are now under suspicion.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Rex Estudillo,  
 REX ESTUDILLO,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps,*  
 Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 12, December 1941.*

Information Bulletin Number 44.

1. All employees of the Depot will be issued gas masks, which are to be carried or kept close at hand at all times. These masks will be issued in the near future in the rear of Supply Warehouse Building Number 38. Each Department will be notified as to the time their employees are to appear to pick up the masks.

2. This mask is the training type and differs from the field mask worn by the enlisted men only in that it will not withstand rough handling, such as falling on it. As a protection against gas it is equal to the other type mask. There have been rumors that this mask is not effective. This is untrue.

3. The diaphragm which will permit an individual wearing the mask to talk will be issued to some employees. The mask costs \$3.75 and the diaphragm costs \$16.00. Each employee issued a mask will be responsible for his mask and in case of loss will be required to pay the cost.

4. At the time the masks are issued, each employee should inspect the mask in order to see that it is in good condition. If not in first-class condition, the same should be mentioned at the time of issuance.

5. Employees that have not received gas mask instruction will be so instructed in the near future.

6. The fact that gas masks are being issued does *NOT* mean that a gas attack is expected. This is only another method of protection against anything that might occur. Practically no gas has been used in the war in the Orient, Europe, or in Africa insofar as is known, and it is not expected that it will be used.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Rex Estudillo,  
 REX ESTUDILLO,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps,*  
 Adjutant.

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HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 17 December 1941.*

Information Bulletin Number 49.

1. The Hawaiian Housing Administration has advised that all tenants may return to their quarters Friday, December 19, or at any time thereafter.

2. There is only one entrance to the housing project, and that is the road adjacent to Hickam Field.



3. When returning, each tenant must report to Mr. Strawn, the manager, at his office, and furnish him information as to where he has been living since December 7. Mr. Strawn's office will be open until five o'clock each day, including Saturday, December 20, and Sunday, December 21.

4. Sufficient air raid shelters will be completed to take care of all tenants. By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD;

R. L. Tscharner,  
R. L. TSCHARNER,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps,  
O. I. C. Housing.*

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 21 December 1941.*

Information Bulletin Number 51

CENSORSHIP OF PERSONAL MAIL

1. It is not the desire nor wish of the censor to suppress all news or to interfere in any way with normal letter writing. Censorship is imposed only to suppress any statements that might be of military value or encouragement to the enemy.

2. It is permissible to relate your own individual experiences during the recent raid, so long as you do not reveal any of the following:

(1) Strength, efficiency, morale, or organization of our forces, including any comment on the absence or presence in the combat zone of the communications zone of a unit or detachment, or disclosure regarding the organization to which any unit is attached or belongs.

(2) Location or movement of any naval, military, or air force organization or detachment, and presence or absence of reinforcements.

(3) Armament or equipment of any kind.

(4) Distinguishing signs used for the identification of organizations or their transportation or baggage.

(5) Plans and forecasts or orders for future operations, whether known or merely surmised.

(6) The use, condition, or probable extension of roads, railways, or other transportation facilities.

(7) State of the maintenance of services, including any reference to reserves.

(8) Position or description of billets, bivouacs, or camps.

(9) Casualties, before official publication.

(10) Results of enemy action which, if published, would tend to encourage him, to cause despondency in our own forces or people, or to incite a feeling of hostility among the people in the theater of operations or in neutral countries.

(11) Criticisms and statements which might tend to bring our forces or those of our allies into disrepute.

(12) Unverified reports of atrocities.

The use of codes, ciphers, and shorthand in private correspondence is forbidden.

To send or to attempt to send to any person or agency, otherwise than in the course of official business, any of the following is forbidden:

(1) Official documents.

(2) Documents captured from the enemy or found in places occupied by the enemy, or containing information about the enemy.

(3) Official documents belonging to civil authorities in allied or enemy territory.

3. Local and inter-island mail will not be censored. These letters may be sealed and posted as usual.

4. Do not seal letters to the mainland U. S.

5. If you mention the enclosure of money, be sure that such enclosure is made.

By order of Lieutenant Colonel HURD:

Paul H. Harrison,  
PAUL H. HARRISON,  
*2nd Lt., Air Corps, Censor, Hawaiian Air Depot.*



HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 18 December 1941.

Subject: Hawaiian Air Depot Guard.

To: Commanding Officer, Maintenance Command,  
Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. In order that the Depot may have adequate guard augmentation, it is requested that a guard detail sufficient for 9 posts and 1 NCO in charge be furnished this Depot for 24-hour duty, 7 days a week.

2. If we can divide this into three 8-hour shifts, 27 enlisted men and 3 NCO's will be sufficient.

LELAND C. HURD,  
*Lt. Col., Air Corps, Commanding.*

NOTE: Guards requested were assigned and 9 new posts are being patrolled by these guards. Civilian guards have been changed to 3 shifts per day, to patrol the interior of the buildings and the military guard the exterior. Guards have been stationed at all entrances to the Depot area. No unauthorized individual is permitted to enter.

HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 19 December 1941.

Special Orders: (Hawaiian Air Depot Guard)

ALL POSTS:

1. I will enforce all Blackout regulations.
2. I will not allow any unauthorized person to enter any of the inclosures, whether in a vehicle or on foot.
3. I will, in case of the Air Raid Alarm, assist in directing the Hawaiian Air Depot personnel to the Air Raid Shelters and then leave the area and take cover myself.

POST #5:

I will allow no unauthorized person to approach or tamper with any of the airplanes on the mat.

POST #7:

In case of an emergency I will assist the Civilian Guards to disperse the equipment from the Depot Equipment and Maintenance inclosure.

WM. E. ZUERNER,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps, Provost Marshal.*

22 DECEMBER 1941.

Information Bulletin

1. There is a gas alarm system established at the Hawaiian Air Depot to correspond to the standard chemical warfare Service signal. The signal for a gas attack is the sound of a bar beating on an iron triangle. This will be a continuous sound for two or three minutes or longer.

2. At this signal or the word "Gas," the gas masks will be put on immediately. The masks will not be removed until instructions are received from qualified personnel.

3. The gas masks will be kept in reach at all times.

4. Each person should get accustomed to wearing the mask. This can be done by wearing it for short intervals at first and then for longer periods. It is recommended that the practice be done in the near future during spare time.

JOHN M. GOODWIN,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps, Gas Officer.*

Distribution

Each Engineering Officer  
Each Bulletin Board  
Each General Foreman  
Shop Superintendent  
Engine Repair (Hangar)  
E. O. File

HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 20 December 1941.*

Subject: Air Raid Shelters.

To: Commanding Officer, Provisional Maintenance Command,  
Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. The Hawaiian Air Depot is dependent upon the inverted sections of gasoline tanks for shelter and protection of our personnel (1300 employees) in the event of an air raid.

2. The U. S. District Engineer, under the order of Colonel Robinson, are now removing these sections.

3. It is requested that we be permitted the use of these sections until such time as adequate air raid shelters are built for our personnel, or that suitable substitutes be prepared at once.

LELAND C. HURD,  
*Lt. Col., Air Corps, Commanding.*

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS MAINTENANCE COMMAND,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 20 December 1941.*

To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. This Officer is advised that those gasoline tank sections which have already been installed as splinter-proof shelters, may be used as such, pending the completion of permanent shelters by the Engineers.

2. It is estimated that construction of permanent splinter and bullet-proof shelters for Hawaiian Air Depot personnel will be initiated on or about 22 December 1941.

C. S. THORPE,  
*Lt. Col., Air Corps, Executive.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT.  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 13 December 1941.*

NOTICE

A system of air raid wardens has been established to function during all hours in which employees are working in the depot area.

The sole purpose of the air raid wardens is to notify all employees as rapidly as possible of the approach of hostile aircraft. This will be accomplished by word of mouth and by means of a siren mounted in the center of the main shop building.

Wardens will sound the alarm upon receiving a signal either from the Navy or from Hickam Field, upon observing heavy anti-aircraft fire, or upon actually seeing enemy aircraft in action.

All personnel are urged to evacuate the shop area as rapidly as possible after an alarm and to seek cover in dispersed areas until bomb shelters can be constructed.

After an all-clear signal is sounded, all employees will resume working on their regular assignments as soon as possible.

All employees are cautioned to avoid congregating around or talking to air-raid wardens. The efficiency of the warning system is dependent upon all wardens being readily visible and easily identified. To secure the latter aim, wardens have been provided with an orange arm band.

Help the wardens perform their duties perfectly! They are your life insurance!

Keep all entrances and passageways in the shop buildings clear to insure a hasty exit if necessary.

H. A. SHEPARD,  
*1st Lt., Air Corps, Asst. Eng. Officer.*

(The sketch reflecting location of aircraft in Hawaiian Air Depot Shops on December 7, 1941, referred to in the memorandum dated 23 December 1941, *supra* from Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. Hurd will be found reproduced as Item No. 105, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

## EXHIBIT No. 16 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.

Subject: Arrangements of instructions and orders for security of Wheeler Field since the attack of December 7.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, T. H.

1. In compliance with a request by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force that "Copies of such arrangements and new instructions or orders for security as the present responsible officers have made since the attack, both written and verbal, if a record has been made of them" the following is submitted:

Memorandum issued 7 December 1941, Subject: Information for conduct of families in air raids, Incl. 1.

Memorandum 7 December 1941 to all concerned regarding evacuation, Incl. 2.

Memorandum 9 December 1941 pertaining to blackout, rations for evacuees, field hospitals, release of men for key positions, vehicles, location of evacuees, Incl. 3.

Memorandum 9 December 1941 to all concerned, Subject: Standing orders for defense against chemical attack, Incl. 4.

Memorandum 9 December 1941, Subject: Practice air raid alarm, Incl. 5.

Memorandum 9 December 1941, reference gas masks, Incl. 6.

Memorandum 10 December 1941 covering ammunition and weapons, Incl. 7.

Memorandum 11 December 1941 reference cameras, censorship of mail, Incl. 8.

Memorandum 17 December 1941 reference captured material, Incl. 9.

Memorandum 11 December 1941 reference drawing of supplies, Incl. 10.

Memorandum 12 December 1941 reference housing of married enlisted men's families, Incl. 11.

Memorandum 13 December 1941 reference evacuation of quarters, Incl. 12.

Memorandum 14 December 1941 practice air raid drill, Incl. 13.

Memorandum 15 December 1941 reference evacuation of families, etc., Incl. 14.

Memorandum 15 December 1941 reference ammunition, Incl. 15.

Memorandum 16 December 1941 reference conservation of food, Incl. 16.

Memorandum 18 December 1941 reference gas alarms, Incl. 17.

Memorandum 19 December 1941, Subject: Air raid instructions, Incl. 18.

Memorandum 22 December 1941 reference guarding of mail, Incl. 19.

[2] General Memorandum 7 December 1941 plan showing location first aid stations, Incl. 20.

Memorandum 7 December 1941 silhouette of Japanese airplane, Incl. 21.

2. The following security measures were taken by the Military Intelligence Officer of this post immediately after the attack of December 7:

1. Direct liaison with the territory guard through a special telephone, also through Mr. McKay, Postmaster Wheeler Field, one of their chief officers. This liaison is used for reporting unauthorized lights, flares, short-wave transmissions, over radios, civil disorders, and anything of this nature where army aid is needed.

2. C. S. system reworked to cope with censorship of mail and to secure adequate functioning with squadrons in dispersed positions.

3. Additional staff to S-2 section used to investigate reports and all incidents reported to this office.

4. A closer working agreement between the S-2 sections and the ground defense and ground units of this post.

5. Closer liaison with the Intelligence Officers of the 24th and 25th Divisions and Schofield Barracks post Intelligence Officer.

3. The following security measures were taken by the Operations Officer by this post immediately after the attack of December 7:

1. Ground defense battalion set up defense positions following initial attack.

2. Distribution of Stewart Hand Klaxons in strategic locations throughout Wheeler Field reservations for use as air raid alarm signals.

3. Repair and maintenance of damaged field lighting equipment for emergency use of night flyers. Establishment of emergency lighting equipment.

4. Establishment of telephonic and radio communications with and arming and camouflaging of rescue boats stationed at Haleiwa.

5. Coordination with 804th Engineers on camouflage bunkers, and other defense construction projects. Reconnaissance flights with artillery and engineer personnel to observe camouflaged projects.

6. Coordination with ground defense ordnance and chemical warfare functions for defense against incendiary attacks.



7. Installed remote control for instantaneous use of radio range stations.

[3] 4. The following security measures were taken by the Base Supply Officer immediately after the attack of December 7:

1. Furnishing of motor vehicles for evacuation of women and children.

2. Surveys of damage incurred to vital installations.

3. Directing engineers to repair burst watermains.

4. 15th Pursuit Group mess directed to new quarters.

5. Establishment of field hospitals, dressing, and first aid stations.

6. Groups directed to disperse airplanes not actually flying to bunkers.

7. Transportation directed to evacuate building and to disperse all remaining transportation. Special emphasis on gasoline tankers which were removed to the North end of Wheeler Field.

8. 18th Air Base Group, 15th Pursuit Group, and 18th Pursuit Group directed to furnish supplies and equipment for establishment of evacuation camp on East range.

9. Survey of available critical material by all branches which indicated that the air corps had available for immediate issue 350,000 gallons of aviation gasoline on hand. 10,000 gallons in the hands of troops at Haleiwa and 20,000 gallons of gasoline dispersed in tankers at Wheeler Field. Emergency call on Wahiawa Standard Oil Company for 250 gallons of oil.

10. 804th Engineers directed to repair damage to railroad track East of Air Corps Supply.

11. Requested Department G-4 furnish one dump truck and one small power shovel for repairs.

12. Aqua gasoline system tested and found O. K.

13. Groups directed to keep filled all tankers.

14. Directed airplanes flying over Pearl Harbor to remain at 1,000 feet.

15. Seven D. P's established.

16. Groups ordered to erect tents at dispersal positions.

17. Police and Prison Officer directed to guard dump from being lighted by subversive elements.

18. 804th Engineers ordered to sandbag telephone exchange.

[4] 19. Barbed wire ordered from engineers.

20. Gasoline tank cars to be spotted at dispersal positions.

21. 3209 gas masks ordered for issue.

22. All water breaks ordered repaired.

23. Construction of Mokuleia air field started.

24. Civilian employees instructed in defense against chemical attack.

25. 804th Engineers ordered to clear obstructions to bunkers.

26. Area engineer given list of instructions on work to be accomplished by him.

27. United States Engineers notified to install vents in lower level of magazine area 30-8.

28. Air Corps Supply to survey squadrons Wheeler Field Depot and Hawaiian Air Depot to determine items of essential equipment.

29. Minimum needs for vehicles at Wheeler Field dispatched to Hawaiian Air Force.

30. Notified Air Corps Supply to camouflage all airplanes.

31. Chemical Warfare Service Officer instructed to prepare for defense against chemical attacks at new C. P.'s.

32. Air Corps, Engineering, Chemical Warfare, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal Corps, 18th Group and 15th Group given information on dispersal of supplies.

33. Air Corps Supply ordered to salvage all used oil drums to be used as aviation gas drums.

34. Air Corps Supply ordered to disperse all supplies.

35. 15th and 18th Pursuit Groups ordered to cover all oil drums, in dispersed positions with salvaged canvas.

36. Requested United States Engineers to provide underground shelter for mobile radio stations.

37. Instructed engineers to construct utilities for ground defense units at Kunia Gate and B. O. Q. area.

38. 34th Engineers constructing pit latrines for incoming defense battalions.

39. Engineers constructed fence around reservation.

[5] 5. The following security measures were taken by Medical personnel after the attack of December 7:

1. In order to insure adequate care in evacuation of casualties under conditions of widespread dispersions, two additional aid stations were set up at either end of Wheeler Field; one in a NCO quarters situated at the Southwest end of



the field 300 yards from the hangar line, the other at the Northeast end of the field a similar distance from the planes. Both have alternate routes of evacuation to Schofield Barracks. Each station manned by one Medical officer, one NCO, one ambulance driver, one dressing room man, and two litter bearers. An ambulance is provided each station. These aid stations are properly marked with signs, each station affording 120 beds immediately available with expansion capacity to 240.

2. A brief training directive compiled toward the end of insuring that all assigned and attached enlisted men are cognizant of elementary first aid, especially in regard to treatment of hemorrhage, specifically demonstrating the pressure points and methods of applying tourniquets, bandage of wounds, treatment of shock, approved methods of placing seriously wounded on litters.

3. In the event that all roads to station hospital, Schofield Barracks are blocked by enemy bombs, equipment was requisitioned, received, and placed in aid station for treatment of shock. Such equipment included intravenous infusion apparatus, and facilities to transfuse citrated whole blood.

4. Medical officer instructed to make sanitary inspections of all kitchens, both permanent and field type. Inspection to be made of units dispersed in the field.

5. At the present time they are attempting to organize Medical detachments on a tactical basis; that is, assigning one officer and two or three enlisted men to every one or two interceptor squadrons as availability of personnel permits.

6. Constructing two large aid station dugouts at the far border of the field capable of housing 16 litter patients.

7. In order to insure maximum resistance of flying personnel to pilot fatigue and efficiency of night vision, a quantity of Poly vitamin capsules were obtained through the Medical Department and have been supplied to most of the pilots of this command. This will be conducted until balanced diets are insured to all flying personnel.

7. The following security measures were taken by the Quartermaster Officer after the attack of December 7:

1. All NCO and Officers' quarters vacated by families.

2. Quartermaster security is being insured by the construction of a bomb-proof shelter in an abandoned septic tank at the end of Elleman Road.

[6] 3. Quartermaster supplies are dispersed to three warehouses. Stocks are kept to a minimum. In case of abnormal requests for supplies, issues are made at Schofield Barracks or Fort Armstrong.

4. Approximately 100 families of NCO's vacated from Wheeler Field areas to the new Federal Housing are at Wemoo. All family residents of Wheeler Field vacated from this station.

8. The following security measures were taken by the Wheeler Field Sub-Depot after the attack of December 7:

1. Repairing electrical wiring in final assembly hangars and shops. Paint, dope, sheet metal, instrument shops moved to final assembly hangars.

2. Underground bomb shelters for depot personnel under construction.

3. Reclaimed 95% of all repairable parts from damaged airplanes.

4. Camouflaged airplanes and propellers.

5. All personnel instructed in dispersion during air-raids.

6. Large number of personnel trained on ground defense.

9. The following security measures were taken by the Air Corps Station Supply after the attack of December 7:

1. Dispersion of rubber stocks, oxygen in engines began 9:00 A. M. 7 December. Bomb craters in nearby woods utilized for this purpose.

2. Accountable records moved to quarters of Major White, Air Corps Station Supply Officer.

3. Gasoline tankers and shop trailers dispersed. Drawing of all gasoline at Wahiawa bulk plant. 25,000 gallons of oil dispersed around field and drums. Plans for bomb proofing of aqua system and camouflaging of reserve system delivered to district engineer.

4. Reserve supplies of cleaning gasoline and kerosene dispersed in drums and underground tanks.

[7] 5. Placing of additional reserves of gasoline in aqua system are carried on during the night, the tank cars being placed after dark and removed before daylight. Dispersal of various supplies to NCO quarters. Plans initiated for a trench 4 feet deep, 22 feet long, 10 feet wide to hold 100 drums of oil.

10. The following security measures were taken by the Ordnance Officer of this post after the attack of December 7:

1. Dispersion of automotive vehicles to wooded areas and personnel to most available protected areas.
2. Orders issued that one Ordnance man would be on duty at the Wing Ordnance Headquarters Telephone 24 hours per day to transmit any orders or messages to all Ordnance Units.
3. Removal of small arms ammunition from Warehouse to Outside piles. Removal of spare parts and supplies to spare parts truck. Loading of small arms parts and supplies into small arms repair truck and location of same in wooded area. Erection of Cal. .50 AA gun in ammunition warehouse area by Ordnance personnel.
4. Welding equipment and small arms repair equipment and personnel bivouaced in wooded area. Guns in storage placed in trucks in wooded area.
5. Men advised and cautioned as to actions to be taken in case of recurrence of Air Raids.
6. Blackout precautions executed at Ordnance Base Office and in Barracks.
7. Ordnance Base Office moved out of large Barracks building into non-coms quarters.
8. Crushed rock applied to vital mud road, leading to and from protected motor park.
9. Air raid alarms erected at companies.
10. Instructions given as to responsible men to contact at the company area by the Base Office in case of Raid alarms. Men cautioned in regard to over-anxious dispersion and nervousness.
11. Instructions given as to construction of trenches and dugouts in Shops and Company areas. Men to carry out above, when time is available from Ordnance duties.
11. The following security measures were taken by the Chemical Officer of this post after the attack of December 7:
  1. Plans have been made for the installation of collective protectors in Magazine 30-8.
  2. Plans have been submitted and approved for modifying existing buildings for use as Personnel Decontamination Stations.
  - [8] 3. Six Chemical Warfare decontamination dumps are being constructed at Wheeler and Haleiwa flying fields.
  4. Engine and cockpit canopy covers are being made for protection of airplanes, at Wheeler, Ewa, and Haleiwa Fields, against chemical attack.
12. The following security measures were taken by the Signal Officer this post since the attack of December 7:
  1. The 307th Signal Company, Air Wing, and the 45th Signal Platoon, Air Base, immediately pooled personnel and equipment so that vital communications could be re-established with minimum delay. The following has been accomplished or undertaken.
    2. All circuits to the aircraft dispersed positions were either bombed out or burned out during the attack. These circuits were patched and repaired and placed in operating condition at dusk on 7 December. Permanent circuits to the dispersed positions were completed on 10 December.
    3. Base telephone circuits from Wheeler Field headquarters and Group headquarters to the most important offices, i. e., supply offices, dumps, and motor pools, were in operation at noon on the day of the attack. All base telephone circuits were in operation at eleven o'clock on the morning of 8 December 1941.
    4. Under the supervision of the Signal Supply Officer, the Company and Platoon clerks moved all Signal Corps equipment to four (4) different and separated dispersed locations, the most vital of which has been stored underground. This dispersal was completed on 10 December 1941. All Signal Corps equipment will be housed in a bomb-proof shelter when the shelter is completed.
    5. Signal Corps troops received training prior and subsequent to the attack for individual dispersion for protection during air raids.
    6. Instructions were issued to the Corps of Engineers for the installation of an underground location for the mobile radio unit, type 197. This office has been informed that the Engineers will have completed this underground protection during the current week.
    7. Final tests were completed on 6 December 1941 for the location of a nearby secret master receiving station covering our aircraft frequencies. This station was placed in complete operation on 10 December 1941. Two auxiliary sources of electric energy are provided.
    8. Sites for three (3) secret transmitting and receiving stations at strategic positions on Oahu were being chosen prior to the attack. The positions were

made definite on 14 December 1941. Equipment will be installed when the Corps of Engineers complete necessary housing facilities, on or about 30 December 1941.

[9] 9. All cable circuits and required wiring has been completed in the Wheeler Field bomb-proof shelter. Occupancy awaits the installation of an air-conditioned system which is in the hands of the Engineers.

10. Sand-bagging the telephone exchange, radio transmitter building and control room was completed on 15 December 1941.

11. All damaged wire and other damaged Signal Corps equipment which could be of any possible future use has been reclaimed and has been repaired, or is now undergoing repair.

12. All Signal Corps facilities and equipment are under guard at all times.

13. Working crews stand-by constantly to make immediate repairs or replacements in the communication systems.

13. The following orders have been issued by the Commanding Officer, Ground Defense since the attack of December 7:

1. Being faced with the responsibility of providing adequate ground defense for this station, no other troops except one battalion of the 21st Infantry being available, the undersigned resorted to the expediency of forming a provincial Defense Battalion per S. O. No. 25, Headquarters Wheeler Field, 10 December 1941. See enclosure No. 22. This action has resulted in a decrease of effective man power within the Air Corps organizations on this post, but will be discontinued in the near future due to the permanent assignment of a battalion of the 161st Infantry to this station for ground defense.

2. This provincial Battalion consists of 511 Air Corps men divided into four companies A, B, C, and D, and commanded by an Infantry Officer assigned to the Air Corps.

3. The duty of this command is to guard all vital installations at Wheeler Field and to furnish from dispersed positions adequate fire from advantageous points on this station.

14. The following orders have been issued by the Commanding Officer, 15th Pursuit Group since the attack of December 7:

1. Airplanes will be armed at all times.

2. Install salvaged armor plate in P-36 type airplanes.

3. Airplanes not immediately available for flight to be in bunkers. Other airplanes dispersed during day, and placed in bunkers during darkness.

4. 50 cal. anti-aircraft guns will be placed in vicinity of dispersed positions in trench and behind sandbags.

[10] 5. Three missions of ammunition to be kept in protected sites at dispersed areas.

6. All motor vehicles of groups to be dispersed with gas trucks loaded.

7. All types of airplanes to be camouflaged.

8. Entire group to be on 24-hour alert.

15. In addition to the foregoing, the following action has taken place since our attack:

1. Survey made of possible landing fields at Schofield Barracks and Mokuleia Field.

2. Evacuation of congested danger area near hangar line. Complete group personnel moved to Leilehua School.

3. All men in group armed with small arms and equipment with gas masks and steel helmets.

4. Air raid shelters constructed in group areas. Local security against air raid attack established.

5. Instruction given in identification and performance data of enemy airplanes and ships.

16. The following security measures were taken by the 18th Pursuit Group after the attack of December 7:

1. All personnel armed with small arms.

2. All airplanes placed in dispersed positions.

3. Squadron commanders charged with security of the squadrons and positions.

4. Personnel of group headquarters instructed as to their dispersal area in the event of an attack.

5. Training gas masks issued to personnel.

6. Units engaged at various times in acclimating personnel in use of small arms by firing on local short distance range.

17. The members of the 18th Air Base Group have been given training in the use of small arms, gas mask drill, and evacuation procedure in the event of an



attack. They have also been assigned positions to augment ground defense units.

Wm. J. Flood,  
Wm. J. Flood,  
Colonel, Air Corps, Commanding.

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Enclosure No. 1

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum:

Subject: Information for Conduct of Families in Air Raids.

1. It is considered advisable to remain in your quarters during a raid.
  2. Two or more families should move in together for morale effect. Do not congregate in too large a group.
  3. During raid it is advisable to lay on the floor near center of the house and in all cases stay on the ground floor.
  4. Private motor vehicles must be removed from roads in quarters area and may be parked along side of the house or in garages. They should be kept in readiness for immediate use.
  5. ALL QUARTERS WILL BE PREPARED TO BLACKOUT IMMEDIATELY AND BLACKOUT WILL BE PUT INTO EFFECT BEFORE DARKNESS..
  6. ALL WATER FOR DRINKING PURPOSES WILL BE BOILED OR CHLORINATED BEFORE USING.
  7. Use of telephone will be reduced to a minimum.
- By order of Colonel FLOOD:

A. W. OWEN,  
A. W. Owen,  
Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

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Enclosure No. 2

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 7 December 1941.

Memorandum:

To: All Concerned.

1. There will be no evacuation of women and children from Wheeler Field for the time being.  
The safest place in the stone dwellings is in the center of the house, in the event of an attack.
  2. All members of this Field will wear identification tags.
- By order of Colonel FLOOD:

A. W. OWEN,  
A. W. Owen  
Major, AGD, Adjutant.

Distribution: All Organizations and Quarters at WF.

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Enclosure No. 3

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 9 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 1

1. **BLACKOUT**—Extreme caution will be taken by all organizations and those occupying dwellings. NO LIGHTS WILL BE SHOWN. Cars or automobiles will not be parked in roadways, about Clubs, or buildings between the hours of sunset and dawn.
2. **RATIONS FOR EVACUEES AND FIELD HOSPITALS**—The 18th Air Base Gp will draw sufficient rations for Field Hospitals and Civilian Evacuees. Mr Sgt Francis X. Mills, Hq Sq 14th Wing, will represent the Civilian Evacuees. Non-commissioned officers drawing rations for the Field Hospital will draw rations only upon authority signed by the Post Surgeon.



3. *RELEASE OF MEN FOR KEY POSITIONS*—Whenever possible and practicable where men are on Ground Defense and can be spared for key positions in the Post, whether in the Wing or Air Base, they should be reported to the Post Adjutant.

4. *VEHICLES*—All personnel will take extreme caution in operating vehicles around or near telephone lines. Communications have been extremely difficult because of disregard for existing lines.

5. *POST EXCHANGE*—A small Post Exchange has been opened and is prepared to supply cigarettes, cigars, smoking tobacco and toilet accessories. PX will be opened daily from 8:30 AM to 3:00 PM. (Sgt & Cpls Club—Wright Ave).

6. *LOCATION OF EVACUEES*—All calls in the effort to locate dependents who have been evacuated to Honolulu and other vicinities should be addressed to the Post Caaptain (phone WF 453).

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

A. W. OWEN,  
Major, AGD, Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

A. W. OWEN

A. W. OWEN,

Major, AGD, Adjutant.

[1]

Enclosure No. 4

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

Wheeler Field, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Memorandum To: All Concerned.

#### STANDING ORDERS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK

##### SECTION I. GENERAL

1. The following standing orders are published for the information and guidance of all concerned. They will be made the basis of protective procedures in event of gas attack.

2. Unit gas officers will make frequent inspections to ensure the serviceable condition of gas defense equipment and the proficiency of units and individuals in the procedures for defense against chemical attack.

3. Unit gas officers will make immediate report of enemy gas attacks directly to the Base chemical office, stating amount and kind of chemical used, method of attack, location of areas affected and casualties resulting.

##### SECTION I. PERSONNEL

1. *a.* Each group and squadron will have one gas officer and one gas non-commissioned officer.

*b.* Each company and detachment will have one gas noncommissioned officer.

2. Each and every sentry or guard will be a gas sentry and will be on the alert for a gas attack.

##### SECTION III. COLLECTIVE PROTECTION

1. Unit gas officers will make provisions for posting an adequate number of gas sentries over sleeping men and working parties to ensure that every sleeping man and every man engaged in work is warned in time.

2. The Duties of a Gas Sentry are to:

*a.* Enforce all special orders of his post for defense against chemical attack.

*b.* Locate the position of all sleeping men in his area.

*c.* Detect the presence of chemical agents by odor, color and physical state (solid, liquid or gas).

[2] *d.* Give the alarm whenever gas is detected.

*e.* Protect supplies in his area.

3. In the event of a gas attack, the gas sentry will adjust his mask, sound the alarm, and immediately proceed to warn every man in his area. *HE WILL*

*NOT PASS ON ALARMS ARISING IN OTHER AREAS BUT WILL GIVE THE ALARM ONLY WHEN HE HIMSELF DETECTS THE PRESENCE OF GAS.*

4. The device for sounding the gas alarm will be the Stewart Gas Warning Signal.

5. Such gas-proofing of command posts and other shelters as it may be found practicable to conduct as organization of the ground will be supervised by the unit gas officer concerned. Measures for ventilation of gasproof shelters after a gas attack and for prevention of their contamination by persistent gas carried in on the shoes or clothing of personnel will be enforced. Technical advice will be furnished by the Base Chemical Officer.

6. *Protection of supplies, equipment and munitions* will be effected by routine use of protective coverings.

a. All food and water will be kept in closed containers or covered by paulins or other suitable cover. Food and water suspected of having been contaminated by gas will not be used except under instructions of the Base Chemical Officer or the *Medical Officer*.

b. Any article contaminated by liquid persistent gas must be decontaminated before it can be handled safely. Articles may be decontaminated as follows:

(1) They will be swabbed with kerosene or gasoline to remove as much of the liquid persistent gas as possible. It is to be noted that this contaminates the waste or cloth swabs and that they must be buried or burned.

(2) The remaining contamination will then be neutralized by repeated treatment with *issue soap and water* or with other non-corrosive material supplied.

c. The best protection for any article against liquid persistent gas is to keep it covered as long as practicable by a paulin or other suitable covering.

7. *Decontamination of areas* is not practicable on a large scale and will be limited to small areas of special importance where withdrawal to alternate positions is not practicable or is less convenient than neutralization of the contamination. The need for decontaminating operations beyond the means at hand will be reported to higher authority.

a. Temporary protection can be provided by covering contaminated ground with earth to a depth of at least 3 inches without spading. This does not destroy the liquid persistent gas but merely forms a temporary seal preventing the escape of toxic vapor.

b. It is to be noted that fine droplets of liquid persistent gas distributed by airplanes will evaporate within 24 hours in normal weather.

c. Contaminated areas, whether decontaminated or not, will be marked with danger signs showing the agent involved and the date of contamination or treatment. These signs will be removed by qualified gas personnel when the danger has terminated. Gas sentries will be posted as required to warn unauthorized persons from entering such areas.

8. The location of Personnel Decontaminating Stations will be determined by the tactical situation and the available facilities in existing buildings. In event of gas attack, signs indicating the location of these stations will be posted at vantage points.

[3]

#### SECTION IV. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION

1. Gas masks will be adjusted upon detecting the presence of gas, at the alarm of gas or at the command of an officer or noncommissioned officer.

2. All practicable use will be made of the temporary cover provided by roofs, paulins, raincoats, and woods against surprise attack by liquid persistent gas in air spray or bombs.

3. Upon detecting the presence of liquid persistent gas, either by odor or by appearance (suspected shell or bomb craters or spotted vegetation), care will be exercised to avoid contact with the liquid. Men must not be allowed to remain in the vapor any longer than the tactical situation may require.

4. Clothing contaminated with the liquid will be removed at once, and first aid measures will be taken by swabbing the affected part with kerosene and then washing it with soap and water or with such other non-corrosive materials as may be supplied for that purpose.

5. All individuals will be required to know the following simple rules for the handling of gas casualties:

a. Men who are lacrimated need only to leave the contaminated atmosphere, face into the wind to allow it to blow into the eyes, and refrain from rubbing the eyes. They do not require evacuation.

b. A man who is a casualty from inhaling gas (whether non-persistent gas or the vapor of persistent gas) should, as promptly as possible, be removed from the gased area, the gas mask being left on until out of the contaminated atmosphere, and evacuated as *an absolute litter case*. In the meantime his equipment should be removed and his clothing loosened, and he should be kept warm and given hot tea or coffee. *He should never be permitted to walk.*

c. Vesicant vapor burns from persistent gas may be lessened or even prevented by application of the prescribed first aid measures of thorough cleansing with issue soap and water immediately after exposure. Cleansing the affected parts with kerosene or non-leaded gasoline prior to the use of soap and water will facilitate removal of the gas. As soon as possible after these first aid measures the man should be evacuated.

d. Men contaminated with *liquid* persistent gas must be decontaminated at once and evacuated.

e. Personnel handling vesicant casualties must exercise care to prevent contamination of themselves.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

A. W. Owen,  
A. W. OWEN,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.

Enclosure No. 5

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 9 December 1941.

Subject: Practice Air Raid Alarm  
To: See Distribution.

1. There will be held in the city of Honolulu a practice *Air Raid Alarm*, Wednesday, December 10, 1941.

TIME: 3:00 P. M.

2. The signal for the practice *Air Raid Alarm* will be *one* long continuous Sound of the Stewart hand claxon siren.

3. Members of the Military Police, Honolulu City Police, Home Guard, and Honolulu Fire Department have been issued a supply of Stewart hand claxon sirens for distribution throughout the City of Honolulu.

4. Any individual Patrol or Unit equipped with a Stewart Siren when notified that an *Air Raid Alarm* is announced will *immediately* sound *one* long continuous blast of the siren until it is picked up and relayed by a neighboring, or individual unit, patrol, or individual Warden, as the case may be. In this connection it should not be necessary to sound the siren over one (1) minute duration before a neighboring unit relays the sound.

5. During *Air Raid Alarms*, real or practiced, individuals will clear the streets and sidewalks without delay, taking advantage of the nearest cover in order to provide protection from falling shell fragments.

6. Recall from practice *Air Raid Alarm* will take place at 3:15 p. m., and will be signaled by the repeated *short blast* of the siren. All *real* or *drill* air raids will be announced over KGMB and KGU and over tactical communications networks.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Colonel, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,  
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: "A" plus the following: Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, Mr. T. G. S. Walker, Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Editor, Honolulu Advertiser.

## Enclosure No. 6

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 12/9/41.

Memorandum: To All Concerned.

1. All training gas masks will be turned in immediately in exchange for new service gas masks.

2. The service and diaphragm gas masks obtained from the Ordnance Warehouse, near Wing Headquarters, are unserviceable and must be exchanged for new masks immediately.

a. The old type diaphragm mask is easily distinguished from the new by the facepiece, which is of rubber covered with stockingette.

b. The old type service and diaphragm masks may be distinguished from the new types by removing the canisters from the carriers. If the inlet valve is located on top of the canister, the mask is of the old type and must be exchanged immediately.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.

Distribution "B" Plus: 804 Engineers (5); 32 (1); 33 (1); and 34 (1).

## Enclosure No. 7

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Memorandum To: All Organizations.

1. The following directive will be complied with by all organization and detachment commanders immediately.

a. All Ground M. G's., Cal. .30 and Cal. .50, except those issued to the Ground Defense Bn. and outlying airdromes will be turned in at once.

b. B. A. R's. and M1 Rifles will be turned in at once.

c. All excess Rifles and Pistols will be turned in at once. No man will have more than one weapon. Wherever possible, Rifles will be used in place of Pistols.

d. All Ammunition in excess of following will be turned in:

150 rounds Ball Cal. .30, per Rifle.

3000 rounds Ball and Tracer, belted per M. G., Cal. .30 M1917A1.

3600 rounds Ball and Tracer belted per M. G., Cal. .50 M1921A1.

21 rounds Ball per Pistol.

e. All A. P. Ammunition is reserved for Aircraft use only.

f. All units will take steps to conserve Ammunition. Open Ammunition cases will be covered and protected from weather.

g. Each individual is responsible that his Armament is in serviceable condition at all times.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile.  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.

## Enclosure No. 8

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

Wheeler Field, T. H., 11 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 2:

1. *Cameras*—All cameras will be locked in foot or wall lockers and remain there until authority is given to release same. Organization Commanders will



take the necessary steps to insure that cameras will not be removed from barracks.

2. *Censorship of Mail*—Squadron Commanders or an Officer designated by the Squadron Commanders will censor all mail going out of their respective squadrons.

3. *Identification Tags*—Stamping Machines and blanks for identification tags were issued to most organizations prior to 6 December 1941. A small supply of blanks are still on hand at the Post Quartermaster. Necessary steps will be taken by organizations to equip all personnel with identification tags.

4. *Payment of Accounts*—The First Three Grades NCO Club and the Sergeant and Corporals Club are prepared to accept money in payment of bills. Club dues for the month of December will not be accepted for the present time.

5. *Post Exchanges*—Post Exchange, Schofield Barracks, is prepared to receive payment on accounts. Payments of accounts for Post Exchange, Wheeler Field, will be announced at a later date.

6. *Rubber Censorship Stamps*—Rubber stamps with the word "CENSORED" will be available for all organizations in the Wheeler Field S-2 Office at 6:00 P. M. this date.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, Adjutant General's Department,  
Adjutant.

Official:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, Adjutant General's Department,  
Adjutant.

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Enclosure No. 9

Date: Dec. 15, 1941  
File #421

AF1 79 OB

ALATMANU CRATER 1547 DEC 11 1941

In addition requirements see IV FM 30-15 22 July 1940 desired all military equipment accessories etc and clothing and other articles that could possibly be of value as intelligence found in enemy aircraft or on persons enemies be turned in repeat turned in earliest practicable moment G-2 this echelon

Issued instructions to effect recovery any such items collected as souvenirs since beginning operations by members your command signed Walter C Philipps Colonel General Staff Corps Chief of Staff  
516P

MARTIN

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Ist Ind.

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 12 December 1941.

To: All Organizations and Activities, Wheeler Field, T. H.

1. All items of clothing, jewelry, papers, etc., will be turned in to the S-2 Office, Wheeler Field.

2. All captured enemy matériel is the property of the United States Government. The removal or retention of same for personal souvenirs is a court martial offense. All souvenirs will be immediately turned in to the S-2 Office.

3. All enemy Ordnance matériel and ammunition will be turned in to the nearest Ordnance Officer and in the case of duds or shells, report to the nearest Ordnance Officer. (See HAF Regulation No. 45).

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. C. D.,  
Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A"

## Enclosure No. 10

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
*Wheeler Field, T. H., 11 December 1941.*

Memorandum to: All activities, Wheeler Field, T. H.

1. *a.* (1) All organizations and activities will not draw more supplies of any nature than are absolutely required.

(2) All supplies and equipment in excess of requirements will be returned to the supply agency concerned without delay.

(3) All unserviceable property or supplies will be turned in to the supply agency concerned for reclamation.

*b.* (1) To facilitate supply, all organizations and activities requiring supplies will requisition through their respective group S-4's.

(2) The group S-4's are charged with the responsibility of insuring that organizations and activities under their control do not overdraw.

(3) Special troops which do not come under the Group S-4 of the 14th Pursuit Wing will draw their supplies from the supply agency concerned.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
*Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.*

DISTRIBUTION "A"

## Enclosure No. 11

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
*Wheeler Field, T. H., 12 December 1941.*

Memorandum to: All Concerned.

*Housing of Married Enlisted Men*

1. Married non-commissioned officers' quarters located on the Post of Wheeler Field will not be occupied by families at any time in the future.

2. Married non-commissioned officers who were occupying quarters at Wheeler Field and who desire to remove their families from evacuation quarters will make application direct to the Post Quartermaster, Wheeler Field, for assignment in the Wheeler Field Defense Housing Project. There are one hundred and fifteen (115) sets of quarters available in the Defense Housing Project.

3. Applications will show the ages and number of dependents.

4. These quarters may be occupied immediately.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
*Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.*

DISTRIBUTION "A"

## Enclosure No. 12

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
*Wheeler Field, T. H., 13 December 1941.*

General Memorandum Number 4

1. All members of the families of officers and non-commissioned officers (Women & Children) who are occupants of quarters on Wheeler Field will immediately evacuate such quarters.

2. The Post Police and Prison Officer will start patrol at 6:00 P. M., 13 December 1941 to enforce the above order.

3. All quarters will be left unlocked by the occupant.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A" Plus All Quarters.

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Enclosure No. 13

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 14 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 5

AIR RAID DRILL

1. The 18th Air Base Group (R), AC, will conduct a practice Air Raid Drill tonight (14 Dec. 41) at about 7:30 P. M., during which the Air Base Barracks will be evacuated and personnel sent to dispersed positions. Other organizations may hold drills at the same time, if desired.

2. In order that no undue alarm may be caused among personnel or organizations not participating in the drill, there will be no general air raid alarm and the normal air raid signals will not be used—verbal commands being substituted. All noise will be kept to a minimum.

3. Initiation of the drill and release therefrom will be handled by organization commanders.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

H. H. BASSETT,  
Major, Air Corps, Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A".

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Enclosure No. 14

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 15 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 6

1. a. By orders of Lieutenant General Short, Military Governor, all women and children of Wheeler Field have been evacuated with the exception of those who are on special duty and living at the First Aid Stations. The time of return of evacuees to Wheeler Field is indefinite. The Commanding Officer appreciates and commends the excellent cooperation that has been received in connection with evacuation by all concerned.

b. The NCO quarters will be permanently evacuated. Families may move to the Wheeler Field Low Cost Housing Project. Married non-commissioned officers who were occupying quarters at Wheeler Field and who desire to remove their families from evacuation quarters will make application direct to the Post Quartermaster, Wheeler Field, for assignment in the Wheeler Field Defense Housing Project. There are one hundred and fifteen (115) sets of quarters

available in the Defense Housing Project. Applications will show the ages and number of dependents. These quarters may be occupied immediately.

c. To assist evacuees to find suitable quarters, medical attention, necessities, or transportation, the following centers have been established to handle all such activities: Post Chaplain, Wheeler Field, 453; Cook's Farm, Wahiawa; Mrs. Howard Davidson, Wahiawa 4415 or 4755. Army Committee: Iolani School, 2435; Miss Lenne, Wheeler Field hostess. Evacuation Committee, City Hall, 6161. Honolulu Wheeler Field Committee for Evacuees: Mrs. Wall, 2668; Mrs. George Angus, 69678; Mrs. Walker Wilson, 6S115; Mrs. Fritz Hart, 69076; Mrs. Russell Cole, 92159.

d. Evacuees may return to the Post during the day for food and equipment.

c. Attention is called again to the message issued by Lieutenant General Short, Military Governor, in the Star-Bulletin: "The citizenry of Honolulu and of other towns have been most hospitable in caring for evacuees. They have given most generously of their means. It is but right that the evacuees should make evident the deep appreciation which they must all feel in their hearts. It is felt that all evacuees will want to share all expenses to which their generous hosts are being put and will desire to assist in every way possible.

2. **LAUNDRY**—Families are restricted to Flat Work, Cotton Underwear and Uniforms only. Pick up of Family laundry will be resumed December 15th and will continue on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday until further notice. (QM Laundry)

3. **THE FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION**.—Will run two busses daily from the Army-Navy "Y" in Honolulu to Schofield Barracks, leaving at 6:15 AM and from the Federal Taxi stand on Foote Ave. to Honolulu leaving at 4:15 PM, first trip beginning Monday, December 15, 1941.

4. **CENSORSHIP OF MAIL**.—Paragraph 5, Memorandum No. 3, Headquarters Wheeler Field, dated 13 December 1941, is revoked as complete instructions on military censorship is covered in General Orders No. 78, HHD, dated 12 December 1941.

5. **EVACUATION OF MAINLAND**.—In connection with paragraph 6, letter HHD, dated 14 December 1941, subject "Evacuation to Mainland", QM Forms No. 219. (Certificate of personal property shipped) will be obtained by each individual from the Chief Clerk, Wheeler Field, Quartermaster Office.

6. **PX NOTICE**.—The Post Exchange may sell two (2) packages of cigarettes per man per day.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

H. H. BASSETT,  
Major, Air Corps, Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

J. E. Carwile,

J. E. CARWILE,

Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A".

Enclosure No. 15

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 15 December 1941.

Memorandum to: All Unit Commanders.

1. **AMMUNITION REPORTS**.—It is apparent from reports being received as to status of ammunition and armament on hand, that Unit Commanders are not taking steps to see that these reports are accurate.

a. Ammunition and armament reports of status of stocks on hand, are to indicate the amounts that the Unit actually has in its possession at that time. Unit Commanders are responsible for producing or accounting for all items reported. Any changes from day to day must be explained on the report as having been received, expended or turned in.

b. Armament and ammunition in the hands of the Guard will be reported by the Ground Defense Commander, and will not be included on other Unit reports.

c. The reports of status of ammunition and armament as of 1800, 15 December 1941, will be taken as an official inventory of Government Property for which the Unit Commander is responsible. Any turn-ins, expenditures, except for combat, or receipts, will be authorized by the Wing Commander, through the Wing Ordnance Officer.



2. **AMMUNITION ALLOWANCES FOR TRAINING.**—*a.* The following ammunition will be allowed for the training of all men with the arm with which he is equipped:

(1) Pistol—10 rounds—5 rounds to be fired slow fire, 5 rounds at bobbing target.  
 (2) Rifle—40 rounds—Group and separate unit Commanders will arrange for qualified instructors and supervisors of this firing.

*b.* Assignment of the range will be made by the Wing Ordnance Officer.

*c.* The units firing will be responsible for furnishing Range Guards and Range Officers.

*d.* Target material will be drawn by the unit firing, at the Ordnance Warehouse.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
 J. E. CARWILE,  
 Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

Enclosure No. 16

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
 Wheeler Field, T. H., 16 December 1941.

Subject: Wastage of Food  
 To: All organizations

Letter HHD, dated 10 December 1941, subject as above, is again brought to the attention of all members of this command:

"1. Inspections of left-overs on plates and mess kits, and contents in garbage cans, indicates that there is an excessive waste of food throughout the command.

2. The distance from the source of supply and present transportation difficulties makes it imperative that wastage of foods be reduced to a minimum.

3. Commanding Officers of all organizations and units operating messes will take measures to assure themselves that men are getting sufficient food, but no more than they can consume. This can be accomplished by dishing out small quantities at first helpings and allowing second helpings when requested.

4. It is incumbent upon the army to set an example to the civil population in the conservation of all foodstuffs."

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
 J. E. CARWILE,  
 Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A".

Enclosure No. 17

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
 Wheeler Field, T. H., 18 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 8

1. **WIRE AND 'PHONES.**—Squadrons will conserve all wire W-110 in cleaning area along hangar line. Organizations are requested to report all loose 'phones taken from desks to the Post Signal Office, WF 480.

2. **DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK.**—Paragraph 4, Section III, of the Standing Orders for Defense Against Chemical Attack, dated 9 December 1941, is hereby rescinded.

The devices for sounding the gas alarm will be sections of iron bars or tire rims suspended in air. The alarm will be given by rapidly striking this device with a heavy iron bar or hammer.

