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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

—————
PART 26

PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY
—————

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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 JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
 EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
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4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
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9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 144

[TOP SECRET]

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TO RECORD TESTIMONY PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

February 12, 1944—June 15, 1944

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[1] RECOMMENDED SEQUENCE FOR READING THE TESTIMONY CONTAINED HEREIN

Insofar as there was a plan for the sequence of witnesses, it consisted of examining officers who were in Hawaii, 7 December 1941, and then following what they brought out by examining officers who were elsewhere, most of such being of the Navy Department. However, it was necessary to seize opportunities when and where officers were available and irrespective of logical sequence.

Therefore, in reviewing this testimony it will be advisable to depart from the order of the actual proceedings and the following sequence is recommended. However, some reviewers may find that for them the flow of thought will be better if Part III is read before Part II.

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(39) Charles Welborn, Jr., Captain, USN.....	Administrative Aide to CNO.....	383
(40) Roland M. Brainard, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret).....	Director of Ship Movements Division, OpNav.....	399

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

In reply address
Secretary of the Navy
and refer to No.

[A(1)]

[Copy]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 12 February 1944.

JAG: D-1: LLP

PRECEPT FOR AN EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AND THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Subj: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Whereas, on 7 December 1941, Japanese armed forces made an attack against Army and Navy installations and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, which attack was a complete surprise to the commanders of the said installations and ships, and

Whereas, regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the said attack, and

Whereas, certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments at great distances from the United States, and

Whereas, it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony, pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved,

I hereby detail you to examine such members of the naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the said surprise attack and fully record the testimony given thereby. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter.

In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and . [A(2)] therefore, has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.

Upon completion of the examination you will submit a complete record of all the testimony taken, including any documents introduced therein, to the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of Sections 733 and 734, Naval Courts and Boards, will govern the proceedings of this examination, in so far as such provisions are applicable thereto.

The necessary clerical assistance to aid you in recording the testimony will be furnished you upon your request by the appropriate command in the area in which meetings are held.

(SGD) FRANK KNOX.

[B] Office of the Secretary.
JAG: D-1: ps.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 16 Feb 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.

1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, as counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

1-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Delivered.

/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. GATCH,*The Judge Advocate General.*

Confidential

2-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Reported this date.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.

[C] Office of the Secretary.

JAG: D-1: ps

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 16 Feb. 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.

1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, as assistant counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

1-End.

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington Jr., U. S. N. R.

1. Delivered.

/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. GATCH,
*The Judge Advocate General.**Confidential*

2-End.

17 FEB 1944.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington Jr., U. S. N. R.

1. Reported this date.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
 THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.

[D] Office of the Secretary

JAG:I:ps

(SC)/P16-4/00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
 Washington 25, D. C., 27 April 1944.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.

Ref: (a) SecNav. ltr., JAG:D-1:ps (SC) P16-4/00, dated 16 February 1944, with endorsement thereon.

1. When directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, you will consider yourself relieved of the duties assigned by reference (a) and will then report to the Judge Advocate General and resume your regular duties.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

JAG:AJ:RLD

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

28 April 1944.

End-1

From: The Judge Advocate General.

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. N.

1. Delivered.

/s/ F. L. Lowe,
 F. L. LOWE,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

2nd Endorsement

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Washington, D. C. 9 May 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy (Ret).

To: Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.

1. Relieved as counsel to assist the examining officer. You will carry out the basic orders.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart.
 THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

*Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
 Examining Officer.*

[E] Office of the Secretary

JAG:I:ps

(SC)P16-4/QR3

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 28 April 1944

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.

Via: The Judge Advocate General.

Subj: Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.

Ref: (a) SecNav ltr., JAG:D-1:ps (SC)P16-4/QR3, dated 16 February 1944, with endorsement thereon.

1. Reference (a) is hereby modified to the extent that when directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, you will assume the duties of counsel to assist him in the examination of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12 February 1944.

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.

JAG:AJ:RLD

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

28 April 1944.

End-1

From: The Judge Advocate General.

To: Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR.

1. Delivered.

/s/ F. L. Lowe,
F. L. LOWE,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Confidential

[1] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1944

FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:00 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

The examining officer read orders from the Secretary of the Navy, originals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel and assistant counsel, respectively, to the examining officer. Captain Wallace and Lieutenant Whittington took seats as such.

The examination was cleared, and the examining officer read the precept, original prefixed marked "A(1)" and "A(2)".

All matters preliminary to the examination having been determined, and the examining officer having decided to sit with closed doors, the examination was opened.

The examining officer introduced in evidence a certified copy of his confidential letter of 17 February 1944 to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 1".

The examining officer introduced in evidence the original of a letter from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, signed by Captain Robert A. Lavender, Retired, by direction, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer, dated 19 February, 1944, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 2".

The examining officer announced that the request of the interested party contained in the above mentioned letter is approved, to the extent that the interested party will be afforded a reasonable time to prepare for the examination, and that the examination, upon completion of the present session, will adjourn until called by the examining officer.

The examining officer stated that on 19 February 1944, he had delivered to Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, Retired, counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, two copies, marked Confidential, of the precept signed by the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, ordering the present examination.

The examination then, at 10:15 a. m. was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[2] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1944

SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:07 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter.

The record of proceedings of the first day of the examination was read and approved.

The examining officer and the reporter were duly sworn.

The examining officer read a copy of a letter, dated 4 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, retired, interested party, informing him of the beginning of proceedings in the present examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 3 (1) and (2)".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This examination is convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, for the purpose of examining witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941. The precept states that certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matter, are now or soon may be on dangerous assignments and that it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and preserved. From available records, it is believed that you have knowledge pertinent of the aforementioned attack. The examining officer asks your statement of facts personally known to you covering certain points. In such statement you should, as far as you can, speak from your knowledge prior to the event and as the situation presented itself before the actual attack. In making such statement, your attention is invited to Sections 280 and 281 of Naval Courts and Boards, regarding the use of documents to refresh and supplement your recollection.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, will you please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, on duty as a member of the General Board, Navy Department.

[3] 2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, Sir?

A. I was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, and Commander of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

3. Q. For how long had you been Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I reported on April 10, 1940.

4. Q. Who was your immediate superior in performing these duties, Sir?

A. By order of the Navy Department, I was a member of the forces afloat, Subordinate to Commander of the U. S. Fleet.

5. Q. Will you please explain the nature of your organization under the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.

A. Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet in February, 1941, and almost immediately thereafter he issued a Base Defense Order known as "2CL". Its date was in February sometime. And in that order, the Commandant of the District, who was me, was Commander of the Base Defense Force. The object of that order, as I understand it, was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet, insofar as the Commander-in-Chief and his forces could augment the forces of the Army, who really had the responsibility for the defense of all land areas, and Pearl Harbor particularly. This order was subsequently revised in October, 1941, by another order known as "2CL (Revised)", and in that order some changes were made in the original order. In the Fall of 1940, as Commandant of the District and having a very close liaison with the Army, I became convinced that the Army's means of defense, insofar as it related to aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, was insufficient, and I discussed this matter with the Commander-in-Chief, which was Admiral Richardson. I told him my views and he became alarmed and he asked me how many guns the Army had, anti-aircraft guns, how many fighter planes, and how many bombing planes. And I told him approximately how many I understood that they had and, as the result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson went to the Commanding General, General Herron, and asked General Herron to go around with him and interview, first-hand, the officers and find out what guns, what planes, and what forces the Army had there. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave me a memo informing me of a number of anti-aircraft guns, the number of planes, marks and models, that were in existence at Oahu and discussed the matter again with me. As the result of this information and my conversation with Admiral Richardson, I wrote a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the numbers and that I considered the defense inadequate and presented the entire matter to the Department. This letter was taken by Admiral Richardson and he put a strong endorsement on it and sent it to the Navy Department.

Note: The letter mentioned by the witness was later introduced as Exhibit 23 of his testimony when he was recalled at a later date. Record page 87.

A. (Continued) That correspondence was the basis of a letter written by the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, under date of 24 January 1941 in which the Secretary of Navy presented this condition to the War Department and expressed his anxiety about the security of Pearl Harbor, and asked [4] that some action be taken immediately.

Note: The letter mentioned by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being a letter from the Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, file No. Op-12B-9-McC, (SC) A7-2(2)FF1, Serial 09112, and copy of which is now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The answer of the Secretary of War to this letter has been identified by the examining officer as being letter of February 7, 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii", the original of which is on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. (Subsequently, both letters were introduced in evidence as "Exhibit 40", Record Page 407.)

A. (Continued) Before we received any information from the Navy Department about what was happening about this letter, Admiral Kimmel superseded to the duties of Commander-in-Chief and he was even more concerned—or equally concerned, I'll say, not more concerned, with the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor from an air attack. And when I refer to "air attack", I don't mean an air attack necessarily which would initiate a war but I mean any air attack which might develop in the course of a war. So he went over certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that as long as the ships in the harbor had certain anti-aircraft batteries themselves, they should be used to the fullest extent in increasing the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor, over what could be furnished by the Army itself. Furthermore, he decided that inasmuch as the Navy also had a lot of planes on shore—usually had a lot of planes on shore, a great many of them carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they should also be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned to me Admiral Halsey from his command and Admiral Bellinger from his command to talk over with the Army how we could coordinate the action of the planes. They reported to me before they had their meeting with the Army authorities, and, I suggested to them that all the fighting planes that we had on shore, at any time that an attack might be made, would be placed under the Army's command for fighter purposes, to be run by the Army in such way as they saw fit; that all bombers that the Army had which were capable of going to sea would be likewise turned over to the Navy command for fighting off ships and carriers. That agreement was reached and signed. Then we had in the security order the use of the ships' batteries for anti-aircraft purposes, all Navy planes, fighting planes, to be consolidated for use in attacks under the Army, and all Army bombing planes capable of flying over the seas to be consolidated with Navy bombers under Admiral Bellinger. Concerning the order itself, insofar as it related to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was a task force under this order; it specifically assigned to him the duty of operating the gates, sweeping mines, and using local defense forces a certain ways for patrol of the harbor, and also, in one paragraph, more or less summarized the duties of the task force commander.

6. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, sir?

A. This is "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2ÖL-1941 (Revised)" and it is the order of which I spoke in my testimony.

[5] The letter was thereupon filed in evidence and is appended marked "Exhibit 4 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)".

7. Q. Where was Admiral Kimmel on the morning of December 7, Admiral?

A. Admiral Kimmel's Fleet Headquarters were on the second floor of the Submarine Base, which is immediately adjacent to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I have no first-hand information where he was at the time of the attack but I believe he was in his residence, which was about a half mile away from the Submarine Base.

8. Q. Had he been physically present in Oahu during several days before the attack?

A. Yes.

9. Q. Where were your headquarters, Sir?

A. My headquarters were in the office building which is located in the heart of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. In carrying out the functions you have outlined as a Task Force Commander, you have referred to an agreement had with the Army. Could you further identify that, Sir, does it have a name?

A. I don't believe that I know the title of it. The agreement was a local agreement between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Short, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. After the agreement was made, it was submitted by me to the Commander-in-Chief for his approval and he did approve it. I do not believe that it was sent to the Navy Department in the first instance, but I have a definite recollection that at a later date Admiral Stark asked for a copy of it because someone had told him about it and he said that so far as he knew it was the first agreement of its kind between the Army and Navy and he wanted a copy here to see if he couldn't get similar agreements in other districts, and I believe a copy was sent to him.

11. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, Sir?

A. This is a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District, short title "JCD", I think we called it, "'42". It was signed on April 11 by the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. Is that the document to which you have just referred, the agreement to which you have just referred?

A. No, this is not the one. This is not the one that I just referred to.

13. Q. The agreement to which you referred and this document, both relate to agreements between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Can you give the relationship between the two?

A. This later document, which I now have before me, JCD, Hawaiian Department, '42, is a part of the War Plans known as "Rainbow 1", and it was a requirement that all commandants submit such a plan of their joint action. The other agreement which I refer to was supplemental to this and was made in order to clarify a situation with regard to command relations between the [6] air forces of the Army and the Navy Air; and I'm sorry that I can't remember the exact date of it, nor have I been able to find a copy in

the Department since I have been here, though I looked once. It must be here.

14. Q. Was this document now before you the plan under which you were operating on 7 December 1941?

A. That was the plan, the joint agreement, for the Hawaiian coastal defense that was effective from the date of signature, but all features there were not in execution by the terms of the plan itself. The plan was not to be executed until "M" day, unless the War and Navy Departments decided to put it into effect sooner or unless the Commanding General and Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District should mutually agree that certain parts of it or the whole thing should go into effect sooner. Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy, in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance; the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to War Plans Division, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet's Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 5".

[7] 15. Q. This joint plan, you stated, is based on Rainbow No. 1 Plan, Admiral. Did it also take into consideration the provisions of the letter 2CL-41?

A. This plan JCD-42 was a Navy Department plan. 2CL-41 was the Commander-in-Chief's order and I do not believe they are in conflict. As a matter of fact, I think 2CL-41 contains certain provisions that are also in JCD-42. But, the difference was that 2CL-41 was effective from the date of its signature and was in execution the entire time, but JCD-42 does not necessarily go into execution until "M" Day, except insofar as it relates to items agreed to for execution ahead of time.

16. Q. Your agreement with respect to the use of aircraft was effective on December 7?

A. That was effective from the date of signature and to be in execution in the same manner as JCD-42.

17. Q. Admiral, did you look upon Admiral Kimmel's physical presence in Pearl Harbor as having become a fairly permanent condition?

A. Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February, 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command, and with exception of possibly a couple trips at sea and one trip to Washington, he was there the entire time, so I looked on him as being permanent, although he told me that in time of hostilities that he would go to sea. That was his intention.

18. Q. Did you, during those last few weeks prior to 7 December and in carrying out the duties which had been imposed upon you or which you had assumed in connection with security, feel any embarrassment or, say, unhappiness in your required cooperation with the Army on account of Admiral Kimmel's presence?

A. Well, I wasn't unhappy and I can't say that I was embarrassed. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good, extremely cordial; my relations with the Commanding General were cordial and our cooperation, I thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to the Commander-in-Chief directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with me, and, on one or two occasions, I didn't know exactly whether he had discussed matters with Admiral Kimmel before or whether he was coming to me in the first instance, but I can't say that it caused any disagreement because I talked everything over quite fully with Admiral Kimmel and I don't think there was any doubt in my mind as to where I stood in the picture.

19. Q. Admiral, this plan, Exhibit 5, JCD, required of both the Army and Navy certain functions, many of which would require close coordination. Will you please make a statement of anything within your knowledge as to how this plan worked out in the days leading up to the 7th of December, particularly with respect to coordination between the Army and Navy in preparing to execute this plan, and in carrying out the planning functions for which it provides, the Joint Planning Committee and representatives and all?

A. I had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly, about the details of the plan, two in particular, the Chief of Staff, Captain J. B. Earle, and the War Plans Officer, Commander C. B. Momsen. They had to carry the load, but they were almost in constant contact with the Army. And the District Communication Officer, Captain Graham, I think he was just before Pearl Harbor, was in constant communication, getting communications straightened out, making preparations for the necessary teletypes and telephones, radio. While

we had differences of opinion, there were none of them serious. Some of them [8] were referred to Washington but they were always settled and I don't know that you can ask any more than that. I thought that our preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously.

20. Q. During the time that your representatives were working with the Army, were you kept fully advised as to the work of the Joint Planning Committee and the other representatives?

A. I think so.

21. Q. This joint coastal plan requires considerable on the part of the Army. Was there brought to your attention in any way the ability of the Army, from the viewpoint of both materiel and personnel, to carry out the commitments of the plan?

A. As I have stated before, we knew the Army was deficient in anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes and bombing planes, back in the Fall of 1940. After the Secretary of Navy wrote his letter of January 24, 1941, subsequent to that date a large number of fighters were sent out to Hawaii. Some bombers; a large number of fighters and some bombers. So far as I know, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. So it was my knowledge that their fighter strength had been increased considerably. I believe they had somewhat in excess of 250 fighting planes on the 7th of December, but their anti-aircraft guns were deficient in number and we knew that. We knew nothing about the deficiencies of the coast guns, the coast artillery. I had no knowledge as to whether the personnel of the Army was deficient or adequate, but was very definitely of the opinion that it was being increased all the time and was considered, with certain minor deficiencies, adequate by the Army for its task.

22. Q. Similarly, you previously stated that there were certain deficiencies in your force.

A. Well, I knew the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing one of their agreed functions. That's the inshore air patrol. They had told me they only had three planes capable of performing that duty and they knew that I had no reconnaissance planes attached to the District.

23. Q. Did you or your representatives, together with the Army officers in Hawaii, endeavor to make any sort of makeshift arrangements to fill these deficiencies caused by shortage of personnel or materiel, prior to the 7th of December?

A. I had pressed the Bureau of Personnel on the question of officers very vigorously; I had quite a number of reserve officers, but I wanted, in the key posts, more experienced officers and I was never able to get what I considered an adequate number in those positions.

24. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was that there are certain functions, such as distant reconnaissance, that you could not carry out, which the war plans called for, similar—

A. (Interposing) I had represented that to the Navy Department and asked for aircraft. I had taken it up, talked with the Commander-in-Chief, about it and asked him if he would supply the planes for it and he told me he could not commit himself to that duty, except insofar as was possible on any [9] occasion; that he might have to go away from the locality and take his forces with him and the District should really have its own forces.

25. Q. What I was getting after, Sir, was the practical problem as to what was done in the absence of the ability to fill all the commitments, to do as much as you could with what you had.

A. It is my very definite understanding that, in the absence of any planes of my own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes. That's the patrol planes belonging to the Fleet; and, it was also my very definite understanding that Admiral Kimmel reserved, to himself or his command, his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for oversea work; although, order 2CL did, insofar as it related to an air attack, place dispatch of essential planes under the Commandant of the District in a supervisory way. Actually, it was done by a Fleet officer, Rear Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet. He was also in command of the Base Defense Air Force. So, while the order says that the Commandant of the District would dispatch planes to look for carriers and enemy vessels in the case of air attack, actually it was done by Admiral Bellinger, and it seems obvious that the Commandant of the District couldn't use patrol planes without permission of the Fleet because the planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, and I don't believe there was any confusion of thought. It was well understood, and, owing to the fact that Admiral Bellinger was both my Task Group Commander and a Fleet Air Commander, Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer—or somebody delegated by him would be the officer who designated what reconnaissance was to be made.

26. Q. Admiral, you gave in numbers of Army fighters what really amounts to a very strong force. What did you know of the relative efficiency of the personnel of the fighter command?

A. Well, my knowledge of the capabilities of personnel is not first-hand information. I heard from other people. I think though it is fair to state that they had some good pilots and many inexperienced ones.

27. Q. Did you have an airman on your staff?

A. Up 'till the summer of 1941, I had no airman on my staff whom I could use. At that time, I was able to obtain, by calling into active duty from the reserve at Honolulu, quite a good man except that he had been out of the Navy for a number of year; he was a good flyer and a dependable and loyal man. Admiral Kimmel was very cooperative. He placed Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger at my disposal on a number of occasions and I never hesitated to call on them, and I also had the Commanding Officers at the Air Stations at Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, who were in my command. I could talk with them. They were difficult to get hold of but I could and did talk with them.

28. Q. Did you get advice from any of those officers concerning the efficiency of any of those officers—the efficiency of the Army pilots?

A. I can't say that I did. As usual in conversation, after our joint exercises, and we had a great many of them, I would hear the usual criticisms and recriminations between the Army and Navy as to about how poor the other fellow had been and what he failed to do, and so forth and so on, but whether they were correct or not, I don't know.

[10] 29. Q. Inasmuch as even in those days, it was rather generally known that the best defense against an enemy air attack

lay in fighters, numbers of planes, and efficiency was highly important, was it not?

A. I think it was generally accepted that, in view of the deficiency of the guns of the Army for anti-aircraft purposes, that we had to depend largely on the fighters. In addition to these 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, that is my recollection of the number, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters available that were to be turned over to the Army. Each morning at eight o'clock Admiral Bellinger, who was Air Commander under 2CL, would give the Army a list of the planes that were available to them that day for fighters and they were supposed to send to him at that same time a list of Army bombers that were available to the Navy. That was done. That was routine. Whether it was done on the 7th of December, I don't know.

30. Q. Admiral, do you know of any other instructions issued to you or to other officers in Hawaii at the time relating to—by Admiral Kimmel, concerning the defense of the Island, other than this 2CL-41?

A. 2CL is a governing order for base defense. It also governs sorties and a number of other things. Contributory to that order, of course every task force commander got out a great many orders of their own. For instance, the Commandant of the District, the Base Defense Officer, had to get out an order about the minesweepers, about the nets. I also got out one order which required the Air Commander of the Base Defense Force, Admiral Bellinger, to get out an order about the air defense. All of those were contributory to the plan and were not signed by Admiral Kimmel. The Army had copies of them and at first we had hopes, when we had the drills—we had an air raid drill and blackout drill once a week to start with and, later on, we couldn't have it that often—and we had hopes the Army would come in on the drills. They didn't always come in. On occasions we'd have a carrier at sea coming in and she would send her air group in and on those occasions nearly always the Army joined. We had some interferences because the time I would choose for the air raid drill wasn't always agreeable to other forces; it interfered with their work, the force commanders at sea. Some of them complained. Then just about the time this order was issued we decided that we would set the dates two or three months ahead, certain definite dates when everyone would know they were going to happen on that day. We definitely prefaced every air raid drill by broadcasts on a frequency that all ships at sea were guarding and all ships in port and all stations, telling that this was a drill so there would be no mistake between the real thing and a drill. We always let them know, ahead of time, when we would have a drill. But I know of no other order issued by Admiral Kimmel.

31. Q. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel, did he indicate that this was his basic order, so far as his participation in the defense was concerned?

A. No, I don't know that he ever said that. If you are trying to establish command relations, I think it was thoroughly well understood by Admiral Kimmel, and by the Commandant of the District, that the Commandant of the District would do everything in his power and everything would be done to the best of the Commandant's ability.

32. Q. Admiral, JCD, as of course you will recall, has several entries concerning what would be done when certain reinforcements were available, the [11] plan, of course, to be effective, on "M" Day when it was declared. In the meantime, and prior to such declaration, of course some plan for security of the Fleet was necessary. My understanding of your testimony was that you look upon the 2CL-41 as, in effect, being the security plan and putting into effect everything in the way of precaution which was required by the JCD and for which you had forces available; is that right?

A. No, that is not correct, in this respect. While I think that 2CL-41 is consistent with JCD, it actually puts into execution certain requirements of JCD but not all of them. For instance, it puts in the minesweeping, it puts in the inshore patrol, it puts in the underwater defenses—that is the nets, but it did not—I see no place in 2CL-41 where the distant reconnaissance was put in force.

33. Q. That is about the only—

A. (Interposing) If you will examine JCD, you will find that the Army is charged with the defense of the land insofar as it relates to the coast and anti-aircraft defenses and with particular respect to Pearl Harbor. In other words that was their specific responsibility: it might be said that the Navy had no responsibility because there is nothing said in JCD to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against an air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity, on account of the fact that he had means that he could use, that he must help out.

34. Q. Admiral, the Army's warning system, particularly the radar part of it; what steps did you take to ascertain the Army's efficiency in that respect?

A. Such information as I had about the Army's warning I had received from the Army and the contacts of my subordinates with Army subordinates. I made no formal requests for information but I kept in touch by contact—occasionally, General Short would tell me something about it and frequently some of my subordinates would contact the Army and let me know the situation. When I arrived in Honolulu in 1940, General Herron was in command and he told me at that time—that was in April, 1940—they were putting in this warning net, that they were starting to put in the radar, that they were making the surveys and selecting the sites. And he told me how wonderful it was and I told him I knew very little about it, although some of our ships had it. When General Short came in February, we talked about it and as the net progressed in completion, he came to me—I think it was in September or October, 1941—and told me he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train his operators. None of the Army knew how to train them and he wanted to know if there was anything I could do to help him. I told him I had no means myself but the Fleet had radar operators and the Fleet had radar installations, and I made the request on the Commander-in-Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea, which he did. In November, it was my knowledge that they were training the operators and that they were having difficulties; this information came to me—I don't know whether General Short came to me or whether my subordinates told me, having obtained it from their opposite numbers in the Army—and as of December I thought

that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but I had no knowledge as to whether or not they were standing regular watches on it, nor did I make any inquiries about it. And I would like to supplement that statement by [12] saying at that time, December 7 or thereabouts, that we had not developed a means for controlling our own aircraft to the degree that we knew where they were at all times—or that the Army had not developed any means to know where all the planes were at all times—friendly planes, so that they could differentiate friendly planes and other planes.

35. Q. Admiral, will you please explain the facilities you had for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies, what your setup was.

A. We had a unit at Pearl Harbor, when I arrived, composed of communicators and intelligence people, Japanese language students, and they were separated into two units and their information had to be coordinated, and all the information we got from that intelligence, by radio intelligence and such other information as we got from that unit, was transmitted to Cavite and the Navy Department. They had a private circuit or private channel, they talked to us and we to them telling what we were getting, and the material was correlated and sent out. That was our principal source of Japanese intelligence; We also got the intelligence that was collected at Cavite. That was sent to us over this private channel and we knew that. When I arrived, I was dissatisfied with the organization and I organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence" where they were under one head, which unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors, and all the other things they had with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, when we had the facilities, we put them in one big room in the basement of the office building, a secure place, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders, and so on; I always did my best to augment the force by getting more men and better men. In addition to that unit, we had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army intelligence and the FBI; we had local intelligence that way, and, we also had such reports as were sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. We kept touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best we could. He was on shore and within a mile and a half of us. I never had any way to know whether I got everything, or not, but I had the feeling that we were getting everything that was pertinent. The Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that I didn't have. He had all of his subordinates in the Fleet. He unquestionably had a good many reports from ONI and the Chief of Operations that I knew nothing about unless I happened to hear about them; I think he conscientiously endeavored to give me everything that he thought I should have. I had a very definite feeling that the Navy Department knew more about the situation and were able to evaluate matters far better than we were because they had the liaison of the State Department, the political situation, the Department of War, and the President. I thought their knowledge was far greater than ours about actual conditions.

36. Q. Please state the name of the Intelligence Officer in command of this Combat Intelligence unit.

A. Rochefort; I think his name is Commander J. J. Rochefort.

37. Q. He was a subordinate of yours?

A. He was a subordinate of mine and, in a way, he was also, while he had no orders to be, a subordinate in the Fleet. This unit was a Fleet unit and the Commander-in-Chief had the right to take any man away if he wanted to for other purposes.

[13] 38. Q. Was the information that they received always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. All of it. As a matter of fact, my Staff, my subordinates, had orders to send the Fleet everything that could possibly have any bearing on movements: ships coming in or going out, enemy, or anything new. This had to be done as the Commander-in-Chief was physically present in the place; it was very simple to do it. I think he was also on our teletypes to the Army and he had the same telephone lines to the Army that we had, so he was in a position to get the information over these circuits.

39. Q. Did you also receive intelligence or other dispatches from the Navy Department relating to the international situation and possible enemy action?

A. My recollection is that originally, in 1940, they were sent to the Commandant as an addressee and, later on, they were all sent to the Commander-in-Chief, as the addressee, and I was not always included as an addressee, although, on some occasions, I was. On other occasions, it was stated in the dispatch that I was to be shown this dispatch. While I have no way of knowing whether I saw everything that came in, or not, I think that Admiral Kimmel endeavored to keep me informed. Of course, it must be borne in mind that Admiral Kimmel, as well as Admiral Richardson, had almost constant communication with the Chief of Naval Operations by mail. Occasionally, I would see one of the letters, but not always.

40. Q. Can you recall any specific messages relating to the international situation in the Pacific or intelligence of Japan which were received in the two months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. I can, and I would like to go back to the summer of 1940, if I may, because I think it is pertinent to this examination. Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I can not recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, "Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch." We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral

Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a [14] position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but, so far as I know, we got nothing there. To go ahead with your question, the Neutrality Act was in effect. The President had issued an order covering the movement of submarines in our territorial waters, and about the maintenance of neutrality and the responsibilities of commandants and Naval officers and Army officers in connection with it. In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I can not recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 or 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued. In October, I remember distinctly a dispatch, but I do not remember whether I was an addressee or whether the Commander-in-Chief informed me, but I remember a dispatch to the effect that there was a change in the Japanese Government and we might expect things to happen in the next few days. I'm quite sure Admiral Kimmel had a conference after that, although it is hard for me to remember when we had the conferences because I saw Admiral Kimmel practically every day; I can not remember whether General Short was present, or Admiral Pye, Admiral Halsey, or who was present. Again, on November 27, a warning was received which was stated to be a war warning. That dispatch was received, I think, on Thursday, the 27th of November in the afternoon, somewhere around four o'clock. I was not on the station. I had gone up town to the hospital to see a patient and when I returned the Chief of Staff telephoned to me and told me he would like to come over and see me. He came over and he had a paraphrase of this dispatch. As I recall it, I saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. I can not recall who was present besides myself. There were other persons there. In that dispatch there was a term used whereby he was directed to take defensive deployment. Just exactly what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was, I don't know, but it is a fact, at that time, there were four submarines deployed to the westward, two at Midway and two at Wake. They were there for information purposes and defense. I don't know what orders they had. Some other instances came up in the Summer of 1941, prior to this warning on the 16th and prior to this warning on the 27th that caused me to write letters to the commanding officers of the outlying bases. Under the District, we had outlying bases at Palmyra and Johnston, we had one at Midway, and one was under construction and being garrisoned at Wake. The substance of my letter to these commanding officers was to try and train their civilian workers there in the use of the arms to

supplement the armed forces. Somewhere about that same time, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, having been designated as defensive sea areas by Executive Order of the President, I gave the commanding officers instructions about the planes that came in there that were not identified as being friendly; they were to be fired on. I think that all those actions were taken as the result of some warning or some feeling on my part, derived from some definite information I had received that the situation was tense. Now there were a lot of other dispatches that were received and I am unable to remember now whether my knowledge of those dispatches, warning dispatches, was information that's been acquired since the 7th of December or whether it was before.

[15] 41. Q. Were you receiving, during those few days prior to 7 December, any radio intelligence which was supplied by your Combat Intelligence Unit based upon things which they received from Japanese in Oahu?

A. We received nothing from the Japanese on Oahu, except I had knowledge from the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. While anxious that they be indicted and tried, the Army would not agree and the matter was referred to Washington and the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial.

Note: A letter on this subject written by the witness has been identified by the examining officer as being one from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District to the Chief of Naval Operations, classified Secret, dated November 10, 1941, file S-AS-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC)AS-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

42. Q. Then you were unable to get any information at all based upon communications which those Japanese were sending out?

A. We were unable to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies, commercial communication companies, did not and would not give us dispatches.

43. Q. Did those dispatches go entirely by cable?

A. They went by cable.

44. Q. None by radio?

A. So far as I know, none by radio.

45. Q. You have mentioned, Admiral, the warnings received prior to December 7. Will you please state what you felt to be the probabilities and possibilities of surprise hostile action on the part of the Japs, if you have any thought beyond what you've given us?

A. The dispatch of November 27 had as its preface that negotiations with Japan, looking toward a stabilization of the Pacific area, had stopped. Then the dispatch went ahead to say that they expected action on the part of Japan within the next few days, based on that premise. Then the dispatch went on to some extent in giving a deployment of Japanese forces, amphibious forces, pointing to general war on the south coast of China, Siam, and also a statement in the dispatch to

the effect that this was a war warning. Subsequent to the receipt of that dispatch, negotiations were resumed. That had a very definite effect on my mind; that while the negotiations had stopped once, and this was the reason that they thought that action by Japan was due in a few days; subsequently, negotiations were resumed; there was uncertainty in my mind as to whether anything was likely to happen immediately. Furthermore, as I stated before in this examination, I felt that the authorities in Washington had far more information, were far abler to evaluate the situation than I was and I had no apprehension around December 7 that any hostile action in that area was imminent. I know now, and, as I stated before, I'm not sure whether I knew [16] this before the 7th of December, or not, that a dispatch had been sent about the end of November to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet giving him a warning that something was likely to happen, and I believe in that dispatch it was mentioned that the action might be against the Philippines. I can not recall it exactly but I have that impression. But so far as the Hawaiian area was concerned, I had no feeling of impending hostilities around the 7th of December.

46. Q. Will you please relate what action was taken by the Army and Navy with respect to the security of Pearl Harbor after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27. of which you know.

A. I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, no, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80—they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear—and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November.

47. Q. The letter here, Exhibit 4, or 2CL-41, provides for three conditions of readiness. Would you please state, with respect to these conditions, the condition that existed on December 7, prior to the attack?

A. So far as I know, there was no condition prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief and the order gives, as a duty for the Commander of the Base Defense, the duty of advising the senior officer present and afloat the conditions of readiness, advising him what condition of readiness should be kept. What the Fleet orders were in addition

to the advice that they were to receive from the Commander of the Base Defense Force, I don't know.

48. Q. Did you take any action as Commander—

A. (Interposing) So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in, and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness.

[177] 49. Q. Please state anything within your knowledge relating to any effort which was made after the warning contained in the dispatch of November 27 to establish a distant reconnaissance.

A. There were orders contained in 2CL about the patrol of the operating areas and the covering of the forces going out and coming in, and, in addition to that, either the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of Air Force Scouting Fleet were undertaking other reconnaissances of which I was not intimately informed of; so far as any additional reconnaissances being conducted by air, I have no knowledge. In other words, I know of no additional aerial reconnaissance that was made as the result of the dispatch of the 27th of November. I did take one other step that I have forgotten to mention that has just occurred to me. The Honolulu area was under command of the District Coast Guard Office. The Coast Guard had been placed under my command prior to the 7th of December. They had three cutters, Captain Finlay, who was the District Coast Guard Officer, was the Port Commander of Honolulu and I required him, on receipt of this dispatch of 27th of November, to put an inshore patrol out of Honolulu, the same as we had at Pearl Harbor, except at Pearl Harbor it would be conducted by Destroyer Division 80.

50. Q. Do you know of any other steps that were taken to counter possible enemy action on the morning of December 7?

A. No, I do not.

51. Q. I understand that you made no recommendation toward instituting distant air reconnaissance?

A. No, I did not.

52. Q. Going back to communications from the Department and your reaction thereto, do you recall being informed that the Japanese had been detected destroying some of their codes and files in certain localities?

A. I recall the existence of certain dispatches to the effect that the Japanese were believed to be destroying their papers, dispatches.

53. Q. Do you remember the dates; was it after the 27th of November?

A. I think it was around the 3rd of December.

54. Q. What was your reaction to that intelligence?

A. Well, I'm not sure that I remember exactly what my reaction was, except that they might be doing it and they might not be doing it, and I didn't know, I had no way of knowing what they were destroying and what they were burning and whether it was something that was really filled with meaning, or not. It might be and it might not be. But I still had a belief that as long as there were negotiations going on in Washington there was a possibility of this period of waiting being extended. I had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future, but just how far in the future, I was unable to predict.

55. Q. Was the subject of the dispatch to which you have just referred discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?

A. The dispatch of the 27th?

56. Q. Of the 3rd, about destroying the codes.

A. Perhaps it may have been. I don't remember.

[18] 57. Q. Was any action of any kind that related to the defense of Pearl Harbor taken as the result of that dispatch?

A. The security measures prescribed and the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, and the warning that was given the destroyer captains, and the fact that I believed that the Army was on a full alert, were the only measures that I know that were taken.

58. Q. The JCD plan calls for planning between your representatives and those of the Army. Do you know whether these warning messages were available to this planning group?

A. I do not believe that they were informed. The messages were secret messages and we were admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, and I'm not sure—my own War Plans officer knew about them but I don't know whether the Army's War Plan people knew about them.

59. Q. Did you consider it a function of the joint planning representative and other planning representatives to keep abreast of such developments and take them into consideration in the preparation of plans?

A. Not as a joint organization. I considered that I had to keep my own war planner advised and I did. He knew everything that came in.

60. Q. But the planning of any action taken as the result of such warning messages, you felt to be a matter personal between you and the Commanding General, so far as it affected your joint plans?

A. I felt there was a definite agreement between the General and myself as to our responsibilities, and within my own responsibilities the planning that I did could be done independently of him, but something that involved joint planning, of course, it had to be taken up with the joint planners, and I had to take it up with the General. And if you visualize the fact that General Short and I saw each other very frequently, Admiral Kimmel and I saw each other practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of any importance should take place or that anything should be received of even small importance that wasn't discussed between us, because it is only fair to assume that we discussed everything.

61. Q. But any joint planning which would be necessary as the result of such warning would be the function of the highest echelon of commands? And all information that you had, such as condition of the

Army with respect to alerting their personnel, you received from the Commanding General and not through any liaison or other channels?

A. He had in my office an Army Colonel who was a representative of the General and was known as a liaison officer, and I had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve of the Fourteenth District who was my representative up there and was a liaison officer, and these men were supposed to be informed, although I will say that my liaison officer did not know of dispatches that had been received because I didn't consider it was proper to tell him. He was quite inexperienced. Nor am I sure that the liaison officer from the Army in my office knew about them, but we were in close touch through those liaison officers who were there for that purpose and we felt we knew what was going on. Indications are that there are some things we were not correctly advised on or informed about.

[19] 62. Q. Admiral, please explain the method of rapid communications which existed between your headquarters and those of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

A. The communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. I don't recall the frequency but every station was required to keep a broadcast receiver of standard wave length and we gave all of our notices of air raid drills, commence fire, cease fire, what was taking place, over that and it was supposed to be listened to at all times by all ships at sea and by the group commanders in port and by my own stations, like Kaneohe and the ammunition depot and the air station at Pearl Harbor and the net depot, and various other places, submarine base. In addition to that, we were actively prosecuting the rapid communication by telephone under JCD. We had teletypes between Army Headquarters and my Headquarters. I think there was a branch of that in Admiral Kimmel's office. We had difficulty in getting direct line to Kaneohe, and I think it had just been established. Formerly we had to go through central in Honolulu but I think we had just succeeded in having the Army put down a special line for us to Kaneohe. We had a telephone from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, to the gates. I had a telephone between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. I think we had a direct line between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters in what he called his "Message Center". My Harbor Control and Operation room was manned twenty-four hours a day. There were always talkers, listeners, and officers on duty there. In addition to that, we had duty officers on duty in the building. The Chief of Staff and the War Plans operation officer and myself all lived close to the Harbor Control Post and could be gotten by yard telephone. All of the lines planned had not been finished. We had means for rapid communication.

63. Q. Did this include communications with the Army warning net system; warning net?

A. The Army warning net lines came into a certain place known as the "Interceptor Command" where they had the plotting room. I'm not sure how well organized the Interceptor Command was prior to December 7, but I think it was just in the forming. There was a means for communicating—for providing a communication from that room to my headquarters, which I immediately put into effect after

the attack on the 7th of December. My talkers, teletype operators, who operated with the various Army places connected with, were there all of the time, twenty-four hours a day, and they were in constant practice communication with these outlying places, but it is my recollection that I was told on several occasions that the Army ends of the line always went dead in the evening, that they could not get anybody on it. It had been a matter that we had taken up, or tried to take up to get rectified, because we wanted Army twenty-four hour a day communication.

64. Q. Did you have in effect any liaison or the presence of a naval officer with the Interceptor Command?

A. There was no officer detailed specifically at the Interceptor Command. As I said before, I don't think the Interceptor Command was completely formed up and I am very definitely of the opinion that the Army did not keep a twenty-four hour watch in the place. The place was not completely organized. Immediately after December 7, they staffed the place by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them in their duties and, at that time, they asked for watch officers there to communicate with the Navy, although it [20] had been my plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to us and received by the Navy people, but we sent Navy people there on December 7.

65. Q. This net had been in use during some of your tactical exercises, had it not?

A. I think not. I have no recollection of it ever having been used in any tactical operations. The Army was training operators principally and trying to get the system so it would work. There was a great deal of trouble with the electronics in it and they had asked for help; they had come to me once and wanted assistance, had been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, and there was some officer who was transiently present at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters whom he sent up there to help them, but, that officer was on his way to join some ship, and when he joined up, another officer, by the name of Taylor, appeared. He had had a great deal of experience in radar and he was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to help the Army; but, that was an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison, and while I knew he was there, I had no idea that he was there in any other capacity other than as an expert to try to assist them with their electrical and mechanical difficulties.

66. Q. Just how far did you feel you could rely on this net to assist you in obtaining a warning of approaching aircraft prior to December 7?

A. I had no feeling of confidence or reliance on it because I was very definitely of the opinion that it wasn't completely formed up; the operators were not completely trained, and we had no way—no way was then established so we could tell what planes of our own were where they could be completely identified.

67. Q. Were the Army and Navy planes operating in the Hawaiian area at that time equipped with any modern recognition devices, such as IFF?

A. No. We had a standard procedure of entrance to Oahu and of departure from Oahu; certain grooves Army and Navy planes must

fly in coming in and going out in order that we might know, assuming the planes that flew in those grooves were our planes and those that flew somewhere else were not ours. In addition to Army and Navy planes, there were commercial companies operating from Oahu, interisland companies operating planes to adjacent islands, Pan American operating planes to the trans-Pacific, and there was an air school located on the municipal airport, John Rogers Field, which had planes up and these planes were controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Authorities.

68. Q. Did the Army warning net have any set up for visual observation of approaching aircraft, if you know?

A. The Army had a number of observation posts around the Island of Oahu and on adjacent islands, but unless they were in a full out alert, these posts would not be manned, but they were of no real use because they all didn't have means of rapid communication direct from the post to headquarters.

[21] 69. Q. Was there any arrangement made by the Navy for obtaining information with respect to approaching ships or aircraft by visual observation?

A. None that I know of, except the signal tower.

70. Q. Do you recall ever having given General Short any ground for supposing that our task forces at sea were anywhere near an adequate guard against a surprise attack by carriers?

A. I gave General Short no reason for believing that our forces at sea were adequate warning against hostile attack.

71. Q. Referring to the Army's force of fighters, were the flying fields available on Oahu adequate for the use of all those planes?

A. The Army's main fighter field was Wheeler Field, which was near Schofield Barracks. They had another fighter field at Bellows Field, which was on the northeast side of the Island, and an improvised field somewhere in the neighborhood of Haleiwa. Some three to four months previous to December 7, General Short had made a request on me to release a field which the Navy had at Kahuku Point to the Army and I had taken it up with the Commander-in-Chief and, as a result, we had appointed Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey to discuss the entire matter with Army air authorities. This joint conference made a report in which they recommended that the Navy keep Kahuku Field. I endorsed on the report to the Commander-in-Chief my opinion that it should be given to the Army and he approved my recommendation. There were other things in the recommendation but that was the principal thing. He approved my recommendation and it was sent to the Navy Department. So far as I know, no reply had been received to that prior to the 7th of December. In my opinion, the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on.

72. Q. This is a matter of defensive attitude. As regards operation, were they hampered as regards inadequacy of fields?

A. I can not answer that.

73. Q. Admiral, what provisions were made for obtaining and disseminating to the Army, particularly, any intelligence information, and particularly contact reports, obtained by any of the task forces or other forces operating in the Hawaiian area?

A. All such reports would be received in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief who had two courses of action open. One was to have them sent to the Army through the District Headquarters, informing the District at the same time, or else sending them direct to both places, as he had direct means of communication on the same telephone line that we had—teletypes that we had.

74. Q. Was any such information actually received on the morning of December 7?

A. On the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by U. S. S. WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the U. S. S. ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counterattacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged [22] in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations watch officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were.

75. Q. Do you know whether that information was conveyed to the Army?

A. So far as I know, it was not. I'm not sure; but, I don't think it was.

76. Q. And there were no other similar information received to your knowledge?

A. No other contacts.

77. Q. Reverting to that dispatch from the Department, 27 November, containing the war warning, there was also a directive to effect a defensive deployment. It really was a directive, was it not?

A. I think it was.

78. Q. Did you give any thought at the time to what you considered that directive to mean for the Navy forces, other than those belonging to the District?

A. I have a distinct recollection of Admiral Kimmel discussing that matter in my presence with someone else. Who it was, I can not recall. Probably some member of his Staff. The terminology employed is not one that I've ever heard used before. In dealing with war plans, naval tactics, it has always been our practice to use very precise terminology with definite known meanings. So far as I know, I have never encountered that terminology before. It's quite possible—this is a matter of opinion—that Admiral Kimmel might have construed that the fact that he had submarines at Wake and Midway was a

defensive deployment or he may have asked Admiral Stark what it was. I don't know whether he did, or not.

79. Q. What did it mean to you?

A. I don't know.

80. Q. The war warning message, of course, was also to be communicated to the Hawaiian Department. Those words "defensive deployment" being, as you say, unusual, did it occur to anyone to discuss with the Army whether or not those words had a definite meaning which might be obscure to you?

A. Not so far as I know, although I believe the dispatch directed the Commander-in-Chief to transmit a copy of this dispatch to the Commanding General.

81. Q. Then, in effect, it was somewhat in the nature of a dispatch to both Services?

A. It was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief; he was the action addressee. He was told to inform Commandant Fourteen and the Commanding General.

[23] 82. Q. Admiral, this dispatch of 27 November, which will be introduced as an exhibit before you finish your testimony and we'll ask you to identify it then, went on to direct appropriate deployment preparatory of carrying out defensive tasks assigned in WPL 46, which was the Rainbow 5 Plan. I note that your Joint Coast Defense Plan expressly states it is based on plan Rainbow No. 1. Would you please explain anything you know or anything within your knowledge with respect to the situation among the higher echelons of command in Hawaii as to which plan, Rainbow 1 or Rainbow 5, should form the basis for planning or which was considered as the plan which would probably be used in the event of war?

A. Rainbow 1 contemplated the United States being against the Axis Powers and Japan without any assistance except, maybe, some of the South American Republics. We had had that and JCD was based on that. Rainbow 3 had been received some two or three months before and Rainbow 3 was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis Nations and Japan. And the disposition of the Hawaiian Department in that was just the same as in Rainbow 1. Now I don't recall Rainbow 5 distinctly, when we had received it, if we had received it or how long before we had received it, but it is my impression that the provisions in there were about the same as they were in 1 also, that is in so far as related to the Fourteenth Naval District.

83. Q. Are you familiar with the general nature of the task assigned to the United States Pacific Fleet in these plans; were there specific references to whether the plans called for offensive or defensive action?

A. No. 1 was defensive, purely defensive. No. 3, as I recall it, had offensive tasks in it. I remember for our Forces we had to sever the lines of communication from Japan in the East and I think it required certain offensive action from the Asiatic Fleet which was to be reinforced from the United States Fleet. Rainbow 5, I don't recall the tasks in there, although I've read them. I don't recall them now.

84. Q. You did know, however, did you not, that an early offensive movement was required of the Pacific Fleet in the event of hostilities with Japan?

A. In Rainbow 3, I knew it was required and I assume I knew it was required in 5 if the record shows I received it. It is not quite clear in my mind. But I knew that offensive action was required in 3, and if 5 had been received, and I assume that it had been received, I'm not sure about it, I knew that offensive action was required. But Rainbow 1 was the only one where we were on purely the defensive.

85. Q. That being the case, that CinCPac Fleet was expected to make an offensive movement quite early, did it seem to you at the time that such requirement was difficult to reconcile with the requirements for security of the Fleet which obtained up to the outbreak of war?

A. Admiral Kimmel had told me on the occasions which I had asked him for patrol planes to supply the District's deficiencies in that respect, that he would do what he could and supply them when he could, but he couldn't make any commitments because he expected the Fleet, parts of the Fleet, to leave there in the case of hostilities and he might go. He didn't say he might go but he would go. So far as I was concerned, I can not say that I gave any very deep study to what the Fleet was going to do, how they were going to do it, when they were going, or how we could preserve the security [24] of the place after they were gone because I had so many things to do that I could only do so many. I was very much dissatisfied with the deficiency in my forces that were required for me to perform my tasks, and JCD had been approved by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department; it was not only my plan but their plan. I had made representations to the Navy Department about the deficiencies of the forces, both surface and air. As late as the Summer, I had made a reappraisal of the forces and made definite and urgent recommendations to the Navy Department for ships and planes, which they had promised to do as soon as they could. What went on in the minds of the planners and operating people of the Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, I don't know, but I know they did have plans for offensive action.

86. Q. Then nothing was represented to you by the Commander-in-Chief to the effect that he could not take any other particular or specific security measures because of his commitments for those offensive movements?

A. No, I remember no such representations.

87. Q. Admiral, as Commandant of the Navy Yard, much of your time and thought was given to the employment of its forces on both maintenance and alterations to ships of the Fleet. Those alterations directed made by the Department were considerable, were they not?

A. Our principal activity in the Navy Yard was a twenty-four hour a day schedule of docking, keeping ships' bottoms clean. This had been in effect for over a year. The first instance the Department sent a schedule of docking out in order to keep the ships in condition, which required a lot of ships to go to the coast for docking, and we told them by working three shifts a day we could absorb a lot of this at Pearl Harbor and this was done. So far as alterations to the Fleet were concerned, I don't know of a great many which were being done at Pearl Harbor, although unquestionably we had some in the nature of adding more guns to the anti-aircraft battery and also some radar installations, but I don't recall any tremendous number of other alterations. To understand how the Navy Yard worked, we worked

in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief's people. We worked on the ships and they sent us the work to do. The force was expanding rapidly. In April, 1940, I think there were two thousand total employees, which included maintenance and office force in Pearl Harbor, and by December 7, I think that had been built up to something like eight or ten thousand. I'm not sure of the exact size. It was expanding very rapidly.

88. Q. Then the alterations directed by the Department to be made at Pearl Harbor were never any considerable embarrassment, insofar as you know, concerning affecting the operations of the Fleet?

A. Well, I can not answer that categorically because I don't know. We took the work load that was thrown on us. They knew how much we could take; we told them what we could do at all times. They knew what we had to do and we did it as fast as we could. However, whether that interfered with the mobility of the Fleet, I'm not prepared to state. I don't know.

89. Q. Admiral, you stated, sometime back, that Admiral Bellinger, acting as your subordinate in the matter of relations with the Army, advised the Army each morning as to the number of fighter planes available for Army use [25] in the event of emergency or hostilities. Do you know how many planes were available to the Army at the time of the December 7 attack?

A. There were, or had been, four carriers at Pearl Harbor at various times, and on December 7 two carriers, the LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE were away from Pearl Harbor on missions. The SARATOGA and YORKTOWN were on the coast. It is my recollection that both those ships carried the planes to the coast. It is my recollection that the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE had their planes with them so the only planes that were left at the air station at Pearl Harbor at Ewa Field were a number of Marine fighting planes belonging to the Fleet Marine Force. I believe there were about 70 Marine planes. How many were available on that morning, I do not know.

90. Q. Do you know what number of the 250 Army planes were effective planes, in condition for use?

A. The Army had a number of P-36's, I think they were, when I arrived in Pearl Harbor. And after the letter from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, the Army sent a large number of fighter planes out; sent them out by Navy carriers and put them ashore for the Army air fields, and I think most of those planes were the type known as P-40. There might have been some P-36's with them but mostly P-40. It is possible I may be mistaken in saying P-39, but I think that's what it was. I guess I'm wrong, it probably was a P-36. P-40's came and they were supposed to be the latest thing. They were a disappointment in the respect that they were only good for about fifty-five minutes in the air and they couldn't go out of sight of land, or only a little out of sight of land, or they'd have difficulty in getting back.

91. Q. Do you know whether the fighter planes were, in fact, used for inshore air patrol purposes?

A. They were not. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Frederick Martin, told me that he only had three planes for inshore air patrol. He couldn't use the bombers because

they couldn't see and he couldn't use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and couldn't see very well either. I believe that prior to December 7 one of the planes cracked up so he only had two planes on December 7.

92. Q. Did the Army make a similar report to you or your subordinate commander concerning the number of bombers available for patrol?

A. I think they did.

93. Q. Do you know the number of such planes that were available on the morning of December 7?

A. I don't know what the Army report said. It is my belief that the Army had a few old bombers that were obsolescent, that there were in 1940, and after the Secretary of Navy's letter they had started sending in some B-17's. I think the ones they originally had, were known as the B-18, and they were obsolescent and we began to get in some B-17's. I think that the first B-17's came out were ferried on to the Far East, some twenty-five or thirty of them. That was somewhere in September or October. And that on December 7 that in addition to the B-18's, there probably were not over ten or fifteen B-17's there. As a matter of fact, a squadron of B-17's [26] has been dispatched from San Francisco on the night of December 6 and they arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the air attack and some of them were lost.

94. Q. Just how did the command over these planes pass from the Army squadron or other commanders to the naval commanders?

A. My general understanding is that Admiral Bellinger would direct his fighters, his fighters that were assigned for the day, to report to the Army and this man would go up and report to the Army. They had a frequency. And the Army bombers reported to the Navy the same way.

95. Q. After they were air-borne?

A. Yes, after they were air-borne.

96. Q. Do you know whether those able to fly did so report during or after the attack?

A. I don't know, definitely.

97. Q. Admiral, aerial torpedoes were used in the attack, were they not?

A. Yes, sir.

98. Q. Would you please outline the facts related to the protecting of ships in Pearl Harbor with respect to attack by aerial torpedoes, what had been done and so on?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had received a letter from the Chief of Operations in which the question of placing nets around ships in Pearl Harbor was discussed. It gave the information that one net, a single net, was forty per cent effective and another net, if spaced 100 feet apart, was ninety per cent effective. That made the outer net 190 feet from the ship's side. CNO wanted recommendations from the Commander-in-Chief concerning the netting in of ships. The Commander-in-Chief and I discussed the matter. I was not very familiar with the capabilities of aircraft torpedoes but I recollect the Commander-in-Chief asked the Navy Department, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in what depth of water could an aerial torpedo be expected to be used effectively. I remember a letter

coming back from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance which stated, in effect, that judging from our own torpedoes that seventy feet was necessary for their effective use; seventy feet of water. The water in Pearl Harbor is forty-five feet deep, and I think when the Commander-in-Chief got that information that he then wrote a letter to the Chief of Operations and the Navy Department. The Chief of Operations and the Commander-in-Chief agreed that there was no need for netting in the ships. I have heard subsequently that a letter was afterwards written by the Bureau of Ordnance modifying the original letter. I never saw the modifying letter and I'm unfamiliar with it.

99. Q. Would you consider the matter of safety through static means of the ships, from attack by torpedo while in Pearl Harbor, as your responsibility?

A. The operation of netting in the ships would be a function of the District forces; the net depot would handle that task, using their craft and their nets. If I had thought it necessary, I would have recommended it to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief might have had other ideas. One of our seaplane take-offs is right up the Pearl Harbor channel; the best take-off area [27] we had. And at one point in this take-off it had to pass within, I think, two hundred feet of one of the berths in order to get the necessary straight runway to take-off with a loaded seaplane. Naturally, I didn't want to place any obstructions in the Harbor unless it were absolutely necessary. Moreover, the question of getting ships in and out quickly was affected by whether or not they had nets around them and I don't think the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the District wanted to hamper their mobility or their ready mobility unless it was absolutely necessary. I knew little or nothing about the effectiveness of the net except what I was told by the Bureau of Ordnance: forty per cent by the single net and ninety per cent with the double net. I knew very little about whether torpedoes could be used in shallow water of forty-five feet and I depended on the technical sources of information. When the matter was referred to the Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of Operations and he reached a conclusion, I assumed that that was final. I agreed with him and did not protest his decision. After all, the matter was referred to Washington and the Bureaus in Washington probably had more information—certainly had more information than we had on the subject—so no question was raised about it at all. The practice is today there to net ships. Of course, they have ample supplies of nets there for that purpose. At the time this question was brought up, we didn't have enough nets to maintain the gates; when we first put the gates down in the Harbor, we had to use old net which was left over from the first World War and didn't get our new nets—we didn't get our nets for Midway until quite late. In other words, regular nets weren't forthcoming in quantity.

100. Q. About how late did you get a sufficient supply of nets for the gates at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Midway, and so forth?

A. We had our nets in Honolulu installed in the summer of 1941, but, as I recall it, the Honolulu gate was made up of 1918 net and sometime subsequent to that we received enough net to replace that with new net. I don't know how late it was. As far as Midway is

concerned, we had projects at Midway for installation of nets but I don't believe that at the beginning of war they had been actually installed at Midway. That's my recollection. I'm quite certain after the 7th of December when I wanted nets for dry docks, caissons, floating dry docks, and for ships at anchor, we didn't have nets and we had to improvise. We tore down fences, tore down the fence between Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, took the extruded material that was used for the fence and welded it, lapwelded it to other sections in order to get a sufficient baffle that we could hang in the water at the ends of docks and around ships. And in so doing, of course, we had no knowledge whether that kind of net would be any good at all, but it was the best we had. We also took all of the target rafts we had and hung sections of fence below them and put them in front of the dock caissons and some of the important repair docks.

101. Q. Are you able to say that the nets would not have been forthcoming had you asked the Department for them?

A. I'm unable to say that with any authority.

102. Q. Admiral, was it necessary that this seaplane area, to which you have referred here as requiring the passing of the vicinity of the berth, be used at all times? I mean were there times when only that one seaplane area take-off was available?

A. We had two areas. One was north of Ford Island and one was south of Ford Island. That area was the best area for taking off and was used when [28] possible. Sometimes it was not possible to use that area. Sometimes it was not possible to use the other area because we were continually conducting dredging operations in the Harbor and had these dredges and piles stuck out and we might have to use the other area. Pan American planes usually use the area north of Ford Island. There were times though that either one or the other could not be used.

103. Q. What types of ships use the berth adjacent to this take-off area south of Ford Island?

A. We had one carrier berth there and I think four or five battleship berths, although the battleship berths could take other types, depending upon whether they were filled, or not.

104. Q. On the 7th of December, were the berths alongside of the south side of Ford Island filled with battleships?

A. Yes, with the exception of one ship, I think they were in pairs; two ships in each place, an outer and inner ship. The practice was for the battleships to come in north about Ford Island and go down and head out. They were always moored heading out, and the arrangement of the berthing was made by Commander, Battleships. The berths were assigned to him and he could assign them as he saw fit; he usually assigned them in the sequence for sorties: so they could move right out.

105. Q. It was he who made the decision to moor them in pairs, although that practice wasn't in compliance with the letter 2CL-41?

A. He made the decision how they were to be berthed. He was limited in his choice by the number of berths he had available and the number of ships he had in port. The battleships, I think, were in two separate task forces, and, one was supposed to be at sea while the other one was in port, so that the station and liberty facilities would

not be congested. But on the morning of December 7, I think all available battleships were in Pearl Harbor, both task forces, eight battleships.

106. Q. Were those most severely damaged in the outer position at the moorings?

A. Yes, sir. The ones in the inner berths practically escaped torpedoes except in the case of the—I think it was the HELENA and the OGLALA were moored abreast at 1010 pier. The HELENA was torpedoed; she was outside. She was torpedoed but the explosive effect was enough to sink the inner ship too, the OGLALA.

107. Q. There were no other berths available so that the use of pairs could have been avoided?

A. I think not. There were two carrier berths on the north side of Ford Island. I think they were known at F-7 and 8, or F-8 and 9. I've forgotten the numbers. They were built for carriers and, on this occasion, one had been assigned to the UTAH and one had been assigned to the RALEIGH.

108. Q. Who was the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor other than the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Vice Admiral Pye was present. He was the next senior. He was not on board his Flagship at the time of the attack.

109. Q. Do you know whether a sortie order was issued following the attack?

[29] A. I believe it was. An order was issued to sortie in accordance with the security plan and quite a number of ships went out; small ships. The NEVADA was attempting to go out when she was attacked and torpedoed. She was the only battleship that actually got under way.

110. Q. Do you know who issued the sortie order?

A. I'm not sure but I think it was issued from the Flagship of Admiral Pye.

111. Q. Admiral, during 1941, do you recall having received from the Navy Department any intelligence concerning professional, personal characteristics of the leading Japanese Admirals?

A. No, I don't recall any.

112. Q. Did you ever hear the characteristics of Yamamoto, for instance, discussed?

A. Not prior to December 7.

The witness was advised that he would be recalled at a later date for further examination, was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:28 p. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Leonard D. Brown, civilian, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Benjamin Katz, Commander, U. S. Navy, Officer in charge of the Code Room of the Navy Department.

2. Q. Commander, are you the regular custodian of the classified communication files of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, I am the custodian of classified dispatch files.

3. Q. There are certain dispatches which this examination would like to have. I will give you the dates of those and if you are the custodian and have them in your custody, will you please produce them. The first is a dispatch of 16 October 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

A. I have one that is addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and also to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

[30] Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 6".

4. Q. If you have the dispatch of 24 November from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, please produce it.

A. I have the message.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 7".

5. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941, please produce it.

A. I have that message also.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 8".

6. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations on 29 November, please produce it.

A. Yes, sir, this is it.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 9".

7. Q. If you have a dispatch in your custody addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, information Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November 1941, please produce it.

A. I have it, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 10".

8. Q. If you have in your custody the dispatch of 3 December, 1941, [31] addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, please produce it.

A. I have that.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 11".

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 2:50 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m. tomorrow.

[32]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1944

THIRD DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the second day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral Smith, I am directed by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony pertinent to the facts attending the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. My precept states that this is for the purpose of having on record testimony which eventually might be lost due to death or any cause which might make a witness unavailable when the time comes. There is possibility that this testimony will be used in future legal proceedings. Now, in such testimony as you give us, I ask that as far as you can, you speak from your knowledge which you had prior to 7 December and from facts which presented themselves to you before that date. I realize that that is a long distance back, and if at any time you have means of refreshing your memory from documents, or otherwise, we will stop and permit you to do so.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Director, Naval Transportation Service, Naval Operations.

2. Q. What was your assignment of duty on 7 December 1941?

A. Chief of Staff, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. On what date did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet?

A. On February 1, 1941, the date on which Admiral Kimmel became Commander-in-Chief. I might add that I served a year and a half, prior to that date, as Captain of one of the Admiral's cruisers

when he was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet; and before that date I don't recollect having seen him.

4. Q. As the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or United States Fleet, did you supervise all the divisions of the Staff?

A. Yes, everything.

[33] 5. Q. Then everything that transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief passed back and forth through you?

A. Yes, it did. The Commander-in-Chief very frequently would have certain members of his Staff in his office, and spent a great deal of time down in the War Plans Office, and I had other things to do, but nothing was ever completed without my knowledge. I was in his confidence all the time.

6. Q. Did this relate only to matters of major importance?

A. To everything. The usual thing in the morning was to look over the dispatches and talk with him, and then the Fleet Intelligence Officer would come in with his later information. Then, the members of the Staff would be called together at least once a day, not always a full conference, but the people concerned.

7. Q. Were you shown all confidential, secret intelligence concerning the Japanese, both from the Navy Department and from the Staff organizations on Oahu?

A. Yes. My recollection is, we got very little on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence, which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but we had radio intelligence, and every time the three Force Commanders were in port, or even one or two of them, as a matter of fact, the Commander-in-Chief would have them over, and his Type Commanders who were in port, and have the Intelligence Officer point out on the chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of where all units of the Japanese Fleet were, at the time.

8. Q. Were you present at such conferences?

A. Yes, all of them.

9. Q. What other members of the Staff were fully informed of all intelligence in this manner?

A. Always the War Plans Officer, who was Captain, now Rear Admiral, McMorris; and the Operations Officer, Captain DeLany, now Rear Admiral DeLany; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and the Fleet Communications Officer, and as many others as the Commander-in-Chief thought necessary, but those four were always in on it.

10. Q. By "Fleet Intelligence Officer", do you mean Layton?

A. Yes, sir; Commander Layton.

11. Q. You don't include Rochefort?

A. No, sir. Rochefort was Combat Intelligence Officer under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and was not brought into these conferences at all.

12. Q. Do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief kept you fully advised as to his thoughts and reactions to all such intelligence information?

A. I do. The Commander-in-Chief showed me every letter he wrote, or received—wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations. These letters were usually personal letters because the Chief of Naval Operations had used that form of correspondence for long before Admiral Kimmel took over, and these papers had to be considered

as official papers and they were filed, although they were personal letters. The Commander-in-Chief numbered them all, and I saw everything that he wrote or received.

13. Q. Do you know where that file is, at present?

[34] A. So far as I know, it is still in there with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It was there when Admiral Nimitz took over, as are also the letters of Admiral Richardson, who preceded him; he left his personal file there, too, because he said it was official business.

14. Q. Were you afforded an opportunity to express your views to the Commander-in-Chief concerning matters of major importance?

A. Yes, sir; always. I might add that that was one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief told me when he took over, that he had had experiences in the past where people were not kept informed and he wanted me to remind him to keep his Force and Type Commanders informed of everything that was going on.

15. Q. What members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff messed with him?

A. Only the Fleet Operations Officer, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff, i. e. Admiral Kimmel, DeLany, and myself. When McMorris, War Plans Officer, was with us at sea, he also was a member. Now, when he moved ashore, the mess was increased to include the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris; the Fleet Aviator, Captain A. C. Davis, now Rear Admiral Davis—and I think that is all.

16. Q. The Staff conference—was it a daily routine matter?

A. No, sir. There was no set hour for it. He had a conference practically every day, and he would send for the people that he wanted. He would usually have over there officers from the Fleet at the same time. He also very frequently, at his conferences, would send for Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye. I have known him to have Admiral Pye over there two or three times a day. Admiral Pye was important.

17. Q. Admiral, would you please advise us as to the organization of the Pacific Fleet just prior to Pearl Harbor, both as to the Type Organization and the Task Force Organization, as you recall it?

A. The Type Organization had existed for considerable time. That is, the Commander Battleships, Commander Destroyers, Commander Cruisers, and the Commander Scouting Force, who was Admiral Brown. One of the first things that Admiral Kimmel did was to split them up into three task forces, exclusive of submarines. Admiral Pye, who commanded the battleships, had one task force consisting of battleships and destroyers; Admiral Halsey had a task force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers; and Admiral Brown—Wilson Brown—had the third task force, in which he had a carrier, cruisers, and destroyers; and for operation or exercise purposes, battleships would be transferred to those task forces. One task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against each other. Sometimes all three would be at sea.

18. Q. Were there task forces, other than those you have mentioned, which were composed of the combatant ships?

A. No, sir; except the submarines and the service force, there were only those three major task forces. Patrol Wing Two was organized as a task force to operate with the Fleet.

19. Q. How about the forces ashore, sir?

A. Well, with the exception of the Fourteenth Naval District, the Navy had no forces ashore. Of course, they had Marines and an offshore patrol of destroyers, under Com 14.

[35] 20. Q. Was the Fourteenth Naval District a Task Force, a subdivision of Admiral Kimmel's command?

A. Yes, the Fourteenth Naval District was under Admiral Kimmel's command, and it was listed as a Task Force under his command. I have forgotten just exactly what it was called, but the Fourteenth Naval District has always been under the command of the Commander-in-Chief.

21. Q. How did Patrol Wing Two fit into this Task organization?

A. Patrol Wing Two was under the Commander-in-Chief, based on land, and furnished planes—was used mostly for a constant patrol of the areas in which the Forces were operating. There was a daily patrol at all times, regardless of whether the Fleet was operating south of Oahu or north, the operating area was always protected by planes, against a possible submarine attack, and, of course, Patrol Wing Two also had planes at Midway, and made trips to Midway and Wake. The Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Admiral Bellinger, was very often brought over to the Commander-in-Chief's and assigned a task in connection with the operations that were projected.

22. Q. Did the Commander of Patrol Wing Two come under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, he did.

23. Q. Would you explain just how that relationship works?

A. You see, he was based on Ford Island and was within the Commandant's jurisdiction, but both were under the Commander-in-Chief, and he was subordinate to the Fourteenth Naval District, but Admiral Kimmel very frequently would assign him a task, without going to Admiral Bloch.

24. Q. Was the organization of the Pacific Fleet by Forces and Types a published document?

A. My recollection is that it was issued monthly.

25. Q. Was the Task Force organization similarly published?

A. Yes, it is all a matter of record.

26. Q. Admiral, would you please explain the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, in Hawaii?

A. Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him, both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent.

27. Q. Under the official set-up, Admiral Bloch, rather than Admiral Kimmel, was the opposite of General Short, was he not?

A. No, sir. Admiral Kimmel never looked upon it that way. He felt that he was General Short's opposite.

[36] 28. Q. Was it not the case that the War Plans, and other official documents, were based upon the probability or possibility that Admiral Kimmel would be absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and in the book known as "Joint Army and Navy Action", the chart shows Admiral Bloch as the one, and the diagram leads to units of the U. S. Fleet, if present; but Admiral Kimmel felt that when he was present, he was the man who should deal with the Army and with everything else. He took that responsibility.

29. Q. But nothing in the way of official arrangements on paper, to that effect, was ever drawn up, was it?

A. To my knowledge—no, sir.

30. Q. That seems to have been an arrangement which might have left Admiral Bloch in some state of uncertainty as to his own relationship with the Commanding General. Do you recall any difficulties incident to that?

A. No, sir, I do not. As I have said before, Admiral Kimmel sent for Admiral Bloch very frequently and I never saw anything in Admiral Bloch's attitude indicating that he resented that. I have known occasions when Admiral Kimmel went to Admiral Bloch's house at night, on receipt of information, to talk things over and ask his advice. He had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch.

31. Q. Admiral, under the provisions of the Joint Action Army and Navy, what method of command as between the Army and Navy was in effect at Hawaii?

A. My recollection is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had the predominate interest, and I think General Short recognized that fact.

32. Q. Although the mutual cooperation method was actually in effect, was it not?

A. Yes, sir. You see, when Admiral Kimmel took over, the first thing that I did before assuming the duty as Chief of Staff, was to inquire all of the means of defense of Oahu. Pearl Harbor had no defense whatever, in itself. I was informed that the Army had no airplanes less than six years old—six years, in design. The Army had some 36 portable 3-inch guns that could be thrown around Pearl Harbor for the air defense. We were not very much impressed with that and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet, itself, which it was.

83. Q. Returning to this Kimmel-Bloch-Short relationship, the War Plans, Joint Action Pamphlet, and all, very definitely put the Navy's part of the responsibility for the security upon Bloch, did it not?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Was the reason that the Army and Navy business was between Kimmel and Short, instead of between Bloch and Short, due to the fact that Bloch had practically no force, or was it due more to the physical presence of Kimmel in Pearl Harbor during those months?

A. Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordi-

nate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say.

[37] 35. Q. Then the primary reason was Kimmel's physical presence at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir; and, of course, when he moved ashore, which was in the summer of 1941, after he moved ashore and was there all the time, practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature.

36. Q. In speaking of responsibility, do you include responsibility for the Fleet units' safety, as well as for the installations, themselves, at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. The plan put out by the Admiral, fifteen days after he took over, directed the Fourteenth Naval District, as well as the Fleet units, what to do in case of an air attack or a submarine attack. The ships' moorings were changed so that they were moored in sectors, where each ship would have a clear arc of fire, and all the moorings would be covered, and if one task force was out, the moorings were shifted to maintain that arc of fire; and if one area was not occupied, the one task force coming in was told where to distribute their ships and where to tie them up so that every arc of fire could be covered. It was realized that the only defense was by the Fleet. There was no defense ashore, except the net or the gate.

37. Q. Was this letter that you referred to subsequently revised?

A. It was revised about the middle of October, 1941.

38. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Could you identify that?

A. Yes, that is the one, revised. The original issue was the 15th of February. This was revised the 14th of October.

39. Q. Does this document, Exhibit 4, contain all instructions that Admiral Kimmel issued with respect to the defense of the base at Pearl—the security of the base at Pearl Harbor?

A. To the best of my recollection—it is a long time ago, of course—everything is in that letter. I don't recall anything else.

40. Q. This letter, Exhibit 4, prescribes certain tasks in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, to be performed by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Many of these tasks involved coordination with the Army. Was it Admiral Kimmel's intention that Admiral Bloch operate directly, or cooperate directly, with the Army in this connection, or through him?

A. I think, directly; I am quite certain, directly. You see, the Commander-in-Chief occasionally went to sea for tactical exercises, and Admiral Bloch had to carry on directly with the Army.

41. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief apprised of all the plans that were adopted between the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Were you familiar with the Joint Defense Plan which was signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaii Department, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I don't remember it.

43. Q. This is Exhibit 5 before this examination, and is that plan?

A. Frankly, I do not remember having seen that document before.

[38] 44. Q. Admiral, was the status of the Fleet, with respect to materiel and personnel, satisfactory to Admiral Kimmel at the time he assumed the command thereof; that is, of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No, it was not; he demanded such things as radar—at the time he took over, to my knowledge, there were only radars on four cruisers and on the carriers. He asked for it on all ships. He asked for additional aircraft guns. He asked for self-sealing tanks for airplanes, and when he finally got them, they had to be installed at Pearl Harbor. He continually asked for men. He demanded them so many times that some members of the Staff advised him that he was only boring the Department with it, because he usually got an answer back that the men were not available. He would ask for 20,000 men; 10,000 to fill vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000 for more training, because he knew that men had to be sent back for new construction, and the answer he invariably got was that, "The men are not available. They are needed in the Atlantic." In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received an official letter stating, "I know that you would like to have 20,000 men, and we would like to give them to you." As I remember the exact wording: "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." That letter was actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before, of course.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, file No. FF12/MM(55), and copy is now on file in the Secret—Confidential File Room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

A. (Continued.) The letters from the Chief of Naval Operations were usually personal letters, but they were along the same line, such as, "I have seen the President and I am sorry but he will not give you any more men." And while talking along that line, I might say that in—I think it was towards the end of May, 1941, while at sea, we issued orders by calling destroyers alongside, and detached the YORKTOWN; Battleship Division Three, which was then the strongest division of the Fleet; Cruiser Division Eight, of four modern cruisers; and, I believe, two squadrons of destroyers, which sailed under sealed orders, went through the Panama Canal and into the Atlantic. Those ships were all returned after war was declared, and they were equipped with all of the modern devices that we had tried to get for them while they were in the Pacific Fleet.

45. Q. What was the result, in your opinion, of these personnel and materiel shortages on the training program—the efficiency of the training program of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact, the complements had just been revised and I have always felt that they were unnecessarily large. The Fleet was adequately manned, and I considered the ships very efficient and the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by this; but, the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction.

46. Q. Did that condition ever develop, prior to the 7th of December, whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construction?

A. No, it did not; not below the level necessary.

47. Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance of materiel?

[39] A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander-in-Chief, for degaussing and the installation of armor—what do you call it—splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief.

48. Q. Were you able to keep abreast of the program of alterations as laid down by the materiel bureaus of the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir; pretty well.

49. Q. Did it interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet to carry out this program?

A. No, it did not.

50. Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?

A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely. The morale of the Fleet did not suffer. In the summer of 1941, we arranged a schedule whereby small task forces of one or two battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would proceed to the coast of California and remain there for a period of approximately ten days, and return. The force was never large enough to weaken the Fleet, and this step was not taken until at a conference with his Flag Officers, the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question and it was decided by all that it would be a very good thing for the Fleet to keep some of them constantly going back to the coast. About this time, we had completed a stadium which seated about 5,000 men. That took care of the morale of the men pretty well. There may have been a question in the minds of the Flag Officers, and some Captains, as to why they were being kept out there—I had heard discussions of that, unofficially—knowing that part of the Fleet had been moved to the Atlantic Coast. A great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific. The movement of part of the Fleet to the Atlantic Coast undoubtedly had some effect on the minds of the personnel in the Fleet. The health of the officers and men of the Fleet was never impaired by remaining in Pearl Harbor, in fact, it was excellent.

51. Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, rather than on the mainland, affect the materiel conditions and the materiel readiness of the Fleet?

A. No, it did not.

52. Q. For war?

A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement, that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet, and we felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander-in-Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for

the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.

[40] 53. Q. Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed—during 1941, I am speaking of—and returning to the old way of basing on the California Coast?

A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard him say to me or any member of his Staff, that the Fleet should return to the Coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recommended it.

54. Q. Referring to your statement about feeling within the command which was promoted by the transfer of certain powerful units to the Atlantic Coast, do you think that the mental attitude of the various senior officers in the Fleet was in any way adversely affected by the long maintenance of the position in Hawaii?

A. No, I do not. By that statement, I meant that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them had the units of the Fleet not been taken away. There was no dissatisfaction or loss of morale.

55. Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay out there, the entire Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in—moved everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.

56. Q. Admiral, you have stated that when you assumed the duties of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, you made a survey of the Army's ability to defend Pearl Harbor. Please state any knowledge you have of subsequent improvements in the situation in that respect, if any?

A. The situation was considerably improved after the arrival of General Short. He had modern planes out there, modern fighters, before the war broke, P-40's, some Flying Fortresses, and I have traveled across the Island and seen the fighters staked out. When the attack came on Pearl Harbor, after the warnings they had, the Army had assumed, as perhaps they had been trained to, that if there was to be an attack, there would be sabotage, and they feared sabotage more than an attack, and brought them all in the hangars, and that is why they were all burned up.

57. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and matériel readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?

A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing them

with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they [41] would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports", or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out.

58. Q. This was a definite order issued by the two Departments?

A. Yes, sir; by dispatch.

59. Q. About what date?

A. To the best of my recollection, about seven days before Pearl Harbor.

60. Q. What was to be done with the Marines and the Marine planes?

A. That we did not know. We wondered why—whether they were needed elsewhere. We thought perhaps that it was planned to prepare an expedition force and the Marines were needed elsewhere. No member of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff knew why that was done, and we still don't understand why it was not carried out, or what they had in mind—what the Department had in mind at the time.

61. Q. Had the Army situation with respect to anti-aircraft artillery been bettered?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

62. Q. Did they have facilities for obtaining early information of the arrival of enemy forces by water or air?

A. The Army?

63. Q. The Army.

A. No. The Army had just built a radar station, but it was not in operation. They had a Naval officer named Taylor, a Reserve, who had had considerable experience in England, and he was assigned to the Army with the idea of teaching them how to operate the radar, but it was not in full operation, and of course the radar of the ships was no good because they couldn't go through the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor.

64. Q. The fact that the Army radar station was not functioning was known to Admiral Kimmel, was it not?

A. Yes. It had just been completed and was not ready for operation. It had been on that morning of 7 December but he hadn't known it.

[42] 65. Q. Were you familiar with the local defense forces available to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to execute his functions in connection with the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. I was, at the time. I doubt if I could quote them now, however.

66. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel also familiar with this situation?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Was it your belief that the Army and Navy, operating through the local defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?

A. We thought so at the time. I realize now, we were not.

68. Q. Were you familiar with the plans for reconnaissance and inshore-off-shore patrol then in effect?

A. Yes.

69. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel take any action, to your knowledge, to augment the forces of the Army and the Fourteenth Naval District prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, at any time, in order to enable them to carry out their defense functions?

A. He continually asked for more Navy planes. What recommendations he made for the Army, I don't recall, or what recommendations General Short made, but I know that they conferred on it very frequently. I don't believe that Admiral Kimmel made recommendations for building up the Army—General Short would make those recommendations to the War Department.

70. Q. Did he augment the local forces with any aircraft or vessels of the Fleet, to your knowledge, for defense purposes?

A. Well, he had a destroyer off-shore patrol that was built up, and, as I say, the operating forces were always protected by air coverage against submarines. We were very submarine-conscious and one reason for that was that we had several sound contacts—perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, which was in the month of February, before Admiral Kimmel had been in command a month, we had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head, and it moved slowly so that they had it for 36 hours. It occurred again a month later. We never found exactly what it was, but we had officers go over to the Bishop Museum to learn all they could about the waters around Honolulu, and came to the conclusion that it was two different water levels, or water temperatures. The destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about 6 o'clock in the morning, told me to issue orders to Admiral Draemel to bomb this thing, depth charge it. Before the order went out, however, he cancelled it, and reported the fact to the Chief of Naval Operations, saying that he had no authority to do this, except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor, and the reply he got was "Thank God you didn't. It might have caused international difficulties," or words to that effect. So, we had so many of these contacts, probably all of them false, that we were submarine-conscious more than air-conscious, and I think every one in the Fleet expected if an attack came, it would be by submarines

rather than aircraft. You will notice that that order covers both air and submarine attack, but I believe that the people of the Fleet felt little danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

71. Q. Was this off-shore patrol maintained at all times, or intermittently?

[43] A. At all times.

72. Q. What belt around Oahu did it cover, in distances?

A. The area south of Pearl Harbor. Occasionally we had destroyers go around the Island at night, but our destroyers at that time were not equipped with radar, they were equipped with sound. There was not a constant patrol around the Island, we didn't have enough destroyers for that purpose, but there was a constant patrol in the operating area south of Pearl Harbor.

73. Q. Do you know if any other patrol, either air or destroyer, was maintained by either the Army or the Navy?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no patrol maintained by the Army. The patrol maintained by the Navy was as extensive as Commander PatWing Two felt he could make it. He claimed that he did not have enough planes to maintain a patrol, daily patrol, in all directions from Oahu, and for that reason the air patrol was confined to the operating areas—the regular patrol.

74. Q. Do you know whether the statement or views of Commander PatWing Two were based upon the fact that a continuous air patrol would fatigue personnel and wear out matériel, or was he referring to his inability to make such a patrol over short periods of time?

A. Based entirely on matériel.

75. Q. Long-range, every day?

A. Yes. The planes wouldn't stand it.

76. Q. Then the only two types of normal patrol maintained, say, a month before Pearl Harbor, that you know of, were destroyers off-shore, and the air patrol covering the operating areas?

A. Well, we had a Patrol Wing at Midway, of course, and they very frequently patrolled back and forth, going by way of Johnston's Island; and of course we had planes on Wake, but there was no patrol such as we use today, the long-range, daily patrol.

77. Q. Would you please explain what action was taken by the Task Forces while at sea to obtain information of important enemy movements in the close vicinity of Pearl Harbor?

A. When the Task Forces were engaged in operations, they were blacked out at night. They had destroyer protection. There was no long-range search, however, made by the carriers with planes, against an enemy.

78. Q. They were not, then, considered as a part of the reconnaissance facilities for the defense or security of Pearl Harbor?

A. Not until the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when Admiral Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, was given instructions by Admiral Kimmel not to return with the Task Force but to take 18 Marine fighters out to within 200 miles of Wake and fly them off, because the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the defenses of Wake, and of course it was for that reason that the ENTERPRISE was not lost, because she was due to be in the port, where the UTAH was tied up, during the attack. Before he left, Admiral Halsey said "This is a very secret movement. What shall I do in case I meet

Japanese forces?" And Admiral Kimmel said "In that case, use your own discretion." And Admiral Halsey replied "Those are the best orders I have ever received, and to keep my movements secret, if I find even a Japanese sampan, I will sink it." So that trip I believe Admiral Halsey had an air search out all the time, in fact, I know he did.

[44] 79. Q. Under the Army-Navy agreement, responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack, bombardment from ships, and landing forces, of course is all Army responsibility. Are you sure that you have conveyed to us all steps known to have been taken to ascertain the Army's readiness to meet their commitments on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. About how many Army pursuit planes did you understand to be available on Oahu?

A. Something in the vicinity of a hundred, I should say.

81. Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel?

A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet Operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good.

82. Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?

A. Both.

83. Q. Insofar as you did give thought to the possibility of a Japanese air raid, what did you consider the most effective defense against it?

A. The most efficacious defense against it, we felt, was from our own carrier planes, and when the attack occurred, our carriers were all at sea.

84. Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency of Army aircraft?

A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy fliers, but the opinions expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army fliers.

85. Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor, including the Fleet,—is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?

A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did.

88. Q. Admiral, you were familiar with the basic War Plans in effect in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, were you not?

A. Yes.

89. Q. Were you familiar with the missions assigned therein to the United States Pacific Fleet?

[45] A. I do not recall what the detailed mission of the Pacific Fleet was, except that we had no orders what to do in case of war, or where to go.

90. Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?

A. My recollection is—they were defensive.

91. Q. Do you recall whether they called for any contemplated movement to the westward?

A. I am positive they did not. I am now thoroughly familiar with the War Plans, but I know that the Fleet had no orders or plans to move to the far westward, such as to relieve the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The witness was directed to refresh his memory on the point in question, and be prepared to answer in more detail later.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

92. Q. Admiral, what intelligence organizations were available to the Commander-in-Chief to give him enemy intelligence, with respect to the Japanese particularly?

A. There was the intelligence organization of the Fourteenth District, and there was the intelligence officer. The Fleet Intelligence officer and his assistant, a Lieutenant Hudson, were both Japanese-language-speaking officers. Just what intelligence they got from the Army, I do not recall. We had our dispatches, of course, from the Department and radio intelligence. The Fleet Intelligence officer believed he knew where all units of the Japanese Fleet were and would report them from day to day. Of course, it turned out he was wrong.

93. Q. The Commander-in-Chief then was given the intelligence information available in the Combat Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Oh, yes.

94. Q. Were you also acquainted with such information?

A. Yes, every morning the Fleet Intelligence officer came to the Commander-in-Chief about nine o'clock in the morning, after the Commander-in-Chief had read the morning dispatches, and gave him the latest information. I was always present when he did.

95. Q. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence provide the Commander-in-Chief with periodic information as to Japanese current movements?

A. I can recall only their pamphlets, stuff that they regularly put out. I don't recall any dispatches from Naval Intelligence.

96. Q. Are you familiar with their fortnightly summaries that they provide to the senior command afloat?

A. Yes.

97. Q. What information was furnished concerning Japanese naval leaders?

A. The best information that we received on Japanese naval leaders came through Commander McCrea on his return from a mission to the Commander-in- [46] Chief Asiatic. That was a week before Admiral Kimmel took over and gave Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of these Japanese naval leaders and was the best estimate we ever received. I can not recall that we ever received one from Naval Intelligence or from the Navy Department.

98. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel receive this information from Commander McCrea?

A. Yes, he and Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, the War Plans officer, and I were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in the Commander-in-Chief's cabin when McCrea came through and we had an all afternoon conference. McCrea read out from this little book that he carried these comments. They were copied down and put in the secret file.

99. Q. Did his information include information concerning Japanese Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Very much so; yes. As I recall the comment on him, he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous. I may have those words wrong but that's the impression I got at the time.

100. Q. During 1941, was Admiral Kimmel informed as to the duties being performed by Admiral Yamamoto in the Japanese Navy, as to his position?

A. I'm quite certain; yes.

101. Q. The Commander-in-Chief was in touch with anything vital in the way of local intelligence obtained in Hawaii, was he not?

A. Yes, sir, except that we did not have access to the files of the cable office. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files. My recollection, it was taken to Mr. Mackey of the Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph or cable message. At that time, there were certain Japanese codes which we could break and the intelligence officer felt that if he could get those messages he might learn what was going on. We didn't get them until three days after Pearl Harbor. We never got anything from that before the war.

102. Q. Do you know anything of an attempt having been made to arrest or otherwise segregate suspected Japanese agents?

A. I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent out by the Japanese, by plane. The intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe a Charlie Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about [47] it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when

Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after dark and stayed at sea for a week or more, preserving radio silence, and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communication between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them.

103. Q. Then you do not recall a discussion between the Army and Navy at Oahu concerning the rather wholesale arrests or segregation of some agents?

A. No, sir, I do not. I believe that the Army did have certain Japanese spotted with the idea of taking them in, in case of war, but I did not take any active part in discussions of that.

104. Q. Other than daily reports by Layton, in which he considered that he knew the location of all important Japanese naval units, do you recall receiving any other similar intelligence during the last few weeks of 1941?

A. We had frequent dispatches on the course of events from the Navy Department. The last of which I believe was the 27th of November. No, sir, all that I received was through the Fleet Intelligence Office.

105. Q. On or about 1 December '41, where do you recall that information to have indicated the important Japanese naval units to be?

A. I can not recall that in detail. One Fleet was supposed to be at Truk, and, to the best of my recollection, the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters.

106. Q. What about the carriers?

A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were.

107. Q. Do you recall any difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers?

A. No, sir, I do not.

108. Q. Admiral, you have referred to certain dispatches received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Navy Department with relation to the international situation in the Pacific. I have here Exhibit 6 before this examination, dispatch of 16 October 1941, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, which I will give to you and ask whether you are familiar with that dispatch?

A. Yes, sir, I remember it.

109. Q. This dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

110. Q. It is noted that this dispatch refers to the grave international situation and indicates possible action, aggressive action, on the part of [48] the Japanese. Do you recall whether the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff made any estimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of the contents of this dispatch?

A. To the best of my recollection, no specific change of plan was made because we had received warnings constantly—I should say weekly—for a period of more than a year; warnings long before the Commander-in-Chief ever took over, or Admiral Kimmel ever took over. These were in the form of letters, usually from the Chief of Naval Operations, who frequently wound up his letters by saying “It may happen tomorrow.” So that the Fleet had been pretty much on the alert from the time it got out there. I don’t recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; the 16th.

111. Q. The dispatch also provides that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities. Do you know that this was done?

A. Yes. I may get that mixed up with a later dispatch. Frequently, those dispatches of that nature were taken over by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in person to General Short and Admiral Bloch was always asked to come over and read them in the Commander-in-Chief’s office. In a later dispatch, General Short was sent for; a dispatch of that nature which I think was dated the 27th of November. There were so many of those that I may confuse one with the other.

112. Q. We’ll get to the others shortly and you may have some comment on them in general. Now I’d like you to confine your testimony about what you know about the individual ones. Do you know whether or not any discussion of the meaning and the possible repercussions which might follow, meaning of the contents of this dispatch, were discussed by the Commander-in-Chief with General Short or with Admiral Bloch or both?

A. I can not recall in this specific case, but I believe that every one of the messages of that nature were discussed by General Short, Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch.

113. Q. What was the nature of such discussions?

A. Well, usually we would call in members of the Staff and, as I said before, Admiral Pye, if in port, and would exchange ideas and information on it.

114. Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

115. Q. Was there any discussion as to the availability of the proper means on the part of any of the Services to carry out its functions in protecting Pearl Harbor in the light of the warning?

A. The warning was not made that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The warning indicated that the attack would go elsewhere. We never received a warning about an attack on Pearl Harbor.

116. Q. Was there any contemplation by any of the parties that conferred of an attack on Hawaii by air, any time that you recall?

[49] A. No, I do not, except, as I stated before, the ships were so berthed that they had a clear arc of fire for anti-aircraft guns in all four sectors, and that when a task force came in, the senior officer of a sector invariably reported that he had taken over command of that sector. I believe that’s laid out in that October 15 letter.

117. Q. Do you ever recall that General Short asked for any assistance from Admiral Kimmel in providing for the defense of Pearl Harbor should it be attacked by air?

A. No.

118. Q. Do you ever recall Admiral Bloch asking for assistance from the Fleet carrying out the functions assigned him by the security letter, Exhibit 4?

A. No, never.

119. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 6, further provides that the Commanders-in-Chief addressed, including Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, should take precautions, including preparatory deployment as will not constitute strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan. Do you recall the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to this directive?

A. My recollection is that in each one of those cases, including the one you mentioned, his alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas and, on those occasions, the training exercises were halted and the ships assembled with their destroyer screen and placed, until further orders, as a Fleet and still kept at sea. The ships in port, however, were not moved out. Conditions of readiness were prescribed for ships in port.

120. Q. You speak of the task forces being alerted. Do you mean that a prescribed state of readiness was designated?

A. I believe the October 14 letter told what to do. The message was sent out: Task force operating at sea. Dispatch striking unit. Make appropriate defense disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea. Dispatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Defense Officer and Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

121. Q. It is your belief then that after receipt of this dispatch of October 15 and its further promulgation to the forces afloat, that the action—preparations were made to take the action contemplated by the security letter?

A. On several occasions that was done.

122. Q. Was this concentrating of ships intended as a protective measure for the task force or for offensive action, or as a protection to the base?

A. Not for the protection of the base. For the protection of the heavy ships in the task force and to organize a striking force if the enemy were sighted. There was no idea of protecting the base with the Fleet.

123. Q. Are you familiar with any movements of forces other than those incidently at sea which resulted from action taken as a result of this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. That's not quite clear.

[50] 124. Q. Are you familiar with any other deployment made or movement of ships or aircraft or personnel in compliance with the directive contained in this dispatch, other than the concentration of task forces incidently at sea?

A. No, I'm not.

125. Q. I show you here a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic, Pacific Fleet, and certain Naval District Commandants, Exhibit 7 for this examination. Are you familiar with that document?

A. I recall it vaguely. It does not stand out in my memory. As I say, it was one of several. I may confuse one with the other, but I notice that it speaks of attack on the Philippines or Guam.

126. Q. Do you know whether this dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not swear to it; no.

127. Q. I have here Exhibit 8 before this examination which is a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets for action. Are you familiar with that dispatch?

A. Very much. This is the one that I remember above all others. This was received somewhere in midafternoon of the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and the conference was held and by six o'clock that evening the Army was on the march. Unfortunately, what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, the bridges—in other words, they alerted against sabotage; sabotage because it was the consensus from this dispatch that the attack would, as it states, be against the Philippines or Thai or Kra Peninsula, possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and, by the Army, sabotage from the enormous Japanese population in the Islands. At that time, we had two of the three task forces at sea and one of these returned on the 5th of December, which placed two in port, 1 at sea, but the carrier of the task force returning on 5 December remained at sea to deliver planes to Wake.

128. Q. Admiral, at the conference with General Short, was this dispatch carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning, insofar as it could be determined?

A. I should say yes, certainly.

129. Q. Was the study made in the nature of an estimate of the situation?

A. No. But remember this is only one of a great many warnings.

130. Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning?

A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the Islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

131. Q. Did the question of possible attack by air arise?

A. No.

[51] 132. Q. Was the Navy fully apprised at that time of the contemplated action of the Army; I mean the alert against sabotage only?

A. I was not. I don't believe the Commander-in-Chief was.

133. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District present at this conference?

A. Yes. He got there before General Short did.

134. Q. Were measures to be taken by his task force—that is the Commandant's Task Force—discussed?

A. I don't recall.

135. Q. Was any action taken in the light of this dispatch to augment the forces of either the Army or the Commandant of the Four-

teenth Naval District, so as to assist them in defense from air attack?

A. Not that I recall, although a squadron of B-17's took off from the Coast a few days later and actually arrived on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Whether that was instigated by the Commanding General or by the War Department, I do not know. They arrived with machine guns mounted and no ammunition, during the attack.

136. Q. Were the task force commanders at sea apprised of this warning?

A. Yes, they were apprised of all warnings received.

137. Q. Were they given any specific directives with respect to action to be taken by the task forces in the light of the warning?

A. Only that as laid down in the directive of 15th of October.

138. Q. Was any action taken to change the condition of readiness of the vessels at Pearl Harbor in the light of this warning?

A. It is very difficult for me to recall that because I get confused between that period and the period immediately afterwards when we shifted from Condition 1, 2, and 3 so frequently. I believe that we did before the war, but I may possibly be in error on it.

139. Q. You mean the condition of readiness of the ships in the Harbor were changed during that period?

A. Yes, they were frequently done for drill purposes also, before.

140. Q. But you do not know what condition of readiness was taken following the receipt—

A. (Interposing) No, I do not. It should be shown in the files, however, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

141. Q. Admiral, you will note in the dispatch a directive concerning a deployment. State what you considered that directive to mean when you saw it.

A. It was impossible to keep the entire Fleet at sea at all times and had we put the entire Fleet at sea, everytime we got a warning, the Fleet would have been worn out. As it was, we were fueling our task forces at sea. As I remember the decision was made to take the precautions that we had for months laid down in case of one of these warnings, but to make no change in the disposition of the forces in port. As I say, at the time of this warning, two of the three task forces were at sea. It was at this time, however, that the Commander-in-Chief sent the ENTERPRISE task force to deliver planes to Wake and that Force was fully prepared to take offensive action against anything it might meet. There was no disposition made by the Fleet for the defense of Pearl Harbor, because I believe that no one on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff or his force believed that an air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor.

[52] 142. Q. Was what the dispatch says concerning a preparation for doing something else a consideration when it was decided not to change any movements?

A. We had sufficient forces at sea to do what the war plan called for.

143. Q. Do you recall what ships were returned to Pearl Harbor between the receipt of this dispatch and 7 December?

A. Yes, sir, the task force—I believe it was Admiral Pye's Task Force that returned on the 5th of December, two days before Pearl Harbor, with the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also part of Admiral Halsey's Task Force.

144. Q. Did that considerably increase the number of ships that were in the Harbor?

A. Very considerably. When that task force entered, Admiral Brown's Task Force departed, I think on the 4th of December, and that Task Force had no battleships in it. He had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers in his Task Force. So the result was we had two of the task forces in port when this thing happened; two of the task forces, with the exception of the ENTERPRISE, Admiral Halsey—and accompanying light forces of Task Force Two.

145. Q. Then, in effect, rather than a deployment involving movement outward, there really was a movement of ships inward after the receipt of the war warning?

A. Yes, but not as a result of the war warning. This was our planned operations for the month. It may very well be that these plans were known to the Japanese and that they chose their time when we had scheduled two task forces in port. They were operating on schedule. It was not changed as a result of this.

146. Q. In other words, the operating schedule made and printed weeks previously was not departed from?

A. Yes, sir, that's correct, with the exception of the one outfit going to Wake.

147. Q. This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8) is different from all other warnings received previously in that the words "War Warning" were used. What was your own reaction to those particular words?

A. My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before; we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr. Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and I said, "No, it may be that the plane was told by the Administration to break down. They know more what's going on than we do. Let him stay there."

148. Q. Didn't that happen considerable time previously?

A. Not very long previously, to my recollection. Previous to this dispatch, yes.

149. Q. But this dispatch states that negotiations have ceased.

A. As a matter of fact, they had not ceased, Admiral.

150. Q. Then the use of the words "War Warning" did not impress you as requiring any increase in security precautions or any departure from the scheduled routine deployment?

A. No, sir, with the exception of the protection of ships at sea as laid down in our October 15 directive. They did not impress me that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[53] 151. Q. And in your recollection, all others with whom you were officially associated had reactions similar to yours?

A. Yes, sir.

152. Q. After the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral, is it not true that you realized that a greater part of the arc of approaches to the Pearl Harbor area were not covered by any air or surface forces to give information as to the approach of any possible enemy?

A. Yes, sir.

153. Q. Was this matter discussed at the conferences, either with the Army or by Admiral Kimmel?

A. The danger of ever having an attack on Pearl Harbor?

154. Q. The fact that so much of the arc was not covered by any means.

A. No, sir. That is the last warning that I recall, except that we got one about 5:30 p. m. on the 7th of December, through the Army. It had originated the day before and was sent by cable. It was delivered by General Short's Aide to us some ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

155. Q. I have here Exhibit 9 before this examination, Admiral, which is a dispatch transmitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief—to certain Frontier Commanders, with copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It is dated November 28, 1941. Are you familiar with it?

A. I don't recall this message. I probably saw it at the time but I don't recall it. I note that it states that this WPL will not be placed in effect in the Pacific.

156. Q. Admiral, I have here a dispatch, Exhibit 11 before this examination, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and Commandants Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, dated December 3, 1941. Are you familiar with that dispatch, sir?

A. Yes, I remember that.

157. Q. Upon seeing this, did you not consider that the steps being taken by the Japanese were extremely significant as point out future action?

A. I did.

158. Q. Did it leave much, if any, doubt in your mind that they were about to make a hostile move?

A. No. In fact, as I recall, we had, by that time, received word from the Asiatic Fleet that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the southward. It did not occur to us, however, that the attack was coming in our direction.

159. Q. That is, your reaction was that the Japs were about to go to war with someone but it, in no way, conveyed to you any increased imminence of danger of an attack against Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir. I believed, from previous warnings that we had had, that the attack was going to be possibly against the Philippines but toward the Malay Peninsula.

160. Q. And within your remembrance, was the reaction of the others with whom you were associated at Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters quite similar to your?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:30 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1944 .

FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

159. Q. Admiral, you testified that in the week or so prior to the attack on December 7 several conditions of readiness were prescribed. Do you know if these conditions were at any time prescribed by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. My recollection is that the condition of readiness came from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I do know that Admiral Kimmel had prescribed them as a drill. Whether he actually ordered it, I do not recall. However, all of this is a matter of record and can easily be ascertained from the files of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or from the then Communications Officer, Captain Curts, now in the Navy Department.

At this point, in order to introduce certain documents into the proceedings which were not until now available, for use in the further examination of this witness, the examining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and Commander Benjamin Katz be recalled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Do you have in your custody a dispatch dated January 26, 1941, transmitted from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, reference office No. 270038?

A. I have that, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document [55] introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 12".

2. Q. Do you have in your possession the dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, office reference 270040?

A. I have that too, sir.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 13".

3. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, office reference 282054?

A. Yes, sir, here it is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 14."

4. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, office reference 280627?

A. I have that. Here it is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 15".

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer, who warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

160. Q. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet confidential letter, No. 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination, provides that the Commandant of the Fourteenth District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer, should advise the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Do you [56] interpret that directive to grant authority to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to order conditions of readiness?

A. Yes, I do. In my recollection, that was what was in effect at the time.

161. Q. Do you know what condition of readiness was in fact in effect just prior to the attack on the 7th of December?

A. I do not. It is impossible for me to remember details that long ago. However, the fact that the ammunition was readily obtainable and the guns were manned very promptly on the morning of 7 December, I believe that a condition of readiness had been prescribed.

162. Q. Where were you when the attack commenced?

A. I was at home. I believe I was one of the first notified. I was at breakfast at home in Honolulu when I received the telephone call saying, "This is not a drill." I proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor in my own automobile.

163. Q. At about what time did you arrive at the Navy Yard in Pearl Harbor?

A. At about twenty minutes after eight.

164. Q. What was your observation as to the readiness and effectiveness of the batteries of the various ships in meeting the attack?

A. All ships seemed to be firing. The sky was full of bursts. I could see those long before I got down there. The ARIZONA had already been hit and was smoking. Not only the batteries were firing, but men and machine guns and rifles were all over the tops of buildings and out in the park and everybody was shooting.

165. Q. Did you receive a report of any contact with submarines on that morning, prior to the attack, on the part of naval vessels of the United States?

A. I did not. The report of the submarine was received by the Staff Duty Officer who was Commander Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bloch, and, I believe, to Admiral Kimmel. My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate

with the Army. It had to go through several stations. The Fleet Communications Officer can give you more details of this than I can, but I do know it had been taken up months before, both by the Army and Navy, to improve these communications. [57] In fact, I was quite astounded that the message from the Fleet Office ashore in Pearl Harbor reached me as quickly as it did. I do not know whether any attempt had been made to inform me of the submarine attack, but if any attempt was made, I never received it.