The gas alarm will be sounded only when the gas sentry detects the presence of gas or when the general alarm is given over the telephone.

3. **RECREATION FUND ACCOUNTS** should be paid at the S-2 office to Sgt COEN or Pfc FRY, Recreation Office assistants.

4. **CATHOLIC CHURCH SERVICES** will resume beginning 18 December and daily thereafter. Daily Mass at 6:30 AM and Sunday Masses at 7:00 and 9:00 AM. Confessions on Saturday from 4:00 to 5:00 PM and before all Masses. All services will be at the new chapel near Castner Chapel.

5. **LOST AND FOUND ARTICLES** should be sent to the Guard House and

queries for same should be addressed or called to the Guard House. (A coat and pair of trousers are now at the Guard House.)

6. *PETS*.—Only one of the transports or freighters will take "pets" to the mainland. Pets to be shipped to the mainland must be closely inspected by a Veterinarian.

7. *GAS MASKS*.—Dependents of officers and enlisted personnel as they are evacuated will turn in their gas masks at the Wheeler Field Officers' Club or at the Base Chemical Office.

8. *CHANGES IN GROUND DEFENSE PERSONNEL*.—Personnel assigned to Ground Defense duty will not be withdrawn therefrom by organizations without the approval of this headquarters.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

OFFICIAL:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, AGD, Adjutant.

Enclosure No. 18

File #353.6  
Dec. 19, 1941.

HEADQUARTERS, WHEELER FIELD,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 18 December, 1941.

Subject: Air Raid Instructions.

To: Commanding Officer, 18th Air Base Group and Special Services.

Commanding Officer, 18th Pursuit Group.

Commanding Officer, 15th Pursuit Group.

1. The provisions of letter HHD, subject as above, dated 10 December 1941, will be brought to the attention of all personnel.

2. It is desired that each group formulate a comprehensive plan covering the activities of all its personnel during an air raid. Such a plan should cover the following points:

a. Action to be taken by personnel who are on duties which should be continued during an air raid.

b. Action to be taken by personnel who are on duties which are discontinued during an air raid.

(1) Selection of dispersal areas for personnel covered in b above.

c. Action to be taken by personnel who are not on duty; i. e. personnel in bivouac, barracks, mess areas, theaters, etc.

(1) Selection of dispersal areas for personnel covered in c above.

d. Plan for control of small arms fire by personnel in dispersal areas when same is ordered by competent authority.

e. Plan for vacating barracks under total blackout conditions.

f. Plan for location of alternate CP's in case change of location is contemplated during air raids or in case of destruction of present C. P.

3. The following general information is furnished for your information and use in formulating air raid plans:

a. Dispersal areas will be available for use by organizations as follows:

(1) New NCO quarters area—18th Pursuit Group.

(2) Old NCO quarters area—18th Air Base Group & Special Troops.

(3) Leiluhua School and Old Officers Quarters area—15th Pursuit Group.

4. Organization commanders may use such other areas for dispersal purposes as they desire, provided areas selected do not interfere with ground defense or other necessary activities.

a. Personnel in dispersal areas will not do any firing nor will they move from their dispersal area except when ordered to do so by competent authority. In general they will merely seek self protection during the period the air raid is in progress.

b. Group commanders will make the necessary arrangements to insure that sufficient officers and non-commissioned officers are in the dispersal areas to insure proper control of all personnel.

c. Depending on the type of attack it is possible that the lower floors of barracks may be relatively safe and same may be used for sheltering personnel provided they are well distributed.

- d.* Trenches may be constructed in dispersal areas.
- e.* Personnel caught in the open where no shelter is available should be instructed to lie flat, preferably in a ditch or fold of the ground.
- f.* The temptation to find out what is going on, for example to stand at a window watching bombs exploding, should be strongly resisted, as this results in exposure to unnecessary risks from bombs splinters and flying bits of debris. If in the open, the mouth should be left open, in order to protect the lungs against the action of the blast. For this purpose it is useful to grip a piece of wood between the teeth.
- g.* All personnel should be familiar with the location and operation of fire extinguishers.

By order of Colonel FLOOD :

J. C. HADLEY,  
2nd Lieut., A. G. D., Ass't Adjutant.

Enclosure No. 19

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.

General Memorandum Number 10

1. *Household goods of evacuees*—The WD has announced that household goods of evacuees will not be stored at Ft Mason, California as previously announced, but must be shipped to an address designated by the owner.

2. *Post exchange accounts*—It is desired that all organizations and individuals settle their post exchange accounts immediately. (The WF Post Exchange office is located in the small building EAST of Post Hq building.)

3. *Ordnance Officers' Candidate School*—Applicants for the Ordnance Officers' Candidate School will appear before Capt. M. R. Williams, OD, President of Board, in person. (Room 105, Wheeler Field Headquarters.)

4. *Settlement of estate*—*a.* Persons having claims against the estate of the late 2d Lt. KARL F. HARRIS, Air Corps, 47th Pur Sq (F), Wheeler Field, or persons against whom the estate has a claim, are requested to communicate with 2d Lt. Harry L. Sylar, Jr., Air Corps, 47th Pur Sq (F), Wheeler Field, Summary Court.

*b.* Anyone having claims against Pvt ANSON E. ROBBINS, 11009597, 25th Matériel Squadron, 18th Air Base Group (R), will be directed to Chaplain Alvin A. Katt, Post Chaplain, Wheeler Field, T. H., charged with Summary Court for the 18th Air Base Group (R).

5. *Catholic church services*—Wednesday, Christmas Eve, Confessions from 3:00 to 5:00. Christmas Day: Masses 7:00 and 9:00 AM in the new chapel near Kunia Gate. Third Mass at Haleiwa at 10:30 AM.

6. *Safeguarding U. S. Mail*—*a.* In the safeguarding and handling of mail to and from enlisted and commissioned personnel and dependents of this post, the following procedure will be put into effect with the least practicable delay.

(1) Each organization will obtain a mail bag from the Wheeler Field Post Office.

(2) The purchase of one lock (with two keys only) for securing contents of mail bags is authorized. One key will be retained in the organization orderly room and the other will be turned over to the Post Office.

(3) Mail will be delivered to and obtained from the Post Office by a Mail Orderly (one) to be designated by each organization.

*b.* Officers and their dependents may call for mail at the Post Office and on request same will be turned over by the clerk. Outgoing mail of officers and dependents will be delivered in person to the Post Censor at the Post Office.

*c.* For the information of all concerned, local and inter-island mail is not required to be censored. Letters addressed to Federal Agencies, local and mainland, are also not required to be censored.

By order of Colonel FLOOD :

J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

OFFICIAL :

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A. G. D., Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A"

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.

Subject: Safeguarding U. S. Mail.  
To: All Organization Commanders.

1. In the safeguarding and handling of mail to and from enlisted and commissioned personnel and dependents of this post, the following procedure will be put into effect with the least practicable delay.

a. Each organization will obtain a mail bag from the Wheeler Field Post Office.

b. The purchase of one lock (with two keys only) for securing contents of mail bags is authorized. One key will be retained in the organization orderly room and the other will be turned over to the Post Office.

c. Mail will be delivered to and obtained from the Post Office by a Mail Orderly (one) to be designated by each organization.

2. Officers and their dependents may call for mail at the Post Office and on request same will be turned over by the clerk. Outgoing mail of officers and dependents will be delivered in person to the Post Censor at the Post Office.

3. For the information of all concerned, local and inter-island mail is not required to be censored. Letters addressed to Federal Agencies, local and mainland, are also not required to be censored.

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. Carwile,  
J. E. CARWILE,  
Major, A.G.D., Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION "A" \*

Enclosure No. 20

(Enclosure No. 20 is in part a diagram showing the location of the various aid stations referred to hereafter. This diagram will be found reproduced as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Aid Station #1—Located in Building 303 on Wright Avenue (Corner of Wright Ave and Chanute Road).

Aid Station #2—Located in NCO Club (On Eastman Road).

Aid Station #3—Quarters #100 (Capt Rhoad's Quarters on Vaught Avenue).

Aid Station #4—Quarters #124 (On Elleman Road—At West end of New NCO Quarters Area).

Aid Station #5—Located in Building across road from Station Dispensary—Wright avenue and Chanute Road).

Aid Station #6—Located in the Officers' Club—On Wright Avenue.

1. All Aid Stations are operating on a 24 hour basis. Any case of injury or illness occurring to any person, military or civilian, will be treated at any Aid Station at any Hour.

2. Soldiers need not present sick book to Aid Stations in order to obtain treatment. However, entries must be made in sick book each day and book sent to Dispensary (Aid Station #1).

3. Cases requiring bed rest and special nursing care will be quartered at Aid Station #2 (NCO Club).

4. For General Emergency calls or information call the Surgeon's office—phone 303, 304 and 305.

Corrected copy.

Enclosure No. 21

(Enclosure No. 21 includes a sketch of a Japanese Navy single seat pursuit plane, 1941, more fully described hereafter. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 107, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Carries pilot only, armed with two 20 millimeter cannon in wings and two rifle caliber machine guns firing through propeller, all of which fire straight to the front, marked with red discs near wing tips, top and bottom, and on sides of fuselage.



Enclosure No. 22

[1]

HEADQUARTERS WHEELER FIELD,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Special Order Number 25:

1. In addition to his other duties, Second Lieutenant JOHN C. HADLEY, (O-386662), A. G. D., 18th Air Base Gp (R), is detailed as Acting Civilian Employment Appointing Officer, Air Corps, this station; Acting Officer in charge of the Civilian Personnel Section, this station, and Acting Postal Officer, this station, effective 10 December 1941.

2. The following named enlisted men, organizations as indicated, are, with the concurrence of the Commanding General, 14th Pur Wing, AC, detailed on Special Duty with the Provisional Ground Defense Battalion, this station, all previous orders in conflict to this order are revoked:

## HQ &amp; HQ SQ., 18TH PUR GP (INT)

Sergeant Edward D. Benton, 6948339,  
Sergeant Michael T. Cossack, 6987369,  
Corporal Glenn A. Leshner, 6949640,  
Corporal Herman W. Surratt, 16012451,  
Corporal George E. Smith, 6551365,  
Corporal Robert K. Froeze, 6993929,  
Corporal Bertle E. Okerstrom, 6546423,  
Pfc Carroll T. Andrews, 16006021,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Harry A. Prazuch, 6913161,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Charles R. Rosson, 6914601,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Charles R. Morehead, 6916567,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl John S. Strong, 6668683,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Daniel Rosenblum, 6975587,  
Pfc Sp 5 cl Felix J. Borowski, 13005957,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Robert W. Green, 6994096,  
Pfc AM 2 cl John F. Godsmark, 6979493,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Milford A. Schrank, 16008144,  
Pfc AM 2 cl Lonzo W. Reinsell, 6987650,  
Pvt Sp 5 cl Clifton N. Hiatt, 19014326,  
Pvt Sp 4 cl Joseph A. Rogalski, 6581786,  
Pvt Sp 4 cl Glo G. Gallagher, 6894735,  
Pvt John R. Martin, 6999581,  
Pvt Harold F. Smith, Jr., 6982188,  
Pvt Harlan E. Smith, 16040955,  
Pvt Abraham Miller, 12018350,  
Pvt Sp 4 cl James Piatok, 12021354,  
Pvt Earle F. Eagan, 11024058,  
Pvt John L. Guarino, 12018507,  
Pvt Sp 4 cl William J. Young, 6947609,  
Pvt Sp 5 cl Stanley A. Pietruszka, 16003453.

[2]

## 6TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Staff Sergeant Charles S. Boykin, 6608571,  
Sergeant AM 1 cl William B. Hullquist, 6914594,  
Sergeant AM 1 cl Robert B. Anderson, 7083932,  
Sergeant Hickey Temenoff, 7028715,  
Corporal AM 2 cl Arnt H. Froshaug, 6979316,  
Corporal AM 1 cl David E. Cooke, 6668192,  
Corporal AM 1 cl Park J. Reed, 6950047,  
Corporal AM 2 cl Philip Valente, 6150096,  
Pfc Angeleno Bucchori, 6152320,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Robert E. Butters, 16012989,  
Pfc Sp 4 cl Robert C. Allen, 16068989,  
Pfc Joseph R. Glynn, 16013081,  
Pfc Gerald J. Charlier, 16008031,  
Pvt AM 2 cl Sherod R. Driggers, Jr., 14027762,  
Pvt Louis S. Hyde, 16013039,  
Pvt Milroy L. Richardson, 17001408,

Pvt Arthur Saunders, Jr., 6968964,  
 Pfc Rodney V. Thompson, 16017240,  
 Pvt Sp 4 cl Rex M. Shier, 6579741,  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Frank L. Wallace, 6845163,  
 Pvt Edward Witt, 7025911,  
 Pvt 1 cl Alfred M. Bronson, 13003667,  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Marvin E. Sloppy, 7028730,  
 Pvt Sp 2 cl Carl C. Leathers, 6566707,  
 Pfc Sp 3 cl Robert E. Canning, 6874514,  
 Pvt Sp 4 cl Martin Nussbaum, 11007935,  
 Pfc Sp 2 cl Joseph Costelnic, 6566383,  
 Pfc Sp 4 cl Thomas W. Lace, 11011332,  
 Pfc AM 2 cl Hubbard M. Stowell, 11008160,

## 19TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Staff Sergeant Donald B. Jones, 6949830,  
 Corporal AM 1 cl Vincent J. Adduci, 6668031,  
 Corporal AM 2 cl Blane D. Brewer, 6994761,  
 Corporal AM 2 cl Alexander Fedorishen, 7028750,  
 Corporal AM 2 cl Walter Jurkiewicz, 11010155,  
 Corporal Lewis C. St Cyr, 16007916,  
 Pfc John E. Wandzel, 16012743,  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Stanwood E. Holt, 11016526,  
 Pfc Alvin L. Aniskowski, 16012885,  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Dale W. Campbell, 6574382,  
 Pvt. AM 2 cl Albin J. Czaplinski, 7025115,  
 Pfc Sp 4 cl Bernard Katz, 13009843,  
 [3] Pfc AM 2 cl Edgar J. Kelleher, Jr., 6979545  
 Pfc Foster D. Hohney, 16012838  
 Pfc AM 2 cl Abraham D. Snyder, 6978420  
 Pfc William C. Storey, 16017554  
 Pfc Louis R. Thibert, 16021388  
 Pvt Spec. 4 cl Dexter E. Tiefenthal, 16012645  
 Pfc Harry A. Wendt, 16008030  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Sam W. Cox, Jr., 13017777  
 Pvt Spec. 4 cl Edward W. Cook, 14000457  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Harold W. Hemphill, 7028731  
 Pvt 5 cl George B. Smith, Jr., 16013053  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Frederic W. Sprague, 16027809  
 Pvt Spec. 4 cl Carroll Walker, 16041000  
 Pvt Spec. 4 cl Ferdinand J. Weidner, 16003139

## 78TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Sergeant AM 1 cl Felix N. Secchera, 6995136  
 Sergeant AM 1 cl James W. Shoemaker, 6994682  
 Corporal A. L. Hill, 6970315  
 Corporal James D. Larash, 6949072  
 Corporal AM 1 cl Frederick C. Windmayer, 6151635  
 Corporal W. B. Young, 6668010  
 Pvt Charlie Isen, 6887037  
 Pvt. Frank Ceuvertine, 13012204  
 Pvt Paul A. Delcuze, Jr., 6978738  
 Pfc 4 cl Davis J. Winnick, 6974066  
 Pvt Stanley C. Mucha, 6975063  
 Pvt Raymond H. Carr, 16007905  
 Pvt 4 cl Stephen Warge, 6998137  
 Pvt 4 cl Jack Trawick, 6396321  
 Pvt 4 cl Joseph L. Platz, 16017432  
 Pvt 4 cl La Verne Morell, 16003172  
 Pvt Rollin D. Moore, 6954371  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Harold E. Mitts, 16017381  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Wylie D. McSwain, 16009523  
 Pvt Samuel LaPorte, 16013017  
 Pvt 4 cl Robert J. Frye, 16017585  
 Pfc 4 cl Clifford R. Manross, 7028850

Pvt William D. Barnes, 16017548  
 Pvt Tony S. Cavalle, 15012572  
 Pfc Douglas T. Young, 16012636  
 [4] Pfc 4 cl Arthur Clement 11018831  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Frederick Kemetic, 7025131  
 Pvt 4 cl Charles Kochenash, 6924919

## 73RD PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Corporal William H. Graf, 6932524  
 Corporal Luther Ledbetter, 6948549  
 Pfc George P. Fous, 11010162  
 Pfc Vernon C. Rubenking, 16017458  
 Pfc Anthony S. Spinitasanto, 7020950  
 Pvt Earl V. Blenins, Jr., 73012668  
 Pvt Donald I. Larsen, 16021532  
 Pvt Kenneth L. Powell, 16008078  
 Pvt Frank M. Ricker, Jr., 6997958  
 Pvt Graydon E. Steelman, 16017228  
 Pvt Adolph F. Sugent, 16007676  
 Pvt AM 2 cl Stanley R. Urenovitch, 6980132  
 Pvt Paul E. Weeden, 39150238  
 Pvt Joe D. Rupe, 15019548  
 Pvt Gary J. Koopsen, 16012991  
 Pvt Donald J. Herzog, 17001352  
 Pvt J. Robert Harris, 6991114  
 Pfc Sp 4 cl Willard Wright, 6987728  
 Pfc Earl D. Pipes, 6972773  
 Pfc Leonard T. Egan, 16013061  
 Pfc Sp 3 cl John M. Frost, 7001704  
 Pfc Orlo C. Burdick, 6977800  
 Corporal Roy G. Smith, Jr., 6994734  
 Corporal Benjamin Dranetz, 2405800  
 Corporal AM 2 cl Martin Alfred, 6975588  
 Staff Sergeant William H. Hardy, 6367545  
 Sergeant Walter A. Przewrocki, 6898767

## HQ &amp; HQ SQ., 18TH AIR BASE GP (R)

Technical Sergeant Samuel W. Fisher, 6024243  
 Corporal Joseph F. Loveland, 6948031  
 Pfc Maynard R. Poradek, 16008044  
 Pvt Charles D. Boyd, 15064609  
 Pvt Eugene J. Doran, 16008007  
 Pvt Francis C. Hand, 13008970  
 Pvt Thomas J. Hillis, 6954694  
 Pvt Dudley D. Reeves, 6928556  
 Pvt Jack W. Hoyt, 20912833  
 [5] Technical Sergeant John Lauterbach, R-2378403  
 Corporal Joseph A. Prouls, 11014529  
 Pvt John P. Robson, 6948565  
 Pvt Leonard A. Daniel, 18063021  
 Pvt Oliver M. Duree, 20759391  
 Pvt Carl Gilman, 13022874  
 Pvt Charles A. Hollis, Jr., 14004263  
 Pvt Horace G. Williams, 14046007  
 Corporal Peter Farrier, 7074216  
 Pfc John Demlis, R-1907607  
 Pvt George W. Black, 16017558  
 Pvt Charles E. Dickson, 15062097  
 Pvt Clifford I. Dyvig, 17029393  
 Pvt Lawrence P. Hansen, 16008045  
 Pvt Remy P. Picard, 17007934  
 Pvt Arthur L. Wilson, 11011168

## 17TH AIR BASE SQUADRON (R)

Sergeant Robert J. Bayham, 6667175  
 Sergeant Barney Magnis, 6137995  
 Sergeant Clarence W. Stem, 6991449  
 Corporal Ernest I. Powell, R-492787  
 Corporal Joseph P. Sullivan, 12022105  
 Pfc Lloyd A. Bentley, 7020640  
 Pfc George A. Bright, 14004262  
 Pfc Nunzio B. Ceraolo, 6981118  
 Pfc Michael C. Doroski, 6981055  
 Pfc Anthony Fidares, 12021987  
 Pfc Joseph M. Hurl, 6578219  
 Pfc Edward Janser, 11010167  
 Pfc Alexander A. Kaminski, 12021998  
 Pvt Colbin D. Blunt, 20909723  
 Pvt Stanley T. Brozek, 6980469  
 Pvt Harry W. Carnes, 6998770  
 Pvt Peter A. Dall'Aglio, 6975834  
 Pvt Harry B. Ernewein, 7021713  
 Pvt John E. Knapp, 6976370  
 Pvt Vernon F. Krinke, 6667752  
 Pvt Chester L. Kurasek, 6912608  
 Pvt Gordon M. Short, 11018698  
 Pvt William P. Henderson, 13034786  
 Pfc Ernest R. Korrales, 12025829

## [6] 24TH MATERIEL SQUADRON (R)

Staff Sergeant Mannie Fundeen, 6549080  
 Pfc Henry Abel, 6980194  
 Pfc Stanley F. Podja, 6145810  
 Pfc Ray S. Miller, 6256855  
 Pvt Harold R. Voss, 12024469  
 Corporal Robert D. Burris, 6587265  
 Pvt Robert T. Johnson, 15055104  
 Pfc Harry T. MacNeal, 6940813  
 Pvt Vernon C. Davis, 16012924  
 Pvt Benjamin F. Hathcock, Jr., 14037439  
 Pvt Rudolph Barlan, 15014718  
 Pvt Edward Dick, 13021873  
 Sergeant Willard E. Space, 6993859  
 Pvt James E. Kelly, 7025280  
 Pvt Louis E. Miske, 16013055  
 Pvt John A. Ley, 6942801  
 Pvt Robert J. Wiedmayer, 6916210  
 Pvt William F. Yahner, 19013397  
 Pvt Frank J. Nizio, 16012997  
 Pfc William H. Wilgus, 6582014  
 Pvt William H. Stauffer, 13027415  
 Pvt Homer A. Harrison, 38008582  
 Pvt Jack M. Spangler, 16012837  
 Pvt Matthew M. Cryer, 13032091  
 Pvt Hubert G. Hutton, Jr., 11024450  
 Pvt Lloyd E. Sprinkle, 16013059 (Cook)  
 Pfc Charles M. Haselden, 7005914  
 Pvt Harold T. Hensley, 7003184  
 Staff Sergeant Ross Lewis, 6433346  
 Staff Sergeant William T. Petherbridge, Jr., 6880286  
 Corporal Edward C. Annunziato, 6975520  
 Pfc Armand E. Bouchard, 6153113  
 Pfc George E. Nash, 16003396  
 Pfc Frederick P. Tawney, 16012896  
 Pvt Roger E. Margeson, 6151674  
 Pvt Peter A. Orłowski, 16003279  
 Pvt George E. Estes, 11024646  
 Staff Sergeant John E. Frentzel, 6552268  
 Sergeant Stanley J. Dudzic, 7022433



Pvt Curtis E. Snow, 6977614  
 Pvt Eugene C. Hess, 13024370  
 Pfc Roger W. Negard, 16008150  
 Pvt James Anderson, 16003521  
 Pvt Fenwick Ridgely, 20920981  
 Corporal Frank Murinka, 6879911  
 Pvt Norman R. Lewellan, 6954399  
 Pvt Stanley Lieberman, 11009113

[7] 674th ORDNANCE CO

Pfc Jack Campbell, 6993911, (Cook)

HQ & HQ SQ., 15th PURSUIT GROUP (F)

Sergeant Emerson B. LaFrance, 11007614  
 Sergeant Robert E. Million, 6654445  
 Corporal James J. McLaughlin, 7028856  
 Pfc James R. Burns, Jr., 13006867  
 Pfc Wilbur S. Carr, 16028185  
 Pfc Robert W. Carroll, 15056778  
 Pfc Arthur F. Chauvaux, 13010794  
 Pfc Bertchel R. Daniel, 16017499  
 Pfc Raymond E. Nass, 16017408  
 Pfc Albert F. Parsons, 13001307  
 Pfc Donald H. Sant Amour, 16007749  
 Pfc Leo M. Smith, 16003063  
 Pfc Paul W. Teter, 6996336  
 Pvt Claude D. Wells, 16017347  
 Pvt Burton G. Chamberlain, 11007558  
 Pvt James J. Culp, 13004078  
 Pvt Joseph W. Dickson, 13004106  
 Pvt Raymond J. Guerin, 6144611  
 Pvt John R. Fletcher, 16007642  
 Pvt Joseph M. Giroux, 16012809  
 Pvt Winston S. Jones, 7001658  
 Pvt Gordon Rutel, 16007484  
 Pvt Lester E. Scarborough, 16040843  
 Pvt Charles W. Soehnlein, 16007764  
 Pvt Ted J. Wheeler, 7001644

45TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (F)

Technical Sergeant Herbert S. Baum, 6228283  
 Sergeant Vernon W. Howe, 6667756  
 Pfc George A. Baron, 6667528  
 Pfc Donald H. Zobel, 16007628  
 Pfc James F. Lavender, 15014922  
 Pfc Anthony A. Mazen, 13001356  
 Pfc Donald C. Thomas, 16007506  
 Pfc Arthur W. Fusco, 11020317  
 Pfc John Kuzmick, 13007362  
 Pvt Robert J. Atkins, 16007865  
 Pvt Spencer L. Olsen, 16007616  
 Pvt Thomas A. Alderson, 13006769  
 Pvt. William Pietrzak, 16003570  
 Pvt Frank J. Wiese, Jr., 16013060  
 Pvt Robert M. Foster, 13017120  
 [8] Pvt. Warren R. Carlson, 16011538  
 Pvt John F. Esau, 16028002  
 Pvt Charles K. Holland, 11020313  
 Pvt David V. Price, 12018165  
 Pfc Harry J. Weatherspoon, 16012768  
 Pvt Vincent O. Watkins, 16003185  
 Pvt Roland A. Marcaurette, 11020326  
 Pvt Roger H. Cummings, 14038223  
 Pvt Burnett P. Stein, 13001349

## 46TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (F)

Sergeant Oscar J. Furuness, 6559264  
 Corporal Charles O. Rogers, 16017349  
 Corporal Charles R. Bowser, 16003445  
 Corporal Donald H. Ratkis, 16017441  
 Pfc Richard N. Starback, 16012814  
 Pfc Robert E. Ricker, 7025467  
 Pvt Elbert E. French, 16041002  
 Pvt David J. Wilson, 16007849  
 Pvt Kenneth E. Krepps, 16017518  
 Pvt Milton C. Hawkins, 16040929  
 Pvt Charles C. Reynolds, 16012661  
 Pvt John H. Perdue, 6917245  
 Pvt John Urdea, 16003134  
 Pvt Marshall R. Priemann, 16003131  
 Pvt Kenneth P. Auger, 16020824  
 Pvt John E. Vrooman, 16007880  
 Pvt Joseph T. Zych, 6669246  
 Pfc Benjamin Wouch, 6916829  
 Pfc Joseph A. Polivka, 16021349  
 Pfc Raymond S. Volk, 16007516  
 Pfc William O. Tuominen, 16000358  
 Pvt John J. Stanek, 16003510  
 Pvt Michael Patrick, 15056463  
 Pvt Ralph E. Nisbitt, 16029694  
 Pfc Robert E. Vilmann, 16007674

## 72ND PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Staff Sergeant Harold C. Hitt, 6982199  
 Staff Sergeant Cecil R. Meadows, 6660446  
 Sergeant Alfred E. Boiney, 6147440  
 Sergeant James W. Dupree, 6921368  
 Sergeant Newman E. Whitt, 6948321  
 [9] Corporal Enrique Ferro, 6975476  
 Corporal Hervey A. Pelletier, 6145819  
 Pvt Paul D. Bird, 11024648  
 Pvt Leon C. Clay, 13014165  
 Pvt Robert G. Fitz-simons, 16003456  
 Pvt Robert J. Wallenstein, 12022125  
 Pfc Frank Kuriklchyle, 6981081  
 Corporal Robert E. Sadler, 11013339  
 Technical Sergeant Raymond W. Gilbert, 6278598  
 Staff Sergeant Sahmer C. Rasmussen, 6628680  
 Staff Sergeant Vernon J. Rogers, Jr., 6385132  
 Private Harry Lonky, 6979204  
 Staff Sergeant Martin A. Iverson, 6564253  
 Staff Sergeant Charles V. Parsons, 6647222  
 Sergeant John M. Bellamy, 6993968  
 Sergeant Oscar G. Sims, 7003748  
 Private 1cl Dale W. Sartwell, 16012818  
 Private 1cl Marvin M. Sauerbroi, 16007750  
 Private 1cl Merle M. Thayer, 17001208  
 Pfc Robert T. Thiel, 16012662  
 Pvt Donald M. Arras, 16003522  
 Pvt Leon De Keyser, 16017543.  
 Pvt Merritt R. Goodman, 14037489  
 Pvt Roy A. Lyerly, 14037443  
 Pvt John H. Skoppas, 16012584  
 Pfc Raymond L. Davis, 15058902  
 Pfc Everett G. Hardy, 16003489  
 Pfc Jack O. C. Rowe, 13011257  
 Pfc Arthur E. Sparling, 6977690  
 Pvt Keith E. Cragg, 6566978  
 Pvt Michael Truty, 16028118  
 Pvt Louis J. Van Hout, 16012594

Pfc Alfred B. Casiani, 7022804  
 Staff Sergeant Walter E. Boggs, 6393985  
 Staff Sergeant Doris E. De Loach, 6926060  
 Staff Sergeant Albert Hall, 6478600  
 Staff Sergeant Egan F. Lisso, 6396047  
 Staff Sergeant Paul P. Sibley, 6784786  
 Sergeant William E. Gillotti, 6949599  
 Sergeant Vernon W. Howe, 6667756  
 Sergeant William B. Leath, 6973309  
 Sergeant John Lorelli, 6395894  
 Sergeant Harry D. Powell, 6559259  
 Sergeant Verle L. Scott, 6573942  
 Corporal James E. Driver, Jr., 6970424  
 Corporal Guy P. Fletcher, 6948526  
 Corporal Olin A. Heifner, 6283041  
 [10] Corporal Donald S. Keister, 6996658  
 Corporal Robert L. Rowe, 15010185  
 Corporal Carl W. Shrader, 11007079  
 Pfc Sewell A. Peckham, 11018729  
 Pvt Wilfred D. Burke, 16012855  
 Pvt Warren R. Carlson, 16011538  
 Pvt Mario P. Chiarolanza, 13006705  
 Pvt Donald Griggs, 15055982  
 Pvt David V. Price, 12018165  
 Staff Sergeant Wallace S. Ryals, 6394526  
 Sergeant Earl F. Bell, 6393943  
 Sergeant Aldege A. Duquette, 6145818  
 Sergeant Myron C. Murphey, 6743740  
 Corporal Lawrence N. Atherhold, 13006457  
 Corporal James J. Cavanaugh, 6288020  
 Corporal Ernest A. Johnson, 6149572  
 Corporal Horace B. Monroe, 6976580  
 Corporal Fred G. Tyrrell, 7003431  
 Pfc Carroll W. Billington, R-2397800  
 Pfc Lawrence J. Hoperoft, 6152017  
 Jfc John E. Perkins, 16012582  
 Pfc Joseph L. Walsh, 16007833  
 Pvt Thomas F. Barnes, Jr., 14032936  
 Pvt Wesley Lechert, 16003552  
 Pvt Stanley P. Sabastonski, 11013355  
 Pvt Edward Sullivan, 16007517  
 Corporal William F. Ormond, Jr., 16012657

3. The following named enlisted men, organizations as indicated, are detailed on Special Duty with the Wheeler Field Guard:

#### HQ & HQ SQ., 18TH AIR BASE GROUP (R)

Staff Sergeant Kraig L. Van Ney, 6667084  
 Corporal George Babich, 7022763  
 Corporal Wilbur J. Bagnal, 6070086  
 Sergeant Milton J. Dunn, 6913498  
 Corporal Edwin E. Nelson, 11024063  
 Corporal George J. Van Gieri, 6978932  
 Pfc Joseph Wiseman, 6667993  
 Pfc Frank J. Wasiewicz, 69880457.  
 Pfc Roy F. Houser, 7021797  
 Pvt Kenneth W. Slocum, 16012559  
 Pvt Lorimer Peterson, 16021535  
 Pvt Jac E. Steinke, 13023633.  
 Pfc Herman A. Radakovitz, 16012914  
 Pfc Raymond E. Dole, 6981941  
 [11] Pfc William L. Cabbage, 13012366  
 Pfc Harold G. Randall, 16012635  
 Pfc Clyde E. Stephens, 14036404  
 Pvt John Bagley, 19058818  
 Pvt William K. Back, 13013890  
 Pvt Kalma N. P. Bongyor, 13012436

Pvt William C. Brady, 7000747  
 Pvt Ben F. Chatham, 14043796  
 Pvt Joseph Conowall, 13027657  
 Pvt Quentin L. Conway, 13013811  
 Pvt Hughey A. Ross, 16017466  
 Pvt Harvey J. Rowland, 16012827  
 Pvt Arthur G. Sandstrom, 16021481  
 Pvt Clarence L. Smith, 14037681  
 Pvt Robert S. Smith, 16012895  
 Pvt Lawrence J. Stankiewicz, 16003544  
 Pvt Robert L. Trapp, 14041433  
 Pvt Lawrence C. Watkins, 14041445  
 Pvt Stannie L. Crain, 18062999  
 Pvt Clarence I. Cummins, 7060127  
 Pvt Thomas E. Cunniff, 7070642  
 Pvt Huston B. Davies, 15015653  
 Pvt Elmer M. Ellingson, 17011075  
 Pvt Harold L. Gerson, 15019455  
 Pvt William D. Hess, 15065215  
 Pvt Carter W. Huff, 14043805  
 Pvt Russell Kurtze, 16009529  
 Pvt Raymond L. Leach, 15064627  
 Pvt Walter R. McFarland, 11024469  
 Pvt James F. Mahr, 11030650  
 Pvt Ralph D. Martin, 14037492  
 Pfc Alexander P. Mazierz, 16012637  
 Pvt William P. Mezer, Jr., 13023791  
 Pvt Harry Mince, Jr., 16013112  
 Pvt Francis H. Mitchell, 6138036  
 Pvt Ben Myrick, Jr., 14046068  
 Pvt John P. Nemsith, 16017480  
 Pvt Lester S. Parks, 11024536  
 Pvt Francis W. Pirtle, 15061276  
 Pvt Ralph E. Pirtle, 15061265  
 Pvt James Roberson, 6263117  
 Pvt Raymond H. Rock, 16017601

[12]

## 17TH AIR BASE SQUADRON (R)

Pfc Thomas M. Davis, 11014527  
 Pvt Jerold M. Fisher, 170280438  
 Pvt William H. Follmar, 18059874  
 Pvt Douglas S. Holmquist, 16004874  
 Pvt Marion E. House, 38001266  
 Pvt Clarence Erwin, 17030910  
 Pvt George F. Keller, 18052242  
 Pvt Pierrie A. Kobylinski, 7013627  
 Pvt Stanley L. Krasciko, 11031300  
 Pvt Robert T. L. Leahey, 13013899  
 Pvt Arthur Patton, 6577035  
 Pvt Ralph C. Riddle, 6231843  
 Pvt Emmett A. Tofsley, 37018007  
 Pvt Nelson J. Touchette, 14054116  
 Pvt Lloyd A. Turner, 18048638  
 Pvt Wayne O. Boevers, 16003520

## 24TH MATÉRIEL SQUADRON (R)

Pfc Howard W. Hawkins, 6970474  
 Staff Sergeant Julius Giardina, 6719629  
 Pvt Lyle E. Hendricks, 19052143  
 Pvt Charles R. Osborne, 14040054  
 Pvt Richard A. Stock, 15019584  
 Pvt Billy A. Oldfield, 17028045  
 Pvt Dwight Morris, Jr., 12028948  
 Pvt James A. Johnson, 17030812  
 Pvt Clarence Litton, 15066813



Pvt James B. Smith, 18015611  
 Pvt Warren C. Mathiasen, 17026327  
 Pvt Joe D. Little, 18063043  
 Pvt Sherman P. Morris, 18063044  
 Pvt Edward R. Anderson, 6974825 (Prisoner)  
 Pfc Lawrence W. Lamb, 6569343  
 Pvt Herbert H. Krumnow, 18059921

## 25TH MATÉRIEL SQUADRON (R)

Pvt Elva J. Keller, 17023664  
 Pvt Daved L. Moffat, 17028041  
 Pvt Bill Richards, 18059911  
 Pvt Robert L. Sheffield, 18059912  
 Pvt Whalen C. Snyder, 13030335  
 Pvt Leo J. Stewart, 17026184  
 [13] Pvt. Roy D. Wignall, 6990491  
 Pvt. Alfred Wignall, Jr., 6990479  
 Pvt. Albert A. Lime, 6578820  
 Pvt. George A. Pulver, 15062299  
 Pvt. Edward A. Ruscavage, 12005897  
 Pvt. Joseph S. Sibille, 14054117  
 Pvt. George M. Spearman, 19011087  
 Pvt. William E. Vasofsky, 17031253  
 Pvt. Carroll G. Beauchamp, 6994087 (Prisoner)

All previous orders in conflict with the above are revoked.

4. The following named enlisted men, organizations as indicated, are, with the concurrence of the Commanding General, 14th Pur Wing, AC, detailed on Special Duty with the Provisional Ground Defense Battalion, this station:

## 73RD PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Corporal Louis N. Karacha, 6974214  
 Corporal Carl L. Stevenson, 6915064  
 Sergeant James M. Babington, 6981023  
 Sergeant Gerald L. Frye, 6913396  
 Sergeant Robert E. Hayes, 6914236

## 19TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Sergeant Albert G. Steckler, 6931378  
 Pfc. Dale W. Campbell, 6574382  
 Pfc Arnold W. Tebussek, 16017569  
 Pfc Alfred P. Turner, 11024484

## 6th PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Pvt. Thomas Carroll, 11019008  
 Corporal Lewis Hammon, Jr., 6913136

## 78TH PURSUIT SQUADRON (INT)

Technical Sergeant Coy C. Simpson, 6225091  
 Technical Sergeant William L. Dyson, R-747570

All previous orders in conflict with the above are revoked.

[14] (S. O. #25, Hq Wheeler Field, 10 December 1941, cont'd)

By order of Colonel FLOOD:

J. E. CARWILE,  
*Major, Adjutant General's Department*  
*Adjutant.*

OFFICIAL: J. E. Carwile,  
 J. E. CARWILE,

*Major, Adjutant General's Department, Adjutant.*

## EXHIBIT No. 17 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

[SECRET]

## HEADQUARTERS 18TH BOMBARDMENT WING, AIR CORPS

Office of the Commanding General,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 23 December 1941.*Subject: Arrangements and Instructions for Security.  
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, T. H.

1. In compliance with telephone conversation with G-3, Hawaiian Air Force, relative to "copies of such arrangements and new instructions or orders for security as the present responsible officer has made since the attack, both in the form of recorded ones and informal (or verbal) orders, if a record of them has been kept", the following instructions and orders are submitted:

a. Airplanes ordered dispersed and dispersion accomplished during first attack. . . . 7 December 1941. Dispersion of aircraft has been improved and continued since that date. Additional dispersion areas have been made available, by fills and by smoothing of rough areas.

b. Patrol of available B-17 airplanes loaded with 600# bombs dispersed. . . . approximately 11:00 a. m., 7 December 1941.

c. Command Post and Signal installations moved from hangar line into signal warehouse. . . . approximately 11:30 A. M., 7 December 1941. Volunteer labor utilized to dig out area underneath concrete loading platform to provide splinter-proof shelter for office personnel on duty at CP.

d. Complete blackout instructions and anti-sabotage plans, insofar as tactical facilities are concerned, put into effect. . . . 7 December 1941. Preparation made for protection of tactical squadrons in dugouts in areas generally near dispersed areas of squadron aircraft and communications set-up to squadron CPs. . . . 8 December 1941.

e. Preparation begun to prepare basement of operations building as workable rooms to be used as command post, CP and signal installation. Roof covered with sand bags, and ceilings shored for support. Construction initiated on bunkers for airplanes. Splinter-proof construction initiated adjacent to hangars, as protection against air raids. . . . 9 December 1941. Camouflaging of airplanes to blend with area in which they are dispersed begun. (Lack of proper colors available prevents getting color desired. . . . 10 December 1941.

[2] f. Issue of gas masks to all personnel completed. Evacuation plans for women and children initiated. Sirens issued for use in giving air raid alarms. Construction of additional facilities underneath barracks floor initiated, to protect men occupying barracks.

2. After the attack immediate arrangements were made for the takeoff of airplanes before dawn and after dusk. Since the attack airplanes have continued standing early morning alert and evening alert in preparation for takeoff in case of imminent air raid. Continuous daily patrols have been flown in cooperation with the navy forces, and striking force missions have been ordered out on the request of the Navy. Instructions on approach procedure, operational procedure, identification procedure and Navy liaison work have been issued, and are attached hereto.

J. H. Rudolph

J. H. RUDOLPH,

*Brigadier General, USA, Commanding.*

Incls.—  
Cys. of orders and instructions  
issued to all pilots.

## EXHIBIT No. 18 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
Office of the Air Force Commander,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 22 December 1941.

Memorandum to Roberts Commission:

1. Since my arrival I have issued orders or instructions for security and protection of the Hawaiian Air Force as follows:

- a. Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.
- b. Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.
- c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.
- d. Moved obsolete B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the airplane congestion at Hickam Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.
- e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion at Hickam Field.
- f. Directed that all planes be camouflaged. Those arriving from the mainland to be painted immediately upon arrival.
- g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.
- h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:
  - "1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset 1/3 Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.  
"All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready to take off.
  - "2. Between 0800 and one (1) hour before sunset:
    - 1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.
    - 1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.
    - "All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes on one hours notice.
  - "3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise 1/4 planes on one (1) hours notice, 3/4 on four (4) hours notice."
- i. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major commanders.
- j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the Department Commander within twenty four hours revised plans for the employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.
- k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well underway for the use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.
- l. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 B-17's available at all times.
- m. Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

C. L. Tinker,  
C. L. TINKER.

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

## EXHIBIT No. 19 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND,  
23 December 1941.

Subject: Arrangements and New Instructions or Orders for Security After Raid of 7 December 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. In accordance with verbal instructions, the following is submitted:
  - a. As soon as it was determined an enemy raid was in progress, the 500 Air Corps men who had been instructed in the duty of internal security, and armed with rifles, were posted to the positions previously assigned for Alert No. 3.
  - b. Group and Squadron Commanders were instructed to immediately pull the

good airplanes from the burning concentrations and hangars, disperse them and load them with ammunition.

c. The 44th Pursuit Squadron at Bellows Field and the 47th Pursuit Squadron at Haleiwa were notified of the raid and instructed to load and take off.

d. The Signal Officer was instructed to repair command lines to dispersed positions of the squadrons. This was accomplished with difficulty due to the fact that the stock of field wire was afire.

e. The public road through the post was closed to traffic.

f. Small arms were issued to all personnel.

g. All dependents were evacuated from the post during the evening of 7 December.

h. The Medical Officer, Captain D. D. Flickinger, took very prompt measures to care for the wounded. He was instructed to set up additional first aid stations in case of a second raid.

i. The Information Center for the Interceptor Command was put on 24-hour operation, beginning 0820.

j. A battalion of the 19th Infantry was secured to assist in guarding Wheeler Field.

k. On 8 December 1941, the following action was taken:

(1) Gas masks issued to all personnel and a check made to see that all knew how to use them.

(2) Squadrons directed to improve dispersal positions, construct dug-outs or prepare secure locations for squadron CP's and armament establishments. They were aided in this by the 804 Engineers (Avn).

l. On 9 December 1941, the following action was taken:

(1) Continuation of construction of squadron CP's and armament establishments.

m. On 10 December 1941, the following action was taken:

(1) Group and Squadron Commanders were instructed to:

(a) Operate from dispersed positions and perform first echelon maintenance on airplanes at dispersed positions.

(b) Airplanes not on alert to be kept in bunkers.

(c) Airplanes out of commission for more than one hour to be drained of gasoline.

(d) Ammunition to be kept loaded in airplanes at all times.

(e) Dispersal huts to be constructed for pilots.

(f) Construct dug-outs for Squadron CP's.

(g) Inventory airplanes and report serviceable ones, and those that could be gotten into operation by squadrons.

(h) Take armor plate from destroyed P-40's and install in P-36's.

H. C. Davidson,

H. C. DAVIDSON,

*Brigadier General, Air Corps, Commanding.*

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EXHIBIT No. 20 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

(C-1)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 20 September 1941.

Subject: Joint Army-Navy Air Force Exercise.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Following is a plan for a Joint Army-Navy Air Force Exercise. Every effort is made to promote realism and to insure a "free" maneuver. The tentative period of maneuver is 17-22 November 1941. The maneuver will start on the day approved for the beginning of this maneuver and will continue until enemy carrier-based aircraft have attacked Oahu and have theoretically destroyed the Hawaiian Air Force and Navy and Marine units present thereat. This will end the air phase of the maneuver and can be the preliminary to the Department Maneuver.

2. The purpose of this exercise is to test:

a. Cooperation of the air units of the Army and Navy as prescribed in the Joint Agreement.

b. Efficiency of the Interceptor Command.



c. Ability of heavy bombardment aircraft to perform long-range search and bombing missions.

d. Ability of carrier-based aviation to attack the defenses of Oahu.

e. Ability of aircraft carriers to evade detection by searching airplanes.

### 3. *Opposing Forces:*

#### a. *Enemy:*

All aircraft carriers with their complements of airplanes that are made available by the Navy.

#### b. *Friendly:*

(1) Patrol Wing Two.

(2) All Marine and Navy fighters available on Oahu.

[2] (3) Hawaiian Air Force.

(4) Aircraft Warning Company.

(5) Anti-aircraft units of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

(6) Anti-aircraft units of Fleet ships temporarily based in Pearl Harbor.

4. It is desired that carriers made available reach a distance of at least 1,000 miles from Oahu at the opening of the exercise. From this position they will attempt to approach Oahu undetected to launch their aircraft for an attack on the vital installations of Oahu. Because of the limited number of B-17D's available in the 18th Bombardment Wing, one carrier should operate in a known 30° sector whose vertex is Oahu. Six B-17D's will make a daily search throughout this sector until they locate and attack the carriers. Another carrier should operate in a different known sector, the size to depend upon the number of patrol planes that can be made available by Patrol Wing Two.

5. As the carriers approach close enough to Oahu for shorter range bombers to participate they will be used in the problem. In all operations carriers should tow sleds so that bombardment aircraft may deliver attacks with practice bombs when they have located carriers.

6. When the carriers have reached their aircraft release line the defense of Oahu will be directed by the Interceptor Commander using recently installed equipment and controlling operations from his control board. The 14th Pursuit Wing and available Marine and Navy fighters will attempt to intercept the enemy and attack them before they reach Oahu. Anti-aircraft units of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to be part of the defensive force and to operate at the direction of the Interceptor Commander.

7. It is strongly recommended that no effort be made to "can" or to stereotype any part of this exercise. It is urged that the carriers in approaching Oahu use all tactics of concealment and evasion that they would use in actual war conditions. Provisions of the Joint Army-Navy Agreement will be in effect throughout the exercise. The striking force to be used against the carriers will consist of every bombardment airplane and patrol plane that has the range to reach the objective.

F. L. MARTIN,

*Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

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## EXHIBIT No. 21 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(T-4)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 5 August 1941.

Subject: Attack of Navy Cruising Disposition.

To: Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. Units of the United States Fleet consisting of four (4) battleships, four (4) cruisers and accompanying destroyers and mine sweepers will be in cruising disposition Thursday 7 August. Their position as 0900 August 7 will be, battle line guide to pass through point latitude 20° 40' longitude 158° 20', course 315, speed 10. At 1000 all battle ships and cruisers will tow targets for bombing.

2. The 18th Bombardment Wing employing all bombardment airplanes in commission will attack the sleds from 1000 to 1200. Co-ordinated attacks will be made employing the B-18's in flights of three (3) and the B-17's individually.

3. The 18th Bombardment Wing will perform a similar mission for one hour on August 8 at a time to be announced later. This mission probably will be co-ordinated with units of Pat Wing 2.

4. Reports. Brief comment will be submitted on plan of attack, number of

## 2012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

planes, results of bombing and any conclusions to the best method of attack against the cruising disposition.

5. Attached hereto a systematic drawing of the fleet disposition in cruising formation.

By command of Major General MARTIN:

CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
*Lt. Col., A. G. D.,*  
*Adjutant General,*

1 Incl. Chart.

[2]

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS 18TH BOMBARDMENT WING,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 14 August 1941.*

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. The following comments are submitted as required by paragraph 4, basic communication:

*a. Plan of attack:*

(1) Operations were conducted as per Operations Orders No 21 and 22, Headquarters 18th Bombardment Wing (copies attached and marked Incl 2 and 3).

(2) Attacks on the battleships were made with B-17 type airplanes. The Provisional Squadron, 18th Bombardment Wing operated against two battleships and two flights of three B-17 airplanes operated against the other two battleships. All attacks with B-17 airplanes were made with single aircraft.

(3) Six (6) B-18 airplanes were used against each cruiser. Flights of three were used in these attacks.

(4) All attacks were made from approximately 90° to the course of the towing vessel.

*b. Number of Airplanes:*

(1) Fourteen (14) B-17 airplanes and twenty-four (24) B-18 airplanes were used on 7 August 1941.

(2) Fifteen (15) B-17 airplanes and twenty-four (24) B-18 airplanes were used on 8 August 1941.

*c. Result of Bombing:*

(1) There were insufficient cameras to record the results of all bombings. All B-18 airplanes used as lead airplanes were equipped with cameras, but four (4) B-17 airplanes were not equipped with cameras.

(2) Twenty-five percent (25%) of the patterns, released by three B-18 airplanes in formation, secured at least one hit on the target.

[3] (3) Thirty-six percent (36%) of the trains, released by individual B-17 airplanes, secured at least one hit on the target.

(4) The net results of all bombing was thirty-two percent (32%) of the sighting runs secured at least one hit on the target.

*d. Conclusions as to Best Method of Attack:*

(1) Attacks should be made from the direction of the sun.

(2) Attacks should be as nearly perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the target as possible, consistent with the requirements in (1) above. Bomb releases should be from individual airplanes staggered both in altitude and position. This minimizes the effect from anti-aircraft fire. Bombs should be released in train.

(3) Formation should remain intact until within range of anti-aircraft fire.

(4) Capital ships would be attacked first, although all capital ships and cruisers would be attacked if the size of the air force indicated a high probability of securing hits.

[S] J. H. Rudolph,  
[T] J. H. RUDOLPH,  
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commanding.*

3 Incls—

Incl 1—N/C

Incl 2—Cy 18th Bomb Wg O. O. 21

Incl 3—Cy 18th Bomb Wg O. O. 22

EXHIBIT No. 22 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, February 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

[2] 5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective.

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON,  
Secretary of War.

EXHIBIT No. 23 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 December 1941

Memorandum to: Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps.

In response to a radiogram of this Headquarters sent to all major echelons, post and district commanders, the following tabulation shows the percentage of strength present at 8 a. m., 7 December 1941:

24th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.-----	90.0%
25th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.-----	85.6
Hawaiian C. A. C.:	
Hq & Hq Btry, HCAC-----	86.0
Hq Btry & Intelligence Btry, 53d CA-----	88.0

## Hawaiian C. A. C.—Continued.

Harbor Def. of P. H. (includes the following 97th CA, Ft. Kam., T. H.)	97.0%
Harbor Defenses of Honolulu	91.0
64th C. A., Ft. Shafter, T. H.	89.5
98th C. A. (includes 97th CA, at Scho Bks)	94.0
251st C. A. (Camp Malakole)	67.0
Hawaiian Air Force, T. H.:	
Hq & Hq Squadron, HAF	100.0
19th Transport Squadron	90.0
428th Signal Maintenance Co.	96.0
Tow Target Detachment	91.0
5th Chemical Co. Service	100.0
7th AC Sq Communications (based on total strength including men on DS)	53.0
7th AC Sq Weather	90.0
407th Signal Co. Avn.	97.3
18th Bomb Wing, Hickam Field, T. H.	94.0
14th Pursuit Wing, Wheeler Field, T. H.:	
Officers	95.0
Enlisted men	84.0
Schofield Barracks, T. H. (Non-Divisional Units less reception Center)	
Trainees at Reception Center	93.49
Hickam Field, T. H.	27.0
Wheeler Field, T. H. (non-tactical units)	
Officers	97.0
Enlisted men	81.0
Fort Armstrong, T. H.	81.0
Percentage of Strength present at 8:00 a. m., 7 December 1941:	
Bellows Field, T. H.:	
Officers	51.0
Enlisted men	85.0
Kilauea Military Camp, Hilo, Hawaii:	
Permanent Det.	80.0
Visiting Det.	70.0
Hawaii Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Hilo, Hawaii	95.0
Maui Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Wailuku, Maui	59.7
Tripler Gen. Hospital, Ft. Shafter, T. H.:	
Officers	20.0
Nurses	99.0
Det. Med. Dept.	97.0
Det. QMC	100.0
DHST, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	95.0
Hawaiian Ord. Depot, Ft. Shafter, T. H.:	
Officers	42.0
Enlisted men	95.0
Kauai District, Lihue, Kauai	Not received.

Robert H. Dunlop,  
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND,  
23 December 1941.

HONORABLE OWEN J. ROBERTS,  
Associate Justice of The United States.

Chairman Investigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: AS requested by your Committee, the following figures on the strength of Wheeler Field as of Midnight 6-7 December 1941, are submitted:

Present: 228 Officers, 2,547 Enlisted Men.

Absent: 1 Officer, 406 Enlisted Men.

Of the 406 men absent:

373 were on Detached Service (Schools, etc.).

5 were sick.

21 were on furlough.



2 absent without official leave.  
 5 absent in confinement.  
 406 total.

H. C. Davidson,  
 H. C. DAVIDSON,  
*Brigadier General, Air Corps, Commanding.*

The Commission desires a table showing:

- (1) The authorized strength of the Hawaiian Department.—
- (2) Actual strength on December 7.—
- (3) Reinforcements received since December 7.—

The report to show major items of equipment, including coast artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, both guns and automatic weapons; artillery and automatic weapons in the hands of the troops in excess of that authorized by tables of organization.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 27 December 1941.*

Memorandum for Major Allen, AC:

The authorized strength and actual strength of the Hawaiian Department, as of 7 December 1941, was as follows:

	Officers	Nurses	W.O.s	Enl. Men	Total
Authorized strength as of 7 December 1941__	2,411	166	45	37,848	40,470
Actual strength as of 7 December 1941-----	2,295	153	50	40,665	43,163
Reinforcements since 7 December 1941-----	555	14	2	8,241	8,212

Report showing major items of equipment in hands of troops is attached, marked Incl. #1

Robert H. Dunlop,  
 ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
*Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General.*

1 incl.

Inclosure No. 1

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
 INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Information for Commission investigating Air Raid of Dec. 7th relative to major items of equipment in hands of troops.	
1st Ind. .... G-4 27 Dec 41	AG	1. Attached hereto are reports from DQM and DOO prepared in compliance with your request of 26 Dec 41.	BFH B. F. Hayford Lieut. Col. F. A., Asst. A. C. Of. & G-4

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
 OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 December 1941.*

Memorandum for: G-4.

Please furnish me the following information, desired by the Commission now in session investigating the air raid December 7:

Major items of motor tpn and equipment, including coast artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, both guns and automatic weapons; artillery and automatic

weapons in the hands of the troops in excess of that authorized by tables of organization.

Robert H. Dunlop,  
 ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
*Colonel, A. G. D.,*  
*Adjutant General.*

[Handwritten:] Weapons and motor tpn as shown in TBA —as of 7 Dec.

INCLOSURE No. 1

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff, including the Department C/A, the B&LDO, the Const. QM, and the Dist. Engr. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him. DOO 381.4/433

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Ord. Weapons in the hands of troops of Haw. Dept. garrison, as of 6 Dec. 1941.	
1st Ind. DOO 27 Dec. 41	G-4	1. In accordance with telephonic information requested by Maj. Hayford, the following inclosed list compiled as of 6 December 1941. 1 Incl: Chart—"Ord. Wpns. in the hands of troops of Haw. Dept. garrison, as of 6 Dec. 1941."	W. A. C.

[SECRET]

*Ordnance weapons in the hands of troops of Hawaiian Department garrison, as of 6 December 1941*

[Ordnance Office, Hawaiian Department, 27 December 1941]

Item No.	Item	In the hands of troops	Authorized by Current T/BA or T/O	Excess or shortage of weapons in hands of troops over quantity authorized by T/BA.	
				Excess	Short
<i>a. Organizational Weapons, other than aircraft machine guns</i>					
1	16" guns on barbette carriage.....	4	4	0	0
2	14" guns on disappearing carriage.....	2	2	0	0
3	12" guns on disappearing carriage.....	2	0	2	0
4	12" guns on barbette carriage.....	2	2	0	0
5	12" mortars on fixed carriage.....	20	0	20	0
6	8" guns on fixed carriage.....	2	2	0	0
7	8" guns on railway mounts.....	12	12	0	0
8	6" guns on disappearing carriage.....	4	2	2	0
9	3" seacoast guns on barbette carriage.....	4	0	4	0
10	155mm guns.....	36	24	8	0
11	240mm How.....	2	0	2	0
12	155mm How.....	32	24	8	0
13	90mm AA guns.....	0	12	0	12
14	3" AA guns (fixed).....	26	26	0	0
15	3" AA guns (mobile).....	60	60	0	0
16	75mm guns M1897A4.....	16	16	0	0

Ordnance weapons in the hands of troops of Hawaiian Department garrison, as of 6 December 1941—Continued

Item No.	Item	In the hands of troops	Authorized by Current T/BA or T/O	Excess or shortage of weapons in hands of troops over quantity authorized by T/BA.	
				Excess	Short
<i>a. Organizational Weapons, other than aircraft machine guns—Continued</i>					
17	75mm guns M1917.....	64	72	0	8
18	37 mm AA guns.....	20	74	0	54
19	37mm guns M3 (antitank).....	18	160	0	142
20	37 mm guns M1916 w/Inf. carr.....	54	0	54	0
21	81mm mortars.....	68	68	0	0
22	3' trench mortars.....	32	0	32	0
23	60mm mortars.....	150	150	0	0
24	Cal. .50 AA machine guns.....	107	166	0	59
25	Cal. .50 machine guns ground.....	12	185	0	173
26	Cal. .50 machine guns IIB flex, CV.....	0	52	0	52
27	Cal. .50 machine guns IIB fixed, CV.....	17	17	0	0
28	Cal. .45 submachine guns.....	21	524	0	503
29	Cal. .30 machine guns M1919A4 gd.....	104	103	1	0
30	Cal. .30 machine guns M1919A4 CV, flex.....	38	34	4	0
31	Cal. .30 machine guns M1917A1 ground & AA.....	1,362	238	1,124	0
32	Browning automatic rifles M1918 A2 or A1.....	698	686	12	0
33	Browning automatic rifles M1918.....	1,750	1,243	507	0

[SECRET]

Recapitulation of major items of tactical and administrative transportation in Hawaiian department revised to 7 December 1941

Type	T/BA & T/A for units in dept.	Total on hand	Number on hand 1938 or earlier	Number on hand 1939 or later	Shortage in department	Excess in department	Remarks
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Ambulance ½ T & 1½ T.....	157	120	32	88	37	-----	Excess are substitutes for ¼-ton truck.
Car, lt. sedan.....	174	134	71	63	40	-----	
Command reconn. ½-T.....	375	685	191	494	-----	310	
Weapon carrier or pick-up.....	1,162	1,090	124	966	72	-----	Includes vehicles w/FA units being used as sub. for SWB.
Truck, carry-all, ½-ton.....	94	31	5	26	63	-----	
Truck, radio, ½-ton.....	59	39	0	39	20	-----	
Truck, dump, 1½-ton.....	275	228	26	202	47	-----	
Truck, panel, delivery, 1½-T.....	11	3	0	3	8	-----	
Truck, 15' body, 1½-ton.....	24	12	0	12	12	-----	
Truck, tele. const. 1½-ton.....	0	6	1	5	-----	6	
Truck, cargo, 1½-ton.....	1,069	1,455	590	865	-----	386	
Truck, wrecker, 2½-ton.....	20	6	0	6	14	-----	
Truck, 2½-ton SWB, FA, PM.....	562	366	0	366	196	-----	
Truck, 2½-ton LWB.....	1,116	619	210	409	497	-----	
Truck, 4-ton, cargo.....	82	87	24	63	-----	5	
Truck, 4-ton Wrecker.....	28	6	3	3	22	-----	
Truck, 5-ton Dump.....	36	12	12	0	24	-----	
Truck, 6 and 7½-ton Cargo.....	83	79	27	52	4	-----	
Truck, 2½-T Dump.....	33	6	6	0	27	-----	
Truck, ½-Ton Panel Del.....	42	19	4	15	23	-----	
Truck, ¼-ton Comm. Reconn.....	1,274	9	0	9	1,265	-----	
Truck, S/L 2½-ton.....	0	42	0	42	-----	42	For additional S/L Equipment.

## EXHIBIT No. 24 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

[SECRET]

DECEMBER 25, 1941.

Major General FRANK MCCOY,

*% A. D. C. to Chairman, Military Investigating Committee,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.*

MY DEAR GENERAL MCCOY: After leaving the committee room yesterday morning and reconsidering the questions which were made to me concerning the message received immediately after Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, I remembered that I had directed that a copy of an important message received be filed in my G-2 safe.

As I stated to the committee I sent a liaison officer to the Headquarters Hawaiian Department as soon as the Alert No. 1 was announced on November 27. About an hour later he reported to me giving information substantially as I gave it to the committee. However, when I remembered that I had directed this liaison officer to make a copy of the message and file it in the safe at my headquarters for future reference, I decided to send for it and furnish this copy to you. At the time this liaison officer gave me the message he told me that he had been allowed to read the message received from the War Department but was not permitted to make a copy of it. He was instructed to read it and repeat it to me in person, and he carried out his orders to the letter. The copy of the message as filed in my safe follows:

(Quote) "Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking of relations. We will let them make the first overt act. You will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out Rainbow plan.

Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Above message is signed MARSHALL." (End quote)

I repeat that the above message was written from memory (by my liaison officer) approximately three-quarters of an hour after my liaison officer had read it at the Department Headquarters. I received it in my headquarters at Schofield Barracks. I do not recall any other conversation or message from the Department which indicated an emergency more acute than that pictured in the message quoted above.

The above may be of interest to the committee as an indication of exactly what information was given the Division Commanders after the initial Alert No. 1 was ordered.

[2] I also recalled after leaving the committee room that I was in error in stating that I had received the announcement of the Alert by telephone directly from the Department Headquarters, and that I had been in my Division Headquarters at the time the Alert was called. Upon checking this statement after my return to my headquarters yesterday I recalled I had left my headquarters temporarily, for dental treatment at the Post Hospital and while there received the telephonic message directly from my Chief of Staff. The Alert was being announced to the troops when the message reached me. I do not consider this statement as having any major bearing on the information of your committee but I do not wish to allow a misstatement of my whereabouts, even though unintentional, to be recorded.

I am sorry that I have not had the pleasure of seeing a little of you during your stay and trust that before you leave I will have the opportunity to see you again.

With kindest regards, I am  
Very truly yours,

Maxwell Murray,  
MAXWELL MURRAY,  
Major General, U. S. Army.



## EXHIBIT No. 25 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
*Hickam Field, T. H., 26 December 1941.*

MEMORANDUM TO: Roberts Commission.

In compliance with informal Memorandum, this date, the following information is submitted:

a. The Defense Plan specifying numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii was submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, but was not returned approved by the War Department. This plan requested the aircraft tabulated below:

- 182—Heavy bombers.
- 18—Dive bombers.
- 36—Torpedo bombers (long range).
- 326—Pursuits.
- 36—Observation planes.
- 13—Transports.

b. The following airplanes were on hand 7 December 1941:

- (1) B-17D's—12
- (2) B-18's—33
- (3) A-20A's—12
- (4) P-40C's—12
- (5) P-40B's—87
- (6) P-36A's—39
- (7) P-26A's—8
- (8) P-26B's—6
- (9) B-12A's—3
- (10) A-12A's—2
- (11) AT-6's—4
- (12) OA-9's—3
- (13) OA-8's—1
- (14) O-47B's—7
- (15) O-49's—2

c. Airplanes ready for immediate use:

None.

[2] d. The following airplanes were not ready for immediate use and reasons therefor:

(1) In commission but not loaded with bombs or ammunition:

- (a) B-17D's—6
- (b) B-18's—21
- (c) A-20A's—5
- (d) P-40C's—9
- (e) P-40B's—55
- (f) P-36A's—20
- (g) P-26A's—7
- (h) P-26B's—3
- (i) B-12A's—1
- (j) A-12A's—2
- (k) AT-6's—3
- (l) OA-9's—3
- (m) OA-8's—1
- (n) O-47B's—5
- (o) O-49's—2

(2) Out of commission for 1st echelon maintenance:

- (a) B-17D's—4 (1 out for engines since 11-3-41 not available at HAD)
- (b) B-18's—9 (1 out for cracked landing gear, and 1 out for elevator—  
Not in stock, 7 miscellaneous)
- (c) A-20A's—5 (2 out for parts—Not in stock)
- (d) P-40C's—2
- (e) P-40B's—22
- (f) P-36A's—19
- (g) P-26A's—1
- (h) P-26B's—3
- (i) B12A's—2
- (j) A-12A's—0

- (k) AT-6's-1
  - (l) OA-9's-0
  - (m) OA-8's-0
  - (n) O-47's-2
  - (o) O-49's-0
- (3) Out of commission for 2d echelon maintenance:
- (a) B-17D's-0
  - (b) B-18's-0
  - (c) A-20A's-0
  - (d) P-40C's-0
  - (e) P-40B's-2
  - (f) P-36A's-0
  - (g) P-26A's-0
  - (h) P-26B's-0
  - (i) B-12A's-0
  - (j) A-12A's-0
  - (k) AT-6's-0
  - (l) OA-9's-0
  - (m) OA-8's-0
  - [3] (n) O-47B's-0
  - (o) O-49's-0
- (4) Out of commission for 3d echelon maintenance:
- (a) B-17D's-2
  - (b) B-18's-3
  - (c) A-20A's-2
  - (d) P-40C's-1
  - (e) P-40B's-8
  - (f) P-36A's-0
  - (g) P-26A's-0
  - (h) P-26B's-0
  - (i) B-12A's-0
  - (j) A-12A's-0
  - (k) AT-6's-0
  - (l) OA-9's-0
  - (m) OA-8's-0
  - (n) O-47B's-0
  - (o) O-49's-0
- e. The following airplanes were on hand after the raid:
- (1) B-17D's-8
  - (2) B-18's-21
  - (3) A-20A's-10
  - (4) P-40C's-7
  - (5) P-40B's-50
  - (6) P-36A's-35
  - (7) P-26A's-3
  - (8) P-26B's-5
  - (9) B-12A's-3
  - (10) A-12A's-2
  - (11) AT-6's-3
  - (12) OA-9's-1
  - (13) OA-8's-1
  - (14) O-47B's-7
  - (15) O-49's-1
- f. The following airplanes were usable after the raid:
- (1) B-17D's-4
  - (2) B-18's-11
  - (3) A-20A's-5
  - (4) P-40C's-2
  - (5) P-40B's-25
  - (6) P-36's-16
  - (7) P-26A's-2
  - (8) P-26B's-2
  - (9) B-12A's-1
  - (10) A-12A's-1
  - (11) AT-6's-2

- (12) OA-9's-1
- (13) OA-8's-1
- (14) O-47B's-5
- (15) O-49's-1

g. The following airplanes took to the air at the times indicated:

- 0830-4 P-40's.
- 0830-2 P-36A's.
- 0855-2 P-40's.
- 0915-6 P-36A's.
- 0930-5 P-40's.
- 0930-6 P-36A's.
- 0950-1 O-47B.
- 1040-3 O-47B's.
- 1127-4 A-20A's.
- 1140-2 B-17D's.
- 1200-5 P-40's.
- 1300-3 A-20A's.
- 1330-2 B-18's.
- 1500-11 P-40's.
- 1500-3 O-47B's.
- 1520-3 B-17D's.

for A. W. MEEHAN,  
Major Air Corps,  
A. C. of S., G-3.

EXHIBIT No. 26 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] *For Roberts Commission:*

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 December 1941.

AG 600.12

Subject: Priority of Construction Projects.

To: Distribution "B" and "F less 5 and 6".

1. It is essential that the construction agencies and equipment available in this Department be concentrated on projects of high priority to avoid dissipation of these facilities.

2. The following priority of essential military construction is announced:

*First Priority*

- a. Protection for present dirax stations and operating personnel.
- b. Construction of the additional dirax stations.
- c. Construction of flying fields (runway) in following order:

- (1) Bellows.
- (2) Haleiwa.
- (3) Mokuleia.
- (4) Schofield.
- (5) Kahuku.
- (6) Kipapa.
- (7) Waialae.
- (8) Waielei Gulch.

d. Construction of protective revetments for airplanes in order of:

- (1) Hickam.
  - (2) Wheeler.
  - (3) Bellows.
- [2]
- (4) Mokuleia.
  - (5) Schofields.
  - (6) Kahuku.
  - (7) Kipapa.

(8) Waialae.

(9) Haleiwa.

(10) Wateli Gulch.

e. Protective work at vital public utilities.

f. Personnel shelter at flying fields.

g. Dispersing of air supplies and repair facilities.

h. Underground air depot.

#### *Second Priority*

a. Personnel shelters of slit trench type at critical points.

b. Completion of certain essential projects already initiated which will increase defensive strength. Each project in this category must be approved by this headquarters. Example—Water supply systems in ammunition area.

c. Completion to minimum usable requirements of those bombproofing projects approved prior to the war. These include command posts, signal installations, cold storage facilities, etc.

d. Construction of by-pass around Kam Highway bridge across Waiawa Gulch.

e. Expansion of existing hospitals, and adaptation of new ones.

f. Protective works for elements Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

#### *Third Priority*

a. Field fortifications.

b. Improvements and additions to Roads and Trails system.

c. Evacuation centers, rest camps, etc.

d. Minimum housing needs for reinforcing troops.

[3]

#### *Fourth Priority*

a. All projects not elsewhere classified.

3. a. No civilian labor or civilian-owned plant, including the equipment owned or leased by the District Engineer, Honolulu, will be assigned to a project until the needs of all projects of a higher priority have been adequately met.

b. The employment of military-owned construction equipment, other than that of the 804th Engineers, is exempted from the instructions of paragraph 3 a above.

c. Construction type equipment being used for the emergency production of food stuffs will be considered as employed on a project of second priority.

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,

*Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General.*

#### NOTES

Additional work not covered specifically in this program has been undertaken as follows:

1. Evacuation Camps. Grant of \$2,800,000 for evacuation and protective shelters made to Governor. Work is being done by District Engineer, Honolulu, and one unit completed for inspection and acceptance before initiating work on remainder.

2. Blocking of possible landing fields. Fields which could be used for landing hostile carrier planes have been or are being blocked. Existing airports are blocked with removable blocks; others are being plowed or ditched.

3. Dredging Keehi Lagoon seaplane basin has been continued because of need for dredge fill. This fill is being used to extend runways at John Rodgers Airport, which will eventually be connected by taxiways with Hickam Field to provide additional runways for Hickam.

4. Outer Islands, Hawaiian Group—Labor and materials which are short on Oahu are available in some quantity on other islands. Equipment in some cases has been brought back to Oahu. Since labor is available, work is continuing on the Maui Airport, Hilo Airport, and at Barking Sands on Kauai. Also some work on housing the additional troops coming in is under way.

5. Field Fortifications—Project for clearing fields of fire, clearing trees, and construction of obstacles along beach between Fort Weaver, Barbers Point and Kahe Point has been added to first priority. This area is one of most vital, and hardest to defend on island.

6. FERRY PROJECT. This project is not directly concerned with defense of Hawaii. The Department Commander was charged by War Department with construction of these bases, and since war was declared, the War Department has



stated that this work should be pushed as fast as possible. Construction is under District Engineer, Honolulu, who is expediting completion of minimum requirements.

EXHIBIT No. 27 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

69512

*Telephone conversation of Dec. 3, 1941, between a citizen in Honolulu (Japanese) and a military or naval officer in Tokio. Translated and available to Military until, Hawaii, Dec. 5, 1944.*

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There arn't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

[-2-]

(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in —? — of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3]

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[4]

(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

\*(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor, British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

\*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums

are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

EXHIBIT No. 28 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

General McCoy

RESTRICTED

SOP 25D

STANDING  
OPERATING  
PROCEDURE

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

TWENTY-FIFTH INTANTRY DIVISION

(SOP-25D)

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[1]

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE  
 TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION  
 (SOP-25D)

December 2, 1941.

## SECTION 1—GENERAL

1. **PURPOSE.** Standing Operating Procedure is designed to reduce the volume of orders and instructions, and to establish a common understanding of routine operations. (See paragraph 159, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations and paragraph 56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.)

2. **UNIT PROCEDURES.** Conforming to division procedure, subordinate units will develop appropriate unit standing operating procedures.

3. **DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.** *a. Forward Echelon.* (1) *Command Section.*—Commanding General, Assistant to Division Commander, Chief of Staff, AC of S, G-3, AC of S, G-2, Artillery Officer, Engineer Officer, or assistant, Chemical Officer, Signal Officer and Headquarters Commandant.

(2) *Service Section.*—Assistant G-4 and *when required* Ordnance Officer.

*b. Rear Echelon.* Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Quartermaster, Surgeon, Chaplain and members of Service Section not required with Forward Echelon.

*c. Security of Command Post.*—Headquarters Commandant is charged with local protection against hostile ground troops. He will organize, train and maintain a CP Defense Detachment for this purpose. Local security measures will be coordinated with detachments charged with the protection of installations adjacent to Division CP to obtain maximum benefit of incidental protection against hostile air and ground forces afforded by these detachments.

[2] 4. **TROOP GROUPINGS.** Organization and designation.

*a. Combat Team No. 35 (CT-35).*

35th Infantry  
 64th FA Battalion (Supporting)  
 Co. C, 65th Engineer Battalion  
 Det., 25th Medical Battalion

*b. Combat Team No. 27 (CT-27).*

27th Infantry  
 8th FA Battalion (Supporting)  
 Co. B, 65th Engineer Battalion  
 Det., 25th Medical Battalion

*c. Combat Team No. 298 (CT-298).*

298th Infantry  
 89th FA Battalion (less Dets) (Supporting)  
 Co. A, 65th Engineer Battalion  
 Det., 25th Medical Battalion

*d. DIVISION TROOPS.*

(1) *Special Units (SU).*

Fwd. Ech. Div. Hq. (less command group)  
 65th Engineer Battalion (less Dets)  
 25th Signal Company  
 25th Div. Hq. & MP Co.

(2) *Division Artillery (DA).*

Division Artillery (less Dets)

(3) *Service Troops (ST).*

Rear Echelon Division Headquarters  
 25th Medical Battalion (less Dets)  
 325th Quartermaster Battalion

5. **TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.** See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The primary tactical principles applicable to the Defense of OAHU are:

*a.* Complete organization of the ground.

*b.* Position held lightly.

*c.* Large reserves, held mobile, with sufficient motor transportation to transport them.

*d.* Prompt and energetic counter-attack.

*e.* Maximum development of mobility, fire power and communications.

[3] 6. **SECURITY.**

*a. General.* All units are responsible at all times for their own security from hostile ground and air attacks. See paragraphs 233-273, FM 100-5.



*b. Against Air Attack.*

(1) *Passive Measures.* Dispersion, concealment and camouflage.

(2) *Active Measures.*

(a) All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have all small arms and automatic weapons habitually in readiness for anti-aircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

(b) *In Bivouac or Assembly Areas.* One half of the automatic weapons will be continuously posted for AA defense and loaded with AP ammunition. (See paragraphs 103 and 208, FM 7-5).

(c) *On the March.* Two men in each troop-carrying vehicles will watch for, and warn of impending air attacks. (See also paragraph 208, FM 7-5).

All small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be interspersed throughout the column in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on hostile aircraft. (See paragraph 264, FM 100-5).

*c. Warning Signals.* Air danger.

(1) By radio.

(2) Three equally spaced blasts of whistle, vehicle horn or siren, repeated several times.

(3) Three equally spaced rifle or pistol shots or bursts.

(4) Individual giving the alarm during daylight points in the direction of the threat, at night, supplements signal by voice warning.

*d. Responsibility of Commanders.* All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation. (See paragraph 208, FM 7-5).

[4] (2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover and camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position, and by increased speed during movement.

(4) Immediate action to destroy hostile parachute and air-borne troops landing within their respective sub-sectors. (See paragraph 273, FM 100-5).

**7. MOVEMENT.**

*a. General.* (See FM 25-10).

(1) All troops will be moved by motor. Maximum space will be utilized for troops (standing if necessary).

(2) Trucks attached to units for specific mission revert to parent units when mission is accomplished.

(3) Trucks will not close up, except when directed. Halting in the open will be avoided whenever possible—maximum use will be made of any overhead cover.

(4) Vehicles in bivouac or assembly areas: Well dispersed if in open—maximum dispersion practicable if in concealed position.

(5) Person in charge of vehicle halted where passing is dangerous will provide control for passing traffic. If halt is due to individual stalled truck, warn remainder of column to continue. If column is halted, and following vehicle is obscured, have man dismount, hurry to rear warning next vehicle: if preceding vehicle is obscured at halt, send man forward to signal when march is resumed.

*b. Method of Motor Marching.*

(1) *Rates.* Maximum speed authorized by law consistent with safety, (leading vehicle 10 mph less than maximum, other vehicles not to exceed maximum).

[5] (2) *Administrative.* Distance between vehicles: Minimum safe (approximately twice speedometer reading in yards), or any greater distance which will facilitate the movement. At halt close to 5 yards, front wheels cut toward road. March unit—company or battery (25 vehicles or less).

(3) *Tactical. Daylight.* (See paragraph 1a, Annex No. 2).

*Night.* On two-way roads sufficient distance to permit unimpeded flow of traffic will be maintained. Night moves will be made under one of the following conditions as ordered:

(a) *Standard Blackout.* Blackout or blue lights with shielded tail light on all vehicles.

(b) *Dark Column.* Blackout or blue lights with shielded tail light on front and rear vehicles only—other vehicles no lights.

(c) *No lights.* No lights on any vehicles. May be used on *one-way* secondary roads, cross-country, on military reservations and on leased lands.

(4) *March Tables.* (See Annex No. 1).

#### 8. LIAISON.

*a. Officers.* The AC of S. G-2 will report to Department Headquarters with motor transportation for all operations and alerts. He will remain thereat until relieved, except when on a mission to this Headquarters.

*b. Units.* Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefore is from right to left and from front to rear. Upon receipt of SOP-25D all Infantry Regiments will locate and contact all Coast Artillery Group Stations within their respective sub-sectors and perfect plans for and maintain liaison with these groups during operations and alerts. Artillery battalions will install and maintain wire communication to nearest Coast Artillery Group for searchlight liaison.

[6] 9. ORDERS. To expedite issue and conserve time, battalion and higher unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

10. INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM. All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith. To satisfy this requirement unit commanders will provide standing guards with field telephones or make arrangements for them to use commercial telephones. All motor patrols will be provided with a field telephone and will report by telephone to appropriate headquarters at regular stops at specified cable terminal cans.

#### 11. GUIDES.

*a.* In case of relief, guides from the organization being relieved will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until released by the commander of the incoming unit.

*b.* Whenever units are ordered from one sub-sector to another, the subsector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.

#### SECTION II—ALERTS

[7] 12. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack.

#### 13. ALERT NO. 1.

*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

*b.* One staff office and one clerk will remain on duty at Division Headquarters (telephone 63) on a 24-hour basis.

*c.* All units of this Division will conduct normal training except as indicated in the succeeding paragraphs.

*d.* Each *INFANTRY REGIMENT* will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, within its assigned sub-sector.

(2) Initiate anti-sabotage patrolling without delay.

(3) Maintain one officer on duty at Regimental Headquarters on a 24-hour basis.

(4) Protect important installations on the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation as prescribed and all vital installations in its assigned sub-sector (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. (See paragraph *h* below). The following are among the important installations to be protected by the Regiments indicated.

#### *27th Infantry.*

Gasoline and oil storage SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Police District No. 1, see inclosure No. 2. (The Department Provost Marshal will assist the 28th Infantry in posting guards on vital installations).

Command and Fire Control Cable System. (See Inclosure No. 1).

Railway and Highway Bridges. (See Inclosure No. 2).

[8] WAI AU Generating Plant.

Electric Sub-station at WAIPIO and electric power lines from WAIPIO to WAHIAWA within the 27th Infantry sub-sector. (See Inclosure No. 3).

Pumping stations at MOANALUA GARDENS and KAPAHULU. (In every instance where guard at MOANALUA GARDENS is removed, G-3, Hawaiian Department will be notified in advance and the 27th Infantry guard will remain on duty until relieved by troops from Fort Shafter).

Assist the Navy in guarding Pumping Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

*35th Infantry.*

Ordnance Depot SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Telephone Exchange SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Command and Fire Control Cable System. (See Inclosure No. 1).

Railway and Highway Bridges. (See Inclosures No. 2).

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

Telephone Exchange at WAIPAHU.

EWA PLANTATION Generating Plant at (95.6-77.3).

Transformer on WAIANA E HIGHWAY at (94.65-81.2).

Electric Power Lines from WAIPIO to WAHIAWA, and from WAIPIO to FORT BARRETTE (exclusive) within the regimental sub-sector. (See Inclosure No. 3).

The 35th Infantry will maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hours notice.

*298th Infantry.*

Booster Pump near Ordnance Depot at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Command and Fire Control Cable System. (See Inclosure No. 1).

Highway Bridges. (See Inclosure No. 2).

Telephone Exchange at KANEOHE.

Electric Sub-station at KAILUA.

KOOLAU Switch Station.

Electric power lines from KOOLAU Switch Station to BELLOWS FIELD, and from KOOLAU Switch Station to MOKAPU. (See Inclosure No. 3).

[9] (5) Continue organization of the ground.

e. Infantry Regiments and Division Artillery are authorized to establish field bivouacs for units performing anti-sabotage missions where such arrangements prove more economical in personnel and transportation, and facilitate the execution of assigned tasks.

f. *Division Artillery* will place necessary guard on Panama mounts of 240mm positions.

g. The Division Provost Marshal will assist the Department Provost Marshal in the regulation of traffic on OAHU.

h. *TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD*.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard it is anticipated that this organization will relieve this Division of the responsibility for the protection of all vital installations *except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations*. (See paragraph 13d (4) above). Instructions will be issued.

[10] 14. *ALERT NO. 2.*

a. *This Alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.*

b. At Division Headquarters G-2 and G-3 Sections will function on a 24-hour basis.

c. *ALL UNITS*. Establish anti-aircraft defense, post anti-aircraft observers and air alarm guards.

d. Each *INFANTRY REGIMENT* will:

(1) Suppress civil disorders including sabotage within its assigned sub-sector as prescribed in paragraph 13d (4) above. (See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 13h above.)

(2) Initiate anti-sabotage patrolling without delay.

(3) Maintain one officer on duty at Regimental Headquarters on a 24-hour basis.

(4) Establish field bivouacs for elements performing anti-sabotage missions within their respective sub-sectors as indicated below:

*27th Infantry.*

One (1) battalion at FORT SHAFTER for anti-sabotage missions in the city of HONOLULU.

One-half of each beach battalion in its defense sub-sector.

*35th Infantry.*

One-half of two beach battalions in their respective defense sub-sector.

The 35th Infantry will maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hours notice.

*298th Infantry.*

One-half of one (1) beach battalion in its defense sub-sector.

(5) *ALL UNITS*. Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their current strength, except those required under paragraph 14d (1) (2) and (4) above.



(6) Install local communications for which responsible.

[11] (7) Complete organization of the ground including the installation of tactical and protective wire, obstacles, road and trail blocks and beach defense searchlights.

c. *DIVISION ARTILLERY* will:

(1) Place 240-mm howitzers in position in South Sector, establish necessary guards, and when directed, place ammunition at these positions.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their current strength, vehicles at gun parks.

(3) Maintain one (1) officer on duty at Division Artillery Headquarters on a 24-hour basis.

(4) Be prepared to:

(a) Emplace and man all beach guns and distribute ammunition to gun positions when authorized.

(b) Complete field works to include protective wire—beach positions first priority.

(c) Install and man searchlights—one per beach gun.

(d) Install communications and establish necessary patrols for security of these installations.

(e) Erect necessary range markers in EWA Plain and in similar areas where observation is difficult.

f. *DIVISION SIGNAL OFFICER* and *HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT* will make necessary preparations for occupation of Division Advance Command Post.

[12] 15. *ALERT NO. 3.*

a. *This Alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU.*

b. *DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.*

(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 3a) will occupy stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections in the rear echelon (see paragraph 3b) will continue their normal duties at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) Blackout instructions will be enforced.

c. Each *COMBAT TEAM*, less Engineers, will occupy initial positions and defend its sub-sector on OAHU.

d. Each *INFANTRY REGIMENT* will:

(1) Protect all vital installations as prescribed for Alerts Nos. 1 and 2 (see paragraph 13d (1) (2) and (4) above), except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations, including SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, and except those installations protected by the Territorial Home Guard. (See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 13h above).

(2) Release all Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

e. *DIVISION ARTILLERY* will:

(1) Occupy all initial defense positions with all artillery weapons and searchlights.

(2) Deliver initial issue of ammunition at all positions.

(3) Establish communications.

(4) Complete organization of the ground.

(5) Establish and maintain contact with Infantry beach groups.

(6) Complete the erection of range markers in EWA Plain and similar areas where observation is difficult.

f. The *65TH ENGINEER BATTALION* will:

(1) Assist in the organization of the ground.

[13] (2) Retain all personnel not employed on organization of the ground in status of mobile readiness at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) Maintain a liaison officer, or agent, with Division Forward Echelon and with each Combat Team.

g. The *DIVISION SIGNAL OFFICER* will install and maintain communications.

h. *HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT* will establish Advance Command Post. (See also paragraph 3c above).

i. The *DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL* will assist the Department Provost Marshal in the regulation of traffic on OAHU and in the duties listed in paragraph 16i, "SOP-HD".

j. *SERVICE TROOPS* (less detachments) will remain in state of mobile readiness at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS pending instructions from this HEADQUARTERS.



## SECTION III—INTELLIGENCE

The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

16. *ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.*

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEHOE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accomplished by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEHOE BAY and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal Islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

[14] d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers.

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist land operations, or other acts of assistance?

17. *MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.*a. *Each Infantry Regiment and Divisional Artillery:*

(1) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed, thereafter hourly on the half hour.

(2) Report enemy front lines and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the odd hour.

(3) Report location of *own front lines* every two hours, on the odd hour.

(4) Report at once all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(5) Report immediately indications of landing of artillery and tanks, including caliber of artillery.

(6) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Report important damage immediately; other damage at 1730.

(7) Report IMMEDIATELY time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(8) *Infantry Regiments only* report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0245, 0645, 1145, 1645 and 2145.

b. *All elements of 25th Infantry Division:*

(1) Report immediately the presence of parachute troops, air-borne infantry, assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(2) Report immediately location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruction should be taken.

[15] c. *Transmission of G-2 Information.*—In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. If wire and radio signal communications are not functioning, important intelligence information will be reported by any means at hand. Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicles, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information will be utilized.

d. Infantry Regiments will be prepared to furnish one or more qualified enlisted men to Department on call to assist the Provost Marshall in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in the South Sector.

18. *FORMS FOR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.* (See Inclosures Nos. 4 and 5).

## SECTION IV—ADMINISTRATION

19. *SUPPLY.* (See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).

a. *SUPPLY AREAS.*

(1) *Schofield Area.*—All of OAHU north and west of the line LAE O KA OIO-PUU KAAUMAKUA-KIPAPA-KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9-91.0)-

## KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY-PEARL CITY-JUNCTION-PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) *Honolulu Area*.—The remainder of OAHU and all outlying islands.

(3) *Detached Units*.—Supplies (all classes), for a small unit of a command, when moved into a different supply area, from the parent organization, may be continued through the parent organization or the nearest DP.

b. *CLASS I* (rations) and QMC Class II and IV.

[16] (1) *ALERTS NOS. 1 and 2*. Present method of distribution will continue.

(2) *ALERT NO. 3*. A standard menu ration will be prescribed and issued to all units by Post Quartermasters when Alert is announced. Ration cycle will begin with supper. Initially all units will take into the field from their own stores, the unconsumed portion of the garrison ration and the equivalent of one field ration.

(3) *Distributing Points*. SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and FORT ARMSTRONG. Alternate DPs may be announced later.

(4) *Distribution*. Will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to DIVISION HEADQUARTERS by 0700 daily.

(5) *Schedule of Issues*. (See Inclosure No. 6.)

c. *CLASS III*—(Gasoline and Lubricants).

(1) *ALERTS NOS. 1, 2 and 3*. Distribution from the nearest Army Post, exclusive of MALAKOLE, FORT BARRETTE, FORT WEAVER, BELLOWS FIELD, KANEOHE and MOKAPU POINT. Additional DPs as announced.

(2) All motor vehicles except passenger cars, motorcycles and ammunition trucks will leave the post on any alert with full gasoline tanks and carry ten (10) gallons in containers.

d. *CLASS II and IV*. (Except Quartermaster Corps).

(1) *Medical Supply*.

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(2) *Signal Supply*.

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(3) *Chemical Supplies*. All supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) *Engineer Supplies*. All supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Distributing points for Class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9- [17] 04.2). Credits at DPs to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.

(5) *Water Supply*. (See letter, HSB, file 671, dated October 20, 1941). Locally after inspection and approval by unit surgeon, or from any part of CITY OF HONOLULU water systems.

(6) *Ordnance Supply*. (Other than ammunition Class V).

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—(General Storage and Shop). Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

e. *CLASS V SUPPLIES*. (Ammunition). (See Memorandum "Supply of Ordnance Ammunition," HSB, November 17, 1941).

(1) DP for all units initially—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, (except 240 mm howitzer).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—ammunition storage area—Hawaiian Ordnance Depot for all units in that area.

(3) Additional DPs as announced.

(4) Credits of an "Initial Issue". (See Inclosure No. 7) and of one "Unit of Fire". (See Inclosure No. 8) are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of unit commanders whenever an alert is ordered.

(5) The "Initial Issue" of small arms ammunition (less small quantities expended during current training) will be kept in storerooms at all times, (except 27th Infantry which will keep in unit storerooms  $\frac{1}{3}$  or the "Initial Issue").

(6) *ALERT NO. 1*. Infantry units will draw  $\frac{1}{2}$  of their "Initial Issue" of grenades.

(7) *ALERT NO. 2*. Infantry units will draw all of the "Initial Issue" of Special Infantry ammunition (37 mm, 60mm, 81 mm, grenades and pyrotechnics).

The Division Artillery will draw only  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the "Initial Issue" of Field Artillery ammunition until after occupation of positions by organic and sector weapons.

(8) **ALERT NO. 3.** All "Initial Issues" will be drawn.

[18] (9) *Ammunition Issue Schedule.* (See Inclosure No. 9).

(10) *Ammunition Reports.* OFM Form 303 (see Inclosure No. 10) will be submitted by unit munition officers to the Division Ammunition Office (DAO) located initially in Building 2131, (Tel. 296) Ordnance Area, Schofield Barracks daily by 1900 for the period ending at 1800. If desired these reports may be telephoned and confirmed in writing within three (3) hours.

20. **EVACUATION.**

a. **PERSONNEL.**

By 25th Medical Battalion on call from battalion aid stations through collecting stations at:

(1) CP 298th Infantry.

(2) CP 27th Infantry.

(3) Vicinity of EWA-KUNIA ROAD JUNCTION at (96.75-82.13).

b. By 25th Medical Battalion to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area north and west of the line LAE O KA OIO-EWA JUNCTION-PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

c. The 25th Medical Battalion will be prepared on call to evacuate personnel from nondivisional units operating in the South Sector.

d. **SALVAGE.** To supply points designated in paragraph 19d above for services indicated.

21. **TRAFFIC.** Regulated on OAHU by Department Provost Marshal assisted by Division Provost Marshal.

22. **MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.**

a. The organic transportation of each Infantry Regiment will be used for the movement of beach battalions to assigned tactical localities and the subsequent movement of other elements by shuttling when necessary.

b. The 325th Quartermaster Battalion will furnish six (6)  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton cargo trucks with drivers to 298th Infantry for transportation of ammunition under Alert No. 3.

[19] c. By H 12 hours unit pools of motor vehicles will be established by Infantry Regiments, Artillery, Engineer and Quartermaster Battalions. These pools will consist of available tactical and administrative vehicles of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ton and larger capacity with a proportionate number of smaller vehicles for convoy control purposes. Following trucks may be excepted from the pool:

All prime movers

Motor maintenance trucks

Wire trucks

1 truck per mess

d. At H 12 hours and by 0700 daily thereafter a written report will be made to the Division Transportation Officer indicating the number and type of vehicles in each unit pool subject to Division or higher echelon dispatch. Such reports may be required at more frequent intervals by telephone.

e. See **ANNEX NO. 1.**

By command of Major General **MURRAY:**

Thos. B. Burgess,

Thos. B. BURGESS,

Lt. Col., G. S. C.,

Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Donald J. Myers.

D. J. MYERS,

Lt. Col., G. S. C.,

AC of S, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: A, B & E (less The Adjutant General).

[20]

**INCLOSURES**

Incl.

Subject

1 Map-Communications Installations.

2 Map-Important Installations.

3 Map-Electric Power Installations.

4 Form for Intelligence Reports.

5 Form for Intelligence Reports.



- 6 Ration Distribution List.
- 7 Initial Issue—Ammunition.
- 8 Unit of Fire.
- 9 Ammunition Issue Schedule.
- 10 Form for Ammunititon Report.

## ANNEXES

- 1 Organization for Motor Movements.
- 2 Administrative Installations.

(Inclosures Nos. 1 and 2 mentioned *supra*, being an outline map of Oahu showing communications installations and a map of Oahu reflecting important installations, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 108 and 109, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[1] *Annex to Incl. No. 2, SOP—25D*

## Railroad Bridges

No.	Location	Type	Height	Span
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-T	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-C	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-T	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-T	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-T	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	CP-T	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	CP-T	4.3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	CP-T	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	CP-T	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	CP-T	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	CP-T	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	TP-T	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	CP-T	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	CP-T	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	CP-T	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	CP-T	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	CP-T	3.0'	16'
20	Waipahu	TT-T	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	TT-T	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	TT-T	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	TT-T	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli	TT-T	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	TT-T	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	TT-T	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	TP-T	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	TP-T	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	TT-T	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	TT-T	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	TT-T	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	CP-T	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	CP-T	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	CP-T	7.0'	448'
78	Haleiwa	TT-T	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	TT-T	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	CP-T	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	TT-T	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	TT-T	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	TT-T	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	TT-T	14.0'	75'
91	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	TT-T	10.5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	CA-T	23.5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	WT-T	22.0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	WT-T	11.0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	WT-T	22.0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	WT-T	20.0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	WT-T	30.0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	WT-T	75.0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	WT-T	115.0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	WT-T	107.0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	WT-T	55.0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Jet	WT-T	13.0'	112'



LEGEND

Two-letter combinations under TYPE indicate "Bents" as follows:  
 CP—Concrete Pile  
 TP—Timber Pile  
 TT—Timber Trestle  
 CA—Concrete Arch

WT—Wood Trestle  
 Third letter under TYPE indicates "Girders" as follows:  
 T—Timber  
 C—Concrete

Highway Bridges

PRIORITY I

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream	01. 95-84. 12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98. 25-82. 99
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 46-95. 68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 37-96. 75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa	87. 98-07. 98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea	92. 82-13. 52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95. 27-98. 92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93. 72-96. 96

PRIORITY II

13	Kam Highway over at Waialua	87. 78-06. 33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32. 45-70. 22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 06-04. 57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 12-05. 76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 52-06. 20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keahi Lagoon	11. 76-76. 55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay	14. 34-03. 25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97. 79-95. 34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. Railroad at Waipahu	98. 56-82. 46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06. 82-80. 30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia Fish Pond	21. 04-89. 11

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of Oahu showing electric power installations and will be found reproduced as Item No. 110, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[1]

From: (Date and hour).

To: (Date and hour).

PERIODIC REPORTS

Issuing unit.  
 Place.  
 Date and hour of issue.

No. 2.

Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report).

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements). Location and nature.
- b. Defensive organization. Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
- c. Units in contact. Composition of units, with identification if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
- d. Artillery. Location and calibers.
- e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. General summary. Action of forces as a whole.
- b. Operations of component elements.
  - (1) Enemy Naval Operations. Movements (by fleet or groups).
  - (2) Enemy Land Operations.
- (a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications.)

(b) Operations of Land Components.

1. Anti-aircraft artillery.
2. Anti-tank forces.
3. Armored forces.
4. Artillery.

[2]

5. Aviation, combat.
6. Aviation, observation.
7. Parachute troops.
8. Cavalry.
9. Chemical Warfare.
10. Engineers.
11. Infantry.
12. Tanks.
13. Administrative elements.

c. Sabotage.

d. Miscellaneous. Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
- b. Morale.
- c. Supply and equipment.
- d. Terrain not under our control.
- e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
- f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
- g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

S-2

[3] ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

Title  
Place  
Date and hour

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Naval Operations (by fleet or groups).
- b. Enemy Land Operations.
  - (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
  - (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
  - (3) Sabotage.
  - (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy capabilities. An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.

b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.