166. Q. Do you recall the initials of the Commander Murphy who was the Staff Duty Officer?

A. V. R. Murphy, now head of the Post Graduate School at Annapolis.

167. Q. What consideration, if any, had been given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the members of his Staff to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to any declaration of war?

A. I believe every consideration that was given is laid down in that directive that you have, dated the 14th of October (indicating Exhibit 4). There was no one, to my knowledge, on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, or, from later inquiries I have made, in the Navy Department itself, who believed that there was danger of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. As I have stated yesterday, it is provided for in our directive but in the minds of the people out there, it was not expected.

168. Q. As I understand the directive, that sets up the measures to be taken in the event of an air attack. What precautions were taken to get advance warning of an air attack?

A. We had no air patrol to the northward; we had submarines patrolling at Wake and Midway and had had them there for some time. I would say that on the morning of the 7th of December no special precautions were taken against air attack. The air patrol to the South of Oahu was being maintained.

169. Q. And upon what consideration was this decision that such a surprise attack was not considered a possibility based; why was the possibility of a surprise attack not considered and taken into consideration in formulating the security plans of the Fleet?

A. I believe that the attitude was very well stated by the War Plans Officer in his testimony before the Roberts Board when asked that question. I don't know whether it is a matter of record, but I was informed at the time his reply was: "I didn't believe they had the guts to try it, and if they had, they wouldn't get away with it." Unfortunately, I believe that was the attitude of most of us.

170. Q. Under the Navy's usual methods, everything of that sort is primarily based upon an estimate of the situation, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

171. Q. Those estimates usually contain the courses of action open to the enemy; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

172. Q. Do you recall any serious consideration in any estimate of the situation which was made of that particular course of action, which naturally was open to the enemy?

A. The estimate of the situation is laid down in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued about the 1st of July, 1941, and it did not, to the best of my knowledge, consider that the Japs would make

an attack against Pearl Harbor. It contemplated their action against Malay and the Philippines, with raids on our outlying islands: Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston. To the best of my knowledge, this estimate did not consider an air attack possibility against Pearl Harbor itself.

[58] 173. Q. Admiral, I show you a publication which is listed as "U. S. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5". Do you recognize that?

A. I do. It was issued after receipt of the Basic War Plan, Rainbow 5, and was prepared by Captain—now Read Admiral McMorris and his Staff in the War Plans Division of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. It was issued about July 1, 1941.

174. Q. Was it approved by Admiral Kimmel as the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

A. It was approved and signed by Admiral Kimmel.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to Registered Publications Section, Chief of Naval Operations Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 16".

175. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the contents of this document which has just been introduced and identified as Exhibit 16 before this examination?

A. Yes.

176. Q. In your testimony of yesterday, with reference to the Basic War Plans, you made certain statements concerning the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Since that time, through the use of this plan, have you recalled to your memory more specifically the provisions of the plans provided herein?

A. Yes, sir, there were a number of task forces, and the Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 stand out in my mind more than the others. Task Force 1 was the battle force under Admiral Pye. He then had six battleships and cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not remember. He was the supporting force. And striking Task Force 2, under Admiral Halsey, consisting of one division of battleships and one carrier, cruisers, and destroyers, was to make a raid on the Marshalls, supported by Task Force 1 of heavy ships. Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown, was composed of one carrier and some eight heavy cruisers, and destroyers, and that Task Force was scheduled to raid enemy commerce. All of this was in accordance with the basic plan. The basic plan also called for us to capture—to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines and to capture a fleet base in Truk. You will find that the Pacific Fleet Plan is divided into several phases, because obviously the capture of Truk was impossible. We had only one division of transports, then under intensive training at San Diego for amphibious operations; we had none in Pearl Harbor. We had only a few hundred Marines; we had no supply ships beyond those necessary to service the Fleet, and the outlying islands. In fact, we found it rather difficult to supply the outlying islands with what we had, so that we could not have possibly taken any of the Marshall Islands. We could raid them but we could not capture them. The plan called for the movement, as soon after declaration of war as possible, of the Second Marine Division from the California Coast to Hawaii. I might add also, the submarines were given the task of es-

tablishing patrols in enemy Empire waters, and in the Marshalls and Carolines. Their plans were all made and what to do, but we were continually warned not to take any action until Japan made a move which indicated opening of hostilities. We had not based our submarines in Japanese waters, but we had established a submarine patrol operating from Wake and from Midway.

177. Q. Admiral, confining the problem to the first phase, notably the intended raid to the westward, was readiness for that step to be made immediately after [59] the outbreak of hostilities very much in the picture around Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters and to such an extent that it amounted to a major preoccupation?

A. It was very much in the minds of Admiral Kimmel and of Admiral Halsey. In fact, Admiral Halsey was anxious to go.

178. Q. Did that preoccupation have any decided effect on the measures for security of the Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. I believe that the question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered. The Fleet was ready to carry out its task at the outbreak of war. The question of an attack before negotiations were completed, in spite of the fact that the Japs had done it in previous wars, was not, in my opinion, seriously considered. There was a great deal of confusion in the minds of the entire Staff. They knew that Mr. Nomura and Mr. Kurusu were still in Washington, and perhaps we were too trustful.

179. Q. Referring to your testimony about qualities of Japanese naval leaders, did you not receive anything direct from the Navy Department and in addition to what Commander McCrea told you?

A. Not to my recollection; no, sir.

180. Q. In the minds of the various members of the Pacific Fleet Staff, do you remember much expression of opinion as to the relative efficiency of the Japanese navy prior to the outbreak of the war?

A. It was very much discussed at Staff conferences and it was brought out by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as it had been brought to my attention years before through Commander Rochefort while on the Staff of Admiral Reeves in 1935, that we had very little knowledge as to the efficiency of the Japanese Navy, but it had spent a great deal of time at sea and we believed it was very efficient. We had a high regard for the Japanese Navy on the meager information obtainable, and we were informed by our intelligence officer that it was impossible to get any information on the Japanese Fleet since our ships were never near it. And when ships of our Navy visited a Japanese port, such as the ASTORIA did, about 1939, if they met units of the Japanese Fleet, those units were immediately surrounded by a smoke screen. All of our information on the Japanese Fleet was by radio intelligence only, meaning as to its location.

181. Q. Then you did not, in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, tend to underestimate the Japanese, as we now know was the case in other circles?

A. Not at all. We did not underestimate them.

182. Q. Admiral, I gather from your testimony that you, yourself, were very much preoccupied with the day to day administrative duties of the position of Chief of Staff. Did you think at the time that you were being left insufficient time for thought on matters of greater import, particularly into the future?

A. I felt then, and still feel, that entirely too much of my time was taken up with administrative matters. I was warned to that effect by my predecessor, Admiral Taffinder. While still afloat, while the Commander-in-Chief was in the PENNSYLVANIA, there was time for deep thinking because it was possible to close the door and shut people out and there were intervals at sea when we had plenty of time for thought, but when the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff moved ashore, with the desk always full of papers and many times a day spending hours in conference with the Commander-in-Chief and as many members of his Staff as he had present, I found it difficult to keep the day by day routine going. And I found it almost impossible to give deep thought to future events. I did know, however, that we had four very competent officers in War Plans who were spending all of [60] their time on that and I attempted, so far as possible, to keep the pressure off of those officers because the pressure is high in a Staff organization on shore where the Chief of Staff has one very small office and people are constantly coming in and going out.

183. Q. Who, if anyone, was to blame for that situation in which you found yourself?

A. Possibly I was to blame myself. I had given instructions to the Flag Secretary as to the type of papers which were to be shown to me and many, many papers were not brought to me at all. I attempted to reduce that paper work, but the Commander-in-Chief, whose office was next to mine, rang my bell perhaps too frequently and kept me too long in the office. He knew that because I told him so. But he was a very energetic man, he worked long hours, and when something was on his mind he would always send for me and usually for several other members of the Staff. I believe now that we spent entirely too much time in those discussions.

184. Q. Do you blame anyone outside of the Fleet?

A. No, sir, I do not. The entire Navy system of paper work, as you know, is somewhat to blame, but it was not any more so in the Pacific Fleet than it was in the rest of the Navy organization.

185. Q. Do you think that the fact that you, yourself, spent most all of your time and energy on the day-to-day administrative matters left the Commander-in-Chief correspondingly free to give thought to matters of greater importance, particularly dealing with the future?

A. I tried to make it that way, and I believe he was more free. I know he was much more free than I to think of future events. The Commander-in-Chief's day did not end at the office; he considered these things far into the night in his quarters.

186. Q. Admiral, was the matter of the protection of the ships berthed in Pearl Harbor from torpedoes dropped from aircraft considered by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff?

A. Yes, and by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. In the Summer of 1941, we had a communication in the form of an official letter from the Chief of Naval Operations asking whether we needed barrage balloons and torpedo nets for protecting berths. This letter was accompanied by a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance which stated definitely that torpedoes launched from aircraft could not be effective in a depth of water less than 75 feet. The question of the advisability of installing nets about the berths at Pearl Harbor was thoroughly discussed by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch,

Admiral Pye, and members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. The chart showed that we had practically no spots where the water was more than forty-six feet in depth. And I remember at that conference Admiral Bloch having stated that these nets would further reduce the maneuvering room in the waters of Pearl Harbor, and that if torpedoes were not effective in such shallow water, it would seem unnecessary to use torpedo nets. As a result of that conference, an official letter was signed by the Commander-in-Chief. I would not trust my memory to the extent of making a definite statement, but I believe that the letter to the Navy Department stating that we did not want torpedo nets was originated by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet put a concurring endorsement on it. At any rate, I know that we officially informed the Navy Department that we did not consider nets necessary. I believe the opinion expressed by the Bureau of [61] Ordnance was based, of course, on our own torpedo experience and we did not have the information on the Japanese torpedo.

187. Q. Admiral, I show you here several letters, a part of the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Can you identify them?

A. I remember the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations on 15 February, 1941, very well. It is this letter I had in mind in my recent testimony. I do not recall ever having seen the second letter.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 17".

188. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter signed by Admiral Kimmel, on file in the Secret-Confidential Files in the Navy Department, dated March 12, 1941. Can you identify it?

A. Yes; it passed through my hands before it was signed by the Commander-in-Chief and this letter was written as a result of the conference to which I referred. I was under the impression that it was an endorsement on the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District's letter but I see it originated in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief. I do know, however, that Admiral Bloch was very much in the discussion before that decision was reached.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 18".

189. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter, now on file in the Secret-Confidential Files, Navy Department, dated June 13, 1941, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the several Commandants of Naval Districts, and marked that a copy was furnished, among others, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you identify that letter as anything you received?

A. I do not recall ever having seen that letter.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 19."

190. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as outlined in his letter of March 12, 1941, Exhibit 18, was at any subsequent time reconsidered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I'm positive it was never reconsidered. I believe that in the original discussion one of the factors that were stressed was that these old battleships of ours, all overweight and drawing much more water than they were designed to draw, were very difficult to handle at slow speeds, and that the argument advanced by Admiral Bloch was that these torpedo net baffles would restrict too [62] much the maneuvering room in Pearl Harbor in the vicinity of the berths. But the main reason for stating that they were not necessary was that impression carried by this CNO letter that torpedoes could not be expected to be effective in depths of less than 75 feet and that a depth of 150 feet was preferable.

191. Q. In discussing the possibility of providing torpedo baffles, was consideration given to the fact that in the channel that approaches Merry Point, there would probably be clear water for torpedoes to run a sufficient distance to arm themselves, thus making an approach by torpedo planes from that direction a distinct hazard to battleships moored along the south shore of Ford Island?

A. Yes, consideration was given to that, but it was not a question of whether there was sufficient water for the torpedo to arm itself but it was the 75 foot depth required which made us believe that the torpedo could not be launched in that water. I would like to bring out in this record an opinion that is very strong with me, that we are entirely too secretive about such things as torpedoes and that we do not give enough information to the Fleet itself. I have in mind a movement ordered in the early part of 1941 when a number of cruisers and destroyers were ordered to Samoa by the Chief of Naval Operations and they were to be prepared for distant service. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, did not know what this service would be. It turned out to be a cruise to Australia and New Zealand, but the destroyers were ordered to equip themselves with the Mark VI exploder. This dispatch was read by the Commander-in-Chief in my cabin and I asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is. He did not. I told him that I suspected it was a magnetic head because such a magnetic head had been under experiment while I was manufacturing officer for torpedoes in Newport in 1928 and 9. I had never been able to get any information on whether this magnetic head had been a success. We sent for the Fleet Gunnery Officer, Captain Kitts, now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is and he replied that he did not, although he had been a gunnery man practically during his entire career. We returned to port and sent for Admiral Draemel, then commanding the Destroyers of Pacific Fleet. Neither Admiral Draemel nor his Staff had ever heard of the magnetic head. The exploders were in store at the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor and the submarine people were the only ones who had any knowledge in the Fleet. Now if all of our torpedo information is kept as secret as the Mark VI exploder was kept, then I can understand why we

didn't know at what height or depth of water a torpedo could be launched from an airplane. I bring that out in my testimony in the hope that in the future things will not be kept so secret.

192. Q. Admiral, was the use of barrage balloons, which happens to have been considered along with the baffles, abandoned for the same reason that you didn't feel that torpedoes could run?

A. Yes, that is my recollection.

193. Q. Admiral, in your testimony yesterday you made reference to the proposed relieving of certain Marine units in the outlying islands by the Army. I now show you a dispatch which has been identified as Exhibit 12 before this examination. Can you identify it in connection with your testimony?

A. Yes, that is the message I had in mind in my testimony yesterday. I don't know the exact date, but I stated at the time I believe it was received in the week preceding Pearl Harbor.

[63] 194. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 13 before this examination.

A. The Army received a message similar to that (indicating previous Exhibit 12). Yes, I remember also that the Army had no guns to put on the islands. It was agreed that we would leave our guns there.

195. Q. Can you identify Exhibit 15 before this examination?

A. Yes, I remember that dispatch which was prepared as a result of the conference we had with the Army. You will note that it questions the usefulness of Army airplanes since they cannot operate more than twenty miles off shore, and it answers the question of whether Army bombs can be used in Navy planes, or Navy bombs in Army planes. That had already been remedied. And it also makes that statement, as of 26 November, that Marine fighters were being sent to Wake. This was the special trip that the ENTERPRISE made.

196. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 14. Can you identify that, sir, as a dispatch under consideration by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, I have a recollection of that dispatch, and the SARATOGA was in San Diego at the time, I believe.

197. Q. Admiral, it is noted that the first two dispatches, by exhibit numbers 12 and 13, were transmitted by the Navy Department on the 26th of November, 1941, and that the Commander-in-Chief replied to these dispatches on November 28, 1941. It is also observed that the war warning dispatch was dated November 27, or the day intervening. Would you please explain to us the consideration given by the Commander-in-Chief to this problem in connection with the war warning problem, and give particular reference to the bearing of this problem, presented by this series of exhibits, on the actions and thoughts of the Commander-in-Chief as it related to his decisions with respect to the war warning?

A. I don't believe that the dispatch concerning the outlying islands was considered related to the war warning. We had the impression that Marines were needed elsewhere. Also it is my recollection that the discussion didn't end with the dispatch sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 28th of November, but it lasted several days as plans were being made. I have always felt that the question being given such full consideration by the combined Staffs of the Army and the Navy was diverting at a time when we should have been thinking about other things.

198. Q. Then you think that it amounted to a decided mental pre-occupation on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii?

A. I certainly do.

199. Q. Referring to your previous testimony concerning personnel of the Pacific Fleet, was the Fleet being hampered and administrative difficulties and work increased by repeated directives to transfer personnel elsewhere?

A. We had, for years, before us this problem of repeated transfers of personnel, and most officers complained of it, but the plan of new construction was known and, in my opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet didn't suffer from too frequent changes of personnel.

200. Q. Admiral, was the lack of mental apprehension of a carrier raid based upon preoccupation incident to what would be required of the Fleet in the way of an offensive movement at the beginning of a war?

A. No.

[64] 201. Q. Was that same lack of apprehension in any degree incident to the administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which were caused by long-time basing at Pearl Harbor?

A. In my opinion, no.

202. Q. Was it due to a lack of warning of possible surprise attack from the Navy Department; lack of warning from the Navy Department?

A. I think very possibly, yes. This and the fact that all of our warnings mentioned attacks in the Far East probably resulted in a state of mind where we did not believe that we would be subjected to an air attack at Pearl Harbor. We did expect a submarine attack. I believe you will find that the mental attitude of every one, practically every one out there, was such that they did not expect an air raid on Pearl Harbor, although plans were made to meet one, as I have said, by the stationing of ships and conditions of readiness.

203. Q. You've mentioned in previous testimony warnings of surprise hostile action somewhere having been received over a long period of time prior to 7 December. Do you think that so many of those warnings had been received that it was something of the nature of too much crying "wolf"?

A. I most certainly do, because those warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but the files show they had been received at least six months previously by Admiral Richardson, usually in weekly letters from the Chief of Naval Operations in the form of personal letters, all of which were kept on file.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The thought I have had in mind is that we spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. We had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway and the Commander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, in fact more time than I think we should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent

of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan will indicate. Looking back upon it, I think that we probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger thing. I may be wrong about that but that is my opinion.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

204. Q. That is the way it looks to you now?

A. Yes.

205. Q. It did not so occur to you at the time?

A. It did at the time. And to emphasize that, I will state that one afternoon I went into the Commander-in-Chief's office and found him comparing these lists of ammunition with a list brought over by Admiral Bloch at the [65] Commander-in-Chief's direction. The two papers disagreed. And I made the remark that the Commander-in-Chief should not be counting bullets, that he had a Staff to do that. Both Admirals laughed and agreed with me.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:05 a. m., took a recess until 2:30 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as the reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[66] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please give us your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on December 7, 1941, sir?

A. I was Assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Was the War Plans Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, divided by duties?

A. Yes.

4. Q. Will you please explain just where you fitted into that division of duties?

A. Under Rear Admiral—he was then Captain—McMorris, I was responsible for the preparation of the written War Plans for the Pacific Fleet, which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect.

5. Q. And how long prior to December 7 had you been performing these duties, sir?

A. I reported for that duty on February 1st, 1941.

6. Q. In connection with your performance of your duties, were you familiar with this document, which is Exhibit 16 before this examination?

A. Yes.

7. Q. In connection with the Exhibit before you, will you please state the commitments the U. S. Pacific Fleet provided during the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 plan?

A. In general, it was to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories, specifically Guam, which was in the category "F", which indicated that it was more or less indefensible; it was to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; raid the enemy sea communications—I believe that, more specifically, it was to interrupt the Japanese communications east of Longitude 180.

8. Q. With respect to the task forces composed of combatant ships, then this would provide basically for offensive operations, is that not correct, sir?

[67] A. That is correct, up to the extent of the capabilities of the Fleet at that time, which limited such operations to raids.

9. Q. Please explain briefly what parts and what percentages of the ships available, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase, or first phase providing for Japanese participation in the war?

A. If you are taking into account the use of a covering force, you might say that it was the whole of the Fleet.

10. Q. Was there any question in your mind as to the adequacy of the forces then available for making that first raid to the westward?

A. I would say that I was of the opinion that with the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet, if they had been available, we could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. At that time of December 7, there were only two carriers, there being one at the Navy Yard.

11. Q. Was it the custom, or, we will say, the routine of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to keep this part of his plan in any way fluid, to fit the availability of his forces, or did you simply hope to carry out the plan as laid down, with whatever might be available?

A. I can't state for certain, but I believe that it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to carry out the plan, even with the two carriers that were available. I would like to make it clear that that is not confirmed knowledge. But, the Fleet was organized at that time, before the outbreak of the war, into three main task forces of which one was a striking force, with the main carrier strength, one was a covering force, and one was the force that we visualized would support whatever amphibious operations were conducted. These three forces were trained together, went to sea together, and were specifically ordered to train for the tasks which their names imply.

12. Q. I understand from your answer, Admiral, that the operating schedules were more or less built around the War Plans, insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned.

A. That is correct, with the one exception that we had no actual amphibious forces available to us out there, or with any certainty of getting them in any very short period, with the possible exception of the Second Marine Division, which was the Fleet Marine Force.

13. Q. Admiral, were you present at the conferences of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with his Staff, which related to war plans, future war planning?

A. At a small percentage of them.

14. Q. Were you familiar with the general attitude of the War Plans Division, as it reflected the Commander-in-Chief's attitude with respect to his current thoughts with respect to the international situation and possible future Fleet operations in case of war?

A. I think that Captain McMorris kept his section adequately informed, but there were undoubtedly matters that he and Admiral Kimmel, discussed, of which we were not informed—the remainder of the section was not informed.

[68] 15. Q. Did the War Plans Section make its own estimates of the situation, of possible enemy action, or war operations?

A. I can remember only about two formal estimates of the situation that were prepared along those lines. I would say that the Commander-in-Chief arrived at his opinions of what enemy action might be more through the means of these conferences that I speak of.

16. Q. During your preparation of war plans did you not, though, perhaps informally rather than formally, in estimating the situation, keep fully apprised of such information as was available with respect to the international situation?

A. I would say that I was quite generally informed of the information that Admiral Kimmel received along those lines, but the usual channel of information was from the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel, in the first place, rather than through any channels that the staff might have to do with.

17. Q. Did you, in your war planning, cover all possible courses of action, as you saw them, of the enemy, Japan, in the event of war?

A. Yes.

18. Q. In arriving at such decisions as to possible courses of action, would you please outline what you believed to be the courses that were open to the enemy?

A. The courses open to the enemy, as we saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks, and the seizure of our possessions which lay easily within their reach. I will change that to the seizure of all possessions in the Western Pacific. So far as any employment of their heavy forces, you might say that it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the Western Pacific.

19. Q. You no doubt listed a possible attack by air on Pearl Harbor as a course of action, though; sir?

A. Yes.

20. Q. In the preparation of plans, Admiral, which situation was of major concern to the staff planners—the offensive movements of the Fleet or the security measures needed to protect the islands to the westward of Hawaii?

A. I think probably the best answer that I could make to that question is to state where I think the predominant attention was focused—preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. In regard to attack by air at Pearl Harbor, it was of course given full consideration, and a great deal of time and attention had been, or rather, was placed on defensive measures against such attack. Immediately after Admiral Kimmel took command, he activated our planning with the Army, on Oahu, with the idea of making up complete plans for repelling an air attack. As

regards the probability of such attack, particularly before war was well under way, there is no doubt that a very low degree of probability was assigned to it. If you like, I can go into more detail in connection with the actual preparations that were made under Admiral Kimmel's direction.

[69] 21. Q. No, we don't need that. That opinion just expressed—was that based upon careful consideration of the availability of the forces that the Japanese had, and in such an investigation did Admiral Kimmel call in the advice of any of the Navy aviation personnel?

A. I would say that the capabilities of the Japanese from this point of view, were constantly in mind, but undoubtedly were greatly underestimated. I don't think that any of us, including Admiral Kimmel's aviator advisors, had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made. With respect to Admiral Kimmel's aviation advisors, I would say that they were able, as near as I know, and had full opportunity to present their views.

22. Q. But you do not recall any disagreement in that general point of view on the part of any of our aviation personnel?

A. I do not.

23. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter—are you familiar with that—which is Exhibit 4 before this investigation?

A. Yes, I am.

24. Q. Was that prepared by the War Plans Section of the Staff, sir?

A. It was prepared chiefly by the Operations Section of the Staff, although I should say that the War Plans Section had sufficient opportunity to advise on it.

25. Q. That letter, of course, was intended to provide for the security of the Fleet while in bases, particularly Pearl Harbor. In your preparation of war plans did the War Plans Section consider that the protection afforded through the means set out, to be adequate for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor prior to the declaration of war?

A. I should say that we had the opinion that this was the best deployment and arrangement that we could make with the forces that we had. When it came to being ready to have war brought to Pearl Harbor, the next day, you might say, no one was under any illusions as to the inadequacy of many parts of the means at hand. In general, I might make the remark that it didn't seem possible to be ready in all respects for war until mobilization had been accomplished, and the deployment of extra forces that everyone knew would be necessary, had been accomplished.

26. Q. Did the offensive mission of the combatant forces during this first phase of war enter into your conclusions with respect to the adequacy of the security measures provided in this letter?

A. I don't believe I understand that question.

27. Q. In connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, was consideration given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local defense forces in event of war, or surprise attack?

A. Yes, decidedly. The Fleet would constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security, and there were little available in the way

of naval force in the Fourteenth Naval District which would contribute in any degree. The necessity for training for offensive missions, or any other part of war, naturally makes it impossible to keep the forces wholly employed in routine security measures.

[70] 28. Q. Then, the foremost thought in the minds of the Commander-in-Chief's war planning advisors was the offensive movements to be contemplated, rather than the security angle?

A. I don't think that is true, to the state of imbalance, although it was the intention to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size permitted.

29. Q. Admiral, what sources of enemy intelligence were available to the War Plans Section of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. We had, of course, the routine publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the studies on Japan, and the Japanese. As regards any operational or combat intelligence, if you might call it that in time of peace, I would say that there was no information that came to us except I think that we were cognizant of all warnings that came to the Commander-in-Chief during the pre-war period.

30. Q. Did the Intelligence Section of the Staff provide you with periodic reports as to the information available to them?

A. I may be drawing a blank, but I don't believe I ever saw one. If there was such a one, undoubtedly Admiral Kimmel used it, and probably told Admiral McMorris. I will answer that question by saying that I had no knowledge, I personally had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until we saw despatches. I think about two despatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China.

31. Q. Do you recall the source of that information, sir?

A. I believe that came in the form of a despatch from the Navy Department, but I am not quite sure.

32. Q. But you were not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence, or Fleet Intelligence?

A. For the War Plan Section, as a whole, I would say not. The answer is "No."

33. Q. In formulating such estimates of the situation as you did work through, were the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders taken into consideration?

A. No specific characteristics were ever, in any estimate that I had any part in the preparation of.

34. Q. Did War Plans section receive any intelligence derived from local sources?

A. I remember no instances of it, except a case or two of dealing with counter-espionage.

35. Q. Did you ever hear anything concerning a Navy effort to have certain Japanese agents arrested, or otherwise segregated, somewhat prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I have no recollection of it.

36. Q. You were cognizant of what is known, or what has come to be known as the "War Warning Despatch" from the Navy Department, 27 November?

A. I remember one such despatch which had.

[71] 37. Q. You know what I am talking about?

A. I had the impression this is it.

38. Q. When did you first see that dispatch?

A. Probably the day that it came in.

39. Q. Do you recall any particular significance which you then attached to those words "War Warning"?

A. To me, the words were impressive as a general method of alerting for war, but I might add that I had seen a good many messages during the previous months which were only slightly less impressive.

40. Q. At that time, did any thought come to you that perhaps the force in Pearl Harbor should be doing anything different from what they were actually doing, and continued to do until 7 December?

A. I think we all, on Admiral Kimmel's Staff, had knowledge of the warning, reviewed the measures that might be taken, and I am not quite sure as to just the exact measures that were taken, but I think it was as a result of this message that some further action was taken in regard to Wake, and our ships in Pearl Harbor were always in a designated condition of readiness and, although at this time it was the lowest condition of readiness, as I remember it, all higher conditions of readiness would have considerable effect on the condition of the personnel and their ability to continue the program of training for war.

41. Q. That dispatch contained a directive concerning deployment. Do you recall at the time what that directive meant to you?

A. It meant that the forces should be placed in the best position to initiate tasks in the War Plan, if war eventuated immediately. It did puzzle us that the term "defensive deployment" was used. My recollection is that further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his Staff could derive from this directive.

42. Q. Insofar as the security of the Fleet was concerned, the Japanese submarines were the major considerations, is that right?

A. That is undoubtedly true.

43. Q. Is it true that concern for the outlying islands west and south was a major worry, as regards a surprise attack?

A. Aside from submarine action, that is my recollection.

44. Q. So, security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was really quite a minor consideration in the thoughts of everyone, is that correct?

A. Except for the submarine menace already mentioned, which might include a submarine entering the harbor, I think that is true. I can say that I know of no one present at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack.

45. Q. As one of the associate members of the Staff, rather than simply as a War Plans officer, do you recall having had any particular doubts as to the ability of the Army Air Forces on Oahu to meet their commitments as regards the security of the Fleet?

[72] A. In line with what I said about all forces being insufficient for a state of actual war at Pearl Harbor, the Army aircraft were insufficient in number, and due to the limitation of Army fighters over water, were of limited usefulness for that purpose.

46. Q. What was the particular difficulty about Army fighters flying over water?

A. My understanding is that it was the lack of navigational equipment and some weakness in radio—probably no radio.

47. Q. Was comparative efficiency of personnel in your mental picture at the time?

A. No, sir.

48. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the joint planning with the Army located on Oahu?

A. I took part in some of the conferences which were held in connection with the joint defensive and security matters, which I have already mentioned were initiated by Admiral Kimmel.

49. Q. Did you take part in any conferences during which the warning message, Exhibit 8, was discussed?

A. I am quite sure that I was present at one conference that Admiral Kimmel held in connection with this message.

50. Q. At that conference, was the meaning of this message discussed with the Army officers?

A. I haven't an exact recollection of this particular instance, but it was my observation General Short usually attended Admiral Kimmel's conference when warning messages were discussed.

51. Q. Were the relations of the Army and Navy with respect to contemplated action, joint action, cordial, at these conferences?

A. According to my observation, yes.

52. Q. Then Admiral, you participated, as a Planning Officer, in the work which led up to 2CL-41 (revised), which is Exhibit 4 in these proceedings?

A. I did, insofar as there was joint planning with the Army.

53. Q. Admiral, we have no further questions to ask you. We will be very glad if you will give us any other testimony pertinent to the facts which you consider would be helpful.

A. I am very glad to testify that, in my opinion, no one could have been more whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war than was Admiral Kimmel. There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, it has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

[73] The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:30 p. m., adjourned until 2:45 p. m. tomorrow.

[74] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MARCH 10, 1944

FIFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2:45 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fourth day until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer introduced in evidence a copy of a letter, dated 10 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the progress of proceedings had under the precept, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 20".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station, sir.

A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness, of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, sir?

A. Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties?

A. Well, since February, 1941, when Admiral Kimmel took command, and previous to that, I had been his Chief of Staff when he was ComCruBatFor.

4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is

especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify: Forces available to CinCPac, with organization thereof. Briefly, the general nature of the tasks assigned in the War Plans to the Fleet during the early phases of war with Japan. Methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack and the relationship of this [75] training to the war tasks. Consideration given by CinCPac and his Staff to the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor and security measures adopted with respect thereto. Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan with the source thereof. Action taken by CinCPac during the weeks preceding the attack in the light of such information. Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war.

A. Well, I think so far as the first question there, "Forces available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the organization thereof," the most accurate statement of the forces available appears in the Commander-in-Chief's Confidential Letter 14CL-41, of 31 October 1941, which cancelled a previous organization of a similar nature, and is a revision of the task force organization.

5. Q. May I interrupt, sir? Do you have in your custody a copy of that order? I would like to introduce it in evidence and then give it back to you, so we would know where it is.

A. I have the Chief of Naval Operation's file copy of it, because when I saw this question, I went to the files of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and got his copy.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

NOTE: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned to Admiral DeLany. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 21".

A. (Continued.) I would like to have this included. I want to point out that this reference is not a new concept of the organization of the Pacific Fleet, because the Fleet had been organized into task force organizations, the same as this, ever since about April of 1941. The main difference between this and the previous letter was that it made the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief whose primary mission was to train, organize, and develop the island bases in order to insure their defense and provide efficient service to the Fleet units engaged in operations. It also provided on paper for the organization of submarines and patrol planes into task forces, although this was true before this letter of 31 October placed it into the Fleet Organization on paper.

6. Q. Would you like to go right ahead, sir?

A. So far as this next general statement is concerned, the War Plans Section of the Staff was continually keeping Pacific plans up to date, and was forced to revise them continually because I think you are familiar with the fact that the Pacific Fleet had been rapidly decimated in that carriers and battleships and destroyers and transports and other types had been withdrawn from the Fleet. The concept of what could be done in the Fleet with the forces available had to be changed continually, with the reduction of the forces that became available to the Commander-in-Chief. So far as the situation around

Pearl Harbor was concerned, we did keep a plan which was in possession of the Duty Officer continually, on what would be done with the forces in the Fleet that were available in the [76] in the event that we were informed that war had been declared against Japan. One of the things was the raiding forces to the northward, and another, as I recall it, was a strike in the Marshalls. It was not possible to make those things effective because of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Plans were actually available and the people on the Staff knew what they were, and everybody knew what they were supposed to do.

This question of "training the Fleet" I think I have already mentioned the fact that one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief did when he assumed command out there was to change the organization of the Fleet from a type organization into a task force organization, with the available forces in the Pacific Fleet roughly divided into three task forces, so that the types of the Fleet could become familiar with the requirements of inter-type tactics in a combined task force. That even went so far as to require the patrol planes and the submarines to be assigned to the surface ship task forces. In all training exercises in the operating areas, the surface, submarine, and air forces available in the Pacific area conducted coordinated and inter-type tactics. In addition to that, the Army Air Forces were always invited and usually did participate in the exercises at sea. Their long-range planes would come out and look for the task forces operating in that area. It is my personal belief that so far as that joint training was concerned, there was a very clear understanding between the people of my own echelon of what the joint problem in the area was.

I believe that there is, there must be, copies of the letters on file which were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which required Army planes to land on Navy fields and to be serviced by the Navy, and required Navy planes to land on Army fields and be serviced by them. I think there was a very definite understanding between the people that Army and Navy bombs had to have certain modifications in order to fit into each other's planes, and all that had been taken care of in the training exercises that had been conducted before this 7th day of December.

The Fleet letter which the Commander-in-Chief issued early in February and then kept modernized, so to speak, indicates the concept which everybody had out there, that it was a joint responsibility and a joint job to do what they could do to defend Pearl Harbor in the event of an attack. I think everybody realized that the defense of the Island did depend on the Navy there, because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base. The training of the Fleet had been given such consideration, and as I say, it was organized into what the Commander-in-Chief's concept of a war task force would be. I believe his concept has been shown to be correct because if we look at any of the task forces that appear in this letter we see that their organization is almost identical with the present carrier task forces.

Our training operations were not confined to particular areas. We operated to the northward of the Island and operated to the southward of the Island. The Commander-in-Chief personally discussed this training with the Commanding General out there, and I know,

so far as any relations with the Army on my [77] own level were concerned, that we discussed them frequently. We used Army facilities in our range-finding checks. We developed the use of smoke outside the harbor. And the Army was enthusiastic about the training cooperation they got from us because they had high-speed targets running around the Island that they had never had before and I am sure that we appreciated very much the service we got from them. I know the same thing existed about air, because I mentioned that before. The training was not only conducted with the idea of training the Fleet in seagoing tactics in the operating areas, but as that letter there shows, we also had given quite some consideration to the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I believe that you are familiar with the defense letter that shows how carefully the ships had been moored in Pearl Harbor and how the sectors were assigned and what the whole concept of the defense was.

We did conduct numerous air raid drills, and whenever a drill was conducted, we carefully analyzed what had been done at the drill, so far as communications and joint cooperation was concerned. In that connection, I feel that the Commandant of the District there, too, was entirely familiar with the whole concept of the thing because he was the Base Defense Officer, so far as local defense was concerned, and as I pointed out, in this letter here he was actually a task force commander within the Pacific Fleet organization for outlying bases. It wasn't only the defense of Pearl Harbor that was involved but also the defense of the outlying islands with which the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was concerned. I know that nothing was undertaken having to do with the training for the defense of the bases that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the area were not consulted about.

This next thing of "surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor"—I will say it this way—from my own personal point of view, and with a rather complete knowledge of the dispatches and correspondence within the command out there, I did not and never would have expected that the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor as they did. I believe that everyone there was of the opinion that our danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area and also that there might be sabotage on the Island. The general concept of our defense of the Island and the security of the Base there was based on that idea. I believe that you know that in several instances that it was suspected that submarines might be operating off the Island and I think probably it is a part of the previous record, the decision that the Commander-in-Chief took regarding his defense of the Island against submarines and the exchange of correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department on the question of dropping depth charges on what was supposed to be sound contacts off the Island.

I have covered the training and general set-up that we had for the security measures around the Island, and I believe that the security letter of the Commander-in-Chief's which was in effect at the time was quite indicative of our concept of what might happen there.

7. Q. May I interrupt, Admiral? This is Exhibit 4 before the examination. May I ask if that is the letter to which you have been referring?

A. Yes, 2CL-41 of October 14, which revised previous letters on that same subject.

8. Q. And that is the one to which you referred?

A. Yes.

[78] 9. Q. I just wanted to get the record straight.

A. (Continued.) This question of "Information available as regards the imminence of hostilities with Japan", I believe I saw every dispatch that came into the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters out there, and there had been a series of these dispatches, but I think in no single instance was there any expression in any dispatch which indicated that anybody here in Washington, or anybody any place else, had the belief that hostilities would open with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The information, I think, indicated that there were movement of transports and the Japanese Fleet. There was every indication that something was going to break because the dispatches indicated burning codes, and so forth, but from my own point of view there, as I said before, there was nothing in any dispatch which indicated that hostilities would be started the way they did.

"Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief during the weeks preceding the attack", I know that the Commander-in-Chief was fully aware of the fact that a tense condition was existing, he appreciated that, and, in my opinion, he took proper precautions to safeguard the Fleet whenever it was in the operating areas conducting vital training exercises. I believe that he was familiar with the terribly weak defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet, and I believe that his letter there, which we referred to before, his security measures, indicated that he had given a lot of thought to that. As I mentioned previously, he did have a plan which everyone on the staff knew about, as to what would be done with the Fleet there in event hostilities did break out, and I feel certain that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and every senior officer in the Fleet organization was given the information that the Commander-in-Chief had. I know that the Commandant and the Commanding General attended numerous conferences when this whole matter was discussed.

This "Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war"—I think that the Commander-in-Chief, as I said before, discussed all matters with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and that there was a mutual understanding of what cooperation was going to be required under a joint effort in the Hawaiian Area. I think that the Army was entirely familiar with the efforts that the Navy was making to secure more equipment for the Navy in the area, and I believe, too, that the Navy was familiar with the communications that went on between the Commanding General and the War Department in his effort to get more material into the Hawaiian Area. They both appreciated that whether it was anti-aircraft, radar, or aircraft, or anything else, the whole area was woefully weak and both of them knew of the efforts that the other one was making to get more of such materials. I feel that the training exercises that were conducted by the joint effort out there indicates that there was an understanding of the problem, and I can certainly say that the re-

relationships between the Army and the Navy out there was one of complete understanding and very close relationship.

10. Q. Admiral, do you feel that everything was done that was possible with the forces under your disposal, under the Commander-in-Chief's disposal, to secure early information of possible attack, considering the shortage of aircraft suitable for that purpose, and the shortage of ships, the necessity [79] for carrying on the training program, the general situation, in the light of the warning dispatches—did you consider that you had done everything reasonable?

A. Yes, within our concept, as I said before, and the belief that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine activities and sabotage within the Island.

11. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the dispatch that was received on the 27th of November, which contained a war warning, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination?

A. Yes.

12. Q. Do you know, sir, whether Admiral Kimmel discussed this dispatch with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

A. I believe that he did, and, as I say, that with the feeling that I don't believe any dispatch ever came to the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters of this importance that was not discussed before the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General.

13. Q. Were you present at this discussion?

A. Yes, I am quite sure I was.

14. Q. Did it discuss an interpretation of the meaning of the dispatch with respect to the war warning angle?

A. Yes, and, as I recall the thing, I believe that the Island was alerted on this dispatch and I believe that the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of that security letter in effect with the forces afloat.

15. Q. Admiral, this dispatch, Exhibit 8, requires certain action in the nature of deployment. Will you please state, as well as you can recollect, your reaction to the meaning of that provision?

A. I think the fact that the Fleet was organized into task forces which, from the concept of the organization and the missions assigned to them were to be offensive in nature, indicates the actual deployment of the Fleet. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief issued, or rather, directed compliance with certain paragraphs in 2CL was indicative of the fact that he appreciated a situation had arisen wherein he had to take action to prevent a surprise attack on the Fleet at sea from submarines, which, as I said before, was the general concept that everybody had of the way that action might be taken in the Hawaiian Area. No further action, so far as offensive deployment or offensive steps should be taken in this thing because the very nature of the organization of the Fleet was such that the Fleet had been organized and ready for a deployment for offensive action.

16. Q. Admiral, do you know of any action taken by the Commander-in-Chief other than that you have outlined in compliance with that directive?

A. So far as aircraft is concerned, Commander ComPatWingTwo was given orders to accelerate the refitting of all the planes in the

Hawaiian Area which had come to us without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment on board. I don't remember when the submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and Wake; I don't recall whether that was incident to this dispatch, but I am quite sure it was very close to this time.

[80] 17. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the Army's aircraft warning service—radar?

A. Yes, I think I was. Of course there wasn't very much to be familiar with.

18. Q. Do you recall its condition as to readiness for use on the 7th of December?

A. I believe that the radar itself was operative, and that certain periods were assigned for training operators. I know that not only the Commander-in-Chief's Staff but the people in the Naval District and the Army and ComPat Wing Two's Staff had paid a lot of attention to the aircraft warning set-up that was to go into the District, because the organization actually appeared on paper, a diagram of the stations, the personnel that were required to man it, had all been actually prepared and, well, all we needed was the equipment which just didn't get there.

19. Q. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff, then, didn't rely on it for any information at that time.

A. No, because the whole warning service that was in existence on that day was just the normal telephone communication that existed in the Island, and as I said, the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. The idea that the Island would have an air warning service was fully accepted, and we knew that we were supposed to get the equipment but it had not arrived and we were prepared to use it as soon as we could get the equipment because, as I said before, the actual diagram and layout of the whole warning service, organization, equipment, personnel, and the need for the respective stations had all been drawn up.

20. Q. Admiral, you stated several times that you and other members of the Staff didn't think a surprise attack by air possible at Pearl Harbor. Could you develop your reasons why that wasn't taken into consideration, or was deemed an improbability?

A. I believe that I am correct in stating that the last information which we had regarding the location of the Japanese Fleet placed them in home waters. I believe the idea that the Japanese Fleet would come to the Pearl Harbor area for an attack was not considered likely because of the inherent danger that was involved, and also the fact that from my own point of view, and that was discussed out there, there was one thing that would inflame Americans into war and that was an attack on their home territory. We frankly felt that with the indecision that we knew and interpreted from the dispatches as to what America would do if Japan went into the Malays or went into India, or went into any other place,—it was such that the Japanese must have been of the same opinion that we had there, that the one way to incite America into the war was to come over and attack the Hawaiian Islands and I believe, and still feel as I always felt, that the one single thing that put America in the war with a bang, was the attack on Pearl Harbor and I don't believe anything else would have done it. I think that there was a lot of discussion about that around the Pearl

Harbor area as to just what an attack of Pearl Harbor would mean to the United States, and to throwing the United States into a full war effort, and all-out against Japan.

[87] 21. Q. In that formulation of opinion did you give much weight to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders, Admiral Yamamoto, in particular, who had been described as bold, reckless, an air expert, a man who built up the Japanese Naval air forces; was that given much weight?

A. Yes, I think that that was discussed, among other things, in the general concept of what might happen in the event that Japan decided to take some offensive action.

22. Q. During that tense period preceding 7 December, were the outlying islands, notably Midway, Guam, and Wake in particular, a matter of great concern to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. Yes, sir, very definitely so, and it was at the insistence of the Commander-in-Chief that the defenses of Midway and Wake were pushed and strengthened, because I think he appreciated the value of those two places. As you know, prior to this time, the Army and Navy out there were quite involved in a discussion which originated here in the Navy Department as to putting planes on those islands. The Commander-in-Chief made the decision, himself, to put Navy planes on those islands and as you know, the task force was out there at the time of the attack putting planes on both the islands. In addition, everything was set up and patrol planes were actually operating from Midway.

23. Q. Did the Departments' proposal to make certain shifts in those garrisons from Marines to the Army cause additional worry and concern?

A. Yes, they did; because so much was involved in the thing. There are differences in the tables of organization of the Army and the Marines. The Marines are set up with a defense battalion organization and I believe I am correct in saying that there is nothing comparable to that in the Army setup. And, there was the fact that it would have meant shifting not only personnel but equipment, with vital shipping and other things involved. Then there was a continued discussion as to whether Army fighters would go into the islands, and we just couldn't see how that could be done, and that caused a lot of concern and was a subject of many conferences not only between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General, but also between the respective members of the Army and Navy Staffs out there.

24. Q. And it came at a bad time?

A. Yes, sir; I think it was just about the time this dispatch was received, if I remember correctly. (Exhibit 8.)

25. Q. In late 1941, what were your own thoughts concerning the correctness of the Department's action in continued basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Well, to be very frank, Admiral, it is my own opinion and I believe it is the opinion of other people that were there, that we could not see the consistency in basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan, and at the same time being continually advised of the fact that whenever we asked for material, we were more or less told that the war was in the Atlantic, and that we were continually being picked upon to get units of the Pacific Fleet

moved into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Kimmel had the same point of view because I believe that his trip to Washington, here, in the early summer of 1941, one of the subjects of discussion, involved that very thing.

26. Q. As seen by you as the Operations Officer, were the attendant difficulties of maintenance of supplies and materials, supplies for the Fleet, health and morale of personnel, such as to make that long-continued basing out there questionable?

[82] A. So far as the morale of the officers and enlisted men of the Fleet was concerned, the biggest single factor that came into that was the one of indecisiveness. I believe that the sailorman's nature is such that he is satisfied to serve where he is ordered, if he knows that is what he is going to do. The rather indecisive attitude about whether you were going to stay at Pearl Harbor or whether you were going back to the Coast, and what you were going to do, was a matter of concern to everybody out there because it did make it very difficult to handle the whole morale situation. As you know, we did attempt to send units back to the Coast to let them get a bit of a blow back there, but I do believe that the question of nobody knowing just what was going to happen, whether the Fleet was going to stay out there, was a difficult thing to overcome. So far as the material conditions of the Fleet were concerned, it is my opinion that the organization of the Fleet into task forces which required the operating part of the Fleet to be at sea for as long as ten days, in which they were continually busy, and then permitting them to come into port for a period of ten days, contributed to the betterment of the material conditions of the Fleet because you had a long enough time in port to overhaul, and people knew that they were going to be in for that length of time and the entire up-keep project for that period could be laid out. I do believe that the material condition of the Fleet was improved by the operations of the Fleet by the task forces. I don't believe that the continued steaming for ten days, under normal conditions, so far as maintenance, engineering plant, and so on, were concerned, affected the material condition of the Fleet. So far as supplies, and so forth, were concerned, well we just didn't get any of the new material that we read about in letters and books that came to us, so that we weren't too much affected by that except to hope and pray that our turn would come to get something.

27. Q. The Fleet's presence out there increased the war-mindedness of the personnel, did it not?

A. It resulted in the development of a lot of war time practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war was declared, in that every type of ship out there was required to fuel at sea, every type of ship was required to go into a reasonable organization that was practical, battle organization, instead of just a paper one, because when the Fleet went to sea they actually stood condition watches, and a lot of paper organization that existed in all types had to be revised to meet war time conditions. I think that the fact that the Fleet was required to steam darkened, and the fact that they exercised inter-type tactics developed an understanding between the task force commanders and the lower echelons of the different types, that proved invaluable in war. As to whether or not people became war conscious out there, I believe that everyone realized that the situation was getting graver and that there

would be a war with Japan, but I believe that the war-mindedness turned more toward war time training than it did toward the actual thought that today or tomorrow we were going to be in a war.

28. Q. One of the personal duties of the Operations Officer was the getting out of a periodical known as "Schedule of Employment", is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

29. Q. For what period did you get them out—how long?

A. They were originally prepared on a quarterly basis which attempted to match up task force operating periods with navy yard overhauls, and also the [83] requirement that certain types be degaussed, and have the new anti-aircraft splinter protection put on. I believe I am safe in saying that practically none of those quarterly employment schedules were ever carried out in their entirety because different units of the Fleet would be detached and either sent to the Atlantic, or in the later summer, instituted the convoy systems to the Philippines, so that all those employment schedules were deleted or continually under revision.

30. Q. But they were gotten out for a three months period, at the time?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. About how long before a period began was the coming schedule issued?

A. As I recall it, about six weeks before the end of the quarter the task force commanders were required to submit their next quarter's schedule, and that they had about ten days to put that in, and then at the end of that time, the whole quarterly schedule of requirement for services, such as aircraft, and target vessels, and things like that, were discussed and the schedule appeared probably three weeks before the beginning of the next quarter. That is my recollection of it.

32. Q. The schedules were printed?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Under what classification?

A. I believe that up until about June or July they appeared in a Restricted Classification, and after that, they were Confidential. That is my off-hand remembrance of the thing.

34. Q. About how many copies of that were printed each time?

A. I don't know.

35. Q. Was it available for the scrutiny of a good many people?

A. I would say that every commanding officer and all the heads of departments on board ships had access to the thing, in view of the fact that all of the heads of departments of the ships were interested in the ship from a training and material point of view, on the schedule.

36. Q. Well, I gather from that testimony that for any potential enemy who is bent on a surprise attack, possession of one of those schedules would have been invaluable, would it not?

A. Under normal conditions, yes, sir; but as it developed, I think the schedule that appeared in print for the last—for the second quarter of the year, was not actually effective on the 7th of December because it did not, as I recall, contain the carrier trips to either Midway or Wake. That is something that has to be verified, but that is my own recollection.

37. Q. But I understand that there were a considerable number of copies of that printed document, and in all, they were in the hands of a good many individuals?

A. That is correct.

The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[84] 38. Q. Admiral, coming back to this Exhibit 4, which is Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41, we have been given to understand that the preparation of this document was in the hands of your operational section of the Staff, is that correct, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

39. Q. With respect to the air patrols that were to be maintained, this provides for daily search of the operating areas, air patrols covering entries and sorties. Would you please state why, if you recollect, air patrols were limited solely to these patrols?

A. Well, the main reason was we felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating area was something that we had to guard against. The patrols on sortie and entrance were definitely with the idea of attempting to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor. The patrols that were maintained were a part of the routine work of the patrol planes there, entirely separate from long-distance training flights which the Commanders of the Patrol Wings there carried out, and were also dependent on the number of long-range patrol planes which were available in the area actually flyable and the limited number of pilots that were available.

40. Q. Were you familiar with the large type Army airplanes that were available to the Hawaiian air force in the months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. Generally, yes.

41. Q. Was consideration given to the augmenting of the overseas patrol with this type of plane?

A. Not as a part of the regular long-distance search, but I believe I'm correct when I say that long-range Army planes actually trained with and flew with Navy patrol planes for Army training in navigation and overseas flights.

42. Q. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Staff, were you and the other members of the Staff thoroughly satisfied with the intelligence reports you were getting: in other words, did you feel that you could rely on the information that you had? I'm referring back to the earlier questions as to why the air attack was so much discounted as a possibility.

A. In answering that, I'll say that I believe that the information that was furnished us from our own Staff Intelligence Officers and from the Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth Naval District, between whom there was very close cooperation, was the best information that those two sources could assemble and prepare for presentation to the Commander-in-Chief from what they were able to get in the area.

43. Q. Were you fully aware that their sources were inadequate, in a sense?

A. Yes. I feel that there was a general feeling among all of us out there that we were more or less operating in the dark, not only from the information that we were able to collect by our own means in the Pearl Harbor area but also the information that was furnished us from other sources.

44. Q. Would that answer be descriptive of your attitude both as to location of Japanese units and as to the international situation and probabilities of an immediate war?

A. Definitely yes to both.

[85] The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:10 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[86] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 11, 1944

SIXTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fifth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, was recalled as a witness by the examining officer, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, in your earlier testimony before this examination you referred to a joint agreement signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and yourself as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District covering the use of aircraft. I show you a document which is contained in the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Could you identify this document, sir?

A. This document that I have before me was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter dated 1 May 1941 and was signed by me and is the document which I referred to previously. The letter has two enclosures: "B", which is the joint agreement referred to, and "C", a joint estimate of Base Defense Air and Army Air Force Commanders; dated 31 March 1942.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned, at the conclusion of the examination, to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 22".

2. Q. Admiral, I noted that this document, Exhibit 22, is dated before the issuing of the latest JCD, which is before this examination as Exhibit 5. Did this Exhibit 22 go out of effect with the issuing of the new JCD, Exhibit 5?

A. No. JCD-42, which was signed subsequently to this air agreement, contains a provision in Paragraph 21 that Annexes I to VII continue effective with JCD-42.

3. Q. Then this agreement with respect to aircraft, which is Exhibit 22, was in effect up until the time of the attack, Admiral?

A. Yes, sir.

[87] 4. Q. Admiral, also in your earlier testimony, you have referred to a letter written by you as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District concerning the security of Pearl Harbor, and to the endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief thereon. I show you a file which has been taken from the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department and ask you whether you can identify the basic letter and the first endorsement thereon?

A. I identify this letter as being the letter I referred to.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, at the conclusion of the examination it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 23".

5. Q. Admiral, having read this letter again, is there anything that you would like to state with respect to its contents?

A. I might invite attention to the fact that this letter, dated 30 December 1940, calls attention to the lack of reconnaissance planes and to the necessity for having to use reconnaissance planes from the Fleet as the District forces had no such planes. I also wish to invite attention to an error made concerning the vessels of Destroyer Division 80. It was stated in the letter that the vessels of that Division had listening gear. As a matter of fact, only one vessel of this Division had listening gear at the time of Pearl Harbor attack. By listening gear, I am referring to supersonics. Throughout the letter are constant references to the lack of suitable craft for the proper protection of an important base. Mention is made also in the letter of the lack of defense of Lualualei and Kaneohe. Subsequent to the time of writing this letter, I took up with the Commanding General the question of the defense of Kaneohe. When the Kaneohe Air Station was established, there was in existence a standing agreement between the Army and Navy that the Army would not have to defend Kaneohe, as they had said that they could not do it. This agreement had been made by some predecessor of mine. The Commanding General agreed with me that the Army should defend Kaneohe and a rough scheme of defense was drawn up and forwarded to Washington and the Joint Planners of the Army and Navy agreed to the Army taking over the defense of Kaneohe. The Army had also insisted that Lualualei could not be defended, although I understand, at the present time, they now admit that it can be defended. In the endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, I wish to invite attention to his opinion, on the 7th of January, 1941, of the improbability of an air attack under present conditions and also to his opinion on that date that there was no practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the Harbor without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor and interference with the take-off of patrol planes. I also further wish to invite attention to the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, expressed in paragraph 5 of his endorsement, that adequate and sufficient forces

should be supplied with a higher priority than was to be given to continental districts.

6. Q. Admiral, in your thinking, with respect to any possible attack on Pearl Harbor, prior to the time of the attack, did you ever consider the influence on public opinion in the United States that such an attack as occurred would produce?

[88] A. I can not say that I'd ever seriously considered, nor did I hear anybody else talk about, what the effect on public opinion would be by an attack made on Pearl Harbor.

7. Q. Admiral, did you, in your shore establishments at Pearl Harbor, have any anti-aircraft weapons?

A. There were Marine defense battalions coming and going at Pearl Harbor. They were part of the Fleet Marine Force and were sent out primarily for the purpose of garrisoning the island bases. I think at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, there was one such Marine battalion at Pearl Harbor and they had some anti-aircraft weapons. Our plan was made to turn those over to the Army for anti-aircraft defense or Army control, and after the attack they were turned over. Normally, a defense battalion had twelve three-inch anti-aircraft guns and a number of .50 calibre guns. Whether this battalion had all of those weapons, or not, I don't remember.

8. Q. How about your own Marine detachments, Sir, were they provided with anti-aircraft weapons?

A. They had nothing that I know of except their small arms and machine guns, and they were not intended for anti-aircraft. Of course, they could be used and probably were on the 7th of December.

9. Q. Admiral, were there any attempts at sabotage within the naval establishments at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. Prior to the 7th of December, we had many complaints that our internal security orders were unnecessarily rigid, but I believe they were all reasonable and sound, and the mere fact that, so far as I know, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor, with the exception of one or two isolated cases, both of which were disgruntled sailors, leads me to believe that they had a highly deterrent effect. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December, insofar as I know.

10. Q. Had you instituted any conditions of readiness with respect to such guards and other personnel as were under your command with respect to protection from sabotage?

A. I recall none, except our regular security orders.

11. Q. Reverting to this document, labeled Exhibit 22, there is attached thereto a joint estimate concerning air action which is dated 31 March and is signed by Major General Martin and Rear Admiral Bellinger. Under the heading of "Possible Enemy Action" appears the following: "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles." Was that estimate carried through and was any particular attention paid to it by the higher command echelon, including you?

A. The joint agreement made between the Commanding General and the Commandant became an annex under JCD-42 and was ef-

fective. Every Force Commander necessarily had to get out his orders. Although Admiral Bellinger was a Naval Base Defense Air Officer, under CL2, he had also been one of the important officers in working with the Army to reach the joint agreement, and he and General Martin made plans to implement the joint agreement, and this joint order is the plan. The Commandant of the [89] District received the order and it must be assumed that he was familiar with it. In the joint operation plan, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin made certain decisions, one of which was that their force would locate the attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu, and, on page 4, under section 4, they made some discussion of their search plans. In this discussion, it was stated: "A search plan will be desirable. It can only be effectively maintained with the present personnel and materiel for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits." On page 8, under section 5, there was included a discussion of conditions of readiness for the air forces. In this discussion, General Martin and Admiral Bellinger referred to establishing a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is, at all times, prescribed by the senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. Whether or not I concurred with the surveys of opposing strength and the possible enemy action and the action open to us in the joint plan, I can not remember definitely as to details. But I feel quite certain that, generally speaking, I took no exception to their plan.

12. Q. You have testified that prior to 7 December you thought the probability of a Japanese carrier air raid was very remote. In formulating that opinion at the time, did you have in mind the opinion expressed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

A. I don't know. I was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii, preceding a declaration of war, was remote. Just what all of the logical processes were that caused me to arrive at that conclusion, I'm unable to say, but I believe that one important consideration was my belief that a large body of surface vessels, which would be necessary to launch such attacks, could not cross a large expanse of water, which they would have to cross, without our having some prior knowledge.

13. Q. Do you remember whether or not the existence of that formally expressed opinion by those two officers who, presumably, were the most experienced in their own line, was generally known in the upper echelons of command around Oahu?

A. The Commander-in-Chief had a copy of this Joint Air Operating Plan and he had on his Staff competent officers and I think it is fair to assume that he must have known about the plan. I also believe that General Short must have known about the plan.

14. Q. I'm questioning you particularly as regards this formal joint estimate by those two officers. Did you know of any other formally expressed opinions that were given by officers experienced in aviation on that particular point?

A. I can not definitely say any certain officer had ever expressed an opinion that such an attack was improbable. I had considerable contact with Admiral Halsey, who was Commander, Air Battle Force, as

did the Commander-in-Chief. I had considerable contact with Captain Martin, who was in Command of the Air Station at Kaneohe, and Captain Shoemaker, who was in Command of the Air Station at Ford Island. I do not recall specifically any comment one way or the other by these officers. Yet, I very definitely had the opinion that an attack by air, prior to declaration of war, was remote. Unquestionably, this opinion can not have been [90] reached by me independent of all other opinions and conversations that I had with other officers. At this late date, and even at the time of the Roberts Commission's meeting, I was unable to analyze my opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused me to reach that opinion.

15. Q. Then you are unable to give me any clue to any other formally expressed opinion on the point by air officers; is that right?

A. I am not able to give you any clue to any other expressed opinion by air officers.

16. Q. Admiral, is it proper to say that the situation, during 1941, was with the Pacific Fleet held in a "position of readiness" at Pearl Harbor?

A. The Fleet arrived in Pearl Harbor in April, 1940, and never departed in its entirety up until December 7. What the reasons were for keeping it in Pearl Harbor, I can only guess. I think that all Fleet officers, all people connected with the Fleet, endeavored to keep it in a state of "readiness".

17. Q. Then you think the expression "position of readiness", applied to the location of the Fleet, is not really correct?

A. As I stated before, I can only guess as to the reasons why the Fleet was kept in Hawaii.

18. Q. From your observation up until, say, November, '41, what did you feel was the overall effect upon actual war readiness of the Fleet, having maintained its position in Hawaiian waters over such a long period?

A. I know that the Commander-in-Chief, in 1940, was somewhat concerned over the stay of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters and that he took steps to arrange having small detachments of the Fleet go back to the West Coast for short periods. I think that after 1940-1941, prior to December 7, that the Fleet was forced to carry out its exercises and training under conditions which imposed considerable strain. I mean by this that the Fleet had to conduct exercises and yet, at the same time, had to take certain measures to be ready to defend itself in case of a sudden attack, and such conditions, over an extended period of time, must necessarily have imposed considerable anxiety upon responsible officers.

19. Q. What was your observation of the effect of those conditions that you just mentioned?

A. I can not give any accurate impressions. In my own position, I had so many things of my own that were closer to me and with which I was more intimately concerned, that I didn't have very much time or opportunity to note what was taking place in the Fleet.

20. Q. You recall that certain of the Pacific Fleet's forces were detached somewhere during 1941, some of those detachments going to the Atlantic permanently, insofar as it was known, another de-

tachment going to the South Pacific. Did you notice any particular effect on mental attitudes due to those occurrences?

A. In a general way, I knew that detachments of the Fleet were going to other places. I knew specifically that certain cruisers went to Australia and New Zealand. I knew that, on one occasion, the entire [91] Fleet was ordered to go to mid-Pacific, east of Hawaii, and remain in a condition of radio silence and without knowledge on the part of anyone as to where they were for a long period of time. But what the reasons were for these movements or what the effects were on our own personnel, I don't know.

21. Q. I believe that in your area a great deal of construction work, preparation of new installations, was in progress in 1941; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

22. At the time, did you think that those installations were generally too elaborate and hence being completed too slowly to accord with the general situation that faced our Nation?

A. At Pearl Harbor, there were two projects of paramount importance, one of which was a new, big dry-dock, another of which was two smaller, twin dry-docks, and a third was underground fuel oil storage. These projects were pressed to my utmost, and, being of somewhat impatient temperament, I naturally thought they were going too slow, although actually the record will show that they progressed very rapidly. There were innumerable other projects, such as the Air Station at Kaneohe, rehabilitation of Ford Island, the Air Station at Barbers Point, the Air Station on Maui, which were all underway, to say nothing of new cold storage plants, new wharves, new docks, barracks, new improvised Marine camp to take care of five thousand Marines; all on Oahu. Then over and above these were the island bases: Palmyra, Johnson, Midway, and Wake. These island bases had been originally conceived as being very small. They were only to consist of a deep water area for seaplanes taking off, and certain minor things, such as gasoline stowage, and small living facilities. As time went on, they expanded in their scope. Midway was required to have a landing strip. Midway became quite a considerable air station. Midway was planned for quite a considerable submarine base. All of these things placed quite a load on the District, and our natural tendency was to endeavor to simplify to the barest essentials. General requests for revisions of plans and for expansions came from the Fleet itself, and in all of those cases, after discussing the matters involved with the Commander-in-Chief or his representative, the Fleet wishes were followed, if the Commander-in-Chief felt they were necessary. Wake Island was not started until 1941. Prior to starting it, I wrote to the Navy Department, via the Commander-in-Chief, and asked if the place should be started at this late date. The Navy Department replied, in what I considered to be a rather unusual communication, to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were the officers on the spot and they would have to make the decision. This having been thrown in our laps, the Commander-in-Chief and I considered the question. I was of the opinion that Wake would be untenable and that it was a mistake to start it. The Commander-in-Chief heard me and discussed it with officers of his Staff, in my presence, and the decision was to start it. This station was a station of considerable extent and the final plans contemplated

seaplane base, air strip, and some submarine facilities. Maui Air Station was started as an improvement to the municipal airport to accommodate wheel planes, with small barracks and facilities to accommodate one carrier group. Before the original plans had been completed, approved extensions were underway to make it a much larger place than ever was contemplated. [92] In the light of hindsight, I don't say that these extensions were incorrect. More probably they were correct but, at that time, my idea was to complete the places as quickly as possible and get the civilian component out and get the garrisons in.

23. Q. Were the designs and specifications on broad lines fixed by the Navy Department or by the authorities in Hawaii?

A. Originally, the designs were fixed by the Navy Department, but as the work became greater and greater, details of design were largely left to the District.

24. Q. But on broad lines, everything about those installations was then decided by the Navy Department, rather than by local authorities?

A. In fact, all construction work had to receive the decision of the Navy Department, because expenditures of funds were involved and the funds had to be forthcoming from the Navy Department.

25. Q. Reverting to my original question on this subject, did you consider that any or all of these installations were conceived on too elaborate lines and, consequently, slow of construction?

A. I felt that my position as the Commandant of the District was one of service and when ideas occurred to me that something was too elaborate or too expensive, or possibly was not necessary, I would present my argument, but if the Commander-in-Chief, who would have to use these facilities, stated that he wanted them, my job was to do them. As far as the extravagance and expansiveness of the project was concerned, I believe that all of the specific plans of structure were fairly simple and as inexpensive as they could be made, under the circumstances.

26. Q. In, say, November, 1941, were you or others in the high command echelon that you know of particularly worried about the situation in the outlying islands?

A. I will say that I think the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the District were both concerned about the situation in the outlying bases.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 10:41 a. m., took a recess until 11:13 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, the reporter, and the witness.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

[93] Examination by the examining officer: (Continued)

27. Q. Was it what you would call a primary worry?

A. All of the outlying bases with the exception of Palmyra were dependent upon distilling plants for their water. Therefore, their capacity to support personnel was limited by their distilling capacity.

This meant that as long as civilian workmen were on the islands, working on public works, not as many military personnel as was desirable could be placed in the garrisons. We were also much concerned about our ability to supply the islands with the necessary items of stores and food, as at no time did we ever have what we considered to be adequate transportation. The Commander-in-Chief actually had to supply cruisers to transport personnel and equipment. The concern of the Naval authorities was heightened in the summer of 1941 by the request of the Army to ferry bombers to the Far East via Midway and Wake. This meant additional supplies of gasoline, and so forth. Concern was also involved by the decision of the Army to build a separate line of bases, whereby planes could be ferried from Hawaii southward to the Australian area, and the amount of naval effort which would unquestionably be required to assist them. In the late autumn of 1941 the question was raised by the Army and Navy authorities in Washington about garrisoning the outlying bases with Army personnel and using Army planes on them for defense purposes. All of these questions caused much concern and many cases compromises had to be reached which were forced by circumstances then existing.

28. Q. In, say, November, 1941, was the security of the outlying islands as against a surprise attack, a primary worry to you and others in the high echelon of command?

A. It was a concern of some weight. In some way, I had gotten a date fixed in my mind that any move on the part of Japan would be April or May. How I got this information or from what source I don't know, but in connection with Wake Island, I had spent some personal effort and a great deal of District effort in devising a means to use the lagoon there by ships of moderate draft, so that it could be completed prior to April or May 1942, rather than the original plan, which would have required several months longer. The Commander-in-Chief was anxious to put a large garrison in Wake Island when the water capacity of the island would only support about 1500 men. In order to expedite construction work there, a minimum force of about 1050 was required, so this limited the garrison on Wake to, roughly speaking, between four and five hundred. At Midway, there was a large garrison, in the neighborhood of 1,000 men, but a larger garrison could be put there as soon as the civilians were evacuated. They could not be evacuated at that time, although the work was drawing to a close rapidly. In Johnston Island, there was particularly an acute situation. The islands are very small and the garrison was necessarily small in order that we could retain civilian workers. In Palmyra, we were working on a long airstrip and devoting every effort to its completion at the earliest possible date as the airstrip there, in conjunction with the airstrip which we were constructing in Samoa, formed a second chain for ferrying planes to the southwest. All of these matters caused concern. The security of bases depended upon just when a war should break out and the condition of readiness at the time.

[94] 29. Q. Were you no more apprehensive of a surprise attack on those outlying islands than you were of such an attack on Oahu?

A. I was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway, than I was of Oahu.

30. Q. In late November, '41, did the concern and worry concerning those situations seem to influence anyone as regards the security on Oahu?

A. I'm not conscious of anyone lessening his alertness or concern over any part of his duties. If such was the case, it must have been unconscious because I'm fully convinced that everyone out there was trying his utmost to be on his toes all the time.

31. Q. A somewhat hypothetical question: Could the carrier raid of 7 December have damaged us more effectively and more lastingly if the objective of the attack had been directed against installations other than those which were attacked?

A. In my opinion, yes, we would have been damaged infinitely more than we were. At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, the objectives of the Japanese were, first, the air fields, and then capital ships of the Fleet. In my opinion, with a different method of attack, the Japanese might have caused our entire Fleet to sortie, to seek them out. We know accurately now what force was brought on the attack against Pearl Harbor. Had our ships been effective in making a concentration outside of Pearl Harbor, a serious question is in my mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would not have been destroyed, in view of the powerful force that the Japanese had in the area. But even assuming that the form of attack that was made had been pursued vigorously against our oil supply, which was all above ground, against our drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities, storehouses, I feel that insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned, that we would have been very much worse hurt than we were by the attack on capital ships, even though we did have a tragic loss of life.

32. Q. Will you enlarge a little upon that statement as regards the oil tanks?

A. The oil storage, fuel and diesel at Oahu, amounted to approximately 4,000,000 barrels. All of this oil was stored in tanks above the ground, metal tanks, with the exception of one concrete tank embedded in the ground but visible from the air. These tanks were located in two groups of tanks known as the "Upper Farm" and "Lower Farm." They were immediately adjacent to the submarine base, industrial navy yard, hospital, and Hickam Field. Struck by bombs and set on fire, not only the reserve oil would have been destroyed but the burning oil would have flowed over the dykes and caused wide conflagration in the yard and general area. Ships desiring oil would have been unable to obtain it. Submarines desiring diesel oil would have been unable to obtain it. We had one drydock with a battleship in it, and two destroyers, on December 7. If the caisson had been breached, the dock would have been partially destroyed and the ships in it would have been wrecked; a serious casualty would have been the loss of our machine shops and the tools, our storehouses with the spare parts, spare torpedoes, storehouses with our food supply for 50,000 men for a hundred days and all the various elements that went [95] to make up the requirements of the base. An attack on the ammunition depot at Lualualei certainly would have destroyed our radio transmitting stations which were located there and might have destroyed some of the ammunition storage.

33. Q. It has been brought out that prior to 27 November, and extending back a considerable period, the Fleet had received from Wash-

ington numerous warnings of impending difficulties with the Japanese. Were you, by late November, '41, so affected by that multiplicity of warnings as to effect your reaction to the war warning which was given in definite form on 27 November?

A. Not consciously so, but there had been a number of warnings, and I'm of the very definite recollection that the Commander-in-Chief preceding Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kimmel, himself, had received written warnings, possibly in personal correspondence from the Chief of Naval Operations. I'm very definitely of the impression that this same question had been discussed by Admiral Richardson and myself in 1940, and that either he or I or both of us had been of the impression that too many warnings were being given and that it might ultimately have a bad effect, but I think I can say that so far as I was conscious of it, in the end of November or early part of December, I knew of no lessening of sensitivity on my part, although, perhaps, such did exist. I was not conscious of it.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have mentioned in my previous testimony that I considered that the Navy Department had far more information about the general situation, the possibility or probability of hostilities, and the political situation than anybody in Hawaii could possibly have, and that they were in a far better position to evaluate this information than we in the field were. Quite a number of warnings were sent out by the Department from October to December. Yet, with the sendings of all these warnings, the Navy Department never once saw fit to exercise the most certain way of placing everyone on the alert. In JCD-42, and I think in other war plans, the Navy Department had a means of putting into effect all of the war plans prior to "M" day, which would have the effect immediately of indicating to everyone concerned, not only in Oahu but in every other place, that, in their opinion, something was about to happen quickly. Such an action on the part of the Navy Department did not necessarily—did not mean that hostile action was to be undertaken by our forces, and I believe that that is so stated explicitly in some of the war plans. Yet, I believe that if this procedure had been adopted, it would have been far more effective than the sending out of a lot of information and warnings in various telegrams, and particularly inasmuch as the most important warning dealt largely with conditions in the Far East. I have ascertained, subsequent to December 7, that on or about the 27th of November, the State Department sent a note to the Japanese Government which, I believe, was [96] couched in the most positive and uncompromising terms. I knew nothing of this dispatch, nor do I believe anyone in Hawaii knew anything about it until after the 7th of December. In any evaluation, such a dispatch would have important weight.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer, then, at 11:49 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Monday, March 13, 1944.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1944

SEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Arthur C. Davis, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties, sir?

A. For approximately a year and a half.

[97] 4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify:

The advice that you gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with respect to possibility of a surprise air attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, together with the basis and reasons therefor.

If you did not advise the Commander-in-Chief in this respect, please state the views held by you prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor with respect to the possibility of such an attack.

The information you had prior to 7 December 1941 regarding the Army Interceptor Command, including:

- (a) Number and types of its planes,
- (b) Sufficiency of air fields for operation and dispersal of airplanes,
- (c) Caliber and experience of its pilots,
- (d) The nature of training in progress,
- (e) Its air warning net,
- (f) Provisions made for command in the air, including direction of planes, so as to bring them into combat with the enemy in the event of surprise attack, and
- (g) Any matter relating to the ability of the Army Interceptor Command to carry out its commitments under the War Plans.

Please include any advice you gave Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in this respect.

Information regarding efficiency of Japanese Naval aviation available to you and your conclusions drawn therefrom.

A. My duty, as Fleet Aviation Officer, was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As was the case with the Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many months had been the improvement in strength and proficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible, for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was necessary. However, this fact made it all the more important to concentrate on all phases of materiel and training. I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members of the Staff and also by the Commander-in-Chief with the Staff at times when I was present. From these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would interfere with [98] this work, so that I am convinced it was his sincere intention to accomplish all that could be done before hostilities began and that he believed there was still time to keep the work going.

As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw or heard of warnings that may have been received by the Commander-in-Chief. I know that there had been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over a number of months, and I had the impression that it was within the Commander-in-Chief's discretion to determine how far to go in action with regard to such warnings. I believe his thought, throughout, was to take precautionary steps within reason but to regard the warnings as all the more reason for concentration on improving the Fleet's readiness.

During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7 December, I am certain that the Commander-in-Chief gave the situation the carefulest possible consideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself, concerned because of information that was available in the press and that I concluded that there must be other information which had not been shown me that influenced the decision to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken.

As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked not so much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of comprehensive searches and their effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air searches were practicable and I so stated. I also stated the fact that this would very definitely interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet. This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the training demanded by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take place.

With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the opinion that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by the most extensive searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface vessels. I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. I do not believe that anybody else in the American Navy had any proper conception of this development, either. Certainly I had never seen anything, either officially or unofficially, that would lead me to suppose that Japanese naval aviation was to tremendously effective and well developed as it turned out to be.

This is so well known now, by the average naval officer, that one is apt to forget how universally it was not known before the Pacific war began. I consider this primarily an indication of how effectively the Japanese succeeded in keeping their high state of development secret. I am sure that our Naval Intelligence organization did its best to keep the Navy fully informed, but I am convinced that information on this subject was lacking.

Perhaps a simpler way to put all this is that I do not believe the Commander-in-Chief regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid as very great. I know that he was concerned, of course, regarding all damage possibilities, but it was apparent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly in view of what I understood at the time to be his belief [99] that there would not, at that time, be any overt action.

Precautions to a certain degree had been taken, of course. It had, for a considerable time, been standard practice to provide daily covering sweeps by air for all sea areas in the Hawaiian area in which any of our forces might be operating. Also, occasional searches in other sectors, to long distances, were made and sometimes maintained for a considerable time. The idea of these was to give the impression of comprehensive search and at the same time to avoid really extensive interference with other forms of training.

Although I did not feel that I had sufficient information as to the actual situation to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's policy, as 7 December approached I was concerned about the general situation with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason, I stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late to attempt after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the ENTERPRISE task force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting planes at Wake, and the LEXINGTON task force on its way to land Marine aircraft at Midway.

5. Q. Were you familiar with an arrangement between Com 14 and the Army for joint command in the air of Army and Navy aircraft, under certain conditions?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Were you familiar with an estimate of the situation by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin in which the possibility of a surprise air raid figured

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days which led up to 7 December?

A. I did.

8. Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no particular estimate, yourself, along that same line, formal or otherwise?

A. No, sir, it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider it; it was rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and thorough preparatory plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation justified taking up what might be called a defensive deployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given point, have been taken up, I necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was final.

9. Q. And your advice on the point was not asked?

A. No, sir.

10. Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November, the one which has come to be known as the war warning (indicating Exhibit 8)?

A. No, sir.

11. Q. You never saw it prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir.

[100] 12. Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly, earlier in your testimony, to say that in your opinion a comprehensive air search could have been carried on at that time?

A. Yes, it could.

13. Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360 degree distant reconnaissance could have been carried on with the material at hand at that time?

A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long-range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and materiel fatigue set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained.

14. Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing on to the Army part.

A. Prior to 7 December, I had relatively little detailed information regarding the Army Interceptor Command. I knew approximately the numbers and types and my recollection is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's and P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were enough air

fields to operate them, but not enough to provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were revetments and dispersal runways provided at the various fields.

As to the caliber and experience of the pilots, they were, naturally, none of them experienced in war combat. I had the impression that the state of training did not average very high, for the Army was handicapped by expansion requirements and there had to be a choice between numbers and skill. I know that they were doing all in their power to improve their skill, and that they were busily engaged in training at all times.

The Army's air warning net had not yet been fully developed. It was, broadly speaking, still in a status of test, completion, and training, rather than on a full-out basis of readiness such as is now recognized as standard. In fact, continuous watches were not yet being stood. It was only fortuitous that radar indications of approaching aircraft were seen on the morning of 7 December.

As to provisions made for command in the air, including directions for interception, these were still only of a general nature and there had been, to my knowledge, no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: one is that the air warning net and radar warning system had not yet been completed and placed in actual operation; the other is of a general nature, but, nevertheless, important—the Hawaiian area had not yet been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was slower than it might have been. I kept Admiral Kimmel informed of the general status of the Army Interceptor Command and arrangements for carrying out the joint directive, including progress and development and completion of the air warning net. I was, on the whole, well impressed with the potentialities of the Army Interceptor Command, and with the progress in developing the system. I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for fully effective employment.

[101] 15. Q. Admiral, what information was available to you as to the character and ability, and so forth, of the various Japanese Naval leaders?

A. I knew nothing about them.

16. Q. Were you present when Captain McCrea discussed these leaders with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel, and some of the Staff, in January, '41?

A. No.

17. Q. What did you know, prior to the attack, concerning the character of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Nothing.

18. Q. Admiral, in connection with your duties, did you confer with the Army command and echelons of command corresponding to your position—the Army located on Hawaii—regularly?

A. There was not, in fact, anybody in the Army with an assignment similar to mine. I was Fleet Aviation Officer on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. General Short had no corresponding Staff Officer. The Army Air Corps Commanding General was his senior airman. I consulted with him and his juniors, occasionally, but the primary contact between Army Air and Naval aviation was between the Army Air

Commanding General and Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander, Patrol Wing Two. In short, my job was not an executive job.

19. Q. Were your relations with the senior Army Aviation Commanders cordial?

A. Yes, sir, they were extremely cordial and remained so throughout the time I was on duty on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, which extended through June, 1942. After 7 December, and the establishment of unity of command, I worked very closely with Army Air in the area in order to be certain that everything possible was done effectively, and I could not have asked for better and more intelligent cooperation.

20. Q. Admiral, were you, prior to 7 December, familiar with the use of aircraft torpedoes?

A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. Had you given consideration to an attack on the ships in Pearl Harbor by this means?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Q. Will you please state your views as of that time as to the possible outcome of such an attack—the possible success of such an attack?

A. My views at that time were based on what I recall to be a definite statement by the Bureau of Ordnance that a torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor, because of the shallow depths, was not practicable. As I recall it, this, together with the desire to have major ships readily able to move in an emergency, was what influenced the Commander-in-Chief in his decision not to protect the major ships in Pearl Harbor with torpedo nets. Shortly after 7 December, I recall a dispatch from the Bureau of Ordnance which clarified its position in the matter. The general tenor of this dispatch was that actually torpedoes could be effectively used in depth as shallow as Pearl Harbor, but that some of them would hit the bottom. The only way I can reconcile this with earlier views is the peacetime attitude; that [102] is, the first question in peacetime had always been whether or not a torpedo could be recovered after a practice drop. Since it was desirable to avoid loss of the torpedoes, the data given to the Service naturally stressed the necessity for depths that would insure against the loss of all but erratic torpedoes.

23. Q. You had no information concerning aircraft torpedoes then that caused you to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief's decision?

A. No. In fact, the opposite was the case.

24. Q. Admiral, did you consider the Fleet aircraft would be necessary to the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack?

A. No, nor did I believe that they should be considered assigned for that purpose, except in the case of shore-based patrol planes. It was my belief that any Fleet aircraft that might be present should be made available while present, but, naturally, carrier aircraft, by definition, had to be considered primarily available for their mission, which certainly was not that of local defense.

25. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, was it customary for carrier aircraft to have guns installed when operating?

A. I cannot state positively after more than two years, but I think so.

26. Q. Do you know if they were kept ready for combat use while shore-based at Oahu?

A. As in the previous question, I am not positive, but I think so.

27. Q. Are you familiar with the condition of readiness for battle of the Marine planes that were present at Barber's Point on the day of the attack?

A. No.

28. Q. Had carrier planes previously been assigned to the Army for use under the plan then in effect during any training exercises?

A. Yes, sir, I think so, but I can not state positively.

29. Q. Prior to becoming air officer on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, what was your assignment?

A. What was the last part of that?

30. Q. What was your job?

A. I was Commander Aircraft, Asiatic Fleet, and Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LANGLEY.

31. Q. As such, you had long experience with PBY planes, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. And under circumstances under which their ability for reconnaissance, distant reconnaissance, was very much in the picture?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Based on that experience, which indicates you are an expert in the line, I will ask you a question which is perhaps somewhat hypothetical but is pertinent: Air reconnaissance over 360 degrees has frequently been mentioned. The entire circumference was not of equal importance, was it?

A. No, sir.

[103] 34. Q. A considerable arc to the north and west and another to the south and west were the most important; is that true?

A. Yes, sir, that is true, but it doesn't naturally follow that they would be certainly sufficient.

35. Q. Assuming a coverage of, say, 180 degrees so divided north and south, with the long-range planes which were available, including the Army's; suppose a distant reconnaissance patrol had been established upon the receipt of the Department's dispatch of 27 November. At that time, about what chance would you have estimated there was that such patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers the day prior to the attack?

A. My estimate at that time would have been that the chance was fairly good, perhaps two out of three, of course subject to reasonable breaks on weather and visibility. Based on knowledge since acquired, primarily that from war results to date, I should be inclined to put the chance no better than one out of two. We have, ourselves, quite often made an attack wherein Japanese search planes failed to sight our forces, even though in many of these cases we know that they were making intensive search flights. In the Guadalcanal landing, as an example, a Japanese search plane, under scattered cloud conditions, came close enough to our force actually to be sighted by long-range telescope from the ENTERPRISE, but failed to see and report the force. In a number of other cases, their search planes either failed to pass near enough for a sighting report or were hampered by bad visibility. On the other hand, the chances have always been

good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it could have been possible for the Japanese, by correct timing, high speed run-in and long-range launching of their carrier groups, to have been outside of search radius of our patrol planes the day before. I have always been of the opinion that the Japanese did launch at very long range in order to make certain that no search would find them the day before. They took this chance long-range launching, I believe, for the sake of certainty of surprise. Therefore, I think that in the specific case of the Pearl Harbor attack, our chances of sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were actually less than one in two.

36. Q. Would a radar warning net, involving search radar only, which was properly manned and fully efficient, have contributed any greater degree toward the certainty of ample warning for us?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. Are you positive of that, and that the degree of certainty would have been quite considerable?

A. On the premise which I understood to be that it was an effective and efficient warning net; yes, sir.

38. Q. Then, in short, the most vital preparation that forces on Oahu could have had to prevent such a surprise air raid, would have been a proper radar net, is that the case?

A. Hardly to that extent, Admiral. I believe that the present provision, and the provision that should be made, is what is standard practice everywhere now. This involves both long-range search and effective radar warning nets. It is always best, if there is any chance of doing so at all, to have more warning than that which can be given by any local radar search. I believe that the two are complementary. I believe that radar is more certain, all things considered, than the air search. On the other hand, the [104] warning it gives is very much more brief than that which can be had from unsuccessful search. This, of course, is another way of stating the old truism that it is better to hit an enemy before he starts than when he arrives.

39. Q. Have you any evidence indicating the distance from Oahu at which the Japs did actually launch their planes?

A. Shortly after 7 December, I saw a chart recovered from a Japanese scout bomber which had been shot down, which had navigational lines drawn on it. These lines indicated the probability that this airplane had been launched from a point 250 miles North of Oahu and that it was to be recovered several hours later about 175 miles North of Oahu.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:20 a. m., adjourned until 2 p. m. tomorrow.

[105] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 1944

EIGHTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Curts, M. E.; Captain, U. S. N.; Staff, CominCh.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was attached to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.

3. Q. And how long had you been so serving prior to that date, approximately?

A. Approximately two years, under two different Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

4. Q. Had you ever had any previous experience of that nature?

A. Yes, sir; several years.

5. Q. With the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, established in a shore command post, through what agencies did you transact the Fleet's communications?

A. Insofar as practicable, and nearly to 100 per cent, in the same manner in which we would have communicated with the mobile units of the Fleet while aboard the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, the Pacific Fleet Flag.

6. Q. Did you use the ships' installations?

A. We had our own radio station at the sub base to communicate with the ships in the Harbor and with the task force commanders at sea directly from that station. We also had facilities for utilizing the

fixed radio communication facilities of radio station NPM, both by radio control and by land line in parallel. The installation ashore and the location of the [106] Commander-in-Chief's headquarters temporarily ashore, in no way hampered the mobile Fleet communications of the Commander-in-Chief and, to a certain degree, facilitated his communications with the shore activities of the Sea Frontier and the Army and the higher command echelons in the Continent.

7. Q. Then, in effect, you both received and transmitted at that station at the Submarine Base just the same as if you were on board the Flagship; is that true?

A. Yes. We paralleled the shore control lines with radio lines because of our apprehension to sabotage of the land lines. When on the morning of December 7 a bomb or a shell cut the majority of control lines in the Navy Yard, CinCPac did not lose control of transmitters which he was using to work the ships present in the Harbor, the task force commanders at sea, and all ships at sea.

8. Q. Didn't you have telephone lines to the ships that were berthed alongside?

A. No, sir, only few instance. Some of the ships had telephone lines on the regular Pearl Harbor exchange, but that circuit, in no sense, could be called a military circuit.

9. Q. Your communications between Headquarters and ships were entirely satisfactory in all respects then, I take it?

A. Yes; we never lost control of the radio lines even during the attack. We continued to handle combat traffic. Every ship in Pearl Harbor was guarding a common frequency, regardless of administrative organization. This circuit was supposed to be controlled by the Sea Frontier Commander and was primarily established for the issuance of fire control orders, as the batteries of such ships as were present had, by prior arrangement, been made available to the Sea Frontier Commander to assist him in defending the Naval Base.

10. Q. The Commander-in-Chief used the same call, same set of calls, whether he was afloat or ashore?

A. Yes, sir, we made no difference in our communications, external communications, while located at the sub base, from those ordinarily performed on the ship, except that for the Harbor circuit, of which I have previously spoken, which was under the control of the Sea Frontier Commander, who was also the District Commandant. We had special calls made up and promulgated for use on that circuit so that the Army, if they needed them, would have these calls available.

11. Q. Communications to the mainland and other points far removed, were always through Fourteenth Naval District equipment; is that right?

A. Yes, sir. Ordinarily the communications to Washington and the mainland were via radio station NPM, which station was under the control of the Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief have his own coding boards so that the District personnel had nothing to do with his dispatches?

A. Yes, sir, we operated exactly as though we were aboard ship, using the same facilities, and we kept ourselves mobile to the extent that we could go aboard ship at any time on two or three hours notice, with personnel, code ciphers, and some special equipment.

[107] 13. Q. Still speaking of conditions as of November, '41, what arrangements were there under your charge for communication with Army and with Naval units on shore Hawaii, outside of Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, we communicated with the Army and the District by telephone.

14. Q. Was that through the city exchange?

A. No, sir, through the Pearl Harbor exchange. We, ourselves, had a switchboard which had trunk lines to the regular Pearl Harbor exchange and to the city exchange.

15. Q. Then everything went through the city switchboard?

A. No, sir. The District switchboard, or the switchboard at Pearl Harbor, had some but not all of the District facilities tied into its board. Others were obtainable through the city board. The telephone situation on Oahu, prior to December 7, was far from satisfactory. All trunk lines were overloaded, insufficient equipment was available to take care of the rapidly expanded Naval and Army facilities, and the civilian telephone company found itself in the same position in regard to civilian telephone service.

16. Q. Did the Army organizations on Oahu have direct telephone connection between their various posts and stations?

A. In general, yes, but by a very poor Army cable system, which was subject to constant breaks and deterioration from years of service. As a matter of fact, the Navy also used this Army cable system and it was partially because it was so unsatisfactory that I paralleled it with radio, in order that I might key the transmitters of NPM regardless of failures of this cable from either deliberate sabotage or because it was generally unreliable.

17. Q. Did you have a direct wire to that Army system?

A. Yes, sir, for keying of transmitters and I believe for some teletypes only; not for telephone.

18. Q. Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters was on the teletype system then?

A. I believe that prior to December 7, we had some teletypes installed. However, there was a great shortage of teletypes on the Island and but few of the units desiring same had been able to obtain them.

19. Q. Are you able to tell us anything about the means of communication with planes in the air in the vicinity of Oahu, including whether or not it was satisfactory?

A. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the communication with planes in the air was almost entirely through their base stations. In general, such communication was fairly satisfactory. After December 7, planes in the air were governed by the policy that all planes on a common mission, whether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, land or seaplanes, would be on a common frequency, and that the Shore Commander of this mission and the parent stations of the planes would all guard this common frequency.

20. Q. Was not that the case prior to 7 December; did not that machinery exist?

A. Only for drills, to the best of my recollection. As a matter of fact, the only missions assigned were drill missions.

21. Q. Was it necessary, before conducting a drill, to make special arrangements for those communications?

A. Yes, sir.

[108] 22. Q. Do you recall any particular difficulty in communicating with the Air Station at Kaneohe Bay?

A. Yes, sir. Telephone service—teletype service to Kaneohe Bay from points on the Island of Oahu was entirely inadequate and, in several occasions, air commanders reported that it was quicker to take off from the southside of the Island and fly to Kaneohe than it was to try to telephone; with a considerable degree of truth. In addition, Kaneohe was established as a Naval Air Station with inadequate radio equipment. If my memory is correct, it was actually commissioned before a single piece of radio transmitter apparatus was furnished for installation on the Island by the Navy Department. There existed, insofar as their local radio communications were concerned, portable apparatus which was supposed to be used for landing forces and special use by CinCPac.

23. Q. Captain, looking back upon the few weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, what stand out in your mind as your greatest difficulties of that time? I mean, of course, as regards your own place in the picture.

A. Personally, I had been apprehensive for a long time, not just two weeks, about the danger of Japan starting a war without formal declaration. Insofar as my own work was concerned, I was principally worried because, to my mind, there was not a single unity of command organization, either authorized or set up, and I believe anyone who has had any experience with military communications will agree that if command is not definite and not set up, it is well nigh impossible to anticipate the communication needs when an emergency occurs. I, personally, was very apprehensive of local sabotage, there being in the neighborhood of 150,000 Japanese on the Island of Oahu alone.

24. Q. In that sabotage, you mean particularly as against your important land lines?

A. I rather expected sabotage against both the land line control wires, the telephones, but more particularly against the transmitters and service proper of the shore installations outside of Pearl Harbor. It would have been possible also to have wrecked, with comparative ease, the transmission power lines of the electric companies, which were quite vital to our communications. I had an arrangement whereby, from local power at the sub base, I could key the transmitters in San Diego and carry on Fleet communications from that point. In fact, we often did so and we did so to a certain extent on the morning of December 7.

25. Q. As regards the Communication Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, was he wholly independent of you or was he, with his own organization, fitted into your own organization?

A. Organizationally, he operated directly under the Commander of the Sea Frontier and of the Fourteenth Naval District. At all times, he, individually, was 100 per cent cooperative with us, and his attitude at all times was that the shore radio facilities under his command were primarily for service to the Fleet.

26. Q. Do you remember if there was a considerable traffic congestion in, say, November '41, over the radio system between Oahu and the Continent?

A. No, I do not, sir.

27. Q. In the few weeks prior to 7 December, were you cognizant that there was much Japanese originated traffic, particularly outgoing traffic?

A. No, sir. You don't mean from the Island of Oahu?

[109] 28. Q. No.

A. No, sir, I was not, but I was not in the Intelligence Department of CinCPac Staff.

29. Q. Then that was a subject in which you had no responsibility and concerning which you were not informed, is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

30. Q. I believed you were stationed at the Experimental Laboratory, Bellevue, sometime in the past; if, so, when was it?

A. During 1936 to 1938.

31. Q. While there, did you have any duties in connection with the development of radar?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. What duties?

A. I was liaison officer for the Radio and Sound Division, and as such closely watched development of radar, contributed what I could to it, kept the Navy Department informed as to the progress thereon.

33. Q. Did you have any administrative work in connection with that development?

A. Yes, sir; practically all duties I just spoke of were administrative.

34. Q. You used the word "liaison."

A. Yes, sir. I controlled the funds, pushed the applications, endeavored to bring it over from a scientific study to an instrument which could be used aboard ship.

35. Q. You were then a sort of manager and steerer of the technicians and scientists who were working on the development; is that it?

A. Yes, sir; a steerer but not in direct control thereof.

36. Q. Was there anyone on the officer's list who was in any better touch with that development when you left it in 1938 than you were?

A. I don't believe so, sir.

37. Q. What was the state of that development when you left, in general terms, as regards its application for war use?

A. In the summer of 1938, the frequencies, which we were then able to use with radar, had been so shortened that it was practical to install it on board ships of the carrier and battleship class. One model had been tested aboard a destroyer with some degree of success. It had been decided to build a shipboard radar copied directly after the one installed on top of the Naval Research Laboratory for tests on board a battleship.

38. Q. At that time, and using the laboratory installation under average conditions, how far could you detect a medium size plane in flight at the maximum altitudes at which planes fly?

A. The rotating model, at the Navy Research Laboratory, in the spring of 1938, was able to detect aircraft at the higher altitudes to

distances up to 100 miles, with an azimuth discrimination of better than one degree and a position angle discrimination of approximately six degrees.

39. Q. At that time, had any knowledge of this development been communicated to the Army Signal Corps?

A. Yes, sir.

[110] 40. Q. When?

A. Radar, as we know it, was disclosed to the Army by permission of the Chief of Naval Operations, in about January, 1937. It did not appear at that time that we would be able to get a small enough antenna to work aboard ship, and because of its tremendous defensive value to the Army, full disclosure was made.

41. Q. After leaving Bellevue, were you able to keep in any sort of touch with subsequent developments?

A. I lost touch for about one year, except for minor information. At the end of that year, I went to Staff communication duty and followed the development as closely as possible, being interested in its potentialities for the Fleet.

42. Q. In, say, the summer of 1941, how far had the Navy gotten towards actually using and installing radar on board ship?

A. There were approximately twenty search type (CXAM) radars installed on carriers, battleships, and cruisers.

43. Q. In general, what results were they giving as results search for aircraft?

A. From the low altitude positions aboard ship, they were, in general, reliable to distances in the neighborhood of seventy-five miles.

44. Q. What would be the relative difficulties of radar installations on board ship, as compared with similar installations on shore?

A. The principal difficulty of installing a radar aboard ship lies in the necessity of having a large antenna which must be free to rotate, either in its own right or by turning the ship. The larger the antenna is, the better angular discrimination will be obtained and and to a lesser degree a better range will be obtained. Topside space on a ship is at a great premium. Similar conditions do not prevail ashore, and a fairly large structure built, if necessary, on a railroad turntable, can be erected.

45. Q. By the end of November, 1941, had the Army Signal Corps gotten to installing and being ready to work radar equipment?

A. In November, '41 the Air Warning Service for Oahu were installing radars on various points in the Island of Oahu. I should say that approximately four Air Warning Service radars had been installed at that time but they were definitely in a training status and were not being used as an integral part of the Air Warning Service except during brief periods of drill.

46. Q. Do you know whether or not the design and conception of the apparatus was entirely satisfactory for war purposes?

A. The early warning sets being installed on Oahu are the Army 270 type which are still being used in a great many locations. They were not a perfect instrument but properly operated and installed, they are reasonably satisfactory. In November, 1941, the Air Warning Service out on Oahu knew very little about this new art. They were

trying to learn how to install them and how to use them at the time of the attack.

47. Q. During those intervening years, had you been personally of the belief that a device of that nature was a very satisfactory security [111] measure in a situation like that on Oahu?

A. Yes, indeed. Search radar extended all the value of aircraft warning service by observers to times of low visibility and to distances far beyond the visible range. It, of course, would have to be coupled with knowledge of the presence of friendly forces or planes or by an efficient electrical identification system which wasn't at that time in existence.

48. Q. Did you then know of any reason why the Army Signal Corps had not been properly equipped with this device as soon as we had the radar on board ship?

A. No, I don't know what delayed the Army in the securing of radar. To my mind, their problem was much simpler than that of the Navy's, as they could use larger equipment, at longer frequencies, and in a part of the radio spectrum more familiar to manufacturers and scientists.

49. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel or the senior members of his Staff concerning the state of efficiency of the Army's radar on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir. I informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was in an instruction status only, and not in an operational status. Such was the case on December 7, 1941.

50. Q. In late November, '41, did you see the various dispatches from the Navy Department which contained warnings of the imminence of hostilities with Japan?

A. I believe I saw all of them, sir.

51. Q. When you first saw the Department's war warning dispatch of 27 November '41, what was your reaction to the words "war warning"? What did you think it called for in the way of action, in the way of security measures, or other action?

A. My first reaction was that it was just another war warning, as we had had several dispatches extending over a long period of time, which, although they didn't contain the words "war warning", were, in fact, war warnings. This, plus the inclusion of information in this dispatch giving the probable location of the attack, took the keen edge off the dispatch so far as Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were concerned in connection with an air or amphibious operation. This (indicating Exhibit 8) dispatch, along with several others received about that time, increased my own worry about the danger of local sabotage, particularly because of sabotage reference to Guam and Samoa.

52. Q. Do you recall your reaction, if any, from the use of the word "deployment" and the language around that word?

A. My only recollection is that I questioned how to take a defensive deployment, as this dispatch, coupled with other dispatches which told us to take no offensive action until attacked, confused me as to how I would have placed units of the Fleet, had I been the Commander-in-Chief.

53. Q. Captain, I show you a dispatch which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Have you seen that dispatch?

A. I don't recall having seen that dispatch. I may have seen it but I don't remember it at this late date.

54. Q. Captain, it is noted that the dispatch which you looked at a while ago, the November 27 dispatch, which is Exhibit 8, directs that the Army authorities be advised as to the contents of the dispatch. Will you [112] please explain your system for conveying such information to the Army?

A. Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending his intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Short's G-2 officer for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G-2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about upsetting the system of receipts, but in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short, although I held no receipt.

55. Q. Do you recall what date that dispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. It was about the 27th of November. There was no inordinate delay in this dispatch.

56. Q. And the day of delivery to which you referred is the date of receipt—I mean, delivery to General Short and Admiral Bloch?

A. I believe so, but I am not certain.

57. Q. Do you recognize this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination?

A. I recall having seen that dispatch.

58. Q. Do you recall anything about its delivery to the Army?

A. No, I do not recall this individual dispatch. I feel certain that it was because in the review of all dispatches prior to this time, we found no non-deliveries, however, I can not recall this delivery of the individual dispatch.

59. Q. Do you recall any other dispatches, other than the one of November 27, that delivery was not made in a normal manner?

A. Yes, I believe there were certain dispatches which were handled through Intelligence G-2 channels, against my protest, which was made only because it upset bookkeeping, not because I had any doubt that the information would ultimately reach the addressee.

60. Q. At the time that you were the Fleet Communications Officer, what was the practice with respect to the retention of such dispatches in the files? I'm getting at the period of time they were retained.

A. We would keep all such dispatches two years, and, in fact when I left, I left directions that all traffic which might be pertinent to Pearl Harbor be retained in the files.

[113] 61. Q. Did these file copies show the signatures of General Short which you have testified about, indicating his receipt of the dispatches?

A. I believe so, except the one of November 27, I know does not contain his receipt.

62. Q. What system did the Army follow in delivering to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, information that they received and were directed to pass on to the Navy?

A. They sent it down by officer-courier, and obtained a receipt for it, in general. There may have been times in which they delivered traffic directly to Admiral Kimmel and I may not have seen it.

63. Q. Was any delivery normally made to you personally?

A. No, sir; to my Communication Watch Officer.

64. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Army of a dispatch originated on the 27th of November, 1941, in the War Department, containing a warning similar to that contained in the Navy dispatch of the same day?

A. Frankly, I do not recall. There were many warning dispatches received over a long period of time. If we received it, I feel sure it is in CinCPac files.

65. Q. Captain, you've testified, with respect to your apprehensions, that your communication installations might suffer from sabotage in the event of hostilities or a surprise start to hostilities. Did your communication installations in fact suffer on 7 December 1941 from sabotage?

A. No, sir; I saw no evidence of sabotage, interference, or deception by the enemy, or by local Japanese.

66. Q. You referred to the lack of radio equipment at Kaneohe at the time the station was commissioned. Was this condition remedied prior to the attack on December 7?

A. Yes, sir; the radio equipment was, but the telephone lines were still far from satisfactory. We had made them put in some direct telephone lines and teletype lines, but they were none too good.

67. Q. Were they on the teletype system?

A. There were all kinds of teletype circuits around there. I believe they had a teletype installed between Kaneohe, Com 14 and Ford Island.

68. Q. Were you cognizant of an important dispatch from either the Chief of Staff, Army, or the Chief of Naval Operations, giving a very definite warning of the imminence of hostilities which was delayed in transmission and not received until sometime late on 7 December?