(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

\_\_\_\_\_, Chief of Section.

Incl No. 5.

[4] Ration distribution list for Alert No. 3, using a standard menu

From: SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Unit	Night	Day
35th Infantry .....	1900	0800
64th Field Artillery Battalion .....	1945	0845
90th Field Artillery Battalion .....	1955	0855
65th Engineer Battalion .....	2250	1150
(Attached) Hqs & MP Co, 25th Inf Div 25th Medical Battalion 325th Quartermaster Battalion Hawaiian Pack Train (from 65th Engineer Ration DP)		

From: FORT ARMSTRONG

Unit	Night	Day
298th Infantry.....	2000	0700
89th Field Artillery Battalion.....	2105	0715
27th Infantry.....	2030	0730
5th Field Artillery Battalion.....	2045	0745
Hq & Hq Btry, 25th Div Arty.....	2100	0800

Incl No. 6.

[5] Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds per weapon				
		AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal 30, M1903.....	Engr.....		40			40
	FA.....		32	8		40
	Inf (Rifle Plat).....	16	112	32		160
	Inf (except Rifle platoon).....	4	28	8		40
	QM.....		49			49
	Signal.....		25			25
Rifle, US, cal 30 M1.....	Others.....	30	105	15		150
	Engr.....	48	80	24		152
	Inf (Rifle Plat).....	24	162	46		232
	Inf (except Rifle platoon).....	4	28	8		40
	Ordnance.....		64	16		80
	Signal.....		40			40
	MP.....		48			48
	Others.....	30	105	15		150
Rifle, Automatic, cal 30.....	FA.....	960		240		1200
	Inf.....	60	992	120		1172
	Ordnance.....		240	60		300
	QM.....	30	30	20		80
	Others.....	150	525	75		750
	Engr.....	250	1500	250		2000
Mach Gun, cal 30, HB (M1919A4).....	Inf.....	500	3500	1000		5000
	Engr.....	250	1500	250		2000
Mach Gun, cal 30 WC (M1917A1).....	Inf.....	675	4725	1350		6750
	Others.....	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal 45.....	Engr-Inf-FA.....		28			28
	Others.....		21			21
Mach Gun, cal 50, HB.....	FA.....	600		150		750
	Inf.....	960		240		1200
Shotgun.....	All.....					25
Gren, hand, frag (per Rifle Co.).....	Inf.....					150
[2] Signals, ground (assorted).....	Inf.....					25
Lights, Very Signal (assorted).....	Sig (Tri. Div. Co.).....					30
37mm gun (M1916).....	All.....				240	24
37mm gun, antitank (M3).....	FA.....	200				200
	Inf.....	180			20	200
60mm Mortar.....	Inf.....				120	120
81mm or 3" Tr. Mortar.....	Inf.....		(light) (heavy)		132	150
75mm gun, Truck-D.....	All.....					459#
75mm gun AT.....	FA.....					144#
105mm How.....	FA.....					205
155mm How.....	FA.....					117#
240mm How M1918.....	FA.....				60	60

Incl No. 7

NOTES: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

#Proportions of type (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

## [16] Unit of fire (other than aircraft)—Hawaiian Department

Weapon	No. rounds for 1 unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rif, cal 30 M1 or M1905	30	105	15		150
Rif, automatic, cal 30	150	525	75		750
Mach Gun, cal 30, HB (M1919A4) (other than comb vehicle)	150	525	75		750
Mach Gun, cal 30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle)	600		150		750
Mach Gun, cal 30 (M1917-17A1)	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal 45		20			20
Submachine gun, cal 45		160	40		200
Mach Gun, cal 50, HB	720		180		900
Mach Gun, cal 50, AA, WC, (except gun batteries)	1920		480		2400
Mach Gun, cal 50, AA, WC, (in gun batteries)	690		240		1200
Grenades, hand, frag., (per Rifle Co.)					150
Projector, signal, ground (assorted)					25
Pistol, Very, Mk III					24
37mm Gun, M1916				120	120
37mm Gun, anti-tank M3	84			36	120
37mm Gun, anti-aircraft	60			540	600
60mm Mortar				400	400
81mm Mortar			{ Light	234	
			{ Heavy	66	300
				300	300
3" Trench Mortar 75mm Field Gun			{ Super	36	
			{ Normal	150	
			{ Reduced	114	300
75mm Gun, anti-tank	111			39	150
105mm Howitzer				225	225
155mm Howitzer, M1918				150	150
3" AA Gun, mobile	15			285	300
90mm AA Gun, mobile	12			258	250
3" AA Gun, fixed				300	300
[2] 155mm Gun, M1918, M1	112			38	150
240mm Howitzer, M1918				60	60
8" Railway Gun	85				85
4" Chemical Mortar					200
4.2" Chemical Mortar					230

NOTES: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.



Inclosure No. 8

AMMUNITION ISSUE SCHEDULE

Ser	Arrive at Control Post	Unit	75 mm			155 mm				Fuzes	
			Shrap	RC	NC	Shrap	HE	Chg	Prim	46	47
25-A	H+1:20	64th	408	996	996				2000	300	1-1½ ton (Fuzes), 10-2½ ton.
25-B	H+1:20	90th				100	400	900	1000	150	1-WC Fuzes & prim. (100 comb) 12-2½ ton.
25-C	H+2:00	89th	408	996	996				2500	500	1-1½ ton (Fuzes), 10-2½ ton.
25-D	H+2:00	8th					100	468	500	50	3-2½ ton (1 chg & 2 Prof), 1-WC (Fuzes & Primers).
25-E	H+2:20	8th	408	996	996				2500	500	1-1½ ton (Fuzes), 10-2½ ton.
25-F	H+2:20	90th					400				8-2½ ton.
25-G	H+3:00	64th	612		1494				1500	200	1-1½ ton (Fuzes), 9-2½ ton.
25-H	H+3:40	64th	612	63	1245				1300	150	1-1½ ton (Fuzes), 9-2½ ton.
25-I	H+4:00	90th	156		996				1000	150	1-WC (Fuzes), 5-2½ ton.





f. Combat team commanders will establish officer control points for troop movement under Alert No. 3 as follows:

- CT-27 (a) Intersection of Foote and Kōle Kōle Avenue  
(b) Wright gate

[2]

- CT-35 (c) Intersection of Dirt Road and Kunia Highway .8 mile south of Kunia Gate

SECTION II—ALERT NO. 1

2. Movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative. Elements of each Infantry Regiment will move when directed by their respective regimental commanders except when special circumstances require Division Control. The battalion of the 27th Infantry designated for anti-sabotage missions in Honolulu and vicinity will have priority on the road Foote Avenue—Kōle Kōle Avenue—Waianae Avenue—Kam Highway.

SECTION III—ALERT NO. 2

3. a. One half of all beach battalions will move to their respective defense sectors. For routes see attached March Tables and Sketch. Daylight movements to position will be either administrative, or open column with distance between vehicles 100 yards, or 300 yards, as announced by this Headquarters.

b. The battalion of the 27th Infantry designated for anti-sabotage guard in Honolulu and vicinity will precede elements of the beach battalions.

c. 240mm howitzers will follow elements of beach battalions.

[3] d. Units will be prepared to disperse vehicles remaining at Schofield Barracks in the areas indicated below when directed by this Headquarters.

(1) 27th Infantry: Kōle Kōle Avenue (exclusive)—Cadet Sheridan Road—Menohar Road—Carpenter Street.

(2) 35th Infantry: Kōle Kōle Avenue (inclusive)—Carpenter Street—South Reservation Boundary—Wright Ave.—Foote Avenue.

(3) 298th Infantry: Areas south of Trimble Road and west of Maili Street.

(4) Division Artillery: Division Review Field and Central Range.

(5) 65th Engineer Battalion and 325th Quartermaster Battalion: Wilikina Avenue—Macomb Road—Waianae Avenue—Carter Road.

SECTION IV—ALERT NO. 3

4. a. All organizations move to defense positions. Daylight movement will be either administrative, open column with 100 yards between vehicles, or open column with 300 yards between vehicles. Type of formation will be announced by this Headquarters.



b. Beach companies and artillery will move direct to their respective sub-sectors; other elements will load cargo vehicles and be prepared to disperse in the areas indicated in paragraph 3*d* above and await the hour of departure designated in attached March Tables. If dispersion is required announcement will be made by this Headquarters.

[4] 5. All times are H+, i. e., 1:34 indicates arrival or clearance by a particular column at indicated point one hour and thirty-four minutes after H-hour.

6. *Routes*: Reference Road Map, Schofield Barracks. The following are the routes listed in "Route" column of March Tables:

A—27th Infantry Quadrangle—Foote—Kole Kole—Waianae—Wright—Wright Gate.

B—McMahon—Beaver—Trimble—Hauula—Hasebe Gate—Dirt Road.

C—Flagler—Ludington—Kunia Gate.

D—298th Infantry area—Trimble—Carpenter—Kole Kole—Waianae—Wright—Wright Gate.

E—Menohr—Carpenter—Kole Kole—Waianae—Wright—Wright Gate.

F—298th Infantry area—Trimble—Heard—Waianae—Funston—Funston Gate.

By command of Major General MURRAY:

Thos. B. Burgess,  
THOS. B. BURGESS,  
*Lt. Col., G. S. C.,*  
*Chief of Staff.*

OFFICIAL:

Donald J. Meyers,

D. J. MYERS,

*Lt. Col., G. S. C.,*

*AC of S, G-3.*

8 Incls.

#1—March Table, Alert No. 2, Day Move.

#2—March Table, Alert No. 2, Night Move.

#3—March Table, Alert No. 2, Blackout Move.

#4—March Table, Alert No. 2, Air Attack Imminent (300 yards).

#5—March Table, Alert No. 3, Day Move.

#6—March Table, Alert No. 3, Night Move.

#7—March Table, Alert No. 3, Blackout Move.

#8—March Table, Alert No. 3, Air Attack Imminent (300 yards).

#9—Partial Road Map, Schofield Barracks

## Inclosure No. 1

MAP: Oahu  
Schofield & Wahiawa Sheets

March table  
Alert No. 2  
Day move

HEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

Ser. No.	Organization	Present location and at H-hour	Route	March		Control of movement			
				Rate (in. p. h.)	Type	Time length (min.)	Location	(Head) time of departure (H+)	(Tail) time of clear (H+)
1	1st Bn, 27th Inf. (60 vehicles—500 men).	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Open column (100 yd.).	14	Barracks Wright Gate..	1:30	1:52
2	½ of 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles).	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Open column (100 yd.).	7	Barracks Wright Gate..	1:45	2:00
3	½ of 3rd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles)	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Open column (100 yd.).	7	Barracks Wright Gate..	1:55	2:10
4	½ of 2nd Bn, 298th Inf (less Co. E) (20 vehicles).	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	15	Open column (100 yd.).	5	Barracks Wright Gate..	1:55	2:18
5	89th F.A. Bn (240mm Howitzers)...	89th F.A. Bn Barracks.	E	5	Open column (100 yd.).	20	Barracks Wright Gate..	May follow any time after H+ 2:15.	
6	90th F.A. Bn (240mm Howitzers)...	90th F.A. Bn Barracks.	B	5	Open column (100 yd.).	20	Barracks Hasebe Gate..	May follow any time after H+ 2:15.	
7	½ of 1st Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles).	Flagler Rd.....	C	15	Open column (100 yd.).	7	Barracks Kumia Gate..	1:30	1:41
8	½ of 2nd Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles).	Flagler Rd.....	C	15	Open column (100 yd.).	7	Barracks Kumia Gate..	1:40	1:51
9	3rd Bn, 35th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	35th Inf Barracks.....	As ordered	15	Open column (100 yd.).	14	Call CO, Hq & MP Co, direct for necessary escort.		

MAP: Oahn  
Schofield & Wahlawna Sheets

Inlosure No. 2

HEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

*March table, alert No. 2, night move*

Ser. No.	Organization	Present location and at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (m. p. H.)	Type	Time length (min.)	Location	(Head) time of departure (H+)	(Tail) time of clear (H+)
1	1st Bn, 27th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	27th Inf Barracks	A	15	Close column	10	Barracks Wright Gate	2:00	2:18
2	½ of 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles).	27th Inf Barracks	A	15	Close column	5	Barracks Wright Gate	2:10	2:23
3	½ of 3rd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles).	27th Inf Barracks	A	15	Close column	5	Barracks Wright Gate	2:15	2:28
4	½ of 2nd Bn, 298th Inf (less Co. E) (20 vehicles).	298th Inf Barracks	D	15	Close column	5	Barracks	2:15	2:35
5	89th FA Bn (240mm Howitzers)	89th FA Bn Barracks	E	5	Close column	15	Barracks Wright Gate	May follow any time after H+2:15.	
6	90th FA Bn (240mm Howitzers)	90th FA Bn Barracks	B	5	Close column	15	Barracks Hasebo Gate	May follow any time after H+2:15.	
7	½ of 1st Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles).	Flagler Rd	C	15	Close column	5	Barracks Kunia Gate	2:00	2:04
8	½ of 2nd Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles).	Flagler Rd	C	15	Close column	5	Barracks Kunia Gate	2:05	2:09
9	3rd Bn, 35th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	Flagler Rd	As ordered	15	Close column	10	Call CO, Hq & MP Co direct for necessary escort.		

(Enclosure No. 3)  
*March table, Alert No. 2, blackout*

HEADQUARTERS,  
 25th Infantry Division,  
 Schofield Barracks, T. H.

MAP: Oahu  
 Schofield & Wahiawa sheets

Ser. No.	Organization	Present location and at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (m. p. h.)	Type	Time length (min.)	Location	(Head) time of departure (H+)	(Tail) time of clear (H+)
1	1st Bn, 27th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:30	2:52
2	½ of 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles)...	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:40	2:57
3	½ of 3rd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles)...	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:45	3:02
4	½ of 2nd Bn, 298th Inf (less Co. E) (20 vehicles).	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:40	3:10
5	89th F. A. Bn (240mm Howitzers)...	89th F. A. Bn Barracks..	E	5	Close column.....	15	Barracks Wright Gate.....	May follow any time after H+2:15	
6	90th F. A. Bn (240mm Howitzers)...	90th F. A. Bn Barracks..	B	5	Close column.....	15	Barracks Hasebe Gate.....	May follow any time after H+2:15	
7	½ of 1st Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles)...	Flagler Rd.....	C	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Kumia Gate.....	2:30	2:41
8	½ of 2nd Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles)...	Flagler Rd.....	C	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Kumia Gate.....	2:35	2:46
9	3rd Bn, 35th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	35th Inf Barracks.....	As ordered	10	Close column.....	10	Call CO, Hq & MP Co direct for necessary escort.		



Enclosure No. 4

HEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Sehnsfeld Barracks, T. II;

MAP:  
Oahu  
Sehnsfeld & Wahiawa Sheets

March table alert No. 2 air attack imminent (300 yds)

Ser. No.	Organization	Present location and at H-hour	Route	March		Control of movement			
				Rate (m. p. h.)	Type	Time length (min.)	Location	(Head) time of departure (H+)	(Tail) time of clear (H+)
1	1st Bn, 27th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	27th Inf Barracks . . . . .	A	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	45	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	1:30	2:23
2	½ of 2nd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles) . . . . .	27th Inf Barracks . . . . .	A	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	2:15	2:43
3	½ of 3rd Bn, 27th Inf (30 vehicles) . . . . .	27th Inf Barracks . . . . .	A	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	2:35	3:00
4	½ of 2nd Bn, 288th Inf (1uss Co. E) (20 vehicles) . . . . .	288th Inf Barracks . . . . .	D	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	15	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	3:00	3:30
5	80th FA Bn (240mm Howitzers) . . . . .	80th FA Bn Barracks . . . . .	E	5	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	May follow any time after H+2:15	
6	90th FA Bn (240mm Howitzers) . . . . .	90th FA Bn Barracks . . . . .	B	5	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Wright Gate . . . . .	May follow any time after H+2:15	
7	½ of 1st Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles) . . . . .	Flagler Rd . . . . .	C	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Kunia Gate . . . . .	1:30	1:54
8	½ of 2nd Bn, 35th Inf (30 vehicles) . . . . .	Flagler Rd . . . . .	C	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	20	Barracks Kurin Gate . . . . .	1:15	2:14
9	3rd Bn, 35th Inf (60 vehicles—500 men).	35th Inf Barracks . . . . .	As ordered	15	Infl. (300 yd) . . . . .	45	Call CO, Hq & MP Co direct for necessary escort.		

Inclosure No. 5  
March table alert No. 3 day move

MAP:  
Oahu  
Schiefel & Wahiana Sheets

HEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schiefel Barracks, T. H.

Ser. No.	Organization	Location at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (mph)	Type	Time length (min)	Location	Arrive H+	Clear H+
1	27th Inf Beach Cos.	27th Inf Barracks.	A	15	Open column (100 yd).	10	Barracks. Wright Gate.	1:30	1:48
2	298th Inf (less Co. E) Beach Cos.	298th Inf Barracks.	A	15	Open column (100 yd).	5	Barracks. Wright Gate.	1:44	2:05
3	8th FA Bn.	8th FA Bn Barracks.	E	15	Open column (100 yd).	25	Barracks. Wright Gate.	2:20	2:57
4	89th FA Bn.	89th FA Bn Barracks.	E	15	Open column (100 yd).	25	Barracks. Wright Gate.	2:45	3:27
5	27th Inf (less Beach Cos.)	27th Inf Barracks.	A	15	Open column (100 yd).	20	Barracks. Wright Gate.	3:22	3:50
6	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn)	298th Inf Barracks.	D	15	Open column (100 yd).	10	Barracks. Wright Gate.	3:32	4:02
7	35th Inf Beach Cos.	Flagler Rd.	C	15	Open column (100 yd).	10	Flagler Rd. Kuna Gate.	1:30	1:44
8	64th FA Bn.	64th FA Bn Barracks.	B	15	Open column (100 yd).	25	Barracks. D R K u n i a Highway.	1:35	2:15
9	90th FA Bn.	90th FA Bn Barracks.	B	15	Open column (100 yd).	30	Barracks. D R K u n i a Highway.	2:00	2:45
10	35th Inf (less Beach Cos. and 3rd Bn).	35th Inf Barracks.	C	15	Open column (100 yd).	20	Flagler Rd. Kuna Gate.	4:00	4:28
11	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn)	298th Inf Barracks.	D	15	Open column (100 yd).	5	Barracks. Funston Gate.	1:30	1:45

Co. E to clear ahead of 24th Div. 1st Bn follow 24th Div.

HEADQUARTERS  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

Inclosure No. 6

March table Alert No. 3 night move

Map:  
Oahu  
Schofield & Wahiawa Sheets

Ser. No.	Organization	Location at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (mph)	Type	Time length (min)	Location	Arrive H+	Clear H+
1	27th Inf Beach Cos.....	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Close Column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:00	2:18
2	298th Inf (less Co. E) Beach Cos.....	298th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:02	2:23
3	8th FA Bn.....	8th FA Bn Barracks.....	E	15	Close column.....	25	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:20	3:02
4	89th FA Bn.....	89th FA Bn Barracks.....	E	15	Close column.....	25	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:45	3:27
5	27th Inf (less Beach Cos.).....	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	15	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	3:22	3:40
6	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn).....	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	15	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	3:24	3:50
7	35th Inf Beach Cos.....	Flagler Rd.....	C	15	Close column.....	10	Flagler Rd. Kunia Gate.....	2:00	2:14
8	64th FA Bn.....	64th FA Bn Barracks.....	B	15	Close column.....	25	Barracks D R - Kunia Highway.....	2:05	2:45
9	90th FA Bn.....	90th FA Bn Barracks.....	B	15	Close column.....	30	Barracks D R - Kunia Highway.....	2:30	3:15
10	35th Inf (less Beach Cos. and 3rd Bn).	35th Inf Barracks.....	C	15	Close column.....	20	Flagler Rd. Kunia Gate.....	4:00	4:28
11	298th Inf (less Co. E., 1st Bn and Beach Cos).	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	15	Close column.....	5	Barracks Funston Gate.....	1:30	1:45

(Enclosure No. 7)

*March table, Alert No. 3, Blackout*MAP: Oahu  
Schofield & Wahiawa SheetsHEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

Ser. No.	Organization	Location at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (mph)	Type	Time length (min)	Location	Arrive H+	Clear H+
1	27th Inf Beach Cos.....	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:30	2:45
2	298th Inf (less Co. E) Beach Cos.....	298th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:29	2:50
3	8th F A Bn.....	8th F A Bn Barracks.....	E	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:45	3:10
4	89th F A Bn.....	89th F A Bn Barracks.....	E	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	2:55	3:22
5	27th Inf (less Beach Cos.).....	27th Inf Barracks.....	A	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	3:15	3:33
6	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn).....	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks Wright Gate.....	3:20	3:35
7	35th Inf Beach Cos.....	Flagler Rd.....	C	10	Close column.....	10	Flagler Rd Kunia Gate.....	2:30	2:44
8	64th F A Bn.....	64th F A Bn Barracks.....	B	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks DR-Kunila Highway.....	2:34	3:00
9	90th F A Bn.....	90th F A Bn Barracks.....	B	10	Close column.....	10	Barracks ID-Kunila Highway.....	2:45	3:10
10	35th Inf (less Beach Cos.).....	35th Inf Barracks.....	C	10	Close column.....	10	Flagler Rd Kunia Gate.....	4:00	4:15
11	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn).....	298th Inf Barracks.....	D	10	Close column.....	5	Barracks Funston Gate.....	2:00	2:15



Inclosure No. 8

March table, alert No. 3, air attack imminent (300 yd)

MAP: Oahu Schofield and Wahiawa Sheets

HEADQUARTERS,  
25th Infantry Division,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

Ser. No.	Organization	Location at H-hour	Route	March			Control of movement		
				Rate (mph)	Type	Time length (min)	Location	Arrive H+	Clear H+
1	27th Inf Beach Co.	27th Inf Barracks	A	15	Infil. (300 yd)	30	Barracks, Wright Gate.	1:30	2:08
2	298th Inf (less Co. E) Beach Co.	298th Inf Barracks	A	15	Infil. (300 yd)	15	Barracks, Wright Gate.	1:52	2:23
3	8th FA Bn	8th FA Bn Barracks	E	15	Infil. (300 yd)	75	Barracks, Wright Gate.	2:40	4:12
4	89th FA Bn	89th FA Bn Barracks	E	15	Infil. (300 yd)	60	Barracks, Wright Gate.	4:00	5:17
5	27th Inf.	27th Inf Barracks	A	15	Infil. (300 yd)	30	Barracks, Wright Gate.	5:10	5:48
6	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn)	298th Inf Barracks	D	15	Infil. (300 yd)	20	Barracks, Wright Gate.	5:35	6:10
7	35th Inf.	Flagler Rd.	C	15	Infil. (300 yd)	20	Flagler Rd, Kunia Gate.	1:30	1:54
8	64th FA Bn.	64th FA Bn Barracks	B	15	Infil. (300 yd)	75	Barracks, D R-Kunia Highway.	1:55	3:25
9	90th FA Bn.	90th FA Bn Barracks	B	15	Infil. (300 yd)	75	Barracks, D R-Kunia Highway.	3:10	4:40
10	35th Inf.	35th Inf Barracks	C	15	Infil. (300 yd)	45	Flagler Rd, Kunia Gate.	4:35	5:25
11	298th Inf (less Co. E and 1st Bn)	298th Inf Barracks	D	15	Infil. (300 yd)	10	Barracks, Funston Gate.	1:00	1:20

(The remaining portion of Inclosure No. 8, *supra*, is a map of Oahu showing supply and evacuation installations and will be found reproduced as Item No. 111, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 9

(Inclosure No. 9 is a Partial Road Map, Schofield Barracks, and will be found reproduced as Item No. 112, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

EXHIBIT No. 29 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION,  
*Schofield Barracks, T. H., 27 November 1941.*

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure.

To: See Distribution.

1. Attention is directed to inclosed Standing Operating Procedure, this Headquarters.

2. Sections pertaining to Intelligence and Administration will follow.

By command of Brigadier General WILSON:

Arch A. Fall,

Arch A. Fall,  
ARCH A. FALL,  
*Lieut. Colonel, A. G. D.,*  
*Adjutant General.*

Distribution:

CG Haw Dept—2  
CG 25th Inf Div—1  
CG 24th Inf Div—1  
C/S 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G—1, 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G—2, 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G—3, 24th Inf Div—3  
AC of S G—4, 24th Inf Div—1  
CO, 24th Div Artillery—5  
CO, 19th Infantry—5  
CO., 21st Infantry—5  
CO, 24th Medical Bn—1  
CO, 3rd Engineer Bn—1  
CO, 24th Signal Co—1  
CO, Hq & MP Company—1  
CO, 11th QM Battalion—1  
CO, Schofield Bks.—1  
Ordnance Off—2  
Chem Off—1  
Signal Off—1

[a]

HEADQUARTERS 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H., 27 November 1941.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

SECTION I—GENERAL

Paragraph	Subject	Page
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2	Unit Procedures.....	1
3	Short Title.....	1
4	Division Headquarters.....	1
5	Tactical Principles.....	1
6	Security.....	1
7	Liaison.....	1
8	Orders.....	2
9	Movements.....	2
10	Anti-Aircraft Defense.....	2
11	Guides.....	2
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SECTION II

1	Alert No. 1.....	3
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3	Alert No. 3.....	12

[1]

SECTION I—GENERAL

1. **PURPOSE:** To save time in the preparation and issuance of orders. To minimize the chance for confusion and errors when under stress of combat and to simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the field.

2. **UNIT PROCEDURES:** Will be developed by subordinate units.

3. **SHORT TITLE:** "SOP-24D."

4. **DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:** Division Headquarters may operate in one or two echelons. When divided the composition will be generally as follows:

a. *Forward Echelon.*

- Commanding General and Aide
- General Staff (less G-1)
- Artillery Commander and Staff
- Headquarters Commandant
- Chemical Officer
- Signal Officer
- Engineer Officer (or his representative)

b. *Rear Echelon.*

- G-1
- Special Staff less those in Forward Echelon

5. **TACTICAL PRINCIPLES:** See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The tactical principles pertinent to the defense of our assigned sector are:

- a. Complete organization of the ground.
- b. Position to be held lightly.
- c. Mobile reserves with sufficient motor transportation.
- d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. **SECURITY:** Each commander is responsible for the security of his command at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5, Operations.

7. **LIAISON:**

a. When an alert is sounded a liaison officer from each of the following units will be sent at once to this headquarters:

- 19th Infantry
- 21st Infantry
- 24th Division Artillery
- 24th Signal Company
- 24th Medical Battalion
- 11th Quartermaster Battalion (Maneuver Officer if only one officer with battalion)
- Headquarters & Military Police Company
- 3rd Engineer Battalion

[2] b. During operations Infantry Regiments will furnish a liaison officer to this headquarters.

c. Liaison responsibility will be from right to left and from front to rear.

d. The 24th Division Artillery will send a liaison officer, with transportation, as Division Liaison Officer to Department Headquarters. He will report to this headquarters for instructions prior to departure. This headquarters will be kept advised of the named of this officer.

#### 8. ORDERS:

a. Unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders.

b. Competent stenographers, clerks, and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

c. Prior to the issuance of orders by any commander and when time is available, staff officers of the unit issuing an order will acquaint staff officers of the unit receiving the order with all details of the enemy situation, the situation of friendly troops, and such administrative matters as are known.

#### 9. MOVEMENT:

a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized (standing if necessary, in which event appropriate guard rails or ropes will be used for troop safety).

10. *ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE*: This is the responsibility of every unit.

11. *GUIDES*: When a relief is to be effected, guides from the relieved unit will meet and remain with the incoming unit, until relieved by the commander of the incoming unit.

12. *BLACKOUT*: During blackouts, Regimental Commanders and separate unit commanders will take the necessary steps to assure that lights in their areas are promptly extinguished or used only in light-proof rooms or tents. "Blackout" flashlights and "blackout" vehicle lights will be used. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

13. *INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM*: During alerts all important installations not protected by Territorial Home Guards will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established by sub-sector commanders in connection therewith.

[2.1] *SUPPLY*: (See Pars. 75-80, FM 100-10).

#### a. SUPPLY AREAS—

(1) *Schofield Areas*: All of Oahu north and west of the line LAE O KA OIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—at (197.9—91.0) KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE. (See Inclosure No. 4.)

(2) *Honolulu Area*: The remainder of OAHU and all outlying islands.

(3) *Detached Units*: Supplies (all classes), for a small unit of a command, when moved into a different supply area, from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or the nearest DP.

b. *DEPOTS AND DISTRIBUTING POINTS*—(See Inclosure No. 4 for designations and locations).

#### c. GASOLINE—

(1) Under any "Alert" all motor vehicles leaving the post except passenger cars, motorcycles and ammunition trucks, will carry the full allowance of filled gasoline *containers* (10 gallons). All vehicles will have full gasoline *tanks*.

(2) Distribution for all "Alerts" will be made from DP's at the nearest Army post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT and KANEOHE.

#### d. AMMUNITION—

(1) Credits of an "initial issue" (Inclosure No. 5) and one "unit of fire" (Inclosure No. 6) of all types and calibers of ammunition are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of unit commanders whenever an "Alert" is ordered.

(2) The "initial issue" of *small arms* ammunition (less small quantities expended during current training) will be kept in unit storerooms at all times.

e. *WATER SUPPLY*—Locally after inspection and approval of source by Unit Surgeon, or from any post or CITY OF HONOLULU water system.



15. *EVACUATION:**a. PERSONNEL—*

(1) By 24th Medical Battalion to Station Hospital SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.  
 (2) The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared on call to evacuate personnel from non-divisional units operating in the North Sector.

*b. SALVAGE—*During all "Alerts," to branch supply depots shown on Inclosure No. 4.

*c. PRISONERS OF WAR—*

(1) Collecting points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Division Provost Marshal when directed.

16. *TRAFFIC:* During all "Alerts" traffic on OAHU is regulated by the Department Provost Marshal. The Division Provost Marshal will be prepared to assist the Department Provost Marshal when directed.

[2.2] 17. *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION:*

*a.* Infantry regiments will maintain current movement and loading tables showing:

(1) The number of vehicles within the unit and the number of men and amount of impedimenta which can be moved initially into position.

(2) The number of *additional* cargo vehicles, if any, which would be required to transport personnel, with their impedimenta, required for employment under Alert No. 2.

(3) The number of *additional* cargo vehicles which would be required to transport the entire unit, with its impedimenta, in a single movement.

*b.* Copies, in duplicate, of above tables will be furnished Division Headquarters when prepared initially and whenever changed.

[2.3] 18. *INTELLIGENCE—GENERAL*

Combat Intelligence has a wider meaning in the Hawaiian Department than in the usual combat zone. Here, it not only includes information of an enemy who may land by force and oppose us in open battle, but it also includes any and all information on sabotage and saboteurs, both actual and potential.

Within all units of the 24th Infantry Division there are especially trained intelligence personnel, as required in regulations, whose duty it is to look for information of all kinds on any enemy from outside the island, as well as possible sabotage or saboteurs on the island. This responsibility does not, however, rest on the intelligence personnel alone. Every officer and man in the 24th Infantry Division will be constantly on the alert for any information of any enemy whatever, including subversive activities at any time, and will promptly report such information to his unit commander or unit intelligence officer.

## [3] STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

## SECTION II.—Alerts

All defense measures, except in case of a surprise hostile attack, are classified under one of the three (3) ALERTS indicated below:

## 1. ALERT NO. 1:

*a.* This requires a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

*b. The 19th Infantry will:*

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.

(2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified—

(a) The Command and Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).

(1) Huts 96, 97 and 105 by standing guards.

(2) Remainder by a system of patrols.

(b) Railway and highway bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).

(1) WAIMEA BAY Railway and Highway Bridge by standing guards.

(2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods over irregular routes.

(c) Telephone Exchanges in WAHIAWA, and LAIE by standing guards.

(d) Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, and KAHUKU by standing guards. (See Inclosure No. 3).

(e) Cold storage plants in WAHIAWA by standing guards.

(f) Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(1) KUTREE RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(2) KOOLAU RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(3) EAST PUMP RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(4) DEEP WELL by standing guards.

(5) Ditches and pipe line connecting the above mentioned installations by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

c. *The 21st Infantry will:*

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.

(2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector, unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified:

[4] (a) Command & Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).

(1) Hut 57, 102, 103 and 104 by standing guards.

(2) Remainder by a system of patrols.

(b) Railway and Highway Bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).

(1) ANAHULU RIVER Highway Bridge and TWIN BRIDGES by standing guards.

(2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

(c) Telephone Exchanges in WAIALUA (in HALEIWA) by standing guards.

(d) Electric sub-stations in WAIALUA by standing guards (See Inclosure No. 3).

(e) Transformer station at MACOMB GATE by standing guards.

(f) Maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

d. The remainder of this Division, including troops not used by the 19th Infantry and 21st Infantry under paragraphs b and c above, will continue routine duties and training.

e. ADMINISTRATION:

(1) SUPPLY:

(a) Except as noted below the existing procedures prescribed for the requisition, issue and distribution of all classes of supply in garrison will remain in effect.

(b) Class III (Gasoline and Lubricants). Distribution from DP's established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT, and KANEOHE. These supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks.

(c) Class V (Ammunition). In addition to the "initial issue" of small arms ammunition then in their possession, infantry units will draw 1/3 of their initial issue of grenades (equal proportions of H. E. and C. N.). Ammunition Reports (OFM Form 303) will be submitted upon call from the Division Ammunition Officer.

(2) EVACUATION:

(a) *Personnel.*—The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared to dispatch, on one hour's notice, two ambulances with drivers and a detachment of one officer and four enlisted men, on call from the infantry battalion which is being held in readiness. It will also be prepared to operate an ambulance shuttle between the point(s) of disturbance and SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, when directed.

(b) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting point initially at the Post Stockade, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, and at FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER and KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal assisted by Division Provost Marshal when directed.

[1] 1. f. INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT NO. 1.—

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of sabotage and saboteurs to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured or deduced:

(a) Report damage by saboteurs. Where? When? How much? Explosives? Other means?

(b) Where are saboteurs?

(c) What are they doing? Are they on the move? Headed where?

- (d) Are they organized? Do they appear to have a plan? Leaders?
- (e) What weapons have they?
- (f) Numbers and nationality? Report immediately.
- (g) Any prisoners? Documents?
- (h) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.
- (i) Contacts with saboteurs?
- (j) Any suspicious boats? Where, direction, type, distance, formation? Report when observed—thereafter report hourly.

- (3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.
- (4) *Intelligence Reports to the Division CP.*—
  - (a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?
  - (b) Initial observation or contact with saboteurs.
  - (c) Any major change in movement, tactics or numbers of saboteurs.
  - (d) Captured documents.
  - (e) Indications of spread of sabotage. Also any apparent plans or intentions.

- (5) *Saboteur Prisoners.*—
  - (a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel.
  - (b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service.
  - (c) Any indications of use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.

[2] (6) *Counterintelligence.*—  
 Every effort will be made to discover sabotage intent before it happens. Also to report the temper and morale of the civilian population.

- (7) *Miscellaneous.*—
  - (a) Assemblies of provocateurs of any nationality, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions.

- (b) Sea mines or captured equipment of any kind will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay.
- (c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important information of sabotage or saboteurs will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.

[5] X. (1) *COMMAND POSTS:* Command Posts at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and in the field will operate continuously but with reduced strength after normal training hours.

(2) *MOVEMENTS:* All movements under this alert will be administrative with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles (See par. 31, FM 25-10).

(3) *THE TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD* when formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations *except* THE COMMAND and FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.

(4) *BLACKOUT:* As ordered at the time.  
 (Paragraph (5) is crossed out on exhibit.)

(6) *MOTOR PATROLS:*  
 (a) Motor patrols will operate either as single vehicles or in mutually supporting pairs of vehicles, in accordance with subsequent orders from subordinate headquarters.

(b) The mission of motor patrols will be to inspect and afford protection to certain parts of the Command and Fire Control Cable Systems, and certain Railway and Highway Bridges, and other installations as outlined in this alert. Patrols will check in with all standing guards on their routes.

(c) In the performance of the above mission, patrols will operate over irregular routes at irregular periods.

(d) Composition of single vehicle patrols:

<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Weapons</i>	<i>Ammunition</i>
1 Driver	1 Cal .30 MG	750 rounds Cal .30 MG
1 NCO	1 Riot Gun	ammunition, belt loaded.
3 Pvts	4 Rifles	24 brass cased shot-gun shells.
	18 Tear Gas Grenades	144 rounds Cal .30 rifle
		ammunition per rifle.



(e) Composition of two vehicle patrol:

These will be mutually supporting and will be equipped with radio:

	<i>Loading Vehicle</i>	<i>Rear Vehicle</i>
Personnel-----	1 Driver 1 NCO 2 Pvts.	1 Driver 1 NCO 3 Pvts.
Weapons-----	1 Riot Gun 3 Rifles	1 Cal. 30 MG 5 Rifles
Ammunition--	18 Tear Gas Grenades 24 brass cased shotgun shells. 144 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.	750 rounds MG ammunition, belt loaded. 144 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.

(7) *STANDING GUARDS*: Standing guards will be placed as indicated under this alert. Their minimum composition will be as follows:

[6]

	<i>Day</i>	<i>Night</i>
Personnel-----	1 NCO 1 Pvt.	1 NCO 3 Pvts.
Weapons-----	1 Riot Gun 1 Rifle	1 Riot Gun 3 Rifles
Ammunition--	24 brass cased shotgun shells. 96 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.	24 brass cased shotgun shells. 96 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.

[7] 2. *ALERT No. 2*:

a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than *ALERT NO. 1*. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, will be provided.

b. *The 19th Infantry will*:

- (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.
- (2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified—
  - (a) The Command and Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).
    - (1) Huts 96, 97 and 105 by standing guards.
    - (2) Remainder by a system of patrols.
  - (b) Railway and highway bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).
    - (1) WAIMEA BAY Railway and Highway Bridge by standing guards.
    - (2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods over irregular routes.
  - (c) Telephone Exchanges in WAHIAWA, and LAIE by standing guards.
  - (d) Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, and KAHUKU by standing guards. (See Inclosure No. 3).
  - (e) Cold storage plants in WAHIAWA by standing guards.
  - (f) Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
    - (1) KUTREE RESERVOIR by standing guards.
    - (2) KOOLAU RESERVOIR by standing guards.
    - (3) EAST PUMP RESERVOIR by standing guards.
    - (4) DEEP WELL by standing guards.
    - (5) Ditches and pipe line connecting the above mentioned installations by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

c. *The 21st Infantry will*:

- (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.
- (2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector, unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified:
  - (a) Command & Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).
    - (1) Hut 102, 103 and 104 by standing guards.
    - (2) Remainder by a system of patrols.
  - (b) Railway and Highway Bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).



[8] (1) ANAHULU RIVER Highway Bridge and Twin Bridges by standing guards.

(2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

(c) Telephone Exchanges in WALALUA (in HALEIWA) by standing guards.

(d) Electric sub-stations in WALALUA by standing guards (see Inclosure No. 3).

(e) Transformer Station at MACOMB GATE by standing guards.

(f) Maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

d. *The 24th Division Artillery will—*

(1) Place the 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards, and when directed place ammunition at positions.

(2) Release units manning seacoast armament (155mm GPF) to the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

e. *ADMINISTRATION:*

(1) *SUPPLY—*

(a) Except as noted below, the existing procedures prescribed for the requisition, issue and distribution of all classes of supply in garrison will remain in effect.

(b) Class III (Gasoliné and Lubricants). Distribution from DP's established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT and KANEOHE. These supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

(c) Class V (Ammunition). In addition to the "initial issue" of small arms ammunition, infantry units will draw all of their "initial issue" of special infantry ammunition (less grenades) issued under Alert No. 1) (See Incl. No. 4a for schedule of issue). The Division Artillery will draw initially 1/2 of the "initial issue"; the balance (1/2), will be drawn after all guns and howitzers have been placed in position. Ammunition Reports (OFM Form No. 303) will be submitted upon call from the Division Ammunition Officer.

(2) *EVACUATION—*

(a) *Personnel.*—The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared, when directed: To ditspatch on one hour's notice two ambulances with drivers and a detachment of one officer and four enlisted men; to operate an ambulance shuttle between point(s) of disturbance and SHOFIELD BARRACKS: to establish a collecting station in the vicinity of THOMPSONS CORNER (86.95—04.20).

(b) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting point initially at the Post Stockade, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, and at FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, and KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal assisted by Division Provost Marshal, when directed.

(3) *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION—*

(a) Should the organic transportation of infantry regiments be insufficient to transport all personnel, with their impediments, which would be required for employment under Alert No. 2, the additional transportation, as reported in paragraph 17 a (2) Section I, will be provided as directed by Division Headquarters.

(b) The 11th Quartermaster Battalion will be prepared to dispatch, on one hour's notice, 20, 2 1/2 ton trucks (or equal cargo and personnel capacity) when directed.

[8.1] 2. *INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT NO. 2:*

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of the enemy or saboteurs to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured, or deduced:

(a) Boats? Where, direction, Type, distance, formation? Report when observed—thereafter report hourly.

(b) Report any landings or gathering of saboteurs or potential saboteurs.

(c) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, or saboteurs. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1800.

(d) Where is the enemy? What strength?

(e) What is he doing? Direction of movement?

(f) What weapons has he? Are saboteurs armed? How?

(g) Identifications? Unit or nationality? Report immediately.

(h) Any prisoners? Documents?

- (i) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.
  - (j) Contacts with enemy?
  - (k) Flares? Where, direction, type and altitude.
- (3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.
- (4) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Quickest Means Available*—
- (a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?
  - (b) Initial observation or contact with enemy.
  - (c) Any major change in movement, tactics or strength of enemy.
  - (d) Captured documents.
  - (e) Identifications of new enemy units or saboteurs groups.
- (5) *By Routine Means.*
- (a) Enemy front line (after initial contact)—Every 2 hours at 10 minutes before the even hour. Include boundaries between units wherever possible.
  - (b) Weather, visibility and surf reports on all favorable landing beaches at 0245, 0645, 1145, and 2145.
- [8.2] (6) *Prisoners of War.*—
- (a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the 24th Division Prisoner of War Enclosure at the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel especially selected for that purpose.
  - (b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service. Reports of captured material will be sent back in the same manner.
  - (c) Every enemy wounded prisoner, except the badly wounded, will be handled in a manner similar to the other prisoners. Badly wounded who cannot be moved but who may have important information, will be promptly reported to the Division G-2.
  - (d) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.
- (7) *Counterintelligence.*—
- (a) Utmost care will be taken to conceal from enemy air observation, our own troop movements and establishments.
  - (b) If captured, your NAME, RANK, AND SERIAL NUMBER, is the only information you are required to give.
  - (c) Secret or confidential documents and codes will not be carried into forward areas.
- (8) *Miscellaneous.*—
- (a) Enemy parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions. Also include information on their arms and equipment, as well as their apparent state of training and organization.
  - (b) Enemy mines or beached boats or naval equipment will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay, since these will be handled by the Navy. They will not be destroyed by military personnel.
  - (c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.
- [9] X. (1) *COMMAND POSTS:* Command Posts at Schofield Barracks and in the field will operate continuously but with reduced strength after normal training hours.
- (2) *MOVEMENTS:*
- (a) Movements under this alert will be tactical unless authorized specifically otherwise by this headquarters. Vehicles will be moved at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety, except that in convoys or by infiltration, the leading vehicle will move at not to exceed ten (10) miles per hour less than the maximum speed. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration (see par. 63, FM 25-10). The distance between vehicles will not be less than 300 yards.
  - (b) *Night Movements.*—
  - (1) Under blackout conditions, motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of con-

voys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one way* secondary roads and cross country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads, the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

(2) When blackout conditions are not prescribed, vehicles may be run singly or in convoys with lights. Distances between vehicles will be consistent with safety and such as to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

(c) *Initial Road Priorities.*—

(1) 19th Infantry: LEWIS STREET-TRIMBLE ROAD-HEARD AVENUE-WAIANAE AVENUE-MACOMB ROAD-WAHIWA-KARSTON-NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

63rd FA Bn.: REILLY AVENUE-WILLISTON AVENUE-CADET SHERIDAN ROAD-TRIMBLE ROAD-HEARD AVENUE-WAIANAE AVENUE-MACOMB ROAD-WAHIWA-KARSTON-NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

13th FA Bn.: Same as 63rd FA Bn.

21st Infantry: 21ST INF FOOTBALL FIELD GATE.

52nd FA Bn.: McMAHON RD-GULCH RD-ARTILLERY GATE-OLD KAM HIGHWAY.

11th FA Bn.: Same as 52nd FA Bn.

[10] (d) *Road Circulation Outside of Schofield Barracks.*

After H plus 6 military traffic of this Division returning to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS from the NORTH SHORE will come via THOMPSON'S CORNER-OLD KAM HIGHWAY-ARTILLERY GATE. Military traffic of this Division leaving SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for the NORTH SHORE will proceed via FUNSTON GATE or MACOMB GATE-WAHIWA-NEW KAM HIGHWAY-TWIN BRIDGES.

(e) In general, trucks will move from one concealed position to another.

(f) *Control.*—

(1) (a) A *regulating point* will be prescribed by the headquarters ordering a truck movement.

(b) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the regulating point with unit guides. He will insure: that trucks are properly divided; that essential instructions are given; and that guides are furnished from the regulating point to unit ontrucking points.

(2) (a) An *initial point* will be designated by the headquarters ordering the truck movement.

(b) Guides will move truck groups from ontrucking points to the initial point.

(c) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the initial point to insure that truck groups pass the initial point at the proper time and in the prescribed order.

(g) *Entrucking and Detrucking Points.*—

(1) Entrucking or detrucking points will be selected by the unit being moved. They will be on side roads where possible, and well dispersed.

(2) Each ontrucking group will be notified of the number of vehicles of each type available to it prior to their arrival.

(3) Entrucking groups will be assigned as vehicle loads prior to the arrival of the truck train.

(4) Guides will be used to load ontrucking groups to their proper trucks.

(5) Massing of trucks in the open is prohibited. Speed is essential and will be stressed in loading and unloading.

(b) *Markers or guides* will be placed at all points where the column might go astray or where congestion or delay might occur.

(i) *Safety Precautions.*—

(1) Maximum use will be made of overhead cover and dispersion in bivouac and assembly areas.

(2) During truck moves, guards will be stationed at the following points:

[11] (a) Railroad crossings.

(b) Turns into main highways.

(c) One-way obstacles.

(d) Points where secondary roads used by truck column join or cross main highways.

(3) During the hours of darkness, trucks moving cross-country or on trails will:

(a) Have a guide who will assure that there are no men sleeping in the trucks' path.



(b) Not be moved until the driver has carefully examined the ground under his vehicle to see that there are no men asleep under it.

(c) Before backing, be furnished a guide who will warn the driver of obstructions in his path.

X. (3) *ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE:*

(a) All units not occupying front line positions will have their weapons in readiness to meet an air attack.

(b) On marches, suitable weapons will be mounted for AA fire. When an air attack is delivered, troops will detruck, disperse and fire at the planes. Any automatic weapons which cannot be quickly removed and fired will be fired from the vehicle.

(c) Unit commanders are responsible for the following:

(1) To maintain air guards for timely warning.

(2) Concealment through cover and camouflage to render enemy visual and photographic aerial reconnaissances useless.

(3) To have troops disperse quickly in order to render an air attack less effective.

(4) To report each hostile air attack.

(4) *BLACKOUT:* As ordered at the time.

\* \* \* \* \*

(6) *TERRITORIAL HOME GUARDS:* When formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations *except* THE COMMAND and FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.

(7) *STRENGTH OF UNITS:* All units will maintain 50% of their strength, with due consideration to tactical organizations, (less those already operating under this alert) available at all times for such service as the situation may warrant.

[12] 3. *ALERT NO. 3:*

a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of assigned sectors.

b. *The 19th Infantry will—*

(1) Defend its assigned sub-sector according to current defense plans.

(2) Insofar as the situation will permit, protect vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sub-sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

c. *The 21st Infantry will—*

(1) Defend its assigned sub-sector according to current defense plans.

(2) Insofar as the situation will permit, protect vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sub-sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

d. *The 24th Division Artillery will—*

(1) Render Artillery support according to current defense plans.

e. All other units not mentioned will carry out their part of current defense plans.

f. (1) The forward echelon of this headquarters will occupy its command post.

(2) The rear echelon will continue to function at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS observing blackout conditions.

3. [12.1] g. *ADMINISTRATION:*

(1) *Supply:*

(a) *Class I (Rations):*

(1) A standard menu will be prescribed and issued by Post Quartermaster concerned, to all units, after H plus 24. Ration cycle will begin with supper. Initially all units will take into the field from their own stores, the unconsumed portion of the garrison ration and the equivalent of one field ration.