A. Yes, sir. I believe that there was a joint dispatch sent by War and Navy through the War Department, via RCA communications, to Shafter at Honolulu, which was not received at Shafter until after the attack had commenced and was not received by CinCPac until late on

the afternoon of the 7th. I believe that dispatch indicated the immediate opening of hostilities.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter [114] of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:40 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m., tomorrow.

[115] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1944

NINTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:07 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy; Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, with administrative offices at Norfolk, Virginia.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. On the 7th of December, 1941, I was Commander, Patrol Wing Two; I was also controlling Patrol Wing One, which was also based on the Island of Oahu with headquarters at Kaneohe; I was Commander, Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; I was Commander, Task Force Nine, which was the Task Force of the patrol planes and tenders and such other units as may be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; I was also assigned as liaison with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in connection with aviation facilities being developed at the various outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston. In addition, I was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, which was an organization set up by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and headed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who was termed Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

3. Q. Admiral, please relate, approximately, the forces normally included in your command as Commander, Patrol Wing Two, and under your control the forces of Patrol Wing One.

A. There were several squadrons of patrol planes with a total of eighty-one planes on December 7, together with the aircraft tenders assigned.

4. Q. Were there any additional aircraft available to you as the Base Defense Force Air Commander?

A. Under the setup of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, in case of emergency, aircraft of the Navy that were then on shore from carriers and otherwise, came under this Command. However, the fighting planes were further assigned, through my organization, to the Army Fighter Command for operation. [116] Also, such planes of the bombardment type as the Army might make available were subject to my operational control in such capacity.

5. Q. Admiral, will you give us, please, the approximate location, with respect to Oahu and the outlying islands, of the patrol planes on December 7.

A. There were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl, and 12 planes at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on 5 December, having had, prior thereto, an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake.

6. Q. For how long a period preceding the date of the attack had patrol planes been stationed at Midway and Wake?

A. The squadron I last referred to as having returned to Pearl on 5 December had been stationed at Midway or Wake since 17 October.

7. Q. Were any additional planes sent to the outlying islands between the 27th of November and the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I don't remember the date that one squadron was dispatched to Midway in connection with a Fleet operation in the reenforcement of Wake, but I am practically sure it was prior to November 27, shortly thereto. I don't believe any of my patrol planes were dispatched from the Island of Oahu to outlying islands subsequent to November 27.

8. Q. Do you recall that the Fleet operation to which you referred was the sending of a task force to deliver fighter planes to Wake?

A. Yes.

9. Q. It was that?

A. It was in connection with sending Marine planes to Wake.

10. Q. Admiral, please outline the general nature in the deployment of patrol planes in the several months preceding the attack, that is, the nature of the training and so forth.

A. The main effort was expansion training, expansion meaning the qualifying of personnel to form additional patrol plane crews, and to qualify them all personally in their main job. Shortly before December, the patrol plane squadrons were attached for operational control to various task forces of the Fleet, they worked in connection with the training operations that these task forces were conducting. Later, this organization was done away with and the operation of patrol planes with task forces was done by assignment as directed by higher authority. New planes, with which Patrol Wings One and Two were being equipped, arrived in Oahu in accordance with the following dates: 12 planes, 28 October; 8 planes, 28 October; 12 planes, 8 November; 12 planes, 23 November; 12 planes, 23 November; all of 1941. These planes were the PBV5 type, for which there were scarcely

any spares on hand to maintain. Therefore, a great deal of time and effort was utilized in maintenance difficulties and also in the preparation of this new type of plane for war conditions.

11. Q. Were these operations conducted under an approved quarterly deployment schedule?

A. Yes, under approved schedules. Sometimes they were not quarterly.

12. Q. But they were announced well in advance?

A. Yes.

13. Q. Do you remember how they were classified?

A. I think they were confidential.

[117] 14. Q. Admiral, will you please state the condition of the patrol planes on Oahu on December 7, with respect to their material readiness for operations?

A. In accordance with information I gain from notes made on December 19, 1941, the following was the situation: 36 planes were at Kaneohe; 33 planes at Pearl; and 12 planes at Midway. Of these 81 planes, 9 were under repair; 58 were in commission, and 14 were in the air.

15. Q. Were the Marine planes on Oahu subject to your operational control during emergencies up to 7 December, or were your duties in connection with the Fleet Detachment confined to those planes on Ford Island?

A. In my status as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, the Marine planes functioned under my operational control when drills were scheduled, or when there was an actual emergency. That is, those planes that were made available to me. However, I wish to differentiate between the bombing and scouting planes and the fighting planes, the latter, of course, functioned under the Army Fighter Command.

16. Q. In general, what was the state of training of the patrol plane personnel just prior to 7 December, '41?

A. In general, it was good, but there was a lot actually to be perfected as was proved after December 7. However, we were short of our allocated number of crews for patrol planes, and the main training was the expansion training which was being conducted in order to increase the number of crews that would be available.

17. Q. This examination has received an estimate of the situation which is an inclosure to a letter marked Exhibit 22, which is purportedly approved by you in your capacity as Commander, Naval Air Base Defense Force. I hand you the Exhibit; do you identify the inclosed estimates?

A. Yes, sir. This paper was practically wholly prepared by my organization.

18. Q. Do you have in your custody a copy of the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 to which this estimate is a supplement?

A. No.

19. Q. It is noted that this estimate recognizes as possible enemy action almost identical with the action of the Japanese Navy on 7 December 1941, and arrives at decisions for the defense of the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor from such enemy action. I would like to discuss certain aspects of the estimate to obtain additional information with respect thereto and to obtain information as to how the

resultant plan worked out when the attack came. It is noted that the estimate, under "Action open to us", provides for daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees. It further states that this would be desirable but that it could only be effectively maintained with personnel and materiel then available for a short period. Would you please explain more fully the reason that the extended patrols had to be so limited?

A. Because of the number of planes available, the limitations of personnel, and the maintenance problems of the aircraft available. As a regular proposition, it is believed that a crew could conduct one patrol every third day of the type listed in the estimate. Crews have done more than that at times for short periods, but the physical fatigue is something that has to be watched in the conduct of continuous search operations. It was estimated that to conduct a search through 360 degrees, to a distance of at least 800 miles, [118] assuming a 15 mile radius of visibility, would require a daily flight of 84 planes. Therefore, to conduct a continuous search of this type would require an overall force of approximately 200 planes. There is always a question, of the life of the planes versus the physical fatigue of the crew. The planes now stand up and can operate continually more and to a greater extent than can the crews. Therefore, the question of number of planes and number of crews for these planes, in order to place them in the air each day a flight of 84 planes, becomes a matter of adjustment and not a concrete statement as regards to the actual number of planes required. But, undoubtedly, it would require 252 crews and more than 170 planes.

20. Q. Admiral, were considerations given to extending a distance patrol to cover the more important arcs rather than the total of 360 degrees?

A. Many phases of a possible attack were considered, and in air raid drills, our own carriers were used. Their location was unknown even to myself. There was no hard and fixed decision as to what direction a possible attack might be launched, although the wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location of bases from which such attack might come were in the southwesterly direction.

21. Q. Were not such sectors as a narrow one to the southeastward fairly well covered by the presence of other islands in the chain; another, similarly, northwest toward Midway; and was not the steamer lane to the mainland so well occupied that a narrow sector there also would most likely be unused by the enemy?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct, except that there were no planes operating from outlying islands except Midway at that time.

22. Q. You would not expect an enemy to send in an attack which went anywhere near those rather narrow sectors, would you?

A. No, sir. The enemy, undoubtedly, would endeavor to guard against all detection, shipping, and such other operations as they might assume were in progress.

23. Q. What is the basis of those words in the estimate which you have just stated, that a distant reconnaissance would have to extend to at least 800 miles?

A. The following applies to 22 December conditions: Launching radius of enemy carriers, estimated at 300 nautical miles; enemy's night-run, estimated at 27 knots times 13 hours, equals 351 miles;

enemy's day run, before search planes reach 300 mile radius, 81 miles; radius to cover effective at dark, 732 miles. The PBY plane was the only type of plane the Navy had to conduct this search with, and 800 miles was considered about the maximum length of leg that could be carried out by the PBY plane. And to give another estimate for the PBY on the basis of 25 miles visibility, I quote the following: "Radius of delay search, 800 miles; number of searching planes daily, 25 mile visibility, 50; flight times per search plane, 16½ hours; total planes hours per month, 24,750; total number of planes required, 150; number of flight crews required, 225; engine changes per month, average, 82½; spare engines required, 182; fuel consumption per month, gallons of gasoline, 1,980,000; search effectiveness estimated at 50 per cent."

24. Q. Was the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius rather a high estimate?

A. Yes, I thought they would come in closer, but that was selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.

[119] 25. Q. Admiral, were the PBY patrol bombers equipped with radar at that time, that is, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

26. Q. Did conditions of personnel and materiel improve between the 31st of March, 1941, the date of the estimate, and December 7, 1941?

A. In this way only, that gradually facilities were being built up, that obsolete planes were gradually being replaced, that more materiel was gradually being sent out, but even up until November 23, when I received word from an officer who had just arrived in a ferry flight from the Pacific Coast and who had made a special trip to Washington for me, informed me that from all information he could receive, the Atlantic was receiving the priorities.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

27. Q. Were these changes sufficient to cause you to reconsider your estimate of the situation made in March of '41—were there enough differences?

A. Changes?

28. Q. You stated that they did improve somewhat, and I wondered if you considered them sufficient—

A. No; by no means.

29. Q. The estimate further provides that in view of the difficulties that you have just discussed, extensive daily patrols could not be undertaken unless intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time limits. Did you receive intelligence of this nature prior to the December 7 attack?

A. No.

30. Q. Also as an enclosure with Exhibit 22 before this examination is a supplement, or annex, to a plan signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. I show it to you. Do you recognize it?

A. Yes.

31. Admiral, did you consider that this agreement authorized you, acting under Commander Base Defense Force, to call on the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, for planes of an appropriate type that they might

have, to augment your available planes for search purposes, in the absence of a declared or recognized emergency?

A. No, it did not give me that authority, and any time that use of Army planes was involved, and they were involved only prior to December the 7th in case of drill, special arrangements had to be made ahead of time in order to utilize Army planes in the drill, and on account of failure to get joint action in these drills, it was necessary to set up a pre-determined schedule for drills which the Army was asked to agree to. The Army's point of view was that they were so busy training their personnel that they could not divert them to drills. If you will note in this paper, in paragraph 2, "When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each Commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other Commander such a portion of the air forces at his disposal. . . ." and so forth. That was one of the main impediments of this agreement and of this organization. No air [120] defense can be effective unless it is functioning 24 hours every day, and this set-up that existed in the Hawaiian Islands was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent, or take action in an air attack. It was not the primary objective of either Army or Navy. There was no unity of command or control.

32. Q. Was the paragraph 2, of this annex to which you have just referred, used prior to the attack so as to bring the plan into effect?

A. Actually, no. At time of attack, I received no word from anybody. We took action directly with the Bomber Command, General Rudolph, and he agreed to do all he could in carrying out my desires.

33. Q. However, could not an agreement between you and your opposite number in the air, as to correct action, have been reached under a declaration by the highest echelon that danger of attack existed, or even if the two of you, from what you knew, had made such an estimate?

A. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and myself, were in very close accord on many subjects and we worked together in drills, outside of air raid drills. If he saw or I saw an emergency situation, I feel very sure that he would have cooperated in any specific instance.

34. Q. Admiral, you have several times referred to "drills". Did you include in this, regular tactical exercises, involving units of the Fleet, carriers, and so forth?

A. What did you say?

35. Q. Did you include in that term "drills", regular scheduled tactical exercises?

A. That was other than air raid drills, I am speaking about.

36. Q. Yes, but that includes regular Fleet tactical exercises in which the Army Air participated?

A. No, these were special drills or exercises that were arranged between the Army Air Force Commander and myself.

37. Q. Did not the Army also participate in some of the Fleet exercise periods with their Air arm?

A. Yes, by special arrangement.

38. Q. Did the conditions as to cooperation which you have mentioned apply in the same manner as they did during your drills arranged among the Air Commanders?

A. Yes.

39. Q. Admiral, had you been physically present in Pearl Harbor in the week or so preceding the attack on 7 December?

A. Yes, I was at my quarters, and in bed with the "Flu" for approximately five days prior to December 7th, and December 7th was to be my first day up from the "Flu".

40. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Do you recognize that dispatch as one you saw prior to the attack?

A. I don't recall ever seeing that.

[121] 41. Q. It is noted from your testimony that on the day following the date of this dispatch certain patrol planes were dispatched to Midway. Was this in accordance with and in compliance with orders of higher authority, sir?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Do you recall whether the dispatching of that squadron had been planned in advance, or whether it was a sudden decision?

A. I think it was a sudden decision by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

43. Q. Were you advised of the reason for dispatching the squadron at that time?

A. I don't think so, except that, as I remember, it was done in connection with reinforcements at Midway, and, later, at Wake.

44. Q. Admiral, I show you another dispatch, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. Had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

45. Q. And another dispatch, Exhibit 8; had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

46. Q. Were you advised—

A. (Interposing) As a matter of fact, I didn't see it until about five days afterward, when Admiral Kimmel showed it to me; after December 7.

47. Q. Were you advised, in any manner, of the receipt of a dispatch of this nature about this time?

A. No, not prior to December 7.

48. Q. I show you Exhibit 9. Had you seen that prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

49. Q. Had you seen the dispatch, Exhibit 11?

A. No.

50. Q. Was any other intelligence relating to American-Japanese relations, or the Pacific situation, received either from local or other sources which caused you to extend the air patrols prior to the launching of the attack on December 7?

A. The newspapers, of course, were all alarming; rather, the newspapers indicated a critical situation. I was reading those. There

were no special flights that were carried out, other than the training exercises and the security flights that were ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

51. Q. I had in mind, Admiral, the revision of the estimate to the effect that extensive patrols could not be undertaken unless intelligence indicates that a surface raid was probable, within rather narrow time limits. None of the intelligence information received by you, if you did receive any, was sufficient to bring about the exception here to your patrols so as to cause you to expand the areas patrolled by air?

A. In order to expand the patrols to the extent that would have been necessary to get early information of an approaching force, it would have [122] been necessary for me to take the question up with higher authority, in order to carry out such employment of my forces. That would have been either through the District Commandant, who was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force, of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The situation in the Pacific had been critical for sometime, but at some times it had appeared to be more critical. It was a question, from the newspaper accounts, of whether the situation was more critical prior to December the 7th then it had ever been before, or not.

52. Q. Did you receive orders from higher authority in the period between 27 November and 7 December to extend the air patrol in any way?

A. Not from Oahu; only in connection with the operations that were taking place at Midway and Wake, and that was for a particular reason with reference to our own forces that were in that vicinity.

53. Q. During those days of your illness, did you do any business at all, or did the officer who normally would succeed you, carry on the work of your command?

A. He came in to confer with me, brought papers for signature, but relieved me of most of the work of the command.

54. Q. Who was he?

A. Captain Logan Ramsey.

55. Q. And you received nothing from him other than, as you have stated, what was in the newspapers, indicating any particular reason for thinking of security in Pearl Harbor?

A. No, sir.

56. Q. It appears that very important information and Navy Department directives were not passed to you. Being a very important subordinate commander, I have to ask how Admiral Kimmel did get advice and information concerning air matters. Insofar as you know, who acted along that line?

A. I dealt directly with Admiral Kimmel quite considerably, and also with his Aviation Aide, who was Captain Davis and Admiral Kimmel seemed to be very much interested in aviation matters.

57. Q. Did you ever talk over with him the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese?

A. No, not in conversation. The actual wording of the estimate was never discussed with Admiral Kimmel. In fact, it was never discussed to my knowledge, except in my own organization and with the Army personnel concerned; Army and Air personnel concerned.

However, this estimate was part of the original assignment given me by Admiral Kimmel in connection with his desire to bring about a coordinated scheme of air defense of Oahu.

58. Q. Then insofar as you knew, Admiral Kimmel had never paid any unusual attention to that part of the Army and Navy joint estimate which set forth the possibility of the carrier raid; is that true?

A. Not to my knowledge did he go into any particular phase of it. He knew, of course, of all that had been done in the work with the Army in bringing about this organization, but I was not satisfied with the organization and I so expressed to him and I am sure that he was not, for the simple reason that it was based on too much cooperation and also on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and no organization of this kind is any good unless it functions twenty-four hours a day prior to any air attack, completely and fully manned. And there were insufficient [123] personnel actually in my establishment to have such an organization functioning that way, and I am sure it was the same with the Army.

59. Q. As regards Admiral Bloch, under whom you acted in a certain capacity, did you have frequent conversations with him concerning this same general subject?

A. Yes, sir; but not too frequently. At the beginning when the organization was being set up, I worked with Admiral Bloch, either personally or with his representatives, considerably. Later I took up with him matters in connection with arrangements for air raid drills or matters pertaining to failure of the organization to function particularly as applicable to the Army. As he was not an air man, I only took those subjects up with him that I felt he should know and which he, through his relationship with the Commanding General of the Army, could rectify.

60. Q. As the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, during, say, October and November, there was no particular conversation thereby instituted with Admiral Bloch, is that true?

A. I had many conversations about the various aviation developments that were in his District. The prior answer was with reference to the air defense, only; but since all aviation developments such as at the outlying islands and Kaneohe and Pearl were under Admiral Bloch, many of these matters came up for discussion, and they likewise had a bearing on the air defense of that area.

61. Q. Having participated in that joint estimate back in March, 1941, as the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, did not those portions of the estimate dealing with the carrier raid come back into your mind?

A. Yes, sir. I remember discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented me on the organization that had been set up, indicating cooperation with the Army, and I told him that that was all right, but it wouldn't work in case of war. He mentioned that practically, we were at war, and I stated "Well, true, but not shooting war, yet, in the Pacific." I indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 12:45 p. m. took a recess until 2:00 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

62. Q. It has been brought out in other testimony that the estimated most [124] probable courses of Jap action in a surprise attack would be either a submarine attack on ships at sea or a sabotage on Oahu, or both. Were you concurring in those opinions in late November, 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I concurred in the opinion that there might be Jap submarine activity and also sabotage on the Island of Oahu. Of course, I did not discount the other possibilities as indicated in the estimate, but I thought it most probably would be a submarine attack or sabotage.

63. Q. Admiral, during your testimony, with respect to the plan for the deployment of aircraft, through the means of mutual cooperation, you have expressed your opinion to the effect that this was not the best plan which might be used. Did you make any recommendations or take any action with respect to higher authority changing the method of command at Oahu?

A. I didn't think that any joint plan, based on cooperation alone, would function or could function properly in an emergency, and I mentioned my more or less dissatisfaction with the general setup of this air defense, both personally in conversation to Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of Navy.

64. Q. Admiral, were you responsible in any way for the defense of outlying islands, such as Midway and Wake?

A. No, except in this way, that in the war plans of the Pacific, prior to December 7, my job was to control the air operations from Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston, with headquarters on Midway.

65. Q. Were these to be offensive or defensive deployments?

A. Presumably both, insofar as the forces available and the situation demanded.

66. Q. Did your responsibility in this respect cause you any concern or preoccupy your mind in the days prior to the attack with respect to your more immediate duties at Oahu?

A. My immediate duties at Oahu was expansion training rather than defensive operations against a possible attack. The need for this expansion training in aviation was very vital because every operating outfit was concerned in this expansion, and qualified personnel were being drawn from operating units to be sent to training establishments for further expansion in training. As a consequence, the expansion training was vital and that was what was stressed by high authority. Now with reference to anything taking my mind away from the situation, I was vitally concerned and worried about the lack of many things that were required in the Pacific area which Honolulu represented the main base of, as official correspondence will

show. But you must remember that this Naval Base Air Defense was an organization set up to meet an emergency. It was hoped that that emergency would arrive after prior information which would set the organization in operation.

67. Q. I had particular reference to your planning preparation of security measures under your duties as the Base Defense Air Commander and possibility of the responsibility for defense of the outlying islands, and the need for employment of aircraft there, amounting to a concern and preoccupation in connection therewith.

A. The planes which I had command of, insofar as outlying islands were concerned, had no particularly offensive ability. That is, the patrol planes, except within limitations. To indicate my concern, with reference to these outlying islands, I would like to refer you to a letter which I wrote the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Serial No. 0026, dated 22 October 1941, subject: Types of combatant aircraft for a [125] Pacific campaign, in which I stressed the need for 160 long-range, high-speed, land plane bombers, and 160 interceptor fighters for operations in connection with Midway and Wake Islands, and also the development of these Islands to accommodate operating complements of these planes.

68. Q. Admiral, in your estimate of the situation, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this investigation, you pointed out that long-range or distance reconnaissance was possible only for short periods of time when intelligence reports indicated a probable attack on Oahu. Did both the Naval Base Defense Officer and the Commander-in-Chief know that that situation continued to obtain up to December 7?

A. I'm practically sure that they did. The Commander-in-Chief was very aware of the spare part problem with which we were confronted with reference to the 54 planes of the PBY5 type.

69. Q. Whose responsibility was it to order distance reconnaissance when it was indicated that there was a probability of an attack on Oahu?

A. I would assume it to have been that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. If an emergency was apparent, I would have taken the initiative, and I am very sure that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District would have taken the initiative, but lacking definite information, then, in view of the employment of forces involved, it becomes a question of authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

70. Q. Admiral, please outline the patrols that were maintained prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941.

A. There were three planes on patrol on the morning of 7 December 1941 whose job was to search the operating areas being utilized by units of the Fleet on that day in the early morning. This form of security patrol was a daily routine occurrence in accordance with instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. That was from Oahu. From Midway, seven planes were conducting a search between 120 to 170 degrees from Midway for a distance of 450 miles.

71. Q. Was that also a normal routine search?

A. The one from Midway was a special search, conforming to an operation directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

72. Q. Were there any normal, daily searches made from Midway by patrol planes?

A. When planes are based on an island, they conducted search operations from that island, but, normally, they were not based on Islands except for special circumstances.

73. Q. Please relate, if it is within your knowledge, the searches conducted from Midway on 6 December 1941.

A. On 29 November, a squadron at Midway was directed to search area within 100 miles of Midway daily and to be prepared to shift base to Wake. There is an operation order issued by me as Commander, Task Force 9, to Patrol Squadrons 21 and 22 and Commander, Task Group 9.2, which required prescribed flights on certain days from Midway. On December 5, the requirement was to search Sector 126-168 to 525 miles, using 6 planes. The searches from Midway and also from Wake were in connection with a task force that was augmenting air strength on Wake, and the completion of that assignment in connection with Wake was supposed to be on the 5th of December, I believe. The operation order that I'm referring to is in Mailgram from ComTaskForce-Nine, No. 292103 of November, 1941. I do not recall the searches made from Midway on 6 December 1941.

[126] 74. Q. Admiral, with respect to the conditions of readiness prescribed in the estimate, please relate the condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, prior to the attack.

A. The following was the condition of readiness of patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two on the morning of December 7: VP-21: 7 planes in the air conducting search 120 degrees to 170 degrees to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; 4 planes on the surface at Midway armed, each with two 500-lb. bombs and on 10 minute notice. VP-11 at Kaneohe: 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-12 at Kaneohe: 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice: 5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-14 at Kaneohe: 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol, armed with depth charges; 3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice; 4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-22 at Pearl Harbor: 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-23 at Pearl Harbor: 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-24 at Pearl Harbor: 4 planes in the air conducting intertype tactics with U. S. submarines; 1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. All planes were equipped with machine guns and ammunition.

75. Q. What planes for distant reconnaissance did General Rudolph's routine report of 5 or 6 December make ready to you for that week-end?

A. In a dispatch dated December 5, from the Headquarters, Hawaiian Air Force, stated that there were available 8 B-17's, 21 B-18's, and 6 A-20's, all in Condition Easy 5, which is as follows: "All aircraft conducting routine operations. None ready for the purpose of this plan. Degree of readiness: All types, 4 hours." Of the above planes, the only types for really effective search missions were the B-17 type. The B-18 and the A-20 were effective for short-range bombing.

76. Q. Who established this condition of readiness with respect to the Navy planes?

A. The condition of readiness of aircraft, with respect to air raid precautions, was set by the Commander, Naval Base Defense, or higher authority.

77. Q. Were you satisfied with the prescribed condition of readiness, if you recollect?

A. With the work in hand and under the conditions as I saw them, yes. One must remember that the situation in the Pacific, so far as anticipating an emergency, had been going on for sometime.

78. Q. Admiral, you have testified with respect to the report of available planes made to you by the Army. Did you make a similar report of naval planes available, addressed to the Army?

A. I did.

79. Q. Will you please give us the substance of that report?

A. On 6 December. I quote a dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, from Commander, Naval Defense Air Force: "7 fighters, 5 Condition 5. 9 scouts, 3 Condition 4, 6 Condition 5." Condition 4 means all types ready in two hours. Condition 5 means all types ready in four hours.

80. Q. Did this include the Marine Corps planes available ashore?

A. I think that this was entirely the Marines, although I'm not positive. I quote another dispatch from the Marine Air Group in reporting their readiness to Commander, Patrol Wing Two: "18 scout bombers: 3 Condition 4. 15 [127] scout bombers, Condition 5. For December 5, 6, and 7."

81. Q. Admiral, we do not have your Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41. Was that plan actually in effect prior to the attack?

A. The plan, as a plan that would go into a functioning state when put into such a state, was in effect prior to December 7, but the plan was not a functioning affair except when placed into being.

82. Did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor place it into being?

A. The Japanese attack did place it into being. There were no orders received by me from any higher authority prior to starting all action that could be taken.

83. Q. The plans, then, for coordination and exchange of planes between the Army and Navy, became effective with the initiation of the Japanese attack?

A. It did.

84. Q. How many of the Army planes reported available actually reported to you after the attack was initiated and the plan became effective?

A. That is a question I was never able to find out. It finally became a question of asking General Rudolph to get planes going as soon as he could on prescribed searches which I requested. We did have certain information as to what the Army sent out but I never was convinced of the accuracy of what actually went out and what they actually did.

85. Q. Were communications established between any of these Army bombers and you as the Air Commander?

A. No. The control of communications between the plane and the base was internal in the Army, and the Navy did not have communications with the Army planes in the air. Any communications to or from the planes was transmitted to the Army planes from the Army Base. That condition prevailed for several months after December 7 when it was finally arranged to set up a communication arrangement within

the bombing planes of the Army so that we could get communication direct with all planes, Army and Navy, that were functioning on the same mission.

86. Q. Do you know if any of the Army planes established communications with your subordinates in the air after the attack was initiated?

A. No, none that I know of, and I'm sure that there was none.

[128] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

87. Q. In general, Admiral Bellinger, what was the state—what was the adequacy of radio communications available to you for handling your aircraft in the air?

A. We were actually able to communicate with planes in the air from our Base. The communication system utilized was the installations at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. To meet the various conditions of air operations that were required, considerably more communication facilities were established both at Kaneohe and at Pearl, even to the extent of building, subsequent to December the 7th, a communication and air control center. The difficulty of communication between Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe, itself, was considerable.

88. Q. Did communication or radio matters of this type, that is, the material angle, come under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and his Communications Officer—that is, base?

A. The shore-based installations came under the air stations which, in turn, came under the Commandant.

89. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District familiar with your deficiencies in the radio field?

A. I feel that he was familiar with it, because I endeavored to keep him acquainted with deficiencies.

90. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, familiar with this problem?

A. Yes, I feel very sure he was familiar with it.

91. Q. Admiral, was any remedial action taken by your superiors with respect to your communications deficiencies prior to December 7?

A. Yes. I would say the answer to that question is, "Yes." Action was being taken, an effort was being made to improve deficiencies, but the question was always, with us, would the deficiencies be provided in time.

92. Q. And it turned out they were not?

A. Not in all respects. I would like to refer to a letter, which was one of the first letters I wrote upon my arrival in Pearl Harbor, concerning deficiencies with which I was concerned in that area. This is a confidential letter, File Number 022, of 16 January 1941, from Commander Patrol Wing Two, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: "Patrol Wing Two—readiness of."

93. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter which has been obtained from the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Is that the letter to which you refer?

A. It is.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Secret-Confidential Files

of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 24".

[129] 94. Q. Admiral, of the planes reported by you as available to the Army, how many of these planes actually reported to the Army after the attack was initiated?

A. That, I am unable to say. I feel very sure that the planes referred to were the Marine planes based at Ewa, and I feel very sure that these Marine planes were damaged by machine-gun fire from enemy planes on December 7.

95. Q. Admiral, were you advised of a contact with a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. No.

96. Q. I mean, it happened prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. Prior to the attack?

97. Q. Yes.

A. No, I was not informed, evidently, because of my being laid up, as soon as I might otherwise have been informed. One reason for the delay in the knowledge of the presence of an enemy submarine was the fact that the dispatch informing the forces of this fact were coded, which caused delay both in sending and in receiving.

98. Q. Do you know if any of your subordinates were informed of this contact prior to the time the Japanese launched their air attack?

A. This is a narrative of events in accordance with data taken from an official letter prepared by me on 20 December: "0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL'. 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805."

99. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation—

A. (Interposing) Excuse me. You asked me when did I know about that?

100. Q. Yes.

A. I didn't know about it until I arrived at the office. My first information was by telephone from my Operations Officer that we were under air attack. The plane that sighted and attacked the submarine assumed that he sank or damaged same. This was, I believe, the opinion expressed by the destroyer which aided also in the attack.

101. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation, enclosed with Exhibit 22, in its list of decisions, states: "Provided a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when * * * (c) information is received that attack has been made on Fleet units." I assume that the operation plan which was built around this estimate contained a similar provision. Do you consider that the episode of the submarine would have the effect of placing your operations plan into

execution as soon as this information reached the higher command authorities?

A. That is a doubtful question, whether it would have or not, so far as the Army aircraft were concerned.

[130] 102. Q. Admiral, was any attempt made, that you know of, at your Command Headquarters, to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to the Army Air Forces authorities?

A. I don't know of any action of that kind. It went to the Commander-in-Chief's office, his Staff Duty Officer. I don't think it went to the Army. Normally, it would not have gone to the Army because it is doubtful what action they would have taken in connection with that particular submarine. There was grave doubt in the mind of the pilot of the plane, at the first sighting, whether that was an enemy submarine or merely one of our submarines, on account of its location relative to the destroyer, and its location relative to the entrance, but having no information of a U. S. submarine in that area, he then definitely assumed that it must be an enemy submarine.

103. Q. If a message had been relayed to the Army that an enemy submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your air operating plan in effect?

A. I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority in the Army to place it in effect. Now, in order to amplify that statement, I would like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army subsequent to the joint estimate and orders issued setting up the air defense plan. During one night, prior to the operations for the next day, I received a message stating that the Bomber Command was no longer subject to the orders of Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I wondered what was the matter. I finally found out that the Army wanted to revert to the old "Joint Action" wherein, if the Navy wanted the Army to assist, it was necessary for the Navy command to so request the Army. Therefore, in the early morning, at 5:00 o'clock, the Army Bomber Command asked if I was going to request the Army to assist. I informed him that I did not understand that that was necessary in our agreement, that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was the only one to ask the Army to assist. He stated he would like to participate in this drill. I said I would give him the information and he could act as he saw fit, and in accordance with his orders. After that, I made an official report of same to the Commander-in-Chief and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General Short, trying to straighten this out. In other words, to place the plan for air defense into effect evidently required authorization from higher Army authority for each instance. My letter, just referred to, was designed to correct that situation.

104. Q. Admiral, please outline the operations of the Search and Attack Group under your command, after the attack was initiated by the Japanese.

A. In accordance with my data, which I think is correct, planes of various types, including patrol planes, utility planes, VOVS planes, and Army planes—were dispatched covering sectors primarily from the North through Southwest. Three B-17's were requested to make the flight covering a sector through 165 True to 095. This was at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from certain information, felt that the Japanese carrier force was in that area.

Eight utility, eleven patrol planes, and six VOVS planes, and nine SBD planes were the Navy planes participating. The total Army planes participating were five B-17's, three B-18's, and six A-20's.

105. Q. What else, upon what information was the choice of sectors to be searched based?

A. Wind direction, the general relative strategic locations, and the general information as developed from the departing Japanese planes.

106. Q. Do you know what information the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had as a basis of the search to the southeasterly?

A. A radio bearing, I presume.

[131] 107. Q. Admiral, please give us, along broad lines, such information or even impressions as you had, say, November, 1941, as regards the ability of the Army Interceptor Command to carry out its commitments toward protecting Pearl Harbor from an air raid.

A. My impression might be expressed by saying that the Army was not ready to perform their part in the protection of Pearl Harbor, and I might say that the need for training of their personnel was one of the reasons brought up for their reluctance to have air raid drills prior to December the 7th. I would say that they were not ready, from the point of view of their radar installations, their ability to control their fighter groups, in the number of planes they had, and in the quality of the general run of their pilots.

108. Q. Did you ever advise either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch to that effect?

A. Not in so many words, but there were conversations in regard to what the Army was able to do and in regard to the number of planes, and it was also known that the Air Control Center of the Army Interceptor Command was in process of being organized.

109. Q. During your association with the Army, did you ever detect any prevalent belief that they expected the Navy's forces at sea to intercept a carrier raid?

A. No, but in discussing various plans with the Commanding General, Air Force, Hawaiian Area, he apparently expected the Navy to have early information of the movement of enemy forces, so that a raid might be anticipated more definitely.

110. Q. Have you any idea upon what they based that impression?

A. He assumed that the intelligence service would give that information and he seemed surprised when I told him that we should not expect such information.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

111. Q. Did you know, prior to 7 December, of Admiral Yamamoto's previous experience with the Navy Air?

A. Yes, I think so.

112. Were you ever told anything about his personal characteristics?

A. I have read—I'm not sure whether it was prior to December 7, or not, about his characteristics.

113. Q. You have testified concerning the inadequacy of our planes suitable for reconnaissance to extend the full 360 degrees search to the distance deemed requisite. Did it ever occur to you to have ready modified plan, confining the search to the most probable areas, so that

you would more or less build your suit in accord with the amount of cloth that was available?

A. Yes, and that was actually proved in practice in what we subsequently did with the planes we had available in the daily search that started on December 7.

114. Q. Did you ever get so far along that line as to have what might be termed an "As-Is" plan for air reconnaissance, based upon what was actually available?

A. Subsequent to December 7, there was a daily search conducted. There were so many planes available—

[132] 115. Q. Not before December 7?

A. We had search plans made to cover various distances and various sectors and depending upon the number of planes available for search, the sector to be placed in that part of the compass rose where the most logical location of enemy forces were assumed to be.

116. Q. In your previous testimony, I believe you stated that under the full 360 degree reconnaissance you expected about a fifty per cent chance of sighting an enemy within the waters covered; is that correct?

A. Correct.

117. Q. So that even if you had, prior to December 7, been supplied with planes and had actually carried on such a search, that fifty per cent measures about what you thought at the time of the chances. In the light of subsequent experience, what did you think of the correctness of that figure, fifty per cent?

A. I think the fifty per cent would be raised considerably because of the development of radar.

118. Q. Without radar?

A. The fifty per cent was based on twenty-five mile visibility and the various conditions of visibility in the Pacific are quite changeable. Perhaps fifty per cent may be underestimating, but in judging from reports of per cent of coverage of the sectors, assigned individual planes, on search flights subsequent to December 7, considerable areas were poorly covered on account of the weather condition.

119. Q. In view of that degree of probability of detection in a carrier raid, what other instrumentality, which would have been available on December 7, '41, would have given a greater measure of security?

A. You mean in addition to aircraft?

120. Q. No, in lieu of.

A. Considering what was available, I know of nothing more that would give more practical assurance of timely information.

121. Q. What about radar?

A. If radar had been available, then, as it is today, of course the search by planes would have been very much more effective.

122. Q. Was search radar not developed to a high degree of efficiency at that time?

A. No.

123. Q. Were our ships not equipped with search radar that was reasonably efficient at that time?

A. Some were equipped, but all of them were not equipped. Some few ships were equipped.

124. Q. How about those that had the equipment, were they not efficient?

A. They were not as effective as they are today. However, it was a great advantage to have radar and every effort was being made, I know, to get them on ships, particularly aircraft carriers.

125. Q. Radar on shore was under Army cognizance, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

[133] 126. Q. As far as you know, was the quality of the material available to the Army inefficient?

A. I would say that it was not completely effective; even sometime after Pearl Harbor, many planes arrived without being detected.

127. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that you had two commands during the weeks prior to December 7, one Commander of Patrol Wing Two, directly under Aircraft Scouting Force, who, in turn, came directly under the Commander-in-Chief; and, two, Naval Base Defense Air Officer, directly under the Naval Base Defense Officer, who was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who, in turn, came under the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir.

128. Q. All of the distance reconnaissances contemplated in your estimate of the situation, dated 31 March, contemplated by JCD-42 and the addendum thereto, would all be carried out in your capacity as Naval Base Defense Air Officer, would they not?

A. Yes.

129. Q. That being the case, would you give us your reasons why, earlier in the day, you said that you looked to the Commander-in-Chief and not to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for directives as to whether a long-distance reconnaissance was necessary because of developments?

A. Normally speaking, the reason for long-distance reconnaissance would be known to the Commander-in-Chief prior to its being known to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and, in view of the fact that the deployment of planes, as units of the Fleet, under the Commander-in-Chief, must be known to him in order that he would know what he had available to use at any time when he wanted to use them. So that, acting for the Commander-in-Chief, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District might start action, but presumably I would get the word from the Commander-in-Chief, perhaps at the same time that he got it. Although, in an emergency, the set-up of the organization did give the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, the authority to start action.

130. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff fully realize that you looked directly to them for instructions on distant reconnaissance rather than to the immediate superior under the plans, the Naval Base Defense Force Commander?

A. Actually, I looked to the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, and when I arranged or when a drill was arranged, it was arranged either by my initiating it to him or by his initiating it, but in view of my relationship with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, I felt that he should know how his planes were being employed and he always knew when a drill or operation of that kind was in progress.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of

record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[134] The witness made the following statement: Prior to his assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, I called upon Admiral Kimmel to offer my congratulations. During my visit he expressed his interest in the aviation situation in the Hawaiian area and indicated that when he assumed charge of the Pacific Fleet he would take steps to bring about a coordinated Army-Navy plan for air defense. Shortly after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet he sent for me and told me to report to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for the purpose of working out an Air Defense Plan in conjunction with the General in command of the Army Air Forces, Hawaiian Area. I proceeded on the duty assigned working closely with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Army Air Forces did not take the initiative in the preparation of the Air Defense Plan but followed along with the Navy, although it is stated in an official report of an Army-Navy Board concerning aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area, dated 31 October, 1941, signed by Major General Commanding Army Air Forces, Hawaiian Islands, and myself, "The mission of the Army in Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is: (1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation. (2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation." The joint estimate of the situation was practically in toto prepared by Patrol Wing Two and from this emanated the orders prepared by Patrol Wing Two and by the Army Air Forces. As a result, there were evolved plans and a skeletonized organization which were to be placed into effect either by higher authority or by an emergency. The basis of coordination was to be by mutual cooperation. Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little if any more in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:35 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. tomorrow.

[135] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1944

TENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 10:14 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Wilson Brown, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the President of the United States.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December, 1941, sir?

A. I was in command of what was known as Task Force 3 of the Pacific Fleet. My orders to sea duty designated me as Commander, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet. I am not quite sure whether my orders from the Navy Department were ever changed from Scouting Fleet to Commander of the Task Force. The thought has just occurred to me, I rather think they were, but my orders on December 7 as Commander, Scouting Force, may not be correct.

3. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you not have administrative duties in connection with the Scouting Force, in addition to your duties as Task Force Commander?

A. No, I never had any administrative duties. The administration was carried out by type commanders and as the Commander of the Scouting Force, I had no matters of administration. I had, by designation, some administrative duties ashore which had to do with some of the recreation bases for the men and other administrative duties that had to do with preparation for amphibious warfare.

4. Q. Did you perform such duties as the approval of the employment schedule, which included submarines and aircraft of the Scouting force?

A. I don't understand that.

[136] 5. Q. Did your duties include the approval of the quarterly employment schedule for submarines which were included in the Scouting Force?

A. No, the employment schedule for the Fleet was prepared by the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, after discussion and consultation with task force commanders, but the schedule was prepared by the Commander-in-Chief for the entire Fleet and all of its units.

6. Q. Admiral, will you please state where you personally were on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, which was my Flagship at that time. I arrived at Johnston Island almost at the exact moment that we received a dispatch that Pearl Harbor had been attacked.

7. Q. Admiral, this is a calendar covering that period; it is in columns here, sir. We would like, if you can give it, your statement as to where you were during the period from the 26th of November through the 6th of December?

A. Well, I tried to refresh my memory yesterday from reading the record that was given to me of the Roberts Board testimony, and there still remains in my mind some doubt as to whether I returned from a tour at sea of about ten days on the 26th of November or the 27th. It was about that time. In other words, I know that I left Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December. I had been in Pearl Harbor for a period of about one week, possibly eight days, and if it was a week, that would have meant returning on the 28th, and if it was ten days, it would have meant returning on the 26th. So there is an element of doubt in my mind as to when I arrived. I could find out from my record, if it is a matter of moment.

8. Q. Admiral, you stated that you returned to Pearl Harbor, after a period at sea, at about the 26th to the 28th of November. Could you please state how long you had been at sea prior to your return at that time?

A. Not with certainty. My belief is that it was a period of about eight or nine days at sea.

Q. How long had you been in port prior to that period at sea?

A. I have records at home from which I can give those exact dates, but my memory is not sufficiently accurate for me to attempt to say without consulting them. In general, the periods at sea and the periods in port varied between one week and ten days.

Memo: The examining officer directed the witness to consult his records and make such further response as they indicate necessary to complete his answer before verifying his testimony.

A. (Continued. See Record Page 170.) My personal records indicate that Task Force 3 returned to Pearl Harbor from sea on 26 November; remained in port until 5 December and sailed for assigned missions at sea on 5 December.

10. Q. Admiral, as a Task Force Commander, and one of the senior Admirals of the Pacific Fleet, during the period preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, it is believed that you were familiar with the em-

ployment and training of the Fleet and the reasons for such employment; also with the security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Please outline, briefly, the facts within your knowledge with respect thereto and state your opinion at the time as to the soundness of the methods used, particularly with respect [137] to the possible sacrifice of some elements of security to further training.

A. I would like to divide my answer in two parts. First, I should like to refer to the statement that as a senior Task Force Commander I was "familiar with the security measures". I think that statement is not accurate. I was not familiar with the details of the employment of submarines, of the extent and nature of the air search, of the Army defense measures, or with the measures of internal defense on the Island of Oahu, other than in the most general terms as I was able to gather them from frequent conferences held by the Commander-in-Chief with the Army and with the Navy on various subjects. I was also not familiar with the details of the defense measures under way to establish the security of the outlying Islands: Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, and Midway, except that I knew that the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District were bending every effort to complete the defense of those outposts before the outbreak of war. To answer the second part of the question, about the effect of training on security measures of the Fleet, I would like to go back to a period six months before December 7 when the Fleet was divided into three task forces. That reorganization assigned to me the task of developing the technique and assembling materials for amphibious warfare. Before the reorganization, I had expressed my keen interest in that subject and a conviction that the Fleet should develop a major part of its energy to that form of naval warfare. Therefore, during the six months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, my own energies and the energies of my Staff were directed primarily to the subject of amphibious warfare. We also took part in Fleet tactical problems which were held for the training of officers and men in the Fleet, and involved a vast amount of work and preparation for review on the game board at the completion of exercises. For over a year before Pearl Harbor, I believe that all major task force commanders recognized that the primary mission of the Fleet was one of training, because of the large naval building program then in progress and the known need of rapid education of officers and men to man the ships that would soon join the Fleet. During that year, it is my impression that we must have had at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break with the Japanese at any moment. At each alarm, the question arose and was debated as to whether we should take defensive measures or whether we should continue our training. By "defensive measures", I mean whether each ship of the Fleet should go to Condition Three, which would involve so many night watches that little could be accomplished during daytime in training and education. My feeling was, and I think it was shared by most of the others, that in order to complete our training as far as possible, we must continue training exercises until the moment that war developed, which is what happened in the Fleet. During the last days of November, 1941, the subject of defense measures was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief

in conference with a group of senior officers, of whom I was one. My recollection of those conferences is that our greatest concern was the security of the outlying islands. We had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when they declared war, when the Japanese decided to go to war. We had discussed the possibility of an air raid on the Islands and my own opinion was that it was possible but highly improbable, and that Fleet dispositions should be made for the defense of Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, rather than for the defense of Pearl Harbor, where we all believed the greatest threat was from local sabotage. On December 7, two of the three task forces were at sea, all engaged in some form of support for the outlying Islands, while continuing sea training in going to and from assigned stations. My own Task Force Three was divided into two parts, the carrier and two of the cruisers and some destroyers [138] were enroute to Wake Island with Marines and air reinforcements. I had the INDIANAPOLIS with six old destroyers converted to sweepers engaged in an attack mission and exercise on Johnston Island. We had with us, at the time, a number of the local authorities on South Sea Island formations. They were with us for the purpose of demonstrating what could be done with dynamite to break through barrier reefs on the weather side to a sufficient extent to allow small boats to attack from the weather side, rather than from the lee side where the attack might be expected. I cite that simply to indicate that my particular group were at Johnston because of our preoccupation with the exposed position and the probability that if an attack was directed at the Hawaiian Islands, those outlying stations would be attacked first before they were ready to defend themselves; while the second part of my task force was engaged on a similar mission to Wake. It is my recollection that Admiral Halsey had taken reinforcements to Midway. I'm not sure. He was up in the neighborhood for some purpose connected with the reinforcement of one of the outlying islands. I would like to complete the comment on that phase with the statement that as I look back on the year 1941, I feel that the entire Fleet, officers and men, were very conscious that war was coming, that all hands were working to their utmost endurance to accomplish as much for the improvement of the Fleet as they could in whatever time might remain available to use for preparation, and that spirit animated all hands through that year.

11. Q. Admiral, how frequently did you confer with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning matters of importance to the Fleet?

A. I think it is correct to say that, in general, the task forces were at sea nearly sixty per cent of their time, and in port about forty per cent. During the time in port, reviews of tactical exercises were held on the game board and such reviews usually required about two days. During the week before December 7, I think I was in almost daily conference with the Commander-in-Chief. During previous weeks, I think I always had at least one and sometimes more during our period in port. In other words, I was present a greater number of times the first week in December than at any other time.

12. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views freely to you with respect to Fleet activities?

A. I don't know that I can answer that question. Admiral Kimmel always had a definite purpose in mind in sending for me and he usually had very clear-cut instructions to issue or definite questions to ask. I think he was more apt to ask other people's opinion than he was to tell other people his own until he was ready to issue instructions, and when he issued instructions they were clear-cut and positive.

13. Q. Admiral, were you kept informed of intelligence received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning the international situation and the movement of the Japanese land and naval forces?

A. All senior officers received the naval intelligence bulletins. The Commander-in-Chief showed some of us some of his correspondence with the Department. I have no way of telling whether he showed us all that he received, or not. My feeling is that it was his wish to keep the senior officer fully informed of the situation and what he was doing about it, and what he looked to us to do about it. His method of carrying out that wish was to send for us when he wished to issue instructions or seek our counsel. And, at that time, he would pass around a file of dispatches which we read there in his office, in turn. That method had the virtue of limiting knowledge of controversies and alarms to a small group. It had the disadvantage that sometimes [139] we had to read dispatches while others were talking and discussion was going on that I found interfered with my strict attention to what I was reading. I go into that detail because I wish to explain why, in the Roberts Board hearing, I was not able to say positively whether I had seen all of the dispatches that they showed me, or not. I feel I was shown, while I was in port, all of the important messages. Whether I saw the particular one that they quoted of 27 November, I do not yet remember.

14. Q. Admiral, were the Commanding Generals of the Army stationed in Hawaii present at any of these conferences which you attended with the Commander-in-Chief?

A. They were present, at about half of them, I should say.

15. Q. And they were advised of information in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and consulted in the manner you have outlined as to the method used to consult you and the other senior naval officers, were they?

A. I think so. I could see no distinction between Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. The Commander-in-Chief summoned those whose duties had to do with the subject he had to discuss, and when it was a matter of security, naturally the Army was just as much involved, or possibly more, than any of us at sea.

16. Q. In discussing dispatches and intelligence information received, did the Commander-in-Chief express his interpretation of the meaning of such information for the benefit of other officers?

A. I think, as a rule, the dispatches spoke for themselves pretty clearly. I can't recollect any particular dispatch that left any doubt in the mind of the readers what it meant. If you have particularly in mind the warning that was imminent, which was the general tenor of the message that was received on the 27th of November, as I understand it, it is my recollection that there was a prolonged discussion as to what that might involve for our forces and what we should do about it, and what our opinion was about the probable developments; where the Japanese would attack, and when, and how.

17. Q. And opinions with respect to such matters were freely expressed and welcomed?

A. Yes.

18. Q. Did this also include action being contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the light of such information? '41, when the Commander-in-Chief contemplated very radical changes

A. I remember quite distinctly an alarm that we had in February, in the movement of ships, the assemblage of forces, because of the threatened outbreak of war, and I remember that I, for one, advised against making any such changes at that time on the general theory that the changes contemplated would have seriously delayed many of our training processes and set us back probably as much as a month. And I remember that my feeling then in February, '41, and also in November, '41, was, as I have stated before, that as far as the units of the Fleet were concerned, our training must remain the major effort until the moment of outbreak of war, which might require other dispositions.

19. Q. Admiral, do you recall seeing the dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on 16 October 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? This is the dispatch which I refer to; it is Exhibit 6 before this examination.

[140] A. I remember being informed of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and of the tense situation that could be expected to follow. I can't say definitely whether I saw this dispatch, or not. I was informed of the sense of it whether I saw the dispatch, or not.

20. Q. Do you recall any conference with respect to the situation as outlined in this dispatch held by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Not distinctly, but, as I said before, I think there were at least six alarms of similar nature in the course of the year 1941.

21. Do you recall, Admiral, any change of the deployment of the task forces or the disposition of vessels or aircraft made shortly after this date, 16 October 1941, which you may attribute to the directions contained in this dispatch, Exhibit 6?

A. I think that about that time the haste in the preparation of the outlying islands was increased, if that's possible. It certainly became a greater source of concern to all those in authority. I remember in my own case that I had prepared, about that time, a written recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief that shore defenses be established on the Rat Islands and a request that I be permitted to take a portion of my task force to visit the Aleutians. I sent in the recommendation about the defending the Aleutians. I did not send in my request to go up because of the strained situation and the evident necessity of keeping our naval forces concentrated.

22. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures effected shortly after that date which might be attributed to the dispatch of 16 October 1941?

A. Oh, yes. It is my impression that about that time all available anti-aircraft guns from the Army were assembled in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, and in view of the pitiful shortage of such weapons, that all available automatic weapons were borrowed from Marines and ships established in the general area of the Navy Yard and of the air fields. The Fleet had anti-aircraft watches prescribed, not

around the clock in order not to interfere too greatly with training. The practice from about October on was to have anti-aircraft ammunition at the guns. And as I look back on it, it seems to me that those measures were reasonable and probably as thorough as are now being carried out in various theatres of war. I noted with interest in visiting Africa that some of our air fields within easy bombing distance of enemy bases don't appear to be any more strongly defended than Pearl Harbor was during November, '41.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

23. Q. Admiral, you have already mentioned the dispatch of November 27, but, despite that, I would like to have you look at it as Exhibit 8 before this examination to see if you can now recall having seen it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. I remember being shown this report by the Roberts Committee. I did not then and I do not now remember seeing a dispatch which started, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." I was familiar, at the time, with the other statements made in this dispatch. Whether I obtained that message through reading it or being informed of it verbally, I do not now remember.

[141] 24. Q. Do you recall having seen in a dispatch any phrasing similar to what appears about the word "deployment", in this dispatch?

A. I think so, yes.

25. Q. Do you recall your reaction at the time to those words—any wonder as to the meaning, or what the Navy Department intended should be done by those orders, or in the light of those orders?

A. I think that the two task forces were sent to the general vicinity of the outlying islands in pursuance of those instructions.

26. Q. I understood, from your previous testimony, that those task forces were engaged in building up the defenses of those islands by carrying reinforcements in to them?

A. Yes, that is true; but they were also in a position to attack any attackers of those places.

27. Q. Were there instructions to remain there for that purpose?

A. No.

28. Q. But still you think that the movements of those forces did amount to the kind of deployment which is mentioned in that dispatch?

A. I remember that we discussed what we ought to do, as a result of the warning by the Department. What the Commander-in-Chief had in mind in directing these moves, beyond reinforcing the islands, I don't know. I do not recollect that any other course of action occurred to me at the time, such as, we will say, getting all hands to sea, and having the Fleet formed against an attack by the Japanese fleet, because the thought that the Japanese fleet would attack never occurred to me. I can only speak for myself. I don't know what the Commander-in-Chief had in his mind.

29. Q. Do you recall any quandary in your mind as to the apparent mixture of defensive and offensive attitude which seems to surround that phrasing?

A. No, sir; I do not, because I have no clear recollection of seeing this entire message, or in studying it, or discussing it. I remember only the general discussion for several days of what we ought to do to meet the threatened situation.

30. Q. Admiral, do you recollect the attendance of any of the Army high command at these discussions, at that time?

A. Yes.

In order to facilitate the verification of testimony given by Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who is now available, the examining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and that Rear Admiral Davis be recalled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

[142] Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination prior to the recalling of Rear Admiral Davis, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

31. Q. Did these discussions at which the Army was represented constitute a full and complete discussion of the entire situation in the Pacific, Admiral?

A. I don't remember ever attending a formal—a conference where the entire situation was discussed from beginning to end, as a formal, joint discussion of joint action.

32. Q. Did they go so far as to discuss courses of action which might be available to the Japanese in the event they decided to start a war against the United States?

A. My rather vague recollections of the discussions in which the Army took part are that they had mostly to do with internal security on the island, and secondly, with what shortages existed in defense weapons such as radar, antiaircraft weapons, and various forms of aircraft.

33. Q. Do you recall any discussion of a surprise air attack on Hawaii?

A. I remember one time, I would say in November, when somebody suggested that that might happen.

34. Q. Was the Army present at that time, sir?

A. I don't remember that. I remember that Admiral Halsey was present and that I expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully, and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment.

35. Q. Were you cognizant, at that time, of the personal characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, in general, as a naval officer, but in particular as regards his interest and work in building up the Japanese Naval Air Force?

A. I knew that Admiral Yamamoto was a very zealous, enterprising officer. I knew that the Japanese Naval Air Force was considered to

be much more efficient than the Army Air Force. My erroneous belief, at that time, was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. I based that opinion on a conversation I had with an American who had spent twenty years in Japan as head of the Singer Sewing Machine, sometime late in November. That gentleman was brought to my cabin by my Intelligence Officer because of the opportunities that he had had to observe the Japanese at first-hand. He stated that of course he had had no opportunity to observe either naval or Army fliers, but that the civilian aviation in Japan was so badly kept up that the Singer Sewing Machine Company had issued instructions to all their employees forbidding them to ever ride in Japanese commercial aviation, and that the general belief was that the Army and the Navy were not very much better. I do not remember ever seeing intelligence reports, prior to Pearl Harbor, that gave a different picture of the skill of the Japanese fliers.

36. Q. Do you recollect any change in the employment of the vessels and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet occurring between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, which you may attribute to the receipt of the information contained in this dispatch; other than the movements you have already referred to?

A. The published schedule of employment had to do only with the dates on [143] which task forces would go to sea and the date on which they would return. Their employment during periods at sea was usually not settled until a few days before leaving port, so that I do not know how the forces might have been employed the week before Pearl Harbor, had we not realized that war was imminent.

37. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures which were placed in effect during that week which you may attribute to the receipt of the dispatch or the information contained therein?

A. I don't remember the date when instructions were issued about the anti-aircraft alert, and special anti-submarine instructions, but sometime during November, I feel sure that we were all warned to be more,—very much on guard, be prepared for air attack, be prepared and always on guard against submarine attack. I can not say when those instructions were given. I am inclined to think that they were reiterated from time to time during November, probably October.

38. Q. Admiral, the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November that you have before you now contains a directive in general terms regarding certain deployments. Do you recall whether or not in the discussions of the contents of this dispatch, any mention was made of the necessity of reporting to the Navy Department what deployments or what defensive measures had been carried out pursuant to this directive?

A. No, I don't remember; but I would not be apt to be consulted about what report would be made to the Department.

39. Q. Admiral, normally would you consider that the recipient of such a directive as that you have before you should make a report to the Navy Department of what had been done pursuant to that?

A. No, I would not except it. I would not have made a report, had I been in Admiral Kimmel's position.

40. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this document which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?

A. I undoubtedly was familiar, at that time, with this order. I had forgotten about it up to the present moment, except that it confirms what I had said before, that it was my impression that the Fleet had been made conscious of possibilities and directed to be on guard.

41. Q. Did you feel, Admiral, prior to the December 7 attack, that this order adequately provided for the security of your task force while at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. I was very conscious that the defenses of Pearl Harbor were quite inadequate in anti-aircraft guns, radar, and planes—types and numbers of planes. I was also aware that these shortages had been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Department, and that we were informed that it was not possible to meet those shortages because of more pressing needs in the war in the Atlantic.

42. Q. Will you elaborate that reply in so far as concerns the ability of the Army on Oahu to meet its commitments toward the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. It is my recollection that I overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to what equipment the Army had to defend Pearl [144] Harbor against enemy air attack, and that General Short replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.

43. Q. In those discussions, or at other times, did you ever hear anything which gave you the impression that the highest Army command echelons expected our Fleet to intercept any carrier raid initiated by the Japanese?

A. I don't know that I ever overheard any discussion with the Army about a carrier raid, but it was my understanding then, and it is my understanding now, that at that time the general agreement between the Army and Navy was that the Navy should do the scouting at sea and the Army's function was to attack the enemy when located by the Navy.

44. Q. But you do not recall hearing of any impression that the Army was depending upon the ships of the Pacific Fleet to intercept a carrier raid?

A. Not that they were depending upon the ships, but I would have expected them to depend upon naval planes to discover the approach of the enemy.

45. Q. While your task force was at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, did you, on your own initiative, prescribe any additional security measures?

A. I did not. I felt that the instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief were well considered and thorough.

46. Q. To what extent did you feel that the vessels of the Fleet present at Pearl Harbor would be required to contribute to the defense of Pearl Harbor in the event of an air attack?

A. Knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, I think the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense, while in Pearl Harbor, as well as at sea.

47. Q. Admiral, this Exhibit No. 4, provides, under part G, which is labeled "Defense Against Air Attack", that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, advise the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain."

Were you, at any time, the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, that is, any time prior to December 7?

A. I think not. I was the junior of the three Task Force Commanders—wait a minute—I might have been. I would like to change that—I may have been.

48. Q. Under the setup here established, did you feel that you would have prescribed conditions of readiness to be maintained by the vessels present, or that you should rely on the advice of the Commandant in this respect?

A. I had complete confidence that the orders issued by the Commandant were all that the circumstances required.

49. Q. Do you recall having received any advice or orders concerning the condition of readiness to be maintained by vessels in Pearl Harbor?

A. Not prior to December 7.

50. Q. The schedule of employment for the Fleet was a printed document, was it not?

A. Yes, it was in the form of a graph which showed the periods at sea for each task force, the general nature of their employment at sea, and periods in port and that covered a period, I think, of about three months.

[145] 51. Q. Was the quarterly issue in effect that which was to terminate at the end of December?

A. Yes, sir.

52. Q. Were there a good many copies printed and issued?

A. I do not know about that. I'm trying to think how many were issued to my own force; I can not say; I know that the information was treated as confidential, not as secret, that for at least six months a very determined effort had been made to impress on all hands the necessity for being very cautious in ever discussing fleet movements; the families were well indoctrinated with the idea that they might be tricked into answering a question as to whether their husbands were in port or out; that very severe penalties were threatened to anybody who was not security conscious; but, of course, I believe that the Japanese were quite familiar with everything about our proposed schedule.

53. Q. You think it is quite possible that the Japanese, in effect, had a copy of that employment schedule?

A. I think it is quite probable.

54. Q. As you recall, do you think it was essential to print scheduled movements of ships of the Fleet so far in advance?

A. Not essential, but it was very helpful in planning work and educational training schedules. I did not think of it, at the time, as being an unwise practice; as I look back on it now, I think it would have been better had we not issued it.

55. Q. We have considerable testimony from other officers of the Pacific Fleet to the effect that there was rather common agreement that if the Japanese made a surprise attack upon Hawaii, it most likely would be either by submarine or by saboteurs. Did you entirely share that opinion in October–November, '41?

A. I did.

56. Q. Then you considered the possibility of a carrier air raid extremely slight?

A. I thought it extremely slight.

57. Q. During those last few days prior to 7 December, when your own task force was in Pearl Harbor, did it ever occur to you that they were in a dangerous position and, during this period of waiting, would be better off at sea?

A. No, on the contrary, I felt, as I have said before, that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of my misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. I did not consider the air a menace. I was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. And I thought it very necessary—because of the intensity of the training schedule at sea and the hours that men were called upon to work, that when they returned to port they should get rest and diversion in preparation for the following tour at sea. Perhaps, I may be permitted to say at this time that I had watched the threat of war with Japan, of course, with tremendous interest. I directed the thoughts and studies of my Staff to all the books about the Japanese and the Japanese methods of waging war. My Staff and I were in almost daily conference, discussion, about possibilities. My own estimate in December was that the Japanese, having observed a reactionary Congress and the reluctance of the people of the United States to go to war, would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the [146] Dutch or the British. I probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation.

58. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, on 3 December 1941. It is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Are you familiar, or were you familiar, with that dispatch prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think so, but I am not certain as it must have come about the time I went to sea. I believe, however, that I did see it and I do not remember to have been impressed by the significance of the alleged instructions to Japanese representatives in Manila and Washington. It occurs to me now, however, that the inclusion of Manila and Washington does not necessarily indicate an intention to attack us but might be in order that they would not be found at fault in case we made war because of their attack on one of our—because of their attack against another country.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, as well as our own losses at Midway and the Coral Sea, fully demonstrated the ability of Japanese naval fliers to inflict heavy damage on naval vessels no matter how well ships might be prepared for attack nor how fully manned the then anti-aircraft batteries. These demonstrations of the ability and determination of Japanese fliers must now make it evident

to all that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were always free to pick the date and hour of attack. It seems to me that to find fault with individuals for the lack of weapons, for the lack of alertness, or for incomplete deployment will not assure security for the future. On the other hand, the high state of efficiency maintained while doubling the size of our Fleet in two years, the seamanship, gunnery, and fighting ability of our Navy during two years of war reflects the quality of our naval leadership and of our training processes during the pre-war period as well as during the war period. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese dared to risk an attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses; and their so-called diplomatic agents on the spot were able to direct the moment of attack. I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 11:45 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Saturday, March 18, 1944.

[147] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 18, 1944

ELEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:35 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the tenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain M. E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and sixth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. William Satterlee Pye; Read Admiral, United States Navy; president, Naval War College, and Commandant of the Naval Operating Base, Newport.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. Commander, Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, and Commander of Task Force One.

3. Q. How long had you been with the Pacific Fleet and in what capacities?

A. From the 6th of July, 1937, to July, 1939, as Commander, Flotilla One, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from July, 1939, until January, 1940, as Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet; from January, 1940, to January, 1941, I was Commander, Battleships, United States Fleet; from January, 1941, until after Pearl Harbor, Commander, Battle Force, United States Fleet.

[148] 4. Q. On 7 December, '41, were you the Senior Officer Present in the Pacific Fleet other than the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I was.

5. Q. Admiral, as best you can recall, will you give the periods, working back from December 7, during which you were in port for the four months preceding December 7?

A. I was in port previous to December 7 from Thursday, November 27. I had been at sea with my Task Force since November 21. Preceding that period, I can not recall the exact dates of being in port and at sea, but the general program was one-third of the time at sea and two-thirds in port, the Fleet being operated in three task forces. As I recall, it was about the middle of October until early in November that I had been on the West Coast with a temporarily organized task force. This task force left Honolulu for the West Coast somewhere around the 14th or 15th of October.

5a. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with Admiral Kimmel with regard to the frequency with which he consulted with you, and the completeness of his consultations?

A. When the Commander-in-Chief moved his headquarters ashore, he turned over to me, in effect, the training program, particularly that of Task Force 1, but, on each occasion when Task Force 1 had a period at sea, one of the other task forces worked with us for one day on tactical maneuvers. My effort during this period in Honolulu was primarily directed toward the training of the forces of the Fleet. In that respect, my consultations with the Commander-in-Chief were frequent. In regard to the general conditions, it was his practice, at least once upon each period in which I was in port, to call me to his office to show me those dispatches which he considered to be of interest, both with regard to the Fleet and to the general situation. He frequently also showed me letters which he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, it was customary for him to call in his Intelligence Officer and to have him explain the situation of the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known or assumed by the Intelligence Section of his Staff. I considered Admiral Kimmel to have the greatest interest in all matters pertaining to the efficiency of the Fleet or to the use of the Fleet in the event of war. I have never known any Commander-in-Chief in the United States Fleet to be more interested in the training or activities of the Fleet. Due to the large amount of correspondence with regard to matériel, the general logistics situation, and to the international situation, he felt that he could not devote as much attention to training as he would like to have done and, therefore, gave me the responsibility for that particular function.

6. Q. Sir, in arriving at his decisions of a major nature, was it Admiral Kimmel's practice to consult freely, not only with members of his Staff, but also with other senior officers of the Fleet, to give full consideration to their advice, and did you feel that in forming his own decisions he acted on this advice?

A. I feel that during the three or four months preceding the war of December 7, that Admiral Kimmel consulted with all of the Flag Officers to obtain their reaction to the situation as he assumed it to be, and their opinion as to what could be done with the forces available in the event of war. About five months before the war, or December 7, a plan was developed for the use of the Fleet which included an air attack on the Marshall Islands by the carrier groups, supported by the battle line. This plan had been developed to the point where we considered it advisable to play it in the method of a chart maneuver. It was impossible to keep this maneuver going at the usual rate, but he did direct the various task group commanders to [149] make maneuvers corresponding to periods of time, whereupon all of their tracks of their respective forces were noted on a master plot in the Headquarters and any contacts noted, assuming that the Japanese forces would operate as the Commander-in-Chief's Staff considered that they would operate, that is, the Japanese Staff estimate was planned by Admiral Kimmel's Staff; the ships were maneuvered as they though such forces would operate. This chart maneuver had been carried on for a period of approximately a month but the game time was much less. Because of the frequent absence of forces from port, actually represented a period of about one week in game time. I cite this to show that the plan for the use of the Fleet as it existed had been made out with all Flag officers and Commanders, Task Forces, cognizant of it, and that we were endeavoring, by the use of the strategic chart maneuver, to throw some light on the soundness of the plan. With respect to the general situation, as Commander of Task Force 1, every time I came into port, I was informed of the situation so far as Admiral Kimmel understood it and was asked my opinion as to the significance of the messages or letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he showed me.

7. Q. Admiral, during this period, what was the situation as regards frequency of consultation with the high echelons of Army officers present in Oahu at that time?

A. That, I'm unable to say. Personally, I attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army high command.

8. Q. Admiral, with respect to your consultations with Admiral Kimmel, you were primarily concerned with Fleet operations, is that not correct, sir?

A. That's correct; only with Fleet Operations.

9. The Army, of course, was concerned with security features. Would you say this was the reason you would most likely not be present when Admiral Kimmel consulted with the Army?

A. I should say so. As far as concerned the defense of the Fleet in port and of the area immediately adjacent to the Island, there were two people, other than myself, who were primarily responsible for advice to the Commander-in-Chief, namely, Commander of the Army Forces and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

10. Q. What did you consider to be the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet during the latter half of the year, 1941?

A. Training for the conduct of war, in order to be able to start operations immediately upon the declaration of war.

11. Q. Please outline, generally, the war tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the war plans then existing during the latter half of 1941.

A. The plan was to use the Fleet to create as much activity as possible in the Eastern Mandate area, to force the Japanese to send naval forces and air forces there in order to reduce as much as possible the strength of the enemy available in the Philippines and China Coast area.

12. Q. At that time, that is during the last six months of 1941, did you feel that the training mission of the Fleet was occupying such a predominate position in the minds of the Commanding Officers that the war tasks were being relegated to the background of the picture?

A. I did not, although I think the training was carried out more extensively than it ever had been before, and, in my opinion, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it ever had attained on December 7. The fact that [150] we had plans, that we were engaged in a strategic exercise to determine how those plans could be carried into effect, is evidence that the war operations were not being neglected.

13. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, could you state, generally, what transfers were taking place as regards material and personnel to other areas other than the Pacific Fleet?

A. In June of 1941, there were detached from the battle force three battleships, four light cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, with orders to report to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. If I recall correctly, there had been detached one division of destroyers previous to that time; so that the power of the Pacific Fleet had been materially reduced in order to strengthen the forces in the Atlantic. I do not consider that this detachment would actually have made much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished, because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Pacific Fleet could not have operated more than 2500 miles from Honolulu, no matter what its strength. The number of tankers available had been seriously reduced and the amount of fuel oil in Honolulu storage had likewise been reduced to purely the amount that was considered necessary as a reserve.

14. Q. Sir, in addition to the detachment of the units which you mentioned in your answer, was there any widespread detachment of individual officers to either the Atlantic Fleet, or returned to the mainland to man new construction?

A. There was. I couldn't state the percentage, but there was a tremendous depletion of the personnel of the Pacific Fleet in order to man new construction.

15. Q. What protest or recommendations were made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in regard to detachments of both units of the Fleet and personnel?

A. I don't recall that I have seen or did see any of his official correspondence in that respect. However, I recall many letters, personal letters, to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to these detachments, in which he stated that the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet was being reduced to an unsatisfactory point for the conduct of war.

16. Q. Sir, do you recall the answer or reaction of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Navy Department, to these representations by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. The reactions I received from the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations was that the situation in the Atlantic was very much more

dangerous than the one in the Pacific and that the Atlantic had to be taken care of first.

17. Q. What was the state of mind on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, his Staff, and other senior officers of the Fleet, as to the correctness of this attitude on the part of the Department?

A. I can only state my own, it probably being indicative of theirs. The reaction in my mind was that whatever happened in the Pacific would be on the initiative of the United States; that I felt that our Government had decided that if we went into war, we would have to lick the Germans first, that we probably would not be engaged in war in the Pacific except at our own volition. I think that the basis of that was sound. I think that had the Japanese not attacked Pearl Harbor that we would have been months later in getting into the war in the Pacific. In my mind, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the worst psychological blunder that any nation has ever made.

[151] 18. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you expressed those opinions to the Commander-in-Chief and whether or not he made any statements to you as to whether or not he agreed or disagreed with your estimate?

A. I couldn't say that I ever used those words, because I don't think any of us felt that that attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. But I believe that that was the way most of us felt, and, confirming that as being the opinion in Washington, in a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations received about the time of the warning message, the Chief of Naval Operations used words somewhat of this tenor: "I do not know what this Country will do." In other words, it impressed me, and I think probably those others who saw it, that the option was going to rest with us.

19. Q. Admiral, on approximately what date did the Pacific Fleet move to Pearl Harbor as its base?

A. I think it was in April, 1940. We went out there presumably on a cruise anticipating remaining in Pearl Harbor for about a period of ten days, but before that ten day period was over, the Commander-in-Chief was directed to remain in Pearl Harbor, to retain the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

20. Q. Sir, when it became known to the Commander-in-Chief and to you and others that the decision had been made to base the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor indefinitely, what were your reactions to the wisdom of this decision?

A. There were two reactions. The first was that it was a move towards Japan, which might incite them to take action; and the second was that it was a very poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared to move to the westward in case of war, because of the lack of proper logistics support. I think that all officers recognized one great advantage in having the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. That one was that in order to spend the money on the ships for repairs and overhaul in Pearl Harbor would permit the Navy Yard to be expanded at a greater rate and thus be better prepared to handle the Fleet in the event of a war in the Pacific.

21. Q. Admiral, in two or three of your answers, as I understand them, you've mentioned shortages, deficiencies in logistic support for the Pacific Fleet. Could you amplify that subject a bit, indicating what were the most critical of those shortages?

A. Probably the greatest deficiency was tankers. The other deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. But Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was in a state of development and in order to continue that development, the money that was normally assigned to a yard performing repairs, would go to Pearl Harbor if the ships of the Fleet were to be repaired there, and, consequently, such action would permit the industrial element in the Yard to be built up.

22. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at that time, that these deficiencies or shortages in logistics were such that the Fleet was not in a condition of materiel readiness to carry out its offensive war tasks as outlined in the then existing war plans?

A. The existing war plans were rather indefinite as to what the Fleet could do. As I say, the estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, and I think agreed by all of the officers in responsible positions, was that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands. It was very questionable in my mind that even with plenty of tankers that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that, because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases of any kind. Therefore, I considered the situation with regard to the Fleet was such that it could not have carried on an offensive as far to the westward as the Philippines or the Japanese Islands.

[152] 23. Q. Referring to your testimony to the effect that you did not think the Japanese would initiate a war. In the estimate behind that opinion, did you take into account the fact that steps had been taken to freeze the Japanese credits so that they would have at least great difficulty in obtaining petroleum products, tin, rubber, and so forth, from the East Indies?

A. In my statement, with regard to the initiation of the war, it was the initiation of war against the United States that I referred to. It was firmly believed that the Japanese would go into the Dutch East Indies and possibly into Singapore and Thailand, so that while we had anticipated war, an extension of the war in the Pacific, we did not anticipate that they would take action against the United States at that time. May I add that they could have obtained the rubber, tin, and so forth, without initiating war with the United States.

24. Q. The logistic deficiencies, Admiral, were well known to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of course?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. Do you know of any action that he took with respect to remedying the situation?

A. I remember of being informed by him of numerous letters which he had written but I can not recall the letters or having seen the letters.

26. Q. Admiral, what response did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, get to his attempts to remedy his logistic deficiencies?

A. I should say very little. The rate at which the fuel oil was being used in Honolulu, during the training periods previous to December 7, was greater than the rate at which fuel was being delivered, and the reserve was being reduced.

27. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. When did you see that dispatch?

A. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time I've seen this dispatch. At the time it was received, I was in California with Task Force 1 on a two weeks trip for recreation for personnel. My Force was in San Pedro at the time and I did receive a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the—I don't remember the words of the dispatch, but, in general terms, that the general situation was considered serious. I immediately put my Task Force on twelve hour notice preparatory to return to Pearl but no further word was received before the scheduled date of sailing on the return trip to Honolulu, which was sometime around the end of October.

28. Q. After your return to Pearl Harbor, were you apprised of the subject matter of the dispatch?

A. In general terms, yes, that the situation had been considered serious at that time. My return was two weeks or so after the date of this dispatch and while it was mentioned to me, so far as I am aware. I never saw the full dispatch before.

29. Q. Do you recall whether or not you were informed that the dispatch contained a statement to the effect that an attack by Japan on the United States was a possibility?

A. I don't believe I was so informed.

[153] 30. Q. Do you know of any additional security measures or other action undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific pursuant to this dispatch?

A. I was not there. The only information I have was the dispatch he sent to me, which indicated to me that he might want us to return almost immediately and I put the force on twelve hour notice. After I got back to Honolulu, I found he had sent another dispatch, which was never received by me, putting my Task Force on twelve hour notice. When he received my dispatch putting it on twelve hour notice, he thought it was in answer to his. We just happened to hit on the same twelve hour notice.

31. Q. Did any of the vessels of your task force return earlier than planned in the employment schedule?

A. Not that I know of.

32. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were at sea during the period 21-27 November. I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac and other addressees, dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. When did you first see this dispatch?

A. I saw this dispatch first on Saturday, November 29. Task Force 1 and Task Force 3 had been engaged in a strategic problem which ended on Sunday, the 23rd. My task force was not due to enter Pearl until Thursday, the 27th. On the night of the 24th, I received a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief to take all precautions against possible submarine activity. From the time of the receipt of that dispatch until after the entry of Task Force 1, complete defensive formations and operations against possible enemy submarine activities were taken. It had been the custom for the Commander-in-Chief to signal to incoming task force commanders when he desired to have a conference with them. No such signal was received upon my entry, nor later, but, upon Saturday morning, I went to the Commander-in-Chief for a conference on my own volition. It was at that time that he showed me this message. He called

in his Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer explained the locations of the enemy forces, so far as he was able to judge, which indicated no unusual activity in the major forces of the Japanese Navy. He also showed me the latest letters he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations, which I mentioned, and in which the Chief of Naval Operations said, "I do not know what we will do," was one. We discussed any possible action that would be taken by Task Force 1 at that time, and Task Force 1 being the only task force, with the exception of the battleships of Task Force 3, being in port, we decided that there was no action that could be taken by that task force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. Task Force 2, under Vice Admiral Halsey, had gone out before my task force returned to port, and part of Task Force 3, as I recall it, left on the same day that I had entered. So that there were in Pearl Harbor, at the time I saw this message, no carriers and only the portion of the destroyers of the Fleet assigned to Task Force 1.

[154] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued) :

33. Q. Admiral, your attention is invited to certain wording in the dispatch before you to the effect that a surprise attack in any direction might be anticipated. Was any particular consideration given to that wording by the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers as regards the possibility of that direction being Oahu?

A. I was not present at any conferences between the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, or other senior officers. So far as I can recall, there was, between Admiral Kimmel and myself, no discussion as to the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. There was, and had been for some months, a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. The differentiation between these two attacks, at least so far as I was concerned, was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action, whereas, an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers, it was felt that the Fleet in port, with the presumed effectiveness of the Army Air Forces, would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea.

34. Q. Admiral, in the dispatch that you have before you there is a directive that Army officials be informed. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that was, in fact, done, and to what extent they were consulted?

A. I have no knowledge.

35. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 27 November 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Will you state when you first saw this dispatch?

A. To the best of my recollection, on Saturday, the 29th of November.

36. Q. In other words, the two dispatches, Exhibits 7 and 8, were seen and discussed at the same time?

A. I am positive—yes, these two were seen at the same time, the 29th of November.

37. Q. In addition to the dispatch that you received at sea in regards to precautions against submarine attack, do you know what action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief pursuant to these two dispatches?

A. I don't recall any positive action other than his talking over with me these dispatches.

38. Q. In a previous answer, I understood you to say that the Commander-in-Chief called in his Intelligence Officer, into this conference on the morning of 29 November, and received a report from him as to the then whereabouts of various units of the Japanese Fleet. At that time, what degree of credibility did you assign to this intelligence report?

A. I think the credibility assigned was fairly high, in view of the fact that there was no other intelligence or information by which a comparison or evaluation of the respective points of view might be made.

39. Q. At that time, did you know what sources the Intelligence Officer was relying on for his information?

A. Yes.

40. Q. In the dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 8, what interpretation was placed on the wording, in general, which directs that certain deployments be made?

[155] A. In order to execute the plan of the Fleet, it would have been necessary to recall the task forces which were at that time absent, in order to properly prepare them, from a logistic point of view, and consequently there was no deployment that could be made immediately that would have better prepared Task Force One than that which existed. Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes to Wake and was not expected to return for over a week, consequently there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Pacific Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress.

41. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the return of your task force to Pearl Harbor on 27 November was done in accordance with the then existing employment schedule?

A. It was.

42. Q. What was the nature of the employment of the task force for its scheduled time in port, beginning 27 November?

A. Overhaul and training and preparation for the next period at sea. In addition, and as a part of that training, the holding of a critique for the exercise which had been terminated on the Sunday previous to our entering port. That exercise had been one to develop air attack on an escorted convoy group, and alternatively, the defense of such a group. Task Force Three, containing a carrier, had been the force which attacked Task Force One, which was acting as escort to the convoy group. I state this primarily to indicate that the question of air attack at sea was uppermost in the minds of all of the officers during the period of training. The system of training that had been developed for these exercises was the most extensive that had ever been practiced by our Fleet. Before the problems were executed at sea, they were played out on the Maneuver Board which was established on shore at the Submarine Base Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The problems having been laid out and commented upon, on the Board, previous to the exercises at sea, were then carried out

as an exercise at sea. Upon return to port, the exercise was criticised, the critique being held on the Maneuver Board, as had been done on the same exercise before the Fleet went to sea. So, for each exercise, there were three distinct periods of mental training—the preparation and trial of the exercise before it was carried out at sea, the conduct of the exercise at sea, and the critique of the exercise after we returned from sea. This critique was to be held on Wednesday following our return to port, and with the exception of the Saturday morning when I went up to see Admiral Kimmel, I was primarily concerned with preparing the critique of this exercise for presentation on the Wednesday following.

43. Q. In other words, is it correct to say that no change in the scheduled employment of your task force was made by virtue of this dispatch?

A. No change was made. The only thing was that during the period at sea, from the time we got that dispatch we were especially careful about maintaining the maximum effectiveness of the anti-submarine defense.

44. Q. When was your task force next scheduled to go to sea, Admiral, if you recollect?

A. About December 11th, I should say,—we were generally in about two weeks.

45. Q. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you receive any orders changing that scheduled sortie?

A. No, I did not.

[156] 46. Q. Did you receive any orders or instructions changing the procedure while in port which would indicate any change in the contemplated use of your task force when it went to sea for its next scheduled period?

A. None that I recall.

47. Q. Did your task force have its full allowance of ammunition and other stores such as would equip it for combat purposes in event of war?

A. To the best of my knowledge, every ship had adequate material on board to exercise its functions in time of war. Many requests had been made for modifications of the anti-aircraft armament, to include more machine guns, which had not been received, but the vessels themselves, in their then state of equipment, were ready to fight.

48. Q. What I had in mind, Admiral, was to determine from any action taken whether the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that on your next departure, you might be leaving on an assigned war task which would require additional ammunition or equipment, and as to whether any such was provided during this period.

A. Well, we were kept up to a point where we expected to be able to operate at any time, should it be required, and I don't think there would have been any hesitancy about going ahead and executing that plan which had been contemplated, had we gone to war under normal conditions.

49. Q. You feel that your ships, had they sortied in accordance with the schedule, would have been so prepared?

A. Yes.

50. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 28 November, from Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, is an information addressee, which is Exhibit 9 before this examination. Will you state whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not see that dispatch before December 7th.

51. Q. Admiral, I hand you another dispatch, which CinCPac was only an information addressee, from OPNav to CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 30 November, which is Exhibit 10 before this examination. Do you recall whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?

A. It is difficult for me to say whether or not I saw this dispatch previous to December 7th, but I believe that I saw it on Wednesday or Thursday, the 3rd or 4th of December, after the critique of the exercise which the Fleet had been holding—I saw the Commander-in-Chief for a short time and again on Thursday, the 4th. It is my opinion that on one of those two days he showed me this dispatch.

52. Q. Do you recall if the indications mentioned as to the direction of a Japanese attack caused any change of the attitude on your part over what you had had as a result of the preceding dispatches?

A. I think it tended to confirm the reaction of the previous dispatches that the activities were anticipated, even by the Department, in the Far East.

53. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 3 December, from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that dispatch?

[157] A. I saw this one on either Wednesday or Thursday—Wednesday, the 3rd, or Thursday, the 4th—this one I am confident I saw before December 7th. This one we discussed—I discussed with the Commander-in-Chief only to this point: “most of their codes”, it said, it did not say “all”, I don’t suppose they could have said “all”, but this same idea had been expressed in the newspapers of that day or the day before. We were completely unaware of the methods by which this information was received and we did feel that if inferences were to be drawn from this, that the best place to draw them was where they had the maximum information.

54. Q. In your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief as to the significance of this dispatch, was any particular mention made of the fact that among the places listed where it was thought the code and cyphers had been destroyed, were the capitols of the United States and the Philippines?

A. I don’t recall any particular discussion of those two points, but it seemed perfectly evident that this could precede war by many days; that it was not to us indicative of immediate action: and we were also, as I say, unaware of the source of information. As this information had appeared in the papers, it probably did not mean as much to us as though we had been aware of how the Department obtained it.

55. Q. Admiral, in addition to the series of dispatches that you have just seen, what other intelligence reports, or information were available to the Commander-in-Chief and to you, as one of his advisers, in making your estimates of the situation as regards the probability of immediate hostilities?

A. There were none available to me, and as I have previously stated, my primary concern was the training of the Fleet. On no occasion was I called into conference with the other Flag Officers and Admiral Kimmel to discuss the possibility of immediate action by Japan.

56. Q. At that time did you feel that you, and the other commanding officers, in Oahu, were sufficiently informed as to the international situation, or did you feel that you were more or less operating in the dark, out there?

A. Well, I can only speak for myself. I don't know how the others felt. I felt we were operating pretty much in the dark.

57. Q. In making your own estimates of the situation, and in giving such advice to the Commander-in-Chief as you did, how much consideration was given to the fact that the Axis nations had been departing from the usual rules of the game, usually, in making surprise attacks without formal declarations of war?

A. I don't think—a great deal. It seems to me, and it seemed to me then, that in every case of a surprise attack there must be something to be gained by it to make it worth while. I felt, and I presume others felt the same way, that the reaction of the United States to a surprise attack would so arouse the people that it would be a very bad psychological blunder for any nation to do such an act against the United States.

58. Q. Also with relation to your estimates of the situation, do you recall any emphasis being given, or any consideration being given to the personal characteristics of the Japanese high command, with relation to any specific individuals of the Japanese high command?

A. If any such studies were available to the Commander-in-Chief, I have never seen them.

59. Q. Although it is apparent that the matter was not particularly discussed [158] in your presence, did you ever feel, during those days, that enough attention was being given to the study of the psychology of the Japanese in general, particularly their military cult?

A. Well, I had personally considered it quite extensively, but to what extent it was given consideration by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, I don't know.

60. Q. Admiral, had you formulated an opinion as to the capability of the Japanese naval air arm prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think the general impression was that they were fairly good. I don't believe that we thought that they were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. In the rules that had been used for the exercises in relation to the efficiency of aircraft, I should say that full weight had been given to the value of air attack as indicated in the particular exercise that was completed by the First and Third Task Forces on Sunday, the 23rd of November. The complete convoy had been wiped out and many of the escorting vessels seriously damaged by constructive bombing. I feel that the attitude of the Fleet toward aviation was confirmed by the later effects. I do not believe that the air has proved any more efficient than we had given it credit for, with this one exception—that I don't believe any people before the war, especially not in the United States, believed that such a large percentage of the industrial capacity of the country, or any country, would be put into aviation. There is one thing with regard

to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and aviation, which I think should be stated: Some discussion had been held between the Commander-in-Chief and the Bureau of Ordnance as to the possibility of using torpedo planes in shallow water. The Bureau of Ordnance had expressed an opinion that the use of torpedo planes in less than 75 feet of water would probably not be effective. As the water in Pearl Harbor was shallower than that, there was probably created an opinion in the minds of the officers of the Fleet, that the torpedo plane could not be used there as effectively as it was used.

61. Q. Admiral, in that connection, did you have any reason to question that information that you received from the Navy Department in regard to torpedo planes, and did you feel that the Fleet was relatively safe from torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor?

A. While I won't say that we felt we were relatively safe, we felt that the efficiency of any torpedoes used in that area would be very much below what might be expected in the open sea. Most of our own torpedoes, dropped from planes, at that time were diving in the neighborhood of 75 feet before they ran.

62. Q. You had no information to the effect that other nations might have developed torpedoes that would be effective at lesser depths?

A. We had no information as to what they actually had developed.

63. Q. Had you any information, sir, as to the aggressive spirit which the Japanese naval air arm displayed on that occasion,—any advance information?

A. No, I don't recall that we had any particular data with regard to that. I think everybody felt that they had plenty of spirit, if they decided to it, they would come in hard—there wasn't any question about that. We had had air raid drills frequently in port, and had a standard routine for it. The defenses of the Fleet, of course, were largely in the hands of the Army, and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet, itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

[159] 64. Q. Admiral, in several of your previous answers you have touched on your own estimate of the situation as regards the probability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on the reasons why you and other officers present did not rate it very high, as a possibility. Is there anything you can add to what you already said as to your estimate of that probability, and the reasons for that state of mind?

A. I don't know that there is much that I can add. I think I have explained, from my point of view, several features, and a primary feature of all was that I felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry in to the war than they could possibly gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. I am still firmly convinced that that was the case. I am also convinced that that was the opinion held in Washington, at least to this extent, that on the day the Secretary of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, one of the first statements he made was that no one at Washington had stated to him any possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner, who was the most aggressive minded of all. These are not quotations, but that is the sense of what he said. I think the feeling that was in Honolulu was greatly

influenced by the attitude of the Department through the preceding months, in taking away forces from the Pacific and indicating throughout that they considered the situation with Germany much more serious than with Japan, and that there was inadequate knowledge of a shift of opinion in Washington, if there was one; that there were no real definite instructions received out there after November 29, I think it was. The only other dispatch that I recall seeing was that one about the burning of the communications cipher code. During that period of about a week, many things were happening in Washington of which we in the Fleet were not cognizant. So far as I know, there was never any follow-up, either on that message received on the 16th of October—even after stating that condition existed, there was never any relaxation of a state of emergency indicated, and yet, six weeks went by before the attack. It seemed to me, and I think it seemed to all, that they were merely additional confirmations of a general feeling that war was approaching, and that we, the Fleet, should be in a state of readiness to carry out our part in the plan. If any change or immediate indication of war had been made in the Department, it seems to me that the message previously referred to would have been followed up by further messages; at least to the extent of asking the Commander-in-Chief what he had done, or what he intended to do.

65. Q. The war plan which was current appears to have been dated sometime in May, 1941, and the growth in tenseness of the situation in which Japan was concerned, was rapid after that. During those months, did it occur to you that the effective war plan had become out of step with the real situation?

A. I think that the plan for the actual use of the Fleet had not become out of step, because due to lack of logistic facilities, it was impossible for the Fleet to take any more offensive action than the contemplated attack on the eastern Mandates in order to try to relieve the situation in the Far East.

66. Q. As regards the broader concept behind the plan, to the effect that our position in the Pacific was purely defensive, did you think that part had become out of step?

A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it seemed to me it was only one thing we could do and we were prepared to do that; we discussed, in this problem we were carrying on at the time what we could do with the Fleet. Well, you couldn't do much because it didn't have oil to get anywhere, and you didn't have repair facilities if you got there, and so far as the Fleet was concerned, [160] the only thing of any usefulness that could be done was to make an attack on the Marshalls with a view to drawing much of the enemy strength to the westward with a view to helping the Allied Forces around Manila and the East Indies. So, so far as I was concerned, the approach to that possible entry in the war had no particular effect on the thing that could be done with the Fleet. At the time I first learned about these messages, Task Force Two was bound out to Wake, part of Task Force Three had gone out to Johnston Island. There was, at that time, nothing that could be done by Task Force One, and it was felt if anything did occur, we should get the other task forces back as quickly as possible and prepare to carry out the plan that had been prepared—for the Fleet to move out to the Marshall Islands.

67. Q. Then no apparent fault in the basic war plans occurred to you during those months?

A. Well, my opinion about the plan, Rainbow Five, was that it was not kept up to date, that people were not sufficiently concerned with keeping the plan abreast the changing situation. If you go still farther back than that, I consider that the whole basic war plans, as I have known them for years, have really not been operations plans but development plans. They have been used as a lever to get more men and ships and naval shore establishment development.

68. Q. Admiral, I hand you an estimate drawn up by Commander Patrol Wing Two and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Army, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this examination. Were you familiar with this estimate prior to December 7th?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I never saw it before December 7th.

69. Q. In this estimate your attention is invited to a statement made in Paragraph III(b), that "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." Do you feel that this estimate is completely out of step with the estimates of the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present in Oahu at that time?

A. Well, in making an estimate of enemy capabilities, there are two methods of procedure: One is known as the method of intentions, and the other is the method of capabilities. The higher up you are in the scale of command, the more apt one is to use the method of intentions, or trying to determine what the enemy intends to do. In the lower echelons of command, in which Rear Admiral Bellinger was, at that time, he was more concerned with the physical capacity of the enemy to do certain things in relation to the activity which he is commanding. For that reason, Admiral Bellinger, being responsible for the use of the aircraft based on shore to cooperate with the Army in defense of the Fleet, or at least to obtain information for the Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, would have assumed situations which required action by his force, and naturally one of those was the information, preceding an offense against air attack on the Island of Oahu, of vessels in the immediate vicinity. I feel that this particular position of Admiral Bellinger led him to this conclusion as being necessary for him to make out his plan, and a perfectly legitimate assumption as a basis for his plan, but that does not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than something else. So far as I can see Admiral Bellinger's assumptions do not indicate that he anticipated an attack in advance of a declaration of war.

[161] Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

70. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the Commander-in-Chief and his senior advisers all considered that the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet was training, and that that training would continue until such time as immediate hostilities were indicated?

A. That is correct. And with the tremendous shift in personnel that was constantly taking place, it was absolutely essential that training be kept up to the last moment.

71. Q. Did you feel at that time that all necessary steps had been taken to effectuate a rapid change from the training mission to the war mission when hostilities became imminent?

A. Yes, I considered that the Fleet was capable of proceeding on its war mission immediately.

72. Q. Referring back to the dispatches that you examined earlier, in the dispatch of 27 November, the statement was made to the effect that aggressive movements by Japan could be expected within the next few days. Did you feel that that statement on 27 November should have caused a change in the mission of the Fleet?

A. I did not consider that any change was necessary. This dispatch is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for action. It was common knowledge that was expected to make an aggressive move into Thailand, and there is nothing in this message that indicates specifically any apprehension on the part of the Department that the aggressive move is to be made against the United States. The extent to which an aggressive move against Thailand or against British or Dutch possessions in the Far East might influence the United States is not mentioned.

73. Q. Admiral, how often were the employment schedules for the Pacific Fleet drawn up and published?

A. I couldn't say definitely, but my estimate would be about once a month.

74. Q. What classification was given to those published documents?

A. Confidential, I should say, although I can't swear to it.

75. Q. In general, how wide a distribution did the employment schedules receive?

A. Through Commanding Officers, I should say, but, naturally, when each Commanding Officer knew the schedule, or each Task Force Commander knew the time he was going to be at sea, he had to make out an employment schedule still more in detail for the various ships, often including various types of target practice and tactical exercises. Those that included target practice, naturally information had to be given to the Gunnery Officers and the gunnery personnel of the ship. So it became well known. Such schedule generally provided for routine periods at sea for each of the three specific task forces.

[162] 76. Q. During the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, and in view of the tense international situation and the general feeling that war with Japan would come sooner or later, did you have any apprehension as to the wisdom of publishing such schedules, from a security point of view?

A. No, I can't say that I did. The schedules had to be worked in such a way that some of the ships were at sea all the time, and in order to carry out the exercise of the Fleet, the people that handled the target practice material, the drones, and so forth, had to know well in advance that certain exercises would be carried out. I don't feel it would have made any particular difference, if an air attack was to have been made on Pearl Harbor, what particular task force was in. The case as it occurred was probably the most advantageous to the United States, because had carriers been in Pearl Harbor under the conditions of the attack, they probably would have been sunk, and that the loss of obsolescent battleships was less serious than would have been the loss of carriers.

77. Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, how closely did the ships present in Pearl Harbor on December 7 correspond to the published employment schedule?

A. So far as I recall, Task Force 1 was scheduled to be in port at the time of the attack. Task Force 3, I believe, intended to be at sea. Because of some additional duty that had been given to Vice Admiral Brown, he proceeded with a part of his task force, I don't remember exactly, but not including the battleships, to Palmyra or Johnston, one of those, and as I recall it the three battleships of the First Division, which were normally in his task force, returned to port several days in advance of the normal schedule of that task force.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 11:50 a. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

Rear Admiral William Satterlee Pye, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

78. Q. Admiral, upon whom did the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor against attack rest?

A. Primarily upon the Army. Naturally, the vessels and naval units in the Harbor were required to take such action as they could on their own behalf.

79. Q. Are you able to cite any plan or other commitment by the Army assuming responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I never saw any plan gotten up by the Army, but by The Joint Action of the Army and Navy. The Army is charged with such responsibility.

80. Q. During the year 1941, what information did you have as to the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments for the defense of Pearl Harbor and how did you evaluate this information?

[163] A. It was definite knowledge that the air force available to the Army and the anti-aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense.

81. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, fully aware of this situation?

A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I am quite confident that he had expressed this idea to the Chief of Naval Operations and also to the Army officer in command.

82. Q. Can you outline, in very general terms, what precautions the Army had taken against a surprise air attack?

A. The only direct information that I have came to me after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was to the effect that in their interpretation of the order received, their primary active had been taken to prevent sabotage.

83. Q. Are you familiar with the Army's anti-aircraft warning net?

A. Yes, of the fact they had many lookout stations in the Island, for visual observation of approaching planes. I was not familiar with the state of radar development. Radar at that time was considered a very secret instrument and while the Navy had made use of it to quite a moderate degree, it was my general understanding that the

Army was behind in this development. I had knowledge that the Army was intending to install radar equipment in the Island, but, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no information that even one such instrument had been established.

84. Q. As contrasted with the available means for detecting the approach of hostile aircraft, what defenses did the Army have against such an attack, once the attack had arrived?

A. They had fighting planes and mobile anti-aircraft batteries. So far as I am aware, these mobile anti-aircraft batteries had been deployed for use by December 7.

85. Q. At that time, what was your appraisal of the state of readiness of the Army's fighter planes, and do you recall that this was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present there; what appraisal they made of the ability of the Army Fighter Command?

A. I don't recall any special discussion of that fact, other than the general position that the Army's installations were not what we'd like to have them. It was not known to me that at any time previous to December 7 the Army had taken any action which reduced the effectiveness of their aircraft defense.

86. Q. Admiral, I hand you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Fourteenth Naval District, which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Were you familiar with this plan at all prior to December 7, 1941?

A. Yes, I had read that plan.

87. Q. By the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii?

A. It would be, apparently, the Navy, under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

[164] 88. Q. Did you know whether or not such reconnaissance flights were being carried out by naval aircraft during the period from October through December '41?

A. I knew that such patrols were being carried out in certain instances, and that they were covering areas in which the operating forces of the Fleet were usually engaged in target practice. The immediate extent of the aircraft search, I did not know. The plan for that was not part of my immediate responsibility and I assumed they were doing the best they could with what they had.

89. Q. Sir, do you know whether any additional reconnaissance flights were ordered after the warning dispatch of 27 November?

A. I have no positive knowledge.

90. Q. As you would interpret the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility to order such reconnaissance flights when the situation indicated that they would be necessary?

A. I think that under the plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be responsible for designating a policy.

91. Q. Referring back to your earlier answer that the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers were aware of the inability of the Army to fully carry out its mission of the defense of Pearl Harbor against attacks of all kind, including air attack, what steps were taken by the Commander-in-Chief to augment the defenses of Pearl Harbor against such an attack?

A. Additional destroyer and small craft patrols in the areas off the entrance. So far as the air is concerned, I don't know what, if any, additional patrols were actually put in operation.

92. Q. Sir, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you familiar with the terms of that at the time of its issue?

A. I was.

93. Q. Admiral, in paragraph "G" of this 2CL letter, under the duties of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, is listed "advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain." It does not seem to be stated definitely who should order the condition of readiness, but is the interpretation of that that the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor should actually issue the order prescribing the condition of readiness?

A. My interpretation was that the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District would inform the Senior Officer Present Afloat as to the condition warranted by the existing circumstances, and the Senior Officer Embarked would order the Fleet to assume such condition.

94. Q. From 28 November to 7 December, were you the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor?

A. I was.

95. Q. Did you prescribe any condition of readiness for the ships in the Harbor pursuant to this?

A. Condition 3 had been prescribed as the standard condition and was in effect on December 7. It had been prescribed previous to our last entry but it was understood that Condition 3 would be the condition unless other notice was given.

[165] 96. Q. During the same period, did you receive any advice from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as to maintaining any other condition or any directive from the Commander-in-Chief as to maintaining a higher condition?

A. No, sir.

97. Q. Admiral, in the same paragraph, your attention is invited to a provision that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced". Were any Army guns actually emplaced at Pearl Harbor on December 7?

A. I believe that there were certain anti-aircraft, fixed defenses, not in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor. I believe this order is interpreted to relate to the mobile guns. So far as I know, they had not been distributed with any intention of defense of the Naval Base previous to December 7.

98. Q. At what distance were these Army guns from the Base, the nearest of the Army guns?

A. I think there was one battery of guns at or near Kamehameha, which was near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Others were not located within five miles of Pearl Harbor, but I think within two miles of the City of Honolulu. They were closer to the Port of Honolulu than they were to Pearl Harbor.

99. Q. Up until the time of the attack, did any naval officer have any authority over the use of those guns?

A. None that I know of.

100. Q. Sir, did the Navy have any anti-aircraft batteries on shore at Pearl Harbor on 7 December?

A. So far as I recall there were none until after the attack.

101. Q. Admiral, under subparagraph 5, of paragraph "G", of 2CL, the Senior Officer Present in each Sector, described in the preceding paragraph, is responsible for the fire in his own sector. Was that interpreted to mean that the Senior Officer Embarked could direct the Sector Commanders or was each one of them an entirely free agent?

A. The interpretation was that he was a free agent, because the time element would not permit the senior man to act. However, that paragraph was discussed many times with the Commander-in-Chief before December 7, pointing out to him with the possible distribution of any attacking planes, it would be impossible for anybody to direct fire. It actually was true on the morning of December 7, that the planes came from so many directions that it was impossible to control the fire of the ships in any one sector.

102. Q. Then, as I understand you, as a practical matter, each ship's batteries were their own directors?

A. As a practical matter, that's what it amounted to. Each ship knew the general direction that they were to guard and that they had a primary responsibility for that direction of approach, but I think when they found something they could shoot at in some other direction that they shot there too.

103. Q. Admiral, there's another subparagraph in this same paragraph "G" that I'll ask you to give your interpretation of. That is subsection "a" of subparagraph "9", which states that "the Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor shall execute the emergency sortie order" which will accomplish certain [166] results listed thereafter. "This order must be prepared and issued in advance." Does that mean that a plan for sortie was drawn up in advance and given to the Commanding Officers so that all that would be necessary, in the event of an emergency, would be an order for execution?

A. By the time that had been in effect for—this was in revision; the original was much earlier than this—there was a definite order of the sorties, the order of ships being the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships, and all that was necessary to give in this case was the order to execute an emergency sortie.

104. Q. In other words, the plan was in the hands of the various commanding officers?

A. The plan for sortie was in the hands of the commanding officers.

105. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, when and by whom was the order for execution issued?

A. I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of

submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul.

106. Q. Under Condition 3, what was the approximate number of anti-aircraft guns which were being manned by each of the battleships in Pearl Harbor?

A. The battleships, as they were disposed there, were in two sectors. That required four guns in either sector. That required only eight guns to be manned, in accordance with the order, but I'm quite certain that there were more manned. I'm quite certain that there were at least two on each battleship manned. I believe that order was given by Commander of Battleships.

107. Q. About what percentage of the total anti-aircraft batteries of battleships would that be?

A. It varies somewhat. It would be about—most of them had eight; I think it probably would run about twenty-five per cent.

108. Q. Approximately what proportion of officers and men of the ships of [167] your task force were on board their ships by the time the Jap attack started?

A. A check of that was made after the attack and, as I recall it, at the time the attack started, there were about seventy per cent of the officers on board and ninety-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel.

109. Q. What was the condition of the ships as regards watertight integrity, meaning the closure of watertight doors and hatches?

A. Everything was supposed to be closed except during working hours. They were allowed to open whatever doors were necessary during the daytime to carry out their work.

110. Q. This being Sunday morning, you would normally expect practically everything to be closed then, was that the case?

A. That was not true on the CALIFORNIA, which happened to be my Flagship, because they were working on Sunday morning in the compartments. I can not say about the other ships, and I can only say *that* through information received from the Commanding Officer.

111. Q. In such a situation as developed under that attack by the Japanese, who, if anyone, would normally be expected to order fire opened by the anti-aircraft guns?

A. It was the general understanding in any attack that fire would be opened without waiting for orders.

112. Q. So far as you know, were any orders given?

A. Not to my knowledge, but I was not on board at the time.

113. Q. Do you know of any orders, other than that for sortie, which your Staff gave prior to your arrival?

A. No.

114. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at the time, that the Commander-in-Chief's instructions adequately provided for the security of your task force when it was in Pearl Harbor?

A. The only thing that was questionable in my mind at all was the part about the sector fire control. I never felt that ships could be held to fire in one sector, nor did I think that if they had targets in another sector they should be confined to the one sector. That had been discussed with the Commander-in-Chief on several occasions. In fact, I had written a modification of the order which was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which I did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander; that if an attack should come and from different directions, that no one should be held responsible for designating targets, that ships should fire when they had the opportunity.

115. Q. Did you feel that the whole scheme of things there relating to the defense of Pearl Harbor were as good as could be done, looking at the overall picture?

A. Yes, I think that as far as the Fleet was concerned, and I can not say for the Army because we were not informed—I was not informed as to what the Army actually was doing.

116. Q. In connection with the command relationships, did you feel, at that [168] time, the need for unity of command there?

A. I felt that for at least ten years before.

117. Q. Unity of command, as a general project, had, for long, been a matter of discussion within the Navy, had it not?

A. Yes.

118. Q. During those few weeks prior to 7 December, do you recall any specific discussions which actually looked to following through to an early improvement?

A. I couldn't place the exact time, but for more than a year previous to that time, I had been advising several Commanders-in-Chief that the coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officer on their Staff so that it could be better arranged at least.

119. Q. You looked upon that as a minimum step?

A. As a minimum step, due to the fact that it seemed impossible to get anything higher than that.

120. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the conferences with respect to the replacing of the Marines in the outlying islands with Army troops?

A. No. I was present during a part of one discussion between the Commanding General and Commander-in-Chief with regard to who should man several of the islands, but I was merely a listener and took no part.

121. Q. Had you discussed the defense of the outlying islands with the Commander-in-Chief?

A. No.

122. Q. Do you know whether the position of those islands, with respect to defense, was a matter of grave concern to him?

A. I believe it was.

123. Q. But you didn't discuss it so as to be familiar with his views?

A. He didn't discuss it with me. He had his Marine and Army people, but he didn't discuss it with me.

124. Q. Returning to your testimony concerning the Army's radar installations, were you aware, in those days, of the great part which radar had played in the defense of Britain against the German bombing attack?

A. In a general sense; yes.

125. Q. Had you heard enough about it to bring home to you that it was a most essential installation, essential to the security while in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

126. Q. Had the radar installations of ships of your own personal command arrived at a state of real efficiency by early December, '41?

A. The efficiency, compared to what it was a year later, might be considered low, but this was due more to the types of radar than to the personnel. The type on the PENNSYLVANIA was very satisfactory; the CALIFORNIA had a different type which was less satisfactory, but had been used with a very good success at maneuvers and the location of planes. Within a short trip, after the beginning of the war, while at sea, planes of the clipper type had been picked up and tracked distances of eight-five miles with the radar on the PENNSYLVANIA.

[169] 127. Q. Do you know of any reason why the Army's Signal Corps radar system should not have arrived at an equal state of development and efficiency?

A. None at all. As I have previously stated, it was known that the Army was trying to get radar out there and it was their intention to install it, but I had never been informed that one set had arrived.

128. Q. Did it occur to you, at any time between your return to Pearl Harbor, about 27 November, and the Japanese attack, that it would be well for you to take your battleships to sea in view of what you knew about the deficiencies in the defense abilities of the Army?

A. No, because it was our confirmed opinion that our greatest danger was from submarines, and that the Fleet at sea was certainly in much more danger from submarines than it was in port. Also, in view of the fact that we had no carriers to go with us, we would have had no air cover at all, and had we run into an air attack at sea, we would have been in presumably a worse position than we were in port where the Army had some protection for us.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to state as my definite opinion that Admiral Kimmel was a most efficient Commander-in-Chief, that when he was nominated as the Commander-in-Chief, although I did not expect to stay at sea at that time, I wrote him a letter congratulating him on his selection, and I firmly believed that he was as good as any other officer that could have been selected.

He had shown tremendous interest in the tactical development of the Fleet while in the Command of Cruisers, and he and I had worked continuously together for six months in trying to develop the tactics of light forces. In this respect, his interest was superior to those of any Commander-in-Chief I had served with. He was also tremendously interested in the material and the logistic support of the Fleet, and worked conscientiously in all respects to bring the Fleet to its highest state of readiness in preparation for war.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 3:43 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., Monday, March 20, 1944.

[170] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1944

TWELFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eleventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that, in accordance with the examining officer's directive at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. (Record Page 136), he desired to make further answer, which, for the purpose of continuity, was inserted at the conclusion of his answer to 9. Q. With this addition, he pronounced his testimony correct, was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Captain Glover, I constitute an examining board acting under a precept from the Secretary of Navy to record testimony under oath concerning the facts surrounding the surprise attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The purpose of the recording is to have preserved testimony of witnesses who might not be available at some future time and will be needed for some purpose possibly not known now. The precept contains the words "pertinent to the facts", which constitute the gist of my instructions in that line. It appears that I have to make my own decisions as to what is pertinent and what is not, and in previous testimony facts come out which point the way to other facts, which, in the first instance, do not seem particularly connected but probably are. I believe that you are in position to testify concerning some of those points. I will be asking you to give testimony on things which were known to you over two years ago, and must ask you to testify from what you then knew, as well as you can, unaffected by what you have learned since. Please do your best in that respect. We will pause at any time for you to refresh your memory by consulting documents or otherwise. I will

give you an opportunity to verify your testimony in rough and correct it if necessary.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, attached to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and also in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.

[171-172] 2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year of 1941?

A. I reported to the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in January, 1941, and during 1941 was assigned various planning duties while in the office. Up to about August, 1941, my duties were in connection with all the color plans, with my principal attention being given on the Pacific and Asiatic areas. In August, 1941, the planning problem was concentrated by what is known as "WPL-46", or "Rainbow 5".

3. Q. Were you the specialist on Pacific plans in the War Plans Division during those months?

A. After August, I was given special cognizance of certain parts of WPL-46. These parts are: Part 3, Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2; Chapter III, Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3; Part 5, Appendix 2; Chapters II and IV and V. These sections generally dealt with the Pacific, Asiatic, and the Naval Transportation Service.

4. Q. On about what date did WPL-46 become effective?

A. About August, 1941. I think that's correct, Admiral. There ought to be a letter when it became effective.

5. Q. Did the plan contemplate Japan as an enemy?

Yes, sir. The plan divided possible enemies into two categories: first consideration being given to Germany as an enemy; the plan further considered Japan as an enemy.

6. Q. Was there anything in the plan, WPL-46, which indicated that hostilities with Japan could eventuate otherwise than at Japan's own initiative?

A. I don't recall the plan indicating by what means hostilities with Japan might occur, except to state possibly following a period of strained relations.

7. Q. Can you give the approximate date of the preparation of the plan?

A. The plan was completed in May. Preparation of the plan covered several months prior to that date. It was a continuing process.

8. Q. Was the plan based upon the forces which were then actually stationed in the Pacific or did it look forward to changes in those forces?

A. The plan states that deployment of forces had practically all been made. Redeployments of forces prior to May and up through June and August had been made. The plan contemplated the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

9. Q. What was the approximate composition of the forces thus detached, and about when was the actual detachment made?

A. As I remember, the forces set up in the plan to be detached was one cruiser division. Other detachments had been made during 1941,

prior to August. The approximate size of these forces were: one BB division, one crudiv, and one desrons.

10. Q. Was there any other considerable detachment of forces from the Pacific Fleet, detachments which were of a permanent nature or of a temporary nature, which continued over a considerable period?

A. The principal force involved were submarines, two divisions, No. 202 and 203, which were directed to remain in the Asiatic rather than being withdrawn to the Pacific Fleet.

[173] 11. Q. Was there a movement of forces to Australian waters which endured over any considerable period?

A. In July, 1941, a task force of cruisers was dispatched from Pearl for the purpose of escorting to Australia a Dutch ship loaded with aircraft and carrying, as passengers, Chinese air pilots. This task force remained in Australia approximately four days, and then returned to Pearl Harbor via Fiji.

12. Q. As regards reenforcements to the Pacific Fleet, did the War Plans Division not have in mind any increases in that force during the first few months after the plan became effective?

A. No.

13. Q. Then was it the case that you intended WPL-46 to be a strictly "As-Is" plan, based entirely upon realism and what was actually available in the way of forces?

A. My concept, at that time, was that the plan made a deployment of forces on a realistic basis to meet the situation that might develop.

14. Q. Did you consider that there was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an adequate logistic support for what the plan called for from forces under his command?

A. I believe that he had adequate logistic facilities for his initial defensive task assigned by the plan.

15. Q. Did the plan not call for offensive measures on the part of the Pacific Fleet?

A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was given an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. He was also given the task to support the forces of the associated Powers, by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. My concept of the plan was that the initial attitude of the Pacific Fleet was defensive, and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive, and it would not have the means available to assume an outright offensive attitude for sometime.

16. Q. However, was not the diversionary movement, which you have just mentioned, something to be classed as a decidedly offensive movement?

A. I believe his action in that case, to my mind, had better be described as by raids rather than by movement of total force.

17. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. In the course of your work, during the first half of 1941, did it occur to you that our general method of producing, issuing, and keeping up to date of basic war plans was in any way defective?

A. My initial impression, when I first joined the office in January, was that the preparation of our war plans was a very laborious and

slow process. WPL-46 was based on Staff conversations between the British, Canadians, and the United States. I, personally, did not take part in those conversations and my only connection with the plan was after it had been issued. I considered WPL-46 was prepared reasonably expeditiously, and issued to interested officers expeditiously. It represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time, and a calculated risk in the Pacific.

[174] 19. Q. You have just said, "at that time." Was it your feeling that WPL-46 tended to be too much frozen or was the plan, itself, and methods for employing it sufficiently elastic to meet situations as they would arise in the future?

A. I felt, at the time, that the plan was elastic. In fact, the plan did meet the situation in the future. Lines of communication were maintained to Australia, and the enemy denied the Pacific east of 180 degrees.

20. Q. Was any special provision included in the working methods of the War Plans Division for keeping the plan in step with forces available as changes therein would eventuate?

A. Yes, sir. On 21 August 1941, a memorandum from the Head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division, was issued which states the following pertinent to the question:

Plan Section, War Plans Division, is charged with (a) Preparation of changes in the plan made necessary by changes in the assumptions or in the strategic situation, or which may be required to keep the plan current with administrative action; (b) The preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect; and (c) The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.

Note: The examining officer identified the memorandum mentioned above as being one dated August 21, 1941, classified Restricted, addressed to "Plans Section, War Plans Division", Subject:—"Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5", signed by Captain C. J. Moore, U. S. N. Said memorandum is on file in the War Plans Section, Commander-in-Chief office, Navy Department.

21. Q. Do you recall any action effecting the content of the plan, itself, in consequence of that directive from which you have just quoted?

A. As I recall, no change was made in the plan prior to December.

22. Q. Do you recall any consideration having been given in your offices to our Government's action in freezing the Japanese credits in this country sometime during the first half of 1941?

A. I can recall nothing definite in regard to freezing these credits as it affected war plans.

23. Q. Was the situation, the international situation, upon which any war plan is presumably based, reestimated in the light of Japan's probable position in being denied strategic materials incident to the freezing of credits.

A. I can only assume they were. I, personally, had no part in that matter. My only assumption is that Japanese action must have been considered during the aforementioned Staff conversations.

24. Q. Had such a reestimate been made, would you not have been concerned in it?

A. I would probably have known, if such was going on.

25. Q. As you recall, who would have actually made the estimate or the reestimate?

A. Probably Admiral Turner, assisted by Captain C. J. Moore.

[175] 26. Q. Was it well known to the War Plans Division that the situation visavis Japan grew in intensity from, say, June, '41 onward?

A. The intensity of the situation was common knowledge with the officers of the War Plans Division. I discussed the matter personally with Captain Wright, who was a special assistant to Admiral Turner.

27. Q. What was done toward a reestimate of the situation in the Pacific in the light of that tense situation?

A. No action, as far as I know, was taken to modify WPL-46.

28. Q. And no formal reestimate was made?

A. To my knowledge; no.

29. Q. Did the War Plans Division know that the Army took steps in the summer of 1941 to build up its forces in Hawaii and the Philippines?

A. Yes, sir; particularly the Philippines.

30. Q. Did the Division participate in any of the discussions or estimates which lead to that action by the Army?

A. I don't know; personally, I took no part in any such discussions. If held, they must have been held by the director.

31. Q. Do you recall if, at that time, you thought that such build-up was putting the Navy out of step with the Army or that it was a matter of getting the Army up into step with the Navy in the Pacific area?

A. In the case of the Philippines, my thought, at that time, was that our forces there, our Navy forces there, were only adequate for a defensive action, and the build-up of the Army would only add to their deficient strength. In the Hawaiian area, by view was that the build-up of the Army forces brought them more in line with the strength of the naval forces deployed.

32. Q. You have stated that a fundamental idea of the basic plan was that our attitude in the Pacific was defensive. Did that idea prevail in the War Plans Division right up to 7 December '41?

A. That was my personal view, and I believe it was the view held generally by the officers of the War Plans Division.

33. Q. That being the case, did the question arise in your offices in, say, October, '41, or thereafter, of the correctness of retaining the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters?

A. I do not recall any study either being made or any conversations pertinent to the question after August, 1941, when WPL-46 became effective.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

34. Q. Is it your recollection that during the latter half of 1941 the Fleet was being retained in Hawaiian waters primarily for the defense of our positions in those waters, or, to be in a position of readiness for making the offensive movements which the Plans called for?

A. My concept was that the Fleet was there for both purposes—first to assist in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian, and, secondly, to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected.

[176] 35. Q. What thought or consideration, if any, was given in your offices concerning the security of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area against a surprise attack by the Japanese?

A. Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press. While a surprise attack by the Japanese was discussed, no definite warning, as far as I know, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

The examining officer directed the reporter to re-read the question.

A. (Continued.) I don't think we were worried about it.

36. Q. Will you please ascertain if those daily studies by Commander Ansel are still on file in the Department, and, if so, enter data in the record from which they could be identified?

A. Yes, sir.

Note: From information later furnished by the witness, the examining officer identified the memoranda under discussion as being those contained in a notebook titled "Daily Information Summary—Op 12", now on file in the Combat Intelligence Section (F-20) of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Room 3704, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

37. Q. Was that because of your low estimate of the probability that the Japs would attack in that way, or because of your belief in the security measures both by the Fleet and by the Army forces which were charged with the security of Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't believe it was generally felt by the officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike in the way they did. In my own case, I did not feel so. I felt that there were adequate means available to the Army and Navy.

38. Q. By the last part of your answer, do you mean, among other things, that the Army forces on Oahu were fully adequate to the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air raid?

A. I felt we had adequate air forces there, adequate Army air forces there, to repel a Japanese air attack?

39. Q. During those days in which the situation with the Japanese was becoming so very tense, do you recall any concern within your offices over the possibility of severe damage by sabotage from the large number of Japanese on Oahu?

A. Yes, sir; I recall that matter being discussed. If my memory serves me right, it appeared in the warning dispatch either by the Army or the Navy, to the Commanders in the Hawaiian area.

40. Q. Do you remember if that caused any reconsideration of the retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters?

A. I have no knowledge of any discussions in regard to the question asked.

41. Q. Will you give, insofar as you can remember, the views held in your offices in, say, October, 1941, on the situation as regards the outlying islands such as Wake and Midway?

A. I discussed Wake with, as I recall, Captain Moore, and it was Moore's view and mine, that we should not attempt to fortify Wake.

The question was up because of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stating [177] that it was his intention to do so. I believe the decision was made to go along with the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation. As regards Midway, the view in the offices of the Plans Division was that we should attempt to maintain our position there. This view, as I remember, was concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief.

42. Q. Then as you recall—our sending forces in to Wake—was at the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Yes.

43. Q. Did the Pacific War Plan then current contain any provision for putting parts only of the plan into effect?

A. The plan provided for execution, in part, by dispatch, indicating the nations to be considered enemy and the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan, or additional tasks, thereof.

44. Q. In order to connect up the Board's record in general, will you explain, briefly, the meaning of "M' Day", and the connection of that term with the Pacific War Plan then current?

A. "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken.

45. Q. In, say, late November, 1941, could an "M" Day have been declared in such a way as to become effective only in the areas west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier areas?

A. Yes, that could have been done.

46. Q. What would have been the effect of such a declaration?

A. Naval forces based on Hawaii and on the Asiatic station could have been ordered to place WPL-46 in effect. Of necessity, the method used in declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier, would have required that these forces be informed that war had not been declared. The declaration would have had the effect of directing the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, the Governor of Samoa, and the Governor of Guam, to take certain mobilization deployments. The effect certainly would have been to alert all naval commanders at sea west of the Pacific Sea Frontier.

47. Q. Would you have thought, at that time, that such declaration would have been more effective in putting our forces upon the alert than the method actually used by the Department promised to be?

A. Using the method under discussion of "M" Day did not occur to me at that time. Possibly its use might have been more effective.

48. Q. Could a directive from the Department, placing portions of the current Pacific War Plan into effect, have served as a more definite means of putting our forces upon the alert?

A. I believe that the plan did not lend itself very easily to be put into effect as a means of warning only. The plan was based on war activities and if used only as a means of warning, would, in my opinion, have required quite a lengthy dispatch in explanation of what was exactly intended.

[178] 49. Q. Is it true that the War Plan then current really did not contemplate the advent of hostilities through surprise action of any enemy, but rather was primarily based upon our starting a war ourselves, through definitely offensive action, after a proper declaration of war?

A. It is my view that the plan contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war.

50. Q. I pass you a document which, before this Board, is known as Exhibit No. 5. Were you familiar with it?

A. Yes, I have seen this document before, when it was first issued.

51. Q. And it had been approved by the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

52. Q. What agency would be required in putting that plan in effect and how would he have to act?

A. The plan provided to become effective on "M" Day, or that certain features of it might be placed into effect by the War, Navy Department, or the local Commander prior to "M" Day. The plan states that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war.

53. Q. Was there any reason why the Department should not have ordered that plan into effect on or about 27 November?

A. No, sir, I see no reason why that plan could not have been made effective, if desired.

54. Q. At the time, would you have thought that action to be a very effective means of placing the forces in Hawaii on the alert?

A. Using that method didn't occur to me at that time, Admiral.

55. Q. Do you recall any discussion, or other happenings in your offices, during 1941, concerning putting into effect the unity of command project for Hawaii?

A. The matter was discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:05 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[179] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1944

THIRTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:50 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twelfth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, Postal Affairs, Division Naval Communications.

2. Q. Where were you serving on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. On the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Flag Secretary.

3. Q. Do you have in your possession the Pacific Fleet Employment Schedule covering the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942?

A. I do. I have the copy issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated August 13, 1941, in which the schedule is outlined and was duly authenticated and distributed to Force and Type Commanders, Pacific Fleet, OpNav, CinCLant, Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; ten copies each to action addresses, and three copies each to the Type Commanders.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 25".

4. Q. Is this copy, this document, complete?

A. No. When drawn from the files, it was observed that enclosure (A) thereto was missing.

[180] 5. Q. What is the nature of enclosure (A)?

A. Enclosure (A) is a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter.

6. Q. Do you have an employment schedule for any other quarter which has attached to it such a photostatic copy?

A. Yes; I also drew from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations proposed employment schedule for the ensuing quarter, schedule dated 10 November 1941, which has an enclosure similar in form to that one originally contained in the schedule dated August 13, Exhibit 25.

The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 26".

7. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the present location of the missing enclosure to Exhibit 25?

A. No, I do not, and when inquiry was made as to its location, the Secret File Room stated that they did not know what disposition had been made of it.

8. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was found to be missing from the letter?

A. No, sir, I do not, except that the file room informed my officer messenger that previous requests had been made for copies of this correspondence.

9. Q. In addition to the copies of this letter required for the distribution you have outlined, to the best of your recollection, how many other copies were made at the time?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no spare copies made except for the files of the Commander-in-Chief, which we usually did with all correspondence in case an additional copy was required by some visiting Flag Officer; in other words, someone would come in to see the Admiral and he'd want to give them one of the copies. We always kept a record of it if that was done. The only way we could determine whether any additional copies of this were issued, would be to check the receipt record in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. Were copies distributed among the members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?

A. They were.

11. Q. To what members, as you recall?

A. The Operations Officer, the War Plans Section, and that was all; the other was a copy that was routed around. Oh, one other; the Admiral kept one in his book.

12. Q. Was any method of accounting prescribed for the copies that were distributed?

A. None other than the usual receipt cards system where the addressee would send back a card acknowledging receipt of a letter or the usual registered receipt handled through the guard mail system.

[187] 13. Q. Did the Task Force Commander supplement this employment schedule with schedules of their own?

A. They did. Each Task Force Commander printed this schedule and gave it a distribution in accordance with the Pacific Fleet mail distribution list.

14. Q. Do you have in your possession copies of the employment schedules for the three task forces covering the second quarter for the fiscal year of 1942?

A. I do. I have Task Force One, Two, and Three schedules.

The documents were introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the confidential nature of the documents, they were returned at the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the documents introduced in evidence are appended marked "Exhibit 27", "Exhibit 28", and "Exhibit 29" respectively.

15. Q. It is noted that the three Task Force Schedules, Exhibits 27, 28, and 29, are all in printed form. Where would the printing of these schedules take place?

A. Usually it can be determined by the printer's symbols on the schedule. Normally, it is done by the Flagship of the Task Force Commander, or, if he is at sea, he will leave the printing work to be accomplished ashore by whatever print shop is designated by the Force Commander of the Commander-in-Chief, depending upon what printing facilities are available. Some of the printing in Pearl Harbor was done by the Submarine Base, some by the Commander Service Force, most of it by the Commander Service Force's Flagship. But for rush work, the Flagship of the particular Command involved was usually used. Task Force One Schedule does not indicate what ship it was printed on, but the CALIFORNIA, at that time, was doing most of their work and it is safe to assume that the CALIFORNIA printed that schedule. Task Force Two likewise does not show the printing shop, but the ENTERPRISE had printing equipment and as the Flagship of Commander, Task Force Two; it is safe to assume that the ENTERPRISE did the work. Task Force Three, with the LOUISVILLE as Flagship, does not indicate the print shop but it is also safe to assume that ship did the printing. I might add, that these printing jobs were normally supervised by an Ensign, commissioned officer, attached to the Staff or to the ship's complement, and the practice was for that officer to watch and maintain custody of the schedules to and from the print shop to the point of distribution.

16. Q. It is noted that the schedules are assigned no registered numbers. What system was in use for accounting for copies distributed?

A. No system of accounting was maintained as it was treated the same as confidential correspondence.

17. Q. Have you information as to the number of copies that were actually struck off in the print shops of these schedules?

A. The printer did not include that information on the three Task Force Schedules, but a close estimate can be made from the distribution list.

[182] 18. Q. That list does not show the spare copies printed, does it?

A. No, sir. I might add, the consensus of opinion seems to be that it was necessary to give these schedules as wide a distribution as possible because of the various activities concerned in the operations outlined therein, such as supplies, gunnery schedules, and other important operations requiring close coordination between the various Type Commanders. This was particularly emphasized in the shift-over

to the task forces, when ships of different types were operating in the various task forces.

19. Q. Will you please state the distribution made of one of the employment schedules, say Exhibit 27, Task Force One, to whom copies were distributed, and how many copies to each?

A. The distribution list for the Task Force One Employment Schedule included as special distribution: the Chief of Naval Operations (50 copies), the Navy Department bureaus (3 to 20 copies), the Fleet Personnel Officer (2 copies), the Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Naval Districts (2 or 3 copies), the West Coast Receiving Ships, Ammunition Depots and Supply Depot (1 copy each), the West Coast and Pearl Harbor Navy Yards (3 or 4 copies), Battle Force Mail Clerk (2 copies), Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (1 copy), Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets (8 copies each); plus the regular distribution to the Task Force including Type, Squadron, division and commanding officers ships, Marine and aircraft units (1 to 5 copies each). Total distribution, 729 copies. I have estimated that it would take approximately 600 copies of each of the Employment Schedules of the other two task forces to complete the distribution prescribed for those schedules. Thus, a total of approximately 1,929 copies of the three task force employment schedules were required to complete all designated distributions.

20. Q. With reference to the Commander-in-Chief's employment schedule, Exhibit 25, does that show the movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and the dates which it was planned that they would be present therein?

A. It infers the same information by stating when the operating period commences and ends, as well as the upkeep period. It also includes tactical periods. These schedules could not be religiously followed because of diversions and other incidental changes that occurred from time to time, but they were very closely followed.

21. Q. Then one in possession of that schedule could calculate, in advance, the ships that were likely to be in Pearl Harbor on any given date?

A. That is correct. To the best of my memory, the WEST VIRGINIA was an exception. As I recall, the WEST VIRGINIA was scheduled for overhaul period on the West Coast and I was present in the Admiral's cabin at the time the desirability of retaining her at Pearl Harbor was discussed, and, at that particular time, he had lost the service, temporarily, of two of his battleships and considered it desirable to retain the WEST VIRGINIA and defer her overhaul period until the balance of battleship power was back to normal. I believe, otherwise, the WEST VIRGINIA would have been on the West Coast on that date (7 December 1941).

22. Q. Similarly, from the employment schedules of the Task Force Commanders, could one determine in advance what ships would normally be present in Pearl Harbor on a given day?

A. Yes, because the Task Force Commanders' schedules were much more in [183] detail, whereas the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was a general schedule. I might add that it is my positive conviction that if any leakage of schedule information occurred, it could be obtained much more easily from the Task Force Command

schedule, and subsequent correspondence, than from the Commander-in-Chief's schedule, because everyone recognized that the latter was always subject to detailed changes after its issue. Also, the mimeographing and printing of the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was under very close supervision in a very small office; any spare copies misdirected could easily be detected.

23. Q. Do you recollect anything which indicates any particular attention to be given to the security of the information contained in the Task Force Commanders' employment schedules?

A. No, sir, I do not.

24. Q. Inasmuch as a great number of copies of the Task Force Commanders' schedules were actually printed and issued, did it occur to you, during that time, that security of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters was being thereby endangered?

A. No, sir. Everybody had been thoroughly indoctrinated and instructed not to discuss the proposed ship movements, repeated letters had been issued on the subject, and warnings by the Commander-in-Chief. The actual movements of the ships could easily be observed from any vantage point in Pearl Harbor or from merchants in town, but I do not ever recall having heard anyone discussing prospective movements.

25. Q. Did you ever hear anyone discuss the possibility of a spy obtaining one or more copies of the Schedules containing this information, which would be vital because it indicated movements of units of the Fleet so far in advance?

A. No, sir. It would have been quite easy for anyone to obtain the information, if they had so desired, by copying it from the schedules in the various offices of the addressees, although I believe it would have been difficult for an agent to have obtained a copy without its disappearance being noted, because the schedules were frequently referred to by the persons concerned with carrying them out.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have no written documents to back up my statement, but I was frequently present when Admiral Kimmel would receive or send correspondence to the Navy Department, both official and unofficial, personal or otherwise, and I repeatedly heard him complain that he could not get what he was asking for, materiel and personnel that he considered essential to put the Fleet in the proper fighting condition, and I know that this worried him considerably and that he never ceased trying. In some cases, he was successful, but in those cases, it appeared to be purely action which he initiated himself rather than outside assistance. As an example, the security measures that he placed into effect in Pearl Harbor, as well as the training of the crews in gunnery and tactical drilling. I recall a particular message, (although I did not have custody of it), I recall [184] a particular message which arrived shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor and I distinctly recall that

the impression of all those who read the message was similar to other messages of that nature that had been received, and it did not strike anyone as being any more critical, although I never heard individual opinions expressed on the subject by the Admiral. I believe this message to which I refer is the one about which there was considerable publicity after the attack. I recall, one day, I can not tell accurately whether it was before the receipt of this message or after, but the Admiral walked to the chart in his office and said something like, "I wonder what those rascals are up to now". I believe it was at the time when the Japanese were reported en route to the East Indies area. The impression that I'm trying to create is that everyone that I had contact with on the Staff, as well as visitors to the Headquarters, felt that the situation bore watching, but that with the representations being made in Washington, at that time, that there had been no critical change other than would normally be expected, and that no definite word indicated that we could believe otherwise.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the third and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the second and fourth days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

[185] Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present duty station?

A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer of the U. S. Fleet—U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. And how long had you been on Admiral Kimmel's Staff in that capacity?

A. Since the first day of February, 1941.

4. Q. Admiral, would you make a statement as to your relations with Admiral Kimmel, with these points in mind: The frequency with which he consulted you, and whether or not those were individual consultations or general Staff meetings?

A. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were quite close and intimate, both personally and officially. I had served with Admiral Kimmel intermittently since 1918. I had served part of every sea cruise with Admiral Kimmel except one, when he served in the Orient and I served in the Pacific Fleet on the West Coast. My official relations and contacts with Admiral Kimmel were frequent, but in general not in Staff meetings and consultations. I was, as Fleet Gunnery Officer, part of the Operations Division of the Staff, and Staff consultations were generally attended by the Chief of Staff, the Operations Officer, the War Plans Officer, and Intelligence Officer. However, Captain, now Admiral, DeLany, who was Operations Officer, passed on all information in which members of the Operations Division of the Staff had interest. Aside from that, I had very close and frequent contact with the Admiral several times a week, and usually alone, in that my primary duties, as he had laid down for me when I first joined the Staff, were the gunnery training of the Fleet—more than the gunnery training, the general Training of the Fleet; a matter in which he was greatly interested and which he continually checked up with me about.

5. Q. Admiral, did you feel that the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was primarily occupied with the training mission of the Fleet, to a point where war readiness was somewhat relegated to the background?

A. Well, you must understand that I was the Training Officer and the Gunnery Officer of the Fleet; therefore matters that he discussed with me dealt with those problems. I know they held a very high place in his mind and he was greatly concerned about furthering the training of the Fleet and took many, what at the time appeared to be, radical steps, in bringing that about. As to his interest in training occupying him to the extent that the war readiness of the Fleet was neglected, that doesn't follow. I do not think that he was unduly occupied with training matters to the extent that he lost sight of the other aspects of readiness and security.

6. Q. Sir, prior to December 7th, were you shown, or were you familiar with the contents of various dispatches coming from the Navy Department containing warnings of the possibility of hostilities?

A. I was not shown any warning dispatch. It is my understanding that those were revealed and discussed at Staff conferences which, in general, I did not attend. However, the purport of all those that had anything to do with my particular work on the Staff was passed to me and I did know of the general tenor of some of the warnings. I can not state as to how many of those were [186] passed on to me by Admiral DeLany.

7. Q. Admiral, prior to December 7, 1941, what was your own personal estimate as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu?

A. My own personal opinion was that an attack on Oahu was definitely possible. I think my opinion was reflected in a Fleet Circular

Letter which I helped compile, that is, 2CL-41, which by my recollection was revised a couple of times. I think it was first written in February or March, 1941. As a matter of fact, seven or eight months after the attack on Pearl Harbor its major part was still in effect in the Fleet. One of the chief considerations of that letter was that the Fleet could be attacked and if it were attacked, it would be by submarine attack, an air attack, or a combination of the two. It was widely discussed between Captain, now Admiral, DeLaney, and myself, that the presence of either submarines or aircraft would lead us to look for the other. I haven't access to that letter, but I believe that thought was written into one of the drafts. I did not think the attack—an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable, but it was considered as a very serious possibility.

8. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, dated October 14, 1941, styled "2CL-41 (Revised)", which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Is this the letter to which you referred in your last answer?

A. This letter is a revision of the letter to which I referred. I think this letter follows very closely the previous and original draft. I probably had nothing to do with the draft of the revision because at the time it was issued I was on temporary duty in Washington.

9. Q. Would you give the approximate date of that temporary duty in Washington, the time you were absent from Pearl Harbor?

A. I left Pearl Harbor on 6 October, 1941, and returned on 8 November, 1941.

10. Q. Referring back two questions to your answer that you did not consider a surprise air attack a probability but a strong possibility, would you say that that represented the consensus of opinion of other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff?

A. Yes, sir. This letter, which I consider one of the most important letters which was issued to the Fleet, so states.

11. Q. Sir, can you amplify a bit the reasoning behind this statement that you have made, which is, as you say, contained in 2CL-41; can you amplify on the reasons behind the basis for this statement?

A. Well, a large part of the world was at war. We were engaged in quasi-war in the Atlantic—this is all my opinion, my reasoning—we were engaged in a diplomatic controversy with Japan which finally ended in conferences in Washington. I, personally, had been in the Hawaiian detachment and had arrived at Pearl Harbor in the Fall of 1939, and all the signs indicated to me, and I can't speak for other members of the Staff, but I feel that they were of like mind, in the discussions with them, that it would be very difficult for us to avoid eventual war.

12. Q. Admiral, at that time, what was your evaluation of the intelligence reports available to you and other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff as regards the relations between the United States and Japan?

[187] A. Well, my evaluation of the situation, my own evaluation of the situation, was somewhat colored by a secret message which I delivered by word of mouth from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief exactly one month before Pearl Harbor. I had been absent from the Fleet for thirty days, and prior to that time I had not, as a regular routine, attended the Staff conferences—I was in

what you might call the second echelon—I did, through conversations with the Fleet Intelligence Officer, know the estimate was that the Japanese were on the move in the Far East and it was a matter of common knowledge in the press that we were trying to persuade Japan to move no further, and that representatives of the Japanese had gone on to Washington to discuss the matter. My estimate as to it, I saw, was colored by the message I brought from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which I did not interpret in any way to Admiral Kimmel other than learning the message by rote. The only interpretation I made of it was to myself. I told no one of this message except Admiral Kimmel, himself. My own conclusion was that the probability was that the move would be in the Far East.

13. Q. Admiral, can you state the contents of that message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Yes. Admiral Stark outlined one or more courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and the United States' probable reaction thereto. A surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no wise presaged by that message which I carried.

14. Q. Sir, upon your return from Washington to CinCPac Headquarters, what was your feeling at that time as to whether the Department here in Washington was furnishing full information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific in regard to the Japanese situation?

A. Having carried that message, I could personally have no other thought but that information, as it was available here in Washington, was furnished, in that case, to the Commander-in-Chief.

15. Q. During the month or six weeks prior to December 7th, what information was available to you and other members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, as regards the then location of the Japanese Fleet?

A. I can not speak as to what knowledge other members of the Staff had. My recollection is that I had knowledge of a large concentration of Japanese naval forces near Camranh Bay. From the time I returned from Washington until the attack on Pearl Harbor, I had not seen any warning messages.

16. Q. Sir, in considering the possibility of a surprise air attack, was any great emphasis placed upon the form that the attack might take—whether by bombs or by torpedoes?

A. All methods of air attack were considered—by high bombers, dive bombers, and by torpedo planes. The danger of a particular type of attack, that is the torpedo plane attack, was minimized in my mind by information contained in one or more letters from the Chief of Naval Operations. I can not quote or recollect the exact phraseology or the figures given. However, to me and in my recollection, the purport of that information was that the success of a torpedo attack, against ships in a harbor with a depth of less than ten fathoms was improbable. In discussions with the War Plans Division of the Staff, my recollection is that we wanted nets to counter such an attack, but the information at the time as to the probability of the success of such an [188] attack allowed us to put the nets, which were not available and hard to get, on a lower priority than other war materials which we needed. There was never a feeling in my own mind that such an attack was impossible, or that nets being available, we should not have them, but the nets definitely took a low priority.

I draw no conclusions for anyone else but myself—they took low priority in my mind. I have a recollection of more than one letter received from the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of torpedo nets. And, serving in the Bureau of Ordnance, I have had made a search of Bureau of Ordnance files for any letters written by the Bureau of Ordnance dealing with torpedo nets and addressed to the Commandant of the District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and have been unable to locate any. The only letter I have been able to locate is a copy of one from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various Commandants, with information copies to CinCPac.

17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, with the information copy for CinCPac, dated June 13, 1941, which is Exhibit 19 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that letter?

A. I think I did see this letter. I do not remember it exactly, but I am led to believe I have seen it before because the figure of "10 Fathoms" which had been in my mind in the past two years, is in this letter, and I imagine I got that date from this letter. I do not recollect the letter in detail.

18. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, what information was available to you as to the frequency with which the Japanese had used torpedo plane attack?

A. I do not believe I had any information at all as to what the Japanese, up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been able to do with torpedo planes and torpedoes as an aircraft weapon. As I look back on it now, I know of no instance where they used the torpedo plane in action. Although they were undoubtedly well drilled in its use, I had no information on it.

19. Q. Sir, were any additional security measures against torpedo plane attack undertaken pursuant to the statements of the letter of June 13 that you just examined?

A. I have no access to the files, but I have a definite impression that the idea of torpedo nets was not abandoned but was given a low priority, a lower priority than other material which was required. I do not recollect any conversations with the Commandant of the District, to whom these letters were addressed, with copies to CinCPac, although quite possibly conversations were had with them. They were frequent visitors at our Headquarters, and these matters were discussed from time to time. My recollection was that the nets were not available, that the ships would have to be left free to maneuver and make quick exits from the Harbor if necessary, and that the non-availability of the nets and desire not to have the Harbor cluttered up had a bearing on our placing the nets at that time in a relatively low priority.

20. Q. Admiral, who was responsible for the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor against an attack of any kind?

A. Well, not referring to this letter, 2CL-41, but to my memory of the letter, which I think is important because I helped to write it—the thought behind the letter—we had spent a great deal of time and effort and ammunition in the training of the Fleet in anti-aircraft gunnery. The defense of [189] Pearl Harbor, since it was a shore base, was, in accordance with the terms of this letter, placed in the hands of the District Commandant, and when one or more ships of the

Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were turned over to the District Commandant in the person of the Harbor Control Officer, as anti-aircraft weapons in the defense of the harbor. When I say responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was placed in the hands of the Commandant, I mean to the extent that alerts were passed on to the ships by him, the conditions of readiness, and the red, yellow, and green signals were all controlled by the Harbor Control Post. I had a fairly intimate knowledge of the setup there in that the Harbor Control Post was one of the CP's, or Command Posts, in the anti-aircraft setup on the Island. The whole anti-aircraft defense of the Island was headed up by an officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces, a Brigadier General. It was placed in his hands because he was the Fighter-Interceptor Commander for the Army, and aircraft attacks were to be countered by fighters and gunners. The Army Anti-Aircraft, the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Brigade, was under the tactical command of this Air Force General, and the Harbor Control Post was a Command Post of the Anti-Aircraft. My recollection is that in the one or more revisions of this letter, we slightly changed the sectors which would be covered by various ships in the Harbor, and I think the second draft of this letter was improved by insuring that at least one ship should be in any one sector. My recollection is that when we first put this into effect, and we had drills from time to time, when few ships were in the Harbor, one sector was left vacant. The guns of the Fleet were under the control of the Harbor Control Post in Pearl Harbor and that Harbor Control Post, which was under the Commandant of the Navy Yard, was a part of the anti-aircraft and interceptor-fighter setup of the Island. The Harbor Control Post received its orders and its directions from the Anti-Aircraft Gun Commander.

21. Q. What portions of the anti-aircraft defense were the direct responsibility of the Army?

A. All those not mounted aboard ship, with the exception of, I believe, one battery of three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, mobile, that the Marines had at the barracks in the Yard. That battery, as I recollect, was part of the equipment of a Defense Battalion which was forming to proceed to one of the outlying islands.

22. Q. Admiral, what Army guns were placed close enough to Pearl Harbor to defend the ships there from dive or torpedo bombing?

A. It eventuated that at the time of the attack that there were not any, except fixed batteries, three-inch guns, at Fort DeRussey, some distance from Pearl Harbor, and I believe on Sand Island, the western side of Honolulu Harbor. The Army's anti-aircraft batteries, aside from fixed batteries, were mobile batteries of three-inch anti-aircraft guns. I believe that no ninety millimeter modern guns reached the Island until after the attack. There may have been one battery on the Island of Oahu, but it was not in operating condition. There were mobile batteries actively engaged in training and firing target practice west of Pearl Harbor at a training camp on the beach.

23. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, do you know the condition of readiness of the Army guns that you mentioned as regards the presence of personnel and availability of ammunition?

A. They were not in place in the field, but were in their gun parks ready to move.

[190] 24. Q. In addition to the one battery that the Marines had at the Pearl Harbor base, did the Navy have any other shore anti-aircraft batteries at Pearl Harbor?

A. Not before the attack; we had many afterward.

25. Q. Do you know anything of the condition of readiness of that one Marine battery?

A. No, except that it was emplaced on that day.

26. Q. In general terms, will you describe the anti-aircraft armament of the ships in the Harbor, by types, as to number and calibre?

A. Yes. The battleships were equipped generally with 3-inch 50 calibre AA guns which were mounted in emplacements which were destined to take 1.1 quadruple mounts. They had their regular batteries of 5-inch 25 AA guns, and were equipped with —

27. Q. Just give the total number and calibre?

A. Eight 5-inch 25 guns; six to eight 3-inch 50 guns; and about twelve 50-calibre machine guns. I might state that the 3-inch 50 guns were interim armament in lieu of 1.1 automatic guns, quadruple mounts. Cruisers were equipped with eight 5-inch 25-calibre guns, except two which had 5-inch 38-calibre guns. Some had 3-inch 50 AA guns in lieu of 1.1 quadruple guns, and some had 1.1 quadruple mounts, four in each case, and eight to twelve 50-calibre machine guns. There were no 20-millimeter guns mounted in vessels of the Fleet, nor were there any 40-millimeter quadruple mounts.

28. Q. Admiral, what fire control plans were in effect for coordinating the fire of the ships and the limited number of shore guns available in the event of an air attack?

A. Speaking of Army guns, now?

29. Q. Overall. Was there any unity of command?

A. The strength of the Army AA defense rested in their mobile mounts and to my knowledge, none of them went into action on that day. The plan for the ships was for ships to cover their regularly assigned sectors, the Senior Commanding Officer in the sector in general command of that sector. The alerts and the orders, general overall fire control orders, were to come from the Harbor Control Post. The overall command of anti-aircraft defense, in accordance with the plan, rested in the Brigadier General of the Army Air Forces, whose station was at the Army Filter Station. He commanded fighters, interceptors, and the gun defense of the Island,—of Pearl Harbor. The Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander, under this Brigadier General, had three commands; gun batteries, automatic weapon batteries, and searchlight batteries. The gun batteries of the Fleet were under the command of this Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander through the Harbor Control Post.

30. Q. Were those control arrangements really in effect—working order?

A. They did not work, sir.

31. Q. Could they have been worked, had the personnel been properly alert?

A. As a matter of opinion, sir, I would say—probably. Certainly it would have worked better than it did, if the mobile batteries had been properly emplaced.

[191] 32. Q. How would the Central Control Station on shore, in Pearl Harbor, communicate fire control orders to the ships' guns?

A. By lights on the big water tower, sir, the signal tower, and by voice radio.

33. Q. In view of the speed of the targets for aircraft batteries, do you think such method of communication would have been effective, or did you think they would have been effective?

A. Yes, sir. Under the plan which was in effect in the ships, and I base this opinion on many drills held after the attack, when this plan, with little or no major change, remained in effect.

34. Q. Where were communications from the voice radio intended to be received on the ships?

A. Well, I cannot state that exactly, sir; various ships had various arrangements. In general a radio watch was kept on that circuit. No too great dependence was placed on that radio communication. The regular alert signals, sirens and lights, and search lights flashing the signal from the water tower were in effect, and before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and afterwards, actual fighting of a battery aboard ship was the responsibility of the commanding officer to take the proper targets under fire. The fire control of the Harbor Control Post over the ships in the Harbor was one of warning and alerting, and no attempt was made, before or after the bitter experience at Pearl Harbor, to require the Harbor Control Officer to pick out targets and direct fire on those targets.

35. Q. Was the system of assignment of fire sectors for the various ships sufficient to prevent confusion when various ships were firing?

A. I think when the attack actually came, that any targets which presented themselves to a ship were taken under fire provided the guns of that ship would bear. The chief reason for assigning sectors was to insure the presence of an even distribution, to insure that no sectors of the 360-degrees around the Fleet anchorage would be left uncovered; so that guns would not bear on any bearing. When the attack came, gunners followed the targets through where ever they presented themselves.

36. Q. Admiral, what fire control orders were actually issued on the morning of December 7, by whom, and how effective?

A. I do not believe that any orders as fire control other than those issued by the ships' commanding officers were issued. The alert came at the moment of the attack. There was one fire control order which was issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the evening of December 7, when some ships of the Fleet opened fire on what appeared to us on the Staff to be friendly planes, and there was broadcast from the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, "Cease firing," I believe, "friendly planes". In other words, we stepped in.

37. Q. Was any damage done to the friendly planes by that mistake?

A. I believe that one or two friendly planes were shot down that night, sir.

38. Q. Admiral, again speaking in general terms, what was the condition of readiness of the shipboard anti-aircraft batteries, as regards presence of personnel and availability of ammunition, immediately prior to the attack on December 7?

[192] A. I think I would have to refer to this letter, to give an accurate answer. I was not actually in the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters when the attack came, but I believe that the Fleet was

in Condition 3, in accordance with this letter. I do know, from first-hand accounts, that ready ammunition was available on the required ships standing watch in the sectors and that fire against the attacking planes was promptly taken up.

38. Q. Do you know who issued the order for that condition of readiness, Condition 3, and when that was put into effect?

A. Well, the Naval Base Defense Officer was the Commandant and he set conditions of readiness.

39. Q. Admiral, do you know of any modification prescribed with respect to this Condition 3 in the battleships?

A. No, sir, I do not. I recollect one modification in conditions of readiness which was permitted by the Commander-in-Chief and that was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He permitted one or two submarine tenders, moored to docks at the Submarine Base, to modify Condition 3 so that a fewer number of guns need be manned in Condition 3. That was because of the crew of those ships being occupied with submarine overhaul. I might state that my recollection of some of these things is a recollection of immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, because I was Fleet Gunnery Officer for nine months after the attack.

40. Q. What were the dimensions of the sectors which anti-aircraft batteries were assigned, which were assigned by 2CL-41?

A. As I remember it, there were four sectors, and refreshing my mind with the letter, I see there were four.

41. Q. That is ninety degrees each?

A. Not exactly, Admiral. The sector to the southeastward was 135 degrees; the sector to the northeastward was 45 degrees; and the other two were 90 degrees.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

42. Q. At the time of the attack of 7 December (these instructions insured the readiness of only a relatively small proportion of the total number of anti-aircraft guns which could have fired into the southeast sector; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

43. Q. About what percentage?

A. A small percentage actually manned with men on watch.

44. Q. Admiral, did the ships of the Pacific Fleet have on board their full wartime allowance of ammunition and other ordnance materials on the morning of December 7?

A. The Fleet not only had its full allowance of ammunition aboard but, in general, had its mobilization allowance, which is an extra amount of ammunition. This statement applies to all categories of ammunition. There was, however, a shortage of .50 calibre ammunition for anti-aircraft machine guns throughout the Navy and throughout the Fleet. This particular shortage had no effect on the attack because no ship expended all of its ammunition that it had on board.

[193] 45. Q. Were the conditions of ordnance material satisfactory to you prior to the attack?

A. Absolutely, except for numbers and types which were destined to come to the Fleet and had not yet reached the Fleet. May I ex-

plain. Many ships had three inch .50 calibre AA guns which were interim-armament and were to be replaced by 1.1 quadruple mounts. Some ships, notably cruisers, would have a mixed battery of three inch .50 calibre AA guns and 1.1's, because a sufficient number of 1.1 mounts had not arrived for the Fleet. The Fleet was destined to receive 20 mm machine guns and only two had been received. Sufficient ammunition, aside from these shortages I just spoke of, was available in the ammunition depot and within twenty-four hours all ships, except those that were very seriously damaged, had their ammunition replaced.

46. Q. Keeping in mind the strained international situation and the imminence of war, and the war tasks of the Pacific Fleet, will you give us the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as you knew them at the time, with respect to his satisfaction with ordnance and gunnery conditions as they existed in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

A. I think that the Commander-in-Chief was well satisfied with the state of training of the men in the Fleet, considering personnel shortages which existed in the Fleet and very large turnovers of men which we had had continuously for the previous year. Target practice allowances had been greatly increased during the previous ten months. The number of practices that the ships fired had been increased, in some cases, by using a certain amount of ammunition for two or more practices, firing less in one practice and a smaller number of guns. Night surface firing had been stressed and drones had been made available in quite sufficient numbers, and anti-aircraft firings had increased, I would say, three or four hundred per cent, considering the additional targets, drones, and the better anti-aircraft visibility conditions existing in the islands.

47. Q. Were the status of your fire control doctrines well established at that time to your satisfaction?

A. Yes, sir, and I feel that is borne out by the splendid performance that the anti-aircraft batteries of the Fleet put forth on the 7th of December. My recollection can be checked by the report of Pearl Harbor, which I helped draw up, and I believe at least twenty-eight planes were shot down by vessels of the Fleet. Not a bad performance for men who had never fired a shot in action and considering the number of guns engaged. I might state that the planes shot down, no matter what their number was, were very carefully screened and identified as to where they landed and what happened to them.

48. Q. In the last several months leading up to the attack, had the gunnery training of the Fleet involved advance practices?

A. Yes, sir, of all kinds. First of all, short-range battle practice, or short-range practice, as we had known it before, had practically passed out of the picture; sled targets were used in place of raft targets. That resulted in higher speeds. I might state, along with gunnery training, I think this has a bearing, that at Admiral Kimmel's insistence the Fleet Gunnery Officer, the Force Gunnery Officer, and Type Gunnery Officer were given flight orders and required to witness practices of their forces from the air, so that immediate corrective actions could be taken by the ships as soon as they came into port. No observation parties were allowed to be transferred at sea.

[194] 49. Q. In these advance practices, using your established fire control doctrines, were the results obtained satisfactory to the

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as practices held in a period when war was quite imminent?

A. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any performance. He was a perfectionist and nothing less than perfection would do. The people who were responsible for the gunnery training of the Fleet were greatly pleased with the state of training and the progress that was being made daily, and I think secretly Admiral Kimmel felt that a good job was being done. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any results; completely satisfied.

50. Q. Of those twenty-eight enemy planes which you estimated to have been shot down, how many were recovered and examined?

A. Admiral, I'd have to refer to the report, because in that report we actually spotted where the planes landed. Several of them—I can't give you the exact number—landed in the water. Some of those that landed in the water were recovered. Several, number I can not recollect, landed in the cane fields and burned almost completely. There was a large recovery of junk.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: Admiral, I would like to add, even at the expense of perhaps repeating some of the things I have said here in answer to questions, and in view of the fact that the apparent readiness and state of training of the Fleet has been one of the questions that has been foremost here in this testimony, that I do not know what more could have been done, under a Commander who was a very hard taskmaster, to put the Pacific Fleet in a higher state of training than it was on the morning of Pearl Harbor. I think that state was very high and I know that if there was anything left undone in making it higher, it is something that I, as an afterthought, have not been able to think of.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter dated 16 March 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the ninth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 30".

The examination then, at 4:05 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[195] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 1944

FOURTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:25 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eleventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Vincent R. Murphy, Captain, U. S. Navy, Head of the Post-graduate School, Annapolis, Maryland.

2. Q. Where were you stationed on 7 December 1941?

A. I was a member of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel's Staff as Assistant to the War Plans Officer.

3. Q. Where were you at the time the Japanese air attack was launched against Pearl Harbor on that date?

A. I was the Staff Duty Officer, and when the attack was launched I was in the War Plans Office, at the Submarine Base.

4. Q. What was the nature of your duties as Staff Duty Officer?

A. They were the usual duties of a Staff Duty Officer, to represent the Commander-in-Chief in his absence, to act on routine matters that might come up, to act on non-routine matters in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, if they came within the confines of established policy; to refer matters not under my immediate knowledge

to the appropriate member of the Staff who had cognizance, if such matters came up; and to keep the Commander-in-Chief informed of unusual or untoward circumstances.

[196] 5. Q. Will you please expand your answer just a little bit to include your authority and duties in connection with the Fourteenth Naval District, if any?

A. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, commanded a task force under the Commander-in-Chief which was charged with the naval defense of Pearl Harbor. He came under the Duty Officer's cognizance the same as any other task force commander or any other unit of the Fleet.

6. Q. At what time and date did your tour of duty commence?

A. As well as I remember, the time of relieving for Duty Officers was after working hours which, on Saturday, would have been around 12:30, when the Chief of Staff went home—on Saturday.

7. Q. At what time on the morning of December 7th did Admiral Kimmel, or a member of his Staff senior to you, appear at the Headquarters so as to relieve you of these extraordinary functions?

A. The first member of the Staff was Captain, now Rear Admiral McMorris, who I would estimate arrived about five minutes after the attack started, which would be around 8:00 o'clock. Admiral Kimmel arrived, I would say, about ten minutes after that, but that could be in error ten minutes either way because I was very busy and he could have easily come in and I wouldn't have seen him. I think Admiral McMorris met Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Kimmel came in.

8. Q. Captain, what information with respect to the international situation in the Pacific was furnished you when you went on watch as a Staff Duty Officer?

A. There was no specific information furnished me as Staff Duty Officer, because I was already cognizant of most of the general picture, anyway, by virtue of my connection with War Plans. I was furnished with a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving me the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet, and giving me instructions that if war were declared or an attack took place, the general idea of what to do with the ships. That idea, as well as I recall, was to get Admiral Halsey's forces, which had been at Wake and which were or would be, out of fuel, back into Pearl Harbor and get them fueled ready to conduct the first operation of the War Plans. Admiral Brown's force was then at Johnston Island, as I recall, getting ready to conduct a practice landing operation. Another force under Admiral Newton, I think it was a task group under Admiral Brown, was delivering planes, or on the way to deliver planes at Midway. The general plan was to get all those ships back and fueled and proceed with our War Plans. I had that information in a memorandum from Captain McMorris. I was also furnished information that locked in the Operations Office was a chart showing what we thought to be the location of the force which was operating under radio silence—Admiral Halsey's force.

9. Q. Were you familiar with the Fleet Intelligence Officer's estimate of the location of Japanese Army and Navy forces?

A. Insofar as I know, I was. There may have been something that the Fleet Intelligence Officer told other people that he did not tell me, but if there was, I don't know about it.

10. Q. Did you keep advised daily of the situation as he viewed it?

A. To the best of my recollection, the Fleet Intelligence Officer reported every morning to Admiral Kimmel and summarized the situation for him. Captain McMorris was generally present at those conferences, I was not, but Captain McMorris made it a point to inform me, as to what went on. I am not [197] sure whether Captain McCormick was in on those conferences or not.

11. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had all the information of that type that it was necessary for you to have in order to properly perform your duties as Staff Duty Officer?

A. I felt, at that time, that I had all the information that was available, but I know of no Staff Duty Officer, or any Commander-in-Chief, who could ever feel that he had all the information that was necessary.

12. Q. Had you been advised of the receipt, in the week preceding the attack, of the dispatch containing a war warning received from the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir; I had.

13. Q. Had you been advised of the Commander-in-Chief's views with respect to the significance of the information that was available to him and his Staff, concerning the international situation?

A. Not altogether. When the message came in, I was sent for, and to the best of my recollection, Captain Smith, now Rear Admiral Smith; Captain McMorris; myself, Captain, now Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany; and, I think, Layton, the Intelligence Officer,—were called into Admiral Kimmel's office and he read the dispatch to us and he passed it around and he said, "What do you think of it?" As well as I recall, each one expressed an opinion, and then Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a conference later on in the afternoon, with his principal commanders, on the subject. I do not believe that Admiral Kimmel gave us, at that time, a complete or even a partial picture of his reaction to the message—inasmuch as none of us had had time to study the message in any detail. Later that afternoon, I would estimate around 4:00 o'clock, there was another conference that I think I attended for part, but whether I was there for the entire time, I can't recall. The best of my recollection of that conference is that it was attended by the same people who came that morning, and I think Admiral Calhoun was there. I think Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, represented Admiral Bloch, but that is subject to correction because there were many conferences and I can't separate them in my mind—each one. At that conference, I believe the decision was made to reenforce Wake particularly, with planes and radar gear, and to send some planes to Midway, which consisted of one patrol squadron, as I remember it, and some fighters, to be delivered by the LEXINGTON. The movement to Wake was made with particular emphasis on secrecy, particularly inasmuch as my recollection of the war warning message specifically warned us against any overt act.

14. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar, Captain, with the Army's responsibility in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I was familiar with the provisions of Joint Action of the Army and Navy, which made the Army responsible for the defense of Naval bases—I interpreted that to include Pearl Harbor.

15. Q. Were you familiar with the Army's setup so as to know just how capable they were of fulfilling their obligations under the Plans and Joint Action?

A. They only feature that I was familiar with was their general airplane picture, and their anti-aircraft gun picture. As I recall it, they had around 200 fighting planes and about 30 or 40 bombers, and I think the figure was 56 anti-aircraft guns, although it could have been 37.

[198] 16. Q. Were you advised as to their condition of readiness, or condition as to alertness on that morning?

A. As well as I recall, the condition of readiness was prescribed by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

17. Q. I am still speaking of the Army.

A. I was not aware of the details of their condition of readiness.

18. Q. Did you know whether they had been alerted at all, or not?

A. I did not.

19. Q. Were you familiar with the radar and air warning net setup of the Army?

A. Only vaguely. I knew that seven or eight stations were in process of being set up. How many of them were actually set up, I did not know.

20. Q. Did you know, the morning of the 7th of December, whether any of them were operating or not?

A. I did not.

21. Q. Did you have any other instructions or information with respect to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's plans for immediate action to be taken in event of sudden starting of war, that is, other than the instructions that were given you by Admiral McMorris?

A. The instructions which would govern the situation that actually occurred were contained in the Joint Plan for the Defense of Hawaii, I have forgotten the name, and under that there was a specific plan for the defense of Pearl Harbor which charged the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, with responsibility for the Fleet's part of that defense, with the distribution of ships in the Harbor, to assist in repelling anti-aircraft attack, with the prescribing of conditions of readiness for the situation, as he might see it.

22. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Do you identify it?

A. Yes.

23. Q. Is that the plan to which you have just referred?

A. Yes.

24. Q. Were you, at that time, or had you, at that time, been advised as to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's views with respect to a surprise air attack on the vessels and installations at Pearl Harbor?

A. Not specifically. I mean by that, by association with the Staff, particularly the War Plans branch, I was, I think, generally familiar with the Commander-in-Chief's views, but I was not specifically advised as to his views of a sudden attack.

25. Q. What were your views, at that time, with respect to such a surprise air attack?

A. I did not think that such an attack would be made. I thought that it would be utterly stupid for the Japanese to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor. I thought it was questionable whether they should attack even the Philippines. I thought that the Japanese could probably have gone into Thailand and Malaya, and even the Dutch East Indies. I doubt if the United States would have declared war under those circumstances. I thought that the [199] Japanese Staff was faced with the proposition of guessing what the reaction of the United States might be if they did not attack the United States and proceeded with their plans; and, having to weigh that possibility, against their open flank if they left the Philippines. I thought that the Japanese, who, in my opinion, generally follow the book, might attack the Philippines, just by virtue of being afraid to leave an open flank—I did not think they would attack at Pearl Harbor because I did not think it was necessary for them to do so, from my point of view. We could not have materially affected their control of the waters that they wanted to control, whether or not the battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. In other words, I did not believe that we could move the United States Fleet to the Western Pacific until such time as auxiliaries were available, as the material condition of the ships were improved, especially with regard to anti-aircraft, and until such time as the Pacific Fleet was materially reinforced. I thought it was suicide for us to attempt, with an inferior fleet, to move into the Western Pacific.

26. Q. Did you recognize, at that time, the possibility of such an attack?

A. Yes.

27. Q. With respect to the security of the vessels at Pearl Harbor, did you have an instructions other than those contained in Exhibit 4?

A. Not that I recall.

28. Q. Did you, at that time, feel that the provisions of Exhibit 4 adequately covered the situation?

A. I felt that the provisions of Exhibit 4 covered the situation as well as it could, with the other considerations which entered into the picture, those considerations being the forces available, our own War Plans, which required almost immediate movements to the attack, and, the requirements of training in a Fleet which contained a considerable portion of new officers and men, and which was very deficient in anti-aircraft defense. The question of patrol plane, all-around search, had come up many, many times. Much thought had been given to it. It was a question of wearing out our planes over a considerable period of time, wearing out our pilots, and not knowing when to expect a declaration of war, to find ourselves completely worn out by practicing for war, including the psychological aspects thereof, and unable to fight it when it came.

29. Q. Do you remember the use of the word "deployment" in the message which contained a war warning?

A. Yes, sir.

30. Q. What was your reaction when you saw that word?

A. The first time I saw that word, the word "defensive" or "defense" was out of place in the message, as I recall it. It said, "Take defensive

deployment for the tasks of Rainbow 5". My thought was that "defensive" was not in that, in its right place, that the message should be: "Take deployment for the defensive tasks of Rainbow 5".

31. Q. Did you think that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment, insofar as they were concerned?

A. I thought it amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, in that our plan called for the immediate movement of those ships to the attack. I felt that the risk, if it were greater in [200] Pearl Harbor than it might have been at sea, had to be weighted against the advantage of an immediate moment. Had those ships been at sea, it would have been necessary to bring them back in to port and refuel them, and get them ready to move. I, personally, wanted to move fast; I felt that our original plan was bold for the forces we had available and that a great deal depended on speed in its execution.

32. Q. Did you then think that those words "defensive" and "deployment" in any way meant security measures?

A. I was not sure, but I interpreted them to leave it open to us. I was doubtful.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

33. Q. Captain, I refer back to your statement when you were giving your estimate of the situation as regards the possibility of surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor. Did I understand you correctly to say that in formulating your estimate you considered that the Fleet was not ready to make any westward move, because of the lack of auxiliaries and lack of material readiness on the part of vessels of the Fleet?

A. I said that and I would like to add to that that we were, in the Pacific, an inferior Fleet. I saw nothing in the Far East that could necessarily have tied up parts of the Japanese Fleet to allow us even approach equality.

34. Q. Captain, at that time, was it the belief of the members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff that the Japanese were obtaining rather full intelligence as to the condition of the Pacific Fleet?

A. There was a general impression that the Japanese could know everything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet.

35. Q. In view of those two answers, why was not the possibility more seriously considered that the Japanese High Command would be rather anxious to disable the Fleet at Pearl Harbor before it could remedy these deficiencies which precluded it from striking westward?

A. I do not know what the general Staff reaction to that possibility was. For my own part, and I may have been guided more by a political analysis than a military one, I did not think that they would attempt to do it.

36. Q. Captain, had you, at that time, formulated any opinion as to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air arm?

A. Yes.

37. Q. Would you please state what your opinion was at that time?

A. My original opinion was that it was poor. That opinion was altered by a conversation with Admiral Yarnell. I then thought that

Japanese aviation was probably pretty good, but nowhere near approaching our own.

38. Q. Did you consider it capable of performing the tasks that it did perform on the 7th of December?

A. Yes.

39. Q. Did that consideration enter into the formulation of your opinion as to the possibility or probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

[201] 40. Q. Captain, with respect to your duties as the Staff Duty Officer, what instructions did you have or what did you consider to be your duty in connection with advising the Army Command on Oahu of any matters of importance that came to your attention?

A. If anything unusual had come up during my tour of duty, I would advise Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who would have advised the Army, as he was charged under Joint Action of the Army and Navy with dealings with the Army.

41. Q. Captain, when did you first receive notice of a contact with any Japanese forces on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I would say somewhere around 7:20 or 7:25.

42. Q. What was the nature of that contact?

A. It was a report of the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Assistant Duty Officer, to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD or had been attacked and sunk by the WARD in the Defensive Sea Area.

43. Q. Please state what action you took, based on that report.

A. At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, "Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?" And he said, "No." I said, "While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch." I finished dressing, Black came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. It was a dial telephone system. I said, "All right, you go to the office and start breaking out the charts and positions of the various ships; I'll dial one more time and then I'll be over." I dialed the phone and it was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from Pat Wing-Two. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, "I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on," and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the Ward and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, "Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?" He said, "The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind." I then called Admiral Kimmel and

gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, "I will be right down." About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, "No," but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and dequisting a Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman [202] came in, said, "There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill." I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: "JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL." I then called Ramsey and said, "How many planes have you got available"—no, I'll correct; I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, "How many planes have you got available?" He said, "I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search." I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events.

44. Q. Upon receipt of the contact report, did you formulate any opinion as to its significance with respect to other possible enemy movements?

A. Yes. The contact itself was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts. All previous ones had, insofar as actual proof is concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, I thought, might be the real thing, but I wanted some information leading to why he thought he had sunk a submarine so that I could formulate whether there was a submarine there or whether there wasn't a submarine there. As in previous contacts, we had never been able to definitely establish that there was a submarine there. I did not interpret the submarine attack as possibly being accompanied by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. I will say this: I had less doubt about the authenticity of this attack than I had had about some of the others.

45. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views as to what significance should be attached to the contact when you notified him of it?

A. He said, "I will be right down." That's all he said.

46. Q. Did you notify anyone other than Admiral Kimmel of this contact, prior to the launching of the air attack?

A. No.

47. Q. Where were you, physically, during the performance of these duties which you have just recounted?

A. In the Commander-in-Chief's Offices, in the Submarine Base Building at the Submarine Base. I was actually in the outer offices.

48. Q. You've mentioned difficulties in telephone communications on that morning. Can you tell me anything concerning the general inadequacy of wire communications in and about Pearl Harbor, including those to the Army?

A. I made some investigation of this when I was War Plans Officer for the previous Commander-in-Chief. At that time, I can best describe the communications system, particularly with respect to communication with the Army, as almost non-existent. There was projected, at that time, the building of a communication center in which a tie-in with the Army circuits would be provided. That building, I believe, was almost complete at the time [203] of the attack, but I do not believe that the facilities or the installations had been completed, although I am not—or was not, familiar with the details of the arrangement. I would say that the methods of communication were most unsatisfactory, in that all the communication that I had with the Fourteenth Naval District was by telephone, and likewise with the Army. There was a Harbor defense circuit by radio in which all ships were connected and which was tied-in with the Army anti-aircraft system and with the plane system. I mean by the "plane system", with the control of aircraft in flight, particularly fighters. I've forgotten the frequency that circuit was on.

49. Q. Was it effective, as yet?

A. I believe it was, Admiral, but I'm not sure.

50. Q. The difficulties of the telephone system, I understand to lie in the fact that everything was via the usual peacetime switchboard arrangement and there was nothing corresponding to a battle telephone circuit?

A. There was not.

51. Q. Was that also true with communications to the Army and did they involve the commercial switchboard in Honolulu?

A. I don't know, sir.

52. Q. Referring to your estimate to the effect that the Japanese would attack someone else in the Far East and they would probably not attack the United States. Did you see a dispatch from the Department of about 3 December concerning some steps that the Japs were taking with their communication equipment?

A. I did.

53. Q. Did seeing that dispatch alter your mental attitude as to the direction in which a Japanese attack might take?

A. No, sir. I considered it a routine precaution in case the United States or Great Britain should declare war and unexpectedly take over the Japanese diplomatic residences.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a mat-

ter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to say this. That the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was confronted with an almost irreconcilable situation in that he had a Fleet which was badly in need of training and matériel improvement, particularly with respect to new planes and new pilots in the patrol squadrons, as well as ships themselves. He had to guess how much training he could do and include in it the possibility of maintaining a continuous alert, which would be destructive both in matériel and, in my opinion, even more important, the morale of the Fleet. I do not believe that any force can maintain, for a long period, an attitude of complete defensive readiness without severe loss of morale. I think that these considerations weighed heavily upon the Commander-in-Chief's mind.

(Examination by the examining officer continued:)

[204] 54. Q. Were those thoughts which you have just expressed with you during that period, November-December, '41?

A. Yes, sir.

55. Q. Did anything occur to you which would have remedied those circumstances and conditions?

A. Only the thought: "If I can only have full information."

56. Q. Did you advocate, or even seriously consider in your own mind, definite steps toward basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast instead of at Hawaii?

A. I had advocated those steps in my capacity as War Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson. I did not advocate it, as well as I recall, later, because I thought the matter had been settled.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 2:50 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Vincent R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fourteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 2:52 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[205] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MARCH 25, 1944

FIFTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 10 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fourteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Willard A. Kitts, III, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twelfth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:25 a. m., took a recess until 11 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the fifth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:05 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[206] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1944

SIXTEENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination set at 10:08 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The record of proceedings of the second through the fifteenth days, both inclusive, of the examination was read and approved.

The examining officer read and received in evidence a copy of a letter, dated 22 March 1944, from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the adjournment of the examination on March 27, 1944, to such places away from Washington, D. C., as pertinent witnesses may be found available, which places are now unknown, and of the examining officer's inability to inform him further of such times of meetings, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 31."

The examination then, at 10:29 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[207] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY MARCH 28, 1944

SEVENTEENTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
San Francisco, California.

The examination met at 12:50 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the sixteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer U. S. S. ABSD2.

2. Q. What were your duties during 1941 calendar year?

A. 1 January 1941 until approximately 15 May 1941, attached to and serving on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS as Assistant Operations Officer and Force Intelligence Officer for Commander, Scouting Force. During the remainder of the calendar year, I was officer in charge of combat intelligence, attached to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Did you spend some time in Japan learning that language?

A. Yes, sir, three years, from September, 1929, until September, 1932.

4. Q. Did you qualify as Japanese interpreter?

A. Yes; interpreter and translator.

5. Q. In addition to attaining that qualification, did you then, or have you since, made any particular effort towards study of the mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?

A. Yes, sir. Whenever my duties at sea and ashore permitted, which were, due to the fact that I was Fleet Intelligence Officer for two years and Assistant District Intelligence Officer for two years, rather extensive.

6. Q. Other than from the work of your own unit at Pearl Harbor, did you have other sources from which you obtained similar information?

A. Yes, sir, from the Washington Headquarters, and from the unit similar to mine attached to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

[208] 7. Q. Was there any other source in particular?

A. Other Government agencies, such as the Army in the Hawaiian Area, the Federal Bureau of Investigation field office in Honolulu, Federal Communications Commission office in Honolulu. However, the information furnished by these agencies was of no value prior to December 7, 1941.

8. Q. Was there a free interchange of information between units similar to yours located in Washington and in the Far East, and your own?

A. Yes, sir, most free, due to the fact that all of our messages were common to all three offices. That is, any message originating in one unit automatically was sent to the other two units.

9. Q. Then did you feel that you had access to all the information which the Navy had available from those two sources?

A. Insofar as general intelligence was concerned, we had access to all information available. Certain types of information were handled either in Washington, alone, or jointly between Washington and the unit in the Far East.

10. Q. Then the three units did, to a certain extent, specialize in certain fields within their own general specialty?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. And you were not positive that you received all of the important information in those particular fields?

A. No, sir, we did not.

12. Q. To what officials did you report concerning the intelligence which came into your hands, during the latter half of 1941?

A. To the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, personally, and to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

13. Q. And you, yourself, or none of your subordinates made direct contacts with the Commander-in-Chief or other members of his Staff, other than with his Intelligence Officer?

A. Except in rare instances, I had no contact with the Commander-in-Chief personally. On several occasions, the Commander-in-Chief came to my office for discussion of certain points which had been raised by either Washington, the Far Eastern Unit, or myself?

14. Q. Did your unit engage in study of material gained from the Japanese Foreign Service?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. Did you receive, during November and early December, anything which the other two units obtained from that source?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

16. Q. Did you receive from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, directly or otherwise, a copy of some communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned, at any time around 1 December '41?

A. Yes, sir.

[209] 17. Q. Did those communications amount to much in the way of volume?

A. No, sir, I would say, perhaps, ten to fifteen messages.

18. Q. Did they come direct to you from the District Intelligence Officer?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. Did you have any request or any instructions in connection with them?

A. Yes, sir. He stated he was vitally interested in any information they might contain.

20. Q. Did you succeed in extracting any information from them?

A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. When?

A. In all except two or three of the messages, within twelve hours; the remaining two or three messages on the evening of 10 December.

22. Q. Did the lot which you handled easily contain any important information?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. Did the other lot?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Why were you unable to obtain that information at an earlier date?

A. Because of the inherent difficulties in the task which were such that we were unable to get earlier results.

25. Did you employ your ablest assistants in that task, and approximately how much time did they devote to it?

A. Yes, sir. It was made a matter of paramount importance and approximately twelve to sixteen hours daily were devoted to that work alone.

26. Q. Was it a part of your duties, or those of your unit, to monitor radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status with the object of disclosing if any Japanese spies were communicating direct with Japan?

A. No, sir.

27. Q. Did you know whether any of that work was being done on Oahu?

A. In conversation with F. C. C. personally, I received the impression that it was their function and that they were endeavoring to cover such channels to the best of their ability.

28. Q. Did you know whether or not it was a sincere and effective effort on their part?

A. Insofar as the local personnel on Oahu were concerned, I believe it was.

29. Q. Did you ever hear of their apprehending any improper communications of that nature?

A. No, sir.

30. Q. Over what channels did the Consular General, Hawaii, communicate with his superiors in Japan?

A. Primarily by cable, occasionally by radio.

31. Q. Was there ever any telephone communication in which he was engaged (I mean trans-Pacific telephone)?

A. None of which I had been informed.

[210] 32. Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 October 1941.

A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic

as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence, due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

A. Two, sir.

35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

[211] A. No, sir.

39. Q. In what respect?

A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

A. I do not recall.

41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, sir, the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.

43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. Did you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger ships.

48. Q. What particular types of Japanese man-o-war did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

[212] A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

A. No, sir.

50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

A. Yes, sir.

51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as during that period?

A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?

A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

A. Yes, sir.

54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands.

55. Q. Reverting to the subject of your general study of Japanese characteristics, do you recall any conversation in which you engaged concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders of that period, particularly of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. I do not recall any specific conversations, but I had, over a two-year period, during which I served on the same Staff as the then Captain McMorris, many conversations with him and other senior officers of my opinion as to the characteristics of the various Japanese naval high command.

56. Q. Do you recall what your general size-up of Yamamoto was at that time?

A. Prior to December 7, 1941, I considered Admiral Yamamoto as not being particularly brilliant, but rather being of a type of General Araki. In other words, a strong character who might take violent action even without the knowledge or consent of his superiors in Tokyo.

57. Q. You thought that he belonged to the so-called younger officer clique?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. Did you have in mind his previous work in building up the air force of the Japanese Navy?

A. Not particularly, sir. In reading the various statements attributed to him, and during the one or two occasions that I met him, my estimate was that he was one of the—what we then called “fire-brands”, and might conceivably disobey any order from Tokyo under certain circumstances.

[213] 59. Q. Did you look upon him as dangerous as well as venturesome?

A. Yes, sir.

60. Q. Insofar as you know, were those opinions of yours and the others with whom you discussed it ever communicated to Admirals Kimmel or Bloch?

A. I could not say definitely whether they had, or not, except in one or two cases where I had prepared, while attached to the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force, estimates in connection with the various Rainbow Plans.

61. Q. Do you recall if the Fleet Intelligence Officer, whom I understand likewise is a Japanese language interpreter, agreed with you in your opinions?

A. I have reason to believe that he did, sir.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to mention, briefly, the equipment which was available prior to December 7. The Pearl Harbor unit was also charged with operating, under the general supervision of the Navy Department, the mid-Pacific radio direction finder net. This was not as efficient or as productive of results as it might have been, due to the type of equipment, lack of trained operators, and long distances involved which rendered an efficient radio direction finder net operation rather difficult. In the summer of 1941, the Commandant personally ordered the erection of additional radio direction finder sets at Midway and Palmyra, after I had discussed the matter unsuccessfully with the Navy Department. It is my opinion that the Commandant ordered the erection of these stations after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. In connection with the exchange of information between the three combat intelligence units, all traffic, other than purely technical traffic, was also sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Prior to December 7, the Army, to the best of my knowledge, was not engaged in any work comparable to that of the Combat Intelligence Naval Unit in the Hawaiian Area.

Examination by the examining officer (continued):

62. Q. Was the Army in Hawaii equipped with material and personnel to do that kind of work?

A. No, sir.

63. Q. As regards the Pacific radio direction finder net, did you ever propose that still further stations be erected?

A. Yes, sir. In general, our proposal was that additional stations be set up in the various Pacific naval air bases then being established, namely, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Midway, as soon as they could be accommodated. No satisfactory answer having been received, the Commandant directed the establishment of Midway and Palmyra, and plans had been made and material had been allocated from the pool at Pearl Harbor for Wake.

64. Q. Was the equipment of your RDF stations up to date?

A. No, sir, it was perhaps the best available at that time but the office of Naval Communications was then developing and had promised us, to my knowledge, since June of 1941, modern equipment, but it had not been completed or satisfactorily tested prior to December.

[214] The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 2:15 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[214] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 1944

EIGHTEENTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 10:20 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the seventeenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy, at present Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

3. Q. Previous to that time, did you spend some time in Japan learning the language?

A. I did, sir.

4. Q. When?

A. From September, 1929, until October, 1932. Again, when I returned to Japan as Assistant Naval Attache in April, 1937, until late March of 1939.

5. Q. And you are qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translator?

A. I am, sir.

[215] 6. Q. In addition to that qualification, have you made any particular study of the mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?

A. To the utmost of my ability; yes, sir.

7. Q. Have you devoted a good deal of effort in that line?

A. I have, yes, sir, both while in Japan and while in America, continuing study along things Japanese and Japanese history, person-

alities, psychology, and particularly study of the characters in prominent positions in Japan, in civil, economic, and military life.

8. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer in 1941, from what sources did you obtain information concerning the Japanese Navy?

A. The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu.

9. Q. Do you recall that in, say, October-November, 1941, you felt that you were obtaining from those sources as much and as good information as should have been supplied?

A. Intelligence being evaluated information and a commodity of which you can never have quite enough, it is difficult to say. I thought at the time in question that our Intelligence coverage was good, always, of course, leaving details of the picture incompletely filled, the task of filling which would be monumental. By this I mean it is like a jigsaw puzzle with parts missing; the whole picture is rarely available as important pieces are missing.

10. Q. Then as you recall, you, at that time, felt that our intelligence sources were doing as well as could have been done?

A. They were doing as well as could have been done with the number of personnel available and the coverage commensurate therewith.

11. Q. Did you feel that available information originating in our State Department, or its agencies, was adequate as well as reliable?

A. The State Department and Consular reports were largely academic political studies, and intelligence—that is, military intelligence—goes, were practically valueless.

12. Did you feel that the State Department was probably in possession of information and estimates which would have been valuable if known to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Emphatically so. I say that knowing the type of reports made by the American Ambassador in Tokyo from 1937 until 1939 during a period of the beginning of the so-called "China incident." Knowing the character of those reports, I think that the State Department reports perhaps contained information in the period in question that would have been of value to the Commander-in-Chief in arriving at an estimate of the situation.

13. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer,* did you intimately concern yourself with the results being obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organization?

A. Yes, sir.

[216] 14. Q. Did you study the relationship between the results obtained by the three principal organizations?

A. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the information from all sources was collected, collated, and used, but the results obtained and made available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were principally

from the unit at Cavite and the local unit here at Pearl Harbor. In fact, almost nothing came from Washington.

15. Q. Did you make your own personal estimates of the distribution of Japanese naval forces?

A. Yes, sir. These estimates were made and placed in Fleet Intelligence Bulletins and distributed to the forces afloat, for their information and guidance in individual estimates.

16. Q. Did you feel that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture along those lines than actually was the case?

A. I did. As a matter of record, when the Japanese became active in the militarization of the Mandated islands about December, 1940, through my liaison with the local Communication Intelligence Branch, a very careful study and check was constantly made of this move. The Commander-in-Chief was kept constantly informed of the situation and when visiting Washington about June, 1941, a discussion regarding the situation apparently arose resulting in OpNav sending the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch stating, in substance, that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence organization apparently had some information on the organization and militarization of the Mandate naval units and requested it by dispatch. It was sent. This information was, at the same time, available in Washington but, apparently, had not been either utilized or collated, much less disseminated.

17. Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free.

18. Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussion concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese disposition, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

19. Q. Was it usual for any other members of the Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer were called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions, I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength, would ensue. Sometimes I was present and sometimes I was excused, as their discussions probably concerned future operations.

[217] 20. Q. During those discussions with Admiral Kimmel, whether or not there were others present, were you in the habit of

expressing your own estimates and opinions of the situation which confronted the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I did, sir, and Admiral Kimmel welcomed and encouraged my independent estimates or opinions, even though we would discuss them sometime if we did not have the same one.

21. Q. Captain, will you elaborate a little further concerning those discussions?

A. The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the *ASAKA MARU* which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls, the estimated air strength in the area, the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called “submerged submarines”—off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions.

22. Q. During October and November, 1941, did you obtain, through Combat Intelligence, any definite information which they gained from the Japanese foreign service?

A. There were several messages that came from Washington regarding Japanese foreign service matters, particularly those concerning destruction of cryptographic devices or documents, and one concerning a hidden broadcast, a pseudo “weather broadcast”: if it’s “east wind and rain”, it meant war with America, and “north wind and clear” meant war with Russia, and “west wind and showers” meant war with England, or some such phrases. There was another in particular I recall which spoke of an intrigue in Thailand, wherein the British were to be drawn into crossing the border on the West coast in reply to an alleged Japanese landing at Singora on the East coast. Insofar then as the British had crossed the border, the Siamese were to declare war, as the British had invaded them, and ask Japan for aid.

23. Q. I hand you a document which is attached to this record as Exhibit 11. Do you recall having seen that when received?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Give, if you can recall it, your own personal reaction to the information contained therein.

A. The reaction at that time was that Japan was prepared for war and was carrying out the previously indicated Southern move and was making preparations accordingly. The fact that Manila and Washington were included was considered highly significant.

25. Q. Do you recall if this dispatch was delivered to the Commanding General, Hawaii?

[218] A. I do not recall, sir.

26. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source.

28. Q. Were you in touch with any measures being employed by any organization on Oahu toward monitoring the so-called "amateur" radio traffic which might have been emanating from there?

A. No, sir. This subject had been discussed with the District Intelligence Officer and with the officer in charge, Combat Intelligence, and with the Fleet Communication Officer, Commander Curts. It was pointed out to me at this time, which was considerably before December, 1941, that this function was not a function of the U. S. naval service, nor the U. S. naval communication service; that under the joint action of the Army and Navy, the control of amateur broadcasts was vested in the Federal Communications Commission, and that the monitoring of other radio transmissions was, by agreement, vested in the Naval Communication Service and the Army Signal Corps by mutual agreement.

29. Q. Did you, personally, inquire into the efficacy of the measures which you just mentioned?

A. I did not.

30. Q. And do I understand you to say that you were not put in touch with any of the results obtained by those organizations?

A. I received nothing from the F. C. C. or the Army, directly or indirectly, so far as I know, although the Japanese foreign office intelligence referred to previously may have come from one of these organizations via OpNav. I did not ask, nor was it considered proper to inquire, as to its source. I believe, however, that that was naval source and not Army Signal Intelligence or F. C. C. I would like to add that the District Intelligence Officer's office maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view. I do not recall the details of this, however.

31. Q. Were you frequently in touch with G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

A. About the early part of October or late September, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Edward Railey, called on me and said that he had been made, by the G-2 Hawaiian Department, the liaison between the Army and the Fleet here, insofar as the functions of the Army Command in this area would rely principally on air operations, and any coordinated action would undoubtedly be through the Hawaiian Air Force in conjunction with the naval units stationed or based here. From that time on, I saw Colonel Railey almost every day, sometimes two or three times a day, and we main-

tained intimate liaison regarding the general situation in the Pacific and, specifically, regarding the rise in Japanese naval air strength in the Marshalls and the increased Japanese surface forces in that area also, insofar as they presented a definite problem in connection with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

[219] 32. Q. Did you obtain from Colonel Railey any valuable information which you had not received from other sources?

A. I did not receive from Colonel Railey, or any Army source, any information of the enemy. We received reports concerning the flight of Army B-17's to Manila by Midway and Wake and northern New Guinea, and we furnished them with weather and other information concerning the route.

33. Q. Will you now please state, chronologically, insofar as you can, the results which were obtained toward keeping track of movements of units of the Japanese Fleet from about 1 October on.

A. Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable numbers of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Sacki area; that the invasion was to follow the lines of the German blitzkrieg of Holland and Belgium, and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Reoccurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands—Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations were noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, "Nothing yet." He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort

that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet which includes the First and second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally, to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihouku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were [220] somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also, that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portugese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of movement, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in

Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, [221] from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received, and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CinCAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Jap Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CinCAF received stated CinC China had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CinCAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. In showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divisions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and

Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six—the latter was marked “May head for the Mandates?”—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the CinC Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes. Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

[222] 36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the numbers of carriers in home waters?

A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate: that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed, formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

[223] 41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously.

42. Q. Reverting to your answer to my question concerning general study of the Japanese characteristics and so forth, do you recall any advice and opinions which you gave Admiral Kimmel during the latter half of 1941, say, concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders?

A. I believe that the discussion regarding Japanese naval leaders was before the end of 1941 but certainly was in the middle of 1941. I don't recall the exact date, but there was a discussion as to who the

Japanese leaders were, particularly when General Tojo became the Premier. There were many discussions as to General Tojo, what sort of a policy he would follow, and also regarding the character, general background, of the leading Japanese naval officers. There were also discussions as to Admiral Nomura, their Ambassador to Washington, and Mr. Kurusu, and the probable negotiations and mission concerned therewith.

43. Q. Do you recall any particular estimate which you gave concerning Admiral Yamamoto?

A. I do. I knew Admiral Yamamoto personally. My estimate was, in effect, that he was very capable, a very thoroughly grounded and trained officer; that he possessed more brains than any other Japanese in the High Command. I illustrated it by saying that he could win at poker among good poker players, and could play better bridge than most good bridge players, and that I knew he was a champion in his own right of the Japanese chess game, "Go." I illustrated that to show that his mind was keen, alert, and that also from my personal observation and from general Japanese service reputation, he was an outstanding officer.

44. Q. Did you consider him one of the so-called "younger officer" element?

A. No, sir, I did not. I do not believe that he was associated with the so-called "young officer movement".

45. Q. Did you advise Admiral Kimmel of Admiral Yamamoto's previous experience in building up the Japanese naval air force?

A. I do not recall the exact details, but I think I discussed the fact that he was not only the Vice Naval Minister when I was in Tokyo, but was also the Commander of Naval Aviation Headquarters, the first that they appointed, and that he was, at the time of the first bombing of China in 1937, particularly concerned with the welfare and operation of the Japanese Naval Air Force. I do not recall, however, as to what degree this was discussed.

46. Q. Did you point out that Admiral Yamamoto was particularly venturesome?

A. No, sir, other than to say that he was an able opponent at poker or bridge, and that he always played a poor hand well.

47. Q. Did you ever specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of these characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, or of others, there was probability of a carrier raid upon Oahu?

[224] A. That matter was discussed at the time, as I previously mentioned. I gave a brief outline of the Japanese book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was specifically mentioned, and he asked me then what I thought of the chances. I said, "I only hope we can intercept them," and that "I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." In the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, I believe that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much wherein she might lose the war in the first battle when she had larger stakes, more vital stakes, at hand.

48. Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over

considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army, that evening, take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street, and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other important points on Oahu.

49. Q. Did you then estimate that the Japs really would make an attack to the southward, perhaps beyond Thailand, leaving the Philippine position on their flank?

A. My estimate was unclear. I was not convinced that they would leave their flank unguarded. On the other hand, I was convinced that they would continue their southern advance perhaps depending on a compromise settlement in Washington to see to it we remained out of the hostilities due, first, the threat, and second, our relatively unpreparedness for war.

50. Q. Did your thinking along those lines at that time take into account the position in which the Japs found themselves, incident to frozen credits, under which they could not obtain petroleum products from the southern oil fields?

A. It did. The freezing of credits wherein their supplies from America were cut off, crystalized my belief in the "expansion to the South" being for the means of obtaining, by military means, if necessary, the petroleum products for which they had fruitlessly negotiated with the Nei through Yoshizawa earlier in the year.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned [225] before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank discussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed.

That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:12 p. m., took a recess until 2:10 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced George Warrington, Jr., Yeoman First Class, U. S. Navy, who was duly sworn.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on December 7, 1941?

A. I was Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet, on board my Flagship, the U. S. S. ARGONNE at ten-ten dock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

[226] 3. Q. Admiral, what opportunity did you have to observe the condition of the officers and men of the Fleet on 7 December 1941 in regards to sobriety or drunkenness?

A. One of my duties as Commander Base Force was in charge of Shore Patrol. At about twenty-five or twenty-seven minutes after eight o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, I was entering through the main gate of Pearl Harbor. It was necessary to clear a way for me as traffic conditions were quite crowded. On one or two occasions I had to get out of one car and into another car and I passed many officers and men returning to their ships. Realizing the importance of getting these men off promptly to their commands, I stopped long enough to talk to the beach guard and patrol officer on the dock and saw that both were being efficiently and properly handled and the people were readily and rapidly being returned to their ships. At about 0845, I arrived at ten-ten dock and on board

the ARGONNE and thereafter used all of our boats and commandeered many other boats to return officers and men to the Fleet. Admiral Kimmel had directed that I take charge of all activities on the waterfront. Ships not having full crews aboard, getting up steam, and ready to go to sea were directed to apply to Commander Base Force and I made up details of men whose ships had already proceeded to sea and sent them to ships, principally destroyers. I, personally, rubbed shoulders with hundreds of officers and literally thousands of men that morning. And it is with a feeling of pride that I can state that they were extremely orderly and cold sober, naturally, to some extent, awed and surprised by the events of the morning, but they were all a well-behaved, very sober group of officers and men, who had only one desire and that was to return to a ship in which they could render service. One the forenoon of December 7, 1941, I sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant, whom I ordered the moment I went aboard the ARGONNE that morning to go to the various landings and in the yard and circulate among the men with exactly the idea of seeing what was their conduct. In 1923, I commanded the U. S. S. Young, Destroyer 312, lost at Honda. I well remembered on that Sunday morning, December 7, how the papers of the West Coast of the United States had commented on drunkenness and published cartoons of drunken men and officers in the Honda wreck. With this thought in mind, that is why I personally sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant to generally observe the conduct of the men and officers of the Fleet while assisting in boat transportation and carrying out other waterfront duties while so observing. My Flag Secretary was Lieutenant E. P. Southwick, now Commander Southwick, and my Flag Lieutenant was Lieutenant Harry Johnson, now Commander Johnson. Both of these officers and the Beach Guard Officer on duty at the Fleet Landing that morning reported to me that the conduct of all hands was excellent. I can not recall having seen one officer or man who was not cold sober. That is a fairly large order, as it was a week-end crowd that had been in town with no idea of sudden return to duty early that Sunday morning.

4. Q. Sir, were arrests by the Shore Patrol for drunkenness on the night preceding the attack greater than was usual for a Saturday night?

A. No, on the contrary our records show that for the two or three weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor that there had been almost no disorderly conduct at any time except an occasional boy here or there who had too many beers in the heat of the tropical sun.

5. Q. Do you recall the orders affecting the men belonging to ships as to determination of liberty on the week-end?

A. Yes. All liberty except for special cases and passes, and except for those married men of the former Hawaiian Detachment who had their families [227] here, was up at one a. m. Overnight liberty was granted for Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. Commanding Officers were granted fairly wide latitude and over this particular week-end a fairly large liberty party was ashore, consisting of married men, Chief Petty Officers, and Petty Officers First Class, and other special passes granted to men who had their homes in the Hawaiian Area. I should state that a great number of

people who crowded the roadway there when I passed through the main gate of the Navy Yard were attached to the Fourteenth Naval District who lived out in the housing area and were quartered there. There were certainly two or three hundred officers concerned and seven to eight hundred men who had liberty in accordance with existing orders. At that time, there must have been at least fifty thousand enlisted men here in the Fleet and I consider that a very small percentage of people ashore over a week-end. A much higher percentage of officers were ashore than of enlisted men.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I became Commander Base Force when Admiral C. C. Bloch was Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. I served as Commander Base Force, through the entire period of command of Admiral J. O. Richardson who relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet; and I continued to serve as Commander Base Force throughout the entire period of Admiral Kimmel's command of the U. S. Fleet. The morale, conduct, and behavior of the officers and men of the Fleet were well known to me. I did not go to sea in task forces. In addition to my other duties, I was in charge of Shore Patrol, and was also in charge of the Off-shore—In-shore Security Patrol until relieved of them by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in February-March, 1940. The Fleet was in a healthy state of training. The conduct of the officers and men after the surprise attack on Sunday morning, and the way they fought back when they did get going, is certainly one of the finest traditions of the United States Navy. I attended all conferences. Admiral Kimmel gave to all Flag Officers in his Fleet every bit of information which he had which he was permitted to pass along to us. I know that the Commanders of the three Task Forces, into which the Fleet was divided, Task Force One, Two, and Three, headed by Vice Admirals Pye, Brown, and Halsey, when they were in port, received this same information because I sat there and heard it. I never missed the Admiral's conferences, because I was always in port. I give as my considered opinion, as one of the senior Rear Admirals here at that time, that Admiral Kimmel would have gladly entertained from any officer under his command any suggestion at any time for the betterment and safety of the Fleet. He repeatedly asked at conferences, when he informed us what he was doing, if anybody had any suggestion for change. Having signed for almost two years the orders for the Security Patrol, which included the Off-shore destroyer patrols and close-in destroyer patrols, until relieved by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District some months prior to the Japanese sneak attack, I do know that most of the emphasis on security was placed on the fact that we were protecting ourselves against the acts of irresponsible nationals. The last order issued by me stated: "As an assumption that responsible foreign powers will not provoke war under existing conditions by attacks on the Fleet or Base, that irresponsible and misdirected

[228] nationals of foreign powers might attempt sabotage or block the channel to Pearl Harbor or to lay magnetic mines outside of Pearl Harbor, or to make submarine attacks without warning." I did not hold or entertain any idea that as long as there was a Minister of Peace in Washington, from Japan, that there would be any imminence of attack. Had I held that opinion, I would have stated it to Admiral Kimmel and I feel sure that nearly every other officer here felt the same as I. We did not expect any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time it came. When I say "we", I mean from the conversations and discussions which I heard almost daily in the Commander-in-Chief's office, where certainly some of the best talent of the Navy was collected. I knew of Admiral Kimmel's orders for patrol and how he was using what little he had, and did not have any suggestion to offer to improve the situation. I would have felt free to make suggestions if I had had them. The attack came as a complete one hundred per cent surprise to me and it was only the terrible tragedy of the morning that really made me believe it had occurred. There was one occasion when acting in charge of Off-shore patrol that a destroyer reported he had contacted a submerged submarine and asked for instructions. At that time, I was Senior Officer Present Afloat, the Fleet being out under command of Admiral Richardson. I gave orders if they had contacted a submarine submerged in the restricted defensive sea area and could not identify it as our own to attack it with depth charges and destroy it. These orders held until Admiral Richardson and the Fleet returned to port and were very soon thereafter cancelled by him. In giving me this order of cancellation, he informed me that it was done on the orders of higher authority. This occurred some time in August or September, 1940, during a period when the entire Fleet was ordered to sea in secrecy. The Fleet took a course, later known to be to the South and Eastward of the Island of Hawaii and stayed out of touch with everybody and everything, in radio silence, for a period of seven or eight days. I know that there was much newspaper comment as to where was the Fleet.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:03 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[229] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1944

NINETEENTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the eighteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Granville C. Briant, Commander, A-(V)G, U. S. N. R., Aviation Aide and District Aviation Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, and Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of 1941?

A. Performing the duties of Aviation Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. That was Admiral Bloch?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Will you give a brief resume of your naval experience prior to assuming those duties?

A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1929, was commissioned Ensign following graduation, reported to the TEXAS in New York Harbor at the time. I was on the TEXAS and acted as junior watchstander and in the Gunnery Department, later Assistant Navigator, until I was detached and sent to preliminary flight training in Norfolk. Upon completion of that duty, I returned to the TEXAS and joined the ship at Guantanamo. I stayed on the TEXAS until October—I believe that's correct—1930, and I went to Pensacola for flight training. Completed Pensacola and was ordered to U. S. S.

LANGLEY as a naval aviator in Scouting Squadron One. I, later, was transferred to the LOUISVILLE as aviator on the LOUISVILLE, Scouting Squadron Ten. From there, I went to Patrol Squadrons, and, following from Patrol Squadron duty, to the SARATOGA. I resigned from the Navy in November, 1939, and attended the Harvard Post-Graduate School of Business Administration. I was in the Naval Reserve while at Harvard, flying from the Naval [230] Reserve Base of Squantum. I was ordered to active duty on the 2nd of June, 1941.

5. Q. Aviation Aide Officer to Admiral Bloch, who, in addition to other duties, was the Naval Base Defense Officer, do you recall having given him any advice concerning the possibility of carrier raids into the Pearl Harbor area in the latter part of 1941?

A. No, sir, I do not.

6. Q. Did the probability or possibility of such a surprise attack enter in your thoughts to any great extent?

A. Vaguely, yes, brought to mind more when Lieutenant Commander Taylor appeared in this area to set up an aircraft warning system for this area.

7. Q. During November-December, '41, were you one of the District Watch Officers?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. How many were on that watch list?

A. I think there were eight to ten officers.

9. Q. Over what hours of the day was that watch carried on?

A. From about four in the afternoon to eight the following morning. On Sundays, the duty officer was on watch all day.

10. Q. How many hours long were the watches?

A. The watches—the one officer—the Operations Officer took the watch, to the best of my memory, from eight in the morning, when he was there, until four in the afternoon. The District Duty Officer, I believe it was called, had to sleep on the Base and perform the functions of District Watch Officer from four in the afternoon until eight in the morning.

11. Q. Where was the regular watch normally stood?

A. It was a room in the Administration Building, Fourteenth Naval District.

12. Q. But after working hours, the District Watch Officer was not required to be physically present?

A. Yes, he had to be in the vicinity and he could go out for food. They ate over at the Officers Club.

13. Q. Could he turn in at night?

A. Yes, sir.

14. Q. In his own quarters?

A. No, sir, he had a bunk in the Duty Officer's room. I was only on that watch list a short time.

15. Q. I show you Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41, which is Exhibit 4 before this board; was that available to the District Watch Officer at all times?

A. Yes, sir, I believe this was in our Watch Officer's Manual. I remember having read this.

16. Q. Were there other specific instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer to the District Watch Officers?

[231] A. There were several directives as to how to proceed on air raid warning. We had an air raid warning system of sounding alarm. I don't remember the details of it but I'm sure there was a procedure in effect for air raid defense.

17. Q. Do you recall whether or not you, as one of the District Watch Officers, considered those instructions sufficiently definite and as covering possibilities in case of surprise attack?

A. At that time, I think the instructions would probably be satisfactory to an officer with considerable naval experience.

18. Q. Were there any changes made in the DWO's instructions as the situation with the Japanese grew more tense in November, 1941?

A. I believe that the Operation Department continually revised operation procedure for defense in this area.

19. Q. Do you recall anything specific which came to you as one of the DWO's during that period?

A. No, sir, I don't.

20. Q. Do you recall whether your last tour of duty as DWO was prior to 7 December?

A. No, sir, I do not, but my next tour would have been on the following Saturday night and Sunday morning, through an exchange of watches.

21. Q. Because of your general naval experience prior to this time, it would appear that you were sufficiently qualified for the duties of DWO and were fully acceptable as such. At the time, what was your own opinion as to the number of officers on the DWO's list who were also qualified for the duty?

A. From, possibly, five. The others had not recently been, in my opinion, in close contact with naval combat activities.

22. Q. Did all the officers on the DWO's watch list have other duties during working hours?

A. Yes, sir, to the best of my memory. I do not believe the Operations Officer was required to stand that watch, except during working hours. He was senior watch officer, to the best of my memory.

23. Q. Would it have been practicable to so assign the District's officers that no one would have been included on the list whose qualifications were doubtful?

A. Possibly, by including heads of departments.

24. Q. As you recall, were there no other officers available to Admiral Bloch who could have been given these duties without doubling up, as additional to their regular duties during regular working hours?

A. No, sir.

25. Q. Outside of working hours, was there anyone in the Duty Watch Officer's post who was awake at all times?

A. I don't remember that.

26. Q. Was there a continuous watch of enlisted men for communication purposes?

[232] A. In the Communication Department, yes, sir. The adjacent Communication Office had a twenty-four hour watch.

27. As one of the Duty Watch Officers, did you consider that the local communications were adequate to carry out the duties which would result from surprise enemy action?

A. At the time, the continuous revision of the defense measures was tending to result in the establishment of a control center which could

receive information from various parts of the Island. That was set up within a day or two after the 7th of December. It was in the process of being set up.

28. Q. Were there available to the Duty Watch Officer any rapid communication other than the regular peacetime telephone system?