(2) *Distributing Points:* SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and FORT ARMSTRONG. Alternate DPs may be announced later.

(3) *Distribution:* Will be based on consolidated strength reports submitted by organizations to DIVISION HEADQUARTERS by 0700 daily.

(4) *Schedule of Issue:* (See Incl. No. 8).

(b) *Class III (Gasoline and Lubricants.* Distribution from DPs established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT and KANEOHE. Additional DPs as announced. From DP at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, distribution will be made:

(1) To unit tankers when available.



(2) By the Quartermaster to unit DPs (filling stations at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS when unit tankers are not available.

(3) To units other than those in (b) (1) and (2) above, by means of 5 and 10 gallon containers to be filled at the DP by unit personnel. All Class III supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks.

(c) *Class II and IV.—DEPOTS*

Branch	Schofield Supply Area	Honolulu Supply Area
Quartermaster-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	FORT ARMSTRONG.
Medical-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	FORT SCHAFTER.
Signal-----	FORT SCHAFTER-----	FORT SCHAFTER.
Chemical-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Engineer-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Ordnance-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	HONOLULU (HOD).

(d) *Distributing Point for Class IV Supplies.* (Engineer Intrenching Tools and Fortification Materials): SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and vicinity of THOMPSON'S CORNER (86.9-04.2). Credits at DPs will be announced separately to unit commanders concerned.

(e) *Class V Supplies (Ammunition)* (See Memorandum "Supply of Ordnance Ammunition", HSB, November 17, 1941):

(1) DP for all units initially.—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot (except 240mm Howitzers).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types.—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot for all units in that area.

(3) The drawing of "initial issues" by all units will be completed by H plus 10.

(4) *Ammunition Reports.*—OFM Form 303 (see Incl. No. 9) will be submitted by unit Munitions Officers to the Division Ammunition Office (DAO) located initially in building 2131, Ordnance Area, Schofield Barracks, daily by 1900 for the period ending at 1800. The Division Artillery Munitions Officer will consolidate reports of all artillery battalions. If desired these reports may be telephoned (#8 or #296) and confirmed in writing within 3 hours.

(2) *EVACUATION.*

(a) *Personnel:*

(1) Collecting station: Initially in vicinity of THOMPSON'S CORNER (86.95-04.20). Preparations will be made to establish a collecting station in vicinity of BM 983 (96.30-13.90) when directed.

[12.2] (2) Preparations will be made to establish ambulance loading points at:

KAWAIHAPAI (78.00-06.00).

JUNCTION MOLULEIA ROAD AND CANE ROAD (82.00-06.00).

PUIKI WOODS (84.65-06.60).

WAIALUA SCHOOL (86.65-06.60).

SOLDIERS BEACH (88.00-08.50).

KAWAILOA CAMP SITE (89.50-09.90).

ASHLEY (90.70-11.45).

KAWELA BAY (98.50-20.50).

LAIE BAY (08.00-15.50).

(3) Personnel of the 24th Medical Battalion will be used to augment Unit Medical Detachments in the evacuation of casualties to the ambulance loading points listed in (a) (a) (2) above.

(4) Evacuations to: Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared on call to evacuate personnel from non-divisional units operating in the North Sector.

(b) *Animals.*—(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SCHAFTER by provisional Veterinary Detachments when attached to the Division.

(c) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SCHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshal, when directed.

(3) *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION:*

(a) The organic transportation of each infantry regiment will be used for the movement of beach battalions to assigned tactical localities and the subsequent movement of other elements by shuttling, when necessary. Should the transportation of an entire unit by a single movement be directed, the required

cargo vehicles, reported in paragraph 17 a (3) of SECTION I, will be provided as directed by Division Headquarters.

(b) By H plus 12 hours unit pools of motor vehicles will be established by infantry regiments, artillery battalions and the Engineer and Quartermaster battalions. These pools will consist of available tactical and administrative vehicles of 1½ ton and larger, capacity, with a proportionate number of ½ ton or smaller vehicles for convoy control purposes. Unit administrative requirements will be reduced to a minimum and the full use made of unit trailers so that a maximum number of vehicles may be pooled.

(c) Each unit must meet its own requirements to the maximum extent with organic transportation. Calls on higher echelons will not be made until all means at the command of units have been exhausted.

(d) At H plus 12 hours and by 0700 daily thereafter a written report will be made to the Division Transportation Officer of the number, total personnel, and cargo capacity of vehicles, in each unit pool subject to Division or higher echelon dispatch. Such reports may be required at more frequent intervals by phone.

[12.3] 3. h. *INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT NO. 3:*

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of the enemy to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages concerning the enemy should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured or deduced:

(a) Boats? Where, direction, type, distance, formation?

(b) Report any landings. Report at once any artillery—include caliber and identifications. Same for tanks.

(c) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(d) Where is the enemy?

(e) What is he doing? Direction of movement?

(f) What weapons has he? Artillery?

(g) Identifications? Unit? Report immediately.

(h) Any prisoners? Documents?

(i) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.

(j) Contacts with enemy? Flanks?

(k) Planes? Where, direction, type and altitude.

(3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.

(4) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Quickest Means Available.*—

(a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?

(b) Initial observation or contact with enemy.

(c) Any major change in movement, tactics or strength of enemy.

(d) Captured documents.

(e) Identifications of new enemy units.

(5) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Routine Means.*—

(a) Enemy front line (after initial contact)—Every 2 hours at 10 minutes before the even hour. Include boundaries between units wherever possible.

(b) Weather, visibility and surf reports on all favorable landing beaches at 0245, 0645, 1145, 1645, and 2145.

(6) *Prisoners of War.*—

(a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the 24th Division Prisoner of War Enclosure at the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel of both Department and Division especially selected for that purpose.

[12.4] (b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service. Reports of captured material will be sent back in the same manner.

(c) Every enemy wounded prisoner, except the badly wounded, will be handled in a manner similar to the other prisoners. Badly wounded who cannot be moved, but who may have important information, will be promptly reported to the Division G-2.

(d) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.

(e) A liaison officer from the Office of the G-2 HHD will be assigned to the 24th Division Examiner Station (which will be at the Prisoner of War Enclosure in the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks) and he will assist the representative

of the 24th Division G-2 and the North Sector Provost Marshal in examining the enemy personnel matériel, and documents, and in determining the destination of the information obtained.

(7) *Counterintelligence.*—

(a) Utmost care will be taken to conceal from enemy air observation, our own troop movements and establishments.

(b) If captured, your NAME, RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER, is the only information you are required to give.

(c) Secret or confidential documents and codes will not be carried into forward areas.

(8) *Miscellaneous.*—

(a) Enemy parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions. Also include information on their arms, and equipments, as well as their apparent state of training and organization.

(b) Enemy mines or beached boats or naval equipment will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay, since these will be handled by the Navy. They will not be destroyed by military personnel.

(c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering, vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.

[13] X. (1) *BANDS:* All bands will be released to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(2) *MOVEMENTS:*

(a) Movements under this alert will be tactical unless otherwise authorized by this headquarters. Vehicles will be moved at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety except that in convoys or by infiltration, the leading vehicle will move at not to exceed ten (10) miles per hour less than the maximum speed. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration (see par. 63, FM 25-10). The distance between vehicles will be not less than 300 yards.

(b) *Night Movements.*—

(1) Under blackout conditions, motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one way* secondary roads and cross country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads, the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

(2) When blackout conditions are not prescribed, vehicles may be run singly or in convoys with lights. Distances between vehicles will be consistent with safety and such as to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

(c) *Initial Road Priorities.*—

(1) 19th Infantry: LEWIS STREET—TRIMBLE ROAD—HEARD AVENUE—WAIANAË AVENUE—MACOMB ROAD—WAHIAWA—KARSTON—NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

63rd FA Bn.: REILLY AVENUE—WILLISTON AVENUE—CADET SHERIDAN ROAD—TRIMBLE ROAD—HEARD AVENUE—WAIANAË AVENUE—MACOMB ROAD—WAHIAWA—KARSTON—NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

13th FA Bn.: Same as 63rd FA Bn.

21st Infantry: 21ST INF FOOTBALL FIELD GATE.

52nd FA Bn.: McMAHON RD—GULCH RD—ARTILLERY GATE—OLD KAM HIGHWAY.

11th FA Bn.: Same as 52nd FA Bn.

[14] (d) *Road Circulation Outside of Schofield Barracks.*

After H plus 6 military traffic of this Division returning to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS from the NORTH SHORE will come via THOMPSON'S CORNER—OLD KAM HIGHWAY—ARTILLERY GATE. Military traffic of this Division leaving SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for the NORTH SHORE will proceed via FUNSTON GATE or MACOMB GATE—WAHIAWA—NEW KAM HIGHWAY—TWIN BRIDGES.

(e) In general, trucks will move from one concealed position to another.

(f) *Control.*—



(1) (a) A *regulating point* will be prescribed by the headquarters ordering a truck movement.

(b) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the regulating point with unit guides. He will insure: that trucks are properly divided; that essential instructions are given; and that guides are furnished from the regulating point to unit ontrucking points.

(2) (a) An *initial point* will be designated by the headquarters ordering the truck movement.

(b) Guides will move truck groups from ontrucking points to the initial point.

(c) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the initial point to insure that truck groups pass the initial point at the proper time and in the prescribed order.

(g) *Entrucking and Detrucking Points.*—

(1) Entrucking or detrucking points will be selected by the unit being moved. They will be on side roads where possible, and well dispersed.

(2) Each ontrucking group will be notified of the number of vehicles of each type available to it prior to their arrival.

(3) Entrucking groups will be assigned as vehicle loads prior to the arrival of the truck train.

(4) Guides will be used to lead ontrucking groups to their proper trucks.

(5) Massing of trucks in the open is prohibited. Speed is essential and will be stressed in loading and unloading.

(h) *Markers or guides* will be placed at all points where the column might go astray or where congestion or delay might occur.

(i) *Safety Precautions.*—

(1) Maximum use will be made of overhead cover and dispersion in bivouac and assembly areas.

(2) During truck moves, guards will be stationed at the following points:

[15] (a) Railroad crossings.

(b) Turns into main highways.

(c) One-way obstacles.

(d) Points where secondary roads used by the truck column join or cross main highways.

(3) During the hours of darkness, trucks moving cross-country or on trails will—

(a) Have a guide who will assure that there are no men sleeping in the trucks' path.

(b) Not be moved until the driver has carefully examined the ground under his vehicle to see that there are no men asleep under it.

(c) Before backing, be furnished a guide who will warn the driver of obstructions in his path.

X. (3) *ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE:*

(a) All units not occupying front line positions will have their weapons in readiness to meet an air attack.

(b) On marches, suitable weapons will be mounted for AA fire. When an air attack is delivered, troops will detruck, disperse and fire at the planes. Any automatic weapon which cannot be quickly removed and fired will be fired from the vehicle.

(c) Unit commanders are responsible for the following:

(1) To maintain air guards for timely warning.

(2) Concealment through cover and camouflage to render enemy visual and photographic aerial reconnaissance useless.

(3) To have troops disperse quickly in order to render an air attack less effective.

(4) To report each hostile air attack.

(4) *BLACKOUT:* All units will blackout unless ordered otherwise by this headquarters.

\* \* \* \* \*

(6) *TERRITORIAL HOME GUARDS:* When formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations except **THE COMMAND** and **FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM**. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.



(At this point in Exhibit No. 29 there appear two maps of the Island of Oahu, one showing communications installations and the other showing important installations. These maps will be found reproduced as Items No. 113 and 114, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[15a]

## Inclosure No. 2

## Railroad bridges

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3'	205'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0'	15'
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mckuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mckuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	445'
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	125'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11.0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20.0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75.0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115.0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107.0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55.0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13.0'	112'

[15b]

## Inclosure No. 2

## Highway bridges

## PRIORITY I

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream.....	01.95-84.12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream.....	98.25-82.99
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	96.46-95.68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	96.37-96.75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa.....	87.98-07.98
74	Kam Highway over Waiamea R., Waiamea.....	92.82-13.52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch.....	95.27-98.92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks.....	93.72-96.96

## PRIORITY II

13	Kam Highway over at Waialua.....	87.78-06.33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head).....	32.45-70.22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa.....	86.06-04.57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa.....	86.12-05.76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa.....	86.52-06.20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon.....	11.76-76.55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay.....	14.34-03-25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	97.79-95.34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu.....	98.56-82.46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea.....	06.82-80.30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond.....	21.04-89.11

## Inclosure No. 3

(At this point in Exhibit No. 29 there appears a map of Oahu indicated as Inclosure No. 3 and showing electrical installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 115, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

## Inclosure No. 5

*Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue*

Weapon	Arm or service	AP	No. of rds per weapon			
			Ball	Tracer	IIE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903.....	Eng.....		40			40
	FA.....		32	8		40
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	16	112	32		160
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8		40
	QM.....		40			40
	Sig.....		25			25
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1.....	Others.....	30	105	15		150
	Eng.....	48	80	24		152
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	24	162	46		232
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8		40
	Sig.....		40			40
	MP.....		48			48
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	Others.....	30	105	15		150
	FA.....	960		240		1200
	Inf.....	60	992	120		1172
	QM.....	30	30	20		80
	Others.....	150	525	75		750
	Machine gun, cal. .30.....	Eng.....	250	1500	250	
HB (M1919A4).....	Inf.....	500	3500	1000		5000
Machine gun, cal. .30.....	Eng.....	250	1500	250		2000
WC (M1917A1).....	Inf.....	675	4725	1350		6750
Pistol, cal. .45.....	Others.....	600	2100	300		3000
	Eng., Inf.....		28			28
	FA, QM, Sig.....		21			21
	MP, others.....					

Inclosure No. 5—Continued

Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue—Continued

Weapon	Arm or service	AP	No. of rds per weapon			
			Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Machine gun, cal. .50	FA	600		150		750
HB	Inf.	960		240		1200
Shotgun	All					25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)	Inf.					150
Signals, ground (assd)	Inf.					25
	Sig. (Tri. Div. Co.)					30
Lights, Very signal (assorted)	All					24
37mm gun, M1916	Inf.				240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3)	FA	200				200
	Inf.	180			20	200
60mm Mortar	Inf.				120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar	Inf.			{Light	132	150
				{Heavy	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D.	All					#459
75mm gun, Antitank	FA					#144
155mm Howitzer	FA					#117
155mm gun, M1918M1	All				100	100
240mm How. M1918	FA				60	60

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.  
 #Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and Normal Charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

Inclosure No. 6

Unit of fire (other than aircraft)

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HE (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle)	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal. .45		20			20
Submachine gun, cal. .45		160			200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	720		180		900
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)					50
Projector, signal ground (assorted)					25
Pistol, Very, MkIII					24
37mm gun, M1916				120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3	84			36	120
60mm Mortar				400	400
81mm Mortar			{light	234	300
			{heavy	66	
3" Trench Mortar					300
75 mm Field Gun			{super	36	300
			{normal	150	
			{reduced	114	
75mm gun, antitank	111			39	150
105mm How.				225	225
155mm How. M1918				150	150
155mm gun, M1918 M1	112			38	150
240mm How. M1918				60	60

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Inclosure No. 7a

Issue schedule for special infantry ammunition (HE and pyrotechnics)

Organization Serial No.	Time to arrive at Amm C. P.	Magazine	No. of Containers and Types of Ammunition										Trucks		
			37mm			Mortar			Pyro.		Hand Gren. HE	No.	Cap.		
			M3 M' 16			60 mm 81 mm 3"			GD	V. P.					
			AP	HE	HE	HE	HE M43	HE M45						HE	
27th Infantry #1	H+1:00	2112											6	1	1 1/2
298th Infantry #1	H+1:15	2112				60	80	40					6	1	1 1/2
298th Infantry #2	H+1:35	2112	15	15	20	60	80	40	50				7	2	18 6
35th Infantry #1	H+1:55	2112				60	80	40					6	1	18 5
19th Infantry #1	H+2:15	2112				60	80	40	100				6	1	18 5
21st Infantry #1	H+2:35	2112				60	80	40					6	1	18 5
35th Infantry #2	H+2:55	2112	15	15	20	60	80	40	100				7	2	18 7
19th Infantry #2	H+3:15	2112	15	15	33								1	1	2
21st Infantry #2	H+3:25	2112	15	15	20								1	1	2
35th Infantry #3	H+3:35	2112				60	80	40					6	1	18 5
19th Infantry #3	H+3:55	2112				60	80	40	100				6	1	18 5
19th Infantry #4	H+4:15	2112				60	80	40	200				6	1	18 8
21st Infantry #3	H+4:35	2112				60	80	40					6	1	18 5
21st Infantry #4	H+4:35	2112				60	80	40					6	1	18 5

NOTE.—Priorities indicated above are for use during "Alerts". #2 and 3 may be changed at any time if a special situation so requires. Amounts indicated above are maximum requirements and are subject to change depending on the status of Depot Stocks.

Inclosure No. 7b

Schedule of initial issue of ammunition—24th Division Artillery

Serial No.:	Arrive at Control Point
A-24	H plus 1:00
B-24	H plus 1:00
C-24	H plus 1:00
D-24	H plus 1:40
E-24 a	H plus 2:40
F-24	H plus 3:20
G-24	(b)
H-24	(b)
I-24	(b)

(a) Trucks of serial E-24 enroute to DP must clear RJ Trimble Road and Carpenter Road before H plus 2:00.

(b) Hours to be announced.

Complete draw of Initial Issue to be completed before H plus 10:00.

Inclosure No. 8

Ration distribution schedule for Alert # 3 using a standard menu

(From: SCHOFIELD BARRACKS)

Unit	Night	Day
19th Infantry	1915	1815
21st Infantry	1930	0830
52nd Field Artillery	2005	0905
13th Field Artillery	2015	0915
63rd Field Artillery	2025	0925
11th Field Artillery	2035	0935
(Atchd)		
Hq Btry 24th Div Arty		
3rd Engineer Bn	2235	1135
(Atchd)		
Hq & MP Company 24th Division		
24th Signal Company		
24th Medical Battalion		
11th Quartermaster Bn.		





## 3. Delete the following from "SOP-24D":

Par. 1X(5) on page 5; par. 2X(5) on page 11; par. 3X(5) on page 15.  
By command of Brigadier General WILSON:

Arch A. Fall,  
ARCH A. FALL,  
Lieut. Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

## Distribution:

CG Haw Dept—2  
CG 25th Inf Div—1  
CG 24th Inf Div—1  
C/S 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G-1, 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G-2, 24th Inf Div—1  
AC of S G-3, 24th Inf Div—3  
AC of S G-4, 24th Inf Div—2  
CO, 24th Div Artillery—5  
CO, 19th Infantry—5  
CO, 21st Infantry—5  
CO, 24th Medical Bn—1  
CO, 3rd Engineer Bn—1  
CO, 24th Signal Co—1  
CO, Hq & MP Company—1  
CO, 11th QM Battalion—1  
CO, Schofield Bks.—1  
Ordnance Officer—2  
Chemical Officer—1  
Signal Officer—1

HEADQUARTERS 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H. 27 November 1941.

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

## SECTION I—GENERAL

Paragraph	Subject	Page
1	Purpose-----	1
2	Unit Procedures-----	1
3	Short Title-----	1
4	Division Headquarters-----	1
5	Tactical Principles-----	1
6	Security-----	1
7	Liaison-----	1
8	Orders-----	2
9	Movements-----	2
10	Anti-Aircraft Defense-----	2
11	Guides-----	2
12	Blackout-----	2
13	Installations and Alarm System-----	2
14	Supply-----	2.1
15	Evacuation-----	2.1
16	Traffic-----	2.1
17	Motor Transportation-----	2.2
18	Intelligence-----	2.3

## SECTION II

1	Alert No. 1-----	3
2	Alert No. 2-----	7
3	Alert No. 3-----	12

[1] *Restricted*

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

## SECTION I—GENERAL

1. *PURPOSE*: To save time in the preparation and issuance of orders. To minimize the chance for confusion and errors when under stress of combat and to simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the field.
2. *UNIT PROCEDURES*: Will be developed by subordinate units.
3. *SHORT TITLE*: "SOP-24D".

4. **DIVISION HEADQUARTERS:** Division Headquarters may operate in one or two echelons. When divided the composition will be generally as follows:

a. *Forward Echelon.*

Commanding General and Aide.  
General Staff (less G-1).  
Artillery Commander and Staff.  
Headquarters Commandant.  
Chemical Officer.  
Signal Officer.  
Engineer Officer (or his representative).

b. *Rear Echelon.*

G-1.

Special Staffless those in Forward Echelon.

5. **TACTICAL PRINCIPLES:** See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The tactical principles pertinent to the defense of our assigned sector are:

- a. Complete organization of the ground.
- b. Position to be held lightly.
- c. Mobile reserves with sufficient motor transportation.
- d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. **SECURITY:** Each commander is responsible for the security of his command at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5, Operations.

7. **LIAISON:**

a. When an alert is sounded a liaison officer from each of the following units will be sent at once to this headquarters:

19th Infantry.  
21st Infantry.  
24th Division Artillery.  
24th Signal Company.  
24th Medical Battalion.  
11th Quartermaster Battalion (Maneuver Officer if only one officer with battalion).  
Headquarters & Military Police Company.  
3rd Engineer Battalion.

[2] b. During operations Infantry Regiments will furnish a liaison officer to this headquarters.

c. Liaison responsibility will be from right to left and from front to rear.

d. The 24th Division Artillery will send a liaison officer, with transportation, as Division Liaison Officer to Department Headquarters. He will report to this headquarters for instructions prior to departure. This headquarters will be kept advised of the name of this officer.

8. **ORDERS:**

a. Unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders.

b. Competent stenographers, clerks, and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

c. Prior to the issuance of orders by any commander and when time is available, staff officers of the unit issuing an order will acquaint staff officers of the unit receiving the order with all details of the enemy situation, the situation of friendly troops, and such administrative matters as are known.

9. **MOVEMENT:**

a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized (standing if necessary, in which event appropriate guard rails or ropes will be used for troop safety).

10. **ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE:** This is the responsibility of every unit.

11. **GUIDES:** When a relief is to be effected, guides from the relieved unit will meet and remain with the incoming unit, until relieved by the commander of the incoming unit.

12. **BLACKOUT:** During blackouts, Regimental Commanders and separate unit commanders will take the necessary steps to assure that lights in their areas are promptly extinguished or used only in light-proof rooms or tents. "Blackout" flashlights and "blackout" vehicle lights will be used. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

13. **INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM:** During alerts all important installations not protected by Territorial Home Guards will be guarded by

troops. An adequate alarm system will be established by sub-sector commanders in connection therewith.

[2.1] 14. **SUPPLY:** (See Pars. 75-80, FM 100-10)

**a. SUPPLY AREAS—**

(1) *Schofield Areas:* All of Oahu north and west of the line LAE O KA OIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—at (97.9-91.0) KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE. (See Inclosure No. 4.)

(2) *Honolulu Area:* The remainder of OAHU and all outlying islands.

(3) *Detached Units:* Supplies (all classes), for a small unit of a command, when moved into different supply area, from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or the nearest DP.

**b. DEPOTS AND DISTRIBUTING POINTS.**—(See Inclosure No. 4 for designations and locations.)

**c. GASOLINE.—**

(1) Under any "Alert" all motor vehicles leaving the post except passenger cars, motorcycles and ammunition trucks, will carry the full allowance of filled gasoline *containers* (10 gallons). All vehicles will have full gasoline *tanks*.

(2) Distribution for all "Alerts" will be made from DP's at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT AND KANEOHE.

**d. AMMUNITION.—**

(1) Credits of an "initial issue" (Inclosure No. 5) and one "unit of fire" (Inclosure No. 6) of all types and calibers of ammunition are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of unit commanders whenever an "Alert" is ordered.

(2) The "initial issue" of *small arms* ammunition (less small quantities expended during current training) will be kept in unit storerooms at all times.

**e. WATER SUPPLY.**—Locally after inspection and approval of source by Unit Surgeon, or from any post or CITY OF HONOLULU water system.

15. **EVACUATION:**

**a. PERSONNEL.—**

(1) By 24th Medical Battalion to Station Hospital SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(2) The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared on call to evacuate personnel from non-divisional units operating in the North Sector.

**b. SALVAGE.**—During all "Alerts", to branch supply depots shown on Inclosure No. 4.

**c. PRISONERS OF WAR.—**

(1) Collecting points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SCHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Division Provost Marshal when directed.

16. **TRAFFIC:** During all "Alerts" traffic on OAHU is regulated by the Department Provost Marshal. The Division Provost Marshal will be prepared to assist the Department Provost Marshal when directed.

[2.2] 17. **MOTOR TRANSPORTATION:**

**a.** Infantry regiments will maintain current movement and loading tables showing:

(1) The number of vehicles within the unit and the number of men and amount of impedimenta which can be moved initially into position.

(2) The number of *additional* cargo vehicles, if any, which would be required to transport personnel, with their impedimenta, required for employment under Alert No. 2.

(3) The number of *additional* cargo vehicles which would be required to transport the entire unit, with its impedimenta, in a single movement.

**b.** Copies, in duplicate, of above tables will be furnished Division Headquarters when prepared initially and whenever changed.

[2.3] 18. **INTELLIGENCE—GENERAL**

Combat Intelligence has a wider meaning in the Hawaiian Department than in the usual combat zone. Here, it not only includes information of an enemy who may land by force and oppose us in open battle, but it also includes any and all information on sabotage and saboteurs, both actual and potential.

Within all units of the 24th Infantry Division there are especially trained intelligence personnel, as required in regulations, whose duty it is to look for information of all kinds on any enemy from outside the island, as well as possible sabotage or saboteurs on the island. This responsibility does not, however, rest on the intelligence personnel alone. Every officer and man in the 24th Infantry



Division will be constantly on the alert for any information of any enemy whatever, including subversive activities at any time, and will promptly report such information to his unit commander or unit intelligence officer.

[3]

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

## SECTION II—ALERTS

All defense measures, except in case of a surprise hostile attack, are classified under one of the three (3) ALERTS indicated below:

1. *ALERT NO. 1:*

*a.* This requires a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

*b. The 19th Infantry will—*

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.

(2) Protect all vital installations within its subsector unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified—

(a) The Command and Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).

(1) Huts 96, 97 and 105 by standing guards.

(2) Remainder by a system of patrols.

(b) Railway and highway bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).

(1) WAIMEA BAY Railway and Highway Bridge by standing guards.

(2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods over irregular routes.

(c) Telephone Exchanges in WAHIAWA, and LAIE by standing guards.

(d) Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, and KAHUKU by standing guards. (See Inclosure No. 3).

(e) Cold storage plants in WAHIAWA by standing guards.

(f) Water supply for SCOFIELD BARRACKS.

(1) KUTREE RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(2) KOOLAU RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(3) EAST PUMP RESERVOIR by standing guards.

(4) DEEP WELL by standing guards.

(5) Ditches and pipe line connecting the above mentioned installations by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

*c. The 21st Infantry will—*

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.

(2) Protect all vital installations within its subsector, unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified:

[4] (a) Command & Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).

(1) Hut 57, 102, 103 and 104 by standing guards.

(2) Remainder by a system of patrols.

(b) Railway and Highway Bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).

(1) ANAHULU RIVER Highway Bridge and TWIN BRIDGES by standing guards.

(2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.

(c) Telephone Exchanges in WAIALUA (in HALEIWA) by standing guards.

(d) Electric sub-stations in WAIALUA by standing guards (See Inclosure No. 3).

(e) Transformer station at MACOMB GATE by standing guards.

(f) Maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

*d.* The remainder of this Division, including troops not used by the 19th Infantry and 21st Infantry under paragraphs *b* and *c* above, will continue routine duties and training.

*e. ADMINISTRATION—*(1) *SUPPLY:*

(a) Except as noted below the existing procedures prescribed for the requisition, issue and distribution of all classes of supply in garrison will remain in effect.

(b) Class III (Gasoline and Lubricants). Distribution from DP's established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT, and KANEOHE. These supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks.

(c) Class V (Ammunition). In addition to the "initial issue" of small arms ammunition then in their possession, infantry units will draw  $\frac{1}{3}$  of their initial issue of grenades (equal proportions of H. E. and C. N.). Ammunition Reports (OFM Form 303) will be submitted upon call from the Division Ammunition Officer.

(2) *EVACUATION:*

(a) *Personnel.*—The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared to dispatch, on one hour's notice, two ambulances with drivers and a detachment of one officer and four enlisted men, on call from the infantry battalion which is being held in readiness. It will also be prepared to operate on ambulance shuttle between the point(s) of disturbance and SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, when directed.

(b) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting point initially at the Post Stockade, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, and at FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER and KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal assisted by Division Provost Marshal when directed.

[4.1] 1. *f. INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT No. 1.*—

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of sabotage and saboteurs to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured or deducted:

(a) Report damage by saboteurs. Where? When? How much? Explosives? Other means?

(b) Where are saboteurs?

(c) What are they doing? Are they on the move? Headed where?

(d) Are they organized? Do they appear to have a plan? Leaders?

(e) What weapons have they?

(f) Numbers and nationality? Report immediately.

(g) Any prisoners? Documents?

(h) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.

(i) Contacts with saboteurs?

(j) Any suspicious boats? Where, direction, type, distance, formation? Report when observed—thereafter report hourly.

(3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.

(4) *Intelligence Reports to the Division CP.*—

(a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?

(b) Initial observation or contact with saboteurs.

(c) Any major change in movement, tactics or numbers of saboteurs.

(d) Captured documents.

(e) Indications of spread of sabotage. Also any apparent plans or intentions.

(5) *Saboteur Prisoners.*—

(a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel.

(b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service.

(c) Any indications of use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.

[4.2] *Counterintelligence.*—

Every effort will be made to discover sabotage intent before it happens. Also to report the temper and morale of the civilian population.

(7) *Miscellaneous.*—

(a) Assemblies of provocateurs of any nationality, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions.

(b) Sea mines or captured equipment of any kind will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay.

(c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important information of sabotage or saboteurs will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.

[5] X. (1) *COMMAND POSTS:* Command Posts at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and in the field will operate continuously but with reduced strength after normal training hours.

(2) **MOVEMENTS:** All movements under this alert will be administrative with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles (See par. 31, FM 25-10).

(3) **THE TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD** when formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations *except* THE COMMAND and FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.

(4) **BLACKOUT:** As ordered at the time.

(5) **AMMUNITION:** Only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn (See Inclosure No. 4).

(6) **MOTOR PATROLS:**

(a) Motor patrols will operate either as single vehicles or in mutually supporting pairs of vehicles, in accordance with subsequent orders from subordinate headquarters.

(b) The mission of motor patrols will be to inspect and afford protection to certain parts of the Command and Fire Control Cable Systems, and certain Railway and Highway Bridges, and other installations as outlined in this alert. Patrols will check in with all standing guards on their routes.

(c) In the performance of the above mission, patrols will operate over irregular routes at irregular periods.

(d) Composition of single vehicle patrols:

<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Weapons</i>	<i>Ammunition</i>
1 Driver-----	1 Cal .30 MG-----	750 rounds Cal .30 MG am-
1 NCO-----	1 Riot Gun-----	munition, belt loaded.
3 Pvts-----	4 Rifles-----	24 brass cased shot-gun
	18 Tear Gas-----	shells.
	Grenades-----	144 rounds Cal. .30 rifle am-
		munition per rifle.

(e) Composition of two vehicle patrol:

Those will be mutually supporting and will be equipped with radio:

<i>Leading Vehicle</i>	<i>Rear Vehicle</i>
<b>Personnel:</b>	
1 Driver-----	1 Driver.
1 NCO-----	1 NCO.
2 Pvts-----	3 Pvts.
<b>Weapons:</b>	
1 Riot Gun-----	1 Cal .30 MG.
3 Rifles-----	5 Rifles.
18 Tear Gas Grenades-----	
<b>Ammunition:</b>	
24 brass cased shotgun shells-----	750 rounds MG ammunition, belt loaded.
144 rounds Cal. .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.	144 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.

(7) **STANDING GUARDS:** Standing guards will be placed as indicated under this alert. Their minimum composition will be as follows:

<i>Day</i>	<i>Night</i>
[6] <b>Personnel:</b>	
1 NCO-----	1 NCO
1 Pvt-----	3 Pvts.
<b>Weapons:</b>	
1 Riot Gun-----	1 Riot Gun.
1 Rifle-----	3 Rifles.
<b>Ammunition:</b>	
24 brass cased shotgun shells-----	24 brass cased shotgun shells.
66 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.	96 rounds Cal .30 rifle ammunition per rifle.

[7] 2. **ALERT NO. 2:**

a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than ALERT NO. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, will be provided.

b. *The 19th Infantry will—*

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.

(2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified—

(a) The Command and Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).

(1) Huts 96, 97 and 105 by standing guards.



- (2) Remainder by a system of patrols.
- (b) Railway and highway bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).
- (1) WAIMEA BAY Railway and Highway Bridge by standing guards.
- (2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods over irregular routes.
- (c) Telephone Exchanges in WAHIAWA, and LAIE by standing guards.
- (d) Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, and KAHUKU by standing guards. (See Inclosure No. 3).
- (e) Cold storage plants in WAHIAWA by standing guards.
- (f) Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
- (1) KUTREE RESERVOIR by standing guards.
- (2) KOOLAU RESERVOIR by standing guards.
- (3) EAST PUMP RESERVOIR by standing guards.
- (4) DEEP WELL by standing guards.
- (5) Ditches and pipe line connecting the above mentioned installations by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.
- c. The 21st Infantry will—*
- (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage within its sub-sector.
- (2) Protect all vital installations within its sub-sector, unless protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The most important of these are listed below and will be protected in the manner specified:
- (a) Command & Fire Control Cable System (See Inclosure No. 1).
- (1) Hut 102, 103 and 104 by standing guards.
- (2) Remainder by a system of patrols.
- (b) Railway and Highway Bridges (See Inclosure No. 2).
- [8] ANAHULU RIVER Highway Bridge and TWIN BRIDGES by standing guards.
- (2) Others by a system of patrols operating at irregular periods.
- (c) Telephone Exchanges in WAIALUA (in HALEIWA) by standing guards.
- (d) Electric sub-stations in WAIALUA by standing guards (see Inclosure No. 3).
- (e) Transformer Station at MACOMB GATE by standing guards.
- (f) Maintain one (1) battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
- d. The 24th Division Artillery will—*
- (1) Place the 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards, and when directed place ammunition at positions.
- (2) Release units manning seacoast armament (155mm GPF) to the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.
- e. ADMINISTRATION:*
- (1) *SUPPLY.*—
- (a) Except as noted below, the existing procedures prescribed for the requisition, issue and distribution of all classes of supply in garrison will remain in effect.
- (b) Class III (Gasoline and Lubricants). Distribution from DP's established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT and KANEOHE. These supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks, T. H.
- (c) Class V (Ammunition). In addition to the "initial issue" of small arms ammunition, infantry units will draw all of their "initial issue" of special infantry ammunition less grenades issued under Alert No. 1) (See Incl. No. 4a for schedule of issue). The Division Artillery will draw initially 1/5 of the "initial issue"; the balance (4/5), will be drawn after all guns and howitzers have been placed in position. Ammunition Reports (OFM Form No. 303) will be submitted upon call from the Division Ammunition Officer.
- (2) *EVACUATION.*—
- (a) *Personnel.*—The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared, when directed: To dispatch on one hour's notice two ambulances with drivers and a detachment of one officer and four enlisted men; to operate an ambulance shuttle between point(s) of disturbance and SCHOFIELD BARRACKS: to establish a collecting station in the vicinity of THOMPSONS CORNER (S6.95-04.20).
- (b) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting point initially at the Post Stockade, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, and at FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, and KANEOHE BAY. Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal assisted by Division Provost Marshal, when directed.
- (3) *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.*—
- (a) Should the organic transportation of infantry regiments be insufficient to



transport all personnel, with their impedimenta, which would be required for employment under Alert No. 2, the additional transportation, as reported in paragraph 17 a (2) Section I, will be provided as directed by Division Headquarters.

(b) The 11th Quartermaster Battalion will be prepared to dispatch, on one hour's notice, 20, 2½ ton trucks (or equal cargo and personnel capacity) when directed.

[8.1] *f. INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT NO. 2.*

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of the enemy or saboteurs to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured, or deduced:

(a) Boats? Where, direction, Type, distance, formation? Report when observed—thereafter report hourly.

(b) Report any landings or gathering of saboteurs or potential saboteurs.

(c) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, or saboteurs. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1800.

(d) Where is the enemy? What strength?

(e) What is he doing? Direction of movement?

(f) What weapons has he? Are saboteurs armed? How?

(g) Identifications? Unit or nationality? Report immediately.

(h) Any prisoners? Documents?

(i) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.

(j) Contacts with enemy?

(k) Planes? Where, direction, type and altitude.

(3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.

(4) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Quickest Means Available.*—

(a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?

(b) Initial observation or contact with enemy.

(c) Any major change in movement, tactics or strength of enemy.

(d) Captured documents.

(e) Identifications of new enemy units or saboteurs groups.

(5) *By Routine Means.*—

(a) Enemy front line (after initial contact)—Every 2 hours at 10 minutes before the even hour. Include boundaries between units wherever possible.

(b) Weather, visibility and surf reports on all favorable landing beaches at 0245, 0645, 1145, and 2145.

[8.2] (6) *Prisoners of War.*—

(a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the 24th Division Prisoner of War Enclosure at the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel especially selected for that purpose.

(b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service. Reports of captured material will be sent back in the same manner.

(c) Every enemy wounded prisoner, except the badly wounded, will be handled in a manner similar to the other prisoners. Badly wounded who cannot be moved, but who may have important information, will be promptly reported to the Division G-2.

(d) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.

(7) *Counterintelligence.*—

(a) Utmost care will be taken to conceal from enemy air observation, our own troop movements and establishments.

(b) If captured, your NAME, RANK, AND SERIAL NUMBER, is the only information you are required to give.

(c) Secret or confidential documents and codes will not be carried into forward areas.

(8) *Miscellaneous.*—

(a) Enemy parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions. Also include information on their arms and equipment, as well as their apparent state of training and organization.

(b) Enemy mines or beached boats or naval equipment will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay, since these will be handled by the Navy. They will not be destroyed by military personnel.

(c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.

[9] X. (1) **COMMAND POSTS:** Command Posts at Schofield Barracks and in the field will operate continuously but with reduced strength after normal training hours.

(2) **MOVEMENTS:**

(a) Movements under this alert will be tactical unless authorized specifically otherwise by this headquarters. Vehicles will be moved at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety, except that in convoys or by infiltration, the leading vehicle will move at not to exceed ten (10) miles per hour less than the maximum speed. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration (see par. 63, FM 25-10). The distance between vehicles will not be less than 300 yards.

(b) *Night Movements.*—

(1) Under blackout conditions, motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one way* secondary roads and cross country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads, the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

(2) When blackout conditions are not prescribed, vehicles may be run singly or in convoys with lights. Distances between vehicles will be consistent with safety and such as to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

(c) *Initial Road Priorities.*—

(1) 19th Infantry: LEWIS STREET—TRIMBLE ROAD—HEARD AVENUE—WAIANAE AVENUE—MACOMB ROAD—WAHIAWA—KARSTON—NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

63rd FA Bn.: REILLY AVENUE—WILLISTON AVENUE—CADET SHERIDAN ROAD—TRIMBLE ROAD—HEARD AVENUE—WAIANAE AVENUE—MACOMB ROAD—WAHIAWA—KARSTON—NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

13th FA Bn.: Same as 63rd FA Bn.

21st Infantry: 21ST INF FOOTBALL FIELD GATE.

52nd FA Bn.: MCMAHON RD—GULCH RD—ARTILLERY GATE—OLD KAM HIGHWAY.

11th FA Bn.: Same as 52nd FA Bn.

[10] (d) *Road Circulation Outside of Schofield Barracks.*—After H plus 6 military traffic of this Division returning to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS from the NORTH SHORE will come via THOMPSON'S CORNER—OLD KAM HIGHWAY—ARTILLERY GATE. Military traffic of this Division leaving SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for the NORTH SHORE will proceed via FUNSTON GATE or MACOMB GATE—WAHIAWA—NEW KAM HIGHWAY—TWIN BRIDGES.

(e) In general, trucks will move from one concealed position to another.

(f) *Control.*—

(1) (a) A *regulating point* will be prescribed by the headquarters ordering a truck movement.

(b) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the regulating point with unit guides. We will insure; that trucks are properly divided; that essential instructions are given; and that guides are furnished from the regulating point to unit entrucking points.

(2) (a) An *initial point* will be designated by the headquarters ordering the truck movement.

(b) Guides will move truck groups from entrucking points to the initial point.

(c) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the initial point to insure that truck groups pass the initial point at the proper time and in the prescribed order.

(g) *Entrucking and Detrucking Points.*—

(1) Entrucking or detrucking points will be selected by the unit being moved. They will be on side roads where possible, and well dispersed.

(2) Each entrucking group will be notified of the number of vehicles of each type available to it prior to their arrival.

(3) Entrucking groups will be assigned as vehicle loads prior to the arrival of the truck train.

(4) Guides will be used to lead entrucking groups to their proper trucks.

(5) Massing of trucks in the open is prohibited. Speed is essential and will be stressed in loading and unloading.

(h) *Markers or guides* will be placed at all points where the column might go astray or where congestion or delay might occur.

(i) *Safety Precautions*.—

(1) Maximum use will be made of overhead cover and dispersion in bivouac and assembly areas.

(2) During truck moves, guards will be stationed at the following points:

[11] (a) Railroad crossings.

(b) Turns into main highways.

(c) One-way obstacles.

(d) Points where secondary roads used by the truck column join or cross main highways.

(3) During the hours of darkness, trucks moving cross-country or on trails will—

(a) Have a guide who will assure that there are no men sleeping in the trucks' path.

(b) Not be moved until the driver has carefully examined the ground under his vehicle to see that there are no men asleep under it.

(c) Before backing, be furnished a guide who will warn the driver of obstructions in his path.

X. (3) *ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE*:

(a) All units not occupying front line positions will have their weapons in readiness to meet an air attack.

(b) On marches, suitable weapons will be mounted for AA fire. When an air attack is delivered, troops will detruck, disperse and fire at the planes. Any automatic weapons which cannot be quickly removed and fired will be fired from the vehicle.

(c) Unit commanders are responsible for the following:

(1) To maintain air guards for timely warning.

(2) Concealment through cover and camouflage to render enemy visual and photographic aerial reconnaissance useless.

(3) To have troops disperse quickly in order to render an air attack less effective.

(4) To report each hostile air attack.

(4) *BLACKOUT*: As ordered at the time.

(5) *AMMUNITION*: All units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, *except* that if Alert No. 2 is not preceded by Alert No. 1, then units will draw initially only, 1-5 of their "initial issue" and the balance after occupation of positions with organic and/or sector weapons. (See Inclosure No. 4).

(6) *TERRITORIAL HOME GUARDS*: When formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations *except* THE COMMAND and FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.

(7) *STRENGTH OF UNITS*: All units will maintain 50% of their strength, with due consideration to tactical organizations, (less those already operating under this alert) available at all times for such service as the situation may warrant.

[12] 3. *ALERT NO. 3*:

a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of assigned sectors.

b. *The 19th Infantry will—*

(1) Defend its assigned sub-sector according to current defense plans.

(2) Insofar as the situation will permit, protect vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sub-sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

c. *The 21st Infantry will—*

(1) Defend its assigned sub-sector according to current defense plans.

(2) Insofar as the situation will permit, protect vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sub-sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

d. *The 24th Division Artillery will—*

(1) Render Artillery support according to current defense plans.



e. All other units not mentioned will carry out their part of current defense plans.

f. (1) The forward echelon of this headquarters will occupy its command post.

(2) The rear echelon will continue to function at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS observing blackout conditions.

[12.1] g. ADMINISTRATION:

(1) SUPPLY:

(a) Class I (Rations).—

(1) A standard menu will be prescribed and issued by Post Quartermaster concerned, to all units, after H plus 24. Ration cycle will begin with supper. Initially all units will take into the field from their own stores, the unconsumed portion of the garrison ration and the equivalent of one field ration.

(2) *Distributing Points*: SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and FORT ARMSTRONG. Alternate DPs may be announced later.

(3) *Distribution*: Will be based on consolidated strength reports submitted by organizations to DIVISION HEADQUARTERS by 0700 daily.

(4) *Schedule of Issue*: (See Incl. No. 8).

(b) Class III (Gasoline and Lubricants): Distribution from DPs established at the nearest Army Post exclusive of CAMP MALAKOLE, FORT WEAVER, FORT BARRETTE, BELLOWS FIELD, MOKAPU POINT and KANEOHE. Additional DPs as announced. From DP at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, distribution will be made:

(1) To unit tankers when available.

(2) By the Quartermaster to unit DPs (filling stations at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS) when unit tankers are not available.

(3) To units other than those in (b) (1) and (2) above, by means of 5 and 10 gallon containers to be filled at the DP by unit personnel. All Class III supplies will be charged against budget credits established with the Quartermaster, Schofield Barracks.

(c) Class II and IV: DEPOTS

BRANCH	SCHOFIELD SUPPLY AREA	HONOLULU SUPPLY AREA
Quartermaster-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	FORT ARMSTRONG.
Medical-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	FORT SHAFTER.
Signal-----	FORT SHAFTER-----	FORT SHAFTER.
Chemical-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Engineer-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Ordnance-----	SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-----	HONOLULU (HOD)

(d) *Distributing Point for Class IV Supplies* (Engineer Intrenching Tools and Fortification Materials): SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and vicinity of THOMPSON'S CORNER (86.9-04.2). Credits at DPs will be announced separately to unit commanders concerned.

(e) *Class V Supplies*: (Ammunition) (See Memorandum "Supply of Ordnance Ammunition", HSB, November 17, 1941).

(1) DP for all units initially.—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot (except 240mm Howitzers).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types.—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot for all units in that area.

(3) The drawing of "initial issues" by all units will be completed by H plus 10.

(4) *Ammunition Reports*.—OFM Form 303 (see Incl. No. 9) will be submitted by unit Munitions Officers to the Division Ammunition Office (DAO) located initially in building 2131, Ordnance Area, Schofield Barracks, daily by 1900 for the period ending at 1800. The Division Artillery Munitions Officer will consolidate reports of all artillery battalions. If desired these reports may be telephoned (#8 or #296) and confirmed in writing within 3 hours.

(2) EVACUATION:

(a) Personnel:

(1) Collecting station: Initially in vicinity of THOMPSON'S CORNER (86.95-04.20). Preparations will be made to establish a collecting station in vicinity of BM 983 (96.3-13.90) when directed.

(2) [12.2] Preparations will be made to establish ambulance loading points at:

KAWAIHAPAI (78.00-06.00).

JUNCTION MOLULEIA ROAD AND CANE ROAD (82.00-06.00).

PUUIKI WOODS (84.65-06.60).

WAIALUA SCHOOL (86.70-06.90).



SOLDIERS BEACH (88.00-08.50).  
 KAWAILOA CAMP SITE (89.50-09.90).  
 ASHLEY (90.70-11.45).  
 KAWELA BAY (98.50-20.50).  
 LAIE BAY (08.00-15.50).

(3) Personnel of the 24th Medical Battalion will be used to augment Unit Medical Detachments in the evacuation of casualties to the ambulance loading points listed in (2) (a) (2) above.

(4) Evacuations to: Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) The 24th Medical Battalion will be prepared on call to evacuate personnel from non-divisional units operating in the North Sector.

(b) *Animals.*—

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS and South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER by provisional Veterinary Detachments when attached to the Division.

(c) *Prisoners of War.*—Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshal, when directed.

(3) *MOTOR TRANSPORTATION:*

(a) The organic transportation of each infantry regiment will be used for the movement of beach battalions to assigned tactical localities and the subsequent movement of other elements by shuttling, when necessary. Should the transportation of an entire unit by a single movement be directed, the required cargo vehicles, reported in paragraph 17 a (3) of SECTION I, will be provided as directed by Division Headquarters.

(b) By H plus 12 hours unit pools of motor vehicles will be established by infantry regiments, artillery battalions and the Engineer and Quartermaster battalions. These pools will consist of available tactical and administrative vehicles of 1½ ton and larger capacity, with a proportionate number of ½ ton or smaller vehicles for convoy control purposes. Unit administrative requirements will be reduced to a minimum and the full use made of unit trailers so that a maximum number of vehicles may be pooled.

(c) Each unit must meet its own requirements to the maximum extent with organic transportation. Calls on higher echelons will not be made until all means at the command of units have been exhausted.

(d) At H plus 12 hours and by 0700 daily thereafter a written report will be made to the Division Transportation Officer of the number, total personnel, and cargo capacity of vehicles, in each unit pool subject to Division or higher echelon dispatch. Such reports may be required at more frequent intervals by phone.