A. There was an air raid warning signal, siren, which was used in air raid drills. We had air raid drills weekly. Admiral Bloch stressed the need for it. That's the only outside one that I can remember, other than the standard communication system.

29. Q. What facilities did the DWO have for coordinating anti-aircraft fire in case of attack?

A. The signal tower and the normal communication channels.

30. Q. How could the signal tower function in that respect?

A. Well, they could send a message by semaphore and they had flag hoists signal, also a signal light. That was the three methods of standard communications. In the Yard there, it was used the same as the signal bridge on a ship; the signal hoists and the usual communications.

31. Q. And nothing else in addition to the regular Yard telephone system; is that correct?

A. Nothing that I remember other than the siren which, when sounded a certain number of times, meant air raid warnings, all clear, etc.

32. Q. Do you recall any changes made in composition of the DWO's watch list immediately after 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. What?

A. The Admiral required the immediate Staff be available continuously—one of the immediate Staff be available continuously on watch for some period after the 7th (after the attack) until other officers were trained and watch standees were used as part of the Defensive Control Office.

34. Q. What responsibility did the District Watch Officer have with respect to the Harbor nets in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbors?

A. To my memory, the Harbor nets were controlled by the Harbor Control Post and he could have those opened or closed as he saw fit.

35. Q. Did he have to get permission from the Commandant or higher authority?

A. I don't believe he did.

36. Q. What was the routine with respect to the nets as to being opened or closed, hours that they were opened and closed, and so forth?

A. I don't remember the exact details on that.

[233] 37. Q. What authority did the District Watch Officer have with respect to the ready-duty destroyer?

A. I can not remember that, sir.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness. The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: In my own opinion, the message which was supposed to have arrived on the 26th of November, concerning the Japanese situation, should have been disseminated throughout the Staff and to the watch officers. To my mind, no attention was ever invited to us of the seriousness of the situation.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

33. Q. Then during the latter half of November, and up to 7 December, '41, the officers of the DWO's list received no specific warnings of the tense situation which might presage an attack?

A. No, sir.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 9:40 a.m., took a recess until 2 p.m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Area.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. During January, I was Operations Officer on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force, and from 1st of February to the end of the year, I was War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. As War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did you attend the Staff conferences?

A. Yes, almost without exception.

[34] 4. Q. Were your relations with the Commander-in-Chief close?

A. Very close. I had his complete confidence and I believe that I knew his views extremely well, advised and consulted with him with the greatest freedom, and was nearly always present at any important conferences with his Flag Officers or with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

5. Q. Did the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, welcome the expression of your views and opinions with respect to matters as they came up?

A. I definitely felt so, and certainly had no hesitancy in expressing my views to him, whether or not he was in accord with those views.

6. Q. Admiral, about when did you receive the basic war plan, Rainbow 5?

A. It may have been immediately on joining Admiral Kimmel's Staff. If it were not, it was immediately thereafter. No, that was Rainbow 3; Rainbow 5 was not received until about June.

7. Q. Do you recall the nature of the tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet in that Plan; that is, particularly whether they were offensive or defensive in nature?

A. The Pacific Fleet was charged with maintaining the security of the territory of ourselves and Allies in the Western Hemisphere, safeguarding our communications, etc. The primary offensive mission was to divert Japanese forces from the Malay Barrier by the activities of our Fleet forces in the Japanese Mandate islands through denial and capture of Marshall positions and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

8. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had adequate forces available to you, or rather to the Commander-in-Chief, for the fulfilling of these tasks? By "that time", I refer to the time leading up to Pearl Harbor when the planning was at its height.

A. Realizing that enemy raiding forces, or even strong Fleet forces, could strike over very wide areas, and that the offensive tasks assigned to the Fleet were few, I felt that we could carry out the missions charged, although there were many marked deficiencies, particularly in anti-submarine craft. I felt, of course, the definite lack of suitable craft for amphibious operations toward the Marshalls and was very much concerned over lack of suitable craft for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to furnish adequate anti-submarine protection. I appreciated the scarcity of carriers and of aircraft and knew of various elements of weakness. But I also knew of the power in our Fleet and expected it to be effective.

9. Q. Were you sufficiently familiar with the views of the Commander-in-Chief at that time to state how he felt in this respect?

A. Yes. I believe that he felt that far larger forces could be employed and that certain weaknesses with regard to aircraft and light forces were very marked. He was concerned also because the plan called for the probable detachment of a portion of the Fleet for transfer to the Atlantic; and for the movement of a division of cruisers to the southeast Pacific. I believe, however, that he considered we did have strong naval forces that could be effectively employed, notwithstanding some handicaps.

10. Q. At the time, how did you feel with respect to logistics support of the Fleet in carrying out its war task; the sufficiency of the logistics?

A. I felt that our tasks would be made more difficult because of the current logistics situation and that we might, from time to time, have to [235] determine the operations that would be possible with the logistics support at hand. I was not happy over the logistic situation, but certainly not discouraged over it.

11. Q. Will you please state, if you can, the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, with respect to the carrying out of the war plans in the event of war?

A. To clarify this, and any possible future remarks, it should be mentioned that the plan, Rainbow 5 I believe it was, made provisions both for our entering the war with Japan a neutral or with Japan in the war. My remarks will deal only with the aspects of Japan in the war. His intention was to, at once, sweep for any Japanese merchant ships that might be at sea, unless intelligence had shown that such an operation would probably be fruitless. It was the intention to make an immediate reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. While it was not expected that the main part of the Japanese Fleet would be encountered in such an operation, it was intended to have

the entire available strength in easy supporting distance of the reconnoitering forces. Operations to establish ourselves in the Marshalls were to be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Patrol plane searches in approaches to Hawaii were to be inaugurated.

12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at that time, feel that the units of his Fleet were ready to carry out such tasks?

A. He undoubtedly recognized many weaknesses and strenuous efforts were being made to improve the efficiency of both materiel and personnel. Perhaps no Commander is ever completely satisfied of his complete readiness to fight, but certainly he felt that a fairly high standard of efficiency was being developed. There were large numbers of green officers and men, and the complements of most, if not all, ships were lower than was to be desired. The anti-aircraft batteries were, in general, far weaker than we desired, and they were being improved as rapidly as material could be made available and the yards could take ships. There was much concern over lack of radars and the requisite skill in their use. There was also weaknesses in certain carrier aircraft and some difficulties were experienced with patrol planes; engines, I believe. The lack of skilled crews in the patrol planes and the lack of replacement crews was very keenly felt. Transports and amphibious craft were lacking; and there were disturbing deficiencies in auxiliary craft and in some materials. Notwithstanding matters of this sort, however, it was felt that the handicaps were not too great to cope with such situations, as were envisaged as arising if war commenced.

13. Q. Did you, at that time, sir, concur in the views of the Commander-in-Chief as you have expressed them?

A. Yes, and it may be that in answering the preceding questions that I have erred somewhat toward giving my own views rather than those of Admiral Kimmel, although they were probably substantially in accord. He was inclined to be somewhat more pessimistic in that regard than myself.

14. Q. Did you, at the time, feel that everything was being done, either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority, to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?

A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that, in general, suitable representations had been made to higher authority and that the [236] Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were taking all corrective measures that they felt within their own power to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with the rapidity of progress.

15. Q. Admiral, going back to the basic Rainbow 5 war plan, what was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemplated that war with Japan would start?

A. The plan itself may not, probably did not, directly give such an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of the Japanese.

16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Pacific Fleet, was a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor considered as a course of action available to the Japanese to initiate such a war?

A. Probably not. At least, I, as War Plans Officer, did not hold such a view with respect to the Hawaiian Area, although I did consider such an act possible in the Philippines or even against Midway or Wake. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with the Commander-in-Chief or with other members of the Staff. Probably some such discussions may have taken place, although I have no specific recollection of such a one.

17. Q. Do you recall that during this planning period any consideration was given to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air forces?

A. Yes. While specific data was lacking, I, and I believe others within the Staff, felt that there was a rather high degree of proficiency in Japanese naval air organization.

18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Japanese naval air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 7th of December?

A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions, took place. I do remember giving consideration to dangers of torpedo attack to ships in Pearl Harbor, particularly after the British night attack on the anchored Italian ships in the heel of Italy; but even though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility of a raid such as occurred on 7 December, I, personally, never considered it as more than a remote possibility.

19. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, held at that time in this respect?

A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea that there was serious danger of that nature, I would have heard of it in every emphatic terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.

20. Q. Admiral, in your thinking and planning at that time, that is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what consideration was given to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders, particularly Admiral Yamamoto?

A. The leadership in the Japanese Navy was discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Operations Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall now, the general impression that obtained was that in case of war we would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership on the part of the enemy.

21. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the character of Admiral Yamamoto?

A. Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.

[237] 22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Commander Rochefort, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force?

A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussion, I feel that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take place; not only when Rochefort and I were serving together in the Scouting Force, but also after I came to Admiral Kimmel's Staff and Rochefort was serving with the Intelligence unit in the Fourteenth Naval District.

23. Q. Admiral, during this planning period leading up to the attack, do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief communicated with naval aviators with respect to the ability of Japanese naval air forces and the possibility of such attack as occurred on 7 December?

A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such discussion with Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger or perhaps other aviation personnel, including Captain Davis, the Staff Aviation Officer; but I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with such an attack.

24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really foresaw the raid of 7 December and so expressed himself before that time?

A. No, sir.

25. Q. Admiral, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief's Contributory Rainbow 5 War Plan, was it contemplated, at the time, that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety or in part by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to the start of actual war?

A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan be placed into effect, either in whole or in part, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of communications; but, on the other hand, I do not believe that that plan circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief's in any way toward taking any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.

26. Q. At that time, then, what methods did you contemplate using for alerting ships, should the international situation so require and before actual start of war?

A. By preparatory or warning message.

27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your previous testimony, it was your estimate, as well as the estimate of practically all of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?

A. For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict.

28. Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due value [238] to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy in a surprise attack?

A. I don't think so now; I did think so then. We did anticipate that heavy submarine concentrations would be encountered in this area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass submarine attack about the time that considerable forces were sortieing or entering Pearl Harbor might be the commencement of the war.

29. Q. Admiral, under the Joint Action, Army and Navy, what service was primarily responsible for the defense of Oahu?

A. The Army.

30. Q. Were you, in the months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, familiar with the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments prescribed by that document?

A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the Island of Oahu with the Commanding General and some members of his Staff to see the defenses, and, as a part of that tour, attended a short presentation at Fort Shafter with particular reference to AA defenses. With my limited knowledge of the Army requirements and methods of defense, I, personally, felt they were good and adequate, although I knew, and the Army authorities too felt that certain improvements should be made, particularly as to AA.

31. Q. Were you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's opinions with respect to the ability of the Army to defend the Island?

A. I believe that he felt that there was some deficiencies, particularly if the Fleet were absent from the area, and I include in the Fleet, the shorebased aircraft. He had been concerned over the AA defenses and talked with the Commanding General and with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject.

32. Q. Who acted for the Navy in coordinating efforts toward the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

33. Q. Would you explain, please, just how the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that he belonged in the picture of the coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the defense for Oahu, while he was present here at Pearl Harbor?

A. In general, he looked to the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier to accomplish that, but recognized the necessity for utilizing whatever Fleet units might be present to assist in the defense. He vised the arrangements because the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was a part of his command and because of his immediate concern for whatever Fleet units might be present, aside from his general concern of maintaining the safety of his primary base. He was particularly active in developing coordination of air operations and communications between the same.

34. Q. Were your plans, during the weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, based on the premise that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would remain in Pearl Harbor after start of a war with Japan?

A. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, had always been very reluctant to accept the idea that he must remain ashore. He had an operational staff that accompanied him when he went to sea. He was slowly accepting the fact that if war came, he would, of necessity, have to be continuously shore-based. That was a matter that I discussed with him a number of times; for I never believed that he would, during war, exercise tactical command at sea but felt that he would be habitually shore-based. The plans, however, were not premised on having the Commander-in-Chief tied to any shore base.

[239] 35. Q. Did this belief on the part of the Commander-in-Chief cause him to feel any additional personal responsibility for the defense of Oahu, and particularly Pearl Harbor?

A. That would be difficult to say, although I doubt if he ever felt that he was divested from the overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet. He did, however, look to the duly constituted authorities

to protect Hawaii, namely, Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

36. Q. Did you, at that time, contemplate that the Fleet would take any part in the defense of Oahu, other than the use of the anti-aircraft batteries of the vessels of the Fleet in their own defense and the use of shore-based aircraft located at Pearl Harbor?

A. We certainly contemplated that any Fleet units that could be brought into contact with enemy forces actually attacking or threatening the Hawaiian Islands would be employed as effectively as possible. That would be true whether the units (when the enemy was first discovered) were in port or in the coastal waters or further afield. Moreover, it was realized that some of the shore-based Fleet aircraft would have to be made available to the Coastal Frontier Commander even though employment for them would be desirable further afield. Such plans or thoughts were necessitated because such aircraft were not available within the Coastal Frontier for its Commander's use. It was also realized that some Fleet destroyers would have to be sacrificed by the Fleet for local anti-submarine protection, even though the Fleet was far short of the numbers desired. In short, if the Fleet left Pearl Harbor it would have to be weakened by leaving behind some aircraft and destroyers. If it were in Pearl Harbor, it would be used to get at the enemy.

37. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this letter 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?

A. Yes, I remember this letter. Although it was prepared by the Operations Section of the Staff, I had opportunity to review it and recall having initiated some minor changes in the earlier drafts; although, at this time, I have no particular recollection of what those changes were.

38. Q. Were there, so far as you can recollect, any other directives of a general nature affecting the security or providing for the security of vessels in Pearl Harbor in effect in the months preceding the attack?

A. I do not now recall whether or not there were. In general, such directives, if there were any, were prepared by the Operations Section and I would have seen them and had opportunity to comment before their issuance.

39. Q. Do you recall whether, at the time, that is, in the months preceding the attack, you considered this letter, Exhibit 4, to adequately provide for the security of the Fleet units at Pearl Harbor, had the instructions therein been fully complied with?

A. I recall that we were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore and the like, and that some discussions and conferences to better perfect arrangements were in progress under the general guidance of Captain DeLany, the Operations Officer. On the whole, however, I must have thought that the security arrangements set forth in this letter were satisfactory, else I would have initiated action to effect a change.

[240] 40. Q. Admiral, do you recall the Joint Coastal Defense Plan which was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember that there was such a plan, although whether that was the exact title or the principal provisions of the plan, I do not remember.

41. Q. Do you recollect whether Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, approved the plan to which I have just referred?

A. Probably, although I can not now say "yes" or "no".

42. Q. Were you familiar at the time with an annex to that plan known as the "Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan, No. A-1-41", of which I show you a copy, which was signed by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin?

A. I do not now have specific recollection of this particular plan but it is almost certain that I did see it, and acquiesced in its provisions.

43. Q. Were you, at the time, familiar with the annex—I think it is No. 1—of that plan which is an estimate of the situation, prepared by, or under the direction of, Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, which is Exhibit 24 before this examination?

A. After examining this paper, I have no particular recollection of it, although it is not only possible but highly probable that I did see it and probably before it was signed or approved. Admiral Kimmel frequently conferred with Admirals Bloch and Bellinger and Army authorities and pressed for development of plans for coordinated action and for drills by joint forces to test them and to develop skill in their use.

44. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not this operating plan, including the proposed use of aircraft, was approved by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Although I do not have any specific recollection, I would expect that the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, was familiar with its general terms and indicated his acquiescence even though there may have been no formal approval.

45. Q. Admiral, under the plans in effect just prior to the December 7 attack, what was your understanding at the time as to the responsibility for obtaining early information of the approach of any possible enemy engaged in conducting a surprise attack on the Fleet and installations at Pearl Harbor?

A. It was, in general, a naval responsibility. Forces available for such detection, in general, were the Fleet patrol planes of Pat Wing-Two, but the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the number available for that purpose and that determination was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As a practical matter, it was impossible, with forces and material at hand, to maintain an effective patrol for any but a brief period.

46. Q. Did you, at the time, contemplate any other means of obtaining such information prior to declaration of war?

A. No, it was not contemplated that any surface vessels would normally be used for that purpose. Lack of coastal frontier craft that might be used for pickets was recognized, but it was felt that destroyers or cruisers could be more profitably employed in offensive operation. Advantage would, of course, be taken of any intelligence information, but it certainly was not contemplated habitually using Fleet forces for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii.

[241] 47. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the provisions made for obtaining such early information of the approach of a possible enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with training and other demands on the units of the Fleet?

A. Answering now from hindsight, the answer is, "No." At the time, the answer is, "Yes." The number of patrol planes was very limited. Some difficulties were being experienced with engines. An extensive patrol planes training program was in progress. Many of the pilots and crews were green and there were very heavy demands for furnishing nucleus personnel for new patrol craft being built. The extent to which searches could be carried on was a matter of serious consideration by the Commander-in-Chief, his Aviation Officer, and his Operations Officer, and I was frequently brought into the discussion. With the number of search planes available and the number of crews available, it was felt that only limited sectors could be searched. At one time, some sectors were searched one day, other sectors another, in order not to hold to a set pattern in case enemy agents were aware or might become aware of the details. To carry on any reasonable effective search would have necessitated complete disruption of the highly necessary training program, and it was strongly felt that many engine hours would be put in at a time when the need was not extremely urgent, and that as a result when the planes were most needed many of them would be due for engine overhaul. At the time, the most serious menace was expected to be submarine activities in the Fleet operating areas, and, as a consequence, the searches were very largely limited to the Fleet operating areas and the approaches thereto, rather than to distant searches. Subsequent events have shown that the decision in that regard may have been unwise. It is my personal belief that had training been discontinued and the searches been conducted to the maximum degree possible of continuous maintenance in what was regarded as the more probable sectors of approach, that the sector from which the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually made might easily have been one not covered. In any event, knowledge of the tenseness of the situation, the availability of forces, the intelligence at hand, and the factors which I have mentioned were given careful consideration in the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was felt we were using good judgment in making our dispositions and searches.

48. Q. Admiral, are you able to state whether or not Admiral Kimmel's views at that time coincided with those which you have just expressed as your own?

A. I believe that he had about the same considerations in mind.

49. Q. Did you continue to hold those opinions which you have just expressed throughout the period October-November-December despite dispatches from the Department which were more or less warnings of impending dangers?

A. Substantially, yes. There had been a greater or lesser degree of tenseness from the time I joined the Staff on 1 February, and several times training was curtailed in order to increase the searches. In the latter part of November, a warning was received that indicated the situation was particularly tense and the considerations mentioned were considered anew about that time.

50. Q. Admiral, during the period from the middle of October until the time of the attack, what were your views at the time with respect to the accuracy and sufficiency of intelligence available to you for use in connection with your planning?

A. We felt that we would like to know lots more than we did. I would say that on the whole that we felt that it was somewhat insufficient, but did not see the probability of achieving improvement.

[242] 51. Q. As War Plans Officer, did you conduct a continuing study of the plans then in effect in the light of such intelligence, particularly with respect to the international situation, as you received it?

A. Yes, and I had been making a habit of giving the Commander-in-Chief, sometimes daily, sometimes every other day a brief memorandum as to the specific action that I thought should be taken if war eventuated in the succeeding twenty-four or forty-eight hours.

52. Q. Were any major changes effected in the Contributory War Plans, based on the intelligence you had as to the international situation during that period?

A. No.

53. Q. Did you feel that the basic plan of the Department, Rainbow 5, continued to meet the international situation as it developed from the middle of October on?

A. Rainbow 5, in brief, called for the major effort of our forces to be in the Atlantic. I was not in a position to determine the merits or demerits of that; but accepting that, then the mission given to the Pacific Fleet was not one upon which I felt that I could improve.

54. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in this respect?

A. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that it might be highly advantageous to American interests to make an early all-out effort in the Pacific.

55. Q. Were you in touch with any informal communications between Admiral Kimmel and higher authority, either written or oral, which bear upon the subject of this examination, of such importance that you think a record of what you remember should be made?

A. Yes. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, exchanged a number of personal letters that bore on the general situation. This was a practice that existed throughout my period of service in the Staff. As these letters frequently dealt with matters of the utmost importance, I, once or twice, suggested to Admiral Kimmel that communications of that nature between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Chief of Operations were necessarily official letters rather than personal ones, as they dealt with official matters of the utmost importance. Although they were written in a personal vein, they did deal with official matters and could be and should be treated as official, and suggested that it might be well to have them in the usual official form; that their secrecy could be safeguarded just as well and that they would become matters of permanent record. Those letters frequently referred to the tenuousness of the situation. It was important that the Commander-in-Chief receive such information as was contained in those from the Chief of Naval Operations. I believe that I read every one of the letters in question, both incoming and outgoing. Some of the letters dealt with difficulties in obtaining personnel or matériel and the reasons therefor. Some of them gave highly secret information with regard to discussions on international matters taking place in Washington or elsewhere among important officials. As to the specific

parts that bear directly on this discussion, I would say that many of the letters indicated a continuous degree of tension between the American and Japanese Governments, with the situation being more critical at some times than at others. They definitely gave the impression that a Japanese war with Great Britain was highly probable and that we might or might not be drawn into it from the beginning. In the latter part of the year, there were more frequent indications that we would be in at the very start.

[243] 56. Q. Admiral, I show you a paraphrase copy of a dispatch which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Are you able to identify that dispatch?

A. Yes, I remember this dispatch.

57. Q. With respect to the wording used, it directs the taking of certain precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action. Will you please state the meaning that you gained from these expressions at the time that you first saw this dispatch.

A. I felt that war was likely to eventuate on short notice and that if we came into it, it seemed quite possible that the initiation would probably be the result of hostile action committed by the Japanese. I considered we should maintain adequate security measures and be prepared to commence our offensive operations as promptly as possible.

58. Q. Were your plans restudied at that time in the light of information contained in this dispatch?

A. Presumably they were. I suspect that the consideration was primarily given toward making the plans effective with least delay.

59. Q. Do you recall the decisions made as the result of this study?

A. It was about this time, possibly somewhat earlier, possibly somewhat later, that Flag Officers were advised of the necessity of being ready to move to distant service on very short notice. They were enjoined to keep certain limits on their fuel supply, below which ships should not be permitted to go. They were cautioned to examine anew their provisions for finally stripping ship, if it were not already completed. Use of aircraft and submarines for protection of Midway was increased and submarines were dispatched to cover Wake. I believe the Commander, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, was enjoined to push the construction work at Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra as rapidly as possible. Consideration was given to putting aircraft on Wake, but the construction work there at that time would not permit that Island to receive them. I do not now recall whether or not any additional Marines were sent to those places, or not, but certainly the matter was given consideration.

60. Q. Admiral, were you present at any conferences at which this dispatch, Exhibit 6, was discussed with the Army High Command on Oahu?

A. At this late date, it would not be possible to say, with reference to this particular dispatch, but during the Fall of 1941, I was present at a number of conferences in Admiral Kimmel's office when General Short and possibly other Army officers were present. It is quite probable that one of those conferences was a result of this dispatch.

61. Q. Admiral, do you recall any major matters that were causing Admiral Kimmel concern at this time, other than matters you have discussed; causing him grave concern at the time?

A. He was very much concerned as to the safety of Midway and Wake, particularly the latter. He was continually concerned, to a very great degree, at the lack of anti-submarine craft available in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The situation, which, despite numerous and vigorous protests, did not improve.

62. Q. In your planning, was the discussion of war tasks or such security matters as the lack of patrol craft for Oahu given the major consideration during these months leading up to the attack?

A. Our major consideration as to employment of the Fleet was to use it effectively to reduce the pressure which we anticipated the Japanese would [244] be exerting in the China Sea by so operating our forces as to cause them to divert important portions of their own force to oppose us. The lack of anti-submarine craft, whatever deficiencies might have existed in the local defenses or even in the outlying bases under construction, did not deter the Commander-in-Chief from giving his principal consideration toward utilizing the Fleet offensively as quickly and as much as possible.

63. Q. It appears that over five weeks elapsed between this dispatch of 16 October and the next similar dispatch from the Navy Department, to which we will come in a moment. During that five weeks, was anything received from the Department which rescinded the directive in this dispatch of 16 October to take preparatory deployments and so forth?

A. No.

64. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, Exhibit 7 before this examination. Were you familiar with that dispatch at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this dispatch without having specific recollection as to the date of it.

65. Q. Do you recall the meaning that you attached at the time, or the significance you attached at the time, to the statement that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be a possibility?

A. My reaction was, I think, that it contained no new information.

66. Q. Did this dispatch cause you to make any changes in your current plans at the time?

A. I think not.

67. Q. During the period between these two dispatches mentioned in the evidence, did there become known to you any change in the distribution of Japanese naval forces which, to you, seemed significant?

A. Until sometime in the early Fall, I, personally, had felt that a Japanese war was certain; but felt that her probable enemy would be Russia and did not believe that she would take on more than one major Power. But the situation gradually changed; and sometime in the late Fall, possibly in late November, our intelligence activities reported not only a large number of transports in Indo-China Sea, but indicated that very large numbers of combatant ships were moving to the southward. I believe that my recollection in the respect is correct.

68. Q. But you do not remember, other than what you have just stated, any specific change in distribution of major units which came to your attention in late November?

A. I feel quite sure that I recall the movement of important units, approximating fleet size, as being reported moving to the southward and, if recollection serves, battleships were sighted toward the Indo-China area, or were reported as sighted. Our information as to location of all Jap naval forces was incomplete, but we thought we knew the general location of his principal strength.

69. Q. Do you remember if, at the time, you connected up in your own mind that intelligence with this particular dispatch of 24 November?

A. I may or may not have connected the two, but probably did. And I do recall that it was about that time that I became convinced that the Japanese war would be directed toward the Malaysia area; and speculated as to whether [245] the Japanese would dare risk moving into that area without attacking the Philippines, and reaching the conclusion that it was improbable.

70. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 27, 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this.

71. Q. Will you please state, as near as you can remember, the meaning which, at the time, you gave to the clause or phrase in there calling for the execution of appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out certain tasks?

A. The question that you have just asked was one that within the Commander-in-Chief's Staff was frequently propounded for some days, and the general conclusion was that we were practically already so deployed and that what we should really do was to stay outside of the Marshalls area rather than to move immediately into that area. In short, we construed it to mean that war was imminent but not certain and that we were to avoid taking a deployment to commence offensive operations until there were further developments.

72. Q. You mean that you were not to undertake offensive operations after a declaration of war or start of war?

A. To amplify: Our plan called for reconnaissance, including attacks in force, on Marshall positions. We felt that we should not move within easy striking distance where we might be sighted and possibly disturb any remote chance that still remained of averting war. As a consequence, our forces were held in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls. Two groups, each of which included a carrier that had been carrying aircraft reinforcements to Wake and to Midway, were exceptions. They were to return to Pearl Harbor as soon as possible after completing their assigned task.

73. Q. Do you recall whether or not Task Force One entered Pearl Harbor subsequent to the receipt of this dispatch?

A. Yes, it did.

74. Q. Did you consider that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor was consistent with the understanding of defensive deployment which you have outlined?

A. We determined that we should continue training operations in the vicinity of Oahu and considered that forces either within Pearl Harbor or in the general vicinity were in consonance with this directive.

75. Q. When you state "we," are you including the views of Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I think so.

76. Q. Was any other action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, based on the dispatch, Exhibit 8?

A. The matter was discussed at considerable length, both on receipt of this dispatch and on subsequent days, and it was determined that existing plans, operations, and arrangements were in accordance with existing instructions, including this dispatch. Prudent security arrangements and readiness to commence offensive action on very short notice were considered to be in effect.

[246] 77. Q. Do you recollect whether the defense forces of the outlying islands were further augmented at the time of the receipt of this dispatch?

A. Whether from this dispatch or from those that had shortly preceded it, additional aircraft were sent to Midway and Wake, arriving at those places in early December.

78. Q. Do you recollect any additional security measures prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief at that time?

A. Except for further warnings, I believe that no additional measures were taken, other than to direct depth bombing submarine contacts suspected of being hostile and to repel hostile planes that might be encountered. As I now recall, the directive with regard to attacking hostile planes was given to both Admiral Newton and Admiral Halsey, who were in command of the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake. I do not recall whether those instructions were written or by dispatch or verbal.

79. Q. Do you recollect any discussion of this dispatch with the Army command on Oahu?

A. No, and I'm under the impression that no discussion occurred, because it was felt that about all had been done that could be done or should be done. Although a general discussion with General Short, Admiral Bloch, and others on defensive matters did occur about this time in connection with a Departmental proposal relative to forces on Wake and Midway.

80. Q. Were you familiar with the condition as to alertness of the Army in the week preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. No. If I was at the time, I'm not now.

81. Q. Admiral, do you recall receipt of any instructions about this time, that is 27 November, with respect to the relieving of the Marines at Wake and Midway and perhaps other outlying islands?

A. I recall that, at some time, not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion that it might be advisable to relieve the Marines at those places, and being present at a discussion that included, among others, Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Admiral Bloch. It was the unanimous opinion that it would be highly inadvisable to do so, particularly at the critical time that the proposal was made, and they were not relieved. There was, at that time particularly, a discussion as to the advisability of using some of the fighter aircraft (I believe it was only fighter aircraft, as I recall now) from Army forces on Hawaii. After considerable discussion as to the methods of getting them there, the difficulties of their upkeep, the virtual impossibility of withdrawing them, etc., they were not sent. I believe

that some tests were made in having some of them fly off carriers because it was believed they could be delivered in that fashion. It was suggested, during the discussion, that the most effective fighters should be sent to that area because there was far greater likelihood of their being usefully employed than there would be from Oahu. I mention this last fact merely as indicative of the fact that the senior officers, Army and Navy, afloat and ashore, gave no indication at that time of anticipating an air attack on Oahu. Incidentally, the War and Navy Departments were proposing considerable reduction in defenses of Oahu in order to strengthen Midway and Wake. At that time, only six Army B-17's on Oahu were operable.

[247] 82. Q. However, did it occur to you that in view of that tenseness of situation, that the proposal as received from Washington was badly timed?

A. Yes, sir, that was why we felt it was highly inadvisable to make any change in the arrangements there, whatever merits the proposal might have had otherwise. Nonetheless, it was agreed, between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that the former would organize several defense battalions for use on outlying islands and would hold several pursuit squadrons in readiness for such employment.

83. Q. Do you recall if the proposal, which, incidentally, bears the same date as this dispatch concerning which you are testifying, in any way vitiated the effect of the statement that the dispatch was a war warning?

A. No, sir, I did not feel that that vitiated the other dispatch. I rather felt that it had in mind making available to the Commander-in-Chief Marine defense battalions for utilization in captured positions in the Marshalls that might be badly needed and might not otherwise be available.

84. Q. Admiral, would you say that there was a doubt in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief and the members of his Staff as to what the Navy Department intended by its directive of 27 November to execute defensive deployments, etc.?

A. I believe that the conclusion reached here was that primarily the Department wished to appraise use of their belief that the war was imminent, that we should continue to maintain our security arrangements, but was cautioning us not to take any disposition that might be regarded as an overt act, such as exposing forces as far as the Gilberts or the close approaches to the Marshalls. It seemed to us that they might have thought that in our enthusiasm to strike as promptly as possible we might advance forces to a position that would be regarded as threatening and thus destroy any remote chance of retaining peace. We were not so uncertain as to ask the Department for a clarification.

85. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, which is Exhibit 9. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Yes, I remember seeing this dispatch.

86. Q. Did the directions contained therein, with reference to being prepared to carry out certain tasks, appear to you to be inconsistent with your view as to the previous dispatch of November 27?

A. No.

87. Q. Was this dispatch, Exhibit 9, the basis for any change in the existing plans at the time of its receipt?

A. No, I think not.

88. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch of December 3, 1941, Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. Yes, I remember this.

89. Q. Will you please state what significance you attached to this dispatch at the time?

A. I felt that it was the best indication which had come to our attention that we would be involved in the war with Japan, from the very beginning.

90. Q. Can you state any significance attached to this dispatch by Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, I don't recall any specific expression of opinion from him with regard to this dispatch.

[248] 91. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a somewhat hypothetical question. Had you foreseen the full power of that Japanese carrier raid, which was made on 7 December, what measures, other than those taken, were open, insofar as the distribution of the battleships was concerned?

A. We would certainly not have had them in port. Had intelligence, chance contact, or search have located the enemy forces, it seems highly probable that we would have concentrated our battleships at sea and had them with attendant light forces disposed to the westward with the expectation of using them against any enemy forces that could be reached. As a security measure, they certainly would not have been in port.

92. Q. The battleships appear to have constituted the primary target for the Japanese. Actually, what would have been the most profitable target in and around Pearl Harbor for the Japanese to have attacked?

A. The oil tanks. The Japanese apparently, from the nature of their attacks, determined, from the very beginning, to at least temporarily immobilize our Fleet. Everything would have been completely immobilized if they had destroyed the oil in Pearl Harbor and would have remained immobilized for a long period of time. If, in addition to that, they had destroyed the shops and the dry docks, our capabilities of waging war in the Central and Western Pacific would have been nullified for a very long period of time.

93. Q. Did you, at any time during your incumbency as War Plans Officer to Admiral Kimmel, question, in your own mind, the advisability of continually basing the Pacific Fleet on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, sir, I frequently did but always came back to the conclusion that if, in the existing international situation, the responsibility were my own, that I would have based them here. There is a considerable divergence of opinion in that regard and it may be idle to go into the pros and cons of it. I express only my own conclusions.

94. Q. However, will you, briefly, express those pros and cons?

A. Among other things, Pearl Harbor has but one entrance. If a considerable portion of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor and that entrance should be blocked, it would have taken a very long time to clear it. Whatever units were in here would have been immobile and there

would have been no other suitable base in the Central Pacific in which to base our Fleet. Operating for a considerable period here, habitually, would make it certain that the Japanese could concentrate considerable number of submarines in one relatively small area. If they were boldly and skillfully used, they would have found numerous opportunities to inflict serious damage. Those are the two major objections to basing the Fleet here. Such matters as deterioration and morale, strain on logistics, and matters of that nature could be overcome. The advantages of basing it here were that it would be a week's steaming nearer the area of operation. The development of schemes for ingress and egress, and for berthing and servicing and the repairing of the Fleet, would be developed to a degree that would never be accomplished unless large numbers of ships were based here for prolonged period. In other times, temporary expedients had been arranged for temporarily berthing the Fleet and for giving limited services; but this area, until the Fleet was actually maintained out here, had never been developed as a real Fleet base.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

[249] The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 5:35 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[250]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1944

TWENTIETH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the nineteenth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This is a board acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony, under oath, surrounding the facts pertaining to the incident of 7 December 1941, comprising the attack on Pearl Harbor. The purpose is to record testimony which might otherwise be lost and be unavailable at some future time, when it may be needed and perhaps used in legal proceedings; or for other purposes. It is necessary for witnesses to testify from facts known to them on or before 7 December 1941, insofar as it is possible to do. I ask them to make every endeavor to that end. I give full opportunity to verify testimony and interpret that liberally to include amendments, as well as corrections; this I feel it necessary to do because of the great amount of elapsed time since those events. There is a significant phrase in the precept—"pertinent to the facts." It has been the experience that interpretation of that phrase is required, which I have to do inasmuch as facts come out in testimony that point back to other facts which, at first, might not appear to be pertinent. You are called as a witness whom I consider to be in possession of such facts.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral (Temporary Grade), United States Navy, in command of the Amphibious Forces of the Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was the War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. How long previously had you been so detailed?

A. I reported to that duty on October 25, 1940, having come from command of the U. S. S. ASTORIA, then a part of the Hawaiian Detachment of the Pacific Fleet.

4. Q. Were you, particularly during 1941, closely associated with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, even beyond the association which the preparation of formal war plans called for?

[251] A. I was. I considered myself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers. We were close personal friends, as well as closely associated officially.

5. Q. What was the official designation of the Department's basic war plan which was current during the latter half of 1941?

A. WPL-46; Rainbow 5, it was known as. That war plan was a joint plan between the Army and the Navy. It had its basis in an international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force. The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that plan were held in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the President. The Navy issued their form of that war plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection the Army form of it was issued about August.

6. Q. Did WPL-46 contemplate any Allies, other than the British Empire?

A. It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war, for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.

7. Q. Against what prospective enemy nations was the plan intended?

A. It was intended against the Axis Powers: Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Powers that were allied with those principal Powers. It did not include any particular participation for the purpose of the plan by the Government of China. It did not include any association by Russia, as it was prepared and promulgated before the Russians were at war with Germany. After its promulgation, the War and Navy Departments made several tentative efforts to bring Russia within the scope of this or a modified plan. During the Fall of 1941, the Joint Board prepared some tentative bases for military conversations with Russia. The representatives of the Joint Board on two or three occasions discussed with the Russian military representative in Washington the question of making a common war plan, but nothing ever eventuated from those conversations during the time I remained in Washington.

8. Q. Did the plan, as put into effect, envisage alternative combinations of enemy nations?

A. It did. Without referring to the plan to aid memory, I believe it envisaged war in which either Germany and her European Allies were the sole enemies, or in which Japan was also engaged. The main basis of the plan, however, was a global war in which both Germany and her European Allies and Japan were at war with United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. It was

agreed that if war was initiated by Japan, Germany would be brought in by offensive action against her by the United States.

9. Q. Then, during the period immediately preceding the issuing of WPL-46, I understand you to say that there was in the minds of your organization that the most likely combination of enemies would include Japan?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. In either or both of the alternative enemy combinations, what attitude, defensive or offensive, did the plan contemplate over the Pacific Ocean Areas?

A. The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy [252] Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was incumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.

11. Q. At about what date was the Contributory Plan of the Commander, Pacific Fleet, approved by the Navy Department?

A. It was about September. Referring to the plan, it appears to have been distributed on July 21. As I recall it, there was some correspondence concerning some of the features, but I believe it was during September that it was finally approved by the Department.

12. Q. Was that interim correspondence caused by any particular disagreement on the part of your own organization with what had been advanced by Admiral Kimmel?

A. No essential disagreement whatsoever. The delay, as I recall it, was due, principally to technical reasons and time required for a careful review of the plan by various agencies in the Department.

13. Q. Do you recall Admiral Kimmel having in any way expressed disagreement with the defensive versus the offensive attitudes which were laid down in the basic plan, WPL-46?

A. So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it.

While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific. The British Government did not hold such a view. They felt that our principal naval effort ought to be in the Atlantic and in the Asiatic. The United States believed that our strongest naval concentration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific.

14. Q. Other than as you have just testified, were there any other considerations lying behind the transfer of a considerable detachment of Admiral Kimmel's forces to the Atlantic, which step was somewhat concurrent with the date of issue of WPL-46?

[253] A. In May of 1941, decision was reached jointly with the British Government to occupy the Azores. The force which was withdrawn from the Pacific at that time consisted of some Marine troops and transports, one or two carriers, I think a division of cruisers, some destroyers, and, as I recall, three battleships. Something like that was withdrawn from the Pacific for the purpose of supporting the occupation of the Azores. That project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland by American troops was substituted. Some of the forces which were withdrawn for that purpose were then returned to the Pacific. The Department consistently made every possible effort to set up, in all of the theatres, the exact distribution of force which is set forth in WPL-46, and, at the time of the outbreak of war, substantially the forces established in that volume were present in all of the theatres.

15. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel make any particular protest against the transfer of that detachment from his command?

A. I recall no official protest. He did not approve it. As a matter of fact, he was not at once informed of the reasons for it. As I recall it, he asked to have those vessels returned as soon as they could be spared from the Atlantic. He felt that his strength here was none too great. That opinion was also held by the Department. There are two points that I would like to mention. In the first place, as you have said, I do not have at hand records of the correspondence which passed between the Department and Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7. As an assistant to Admiral Stark, I presented what Admiral Stark considered to be the principal papers in that case to the Roberts Commission and they can be found in the transcript of proceedings of that Commission. I remember most of those letters and dispatches, but am none too sure about the exact contents of each nor the dates. The second statement which I believe is pertinent is that the feeling by Admiral Stark and by all members of the Department with whom I ever talked was that of a very complete loyalty to the principal Commanders-in-Chief, who were Admiral Hart in the Asiatic, Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific, and Admiral King in the Atlantic. I know Admiral Stark felt and I know I felt, that war was coming and we had, in those three officers, the best possible selection of officers in the Navy for the sea commands. The Department made every effort possible to hold their hands up, and such adjustments as had to be made between the three Fleets, due to many reasons, were considered at length and very carefully before they were made. But I believe that that feeling of essential loyalty ought to be recorded, as

well as Admiral Stark's policy of avoiding minor directives and interferences with the Commanders-in-Chief. He was especially careful, at all times, to give them as full a scope of action as it was possible to give.

16. Q. Both parts of that statement are considered to be entirely pertinent. There can well be added to the record the general belief throughout the forces in the field that such trust and confidence obtained throughout the period leading up to the war. There was the fact that we contemplated Allies, if we became engaged in the war. The examination returns to the incident of that transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. As you recall the innermost opinions held by you and your associates, was that transfer in accord with your own conceptions of what the situation demanded or was it somewhat overinfluenced by the British insistence?

A. The decision was made after a great deal of discussion. Of course, there were differences of opinion, but the Department was entirely loyal to that decision. The British did not insist too greatly. In fact, the expedition was cancelled at the request of the British when they became [254] convinced that the Portuguese would resist the seizure of the Islands.

17. Q. It is in previous testimony that there was, some time during the Summer of 1941, a temporary detachment of surface vessels toward Australia. Did that have any particular part in the overall picture which was confronting the Navy Department?

A. That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up, but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war.

18. Q. During June and July, 1941, formal action was taken by our Federal Government to freeze Japanese credits. At that time, or afterward, did your organization make a reestimate of the international situation in the light of the probability that the Japanese would be badly squeezed in obtaining strategic materials and so forth?

A. The possibility and consequences of action of that nature by the United States Government against Japan were thoroughly considered during our conversations with the British and during our preparation of WPL-46. We felt that that action was going to come sooner or later. We also felt, and I believe that the War Department felt the same way, that action of that nature would almost surely result in

war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. While the subject of economic sanctions was discussed, we felt that there was no necessity for making any change in our planning.

19. Q. Then was it the case that such circumstances had really been included in the situation estimate which laid behind WPL-46 in the first place?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Did it occur to you, during 1941 or previously, that the Navy Department's general method of preparing, and of the administrative handling of its war plans, including keeping them in touch with events and developments, was in any way defective?

A. I shared the opinion with many others that the war plans which were in existence during 1940 were defective in the extreme. They were not realistic, they were highly theoretical, they set up forces to be ready for use at the outbreak of war, or shortly after, which could not possibly have been made available, and they were not kept up to date. When I went as War Plans Officer in October of 1940, I was shocked at the state of the war plans. There was the feeling then in Washington, which I did not share, that war with Japan might eventuate at any moment, and there was no plan for war with Japan. Immediately after my arrival and after a thorough discussion of the matter, we initiated the preparation and issue of WPL-43, Rainbow 3, which was a Navy Department War Plan not concurred in by the War Department. This [255] called for a war with Japan alone, and with an entirely defensive attitude in the Atlantic. That plan was issued about January of 1941. We felt that it would be implemented by the War Department if war should eventuate. It must be understood that a war plan issued by the Navy Department, or by the Government, is principally a mobilization plan for placing in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief the forces with which they are to initiate war and to give those Commanders-in-Chief general directives as to the strategic attitude which they should pursue. Rainbow 3 was, to all intents and purposes, and so far as the Pacific is concerned, approximately the same as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 did contemplate association with the British and the Netherlands East Indies on the Far East, but it did not go so far in that regard as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 was an interim plan. It was necessary, we all felt, to get out a war plan which the Government could carry out. Therefore, every effort was made to strip from the previous plans the unrealistic features, and to give to the new plan forces which could be provided and tasks which could probably be executed by Commanders-in-Chief. As soon as we issued Rainbow 3 and as soon as we issued Rainbow 5, the Navy Department immediately began moving forces to the different theatres in accord with the commitments made in those two plans.

21. Q. Then am I correct in understanding you to the effect that you did consider Rainbow 5 realistic, well described by the word "As-Is", not frozen, and sufficiently elastic insofar as developments could be seen?

A. Yes.

22. Q. Did you, during the Summer of 1941, make any special provision for keeping WPL-46 in step with changes in the general situation and with changes in availability of forces?

A. Yes, I organized the War Plans Division into sections charged with maintaining close cognizance of the different war theatres of the world, and made every effort to keep Rainbow 5 up to date. Rather extensive amendments were practically ready for issue when war broke out. They were not issued in the form in which prepared.

23. Q. In pursuance of that objective, or for any other reasons, were any estimates of the situation, other than running estimates, made by the War Plans Division during the period of, say, August to December, 1941?

A. None other than running estimates. I believed then, and I still believe that those are the most valuable kind of estimates. The long, formalized estimates, as used in the War College, are useful for training, but I have not found them particularly useful during war or preparation for war.

24. Q. Was there, during that period from August on, any particular redistribution of the naval forces of our respective Allies actually made or promised?

A. The British promised to set up the Eastern Fleet as contemplated by our Joint Agreement which would consist of about six battleships, two or three aircraft carriers, and some additional cruisers and destroyers. This Fleet was to be based in the Indian Ocean. Its principal base was Trincomalee with an advance base at Singapore. They actually moved the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and four destroyers to Singapore. En route there were, as I recall it, three battleships and one aircraft carrier additional to the HERMES at the time of the outbreak of war. Also a few destroyers and one or two cruisers. They were, so far as possible, making a loyal effort to carry out their commitments as to the distribution of forces for war. They also moved additional troops and additional aircraft to Malaya. We delivered, [256] under lend-lease, some aircraft to them in the Far East and sent groups of experts and mechanics out to Malaya to show them how to use our airplanes.

25. Q. During the same period, did our own War Department plan and effect any increase in ground or air strength in the Pacific Ocean Area?

A. Yes, as soon as Rainbow 5 was agreed to, the War Department immediately initiated steps for reenforcing the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. They actually moved a considerable number of airplanes to the Philippines and considerable additional troops. They also initiated a very greatly accelerated training of Philippine soldiers and, during the Fall of 1941, undertook what was essentially a mobilization of the Philippine Army.

26. Q. Was your organization kept in touch and frequently consulted concerning other than the basic considerations leading to those steps?

A. We were consulted in detail every time the War Department contemplated a movement of that sort. We had prolonged discussions of ways and means. Our opinion was frequently asked as to the advisability of such and such a movement. At that time, the War Department did not dispose of many trained elements which could be moved overseas without a very bad interruption of their training program. The War Department, after June of 1941, was, I believe, as thoroughly convinced as the Navy Department that war with Germany and Japan was not far distant.

27. Q. Was your organization able to keep touch, during the latter half of 1941, with the actual ability of the Army forces, Hawaii, to meet their commitments?

A. Yes, sir, we had a very definite opinion on the subject. It was substantially the same as was held, I believe, by the War Department, that it would be highly desirable to have considerably greater strength in anti-aircraft and airplanes and troops in Hawaii.

28. Q. Narrowing the examination down to the Hawaiian Area and forces therein; did the War Plans Division, through the latter half of 1941, consider that the Pacific Fleet had sufficient forces to carry out its initial tasks?

A. We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength.

29. Q. Did you consider the Fleet's logistics support to be adequate?
[257] A. We believed it to be adequate for the initial Fleet operations, such as I have mentioned. We did not consider that it was adequate for an early offensive movement for setting up bases in the Marshalls. We did not have the units assembled for setting up such bases and we did not have the shipping to support the Fleet at an advance base, but we believed that we could obtain those forces within a reasonable time after the outbreak of war. That estimate, I believe, has been proved sound by events. We have provided far greater logistics support in the Pacific Ocean than I would have believed possible before the outbreak of war. I refer to our tremendous logistic effort in the South Pacific immediately following the outbreak of war.

30. Q. During the period of preparation of basic Rainbow 5, was it the opinion in your organization and among your associates that if war with Japan eventuated, it would be at our initiative or at that of the Japanese?

A. Always at the initiative of the Japanese. We did not believe it politically possible to initiate war against the Japanese. I, personally, did not believe it politically advisable.

31. Q. And did those opinions endure throughout 1941 up until 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. Please state the methods of liaison with the State Department which were in effect from the summer of 1941 onward, or even

previously, through which you kept in touch with developments in the diplomatic and political fields, and including also the economic field, insofar as it was pertinent.

A. The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling.

33. Q. Is it your impression now that much transpired in those relationships with the Department of which no official record was kept and which rests now only in the minds of individuals?

[258] A. I don't know what records the State Department kept. The Navy Department representative, the Liaison Officer, usually prepared notes of formal conferences which he put in the files. I kept no notes whatsoever.

34. Q. Was it your impression that there were relationships, conferences, and so forth, on the part of State Department and Army officials in which our representatives had no part?

A. There were such conferences but, I believe that we were kept fully informed as to the general features of any such conferences.

35. Q. Insofar as your own participation was concerned, did you gather the impression that State Department officials had a correct realization of the naval and military potentialities on our side and that they kept their own actions in step therewith.

A. I think any broad generalization in an answer to that question could not fairly be made. There were individuals in the State De-

partment who had an unrealistic point of view, in my opinion, just the same as there were individuals in the War and Navy Departments who had an unrealistic point of view of the world situation. I'll say that on the whole, I have no complaint nor criticism of the attitude of the State Department.

36. Q. In continuance of your testimony concerning the attitude of certain individuals, will you go further as respects the individuals who specialized in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

A. I encountered the opinion, held alike by some people in the State Department and in the military service, that we could bluff Japan. I have been fortunate enough to have been associated with the Japanese on several occasions and had made a considerable study of the Japanese character and life and history. I was always of the opinion that you can not bluff the Japanese and that that is not the way to deal with them. But I believe that I, prior to the war, was in a very small minority in that view, so that I can not say that I criticize anyone for holding such views.

37. Q. Do you recall if it was represented to the State Department, at any time in 1941, and particularly upon the decision to build up Army forces in our holdings in the Pacific, that the element of timing in diplomatic and political moves was highly important?

A. That factor was thoroughly considered in every diplomatic and military move that was made, so far as I recall. The matter would be discussed as to whether this was the time to do a certain move or some other time. That was always present. There were sometimes disagreements as to timing.

38. Q. As an example, and in order to be more specific, was our own potentiality in the Pacific properly considered when the date for freezing the Japanese credits was decided upon?

A. It was considered. The State Department was kept well informed as to our strength and advised as to what we could do. What considerations lead to that decision at that particular time, I'm not aware, because I was informed of it after the decision was made and did not participate in any discussion of it in advance.

39. Q. Admiral, will you make a general statement as to the adequacy and reliability of the intelligence furnished concerning Japan in all fields through 1941 for the necessary purposes of the War Plans Division?

[259] A. Of course, we never have enough intelligence. It is particularly true that, as is well known, correct intelligence concerning Japan is very difficult to obtain. However, I think our intelligence regarding Japanese activities and intentions was quite good. In general terms, it was adequate for the preparation of war plans and for the direction of affairs. I believe that the Chief of Naval Operations, during the greater part of 1941, had a very realistic and sound concept as to Japanese general intentions. We received information from undercover sources that was of great value. Those who have studied the Japanese and had realized their character and reactions could draw conclusions, usually sound, from public statements, actions of their diplomats, actions of their Government, which were valuable in estimating their intentions. From these various sources, I became convinced, even before going to the Department, that war with Japan was inevitable within the next year or two. I did not believe that

war was imminent with Japan, unless precipitated by some incident, until the time it occurred. I did believe, from the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, which, I believe, was in June or July of 1941, that matters then were definitely in train for an attack by Japan on the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies. During November of 1941, I believed that the attack would be made by Japan about the last day of that month, but during the last ten days of November, I became convinced it had been postponed for a few days. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise whatsoever to me, nor to the Chief of Naval Operations.

40. Q. Were you, however, surprised that one of the objectives of the Japanese attack was Pearl Harbor itself?

A. Not in the least. I had originated a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War in January of 1941 concerning the defenses of Hawaii, in which an air, sea, and submarine attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was set forth as one of the most probable forms that the initiation of war with Japan would take. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, about that same time, wrote letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General in Hawaii, pointing out these features and asking that steps be taken within the power of those officers to be prepared for such an attack. Those letters were not intended to be construed as indicating an immediate attack, but they attempted to initiate rather long-range preparatory plans.

41. Q. Through 1941, and particularly during the months which saw the increase of tension with Japan, was your organization much concerned and worried as regards the security of units of the Pacific Fleet, as based in Hawaiian waters? I mean, in particular, security against surprise attack.

A. That factor was never absent from our consideration of the problems of war with Japan. We endeavored to do what we could with other parts of the Department, and with the Commander-in-Chief, to push measures that would insure adequate security. The letters and dispatches on that subject initiated by my office are not many because we felt, and it was the Chief of Naval Operation's policy, not to nag on matters of that sort. The problem was put where it belonged, in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

42. Q. In those intra-office discussions, was a surprise attack through the air particularly in your mind?

A. We felt that would probably accompany any attack unless such attacks were confined solely to submarines. Attacks by submarines were, of course, an almost certainty, and might well have been the only form of attack.

[260] 43. Q. While holding that frame of mind, during that crucial period, did you also have in mind the actual state of readiness of Army forces, Oahu, for repelling carrier raid?

A. Yes. On several occasions, we went over in detail the exact forces the Army had available, both anti-aircraft and air, their distribution, and whether or not they were deployed in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor permanently. I am sure there is considerable correspondence in general terms on that subject, but I do not remember whether or not we specifically asked the War Department to deploy their anti-aircraft guns permanently in the immediate vicinity of

Pearl Harbor. I know that we asked them orally to keep their principal anti-aircraft force deployed around Pearl Harbor, and my impression is that they carried that out. We knew that the three inch anti-aircraft gun was not a very able weapon, but the new ninety millimeter and the Army thirty-seven millimeter and the fifty calibre guns were either not available then or available only in small numbers. I believe that the War Department did everything that they could to meet these requests.

44. Q. Were you cognizant of the state of training and readiness of the Army air forces, Oahu, for repelling or interfering with an air raid?

A. No. We knew the types of planes they had had here were of the older models and not particularly valuable in combat. In order to correct that quickly, in the latter part of 1941, we made, I think, two carrier trips from the Coast carrying the later types of Army pursuit planes. They were newly formed organizations and we did not expect their training to be of a very high order. The purpose of those trips by carriers and the purpose of the Army transfers of the later types of pursuit planes and bombers in the latter part of '41 was to deal with exactly the situation that occurred.

45. Q. Did you have knowledge of the state of readiness of the Army's radar equipment and organization?

A. In general terms, yes. When I went to War Plans, the Army had, under manufacture, eight or ten large radar installations of a permanent type. The priority at that time of assignment was, first to Panama, and, I think, second on the West Coast of the United States. On our recommendation, they changed that priority to first, I think, the Philippines, and, second Hawaii; or it may have been the other way. I'm not too certain about that. The first may have been Midway, but the Philippines, Hawaii, and Midway were placed by the War Department very high on the list. Now the installation, the permanent fixed installation in Hawaii, I do not believe was completed at the time of Pearl Harbor, but it was being pushed hard. The Army had, however, moved out here, quite recently to that date, several sets of the mobile type of radar, and we knew that these were being operated.

46. Q. But you did not know anything specific about the relative inefficiencies of the operation; is that correct?

A. That is correct. I knew nothing whatever about radar except what it was intended to do.

47. Q. Continuing as regards the security of units of the Fleet against surprise attack while in Hawaii, and specifically Pearl Harbor, were there, during the months leading up to the war, any specific considerations in your organization as to the advisability of continuing to base the Fleet in Hawaiian waters; if so, please state them.

A. Consideration was given to withdrawing the Fleet from the Base in Hawaii to California throughout the entire time I was in the Department, [261] until a very short period before Pearl Harbor. There were several factors that entered into that consideration. One was political, whether or not the presence of the Fleet here would be more likely or less likely to bring on war with Japan. Another consideration was the welfare of the crews of the ships; the men did not like Hawaii, and there was a certain amount of discontent

among them in not getting back more frequently to the States. Another was the upkeep of the Fleet. Another consideration was its safety in case of attack. I suppose the matter was discussed rather exhaustively a dozen times, and each time the decision was made to leave the Fleet here. For some time previous to the attack, the use of the anchorage at Lahaina Roads had been abandoned on the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, because it was felt to be too exposed, both against submarines and against air attack. It was believed that when the Fleet was not at sea, Pearl Harbor offered better protection than any other place in that vicinity.

48. Q. Then you do not recall any occasion on which decision to withdraw from these waters to the Coast, for security reasons only, came anywhere near to being reached?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Sir, was the estimate that you stated a few minutes ago that you considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor a strong possibility shared by the Chief of Naval Operations and his other senior assistants?

A. Yes, because they approved the letters that we drew up, without any question. They made some improvements in the letters, but the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as well as my own assistants, all believed that the letters were entirely sound.

50. Q. What was the understanding in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the estimate prevailing in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as regards the possibilities of air surprise attack on Oahu?

A. We believed that he held exactly the same views that we did. What his attitude was towards the imminence of such an attack, I have no idea, but the fact that he, himself, had abandoned the use of Lahaina Roads indicated that his attitude toward attack was entirely correct.

51. Q. Did you feel, at that time, that all necessary steps were taken to apprise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet of the apprehension of the Chief of Naval Operations as to a surprise air attack on Oahu?

A. There was no specific warning sent out against attack on the Fleet here at the time the war warnings were dispatched. The only measures that we estimated specifically the Japanese would take were the general forms of his major attack, which was on Malay, the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, initially. That is, it was the major movement with which we were concerned in the Department. It was against policy—rightly so, I believe—to be too specific in details as to tactical matters. The idea was that we would give the Commanders-in-Chief general tasks, provide them with full information, and assign to them forces adequate for executing those tasks. We looked to the officers in the field to decide all tactical matters and methods. We did not wish to hamper them with detailed instructions concerning matters within their own fields of action. This was particularly important in the case of the Pacific and Asiatic Commands, which are so far distant from Washington that the officers there can never be adequately advised as to events and conditions.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[262] Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that

his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Commander Granville C. Briant, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., adjourned until 9:15 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 1944

TWENTY-FIRST DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 8: 15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twentieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

52. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in the testimony before this board. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

A. I prepared the original version of the dispatch. It was discussed with the Army. I think the discussion took place at a joint board meeting, as well as informally between the Staff representatives. I also prepared the final form which is this dispatch. There was no substantial change in the wording, except that, in my original form of the dispatch, instead of [263] saying, "There is also a possibility that Japan may attack Britain and the United States," I made it a good deal stronger than that. I do not remember the exact wording; I think it was "a distinct probability Japan will attack Britain and the United States in the near future". Anyway, that was the meaning. That was felt by the Joint Board to be too strong a statement, and it was modified to the final wording.

53. Q. Do you recall that consultations with State Department officials preceded the sending of this dispatch?

A. I did not participate in any consultations with the State Department concerning this dispatch. As I recall it, the dispatch was shown to the Secretary of State and was discussed by him and the Chief of Naval Operations. It also was discussed by the Chief of Naval Operations with the President. I do not believe it was presented to a Cabinet meeting. In fact, I'm sure it wasn't; but I have the strong

impression that the President discussed its general features with the Secretary of State before it was sent.

54. Q. The next document which the board has in evidence bears the date of 24 November and is of somewhat similar tenor (indicating Exhibit 7). The intervening period is thirty-nine days. Do you recall any action by the Navy Department, any directives and so forth, of major import concerning the situation of the Pacific Fleet during that interim?

A. I don't recall any additional directives. The Navy Department and the War Department increased their efforts to get additional strength here in the Central Pacific and in the Philippines during that period. The situation was discussed at regular and at several special meetings of the Joint Board, and action was agreed to along several lines of effort by the Departments.

55. Q. Following your mention of Army efforts, do you recall any embarrassment coming upon the Navy Department, or its forces in the Pacific, incident to a very high estimate of numbers of B-17's which were to be ferried across the Pacific?

A. I don't recall any embarrassment. We made every effort and sent out directives to hasten the completion of the air fields at Midway and Wake, and we had to send additional men out there, in order to hasten completion of Navy airfields for use by the Army in ferrying planes to the Philippines. That took some of our shipping. The Army asked us to provide shipping for the fields at Canton and Christmas Islands, but we were unable to provide it for Christmas. We did provide some for Canton. Those fields had been started on my recommendation after talking to General Arnold. I told him we would lose Wake right away as soon as war broke out and if he wanted to get planes to the Philippines an alternative route ought to be provided via Australia and Pacific Ocean islands farther to the rear. That conversation took place at Argentia, during the Argentia Conference. The Navy was always heartily in favor of sending the planes to the Philippines, and we did what we could to assist the Army.

56. Q. Do you recall disappointment because the magnitude of that air reinforcement was very much less than what was projected?

A. Yes. The Navy Department was constantly urging the War Department to do all they possibly could in the way of getting additional strength in the Philippines. I will say that the War Department was also in favor of it. I think they sent out everything they could. I would like to add the following as a partial answer to a previous question regarding major steps that the Navy Department took which affected the Pacific situation. It was [264] at about this time that the Navy Department shifted all merchant and military shipping out of the Central Pacific, and sent it down south of New Guinea. It was also about this time that a directive was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to withdraw the Marines from China. The exact date of that dispatch, I do not recall.

57. Q. Do you recall if Mr. Kurusu's mission to Washington caused any particular change in opinions in your organization during this period of thirty-nine days?

A. His mission intensified our belief, already strong, that Japan was playing for time and was going to make an attack in the near future. The Kurusu mission seemed almost proof positive, had we not had proof already.

58. Q. Returning to the dispatch of 16 October. Do you recall approximately what steps Admiral Kimmel took to carry out the directive for a preparatory deployment?

A. He sent additional troops to the outlying islands and some fixed anti-aircraft guns and troops to Wake. He could not put the entire garrison in at Wake because of the large number of civilian workmen there, so he only sent a part of them out at this time. Then, just as war was breaking out, he dispatched another contingent to Wake, and he established an anti-submarine patrol in the Hawaiian Islands. I think he increased his air patrol, and he issued some orders to our own submarines, but I don't remember what they were. Our impression was that he was taking the necessary precautions. We had no doubts as to the readiness of the Pacific Fleet.

59. Q. During the aforesaid interim period of thirty-nine days, were the Department's directives concerning deployments ever rescinded?

A. No, sir.

60. Q. I pass you a dispatch dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7 in this testimony. Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

A. I prepared this dispatch. It went through approximately the same processes as the October dispatch.

61. Q. Do you recall any particular collaboration of organizations, other than Army and Navy, in the preparation of that dispatch or which were in its background?

A. There were frequent conferences with the State Department during this period and frequent conferences between the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the President. The Office of Naval Intelligence was in close touch with the Army Intelligence Service and with the F. B. I. concerning preventative measures being taken in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands. I've forgotten just when the Coast Guard was taken over. I know there were conferences with the Coast Guard and the Treasury Department during this time in order to fit them into the deployment. I understood the situation was discussed several times in Cabinet meetings, and I believe that there were several conferences on the subject between the Cabinet officers most directly concerned.

62. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this testimony. Did you also have a part in the preparation of this dispatch?

A. The preparation of that dispatch followed approximately the same course as the other two. I prepared the original dispatch. It was considered by the Joint Board and was taken up with the State Department and [265] the White House. There were some few changes made in it until it took this form. As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South.

It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses here. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions.

63. Q. In the discussion over the dispatch as you first drafted it, do you recall anything in particular as regards the phrase "war warning"; particularly discussion on what steps those words might lead the Pacific Fleet to take?

A. The words "war warning" were my own words and seemed to me to express the strong conviction on the part of the Department that war was surely coming. We expected all military services and outlying detachments to act in every way as if we were actually at war, except making attacks on the enemy, if encountered, or initiating movements against enemy forces.

64. Q. Will you, similarly, state what, in particular, the Department had in mind in the use of the words in this dispatch concerning "a deployment"?

A. It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment positions for defense of territory.

[266] 65. Q. Do you recall any discussion, during the preparation of this dispatch, over inclusion of a directive to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to report what means he was taking incident to this dispatch?

A. We saw the Army dispatch requiring a report as to measures taken before it went out, but the Chief of Naval Operations and his

advisers, so far as I can recall, did not even consider sending out such a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

66. Q. Or the inclusion of such a directive in this dispatch itself?

A. No, that is a point I do not recall coming up.

67. Q. Do you recall any discussion over the advisability of sending a naval operations officer of authority to Pearl Harbor in order to insure a meeting of minds?

A. No, sir. An inspection procedure of that nature was never considered, so far as I recall, at any time while I was in the Department. We had, in circulating war plans or agreements with the British, on one or two occasions, sent an officer to Hawaii and to Manila to go over the papers with the Commanders-in-Chief to insure that those officers thoroughly understood the Department's intentions and desires, but I heard no suggestions that an officer be sent out here to check on what the Commander-in-Chief was actually doing.

68. Q. It appears, from previous testimony, that the Department sent C-in-C Pacific another dispatch on 26 November, which originated some hours earlier than the other dispatch, and which pre-occupied the High Commands in Oahu. It concerned the substitution of Army air and ground troops in outlying islands as then garrisoned by Marines. Do you recall that dispatch (showing Exhibit 12)?

A. Yes, I recall this dispatch and I am sure it was prepared in my office.

69. Q. Did it occur to you that the timing of these two important dispatches, sent on the same day, was not altogether desirable?

A. No, sir. In fact, the purpose of the dispatch was to strengthen Midway against attack, and while this dispatch probably took several days in preparation, I think we wouldn't have considered it a part of the war warning series but rather a part of the materiel preparation matters, on which dispatches were going out practically every day. I've never had the thought that this would have done anything except more or less reenforce the idea of complete readiness. The fact that the planes had to be taken on an aircraft carrier indicated the necessity for speed.

70. Q. Did the dispatches in question (Exhibits 12 and 13) contemplate exchange of ground troops? I understand from your testimony that you did not consider that the quite extensive administrative measures necessitated by such shifts in forces would get in the way of larger considerations; is that correct?

A. This dispatch does not contemplate the exchange of troops, but merely exchange of ground crews and personnel of the airplane squadrons. The dispatch, Exhibit 13, contemplates reinforcement by infantry units of Marine defense battalions in position in the outlying islands. There was never any intention to relieve the Marine defense battalions, but they needed infantry reinforcement for proper security. Both of these dispatches, in my opinion, relate to a part of the immediate war measures which the Department considered essential. Administrative requirements for moving these forces to the forward positions were necessary. I consider the [267] dispatches relate to a movement which would add considerable strength to our defensive position in the Hawaiian Islands. I foresaw no administrative difficulties that would interfere with a proper defensive attitude of the Fleet and of the Army forces in Hawaii.

71. Q. Referring back to your testimony to the effect that you expected the Pacific Fleet to take up positions in readiness as a part of their reaction to the phrase "war warning", and so forth; do you recall if the logistic requirements which would be thereby entailed had ample attention in your minds at that time?

A. The Fleet actually had put to sea prior to this time, and they were then operating in about three or four task forces, and alternating in Pearl Harbor. The amount of fuel in Pearl Harbor was a constant matter of concern to War Plans and other agencies of the Navy Department. We felt that the logistic position out here was secure enough to execute those movements which we had in mind. I have never heard that it was not reasonably adequate.

72. Q. But if in consequence of such an understanding on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, his task groups had been at sea for several days prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, would they not have had to return to port for refueling?

A. I don't remember whether or not there were enough tankers here at that time to keep the Fleet at sea continuously without returning to port. My impression is that there were enough. The rotation of the task forces in Pearl Harbor was not brought to my attention or the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations until after December 7.

73. Q. Under the Department's directive as contained in Exhibit 8, the deployment was stated to be in preparation for carrying out the assigned tasks in the war plans. Did it occur to you, while framing that dispatch, that the result might well be the assemblage of the entire Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in preparation to jump off on the initial movement which the plans called for?

A. There was no question about an immediate amphibious movement. The only thing which was possible, the only tasks of the war plan which were possible were defensive movements and raids against enemy outlying positions, and the immediate matter was the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and our outlying islands. The place to defend them for the Fleet was at sea.

74. Q. However, the first task imposed upon the Pacific Fleet, though in the nature of a raid, required heavy forces and a blow projected at a long distance. In that view, would it have been unfair to expect that the Commander-in-Chief would assemble all three of his task forces in Pearl Harbor in preparation therefor?

A. The wording of the dispatch relating to that matter is as follows: "Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out the defensive tasks only assigned in WPL-46." That appears to me to be clear and to rule out, for the time being, any immediate preparation for an offensive move.

75. Q. Referring to my question regarding a directive to the Commander-in-Chief to state what measures he was taking, did you receive any report of action by Army forces, Oahu, which contained any indication that the actions taken in consequence of the 27 November dispatch had not been what was contemplated when they were sent?

[268] A. I remember a dispatch being received by the War Department from General Short reporting the measures being taken in compliance with the War Department's directive. A copy of that dispatch was sent to me by the War Plans Officer of the General Staff.

I did not discuss the dispatch with the War Plans Officer of the General Staff. The impression made on me by the dispatch was that the Army was taking satisfactory dispositions, and since the dispatch seemed satisfactory to the War Department, I did not pursue the subject further. The dispatch did not create any impression on me that full and appropriate defensive deployments were not being made by the Army.

76. Q. I show you a dispatch from OpNav, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Do you recall having prepared it or having seen it at the time it was sent?

A. I saw it before it was sent. It was sent by Naval Intelligence.

77. Q. Did the information therein cause thought within your organization and among your associates as to the advisability of any further warnings or instructions to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, sir. The fact that this was going out in this manner was considered all that was necessary to insure that the Commanders-in-Chief and the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts thoroughly understood the urgency of the situation. In this connection, the Navy Department sent out orders to outlying islands and positions in China to burn all codes except such as were immediately essential; for example, to the ships in the Chinese rivers and to our stations in China, we sent orders to burn all except a single code and that was to be destroyed immediately in case of attack. We sent orders to Guam and orders to the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts concerning the same subject. Most of these dispatches, or at least several of them, were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for information. The fact that we considered it necessary to burn codes was considered by the Department as an additional advisory warning to the Commanders-in-Chief.

78. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch of 3 December would create in the minds of the recipients an impression that the attack was coming in the Western Pacific rather than any possibility of an attack on Oahu, since it does not mention Honolulu as one of the points where codes were to be destroyed?

A. It is impossible for me to understand how anyone could receive such an impression. The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United States. Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching war, then war-like actions may occur any place. Such an impression as you mention might have been created if neither Washington nor Manila had been included in the dispatch.

79. Admiral, do you recall anything other than what you have already testified to in the way of directives, warnings, and so forth, which were sent to Admiral Kimmel from, say, 25 November onward?

A. No, sir.

80. Q. Can you explain why the various dispatches from 24 November onward were in minor disagreement as to the actual objectives at which a Japanese surprise attack might be sent?

[269] A. I can not see the disagreement you mention. Exhibit No. 8 mentions several possible objectives of an amphibious expedition. Included among the possible objectives is the Kra Peninsula. Exhibit No. 10, which is a report of what the British Mission in Washington had been told by their Government, mentions an am-

phibious expedition against the Kra Isthmus. Therefore, I see no essential difference.

81. Q. Sir, in the months preceding the chain of dispatches that appear in evidence in this examination, do you recall any other repeated warnings that war was imminent, might happen any day, or words to that effect, contained either in correspondence or dispatches with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I recall no official dispatches or official letters which gave repeated warnings. There were many official letters and dispatches, and there was personal correspondence between Admiral Stark and the Commander-in-Chief in which an effort was made to keep the Commanders-in-Chief constantly advised on the diplomatic situation and on the general thoughts and attitudes of the Department concerning the possibility of war, and also concerning the prosecution of measures in preparation for war. I recall nothing in the several months before Pearl Harbor except this series of dispatches which might indicate that the Department thought war might break out any day. I saw most, if not all, of the personal correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders-in-Chief and was permitted to comment on them prior to their dispatch. If there had been any such thing in his personal correspondence, I certainly would have recommended its deletion. Admiral Stark's opinion and mine on the situation were very close together from the Spring of 1941 on.

82. Q. There is some testimony to the effect that the repeated warnings to the Pacific Fleet were ineffective and that such repetition had one undesirable result wherein the recipients got into the frame of mind which I can most briefly describe as the "cry of 'wolf' " of the fable. Did it occur to you, on about, say, 27 November, that the Department could well put in effect certain portions of Rainbow 5 and thereby most certainly insure that proper steps would be taken by the Pacific Fleet?

A. I frequently heard that criticism made. I do not consider it in the slightest degree justified. I'm speaking now of the "cry of 'wolf', 'wolf' ". So far as I know, there was only one dispatch that was a specific warning for war. The other dispatches relate to preparatory measures and were intended in keep the Commanders-in-Chief fully in touch with the situation as the Department saw it. The Department would have been, in my opinion, most derelict, had it permitted the war to approach closely without letting the Commanders-in-Chief know that it was convinced that war was coming. That exact feature of keeping from alarming the people at sea by frequent alarmist letters and dispatches was constantly kept in mind, and there were several occasions on which there were recommendations from one or another officer in the Department to send out preparatory warnings, but these were resisted until the approach of war was clear. As to putting in effect part of WPL-46, a careful study of that document will show that its mechanism does not permit such a step to be taken. It would be a very complicated procedure if properly done and would require considerable study on the part of the Department and the recipient of such messages, in order that the Commanders-in-Chief could see what the Department's ideas were.

I think nothing could be clearer than to start a dispatch by saying, "This is a war warning," and indicating the enemy and his probable major movements.

[270] 83. Q. Inasmuch as you have stated that WPL-46 did not lend itself to partial execution, would it have been practicable to have declared a mobilization over certain areas, notably the Pacific west of our Pacific Coast?

A. The fact is that the Navy had been mobilized for months, so far as its internal arrangements were concerned. Additional mobilization would, I believe, have accomplished nothing valuable, particularly as the powers that accrue to the military services on the outbreak of war, regarding to seizure of property and persons and regarding the interference with civilian activities, can not be undertaken in peacetime. The organic law of the Territory of Hawaii, I understand, permits martial law to be declared or to be requested by the Governor under certain conditions. That could have been done in peace provided those conditions existed, but would have been necessarily entirely public and would have created a state of mind in the civilian population and among the civilian officers of the Government that I believe would have had serious repercussions against the military. It must be remembered that very few people really believed war with Japan was imminent. Any public declaration, such as is necessary for establishing mobilization, would have been the one sure way of insuring war, and I'm positive that had such a move been made, the Government and the military would have been most severely criticized. We do not have the mobilization system which exists in military countries, and it is my opinion that mobilization by the United States could not legally be effected until a state of war exists. WPL-43 and WPL-46 were drawn up after considerable study of the question with the idea that mobilization prior to war is not practicable for the United States.

84. Q. I show you a document which is in testimony as Exhibit 5. Were you familiar with it prior to 7 December?

A. I had read it at the time it was approved by the Navy Department during the Summer of 1941.

85. Q. Could that plan, which provides for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, have been made effective at any time during the few days prior to 7 December?

A. To a very considerable extent that plan was already in effect prior to December 7, 1941. About the only thing that was not in effect were matters relating to the commission of acts of war. The machinery for cooperation between the Army and Navy had either been set up or was in the process of setting up for some months prior to the outbreak of war. I do not believe that it would have been useful to have placed this plan in effect. Rather, I'm inclined to think that it would have confused the issue.

86. Q. If you can recall, will you please state what constituted Admiral Stark's principal preoccupation and worry during November, '41, and up to 7 December.

A. I don't believe there was any one outstanding matter, other than the imminence of war. We were in a position where the military services strongly believed that we should have been in the war against Germany some months before. We were escorting convoys in the Atlantic, patrolling against German and Italian submarines and ships.

We had troops in Iceland. There were many problems in the Atlantic which required solution and action by the Chief of Naval Operations. There was the tremendous question as to manufacture of materiel and the expansion of the Navy. We had been unable to get the [271] funds or the authority to expand the Navy as much as we believed it should have been expanded, and that feature was always near the top of Admiral Stark's thoughts. There were the situations here in the Pacific and in the Asiatic which also were considered. Admiral Stark's thoughts were all about the close approach of war, and constantly in his mind was getting our forces into as complete a state of readiness as possible. We had established in Washington, since about April 1 of 1941, a British Military Mission, which grew to large proportions. That Mission had to do both with strategic matters and with the provision of lend-lease materials to Britain and other countries. Machinery for handling such materials was in process of expansion, but all during the Fall, a good deal of Admiral Stark's time was taken with talks with the British on strategic and lend-lease matters.

87. Q. During your incumbency as head of the War Plans Division, did you engage in any negotiations which looked toward the substantiation of the principle of unity of command for the joint action method which had been agreed upon for some years?

A. That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore.

88. Q. Admiral, in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, was thought given in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the vulnerability of the Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to attack by torpedoes dropped from aircraft?

A. That apprehension existed in the Department prior to the time I went there as War Plans Officer. I had gone there from duty on a ship based in Pearl Harbor, and while here, I always felt that our ships were defenseless against such an attack, if it could be successfully made. As I recall it, the proposition of using anti-torpedo nets was put up to them out here first during the Summer of 1940. We again put it up to them in January of 1941 amongst other measures which we considered desirable for protection of the Fleet while in port. The use of anti-torpedo nets around ships in the Harbor was rejected by the authorities here in Hawaii, whether by the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, I'm not certain at this time. I'll say this, that the Bureau of Ordnance sent out a letter while that matter was under consideration stating rather categorically that, in their opinion, the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow to permit the dropping of torpedoes, and, unquestionably, that influenced the authorities here in determining not to use nets. I, personally, never accepted that opinion of the Bureau of Ordnance, because I see no reason whatsoever why torpedoes can not be made to drop in shallow water and run without a deep dive. We

now know that it can be done. That letter was changed, I think, in June, 1941, by the Bureau of Ordnance who sent then information substantially to the effect that they then believed that the Japanese had torpedoes that could be dropped from planes without diving, and it was possible to run them in thirty feet of water, as I recall the figure. Whatever the depth, it was indicated that it was possible to make successful drops of torpedoes from airplanes in Pearl Harbor. The subject of nets was then again taken up, but the manner of taking it up, I don't recall, because it was handled in another division of Operations and not [272] by War Plans. The Department was providing a good deal of anti-torpedo nets and I believe it could have been made available out here in time. The feeling, generally, in Operations, was that nets ought to be provided.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:50 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1944

TWENTY-SECOND DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-first day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 9:18 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[273] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1944

TWENTY-THIRD DAY

U. S. S. IOWA.

The examination met at 10:50 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-second day of the examination until such times as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record Page 250.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. John L. McCrea, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. IOWA.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. Until May of 1941, I was attached to the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, but was actually doing work for Admiral Stark on a variety of subjects as directed by him. I regard the work which I did for him largely as that required of an Aide. In May, 1941, I was given orders to report to Admiral Stark as Aide.

3. Q. Captain, I will ask you a rather general question, setting forth the various points upon which I believe you are able to testify. The question will not be in any way complete and you need not confine yourself to the points as set forth, which are as follows: The closeness of your association with Admiral Stark to indicate your acquaintance with the matters of major import which were in his mind; anything out of the ordinary which you recall as regards the background and the preparation of the War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46); discussions as regards probability of the location, in the Atlantic or Pacific, of the war which the plans envisaged; any discussion concerning the appropriateness of Admiral Kimmel's contributory plan WPL-46; any considerations lying behind the transfer of considerable detach-

ments from the Pacific to Atlantic Fleet in 1941; any discussions or information gained incident to our Federal Government's action in June and July in '41 which lead to freezing Japanese credits, thereby making it difficult for them to obtain important materials; any discussions as concern the participation of the Allies which WPL-46 envisaged (particularly any redistribution of the British naval forces which might affect the situation in the Pacific); any discussion or knowledge which may have been in the background of the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. Beginning about September, [274] 1941, any pertinent facts in your recollection as to the background of the various dispatches sent to the Pacific Fleet indicating the imminence of hostilities with Japan; any facts within your recollection concerning the discussions, conferences, and negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations with Japan; any discussion or opinion which you heard expressed concerning the probability of Japanese attack against us, points at which such attack might be directed, and the character of such attacks; discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters—particularly as regards the security aspect; discussions or opinions expressed incident to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Embassy; discussions concerning the use of Army troops in the outlying islands (Midway, Wake, etc.) occurring as the Japanese situation grew very tense in late November. It is in previous testimony that the Pacific Fleet received so many warnings of the imminence of hostilities that the effect was somewhat vitiated, and various witnesses have stated that in the minds of many at Pearl Harbor, it amounted to the cry of "wolf". State anything which you recall bearing upon that aspect; any discussion which you recall concerning the phrasing of those various dispatches, and whether or not consideration was given to putting certain war plans in effect wholly or in part; any discussion concerning the adequacy and correctness of WPL-46 as the tense situation grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December; include also what you can remember concerning Admiral Stark's and Admiral Ingersoll's preoccupations during the few weeks preceding the war, insofar as they seemed to you to affect those officers' mental attitudes.

A. At the outset, I should say that I have available no records from which to refresh my memory. It, therefore, must follow that my present recollection of matters, which happened some three years ago, will probably be incomplete and in error in certain details. In order that a more complete understanding may be had of my relationship with Admiral Stark during the critical pre-Pearl Harbor days, I believe it in order to state the nature of this relationship. I reported for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in October, 1940. I was assigned to the War Plans Division for purposes of record, but to do special jobs for Admiral Stark. In general, my work consisted in assembling for the Admiral, in brief form, reports on matters he had under advisement. My job carried me into all the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department where my contacts were generally on a personal basis. Where cognizance overlapped between Bureaus or Offices, I endeavored to get the composite picture. I attended all of Admiral Stark's formal conferences and many of his

informal ones. On the other hand, he held many conferences with officials and officers in the Navy Department and with officers of the War Department which I did not attend. About the middle of November, 1940, Admiral Stark informed me that he was going to send me to Manila to take out to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, the revised War Plans which were then being prepared in the War Plans Division. I was told that I would also deliver a copy of the same plan to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Admiral Stark directed that I keep in close contact with Vice Admiral (then Captain) Turner (who had reported for duty as Director of War Plans about the middle of October, 1940), in order that I would be familiar with the background and considerations upon which these plans were based. This I did. In late November or early December, Captain (then Commander) V. R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, arrived in Washington in connection with his official duties. As the revised plans (I think this plan was officially known as Rainbow 3, and I shall refer to it as such hereinafter) were nearing completion, a number of conferences were held by Vice Admiral Turner which were [275] attended by both Captain Murphy and myself. Free and open discussion was held and "background" notes were made by me in the hopes that I might be able to anticipate questions that might be put to me by Admiral Hart upon delivering the plans to him. Captain Murphy's presence at these conferences on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, relieved me of any responsibility with regard to that officer. On 13 December 1940, I left Washington with copies of Rainbow 3 for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. I fell in with Captain Murphy in San Pedro and proceeded by air to Pearl Harbor where I was under orders to report to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for temporary duty. I continued my trip, leaving Pearl Harbor 1 January 1941, arriving Manila 6 January. Almost daily discussions were held with Admiral Hart and his Staff during the next ten days in connection with these plans. I was delayed in Manila awaiting the return of Rear Admiral (then Captain) Purnell from Batavia where he had gone to confer with the Dutch, in order that I might take back to Washington with me the results of his conferences. At Admiral Stark's direction, while in Manila I called on the U. S. High Commissioner, Francis B. Sayre, and General Douglas MacArthur. I acquainted these officials with Admiral Stark's anxiety about the Far East. They, in turn, discussed with complete frankness their own views on the situation. Briefly, the High Commissioner was optimistic and hopeful that hostilities could be avoided. General MacArthur thought war "inevitable". I left Manila about 18 January 1941, arriving in Pearl Harbor a few days later where I reported to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Admiral Richardson). Prior to my departure from Manila, I received a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing that I contact Admiral Richardson's prospective relief, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel. I had made many notes while in the East with reference to conditions, personalities, situations, views, etc., etc., and I discussed these matters at a conference, as I recall it now, attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson, Rear Admiral Kimmel, Rear Admiral S. A. Taffinder, Captain W. W. Smith, Captain W. S. De-

Lany, and Commander Murphy. After this conference, Admiral Richardson gave me certain items which he wished me to take up with Admiral Stark. Admiral Kimmel did likewise. Upon my return to Washington, I told Admiral Stark of the shape my notes were in and told him that I would prepare a formal report on the subject of my trip. He directed that I not prepare a formal report but to submit my notes to him informally. This was done. I have a copy of that report among my personal papers at my home in Washington. One item stands out in my mind with reference to my second visit to Pearl Harbor. The day I left Pearl Harbor, I was in a boat with Rear Admiral Kimmel. He directed that I take out my notebook and record substantially as follows: "Tell Admiral Stark that the Army must realize the shortcomings of the air defenses of Pearl Harbor and get busy and do something about them. Tell Admiral Stark further that I'm not going to get obsessed too much with any one item. Everything indicates that the Army and I will get along well together, but we have not yet gotten down to cases, but, in any event, I repeat they must strengthen the air defenses of Pearl Harbor. I expect to take up with the Army the cooperation of Army and Naval aircraft. I want the Army to feel free to use our fields and I would like to have our land-based planes get experience in using the Army facilities." After the attack on Pearl Harbor, I recalled the vigor with which Admiral Kimmel had remarked to me about the inadequacy of the Army's air defenses of Pearl Harbor that day in January, 1941. After my return to Washington, I continued to work on special projects for Admiral Stark. From time to time the Admiral complained that my office was too far distant from him and that he wanted me more available to him. Rearrangement was finally made of office space and in [276] May I was moved up to the "front office." At the same time, I was issued orders by the Bureau of Navigation to report to Admiral Stark for duty as Aide. There was no appreciable difference between the duties that I performed as Aide to Admiral Stark and the ones that I had been performing under my previous set of orders. Among the many things which I did for Admiral Stark, I prepared rough drafts of answers to personal mail which he received from officers in the field, particularly from Admirals Hart and Kimmel. These officers, being at a distance, wrote rather frequently to Admiral Stark. Many of the items which they mentioned in their letters required that contact be made with the various Bureaus and Offices in the Navy Department. This I did. The drafts of the answers to these letters were always placed in Admiral Stark's hands for revision as he thought necessary. These letters took in a wide range of subjects, the general tenor of which had to do with the preparation of the respective Fleets for war. After Admiral Stark had finished revising the drafts of the letters I had prepared for him, they would be put in smooth form and returned to the Admiral for signature. Upon their return to me for mailing, I invariably noticed that he had included something in the way of a postscript to the effect that "Time is short.", "War may come tomorrow or it may not come for months.", "No one knows when the blow will come or from what direction.", etc., etc. Naturally, certain events occurring in the Summer of 1941, of interest to the office, fix themselves in my mind more clearly than do others. Among them, the GREER incident, which

took place, as I recall it, in early September. There had been sinkings of our merchant ships in the Atlantic, notably the ROBIN MOOR, and ships under Panamanian registry in which operators in this country had an interest. The building program was under almost daily discussion. The Congress was demanding a report from the Navy Department on the GREER incident. Everything possible was being done to put Midway and Wake into operation as effectual staging points for our aircraft to the Far East. Reinforcements and materials were being sent to the Far East. Harbor improvements were undertaken in Guam. The Marines were withdrawn from Shanghai. We were trying to get authority from the Congress to arm the merchant ships. Aid to Great Britain and Russia was under study, etc., etc. The Cabinet change in Japan, which occurred about the middle of October, 1941, created very much of a stir in the office. Everyone sensed that war was not far off. I recall that following that change, a dispatch was sent to the various Fleet Commanders to the effect that the Cabinet changes pointed the fact that war with Japan was a definite possibility. As I recall it, Mr. Kurusu arrived in Washington early in November, 1941, ostensibly on a peace mission. It was known, however, to us that the Japanese were pressing to the southward along the Asiatic mainland. It seemed only a matter of a short time until Japan would be in a position to strike at the Kra Peninsula. Negotiations in Washington with Japan's diplomatic representatives were gradually breaking down. On 27 November 1941, a dispatch was sent to all Fleet Commanders which opened up with a statement more or less reading as follows: "This is a war warning." The dispatch then went on to state that while war might be expected at any point, it seemed more probable that it would take place in an attack on the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula. An earlier dispatch had mentioned Guam as a possible point of attack by Japan. There was discussion, as I recall it, as to whether or not the opening sentence, set forth above, should be included in this dispatch. I recall that Vice Admiral Turner was firmly of the opinion that it should be included; that he felt that the seriousness of the situation warranted this language. To this, Admiral Stark agreed. The wording of that dispatch left a profound impression with me, because I [277] remember the thought flashing across my mind that it was a strong statement to make; that it went the whole way, and that if nothing eventuated, confidence in the Navy Department's estimate in future matters might suffer in consequence. I further recall that when the attack on Pearl Harbor did occur, I felt how correctly Vice Admiral Turner had interpreted events and that his foresight had been of a particularly high order. Three or four days before Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, another dispatch was sent from the Navy Department to the Fleet Commanders to the effect that Japanese diplomatic officials in London, Manila, Hong Kong, etc., had been given orders to destroy all their codes and secret papers. With that, everyone in the office felt that war was a matter of a few days. I have given the above background in order that it may be available in evaluating the answers which I shall give with reference to the questions just put to me. I feel that my relations with Admiral Stark during the period in question were reasonably close. We discussed, from time to time, in the office, in his home, and

elsewhere, the proximity of war. I retain the impression that during the Summer and Fall of 1941, he felt war was "just around the corner". I also retain the impression that he was doing everything in his power to push all matters having to do with getting the Navy ready for war. The hurrying of new construction ships, planes, etc., came under his particular scrutiny. Turning now to specific answers to the questions put: (a) I do not recall the background and the preparation of the War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46). It must be remembered that I was not then attached to the War Plans Division, and that any knowledge that I might have of such a plan would be only incidental. (b) I know of no discussion concerning the appropriateness of Admiral Kimmel's Contributory Plan, WPL-46. (c) I do not recall any discussions concerning the participations of the Allies which WPL-46 envisaged with reference to the redistribution of British naval forces which might affect the situation in the Pacific. (d) I recall no discussions concerning the adequacy and correctness of WPL-46 as the tension grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December 1941. (e) I do not recall details of discussions with relation to the transfer of detachments from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet in 1941, although I do know such discussions were held. (f) I do not recall any discussions or information incident to the Federal Government's action during the summer of 1941 which led to the freezing of Japanese credits. (g) I do not have any knowledge as to the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. I do know, however, that those matters were under discussion from time to time. (h) I do not have direct knowledge of any discussions, conferences, or negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations with Japan. Such conversations would come under the purview of the Central Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. (i) I do not recall any discussions or opinions expressed concerning the probability of a Japanese attack on us or the point of attack. I might add that I think that most naval officers thought that war with Japan, if and when it came, would come without formal declaration and very little notice. I retain the impression that the general thought was that Japan would strike either in Guam, the Philippines, or the Kra Peninsula. (j) I do not recall any discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters, particularly as regards the security aspect. (k) I do not recall any discussions or opinion expressed as to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Embassy. (l) I do not recall any discussions concerning the use of Army troops in the outlying islands (Midway, Wake, etc.) as the situation grew tense in late November. (NOTE: The fact that I do not recall the discussions referred to above does not in any way preclude their having taken place. On the contrary, [278] I know that Admiral Stark was in daily contact with those under whose jurisdiction such discussions would naturally come.) (m) As I look back on it now, I do not believe that so many warnings were issued to the Fleet that these warnings could be regarded as the cry of "wolf". It seems to me that matters got progressively worse during the Summer and Fall of 1941, and that warnings were issued accordingly. I am not insensible, however, to a confused state of opinion that appeared in the public press

from day to day. As a naval officer, I am also not insensible to the fact that "standing by" is very difficult. If officers in the Fleet got the impression that "wolf" was being cried and that the number of warnings being sent were too numerous, the thought I have in the matter is that those in the Navy Department whose job it was to evaluate the situation thought things were rapidly and progressively approaching a serious state. This proved to be the case. (n) As I look back at it now, the entire year of 1941 was devoted wholeheartedly by everyone in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with whom I came in contact to getting ready for war. Everyone seemed to feel that war was in the immediate offing; that there was little that could be done to stop it. On the other hand, everyone was hopeful that in some manner war could be avoided. By the Fall of 1941, while our position with respect to Japan was growing more tense, it must be remembered that no warlike actions had been taken by Japan against us in the Pacific, whereas in the Atlantic our merchant ships were being sunk and relations with Germany were rapidly approaching the breaking point. In other words, the Atlantic problem was already with us. (o) I do not recall that Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Ingersoll were preoccupied with any matters aside from those in hand during the few weeks preceding the war. Because of the nature of my duties, I came in closer contact with Admiral Stark than I did with Rear Admiral Ingersoll. However, it is my distinct impression that both of these officers felt that war with Japan and Germany was only a matter of a short time. I retain the decided impression that in the year preceding Pearl Harbor, both of these officers were doing their utmost to strengthen the naval service in every respect against the day when war would become a reality.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:45 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.



[279] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SUNDAY, APRIL 9, 1944

TWENTY-FOURTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER AIRCRAFT
SOUTHERN PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 9 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record Page 250.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Commander Third Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force.

2. Q. Admiral, will you please state the duties you performed during the calendar year 1941.

A. From January 1 to January 30, I was Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and of the Scouting Force. From January 30 to September 26, I was in command of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI. From October 15, I think, until the conclusion of the year, I was director of Naval Intelligence.

3. Q. What were your relations with the Chief of Naval Operations during the time that you were Director of Naval Intelligence?

A. I was head of the Division of Naval Intelligence which was under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. Q. Admiral, this examination is endeavoring to get all testimony available with respect to matters pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Testimony covering radio and other combat intelligence has been obtained, but very little has been recorded concerning matters coming under your cognizance as Director of Naval Intelligence. It is expected that the local situation in Hawaii will be covered by the then District Intelligence Officer and possibly others.

Admiral Kingman is also expected to testify. Will you please state any matters of which you have knowledge and which you believe should be recorded and preserved as pertinent to the attack.

A. At the risk of mentioning basic and earlier matters which might not be pertinent, I should like to sketch out the organization of Naval Intelligence, [280] its relationships within the Department, its activities both in the foreign field and in the domestic field as applicable to the Japanese phase, and the actual events, which, to my recollection, occurred. When I assumed duties as Director of Naval Intelligence, I found that the organization of that office, under the Chief of Naval Operations, was divided into three main branches, with certain subsidiary branches: The Foreign Branch, the Domestic Branch, and the Administrative Branch. The Foreign Branch was headed by Captain W. A. Heard. Within that Branch was the Far East Section headed by Captain A. H. McCollum, assisted by Commander E. Watts and Colonel R. A. Boone of the Marine Corps (all present ranks). Boone now is Intelligence Officer for ComSoPac. Watts is Executive Officer of the APPLACHIAN. McCollum and Watts were Japanese experts by virtue of duty there and subsequent assignment; and Boone was a specialist on China. In the Domestic Intelligence, Captain Kingman—then Captain Waller, date of relief about December 15, I believe, so that Kingman was in charge up to December 7. That contained one division which covered foreign suspects and members of suspected societies, whether foreign or native. Commander Hartwell C. Davis, now Intelligence Officer of the Thirteenth Naval District, was a Japanese expert and was in charge of the Japanese Section. Reverting now to the Foreign Intelligence activities; at the time of my taking over or shortly thereafter, the Japanese-American conversations which had been held intermittently since the preceding Spring, were reopened. A book of radio intelligence was shown to the State Department, the White House, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of War Plans, and the Secretary of Navy, daily or skipping a day if nothing pertinent was at hand. Other sources applicable to Japanese intelligence were the Naval Attaché information, reports of the naval observers, a consul form of Naval Attaché radio direction finder reports, and contacts which the Domestic Branch thought might be of interest to the Foreign Branch in order to complete the picture of Japanese activities. Such information as we obtained, beyond that radio intelligence distribution I have just mentioned, of the nature of basic or static information, was compiled by Naval Intelligence and issued to a wide circulation, including Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, and in general Flag Officers, as well as to the offices in the Department interested. This information was contained in the monograph on Japan, which was revised from time to time, in papers describing the organization of the Japanese Fleet and Air Force as discovered by observers, notes which were all too inadequate, however, in view of the strict secrecy maintained by the Japanese general O. N. I. reports from Naval Attachés with respect to fortifications, trade connections, and so on, and the characteristics of principal naval officers, as information of their appointment was received and insofar as we had data on them. This basic information was circulated by means of a mechanism set up and functioning for some years. There was

not, however, any mechanism established nor effective for the dissemination of information of the type of combat intelligence, which is to say, the immediate movement of enemy ships, fleets, and forces. I had been concerned for some time, during my tours of sea duty and my regular line contact with intelligence requirements, although I had never in any sense been under the Office of Naval Intelligence, with the lack of organization, both in the Fleet and in the Navy Department, for combat intelligence. This would be, I thought, particularly important in time of war and it was one of my concerns when I became Director of Intelligence, to endeavor to improve that or the framework of it, so as to be better prepared in the Fleet and ashore for the collection and dissemination and analysis of combat intelligence. Such combat intelligence as we received, by means of flash reports and direction finder and otherwise, was compiled and analyzed, but it was not a function of the organization of Naval [281] Intelligence to disseminate this information to the Fleet, but rather to report it to the departmental agencies for such analyses as they cared to make, and for dissemination by them. In pursuance of this, for some months prior to December 7, and, in fact, I think, prior to my arrival, the Japanese Section had prepared, daily, an analysis of the situation of Japanese-American relations and of the movement of Japanese forces insofar as we were aware of them. These daily situation reports were held very secret and their circulation was limited to Chief of Naval Operations and Director of War Plans, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the head of the Foreign Branch. They were compiled by Commander Watts and checked and issued by Captain McCollum.

NOTE: The examining officer has identified the memoranda mentioned by the witness as being ones now on file in the Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department. The series of memoranda, titled "Japanese Fleet Locations", are classified "Secret" and the file presently available indicates that said memoranda were issued approximately once a week, rather than daily. The series of memoranda titled "United States-Japanese Negotiations" are classified "Secret", are addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, and were issued almost every date. The last of this series bears date of 24 October 1941. The examining officer is advised by officers then on duty in the Far Eastern Section that the written memoranda on this subject were discontinued on 24 October 1941, and that between that date and 7 December 1941, this subject was covered by an oral report each morning by Captain McCollum, the Chief of the Section, to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who, in turn, reported the information orally to the Chief of Naval Operations.

A. (Continued) I had found that there was a policy in the Department extending, I understood, from War College practices, that Intelligence was responsible only for the collection of information and the supply of data to the operational agencies and was not required to develop, as I believe is the Army practice, the estimate of the situation from the enemy point of view. I felt that the Naval Intelligence, with its experienced personnel in the various fields, could clearly contribute something in an analysis of the enemy or of prospective

enemy intentions; and I consulted Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, who confirmed the Navy practice that Intelligence would supply the data but that the Operational side, and particularly war plans, should make the analysis of enemy intentions. I said, however, that with his permission I would have such an analysis prepared from day to day and periodically summed up, say weekly, and submit it along with our daily situation for such value as might be ascribed to it or derived from it by the Operational agencies. With respect to the relationship of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, contact was usually through the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, but there was every access to the Chief of Operations himself, and, on occasions, when news of importance appeared, particularly toward the end of the period prior to December 7, Captain McCollum would go direct with me, if I were at hand, or alone if not, to Admiral Stark and tell him what news he had and what conclusions he had reached. There was no scheduled conference with the Chief of Naval Operations in which I, as Director of Naval Intelligence, sat, but I had every access to him. I recall at least two occasions, presumably at the end of November and early December, when the information that I brought down as described, along with Captain McCollum, interested the Chief of Operations to the extent of calling in some of his principal subordinates, [282] such as Rear Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps the Director of Communications, to hear the news, and, in brief, to discuss its implications, but I do not recall that at those or any other meetings which I attended, there was discussion of measures to be taken or information to be sent out. On the latter point, however, I may mention, at the risk of momentarily going too far ahead chronologically, that early on the morning of December 7, at such a meeting as I have described, Admiral Stark decided at once as to information which should be sent to Pearl Harbor and departed to consult with General Marshall. Returning to the narrative of events as seen from the Office of Naval Intelligence viewpoint, we had of course followed the development of the very critical stage of the negotiations as evidenced by our information from the State Department and otherwise of diplomatic notes which had been exchanged. We noted a stalemate apparently between the Japanese and American viewpoints; Kurusu's arrival in mid-November, I believe; the United States' statement of policy about November 25; and we learned later, although I do not know that we were specifically informed, as to the war warning which was sent out to the Fleet in late November. With regard to the information we had of the development of the crisis, aside from these dispatches, we had noted the Japanese agreement with Indo-China for the introduction of a minimum of troops; we had noted the apparent violation of that agreement by the introduction of many more troops, and their apparent movement toward the China border, and had concluded that Japan was about to attack China from the South. Later, we had news of the sighting of a transport convoy just off the Central Chinese Coast, the evidence of movements into lower Indo-China, the lack of evidence of enemy movement in the vicinity of the Philippines, reports of the concentration of transport troops in Camranks Bay, indications of the radio silence of some, if not all, of the main Fleet, and the consequent doubt as to their location. We had

come to the conclusion that the occupation of southwestern coast of Indo-China, Kampot, and possibly Bangkok, or lower Siam on the Malay Peninsula, was the immediate objective of the Japanese. I had understood, from a source which I do not recall, that there was a tentative agreement that the American and British would consider any movement beyond certain geographical limits in Southeast Asia as a *casus belli* for England and as a matter of grave concern for the United States. These limits, as I recall, were 100 degrees longitude and 10 degrees North latitude. At that time, in our fortnightly summary of international news, issue of December 1, which was intended rather as current information than as specific war warnings, since that was the function of the operational side of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, we had put in a note to the following effect: "Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and Northern China coast ports headed South, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the South appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. The equipment being carried South is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable number. Activity in the Mandates under naval control consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with [283] yard workmen, engineers, etc." This bulletin was sent, in the same manner as the basic reports I have mentioned, to a fairly wide distribution, including all Flag Officers Afloat. It was sent out by air mail December 1. I do not know the actual date of its receipt in distant portions of the Fleet, and I do not recall that I checked. It was intended, as I stated, as a compendium of current intelligence information. Either this specific text, or the information contained in it, was discussed with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, either individually or both together, I forget. I believe, however, together, in Admiral Stark's office. Admiral Turner was of the opinion, although there were no specific evidences, that the Japanese would launch an attack on the Philippines coincident with or shortly thereafter their indicated activities to the southward. I did not draw a direct conclusion to that effect but believed it possible. Admiral Turner's opinion was obviously correct. This item was the product of Captain McCollum and the Japanese Section and was included in the entire bulletin, which covered other items of current naval interest. I believe that a full set of the daily situation reports as rendered to the offices I mentioned, plus of course a file of the bi-weekly

bulletins, will be available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and if not in the general files the bulletins can be located in the Japanese Section. In the latter days, we received several reports of evidences of Japanese burning codes in Hawaii, notably, and also, as I recall, in Southeast Asia. We had some indication that instructions had been sent out to Japanese official agencies in Allied capitols and ports to destroy their codes. We presumed that this related to diplomatic codes and indicated the imminent severance of diplomatic relations, with the possible reaction of the seizure of the physical properties of the Japanese posts in the Allied countries. Mindful that there might be further implications of possible offensive action coincident with or following the breakage of diplomatic relations, we prepared a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the Naval Districts at Hawaii and the Philippines, stating that such instructions had been given Japanese agencies. This dispatch was referred to and released by Admiral Ingersoll on December 3. This actual intention was followed by physical evidences, such as I have mentioned, of unusual smoke from one or more Japanese agencies, particularly at that in Honolulu.

5. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Can you identify this dispatch?

A. I remember this dispatch as the one I just mentioned.

6. Q. Will you please proceed, sir.

A. Returning now to the question of domestic intelligence, our office in the section devoted to foreign nationalities—I think we called it the “Counter-Espionage Section”—attempted to develop charts indicating the ramifications of all seditious organizations and societies, whether foreign-born, of foreign extraction, or even purely American. Perhaps the organization of the Domestic Branch might be mentioned here. In each Naval District, there was a District Intelligence Officer, who was defined as an Aide on the Staff of the Commandant of the District. His administrative control was vested in the Office of Naval Intelligence and his civilian employees were paid through that office, but his command relationships were direct to the Commandant of the District, and, in fact, some District Commandants objected to anything in the nature of instructions emanating from the Office of Naval Intelligence to these District Intelligence Offices. However, these objections did not seriously impair our functions of using these District Intelligence Offices and their organizations of assisting officers and so-called [284] “agents”—really a higher type of detective—in collecting and reporting a vast amount of information on these societies, their activities, the principal and subordinate members, and on the general foreign population as a whole. This, of course, paralleled the Army and F. B. I. organizations, each of which had District offices reporting in to the Central Office. By informal agreement, the major load of Japanese supervision was accorded to the Navy because of our long interest in that field; the then belligerent nationalities to the Army; and subversive American organizations, such as the Communist Party was then thought to be, in the province of F. B. I. There was, however, a constant interchange and close relationship between all three organizations and the data obtained by any was made available to all. In addition, there was a weekly meeting, inspired by Presidential instructions, between Mr. Hoover, General Miles, then

head of M. I. D., and myself, at which we discussed relationships between the several investigatory services and any conflicts of jurisdictional practice that might arise, as well as measures of cooperation both in head offices and in local offices. I mention this conference because I shall allude to it later. The collection of all this data was intended to facilitate laying hands on and sequestering the suspicious characters at such time as the President might declare an emergency or might authorize that action. We understood, from inquiries of Mr. Hoover at these conferences, that the Attorney General, whether on instructions from the President, or not, would not permit any arrests on suspicion, even of aliens, unless authorized by the President, since it was understood to be against the law. In consequence, we ticketed our suspects in three classes, designated by colored cards, which facilitated ready reference in case of need. One type were those actually dangerous; one potentially dangerous; and a third were those suspected but not definitely belonging to either the first two classes. We endeavored to keep a running record of the location of these individuals so that progressively, from the most dangerous class on, we might, if and when authorized, take them into custody. This actual taking into custody was to be performed, and was subsequently performed rapidly and efficiently after December 7, by the F. B. I. and Federal civil authorities, with the assistance as required of the Naval and Military Intelligence Officers, but the civil officials would make the actual arrests and would retain custody of those taken until further arrangements might be made. Among the District Intelligence Officers, there were two whose field was particularly concerned with the Japanese: Commander Ringle, who is now Chief of Staff Officer to Rear Admiral Ainsworth over in Purvis Bay, Assistant District Intelligence Officer at San Pedro, for the West Coast and for Hawaii, Captain Mayfield. The principal Japanese population of the United States was located on the West Coast and Hawaii. A large number of cards of the three classes were at hand as to suspects in these territories. My recollection of the West Coast is entirely indefinite. Of Hawaii, I roughly recall from 300 to 500 in the dangerous class; some 500 in the potentially dangerous; and 2,000 in the general suspect, although Captain Mayfield can check this. Among the dangerous class were the quasi-consuls, who were not fully accredited as such, to my recollection, but had some semi-diplomatic status as assistants to the Consul in Honolulu. Their status was somewhat different from the normal civilian, whether alien or American, in that they were actually agents of foreign governments and hence required, under a recent law, to register, under penalty of criminal prosecution. The District Intelligence Officer, in connection with the local F. B. I. and civil authorities, was greatly concerned with the activities of these quasi-Consuls and recommended to the Commandant that they be prosecuted for failure to comply with the law cited. [285] In November, the Commandant, taking up this recommendation from the District Intelligence Officer, which was made to him rather than to the Office of Intelligence, as it was a matter of command relationship, recommended to the Department, that these men be immediately prosecuted, but that he understood that despite a similar recommendation of the District Attorney, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had urged the War Department

that their prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and Americans. Admiral Bloch, the Commandant, said that he understood that the Department of Justice had directed the District Attorney not to prosecute the cases, presumably because of the War Department. We were not too happy about this situation and pursued it by further inquiry and finally drafted a letter, which was dispatched by Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Bloch on December 6, stating that the Secretary of War had recommended that these agents should be warned to register and should be given a limited time to do so on penalty of prosecution on failure. The War Department suggested approximately one month as such a time, on the recommendation of the Commanding General of Hawaiian Department "because of the latter's campaign to enlist the loyalty of persons of Japanese parentage". This letter notes that "further investigation is being made to determine what action has been taken by the Department of Justice on this recommendation of the War Department". Obviously the next day the situation became such as to permit the immediate arrest of all these agents, as well as other suspects. This letter was drafted in the Domestic Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence by Commander Hartwell Davis, to whom I have referred, and his information was obtained through his contacts with the F. B. I. who are under the Department of Justice, who could, and doubtless did, disclose the precise status of the matter at that time. During this critical period, we understood, whether by formal instructions or otherwise, that the State Department and the President were desirous of maintaining cordial relations with the Japanese insofar as practicable and not to give rise to any incident which might impair the success of the current negotiations. Aside from actual arrests of suspects, there were, however, some counter-espionage measures which could be and were taken by the intelligence forces under the District Intelligence Offices, such as limitation of the activities of fishing boats, inspection of radios, a constant observation of dangerous suspects, and of society meetings, with a view to counteract any activities, whether sabotage or otherwise, that might be indicated. There was some fear, how well based I do not recall, that public and particularly naval installations on the West Coast and in Hawaii might be damaged by concerted sabotage at a prearranged signal or time, and particular attention was paid at meetings and by information obtained by agents in conversation and otherwise to detect and counter any such moves. I do not recall that any large scale sabotage organization or plan was ever developed. There were, however, very serious limitations upon our activities. We were not allowed to censor the mail nor were we allowed to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents. The District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had sought, both from the Commandant and from United States authority, to obtain copies of such dispatches from the local cable companies, but had been advised by the District Attorney, on instructions, I understand, from Washington, that the law did not permit interference even by Federal authorities with the confidential nature of messages entrusted to common communication carriers. There had been for some time a censorship agreement within the Army and Navy Departments wherein, on emergency when authorized by the President or in war, the censorship of communications outside the limits of the United States would be

divided, in that the Army would censor all mail and the Navy would censor land lines, radio, and cable. Internal land wire was to be the [286] province of the Army and internal mails were not, as I recall, to be censored until later developments might require it. A skeleton organization was erected in both Departments, that in the Navy Department being under Naval Intelligence, with a view to their being able to function at the drop of a hat, and to continue under military control until such time as a Director of Censorship was appointed by the President. This preliminary organization was considerably hampered by difficulties in obtaining funds for offices and telephones and civilian assistants, and by the difficulty of securing sufficient Navy personnel, whether reserve officers or enlisted, in order to build up a nucleus. At any rate, there was no authority for its functioning before December 7, and perhaps the organization is not pertinent. Despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Offices in Hawaii had arranged to tap the long-distance telephone and kept a record of the radio telephone conversations with Japan. As I recall, however, it was only in the last few days before December 7 that this was done. In general, the conversations appeared innocuous and were from civilian sources to supposedly civilian recipients in Japan. There was one very suspicious telephone conversation, however, on the afternoon of December 6, from a doctor in Hawaii to his nephew in Japan, or vice versa, concerning vegetation in Hawaii, mentioning different sorts of flowers and trees, the weather, and mentioning numbers of certain plants, as I recall. This conversation, after translation, was placed on the wire in Hawaii that night but was not received in Naval Intelligence until later on December 7, after the actual attack had occurred. This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct. With regard to the internal organization of the Intelligence organization as the crisis developed, the normal peacetime routine was the maintenance of a twenty-four hour watch in the Domestic Branch and one in the Foreign Branch, in order that inquiries might be looked up and taken care of and, more particularly, any emergencies arising could be handled immediately, either by contact with other agencies or by notifying me or the Assistant Director, and likewise notifying the watch officer of the Chief of Naval Operations and operational agencies. Some two weeks or ten days before December 7, however, I posted a special twenty-four hour watch in the Japanese Section alone, as well as the one covering the whole Foreign Branch, and, shortly before December 7, set up a watch of the heads of the three Branches and the Assistant Director to be in the office throughout the twenty-four hours, although it was a "sleeping watch." In case of any information received in the Navy Department from Naval Attaches or observers, or elsewhere, it was normally routed by the Communication Division to both the Naval Operations watch officer and to our watch officer, but the latter always

checked with the Operations watch officer to make sure that he had received the same information that was then available to O. N. I. On more important matters, when I was called, I indicated what action appeared desirable at the moment and also inquired whether the message had been reported to Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark, directing our watch officers not only to make sure that CNO watch officer had it but that it had actually been transmitted by the latter. On occasion, but rarely, and I do not recall specific incidents, I called up Admiral Ingersoll myself and, once or twice I believe, Admiral Stark, but in general the liaison in the lower levels appeared adequate.

[287] 7. Q. Admiral, would you please develop your statement further to cover information available to the Office of Naval Intelligence with respect to the efficiency and capabilities of the Japanese Naval Air Force, covering also information which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and other Commanders in this respect.

A. My recollection is very indefinite. I know that we were aware of the number of Japanese carriers and of the general plane-carrying capacity and characteristics of these ships, and of the general organization of the Japanese air force. I do not recall any specific issue to the Navy nor the recipients thereof on this subject, but I presume that in accordance with the mechanism I have outlined, such information as we obtained was included in the original monograph and subsequently supplied from time to time in the form of the briefs of Naval Attaches' reports and the individual papers which were distributed to the principal commands, including the Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleets. These reports were fragmentary, and perhaps might not have received the attention of a well digested summary brought up to date, which, from time to time, were issued on various subjects. But of the last such summary of Japanese air in general or naval air in particular, I have no recollection. It no doubt can be located in the Japanese Section of the Foreign Branch and in the General Files of O. N. I.

8. Q. Admiral, did your information include the status of training and the preparedness for war of the Japanese naval air force?

A. Very roughly, because of the secrecy of the Japanese training operations and general preparedness.

9. Q. Had any evaluation of this material been made so as to bring out the capabilities of the Japanese naval air force to conduct such an attack as they did conduct on the 7th of December, 1941?

A. I don't know that any specific evaluation of their capabilities had been done although it was well within the concept of any naval officer that carriers and carrier aircraft, if permitted to come within aircraft range, could conduct such an attack. We had, somewhat unwisely, in our general thoughts as naval officers and not as my job as Director of Naval Intelligence, conceived that the aircraft searches made out of Pearl Harbor would be adequate to detect any carrier force before they could achieve a raiding position. Very probably the mere detection of this carrier force would not result in an attack upon it until further decisions were made in Washington, but precautionary measures in the Hawaiian Islands could be taken. Answering your question specifically, I do not know that any definite analysis of the number of planes which might attack Pearl Harbor

or the number of carriers which might participate in such a raid was made.

10. Q. Admiral, do you recall if you, personally, were greatly surprised over the form and power of the surprise attack which did occur on 7 December, when you first heard of it?

A. My recollection is that I was astounded that an attack had gotten in undetected, whether by picking up the ships or by intercepting the planes, by search operations from Pearl Harbor, and I was amazed at the results of the attack, but I do not recall that I was surprised that an attack in such force *could* be made by a Navy of the type that we know the Japs to have. The subsequent information as to the nicety of planning and execution of the air attack surprised me, although I appreciated that with the open avenues for communication I've mentioned, espionage as to our Fleet movements were simple, but I had not appreciated the thoroughness of the Japanese naval planning evidenced.

[288] 11. Q. But do I understand you correctly as not being surprised over the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid?

A. No, sir. I was surprised in the fact of the raid itself but not in the force of the raid as it developed. I was surprised that the Japanese dared to come within presumably certain interception range of our Fleet and over Hawaii-based airplanes, because I fancied that they would expect to be picked up and challenged either before or after the attack, and would be destroyed or suffer severe losses.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer introduced W. A. Steveley, Chief Yeoman (Acting Appointment), U. S. Navy, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Aubrey W. Fitch, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force.

2. Q. Were you Vice Admiral Bellinger's predecessor in command of Patrol Wing Two?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Between about what dates were you based in Pearl Harbor in that capacity?

A. In early June, 1940, I relieved Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol, in command of Patrol Wing Two, then based at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor. I remained in command of Patrol Wing Two until relieved by Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger in late October, 1940.

4. Q. During that period, did it occur to you that the patrol planes of your command might be called upon to assist, through air reconnaissance, the forces regularly assigned for the defense of Oahu?

A. Yes, sir. I can best bring that out by describing, briefly, what I considered my duties in administering the command that I had at that time. During the Summer and early Fall of 1940, the training of the Wing and our efforts toward the development of the bases at Keehi Lagoon, Kaneohe, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton, were directed primarily towards the perfecting of methods for using patrol planes to give early warning of the approach of Japanese forces to Oahu. It was easily demonstrated that with any number of planes that would probably be made available to us, no adequate warning of [289] the approach of a high speed force could be guaranteed from Oahu bases. Therefore, the efforts of all of us were devoted to: (a) Increasing the war effectiveness and endurance of available material and crews; (b) The development of Western island bases and the formulation of plans for their use to provide distant searches in conjunction with planes based at Dutch Harbor; (c) Efforts to obtain a material increase in the size of the Patrol Wing in Hawaii. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine from Pearl Harbor. The search Plans and Orders used were changed at rather frequent intervals by higher authorities. All of these plans were necessarily unsatisfactory compromises, primarily because the personnel, material and bases available were inadequate to provide protection for all possible contingencies. At least partly as a result of this condition, the searches ordered in 1940 varied from short periods of maximum effort to times when the only search consisted of short dawn anti-submarine sweeps in areas where Fleet units expected to operate.

5. Q. Admiral, a hypothetical question based upon not only your aforesaid experience in Hawaiian waters but your very long experience with patrol planes, particularly for reconnaissance purposes: We will say eighty long-range planes available and employed to the limit of endurance of material and personnel over, say, a two weeks period; give me your estimate of the chances which such reconnaissance from Oahu would have had of detecting the attack made by the Japanese of 7 December.

A. We, at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, figured that approximately double that number of planes would be necessary to maintain, for more or less extended periods, an effective search. With eighty planes available whose performance equals or betters the Catalina, under the conditions stated, and searching only the most probable sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be reasonably expected to be fifty per cent effective in detecting an enemy attack.

6. Q. Admiral, I am aware that in the few weeks preceding 7 December 1941 you were actually stationed at San Diego. While there, and at any time from August, 1941, onward, did it occur to you that there was any great probability or even possibility that the Japanese would venture their carriers in a surprise raid upon Oahu?

A. During the time that I was in command of Patrol Wing Two, that is, from early June, 1940, until late October, 1940, the efforts of the Wing were directed toward being as ready as possible for any possible contingency. Since the only potential enemy in the Pacific was Japan, the general possibility of Japanese attack was naturally the background for this work. At that time, it appeared possible but not immediately probable. In direct answer to the question, in the period

from November, 1940, until immediately before the Japanese attack on Pearl, I was in command of Carrier Division One, based at San Diego, and during this time was concerned primarily with an intensified training program. I do not remember of any occurrence or instance which required an expression of opinion on my part as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese air attack on Hawaii. However, I still felt, knowing what was in the process of development as far as air was concerned in the Hawaiian Islands, that a surprise attack was possible, but I still did not think it probable.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of [290] the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. George VanDeurs; Captain, U. S. Navy; Chief of Staff, Commander Aircraft, South Pacific.

2. Q. Captain, will you please state the duties performed by you in Hawaiian waters during your tour of duty there which preceded 7 December 1941.

A. I commanded a patrol squadron in Patrol Wing Two from June, 1939, until August, 1941. In addition, I performed various additional duties with the Patrol Wing Staff. From some time in October, 1940, until January, 1941, I acted as Chief Staff Officer and Operations Officer for Admiral Bellinger. Shortly after that time, I served as a member of a joint Army-Navy committee convened to consider the problem of air command in the Hawaiian Area. Thereafter, I acted as an aide or assistant to Admiral Bellinger during further protracted discussions on this matter with Army Air Corps representatives. I left the Hawaiian area in August, 1941.

3. Q. Captain, as a part of those joint duties with the U. S. Army representatives, did you participate in the preparation of a full Estimate of the Situation which was dated about 31 March, 1941, and ultimately signed by Admiral Bellinger and by General Martin?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Please give, briefly, your actual participation in that estimate.

A. I, personally, made certain studies and prepared the original draft of that estimate and submitted it to Admiral Bellinger. After some discussion, with both Admiral Bellinger and the Army representative, I prepared the final draft in the form in which it was eventually signed.

5. Q. Then, actually, was the aforesaid estimate very largely your own personal work?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

6. Q. In that estimate, in setting forth the Courses of Action open to the Japanese, did a surprise carrier raid in force appear with prominence?

A. As I remember it, it was the most probable course of action in the estimate.

7. Q. Prior to your departure from Pearl Harbor in August, 1941, about how many years' experience had you had in patrol plane organizations?

A. Roughly, about five years in patrol planes.

[291] 8. Q. Captain, in view of your long experience in that type and of your particular duties in Hawaii, as shown by your testimony, I shall ask you a somewhat hypothetical question: Assume about eighty long-range planes available and used for reconnaissance to an extent which approached the endurance of personnel and material over a period of, say, two weeks; under a reconnaissance plan feature only the most probable sectors through which Japanese attack would have been foreseen, please give your estimate of the chances that would have existed for detecting the 7 December, 1941, Japanese carrier raid, prior to their launching their planes.

A. If there were eighty crews trained to Navy standards for overseas work, the planes performance was equal to or better than the PBY, and they were operated as stated in the question, I would estimate the chances of detecting the Jap force prior to their launching on 7 December at about forty per cent.

9. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the estimate of the situation of 31 March—From, say, October, 1941, onward, do you recall any opinions which you may have expressed, or even any thoughts which you may not have expressed, as to the probability or even possibility that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would take the form which actually eventuated?

A. I don't remember any such expression of opinion by me after the completion of my work in Pearl. But by the time I had completed my work on that estimate, I was convinced that a surprise carrier attack on Pearl would be one of the opening moves of a Japanese war. I also believed that we would eventually fight a Japanese war.

10. Q. I understand from that, that when you heard of that attack you were in no way in a surprised state of mind?

A. The only surprise was the date.

11. Q. Were you surprised by the power and efficiency which the Japanese naval air showed in the execution of that attack?

A. No, sir, not particularly. Probably because the full extent of the damage only became known to me gradually over a long period of time.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:05 p. m., took a recess until 4:15 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened at Camp Crocodile, Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands.

Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[292] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 4:20 p. m., adjourned until 8:15 a. m., tomorrow.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 10, 1944

TWENTY-FIFTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER AIRCRAFT,
SOUTHERN PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 8:15 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-fourth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Captain George VanDeurs, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 8:20 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[293] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1944

TWENTY-SIXTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC
AREA AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 2:15 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-fifth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. William F. Halsey, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding South Pacific Force and South Pacific Area and Third Fleet.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Commander Aircraft Battle Force and Commander Task Force Two.

3. Q. Sir, how long had you been attached to the Pacific Fleet and in what capacity during 1941?

A. During the entire year of 1941, I was in the Pacific Fleet as Comairbatfor. I assumed that command in June, 1940.

4. Q. Sir, will you state, in general terms and as best you can recall, the periods during which you were in Pearl Harbor between the middle of October and the 7th of December, 1941.

A. I should say one-third of the time. I was at sea approximately two-thirds of the time. Prior to November 28, 1941, we had been in port for a normal period. When I left with my task force that morning, I did not let anyone know where we were going until we were clear of the harbor. At this point, I peeled off the battleships and destroyers that were not to accompany us. I went off to the westward and sent them off to the southward and eastward.

5. Q. Sir, on what date did you leave Pearl Harbor prior to December 7?

A. The last date I left prior to December 7 was 28th of November.

6. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the latter half of 1941 with regard to the frequency with which he consulted you and other senior officers of the Fleet; the consideration that he gave to the advice that you and other Flag officers gave him in formulating his decisions?

[294] A. On return from sea, I would usually fly into port from my carrier Flagship and report immediately to Admiral Kimmel's office. We would have long discussions on the events that had taken place during the period at sea, and he, in turn, would tell me what happened in Pearl, the messages that he had received, the efforts he had been making to straighten out the personnel and materiel situation, what he was doing to try to instill cordial relations with the Army, his personal relations with General Short, and other members of the Army forces. I do not remember whether he held any actual conferences at that time. There were always a number of Flag officers in his office and we had a free and open discussion. As far as I know, I was kept absolutely au courant on everything that was going on. My advice was asked and in some cases it was taken and in some cases it was not. This merely represented a normal difference of judgment between two people. I saw Admiral Kimmel very frequently in a private way. We were close personal friends. I talked to him on these occasions probably more freely than at any other time. Our personal and official relations were extremely close.

7. Q. Sir, were his conferences with you mainly along the lines of tactical exercises and training of the Fleet, or did they touch on such questions as the security of the Fleet when in port?

A. All subjects. The principal worries at that time were the materiel conditions, the very heavy turn-over in personnel, the question of balancing security against training and how far he could afford to let his trained men go and still have his Fleet ready for instant action. He was constantly going over in his mind how far this should go. I know that he was very much against the transfer of so many trained men and the influx of so many recruits under the conditions that faced us.

8. Q. During the latter half of 1941, what did you consider the primary mission of the Pacific Fleet?

A. To prepare for war against Japan.

9. Q. Do you feel that Admiral Kimmel was of like opinion, that he considered that the primary mission of the Fleet?

A. Absolutely.

10. Q. What were the primary tasks assigned in the War Plans then extant to the Pacific Fleet?

A. I have forgotten the details. The War Plans directed a raid on the Marshall Islands and we played it on the game board before the war. Curiously enough, my first offensive action, after the start of the war, was the bombing of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. This had been proved impossible on the game board.

11. Q. Admiral, what was the condition of personnel of the Fleet during the latter part of 1941 as regards their experience?

A. It was a little bit less experienced than one normally has in peace times, because of the fact there was a great deal of new construction going on and we were required to transfer a large number of key personnel to man this new construction.

12. Q. Was much emphasis placed on the training of the Fleet at that time?

A. The Fleet spent approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and during this time we were running under war conditions as regards darkened ship, anti-submarine protection, and so forth. The whole period of ten days at [295] sea was spent in training of personnel in combat duties and the perfection of inter-type tactics.

13. Q. Did you feel that the training of the Fleet was emphasized to an extent that preparedness to carry out war tasks was relegated somewhat to the background?

A. You cannot carry out your war tasks unless your men were trained to fight. In your training, you serve a double purpose: You make fighters out of green men and you add security to your Fleet.

14. Q. In the training schedules, was it your impression that the programs were directly contributory to training for the initial war tasks which might face the fleet?

A. Absolutely.

15. Q. Sir, in general terms, would you tell what transfers of units of the Fleet were made from the Pacific Fleet to other areas during the latter part of 1941?

A. There were three battleships, one carrier out of the four we had, and a number of cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not remember. This produced a decided weakening of the Pacific Fleet and left it, according to my recollection, less strength than the Japanese Fleet.

16. Q. Did you feel that these transfers incapacitated the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned to it in the war plans?

A. I felt that it militated against our chances of success in carrying out these plans.

17. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's reaction was to the transfer of these units of his Fleet?

A. I remember very distinctly that he was very much against the transfer; he deplored it.

18. Q. Do you recall what steps he took to call that to the attention of higher authority?

A. I am not certain on that, but, as I remember it, there was an exchange of rather heated dispatches on the subject.

Note: Upon his return to Washington, the examining officer caused a search to be made of the files of dispatches between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the year 1941, in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications, Navy Department, and was unable to find any dispatches fitting this description.

19. Q. During 1941, what was your estimate as to the suitability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the West Coast of the United States?

A. Based on the fact that I thought that the Japs would strike without declaration of war, I thought the closer we had the Fleet to the Japanese the better off we were. I believed that Pearl Harbor was the second best place and Manila the first place.

20. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's estimate was along those lines as to the wisdom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. No, I do not remember. I knew there had been some discussion about Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel's point of view on the subject. I've forgotten the exact status of it.

21. Q. Did you ever recommend to Admiral Kimmel that the Fleet be moved to Manila as you suggested in your previous answer?

A. I do not remember so doing.

[296] 22. Q. Do you recall, from your close association with Admiral Kimmel, whether or not he was so much preoccupied in his daily problems of training, keeping up materiel, that he did not give sufficient thought to the international situation, the possible imminence of hostilities, and was thus preoccupied about the wrong things?

A. I distinctly know that the international situation was constantly before us and constantly being discussed, as were the probabilities or possibilities of an attack. There was a continuous flow of messages from many sources which might be called "wolf" messages. There were many of these and, like everything else that's given in superabundance, the senses tended to be dulled, but the possibilities of the international situation were constantly before our minds during our working hours.

23. Q. Sir, I hand you a copy of a dispatch dated 16 October 1941, which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Do you recall the approximate time that you first saw this dispatch?

A. I believe I saw this dispatch soon after its receipt.

24. Q. Do you recall any conferences that Admiral Kimmel had with his Staff or with Army officials at which you were present at which this dispatch was discussed?

A. I am sure that I, personally, discussed the dispatch with him and members of his Staff, but I can not be sure of any general conference on the subject.

25. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interception of the wording "preparatory deployments" in this dispatch?

A. I believe that was taken up and it was decided that the task forces at sea and in port were acting in a preparatory deployment, ready to go in case the order was given. Submarines were sent to the Far East, as were B-17's. This took away a lot of our attack force from Hawaii. Submarine patrols were established at Midway and Wake, and again the question of air fields on Midway and Wake was brought prominently forward. The question of placing combatant planes in both Midway and Wake was brought to the front. The only planes available for use in Midway and Wake were sent; that is patrol planes. This further weakened the reconnaissance from Hawaii.

26. Q. Admiral, in your own estimation, insofar as you can recall, were those the proper measures and dispositions for the Commander-in-Chief to take in consequence of that dispatch of 16 October?

A. Yes. In addition to that, a great effort, I remember very distinctly, was made to get ground armament to the outlying islands. Guns and ammunition were taken, on Admiral Kimmel's own initiative, and placed in these islands. Just where they came from, I've forgotten at this moment. I remember there was a great deal of talk about that and the question of authority for placing them in the outlying islands. Admiral Kimmel took the authority and placed them.

27. Q. Do you recall that some weeks elapsed between the dispatch of 16 October and any further dispatches of a warning nature?

A. I believe so. This particular dispatch, I remember, was taken very seriously by everybody—the war warning—and, to the best of my recollection, it was some time before we began to be bombarded with dispatches.

28. Q. During that period of some weeks, did it occur to you that you had a right to expect something further from the Navy Department indicating whether they wished the preparatory deployments continued or that they should really rescind that directive?

A. As I remember, that very point was discussed time and time again, and [297] the point was also brought up that they should give us more information or rescind the directive.

29. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addresses, dated 24 November, 1941, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. Do you recall when you first saw that dispatch?

A. I believe I saw this dispatch very shortly after its receipt and it caused a tremendous amount of figuring on where the Japs were likely to strike. Because of Guam and Philippines being mentioned in the dispatch, we probably thought more along those lines than of a surprise attack on Hawaii.

30. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch, in effect, continued the directive of the previous dispatch in regard to deployments?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer. I would say that we felt, during this whole period, that we were subject to imminent war, and that the measure that had already been taken was sufficient at that time, with the means at hand.

31. Q. Sir, do you recall being present at any conferences that Admiral Kimmel or members of his Staff had with their opposite numbers of the Army after the receipt of this dispatch or at which this dispatch was discussed?

A. There was one conference that I recall very well. That happened on the 27th day of November. I believe there were preliminary ones before that conference and that it came to a head that day. The decision was made to send fighting planes to Wake. The field was just then ready for use.

32. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, dated 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall when you first saw that dispatch?

A. I probably saw this dispatch at the conference that took place on the morning of the 27th of November. I might add that I was with Admiral Kimmel from about nine o'clock that morning until about six o'clock that evening.

33. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interpretation of the sentence in this dispatch which reads to the effect that certain deployments were to be carried out?

A. I'm afraid at that particular time I didn't give much thought to that sentence. I had a very precise task given me to carry fighter planes for the defense of Wake Island, where the air field was just about ready. There was a discussion in which General Short, General Martin, and some other Army officers, and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger, and possibly some more, and I took part. It centered

on what planes should be used for this purpose. I remember very distinctly General Martin proposing that we use some of the old combatant Army planes because those were the ones we could afford best to lose. General Short countered with the proposition that if we are going up against the Japanese we wanted the best we had instead of the worst and we would use the best Army planes. I then brought out the fact that I had been informed that the Army was not allowed to fly their pursuit planes farther than fifteen miles from the coast for reasons of security of personnel. General Martin stated this was a fact and immediately, because of that and their lack of experience of flying over water, it was decided to send either Navy or Marine planes. The Marine planes were finally selected and for security reasons it was necessary to get those planes on board the ENTERPRISE at sea the next day without anyone knowing where they [298] were going. This required a tremendous amount of planning and subterfuge before we hit on a scheme for flying these people aboard. We told them they were going out for two or three days' maneuvers. At the same time, to show the Army that it was possible to fly Army fighter planes off carriers, it was arranged to take two Army fighter planes aboard from the dock and fly them off at sea to land in Honolulu. This again required much planning so as not to excite people and break the security. We worked over this until about six o'clock in the evening before plans were completed. We sailed the next morning. I was probably too fully occupied that day to think much about that sentence.

34. Q. Do you recall that the Army participation in outlying island defense was the subject of a dispatch of 27 November, other than the one before you?

A. I recall there had been some discussion of Army units going to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked on outlying bases as part of the Fleet, and, for that reason, he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marines and naval personnel, insofar as practicable. It soon became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases, according to my recollection, were finally picked out to be garrisoned by Army forces.

35. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the dispatching of Marine planes to Wake was a consequence of this dispatch that you have had before you or had that been decided before the dispatch arrived?

A. I believe it was precipitated by this dispatch and the fact that the air fields were just ready at that time. In other words, it was a hurry-up move. One more reason for that was the fact that my task force was due to proceed to sea on the 28th of November and in order not to violate security, they wanted to make it appear a perfectly natural move.

36. Q. In other words, under the published employment schedules, you were due to go out on the 28th?

A. Exactly.

37. Q. Sir, on the mission to Wake Island, what were your orders in the event of sighting Japanese forces?

A. I believe I got the finest orders that were ever given to a man. I waited until the conference was over and I asked Admiral Kimmel, "How far do you want me to go?" He said, "Use your common sense."

38. Q. Admiral, had you discussed with Admiral Kimmel the matter of safety of the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, Johnston, and so forth, in the event of war with Japan?

A. Many times.

39. Q. Would you please state his feelings in the matter. Was he seriously concerned therewith?

A. He was very seriously concerned over the matter. He felt the personnel and materiel was entirely inadequate for the task imposed. Very shortly before, say, sometime in the early Fall, General Price of the Marines, who was at that time in command of the Marines on the West Coast, I think, which included the Hawaiian Department, came out. Admiral Kimmel, in my presence, asked him to make a very thorough study of the defenses of Midway and Wake while he was there; told him about his grave doubts as to our ability to defend them with what we had; and asked for his advice and assistance on anything that could be done to improve the defenses. He stressed, particularly, that it must be done with what we had or what we might take from the common pool. It was a constant source of worry.

[299] 40. Q. Do you recall any plans that Admiral Kimmel had for using Fleet units in the event of hostilities to aid in the protection of these islands?

A. I do not recall any plans but I am quite certain that he would not have split his Fleet and let it be taken in detail by sending a portion out to a given island. He might have sent the whole Fleet out. I say "the whole Fleet"; I mean a sufficient task force.

41. Q. As regards our commitment of considerable forces, including troops and planes on Wake, do you recall any disagreement between Admiral Kimmel and the Navy Department?

A. The Navy Department had specified a certain garrison of troops for Wake and I believe Admiral Kimmel enlarged the garrison out there, strengthened the garrison, without authority from the Navy Department. I also believe that the placing of the twelve Marine fighter planes was done on his own initiative.

42. Q. Admiral, reverting to the wording of the dispatch of 27 November, do you recall your own reaction when you read the words "war warning"?

A. I remember very distinctly my reactions to that whole day. I was very serious about it and probably shaking a little bit. I felt that we were going to be in a fight before I got back to Pearl. The words "war warning" probably had some effect on my feelings.

43. Q. Did you have time, on that day, for any thought concerning the security of Oahu, Pearl Harbor, and so forth?

A. No, sir, I was entirely surrounded by thoughts of my own task force, getting out without people knowing what I was doing.

44. Q. As regards your own task force, upon putting to sea, did you institute any security measures advanced over those which had been in effect while at sea for some time previously?

A. Immediately on clearing the channel, I diverted the battleships, three in number, cruisers and destroyers, under Admirals Draemel and Kidd, and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area. I then headed West with the remainder of my task force. As soon as we were out of sight of the remainder of the task force, I sent a signal

to put war heads in all torpedoes; to regard any submarine seen as hostile and sink it; armed the planes with bombs; gave orders to shoot down any plane seen in the air that was not known to be one of our own. We went into Condition 3, as I remember it, and kept that the entire way out until we got close to Wake and then I went into Condition 2. In other words, I tried to make full preparations for combat. I also ordered ready ammunition for all guns. I might add one other thing. I carried out morning and afternoon searches to three hundred miles, as I remember it, for any sign of hostile shipping. I kept a combat patrol over the ships at certain times.

45. Q. Admiral, referring back to your answer a few minutes ago, that you felt that on 27 November the United States and Japan would be at war before you returned from your mission to Wake, did you have an opportunity to communicate that feeling to Admiral Kimmel, and, if so, do you recall his reaction to your expressions?

A. I did not intend to convey the idea that I thought they would be at war before I got back, but I felt that there was a very grave possibility that I might be attacked or attack before I returned. I thought it might precipitate war.

46. Q. Did you have an opportunity to express that opinion to Admiral Kimmel before you sailed?

[300] A. Insomuch as I asked him how far I should go, I think I expressed my opinion.

47. Q. Did he give his reaction to your expression?

A. It was perfectly understood by me when he told me to use my common sense.

48. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 3 December, which is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you have any information of the receipt of this before December 7?

A. I did not see it.

49. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a hypothetical question. If you had seen this dispatch on 3 December, what would have been your reaction to it?

A. It would have been cumulative information that had been progressing for months that we were about to have a fight.

50. Q. Would this dispatch have indicated to you that the beginning of hostilities was extremely imminent?

A. Not necessarily, in view of all the other dispatches that had been coming in and the various personal letters, O. N. I. Bulletins, and various things.

51. Q. Admiral, after you sailed with your task force on November 28, 1941, did you receive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or higher authority, any additional warnings or instructions with respect to the security of your task force or similar directive?

A. I did not. I considered that Admiral Kimmel had faith in what I was doing and he didn't consider any further instructions than the ones he had given me were necessary.

52. Q. Did you receive, officially, any additional information with respect to the international situation or other intelligence?

A. Nothing official that I recall. However, we were naturally reading the press and we had some garbled message about the Japanese Fleet being near Palau. That came, as I remember it, in a press dispatch.

53. Q. Sir, in addition to these warning dispatches that were received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, what other sources of information did he have as regards the possibilities of a surprise attack, or the movement of Japanese vessels, or the general international situation, that would cause him to feel concern for the safety of his Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

A. Everyone that came through Honolulu of any importance from the Far East was always interviewed by Admiral Kimmel or some of his Staff, usually by Admiral Kimmel, himself. There were letters being passed back and forth at all times between Washington and Admiral Kimmel, and it is my impression that there were certain O. N. I. and intelligence information coming out. Just how that arrived, I'm not quite sure, whether it came in dispatch form, or not.

54. Q. Sir, did you feel, at that time, that the sum total of the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence reports was at all adequate? In other words, did you feel that the Commander-in-Chief was fairly well informed as to what the Japs were doing or did you feel that you were operating in the dark there?

A. I did not feel that we were well informed on what the Japs were doing and I felt that we were operating in the dark. I had the personal feeling, entirely personal, that they knew a lot more in Washington than we knew out there and that we should have been informed.

[301] 55. Q. Do you recall any discussions that you had with the Commander-in-Chief along that line, whether any steps were being taken to improve the situation?

A. I recall, vaguely, discussions along that line and damning them for not letting us in on the information. I believe Admiral Kimmel said he would demand or had demanded that they give him more information.

56. Q. Sir, in your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and members of his Staff, do you recall that any particular consideration was given to the recent history of the Axis Powers of indulging in surprise attacks?

A. We, of course, were all cognizant of the Jap's attack on the Chinese and again on the Russians, and we felt sure that they would pull something like that, but we thought it would take place in the Far East rather than Honolulu, except by submarines, which was the gist of the conversation. We underestimated their ability to operate carriers, or we did not give it enough consideration.

57. Q. Do you recall, personally, being particularly impressed by what you had heard of Yamamoto's characteristics?

A. Yes, I remember we credited him with being probably a very good fighter and having a great dislike for the Americans.

58. Q. Did you know, at the time, of his long connection with the Japanese naval air build-up?

A. Yes, I believe I did. I'm not sure.

59. Q. Sir, what was your estimate, during the three months preceding 7 December 1941, as to the probability or possibility of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?

A. My estimate was that they would probably attack by subs off Pearl Harbor and throw the weight of their main attack into the Philippines or down the South Coast of China towards Malaya.

60. Q. Sir, can you amplify that just a bit, going into the reasons behind that estimate or the considerations upon which that estimate was based?

A. It was based on the fact that they had a strong Army near at home, that they needed oil, they probably needed rubber, that these were close aboard where they could easily exploit them and they could exploit any attack that they made. That they could not, thank God, or did not, exploit a successful attack on Pearl.

61. Q. Did you know at that time whether or not Admiral Kimmel's own estimate was similar to yours?

A. I believe that was the general feeling amongst nearly every one there.

62. Q. Was this a subject of frequent discussion among members of his Staff and the Flag officers of the Fleet?

A. It was a subject of discussion by all hands around there.

63. Q. In addition to the answers that you have made to the last three questions, can you give any other reasons why the senior officers in Pearl Harbor were not more apprehensive of a surprise air attack there? The particular significance lies in a Joint Estimate by Army and Navy Air Officers made back in March, 1941.

[302] A. The question of an air attack on Pearl was always at the forefront of everybody's mind. I merely say, in my own personal opinion, I did not think an air attack was coming. I thought it would be a submarine attack. There was constant drilling in air defense and tracking, both day and night, in port and at sea. If it was in port, all types of Navy and Army planes were flown over the Fleet for recognition purposes. Attacks were sent in against Pearl from carriers a hundred or hundred and fifty miles at sea, for purposes of drill and anti-aircraft defense. Sleeve and drone firing, of course, was always taking place. There were constant drills with such radars as we had at that time in tracking planes. We had no means of determining the altitude of a plane from radar in those days. I, personally, used a squadron of planes, flying them from a carrier, a distance of a hundred miles on one air level, bring them up a thousand feet, and fly them back. I did that from 1,000 feet to 20,000 feet to see if they could determine some method of finding their altitude. We finally did get a very rough method. Using curves, we could pick out the plane's altitude, but that was predicated on the fact that he was flying at the same level. It was very rough. The point I'm trying to bring out is that we were all very conscious that we were going to be attacked, either at sea or in port, and constant drills were held day and night on account of this. I felt that with the radar protection we had, that any attack coming in would probably be picked up. As we all know, it was picked up and did not get to the proper authorities.

64. Q. Prior to your going to sea on 28 November, were you particularly in touch with the state of development and efficiency of the Army's radar system?

A. We were a bit perturbed about the Army radar equipment because, at that time, there had been a very close cooperation and almost unity of command between the Army and the Navy. This was insisted upon by Admiral Kimmel, and we felt that possibly they weren't using the best methods in plotting radar. We had had a great deal

more experience with it than the Army. I discussed it with Admiral Kimmel and I believe it was at his direction that I sent my communication officer, who, at that time and still is, one of the best radar practical men—not a technician—we have in the Fleet, to work with the Army. Again, to the best of my recollection, he made some very valuable suggestions which were adopted.

65. Q. Did he happen to report to you that the Army was very backward in their preparations with radar?

A. He did.

66. Q. Do you recall that estimate, mentioned just previously, having been the subject of discussion between senior officers at any time during the months preceding 7 December (the Army and Navy Air Estimate of March 30, '41)?

A. My recollection is poor on that subject, but I feel quite certain that it was discussed.

67. Q. Admiral, in answer to an earlier question, mention was made of the employment schedules of units of the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Do you recall approximately how often those were published and disseminated?

A. I'm not sure whether it was monthly or quarterly; quarterly, I think.

68. Q. Do you recall the classification that was given to these schedules and how wide a distribution was made?

A. No, but it had a fairly wide distribution until the word went around that people were talking too much in Honolulu. Again my recollection is a little faulty, but I think one or two officers were threatened with court martials because their wives knew too damn much.

[303] 59. Q. Was the distribution limited after that situation was brought to light?

A. I think so, very decidedly. I remember, very distinctly, Admiral Kimmel got out a very strong letter or order on the subject, and after that things tautened up very considerably.

70. Q. What was your own reaction to the wisdom of publishing and giving fairly wide circulation to these employment schedules?

A. I never had any particular reaction to it. I never trusted, and do not today trust, any of the people of Japanese descent who are in the Hawaiian Islands. Anyone from anywheres in the neighborhood of Honolulu can see the Fleet coming in and going out. By using a little deduction, they could figure out what was going on. I don't think these employment schedules had very much to do with it. As a matter of fact, both sides of the entrance to Pearl Harbor were lined with Japanese every time we went in and out. I say "lined", there were a few of them always playing around.

71. Q. Sir, do you know whether any consideration was ever given to the point that the publication of the employment schedules would give notice quite far in advance of the presence of units in Pearl Harbor which might be of great value to the enemy?

A. They undoubtedly would, but I had not given that any consideration at that time.

72. Q. During the few days in late November, while your task force was in Pearl Harbor, do you recall any conversation or did you give any thought yourself toward a departure from the scheduled employ-

ment by virtue of which all fleet units would have been out of Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not and I did not.

73. Q. Admiral, upon what branch of the Armed Services of the United States did the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor rest?

A. The Army. However, by direction of Admiral Kimmel, the Commandant of the Fourteenth District was made a semi-task force commander under the Army and controlled the Fleet anti-aircraft batteries and defenses of the Fleet within Pearl. I might add, after reading the order (Exhibit 4), the Commandant of the District exercised this control through the Senior Officer Present Afloat, excluding the Commander-in-Chief.

74. Q. Admiral, during the months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, what was your own estimate as to the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments to protect Pearl Harbor against air attack?

A. I did not think they had the proper equipment or enough of equipment to defend it.

75. Q. Sir, could you elaborate on that just a bit as to the specific deficiencies that existed at that time?

A. I did not think their anti-aircraft artillery was of the proper calibre or in sufficient quantity to properly protect Pearl Harbor. We were all short of fighting planes, including the carrier-based planes, and Army pursuit planes.

76. Q. What thoughts had you as regards the efficiency of the Army to properly use such equipment as they did have?

A. I had no direct knowledge of their efficiency, but I had seen them, [304] watched them, in other places, and I thought they could use the equipment they had efficiently.

77. Q. You have testified as regards your knowledge of the defensive qualities of the Army radar system. Will you, similarly, cover what within your recollection you estimated the efficiency of the Army pursuit on Oahu?

A. The old time Army pursuit pilots on Oahu were undoubtedly very good. There were a number—and I do not know the exact percentage—of brand new pilots who had just completed basic training and were in Oahu in a semi-training status at that time. These pilots had to be depended upon for part of the defense.

78. Q. Admiral, did the Army have on Oahu anything that resembled what we now know as fighter direction?

A. They were attempting to establish it. I'm a little bit balled up; I don't know whether it happened before or after December 7. I know they were trying to get going. To the best of my recollection, I believe they were attempting to assemble something resembling our fighter direction. We used our planes and carriers to train them.

79. Q. Did you, at the time, consider that the system would have been effective in repelling an attack?

A. Probably not.

80. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December, what information did you have as to what distance aerial reconnaissance was being carried out around Oahu?

A. I was cognizant of the daily plan for reconnaissance. This came out each day showing sections covered by the Army and sections covered by the Navy and the type of plane that was covering. I was also cognizant of the fact that the search planes available were limited in number, had been run very hard. It became a question, and a very serious question, and occasioned many discussions between Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Kimmel whether they should use a plane continually and keep a full coverage and have them all go to pieces at once, or put out the best partial covering they could and keep the planes in shape so that they could be used in case of necessity. Attempt was made to provide two full crews for each plane and the plane was put on a six-days basis. They ran for six days, no Sundays and holidays were counted, and one day off for upkeep and repair by the crew. The only long-distance Army bombing planes we had were the B-17's, and most of them had been flown out to the Philippines. As a matter of fact, we had practically none left, as I recollect. The other plane the Army was using for reconnaissance was a B-18, which was very slow and very limited in its search area. As a consequence of this, instead of having a perfect 360 degree search that we should have had, the search was limited to certain sectors thought to be most dangerous and a form of rotational search was put in those sections with the planes that were available. The Fleet operating areas were searched daily.

81. Q. Admiral, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41 (Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you familiar with that in the months preceding 7 December?

A. Yes, sir.

82. Q. Sir, at that time, did you consider this an adequate security plan?

A. I did.

83. Q. Was this plan being fully carried out as stated in the letter immediately prior to your departure on 28 November?

[305] A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

84. Q. Sir, when your task force was in port, immediately prior to your departure on 28 November, did you feel that your force was reasonably secure in Pearl Harbor?

A. I did.

85. Q. Admiral, what was the location of your task force at the time of the attack on the morning of 7 December?

A. We were returning from Wake and some 150 or 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl.

86. Q. Were your planes still aboard your carrier at that time?

A. No, the planes had been flown off at various positions. First, a scouting flight for sixty degrees, as I remember, on either bow; that was followed up by other planes to return to land at Ford Island. I think we flew them off 200 or 250 miles at sea. I had some planes left on board.

87. Q. What was the first information you received of the Japanese attack?

A. I had left the bridge for the first time since we had departed Pearl Harbor, gone down and taken a nice bath and shave, and was sitting

down to a comfortable breakfast. They brought me a message that read: "AIR RAID. THIS IS NOT A DRILL." My first impression was that my own planes were being attacked because I had sent them in without any notice. I had not broken radio silence since we left Pearl. They tried to persuade me differently and until the second message came in, I didn't believe them.

88. Q. What action did you take upon receipt of those messages; did you make an attempt to communicate with your planes?

A. The planes, I knew, had landed or were landing at that time. There was no necessity for trying to communicate with them. Depending upon where the attack had come from, they were probably better placed at Pearl Harbor than they would be with me for attacking the enemy. My recollection is that I sent a request in that if not needed, my planes be directed to join me.

89. Q. Can you make a statement as to what part the ENTERPRISE planes took in the hostilities on that date?

A. I can give you a very vivid description that was given me by my Flag Secretary, who is an aviator. He was riding in a rear seat with the Group Commander and as they approached Pearl he saw all the anti-aircraft in the air. His first impression was, "My God, the Army has gone crazy, having anti-aircraft drill on Sunday morning." They got in a little bit closer and he said he saw a plane playing around and he thought, "Here's one of these fresh, young Army pilots coming down, playing around, breaking orders." He said just at that time he happened to be looking at the wing and saw a piece of the wing begin to fly off. Just then the plane went by and almost took his head off. He looked up and saw a red ball on it. Then he tried to unlimber his gun and couldn't get it unlimbered. They then went through the damnest amount of anti-aircraft fire and bullet fire that he had ever seen, before or since, and finally got in to the field at Ford Island. Nearly all the ENTERPRISE planes had a similar experience. Some few shot down Jap planes and some few were shot down.

90. Q. Were any of your planes lost, other than by enemy action?

A. Quite a number of them were shot down by our own anti-aircraft fire.

[306] 91. Q. Admiral, was any investigation convened to determine the facts surrounding the shooting down of our own planes by our own gun fire?

A. No investigation, insofar as I know, was called, nor was any necessary. In time of war, you don't have time to go into formal investigation in an affair of that kind, where the reason was so perfectly apparent to anyone. After going through the bombing they had, they were all triggerhappy and shooting at anything that came in.

92. Q. Were you greatly surprised when you learned how ineffective the Army opposition to the attack on 7 December actually was?

A. I don't know if I gave the matter any great consideration, as I was fairly busy from that time on for about six weeks. However, I was always dubious of the ability of anti-aircraft to prevent an attack coming in. It was not until I came down here and saw the effects of the ninety millimeter batteries, when properly handled, and afterwards the effects of the new armament that we have on our ships today, that I believed that anti-aircraft could be effective. I'm convinced

that it is effective now. The talk at that time was principally about the number of planes that had been shot up on the ground, been caught flat-footed, and the good work that the few pilots who got in the air had done. Looking back on it, I probably was surprised at the ineffectiveness of the whole defense.

93. Q. Admiral, while you were last in port, prior to 7 December, or at any time previously, did it occur to you that the Fleet should be protected by anti-torpedo baffles while berthed in Pearl Harbor?

A. It did. I was strongly in favor of having them.

94. Q. Do you recall whether their absence was due to the opposition of any Commander toward having them in the water or was it because of the unavailability of the material?

A. My impression was that it was due, principally, because of the unavailability of the material. There undoubtedly was opposition on the part of some because it certainly slowed down mooring and slowed down the sortie, unmooring.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: One of the most vivid recollections I have of events prior to 7 December 1941 were the unceasing requests by the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders for personnel and materiel, with very little apparent results. Admiral Kimmel was insistent that there should be the closest cooperation between the Army and Navy. He, personally, spent a great deal of time socially with General Short. In golf, and other forms of exercise, I was present on many occasions when this took place. This enabled them to discuss things in an informal way, and by getting to know each other they were better able to understand the other man's thoughts. At this time, there were many Army officers that went to sea with the task forces to obtain a first-hand knowledge of what the Navy was doing. At the same time, many naval officers went on maneuvers with the Army. There were many training directives issued by the Commander-in-Chief in an effort to [307] make the Fleet a potent force and ready for any emergency which might arise. Ships were shorthanded; trained personnel not available. There was, at this time, a continuing influx of new material into the Fleet which required specialized training for efficient operation. As a result, many training schools were locally established in order to maintain the efficiency of the Fleet. There was a constant effort on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and Commander Aircraft Battle Force to obtain a sufficient number of aircraft to keep the carrier complements continually filled and to permit establishment of training and replacement squadrons. This was not successful. Many requests were also made for the Department to develop new aircraft which was so vitally necessary for carrier operations in the face of possible enemy opposition. I have seen statements that task force organizations were changed radically after the 7th of December, 1941. The task force I took with me to Wake remained practically intact under my command

for six months after that date. The LEXINGTON Task Force, under Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, was of similar constitution. This Force was ferrying fighter planes to Midway, and at sea on December 7, 1941. From December 7, 1941, until the present day, Task Forces of the Pacific Fleet are fundamentally the same. Added power is given by fast battleships and new cruisers, both sadly lacking in the early days.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 5:05 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m. tomorrow.

[308] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1944

TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC
AREA AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

The examination met at 10 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

The examining officer introduced Peter Urrutia, Chief Yeoman, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Irving H. Mayfield, Captain, U. S. Navy, serving as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. From March 15, 1941, until the end of the year, I was District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Captain, what previous experience had you had in intelligence work?

A. None, except about two weeks temporary duty in Washington prior to proceeding to the Fourteenth Naval District, and something slightly more than two years as Naval Attache in Chile.

4. Q. Will you please state the organization of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, as you found it upon reporting for duty.

A. Upon reporting for duty, the organization consisted of approximately thirteen persons, of whom two were women, and we occupied office space on the sixth floor of the Young Hotel Building, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

5. Q. Did you at that time consider this force to be adequate for performing the duties prescribed?

A. I did not.

6. Q. Will you please outline developments in the office during your incumbency?

A. About one month after taking charge, I completed a survey of the District from the point of view of intelligence organization and submitted this survey with my recommendations for enlargements and opening of branch offices; other [309] similar details in connection with the organization to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. To the best of my recollection, this report was dated about April 22, 1941.

7. Q. Will you please state what action was taken in this respect; in regard to your recommendation?

A. The Commandant made a report to the Navy Department inclosing my report to him, and recommending certain additions as to personnel and material to be made as soon as practicable, and that thereafter the organization should proceed in an orderly fashion.

8. Q. By the Fall of 1941, had the organization of your Department been improved to the extent that you were satisfied as to its sufficiency?

A. It had not.

9. Q. Was any further action taken, or were recommendations submitted to improve the situation?

A. Constant requests were made for additional personnel and material, principally personnel. It was necessary, at that time, to obtain permission in many instances from the Navy Department before naval reserves actually enrolled for intelligence duties could be ordered to active duty. The procurement quota assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District was far less than the estimated complement, so that many of the personnel for the organization had to come from the mainland; many of the personnel supplied, both from local sources and from the mainland, were totally without training and many without any experience in intelligence work. It was necessary to take the most experienced and use them as instructors. In addition to recruiting and organizing a strictly intelligence organization, I was charged with recruiting, organizing, and training all personnel for radio and cable censorship. It is my considered opinion that the organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7, 1941. This was due to consistent accessions of new and untrained personnel who had to be sent to a constantly expanding organization, which at the same time was endeavoring to carry a heavy load of intelligence work. I believe that the exact figures of the space occupied, and personnel of the various ranks and ratings are available in the District Intelligence Office in Honolulu.

10. Q. Captain, will you please tell us of the relations between your Department and the other investigating agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Army Intelligence of Hawaii, during your incumbency as District Intelligence Officer?

A. The three intelligence organizations were very cooperative, and during my entire tour of duty as District Intelligence Officer, the relationship and spirit of cooperation between the three organizations was excellent, the military intelligence, in my opinion, had far more personnel difficulties than Naval Intelligence. They had fewer men, and greater difficulty in expanding. The F. B. I., similarly, was short-handed. The heads of the three organizations met at least once a

week and were consistently exchanging visits between the regular meetings. The agents, both civilian and commissioned, were free to consult with the agents of the other organizations. My files were always open to an agent of either of the other two organizations, and we had no reason to believe that their files were not equally accessible to the men of my organization.

11. Q. Captain, similarly, will you please outline your relations with [310] the Intelligence Organizations of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the other naval intelligence organization present in Hawaii?

A. The personal relationship between me and the Fleet Intelligence Officer was always cordial and cooperative. I considered it my duty to give every aid and assistance to the Fleet Intelligence Office that he might require. The Intelligence Organization under Commander Rochefort also received from my organization every possible assistance. I supplied him with personnel whenever he desired them, endeavoring to send to him only people, both officers and men, who would suit his needs, and this was done after careful study and selection.

12. Q. Captain, did you have information or indications prior to the launching of the attack that the Japanese contemplated any type of move against the United States in Hawaii?

A. None.

13. Q. The examining officer desires to have in the record information as to the possible sources which may have been used by the Japanese to obtain and to transmit to Japan, or to the Japanese Military and Naval Services, information regarding the Fleet and shore installations in Hawaii. Please state as well as you can remember what information you had prior to the attack, with respect to such sources.

A. It was possible for any person from innumerable points to observe the entrance or departure of any vessel into Honolulu or Pearl Harbor; the Japanese Navy tankers which entered the Port of Honolulu could observe any Fleet operations or arrivals or departures of the Fleet, and officers and crew were frequently entertained by the Consul General of Japan and other Japanese residents in the Island of Oahu. They were not restricted in taking automobile tours to points of interest, or trips around the Island. The road around Pearl Harbor was close to the water line and, at many points, the ships in Pearl Harbor and locations, the state of repair, or any other points of interest could easily be observed from the road. There were many points on slight elevations near Pearl Harbor from which constant observations could have been maintained. There were many points of greater height, at a greater distance from Pearl Harbor, where constant observations with binoculars could have been maintained and photographs taken. The Japanese freight and passenger lines making Honolulu a port of call could easily have brought in material or agents, or could have removed personnel or agents. The only inspections of which I am aware were the customary public health and customs inspections. The Consul General or a member of his Staff could visit these vessels, as could other visitors. The Master of the vessel and his officers were at liberty to call on the Consul General at his office or residence as they desired. I was aware that couriers were passengers on these liners. I know of specific instances which are a matter of record in the files of the District Intelligence Office where parties from

vessels were taken on tours by the Consul General or members of his Staff, but I have no exact knowledge of any individual agent or document that entered Honolulu or left therefrom.

14. Q. Would you please state what you knew at the time of the activities of the Japanese Consul General and his Staff which may have been connected with the obtaining of intelligence and forwarding such information to Japan?

A. It is my belief, which I can not substantiate by actual facts, as the tenseness of the diplomatic situation between the United States and Japan increased that the efforts of the Consulate General to obtain and forward information to Japan increased. There were many Japanese societies and organizations whose reason for existence, at least on the surface, were [311] purely cultural or social. These societies numbered about fifteen hundred. The Japanese Consul General, in my opinion, endeavored to keep in touch with these various societies and Japanese Language schools for the purpose of keeping them tied to Japan as closely as possible. I believe that he did use the consular agents, of which there were some two hundred and fifty in number throughout the Territory. The ostensible use of the consular agents was for the purpose of registering births for the Consul General and the matters concerning citizenship.

15. Q. Were copies of the messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio made available to your organization?

A. They were not, until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of the Radio Corporation of America. The Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company, according to my recollection, handled the traffic during the month of November; traffic was switched to the Radio Corporation of America as of December 1, 1941. Thereafter, I was able to obtain all of his traffic from R. C. A., but since it was all in code and I had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit this traffic to another organization to be read.

16. Q. Were any of these dispatches read before the attack on 7 December?

A. That I can not answer definitely, since there would be no reason to send me copies of the messages that had been read, unless they had some intelligence value.

17. Q. Captain, did you learn the contents of any of these messages at any time subsequent to the attack?

A. Yes.

18. Q. Will you please state the contents of such messages as you learned them subsequent to the attack?

A. Subsequent to the attack, to the best of my recollection—the first one was received by me on the 11th of December. Considerable information as to plans for reporting dates of arrivals and departures, and, in general, movements of the Fleet and other military forces, were to be made by the Consulate General, and the contents of the dispatches read indicated that certain reports were made. Many of us endeavored to take all these reports and compare them with the actual movements of ships of the Fleet. The reports made in many instances did not correspond with the actual movements, leading me to a possible supposition that they had been made carelessly or else on

observation of agents not very conversant with the types of ships of our Navy.

19. Q. Captain, you have mentioned certain consular agents who were active in Hawaii; do you recall any action that was initiated there to subject these agents to control or prosecution?

A. Yes.

20. Q. Will you please state what transpired in respect thereto.

A. For some years, the Office of the District Intelligence Officer had been collecting data on Japanese consular agents. On organization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this information, together with all other information desired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was given to that organization. The personnel of the District Intelligence Office, prior to 1940, consisted generally of one officer and one chief yeoman. With this small force, the amount of data collected could not be properly studied or [312] even methodically filed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with such assistance as my organization was able to give, collected information as to the known existence of approximately two hundred and fifty of these consular agents. It was the desire of the acting U. S. Attorney to prosecute these men as being agents of a foreign government who had failed to register as such. As District Intelligence Officer, I conferred with the Commandant, and with his knowledge and at his direction attended meetings that were held and recommended that some or all of these agents be brought to trial. These meetings were attended, as a rule, by the Acting U. S. Attorney, the Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu, the head of the Military Intelligence, and myself as the District Intelligence Officer. It was my recommendation that at least a group of perhaps twelve or fifteen be brought to trial. Admiral Bloch, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, made official recommendation to the Navy Department that these consular agents be prosecuted. The Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Acting U. S. Attorney also desired to proceed with the prosecution of these consular agents. The Military Intelligence Officer stated that the Army did not deem it wise to proceed with the prosecution; the main reason given being that at that time they were attempting to proceed with their policy of encouraging and promoting racial harmony, and felt that such a prosecution would be harmful to the policy of racial harmony. The matter was referred to the War Department and I believe to the Department of Justice, though I am not certain of the reference to the Justice Department, and the decision reached in Washington as passed to me by the Acting U. S. Attorney was that prosecution would not be proceeded with because of the objection by the War Department.

21. Q. What, if any, evidence did your Department uncover as to the use of Japanese fishing boats in intelligence work?

A. To the best of my recollection, there was never a definite incident of proven espionage on the part of these fishing boats, though I believe it to be definitely established that many of the fishermen had gone to school in Japan to learn fishing methods, and it is my personal conviction, unsupported by facts, that information they obtained from personal observation, including hydrographic data, was forwarded to Japan.

22. Q. Did searches of any of these boats disclose any special radio or other equipment located in them that might have been used for this purpose?

A. Not to my knowledge.

23. Q. Prior to the attack, what information did you have as to the use of amateur or other radio transmitters to convey information to Japanese agencies?

A. I had no exact information that such amateur transmitters or receivers were used. There were, however, a number of amateur stations in the Territory of Hawaii, licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. There was one in particular near Pearl Harbor. Complete information on this station is available in the files of the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District.

24. Q. Captain, what information did you have prior to the attack with respect to the use of Japanese Language commercial radio broadcasts from local stations in Hawaii in connection with espionage or intelligence?

A. There were regular programs broadcast from the commercial broadcasting stations in the Territory in the Japanese Language. My office, from time to time, made spot checks of these broadcasts, but never did we find any information that we considered as improper information to broadcast. We had neither [313] the personnel nor the equipment to maintain a constant check, nor did the District Communication Officer have sufficient personnel or material to record and check these broadcasts continuously.

25. Q. What information did you have prior to the attack, with respect to the use of the trans-Pacific telephone system in transmitting information to Japan; military information to Japan?

A. The trans-Pacific telephone was available to the Japanese in the same fashion as to any other person who was willing to pay the toll. So far as I am aware, these conversations were not recorded or censored. I have no exact or personal knowledge of any harmful information transmitted over this circuit, but I see no reason why it could not have been used if the Japanese desired to do so.

26. Q. Keeping in mind these several matters which we have just been discussing, will you please outline the authority vested in you, or in the Commandant, to take measures to control or to in any way supervise these various sources of supplying information and any action taken by you under such authority?

A. According to my understanding, neither the Commandant nor I, as District Intelligence Officer, had any authority to exercise any control over any of the means by which information could be received in the Territory of Hawaii, or sent from the Territory. The only Federal control or supervision was that normally exercised by the representatives of Public Health, Immigration, Customs, and the Federal Communications Commission. My authority over civilian population extended only to those in the employ of the naval establishment and their families. Any information that I might have obtained indicating espionage on the part of persons beyond my jurisdiction I supplied to Military Intelligence or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whichever might have investigational jurisdiction.

27. Q. Were you at the time satisfied with the methods used, and the action taken, by these other agencies on recommendations made by you?

A. Yes. It is my conviction that both of the other agencies did their best, considering their limitations as to personnel and equipment, principally personnel.

28. Q. Captain, during the period from about the middle of October, 1941, until the attack, were you furnished with any information which the Commandant of the District received from Washington sources with respect to the international situation, particularly the tense situation in the Pacific, to aid you in carrying out your intelligence duties?

A. Not to the best of my recollection, though I might say that I do not believe that such information would have enabled me to do more than I was then attempting to do with the means available to me.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[314] Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer.

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. John Henry Newton, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Deputy Commander South Pacific and South Pacific Area.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. On or about February 1, I was given command of Cruisers Scouting Force and continued as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force during the remainder of that year.

3. Q. About what was the magnitude of that Command?

A. I had three divisions of heavy cruisers, four cruisers to each division.

4. Q. Did you consider it a large and important Command?

A. I did.

5. Q. Who was your immediate superior in command?

A. The Commander Scouting Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown.

6. Q. Then as I understand it, there was one and only one echelon of command between you and Comander-in-Chief?

A. That is correct.

7. Q. Admiral, did you command an expedition which went into southern latitudes during the early part of 1941?

A. I did.

8. Q. Will you give a brief narrative, covering the forces used, their movements, and in particular your instructions, formal or otherwise, prior to beginning that expedition.

A. About the middle of March, while at sea in the operating area, I was directed to return to Pearl Harbor in the CHICAGO, and upon arrival was met at the buoy by an officer detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to inform me that I was to prepare a division, consisting of four cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, for special service. The division of cruisers consisted of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, SAVANNAH, and BROOKLYN. The squadron of destroyers, I can't recall the number, but it was commanded by Captain Mark Bowman; I believe it was Squadron Three. The squadron consisted of nine destroyers. My verbal instructions were that I would fill to capacity with every type of stores considered necessary for service which might keep me away from Pearl Harbor for an indefinite time. Also that this matter was to be considered highly secret and no word of any kind was to be permitted to get out regarding the sailing of this secret force. I immediately contacted Rear Admiral Theobald, who was Commander Destroyers Battle Force, and told him that I considered it necessary that destroyers immediately be checked to see that they had a maximum allowance of depth charges, that they put on war heads, [315] and get rid of exercise heads, and anything that was not considered necessary for war service. He said that he would issue the necessary instructions to his Squadron Commander. I contacted each Captain and told him of the secret instructions I had received and that I would leave it up to him to see that his ship was in all respects ready for war and for distant service, and to safeguard to the limit leakage of any information or conjecturing on the part of anybody of our possible destination, as I did not know that myself. I saw the Commander-in-Chief before the Fleet departed on an exercise of which I was to sortie with. He showed me the dispatch regarding the detail of a force that I was to command and said he had no information except what was contained in this brief dispatch, that I would proceed to Samoa and await further instructions. He could give no information as to my probable ultimate destination. I was furnished a tanker, the SANGAMON, to accompany, and in case my orders, after arrival at Samoa, were such that the SANGAMON would not accompany me, I would, after fueling from her, have her supply what fuel was necessary for Samoa and return to Pearl Harbor. I sortied with the Fleet and, in accordance with previous verbal orders, I peeled off and headed for a rendezvous which I had given verbally to SANGAMON, Captain Bowman, the Squadron Commander, and each of the cruiser Captains. We proceeded from this rendezvous maintaining complete radio silence, and arrived at Samoa about one week after our departure. I did not inform Samoa by radio of my arrival but sent a plane in with my Staff Aviator to acquaint the Governor with the fact that I would arrive about one o'clock that day with a cruiser force, accompanied by the destroyers, and that I wanted to make sure no radio dispatch of my arrival was sent until I had seen him. We received orders the night of my arrival, as I recall, to split my force, sending two cruisers to Auckland, accompanied by one division of destroyers, and for me to take the other two, namely, the CHICAGO and PORTLAND, accompanied by the Squadron Commander and the other division of the squadron, to Sydney. The night before arriving, I sent a dis-

patch to the Sydney authorities saying that I would be off the entrance at six a. m. the following morning. This was necessary in order that entrance to the harbor would be provided for and that I would have the necessary pilot available who would be familiar with the mine fields. I remained in Sydney for three days and sailed at the end of that time for Brisbane, where I remained for three days, and then sailed for Suva, from which port, after a two day stay, I sailed for Pearl Harbor. The division that went to Auckland had orders, upon departure from that port, to proceed to Tahiti and, after a two day visit there, to return to Pearl Harbor. I never received any information after my return as to the purpose of this trip, except I gathered that it was a trip desired by the State Department. I learned in Sydney that the State Department had notified the chargé that we would arrive and that it was to be kept highly secret and only the highest officials informed.

9. Q. When you received your instructions from Admiral Kimmel, did it occur to you as unusual that an official carrying his responsibility was wholly uninformed as to the purpose of the voyage?

A. I was assured that he had no information or idea as to the purpose of this voyage, other than contained in the brief dispatch which said to send this force to Samoa and await further instructions, because he told me so.

10. Q. Insofar as you know, did Admiral Kimmel ever learn the purpose of that long voyage to southern waters?

A. If he did, he never informed me as to the purpose.

11. Q. Was curiosity expressed in Auckland or in Sydney as to the purpose of the visits there?

[316] A. The authorities were agreeably surprised, and I tried to convey the impression that we were making a good will trip.

12. Q. Admiral, during that long voyage outward, do you recall that your state of mind would have been better had you not been in such great uncertainty concerning the purpose of the voyage?

A. No, I had an idea that we were going to wind up on the Asiatic Station and I put in a system of training, both day and night, that would fit us for any eventuality.

13. Q. During the voyage, did you maintain a high degree of battle readiness in all ships?

A. We did. We were in a condition watch the entire trip, day and night, and at night we cruised without lights.

14. Q. Do you recall if you, in fact, did consider it a valuable training cruise?

A. I consider it one of the finest battle training cruises possible.

15. Q. Admiral, can you recall the specific dates which comprised your last period in Pearl Harbor, prior to 7 December?

A. I had been in Pearl Harbor in my Flagship from about 27 November, 1941, until the morning of 5 December, when I went to sea.

16. Q. Do you recall what your particular personal employment was during that period?

A. I was in command of a task force, temporarily, as the Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Brown had departed about 4 December in the INDIANAPOLIS to make a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions, in company with several Marine officers who were interested in amphibious operations. My personal employment was as Commander Cruisers Scouting Force.

17. Q. Other than your usual duties as the type commander of cruisers, did you have any specific duties while in Pearl Harbor during that period up to Admiral Brown's departure?

A. I did not.

18. Q. Prior to Admiral Brown's departure, say, fairly immediately before it, did you receive from him any particular information concerning the international situation or any specific direction about it?

A. I did not.

19. Q. In general, during the few weeks prior to 7 December, '41, was it customary for Admiral Brown to bring you into conferences during which he set forth such information as he had obtained concerning the international situation, possible imminence of hostilities, and so forth?

A. There may have been one or two conferences where precautionary measures might be stressed of preparing for what might happen, but, as I recall, we had all thought, for six months, that the situation was tense and each type commander had taken precautions to get his own type of ships ready for war, and I do not recall that there was any difference in this preparation immediately preceding 7 December than there had been a month before.

The witness was duly warned.

The examining officer then, at 12 o'clock noon, took a recess until 1:15 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

[317] Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (continued):

20. Q. Admiral, going back to your presence in Pearl Harbor during periods preceding the one which ended on 5 December; do you recall having seen this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before this board, dated 16 October; or having been informed of the contents thereof?

A. I never saw nor was I informed of the contents of such a dispatch.

21. Q. And yet you were the Commander of the most powerful unit under Commander Scouting Force, were you not?

A. I was.

22. Q. During the period between 16 October, the date of this dispatch and, say, the middle of November, '41, do you recall being informed by Vice Admiral Brown concerning any other warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments and so forth?

A. I do not recall having received any such warnings or instructions.

23. Q. Admiral, I hand you three dispatches, Exhibits 7, 8, and 11, what are in evidence in this record, all of which were from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief. Do you recall ever having seen any of these dispatches or having been informed by Admiral Brown or anyone else of their content?

A. I never saw nor heard of such dispatches before December 7, '41.

24. Q. During that period, 26 November to 5 December, did you hear anything which indicated the rapid growth in the danger of the situation vis-a-vis Japan?

A. I did not, except what came in the press.

25. Q. Do you recall that a task force with Admiral Halsey in command went to sea early during your last period in port prior to 7 December?

A. I recall that it left about the same time as I came in port, or shortly after my arrival in port.

26. Q. Were you informed, prior to your own departure about 5 December, where Admiral Halsey's Task Force was and what was its mission?

A. I was not informed.

27. Q. What directive or order did you receive prior to your departure for sea on or about 5 December?

A. I was directed to proceed to a point, as I recall, about 300 miles, bearing 130 True from Midway, and arrive at that point and have the squadron of planes destined for Midway be ready to proceed in their flight from that point to Midway and guarded in that flight by planes that would meet me for this purpose.

[318] 28. Q. What ships did you have under your command?

A. I had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, my Flagship, the PORTLAND, and five destroyers, one of which was the destroyer leader and squadron Flagship PORTER. I do not recall the division number.

29. Q. Upon your departure on that mission, or during it, up to 7 December, did you have any knowledge or intimation which led you to suppose your mission to be other than a somewhat routine build-up of the forces on Midway?

A. I considered this mission solely one to reenforce Midway, but inasmuch as my orders said that upon completion of this duty to return to operating area and resume normal operations, that there was no special significance attached to it other than reenforcement.

30. Q. Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your force over a thousand miles toward Japan?

A. I considered that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time and, as there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past, I set a speed of 17 knots in day light and zig-zagged. Also, I had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance.

31. Q. Were those measures something of an increase over normal security precautions of our forces at sea?

A. They were in that during our time in the operating area we carried on normal operations in connection with training, such as target practice, submarine operations, and, therefore, did not keep a patrol of our own planes as this was covered, I figured, by planes from the base at Pearl Harbor.

32. Q. Did the LEXINGTON have on board her regular complement of planes in addition to the squadron which you were transporting to Midway?

A. As far as I recall, she had her full outfit of planes, plus the additional squadron for Midway.

33. Q. At any time during the outward voyage, did you arm the planes with guns, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, and so forth; or direct warheads installed by destroyers?

A. I did not, to the best of my recollection. I gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparations for war other than had been routine.

34. Q. Admiral, I will ask you to give a brief narrative of what actually occurred with your Task Force from the time you went to sea on 5 December until you heard of the surprise attack made on 7 December.

A. I proceeded to sea on the morning of 5 December and headed for the designated point and arrived to within about fifty miles of that point about 0813 on the morning of 7 December, when we received the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I estimated that I would receive orders to intercept the enemy, which I felt must be to the Northward of Oahu, inasmuch as approach on Pearl Harbor from any other direction would probably have disclosed their presence by passing through or near our normal operating areas, which were to the Southward of the Islands. I signalled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was canceled as I assumed that Midway had probably been attacked as well as Pearl Harbor. I also sent my position to the Commander-in-Chief and told him I had canceled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, [319] after I had sent this dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, I received a dispatch from him to report to Admiral Halsey, who, I believe, had Task Force Eight.

35. Q. Did you know of the composition of Task Force Eight?

A. I did not.

36. Q. And I understand from your previous testimony you did not know where it went and, consequently, could have no idea where it was at the time; is that correct?

A. I will say that I knew normally that Task Force Eight had the ENTERPRISE as Flagship of Admiral Halsey, but I could not be sure what it consisted of at this particular time, as the Task Force might be changed in its composition from time to time due to vessels undergoing overhaul. I did not know what vessels Task Force Eight consisted of nor where it was located on the 7th of December.

37. Q. Nor where it had been?

A. Nor where it had been.

38. Q. Please proceed with the narrative, Admiral.

A. When I received orders to report to Admiral Halsey, I immediately realized that he might not know where I was, as I had not included him in my report of my position after I received news of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I, therefore, sent him a dispatch giving my position. My message evidently crossed his telling me to join him in the vicinity of Oahu, and I realized that something had to be done about this as I was about 700 miles distant from him. However, I took a course for Oahu, taking me back South of the chain of reefs and took up a speed, as I remember, about twenty-five knots, standard for the Task Force. About 1000 or 1100 that morning, I received a message from Admiral Halsey to the effect that I was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles South of Oahu at that time and retiring on the Marshalls. My orders were to intercept and destroy. I, thereupon, changed course to take me to the east-

ward of Johnston Island and attempt, that afternoon, to contact enemy by planes and to make an attack by planes that afternoon in order to slow him down so that I could make physical contact during the night or the following day. I was in communication during all of this day with the INDIANAPOLIS and kept her informed of my movements as I expected to be joined by ComSoFor sometime early the following morning. We launched search planes from cruisers, using cruiser planes for the search on the flank, and carrier planes for search ahead, and proceeded on approximately a southeasterly course at a speed of about twenty-six knots. Our search results were negative. The INDIANAPOLIS appointed a rendezvous and we joined the morning of the 8th, and, as I recall, the search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had gotten information which led them to believe that the attack had not been from carriers well to the Southard, but from the Northard. After the morning of the 8th, Admiral Brown had command of the force until our return to Pearl Harbor during the forenoon of the 13th or 14th.

39. Q. Were there any events which were particularly pertinent during that period, 8 to 13 or 14 December?

A. None except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and destroyers from a tanker and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but [320] fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the PORTLAND as an enemy carrier and the PORTER, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes, was reported as an accompanying cruiser.

40. Q. Reverting to the forenoon of 7 December, at which time it was your assumption that the Japanese carrier force was to the Northard; what were your intentions as regards to the use of your Task Force had you been left free to act?

A. My orders to the carrier was to prepare all planes immediately for action, as soon as I received word of the Pearl Harbor bombing. I had planned, if the enemy was reported to the Northard, to cross the shoals, which had plenty of water between the adjacent islands near me, and attempt to intercept the enemy at daylight the following morning by scout planes and immediately follow up with an attack by bombers.

41. Q. Did the LEXINGTON, at the time, possess normal or more than normal power of air attack?

A. She had more because she had the additional planes that were destined for Midway.

42. Q. On your own assumption that the enemy was to the Northward, did the Fleet have any other detachments at sea which were as favorably placed for an attack as was your force?

A. I'm such there was no other detachment as favorably placed as mine.

43. Q. Admiral, in view of your importance in the command echelons of the Pacific Fleet and, more particularly, because of the duties assigned you on or about 5 December, do you recall if you thought at the time that you were adequately informed and sufficiently in the confidence of the command echelons above you?

A. I felt at that time that I probably had been furnished as much information as necessary for me to know, as I didn't realize until sometime afterwards that the dispatches that I saw had been received prior to my departure. However, I believe that the contents of those dispatches had probably been made known to the Task Force Commanders, and I became a Task Force Commander with the LEXINGTON and the two cruisers I have mentioned due to a sudden change in which Commander Scouting Force took the INDIANAPOLIS to go on a special trip to Johnston and Palmyra Islands. I have since thought that he, Vice Admiral Brown, had information that I should have had when I took charge of this Task Force.

44. Q. Do you recall if, when you were being passed a formal order governing your mission to Midway, you saw any of Admiral Kimmel's Staff who might well have ascertained if you were properly informed?

A. I saw Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff almost daily, as he lived in an adjacent apartment to where I lived, but he never mentioned any dispatches or secret information that had been received. I saw no others of the Admiral Kimmel's Staff who disclosed any secret information to me.

45. Q. And you had no conference with the Commander-in-Chief or any other high commander just before your departure or prior to 5 December?

A. As I recall, I saw Commander Scouting Force on his Flagship and he told me the purpose of his taking the INDIANAPOLIS to Johnston and Palmyra Islands and gave me a general idea of what he was going to do and when I might expect him back in the area for operations.

[321] 46. Q. At the time, did Admiral Brown know of your mission to Midway?

A. I am not sure, but I imagine he did.

47. Q. But it was not the subject of conversation between you on that occasion?

A. Not that I recall. There was nothing about my mission other than to proceed to a point, get rid of some planes, and return to the operating area and resume normal training operations.

48. Q. Do you recall the date of your receipt of your formal order and from whom it was issued?

A. I do not recall the date, but I believe it was about one day preceding my day of departure. I am not sure whether the Task Force Commander, Vice Admiral Brown, signed these orders or whether they were signed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Note: The examining officer identified the directive for this task in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as CinCPac secret dispatch 040237 of December, 1941, addressed to Comtaskfor 3, ComFourteen, and ComPatWing 2, information to Combatfor, Combasefor, Comairbatfor, and LEXINGTON. The examining officer was unsuccessful in ascertaining in what form this directive was passed from Comtaskfor 3 (Vice Admiral Brown) to the witness. The communications files of Comtaskfor 3 were transferred from his then Flagship, the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS, to the U.S.S. LEXINGTON, in January, 1942, and said files were presumably lost when the latter vessel was sunk in action during 1942.

49. Q. Admiral, a somewhat hypothetical question: From what you subsequently learned of the area from which the Jap carriers launched their attack, what would have been the probabilities that you would

have been able to put in an air attack on those carriers had you been left free to act or if you had been directed to attack to the Northard?

A. I think it might have been possible to have made contact by plane and possibly to have delivered a bombing attack. Of course, I don't know what course the enemy retired on after the bombing, but I understood that their carriers launched the Pearl Harbor attack from a point about 200 miles due North of Pearl, and I figured that they would retire, if they had not already bombed Midway, to a point to the Northard of Midway which would clear them of scouting planes picking them up from Midway.

50. Q. Then you would have launched your own air search from a point well to the Northard of the line Midway to Oahu?

A. I would. I could have gotten to a 0600 position, which would have had me well to the Northard of the Hawaiian Islands-Midway line, and to the westward of the enemy's best possible position.

51. Q. And would your fuel supply have permitted those movements?

A. It would, as I was fully fueled upon departure from Pearl and had been at sea only two days where speed, up to the morning of the 7th, had not been in excess of about seventeen knots.

52. Q. Admiral, do you recall the reasoning under which you arrived at the assumption that the Japanese carriers attacked from the North?

A. I do. I felt sure that the Japanese had a better chance for coming in with a force from the Northard without being observed than from any other direction because all ships to and from the Asiatic Station, for sometime preceding 7 December, had been routed by a Southerly route. I believe the [322] only traffic to the Northard was between Pearl Harbor and Midway. Also our training grounds were all to the Southard of the Hawaiian Islands, extending as far as two hundred miles South. We very seldom had exercises which took us to the Northard of the Isles. I felt sure the Japanese were fully cognizant of this. I was greatly surprised when I received the word to assume Japanese carriers to be two hundred miles South of Oahu and felt that my reasoning was faulty.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would like to add, at this time, that all hands had felt a gradual tautening of the situation for a period of several months preceding Pearl Harbor. Ships were not allowed to anchor in exposed positions and ships engaged in training exercises were cautioned to transfer observing parties prior to leaving port and to take all precautions not to stop or slow down in the operating areas unless absolutely necessary. We felt that a surprise might come and, for this reason, that we could not take chances of stopping in the area or taking speeds that would make it easy to have submarines make a successful surprise attack on us, especially at night. My ships were better fitted than most regarding radar. The NORTHAMPTON, CHICAGO, and PENSACOLA were all fitted

with the CXAM. We kept this manned at night, usually for exercise in the early hours of evening and training but made frequent sweeps to make sure that our area was clear. I believe that the majority felt that the submarine menace was our greatest menace.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-sixth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 2:35 p. m., took a recess until 5 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Irving H. Mayfield, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Vice Admiral John Henry Newton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously [323] taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 5:10 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[323] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 15, 1944

TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 1:30 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. William B. Stephenson, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve, attached to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Q. When were you called to active duty as a Naval Reserve Officer?

A. 23 June 1941.

3. Q. Please state the duties performed by you during the calendar year 1941 after you were called to active duty.

A. Until approximately 1 July 1941, I was in doctrination status, and from and after approximately 1 July 1941, I was designated as head of Section B7J, which, in Naval Intelligence parlance, at that time, meant the Japanese Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District.

[324] 4. Q. In performing your duties in connection with counter-espionage in Hawaii, did you have occasion to handle matters concerning certain consular agents who, at that time, were in the Territory?

A. I did, sir.

5. Q. Please outline such information as you have relating to those agents.

A. The so-called "consular agents" are what the Japanese call "toritsuginin". I am informed by competent Japanese translators that this term literally means "agent man", or "intermediary", or "come-in-

between man". That is a literal Japanese interpretation of that term, but, for sake of consistency, I will refer to them as "consular agents". These consular agents operated as such in the Hawaiian Islands for fifteen or twenty years before the present war. Their functions were to assist resident Japanese aliens and citizens of the United States to fill out written report forms required to be made periodically by Japanese national law. The average Japanese in Hawaii, being fairly illiterate, was unable to accomplish these forms by himself, and, in the furtherance of Japanese extraterritorial control over its residents abroad, the Japanese Consulate General of Honolulu appointed or recognized certain literate Japanese in the community as consular agents to assist other residents in filling out the prescribed forms. As of the year 1941, there were approximately 240 such consular agents actively engaged in their duties in the Hawaiian Islands and residing on all principal Islands of this group. The consular agents were largely drawn from Japanese priests, Japanese language school teachers, and Japanese hotel keepers. These consular agents were recognized by the Consulate in two ways. Up until 1939, the Consulate annually released to the Japanese press of these Islands a list of recognized consular agents. Second, the Japanese Consulate General provided these agents with certificates certifying their apparent official connection with the Consulate. These agents held themselves out to the public as such and they should not be understood to be in any sense secret espionage agents, insofar as their routine consular duties were concerned. However, in counter-espionage work here, it was recognized by the District Intelligence Officer and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that this group of 240 or more consular agents provided a substantial reservoir of information-collecting agents who could just as well be used by the Consul for economic, political, and military espionage purposes. It was known before the war that for a number of years some consular agents did render economic survey reports to the Consulate. In one instance, and only one instance, that occurring in June, 1940 (and officially reported in the files of the District Intelligence Office), it was learned from a most reliable informant, whose accuracy has since the war on this point been fully established, that one consular agent on the Island of Maui, whose residence overlooked Lahaina Roads, was requested by the Japanese Vice Consul to report on the presence of the United States Fleet at Lahaina Roads and report the fact of its departure when and if it departed. It was further reliably established that such a report was made by this consular agent to the Japanese Vice Consul. Outside of that one instance, there was no information in the files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, that clearly indicated any prewar espionage of the consular agent group. However, the potentialities of the agents to engage in espionage and the fact that one, in June, 1940, did so, was believed to be reasonable basis for such investigation of these men as could be made within limitations of personnel and facilities available. Investigation of individual cases, up until the start of the war, revealed no further espionage activity apparent. Perhaps the most significant question facing the United States Government with relation to these consular agents in 1941, was the question whether prosecution should be instituted against the consular agents for their having failed to register as the agents of a foreign [325] government, as required by Act of Congress, 8 June 1938, as amended 7 August 1939.

Following the discovery of the June, 1940, espionage incident involving one consular agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted numerous investigations of individual consular agents. Their reports were sent forward to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and eventually reached the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I may state, parenthetically, that my testimony on this point is predicated upon a review of files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, and of the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii. On 22 May 1941, the United States Attorney General wrote the District Attorney asking the latter's views with reference to whether these consular agents should be prosecuted. The District Attorney conferred shortly thereafter with representatives of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On 4 June 1941, the District Attorney wrote the Attorney General the result of his conference with these representatives and the files of the District Intelligence Office contain a copy of the District Attorney's letter to the Attorney General of that date.

6. Q. Have you a copy of the letter which appears in the files of the District Intelligence Office in your possession?

A. I do, sir.

7. Q. Will you please present it?

The witness produced a copy of the letter and it was offered in evidence by the examining officer, copy received and appended marked "Exhibit 32 (1) and (2)".

8. Q. Will you please proceed with your statement.

A. The correspondence running between the District Attorney and the Attorney General reveals that the Attorney General, several times up to and including 18 September 1941, asked the District Attorney for further detailed statements of the District Attorney's views in this matter. That correspondence shows that the District Attorney conferred again with the Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in one instance, personally, with Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding that Department. The District Attorney persisted in his views, as stated in Exhibit 32, that these consular agents should be prosecuted. He made no further reference, however, to the continuing opinion of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as expressed through the District Intelligence Officer, that such agents should be prosecuted. That correspondence does not reveal further conferences with the District Intelligence Officer, but, on the basis of my personal recollection, I may state that at a time I believe to have been late in September, 1941, Captain I. H. Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, in conversation with Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R., and myself, stated that he had had occasion to discuss the consular agent question again with the Commandant and with the United States District Attorney, and that the Commandant's and his own view was unchanged, that is, they both considered prosecution of these agents in order and required by law. The correspondence I have referred to shows, and it was the statement of the District Intelligence Officer to me at the time these conferences were current, that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, took the position that he was responsible for internal security in the Hawaiian Islands and that the

arrest and prosecution of several hundred Japanese consular agents would be detrimental to the development of the program [326] of the Army then in progress, which program was calculated to convince the local Japanese that they would receive the utmost fair treatment in the event of a crisis here, in return for their loyalty to the United States. I noted from the correspondence a letter of the Attorney General to the District Attorney, dated 2 August 1941, inclosing a photostatic copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to the Attorney General, the Secretary of War's letter being dated 25 July 1941. In this photostatic copy, the view of the Secretary of War was expressed that he concurred with the view of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that prosecution of the consular agents would be unwise for the reasons stated. There were no prosecutions of these consular agents instituted prior to the war.

9. Q. Please outline other sources available to the Japanese in the Hawaiian area for obtaining information which came to your attention prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. Counter-espionage study in the Hawaiian Islands was based on a number of assumptions as to the probable source of Japanese espionage. Suspected and known sources were investigated as soon as possible and as fully as possible. Investigation was done concurrently by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the District Intelligence Officer by virtue of a Presidential directive giving those two services concurrent jurisdiction in the Japanese field. The files of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, contained considerable information gained by investigation from 1935 until the outbreak of war, and from this reported data, as it developed before the war, the counter-espionage section of the District Intelligence Office, in which I was responsible for the Japanese Section, felt that there were, among many, the following important sources of Japanese espionage information here: (1) The overt and secret activities of the accredited Japanese Consular officials; (2) The officers and men of visiting Japanese naval vessels, and, to a lesser degree, the crews of Japanese merchant vessels; (3) Local residents, chiefly Japanese but not necessarily exclusively Japanese, who, because of loyalty to Japan or other consideration, were willing to give information to Japan detrimental to the United States; (4) Visiting Japanese passing through or temporarily sojourning in the Territory of Hawaii; (5) The public press. I will attempt to elaborate on each one of those sources. It was an operating premise of counter-espionage that Japan must be using its Consular officials in Hawaii to gather military information. The incident of June, 1940, wherein the Vice Consul requested military information of a consular agent, to cite a specific example, supports the correctness of this assumption. However, in operating against the Consulate, counter-espionage agents were at a decided disadvantage. They could do nothing at the critical times following 27 May 1941, to impair the negotiations being carried on by the State Department. This meant, in effect, that only the most limited physical surveillance of the Consulate could be maintained and it was fully recognized that within the limitations imposed by national policy, counter-espionage could not be too effective against the Consulate. The Consulate was in a position to effect daily contact and consultation with the most pro-Japanese organizations in the Territory, including the Japanese press, the

NYK line, the Japanese banks, the Japanese language schools, and Japanese religious groups. It was believed, prior to the war, that the Consulate took full advantage of this liaison and, in effect, extended its information-gathering activities to the farthest corners of the Hawaiian Islands through the Japanese business, religious, and educational groups that he contacted. This group of suspected collaborators (newspapermen, priests, school teachers, merchants, etc.) of the Japanese Consul numbered well over a thousand persons, most of them aliens. Surveillance or other investigation of all of these persons was virtually impossible with only thirty or forty F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence investigators [327] available. Another important source of information, both from the standpoint of its collection and its transmission to Japan, was believed to have been in the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel. Naval training squadrons of the Japanese Navy made periodic visits to the Hawaiian Islands for training cruises, the last of which was in the Fall of 1939. In addition, Japanese naval oil tankers, which regularly plied between Japan and California, regularly stopped in Honolulu. There is very strong evidence, though not conclusive, that it was a regular practice for the Japanese tankers to leave personnel behind in Honolulu and for these personnel to return to Japan on a succeeding tanker. The clear implication of this practice, which was reasonably established by tallying the total number of Japanese leaving and boarding a tanker while in port, was that personnel left behind were left here for espionage purposes. It was also believed that these personnel were brought to Hawaii with the farsighted view in mind of making them personally familiar with the Island of Oahu, and thereby more valuable in the future. Parenthetically, it may be noted that several of the personnel of Japanese midget submarines, which were in these waters prior to and at the time of the attack of 7 December 1941, are now known to have visited Honolulu prior to the war as midshipmen or enlisted men on Japanese naval training vessels. Full reports of the activities of visiting Japanese naval personnel, insofar as they could be determined, were made promptly to the Navy Department by the District Intelligence Officer. As early as 1938, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, strongly urged the Navy Department to attempt to induce the State Department to permit no more visits of Japanese public vessels to Hawaiian ports. The last Japanese naval oiler called at Honolulu in 1940. The crewmen of merchant vessels, particularly the NYK passenger liners, were also quite active in sight-seeing and photographing activities on the Island of Oahu, as were the Japanese naval personnel before them. These men were thus in a position to gain visual impressions of our most vital defense installations and of Pearl Harbor, and return to their ships and immediately record in writing what information they had gained a few hours previously. Information thus recorded was beyond the efforts of any United States agency to control or prevent from reaching Japan. Efforts were made by the District Intelligence Officer to secure the assistance of other Government Departments through their local representatives in Honolulu to restrict, insofar as possible, the shore leave of Japanese merchant crewmen. When the TAIYO MARU, the last Japanese liner to call at Honolulu before the war, was in the port of Honolulu, from the morning of 1 November 1941 until the

evening of 5 November 1941, the Customs authorities did restrict shore leave privileges of all personnel of the TAIYO MARU except those certified by the Master of that vessel to be ashore in the interests of maintenance and operation of the vessel. The District Intelligence Officer, at the same time, was active in his efforts to prevent mail being carried out of the United States on the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. Upon representations made to the Postmaster General in Washington, through channels of which I do not have knowledge, an order was made and enforced that no United States mail, other than second class matter, could be taken from the United States by the TAIYO MARU on that voyage. However, the effect of this counter-espionage measure probably was diminished in that public notice was made of the fact that the TAIYO MARU would not carry first class mail. In cooperation with Customs authorities, searches were effected of the persons and baggage of all persons leaving Honolulu on the last voyage of the TAIYO MARU, in an effort to prevent the transmission to Japan of any vital intelligence. Further, no visitors from shore were allowed aboard the vessel, and the departing passengers, once aboard the vessel, were not allowed back on the dock. Thus, in general, with reference to this particular vessel, the most stringent security measures possible under [328] the law were taken and it was only in his instance, and this instance alone, that the measures so highly desired by counter-espionage agencies in Hawaii were realized.

10. Q. Did you think, at the time, that those measures were effective, in case there was a determination of an adequate prior preparation on the part of the Japanese spies here to get word back home by that ship?

A. It was our view—and by “our view”, I mean the view of the District Intelligence Officer, as I heard him express it—that the measures taken were the very best we could do to prevent information reaching the enemy aboard the TAIYO MARU. It was realized, however, that there were two serious loopholes, even as regards the TAIYO MARU: (1) The fact that departing passengers could take with them such information as they might remember in their minds; (2) That such information as might be placed in a sealed Consulate pouch and delivered to the TAIYO MARU for passage to the Japanese foreign office could not be examined. It, therefore, boiled down to this, that the measures taken would tend to force the Japanese espionage system here to send more information through Consular channels and, second, in all likelihood, prevent the transmission of bulky pictorial or physical intelligence. At that time, the Island of Oahu was experiencing considerable construction of military and naval installations. For example, the underground fuel storage depot at Red Hill, and several auxiliary military landing fields, in which connection, I think it is perhaps pertinent to observe that the only effective fighter plane resistance put up against the Japanese on 7 December 1941 came from certain Army pursuit planes based at a newly constructed emergency landing field. I am informed that this landing field was constructed, although not fully completed, after the departure of the TAIYO MARU. Charts of the Island of Oahu recovered from Japanese aircraft shot down on 7 December 1941 failed to show the existence of this emergency or auxiliary landing field, at, I believe, Mokuleia.

Insofar as my knowledge of the military and naval installations as of 5 November 1941 is concerned, I believe that the charts of this Island used by the Japanese attacking aviators were fairly accurate as to information dated prior to 5 November 1941, but did not contain information of later date except for data on vessels in Pearl Harbor. The third type of source I believe I mentioned was to be found in the loyal individuals believed to be chiefly Japanese who would aid Japan in securing military information. I have been careful to note that the District Intelligence Officer never assumed that this group of individuals would necessarily be all Japanese. The District Intelligence Officer, for example, was the only officer, to my knowledge, who, at a time a year or more before the war, saw the possibility that Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, a resident German alien, might be a Japanese espionage agent. Kuehn was generally regarded in Honolulu as a suspicious character and loosely characterized a Nazi spy, but, from the functional standpoint, the District Intelligence Officer realized that Kuehn might be acting for Germany or Japan, or both, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington was so notified. This is merely given by way of example; however, it was a fact that our best estimate was the large majority of individual spies or information-gatherers would be found among the Japanese. The Japanese population, as of the date of the outbreak of war, was approximately 160,000, about 37,500 of whom were aliens. In the neighborhood of fifty per cent of the 122,500 citizen Japanese also possessed Japanese citizenship and were, therefore, dual citizens. Specific subversive activities of these individuals were difficult to detect but some were detected prior to the war. For example, the Japanese community openly solicited and subscribed to Japanese war bonds to finance the Japan war effort against China. Japanese residents of the Island of Hawaii openly [329] subscribed sufficient money to buy a military airplane for the Japanese Navy, which airplane was presented in Japan by a loyal representative of the Hawaii Island Japanese and was christened by the Japanese Navy "The Spirit of Hawaii". The Japanese residents, right down to the youngest school children, saved and collected tin foil, lead foil, and other valuable salvageable material which was systematically collected and then transmitted to Japan on Japanese naval vessels or other ships. Not publicly, the Japanese Government solicited local residents, who were in a position to do so, to purchase valuable machine tools for shipment to Japan and this was done as early as 1938. The District Intelligence Officer had contemporary knowledge of these activities through informants. Loyal residents made periodic trips to Japan as they were able to do, and it was always suspected that when in Japan they must have been interrogated as to their knowledge of the defenses of these Islands. The lack of adequate restricted areas and the geographical constitution of the Island of Oahu, made it possible that any Japanese resident here would have a wealth of information concerning military and naval installations here. There was no way the counter-espionage agencies could prevent local residents transmitting that information, if they were in Japan as travelers. Similarly, until the departure of the last Japanese vessel, 5 November 1941, there was no power to supervise the mails and such information could have been transmitted in that

manner. Local residents were hand-picked for their information and then patronized and solicited by the Government of Japan in any of many ways. Local residents were freely invited to call aboard visiting Japanese naval vessels, at the docks in Honolulu and at out-ports, and the disaffected persons among those local residents, we assumed freely gave such information as they had at their command. I do not wish it to appear that my detailing of the activities of local Japanese residents is full and complete. I think that that suffices to give a broad view of what those activities were. Visiting Japanese, or, for that matter, any visitor whatsoever, who passed through Honolulu on a trans-Pacific voyage or who stayed here a few days, could, in the space of a very few hours, tour Oahu by taxi cab readily available at the dock, and gather a wealth of information concerning the defenses of this Island. It is known that certain visitors passing through here did that, including Japanese naval officers who were traveling in civilian clothes on NYK liners. On several occasions, these visitors were trailed by agents of the District Intelligence Office and almost invariably they would drive from downtown Honolulu to Aiea Heights overlooking Pearl Harbor, thence around the public highway encompassing the lochs of Pearl Harbor, then to Waianea, which was considered one of the three most vulnerable landing spots on the Island of Oahu. On occasions, visitors also called at the Japanese Consulate General. These activities, whether by visiting Japanese naval personnel, civilians, or non-Japanese, were wholly without our capacity to prevent. In closing my discussion of sources, I include the local press, including the two leading dailys of Honolulu. For approximately the first half of 1941, the District Intelligence Officer also supervised Public Relations and, therefore, relations with the press, for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It was found that in many instances one of the leading Honolulu newspapers, "Honolulu Star Bulletin", would not cooperate fully in withholding news of interest to the national defense, which, because of the inadequacy of our laws, could not be legally suppressed. It was known that the Japanese Consul General subscribed to six copies per day of the Honolulu Star Bulletin and he regularly analyzed and clipped this paper. I recall one incident when the floating drydock was brought to the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor early in 1941 and a local newspaper, the "Star Bulletin", I believe, went out of its way to take a photograph of the drydock while off port and publish it in the newspaper. The Japanese Consul General [330] at Honolulu is known to have transmitted information of one kind or another to Japan in the performance of his duties. He used facilities of the international mails, the Commercial Pacific Cable Company, Radio Corporation of America, Mackay Wireless, and, I believe, Globe Wireless. In addition, the Consular pouch was transmitted manually from a representative of the Consul General to Japanese naval commanders when naval vessels were in port, or to Masters of commercial Japanese vessels when they called here. The Consular pouch was also carried, at times, by couriers plying between Tokyo and Washington. In addition, there was available, although proof of its use is lacking, any trustworthy local resident returning to Japan on any vessel as late as the TAIYO MARU, 5 November 1941, who could have been deputized by the Consul to act as a courier.