[12.3] *h. INTELLIGENCE FOR ALERT NO. 3:*

(1) Each unit of this division is charged with the continuous flow of information of the enemy to headquarters above, below and laterally from its own.

(2) All messages concerning the enemy should be checked to see that they include as much of the following information as can be observed, procured or deduced:

(a) Boats? Where, direction, type, distance, formation?

(b) Report any landings. Report at once any artillery—include caliber and identifications. Same for tanks.

(c) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(d) Where is the enemy?

(e) What is he doing? Direction of movement?

(f) What weapons has he? Artillery?

(g) Identifications? Unit? Report immediately.

(h) Any prisoners? Documents?

(i) Gas? When, where and type? Smoke? Report when observed.

(j) Contacts with enemy? Flanks?

(k) Planes? Where, direction, type and altitude.

(3) Such messages should include the time and place from which the observations were made.

(4) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Quickest Means Available.*—

(a) Report any acts of sabotage, or attempted sabotage. Location? Damage?

(b) Initial observation or contact with enemy.

(c) Any major change in movement, tactics or strength of enemy.

(d) Captured documents.

(e) Identifications of new enemy units.

(5) *Intelligence Reports to Division CP by Routine Means.*—

(a) Enemy front line (after initial contact—Every 2 hours at 10 minutes before the even hour. Include boundaries between units wherever possible.

(b) Weather, visibility and surf reports on all favorable landing beaches at 0245, 0645, 1145, 1645, and 2145.

(6) *Prisoners of War.*—

(a) All prisoners will be searched at once, examined by unit S-2's, and immediately sent to the 24th Division Prisoner of War Enclosure at the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks, where they will be questioned by G-2 personnel of both Department and Division especially selected for that purpose.

[12.4] (b) Every effort will be made to prevent destruction of documents by the prisoners. These documents will be forwarded to G-2 at the Division CP with the minimum of delay through the regularly scheduled messenger service. Reports of captured material will be sent back in the same manner.

(c) Every enemy wounded prisoner, except the badly wounded, will be handled in a manner similar to the other prisoners. Badly wounded who cannot be moved, but who may have important information, will be promptly reported to the Division G-2.

(d) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority, and will be relayed to Department G-2 with the minimum of delay.

(e) A liaison officer from the Office of the G-2 HHD will be assigned to the 24th Division Examining Station (which will be at the Prisoner of War Enclosure in the Post Stockade at Schofield Barracks) and he will assist the representative of the 24th Division G-2 and the North Sector Provost Marshall in examining the enemy personnel matériel, and documents, and in determining the destination of the information obtained.

(7) *Counterintelligence.*—

(a) Utmost care will be taken to conceal from enemy air observation, our own troop movements and establishments.

(b) If captured, your NAME, RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER, is the only information you are required to give.

(c) Secret or confidential documents and codes will not be carried into forward areas.

(8) *Miscellaneous.*—

(a) Enemy parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, as well as acts of sabotage or terrorism, will be reported without delay. Include location, time, numbers involved, damage, and probable intentions. Also include information on their arms, and equipments, as well as their apparent state of training and organization.

(b) Enemy mines or beached boats or naval equipment will not be destroyed, but will be reported without delay, since these will be handled by the Navy. They will not be destroyed by military personnel.

(c) In case wire circuits, radio, and other normal means of signal communications are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand—commandeering vehicles if necessary, or any other method commensurate with the value of the information.

[13] X. (1) *BANDS:* All bands will be released to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

2) *MOVEMENTS:*

(a) Movements under this alert will be tactical unless otherwise authorized by this headquarters. Vehicles will be moved at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety except that in convoys or by infiltration, the leading vehicle will move at not to exceed ten (10) miles per hour less than the maximum speed. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration (see par. 63, FM 25-10). The distance between vehicles will be not less than 300 yards.

(b) *Night Movements.*—

(1) Under blackout conditions, motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one way* secondary roads and cross country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads, the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

(2) When blackout conditions are not prescribed, vehicles may be run singly

or in convoys with lights. Distances between vehicles will be consistent with safety and such as to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. Territorial traffic regulations will be observed on highways off military reservations unless there are specific orders to the contrary.

(c) *Initial Road Priorities.*—

(1) 19th Infantry: LEWIS STREET-TRIMBLE ROAD-HEARD AVENUE-WAIAANAE AVENUE-MACOMB ROAD-WAHIAWA-KARSTON-NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

63rd FA Bn.: REILLY AVENUE-WILLISTON AVENUE-CADET SHERIDAN ROAD-TRIMBLE ROAD-HEARD AVENUE-WAIAANAE AVENUE-MACOMB ROAD-WAHIAWA-KARSTON-NEW KAM HIGHWAY.

13th FA Bn.: Same as 63rd FA Bn.

21st Infantry: 21ST INF FOOTBALL FIELD GATE.

52nd FA Bn.: McMAHON RD-GULCH RD-ARTILLERY GATE-OLD KAM HIGHWAY.

11th FA Bn.: Same as 52nd FA Bn.

[14] (d) *Road Circulation Outside of Schofield Barracks.*—

After H plus 6 military traffic of this Division returning to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS from the NORTH SHORE will come via THOMPSON'S CORNER-OLD KAM HIGHWAY-ARTILLERY GATE. Military traffic of this Division leaving SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for the NORTH SHORE will proceed via FUNSTON GATE OR MACOMB GATE-WAHIAWA-NEW KAM HIGHWAY-TWIN BRIDGES.

(e) In general, trucks will move from one concealed position to another.

(f) *Control.*—

(1) (a) A *regulating point* will be prescribed by the headquarters ordering a truck movement.

(b) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the regulating point with unit guides. He will insure: that trucks are properly divided; that essential instructions are given; and that guides are furnished from the regulating point to unit entrucking points.

(2) (a) An *initial point* will be designated by the headquarters ordering the truck movement.

(b) Guides will move truck groups from entrucking points to the initial point.

(c) An officer of the unit being moved will be stationed at the initial point to insure that truck groups pass the initial point at the proper time and in the prescribed order.

(g) *Entrucking and Detrucking Points.*—

(1) Entrucking or detrucking points will be selected by the unit being moved. They will be on side roads where possible, and well dispersed.

(2) Each entrucking group will be notified of the number of vehicles of each type available to it prior to their arrival.

(3) Entrucking groups will be assigned as vehicle loads prior to the arrival of the truck train.

(4) Guides will be used to load entrucking groups to their proper trucks.

(5) Massing of trucks in the open is prohibited. Speed is essential and will be stressed in loading and unloading.

(h) *Markers or guides* will be placed at all points where the column might go astray or where congestion or delay might occur.

(i) *Safety Precautions.*—

(1) Maximum use will be made of overhead cover and dispersion in bivouac and assembly areas.

(2) During truck moves, guards will be stationed at the following points:

[15] (a) Railroad crossings.

(b) Turns into main highways.

(c) One-way obstacles.

(d) Points where secondary roads used by the truck column join or cross main highways.

(3) During the hours of darkness, trucks moving cross-country or on trails will—

(a) Have a guide who will assure that there are no men sleeping in the trucks' path.

(b) Not be moved until the driver has carefully examined the ground under his vehicle to see that there are no men asleep under it.

(c) Before backing, be furnished a guide who will warn the driver of obstructions in his path.



**X. (3) ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE:**

(a) All units not occupying front line positions will have their weapons in readiness to meet an air attack.

(b) On marches, suitable weapons will be mounted for AA fire. When an air attack is delivered, troops will detruck, disperse and fire at the planes. Any automatic weapon which cannot be quickly removed and fired will be fired from the vehicle.

(c) Unit commanders are responsible for the following:

(1) To maintain air guards for timely warning.

(2) Concealment through cover and camouflage to render enemy visual and photographic aerial reconnaissances useless.

(3) To have troops disperse quickly in order to render an air attack less effective.

(4) To report each hostile air attack.

(4) **BLACKOUT:** All units will blackout unless ordered otherwise by this headquarters.

(5) **AMMUNITION:** All units will draw such of their "initial issue" not already on hand.

(6) **TERRITORIAL HOME GUARDS:** When formed may be ordered to relieve units from guarding vital installations except THE COMMAND and FIRE CONTROL CABLE SYSTEM. Orders will be issued separately for such reliefs.

(At this point in the exhibit there appears a map of the Island of Oahu showing communications installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 116, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[15a]

Inclosure No. 2

**Railroad bridges**

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W. of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0'	16'
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Wai'alua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	448'
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'



Inclosure No. 2—Continued

Railroad bridges—Continued

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10. 5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23. 5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22. 0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11. 0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22. 0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20. 0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30. 0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75. 0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115. 0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107. 0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55. 0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13. 0'	112'

[15b]

Inclosure No. 2

Highway bridges

PRIORITY I

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream	01. 95-84. 12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98. 25-82. 99
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 46-95. 68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 37-96. 75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa	87. 98-07. 98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea	92. 82-13. 52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95. 27-98. 92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93. 72-96. 96

PRIORITY II

13	Kam Highway over at Waialua	87. 78-06. 33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32. 45-70. 22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 06-04. 57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 12-05. 76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 52-06. 20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon	11. 76-76. 55
99	Kam Highway at Kabana Bay	14. 34-03-25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97. 79-95. 34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu	98. 56-82. 46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06. 82-80. 30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond	21. 04-89. 11

(A portion of Inclosure No. 2 is a map reflecting important installations on the Island of Oahu. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 117, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oahu showing electrical installations and will be found reproduced as Item No. 118, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 4

(Inclosure No. 4 is a map of the Island of Oahu showing supply and evacuation installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 119, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 5

*Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue*

Weapon	Arm or service	AP	No. of rds per weapon			
			Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	Eng		40			40
	FA		32	8		40
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.)	16	112	32		160
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28			40
	QM		40			40
	Sig		25			25
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	Others	30	105	15		150
	Eng	48	80	24		152
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.)	24	162	46		232
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28	8		40
	Sig		40			40
	MP		48			48
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	Others	30	105	15		150
	FA	960		240		1200
	Inf	60	992	120		1172
	QM	30	30	20		80
Machine gun, cal. .30	Others	150	525	75		750
	Eng	250	1500	250		2000
	HB (M1919A4)	500	3500	1000		5000
	Machine gun, cal. .30	Eng	250	1500	250	2000
WC (M1917A1)	Inf	675	4725	1350		6750
	Others	600	2100	300		3000
	Eng., Inf		28			28
Pistol, cal. .45	FA, QM, Sig, MP, others		21			21
	Machine gun, cal. .50	FA	600		150	750
HB	Inf	960		240	1200	
Shotgun	All				25	
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)	Inf				150	
Signals, ground (asstd)	Inf				25	
Lights, Very signal (assorted)	Sig. (Tri. Div. Co.)					30
	All				24	
37mm gun, M1916	Inf			240	240	
37mm gun, Antitank (M3)	FA	200			200	
	Inf	180		20	200	
60mm Mortar	Inf			120	120	
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar	Inf			132	150	
				Light Heavy	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D	All				#459	
75mm gun, Antitank	FA				#144	
155mm Howitzer	FA				#117	
155mm gun, M1918M1	All			100	100	
240mm How. M1918	FA			60	60	

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.  
 Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.  
 #Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and Normal Charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

Inclosure No. 6

Unit of fire (other than aircraft)

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle)	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal. .45		20			20
Submachine gun, cal. .45		160	40		200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	720		180		900
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)					150
Projector, signal ground (assorted)					25
Pistol, Very, MkIII.					24
37mm gun, M1916				120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3	84			36	120
60mm Mortar				400	400
81mm Mortar			light	234	300
3" Trench Mortar			heavy	66	300
75mm Field Gun			super normal	36	300
			reduced	150	
75mm gun, antitank	111			114	
105mm How				39	150
155mm How. M1918				225	225
155mm gun, M1918 M1				150	150
240mm How. M1918	112			38	150
				60	60

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Inclosure No. 7a

Issue schedule for special infantry ammunition (HE and pyrotechnics)

Organization Serial No.	Time to arrive at Amm C. P.	Magazine	No. of Containers and Types of Ammunition										Trucks			
			37mm			Mortar			Pyro.				Hand Gren. HE	No.	Cap.	
			M3 M' 16			60 mm 81 mm 3"			GD	V. P.	Hand Gren. HE	No.				Cap.
			AP	HE	HE	HE	HE M43	HE M45								
27th Infantry #1	H+1:00	2112											6	1	1½	
298th Infantry #1	H+1:15	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	
298th Infantry #2	H+1:35	2112	15	15	20	60	80	40	50		7	2	18	6	1½	
35th Infantry #1	H+1:55	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	
19th Infantry #1	H+2:15	2112				60	80	40	100		6	1	18	5	1½	
21st Infantry #1	H+2:35	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	
35th Infantry #2	H+2:55	2112	15	15	20	60	80	40	100		7	2	18	7	1½	
19th Infantry #2	H+3:15	2112	15	15	33						1	1		2	1½	
21st Infantry #2	H+3:25	2112	15	15	20						1	1		2	1½	
35th Infantry #3	H+3:35	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	
19th Infantry #3	H+3:55	2112				60	80	40	100		6	1	18	5	1½	
19th Infantry #4	H+4:15	2112				60	80	40	200		6	1	18	8	1½	
21st Infantry #3	H+4:35	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	
21st Infantry #4	H+4:55	2112				60	80	40			6	1	18	5	1½	

NOTE.—Priorities indicated above are for use during "Alerts". #2 and 3 may be changed at any time if a special situation so requires. Amounts indicated above are maximum requirements and are subject to change depending on the status of Depot Stocks.





OFM 303

This form is designed for use by artillery units; units below the division, corps troops; and army troops.

EXHIBIT No. 31 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[a] *Restricted*

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND,  
*Fort DeRussy, T. H., 26 November 1941.*

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure.

To:  
 Commanding General, 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA),  
 Commanding Officer, Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor,  
 Commanding Officer, Harbor Defenses of Honolulu,  
 Commanding Officer, Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay.

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.
2. Study of this document and Field Manual references therein is an inseparable part of the instruction and training of this command, and will be included in all officers' schools.
3. Each officer of this command will be furnished a copy of this "Standing Operating Procedure," which will be turned in to appropriate headquarters upon relief from duty in this command.

By command of Major General BURGIN:

Earl Fielding,  
 EARL FIELDING,  
*Major, Adjutant General's Department,*  
*Adjutant General.*

[b]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND,  
*Fort DeRussy, T. H., 26 November, 1941.*

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE  
 HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND

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[1]

## SECTION I—GENERAL

1. **PURPOSE.**—*a.* The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is:

(1) To simplify and abbreviate combat orders, expedite their transmission, and permit their being understood.

(2) To simplify and perfect the training of troops.

(3) To promote understanding and teamwork between the commander, staff, and troops.

(4) In general, to facilitate and expedite operations and eliminate confusion and errors. (Par. 56, FM 101-5.)

*b.* A "Standing Operating Procedure" should cover those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. (Par. 159, FM 100-5.)

2. **SHORT TITLE.**—"SOP HCAC" will simplify this Standing Operating Procedure.

3. **UNIT PROCEDURES.**—Conforming to "SOP HCAC", subordinate units will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

4. **COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.**—Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon; composition as follows:

*a.* **FORWARD ECHELON:**

Commanding General and Aides,

Chief of Staff,

Assistant Chief of Staff—G-2,

Assistant Chief of Staff—G-3,

Communications and Engineer Officer.

*b.* **REAR ECHELON:**

Assistant Chief of Staff—G-1,

Assistant Chief of Staff—G-4,

Ordnance Officer,

Headquarters Commandant,

Judge Advocate General.

5. **DOCTRINE AND TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.**—The BASIC DOCTRINE of successful coast defense is to detect the enemy prior to landing or while he is attempting to land. Should he gain a foothold all available means are employed to eject him and drive him back into the water, where his destruction is completed. (Par. 7, FM 31-10, Coast Defense.)

6. **SECURITY.**—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5. (Particularly applicable to "close-in" defense by all seacoast artillery and anti-aircraft units.)

7. **LIAISON.**—*a.* **OFFICERS:**

(1) During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer from this headquarters with motor transportation will be sent to Department Headquarters, and will remain thereat except when on a mission to this headquarters.

(2) The 25th Infantry Division will provide officer liaison at this headquarters.

*b.* **UNITS:** Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where Coast Artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

*c.* Liaison with the Inshore Patrol will be maintained by this headquarters through the Harbor Control Post.

[2] *d.* Liaison officers from the offices of Department G-2 and Division G-2 will be on duty at points where enemy activities demand special attention and will have authority to use the phrase "G-2 priority" in sending messages should circumstances require.

8. **ORDERS.**—*a.* Orders issued by this headquarters covering the action of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and attached troops will normally be brief written orders. (Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order to be confirmed later in writing.)

*b.* Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Commanding General's decisions or directives, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from this command.

*c.* To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters to include groupments.

9. *MOVEMENT.*—*a.* In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

*b.* Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

*c.* In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed.)

*d.* All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration. Vehicles will be dispatched singly at irregular intervals from concealed bivouac over a marked route leading to another concealed bivouac or assembly area. The rate of flow should approximate the traffic density in the general area where the movement is being made. The picture from the air should be one of normal traffic, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue headlights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys travelling closed up, with standard blackout or blue headlights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one-way* secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

*e.* All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized. When administrative movements are by large convoy, escorts will be provided by Department or Division Provost Marshal, and vehicles will be grouped in sections of not to exceed twelve vehicles. In administrative movements at night, all vehicles will use bright lights on highways unless otherwise directed by this headquarters.

10. *ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.*—*a.* Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5.

[3] *b.* All units will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense.

*c.* On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent, trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

*d.* All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attacks and observation, by dispersion of personnel and matériel when in bivouac or in position, and by increased speed during movement.

11. *INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.*—All important installations of this command will be guarded by troops; an adequate alarm system will be provided. (Alarms for air attack, close-in defense, and blackout are indicated.)

12. *GUIDES.*—*a.* In case any unit of this command is ordered to relieve another unit, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

*b.* Whenever a unit of this command is ordered to move to a new position in support of other troops, the commander of the supported unit will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting unit.

#### SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) alerts as indicated below. Operations under any alert will be initiated by a Coast Artillery Command order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack.

14. *ALERT NO. 1.*—*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.



b. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

c. The Commanding Officer, Harbor Defenses of Honolulu, will protect the Radio Beacon and Navy installations on Sand Island.

d. The Commanding Officer, Fort Shafter, will provide a guard for the rear Echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

e. All units will be prepared to assist promptly when directed, in suppression of civil disturbances.

15. *ALERT NO. 2.*—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub- [4] surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. This command and attached Field Artillery, will—

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations and posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. (For FORT SHAFTER see paragraph 15 g, below.)

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon and Navy installations on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

c. The Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor will—

(1) Operate the Pearl Harbor Groupment.

(2) Dispatch to position in the North Shore Groupment, such units as may be designated by this headquarters.

(3) Provide personnel for and operate the Harbor Control Post.

d. The Harbor Defenses of Honolulu will—

(1) Operate the Honolulu Groupment.

(2) Release antiaircraft detachments of 16th Coast Artillery and 55th Coast Artillery to the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA). (See GO #23, HCAC, October 30, 1941.)

(3) Provide seacoast searchlight units and command post personnel to operate with detachments of the Field Artillery in the operation of the North Shore Groupment.

(4) Protect Sand Island Installations as under Alert No. 1.

e. The Commanding Officer, Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay (when activated), will operate the Kaneohe Groupment.

f. The 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) will—

(1) Occupy all field positions, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu against enemy aircraft.

(2) Organize, operate and maintain the Antiaircraft [5] Intelligence System and a system for timely dissemination of intelligence (paragraph 20 d).

(3) Employ under its tactical control such Marine Corps antiaircraft units as may be made available.

(4) Operate under control of the Interceptor Command.

g. The FORT SHAFTER Station Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

e. (1) Each unit will establish the maximum CLOSE-IN defense of installations which can be provided with means available, and will be prepared to support beach and land defenses within range.

(2) Each unit will be prepared to screen lights to meet black-out conditions.

(3) Each unit will be prepared for defense against chemical attack.

(4) All installations will be camouflaged and camouflage discipline will be strictly enforced. Full advantage of natural cover will be taken.

(5) Requests for airplanes for the observation of fire and for photographic or practice missions will be made through this headquarters.



(6) Harbor Defense commanders will be prepared to communicate and cooperate with the nearest element of the inshore patrol. Hostile surface vessels will be taken under fire only under the following conditions:

- (a) Upon request from the inshore patrol.
- (b) When hostile offensive action (such as use of bombs, torpedoes, mines, or other ammunition) is observed.
- (c) After receipt of a verified report of hostile action.
- (d) Upon orders from this or Department Headquarters.
- (7) Seacoast searchlights will normally be kept out of action except—
- (a) When an enemy's presence has been detected by the inshore patrol or by observers on shore;
- (b) When identification of unknown vessels is required;
- (c) When necessary to assure commanders of the presence or absence of an enemy;
- (d) When required for use as barrier lights;
- (e) When it is necessary to illuminate targets for fire action. (Paragraph 12, FL 4-5, Seacoast Artillery Organization and Tactics).

16. **ALERT NO. 3.**—*a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

[6] *b.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will—

- (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
- (2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
- (3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
- (4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
- (5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
- (6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
- (7) Provide the Army personnel to operate the Harbor Control Post.
- (8) Release the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
- (9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER.
- (10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

*c.* Missions for Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command troops under Alert No. 3 are identical with missions under Alert No. 2 with the following exceptions:

- (1) Railway positions will be occupied as directed by this headquarters.
- (2) Each unit will be prepared to deliver fire in support of division troops.

SECTION III

17. *Conditions of Readiness under Alerts No. 2 and No. 3.*—

*a.* In order that this command may be prepared to meet any emergency which may arise while operating under conditions of Alerts No. 2 and No. 3, one of the **CONDITIONS OF READINESS** listed below will be maintained upon directions from this headquarters:

(1) **RATTLE CONDITION** ("**CONDITION OF READINESS**" No. 1).—One complete relief of personnel will be in readiness for immediate action at the battery, station or other installation to which assigned. Ammunition will be ready for instant use.

(2) **ALERT CONDITION** ("**CONDITION OF READINESS**" No. 2).—One complete relief of personnel will be in readiness to man all stations, batteries and other installations within five minutes. The following personnel will be maintained on the alert:

- (a) Three air guards at each antiaircraft gun battery.
- (b) One air guard at each antiaircraft machine gun.

[7] (c) During hours of darkness, when searchlights are in field positions, one observer at each searchlight.

(d) Personnel required to continue AAAIS wire and radio broadcasts, one man on each AAAIS receiver, and one observer at each AAAIS and seacoast observation station.

(e) At each command post, one telephone operator and one observer.

(f) At each groupment and group command post one officer or maneuver officer and such personnel as may be required in addition to (c).

(3) **READINESS CONDITION** ("**CONDITION OF READINESS**" No. 3).—Command Post, observation and communication and searchlight personnel will

be maintained as under the *ALERT CONDITION* ("*CONDITION OF READINESS*" No. 2) except that but one air guard per antiaircraft gun battery will be maintained. Other personnel will remain sufficiently close to the battery, station, or installation to which assigned to be able to man it within twenty minutes after being alerted. Powder which has been opened will be replaced in containers.

NOTE.—"*CONDITION OF READINESS*" No. 1 (*BATTLE CONDITION*), will be used for brief periods for training purposes only, except when the tactical situation demands its use. During maneuvers and field exercises, units in "*CONDITION OF READINESS*" No. 2 will be assumed to be "*READY FOR DRILL*" and may be so reported.

b. *IMPROVEMENT PERIODS*.—Depending on the situation, this headquarters may designate certain periods to be known as "*IMPROVEMENT PERIODS*" for necessary work, and for rest and recreation. A minimum of command post, guard, observation, and communication personnel will remain on duty. All arrangements will be such as to permit the unit to man its armament within three hours after being alerted. (Daylight hours will constitute normal "*IMPROVEMENT PERIODS*" for searchlight units.)

NOTE.—During designated "*IMPROVEMENT PERIODS*" at least half of the antiaircraft batteries will, unless otherwise directed by this headquarters, remain in "*READINESS CONDITION*." The Commanding General, 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), will so allocate "*IMPROVEMENT PERIODS*" to antiaircraft batteries as to secure the maximum defense of each area by those batteries held in "*READINESS CONDITION*."

#### SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The intelligence standing operating procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

19. *Essential Elements of Enemy Information*.—

a. Will the enemy attempt (without occupation) to destroy or neutralize NAVAL INSTALLATIONS at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES? If so, will his air attacks be accompanied by naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL INSTALLATIONS at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establishing bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

20. *Measures to Obtain Information*.—

a. The collection of information and the dissemination of intelligence by Coast Artillery organizations will be conducted in accordance with instructions given in Chapter 14, FM 4-5 (Seacoast Artillery Organization and Tactics), and in Chapter 9, FM 4-105 (Antiaircraft Artillery Organization and Tactics).

b. The commanding officers of all seacoast groupments are responsible for observing and reporting to this headquarters information concerning all water-borne traffic activity (naval or otherwise) visible in their respective Zones of Action.

c. The Commanding General, 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), will collect, evaluate and disseminate aerial intelligence. He will maintain a system for alerting antiaircraft units and for disseminating to interested agencies information concerning the arrival and departure of friendly aircraft.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) *Transmission of G-2 Information*:

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire

circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

(2) Blinker stations have been established for the purpose of communicating with the Inshore Patrol.

(3) Target locations will be reported to this headquarters by the unified grid system of the Hawaiian Islands; e. g., 55 AB 25.

#### 21. REPORTS.—

##### *Report of Alerts:*

a. Immediately upon receipt of an alert order, the commanding officer receiving it will verify the authenticity of the order for the alert.

[9] b. Harbor defense and regimental commanders, and the Commanding General, 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) will make the following reports to Headquarters Hawaiian Coast Artillery command in case of an alert ordered by this or higher headquarters:

(1) By telephone as soon as all units have reported in order and units with initial missions requiring departure from the post are ready for movement. The reports will furnish the following data:

(a) The source of alert order.

(b) The time of receipt of alert.

(c) The time when the command was fully alerted, and detachments ready to be dispatched to other commanders.

(2) Time all units are "IN ORDER" at positions.

(3) After recall from a test alert, a written report will be submitted indicating:

(a) Results of inspections made.

(b) Recommendations for correction of defects noted and for revision of plans.

##### *c. Periodic Reports:*

Combined G-2 and G-3 periodic reports will be submitted (normally by teletype) daily by Brigade and Groupment Commanders for the period 1800 to 1800, to reach this headquarters by 1930. Reports will summarize, in tabular form so far as possible, the results of important actions that have taken place during the period. A statement will be included listing important armament out of action, with an estimate of the time when repairs will be completed.

##### *d. Other Reports required:*

The 53d Coast Artillery Brigade and Groupment Commanders will report to this headquarters as follows:

(1) FLASH messages to G-2 (over intelligence line):

(a) FLASH messages immediately upon *initial* discovery of hostile naval vessels, giving target number, location, type, formation and course.

(b) FLASH messages upon *discovery* of landing boats, giving location, number, type and formation and the composition of supporting naval vessels.

(c) FLASH messages immediately upon *discovery* of attempt to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR or KANEHOE BAY.

(d) FLASH message immediately of enemy *use of chemicals*.

(e) FLASH message (SEACOAST) *When action is begun* by either hostile naval vessels or seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels firing and areas being fired upon, or batteries firing and location and type of targets. See form #2, Inclosure No. 1

(2) FLASH message (SEACOAST) to map board (over intelligence line):

[10] Subsequent reports of targets reported under paragraph 21 d (1) (a) every 15 minutes or when an important change in direction or composition takes place. See Form #3, Inclosure No. 1.

(3) Ordinary message to G-2 (over intelligence line):

(a) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(b) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. (*No other action*, i. e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately.)

(4) Ordinary message to G-2 (by teletype or telegraph):

(a) Report upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy air force, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked and damage to enemy airplanes.

(b) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damages due to chemical agents. Reports of minor damage will be made daily at 1900. The Commanding General, 53d Coast Artillery Brigade



(AA), will make report both to G-2, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and to G-2, Hawaiian Department. (Report to Hawaiian Department will be by messenger.)

(c) Report as soon as practicable upon *completion of action* giving damage inflicted on hostile capital ships and transports. See Form #1, Inclosure No. 1.

(5) Visibility Reports at 0345, 0645, 1145, 1645, and 2145 (normally by teletype or telegraph). See Forms #4 and #5, Inclosure No. 1.

d. Summaries will be distributed from this headquarters at such times as may be deemed necessary.

e. Time will be expressed by the 2400 hour clock system.

#### SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

22. **SUPPLY.**—(See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).

##### a. SUPPLY AREAS:

(1) Schofield Supply Area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO-PUU KAAUMAKUA-KIPAPA STREAM-KAMEILAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9-91.0)—KAMEILAMEHA HIGHWAY-PEARL CITY JUNCTION-PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU.

b. **CLASS I SUPPLIES** (rations); including QMC class II and IV:

Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area.—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONOLULU.

[11] (1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Department Quartermaster) by 0800 daily.

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Department Quartermaster and G-4, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.

##### c. **CLASS III SUPPLIES:**

(1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers *filled*. Replenishment will be made in the following manner:

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, will establish D. P.'s at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area, except for units at MALAKOLE.

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish D. P.'s at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area.

(c) MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE will establish a D. P. at their respective posts for the supply of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.

(d) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the D. P. nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.

(e) Normally, the supply of gasoline from D. P.'s will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.

(f) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the D. P. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.

##### d. **CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES** (except Quartermaster Corps).—

###### (1) *Medical Supply:*

Schofield Supply Area.—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area.—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

[12] (2) *Signal Supply.*—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(3) *Chemical Supplies.*—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.



(4) *Engineer Supplies.*—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUCER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARNETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at D. P.'s will be announced separately to commanders concerned.

(5) *Water Supply.*—Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY OF HONOLULU water systems.

(6) *Ordnance Supply* (other than ammunition class V).—

Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and hop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

c. CLASS V SUPPLIES:

(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types.—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (see (3) below).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types.—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)

(3) 8-inch railway and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 3 and 4 herewith.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be arranged by this headquarters between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.

Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.

Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn. The following ammunition is reserved especially for use during Alert No. 1:

(a) Each battery armed with the rifle; two (2) boxes caliber .30 (ball in bandoliers) ammunition. In addition each such organization which is provided with caliber .30 machine guns with ground tripod mounts will man two machine guns and will reserve two (2) boxes caliber .30 MG (ball in cartons) ammunition for use therewith.

[13] (b) Each battalion; one (1) box caliber .45 pistol (ball in cartons) ammunition.

(7) Pending issue, storage of reserved small arms ammunition must conform rigidly to the normal requirements of ammunition storage and to the following:

(a) Only complete boxes of ammunition are to be issued.

(b) During such storage the seals of ammunition boxes will not be broken.

(c) This ammunition will not be issued for target practice.

(d) The edges of the ammunition boxes will be painted on orange color and in such manner as to avoid obscuring identifying markings on the boxes.

(e) Complete boxes will be replaced whenever necessary by post Ordnance Officers. Old stocks will be used for target practices, and replaced by new ammunition when necessary.

(8) In case the situation should require it, the Department Commander will make available a supply of grenades and shotgun ammunition.

(9) Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

f. *General.*

(1) Gas masks on hand at each post will be held available for prompt use upon receipt of further instruction.

(2) Tentage on hand at each post will be held available for prompt use.

23. *EVACUATION.*—

a. *PERSONNEL:* By the Surgeon, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command (Collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.

**b. SALVAGE AND CAPTURED MATERIAL:**

To supply points designated in paragraph 22, above, for services indicated.

**c. PRISONERS OF WAR:**

Collecting Points.—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEHOE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

**24. TRAFFIC.—**

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

**25. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.—**

**a.** Utmost economy in the use of motor vehicles of all kinds will be exercised by all concerned.

**b.** The assignment of motor transportation for one specific purpose will be the exception. Motor vehicles used for transportation incident to initial deployment which can be released will be returned to home stations promptly.

**c.** When Alert No. 2 or 3 is put into effect, all attached motor transportation is automatically released to parent organization. All motor transportation, other than tractors, special vehicles and those required for immediate needs, which are assigned to subordinate units will be pooled under direction of 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), Harbor Defense and North Shore Groupment Commanders. Detached units will be provided with sufficient transportation from these pools to effect their normal supply including ammunition. Brigade, Harbor Defense, and North Shore Groupment Commanders will furnish transportation for ammunition and other supplies from supply points to their subordinate units. When transportation within their pools is inadequate to provide for their needs, request for additional transportation will be submitted to this headquarters.

**d.** Current movement and loading tables will be maintained at each pool as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9, above and Inclosure No. 2.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position, which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved. See Inclosure No. 2.

**e.** Notice of Movement (under Alert No. 1 only):

Duplicate copies of all March Tables or Entraining Tables will be furnished to the Department Provost Marshal and contemplated movements in excess of four vehicles will, if practicable, be reported directly to the same authority by telephone, or telegraph, at least three hours before the movement is to begin. (See Par. 24 above.)

**f.** Maintenance of Routes:

Elements of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command will maintain all trails leading to Fire Control Stations, observation posts and search-light positions manned by them, and other roads and trails specifically assigned to them for maintenance.

**26. MISCELLANEOUS.—**

**a.** Stragglers will be controlled by the Infantry Divisions.

**b.** Mail: Normal distribution to Army posts, thence to groupments and subordinate units as directed by commanding officers.

**c.** Shelter: Barracks and quarters will be used wherever practicable.

**d.** Combat units drawing ammunition and engineer supplies will furnish the personnel for loading them at supply points until civilian personnel are made available for this purpose.

**c.** Periodic Reports:

(1) Rendered by: Groupment Commanders (and Commanding General, 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA)).

[15] (2) Data to be included in reports:

G-1: Daily Strength returns.

G-2 and G-3: As prescribed by paragraph 21b.

G-4: Ammunition Expenditure Reports. (May be made by telephone)

(Direct to Department by 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) with copy to this headquarters) See Inclosure No. 5.

(3) Periods to be covered in reports:

G-1: 0001 to 2400.

G-2, G-3, and G-4: 1800 to 1800 (except for Daily Movement and Loading Tables. See paragraph 25d (2), above).

(4) Reports to reach Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command Headquarters by:  
G-1: 0600.

G-2, G-3, and G-4: 1930 (except for Daily Movement and Loading Tables.

See paragraphs 25d (2), above.)

27. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL.—

a. All personnel detailed on special duty of a nature not essential to the purpose for which an alert is called will be relieved from such duty at once and be made available for alert duty. All other special duty men will be alerted, equipped, and instructed to continue their routine duties as well as to meet the exigencies of the emergency.

b. The equipment to be taken into the field by troops to meet a situation for which an alert has been ordered will depend upon the nature of the emergency. Individuals will be equipped according to the nature of the duties they will perform. Units will normally assemble with the small arms which are included in the equipment of the individual, and will be prepared to draw at once the ammunition reserved for use in emergencies.

By command of Major General BURGIN:

R. M. Perkins,  
R. M. PERKINS,  
Colonel, C. A. C.,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

Official:

James C. Bates,

JAMES C. BATES,

Lt. Col., C. A. C.,

Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Inclosures:

No. 1—G-2 Forms #1-#6, inclusive.

No. 2—Movement and Loading Tables.

No. 3—Allowances of Ammunition.

No. 4—Units of Fire.

No. 5—Ammunition Expenditure Report.

Form No. 1—Inclosure 1

BATTERY OUT OF ACTION REPORT

From: Pearl Harbor To: H. C. A. C. Date: -----

REPORTING BATTERY OUT OF ACTION

Btry	Time report made	Ceased firing time	At target			Ammunition		Damage to enemy	Enemy's action
			No.	Type	Location	No.	Kind		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Closson.....	1745	1738	P4	BB	55FB98	50	AP	Destroyed	None.

NOTE.—This message to be transmitted by teletype or by phone to G-2 clerk.

Form No. 2—Inclosure 1

BATTERY IN ACTION REPORT

From: N. S. To: H. C. A. C. Date: -----

REPORTING BATTERY IN ACTION

Time report made	Battery	Commenced firing time	At target		
			No.	Type	Location
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1814.....	Puuiki.....	1801.....	T4.....	CC.....	55CJ13

NOTE.—This message to be transmitted by phone to G-2 clerk.

## Form No. 3—Inclosure 1

## NAVAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

## FLASH MESSAGE

From : Honolulu To : H. C. A. C. Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Msg. No.	Designation	Target No. and type	Ident.	Location	Direction	Time	Remarks
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	E-1	8BB	NM	55HA43-----	W	0614	

NOTE.—This message should be transmitted by phone to the Map Board Operator. It is not necessary to repeat the column headings. *Important* initial report of enemy to G-2 direct by phone *immediately*.

## Form No. 4—Inclosure 1

## VISIBILITY REPORT (SEACOAST)

From : Pearl Harbor To : H. C. A. C. Date : \_\_\_\_\_ Hour : \_\_\_\_\_

Shore	Sea	Wind MPH	Wind Dir.	Visability
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N-----	Heavy-----	5	N	5,000
E-----	Mod-----	10	E	10,000
S-----	Calm-----	15	S	20,000
W-----		20	W	40,000

NOTE 1.—The above entries are furnished as examples of the information desired in each column.

NOTE 2.—This message should be transmitted by teletype or by phone to G-2 clerk.

## Form No. 5—Inclosure No. 1

## VISIBILITY REPORT (ANTIAIRCRAFT)

From : \_\_\_\_\_ To : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_

Clouds	Ceiling	Atmosphere	Wind	Wind direction	Visability
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Overcast-----	Unlimited-----	Rainy-----	Stormy-----	N N E E-----	Good.
Scattered-----	High-----	Hazy-----	Moderate-----	SE S SW-----	Fair.
None-----	Medium-----	Clear-----	None-----	W N W-----	Poor.
	Low				
	Zero				

## Form No. 6—Inclosure 1

## G-2, G-3, G-4 JOURNAL, HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND

From : \_\_\_\_\_ To : \_\_\_\_\_ Page No. \_\_\_\_\_

Serial No	M/Cen No	Time	From	To	Incidents, messages, orders, etc.



Inclosure No. 2

Maneuver:

Inclosure No. ....

Date: .....

*\*Initial \*Daily movement and loading tables, H. C. A. C.*

(1) Unit	(2) ¼-Ton pick-up		(3) ¼-Ton Weapons C.		(4) ½-Ton C. & R.		(5) 1½-Ton		(7) 2½-Ton		(7) 4-Ton		(8) 6 & 7½-Ton		(9) Miscellaneous		(10) Total		
	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	Tons	Men	
H. D. of P. H.																			
H. D. of HON.																			
HD of Kaneohe Bay																			
North Shore Gpnt.																			
53rd CA Brigade																			
64th CA																			
95th CA																			
97th CA																			
98th CA																			
251st CA																			
Totals																			

\*Strike out inappropriate word.

2. Instructions:

- a. Each harbor defense S-4 will render consolidated reports for all units of their respective harbor defense except those attached or assigned to the North Shore Groupment for which consolidated reports will be submitted by S-4, North Shore Groupment as a daily report after deployment. Initial reports by harbor defenses will include all vehicles to be used in deploying units assigned to the North Shore Groupment.
- b. Reports for units of the 53rd CA Brigade will be collected and submitted by S-4, 53rd CA Brigade, broken down by units as listed above.
- c. INITIAL reports will include all available vehicles; DAILY reports will include all available vehicles less minimum requirements for administrative purposes.
- d. INITIAL reports will be submitted *at once in writing*. Material changes affecting *initial* reports will be submitted in writing (revised report) as changes occur.
- e. DAILY reports will be submitted to G-4, HCAC, by 0900 (by telephone or teletype) daily after deployment has been accomplished and written record of these reports will be referred to by all reporting officers.
- f. DAILY reports will be submitted by columns: EXAMPLE: \*COLUMN ONE, HD of PH; COLUMN TWO, FOUR TONS, TWENTY FOUR MEN; etc.\*
- g. Periods to be covered by daily reports will be from 0730 to 0750.

## Inclosure No. 3

NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

*Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon for initial issue H. C. A. C.*

Weapon	No. of rds. per weapon			HE	Total
	AP	Ball	Tracer		
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	25	140	20		185
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	25	140	20		185
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	60	560	60		680
Machine gun, cal. .30 WC (M1917A1) (AW Bn)	7200		1800		9000
Machine gun, cal. .30 WC (M1917A1) (except AW Bn)	3600		900		4500
Pistol, cal. .45		28			28
Machine gun, cal. .50 WC (AA) (AW Bn)	5760		1440		7200
Machine gun, cal. .50 WC (AA) (except AW Bn)	2880		720		3600
Grenades, hand, frag		(per approved project)			
Lights, Very signal (assorted)					24
37mm gun, Antiaircraft	180			1620	1800
3" AA mobile	15			285	300
90mm AA mobile	12			238	250
3" AA fixed				300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1				100	100
8" Ry. Gun	85				85
Shell, shotgun, 12-gauge					25
<i>Fixed Seacoast Artillery</i>					
3" gun, M1903				505	505
6" gun	1000				1000
8" gun	350			200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)	335				335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)	275				275
12" Mortar	300				300
14" gun	280				280
16" gun	250				250

NOTE.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

## Inclosure No. 4

NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

*Unit of fire H. C. A. C.*

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal. .45		20			20
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries)	1920		480		2400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)	960		240		1200
Pistol, Very, MkIII					24
37mm gun, antiaircraft	60			540	600
3" AA gun, mobile	15			285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile	12			238	250
3" AA gun, fixed				300	300
155mm gun, M1918 M1	112			38	150
8" Ry Gun	85				85

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Hawaiian Department in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Form Ord 101-B

Ammunition expenditure report of -----

AER-B

From: -----  
To: -----

PERIOD COVERED  
From: -----  
To: -----

Item No.	Ammunition for Field Artillery, Mobile, AA & Ry Arty. (Complete rounds except as noted)	A	B	C	D	E
		Previous balance	Receipts	Total	Expended	Balance end of period
1	Shell, HE, Mk. I, reduced charge 75 mm G., unfuzed					
2	Shell, HE, Mk. I, 75 mm G., unfuzed					
3	Shell, smoke, Mk. II, 75 mm G., unfuzed					
4	Shell, gas, persistent, HS, Mk. II, 75 mm G., unfuzed					
5	Shrapnel, fixed, Mk. I, 75 mm G.					
6	Shell, HE, Mk. I, 155 mm How., unfuzed					
7	Shell, smoke, Mk. II, 155 mm How., unfuzed					
8	Shell, gas, persistent, Mk. II, 155 mm How., unfuzed					
9	Shrapnel, Mk. I, 155 mm How.					
10	Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3					
11	Shell, HE, Mk. III, 155 mm gun, unfuzed					
12	Shell, HE, Mk. III, 240 mm How., unfuzed					
13	Shell, AP, 260-lb., 8" gun					
14	Shell, HE, 200-lb., 8" gun, unfuzed					
15	Shell, DP, 700-lb., 12" mortar					
16	Fuze, PD, M47 or Mk. III (long)					
17	Fuze, PD, Mk. IV, short delay (short F. A.)					
18	Fuze, PD, Mk. IV, star, short delay (short C. A.)					
19	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .45, M1911					
20	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .30, Grade AC					
21	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .30, Grade NG					
22	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1, Grades AC, AC or R, & R & AC					
23	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1, other grades					
24	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1906 or M2					
25	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. .30, Grade AC					
26	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. .30, Grade MG					
27	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .50					
28	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .50					
29	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. .50					
30	Link, metallic belt, Cal. .50					
40	Shell, HE, 37 mm AA gun					
41	Shell, AP, 37 mm AA gun					
50	Shell, HE, 90 mm AA gun					
51	Shell, shotgun, 12-gauge					

See reverse side for instructions.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

1. The report will be rendered daily by unit munitions officers to the Ordnance Supply Officer of the next higher echelon, to cover 24-hour periods designated by local commanders.

2. "Previous balance" is taken from Column "E" of previous report, or as the initial issue on first report.

3. Leave entry blank where "no change" has occurred.

4. Round numbers (not precise figures) may be used in reporting small arms ammunition.

5. Where required, telephone, telegraph, or teletype report in code, with confirmation copy to follow, may be used as indicated below:

Assume 64th CA at 0001 November 15 had ordered 1200 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3 and 6,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. During the following 24 hours they drew from the ammunition supply depot 200 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3, and 1000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50: Their total ammunition available during the period was 1400 shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3, and 7,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. During the same period they expended 400 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 and M3, and 2,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. The telegraphic report covering the 24-hour period would be: AERB 64 CA 1516 10 A1200 B200 C1400 D400 E1000 28 A6000 B1000 C7000 D2000 E5000. The verification on Form Ord 101-B would show:

*Ammunition expenditure report of 64th Ca (AA)*

AER-B

From: 64th CA (AA)  
To: 53rd CA Brigade (AA)

PERIOD COVERED  
From: 1800 May 15, 1941  
To: 1800 May 16, 1941

Item No.	Ammunition for Field Artillery, Coast Artillery (TB, AA, RR) (Complete rounds except as noted)	A	B	C	D	E
		Previous Balance	Receipts	Total	Expended	Balance End of Period
10	Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3.....	1200	200	1400	400	1000
28	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .50.....	6000	1000	7000	2000	5000

Form 101-C

*Ammunition expenditure report of -----*

AER-C

From: -----  
To: -----

PERIOD COVERED  
From: -----  
To: -----

Item No.	Ammunition for fixed seacoast and fixed anti-aircraft artillery (Complete rounds except as noted)	A	B	C	D	E
		Previous balance	Receipts	Total	Expended	Balance end of period
1	Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1917.....					
2	Shell, HE, 3" (15-pdr.), M1903.....					
3	Shell or shot, AP, 6" gun.....					
4	Shell, AP, 260-lb., 8" gun.....					
5	Shell, HE, 200-lb., MK. I, 8" gun, unfuzed.....					
6	Shell, DP, 700-lb., 12" mortar.....					
7	Shell, DP, 824-lb., 12" mortar.....					
8	Shell, DP, 1046-lb., 12" mortar.....					
9	Projectile, AP, 975-lb., 12" gun.....					
10	Projectile, AP, 1070-lb., 12" gun.....					
11	Projectile, AP, 1400-lb., 14" gun.....					
12	Projectile, AP, 1560-lb., 14" gun.....					
13	Projectile, AP, 2100-lb., 16" gun.....					
14	Projectile, AP, 2340-lb., 16" gun.....					
15	Fuze, B. D., M46 or MK. III (long).....					
16	Fuze, B. D., MK, IV Star, short delay (short, C. A.).....					
17	Cartridge, ball, cal. .45, M1911.....					
18	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .30, Grade C.....					
19	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .30, Grade MG.....					
20	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1, Grade AC, AC or R, and R&C.....					
21	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1, other grades.....					
22	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .30, M1906 or M2.....					
23	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. 30, M1, Grade AC.....					
24	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. 30, M1, Grade MG.....					
25	Cartridge, AP, Cal. .50.....					
26	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .50.....					
27	Cartridge, tracer, Cal. .50.....					
28	Link, metallic bolt, Cal. .50.....					
40	Shell, H. E., 37 mm AA gun.....					
41	Shell, AP, 37 mm AA gun.....					
51	Shell, shotgun, 12-gauge.....					

(See instructions on reverse side.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

1. The report will be rendered daily by unit munitions officers to the Ordnance Supply Officer of the next higher echelon, to cover 24-hour periods designated by local commanders.
2. "Previous Balance" is taken from Column "E" of previous report, or as the initial issue on first report.
3. Leave entry blank where "no change" has occurred.
4. Round numbers (not precise figures) may be used in reporting small arms ammunition.



5. Where required, telephone, telegraph, or teletype report in code, with confirmation copy to follow, may be used as indicated below:

Assume 64th CA at 0001 November 15 had ordered 1200 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3 and 6,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. During the following 24 hours they drew from the ammunition supply depot 200 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3, and 1000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. Their total ammunition available during the period was 1400 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3, and 7,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. During the same period they expended 400 Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 and M3, and 2,000 Cartridges, ball, Cal. .50. The telegraphic report covering the 24-hour period would be: AERB 64 CA 1516 10 A1200 B200 C1400 D400 E1000 28 A6000 B1000 C7000 D2000 E5000. The verification on Form Ord 101-B would show:

*Ammunition expenditure report of 64th Ca (AA)*

AER-B

From: 64th CA (AA)  
To: 53rd CA Brigade (AA)

PERIOD COVERED  
From: 1800 May 15, 1941  
To: 1800 May 16, 1941

Item No.	Ammunition for Field Artillery, Coast Artillery (TB, AA, RR) (Complete rounds except as noted)	A	B	C	D	E
		Previous Balance	Receipts	Total	Ex-pended	Balance End of Period
10	Shell, HE, 3" AA guns, M1918, M1 or M3... ---	1200	200	1400	400	1000
28	Cartridge, ball, Cal. .50.....	6000	1000	7000	2000	5000

EXHIBIT NO. 32 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[a] *Restricted*

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.*

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure

To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July 1941.

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop,  
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,  
*Colonel, A. G. D.*  
*Adjutant General.*

1 Inclosure: SOP HD.

[b]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
*Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.*

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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[1]

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

## HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

## SECTION I—GENERAL

1. *PURPOSE*.—The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 159, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

2. *UNIT PROCEDURES*.—Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

3. *SHORT TITLE*.—"SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. *DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS*.—Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. *FORWARD ECHELON*.—

Commanding General and Aides.  
 General Staff (less G-1 and G-5).  
 Secretary to General Staff.  
 Engineer Officer.  
 Signal Officer.  
 Chemical Officer.  
 Ordnance Officer.  
 Surgeon.  
 Headquarters Commandant.  
 Provost Marshal.

b. *REAR ECHELON*.—

G-1.  
 G-5.  
 Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. *TACTICAL PRINCIPLES*.—See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground

b. Position to be held lightly

c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them.

d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *SECURITY*.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

7. *LIAISON*.—a. *OFFICERS*.—During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

24th Infantry Division.

25th Infantry Division.

[2] Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command

Hawaiian Air Force

86th Observation Squadron

Each Department Reserve Unit.

b. **UNITS.**—Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

8. **ORDERS.**—*a.* The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.

*b.* Orders issued by the Department (except as in *c* below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.

*c.* Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

*d.* To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. **MOVEMENT.**—*a.* In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

*b.* Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

*c.* In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).

*d.* All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25-10, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized.

*e.* All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.

*f.* Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one-way* secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

[3] *g.* Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. **ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE.**—*a.* Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5.

*b.* All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

*c.* On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

*d.* All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of



personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

11. *INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.*—All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.

12. *GUIDES.*—*a.* In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

*b.* Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.

#### SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 *f* (8) below.

14. *ALERT NO. 1.*—*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

*b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

*c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

*d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will—

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

[4] (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below.

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1.

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAI AU Generating Plant.

Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 *j* below.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will—

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will—

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 *g* below.

*g.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will—

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

*h.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will—

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.



(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations

[5] (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 *d* (3) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

15. ALERT NO. 2.—*a*. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

*b*. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

*c*. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

*d*. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will—

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 *h* (2) below.

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1.

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAI'AU Generating Plant.

Telephone exchanges at WAIPA'U, WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA (in HALELWA), LAIE and KANE'OE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO—WAHIAWA—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPA'HULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[6] (6) Place 240-mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155-mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 *e* below.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 *l* below.

*e*. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will—

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and anti-aircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and anti-aircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

- (7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
- (8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
- (9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
- (10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will—

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

*g.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

*h.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will—

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).

*i.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will—

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

[8] *l.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

16. ALERT NO. 3.—*a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions

by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

*b.* At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS :

(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 *a*) will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 *b*) will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

*c.* DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

*d.* Each INFANTRY DIVISION will—

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

*e.* The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field Artillery, will—

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and anti-aircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

[9] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For PORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and anti-aircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

*f.* The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will—

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commander. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 *e* (8)

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

*g.* G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) A Food Administration.

(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

*h.* The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the district, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

*i.* The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will—

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.



(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

[10] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

*j.* The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include—

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBOR.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

*k.* The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will—

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

*l.* STATION COMPLEMENTS.—

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complement, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

*m.* TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above. Instructions will be issued.

#### SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

*a.* MATERIAL READINESS.—

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

[11] B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

*b.* DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2. All types: 30 minutes.

3. All types: One hour.

4. All types: Two hours.

5. All types: Four hours.



## SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

19. *ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.*—

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

20. *MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.*—

## a. NAVY.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[12] (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

(g) See paragraph 20 c below.

## b. ARMY.—

(1) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUUKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHŌOLAWĒ; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIŪ POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) *86th Observation Squadron.*—

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"—see 20 b (1) above.

[13] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of long-range artillery fire.

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(4) *Each Infantry Division.*—

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report *enemy front lines* and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report location of *own front lines*. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important, Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South Sector.

(5) *Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.*—

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formation.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, OR KANEOHE BAY.

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage due to use of chemical agents.

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) *District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts.*—Report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation.

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group.

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) *Department Signal Office.*—

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately, should be taken.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) *Transmission of G-2 Information.*—

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

21. *MEASURES FOR HANDLING.*—

a. PRISONERS.—Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy personnel, material and documents, and in determining destination of reports.

c. MAPS.—Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. *REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.*—

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. *THE DEPARTMENT G-2 will*—

a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and adhered to.

c. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Department Provost Marshal, with a view to—

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. *G-2 FORMS.*—

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see page 2, Inclosure No. 5.



## SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. *SUPPLY*.—(See paragraphs 75–80, FM 100–10).

a. *SUPPLY AREAS*.—

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9–91.0)—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying islands.

b. *CLASS I SUPPLIES* (rations) ; including QMC class II and IV :

Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area.—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONOLULU.

(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and G–4, H. H. D.

(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.

c. *CLASS III SUPPLIES*.—

(1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers *filled*. Replenishment will be made in the following manner :

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area.

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the supply [17] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.

(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.

(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DP's will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.

(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.

(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air Corps Station.

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.

(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the District Commanders.

d. *CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES* (except Quartermaster Corps).—

(1) *Medical Supply*:

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(2) *Signal Supply* (except Signal Corps aircraft radio) :

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, Fort SHAFTER.

(3) *Signal Supply*—Aircraft radio only :

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.

(4) *Chemical Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) *Engineer Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9–04.2). Credits at DP's to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.



(6) *Water Supply:*

Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems.

(7) *Air Corps Supply:* All supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD and WHEELER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of services announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

(8) *Ordinance Supply* (other than ammunition Class V).—

Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES:

(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (See (3) below).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)

(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the United Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.

Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.

Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.

Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

26. *EVACUATION.*—

a. *PERSONNEL:*

(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area west of the line: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL—EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hospital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [19] Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.

(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.

(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOWS FIELD to Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.

(d) Air fields on outlying islands, by vehicle to local hospital or by air to Tripler General Hospital or Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be arranged by the responsible commanders for each field.

(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.

(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquarters to each District Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.

b. ANIMALS:

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to units having animals.

c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services indicated.

d. PRISONERS OF WAR:

(1) Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures—Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. TRAFFIC.—

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.—

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [20] consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,  
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

Official: Wm. E. Donegan,  
WM. E. DONEGAN,  
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Inclosures:

- No. 1—Map, Communications Installations.
- No. 2—Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
- No. 3—Map, Electric Installations.
- No. 4—Estimate of Enemy Situation.
- No. 5—Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
- No. 6—Allowances of Ammunition.
- No. 7—Unit of Fire.
- No. 8—Load of Aircraft Ammunition.

Inclosure No. 1

(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of the Island of Oahu showing Communications Installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 120, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Inclosure No. 2

(Inclosure No. 2 is in part a map of the Island of Oahu showing important installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 121, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commisison.)

[20a]

RAILROAD BRIDGES

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0'	16'
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Manakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Manakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Manakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	448'
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11.0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20.0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75.0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115.0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107.0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55.0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13.0'	112'

[20b]

Highway bridges

PRIORITY

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream.....	01.95-84.12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream.....	98.45-87.8
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	96.46-95.68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	96.37-96.75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa.....	87.98-07.98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea.....	92.82-13.52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch.....	95.27-98.92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks.....	93.72-96.96
13	Kam Highway over Opaepa (Twin Bridges) at Waialua.....	87.78-06.33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head).....	32.45-70.22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Thompson Corner.....	86.06-04.57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa.....	86.12-05.76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa.....	86.52-06.20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon.....	11.76-76.55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay.....	14.34-03-25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir.....	97.79-95.34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu.....	98.56-82.46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea.....	06.82-80.30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond.....	21.04-89.11

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oahu showing electrical installations. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 122, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[20d] *Restricted*

Inclosure No. 4

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

TITLE  
PLACE  
DATE AND HOUR

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
- b. Enemy land operations.

- (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
- (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may effect accomplishment of the mission of the command.

b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.

(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

-----  
Chief of section.

[20e] *Restricted*

Inclosure No. 5

PERIODIC REPORTS

From: (Date and hour)  
To: (Date and hour)  
Issuing unit  
Place  
Date and hour of issue

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)



## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).—Location and nature.

b. Defensive organization.—Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.

c. Units in contact.—Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).

d. Artillery.—Location and calibers.

e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.—Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.

f. Supply and evacuation establishments.—Location and nature.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General summary—action of enemy forces as a whole.

b. Operations of component elements.

(1) Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).

(2) Enemy Land Operations.

(a) Landings.—(By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).

(b) Operations of Land Components.

1. Antiaircraft artillery.

2. Antitank units.

3. Armored forces.

4. Artillery.

5. Aviation, combat.

6. Aviation, observation.

7. Parachute Troops.

8. Cavalry.

9. Chemical warfare.

10. Engineers.

11. Infantry.

12. Tanks.

13. Administrative elements.

c. Sabotage.

d. Miscellaneous.—Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in *b* above.

## 3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.

b. Morale.

c. Supply and equipment.

d. Terrain not under our control.

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.

f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.

g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

[20f]

Inclosure No. 5

## INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS

FORM G

A form for

## PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

for

AIR COMBAT UNITS

(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)

## PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From: (Date and hour)

To: (Date and hour)

Issuing unit

Place of issue

Date and hour of issue

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.—(Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.—(Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.—(Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.—(Additions or changes giving serial number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS.—(Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.—(Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—(List in priority of their probable adoption or, if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.—(Any items not covered by above.)

NOTE.—Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.

Inclosure No. 6

*Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue—Hawaiian Department*

Weapon	Arm or Service	No. of rds. per Weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903.....	CA.....	25	140	20	185
	Eng.....		40		40
	FA.....		32	8	40
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	16	112	32	160
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	QM.....		40		40
	Sig.....		25		25
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
	Eng.....	48	80	24	152
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1.....	Inf. (Rifle Plat.).....	24	162	46	232
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	Ord.....		64	16	80
	Sig.....		40		40
	MP.....		48		48
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
	CWS.....		460	120	580
	CA.....	60	560	60	680
	FA.....	960		240	1200
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	Inf.....	60	992	120	1172
	Ord.....		240	60	300
	QM.....	30	30	20	80
	Others.....	150	525	75	750
	Eng.....	250	1500	250	2000
	Inf.....	500	3500	1000	5000
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	4800		1200	6000

Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Weapon	Arm or Service	No. of rds. per Weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC (M1917A1).....	CA (AW Bn.).....	7200		1800	9000
	CA (except AW Bn.).....	3600		900	4500
	Eng.....	250	1500	250	2000
	Inf.....	675	4725	1350	6750
	Others.....	600	2100	300	3000
Pistol, cal. .45.....	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf.....		28		28
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.....		21		21
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	Sig. (motorcycles).....		340		340
	Sig. (other than motorcycles).....		250		250
	MP.....		440	110	550
	Others.....		240	60	300
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA).....	CA (AW Bn.).....	5760		1440	7200
	CA (except AW Bn.).....	2880		720	3600
	Others.....	2880		720	3600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	FA.....	600		150	750
	Inf.....	960		240	1200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	1568		392	1900
Shotgun.....	All.....				25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....	Inf.....				150
Signals, ground (asstd.).....	Inf.....				25
Lights, Very signal (assorted).....	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.).....				5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.).....				30
	All.....				24
37mm gun, M1916.....			240		240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3).....	FA.....	200			200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft.....	Inf.....	180		20	200
	CA.....	180		1620	1800
60mm Mortar.....	Inf.....			120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar.....	Inf.....		light	132	150
			heavy	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D.....	All.....				459#
75mm gun, Antitank.....	FA.....				144#
105mm How.....	FA.....				205#
155mm How.....	FA.....				117#
3" AA mobile.....	CA.....	15		285	300
90mm AA mobile.....	CA.....	12		238	250
3" AA fixed.....	CA.....			300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1.....	All.....			100	100
240mm How, M1918.....	FA.....			60	60
8" Ry. Gun.....	CA.....	85			85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY					
3" gun, M1903.....				505	505
6" gun.....		1000			1000
8" gun.....		350		200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage).....		335			335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage).....		275			275
12" Mortar.....		300			300
14" gun.....		280			280
16" gun.....		250			250

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

#Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

## Inclosure No. 7

## Unit of fire (other than aircraft)—Hawaiian department

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903.....	30	105	15		150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle).....	150	525	75		750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle).....	600		150		750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1).....	600	2100	300		3000
Pistol, cal. .45.....		20			20
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....		160	40		200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	720		180		900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries).....	1920		480		2400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries).....	960		240		1200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....					150
Projector, signal ground (assorted).....					25
Pistol, Very, MkIII.....					24
37mm gun, M1916.....				120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3.....	84			36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft.....	60			540	600
60mm Mortar.....				400	400
81mm Mortar.....			flight.....	234	300
3" Trench Mortar.....			heavy.....	66	300
75mm Field Gun.....			super.....	36	300
			normal.....	150	
			reduced.....	114	
75mm gun, antitank.....	111			39	150
105mm How.....				225	225
155mm How. M1918.....				150	150
3" AA gun, mobile.....	15			285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile.....	12			238	250
3" AA gun, fixed.....				300	300
155mm gun, M1918 M1.....	112			38	150
240mm How. M1918.....				60	60
8" Ry Gun.....	85				85
4" Chemical Mortar.....					200
4.2" Chemical Mortar.....					200

NOTES.—Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.



Inclosure No. 8

Load of aircraft ammunition per airplane

Type airplane.....	Bombers			Pursuit			Obs. (O&D)
	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	1-engine (O-47)
ITEM							
Ctg.AP Cal 30							
Ctg.ball Cal 30.....	480	1280	1920	1600	400	800	640
Ctg.tr Cal 30.....	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#.....	600	1600	2400	2000	500	100	800
Ctg.AP Cal 50.....	60			20	10		
Ctg.ball Cal 50.....	900			300	150		
Ctg.tr Cal 50.....	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#.....	1200			400	200		
BOMBS							
Bomb frag.30# and.....			40			10	
Bomb Demo.100# or.....	20	32	12				
Bomb Demo.300# or.....	14	14	4				
Bomb Demo.500.....	8	6	2				
600# or.....							
Bomb Demo.1000.....	6	4	1				
1100# or.....							
Bomb Demo.2000#.....	4	2					
PYROTECHNICS							
Bomb Photoflash.....	*4	*4					*4
Flare M26**.....	3	3	1				1
Flare M19.....	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd.....	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift.....	10	7					

\*For Reconnaissance squadrons only.

\*\*Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

EXHIBIT No. 33 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

(Exhibit No. 33 consists of a radar chart, Opana station, 7 December 1941 and a Special Military Map "AA" of the Hawaiian Islands. The chart and map will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 123 and 124, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

EXHIBIT No. 34 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[a] Confidential

Copy

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR OFFICER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 17 November 1941

In reply refer to:  
Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.

(AG-1)

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter AG 383.4/6 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 1 May 1941, subject: "Provisions for Security of Installations", there are inclosed special reports on Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and the Hawaiian Air Depot.

2. These reports have been carefully studied by this headquarters and those deficiencies susceptible of correction have been corrected. Many of the opinions expressed by the inspecting officer are in conflict with established policies and Army organization and as such cannot receive remedial action by local commanders.

3. The vital installations on all Air Force stations are believed to be adequately guarded and all commanders are fully cognizant of their responsibilities.

F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls.

- #1—Report on Hickam Field.
- #2—Report on Wheeler Field.
- #3—Report on Hawaiian Air Depot.

[b]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Provisions for Security of Installations.	
1st Ind. Air O. 11/17/41	C/S	There is attached special report on Hickam Field together with comments thereon by the Hawaiian Air Force Staff and General Martin. 1 Incl. For the Air Officer:	J. A. M.
		Chart showing Burwell Report General Martin's comments and Staff Comments.	

COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT

Subject: Special Report.  
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>1. The following report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, is submitted pursuant to contents of letter AG 383.4 (3-21-41) M-B-M, from the War Department, Washington, D. C., to the Commanding General, dated March 26, 1941, subject: "Provisions for security of Installations", and to conferences held by the undersigned with the General Staff of the Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to determine the Department Commander's policy in respect to additional steps required by the recently declared unlimited emergency.</p> <p>2. <i>Estimate of the Situation:</i></p> <p>a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.</p> <p>b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the [?] controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent anti-sabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has <i>as yet been ordered</i>, or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.</p> <p>c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.</p> <p>(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa of quick movement of all heavy bombardments from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been deduced from such incipient events as:</p> <p>[?] (a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away.</p> <p>(b) Or, of a final break with the German Italian Axis.</p>	<p>Concur. However, it is believed the condition will be corrected as experience is gained and discipline is improved.</p> <p>Concur.</p>	<p>While this may have been true at the time, this survey was started during the elapsed time since the lower echelon commanders have become impressed with the need for increased precautions to prevent acts of sabotage.</p> <p>This will always be difficult to prevent but is becoming increasingly more difficult of accomplishment due to the fact that all concerned are indoctrinated with the need for constant vigilance.</p>
<p>So far as the majority of the command is concerned this probably is true, however it is believed that responsible command and staff officers of all echelons are cognizant of the situation as it may affect the Hawaiian Air Force.</p>		<p>As many intelligent men throughout the United States fail to understand the significance of international events, it cannot be expected that all members of this command can properly evaluate these events, nor is that necessary. Command and staff officers keep informed as to the situation as it affects the Hawaiian Air Force.</p>

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(c) Or, a rupture with the German-French coalition over conflicting interests in the Caribbean or South China Seas.</p> <p>(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia.</p> <p>(e) Or a repercussion in sequence of the recent occupation of Iceland.</p> <p>(f) Or an occupation of the Gallipagos Islands as a result of the conflict between Peru and Ecuador.</p> <p>(2) Thus the growing importance of Hickam Field as a vital terminal from which to reinforce the Navy quickly with B-17 type bombers from the mainland or from which to reinforce Manila with B-19's and the belief that Hickam will be fully spot-lighted whenever the fleet departs, is not fully comprehended from a sabotage prevention viewpoint.</p> <p>(3) Such a series of events obviously may force a hostile decision to burn up Hickam Field, by German agents acting alone or by Japanese agents acting jointly in support of her tri-partite pact.</p> <p>[4] (4) Such a decision would logically precipitate an order for the execution of secretly prepared plan for sabotage.</p> <p>(5) Such an order, of course, will be preempted whether hostile powers consider it imperative to prevent us from quickly reinforcing our far-flung critical areas with the only decisive influence against sea forces in the narrow seas that can be employed en masse within tactical times over strategical theatres of 2500 miles extent. (As an illustration of the precept in mind see copy of G-2 map for July 7, 1941.)</p> <p>d. Hence it is considered that additional security measures required to protect all services necessary to quickly employ this vital far-striking weapon should be pre-conceived now and receive first consideration over all other types of military field forces in Hawaii, while medium bombardment, airborne infantry transports, and pursuit necessary to secure all outlying fields should receive the next highest consideration. In brief, it is estimated that long-range forces have become the initial line of defense for the safe movement into action of either the Army or Navy regardless of whether either body constitutes the first line of national defense. This estimate is based upon the fact that hostile powers first organize an immediate state of air readiness and seek first, by any and all means, to destroy the opposing state of air-readiness.</p> <p>3. <i>General Findings</i></p> <p>a. Reference the axiom that a stable system of personnel control is commonly acknowledged by all authorities to be the one dominant consideration to [3] successful prevention of subversive activities, the undersigned finds that the recently assigned commanders of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, have inherited an unexpected emergency status without having inherited, from preceding administrations, the standards of administration, organization and management which are now required to master the present border-line war situation.</p>	<p>Strongly concur. It is believed that the development of a strong striking force of heavy bombardment aviation in the Hawaiian Department is imperative to the safety of the Hawaiian Islands. It is further believed that a collision of air forces will occur prior to and independent of any activities of defending ground forces.</p> <p>Concur. However it is pointed out that the component parts of the H. A. F. are organized in the same way as are those of the Air Force as a whole. Any change made must of necessity apply not only here but to all Air Force organizations. It is believed the present A. C. squadrons should be reorganized and given an internal organization structurally similar to that of a battalion. G-3 does not concur with the foregoing so far as battalion organization is concerned.</p>	<p>Concur. The long range bomber is the only offensive weapon available to the Department Commander, it will be first into action and will so remain as long as available. The importance of this weapon dictates every possible protection from all available sources that it may be immune from sabotage.</p> <p>This statement infers that a change in organization is necessary to meet changed conditions. It is held that the present organization is satisfactory to cope with the existing circumstances.</p>



Concur with Staff Comments.  
  
Concur in all Staff Comments pertaining to paragraph c.

It is impossible for any wing to function to the maximum capabilities with the numerous diversions of personnel to doubles not provided for in any existing tables of organization.

A minor contributing factor.  
Not concurred in.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur but unavoidable.

Concur.

Concur.  
Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.  
Concur in the fact that the sabotage potentialities are great but the assumption that the Department or the H. A. F. is not cognizant of the situation is not concurred in.  
Concur.

Unavoidable in processing and assigning recruits to old organizations and creating new ones.

Unavoidable.

Unavoidable.

b. He finds that the Commanding General, 18th Wing, Hawaiian Air Force, is faced with the concurrent task of reforming and retraining control of a highly unstable personnel situation while conducting an intensive transition training to new types of aircraft and an intensified ground security program, without disrupting the continued development and maintenance of such a sizable city at Hickam Field.  
c. He finds that the present unstable status and condition is due:

- (1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.
- (2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces.
- (3) To the existence of army posts built in peace-time instead of war-time security.
- (4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions.
- (5) To the necessary restraint exercised in making critical reports on sabotage control and natural conflict between need for secrecy and need for information.
- (6) To the normal pre-occupation of military personnel with heavily increased administration.
- (7) To conflicting problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Air Force.
- (8) To the first need, regardless of increased danger of sabotage, for the quick employment of civilians of widely varying types from the mainland to construct buildings and grounds.
- (9) To the second need for enlisting recruits and for commissioning reserve officers to activate new units.
- (10) To the third need for organizing new combat crews and for inserting new men into jobs of both a confidential and secret nature.
- (11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequence of the above first needs.
- (12) To the diversion of daily attention to the daily conflicts between new projects, maneuvers, exercises and normal training schedules and daily post duties.
- (13) To the deceptive existence of tranquil peace-time law and order now existing within the territory and misplaced reliance on the vouchered-for reliability of all civil service employees.
- (14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.
- (15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future.

(16) To congestion in water transport service and local shortages of labor and materials required to meet the need of all arms and services.

d. It is considered that the present unstable status of personnel control has been caused by the excessive rotation of men within and between squadrons, departments, and daily mass details, due in turn:

- (1) To a roughly one hundred percent turnover of individual men periodically to the mainland.
- (2) To a roughly two hundred percent expansion with recruits and reserve officers within the last year.

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(5) To a roughly three hundred percent dilution of experienced trained men caused by the creation of new units and by the increased overhead growth of higher echelons.</p> <p>(4) To the initial need for centralizing recruit training.</p> <p>(5) To the initial need for decentralizing by not duplicating technical school courses at Wheeler Field and Hickam Field.</p>	<p>Unavoidable.</p> <p>Corrected by establishment of recruit casual camp at Bellows Field.</p> <p>The only duplication is in the clerical course. This duplication is considered necessary in view of the large number of additional clerks required by the expansion.</p> <p>The requirements for furnishing men for ground defense and security measures has been responsible for this dislocation more than any other factor.</p> <p>It is believed this condition could be and should be corrected by the establishment of organization messes in mobilization type buildings.</p>	<p>Infantry instruction in the School of the Soldier is centralized in the Recruit Casual Camps.</p> <p>A central mess conceived in the interests of economy has, to my knowledge, always been destruction of morale. Separate messes would remove this source of dissatisfaction but the established general mess cannot now be changed. It is a continuing menace to morale the affects of which can be ameliorated by most careful supervision.</p>
<p>(6) To the initial need for centralizing mass instruction in infantry drill and ground security messions.</p> <p>(7) To the present need for centralizing the messing and housing of several thousand men in a consolidated mess hall, kitchen and barracks.</p>	<p>The detachment of any A. C. personnel for other than A. C. duties is objectionable and will reflect on the efficiency of the Air Force.</p>	<p>Participation in centralized athletics has a decided value as a moral builder and development of "Esprit de Corps". Mass athletics should be encouraged for the development of healthy bodies and minds of the command as a whole.</p>
<p>(9) To the prevailing need in Hawaii to specialize in centralized athletics.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>
<p>(10) To the present need for absorbing 700 recruits, assigned without a proportionate increase in grades and ratings, who require preliminary recruit and technical school training.</p> <p>(11) To the continuing need, in consequence, for detailing trained specialists from the Service Department and Tactical Squadrons to guard, police, drill, and for other post special duties which are required to maintain a command that comprises approximately 25 squadrons and over 100 separate specialized divisions, departments, and sections.</p> <p>(12) To the culminating cause and effect which has resulted in the growth over several years time of a seriously under-organized form of security and an over-complicated administration of it.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>
<p>4. <i>Special Findings:</i> a. Reference to the common justice of the uniformly accepted Army axiom to the effect that every basic unit such as the Air-Squadron must mediate legal jurisdiction—this to include each man's intelligence, physical, trade, experience and "trait" data and must</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>

possess a daily knowledge of the whereabouts of each man. The undersigned finds that the following complications exist under the present setup.

- (1) Five or more different applications of the War Department's prescribed standardization of statistical control in personnel administration centers exist in the Department.
- 1st—At Schofield, on regiment centralized separate company personnel units in regimental headquarters.
- 2nd—Another regiment centralized composite battalion units in regimental headquarters.
- 3rd—Another regiment centralized the separate specialized function that are common to all companies in regimental headquarters.
- 4th—Wheeler Field centralizes its separate squadron units in the Wing Headquarters.
- 5th—Hickam Field centralizes its separate squadron units in three Group Headquarters (i. e., 17th Air Base Group and the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups) to which other separate squadron units of the Wing are attached.

(2) Group Headquarters maintains the squadron service records, payrolls, reports of changes, etc.

1/11 (3) Squadron Headquarters maintains the duty rosters, morning and sick reports, laundry and collection sheets, etc.

(4) Group and Squadron systems are different in detail to various degrees

(5) Under conditions noted in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, it is impractical for all men who are detached daily on special duty to attend squadron roll calls at reveille, meal hours and retreat.

(6) The control of absentees and a knowledge of the whereabouts during the night and working day of large numbers of men devolves mainly upon the various noncommissioned officers or enlisted clerks in charge of numerous offices, who endeavor to keep track of daily changes in rosters and who report to Squadron Headquarters when and if absences in attendance occur. Squadron Headquarters reports daily to Group Headquarters such changes with which they have knowledge. Group Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department or to Wing Headquarters. Wing Headquarters makes required reports direct to Department Headquarters and to the Hawaiian Air Force Headquarters but in the interim of two, three or more days consumed between the reports en route from the Squadron to the Department or from the Department to the Squadron, it is found that the Air Force, Wing, or Group Headquarters have, in the meantime, issued special orders which require daily squadron action. In all such events, the Wing call upon the Base Group and Tactical Groups. The Group calls on the Squadrons, which in turn calls back upon the various base departments for the changes or [12] exchanges of men required to comply with whatever the daily emergency dictates.

(7) Due to the fact that one of the numerous base departments may receive varying details from various squadrons, while one of numerous squadrons may detail men to various departments, it is obvious that close daily control obtained from close daily coordination between intelligence and personnel is physically dissembled through the existing channels of communication. Daily management is thereby prevented rather than preempted by the system itself.

(8) This vital defect in the daily timing of coordination throughout all intermediate echelons between the squadron and the Department is further complicated by the insertion of Army District Commanders and Naval Commanders in the channels of communications which govern the relations of S-2 intelligence functions with S-3 operations, S-4 supply, and S-4 personnel functions.

(9) Due also to the fact that the tactical and service squadrons are not relatively self-contained units, similar to infantry companies, it is found that the chain of personnel control and the chain of intelligence-control must be coordinated regularly and systematically in the lower echelons in order to insure daily security.

Absolutely uniformity is not regarded as essential.

No comment.

No comment.

No comment.  
Concur.

Concur. Under the present organization there will always be this conflict between daily emergencies and the training and control of the tactical units.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

The solution of this problem lies with the respective squadron commanders. Squadrons must maintain a positive record by name of all men on each detail, regular or special, those on sick report or absent for any cause. Record of changes in status of this personnel is a function of the Personnel Section for the Squadron.

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(10) In further consideration of conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, combined with the further fact that the intelligence and front-line capabilities of the squadrons are further adversely affected by the separate variation in the [13] timing of the the mass of personnel, operations, material, flight and command communications flowing daily between the Department to the Squadron and the Squadron to the Department, the undersigned finds that a standard system of systematic daily coordination throughout all echelons in both Wings of the Hawaiian Air Force is now a necessity.</p> <p>(11) That the excessive complications of the present set-up may be simplified by grouping the agencies, functions, and sub-centers of coordination, uniformly and commonly alike into five standard divisions throughout all echelons of command. For this purpose, authority should be granted to rearrange existing tentative Base Group tables of organization into a more natural operative form using the proposed "maintenance service command" and "operations control office" and "ground security troops" as a basis.</p> <p>(12) That principal activities, main delays upward daily from the Squadron by each of the five standard divisions to all command echelons in the Air Force for successive staff coordination of daily difficulties over which the lower echelons have no direct control.</p>	<p>This paragraph is apparently an introduction to paragraph 11.</p> <p>This paragraph implies a fundamental change in the military establishment which should only be considered after a more thorough and exacting study has been made of the ramifications of such reorganization.</p> <p>It is not believed that a system involving formal daily reports is required. As stated above, any basic change in the theory of staff organization requires further study.</p> <p>No comments.</p> <p>It is believed that the question of priorities is being handled in a manner as satisfactory as can be expected under existing conditions.</p> <p>It is being so regarded.</p> <p>The subdivision of the entire military function into the 5 classifications noted is a subject requiring further study.</p> <p>It is not believed that the combining of administration and technical inspections into a single agency would serve a useful purpose. As to each of the present inspection branches the statement under discussion substantially describes existing procedure.</p> <p>The recommendation that Plans &amp; Intelligence be combined is not concurred in. A Wing, when it constitutes a component part of [16] a larger unit, is not regarded as a planning echelon.</p>	
<p>5. <i>Detailed Findings:</i></p> <p>a. In the spirit of cooperation the following detailed findings in a large part were prepared jointly by the undersigned and Headquarters of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, who has initiated action or prepared a plan of action and with whom this report has been previously coordinated in conjunction with the Inspector General's report.</p> <p>[14] <i>B. Command Divisions:</i></p> <p>(1) That a complete list of all prepared plans and recommendations of the Commanding General, 18th Wing, be brought to the personal attention of the Department Commander to insure a formal decision in respect to required priorities and time limits prescribed by the Department for the guidance and compliance of the Department Engineer.</p> <p>(2) That the status and condition of Hickam Field be treated as one necessitating a formal regard for the serious legal consequences involved.</p> <p>(3) That intelligence functions be assigned to the five functional divisions of the Wing; to wit: (1) command intelligence, (2) personnel intelligence, (3) operations intelligence, (4) material intelligence and (5) flight intelligence.</p> <p>(4) That the Chief of the Wing Inspection Department to furnish a list of critical items mentioned hereinafter for collaboration, inspection and report.</p>		<p>(5) That a Chief of a Wing Plans and Intelligence Section be organized as a fifth section of the staff and work similar to the Inspection Department, under the direct control of the Wing Commander.</p>



[15] (6) That the Chief Executive of the Wing exercise a more exclusive and separate sense of control over his associate executives who are charged especially with the responsibility for coordination of the agencies in personnel, operations, and matériel divisions.

(7) That a special investigation, comment and recommendations be directed to determine the underlying causes for the reported discontent and lowered morale of the junior officer and private soldier; this in order to separate the effects of self-inflicted disaffection from the effects of possible subversive agents.

c. *Personnel Divisions:*

(1) That the personnel administration centers be standardized within the Hawaiian Air Force.

(2) That the interior watchmen, guard and security functions at Hickman Field be organized with separate grades and ratings into an organic detachment similar to the set-up in effect in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Division at Schofield and the Hawaiian Headquarters at Fort Shafter.

[16] (3) That the general consolidated mess be similarly organized into a semi-permanent department with direct control of its separate officers, men, grades and ratings, similar to the practice in the Navy.

(4) That the additional equipment and installations urgently needed by the general mess be expedited in every way possible to prevent the reoccurrence of the recent epidemic of stomach disorder.

(5) That all serious illegalities committed by enlisted men be coordinated with the Flight Surgeon for a physiological "treat" analysis and report to S-2.

(6) That a special morale report be required as to the status of the swimming pool, gymnasium, motion picture theatre, and low cost housing program with estimated dates of completion.

(7) That an Assistant S-1 be assigned as Director of Morale, Recreation and Athletics, similar to the position created in the Hawaiian Division, and that he give special attention to such items as the acquisition of six additional tennis courts and the maintenance of the six courts now in use, etc.

(8) That daily Squadron Work Sheets showing the actual daily physical location of assigned men be prepared daily by all Squadrons.

[17] (9) That centralized recruit training and centralized technical school courses be set-up as a separate organic department and made to function as a personnel replacement center directly under the control of Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force similar in general purpose to the Hawaiian Air Depot which acts as a Materiel Replacement Center.

(10) That a minimum number of men, grades and ratings, be set-up for each service division, department and section of the Base which constitutes the relatively constant permanent overhead of the station whether or not one, two or more Groups are assigned thereto.

The necessity for close staff coordination requires no comment.

It is the unanimous opinion of the staff officers working on this report, that the morale condition at Hickman Field is unsatisfactory.

Inasmuch as these units are practically standardized now and will be completely standardized in the near future, this recommendation is taken care of.

Concur.

As previously stated it is recommended that the consolidated mess be discontinued as soon as practicable.

Equipment has been or is being purchased and improvements are now underway.

Concur.

Concur.

This has been done.

All concur except G-2. G-2 thinks it is entirely useless and invariably inaccurate paper work.

Concur. Recruit training is now centralized at Bellows but it is considered impracticable to combine the technical schools with that organization due to lack of suitable housing and buildings. It is further believed that replacements for Hawaii as well as all foreign stations should be graduates of technical schools on the mainland.

Concur.

Under existing circumstances it is physically impossible to organize separate messes in the existing building. The consolidated mess is now operating as a general mess in accordance with existing Army Regulations.

Concur. This can be accomplished by making separate lists containing names of men on specific details. These lists [17] to be prepared from a complete roster of men in the organization.

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>(11) That a standard system of control governing the promotion of all men within the ratios of grades and ratings prescribed for the command, service and combat divisions, be based predominantly upon the efficiency report and the recommendation of the operating departments.</p>	<p>A standard promotion system is now under study in this Headquarters for the Hawaiian Air Force. It is believed that representation should be made to the Chief of the Army Air Forces looking to an established system throughout.</p>	
<p>[18] (12) That a complete list of day and night shifts for all types of tours of duty be prepared to counteract the inaccurate impression created in the Department by seeing numerous unemployed "off duty" men about the station.</p>	<p>It is fully recognized that a large number of activities have to function at night. It is not believed that this condition has created any erroneous impression.</p>	
<p>(13) That the remaining men only be made available for guard and security in the form of a separate organic department composed preferably of infantrymen.</p>	<p>The tables of organization provide an entirely inadequate force for security and guard. It is strongly recommended that a form of security organization which is capable of providing close-in defense against all forms of attack should be an integral part of all A. C. stations. G-2 concurs except the word units should be substituted for stations.</p>	<p>Concur in Staff Comments. The security organization be authorized for each station to meet the requirements of that station. This means that there can be no uniformity as to strength and grades and ratings for this organization. A security detachment within units could not properly serve this purpose.</p>
<p>(14) That the informal recommendations of the Infantry Liaison Officer, Hickam Field, be submitted formally and that his recommendation for the type and number of men and weapons required be favorably considered; also, that officers assigned to ground defense and security wear side-arms.</p>	<p>Recommendations of Infantry Liaison Officer should be considered on their merits when they are submitted.</p>	
<p>[19] (15) That the guard at the main gate be equipped with accessories necessary to operate a recording machine that will automatically check the license number of all cars entering and leaving the post.</p>	<p>Recommend this or some other similar system be adopted.</p>	
<p>(16) That enlisted guards be requested to avoid carrying on extended conversation with strangers or from being diverted by people of either sex when on duty.</p>	<p>This is covered in the General Orders of all guards.</p>	
<p>(17) That men employed on the line and in the engineering shops be furnished distinctive arm bands, or straps, or caps, or other means of controlling any unnecessary interflow of personnel within the station.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	
<p>(18) That special instructions in writing be furnished the guard and patrols to check all parking plans in order to insure as far as possible that no unauthorized car with hidden personnel or material is permitted to remain overnight on the station.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	
<p>(19) That in the absence of day time guards, the Chief Clerk of Principal Departments be issued pistols.</p>	<p>Guards should be present at all times on critical points.</p>	
<p>(20) That S-1 maintain a list and check on all enlisted men who may be taking civilian flying instructions.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	
<p>(21) That the Fire Department be instructed in writing to judge carefully the question of not employing all equipment at any one time on brush, cane or small fires at a distance beyond quick recall.</p>	<p>This is being investigated.</p>	
<p>[20] (22) That the question of any heavy indebtedness of young officers for autos and uniforms be re-checked.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	
<p>(23) That cases of heavy indebtedness of enlisted men at the Post Exchange and Non-commissioned Officers' Club be re-checked.</p>	<p>Concur.</p>	

They are not supposed to be enlisted with such a record.

Concur.

The character of the local population makes this an extremely difficult question to deal with and we believe that the seriousness cannot be over emphasized.

This and the following paragraph discuss conditions common to the Air Corps at large and should be studied from the viewpoint of the Air Corps at large.

Concur.

Concur. They should be separated down to and including the wing.

Concur.

This is being done.

Concur.

Concur.

Concur. It is also to be noted that "Standing Operating Procedure" is now being revised.

Concur.

This project is now under-way.

Concur.

This condition is under continuous review. No provision is being made for storage of bombsights at outlying fields. Bombsights are under constant guard when the airplane crew is absent.

It is believed that the responsible commanders concerned are fully aware of the critical situation in regards to water supply.

Concur.

(24) That enlisted men and civilian employees with bad police records be returned to the mainland.  
 (25) That the vital question of food and water poisoning receive increasing daily attention and that the question of alien servants be re-checked.

(26) That a special study and report be made of the specific causes for dissatisfaction with the pay and promotion of enlisted guard and of the distribution of air mechanics and flying pay to enlisted men.

(27) That the wide variation between Squadrons in the internal distribution of pay, including air mechanics pay, flying pay, pay for grades and ratings, and special pay (exclusive of per diem allowances) be made the subject of a special study and report with the view of creating a more uniform control of the minimum amounts that should be assigned to vital specialties such as squadron mess, communications, armament, maintenance, without adversely affecting the basic combat crew's need for first priority of flying pay.

(28) That S-1 offices, officers and functions be separated organically from that of the Adjutant General's office throughout all echelons.

(29) That consideration be given to extending the excellent practice of the travelling nurse in the Depot to married noncommissioned officers and civilian employee families of Hickam Field.

*d. Operations Division:*

(1) That all photographic mosaics of Hickam Field and the Island of Oahu be re-checked now, and numbered.

(2) That all plats of communication systems and terminals be checked and numbered.

(3) That a technical Signal expert be required to re-check the proposed use of communications personnel set-up in the various alert, security and defense plan to prevent conflict.

(4) That field orders which prescribe various degrees of readiness be re-checked in connection with plans for Ground Security, alert plans and plan for the Evacuation of Civilians, in order to prevent conflict in the successive or concurrent execution of such plans and orders.

(5) That no intermediate supervisor of heavy bombardment training be interposed, for an extended period, between Wing Headquarters and the Commanding Officers of either tactical group, contrary to the due rights and process vested in duly constituted commanders who are legally responsible in the event of riot, disorder, aircraft fatalities and for the safety and security of their command pursuant to the orders of duly constituted higher commanders.

(6) That the action required by the Wing Plan to increase the lighting of critical areas along the hangar-line, dead-line, and under parked aircraft be expedited.

(7) That instructions governing the supervision of the amateur radio operators be reduced to writing.

(8) That special instructions governing the supervision of chemicals, ordnance and armament, to include heavy demolitions that lie in the open at outlying fields and for the safeguarding of bombsights on over-night stops be reviewed in the light of emergency conditions.

(9) That the storage and shortage of water and exposed pipelines at outlying fields be considered critical from an operating standpoint as well as a ground security viewpoint.

[23] (10) That the custody of keys to all small arms be reviewed and reduced to writing to include the names of individuals possessing keys to racks and vaults.

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
(11) That security measures to prevent tapping of telephone wires between Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields be reduced to wiring and frequent practice.	It is considered that the possibility of tapping exposed wires is an ever-present danger. Concur.	
(12) That the question of developing an auxiliary mobile message center in an air transport equipped especially with a receiving and sending set, wire and repair men, be considered. (13) That the recommendations of the Hawaiian Air Force Signal Officer in reference to safe-guarding of critical radio and telephone terminals be re-submitted and receive favorable action.	The Air Force Signal Officer will be called upon to re-submit any recommendations he may have made and they will be given such consideration as they deserve. Concur.	
(14) That additional measures, such as a voice code, be prescribed and tested to insure the authenticity of parties who transmit telephone messages and the private soldiers be excluded from the duty of transmitting important verbal orders of serious purport. <i>Meterel Division:</i>	It is believed that this should be covered by instructions to the guard supplemented by such standing orders that will insure periodic inspections by the department head concerned. Concur.	
(1) That the present inspection of the aqua system to include periodic chemical analysis of oil as well as gas, be revised and prescribed in [24] writing as a part of an intelligence pamphlet and that it include further safe-guards against the danger of leaking containers in buildings and the pollution of lubricating oil in critical pieces of heavy machinery. Also, that the cooperation and technical advice, in this respect, of the shop superintendent, Hawaiian Air Depot, be solicited.	Concur.	
(2) That the openings under the platform of the Hickam Field dock at the head of the aqua system be further secured by some form of a gate that will prevent any unauthorized small boats from planting explosives under the dock.	This project is underway.	
(3) That additional protective security measures to safe-guard all man-holes and terminals for water, light, power, sewage, compressed air and communications be requested of the District Engineer as a separate project.	Concur.	
(4) That a list be obtained from all Squadron Engineers and prepared by Wing S-4 of all items on B-17 type aircraft that are considered to be "critical", such as the electrical fuel pumps, the apertures under the main wings in which small explosives may be hidden, the main control cables, the connection of control cables with the servo drums of the Automatic pilot, the heavy lead counter-weight in the tail of the fuselage, slits or punctures in the rubber tires, etc.	Concur.	
[25] (5) That the daily inspections required by Form 41, Standard Air Corps Maintenance and Inspection System, be increased by local orders to include such a selected list of "critical" items.	This project is under way and appropriations have been made for the accomplishment of same. Concur.	This is being cared for by the temporary organization, Maintenance Command.
(6) That a time limit or priority for the completion of work required of the Engineer Corps in the Wing plan for screening, lighting and fencing of Hickam Field be prescribed particularly by special order.	Concur.	
(7) That second line of maintenance in the Base Engineering Shop be rendered more self-contained and independent of third line of maintenance in the Depot, in order that Hickam Field may carry-on if and when the Depot is incapacitated; also that the additional power lines for the Base Engineering Shops, for which funds, it is understood, have been available to the Engineers for several months, be put on a prescribed priority list by the Department.	Concur.	This paragraph is not understood. It seems to be contradictory. A certain amount of rotation of technical workers is
(8) That rotation of technical workers assigned to toe shops be sharply reduced, in order to prevent one link or another in the chain of shop management from breaking the completion of daily work orders.		



desired that they may acquire knowledge which will permit flexibility in assignment. Such flexibility should operate to prevent interruptions in completion of work orders.

Concur.

Concur

Concur.

Not concurred in. Considered unnecessary.

Concur.

Recommend that personnel concerned be interviewed or otherwise questioned to determine whether or not any dissatisfaction exists with a view to correction thereof.  
Concur.

It is considered that this is now in effect but that the allusion to a train commander is hardly pertinent.

This is in effect.

This is in effect.

Existing regulations from the War Department make the pilot of army airplanes fully responsible for handling and safeguarding his airplane at all times while in his control.

(9) That the Base Supply Department receive the same corrective consideration as the Base Engineering Department for the same reasons

(10) That the space occupied by the Engineer lumber piles that were stacked at the end of the runway, previous to the special inspection of the Depot, be further cleared of lumber and scrub growth to allow an unobstructed night approach to the diagonal runway and that this area be smoothly leveled to allow an unobstructed landing short of the runway as well as to prevent a concealed approach to the paint and oil section of the Depot.

(11) That all plans and diagrams of electrical, water, sewage and gasoline systems be re-checked and numbered.

(12) That copies of the detailed findings of Hawaiian Air Depot and Hickam Field and post orders and regulations in the premise be furnished the District Engineer Detachment at Hickam Field with request that a copy of report of action taken be furnished.

(13) That additional measures for nighttime security be prescribed to prevent the unauthorized use of gas trucks or other similar civilian or military vehicles that might be employed by a subversive operator to spread a large amount of leaking gasoline over critical areas around the shops, hangars and dead-line.

(14) That the status of all civilian foremen of the Quartermaster, supply, fire department, etc., who control nearly all utilities [§7] that can tie up the operation of a military leges be re-checked with a view of giving them increased personal consideration and privileges designed to enhance social morale.

(15) That the execution of plans for increasing the number and length of runways on Hickam Field and the island of Oahu be expedited.

*f. Flight Division:*

(1) That flight and airplane commanders; especially of B-17 type of bombardment aircraft, be formally delegated the legal responsibility of a commander in a sense similar to that delegated to Train Commanders in Army Regulations.

(2) That each airplane commander be held directly and legally responsible for the intelligence functions of his combat crew in flight.

(3) That each airplane commander be also held directly and legally responsible for the related function of his flight plan, the coordination of flight communications, and the supervision of pre-flight inspection, loading, dress, discipline and tactical reports.

*6. Conclusions:*

## COMMENTS ON BURWELL REPORT—Continued

Burwell's report	Staff comments	General Martin's comments
<p>a. That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities [28] within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities.</p> <p>b. That a standard outline of organization and system of coordination is required for the [29] Air Force, to include a prompt revision of tables of organization for the Air Base Group.</p> <p>c. That a list of priorities covering all pending projects of Hickam Field be approved and directed by the Department for the guidance of the Department Engineers, and that a monthly "degree of completion report" be furnished to insure compliance within prescribed time limits.</p> <p>7. <i>Recommendations:</i> That the Department Commander authorize a board of general officers of the Hawaiian Air Force to constitute the uniform standards of organization and standard system of coordination required by present conditions and the existing emergency.</p> <p>8. <i>Appreciation:</i> a. Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers Federal Bureau of Investigation.</p>	<p>Morale is satisfactory but it is agreed that morale is questionable however it is felt that it is occasioned by the lack of proper recreational and athletic facilities coupled with numerous small irritating regulations and restrictions which in themselves seem minor but accumulate to a point which defeats their intended purposes. Other contributing factors are the present method of promotion, extension from two to three year tour of service for enlisted men, and the consolidated mess. It is believed that immediate steps should be taken to provide any or all of the following recreational and cultural facilities: bowling alleys, soft-ball diamonds, swimming pools, theatres, boxing and wrestling arenas, football, amateur theatricals, paid vaudeville acts, vocational and academic schools (night), tennis courts, outdoor handball courts, skating rinks, libraries, and service clubs. Any or all of these to be under the supervision of officer personnel particularly qualified in these activities.</p> <p>The organization for units of the H. A. F. is now standard. It is agreed there is room for improvements in the organization of Air Base units.</p> <p>It is presumed that the Department Commander requires such reports and records as he considers necessary.</p> <p>No comment.</p>	

b. The cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff, of Lieutenant Colonel Parker Tenney, Inspector General of Hawaiian Air Force, and Major A. W. Meenan, G-3 is acknowledged.

c. The spirit of open honest helpfulness [29] displayed by Brigadier General J. H. Rudolph, regardless of his own immediate duty for administering the necessary changes from a peace-time status to a critical border-line war-time condition, is considered worthy of commendation.

d. Reference paragraph 5, subparagraph a above, it is appreciated that the present status is the product of several years growth therefore only a collective sense of responsibility is at issue.

e. For above reason, a copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 18th Wing, with a request that he register any difference of facts or opinion and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.