11. Q. What was your occupation prior to coming on active duty with the Navy?

A. I was an attorney at law, practicing in all the courts of the Territory of Hawaii?

12. Q. How long had you been practicing law?

A. Since November, 1938.

13. Q. Will you please now outline the authority of the District Intelligence Officer to control espionage by the Japanese and such action of a counterespionage nature as was taken under these powers prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. The District Intelligence Officer, as a member of the Commandant's Staff, but having certain direct responsibilities to the Chief of Naval Operations in the professional field of counter-espionage, had no authority whatsoever to invoke practical counter-espionage measures. His investigative jurisdiction was complete insofar as investigations of naval personnel or investigations on area under control of the Navy Department was concerned, but even in that field he had only the power to recommend, through the Commandant or through appropriate commanding officers, action to be taken. So far as civilians were concerned, and therein we believe before the war lay the greatest danger in the espionage field, the District Intelligence Officer had concurrent investigative authority with F. B. I. in cases involving Japanese persons, but espionage by other than Japanese was to be investigated only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In any event, the District Intelligence Officer, if he investigated Japanese in the general civilian population, had no power whatsoever, nor did, for that matter, anyone in the Navy Department have power to take active steps to invoke counter-espionage measures. Prosecuting espionage agents was never considered an adequate answer to Japanese espionage, and even insofar as prosecution was concerned, that lay entirely with the United States District Attorney. Active counter-espionage encompasses such matters as supervision of communications, registration of aliens, erection of physical barriers and pass systems at vital installations, as well as under-cover investigation and neutralization of suspected agents. To a large degree, the affirmative steps that might have been taken to deny information to Japan before the war lay within the province of other government agencies or were wholly illegal under our system of law. As I previously noted, one of the most compelling restrictions on counter-espionage activity was the fact that the State Department was engaged in crucial negotiations whose ultimate success must not be endangered by open measures that might have been taken against the Japanese Consulate General here. Just to give one very good example, but very relevant to the success of the attack on 7 December 1941, the Japanese Consulate was believed, and on the basis of information acquired after the attack is known, to have been sending intelligence to Japan by encrypted messages filed [331] with the commercial communication companies in Honolulu. There was no authority in any of the counter-espionage agencies to examine or supervise, in any way, this Consular traffic. It is known, on the basis of information acquired after the war, that the Consulate used commercial communications facilities for the transmission of vital intelligence from and after 3 December 1941. After the beginning of the war and starting approximately at 1100 on the 11th of December 1941,

I was engaged at length in an investigation and analysis of certain information transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General to Japan prior to the war. The purpose of this investigation was not to reconstruct a historical account but to determine whether any vestiges of the pre-war Japanese espionage system possibly remained to operate during the period of war. For reference, I may state that this investigation, in its first stages, including extensive analysis of the available Japanese intelligence traffic of December, 1941, was written principally by myself and submitted over the signature of the District Intelligence Officer to the Office of Naval Intelligence. These reports were carried under the caption "Japanese Consulate Honolulu—Espionage Activities of." The first two reports were dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942, and five copies of each were transmitted to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C. Subsequent reports, under the same title but dealing with different phases of the Consulate's espionage activities, are also on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. For additional information on the pre-war espionage activities of the Consulate, I would also refer to the District Intelligence Officer's secret "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands," dated 20 April 1943, available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. Paragraphs 81-106 thereof briefly outline the type of information collected by the Consulate, personnel used, and methods of collection, evaluation, and transmission of such information.

Note: The examining officer has identified the reports mentioned by the witness as being ones on file in the following locations: (a) Two reports titled "Japanese Consulate Honolulu—Espionage Activities of", dated 9 February 1942 and 14 February 1942, on file in General Files of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Op 16-A-7), Navy Department, in the case history jacket of Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, File No. 3919; (b) Report titled "An Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands", dated 20 April 1943, on file in the Counter Intelligence Branch (Op 16-B-7), Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

14. Q. What was your opinion, say, during the Fall of 1941, with respect to the adequacy of the security afforded to vital military information in Hawaii under the intelligence set-up as you have outlined it?

A. I'll have to answer this in two phases. I believe that the quality of attention devoted to the problem by the District Intelligence Officer and Federal Bureau of Investigation was quite satisfactory, but the quantity woefully insufficient. By that I mean, as I have said earlier, there were insufficient personnel, and more so, insufficient trained personnel, to cope with the espionage problem. The second phase, namely, the physical safeguarding of information concerning various military and naval installations by the Commanding Officers, I can merely state that no outstanding examples of lack of physical security whereby information might have been compromised came to my attention. The most vital information was before the war conceived to be the information concerning Fleet movements insofar as presence of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or the entry or departure of Fleet units from Pearl Harbor was concerned. Except as to Fleet units that might depart under cover of darkness, there was virtually no security that could be afforded Fleet movements. Aiea Heights, overlooking Pearl Harbor, and Pearl City Peninsula, jutting into

Pearl Harbor, and being within two hundred yards of a new carrier berth, were areas both populated by Japanese, among them suspects. Nothing could be done to remove them from these areas in the absence of conclusive legal evidence that would sustain an espionage prosecution. In [332] addition, any businessman in Honolulu, whose office happened to look to seaward, could see vessels passing by, and those on the fourth and fifth stories of certain buildings could, with the naked eye, assuming the usual good visibility, determine the numbers and types of battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers entering or leaving Pearl Harbor. Thus a fairly accurate count of the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor at any given time of day could be made from Aiea Heights and Pearl City, and entries and departures be observed from even downtown Honolulu as well as more proximate localities on the beach.

15. Q. Did any means of adding to the security of ships' movements occur to the personnel of the District Intelligence Office at that time?

A. Realizing the impossibility of preventing the collection of this vital information, we early worked on the premise that our job should be to try to detect the means whereby it was being transmitted to the effective enemy destination, namely, Japan. As I have previously outlined, various public and private means of communication, not subject to official supervision and so manifold as to be impossible of total regulation, were available to Japanese espionage for transmission of this information. It was unnecessary for the Japanese to resort to anything so romantic as illegal radio transmitters in the hills or anything like that.

16. Q. Had you any information prior to the attack concerning the use of Japanese-manned or controlled fishing vessels in espionage?

A. For many years, the Japanese sampan fleet in Hawaii was openly suspect. It was almost entirely manned by Japanese aliens, many of them known to be ex-Japanese naval enlisted men. It was known that many of the crewmen had entered the United States illegally, that these sampans had, to some extent, assisted in the smuggling of narcotics, and it was rumored, but never proved, that they sometimes contacted Japanese submarines off these Islands. Numerous reports were received from Commanders afloat concerning the presence of Japanese fishing sampans proximate to Navy units engaged in target practice or tactical maneuvers. However, it was never satisfactorily established that these meetings were other than innocent coincidences. The normal fishing grounds which these sampans plied, extended, in some instances, hundreds of miles off Oahu, and it was recognized that perhaps, in effect, the Fleet units were "trespassing" on fishing grounds which the Japanese sampans had long used. However, it was recognized, but without any power available to limit their operations, that these sampans could be used to reconnoiter Fleet units at sea and also to establish to what extent, if at all, air and surface patrols operated from Oahu. No evidence that any sampan crewmen gathered vital intelligence and transmitted it to Japan has ever been found.

17. Q. Will you state what information you had prior to 7 December or that you learned thereafter concerning other intelligence sources which operated in Oahu, other than that which funneled through the

Japanese Consul here, during the week immediately preceding 7 December?

A. No information has come to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer to indicate that any intelligence was transmitted from here to Japan in the last week before the war except that which was transmitted by the Japanese Consulate. However, there was one suspicious fact that came to the attention of F.B.I., G-2, and the District Intelligence Officer immediately preceding the war that may have been a transmission of intelligence. On 4 December 1941, the editor of the most militaristic daily newspaper in Tokyo wired his local correspondent in Honolulu, Mrs. Motokazu Mori, that he wished to interview, by trans-Pacific radio-telephone, some prominent Hawaiian Japanese with respect to the conditions in Hawaii, and the editor requested that Mrs. Mori arrange for such an interview. Mrs. Mori was unable to secure any prominent local Japanese who would permit himself to be so interviewed and so, when the Tokyo editor placed a call on 5 December 1941 to Mrs. Mori at Honolulu, she asked her husband, Dr. Motokazu Mori, to permit himself to be [333] interviewed. At the time this trans-Pacific telephone call was made, a confidential source furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu with a transcription of the telephone conversation. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the facts I have just related about this incident were not fully known until after the war started. However, it was known on 6 December 1941 the following had occurred: About 1400 on 6 December 1941, the duty officer at the District Intelligence Office was apprised by representative of F.B.I., Honolulu, that F.B.I. had a written transcript of the telephone call of Dr. Mori and the Tokyo editor and that the same was available for inspection by the District Intelligence Officer, or his representative. The Duty Officer, Lieutenant Commander—then Lieutenant—Denzel Carr, U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant George P. Kimball, U.S.N.R., head of District Intelligence Office, Counter-Espionage Section, immediately communicated with Captain Mayfield at his quarters, Pearl Harbor, and advised him they believed the matter of sufficient importance that he should return to his office and then confer with F.B.I. Captain Mayfield returned to the District Intelligence Office, discussed the matter with Lieutenants Carr and Kimball, and then proceeded to F.B.I. Office, where he examined the transcript, discussed its import with Mr. Robert L. Shivers, local F.B.I. head, and Lieutenant Colonel G. W. Bicknell, in charge of G-2 counter-espionage activities. An examination of this transcript, both by Captain Mayfield and Lieutenant Carr—Lieutenant Carr being an internationally recognized language scholar and very proficient in Japanese—impelled these two officers to the conclusion that the original transcription of this conversation should be examined immediately by Lieutenant Carr in order to study any possible hidden meanings in the conversation that might be concealed in the inflections of the voice, this conversation having been in Japanese. Lieutenant Carr stated, at that time, that certain of the passages, as translated by the F.B.I. translator, appeared somewhat incongruous in the Japanese speech, that he, personally, felt he should examine the whole recording. Lieutenant Carr wished to do this immediately but F.B.I., for some reason, stated the recording would not be available for his study until 1000 on 7 December 1941. Lieutenant Carr, sometime after

the attack, was allowed to listen to the recording and he was unable to conclude therefrom that it did contain military information in any hidden form. Lieutenant Carr subsequently participated in an intensive interrogation of Dr. Mori and Mrs. Mori and was of the opinion, which was concurred in by interrogators of the other Government agencies present, that the Moris were absolutely blameless and wholly surprised by this so-called trans-Pacific telephonic interview. A study of the transcript itself, which is available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, will show that there was an open conveyance of some military information in this telephone call. For example, the reference to the presence or absence of planes in the sky and armed force personnel on the streets of Honolulu, Dr. Mori having answered directly questions put to him by the Tokyo editor. I, personally, believe it unlikely, from my extensive study of this incident, that it was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan, because other, more efficient, more concealed methods of transmission, namely the use of encrypted dispatches by public communications, were open to the Consulate.

18. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the refusal to prosecute the Japanese agents for nonregistration, did that failure to get results, in a step which your office felt should have been taken, adversely affect the esprit of your office and reduce its efforts in other directions?

A. I feel that I can state categorically that the failure to prosecute these consular agents did not adversely affect the esprit of the District Intelligence organization and its operations, principally because the matter was one of policy, not generally known in the organization, and because there [334] were so many other unsolved problems, possible leakages, to be worked on continually.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I think it should be added, in conclusion, that the Commandant authorized the District Intelligence Officer to deal directly with the Fleet Intelligence Officer on all matters conceived to be of importance to the Fleet in the interest of speedy transmission of information to the Fleet. To my knowledge, in every instance where the District Intelligence Officer secured information of possible value to the Fleet, that was immediately transmitted, generally by Captain Mayfield personally calling on the Fleet Intelligence Officer. It was recognized that there was some possibility that local events and happenings in the espionage field might provide some clue, however remote, as to the prospective enemy's intentions, and in this respect the Commandant was most liberal in allowing free flow of information. However, there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization, which, at that time, included a section whose responsibilities have since passed to the District Security Officer, that the Commandant, namely, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, was not security conscious, nor was he too mindful of the en-

emy espionage potential here. I can state, from personal recollection, that on many occasions before the war, this apparent attitude of the Commandant was the cause of minor depression amongst officers in the District Intelligence organization. This was particularly apparent with regard to the Commandant's attitude toward physical security measures that the Security Section of the District Intelligence thought were necessary to the safeguarding of both the physical plant and information available in the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor. I can, however, cite no causal connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack here.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[335] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

MONDAY, APRIL 17, 1944

TWENTY-NINTH DAY

PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The examination met at 9:28 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the twenty-eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, U. S. Navy, Commander Battleship Division Two.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. I returned from duty on the Asiatic Station to duty at Navy Department, Washington, May, 1941. Upon my arrival in Washington, I was assigned to duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence as head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch. I remained on this duty until early in October, 1941, when I was assigned the duty of Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence under Captain T. S. Wilkinson. I continued on this duty throughout the year 1941.

3. Q. Admiral, while you were serving as Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, did your duties in any way bring you into contact

with the activities of the Intelligence Offices of the several Naval Districts?

A. As Assistant Director, I had no direct contact or supervision over the administration or activities within the several Naval Districts' intelligence organizations.

4. Q. Prior to that time, while you were the head of the Domestic Branch, will you please outline your relations in connection with the District Intelligence Offices?

[336] A. The officer in charge of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, sometimes referred to as Branch "B", has direct control and supervision over the activities of the several Naval Districts' intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States. In this capacity, the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch does have a general good over-all knowledge of what is being done in the intelligence field in the several Districts. The Office of Naval Intelligence did not, however, during the period in question, attempt to issue detailed instructions or control the details of operation within each Naval District. The policy of O. N. I., at that time, was very definitely set forth to the effect that each District Commandant would execute the general policies established by O. N. I. and carry out the broad directives in such manner as the Commandant felt best suited the organization within his District.

5. Q. Admiral, will you please extend the answer to the previous question so as to set forth relations between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (Honolulu).

A. The intelligence organization in the Fourteenth Naval District being far removed from Washington, had a somewhat different status from those District intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States which could be more easily controlled and directed from Washington. Consequently, the details of administration with regard to "investigative activities" within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the District Commandant than was done in those Districts which were closely connected to Washington.

6. Q. Admiral, do you know of any expression by the then Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District of his views with regard to any of the activities of the District Intelligence Office of that District during 1941?

A. I recall that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the "investigative activities" being carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty at that time in the Fourteenth Naval District's Intelligence organization. I believe that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District mentioned this matter and stated to the Navy Department the fact that he was somewhat concerned in regard thereto. To the best of my memory, this matter was covered in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations.

7. Q. Admiral, where do you believe this letter to have been filed?

A. I could not say because I believe this letter was a personal letter to Admiral Stark and I have no knowledge as to where or how he filed his personal correspondence. This letter was shown to me by the

Director of Naval Intelligence at that time, Captain A. G. Kirk, and I recall having made a pencil memorandum in regard to the particular paragraph in question. I believe that this memorandum could be found in the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Branch "B".

Note: The examining officer caused a search to be made of the files of the Domestic Intelligence Branch (Branch "B") of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but was unable to locate the pencil memorandum mentioned by the witness.

8. Q. Admiral, at the time that you were the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, did you have any information relating to the activities of certain persons known in Hawaii as "consular agents"?

A. None whatsoever that I can recall at this time.

9. Q. You do not then recall certain recommendations with respect to the prosecution of such agents under the law requiring agents of alien governments [337] to register with the State Department?

A. I can recall nothing of a specific nature in regard to this matter having been undertaken in the Fourteenth Naval District. However, I do recall that the whole matter of consular agents in all Districts was a matter of discussion at one of the joint intelligence meetings held in Washington. The heads of the three intelligence agencies, namely, M. I. D., O. N. I., and F. B. I. constituted the membership of these meetings. The minutes of these meetings are filed in all three departments or offices and should be found in any one of them without difficulty. Copies were given to O. N. I. and F. B. I. and any one of them should have them. Perhaps Captain Waller, who relieved me as the officer in charge of Branch "B" could give further information on this subject.

Note: The documents mentioned by the witness have been identified by the examining officer as being titled "Minutes of Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conferences", now in the custody of the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Branch (formerly Domestic Intelligence) of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[338] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1944

THIRTIETH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the twenty-ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 5 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the seventeenth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 33".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 5 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twentieth and twenty-first days of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 34".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twenty-third day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 35".

The examining officer read and introduced a copy of a letter, dated 24 April 1944, from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the reconvening of the examination in Washington, D. C., appended hereto marked "Exhibit 36".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. William E. G. Taylor, Commander, A-V(T), U. S. N. R., attached to Commander, Fleet Air, Quonset, Quonset Point, Rhode Island.

[339] 2. Q. Were you born and brought up in a family of the armed Services?

A. Yes, sir. I was born at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. My father is Colonel James G. Taylor, U. S. Army, Retired.

3. Q. What was your college education?

A. My college education consisted of two years of aeronautical engineering at New York University.

4. Q. State, briefly, the circumstances surrounding your first connection with the naval service.

A. During the second year of my college, I had a particular desire to get into the flying end of aviation rather than the technical end, and applied for flight training, was accepted, went through flight training in 1926 at Hampton Roads, Virginia; completed flight training and was commissioned an Ensign AF, U. S. N. R., in March, 1927.

5. Q. Did that course of training make you a full-fledged naval aviator?

A. Yes, sir, I was designated a naval aviator on the completion of the course.

6. Q. State, briefly, your duties and experiences in naval aviation subsequent to that acceptance.

A. On July 1, 1927, I was ordered to active duty as a pilot in the Fifth Fighting Squadron, later attached to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON, and I served one year's active duty with the Fleet. On the completion of the year's duty, at the end of the year, I was ordered to inactive duty, was then asked to transfer to the Marine Corps Reserve as an instructor, during the period when the Marine Corps Reserve was building up an aviation reserve.

7. Q. When was that?

A. I resigned my commission as an Ensign in July, 1928, and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve the same month. I served as instructor at Pensacola as an officer in charge of the Marine Corps Reserve Aviation Unit at Squantum, Grosse Isle Field; served a period of duty at Quantico. Most of this period of active duty was as an aviation instructor. In 1934, I was ordered to inactive duty.

8. Q. During these years in the Navy and the Marine Corps, which I understand totaled about seven years, were you specialized in any particular type of aircraft?

A. Yes, I specialized in fighter aircraft.

9. Q. What was your rank when you were placed on inactive status in 1934?

A. Captain, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, sir.

10. Q. Do you know why you were transferred to the inactive list at that time?

A. No, sir, I do not. I was given to understand that the Marine Corps Reserve, which was limited in its funds for training, wanted to increase the number of officer instructors by ordering senior officers to inactive duty and taking on new Second Lieutenants.

11. Q. Following your placement upon inactive status, in what pursuit or occupation did you engage?

A. After I was ordered to inactive duty, the first occupation that I took up was as manager and flight instructor at the Aviation Country Club in [340] Hicksville, Long Island. I remained at this work for approximately two years and left to take a job as pilot with United Air Lines. I was with United Air Lines about nine months. I next became a pilot for an oil processing company in New York. I remained at this job until 1938 when I left the job and went to England.

12. Q. While in the employ of the United Air Lines, what were your actual duties?

A. I was employed as a co-pilot.

13. Q. On what run?

A. On the run between Chicago and New York, sir.

14. Q. What were the circumstances and reasons for your going to England in 1938 and what was the approximate date?

A. I sailed for England in mid-July for the purpose of attempting to get into the Royal Air Force if war were declared. As it appeared that war would not be declared by mid-August, I returned to the United States.

15. Q. How long did you remain in the United States?

A. I remained in the United States until August, 1939, when I again went to England to join the Royal Air Force. I was put in touch with Royal Air Force officers and British Naval Air Officers by the Naval Attache, London. The Royal Air Force was non-committal or would not commit themselves to accepting me until war was declared. The British Navy signified their willingness to accept me as a Sub-Lieutenant, R. N. V. R., even before war was declared. I sent my resignation as a Captain of the Marine Corps Reserve back to the United States via the American Naval Attache, London, on 1 September 1939. I was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant in the R. N. V. R. about 4 September 1939.

16. Q. Upon accepting that commission, what became your employment in the British Navy?

A. I was first sent to the Fleet Air Fighter Training School at Donibristle, Scotland, following which I was sent to the Mediterranean in H. M. S. ARGUS for carrier qualifications. Upon completion of carrier qualifications, I was ordered to Scapa Flow to a Fleet Fighter Squadron whose function was the defense of the Fleet in Scapa Flow.

17. Q. About what date was that?

A. That was about November or December, 1939. My squadron remained at Scapa Flow until the beginning of the Norwegian Campaign, which, I believe, was March, 1940, when we were attached to H. M. S. GLORIOUS and H. M. S. FURIOUS; we made four trips between Scapa Flow and the Norwegian Coast. We returned to Scapa Flow at the end of the Norwegian Campaign in June, 1940.

18. Q. During that period, while based ashore at Scapa Flow, or on those two British carriers, what actual active service did you have in the air?

A. My service consisted mainly of attempting to intercept occasional German reconnaissance aircraft while I was at Scapa Flow. We had three dusk and night raids on the Fleet in Scapa Flow. At sea, in H. M. S. FURIOUS and H. M. S. GLORIOUS, we formed the combat air patrol. Approximately four or five days of our entire time was spent intercepting bombers sent out from Norway to bomb the Fleet.

19. Q. Did you make full interceptions and engage in combats?

A. Yes, sir.

[341] 20. Q. Will you state it briefly?

A. During the night raids at Scapa Flow, most of the raids were over land by the time we were sent up to intercept. Due to darkness, we made very few interceptions. At sea, however, we had a great many interceptions with the bombers that came over. As there were twenty-four hours a day of daylight off the Norwegian Coast at this time, we had continual interceptions for approximately thirty-six hours. The bombers were sent out singly at intervals of approximately three to five minutes.

21. During those operations, was your unit, while in the air, commanded by agencies of the character which later become known to us as "fighter direction" agencies?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Will you describe, briefly, what you knew of the composition and effectiveness of those agencies as they were then operating?

A. Based ashore at Scapa, we were controlled by the Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations Control. We were never given any information as to how the Fighter Operations received its enemy information, but from the size and general make-up of the radio towers, we more or less guessed that information was received by advance electronics. We knew that there was a network of radio or radar stations along the Coast of England which kept a continual watch for hostile aircraft and reported to a system of Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations rooms. At sea, we were controlled by what was known as an "anti-aircraft cruiser." We had heard of anti-aircraft cruisers from a Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadron in the Shetlands which had been controlled by H. M. S. CURLEW. H. M. S. CURLEW was in the task force during the Norwegian Campaign and it was H. M. S. CURLEW which controlled all fighters during operations off the Norwegian Coast. The interceptions were accurate except for height. However, the visibility was good enough so that the error in height made little difference in actually accomplishing interceptions.

23. Q. Did you then consider that the fighters of your unit were being effectively directed while they were in the air?

A. Yes, sir, very effectively.

24. Q. Were the results accomplished against the enemy aircraft considerable?

A. We were able to keep all of the German bombers from closing in our Fleet. No ship was bombed or even did we have a near miss during that period. However, our aircraft were not fast enough to chase German bombers. The German bombers turned away and jettisoned their bombs before we intercepted them.

25. Q. Did you know whether or not the anti-aircraft cruiser from which you were commanded in the air, obtained its enemy information through some form of electronics?

A. I did not know what method the anti-aircraft cruiser was using, but the general assumption was, amongst my contemporaries, that the same type of equipment that was used ashore was being used aboard ship. We could see a special antenna on the foremast which we assumed had something to do with her detecting system.

26. Q. How many fighter aircraft were in your squadron and about how many did the GLORIOUS and FURIOUS carry when off the Norwegian Coast?

A. There were twelve aircraft in my squadron; there were also six aircraft of one other squadron attached. The ARK ROYAL had one twelve-plane fighter squadron, which was actually a dive bomber squadron.

[342] 27. Q. What did you think, at the time, of the ability of those aircraft carriers as regards handling planes?

A. By comparison with American carriers, the British carriers carried very few aircraft and operated them more as single aircraft than as a large striking force. The British Navy had just taken the Fleet Air Arm over from the Royal Air Force three months before war was declared. The Fleet Air Arm was in pretty desperate condition, both as regards pilots, numbers of aircraft, and types of aircraft, but with what they had, it was my opinion that they did an excellent job.

28. Q. Did it occur to you at the time that the results obtained under those conditions were considerably promoted by the method of command and control of the aircraft while in the air?

A. Yes, sir, it was my opinion that without the type of fighter direction and control that we had, we would never have been able, with the few number of aircraft we had, to intercept more than approximately one-tenth of the number of bombers which came over.

29. Q. As result of those experiences, did you make any reports, official or otherwise, to U. S. naval representatives in Britain?

A. Yes, sir. I became very much interested in the method of control; did everything within my power to get as much information on how control was accomplished, and made periodic reports to the Naval Air Attache, London.

30. Q. Subsequent to the service which you have just described, what constituted your next activities?

A. At the end of the Norwegian Campaign, at the suggestion of my Squadron Commander, I went to Admiralty, while on leave, and offered to return to the United States in an attempt to get faster fighter aircraft which could be used by the Fleet Air Arm. As a result, I was sent back to the United States. By the time I reached the United States, France had fallen and I located a cancelled French contract for the first F4F Grumman fighters. I spent approximately six weeks having these fighters converted for British shipboard use and arranging for shipment back to England. I then returned to England and worked for the month on getting the aircraft reassembled and shipped out to fighter squadrons. During this month, the Royal Air Force was forming an Eagle Squadron made up of American volunteers and had asked the British Navy for my services as squadron commander. At

the end of the month, the Air Ministry and Admiralty reached an agreement and I was transferred to the Royal Air Force. This transfer was effected on 2 October 1940. I was sent to a Royal Air Force Fighter Operational Training unit for three weeks, at the end of which time I was ordered, at my own request, to 242 Fighter Squadron, stationed at the Royal Air Force Station at Duxford. I asked to be sent to 242 Squadron before taking over 71 Eagle Squadron because I wanted to get some operational experience in an active air force squadron before forming my own.

31. Q. Give a brief summary of your operational experience while attached to R. A. F. Fighter Squadron No. 242.

A. During the four month period I was attached to 242 Squadron, I participated in four or five actual interceptions against hostile aircraft, flying wing on the Squadron Commander. Although we saw numerous hostile aircraft during these operations, we were never ordered to attack. The actual attacks were to be made by other squadrons which were also in the air. The greater part of my time in the 242 Squadron was spent learning current tactical information and learning the organization of R. A. F. squadrons.

[343] 32. Q. State, briefly, the result of your observations of the R. A. F. Fighter Command during the most important periods of the so-called "Battle of Britain".

A. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force Fighter Squadrons were well dispersed. Their fighter direction control system was well organized. Squadrons were tactically made up of only sections sent up to intercept sporadic raids. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain, large numbers of aircraft came over in an attempt to wipe out the fighter defense of the Royal Air Force and the early squadron organization was not capable of coping with large raids. However, within a remarkably short time Fighter Command managed to reorganize, tactically, their fighter force into squadrons and wings capable of intercepting large raids and inflicting considerable damage on the enemy bombers and fighters. It was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the Royal Air Force fighters over the German raids was due to the magnificent fighter direction control. My own participation in these raids was only towards the end or in an occasional raid of not over forty or fifty German bombers escorted by fighters that came over to bomb the London docks or to bomb ships of convoys in the Channel. In every case, we were directed by the controller at our home station who was able to give us accurate information and direct us to the incoming raids. He was able to give us approximately the number of aircraft we could expect to run into and would put us in an advantageous position for an attack. At the end of attacks, when pilots were lost in bad weather or in good weather, the controller was always able to bring the lost aircraft home to its base or to another base. The question of navigation in fighters never came up. The entire navigation of aircraft, both going up, making interceptions, and returning, was done by controllers in an underground operations room. I became extremely interested in the entire controlling system, spent a great deal of time in various sector operation rooms, group operations rooms, and fighter command operations rooms, trying to learn as much about the British method of interception as possible. I made frequent reports of what I had learned to the American Naval Attache, London.

33. Q. During that period, Autumn of 1940, did you become cognizant of any officers of our own Army who were having similar opportunities for learning the British system?

A. Yes, sir, both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system.

34. Q. Would you say, from such observation, that both the War Department and Navy Department became somewhat fully informed concerning the R. A. F. Fighter Command apparatus and operation in handling their interceptor fighter aircraft?

A. My impression at the time, and later, after I returned to the United States, was that all of the information was made available to the American Army and American Navy observers but it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of method of the Royal Air Force intercepting system.

35. Q. At about what date would you estimate that Army and Navy officers directly detailed for the observation of that system became sufficiently cognizant of it to make adequate reports on the same?

A. I know that a special Army Air Corps group of observers were at Fighter Command in October or November, 1940, specially studying the Royal Air Force fighter direction system.

36. Q. Did you think that they had full opportunities for observation and were given all the so-called "secrets"?

[344] A. I believe that the Army mission was given all of the information necessary to understand and duplicate the British system.

37. Q. Upon what do you base that belief?

A. I base the belief on the fact that the Army observers were actually in the operations rooms at Fighter Commands, at groups, and the various sectors. They were permitted to talk to fighter squadrons who were employing the fighter direction system. I do not know that they were permitted to see the actual radar sets, but I was told, however, that special Army tactical officers had been permitted to see the actual radar stations along the coast.

38. Q. Did you, yourself, become acquainted with the British radar apparatus and with its technical operation?

A. I was given a very good basic understanding of the function and limitations of the radar equipment, but I had never actually seen a British radar system until after I had resigned from the Royal Air Force.

39. Q. In addition to the representatives of the United States Army Air Corps, were similar bodies of naval aviators also given opportunities to learn the British fighter direction system?

A. I did not hear of any naval observers studying either the Royal Air Force or British Navy Fighter Direction System until late Spring of 1941.

40. Q. Did you, during 1940, make any reports, formal or otherwise, which may have reached the Navy Department and particularly describing the British radar apparatus and its operation?

A. Yes, sir, I made a full report of all of the operations that I had been engaged in and of all the information that I had picked up in England to several groups of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics. I particularly sought out the officer who was, at that time, in charge of radar development in the Bureau of Aeronautics to give him what in-

formation I had on the British Fighter Direction System. I was told that the U. S. Navy had radar either in our ships or being developed for shipboard use. I could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction.

41. Q. At about what date did you complete the assembling and training of your own squadron and where did it then become stationed?

A. 71 Eagle Squadron completed its training and became operational in January, 1941, at Kirton Lindsey, Lincolnshire, on the East Coast of England, and we were immediately ordered to Martelsham Heath where our main function was the defense of convoys going to and from the Thames and Humber Rivers.

42. Q. What kind of planes did you have?

A. We were originally equipped with Hurricane fighters and, later, were reequipped with Spitfires.

43. Q. Give a brief resume of your experiences while in command of the Eagle Squadron, operating under the R. A. F.

A. From the time that we became operational, in January of 1941, until July of 1941, our squadron stood a regular fighter watches on the Southeast Coast of England. Our combat work was mainly the protection of convoys off the Coast and making interceptions on any hostile aircraft which came over. During this period, there was very little German activity except at night. During the moonlight periods, we sent up four planes of our squadron to join the night fighter defense. Having no radar, our night work was ineffective. Up until this time, the only type of radar that was functioning in England [345] was the seaward-looking radar. All overland direction of fighters was done by radio direction finding on the fighters. All of the hostile aircraft positions were reported by visual observers. Radar interceptions overland were, therefore, almost impossible except with the aid of searchlights or airborne radar. This was approximately the period during which the R.A.F. was building up an improved system for interception of enemy planes overland and at night.

44. Q. What were the circumstances of the termination of your services in the Royal Air Force?

A. In July, 1941, I was called to Group Headquarters and told that because of my age, I was going to be made a Wing Commander and put in command of a fighter operational training unit. I was disappointed in losing my squadron and asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to return to the American Navy. The American Naval Attache had been, for the past year, asking me to return to the American Navy for the purpose of working on fighter direction. I was allowed to go to London to talk to the American Naval Attache, who sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, Washington, advising them that my services were available. In approximately two weeks' time, my commission and orders to duty to the Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington were received in London. I was commissioned Lieutenant Commander, A-V(S), U. S. N. R., in London in the month of July, 1941. However, as there was no immediate transportation back to the United States and as the Naval Attache wanted me to collect more information on radar equipment, I was given a special assignment to visit several radar stations. I was given every opportunity to thoroughly inspect the most modern

radar stations in the South of England and all of my questions were answered willingly. In August, in about 15 August 1941, I was returned to the United States by Clipper and reported to the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.

45. Q. Upon your arrival in the Navy Department, did it occur to you that you were being looked upon as an expert in the utilization of radar for purposes of command and direction of airborne aircraft?

A. Only by a very few officers. The vast majority of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics seemed to consider fighter direction of very little importance.

46. Q. Did those who seemed to realize its importance appear to look upon you as expert in that specialty?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. From your experiences, soon after you returned to Washington, did you find anyone else whom you considered, at the time, as equally expert as yourself?

A. There were several officers in this country who had been in England studying both the Royal Air Force and the British Navy method of fighter direction who were, at that time, setting up fighter direction schools at Norfolk and at San Diego. However, it was apparent that their brief period of observing in England did not give them nearly the full picture of what fighter direction involved.

48. Q. Then you found no one who had the breadth of experience in that line which you had enjoyed?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Please state, briefly, the duties which you came to perform upon your return to the United States.

A. I was sent out on temporary duty in the YORKTOWN, RANGER, and WASP in September, 1941, to lecture to the fighter squadrons on combat tactics and fighter direction to pass on to the ships' officers what information I had on [346] the use of search radar for fighter direction purposes, and to learn what I could of what each ship contemplated as a fighter direction organization. I completed this duty in approximately one month's time and returned to Washington.

50. Q. Did that brief assignment with the carriers in our Atlantic Fleet acquaint you with the capabilities of the radar installations which you found on board those ships?

A. Yes, sir. There was radar only aboard the YORKTOWN at that time.

51. Q. At the time, what was your judgment as to the performance of that radar as compared with those which you had recently seen in Britain?

A. It was my impression that the radar equipment aboard the YORKTOWN was superior to any radar equipment used in the British Navy and at least as good as the Royal Air Force shore-based search radar.

52. Q. What did you find as to the comparative ability of the radar operators?

A. The radar operators were largely under training, but the main radar enlisted man and the main radar officer aboard ship were both very well trained and versed in the operation of the equipment.

53. Q. Next, following that detail, what became your duties?

A. I was given temporary duty orders to report to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, for temporary duty. My duties were to be the same as they had been on the East Coast carriers. I joined the U. S. S. LEXINGTON at San Diego and lectured the fighter squadrons and spoke to the ship's officers en route to Pearl Harbor in early October, 1941. On my arrival at Pearl Harbor, I found the ENTERPRISE was at sea. I, therefore, reported to the Air Officer on CinCPac's Staff. When the ENTERPRISE returned in early October, approximately three days later, I reported to Admiral Halsey. Admiral Halsey instructed me to report to Admiral Kimmel for such use as he wanted to make of me. Admiral Kimmel questioned me while I was at Pearl Harbor. He also instructed me to lecture to the fighter squadrons of the Army Air Force. Admiral Kimmel's Staff made arrangements for my lectures at Wheeler Field. I made a series of four lectures to all of the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field.

54. Q. Upon completing those lectures, what became your duties?

A. On completion of the lectures to the Army Fighter Squadrons, I lectured to the pilots and ship's officers of the U. S. S. SARATOGA and I then reported to the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. I went to sea in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, lectured to the squadrons attached to her, also had an opportunity to observe their method of fighter direction. The ENTERPRISE's fighter direction had gone much further than any other ship. The ENTERPRISE's fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods. This was so because the fighter system had been improvised by the Staff Communications Officer with little information to work on.

55. Q. Then you found the ENTERPRISE considerably advanced over the other carriers in the utilization of radar?

A. Yes, sir.

56. Q. As regards the radar equipment and its actual operation, will you state the conditions which you found on the various carriers of the Pacific Fleet?

[347] A. The ENTERPRISE had had their radar aboard a considerable time and had been able to calibrate the radar equipment and train to a certain extent one or two fighter director officers. The SARATOGA had no radar. The LEXINGTON, on which I came out from San Diego, had just had her radar installed and was just learning to use it. In all ships equipped with radar, the radar installation had been very recent and all hands were going through a training period in the operation and utilization of the equipment for fighter direction.

57. Q. Was it the same variety of equipment which you found in the carriers in the Atlantic and which you have stated was very good for its kind?

A. Yes, sir.

58. Q. Following that period at sea in the ENTERPRISE, what was your next duty?

A. While I was at sea in the ENTERPRISE, a dispatch was received from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stating that my services were requested by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, for technical purposes. Upon our return to Pearl Harbor, I was instructed to report to the Acting Commanding Officer, Interceptor Command, to assist in an advisory capacity in setting up the Army Information Center at Fort Shafter.

59. Q. Did you have reason to believe that either the Navy or the Army, or both, in the Hawaiian Area, were looking upon you as expert in that specialty?

A. Yes, sir. A very few officers in both the Army and Navy seemed to feel that I was an expert on fighter direction and the utilization of radar.

60. Q. Was that because the installations and the use of it was so new that very few officers knew anything about it?

A. Yes, sir. That was true generally in both the Army and Navy. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 12:10 p. m., was adjourned until 11 a. m., tomorrow.

[348]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 1944

THIRTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11:20 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirtieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the examining officer (Continued):

61. Q. Please give a resume of your experiences while thus loaned to the United States Army, Hawaiian Department, including your relations with Army officials, and with Navy officials as well if such occurred, covering also radar apparatus, ability to use same, communications from the radar stations, and so on.

A. I was instructed to report to the Interceptor Command at Wheeler Field and reported to find the Commanding General of the Interceptor Command was in the United States. The Acting Commanding Officer requested me to work in an advisory capacity with his Operations Officer and assist him in expediting the completion of the air warning system. During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true: (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The

Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning [349] equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. (5) There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen mile radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four hour operation. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti-aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established

between the anti-aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. The foregoing is a summation of conditions found at Oahu during my inspection about 1 November 1941. These were reported by myself and the Interceptor Command Operations Officer to the Staffs of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; Commander, Patrol Wing Two; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force and Bomber Command, prior to November 15, 1941. By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command [350] lines were installed from Liaison position in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Halienua Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti-aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that "No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down." However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down U. S. S. ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was

declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corps' (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G-2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400-0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on or about 1 December and was told that in view of the [351] of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty-four hour basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7. On the morning of December 7, I was informed, by the telephone operator of the hotel in which I was staying, that all naval officers were instructed to report to their ships immediately. I reported to the Information Center between 0800 and 0830 to find considerable confusion in progress. The duty controller was a Squadron Commander who had stood his first training watch during the 0400-0700 period that day. Through no fault of his own, he was almost totally unable to cope with the situation. The Interception Command Operations Officer had reported before my arrival, and was doing his utmost to get the Information Center organized. Sentries, mess cooks, and telephone linesmen were pressed into the liaison positions to man the telephones. As they were untrained, it was impossible for them to interpret and report the current situation to the activities requesting information. Someone had removed the large scale overlay chart of

the Islands from the plotting table. The scale of the plotting table chart was too small for plotting, with the result that the plotting table was covered with a confusion of plots too numerous and large to evaluate properly. The Operations Officer was doing the best job possible under the circumstances to control the few fighters which were air-borne. During this time, I was occupied in an attempt to keep all of the interested activities as well informed as possible over the many liaison command lines. I should like to state here that several traced records were kept of the many plots which appeared on the plotting board. After the raids on December 7, these tracings were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from, and in what direction they had returned. As a flight of Army B-17 bombers had arrived almost simultaneously with the first raid, and as there were a considerable number of friendly aircraft in all areas, it was only possible to reconstruct an estimated plot of what had occurred. This plot was not completed until nearly forty-eight hours after the raids. However, it is my understanding that this plot was shown to the Secretary of the Navy during his visit as evidence that all information was received in an orderly manner by the Information Center during the raids.

62. Q. Referring to your statement concerning the fifteen mile "dead area" around Oahu, was there any visual system to supplement that weakness in the radar coverage?

A. After December 7 only, sir.

63. Q. Will you please elaborate your statement concerning what seems to have been a dual responsibility as between the Army Signal Corps and the Army Air Corps covering the installation of the complete warning system?

A. Where it was the Signal Corps' job to expedite the completion of the Information Center, the full initiative for expediting this work was taken on by Interceptor Command. The Chief Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, seemed to attach very secondary importance to the completion of the Information Center, both as regards providing materiel and trained personnel.

64. Q. Which organization had the responsibility for the supply of personnel in the first place?

A. It was my impression that the Signal Corps had the job of furnishing all personnel for the Information Center.

[352] 65. Q. What, as regards the installations and operators of the remainder of the system outside of the Combat Information Center?

A. The Signal Corps equipment was field equipment but satisfactory; personnel for installing communication lines were well trained, capable, and in sufficient numbers; the radar operators and maintenance men at the radar stations were too few in numbers and were not fully trained even up to December 7.

66. Q. Was all that a responsibility of the Army Signal Corps?

A. Yes, sir.

67. Q. You have stated that you obtained no liaison officers for the Information Center from the Navy. How many did you ask for?

A. I asked for six. On December 8, I received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA.

68. Q. Other than the failure of the Naval District to supply liaison officers, did you experience other lack of cooperation from that organization?

A. I can not remember receiving any active cooperation from Fourteenth Naval District, at any time, prior to December 7.

69. Q. In your estimation, at the time, what additional cooperation or measures were required of the Naval District?

A. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff pointed out to me that according to the war plans, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, had the responsibility of the defense of Oahu, and I was, therefore, instructed to report to him for any assistance needed to activate the Information Center.

70. Q. What assistance did you ask for?

A. Other than to ask for liaison officers, I requested that control of the anti-aircraft guns in naval vessels in the harbor, which were directly under his control, should be held by the Information Center. I asked that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu. At the Commander-in-Chief's Operations Officer's suggestion, I asked him to initiate a letter to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a twenty-four hour basis.

71. Q. Did you, at any time during the period during which you were loaned to the Army, report to the Commander-in-Chief, or his representatives, of the unreadiness of the warning system in general or of the Information Center in particular?

A. Yes, sir. A full report concerning the readiness of the Army Air Warning System was made to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff immediately after my initial inspection. On about 1 December, I reported to CinCPac's Operations Officer that Information Center personnel were still not forthcoming, and that the operating hours had been limited to 0400-0700 daily. During the entire period of my duty at the Information Center, I made frequent visits to CinCPac's Office and conferred with his Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Air Officer or Communications Officer.

72. Q. Did you make those reports in such form and with such emphasis as to convey the thought that little could be expected in the way of information concerning a surprise air attack?

A. Yes, sir, I did. I feel quite sure that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's Staff fully realized the situation.

[353] 73. Q. During your association with the Army, what did you gather was in the minds of the Army fighter command as constituting their primary mission while based on Oahu?

A. It is my distinct impression that the Interceptor Command believed that they were charged with operating the air warning system, once it was completed, and furnishing the fighter defense for the Hawaiian Islands.

74. Q. Do you mean that the conception of that part of the Army Air Force, Oahu, was that their primary mission and purpose was repelling air attacks upon the installations on that Island?

A. No, sir, I do not. The Army Air Force was broken up into two commands. The Army Interceptor Command which had their fighters, I believe they considered their primary mission to repel enemy air attacks.

75. Q. Based upon your experiences in England, what was your estimate in those days as to the ability of the number of fighter planes based on Oahu to repel a heavy air raid if they had been properly handled in the air?

A. I believe there were sufficient numbers of fighters at Oahu to repel the number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7.

76. Q. Was the quality of those fighter planes good enough for the purpose?

A. The quality of the P-40 fighter plane was not sufficient to outperform the Japanese fighter aircraft, but the performance was sufficient, I believe, to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort that came in on December 7.

77. Q. If you had any opportunity to estimate the quality and state of training of the fighter pilots, please give the conclusions which you reached at the time.

A. As I remember, at least fifty per cent of the fighter pilots in Interceptor Command were well trained; the other fifty per cent were green pilots who had just been received from the United States.

78. Q. Does that answer mean that only half of the Army fighter aircraft could have been ready to combat the attack of 7 December?

A. No, sir. All aircraft in commission could be ready, as far as the pilots were concerned. I meant that approximately half of the pilots were well trained fighter pilots. The other half had not had sufficient squadron tactical training to be "experienced" fighter pilots. Pilot training was being pressed.

79. In your recollection, what actual opposition did the Army fighters bring to bear upon the Japanese air attack?

A. I was never told the actual number of Army fighters that took the air, but I was under the impression that between ten and twenty Army fighters were airborne and engaging the Japanese more or less on their own.

80. Q. Did that number get into the air in time to effectively oppose the attack?

A. No, sir.

81. Q. About how many did?

A. I have no idea how many actually got into the air, sir.

82. Q. Were the ones which were in the air in any way directed by the Interceptor Command officer on the ground?

[354] A. They were not actually directed. The Operations Officer informed the fighters in the air by radio of the situation, as well as he could interpret it. In discussions with Army pilots who did engage the Japanese, I learned that there were so many Japanese aircraft in the air that they did not need fighter direction from the ground to find them.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 12:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:50 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Commander William E. G. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirtieth and thirty-first days of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:52 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[355] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1944

THIRTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:35 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-first day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. L. F. Safford; Captain, U. S. Navy; Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was the officer in charge of the Communication Security Section of Naval Communications. The word "Communication Security" was a covering title to most Communication Intelligence, although we also performed security duties in the design and preparation of naval codes and ciphers and general communications security duties; that is, surveillance over their use.

3. Q. How many units were there in that organization and where were they located?

A. There were three main radio intelligence units. One in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic Seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean. The second in size was located at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations and direction finder stations in Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor. The third was located on the Island of Corregidor in the Philippines with intercept and direction finder station there and a small intercept and finder station on the Island of Guam. There had been an intercept and direction finder station at Shanghai, but it was evacuated to Corregidor in December, 1940.

There were also intercept and direction finder stations on the West Coast of the United States. The West Coast intercept stations fed their traffic directly into Washington; the direction finder stations were coordinated and controlled by the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

4. Q. Were the three units somewhat specialized in their duties?

A. Yes.

5. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station in Washington confined?

[356] A. To naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. In addition to the foregoing duties, the Washington Unit had another important function: Training personnel for the other units so that they would be able to "pull their weight in the boat" when transferred to duty overseas. For this reason, the Washington Unit had, at this time, the most experienced personnel (some with over ten years of C. I. duty) and the least experienced (ninety per cent with less than one year of C. I. duty). The Washington Unit had been standing continuous watches since February, 1941.

6. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station at Pearl Harbor confined?

A. To the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific Ocean and to surveillance over Japanese naval communications. We expected that this would prevent the Fleet being surprised as the Russians had been at Port Arthur. These duties were prescribed in the current War Plans (WPDNC-8: Appendix IV; Art. 4-25) approved March, 1940, and by dispatches and letters of instruction issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. These duties did not include surveillance over Diplomatic communications of any sort. The personnel of this Unit had about four or five years of C. I. experience on the average. The officers included our best, and six or seven had had previous C. I. duty in the Asiatic C. I. Unit.

7. Q. To what special branch of intelligence were the duties of the main station at Corregidor confined?

A. The Asiatic Unit was at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet to use as he saw fit. During 1940 and early 1941, this Unit was mostly concerned with Japanese Diplomatic communications, but in October or November, 1941, it shifted its main attention to Japanese Naval communications. The personnel of this Unit had about two or three years of C. I. experience on the average, and the officers were young, enthusiastic, and capable.

8. Q. Were all three units kept in close touch with the results which they, individually, obtained?

A. Yes, sir, as far as it pertained to the technical work they were doing, but not otherwise.

9. Q. Was the unit at Pearl Harbor kept fully informed of the aforesaid results obtained by the Washington Unit?

A. Only as regards the operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific Ocean, with one important exception: On December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Communications released OpNav Secret 011400; *Urgent*, to CinCAF and Com 16; *Priority* to CinCPac and Com 14; indicating that the Japanese were planning landing at Kota Bharu in Malaya.

10. Q. Did you consider that you, yourself, were kept fully informed of the results obtained by the units in Fourteen and Sixteen Districts?

A. Yes, I was kept informed of important developments by radio, and of details weekly, by air mail.

11. Q. During November, 1941, did you obtain, from the units in Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, estimates covering the organization and distribution of the Japanese naval forces?

A. Yes, sir, we did on November 26. The message from Com 14 was the Pearl Harbor estimate as to the current organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet with particular reference to recently organized task forces which were [357] suspected to be employed in the invasion of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, plus a suspected covering force of submarines and one carrier division in the Japanese mandated islands. This was a summation of results obtained during the month of November, 1941.

12. Q. At approximately that date, or perhaps somewhat later, did you obtain a similar estimate from the unit in the Sixteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir, we did.

13. Q. Please state, very briefly, any respects in which the two estimates differed.

A. Com 16 disagreed with the estimate that carriers and submarines in force were in the mandated islands. Com 16's report placed one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters; and further added "evaluation considered reliable".

14. Q. What is the date of that estimate from the Sixteenth District unit?

A. That was the same date, November 26, 1941. It was sent twelve hours later than the Fourteenth District's dispatch.

15. Q. Do you recall what impression prevailed in the Washington unit as regards the disagreement between the other two?

A. We believed that the Sixteenth District unit was correct in their estimate.

16. Q. Did you advise the Fourteenth District unit to that effect?

A. No, sir, we did not. On November 24, a dispatch from the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; information Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; stated that Sixteenth District's intercepts were considered most reliable and requested that other reports be submitted to Com 16 for action, OpNav for information; and after combining all incoming reports, Com 16 forward reports to OpNav, info CinCPac. From this, we believed that both Commanders-in-Chief understood that we gave more weight to Com 16's reports than to Com 14's reports. The Department's directive was based on geographical considerations rather than ability of personnel or efficiency of the units.

17. Q. Did your unit, as engaged upon its specialized endeavor, obtain, during November and December, any definite information which indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. Please give, chronologically, with particular reference to dates, a brief summary of that information.

A. Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the North-east Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both [358] political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark.

At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately.

19. Q. Going back over that series, to what officials did your unit transmit the information concerning which you have just testified?

A. My unit transmitted information directly to Signal Intelligence in the War Department and to Naval Intelligence representative (that is, Commander A. H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, or Lieutenant Commander A. D. Kramer, attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence but actually working in the Communication Intelligence Unit). The further distribution of information within the Navy and to the President normally was undertaken by Kramer in his status as a subordinate to McCollum. Information was distributed daily, as a matter of routine, to the President, to the Secretary of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Communications, and, of course, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Within the Army, the Signal Intelligence Service, our opposite numbers, gave information to G-2, or Military Intelligence, and Colonel Bratton, head of the G-2 Far Eastern Section, distributed the information to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Director of War Plans, and, of course, to the Director of Military Intelligence. On Special occasions, information was disseminated at night or whenever it came [359] in. There was a direct exchange of information between S. I. S. and the Navy Department C. I. Unit; also between O. N. I. and M. I. D.

20. Q. Was the foregoing information communicated to officials in the State Department?

A. It was always given to Secretary Hull and sometimes given to Under Secretary Sumner Welles. In the Spring of 1941, the information had gone further but, after a leak to the German Embassy, it was restricted to Secretary Hull and Secretary Welles.

21. Q. Is there any documentary report which shows the date and hour of delivery of the foregoing information to various officials?

A. There is no documentary evidence.

22. Q. Are you able to state, from memory, the date and hour on which the important information, say, from 1 December onward, was transmitted?

A. I can, from my recollection of Lieutenant Commander Kramer's verbal reports to me.

23. Q. Please give what you recall as regards those dates and hours.

A. The information on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, was disseminated about eleven a. m., within the Navy Department and was then given to the Naval Aide to the President who took it over to the White House, some time in the early afternoon. The "Winds Message" was given a special distribution shortly after eight a. m. on December 4, 1941, and was also included in the routine distribution. The information received late on December 6 was highly important and was distributed as a rush job by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who left the Navy Department in an official station wagon shortly after nine p. m., and who had reached his last official by eleven p. m. Kramer returned to the Navy Department about one a. m. in the morning to see if there was any further information and then went home.

He came down the next morning in time to give Admiral Stark written information at the Admiral's nine o'clock conference. Much of the December 6 information was distributed over the telephone by Admiral Wilkinson and by Secretary Hull. The following officials were given this information that night: President Roosevelt (via the White House Aide), Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Rear Admiral Beardall, Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Bratton, U. S. Army, was given the same information at nine p. m. for dissemination to War Department officials, and we did not know any more, except that he got a copy over to Secretary Hull by ten o'clock. As regards information on the 7th, the same officials had this information by eleven a. m.—some sooner.

24. Q. Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in Fourteenth Naval District?

A. No, sir. That was not permitted by a written order then in force; but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OpNav Secret Dispatch 031855, which was released by Captain Redman, the Assistant Director of Naval Communications. A similar dispatch was released by Admiral Wilkinson and filed at 031850. Admiral Wilkinson's message is referred to in the Roberts report. Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing *anything* to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?" And McCollum replied, "We are doing everything *we* can to get the news out to the Fleet." McCollum emphasized both "we's". In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as [360] established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav 031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its significance.

25. Q. Did the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts?

A. No, sir, they did not have the material and they could not possibly have gained this information.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The C. I. Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the C. I. Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction finding, interception, and so forth. The dissemination of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the Office of Naval Intelligence as

prescribed in Communication War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in March, 1940. On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the "Winds Message". The "Winds Message" was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State [361] Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "Winds Message" when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The "Winds Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not

hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the "Winds Message" we had been looking for. The significant part of the "Winds Message" read: "HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI". The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY". The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia". I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and a piece of paper in his hand and said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message". As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds" underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the "Winds Message", I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the "Winds Message", McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the "Winds Message" as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the "Winds Message": [362] Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The follow-

ing officers should have some recollection of the "Winds Message": *U. S. Navy*—Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. *U. S. Army*—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time. Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December, 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station "H"—in the "Chronology" which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks.

Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station "H" "Chronology" for December 1–December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communication Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 11:37 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[363] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

 WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 1944

THIRTY-THIRD DAY

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER.

The examination met at 4:30 p. m.

Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.

The examining officer introduced Rose Mullen, civilian, as reporter, who was duly sworn.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-second day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Will you give your name, rank and present station?

A. Herbert F. Leary, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding Eastern Sea Frontier, stationed at 90 Church Street, New York.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. In January, 1941, I was detached from duty as Director of Fleet Training in Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and ordered to command the Cruisers, Battle Force, relieving Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel. I relieved Admiral Kimmel on 1 February 1941 and remained in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, until 1 February 1942 when I left for Australia to become Commander of the Anzac Force in the Southwest Pacific.

3. Q. Admiral, during the Autumn of 1941 what officers were your immediate superiors both in administrative activities and in operational activities?

A. As a Type Commander of the Light Cruisers of the Battle Force, my immediate superior was Vice Admiral Pye, the Commander of the Battle Force, who in turn was immediately under Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief. These officers were both my administrative and operational commanders.

4. Q. Then during your periods at sea were you always in Admiral Pye's Task Force?

A. Not always. The Task Forces for the various operating periods were varied and I served under various Task Force Commanders.

But I should say that the majority of the time I was under Admiral Pye.

[364] 5. Q. Do you recall the approximate inclusive dates of your last stay in Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941?

A. My Task Force entered Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941, and did not leave again until after the attack.

6. Q. Prior to that entry on 28 November, about how many days were you at sea?

A. One week. We left Pearl Harbor on November 21 for Fleet maneuvers.

7. Q. Who was your Task Force Commander during that week?

A. Admiral Pye.

8. Q. Admiral, a general question. I understand that you were in what might be called the third echelon of the command in the Pacific Fleet. As such, did you have opportunities to observe the general relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanders of the echelon above you as well as of your own echelon?

A. Yes. Whenever the ships were in port I was invited to attend the daily conferences which the Commander-in-Chief held with his immediate subordinates and, in my opinion, there was complete and free interchange of information and opinions among the higher naval command. I did not attend these conferences as a regular member but, when other duties permitted, my natural interest caused me to be present.

9. Q. What was your opinion as to the correctness and adequacy of the information distributed incidental to those relationships between the highest officers of the Fleet?

A. In my opinion, based on my intermittent observation, I should say it was as full and free as could be possible. At these meetings, Admiral Kimmel frequently read extracts from personal letters received from the Chief of Naval Operations and other officers, commented on them, and stated what action he was taking in regard to various matters and included a daily intelligence presentation by his Fleet Intelligence Officer, in which were presented all the facts as he saw them.

10. Q. In addition to the information which you gained at the Commander-in-Chief's conferences when you attended them, was important information, particularly as regards the situation vis-a-vis Japan, imparted to you by your immediate superior?

A. No, except in a general way. I had frequent, almost daily, contact with Admiral Pye and we naturally discussed the situation as it appeared to us.

11. Q. Do you recall having seen or heard discussed a dispatch from the Navy Department about 16 October, in which was set forth the seriousness of the situation then current and which contained a directive concerning precautions to be taken by the Fleet? (Indicating Exhibit 6)

A. No.

12. Q. Upon your return to port 28 November 1941, did you see or were you told of certain dispatches from the Department received during the three or four days preceding, which contained warnings and at least one directive?

A. No. I do not remember any specific directives which were called to my attention on arrival in port.

13. Q. Did you, at any time between 28 November and the date of the surprise attack, become aware that the Navy Department had sent the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch which amounted to a war warning?

[365] A. No. To the best of my recollection, the conditions existing in port at this time were roughly as they had been on the preceding period in port.

14. Q. Do you recall if you were called upon to increase in any way the security precautions which had before then been in effect while the ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. No. To the best of my recollection, the security conditions existing on my ships were the same as on the previous stay in port.

15. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that your duty prior to beginning the cruise in 1941 had to do with Fleet Training. Will you briefly describe your responsibilities and your authority while engaged on that duty?

A. As an Assistant to the Chief of Operations in charge of Fleet Training, it was my duty to carefully scrutinize and analyze the reports received from the Fleet as to the proficiency of the ships in gunnery, engineering, communications and damage control; to publish results of these studies and to promulgate to the Fleet general directives which would increase efficiency in the above branches.

16. Q. Then, were you, in effect, the Navy Department's Director of Training of all forces at sea?

A. In a general way, yes. The schedules governing the time allotted to training were made out by the Fleet Commanders and the Department (Office of Fleet Training) merely checked these as to the general adequacy of time allotted and the covering of all different forms of training required.

17. Q. During the Autumn of 1941, while our relations with Japan were becoming steadily worse, did you, as an officer who had been intimately concerned with training, ever give consideration to the balance which the Fleet was maintaining between the necessities for training and those for security measures?

A. Yes. This was a subject of constant concern and frequent discussion between the officers in high command in the Pacific Fleet. Due to the large numbers of new men being trained and the constant demands made upon the Fleet to furnish experienced officers for other duty outside of the Fleet, the question of training was always a paramount one. There were frequent discussions on this in regard to the cycle of operations, whether the Fleet should be sent to sea as a unit; divided into two parts with one half in port; or divided into three groups for operations and training. There were advocates for all three schemes and the question of security was always considered, but the prevalent opinion in the Fleet among the higher command, as I sensed it, was that the situation permitted of emphasizing training at the expense of security at this time. It was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures.

18. Q. Admiral, do you recall that you gave any considerable thought, during the few weeks prior to 7 December 1941, to the possibilities, or even probabilities, of a surprise attack by the Japanese?

A. In a general way, yes, but I think that we all felt that the contingency was remote and that our Intelligence Service would give us adequate warning if an attack were imminent, or that a declaration of hostilities were apt to occur. We all realized that Washington was in telephonic communication with our Commander-in-Chief.

19. Q. Do you recall having given thought or, shall we say, even speculation as to the form in which a Japanese surprise attack might be made?

[366] A. Yes. We had discussed this matter and I think everyone more or less realized that a surprise attack would be an air attack.

20. Q. Was that your own estimation—that it would be made by air rather than by some other weapon?

A. Yes.

21. Q. Do you recall having been in any discussion in which you put forward that opinion?

A. I do not remember that we had any specific discussion exactly along those lines. The Fleet was, as I have previously stated, mainly engaged in training, perfecting materiel devices—in other words, general preparation—and, as I have stated, the feeling strongly existed that the Fleet would have adequate warning of any chance of an air attack; in other words, of a beginning of hostilities.

22. Q. Were you during that period prior to December 1941 in any way in touch with the Army's potential ability to repel a surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor?

A. No, and I was quite surprised to learn after the attack that the Army anti-aircraft guns were not in position. I had no information as to the disposition of the Army Air Force available in the Hawaiian Islands. I had a general impression that there was very little air support for the Fleet available and also that the Navy Air was inadequate for a complete coverage of the waters around Pearl Harbor.

23. Q. Admiral, as a Type Commander of all the light cruisers of the Fleet, do you recall any particular dissatisfaction which was in your mind concerning the Department's action in keeping your ships up to date, in supplying them with ammunition, other war materials and with proper personnel?

A. Yes. There was frequent and emphatic disagreement with the Department's actions and a great deal of correspondence on this subject. The ships were being constantly depleted of trained personnel and requests made for equipment were being inadequately supplied and frequently with the information that we would be supplied after the demands for vessels in the Atlantic had been met. The cruisers of the Battle Force normally consisted of two divisions of light cruisers, but one division was detached from the Fleet and sent to the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor. This, along with other indications, left me with the impression that the situation was not considered critical in the Pacific Fleet at this time.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement :

Yes, I would like to submit the following additional comments. Admiral Kimmel was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet on 1 February 1941 and met with general approval of the Fleet officers and came, I understood, as the result of personal observations by Secretary of the Navy Knox during a [367] visit which he made to the Fleet and his subsequent opinion that Admiral Kimmel was more alive, on his toes and energetic in preparing his ships for action than any other Commanders in the Fleet. Although not belonging to the higher echelons of command in the Fleet at this time, I know that Admiral Kimmel immediately called conferences of responsible officers to provide additional security for the Fleet while at sea and in Pearl Harbor; that he initiated steps to obtain closer cooperation with the Army and particularly with the Army Air Force in Hawaii. The results of his efforts were a better organization and division of duties as between the two services. He also realized the impracticability of handling the Fleet from a vessel at sea and was our first Commander-in-Chief to move his organization and staff to buildings in the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor and set up a command organization which still exists, although greatly amplified since his time. It was evident to all Flag officers in the Fleet that he immediately made vigorous and determined efforts to obtain personnel, planes, guns, ammunition, bombs and additional ships which were all badly needed at this time. He also initiated a training program for aircraft and all types of ships to more closely fit them for the war effort and these programs were placed in effect and had the effect of increasing the training and effectiveness of the Fleet for action. He issued an order requiring our Naval Air Squadrons to land and be serviced on each Army airfield in the Hawaiian area and required an extension of the same services to Army aircraft landing on Navy fields. This had never been done previously. As far as my knowledge goes, the warnings received immediately prior to December 7, 1941 were of the same character and urgency as previous warnings and their effect was minimized by reason of repeated false alarms and by the inference derived from Departmental action that it was more important to equip and supply Naval units in the Atlantic at this time. I believe that Admiral Kimmel made unusual efforts in his desire to keep his principal subordinates fully informed of the situation as it developed and that he constantly sought advice and counsel from his principal subordinates; that he conferred frequently with General Short and that he was throughout his period of command on the best of terms with General Short and that he deliberately cultivated such a relationship, realizing its importance. It was my opinion, on relieving Admiral Kimmel, that his command was the best trained unit in the Fleet and that he had shown more energy and initiative in developing organization and practices to increase war-time efficiency of his ships than any other Type Commander then in the Fleet. I believe that the Fleet at war now shows the effect of training, organization and practices instituted during his term as Commander-in-Chief. This is particularly true as regards the development of practices in regard to damage control, and was splendidly evidenced in the case of the U. S. S. BOISE in her action with the Japanese fleet. I left Pearl Harbor for Australia on 1 February 1942. Up to the time of my

departure I believe that in general the security, training and organization orders issued by Admiral Kimmel were in general permitted to stand or were reissued without major change by his successor. I believe that the factors which determined the state of readiness in effect at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 were the result of the information which had been received by the high command at that time and that the general opinion was that the main threat to be feared was one of sabotage and that no direct attack upon the Fleet was considered to be imminent. I believe that undoubtedly had the high command been made aware of any imminence of attack from without that additional steps would have been taken to secure a more advanced state of readiness on December 7.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 6 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[368] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1944

THIRTY-FOURTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-third day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Captain J. B. Earle, U. S. Navy, attached to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as Director of Naval Instruction.

2. Q. What duties did you perform during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five, of the United States Fleet until the 9th of June, '41, when I reported for duty as Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. Q. Captain, I show you a document which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Do you identify it as one which you were familiar with in 1941?

A. Yes, I believe that that is the document that I saw after I reported.

4. Q. Referring to paragraph 5 of that document, Exhibit 5, it is noted that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, is a member of the Joint Planning Committee established by the document. While you were Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, did you serve on that Committee?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not serve formally on the Committee, but the Chiefs of Staffs acted informally as members of the Planning Committee with subcommittees appointed doing the majority of the detail work.

5. Q. Were you familiar with the work covered by these subcommittees at that time?

A. I do not recall at this time any particular problem that was handled by a subcommittee, but the War Plans Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District was continually working with the corresponding officer, personally, in the Hawaiian Department to bring up to date and to keep up to date the various Joint War Plans in the Library.

[369] 6. Q. Were you, at the time, kept advised of the various plans which were being considered by the War Plans Officer and the Army?

A. Yes, I think I can say I was.

7. Q. Were you, at the time, familiar with the relationship, cordiality, and so forth, between the Navy planners and the Army planners?

A. My recollection is that the preliminary plans were always easy to prepare, but that it took considerable time after they were prepared, more or less to our satisfaction, to get them finally approved by the Army. This more or less peacetime attitude underwent gradual changes as the impression was received that war was possible. What I'm trying to say is that when I first went there, though everything was proceeding at considerably accelerated peacetime manner, that as the various warnings were received that trouble was brewing, it became easier to get joint agreements and the joint action came more rapidly.

8. Q. Captain, in the period preceding the attack, was this plan, Exhibit 5, in full effect?

A. No, this was a plan prepared for execution at such time as it was found necessary. Some provisions were in effect, such as the planning parts, but the general overall plan was not in effect.

9. Q. Were you, prior to the attack, familiar with the aircraft warning net which was being established by the Army?

A. No, I was not. I knew that the Army was planning for such a net, but I had no information of the details.

10. Q. Captain, I show you a document, which is Inclosure "B" to Exhibit 22 before this examination, and which is annex No. VII to the JCD Plan, Exhibit 5. Were you, in the period preceding the attack, familiar with this document?

A. Yes, I recall this document.

11. Q. You will note that paragraph 11 of this document deals with the aircraft warning service to be established by the Army. This paragraph calls for the Army to expedite the installation of the warning service and for the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attacks until such time as the Army system was in operation. Do you recall at any time prior to the attack that this matter was discussed or considered by the Planning Officers of the Army and Navy, either individually or collectively?

A. No, I do not recall.

12. Q. Do you recall any endeavor on the part of the Navy, the Fourteenth Naval District, to carry out its commitment to render temporary service?

A. No, I don't recall that anything was done primarily because the District had nothing to do it with except possible by the use of Fleet radar on the ships of the Fleet and, so far as I know, no steps were taken to provide for their use.

13. Q. In paragraph 6 of this document, which also deals with the aircraft warning service, reference is made to the use of Navy liaison

officer in connection with the dissemination of information. Will you please state anything within your knowledge with relation to the detail and training of such officers of the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. I have a vague recollection of some talk with a Fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of District personnel to the Army warning net, but, at that time, the District had no aviation personnel and my recollection is that he was told that as soon as we could get somebody who was qualified, we would be glad to turn him over to the Army.

[370] 14. Q. Do you recall any consideration that was given, prior to the attack, to plans for the utilization by the Navy of information obtained by the Army warning net?

A. Yes, I do. There was a hook-up between the Army Warning Service and the District Operation Office, so that air raid training could be conducted. In other words, the Army would prearrange when we would have a drill, an air drill, and the information would come down from the warning system, but whether we ever received anything else but the training material, I can not recall.

15. Q. Do you recollect any plans that were made prior to the attack for establishing communications between the Army warning net and the Naval District?

A. Oh, yes, my recollection is that we had telephone communication, and I'm not sure, but possibly teletype.

16. Q. Prior to the attack, were personnel available to man this communication system?

A. Yes, we had officers with necessary enlisted personnel on watch in the Operations Office and Communication Office of the District to handle such communications.

17. Q. Do you recollect any request during November 1941 from the officers designated to establish this warning net for assistance from the Commandant in obtaining the placing of the net on a twenty-four hour operational basis?

A. My recollection is that we were all concerned about the situation, but whether any definite steps were taken to ask the Army to put it on a twenty-four hour basis, I can't say.

18. Q. Captain, the plan, JCD, or Exhibit 5, provides that the Army furnish an in-shore air patrol. Was such a patrol maintained in the period just prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I doubt it. We had, as I recall, drills, which included a problem of ships approaching Hawaii, and during these drills there was a coordinated operation of the Army and Navy, but, to the best of my recollection, this was only done during drill. I do seem to recall that there was a certain amount of in-shore patrol aircraft work done for some short time prior to December 7, but, to the best of my recollection, it was done by the Navy.

19. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the aircraft available to the Army to conduct such patrol?

A. No.

20. Q. Captain, referring again to this document, Inclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, in paragraph 8, and also Inclosure "A" to that Inclosure, reference is made to a plan for Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recognition Procedure. Will you please state anything you know with respect to such plan; whether one was established, or not, prior to December 7.

A. It is very hard to recall, but I don't think so. There were detailed procedures in effect, either shortly after or possibly shortly before, but I doubt whether they were in effect before December 7.

21. Q. Do you recollect any consideration of such a plan that occurred just prior to December 7; discussions, conferences, etc.?

A. I do not recall any.

[371] 22. Q. Paragraph 9 of Inclosure "B" of Exhibit 22, provides for further investigation and study as to the practicability of the use of barrage balloons in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Do you recollect any such further investigation and study being made prior to December 7?

A. I recall that a barrage balloon plan was made for Pearl Harbor and the vicinity, including a chart showing the locations, and it was approved by the Army and Navy, but whether the balloons got out there before December 7, I don't recall.

23. Q. This document, Captain, is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Where you familiar with that in the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

24. Q. It is noted that that letter provides that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should make arrangements with the Army for the placing of Army aircraft guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. Will you please state any knowledge which you have with respect to the making of such arrangements?

A. As I recall, preliminary studies were made and plans were prepared, but I do not recall that it got much further than the planning phase, except for holding communication drills in connection with air raid drills.

25. Q. Do you recall any occasion prior to the attack, on which the guns were actually placed in the selected locations for drill or training purposes?

A. I seem to recall that they were brought in for drill purposes, but I can not be definite on this point.

26. Q. This document, Exhibit 4, also provides for the Naval Base Defense Officer to have charge of coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense. It sets out specific methods by which this was to be done. Will you please state anything within your knowledge with respect to what was done in compliance with this directive?

A. The anchorage area was divided up into sectors and the Fleet was required to keep the Naval Base Defense Commander informed of who was the Sector Commander in each sector. Instructions were issued regarding the use of signals for "open fire" and "cease firing"; communication plan was worked out and drills were held. In addition, it is my recollection that the various conditions specified were used for some time prior to December 7.

27. Q. Was any plan adopted for coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the anti-aircraft fire of the Army in the Pearl Harbor area?

A. I can recall no plan.

28. Q. Do you recall any consideration being given to such a plan of coordinating anti-aircraft batteries of the two Services?

A. I am sure the consideration was given and probably informal conferences, held, because we all realized it to be a very serious prob-

lem; but so far as recalling whether any definite action or any definite results were obtained, I can not say.

[372] 29. Q. Were you, in late November, 1941, familiar with the location and the status of Army anti-aircraft batteries intended for the defense of Pearl Harbor?

A. I knew in general where the fixed guns were located, but I had no knowledge of any mobile anti-aircraft batteries.

30. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the series of war warning dispatches which you received during October and November 1941?

A. I was familiar with several that came in. Whether I saw all of them, I don't know.

31. Q. Do you recall any discussions with the Army, based on these dispatches, which contemplated the placing of the Army anti-aircraft defenses in a higher degree of readiness to repel an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not.

32. Q. Was any request made by the Naval Base Defense Officer, so far as you know, prior to the attack, for the Army to place its mobile batteries or otherwise prepare for repelling an air attack?

A. I have no knowledge of any such action, if any was taken. We were not, at that time, checking up on the Army and trying to find out what steps they were taking. It was assumed that they were in full knowledge of the situation and that they were taking all practicable steps.

33. Q. At the time, were you familiar with the fact that during the week preceding the attack the Army was only alerted against sabotage?

A. Yes. There has been, however, so much said about that since the war that I'm a little doubtful. However, I do recall that there was some conversation about the valuation and urgency of the messages which the Army and Navy were getting. By that, I mean that to some, it appeared that there was considerable difference of opinion higher up as to just what the emergency was. My recollection is that the Army instructions were so worded as to indicate that although war might be possible, yet no steps were to be taken to unduly alarm the inhabitants of Hawaii.

34. Q. Captain, I show you a dispatch dated 27 November 1941, which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Were you familiar with this dispatch at the time it was received at Pearl Harbor or shortly afterward?

A. I think I can recall having seen that dispatch. I do not recall when I saw it.

35. Q. Referring again, Captain, to this document, which is Enclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, it provides for the use of Marine defense battalion AA batteries in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Will you please state anything you know of any plans that were made for such use of Marine defense battalion batteries.

A. My recollection is that plans were made, but I, again, am not certain whether they were really put in operating condition before December 7 or shortly after.

36. Q. The same document, Enclosure "B" to Exhibit 22, provides for establishing a Harbor Control Post. You will find that in paragraph 14 and also in Enclosure "B" to the Enclosure. Will you please

state what was done about establishing such a post prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and its status just prior to the attack?

[373] A. We had, what was called at that time, a Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District. This Post consisted of an officer on watch, with enlisted personnel, to man a special telephone board and teletype system. I believe that there was a coast artilleryman on watch there, but I'm not certain on that point. Later, this Joint Operations Officer, Harbor Control Post, was expanded and covered all the details envisaged in Enclosure "B" to Annex VII, JCD.

37. Q. Will you please stated the purpose of this Control Post?

A. This Control Post, as then established, was, to the best of my recollection, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised), which assigned certain duties to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer.

38. Q. Was the officer who manned this Post authorized to act as the representative of the Naval Base Defense Officer in performing his duties?

A. It is my recollection that at the time he could give orders direct in emergency, but that if no emergency existed, he would refer to the Commandant or Chief of Staff before he issued direct orders.

39. Q. What officers stood watch at the Harbor Control Post?

A. Officers were detailed from the various Departments of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Naval Yard.

40. Q. What qualifications were required of officers before they were designated for this watch?

A. Some were reserve officers, but effort was made to place officers on this watch who would be considered as reliable. In many instances, it is possible that they did not have long experience in the Navy.

41. Q. What instructions were issued to these watch officers to guide them in performing their duties?

A. I don't recall the detailed instructions that were issued. They were given a routine to follow. They were kept informed of the number of ships in the harbor and of all movements of ships, prospective as well as past movements; they were kept informed of the situation as it existed except when it was built on secret information which could not be given to them.

42. Q. What assistants were provided the watch officer at the Harbor Control Post prior to the attack, insofar as you recollect?

A. I recall he had only one man on the telephone board and possibly a messenger; I'm not sure.

43. Q. Captain, will you please outline the established procedure for the operation of the harbor gate in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor in effect prior to the attack on December 7.

A. At Pearl Harbor, as I recall, the gate was kept closed at night, except when naval vessels were going to have to use that channel at night. In that case, the gate was left open for those ships to use. Whether the gate was opened and closed after each ship, I do not recall, but my belief is that it was. In daytime, the net was left open probably for considerable length of time, as there were large numbers of ships passing in and out, but I'm not certain whether it was closed at that time after each ship in the daytime. As I recall, the handling

of the gate at Pearl Harbor, before December 7, was in the hands of the Captain of the Yard, and I'm not certain as to any details. At Honolulu, the senior Coast Guard Officer was in charge, and, so far as I know, opened and closed the net for each ship, day and night.

[374] 44. Q. In your capacity as Chief of Staff, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, would not the operation of anything as important as the gate at Pearl Harbor be directly under your purview?

A. I can't see why the Chief of Staff of the Naval District should have been required to handle such a detail as opening and closing the gate into Pearl Harbor. However, after December 7, 1941, the Harbor Control Post assisted the Captain of the Yard in operating the gate until the Navy Yard was able, later, to take complete control again.

45. Q. Captain, can you state how the Japanese submarine got past the net into Pearl Harbor on the early morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack?

A. It is my recollection that the gate had been opened to let some vessels out, either minesweepers or some other type, and that it had been left open to let the ANTARES in, which was scheduled to come in early that morning.

46. Q. How far below the surface was the lowest element of the gate?

A. I'm sorry, I do not know.

47. Q. Did it occur to you, after you became aware that a Jap submarine had been in the harbor, that it may have entered by passing under the lowest element of the gate?

A. That point came up shortly after December 7 and it was said at that time that there was sufficient water in the center of the channel, under the net, to permit a small submarine to enter even though the gate were closed. However, either at that time or shortly after, the impression was given that one of these small submarines could not be expected to go under the net because of its buoyancy. In other words, the impression was given that they had to stay fairly near the surface in order to keep going.

48. Q. Captain Earle, do you know whether more than one Jap submarine got into the harbor on the morning of December 7, and, if so, whether the one that got in, or more than one, was destroyed?

A. So far as I know, only one got in and that was the one that was rammed and sunk in the harbor. There were, however, many reports of Japanese submarines in the harbor. Every can and bit of floating refuse was picked up as a sub.

49. Q. Captain, the Plan JCD, which is Exhibit 5, in paragraph 17 (i) and 18 (l) provides for establishing a joint system of land communications by the Army and Navy for use in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Will you please state what you know of the status of this communication system prior to the attack.

A. All naval stations were connected either by telephone or radio. There were teletypes which also went to all those on Oahu. The Army stations were connected by telephone. They eventually became connected by teletypes. But whether that was done before December 7 or after, I am not certain.

50. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was a joint communication plan in effect prior to the attack?

A. I think that there probably was, but I can not say definitely.

51. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. Yes, sir.

[375] 52. Q. Will you please state your impression at the time as to the effectiveness of this office in performing its duties?

A. So far as I know, it was a satisfactory office. In other words, I had no reason to believe that it was not.

53. Q. Did you know at the time the views held by the Commandant, Admiral Bloch, with respect to the activities of the District Intelligence Office, in, say, the six months preceding Pearl Harbor?

A. So far as I know, Admiral Bloch was satisfied with the Intelligence Office.

54. Q. How closely were you kept in touch, in November, 1941, and early December, with the results which were obtained by the unit headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?

A. I knew nothing of the results obtained from their activities.

55. Q. Captain, during the latter half of 1941, how frequently were air raid drills conducted in the Fourteenth Naval District?

A. My recollection is that not oftener than every three or four weeks.

56. Q. Did you, at the time, consider that this number of drills was adequate to prepare the District for defense against air raid?

A. My Operations Officer and I discussed that point several times and though we felt that additional drills might be desirable, yet we didn't succeed in getting any more; just why, I don't recall, probably because of the general feeling that these big drills took up too much time.

57. Q. What major deficiencies were noted during the air raid drills late in 1941?

A. I do not recall any specific deficiencies, except that there was some difficulty in communications and in the ability of the air groups to find their targets, and the failure of other shore establishments to comply with the air raid drill instructions to man all stations.

58. Q. What do you mean by "other establishments"?

A. I mean the other naval stations on the Island of Oahu. We even extended the drill, sometimes, to Maui, in order to make sure that they were coordinating their action with the movements on Oahu.

59. Q. What corrective action was taken in connection with these deficiencies that you have outlined?

A. Other than general discussion, I recall no definite steps. In these discussions, necessary corrective action was indicated.

60. Q. Did you consider, just prior to December 7, 1941, that the difficulties had been ironed out and that the Fourteenth Naval District was effectively prepared to meet an air raid in the event of war?

A. I can't say that we were effectively prepared to meet an air raid. What we felt was that we were improving the system available and that if there were enough planes and ships and guns available, that the defense would be acceptable. In other words, we were playing with what we had.

61. Q. Did you, at that time, consider that your air raid defense system was as effective as it could be made with what you had available?

A. Yes, we thought that with what we had available, it was pretty good.

62. Q. Did Fleet units present at Pearl Harbor take part in these air raid drills?

[376] A. Oh, yes, they had to man their guns and signals were sent to the various Sector Commanders and ships. We also used target planes so that they could actually point their guns at planes going and coming over the Pearl Harbor area.

63. Q. Was their participation in these drills satisfactory to you and the Commandant?

A. We only knew whether it was satisfactory, or not, depending upon the communications, whether the signals were answered, or not, whether the reports were received from the Sector Commander, or not, showing the number of ships that he had available. We had Harbor Control vessels in the harbor but, so far as I know, no report was ever received indicating whether the ships, themselves, were efficient in this problem.

64. Q. Were air raid drills held in which the Army units on Oahu participated?

A. So far as I know, they participated, but we had no way of checking up. In other words, I can recall having seen Army units of mobile anti-aircraft coming into the Navy Yard, but whether this was before or after December 7, I do not recall.

65. Q. Insofar as you were able to observe, was the coordination between the Army and Navy units, during such joint air raid drills, satisfactory?

A. Yes, except in minor cases. By "minor", I mean failures of communication, and somebody not getting the word.

66. Q. Were efforts made to straighten out these minor difficulties?

A. Yes.

67. Q. Captain, when did you first learn of the submarine contact off Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December?

A. About seven-ten in the morning.

68. Q. Did it occur to you at that time that the presence of the submarine might indicate that an air attack was imminent?

A. Not the slightest. It is interesting to note, however, that we had based some of our plans upon that very contingency.

69. Q. What was your reaction to this information?

A. My reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign, or that the WARD, who had made the report, was making another mistake. We had had, on the average, ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted in that area in the several months preceding Pearl.

70. Q. What action, based on this contact, did you take?

A. I told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander-in-Chief's Watch Officer immediately, and to get hold of Commander Momsen, our Operations Officer, and give him the information, and then I called Admiral Bloch and told him what the report was, what I had done, and we discussed the matter over the telephone for, I suppose, five or ten minutes to try to decide what was the reliability of this word and what steps should be taken.

As the matter had been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, we decided that we would wait further developments.

71. Q. During your telephone conversation with Admiral Bloch, did the possibility that an air attack might be indicated by the presence of the submarine receive discussion or consideration?

A. No.

[377] 72. Q. Captain, a portion of this Exhibit 22 (Enclosure C), concerning which you have been questioned, is a joint estimate of the situation, under date of 31 March, 1941, signed by Admiral Beltinger and by General Martin. It contains, under the heading "Possible Enemy Action" a statement to the effect that the most likely form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Were the opinions thereby expressed by aviation officers very much in your mind during the weeks and months preceding 7 December '41?

A. Yes, we considered this point, but, somehow or other, we always felt that "it couldn't happen here", and that this estimate which you have referred to was one officer's opinion—a very valuable officer—and that while it could happen, that we didn't believe the Japanese would take that chance.

73. Q. Captain, under the provisions of 2CL-41 (Exhibit 4), was there, on the morning of December 7, 1941, a large number of battleship anti-aircraft guns so placed that they bore upon the sector through which the Japanese torpedo planes attacked?

A. A great many torpedo planes attacked from the sector up over the channel to the submarine base. These battleships were, therefore, in a position to use their anti-aircraft guns against them. I did, however, see a number of planes attacking from the housing area to the northeast, and the battleships' guns would not have been well placed for that attack.

74. Q. But is it true that a considerable proportion of the Japanese torpedo planes attacked from the southeast?

A. It is true.

75. Q. Is it also true that there were a great many battleship anti-aircraft guns emplaced so that they could bear on that attack?

A. Yes.

76. Q. In view of the well-known vulnerability of torpedo planes making close attacks of low altitudes, to what do you ascribe the fact that this large mass of guns failed to stop most, if not in fact nearly all, of the torpedo planes coming in from the southeast?

A. Surprise.

77. Q. About how long after the initial appearance of Japanese planes did the torpedo planes attack from the southeast?

A. I don't know. The first thing I saw was low-level torpedo planes at about 7:50.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I regret to note that in a great many instances my testimony has been vague and indefinite.

In explanation, it is desired to call attention to the fact that not only has a great deal of time elapsed since the attack on Pearl Harbor, but that I remained on duty as Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, later, also, becoming Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier and Assistant Commandment of the District, until I was detached in May, 1943. I, therefore, find a [378] tendency on my part to recall related events after Pearl Harbor much clearer than I do those before.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.


The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., took a recess until 4:05 p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain J. B. Earle, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-fourth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4:08 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.



[379] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

FRIDAY, MAY 5, 1944

THIRTY-FIFTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:45 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-fourth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Wesley A. Wright; Commander, U. S. Navy; duty at the Navy Department.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?

A. I was Assistant Communication Officer on the Staff of Admiral Kimmel, on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

3. Q. Please state, briefly, what experience you have had with Combat Intelligence work, particularly with regard to detection and location of enemy ships by instrument.

A. Actually none in the traffic analysis field, which includes the location of forces by instruments. However, I had had, at that time, about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of Communication Intelligence work.

4. Q. Sir, will you make a brief statement on the means of detection and location of enemy ships that were available to CinCPac on the morning of 7 December 1941, including in your answer the general opinion among communication officers as to the relative merits of the different instruments you describe?

A. The Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit had available a small DF net, consisting, as I remember, of two DY's, one DT, and one large CXK on Oahu; a DY on Palmyra, and

one on Midway. I feel that I am not a very good witness for the question because, as I stated before, my experience has been largely in other C. I. activities. Commander Williams, who has been ordered to duty here, was handling the traffic analysis end of the job, and, I believe, can answer this question much more satisfactorily.

[380] 5. Q. Can you answer the last part of the question, on the general opinion of the communication officers as to the relative merits of the DY and CXK?

A. Yes. The DY's and the DT's are such smaller instruments and they are capable of much quicker manipulation. As a consequence, a bearing can be obtained on a short transmission much more readily and with an experienced operator satisfactory bearings can be obtained. The CXK is a much larger and much more difficult instrument to operate, but, on a long transmission, it is likely to give you a more satisfactory bearing in that it has a unilateral feature which will determine the hemisphere of the bearing almost without doubt.

6. Q. Is it practicable to obtain unilateral bearings on a DY or DT?

A. It is my belief that, with experienced operators, it is practicable to obtain unilateral bearings on a DY and also on a DT. In general, of course, we hope not to have to depend upon a single instrument. If a small net is available the necessity for unilateral or "sense" determination is not as important.

7. Q. Sir, on the morning of 7 December, were the DY operators at Pearl Harbor qualified to report unilateral bearings from the DY?

A. Yes, in my opinion, the operators were qualified to report unilateral bearings.

8. Q. Under the circumstances obtaining on Oahu on 7 December, what instrument of the various ones available would be the most reliable for determination of a bearing of the Japanese carriers, if they were transmitting freely enough for obtaining results?

A. I should think that if enough bearings were obtainable the CXK would be the better instrument. I say "enough bearings" because with any DF instrument, any one bearing is likely to be considerably in error.

9. Q. Sir, where were you at the time of the attack on 7 December, and what was your station for the remainder of the morning?

A. I was in the Mess Hall at the Submarine Base, that is, the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Mess, at the time of the attack. Commander Williams was eating breakfast with me. I directed that he immediately get over to the Communication Intelligence Unit in the Administration Building, Navy Yard, find out as much as he possibly could about the composition and location of the attacking force, and telephone the information to me at Commander-in-Chief's headquarters in the Submarine Base Administration Building; I immediately went there and made telephone contact with the Communication Intelligence Unit. I remained in this building for the remainder of the morning.

10. Q. Will you give a brief narrative account of reports received, regarding the location of the Japanese ships from which the aerial attack was launched, at the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Headquarters, including in your answer an account of what information was disseminated by the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters to the United States forces that were seeking out the enemy ships?

A. We were primarily interested in learning as much as we could of the composition and the location of the attacking surface forces. In general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the AKAGI and KAGA, by identified radio calls. The bearings [381] obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South, distance pretty well undetermined, but estimated in the neighborhood of between 250 and 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources, one of which stated that the carriers were sighted close to Oahu. This was questioned at length by the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Communication Officer. During this time, I found out that no bearings were being received from Lualualei where the CXK was installed, and also found out that the Army megga telephone line between the Fourteenth Naval District Administration Building and Lualualei was out of commission. I suggested to the Fleet Radio Officer that contact could be established by radio. This was done and at least one bearing report came from this source. I remember distinctly only one bearing being called to my attention by the Fleet Radio Officer. This bearing was in direct conflict with the previous evidence that the force was to the South. The bearing received, as I remember it, was almost exactly due North, either 359, 000, or 001. The latter half of the question, as to how much of this information was transmitted to our own forces, I am unable to answer.

11. Q. Am I correct in understanding that you have no information as to whether or not this CXK bearing was sent out to any of the searching forces?

A. My understanding is that it was not, but I believe that that knowledge has come to me subsequently.

12. Q. Sir, in your previous answer, you stated that all of the earlier reports prior to the receipt of the bearing from Lualualei indicated that the force was due South. Can you give any explanation of why the reports all took that trend?

A. It is my belief that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the southward affected all of the subsequent reports.

13. Q. Sir, you also stated in that answer that there was a report in that the carriers had been sighted South. Can you give any further information as to the source of that report and its evaluation by the officers on duty at CinCPac Headquarters?

A. I believe I stated that the report was pretty definitely discounted by the Fleet Intelligence Officer. He brought it to my attention and made the statement that he thought it was an erroneous report.

14. Q. What evaluation was given to the CXK bearing that you received from Lualualei?

A. I'm afraid I can only answer that from my own reaction. I was a little disturbed, but felt it was probably an erroneous bearing, and when it was called to my attention by the Fleet Radio Officer, I requested that, if possible, we get some more bearings from the CXK to substantiate that.

15. Q. Was that done?

A. It was attempted but I don't believe we received any more bearings.

16. Q. Can you state to whom the information of the CXK bearing to the North was passed?

A. It was passed by me to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lieutenant Commander Layton, and I assumed it was further passed by the Fleet Radio Officer to either the Chief of Staff or to the Admiral, himself.

[382] 17. Q. Do you have any definite information as to whether the CXK bearing went to higher authority, other than the Radio Officer and Intelligence Officer?

A. Nothing definite; no. In addition to that, I did report this bearing to Fourteenth Naval District Unit.

18. Q. Sir, with regard to the various reports that were coming from the DY unit and one report that you mentioned from the CXK unit, can you give the approximate or relative times at which they were received, and was the source of the bearing called to the attention of all who received the information?

A. I'm afraid I can not give very definite times, but I believe that the record of the information exchanged on that day will show the times. My recollection is that we were getting the first bearings at about eight-thirty, Hawaiian time, and we continued to get bearings until afternoon.

19. Q. Do you know at approximately what time within that period this CXK bearing came in?

A. I'm afraid I cannot give a positive answer. As I remember, it was after the second dive bombing attack, which should have been in the neighborhood of 11:15. I think that can be checked by the records.

20. Q. Do you have any information as to the latter part of the previous question, on whether or not the recipients of this information were fully advised as to its source?

A. They were not advised. In any DF work, the question of bilateral or unilateral nature of the bearing is left up to the operator and the DF plot to determine. They are best suited to do the job and are depended on to furnish the correct bearing.

21. Q. In other words, the officers who received this information at CinCPac Headquarters received them as bearings and not knowing that some were received on an instrument that has a bilateral feature and another on an instrument having a unilateral feature?

A. That is correct.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow.

[383] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

SATURDAY, MAY 6, 1944

THIRTY-SIXTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-fifth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-second day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Charles Wellborn, Jr.; Captain, United States Navy; present station the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

A. During the calendar year 1941, I performed duty as Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Q. In the performance of those duties, was your association and mental touch with Admiral Stark unusually close?

A. My association with Admiral Stark was rather close. I, of course, did not know all that was in his mind, but I believe that I was acquainted with many of his thoughts.

4. Q. Had he chosen you for the position in consequence of previous and close personal acquaintance?

A. Presumably so, sir. I had served with him previously in the Bureau of Ordnance and while he was at sea commanding the light cruisers of the United States Fleet.

5. Q. Captain, the war plan which was current during the latter part of 1941 was known as WPL-46. Did your duties, during 1941, bring you into any particular contact with those charged with the preparations of that plan?

A. I frequently saw those charged with the operation of the plan but had no direct responsibility in connection with its preparation.

[384] 6. Q. Do you recall hearing any discussions between the Chief, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and officers of the War Plans Section concerning matters of major import surrounding the preparation of WPL-46?

A. I recall that such discussions were held.

7. Q. As an instance, do you recall any discussion or argument concerning the participation of potential allies in any hostilities in which we might engage in the Pacific Ocean?

A. Yes, sir. I recall participation of possible allies was discussed and there seemed to be general agreement that in a Pacific war participation of allies was almost a necessity, and that it might be expected. Allies counted upon were Britain, the Netherlands, and China. As I recall it, at that time, there was some doubt as to the participation of Russia and France.

8. Q. Do you recall any important discussions on the point as to the most probable location—that is in the Atlantic or Pacific—of the war for which the Navy was preparing?

A. The question of the probable location of hostilities was continually discussed.

9. Q. Did you hear much disagreement over the point as to which Ocean our major efforts of preparation should be directed?

A. There was discussion of that point. As I recall it, the general opinion appeared to be that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic, while holding action was resorted to in the Pacific, since the war might quickly and irretrievably be lost in the Atlantic, whereas initial reverses in the Pacific might later be retrievable.

10. Q. Do you recall the names of any officers around Admiral Stark who disagreed with that idea, which, incidentally, is covered by a part of WPL-46?

A. My recollection is that this view was rather generally held, and I do not remember hearing anyone in a position of importance expressing directly contrary views at that time.

11. Q. Incident to that particular point, do you recall hearing any disagreement as to the correctness of the step which was taken, as a part of WPL-46, toward transfer of a considerable portion of the Pacific Fleet to Atlantic waters, which occurred during the Spring of 1941?

A. My recollection on that point is that there were insufficient forces to meet the requirements in each Ocean. Those officers primarily concerned with activities in the Pacific appeared to feel that no forces should be removed from the Pacific; those primarily concerned with Atlantic activities for the most part held the view that stronger forces were a necessity in the Atlantic.

12. Q. Confining the question to those whose ordinary duties did not confine their interests to one of the two Oceans, do you recall any disagreement?

A. I do not.

13. Q. What do you remember of discussions and arguments concerning the defensive, and particularly the security aspect as affecting our naval forces in the Pacific?

A. Pearl Harbor was not considered a one hundred per cent secure base. Efforts were made to increase its security. Operations of the Fleet were so [335] controlled that normally only a part of the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor at any one time. I recall no specific discussions on this point, however.

14. Q. Captain, will you state what you recall concerning discussions, opinions expressed, and so forth, on the very broad point of our Administration's keeping its diplomatic steps in touch with naval readiness for war, and the reverse thereof?

A. My recollection is that there was a rather complete interchange of information between the Navy Department and the State Department. My recollection is that their opinions were not widely divergent.

15. Q. Can you recall any specific incident of the State Department's making a diplomatic move against the advice of the Navy Department?

A. No, sir, I can't.

16. Q. Our Government, in June or July of 1941, instituted steps which resulted in a freezing of Japanese credits within our country, which was also participated in by our potential allies. What do you recall of discussions within the Navy Department concerning the international situation which that action would bring forth?

A. I recall that there were discussions regarding how far the United States might go with such moves without provoking warlike action on the part of Japan against the United States.

17. Q. What do you recall, in the way of discussions heard concerning more direct actions instituted by our Government which resulted in the stopping of shipments of steel scrap, petroleum products, and so forth, to the Japanese Empire?

A. The overall result of such steps was discussed, both within the Navy Department and between the Navy Department and the State Department. Generally, I believe an effort was being made to take such steps as might prevent, or render more difficult, aggressive action on the part of Japan without provoking Japan to war with the United States.

18. Q. What do you recall in the way of differences of opinions as to the probabilities on that particular point which you have just mentioned?

A. I can't recall opinions of individuals, but I do recall that it was generally felt that the stoppage of crude oil would probably result in a warlike step on the part of Japan. The consensus of opinion, as I recall, was that the stoppage of shipments of aviation gasoline, the freezing of credits, and shutting off of steel scrap were probably moves which would not provoke war.

19. Q. Were the officers around Admiral Stark all in agreement concerning the effect of depriving Japan of crude oil?

A. As I recall it, they were not entirely in agreement, but I'm not able to recall the particular shading of views held by the individual officers.

20. Q. In considering the matter, were aforementioned officers thinking mostly about shipments from this Continent or those from the N. E. I. oil fields?

A. I believe that shipments from both locations were considered in the overall thought given the problem.

21. Q. Do you recall that, following that state of mind which indicated full realization of the seriousness of the petroleum deprivation, the Navy Department particularly advised other Departments of the Government concerning our readiness to back up the action?

[386] A. I believe that the State Department at this time was generally familiar with the state of readiness of the War and Navy Departments and that this state was considered in reaching decisions regarding the stoppage of shipments of oil, aviation gasoline, and scrap, and the freezing of credits. Note was also taken of the fact that regardless of decisions on oil, gasoline, scrap, and credits, the strengthening of our military and naval forces and Japan's probable belief that this strengthening was a threat to Japan's accomplishment of her aims in the Far East might cause Japan to attack the United States before we became too strong.

22. Q. Captain, state what you recall of discussions here and opinions expressed incident to Mr. Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a so-called Assistant Japanese Ambassador.

A. There was general conjecture as to the meaning of his appearance. He obviously was familiar with the views of those who were gaining power in Japan and he was also familiar with the United States. As I recall it, it was generally felt that he was bringing the Japanese Ambassador authentic and up to date information regarding the views of the Japanese Cabinet.

23. Q. Do you recall if his appearance in Washington occasioned an easing or an increase of the general tension of officers of the most responsible mind in the Navy Department?

A. My recollection is that they did not feel that his appearance very greatly changed the tension of the situation; they believed that his appearance called definitely for very careful watching of the situation.

24. Q. Captain, please state any knowledge that you had, at any time in 1941, amounting to background of the Navy Department's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readiness of the Army to meet its commitments on Oahu.

A. The Navy Department, of course, desired Pearl Harbor to be sufficiently well defended to permit the repair and upkeep of ships and rehabilitation of crews with security and continually pressed the War Department to improve the defenses to permit this. The War Department felt that from the overall total of existing men and material, it could not assign to Hawaii all that the Navy Department desired. Particularly, the Navy Department desired better defenses against air attack, both as regards anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. It was the Navy Department's view that there was no more important commitment the Army might have than the defense of Pearl Harbor, and this view appeared to be not completely concurred in by the War Department.

25. Q. Captain, as the situation vis-a-vis Japan became tense in the latter part of November, state what you recall in the way of

background discussions concerning the directive which went out concerning the use of Army troops and aircraft as garrisons of Midway, Wake, and so forth.

A. As I recall it, the Navy Department felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility; that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. With this in mind, effort was made to reduce the overhead requirements of the Marine Corps. One method for this reduction was the relieving of Marine Corps units from static defensive duties. I believe that this was the background for the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense of Midway and Wake.

266. Q. Inasmuch as that directive was sent at nearly the same time as the [387] all important "war warning" dispatch, do you recall how it happened that the Department took the action at that particular time?

A. I do not recall any specific reason for that action having been taken at that time and also do not recall that it was connected in any way directly with the war warning.

27. Q. Did it happen that said directive concerning the substitution of Army for Marines was prepared and released by some officer who was not cognizant of the dangerous international situation?

A. I do not recall specifically, but I think it probable.

28. Q. Captain, what do you recall, as background, of discussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters? My question particularly concerns the security aspect.

A. There was much consideration and discussion on the question of continuing to base the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. There was general realization that the Hawaiian Islands did not afford a completely secure location in which to base the Fleet. It was also felt that, unless Hawaii was actually used as a base and the necessary facilities and technique developed for handling the Fleet in this area, it might be impossible to base the Fleet there in time of war. I believe there was also a general belief that the Fleet based in Hawaii might deter Japan from aggressive action. The decision to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor involved consideration of all of these points.

29. Q. What do you recall of discussions or opinions expressed, say, during October-November, '41, concerning the probability of a direct Japanese attack on Oahu, particularly as regards a carrier raid?

A. I recall some discussion as to whether or not, in the event of aggressive action by Japan against the United States, the attack would be made against Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, or to the Northward against Russia. Some months previous to this time, there had been discussion of a possible aircraft attack on Oahu, which resulted in a letter on this subject to the War Department. At this particular time, that is, October or November, 1941, I recall little discussion on the question of probability of a carrier attack against Oahu.

30. Q. Do you recall, during October and November, '41, an expression of opinion by any officer that a carrier raid on Pearl Harbor was to be particularly apprehended?

A. I do not recall that anyone felt that this particular type of attack was highly probable to the exclusion of attacks elsewhere, but there were individuals who felt that such an attack was probable.

31. Q. Can you recall their names?

A. Yes, sir. Admiral Turner felt that attack on Oahu was quite probable. Other officers felt that such an attack was entirely possible but appeared to regard it as somewhat less probable than did Admiral Turner. I believe that Admirals Ingersoll and Stark were in this category.

32. Q. Captain, I show you two dispatches which are Exhibits 6 and 7 as a part of this record. The first of 16 October contains a directive concerning deployments and no documentary evidence indicates other communications to CinC, Pacific Fleet, along similar lines, up to the date of 24 November. [388] As a background, please give what you remember of discussions pertinent to that point during that intervening period.

A. It is my recollection that during this period there was some personal correspondence between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief, and that frequently officers moved between Hawaii and Washington and that through these media there may have been interchange of information and opinions regarding the degree of tension in the international situation between the dispatches of October 16 and November 24.

33. Q. I show you a dispatch, dated 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this record. Please state what you recall during the few weeks preceding this dispatch of discussions, conferences, and so forth, with officials of the State Department concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan.

A. There was close liaison between the War, Navy, and State Departments at this time. The State Department kept the War and Navy Departments fully advised concerning developments of the discussions with the Japanese representatives and, in turn, the War and Navy Departments provided the State Department with complete information on all intelligence they obtained.

34. Q. What can you recall in the way of disagreements, between Navy and State Departments, in opinions or proposed actions during that period?

A. My recollection is that any divergences of opinion were fully discussed and that final decisions reached were generally concurred in by most of those concerned. Generally, there appeared to be no uncompromisable disagreement.

35. Q. Again referring to Exhibit 8; did you hear the conversations which were incident to eventual agreement over the phrasing of this dispatch?

A. I was present during discussion of the phrasing of one dispatch at about this time. I believe it was the message of the 27th of November.

36. Q. What do you recall of that conversation concerning the phrase which had to do with "war warning" and the other phrase concerning a deployment?

A. I recall there was some discussion as to whether or not the phrase "This is a war warning." was too strong. After discussion, it was agreed that it was not too strong and it was included in the final draft of the message. I do not recall discussion regarding the phrases concerning deployment.