HEADQUARTERS 14TH PURSUIT WING,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Wheeler Field, T. H., 29 July 1941.

Refer to:

Subject: Special Report on Wheeler Field, T. H.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.

**1. Authority:**

a. See paragraph 1, attached copy of Special Report on Hickam Field, Hawaiian Air Force, 9 July 1941.

**2. Estimate of the Situation:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 2 a, b, c, and d.

(Due to the recent freezing of Japanese credits, it is estimated that security measures for pursuit aviation have increased in importance to the extent that Wheeler Field, as an Advanced Depot, should now be prepared to take up the shock in case the Hawaiian Air Depot is incapacitated.)

**3. General Findings:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 3 a, b, c, also copy of memorandum to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, 10 July 1941.

(Reference the verbal authority of the Department Commander to create and test an experimental maintenance command in the Hawaiian Air Force, it is believed that the uniform and common grouping of responsibilities now in effect at Wheeler Field may be used as a guide in stabilizing the control of personnel.)

**4. Special Findings:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 4 a (1).

(Wheeler Field has centralized all squadron units in a Wing Headquarters Personnel Administration Center. Investigation indicates that this set-up may be well-employed as a standard.)

**5. Detailed Findings:**

a. The following detailed findings contained in attached report apply constructively to the 14th Wing: Paragraph 5 a, paragraph 5 b (1), (2), [2] and (3), paragraphs 5c (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (9), (10) (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (29); paragraph 5d (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (10) (11), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 e (1), (3), (4) (re P-40s), (5), (12), (13), (14); paragraph 5 f (1), (2), and (3).

(In order to instill an adequate attitude of mind throughout the lower echelons of the command on the subject of intelligence, the undersigned finds that all squadron intelligence officers need an intelligence manual composed of specific details such as those contained in paragraph 5, attached report. The Commanding General and Staff of the 14th Pursuit Wing fully appreciate the desire of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Hawaiian Air Force to effect, quickly, a change from the previous peace-time status to the present borderline war-time status, and have fully cooperated by preparing a detailed plan of action.)

(Special attention is invited to the need for continued and increasing daily coordination between the Corps of Engineers at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.)

(It is believed that there is an urgent security need for "satellite" fields adjacent to or in the near vicinity of Wheeler Field.)

**6. Conclusions:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 6 b. c.

(Special attention is invited to the need for an organic maintenance command.)

(Special attention is invited to the needs of Wheeler Field for priority consideration and early action on the recommendations of the Commanding General, 14th Wing, in reference to fencing, lighting, facilities at Wright Gate, further military control of the public highway through Wheeler Field, and to required safeguarding of all paint, oil, and gas drums.)

**7. Recommendations:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 7 a.

**8. Appreciation:**

a. See attached report, paragraph 8 a, b, d, e.

(The spirit of helpfulness extend by the Commanding General [3] and Staff, 14th Wing, to the undersigned, in the preparation of the required changes from a peace-time status to a critical borderline condition, is considered worthy of commendation.)



b. A copy of this report has been furnished the Commanding General, 14th Wing, with a request that he register his concurrence or his difference of opinion, and attach thereto a copy of his prepared plans or actions that have already been initiated by his headquarters.

H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Special Inspector.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 June 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Special Report.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Pursuant to instructions contained in attached War Department letter the following special report on the Hawaiian Air Depot is submitted:

1. *General Comments:*

a. Officers of the G-2 Sections, Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force and of the F. B. I. were previously interviewed reference general policy.

b. All commissioned officers and foremen of the Depot were personally interviewed reference their knowledge and familiarity with the names, faces, and reputation of all employees.

c. Headquarters personnel records are inspected for upkeep and statistical data. All warehouses, storerooms, shops and grounds were inspected personally.

d. Critical locations were examined carefully.

2. Judged by standards required in peace time, conditions were found as follows:

a. *Airplanes:*

(1) Officers, superior.

(2) Crews, competent and trustworthy.

(3) Planes, excellent condition, locked at night, spot lighted.

(4) Guards, trustworthy.

(5) History of aircraft evidenced in Form #41 reveals no evidence of previous untoward instances.

(6) Technical inspections complete.

(7) No cases of carelessness noted.

[2] b. *Buildings and Grounds:*

(1) Offices, superior.

(2) Chief clerk and superintendent, especially intelligent.

(3) Foremen, competent and trustworthy.

(4) Technicians, skilled and conscientious.

(5) Workers, industrious.

(6) Shop inspection, thorough.

(7) Equipment, good condition.

(8) Buildings, carefully locked at night.

(9) Guards, trustworthy.

(10) Machinery, clean.

(11) Supplies, stored orderly.

(12) Fire apparatus, good condition.

(13) No cases of carelessness noted.

c. *Related Factors:*

Badges are being worn. Action being initiated on photo badges. Employees are being checked in and out at the main gate. Foremen and workers wear separate, distinctive uniforms. The Depot Commander, the Supply Officer and Chief Engineer, Lieutenant Colonels Hurd, Montgomery and Lewis, respectively, giving intelligent and commendable attention to local responsibilities concerned in the subject of this survey.

2. *Conclusions:*

Based on standards required in time of an unlimited emergency:

a. That the general opinion of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Hawaiian Air Force, to the effect that the requirements prescribed for guards at the gate, the interior watchman system and the inspection of identification badges, should be progressively increased during the present unlimited emergency and that this conclusion is appreciated by subordinate officers in the Depot who are initiating a plan of action to effect a compliance.

b. That progressive and increasing attention be given by every foreman to

insure a more intimate knowledge of every employee's name, face and characteristics and to this end that his intelligence test, physical test, trade test, experience test and, most importantly, his "trait" test data be systematically compiled and maintained.

c. That the vital G-2 aspects of the above test-data be increasingly coordinated with the S-1 office.

d. That the present degree of cooperation between the Depot and the Civil Service, also between the Depot and the F. B. I. are considered to be excellent.

[3] e. That existing conflicts between the communications plan of organization and operation as contained in the Hawaiian Air Force Field Orders and prescribed degrees of readiness in the security, alert and local defense plans be made the subject of a special survey by a Signal specialist or a technical communications expert, in order to insure a coordinated execution of the plan.

f. That all anti-sabotage plans carefully separate requirements that are actually on hand and issued, from plans which deal with future or projected; or, in other words, that anti-sabotage plans emphasize the need for an organization "in being" with material "on hand" for instant utility at any time.

g. That increasingly systematic inspection of the aqua system throughout, to include a chemical analysis of both gas and oil, be further intensified.

h. That, during the period of the present unlimited emergency, all employees be further indoctrinated with a semi-military spirit of morale and discipline and to this end that further stress upon social gatherings, restaurant facilities, personal medical attention, and picnics be encouraged. Also that periodical and orderly assemblies such as roll call, fire calls, etc., be further encouraged.

i. That critical attention be given to selecting critical items.

(1) The electrical fuel pumps on the B-17's may be considered as a critical item.

(2) The aqua system and the fire hazard incident to the storage or leakage of gas and oil in the warehouses and storerooms may be considered as critical items in the supply department.

(3) The power, compressed air, water, and sewage lines or connections may be considered as critical items in the engineering shops; also the pollution of lubricating machine oil be considered as critical.

(4) The main highway through the Depot, the isolated engine test stands, the engineer lumber dumps adjacent to the runway and food in the restaurant be considered as critical items in general.

#### 6. Recommendations:

a. That a regularly assigned Depot S-2 and Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed.

[4] b. That a Depot Inspector and an Intelligence Plans Officer be appointed and directed to prepare a combined inspection, security, alert and defense plan for the Depot and that two administrative reserve officers be assigned to the Depot.

c. That a travelling nurse, qualified as a psychologist, be assigned to the Depot and be authorized to attend employees' families.

d. That the lumber stacked at the end of the main runway be removed on the grounds that it constitutes a flying hazard and furnishes a close-up screen to the edge of the Depot as well as a concealed position from which a saboteur without detection could easily shoot up and hit a plane during its glide, especially at night.

e. That the interior watchman and guard system be increased progressively from the present strength of 21 men to a strength of 42 men and that patrols be instructed to work in units of two men or to keep in regular and frequent contact with each other.

f. That employees in the various shops and warehouses of the new buildings, when completed, be furnished distinctive arm bands, or colored shoulder straps, or caps, to aid in controlling any unnecessary inter-flow of personnel between separate buildings and between separate sections within buildings.

g. That priority of screening, as recommended by the Depot, be approved and that this priority be considered as urgent, especially as it refers to the screening of the motor test stand and a high man-proof screen required between the main depot road and the depot warehouse that contains highly inflammable stores such as gas, oil and chemicals.

h. That written instructions be issued to the guard verifying the present parking plan and verbal orders reference the daily inspection of all cars entering and leaving the Depot, this to insure that no unauthorized personnel or materiel is hidden in the back of cars, and also to insure that no unauthorized personnel remain hidden overnight in the shops.

i. That the subject of locks and keys which may have been in use for a long time be made the subject of a special survey with the purpose of requiring all locks and keys to be changed periodically, and that all men possessing keys to vital installations be listed and systematically checked.

j. That, in the absence of daytime guards, the civilian chief clerks, superintendents and foremen be issued pistols.

k. That all plats or diagrams of water, electrical, sewage and gasoline systems be checked and numbered.

[5] l. That the Depot Commander maintain a list of all employees who may be taking civilian flying instruction.

m. That a confidential general directive be issued by the Hawaiian Air Force to subordinate commanders to the effect that higher authority reposes special trust and confidence in their employees; that the present "unlimited emergency" requires a quick appreciation of the difference between "peace" and "emergency" conditions; that hostile saboteurs prepare most ingenious plans of fire and destruction and effect them with bold and ruthless determination; that our previous habitual sense of peace and security must be realistically tempered; that local commanders are directly responsible for the preparation and supervision of internal security plans which now should be based on the premise that at least a hundred saboteurs might act by criminal intention and stealth at any time, at any hour, even today or tonight; that no matter how far-fetched such a basic premise may seem in peace time or how much it may stretch peace-time credulity, that nevertheless the command responsibility for intelligence requires such a day by day sense of prevention.

1 Incl.

Ltr. TAG, 3/26/41.  
"Provisions for security  
of Installations"

H. S. BURWELL,  
Colonel, A. C.,  
Special Inspector.

[6]

1st Ind.

(A-1)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 June 1941.

To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, T. H.

1. For careful consideration and recommendation on putting into being each item of paragraph 6 of this report.

2. Paragraph 6 h. to be interpreted that parked cars of employees be maintained under constant surveillance that nothing detrimental to security be removed therefrom or placed therein while these cars are in their parking areas.

By command of Major General MARTIN:

CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.

[7]

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 13 June 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Judged by the new situation and standards required in consequence of the recently declared unlimited national emergency, it is considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Inspector are necessary and cover the question constructively. In this respect and in concurrence with the Commanding General's desires, every effort was made by this Headquarters to assist the Inspector by suggestions and cooperation.

2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of basic communication are concurred in.

Re para. a and b:

Priority action is requested on the assignment of two administrative officers to the Depot for assignment as Intelligence Plans Officer and Depot Inspector, as recommended in paragraph 6 b, basic report. These administrative and supervisory duties are being handled at the present time by Depot officers in addition to a large number of other executive type of duties.



*Re para c:*

The Depot First Aid Station has been expanded with the employment of an additional Nurse in order to allow the former Nurse to act as a Traveling Nurse and thus keep in more intimate and helpful contact with employees and their families.

*Re para d:*

The lumber stacked at the end of main run-way #4 has been removed by the District Engineer, which action has removed one of the more serious flying and sabotage hazards.

*Re para e:*

Due to the lack of available civilian guards and consequent difficulty in employing additional civilian guards of trustworthy character, the Depot has called upon Hickam Field for enlisted guards. It is believed that the Guard Roster may have to be materially increased, even beyond 42 men.

[8] *Re para. f:*

Full compliance with this recommendation will, of necessity, be progressive and will be completed when the Depot is moved into its new buildings. In the meantime, this Headquarters has initiated action on making badges with distinctive colors, which are in the process of procurement and issue.

*Re para. g:*

Prepared plans include the screen fences mentioned in the Inspector's recommendation.

*Re para. h:*

Detailed guard duties governing the parking plan have been prescribed in writing to insure that no unauthorized material is brought into or removed from the shops, also to insure that all personnel, other than the authorized guards, are required to leave the shops and parking area promptly after working hours. This special problem will be simplified upon completion of the proposed fence. Then all personnel enroute to and from the parking lot, which will be located outside the fence, will be checked in and out of the new gate, recommended hereinafter in paragraph 3 b.

*Re para. i:*

Survey has been initiated.

*Re para. j:*

Pistols have been issued to Section offices for use in case of internal riot or disorder.

*Re para. k:*

Action has been initiated.

*Re para. l:*

Action has been initiated.

[9] *Re para. m:*

Due to the quick and definite difference between the previous peacetime status and the present unlimited emergency status, this Headquarters is of the further opinion that the Depot area is still subject to successful acts of planned and directed sabotage during the present period of construction of buildings and grounds, and for this reason early action on the assignment of additional administrative officers and the priority requested for protective fence and lights is recommended.

**3. Conclusions:**

a. The conclusions of the Special Inspector were coordinated and concurred in by this Headquarters previous to the submission of his report. Subsequent to the submission of the above inspection report and in attendance with the Special Inspector, a further survey of the joint Hawaiian Air Depot-Hickam Field situation has been made of water valves, electrical terminals and man-holes with the result that action has been initiated to provide additional safeguards in this respect.

b. The Special Inspector concurs in the urgent need for an additional gate for the separate entrance and exit of Depot personnel.

c. Reference to the conclusions of the Inspector in regard to heavy type bombardment aircraft, special attention has been given to the determination of critical items such as, exposed cables, counter-balances in the tail assembly, connection of the cables with the servo drums and for the protection against hidden small electric or chemical bombs or explosives, and to insure a check on the custodian of keys and locks in the fuselage doors.

d. Reference the conclusions of the Inspector in respect to checking personnel traits and records, additional steps have been initiated by this Headquarters to effect a close contact with the Department Provost Marshal with special



reference to the checking of Police, Civil Service, and Immigration records on all newly-employed common laborers.

[10] e. Reference the selection of other critical items, special attention to any leakage of gas and oil in the warehouse and storerooms and the pollution of lubricating machine oil in the shops was suggested by shops superintendents to the inspector and additional safeguards provided with the concurrence of the inspector.

f. Reference the conclusions in regard to increased restaurant and social facilities, actions has been initiated with special reference to the restaurant, athletic association, pistol club, bowling league, and credit union.

LELAND C. HURD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps.  
Commanding.

[1] Confidential

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER,  
Hickam Field, T. H., 20 August 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

(T-3)

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan.)

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is [2] considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands.....	2
Morse Field.....	2
Hilo.....	1
Lanai.....	1
Parker Ranch.....	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

[3] 10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of four-teen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

3 Incls—

- Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu (in triplicate).
- Incl #2—Personnel Requirement Recapitulation (in triplicate).
- Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities (in triplicate).

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EXHIBIT No. 35 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT AVIATION IN THE  
DEFENSE OF OAHU

I. GENERAL

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.

2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary to search through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area

to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for search.

3. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and attack missions will be rotated for the purpose of resting crews and maintaining aircraft.

II. THE PROBLEM

1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

1. *Facts:*

a. The Army mission is: "To defend the Naval Base of Oahu".

b. The bombardment mission is—

(1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:

"To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

(2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in *Numbers or*

*Quality:*

"To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action."

c. \*Capabilities of B-17D type airplanes are:

	Gal. fuel used	Miles flown
(1) Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude (No bombs—2,500 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operations.....	432	214
Two hour fuel reserve.....	272	-----
Climb.....	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr.....	1,766	1,910
	2,500	2,134
Radius of action in nautical miles.....		1,067
[2] (2) Search—Attack at 45% at 5,000' (4—600# bombs—2,100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation.....	432	214
Two hours fuel reserve.....	272	-----
Climb.....	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr.....	1,366	1,485
	2,100	1,709
Radius of action in nautical miles.....		854
(3) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (4—600# bombs—2,100 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation.....	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power.....	272	-----
Climb.....	90	27
65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr.....	687	643
45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr.....	612	643
	2,093	1,549
Radius of Action in nautical miles.....		775
(4) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (8—600# bombs—1,700 gallons fuel)		
One hour full throttle operation.....	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power.....	272	-----
Climb.....	90	27
65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr.....	485	450
45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr.....	408	450
	1,687	1,163
Radius of Action in nautical miles.....	1,700	581

\*NOTE.—The above capabilities were taken from curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by actual flight tests.



d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.

e. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse conditions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.

f. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance mission for the defense of Oahu.

g. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage, other factors being equal.

h. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Department Commander has at his disposal.

## 2. Assumptions:

a. The following are the assumed or known *maximum* capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this performance).

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (based on performance data of the U. S. Navy carrier planes and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

b. The following are the assumed *probable* capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours. (28 knots is the mean top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for four bottoms).

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

NOTE.—In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers operating under conditions *a* and *b* above once committed to action will steam straight in to their launching radius. Any maneuvering by the enemy when within our search area will simplify our problem for it will give the search force more time in which to locate the enemy.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

d. An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the enemy fleet approaches these islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.

e. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of 6 carriers against Oahu.

f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard U. S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in this area.

g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following computations:

### (1) June 22, 20° N. Lat.:

Sunrise	0521
Sunset	1842
Hours of daylight	1321

Add:

Morning Twilight	25
Evening Twilight	24

Total hours of daylight 14:10

### (2) December 21, 20° N. Lat.:

Sunrise	0630
Sunset	1750

Hours of daylight 1120

Add:

Morning Twilight	24
Evening Twilight	24

Total hours daylight 12:08

Average (1) and (2) 13:09



[4]

## IV. DISCUSSION

*Part 1: The Search:*

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100% coverage through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside of that distance becoming a non-covered area beyond that distance. The width of the non-covered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as the search continues *out*. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the plane on its left on the search out but uncovered on the search back. 100% coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.

2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of determining coverage and non-coverage of areas on the *search out* using 3°, 4°, and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, 100% coverage on the search out is obtained to a radius of:

- a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
  - b. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
  - c. 1000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.
3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by:
- a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
  - b. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
  - c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond the radius of action of the carrier planes.

4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reported from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels or Navy patrol.

*Part 2:* This part of the discussions deals with the *maximum* capabilities of enemy equipment namely, his carriers steam at 30 knots and his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See Chart No. 3.

1. *Section No. 1:*

a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illus- [6] trates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out for dusk and dawn is computed from the *most distant* aircraft launching circle, or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the carrier planes will be in the air 3:20 and during that time the carrier steams in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.

b. 1A shows a carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and recovering during darkness; 1B shows the launching at dusk with the attack and recover during darkness; 1C shows the launching at noon with the attack and recover during daylight; and 1D shows the launching at dawn with the attack and recovery during daylight.

c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the radius of action of the attack force but the 1D permits the least time interval for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack at the longest range. *The early morning attack, is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.*

d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to *escape* under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.

(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close range.

(3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.

2. *Section No. 2:*

a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which will be made in order to prevent an enemy from making an undetected approach on Oahu.

b. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force taking off at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 435 nautical miles and no later than 3:03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and 2:10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5:34 D Day, 359 nautical miles out.

c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles from Oahu; dusk D Day-1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D Day-1 is 1246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two forces 1246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1030 nautical miles from Oahu at carrier's dawn plus 7:12 on D Day-1.

d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to our attack force. While a carrier arriving at [6] the 1030 nautical mile circle at dawn plus 7:12 on D Day-1 cannot be attacked that day, it can be attacked the following day as shown in b above when it must come within easy range of the attack force if it is to attempt to steam to within its launching radius.

3. *Section No. 3:*

a. This section illustrates the most difficult problem which the attack force has to solve. It is the same problem that is illustrated in Section No. 1D. The critical point here is the carrier's position at his launching radius at dawn. Under these circumstances he is able to launch his aircraft before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. *Therefore*, we must hit him D Day-1, or the day *before* he arrives at this position.

b. Specifically, if his dawn position D Day is 350 nautical miles from Oahu, his dusk position D Day-1 must be 680 nautical miles out and his dawn position D Day-1 must be 1070 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule, interception by the search force will be made at 884 nautical miles out at his dawn plus 6:11 on D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and to get the attack force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 10:43 D Day-1 at a distance of 748 nautical miles from Oahu and can operate against it during the remaining 2:16 before dusk. *Under the most favorable condition for the enemy, the enemy carrier can be subjected to attack by our attacking force during a period of 2:16 on D Day-1.*

4. *Section No. 4:* This section shows the radius of action of the B-17D type airplane with full load of bombs and 1700 gallons of fuel.

5. *Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 2):*

a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes, each covering a 3° sector, would be needed to operate to a distance of 1030 nautical miles. This number of planes would permit 100% coverage of the entire 360° on the search out.

b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the sector to be searched by each plane and therefore reduces the probability of finding the target. Any uncovered area would, however, with a lesser number of search planes be covered on the search back, and depending upon the location of the carrier and the hour of the day, might permit an attack to be made on D Day-1 or D Day.

*Part 3:* This part of the discussion deals with the assumed *probable* capabilities of enemy equipment (see Chart No. 4). It is believed that his *maximum* capabilities will be reduced from those assumed for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, (Chart No. 3) by the following factors:

1. His average carrier top speed will be 27 knots. This statement is predicated upon the fact that the average top speed of ORANGE carriers is 28 knots, and the belief that on his run across the Pacific, foul bottoms will probably further reduce his speed.

2. The cruising range of his carrier aircraft will be 400 nautical miles. No

allowance is made in previous computations for full throttle operation, for fuel reserve, or for time required to take off from, and land aboard, the carrier.

3. He will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.

a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.

[7] b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180° around Oahu; the next most probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90°; the least probable, 90° to 0°.

c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, commercial ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advance naval line patrol, will tend to disclose his general location and might, therefore, reduce the search area for our forces.

d. He will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.

#### 4. Section No. 5:

a. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the enemy under his assumed *probable* capabilities. Here consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above, with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27 knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft; recovery would be made at 167 nautical miles. Accordingly, the radius of search can be reduced to 833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the attack force make its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched. These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nautical miles and still permit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position from which aircraft can be launched.

b. If on D Day-1 the carrier force is at a distance of 991 nautical miles steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5:49, 833 nautical miles away, the maximum radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack force out and 3:42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus 10:11 D Day-1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the remaining 2:49 before dusk.

c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day-1 there still remains an opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn plus 3:56, 237 nautical miles out.

5. Section No. 6: The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3, Part 2 above, i. e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus 5:11 of carrier's D Day-1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day-1 and can operate against the carrier during the remaining 3:42 before dusk. *Under the most probable plan of action of an enemy carrier, a B-17D attacking force can operate against the carrier for 3:42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.*

#### 6. Effect of Visibility:

a. In Section No. 5, a 5° search spread should give adequate coverage. The search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to deliver an attack by the striking force before [8] dusk on D Day-1. There is 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.

b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above, 100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.



## V. CONCLUSION

1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180 knots.

2. *a.* The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should *base our plans* of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule :

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.

(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2 : 30 after dawn the day of the attack.

*b.* Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a greater time interval and at a shorter range ; or, permits our attack force to strike him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of action of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recovery of its planes.

3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its most adverse condition.

4. *a.* With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72 B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of 833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.

*b.* Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study 72 airplanes employed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap to 600 nautical miles, 80% coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles in the *search out*. In every case, the search out and in would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day-1.

5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approaching Hawaii and the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent.

[9] 6. *Search* must be conducted during daylight hours because of the extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unlighted objective proceeding under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking, an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.

7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.

8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of any known enemy carrier-based aviation.

9. *Attack* must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during darkness.

10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i. e., the employment of 6 enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be required to disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D's with bomb loads of seven 600# bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result (see Study No. 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B-17D's of the maintenance and reserve force if in commission.

11. This attack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-range planes of the B-26 or similar type, capable of carrying torpedoes to be used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2.)

12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replacement and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force if in commission.

13. In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a *minimum* of 216 combat crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.



## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal of better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:

#72 for daily search missions.

36 for attack missions (these airplanes fill be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).

72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.

---

180 total B-17D's.

36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Department for the construction of airdromes on outlying islands of [10] the Hawaiian group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations of the above number of planes. Existing plans for the dispersion of the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate from dispersed airdromes. Modification of the plan to apply to operations therefrom are anticipated and will be made.

3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air Force consideration be given to providing a *minimum* of 216 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 8, basic letter.

4. Our leading tecticians and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and that to their knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu. The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in Europe the fallacy of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a vigorous offensive. We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its *immediate* command well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be made available on short notice their expeditions presence here *will not solve* the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo a certain amount of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plan of action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be prepared for D Day at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered from the standpoint of *replacements for losses only*. Any delay in placing this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would mitigate against its success.

It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft with 36 long-range torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the cost of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this force should be made available as soon as possible even at the expense of other units on the Mainland.

## Study No. 1

## STUDY OF THE BOMBS REQUIRED TO DISABLE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER

1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500 lb. or 600 lb. demolition bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.

2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface craft and from previous experiences by bombardiers who have made attacks of this nature, it is determined that about 90% probability of two direct hits may be expected from 6 B-17D's or similar type airplanes attacking a maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600 lb. bombs in train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.

3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods of attack are considered:

a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close succession.

b. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and in close succession.

c. Formation attack in a 6-plane flight.

In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and airplanes (6) required to give a 90% probability of two effective hits was determined to be nearly the same for each type of attack.

## Study No. 2

## NEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be expected to partially or wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission:

- (1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
- (2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
- (3) Enemy fighter action.
- (4) Hostile anti-aircraft artillery fire.
- (5) Weather obscuring the objective.

b. Consideration of these factors:

(1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of training and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.

(3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier-based fighters will be very effective against the B-17D's at high altitudes.

(4) Reports from abroad indicate that anti-aircraft fire will be only partially effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission.

(5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing missions fail because of overcast conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy bombardment as such is useless against surface craft when low ceilings (200-1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet without prohibitive losses from anti-aircraft fire before reaching the bomb release line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has *no weapon* to effectively combat surface craft under such conditions.

2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem:

a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low flying aircraft. This is substantiated by results from abroad, i. e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc. A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate under a very low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy against all surface craft. The torpedo plane should be land-based, of long range, fast and capable of being accurately navigated. It should operate *in conjunction with* heavy bombardment.

3. *a.* The only type airplane that could be adapted to this purpose at present in the Hawaiian Department is the A-20A. It is believed that this adaptation can be made and the problem is under consideration and test at present.

*b.* It is believed that the medium bombardment airplane of the B-26 type will be even more satisfactory because of its longer range.

*c.* It is recommended that adaptation of some such airplane be made, preferably in such a manner as not to interfere with the normal bombardment mission.

(At this point in exhibit 35 there appear four charts as follow :

Chart 1. A chart showing a method of searching 5 degree sectors through 360 degrees to a radius of 833 miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes.

Chart 2. A graph showing relation of 25-mile visibility to distance.

Chart 3. A chart showing the radius of action of B-17D airplane under various load conditions in relation to possible plans of a carrier group attacking Oahu, reflecting Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Chart 4. *Ibid*, reflecting Sections 5 and 6.

These charts will be found reproduced as Items 125, 126, 127, and 128, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

Confidential

*Operating schedule for 216B-17D combat crews*

Days	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Search.....	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF
Rest and trg.....	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB
Alert.....	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD	EF	AB	CD

1. The 216 combat crews are divided into units of 36 each for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designated by the letters A to F inclusive.
2. On the 1st day of operations, Groups A and B search, C and D conduct training and reserve force are in commission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will conduct training and alert for an attack mission if airplanes of the maintenance and reserve force are in commission.
3. It will be noted that over a thirty day period each unit will:
  - a. Fly a total of 10 search missions averaging 10 hours per mission, or 100 hours per period.
  - b. Be on the alert for attack missions 10 days per period.
  - c. Conduct training and rest 10 days per period.

*Operating schedule for 288B-17D combat crews*

Days	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Search.....	AB	GD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	FE	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD
Rest.....	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB
Training.....	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH
Alert.....	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF	GH	AB	CD	EF

1. The 288 combat crews are divided into units of 36 each for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designated by the letters A to H inclusive.
2. On the 1st day of operations, groups A and B search, G and H rest, E and F conduct training, D is on the alert for an attack mission and the underscored group C is also on the alert for an attack mission. If airplanes of the reserve and maintenance force are in commission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will rest, 72 will conduct training, and 72 will be on the alert for an attack mission.
3. It will be noted that over a thirty day period units will average:
  - a. 7½ search missions averaging 10 hours per mission, or 75 hours per period.
  - b. 7½ days rest per period.
  - c. 7½ days training per period.
  - d. 7½ days on the alert for attack missions.

REMARKS

1. It should be noted that a *minimum* of 216 B-17 Combat Crews are considered necessary. Considerable doubt exists as to whether or not this number of combat crews are sufficient for sustained operations. As has been pointed out, each combat crew will fly approximately 100 hours search per 30 day period and be on the alert for attack missions 10 days during the period. Further it is possible that over an extended period of time combat crews may never fire a round of machine gun ammunition or drop a bomb. They must, therefore, conduct a certain amount of routine training to maintain their combat efficiency. This training would be accomplished on the ten days set aside for rest. It is not improbable that a pilot would fly some 130 hours per 30 days period. It is believed that combat crews, particularly pilots, could not perform continuous flying duty efficiently if required to fly over 100 hours per month for any length of time.

2. The 288 combat crew set-up is, therefore, recommended as an alternate plan and it is requested that serious consideration be given to assigning this number of combat crews in furtherance of the Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu.



Inclosure No. 2

*Strength of Hawaiian Air Force (Air Corps troops only)*

HICKAM FIELD

Units	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
Hq Haw'n Air Force:				
Hq & Hq Sq Haw'n Air Force	200	203	3	
19th Transport Sq	161	158		3
Tow Target Det	139	4		135
Total Hq Haw'n Air Force	500	365	3	138
18th Bombardment Wing:				
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	158	194	36	
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
23rd Bomb Sq (H)	206	219	13	
31st Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
72nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	222	16	
4th Recon Sq (H)	233	238	5	
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
14th Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
26th Bomb Sq (H)	206	215	9	
42nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	223	17	
50th Recon Sq (H)	233	232		1
Hq & Hq Sq 17th AB Gp (R)	131	216	85	
18th AB Sq	145	259	114	
22nd Mat Sq	203	291	88	
23rd Mat Sq	203	304	101	
58th Bomb Sq (L)	192	223	31	
Air Corps Det., Weather	20	28	8	
Air Corps Det., Communications	20	23	3	
Total 18th Bombardment Wing	3,238	3,795	558	1
Total Hickam Field	3,738	4,160	561	139

WHEELER FIELD

14th Pursuit Wing:				
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wg	158	142		16
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F)	204	202		2
45th Pur Sq (F)	175	174		1
46th Pur Sq (F)	175	171		4
47th Pur Sq (F)	175	169		6
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Gp (Int)	204	187		17
6th Pur Sq (Int)	157	161	4	
19th Pur Sq (Int)	157	155		2
44th Pur Sq (Int)	157	154		3
78th Pur Sq (Int)	157	170	13	
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Air Base Gp (R)	131	358	227	
17th Air Base Sq	145	193	48	
24th Mat Sq	203	182		21
25th Mat Sq	203	137		66
Total 14th Pur Wg and Wheeler Field	2,401	2,555	292	138

BELLOWS FIELD

86th Obsn Sq (C & D)	142	141		1
Casual Detachment		306	306	
Total Bellows Field	142	447	306	1
Total Hawaiian Air Force	6,281	7,162	1,159	278
Net overage			881	
Auth. Strength of an Air Base Gp (S) (Hq & Hq Sq-AB Sq-Mat'iel Sq)	479			
2 Air Base Groups (S) required	958			
1-Bellows Field.				
1-15th Pur Gp (F) at new station.				

*Strength requirements*

216 combat crews (less 70 now present)-----	146	
180 maintenance crews (less 70 now present)-----	110	
146 combat crews @ 5 men each-----		730
110 maintenance crews @ 14 men each-----		1,540
2 medium bombardment-torpedo squadrons @ 217 men each-----		434
5 air base squadrons @ 145 men each-----		725
1 observation squadron-----		155
1 dive bomber squadron-----		210
2 air base groups (s)-----		958
Total-----		4,752
Less present over-strength-----		881
Net total requirement-----		3,871

## Inclosure No. 3

*Air Force housing facilities*

Present strength of Air Force personnel-----	7,192
Increase as result of this study-----	3,871
Present strength other services-----	1,500
Projected increase other services (Bellows & Kipapa)-----	250
Total-----	12,813

Housing available	Perma- nent	Mobiliza- tion	Total
Hickam Field-----	3,278	1,512	4,790
Wheeler Field-----	1,537	441	1,978
Bellows Field-----		1,008	1,008
New Air Base 15th Pursuit Group (Kipapa Gulch)-----		1,294	1,294
Outlying Fields (other islands) now being constructed or projected-----		3,218	3,218
Grand total-----			12,288
(Difference) housing to be provided-----			525

## EXHIBIT NO. 36 (ARMY) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1] SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE BY BRIGADIER GENERAL L. T. GEROW, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION, BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSION, DECEMBER 18, 1941

## DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT WAR PLAN

1. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy state the governing policies for joint action of the Army and Navy. These policies serve as basic guides in the preparation of war plans.

2. A war plan is prepared to meet a specific situation requiring the use of all or part of the Army and Navy of the United States. The plan in current use is known as Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5. Broadly considered, it consists of the following documents:

a. Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1).

b. Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22).

c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

d. Navy War Plan and subordinate plans based thereon.

3. The Joint Board in April, 1941, developed the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 based on a. and b. above. The work incident to the preparation thereof was done by The Joint Planning Committee. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy in May, 1941.

4. Based on this joint plan the Army War Plans Division prepared Army Strategic Plan, which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow No. 5. A copy of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on August 21, 1941. Receipt

was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by The Joint Board on November 19, 1941, and a copy of The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Revision No. 1, was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941. Receipt therefor has not as yet been received.

5. The missions assigned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the Army Strategical Plan are as follows:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and the destruction of Axis sea communication by offensive action against the enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

c. Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

6. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established. Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5 placed the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in Category D. This category assumes the possibility, but not the probability of a *major* attack.

[3]

#### WAR PLANS, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

1. War Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consist of the following documents:

- a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
- b. Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Naval Operations Annex.
- c. Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, and plans subordinate thereto.
- d. Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. These plans are based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange prepared for a situation involving a war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. The Joint Mission, the Navy Mission, and the Category of Defense under the Orange Plan is the same as that under the Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5. The Army Mission under the latter plan has been somewhat broadened. Under all plans in existence the War Department's concept of the most probable form of attack which an enemy would adopt against Oahu was a surprise attack consisting of raids and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces and action by local sympathizers.

3. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District) and the Army Operating Defense Plans were forwarded to the War Department for review at time of issue, and published revisions thereto have been furnished from time to time. Such plans are not formally approved by the War Department and are not commented upon unless it appears that they are not in consonance with the Basic Army Plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned. Plans in force in the Hawaiian Department on December 7 were in process of revision based on the Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and recent changes and additions made in the means provided the Hawaiian Department.

4. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, which was revised March 28, 1941, prescribes the joint security measures to be taken for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. The following extracts from this plan are quoted in order to indicate the joint agreement in force on December 7, 1941:

#### "I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39 (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

## II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. [5] This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission."

5. A defense project of an overseas department includes:

First, a statement of the mission to be carried out by the Department Commander as defined by the War Department; second, a brief estimate of the situation outlining the most probable threats against the successful execution of this mission and indicating the course of action and the means necessary to carry out the mission; and, third, a concise statement of the requirements in troops, in defensive installations, construction other than housing, and the supplies and equipment considered necessary to carry out the mission. This summary includes priorities for accomplishment of the requirements enumerated and consolidated estimates of cost. The defense project is revised annually and is submitted to the War Department for approval.

6. The Hawaiian Defense Project, 1940, was approved by the War Department on September 17, 1941. The project contains revisions up to September 29, 1941. The following extracts from this document indicate the mission, the category of defense, and the possible and probable war situations as understood by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category 'D' to this Department.

Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

- (a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.
- (b) Sabotage.
- [6] (c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.
- (d) Air raids carrier based.
- (e) Surface ship raids.
- (f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet."

\* \* \* \* \*

"BASIS FOR PLANNING

*Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based on the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D.

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange.



(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Departments point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will [?] make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the 'cut-off from the Mainland situation'.

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

(c) *Conclusion.*

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort."

ALERTS

1. Following is the chronological record of alerts held by the Army, sometimes in conjunction with the Navy, since July 17, 1940. (Some entries included to indicate awareness of situation.)

*June 17, 1940*

Radiogram War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department.

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

*June 17, 1940*

Radiogram from C. G., Hawaiian Department to War Department answering the above:

"All antiaircraft observation and security detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. No excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore patrols in operation."

[8] *June 24, 1940*

Letter General Herron to Chief of Staff (Reference to alert ordered above):

"I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air and the antiaircraft standing to their guns at dawn . . . I have been gratified by the precision with which the planes get off each morning at 4:30 a. m. . . ."

*June 27, 1940*

Letter prepared from Chief of Staff to General Herron, but not sent on account of secrecy. Explains reasons for the above alert, which were:

"Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources lead to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific Raid against Oahu following the departure of the United States fleet from Hawaii. . . ."

"Whether the information or discussions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act."

"In any event, it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the all clear signal."

*July 16, 1940*

Radiogram from Chief of Staff to C. G., Hawaiian Department (Gives authority to relax alert):

"You are authorized at your discretion, to relax alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness; second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice."

*August 28, 1940*

Letter Chief of Staff to General Herron, asking reactions as to continued alert:

[9] "As to the alert, I want your frank reaction. Is it imposing too heavy a tax to continue on the present basis. \* \* \* ? It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic."

*September 6, 1940*

Reply of General Herron reference burden imposed by alert:

"My absolute frank and honest opinion is that the alert as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the maneuvers being held will build up materially and easily the effectiveness of the alert."

"The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much."

*July 7, 1941*

Radio sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned."

*July 25, 1941*

Joint dispatch sent by Chief of Staff and Chief of [10] Naval Operations by naval radio:

"Appropriate addresses please deliver copies to Commanding Generals of Philippines, Hawaiian, and Caribbean Defense Commands and also to General Chaney in London. You are herewith advised that on July 26 the United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected that these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through the medium of a licensing system for certain materiel . . . Japanese funds and assets in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not expected that Japanese merchant ships in ports of the United States will be shifted at this time. United States flag merchant ships will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by the Japanese. Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means but, you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. Except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates, the contents of this dispatch are to be kept secret."

*October 18, 1941*

Radiogram sent by War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tention between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

*November 24, 1941*

Radiogram from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet:

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur-

prise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has [11] seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 15) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch."

*November 26, 1941*

Extract of secret cablegram sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns."

*November 27, 1941*

Secret first priority message to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can not, repeat can not, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

*November 28, 1941*

Radiogram C. G., Hawaiian Department to Chief of Staff:

"Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad 472, the 27th."

[12] *December 7, 1941*

Radio to C. G., Hawaiian Department, from Chief of Staff (left Message Center at 12:17 P. M.):

"Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

#### MEANS PROVIDED FOR DEFENSE

##### 1. *Troops.*

Units with strength thereof actually present in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, are shown in Tab "A".

##### 2. *Airplanes.*

See Tab "B".

##### 3. *Antiaircraft Materiel.*

The status of antiaircraft materiel in Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, was as shown in Tab "C". Existing shortages had not been met because of nonavailability of equipment.

##### 4. *Seacoast Defense.*

See Tab "D".

##### 5. *Aircraft Warning Service.*

(a) The approved project provides for 6 mobile detector sets and 6 fixed sets to be located as shown on the attached map. All of these sets have a rated range of 120 miles, but under favorable conditions efficient service has been obtained in excess of the rated range.

(b) The six (6) mobile sets and three (3) fixed sets were on hand in the Hawaiian Department December 7, 1941. The remaining three fixed sets had not been shipped from the mainland.

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(c) The three (3) fixed sets on hand were scheduled for installation at the sites given below. Construction had started, but had not been completed.

- Mt. Kaala, Oahu.
- Kokee, Kauai.
- Haleakala, Maui.

[13] (d) The six (6) mobile sets were scheduled for the locations shown on the attached map. Their actual location on December 7, 1941, is not known to the War Department.

6. Considered broadly, defense projects which have been under construction for some time and for which funds have been provided are as follows:

- Bunkers for dispersed airplanes.
- Development of airfields.
- Bombproofing of vital installations.
- Bombproof ammunition storage.
- Command and Fire Control Cable System.
- Storage for gasoline and oil defense reserves (Splinter-proof).
- Military roads, trails and railroads.
- Modernization of seacoast artillery.
- 8" Railway battery positions.

7. All reasonable requests by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department for funds and the supply of equipment & matériel have met within the means available.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	12:17 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Alert Radiogram: Japanese Bombers Attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, Wheeler Field. Extensive Damages.
2	3:34 P. M.	HHD	TAG	
[14] 3	5:00 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Report of Casualties.
4	6:30 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Report of Second Attack at 11:00 A. M.
5	7:30 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Authority to Incur Necessary Obligations.

DECEMBER 8, 1941

1	2:40 P. M.	C/S	HHD	Radiogram: Rush Report of Operations. Readiness for Further Attack? Priorities for Assistance? Radiogram: Request for Shipment Ammunition. Cable: Prepare to Carry Out Tasks Assigned by Rainbow 5 Pertaining to Germany and Italy.
2	2:38 P. M.	HHD	TAG	
3		TAG	HHD	

DECEMBER 9, 1941

1	11:30 P. M.	HHD	C/S	Radiogram: Report of Operations. Request for Troops, Ammunition and Materiel.
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DECEMBER 10, 1941

2	7:48 P. M.	HHD	TAG	Radiogram: Request for Ammunition. Radiogram: Request for 2 Additional Infantry Regiments.
3		HHD	TAG	

DECEMBER 11, 1941

1	10:55 A. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: War with Germany and Italy.
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DECEMBER 12, 1941

1	1:55 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Authority to Evacuate Dependents to Mainland. Radiogram: Martial Law in Effect. Situation Quiet.
2	5:35 P. M.	HHD	TAG	

DECEMBER 13, 1941

1	1:05 P. M.	TAG	HHD	Radiogram: Listing Units, Airplanes, Bombs, Equipment and Ammunition being Dispatched Hawaii. Radiogram: Plan of Defense Canton and Christmas.
[15] 2	9:16 P. M.	HHD	TAG	



*Brief of chronological record of correspondence between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on matters of importance since December 7, 1941*

DECEMBER 14, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	10:22 P. M. ....	TAG.....	HHD...	Radiogram: Are you Planning to Garrison Outlying Islands?

DECEMBER 15, 1941

1	3:45 P. M. ....	HHD.....	G-2.....	Radiogram: Summary of Enemy Activity Hawaii 8 Dec. to 12 Dec.
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DECEMBER 16, 1941

1	5:20 P. M. ....	HHD.....	TAG...	Radiogram: Report of Sub Attack Kahului Maui.
2	8:55 P. M. ....	HHD.....	TAG...	Radiogram: Dispositions for Defense of Airfields Outlying Islands.
3	.....	HHD.....	TAG...	Letter: Report Battle Oahu.

DECEMBER 18, 1941

1	3:27 P. M. ....	Emmons....	TAG...	Radiogram: Unit of Command Vested in Navy Effective this Date.
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/s/L. T. Gerow,  
L. T. GEROW,  
Brigadier General,  
Assistant Chief of Staff.

5 Incls:

- Incl. 1—Troops, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab A).
- Incl. 2—Airplanes, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab B).
- Incl. 3—AA Org & Equip Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab C).
- Incl. 4—Seacoast Def Org, Haw Dept (Tab D).
- Incl. 5—Map, AWS, Haw Dept.

[16] A. MAJOR UNITS IN HAWAII DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. Department Headquarters and Headquarters Troops:
  - 34th Engrs. (C).
  - 804th Engr. Bn. (How) at Canton.
  - How Pack Train.
  - Co. A, 1st Chem. Bn.
  - Aircraft Warning Co.
2. Hawaiian Air Force:
  - 5th Bomb Group:
    - 23d Bomb Sq.
    - 31st Bomb Sq.
    - 72d Bomb Sq.
    - 4th Rec. Sq.
  - 11th Bomb Group:
    - 26th Bomb Sq.
    - 42d Bomb Sq.
    - 50th Rec. Sq.
    - 58th Bomb Sq. (Lt).
  - 18th Pursuit Group (I):
    - 6th Pursuit Sq. (I).
    - 19th Pursuit Sq. (I).
    - 78th Pursuit Sq. (I).
    - 44th Pursuit Sq. (I).
    - 72d Pursuit Sq. (I).
    - 73d Pursuit Sq. (I).

15th Pursuit Group (F):  
 45th Pursuit Sq. (F).  
 16th Pursuit Sq. (F).  
 47th Pursuit Sq. (F).  
 86th Observation Squadron.  
 Air Corps Services.

## 3. Harbor Defense Troops:

15th CA (HD).  
 16th CA (HD).  
 41st CA (Ry).  
 55th CA (155 mm) (TD).

## [17] 4. Antiaircraft Units:

64th CA (AA) SM.  
 97th CA (AA) SM.  
 98th CA (AA) SM.  
 251st CA (AA) M.

## 5. Beach and Land Defense:

24th Division.  
 25th Division.  
 11th Tank Co. (L).

Total Strength----- 2,149 Officers  
   48 WO  
   166 ANC  
   40,494 EM  


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 42,857 Total

[18]

## B. AIRPLANES—HAWAII

Number on December 7, 1941

<i>Type</i>	MODERN	<i>No.</i>	
B-17D-----		12	} Pursuit and Bombardment
A-20A-----		12	
P-40B-----		86	
P-40C-----		13	
		123	
O-47B-----		12	} Observation
O-49-----		3	
C-33-----		2	} Transportation
OA-4A/OAS/OA9-----		5	} Observation Amphibian
BT2B1/2RR/2CR-----		4	} Basic Trainer
AT6-----		4	} Advanced Trainer
	NON-MODERN		
B-12A-----		6	} Medium Bomber
B-18-----		33	
A-12-----		9	} Light Bomber
P-26A-----		9	} Pursuit
P-26B-----		7	
P-36A-----		46	

[19]

C. ANTI-AIRCRAFT

Organization and armament, Hawaiian Department, Dec. 7, 1941

	Authorized			
	Mobile 3" AA	Fixed 3" AA	37mm (AA)	Cal. .50 MGs
64th CA (AA).....	24		30	*40
251st CA (AA).....	12		30	*28
97th CA (AA).....	24		30	*40
98th CA (AA).....	24	12	30	*16
Harbor Defense Units.....		14		
Total.....	72	26	120	*124
On hand.....	60	26	20	113
Shortage.....	12	0	100	**233

+222 for local defense of S. C. Btry airfields.

\* Figures include cal. .50 MGs in MG batteries and for local protection of AA gun batteries, fixed and mobile.

\*\* Maintenance allowance not included.

[20]

D. SEACOAST

Caliber	No. Guns	No. Btrys	Location	Caliber	No. Guns	No. Btrys	Location
16".....	2 (BC)....	1	Weaver	6".....	#2 (DC)...	1	Kam
16".....	2 (BC)....	1	Barrette	3".....	#2 (BC)....	1	Armstrong
14".....	2 (DC)....	1	De Russy.....	3".....	#2 (BC)....	1	Kam
12".....	2 (BC)....	1	Kam	155 mm....	4.....	1	Kam
12".....	#2 (DC)....	1	Kam	155 mm....	4.....	1	Barbers Pt.
12".....	#4 (M)....	1	Ruger	155 mm....	4.....	1	Sand Is.
12".....	#4 (M)....	1	Ruger	155 mm....	4.....	1	Ruger
12".....	#4 (M)....	1	Kam	155 mm....	4.....	1	Ashley
8".....	2 (BC)....	1	Ruger	155 mm....	4.....	1	Kawailoa
8".....	4 (Rwy)...	1	Kaneohe Bay	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Weaver
8".....	4 (Rwy)...	1	Puuiki	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Ewa Beach
8".....	4 (Rwy)...	1	Browns Camp	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Brown's Camp
8".....	#4 (Rwy)...	1	{Waianae	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Kabuku
			{Alt. Maili	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Koko Head
8".....	#4 (Rwy)...	1	{Kabuku	155 mm....	#4.....	1	Punch Bowl
			{Alt. Malahoa	155 mm....	4.....	1	Kaneohe Bay
6".....	#2 (DC)....	1	DeRussy	155 mm....	4.....	1	Kaneohe Bay

# Not manned initially.

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