37. Q. Do you recall who proposed to water down the phrase about the war warning?

A. I do not recall definitely who proposed that.

38. Q. Do you recall hearing any officer proposing, subsequent to the dispatch of 27 November, to send the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, either further information indicating that his position was likely to be attacked or any more specific directive, concerning steps which he was to take, than he had already received?

A. I know of no specific proposal along this line. Although there was considerable discussion of such things during this period, I do not recall anyone actually drafting a dispatch and submitting it to the Chief of Naval Operations for release.

39. Q. Do you recall a discussion as regards ascertaining directly from CinCPac what measures he had taken incident to the Department's directive on 27 November?

A. I do not.

[389] 40. Q. Do you recall hearing any discussion during the last days of November or early December of proposals to put war plans in effect wholly or in part?

A. I recall discussions as to the desirability of placing in effect, wholly or in part, certain war plans, but I do not recall a specific proposal that they should actually be placed in effect. In the dispatch of November 27, there was a directive which mentioned certain measures included in WPL-46.

41. Q. Reverting to my question concerning future directives to CinCPac subsequent to 27 November, and so forth, do you recall hearing any discussions as to the advisability of some very high Navy Department official proceeding to Pearl Harbor, by the most rapid transportation available, in order that there might be a direct meeting of minds?

A. I do not recall such a proposal at that time.

42. Q. Did Admiral Stark have available a method of telephonic communication to CinCPac through which he could talk things over with reasonable security?

A. He did not have any means of telephonic communication with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which was considered secure. Voice scramblers were installed in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, but the opinion of engineers familiar with this equipment was that it offered little security.

43. Q. Can you elaborate upon the latter part of that reply?

A. Upon the occasion of the installation of the voice scrambler, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the engineer who made the installation demonstrated his ability to translate from the scrambled language into plain English parts of conversations transmitted with the use of the scrambler.

44. Q. Sir, can you give a summary or chronology of events from Saturday noon, 6 December, '41, to the time of the attack, indicating, as accurately as you can remember, the times at which CNO received various reports that gave indications of proposed Japanese action?

A. Until sometime in the evening of December 6, probably about seven or eight o'clock, the Chief of Naval Operations was in his office and I recall no particular incidents relevant to the attack of the next

day. I did not see him between about eight p. m., December 6, and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

45. Q. Captain, did you know of information that had been received about two days before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had used a certain code which has come to be known as the "Winds Message" indicating a definite intention to wage war on the United States in the immediate future?

A. I did not know of this.

46. Q. Do you remember anything in particular which occurred during the few weeks preceding 7 December, '41, which seemed to unnecessarily preoccupy Admiral Stark and Ingersoll so that their mental attitudes, as concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan, were adversely affected?

A. I recall no particular preoccupations of either Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There were, of course, the customary interruptions and matters requiring consideration, but I recall no important matter preoccupying either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark.

[390] The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 12:04 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[391] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1944

THIRTY-SEVENTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his assistant counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-sixth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

The examining officer read orders from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, certified copy prefixed marked "D", relieving Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy, as counsel to the examining officer, and orders from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, original prefixed marked "E", detailing Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, as counsel to the examining officer. Lieutenant Whittington took seat as such.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 17 April 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the twenty-ninth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 37".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 May 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the thirty-third day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 38".

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Walter S. Anderson, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, President of the Board of Inspection and Survey of the Navy Department.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. Early in the calendar year 1941, I was detached as Director of Naval Intelligence and took command as Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.

[392] 3. Q. Were the ships which in general suffered the heaviest damage on 7 December '41 vessels of your command?

A. Yes. The vessels of my command were among those that suffered the heaviest damage.

4. Q. In the administrative organization of the Pacific Fleet, in effect during the latter half of 1941, who was your immediate superior in command?

A. Commander Battle Force, also known as Commander, Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye.

5. Q. Then is it correct to say that from the operational standpoint also Admiral Pye was generally your immediate superior?

A. Yes. I might add, however, there were numerous occasions when I, myself, was a Task Force Commander for purposes of operations at sea.

6. Q. Were you Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander?

A. Yes, inasmuch as I commanded his heaviest subordinate unit and was the senior of the Flag Officers under him.

7. Q. During the latter half of 1941, from your position as a principal commander in the third command echelon, what was your observation of the relationships among the officers of the still higher command echelons, particularly as regards information of the situation vis-a-vis Japan and of the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief?

A. My impression was that relations were normal. My knowledge is not precise nor specific as to what degree of information was passed along to them, but I had no reason to believe there was not a proper dissemination of information, and I believe there was. I, personally, saw my immediate senior frequently, and the Commander-in-Chief at least weekly.

8. Q. As you recall, how much of this most important information and the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief concerning the situation in November, say, became passed down to officers in your own command echelon?

A. I knew that the Commander-in-Chief felt that he needed more resources than he had, especially aircraft, and that he was informed that it was, at that time, impracticable to provide him with what he asked for.

9. Q. Did you feel, at the time, that Commander, Battle Force, was passing to you all of the highly important and probably secret information, including the reactions of the Commander-in-Chief thereto?

A. I assumed that Commander, Battle Force, passed along whatever he thought should be passed along.

10. Q. Do you recall if you felt that Admiral Pye went far enough in taking you into his confidence?

A. I had no feeling then, nor have I now, that he intentionally denied me any information that he thought would conduce to readiness and efficiency.

11. Q. In that connection, I hand you a dispatch which is Exhibit 6 in this record. Do you recall having seen or been told of the contents of this dispatch during October, 1941?

A. I don't think I ever saw or was told about this particular dispatch.

12. Q. Do you recall whether or not the Fleet put into effect any additional security measures at sea or in port during the latter part of October or during November?

[393] A. There were a good many additional security measures put into effect in the latter part of 1941. It is difficult for me to remember the exact chronology.

13. Q. Was there, during that period, any particular increase in security measures while in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes. In my own command, I established continuous twenty-four hour a day watch on a limited portion of my anti-aircraft battery. Provision was made by higher authority for a scheme of sector control for repelling aircraft attack and there were frequent drills using that scheme.

14. Q. During what period next preceding 7 December '41 were the battleships of your command physically present in Pearl Harbor?

A. We came in from sea some days prior to the 7th of December, and the battleships of my command were in Pearl Harbor on that day.

15. Q. Do you recall the date of your entry into port?

A. I do not.

16. Q. Can you give it approximately?

A. About 28 November.

17. Q. About how long was the period at sea next prior to that entry into port?

A. As nearly as I can remember, I would say it was five or six days.

18. Q. Admiral, I hand you four dispatches from the Navy Department which were received at Pearl Harbor either during that last period at sea or shortly after your entry into port. They are Exhibits 7, 8, 10, and 11 in this record. Please state which, if any, of these dispatches you were shown or appraised of with the date, insofar as you can recall.

A. Of these dispatches, I distinctly remember being shown Exhibit 8. It is possible that I was shown or informed of the contents of Exhibit 11; I am not quite sure. Exhibits 7 and 10, to the best of my recollection, I neither saw nor knew of.

19. Q. As concerns either Exhibits 8 or 11, but particularly No. 8, what transpired in the way of conferences, discussions, and so forth between you and the command echelons above you at the time?

A. Exhibit 8 was shown to a group of Flag officers, including myself, by the Commander-in-Chief in his office. Under the war plans in force, which I checked after leaving this office, I had no specific duties to perform. I did not know what subsequent conferences there may have been. I knew that there were two task forces at sea. I knew there was an excellent plan in existence for long-distance daily air reconnaissance. Naturally, I thought considerably about the message. I assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of.

20. Q. During that conference, was anything told you concerning the mission of the task forces which you mentioned as being at sea?

A. I don't think so.

21. Q. At the time, or afterward, but prior to 7 December, were you directed to make any change in security measures as applying to your own command?

A. No, but I reviewed, in my own mind, what the situation was, trying to think if there was anything that I should do which was not then being done.

[394] 22. Q. At any time after the conference concerning which you have last testified, were there other conferences or discussions in which you engaged, or to which you listened, concerning security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor which were instituted under the Department's directions or by estimates of the situation in the Pacific, made on the spot?

A. I don't remember being present at any regular conference resulting from this dispatch.

23. Q. Did you have any discussions with Admiral Pye during that period?

A. In a general way, I believe that he and I discussed the situation soon after we learned of this dispatch. Such discussion did not result in any decision to take any more security measures than the considerable ones we were already taking.

24. Q. Admiral, please give, insofar as you can remember, what your own impressions were, during early December, concerning the situation vis-a-vis Japan with particular attention to security features while in Pearl Harbor.

A. My ideas at the time were that there was a very grave situation as far as the United States and Japan were concerned. When I saw this dispatch (Exhibit 8), I was impressed by the fact that it was a war warning; a very serious matter. I noted, particularly, that an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected, but I noted with specific interest and some relief, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, that this warning did not anticipate any attack on United States territory farther East than the Philippines, and that it gave as a reason for that surmise the quantity and readiness of Japanese troops and the setup of their naval task forces. As a former Director of Naval Intelligence, it seemed to me this basis for the surmise was most important, as I knew there were methods that were pretty efficient by which we could tell pretty closely the organization of the Japanese forces and their locations. I remember thinking, "Well, we've got a pretty good idea where they are, and, being where they are, they can not visualize an attack farther East than the Philippines." My recollection is that I expected something further by way of a warning from the Department if the locations of the Japanese task forces moved in any way to indicate a threat farther East than the Philippines.

25. Q. Do you remember whether or not you gave any particular thought to the possibility of a surprise carrier raid on Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember thinking about this dispatch a great deal and I believe I must have canvassed in my mind all the various possibilities. In all my thoughts as to security, I was influenced by the knowledge, or what I thought was the knowledge, that we were maintaining a long-distance daily reconnaissance by air. Under those circumstances, it would seem highly doubtful to me that carriers could get close enough to launch planes without being seen by our air scouts. It is possible that such mental process as I went through was in more general terms than I here express, but the conclusion was about the

same. It is a little difficult, after the event, to be sure just what you thought before the event.

26. Q. Do I understand you correctly as saying that you assumed distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and that you never found that such was not the case?

A. That's correct. I had read a very complete plan for distant air reconnaissance to be carried out daily from Pearl Harbor and I knew that it had been placed into effect. I did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7 until after the attack on the 7th of December. I had a [395] general impression, which I believe was accurate, that there were not enough planes available to make this plan fully effective through 360 degrees of azimuth every day. I should like to add that this comment by me should not be considered as a reflection on any officer, in view of the fact that I, subsequently, learned that he had what he considered good and sufficient reasons for discontinuing this long-distance daily air reconnaissance, in making a hard choice. That is, he didn't have enough planes, in his opinion, for what he had to do then, and what he might be faced with later. With regard to this dispatch, Exhibit 8, I would like to make it clear that it was received with all the solemnity and intense interest at the time that its context manifestly entitled it to. There was nothing light-hearted about the way it was received.

27. Q. Admiral, what was the mission of the United States Army forces which were stationed in Hawaii at that time?

A. Their mission was to defend Oahu Island and, as I understand it, specifically, the naval base of Pearl Harbor. This statement I base upon common knowledge and my general knowledge of joint action by the Army and Navy.

28. Q. What did you know, in November-December, '41, as regards the readiness of Army forces, Oahu, to fulfill their mission?

A. From time to time, I observed Army forces engaged in tactical concentrations and active maneuvers which appeared to be practices against the contingency of attack. I am referring more now to ground movements than to movements in the air. As to the Army's readiness to repel air attack, my knowledge was by no means exact. I knew there were Army fields and Army planes, and I observed them from time to time exercising in the air and, as I remember it, we sometimes operated in cooperation with them.

29. Q. Did you know anything about the state of readiness of the Army's air warning net, Oahu?

A. No. It is pertinent to observe that the prevalent conception of the security of confidential and secret information, in general, visualized confining secret and confidential information to those who had some need of the knowledge in the discharge of their duties, actual or potential, should they by casualty rise to a higher command. This conception necessarily resulted in certain information not being very widely disseminated.

30. Q. Admiral, I hand you a document, Exhibit 4 in this testimony, known as 2CL-41. Were you familiar with it?

A. Yes.

31. Q. Do you recall having, prior to 7 December, '41, proposed any changes in the document as it stood on 14 October '41?

A. Yes. On more than one occasion, I recommended to the Commander-in-Chief that whenever our ships entered or sortied from Pearl Harbor that depth charges should be dropped by our destroyers, my point being that crews would learn to drop them promptly when ordered, that we would all get used to depth charges, and that if there were any Japanese submarines in the vicinity they would think their presence was known and they would then adopt a defensive rather than an offensive attitude. This suggestion was not made in writing.

32. Q. Do you recall having proposed any changes in sub-head (G) which appears on page 4?

[396] A. I may have made minor suggestions but no suggestion of any considerable importance. The plan looked good.

33. Q. During October-November, while at sea, which of the standard conditions of readiness was the Fleet maintaining?

A. There was always some condition of readiness in which a certain number of guns were manned and instantly ready twenty-four hours a day. The exact condition varied at times and also varied by day and by night. I consider that a good state of readiness was maintained at sea which would compare favorably with that maintained during actual war.

34. Q. Reverting to 2CL-41, Exhibit 4, sub-head (G) thereof; which of the three conditions was the Fleet maintaining while in Pearl Harbor during November-December '41?

A. None. That is to say, none of these three specific conditions were in effect at the time of the attack, 7 December.

35. Q. In whose province was it to make effective any one of these conditions of readiness?

A. Exhibit 4 is a copy of a comprehensive security order issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, well before Pearl Harbor, providing in great detail for the security of the Fleet, both at sea and in port. Among its many provisions, the Exhibit states, on page 4: "The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, is the Naval Base Defense Officer." It continues: "As such, he shall . . ." after stating various things, it says ". . . coordinate the Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the Base defense by (1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain", et cetera. I want to make it clear that from time to time drills were carried out with the necessary alarms, et cetera, and for such drills there must have been some condition of readiness in effect at the specific time of the drill.

36. Q. Are you certain, however, that the Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) did not advise the S. O. E., Pearl Harbor, to continuously maintain any one of those three conditions of readiness?

A. That is a statement I, of course, could not make. I do know that there was none of the three conditions of readiness mentioned here usually maintained in port, nor was any one of these conditions of readiness in effect at the time of the attack on 7 December. I am quite clear as to this because I gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and had increased, on my own initiative, the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battle-ships.

37. Q. Did you, on your own authority and as applying only to ships of your command, direct any specific degree of gun readiness which resulted in full readiness of any portion of their batteries during the first week in December?

A. Yes. Prior to that time, I had made effective twenty-four hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and that two of the five inch anti-aircraft guns on each ship should be told off each day as ready guns, their crews specially mustered and instructed with a view to manning these guns instantaneously in case of alarm. As a matter of fact, as near as I could ascertain, these guns functioned in the way it was expected they would, and one of the .50 calibre guns forward in the MARYLAND actually knocked down an approaching Jap plane; he it said upon the initiative of the instructed enlisted gun's crew when they saw the plane approaching from Ford [397] Island where it had been attacking.

38. Q. Did your directive result in the five inch guns' crews being continually at the guns?

A. No, but the directive provided that the guns should be ready with ammunition there so they could go into instantaneous action; the gun crews specially mustered, told off, instructed what their duty was, and to be in the vicinity of the guns to answer a quick call.

39. Q. That is, one set of crews in each ship had that duty for twenty-four hours?

A. Yes, as to the five inch guns, two crews had the duty. The .50 calibre guns though were actually right on the job all of the time. At the two .50 calibre guns on each ship, the watch was the strictest watch that you could contemplate. They were there all the time and had to be relieved, and all that sort of thing. The .50 calibre and those five inch ready guns led off very promptly with firing, I am told. I wasn't there until about nine a. m., 7 December.

40. How many ships of your command were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December?

A. Eight.

41. Q. What was the approximate average anti-aircraft battery of each of those ships, including machine guns above .50 calibre?

A. Their batteries were, generally speaking, eight five-inch anti-aircraft guns, 25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of my ships had either four guns of 3"/50 calibre or four quads of 1"/.1. The ARIZONA and NEVADA did not.

42. Q. Admiral, which form of the air attack suffered on 7 December was most damaging to your ships?

A. Torpedo attack.

43. Q. From what direction did the torpedo planes generally come?

A. While I did not witness that attack, I can speak with assurance when I say that they came from an easterly direction.

44. Q. As the ships were disposed at their berths, was there a considerable number of the ships' guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes?

A. Yes.

45. Q. A hypothetical question: Assuming that at least one-fourth of the anti-aircraft guns' crews had been closed up, entirely in readiness for opening fire, and had known that the approaching planes were enemy and authorized to fire upon them at will; what is your

estimate of the effect that might have resulted as regards defeating that attack?

A. Judging from the experience of this war and the proved inadequacy by the events of this war of the anti-aircraft batteries of our ships as they existed at that time, I would say that the answer to your hypothetical question is that they could not have defeated the attack, nor would they have seriously diminished the attack, notwithstanding that the crews were, in my opinion, well trained crews. The experience of this war has demonstrated that the anti-aircraft batteries of ships must be many, many times greater, especially in heavy automatic guns, than they were at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Also, it should be borne in mind that the ships on that [398] occasion were moored. They could not maneuver. We had no torpedo nets. I think it might be just as well to state here for purposes of the record a fact which those in the Navy will recognize, that there wasn't any choice as to what Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many berths designated as available to him as there were ships. The best estimate made as to the number of planes—not torpedo planes alone—that were shot down by battleship guns was fifteen to seventeen. As a matter of record, it is also desirable to state the Commander Battleships, while an administrative and tactical commander, did not have the say as to what battleships were to be in the Hawaiian or any other area, nor as to which ones were to be in port at any time. Those decisions rested with higher authority.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: In view of all that's been said since Pearl Harbor, and in justice to the Commander-in-Chief, I would like to say that Admiral Kimmel was obviously taking the situation seriously and was obviously most attentive to his duties as he saw them. I had a high opinion of him as an officer and a gentleman before the attack and still have. One most unfortunate impression got abroad, which was incorrect and very unfair to both Admiral Kimmel and General Short. The Roberts Commission, in making what was an observation about a particular dispatch, said that these officers had, in the opinion of the Commission, not conferred adequately as to steps to be taken following receipt of the war warning dispatch in Exhibit 8. Unfortunately, the American press mistakenly seized upon this as a statement—which it wasn't—that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not confer together properly in general. The press even spoke as if their relations were not good. I happened, by accident, to have been present, by invitation of Admiral Kimmel, at one of the conferences these officers held not long before Pearl Harbor and, of my own knowledge, I know that their relations were excellent, they frequently conferred, and the whole impression that their relations were bad and that they didn't try to cooperate, which got abroad

following the attack, was untrue and unfair to them. I'd like to make one further observation from my own standpoint. The report of the Roberts Commission, in one place, referred to a letter of the Secretary of Navy of 27 January 1941, in which was outlined the possibility of various forms of attack on Pearl Harbor. The report stated this letter was known to Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, and then went on to indicate that nothing much about it was thought of or done by any of them, *nor by any of the junior Flag officers*. So far as I was concerned, the Roberts Commission did not ascertain whether or not I knew of the existence of this letter. The facts are, I did not.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:40 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[399] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1944

THIRTY-EIGHTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 9:40 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-seventh day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Roland Munroe Brainard; Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired; serving as senior member of the Joint Production Survey Committee under the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington.

3. Q. Please make a brief statement setting forth the duties of the Ship Movements Division along functional lines as applying to movements of ships in the Pacific Ocean during, say, the last six months of the calendar year 1941.

A. The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved preparation of the publications "Operating Force Plan", "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces", "Assignment of Vessels to Districts", assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Maintenance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modifications by the divisions under the CNO. and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; scheduling and itinerarizing of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location

reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting [400] and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-o-war was obtained through the various sources of O. N. I., naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The acquisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Frontiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this Division.

4. Q. As regards the assignment of important naval units in the various Fleets and Forces; were those decisions made within your Division or subject to the requirements and directives of Naval Operations' echelons above that Division?

A. They were made by higher echelons than my Division, and my Division was the recording or the agency which prepared the summarized paper of assignment of vessels to the Fleet, Divisions, and so forth.

5. Q. In that function of assignment of units, which would seem to come somewhat under policy, were you usually consulted and was your advice freely asked?

A. In the case of smaller units, District craft, and up to and including the suggestions as to the composition of destroyer divisions and their assignment, of individual ships to the Divisions, or Divisions to Squadrons; yes. In the case of larger units, cruisers, carriers, battleships, their assignment to Fleets was determined by policy plan, strategy, as well as by upper echelons.

6. Q. I show you four documents, exhibits in this examination, Nos. 25, 26, 28 and 29, which are the Employment Schedules of the last quarter of the calendar year 1941 for the Pacific Fleet. Do you recall if Naval Operations made any changes in those schedules as submitted?

A. I do not recall of any changes. It was the procedure that tentative schedules prepared by the forces afloat, submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and reviewed by the several divisions thereof as to general features, for conflict, if any, with overhaul periods at yards, gunnery and engineering training periods, and if no modifications, or such modifications as might have been proposed by any division, be reviewed by the Chief or Assistant Chief of Operations, and approval or suggested modification returned to the forces afloat.

7. Q. Did that working method apply to the preceding parts of calendar year 1941?

A. It was the general procedure that I found in existence there and it was continued right straight through until the 7th of December, at least.

8. Q. Was Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, authorized to make considerable changes in the operating schedules as long as the ships movements were confined to the general vicinity of Hawaiian waters?

A. It was my understanding, yes, sir; he could modify, interchange periods of activity. The general, overall guiding idea was that a certain amount of training in gunnery, tactics, engineering, and other activities should be accomplished in the year. A rather general freedom of action was given to the senior Fleet Commanders.

[401] 9. Q. As applying to this particular period, October to December, inclusive, 1941, do you recall if any considerable changes were actually made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. In the early part of the year, schedules were in general made out according to types, in making their preliminary schedules to the Commander-in-Chief. Around the middle of the year, a task organization was set up, to the best of my knowledge, by the Commander-in-Chief, himself. From about the middle of the year through the remainder of the year, it is my recollection that the units of the Pacific Fleet operated mainly and generally in task groups with the consequent greater freedom of action that that organization allowed. They were grouped with units of the various types, which made their disposition easily handled and permitted the conduct of exercises with rather considerable facility.

10. Q. In fulfilling that function of the Ship Movements Division, which kept track of the actual locations of ships belonging to the Pacific Fleet, what information was available in addition to the approved schedules of employment?

A. The movement report system was the only other means of following more in detail the location of ships than as indicated in the schedule. This was a somewhat elaborate system, including code groups and line numbers of sheets prepared in advance by the Fleet Commanders and forwarded to the interested agencies, both afloat and ashore, and, in the case of movements in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands of the Fleet units, reports were often not received until the movement had been made. A prompt report was generally received from individual ships in free route and from ships in the Naval Transportation Service under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Commander-in-Chief, as I recall, was given freedom of movement to use and move ships in the Hawaiian area as he pleased.

11. Q. Then was it true that there was a considerable time lag between the actual change in location of various Fleet units and the date on which your Division was informed concerning that?

A. There was a variable time lag; yes, sir. In some cases, it was several days, and in other cases it might be a matter of hours, depending upon the radio schedule reporting the movements message and the time filed.

12. Q. For example, did the Ship Movements Division know, at the time, when a group of vessels commanded by Admiral Halsey sailed from Pearl Harbor, approximately 1 December '41, for the purpose of landing an aircraft reinforcement upon Wake?

A. I do not recall knowing of that movement before or while it was being carried out. In a recent examination of records available to me, dispatch No. 280627 CR 0750 shows the contemplation of such a

movement, but I found no indication thereon of my having seen it, and the daily movement sheets, information and address changes, from 21 November to 10 December, inclusive, show movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier, between Pearl Harbor, Wake, and Midway.

13. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the "War Information Room", were you, during November and December of '41, kept in close touch with all the information available in the Department concerning locations of Japanese naval units?

A. I'm not quite sure I was. By frequent visits, I kept myself in close touch with the information received and plotted by the War Information Room, who, in turn, received their information from such sources as O. N. I., naval observers, and what was made known to them through the communications system.

[402] 14. Q. At the time, did you think that your War Information Room was receiving absolutely all Japanese information available in the Department?

A. To the best of my knowledge, they were, or should have been, by existing arrangements.

15. Q. During, say, November-December, 1941, were you a part of and in close association with the Officers of Naval Operations who assisted its Chief in the formation of policies, making large decisions on the distribution of ships, and so forth?

A. No, sir, not as a general rule.

16. Q. Did you have any particular touch with the War Plans Division during that time?

A. Yes. There were visits to my office by Captain R. K. Turner, head of the War Plans Division, and of myself to his office, and we were together generally at the Secretary's morning conference and occasional gatherings in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations of certain division heads for discussions or decisions on various matters, through I do not feel that I was in on all the higher policies.

17. Q. I hand you three dispatches, which are Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 before this examination. Were you cognizant of these dispatches, as they were sent, or did you have any part in the drafting thereof?

A. I don't recall and have not yet found indication of having any participation in the drafting of these dispatches or of having seen them at that time. The general conditions of the increasing tension with Japan, as indicated therein, was a matter of my general knowledge. As to the question of war warnings, I knew definitely of a set of war warning dispatches prepared and held in readiness to be dispatched to merchant shipping, and that, for a period of two or three weeks prior to December 7, we were restraining entry into the Western Pacific of merchant vessels and vessels of our NTS Service, in order that they might not be trapped.

18. Q. I gather from your foregoing testimony that the Ship Movements Division was primarily a record-keeping agency, and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities as regards the location of shipping. Further, that neither your Division nor you, yourself, in person, did belong to the policy-making portion of the Office of Naval Operations or participate in broad decisions of the Office; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. I was not in on questions of broad general policy.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously [403] taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-seventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examination then, at 10:35 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.



[404] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1944

THIRTY-NINTH DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-eighth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr., U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-sixth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Vice Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-eighth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

Comander Wesley A. Wright, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-fifth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: This is a board acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy directing the recording of testimony, under oath, concerning the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December '41. A most significant phrase in the precept is "testimony pertinent to the facts surrounding . . .", and so forth. Previous testimony points to the necessity of inquiry into the discussions, conferences, and so forth, between officials in the Navy Department and those of other Executive Departments, as regards keeping in step the Navy's state of preparedness for eventualities with the steps taken by other agencies in the political and economic fields. You are believed to have testimony on that general

subject and are accordingly called. I will be asking you to testify mainly from facts known to you on or prior to 7 December '41, influenced as little as is practicable by what you may have learned of the various subjects subsequent to that date. That is difficult and I ask you to do your best. You will be given a transcript of your oral testimony for verification, during which, if you find it necessary, you are authorized to submit proposals for changes, omissions, or additions to what you have said. I will act upon such requests when received.

[405] The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Combat Intelligence; additional duty as Director of Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. What was your station and duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. The calendar year '41, I was Director of the Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, and as such one of my duties was liaison with the State Department.

3. Q. Please explain, briefly, what those liaison duties with the State Department required of you.

A. The liaison with the State Department was conducted partially by me as questions arose which were of mutual interest to the War and Navy Department. So far as I was able and directed, I acted as go-between between the Navy Department and the State Department on matters which were of mutual concern. There were, necessarily, high level liaison and meetings held at which I was not present.

4. Q. As regards those meetings in which you were directly concerned, were the conferences and goings-between usually at your initiative or by specific directive in each instance?

A. Partially both. I attempted to relieve the Chief of Naval Operations of as much of the burden of liaison with the State Department as I was capable. For example, during the last month or so before Pearl Harbor, while Secretary Hull was conducting his negotiations with Kurusu and Nomura, I would, from time to time, pay a call on him to find out what had occurred in order that I might give the Navy Department fresh information.

5. Q. What official records were kept of interviews, discussions, and conferences, in which you engaged with State Department officials?

A. A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained

liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials.

Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by the witness as being contained in file titled "Record of Liaison Meetings and [409] some other special papers", now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department.

6. Q. Did you, yourself, keep any informal memoranda on those discussions, and so forth, of which you have retained possession?

A. I have none in my own possession. I did keep certain memorandum. The only copies of these that I know of are in the files of the Central Division.

7. Q. As regards those discussions between officials of the two Departments, the highest echelons thereof, were you kept informed as to what transpired in the way of exchanging information and effecting agreements concerning matters in the Pacific theatre?

A. I do not believe that I was fully informed as undoubtedly there were matters which were discussed in the Cabinet, and I presume there were matters discussed in Cabinet meetings and meetings between Secretary Knox, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson, which were very closely guarded.

8. Q. Now to go on with your examination, Admiral Schuirmann, I shall ask certain questions which it is convenient to base upon a State Department publication "PEACE AND WAR, 1931-1941", in which events are set forth chronologically and in a form which is suited to our present purposes.

The examining officer produced a copy of the publication titled "PEACE AND WAR, 1931-1941", and it was introduced in evidence as an aid to future readers of this record, copy appended marked "Exhibit 39".

8. Q. (Continued.) In the introduction of Chapter 12, pages 85 and 86, and headed "Principles of U. S. Policy", there is set forth that State, War, and Navy Departments agreed that in view of our military unpreparedness it was inadvisable to resort to drastic economic measures against Japan. Later on in this chapter, it appears that by early 1941 "moral embargoes" were preventing our export to Japan of many strategic commodities. Now at that time, say, January, 1941, was the Navy Department in agreement that the dispositions and war readiness of its forces in the Pacific were such as to justify the risks which, by then, had resulted from those "moral embargoes"?

A. I can not state whether the Navy Department and the State Department were or were not in agreement on these questions, because I presume that the final position of the Navy Department on such a question would be determined and expressed by the Secretary of Navy direct to the President. It is my belief that the Navy Department was consulted on these questions. The reason for this belief is that from time to time, as questions of imposition of embargoes arose,

I was either asked to ascertain Admiral Stark's views or was present at various meetings, which I cannot place by date, where his opinion on such questions was asked. I do not specifically remember the moral embargo, but I do remember that when the question of limiting imposing embargo on scrap iron and oil was under discussion, that his opinion was asked.

9. Q. Do you recall the Office of Naval Operations, or any part thereof, having been particularly concerned in estimating the Japanese reactions as those so-called "moral embargoes" were imposed?

A. No, not specifically. I believe that Admiral Stark did discuss with the War Plans Division their opinion of what the probable Japanese reaction might be, but I do not know of any formal paper being prepared on such subjects, and the discussions, so far as I remember, were general.

[407] 10. Q. Do you recall hearing discussed within the Navy Department the direct question as to whether our state of war readiness was sufficient to meet the risks that were being taken?

A. I cannot recall specific dates or who was present, but I do remember that the question of the Japanese reaction was discussed and in particular regard to the oil embargo, I remember that whenever the question was raised at meetings where I was present that Admiral Stark expressed the view that the oil embargo on Japan should not be so drastic as to force them to move into the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain oil. His idea was that a total embargo on oil would, of necessity, force them to move South or to collapse.

11. Q. Other than as you have just stated, do you recall any incident, in early 1941, when the State Department was advised by the Navy Department that its measures were out of step with the Navy's state of preparation?

A. No.

12. Q. At that time, early 1941, were the State and Navy Departments in agreement as regards the respective claims on our naval forces as between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres?

A. I do not know, but the question of the disposition of the Fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific was discussed and I believe that such differences as may have existed were reconciled. In other words, so far as I know, there was no open disagreement between the State and Navy Departments as to disposition of the Fleet.

13. Q. There was a considerable transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet during the Spring of 1941. Do you recall whether or not that step was taken incident to desires or particular urging on the part of the State Department?

A. I do not know, but I do know that the State Department generally favored the retention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet.

14. Q. During the late Winter and Spring of 1941, was the security of the Fleet against surprise attack while in Pearl Harbor the subject of representations by the Navy to the State Department?

A. None that I made.

15. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of correspondence between Navy and War Department, beginning with the Navy Department's letter of 24 January 1941, concerning the unreadiness of Army forces, Oahu, to defend Pearl Harbor against the Japanese attack. Do you recall

whether or not the State Department was cognizant of the situation as therein set forth and, if so, please give its reaction.

A. I'm positive that the State Department did not see this correspondence, and it is my belief that they were not fully informed of the conditions portrayed in this correspondence, although, from various discussions, they were, I believe, fairly well informed of the lack of certain equipment and personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally.

The letter of the Secretary of Navy, dated 24 January 1941, together with the answer of the Secretary of War thereto, dated 7 February 1941, were introduced in evidence by the examining officer.

Note: Because of the secret nature of the documents, they were returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, [408] Navy Department. A description of the documents introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 40".

16. Q. Then so far as you recall, that deficiency in the defenses of Oahu was never a factor in the conference and negotiations between State Department and Navy; is that correct?

A. I presume that that factor was taken into account by those who were given final advice on steps to be taken in the line of sanctions and embargoes.

17. Q. On pages 121 and 122 of "PEACE AND WAR", it is set forth that, after the Japanese had begun their full seizure of Indo-China, our Executive Order froze their credits and virtually stopped all of our trade with Japan. Do you recall if the Navy Department was consulted before that step was taken on approximately 26 July 1941?

A. I do not know, but I believe that it was, and the reason I say I do not know is because I know of no record to which I can point showing that this was done. However, I do remember that during that period this question was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department.

18. Q. Do you recall any representation by the Navy Department to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of that action on 26 July 1941?

A. No.

19. Q. What to you seemed to be the prevalent state of mind in Naval Operations concerning the magnitude of such risk?

A. I can only speak from my own state of mind, which was necessarily influenced by those with whom I had contact. My state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China, and perhaps Malaya, and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in the hopes that the divided opinion, political opinion, in the United States between the isolationists and those who favored United States' entrance into the war, to prevent or delay the United States from taking effective measures of force against Japan. Hence, that the United States retained the initiative to a large degree in determining the date of a war with Japan.

20. Q. At that time, late July, 1941, was the relative importance of the Pacific Theatre as against the Atlantic Theatre reexamined and, in consequence, were any new representations made to the State De-

partment concerning the distribution of naval forces or of the security of our forces based in Hawaii?

A. Not that I know of.

21. Q. The State Department paper (PEACE AND WAR) contains no mention of the extensive changes which were made in the Japanese Cabinet in mid-October, 1941. However, the Navy Department's dispatch of 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in this record, indicates that the Navy Department considered that Cabinet change as highly important. Do you recall any discussions, conferences, between the State and Navy Departments concerning the bearing of the Cabinet change upon our situation in the Pacific?

A. I remember that the meaning of this Cabinet change was discussed with the State Department and I believe that the Navy Department received from the State Department a memorandum of the State Department's Far Eastern Division's estimate of meaning of the shift in Cabinet. I do not know whether he submitted it, or not, but, in previous cases of Cabinet shift, the State Department did inform the Navy Department of Ambassador Grew's estimate at [409] its meeting, and I believe that the State Department did transmit to the Navy Department Ambassador Grew's views. I believe that Exhibit 6 was the Navy Department's estimate, arrived at independently of the State Department. The reason for this belief is that, to the best of my knowledge, the State Department did not take as serious a view of this Cabinet shift.

22. Q. Then is it correct to say that you did not gain from the State Department any impression that the Cabinet change was an ominous portent?

A. My recollection of the impression I gained from the State Department was that they regarded the shift as more or less a reshuffling among the leaders who had long been in power and, although they regarded it as not beneficial to the United States, they did not attach to it the same degree of importance as expressed in the Exhibit.

23. Q. The document, "PEACE AND WAR", page 135, shows that on 3 November '41, Ambassador Grew pointed out to the State Department that war in the Far East was not likely to be averted by imposition of commercial embargoes. Do you recall any discussions or representations made to or by the Navy Department concerning such a view, subsequent to that date?

A. No.

24. Q. Do you recall any discussions or representations at any time during the latter half of 1941 concerning that particular view of the situation as expressed by Ambassador Grew?

A. No, no formal representation of the State Department, and unless there was some informal representation, which there may have been, I believe the Navy Department was generally in accord with the view that sanctions would not prevent the outbreak of war.

25. Q. Was there any striking of a balance as between that view and the previously expressed view that sanctions would increase the risk of war with Japan?

A. None that I know.

26. Q. On page 137, first paragraph of "PEACE AND WAR", mention is made of the withdrawal of the last armed forces of the United States from China in connection with proposals made to the Japanese

by our State Department concerning the withdrawal of their forces from China and Indo-China. Please state what you know of the background of the Navy Department's action in actually directing the withdrawal of our Marines and gunboats from Chinese territory and waters.

A. I remember this proposal but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the suggestion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based on desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under discussion for since sometime during 1940. Various recommendations were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941. The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors, such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as withdrawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard [410] it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28, 1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, '41, the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memorandum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggesting a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines from China except those required for communication and custodial duties, and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly withdrawal whereby announcement would be made by Washington in order that civilians, nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and that withdrawal would begin shortly.

27. Q. What was the date of receipt of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet's letter of 28 August, in which he recommended the withdrawal?

A. It was received September 12, 1941.

Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness in the foregoing two answers as being one from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 28 August 1941, Subject: Withdrawal of U. S. Naval Forces from China; classification "Secret"; and now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

28. Q. Between that date and 14 November, which you have just testified was the date of the action upon the recommendation, what were the principal features of disagreement which caused so much delay in action?

A. A lack of agreement as to the effect on the Japanese and the Chinese of the withdrawal, and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawal.

29. Q. Did the Navy Department take the position that the withdrawal should be made, or not?

A. I am not certain. There was, within the Navy Department, a certain lack of agreement as to whether or not the withdrawal should be made and in order to get a definite decision, I instigated the memorandum previously referred to of November 4, '41. At that time, there was a general agreement that the withdrawal should be made. In the State Department, I discussed this question mainly with Dr. Hornbeck. His view was that we should allow sufficient time to again notify the civilians in China to get out and that the Marines should not be completely evacuated until the civilians had been given one last chance to get out. Previous to November 4, the Navy Department had not taken a firm stand on whether or not evacuation should be made.

30. Q. Between the aforesaid dates, 12 September and sometime in the first half of November, was the State Department in opposition to the removal of the forces from China or were they inclined to acquiesce?

A. They were generally in opposition. They were in opposition as to the removal, at least we were unable to get a definite answer as to whether or not they would agree to the Marines coming out.

31. Q. The purpose of bringing in this incident is to inquire whether or not there were disagreements to the disposition of forces in the Pacific. Do you recall any other incidents during 1941 in which there was pronounced disagreement between the State Department and Navy Department as to the location and [411] disposition of forces in the Pacific theatre?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

32. Q. On page 113 of "PEACE AND WAR", there is set forth with considerable prominence a report that in case of trouble with the United States, Japan planned a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Do you note in this document any other "information" entry in which Japanese military intentions were so specifically reported and where a locale for aggression against us was thus narrowed down?

A. No.

33. Q. If that report, by Ambassador Grew of 27 January '41, was transmitted to the Navy Department, what discussions went on concerning it and what evaluation of the contained information transpired between officials of the State and Navy Departments, or of the latter only?

A. The report was transmitted—the telegram containing the substance of the report was transmitted to the Navy Department. There was no discussion of it within the Navy Department or with the State Department, so far as I know, as the report was given a low valuation as it was repeated to a member of Ambassador Grew's Staff by the diplomatic representative of one of the South American Powers and appeared to be hearsay information which was not substantiated.

34. Q. You have testified that you are now the Director of Naval Intelligence, and so forth. In that capacity, and with the ability which that background gives you, please elaborate your answer to

the previous question to further explain the respective evaluation of that dispatch in comparison with the considerable mass of other information which must have been available.

A. The great mass of information available tended to show that the Japanese would move into Indo-China and to the southward. There was always reports that Japan would seize a favorable opportunity to attack Russia. It so happens that this report subsequently proved correct, but the report, in itself, would be given scant attention when there was nothing to substantiate it.

35. Q. Do you know if our Ambassador to Japan, or any of his Assistants, placed a particularly high evaluation upon that particular piece of information?

A. No; it was transmitted merely as a report received and without evaluation by the Ambassador or any of his Staff.

36. Q. In the light of your former close relations with officials of the State Department, can you explain why this dispatch is given so much prominence in "PEACE AND WAR"?

A. No, I am unable to explain the prominence given to this dispatch and until I searched the file, I did not remember that such a dispatch had been received.

37. Q. On about 27 November '41, what particular information did the Navy Department receive from the State Department concerning the breakdown of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu?

A. I do not remember the specific information received, but the Navy Department was kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations.

38. Q. I show you the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November '41, Exhibit 8 in this record. Was the information concerning which you have just testified, the basis of this dispatch?

[412] A. I believe it was.

39. Q. Did the State Department keep the Navy fully advised as to the state of negotiations for the following ten days?

A. Yes.

40. Q. During that period, was the State Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to the Navy Department in accord with the statements contained on page 138 of "PEACE AND WAR"?

A. I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the probability of attack at various points. However, the particular meetings which he mentioned, I do not recall and do not know if I was present. I cannot make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement. However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull phoned me, saying in effect, "I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone." I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I reported the conversation to Admiral Stark.

41. Q. Admiral, in view of the opinion that's been expressed by some witnesses that the armed forces of the United States would have been in much better position to repel attacks at a somewhat later date than 7 December, can you say whether or not any consider-

ation was given to a policy of trying to play for more time in the negotiations with Japan?

A. I remember that, in general, Admiral Stark and General Marshall expressed the view that time played in favor of the United States, that is, any time that was gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to our benefit. The question of prolonging conversations with Kuruu and Nomura arose and the Navy Department again expressed the opinion that any time gained was for our benefit.

42. Q. Do you feel that the State Department cooperated in every way that it could to meet this desire on the part of the Army and Navy?

A. Secretary Hull had in mind some sort of modus vivendi which would be for a period of, say, three to six months, during which the United States and Japan would have opportunity to adjust their differences, but I have no reason to believe that this proposal ever reached the Japanese.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 4:15 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[413] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

 MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1944

FORTIETH DAY

 THE ROOSEVELT HOTEL,
New York, New York.

The examination met at 8:30 a. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the thirty-ninth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. Joel William Bunkley; Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired; Supervisor, New York Harbor.

2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing during the last six months of the calendar year of 1941?

A. Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, attached to the Pacific Fleet at that time based at Pearl Harbor.

3. Q. Admiral, what condition of readiness and what security precautions were being taken aboard your ship while in port in the middle of October, 1941?

A. As I remember it, we were not under any condition of readiness in port; that is, conditions one, two, or three. We had two machine guns manned at all times with about 400 rounds of ammunition at hand, and we had 50 rounds of ammunition for two five-inch guns in the ready boxes on the topside (locked, with keys in hands of the O.O.D.) and the crews of those two guns standing by. We were operating under the security order (U.S. Fleet letter #3L-40 revised, as I recall) promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, prior to October, 1941. We were also operating under Executive Order No. 41-40, U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, dated 27 December 1940, which was revised from time to time and which was a security order to prevent sabotage. This order required a Security Patrol consisting of armed roving patrols on topside and below decks in vital parts of the ship.

4. Q. Did that readiness of a portion of the battery begin to be in effect as early as October, '41?

A. Yes.

5. Q. Do you remember when you did begin to carry it out?

A. No, but some months prior to December 7, 1941.

[414] 6. Q. Then I understand that this condition of readiness in port was set sometime before 7 December. By whose order was that done?

A. By order of Rear Admiral Anderson.

7. Q. At that time, did you have any information as to what motivated that order?

A. None whatsoever except that we all thought there was a possibility of war. Like all others, I didn't, at the time, think they were going to attack Pearl Harbor. We thought possibly it would be submarine attacks.

8. Q. Were any further changes ordered prior to 7 December?

A. None that I remember.

9. Q. In other words, the condition you've just described was the condition aboard your ship on 7 December?

A. Yes.

10. Q. Your testimony to the effect that the two five-inch crews were standing by; just what did that entail in the way of readiness?

A. Originally, I believe, they were to stay in the immediate vicinity of the guns, but, later on, this was modified so that the crews merely had to be on call.

11. Q. Was it a definite watch or did it last throughout the twenty-four hours for each lot of men so detailed?

A. It was a twenty-four hour detail.

12. Q. During the period in port prior to and including 7 December, what precautions were in effect as regards watertight integrity of the ships—the closure of doors, hatches, and so forth?

A. None other than as stated in the Navy Regulations for watertight integrity in port.

13. Q. Was your ship Admiral Pye's Flagship?

A. Yes.

14. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Admiral Pye, or senior members of his Staff, concerning war warnings or anything else especially pertaining to the tenseness of the situation during the latter part of November and early December?

A. None whatsoever. I had no idea of any warnings having been sent.

15. Q. Do you recall gaining any secret intelligence or other information from which you, yourself, could estimate that a dangerous situation was at hand?

A. None whatever.

16. Q. Sir, state, as best you can recall, the consensus of opinion of officers of your rank and position there as regards the danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor, specifically an air attack on the Fleet there, during the last three months of the calendar year 1941, giving, if possible, the reasons why this opinion was held.

A. It was my opinion, and I think the opinion of most of the officers, that there was not any danger of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor at that time. It was my opinion that the attack would come in the Philippines and not at Pearl Harbor.

[415] 17. Q. While at sea during the aforesaid period, the battleships, I understand, did maintain conditions of readiness, zig-zag, darkened ship at night, and so forth. Did you have the feeling that those precautions were carried out as a matter of training and habituating personnel to war conditions, or because of real danger of surprise attack while at sea?

A. In my opinion, it was for both.

18. Q. And what particular form of surprise attack were you apprehending?

A. Submarine attack.

19. Q. Did you worry while at sea over the possibility of air attack?

A. No.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: On October 15, the CALIFORNIA was in Long Beach. We were ordered there for the purpose of giving leave and liberty to the officers and the crew, and had arrived there about 5 October. We had previously stopped at San Francisco for four or five days for drydocking and had let a small portion of the crew go on leave from that port. On the night of our arrival at Long Beach, I received orders from Commander Battle Force, Admiral Pye, who was on board the CALIFORNIA, to recall all men on leave and be ready to sail twenty-four hours hence. Before the expiration of twenty-four hours, I was ordered to remain at Long Beach but to be ready to sail upon twenty-four hours' notice. From that time until our departure, to the best of my memory (the latter part of October or the first part of November) we were standing by under the twenty-four hour sailing orders. A telephone watch was maintained on shore and all men on liberty had to telephone at midnight to find out if liberty would be up at midnight or at eight a. m. the following morning. To prevent sabotage we had a patrol boat, with junior officer on board, circling the ship while at anchor, to contact all approaching boats. I simply received and carried out these drastic changes of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received to cause such a change of plans. The U. S. S. CALIFORNIA was Admiral Pye's Flagship.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examining officer then, at 8:55 a. m., took a recess until 9:20 a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened in the U. S. S. VIXEN.

Present: The examining officer, his counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral, this is a board acting under a precept of the Secretary of the Navy directing that testimony be taken, under oath, concerning the facts attending on the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

A significant phrase of the precept is "testimony pertinent to the facts" and there is available no interpretation of the word "perinent" other than my own. In examining witnesses who were at or [416] near Pearl Harbor, various testimony was obtained which indicates that there is other testimony pertinent to the facts within the knowledge of officers who were not there, particularly officers in the Navy Department, and you are called as being one of those believed to be in possession of such knowledge. This calls upon you to testify as best you can from facts which were known to you on or before 7 December 1941. That, of course, is difficult because it will be asking you to leave out what became known to you only after that date. It probably is impossible not to be influenced by things that have turned up since, but you must do the best you can to confine your testimony to what you then knew. Our procedure is informal in that we pause at any time for explanation of questions, to better define what is wanted, give opportunity for refreshing memory, consulting documents, and so on. The transcript of your testimony will be given you for verification and in that I expect you to modify your testimony, if, upon further reflection you see the necessity to do so, the object being to have the truest possible record. What you give as your first recollection, you may later realize needs amplification or even correction. I will examine you directly and then request that you submit anything else which was not brought out but which, in your opinion, is pertinent.

The witness was duly sworn.

Examined by the examining officer:

[417] 1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?

A. Royal E. Ingersoll; Admiral, U. S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?

A. I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations during the entire year, except the last two or three days of that year. I do not recall the exact date on which I was detached.

3. Q. As the first and principal assistant to the CNO, what was the working arrangement between you as regards the division of the duties of the office?

A. As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent.

4. Did you feel that in matters of great import, particularly in policy, you always knew what was in the CNO's mind and were you always called in for the discussions and conferences with senior naval officers and representatives of other departments?

A. Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details.

5. Q. As regards information, meaning information obtained by ONI and including that obtained by study of radio intercepts; were you always given all important information from those sources?

A. I don't know. I do not recall receiving any information regarding so-called "radio intelligence" obtained by analysis of traffic or analysis of traffic derived from call signs. During the later months of the year, I saw many of the messages—Japanese messages—which were received at the Navy Department.

6. Q. Do you recall daily visits by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who [418] brought to the CNO information concerning the Pacific area which was obtained by various secret methods?

A. Yes, I do. I recall frequent visits by an officer from Naval Communications, but whether I saw them every day, or not, and saw every message, I don't know. I saw a great number and saw them very often.

7. Q. When Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, about February, 1941, the Department had already decided that that area would be the general station of the Fleet, pending further developments. Do you recall what considerations led to that decision?

A. In 1939, an advance detachment under Vice Admiral Andrews had been sent to the Hawaiian Islands to be kept there indefinitely. Later, in the early part of 1940, while Admiral Richardson was still in command, the Pacific Fleet went out to the Hawaiian area and never returned to the West Coast except units for overhaul and training. I was not in the Navy Department at that time. When I left the Hawaiian Islands in the middle of 1940, the major part of the Pacific Fleet was in the Hawaiian Islands.

8. Q. Do you recall at any time during the Winter, 1940-41, while you were stationed in the Department, any reconsideration being given to the decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii, rather than on the Pacific Coast?

A. Yes. The question of the Fleet returning to the West Coast was brought up. The decision was made that the Fleet should continue to base at Pearl Harbor, although units might be sent back to the West Coast for stripping ship, landing excess equipment, and for training. It was considered that Hawaii was the most advantageous point for the operations contemplated in case of war with Japan and also as the best point from which to cover Alaska and the Pacific Coast.

9. Q. In such reconsideration of the decision for the retention of the Fleet in Hawaii, did the question of the Fleet's security as against surprise attack ever get into the argument?

A. I do not recall that particular point, although I do know that from time to time representations were made to the War Department regarding increase of anti-aircraft protection and searchlights at Hawaii.

10. Q. Do you recall any protest by Admiral Kimmel, or any representation by him, concerning the Fleet's security as thus based?

A. I have no recollection of a protest.

11. Q. Do you recall whether or not the Navy Department was in any way influenced by the State Department in its decision to base the Fleet in Hawaii?

A. I do not know. I have no recollection that pressure was put on the Navy Department to keep the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

12. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file of correspondence, which is Exhibit 40 in this record, which begins with a representation by the Secretary of Navy to the War Department to the effect that, within the Army's province, the situation as regards the security of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not satisfactory. State what you can remember of conferences and discussions between representatives of War and Navy Department, at the dates of these letters or subsequently, concerning this subject.

A. I saw the letter of January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War. I do not recall having seen the reply, although I must have seen it. The only part of the reply of the Secretary of War which [419] brings up anything in my memory is the question of balloon barrages and the use of smoke. It is my recollection that the Pacific Fleet did not wish balloon barrages at Pearl Harbor, due to the interference with plane operations. I do not now recall any specific conferences on this subject except I seem to recall information being received that additional Army aircraft would be sent to the Hawaiian Islands. I also recall that we received information of the installation of radar equipment, four stations I believe being set up on the various islands of the Hawaiian group. There may have been discussions between the War Plans Divisions of the Navy and War Departments and there may have been discussions in the joint board meetings, but I can not now recall any further specific action.

13. Q. It appears (as per Exhibit 40) that, on 24 January 1941, the Secretary of Navy pointed out what were thought to be major deficiencies in the Army's readiness to meet its commitments over Oahu; in particular, deficiencies in air raid warning facilities, anti-aircraft artillery, and in opposing aircraft, which, naturally, would be Army pursuit. Did the Navy Department not further urge the Army to overcome those deficiencies, between that date and 7 December '41?

A. I have no specific recollection of any further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of deficiencies noted in the letter of January 24. I have recollection of a later discussion in connection with balloon barrages, which, as I recall, the Fleet did not want because of interference with the operations of Navy aircraft. I seem to recall receiving information that additional planes would be dispatched and also that aircraft detection apparatus was being installed on the tops of four mountains in the Hawaiian

group. Neither were in place at Pearl Harbor in 1939. I recall the placing of nets at Pearl Harbor, although the nets were Navy responsibility and not Army.

14. Q. Do you think that as regards those major deficiencies in anti-aircraft artillery, air warning system, and pursuit aircraft, the Navy failed to further represent the situation due to a reluctance to unduly press its sister service about something which was entirely in its own province?

A. If any reason can be given, I think that was probably the one. The defense of a permanent naval base under the province of joint Army and Navy Action was an Army responsibility. The naval base was supposed to be a position at which the Fleet could remain for repairs, for rest, for replenishment of supplies, for dry-docking, without the necessity of being in a state of readiness for action twenty-four hours a day.

15. Q. Do you recall if, within the Offices of the CNO, this state of unreadiness of the Army at Pearl Harbor was a matter of more or less constant concern and that those offices kept themselves informed on the situation, in an up-to-date fashion?

A. We knew the number of troops, the number of guns, searchlights, the number of planes, that the Army had in Hawaii. We knew when changes took place. I do not recall that we had exact information as to the actual condition of readiness in which the anti-aircraft guns, troops, aircraft detection devices, were maintained.

16. Q. Incident to the general state of readiness, along the lines pointed out in SecNav's letter of 24 January '41, do you recall any reestimate within the CNO's offices as regards the security factor for Admiral Kimmel's Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. No.

[420] 17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a file which is Exhibit 22, which contains an estimate of the situation at Pearl Harbor, signed by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General Martin, dated 31 March '41, which, on its page three, sets forth that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. Do you recall having seen this correspondence in the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I undoubtedly saw the letter of May 1 from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District with its inclosure (Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan) because I have a distinct recollection of this plan being sent to other naval districts as a pattern upon which to form joint frontier defense plans.

18. Q. Did that portion of this file, to some extent predicting an air raid on Pearl Harbor, serve as an occasion for further urging the Army to improve its anti-aircraft defenses on Oahu?

A. I have no recollection that any further formal representation was made to the War Department after the receipt of this plan.

19. Q. Admiral, a considerable detachment involving battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and one carrier was, in the Spring of 1941, transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Will you give the considerations which led to the transfer of forces?

A. That transfer of forces was in accordance with the general concept of the war as visualized in WPL-46, that the initial major effort would be in the Atlantic. The Pacific Fleet was given defensive

tasks, with the exception of a diversion toward the Marshalls and Carolines to relieve pressure on the Malay Barrier. There were other offensive tasks against Japanese communications and shipping, but those were largely tasks for submarines.

20. Q. Inasmuch as the entire British Navy was opposed by relatively small German naval forces, why did the Department conceive it necessary to reenforce the Atlantic when there were so much more powerful potential enemy forces in the Pacific?

A. My recollection was that it was feared that the fast, heavy German ships might get past the British forces stationed in the United Kingdom and get into the Western Atlantic. At that time, there were no United States battleships, other than the very old battleships, in the Atlantic, capable of coping with the German capital ships.

21. Q. Why was the danger from the German naval ships considered to be of more moment than the danger from the entire Japanese Navy which also was a potential enemy nation.

A. With the detachment of the force from the Pacific, which was transferred to the Atlantic, there was left in the Pacific a number of capital ships equal to those in the Japanese Navy. The reason was that the center of gravity of the initial naval effort of the United States in WPL-46 was to be in the Atlantic and not in the Pacific where the role was primarily defensive.

22. Q. Was there involved in this transfer of our naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic any agreement with our potential ally, Britain, to transfer some of their capital ships' strength to the Indian Ocean where they would be near the Western Pacific theatre?

A. The transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic was in accordance with WPL-46, which, in turn, was based on the United States-British conversations which culminated in the plan known as "ABC-1". That plan [421] specifically stated that Germany was the predominate member of the Axis Powers and the Atlantic and European areas were considered to be the decisive theatres, and that, therefore, the principal U. S. military effort would be exercised in that theatre. U. S. operations elsewhere would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. It was stated in ABC-1 that the United States intended to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area so that the British Commonwealth would be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

23. Q. It appears that we met our own commitment, as per those plans, without delay and effected the transfer of forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the Spring of 1941. Can you explain why it was not until November, '41, that any British capital ships arrived in the Indian Ocean and that even then it was only a small detachment?

A. No; I don't know.

24. Q. Admiral, do you recall if, in the Office of Naval Operations, there was any decided disagreement with the concept that Germany constituted the major of our potential enemies?

A. Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major

effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representations made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan.

25. Q. Do you recall if Admiral Kimmel expressed any disagreement with that concept or if he ever made any protest against transfer of some of his forces to the Atlantic?

A. I do not now recall any formal protest or any informal protest.

26. Q. Did you hear the matter discussed when Admiral Kimmel visited the Navy Department in the Summer of 1941?

A. No, I do not now recall any such representations being made by Admiral Kimmel.

27. Q. Narrowing the matter down to the Pacific Fleet alone, what was the prevalent opinion in OpNav as regards the readiness to carry out the mission assigned by WPL-46 to that Fleet?

A. Since the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet in WPL-46 were primarily defensive, with the exception of the diversionary trips toward the Marshalls and Carolines, it was felt that the forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the tasks assigned.

28. Q. What was the general logistic readiness in mid-Pacific for carrying out those tasks?

[422] A. The forces that were necessary to give logistic support to the Fleet were not available during '41 and the war plan called for the acquisition of the necessary auxiliaries to support the logistic effort of the Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, none of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet carried it very far afield from the Hawaiian Islands until it was required to execute the tasks of the occupation of the Caroline and Marshall Islands and ultimately the establishment of a base at Truk. These operations, however, were not contemplated in the initial days of the war; only the diversionary raids against the Carolines and Marshalls.

29. Q. It appears in previous testimony that the entire Pacific Fleet, while in Hawaiian waters, was very much preoccupied in training, incident to the fluid state of its personnel. Do you recall any representations or requirements by OpNav on that subject which, during the latter part of 1941, tended to concentrate the Commander-in-Chief's thought upon that subject?

A. In order to obtain a nucleus of trained men to place new ships in commission, it was necessary for all ships in the Navy, not only the Pacific Fleet but all other ships of the Navy, to send men back to the United States for this purpose. Naturally, the raw recruits who replaced these experienced men had to be trained. That condition pertains today. Our ships are constantly engaged in training new personnel for new construction in time of war. I also recall that I think

permission was given to send ships to the West Coast in small numbers for intensive gunnery training in the San Pedro area.

30. Q. Then do I understand from your answer that this condition was fully realized in OpNav and that it was unavailable?

A. Yes, because there was no other reservoir of trained personnel with which to man new ships except the personnel of ships that were already in commission in all Fleets.

31. Q. Were you aware, during the latter part of 1941, that there had grown up in the Pacific Fleet the thought that training constituted its primary mission?

A. Until war was actually upon us, I cannot see that it had any better mission than to train its personnel for war.

32. Q. Did you sense, during the last few weeks or even days of peace, that there was a considerable preoccupation in that direction on the part of the senior officers of the Pacific Fleet?

A. No.

33. Q. It appears that on 24 July 1941, or thereabouts, the State Department effected an Executive Order which froze all Japanese credits and virtually stopped our trade with Japan. Do you recall if the Navy Department was consulted prior to taking that step and considered that it was in balance with our general situation as regards readiness for war?

A. I do not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing that order. I do not know whether they consulted the Navy Department regarding its bearing on our readiness to wage war.

34. Q. Do you recall if there was a proper appreciation and estimate within the OpNav offices as to the probable effect of that step of 24 July 1941?

A. I do not recall any formal estimate of the results of that particular order. It was only one of an accumulative set of circumstances putting pressure on Japan.

[423] 35. Q. Incidentally, do you recall any prevalent opinion in OpNav that we could either bluff Japan or restrain her by such squeezing methods as embargoes and so forth?

A. I think that the impression in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was that war with Japan was inevitable and the only question was when it would occur. Issuance of WPL-46 and the Staff conversations with the British all are evidence that the Navy Department considered that war with Japan was inevitable.

36. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 16 October, which is Exhibit 6 in this record. I have been unable to find any evidence of any opinion being expressed by the State Department to the Navy Department which set forth the gravity of the situation mentioned as created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. Have you any recollection of such a representation?

A. I have no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department to the Navy Department which would have formed the basis for this dispatch.

37. Q. Do you think that this dispatch indicating the seriousness of the situation vis-a-vis Japan was, therefore, based upon a Navy Department estimate?

A. Yes, I think it was based upon an estimate made by Admiral Stark and by the Chief of the War Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet would result in the situation mentioned in that dispatch. I do recall, definitely, that both Admiral Stark and Captain Turner saw the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, on several occasions at which the situation between Japan and the United States was discussed. It is quite probable that this dispatch was based on their impressions received from their conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, although I cannot state specifically that it did result from any particular conversation.

38. Q. Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant in his directive to make preparatory deployments as contained in this dispatch of 16 October?

A. I think the preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved.

39. Q. Were you advised as to the action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pursuant to that directive concerning a deployment?

A. I do not recall any specific dispatch in response to this one stating what deployments were to be made by the Pacific Fleet. I do not recall that we expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions.

[424] 40. Q. Between the date of the aforesaid dispatch, (16 October), and 24 November, I find no specific directive or informative dispatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. During that period, it appears that the relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating. Do you recall any reason why no other important communications were sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during that period?

A. No, I do not recall why no further dispatches were sent until November 24. That dispatch held out no hope for the betterment of conditions.

41. Q. Admiral, in late November, 1941, how well informed were you concerning the actual disposition from day to day of all forces under Admiral Kimmel?

A. At some time during 1941, the exact date I do not recall, but I believe it was quite early in '41, we established an operational plot on which the disposition of U. S. forces was plotted, and as far as we knew, the position of Japanese and German forces were plotted. The system of reporting ship movements had been placed in a confidential status and these continued to be received and plotted in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As I now recall, we did not receive the reports of purely local movements in the Hawaiian Islands, so long as the ships remained based in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. That is, we did not receive reports of ships going out for two or three days' operations to return to Pearl Harbor. It is also possible that certain movements may have been known to us but were not shown on the operations plotting board because we did not wish, for reasons of security, to show them. I recall one or two instances in the Atlantic where ships were purposely omitted from the operations plot.

42. Q. As you recall the events of early December, 1941, were the dispositions of all of Admiral Kimmel's ships which were definitely beyond the Fleet's usual drill areas, entirely known in the plotting room in OpNav? I have particular reference to early December movements to Wake Island, Johnston Island, and Midway Islands.

A. I think these movements were known when they took place. However, I may be in error and that I now know of them from what we knew later.

43. Q. In keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships, do you recall if the quarterly schedule of employment was mainly relied upon?

A. No, the reports of movements which were received through the movement report system were relied upon.

44. Q. Did you know at the time of the Pacific Fleet's routine of going to sea in rotation for the three Task Groups into which the forces had been divided?

A. Yes. We knew that was the system under which the Pacific Fleet was normally conducting its training and upkeep.

45. Q. Admiral, do you recall, on or about the 10th of November, '41, becoming cognizant of certain dispatches which had passed between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, concerning a method of reporting the exact positions of large ships of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?

A. I do not now recall them. I may have seen them and forgotten. The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[425] The examining officer then, at 11:55 a. m., adjourned until 2:15 p. m., tomorrow, in the Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[425] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1944

FORTY-FIRST DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 2:15 p. m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record of proceedings of the fortieth day of the examination until such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the examining officer (Continued):

46. Q. I hand you a dispatch from CNO under date of 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 in this record. Do you recall the background of this dispatch, whether it was based upon the Navy's own estimate or on advice by the State Department, and so forth?

A. As the dispatch indicates, the reason for sending this dispatch was in the dispatch itself which refers to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval task forces. I do not recall any specific thing in Washington which prompted this dispatch except that it probably was an estimate based on all information, diplomatic and otherwise, that we had at the moment.

47. Q. This dispatch advises the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific that an aggressive move in the Western Pacific is indicated. The preceding dispatch, of 24 November, warned against an aggressive movement in any direction. Can you throw any light upon what led to the change in the information given to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific?

A. The only reason that I can give now is that the character of the landing craft which were referred to in the dispatch of November 27 were such that they could not have been used other than in the Far Eastern area.

48. Q. What do you recall in the way of discussions at about this period in the offices of the CNO as to the possibility or even probability of a surprise air raid upon Pearl Harbor?

[426] A. I do not recall any discussions in the latter part of November or early December regarding the probability of an air raid on Hawaii. We did anticipate observation and possible attacks by submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii and possibly on the line of communications from the islands to the West Coast. We anticipated possible raids, either by light forces or by submarines, on the outlying possessions at Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands.

49. Q. In drafting the dispatch of 27 November, was consideration given to the thought that mention of Western Pacific objectives only might tend to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

A. I'm sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give such an impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would become involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.

50. Q. What action, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the dispatch of 27 November?

A. Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reinforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war.

51. Q. When did the CNO receive a report, if any, from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, concerning the action which he had taken in consequence of the dispatch of 27 November?

A. Except that we had knowledge of the submarines who were on observation missions, I do not recall any reports of movements and I think this is correct because no departures for extended operations were necessary at that moment as long as we were not yet at war with Japan.

52. Q. Do you recall any curiosity within the offices of the CNO concerning the precautionary and security measures which Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, was taking in and around Oahu?

A. No.

53. Q. Do you know why the Commander-in-Chief was not called upon to report specifically what he was doing incident to the receipt of that dispatch?

A. I think the reason that he was not called upon to inform us what he had done was because we had knowledge that submarines were out on missions of observation, that reinforcement of Wake and Midway were contemplated, and we believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time, were being continued.

54. Q. In that understanding of the use of long-range aircraft in patrolling waters around Hawaii, what did you believe was being done at this particular time?

[427] A. We knew that the number of planes based on Oahu were not sufficient to maintain a complete 360 degree coverage at maximum range, twenty-four hours a day. Furthermore, the number of planes that were available could not have flown any such patrol without undue strain on the personnel and wearing out engines for which replacements were not available. Therefore, we knew that the coverage was by no means as complete as it should have been.

55. Q. Did the CNO inquire what security measures the Army forces on Oahu instituted at about this time, 27-28 November?

A. I do not know unless he asked General Marshall in regard to it. I do not recall that I knew what security measures the Army was taking.

56. Q. I hand you two dispatches from the CNO, dated 26 November, which are Exhibits 12 and 13 in this record. They preceded the dispatch which contained the war warning by only a few hours. Do you recall hearing the thought expressed that injecting a matter of this comparatively minor importance, at a time when a war warning was being sent, would tend to complicate the situation and unnecessarily detract the attention of the Commanders in Hawaii from the all-important subject of the imminence of war?

A. These two dispatches were designed to reenforce the outlying stations at Midway and Wake. We were also concerned regarding the security of Johnston Island and other United States islets in the Pacific. If anything, I think these dispatches should have accentuated the idea that these outlying positions were in danger of raids from Japanese light forces or from submarines rather than to allay suspicion of the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. These islands were important to us at that time as staging points for transferring planes to the Philippine Islands (which were routed by Midway, Wake, and Guam), and also for the staging of seaplanes to Australia for the British and Dutch.

57. Q. Do you recall any major discrepancy between the numbers of Army planes which were actually sent on across the Pacific and the estimate which Army authorities previously gave the Navy Department as to those numbers?

A. No.

58. Q. Returning to those dispatches of 26 November, involving the movement of Army forces, either in relief of Marine units or as reinforcements thereto, in the outlying islands; was it not appreciated in the Offices of the CNO that the task amounted to entering into a rather major activity for the Commanders on Oahu?

A. Yes.

59. Q. Did it not occur then that such a directive was a complicating matter?

A. Complicating what?

60. Q. Complicating the situation for the Army and Navy Commanders in Oahu at a time when the relations with Japan were so badly strained. In other words, did it occur at the time that the directive was being issued somewhat too late?

A. The Navy Department was concerned with the vulnerability of Wake and Midway and Johnston Islands, and it deemed it essential that these positions should be reinforced.

61. Q. I hand you a dispatch from the CNO, dated 28 November, which is Exhibit 9 in this record, and which in its latter part contains a directive. [428] This dispatch went to Commander, Pacific Fleet, only as an information addressee but contained a directive concerning offensive action. Can you explain what that particular phrase in the dispatch was meant to convey?

A. This dispatch was addressed to the Commanders of the two Naval Coastal Frontiers on the West Coast of the continental United States. I do not recall that they had previously had any information specifically sent to them in regard to the gravity of the situation as regards Japan. This dispatch was intended to make them cognizant of the situation and was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information, since these two Coastal Frontiers would come under his control once we were at war. The phrase "no offensive action" undoubtedly meant that they were to take no action against Japanese merchant vessels or Japanese submarines that might be within their waters unless these vessels had committed an overt act of war.

62. Q. I hand you an informatory dispatch sent out by CNO on 3 December '41, which is Exhibit 11 in this record. Do you recall any particular significance being attached to that information in the offices of the CNO?

A. Yes. This indicated to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that war was imminent and was a matter of possibly a very few days or maybe hours.

63. Q. Did it change the opinions of such officers in the office of Naval Operations who might, before that time, have thought that the first Japanese aggressive move would not include us?

A. It was the opinion, I believe, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that the first aggressive Japanese move would include us and this was only to emphasize all of the previous dispatches that war with Japan was imminent. The inclusion of Washington in this dispatch is conclusive evidence that such was the case.

64. Q. This examination contains no record of any directive, additional to that of 27 November, having been transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, up to 7 December. Do you recall any discussions in the office of Naval Operations during the ensuing period concerning the advisability of further directing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or of providing him with additional information?

A. There may have been discussions of which I have now no particular recollection, but I'm quite certain that Admiral Stark considered that he had given the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequate warning that war with Japan was imminent.

65. Q. Did it occur to you, or to anyone else in the upper echelons of the Navy Department, that it would be well for some officer to fly out to Hawaii so that a meeting of minds would be better insured?

A. I don't recall any discussion on that point. I think Admiral Stark thought that he had given both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic

Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet every indication that war with Japan was imminent.

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not the CNO inquired concerning what was being done with the radar equipment in the hands of the Army on Oahu?

A. As far as I know, he made no inquiry by dispatch. He may have asked General Marshall in regard to such matters and did not tell me, or if he did tell me, I have forgotten. I do not recall having any information that the Army's radar installations in Hawaii were not operating.

[429] 67. Q. What as regards inquiry concerning the state of readiness of the Army pursuit aviation on Oahu?

A. Again, I do not recall that any inquiry was made by dispatch; whether or not Admiral Stark discussed this matter with General Marshall, I do not know. I have no recollection of any information that I had that the Army air forces on Oahu were not ready to carry out their task in defending that naval base against attack.

68. Q. During November or December, '41, were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes, I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

71. Q. Coming now to the events of the evening of 6 December, Washington time, when did you become cognizant of the receipt of a long thirteen or fourteen part Japanese dispatch which was picked up sometime on 6 December?

A. I do not recall exactly when I saw it. I think I saw it after the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made.

72. Q. Admiral, during this crucial period, from October, '41, onward, was the "Atlantic war" so much in the Navy Department's picture as to amount to undue preoccupation on the part of the CNO and yourself? I mean in particular, were you able to give affairs in the Pacific theatre the time and thought that the situation merited?

A. The undeclared war in the Atlantic had been going on for some time. We were virtually at war with Germany, although the war was undeclared. We were escorting convoys and we were making preparations for the defense of our harbors, anticipating mining operations by German submarines. We had arranged for convoys anticipating attacks by German submarines on merchant vessels in the Western Atlantic. We were not particularly concerned regarding

aircraft attacks, although a raid of one or two planes was a possibility on the Northern part of the Atlantic Coast. On the contrary, as to being preoccupied with the affairs in the Atlantic, we were far more concerned with the affairs in the Pacific than we were in the Atlantic. We felt that the war would be precipitated in the Pacific and that we would only become involved in the war in the Atlantic as the result of war in the Pacific. In addition to the testimony which I have given in regard to strengthening the positions in the Pacific, we had, for two months or more, taken steps to get our merchant vessels out of the Far East and out of the other areas in the Pacific where they could be captured by the Japanese. We began routing them far to the southward around Australia. The last vessels that went to the [430] Philippines were convoyed; also we had initiated convoys in the Pacific for important cargoes going to Australia, including pilots for the Chinese air force and similar things. Answering the question definitely, the Atlantic situation did not preoccupy our attentions to the exclusion of the Pacific.

73. Q. Was the form and power of the attack made by the Japs on Pearl Harbor on 7 December received as a decided surprise to you?

A. To me, it was. I expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be made against the Philippines and Guam with possibly raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to the westward of Hawaii, and submarine attacks against our shipping around Hawaii, between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States and possibly on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

74. Q. Sir, do you recall whether any of the other principal advisors to the Chief of Naval Operations estimated that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a probability?

A. It is an historical fact that Japan started her war on China and Russia with surprise attacks before a declaration of war. We expected such attacks on the Philippines and on Guam without a declaration of war. I do not recall anyone in Operations representing to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.

The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The examination then, at 3:50 p. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer.

[431] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1944

FORTY-SECOND DAY

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

The examination met at 11 a.m.

Present:

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, and his counsel.

Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

The record of proceedings of the sixteenth through the forty-first days, both inclusive, of the examination was read and approved.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were present.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given by him on the thirty-ninth day of the examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 6 June 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Rear Admiral Joel W. Bunkley, U.S. Navy, Retired, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the fortieth day of the examination was correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 41".

The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter, dated 9 June 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer, from Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the transcript of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the testimony given by him on the fortieth and forty-first days of the examination was correct; appended hereto marked "Exhibit 42".

The examining officer made the following statement: Throughout the foregoing examination, the examining officer has attempted to limit the number of witnesses called to the minimum compatible with the necessary coverage of the subject matter designated in the precept. There are many additional witnesses within the naval service who have knowledge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of 7 December 1941. However, it was felt that their knowledge and opportunities for observation were the same as officers who were examined and their testimony would be cumulative, rather than productive of new information.

There are two officers within the naval service whom the examining officer would have called as witnesses in the latter days of the examination if it had been practicable so to do. The officers in question are Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. Navy, the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence during the latter part of 1941, and Commander A. D. Kramer, [432] U. S. Navy, then attached to the Far Eastern Section and acting as liaison officer between that Section and the Communications Intelligence Section. While it would be desirable to have their testimony in this record, it is not felt to be of sufficient moment to warrant either calling them to Washington or proceeding to their current stations, which are at a great distance.

The examining officer did not desire to call any more witnesses.

The record of proceedings of the forty-second day of the examination was read and approved, and the examination being finished, then, at 11:30 a.m., adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

THOMAS C. HART,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBITS OF THE HART INQUIRY

EXHIBIT No. 1 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

17 FEBRUARY 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference: (a) Precept for subject examination.

(b) Section 734, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937.

1. Reference (a) details Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, to conduct the subject examination and further provides as follows:

"In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore, has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request."

2. In compliance with the portion of reference (a) above quoted, you are hereby advised that the first meeting of the examination will occur at 0930 a. m. on Tuesday, 22 February 1944 in room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. You have the right to be present at that and subsequent meetings, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in your own behalf at your own request.

3. It is requested that receipt of this letter be acknowledged.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 2 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

280 BRONXVILLE ROAD,
BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK,
19 February 1944.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference: Your letter of 17 February 1944.

1. Receipt is acknowledged this date of the reference.

2. As the first meeting is scheduled to be held three days from this date, I find that I shall not have time to prepare for my attendance and request that the examination be adjourned after the organization meeting.

3. Attention is invited to the fact that the stipulation between the Navy Department and me as to the conditions under which the testimony may be used, has not been submitted to me as planned.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
/s/ Robert A. Lavender,
ROBERT A. LAVENDER,
Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired),
By direction.

EXHIBIT No. 3 (HART INQUIRY)

In Reply Address
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
And Refer To No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 4 March 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference:

- (a) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 17 February 1944 addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (b) Reply to reference (a) dated 19 February 1944 addressed to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer, and signed by Capt. Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, Retired, by direction of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (c) Ltr. of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, dated 29 February 1944 addressed to SecNav.
- (d) SecNav ltr. dated 4 March 1944 addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. The subject Examination convened at 9:00 a. m., Tuesday, 22 February 1944, of which meeting you were informed by reference (a). At the meeting reference (b) was considered by the Examining Officer who announced that the request contained therein was approved to the extent that the Interested Party, Rear Admiral Kimmel, would be afford a reasonable time to prepare for the Examination. The Examination was accordingly adjourned until called by the Examining Officer.

2. The Examining Officer is now of the opinion that a reasonable time for the Interested Party to prepare for the Examination has elapsed unless there are special circumstances of which the Examining Officer has not been advised, which would constitute reasonable basis for further delay.

3. In view of the above and the directions of the Convening Authority contained in reference (d), the Examining Officer has called for the Examination to reconvene at 9:00 a. m. on Tuesday, 7 March 1944, in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at which time it is proposed to obtain and record the testimony of Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired.

4. The Examining Officer intends to continue hearings on each week day thereafter and to call as witnesses during the hearings in Washington, D. C. the following members of the naval forces:

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy.
Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, U. S. Navy
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy.
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy.

5. You are hereby advised of time and place of the meetings, as set forth above, and of the fact that you will be accorded the rights set forth in detail in reference (a). You will be further advised of subsequent meetings, at all of which you will be entitled to the rights outlined in reference (a).

[s] Thos. C. Hart,
THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 4 (HART INQUIRY)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

[1]

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 2CL-41 (REVISED)

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U.S.F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U.S.F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *CONTINUOUS PATROLS:*

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *INTERMITTENT PATROLS:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) SORTIE AND ENTRY:

(1) Regulation (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[3] (D) OPERATING AREAS:

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(S) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) SHIPS AT SEA:

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(4) (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnet mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) SHIPS IN PORT:

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

- (3) Launch air search for enemy ships.
- (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN OPERATING AREA:

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, FTP. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[6] Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships

accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[7] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NYS-10,

(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors, Enclosure A., *supra*. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B)

Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT No. 5 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

SECRET

Register No. 19

FULL TITLE: JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SHORT TITLE: HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

[2] *Joint coastal frontier defense plan—Hawaiian coastal frontier table of corrections*

Change No.	Date of Entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

[3] *Navy distribution list*

Official to whom issued	Registered numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations.....	1S and 19
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	20
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	21
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	22
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	23
Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	24
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	25
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	26
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	27
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	28
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	29
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	30
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	31
Commander Patrol Wing Two.....	32
Commander Submarine Squadron Four.....	33
Commander Submarine Base PEARL HARBOR.....	34
†Commander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR.....	35
†Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE.....	36
†District Intelligence Officer.....	37
†District Communication Officer.....	38
†Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR.....	39
†Inspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU.....	40

*Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.

†These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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[5] HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR NAVY YARD, T. H.,
11 April 1941.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[6]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by *italic figures* enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. *HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.* The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. *HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. *HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. *HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for PEARL HARBOR and KANEOHE.

(1) *DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.* The Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—HAWAIIAN D. S. A.

(2) *PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area comprises:

The area of water in PEARL HARBOR lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the PUULOA Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE. This area is given the short title—PEARL D. S. A.

(3) *KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The KANEOHE BAY—Defensive Sea Area comprises:

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from KAOIO POINT, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from KAPOHO POINT, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—KANEOHE D. S. A.

(4) *PALMYRA, KINGMAN, REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, and WAKE—DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* These defensive sea areas comprise territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.* The Defensive Coastal Area for OAHU comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

- KEAHI POINT—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
- PUU KAPOLEI—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
- PUUIKI STATION } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
- KAHUKU POINT }

This area is given the short title—OAHU D. C. A.

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Tasks and Forces

12. *CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. *TASKS.*

a. *JOINT TASK.* To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *ARMY TASK.* To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *NAVY TASK.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[8] 15. *FORCES.*

a. *ARMY FORCES.*

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. *NAVAL FORCES.*

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. *OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.*

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. *CIVIL ORGANIZATION.* A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to reorganize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and materiel resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV--DECISIONS

16. *GENERAL.*

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and materiel resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. *ARMY.* The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. *a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. *e.*

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940".

[10] *j.* An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i.*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-power and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. *ARMY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 *d.* above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

c. *NAVY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieut. General, U. S. Army,

Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT No. 6 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

16 October 1941.

From: CNO.

Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (ACKNOWLEDGE).

Info:

162203.

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third aedes inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX

EXHIBIT No. 7 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 24, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: CINCAF CINCPAC COM11 COM12 COM13 COM15.

Info: SPENAVO CINCLANT.

242005.

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.

EXHIBIT No. 8 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 27, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC.

Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO.

272337.

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an

aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

EXHIBIT No. 9 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

November 28, 1941.

From: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Action: COM PNNCP COM PSNCF.

Info: CINCPAC COM PNCF.

290110.

Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander Western Defense Command Quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G Two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X unquote XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

EXHIBIT No. 10 (HART INQUIRY)

SECRET

30 November 1941.

From: OPNAV.

To: CINCAF, CINCPAC (Info).

300419.

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch X Instruct planes to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British Air forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur X British mission here informed X.

EXHIBIT No. 11 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

3 December 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16.

Info:

Ø3185Ø.

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X.

EXHIBIT No. 12 (HART INQUIRY)

PRIORITY—SECRET

26 November 1941.

From: CNO

To: CINCPAC.

27ØØ38.

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT No. 13 (HART INQUIRY)

ROUTINE—SECRET

26 November 1941.

From: CNO.

To: CINCPAC.

27ØØ4Ø.

Army has offered to make available some units of Infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommend armament X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

EXHIBIT No. 14 (HART INQUIRY)

DEFERRED—SECRET

Date: 29 Nov 41.
 Originator: OPNAV.
 Action: CINCPAC.
 282054.

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct COMGEN HAW-DEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future X.

EXHIBIT No. 15 (HART INQUIRY)

TOP SECRET

Nov. 28, 1941.
 From: CINCPAC.
 To: OPNAV.
 Action: 12.
 280627.

Reference urdis 270040 and 270038; Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes. It proceeds afterwards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary operation of 12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Army bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now available there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Usefulness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by their doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. Their use is possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island were landed, and flexibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional anti-aircraft guns needed this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army troop reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Navy command, 12 Marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later, On Dec. 1st sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. The feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.

EXHIBIT No. 16 (HART INQUIRY)

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinpac file no.
 A16/WPPac-46(16)
 Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
 To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
 Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac-46

Subject Matter	Page Number ¹	Change in Effect
Promulgating letter: CinePac file A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W of July 21, 1941.	i.....	Original
List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46.....	ii.....	"
Table of Corrections.....	iii.....	"
Distribution List.....	iv.....	"
Title Page.....	1.....	"
Table of Contents.....	2, 2a, 2b.....	"
Parts I to V (incl.).....	3-52 incl.....	"
	52a-52h incl.....	"
	53-56 incl.....	"
	56a-56d incl.....	"
	57-74 incl.....	"
Annex I.....	1-1 to I-11 incl.....	"
Annex II.....	II-1 to II-9 incl.....	"
Annex III.....	III-1 to III-5 incl.....	"
Annex IV.....	IV-1 to IV-3 incl.....	"

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

iii] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change
.....
.....
.....

[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to Whom Issued	Registered Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations.....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.....	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.....	10, 11
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[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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[3]

SECRET

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

- a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

- b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One.....	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two.....	B-1, "
Task Force Three.....	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force.....	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force.....	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force.....	F-1, "
Base Force.....	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. *TASK FORCE ONE* Commander Battle Force

Batdivs 2, 4	-----	6 BB
SARATOGA	-----	1 CV
Crudiv 3, 9	-----	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9	-----	4 OCL#
		2 DL
		16 DD#
		2 AD

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. *TASK FORCE TWO* Commander Aircraft Battle Force

Batdiv 1	-----	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN	-----	1 CV
Crudiv 5	-----	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50	-----	1 OCL
		8 DD
		2 AD

(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

3. *TASK FORCE THREE* Commander Scouting Force

Crudiv 4, 6	-----	8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA	-----	1 CV
Desrons 4, 5	-----	2 DL
		16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindiv 5, 6	-----	5 DM
Available Transports Base Force	-----	— AP
		— APD

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.

2d Marine Air Group.

[12]	4. <i>TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)</i>	Commander Aircraft Scouting Force	
	All units of Aircraft Scouting Force.....		107 VP
			2 AV
			2 AVP
			4 AVD
	Utility Squadron from Base Force.....		10 VJR
	5. <i>TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)</i>	Commander Submarines Scouting Force	
	All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School..		30 SS
			2 OSS
			1 SM
			1 ODD
			3 AS
			2 ASR
			1 AM
	6. <i>TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)</i>	Commander Minecraft Battle Force	
	All units of Minecraft Battle Force.....		1 CM
			8 DM
	7. <i>TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)</i>	Commander Base Force	
	All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less		8 DMS
	Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.		4 AF
			6 AT
			1 AH
			13 AO
			2 AR
			1 ARD
			2 AK
			2 AE
			1 AKS
			10 AM
			4 AG
			Utility Wing

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Coastal and local defense forces.

10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.

4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1). Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] *Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced

bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reinforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.

[23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. Defend Guam in category "F";

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
 - b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
 - c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
 - d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
 - e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
 - f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
 - g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
 - h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- [26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
 - k. Continue training operations as practicable.
 1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
 - m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
 - b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
 - c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
 - d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
 - e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
 - f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
 - g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
- i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
 - j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
 - k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
 - l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5''/51 caliber guns
12 3''/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5''/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
4 3''/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
8 3''/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japar into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing attack training.

3154. On w-Day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

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(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39]

CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c. 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252. a. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloelap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:

a. Continue training for landing attacks.

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.

c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.

d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 e, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53]

CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54]

CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For.	{ 2 OCL.....	} When directed..	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 3.....	{ 1 CL.....		
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
		{ 1 AVD.....		
		{ 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB.....		
		{ 1 AVD.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
		{ 1 AVP.....		
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3.....	{ 1 ASR.....		
		NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM.....	} J-Day.....	Until further orders.
		{ 8 DM.....		
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
All Forces.....	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.....	When directed..	For escort duty. To revert on completion.
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX,

Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] Section 1. Phase I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ mincraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ mincraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from *Task Force Six*, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from *Task Force Seven* for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Aircofor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to *Task Force Three*.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
 (3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
 Place
 Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One.* Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two.* Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three.*

(c) *Task Force Three*. Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

[69]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two*.

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three*.

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

- YOKOHAMA
- BUNGO CHANNEL
- KII CHANNEL
- TSUSHIMA
- NAGASAKI
- SHIMONOSEKI
- TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

*Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.*

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan

No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 - (b) Task Force Two.
 - (c) Task Force Three.
 - (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 - (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 - (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 - (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2.

Phase I

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

[I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) Task Force One.

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reinforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reinforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reinforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reinforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. ———

Initial Task Organization.

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*
- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reenforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;
- guns and observation posts;
- mines;
- channel and beach obstructions;
- other defense installations;
- beaches suitable for landing operations;
- extent of anchorage area;
- hydrographic, topographic, and meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

- combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
- other ships;
- fuel tanks;
- power and radio installations;
- troop concentrations;
- storehouses;
- other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reenforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two*, to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.

No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kes. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

EXHIBIT No. 17 (HART INQUIRY)

In reply refer to
Initials and No.
OP-30C1-AJ.
(SC) N20-12.
Serial 09330.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation at A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths or large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

(s) H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

Copy to:

CinC Atlantic Fleet.

, CinC Asiatic Fleet.

EXHIBIT No. 18 (HART INQUIRY)

CinC File No.
 S81-5/0398

UNITED STATES FLEET
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 At SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, March 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. file CP-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 19 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, June 13, 1941.

Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC)N20-12
 Serial 055730

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
 The Commandant, Third Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Ninth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
 The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to CinCpac. CinClant. CinCaf. C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon. C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport. Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo. Comdt. NavSta, Samoa. Buord. Op-12.

EXHIBIT No. 20 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 10 March 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December, 1941.

Reference:

(a) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 17 February 1944 addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

(b) Examining Officer's ltr. dated 4 March 1944 to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. As you were advised by reference (a), subject examination met at 9:00 a. m., Tuesday, 7 March 1944. At that and subsequent meetings to date, the following witnesses have appeared and testified before the Examining Officer:

Admiral C. C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired

Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral W. S. Delany, U. S. Navy.

2. The Examining Officer intends to continue hearings on each week day hereafter, in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and to call the following members of the naval forces:

Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy, Retired

Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy

Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy.

3. You are hereby advised of time and place of the meetings, as set forth above, and of the fact that you will be accorded the rights set forth in detail in reference (a). You will be further advised of subsequent meetings, at all of which you will be entitled to the rights outlined in reference (a).

/s/ Thos. C. Hart.
THOS. C. HART.

A true copy. Attest:

THOMAS C. HART,

Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 21 (HART INQUIRY)

[1] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 31, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions.

Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41.

(b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (Furnished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second Marine Div).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 November 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

Task Force One (Commander Battle Force)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR	-----	6 BB.
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON	-----	1 CV.
Crudiv NINE	-----	5 CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE	-----	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE	-----	1 CM, 4DM.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force)

Batdiv ONE	-----	3 BB.
Cardiv TWO	-----	1 CV.
Crudiv FIVE	-----	4 CA.
Desflot TWO	-----	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.
Mindiv TWO	-----	4 DM.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

[2] *Task Force Three (Commander Scouting Force)*

Crudivs FOUR, SIX	-----	8 CA.
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group 21	-----	1 CV.
Desron FIVE	-----	1 DL, 8 DD.
Minron TWO	-----	13 DMS.
Trainron FOUR	-----	A AP.
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.		

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

Task Force Seven (Commander Submarines, Scouting Force)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE----- 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR,
1 DD.

Subron SIX----- 12 SS, 1 AS.

*Subron EIGHT----- 6 SS, 1 AS.

*Subron TEN----- 4 SS, 1 AS.

*Upon reporting.

Primary Missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.

Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two)

Patwing ONE----- 36 VPB(A), 1 AV, 2 AVD,
1 AVP.

Patwing TWO----- 42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 2 AVD,
1 AVP.

[3] *Primary Missions:* (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient long range *Air Scouting and Air Striking Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.

Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force)

Units assigned----- 4 CA or CL

Primary Mission: To escort trans-pacific shipping in order to protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and operations of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the allocation of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise periods of the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of the Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to the above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, and development of the Island Bases.

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operations of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. For the present, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation and in the proportion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, insofar as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Trans-pacific

westbound convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila Area by the Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Commandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

[4] 10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway
2. Wake
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra

in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group 4.1—District Activities at Midway.

7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.

9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignment to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating periods of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10, (A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 22 (HART INQUIRY)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14

(0410)

Secret

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.

Inclosures:

- (A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941.
- (B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42).
- (C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is a new joint agreement with the local Army authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than* secret.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

C. C. Bloch.
C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to:

CinCPac (less inclosures)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 20, 1941.

Op-30B2-BP
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 059230
Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Op-12

EXHIBIT No. 23 (HART INQUIRY)

Op-12B-2-McC
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 067712
D-30798

Secret—Memorandum

JUNE 11, 1941.

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.
Enclosure: (A) Com14 secret letter (0410) S-A16-3/A7-3(3) ND14 of May 1, 1941, with enclosures.

1. Enclosure (A) should have been routed direct to the Director, Naval Districts Division for action.
2. It is recommended that copies of enclosure (A) be forwarded to all Commandants of Naval Districts, to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, for use in the preparation of similar plans, and in the holding of joint exercises. It will be noted that copies have been furnished the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

R. K. TURNER.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

S-A16-3/A7-3(3)/ND14
(0410)

1 MAY 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.
Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.
Inclosures: (A) Copies of two joint letters HHD-14ND dated 14 February 1941.
(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42).
(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local

Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

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6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

C. C. Bloch.
C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to:

CinCPac (less inclosures)
C-A16-1/A6/A&N(3) (0137)
Headquarters,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS,
14th NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
14 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Measures for Communication, coordination, and liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.

To: Officers named in par. 2 herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. CGHD letter AG 354.2/24JAX of 11 Januar 1941.

B. General Gardiner's report on Joint Exercises of 7 November, 1940.

C. Chief of Naval Operations Serial 041230 of 5 November 1940.

D. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy Short Title 14ND JCD-13-Army Short Title HC F-39), dated 14 April 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4, Reference D) on measures for Communication, Coordination and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses, and to implement Reference C, the following joint Committee (Paragraph 5, Reference D) is appointed:

Army Members:

Fort DeRussy : Major I. N. Ritchie.
Fort Kamehameha : Major R. E. Bingham.

Navy Members:

14ND Operations Officer: Comdr. H. B. Knowles.
14ND C. O. Inshore Patrol: Comdr. G. B. Woolley.

Enc. (A) Com14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941.

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committee will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. Senior Officer of this Committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by Committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. The report containing the recommendations of the Committee will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4, reference D) not later than 1 March 1941, with a view to the immediate establishment of a

Harbor Control Post for Joint Defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors, as outlined in Chief of Naval Operations serial 041230 of 5 November 1940.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Commandant.

Copies to:

CinCUS
Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.
Comdg. Gen., ESCAB

HEADQUARTERS
14th NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

I. General

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. Joint Air Operations

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. Joint Communications

* * * * *
 5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. Joint Antiaircraft Measures

8. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. Balloon barrages.

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. Aircraft Warning Service.

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

* * * * *
 (Signed) Walter C. Short,
 WALTER C. SHORT,
 Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
 Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

MARCH 31, 1941.

Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commanding General
 Commander Patrol Wing TWO, Hawaiian Air Force,
 Naval Air Station, Fort Shafter, T. H.
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10—8' guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our 'similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. *Possible enemy action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would

most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us:*

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carriers.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. *Decisions:*

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility Squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft).

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

V. Decisions:

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14

(629)

Confidential

30 DEC. 1940.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References:

- (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
- (b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
- (d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
- (e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for antisubmarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large

numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. Bloch.
C. C. BLOCH.

CinC File No.
A16/

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 7, 1941.

Confidential

First Endorsement to

Com 14 Conf. Ltr.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14

(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet air units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U. S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. Richardson.
J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN

EXHIBIT No. 24 (HART INQUIRY)

[1] PW2/A16-3/022

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

Confidential

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 16 Jan. 1941

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force.

(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

Reference: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Air-Craft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably

more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present, the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferrles or other suitable means for transporting bombs from Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons in-

tended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment [6] of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. L. Bellinger

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:

Comairscovor.

Com. 14.

N. A. S., P. H., T. H.

Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.

C. S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)

UNITED STATES FLEET SCOUTING FORCE,

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, Flagship,

Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 21, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the Department toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited by the Commander of that Wing.

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Commander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline and lubricating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited

by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.

Adolphus Andrews,
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,

Copy to:

Comairscofor Compatwing Two
ComFOURTEEN
NAS, Pearl Harbor
Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe.

CinC File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 31, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to CPW2 Conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation.

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.

4. Attention is particularly invited to:

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes to Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and *one aircraft carrier group*.

(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammunition storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter subject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.

J. O. Richardson.
J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to:

Comscofor
Comairscofor
Compatwing-2
Com-14
NAS P. H.
NAS Kaneohe

OP-23-H-KB 2/19
 CONFIDENTIAL
 (SC)A16-1/PW2
 Serial 015823

FEB. 27, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.
 Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
 Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.
 Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Subject: Patrol Wing Two—Readiness of.

Reference: (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

2. In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)

(a) 1. (a) 3. (b) 2. (b) 4.
 (a) 2. (a) 4. (b) 3. (b) 5.

3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy:

In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting*.

Copy to:

Cincpac, Comscofor,
 Comairscovor, Compatwing 2,
 Com. 14, NAS Pearl.

[1] CONFIDENTIAL

C-A16-1/A7-3(2)/ND14(0135)
 HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
 Fort Shafter, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 14 February, 1941.

SUBJECT: Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

To: Officers named in par. 2, herein.

1. Reference is directed to the following:

A. Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject, dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195)).

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13; Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April, 1939.

2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Representatives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and to improve the effectiveness of the defenses against hostile air attacks, the following joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:

a. *Air Operations Committee*: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 a, c, and d, Reference A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in Oahu against surprise aircraft raids.

Army Members:

Haw. Air Force:
 Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC
 H. S. C. A. B.:
 Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA

Navy Members:

14ND NAS Operations Officer
 Lt. Comdr. H. F. Carlson
 Staff, Com. AirBatFor.
 Comdr. M. R. Browning
 Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22
 Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs

Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941.

[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 b., Reference A.

Army Members:

Hq. Haw. Dept.:
 Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy, SC
 Haw. Air Force:
 Lt. Col. C. I. Hoppough, SC
 H. S. C. A. B.
 Major I. H. Ritchie, CAC

Navy Members:

PatWingTwo C. O. Patron 22:
 Lt. Comdr. W. P. Cogswell
 14th Communication Officer
 Comdr. H. L. Thompson
 Staff ComAirBatFor Communicatio
 n Officer:
 Lt. L. J. Dow

c. Air-Antiaircraft Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 *e, f, and h* of Reference A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination of ship and short antiaircraft artillery gun fire against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability of using balloon barracks in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.

Army Members:

Haw. Air Force:
 Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC
 H. S. C. A. B.:
 Major R. T. Frederick, 64th CA
 Capt. M. G. Weber, CAC

Navy Members:

14ND District Marine Officer:
 Col. H. K. Pickett
 BatFor Gunnery Officer, USS Mississ
 Lt. Comdr. W. W. Juvenal
 Ass't. Air Officer, USS Yorktown
 Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey

d. Armament Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 *g* of Reference A:

Army Members:

Hq. Haw. Dept.:
 Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf.
 Major R. McK. Smith, OD.
 Haw. Air Force:
 Lt. Col. A. B. Custis, OD.

Navy Members:

14ND IOC NAD Oahu:
 Comdr. W. W. Meek
 Staff ComAirBatFor, Gunnery:
 Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr.
 Staff, ComPatWingTwo, Gunnery:
 Lt. H. P. Cooper

[3] *e. Chemical Warfare Committee:* To study and submit recommendations pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices:

Army Members:

Hq. Haw. Dept.
 Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS
 Haw. Air Force:
 Major M. E. Jennings, CWS
 H. S. C. A. B.:
 Major F. T. Ostenberg, 64th CA

Navy Members:

14ND CO Barracks Detachment:
 Major J. M. Smith, USMC
 PatWingTwo CO Patron 21:
 Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris

3. The studies and recommendations of the Committees will be based upon existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve these conditions. The senior officer of each committee will act as its chairman. Direct consultation by committee members with any units under the control of the Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and encouraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint operation plans for defense against air attacks.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.

5. All members of all committees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on other duty will assemble at 0930 seventeen February in Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter.

WALTER C. SHORT

*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
 Commanding Hawaiian Depart-
 ment*

C. C. BLOCH

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
 Commandant Fourteenth Naval District*

Copies to: C. G., H. A. F.
 Fort Shafter, T. H.
 C. G., H. S. C. A. B.
 Fort DeRussy, T. H.
 C. G., Schofield Barracks

Copies to: CinCus
 ComBatFor
 ComSecFor
 ComAirBatFor
 ComPatWingTwo

EXHIBIT No. 25 (HART INQUIRY)

CINCPAC FILE NO.
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01254

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
August 13, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).

Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).

Commander Base Force.

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cincus ltr. A4-3FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.

(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 4C1-4L.

(c) Cincpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject schedule—Action Addresses 10 each, information addressees 3 each.

(Under separate cover)

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5 September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, information Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in exercises, Commander Scouting Force assign submarines and Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR

SARATOGA and planes

Crudiv NINE

Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE

Mindiv ONE, OGLALA

⅓ available submarines

2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE

ENTERPRISE and planes

Crudivs THREE and FIVE

Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY

Mindiv TWO

⅓ available submarines

2 Patrol Squadrons

TASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR and SIX

LEXINGTON and planes

Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO

Transports, Base Force (when present)

Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv

TWENTY-ONE) less ⅓ available submarines.

Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.

BASE FORCE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).

NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE—Vessels operating under Opnav and Com 14.

4. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

6. One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry of the other force commences.

7. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

8. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practicable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21-25 November, 1941.

9. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	<i>Operating</i>	<i>Upkeep</i>
TASK FORCE ONE -----		28 Sep-9 Oct
	10-18 Oct	19-31 Oct
	1-10 Nov	11-21 Nov
	22-28 Nov	29 Nov-12 Dec
	13-20 Dec	21-30-Dec
	31 Dec	
TASK FORCE TWO -----	24 Sept-2 Oct	3-17 Oct
	18-26 Oct	27 Oct-9 Nov
	10-17 Nov	18-27 Nov
	28 Nov-5 Dec	6-17 Dec
	18-26 Dec	27 Dec
TASK FORCE THREE -----		20 Sep-1 Oct
	2-10 Oct	11-22 Oct
	23 Oct-1 Nov	2-16 Nov
	17-25 Nov	26 Nov-4 Dec
	5-13 Dec	14-25 Dec
	26-31 Dec	

10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics :—

Task Forces TWO and THREE—23-26 Oct.

Task Force ONE and THREE—22-25 Nov.

Task Force ONE and TWO—18-20 Dec.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Opnav, CineLant, CineAF, Combatships, Comerubatfor, Cominbatfor, Comeruscofor, Comdesbatfor, Comsubsecofor, Comairscofor, Cominron TWO, Compatwing TWO, Compatwing ONE, Com 14.

/s/ P. C. Crosley
 P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 26 (HART INQUIRY)

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

fal

Cincpac File No.
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01820

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 10 November 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).

Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District (Commander Task Force FOUR).

Commander Base Force (Commander Task Force FIFTEEN).

Commander Submarines, Scouting Force (Commander Task Force SEVEN).

Commander Patrol Wing TWO (Commander Task Force NINE).

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincpac ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.

(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL-41 of 31 October, 1941.

(c) Cincpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure:

(A) Copy of subject schedule—Action addresses 10 each, information addresses 5 each.

(B) Minimum number of vessels required in Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE when operating at sea.

1. Enclosure (A) is the general directive for preparation of the subject schedules.

2. The schedule is divided into operating periods assigned to Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE. Other Task Forces will operate at discretion, the Commanders arranging with the Task Force Commander at sea for operating time and with Commander Battle Force for operating areas.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR, SEVEN, NINE and Commander Base Force will submit third quarter employment schedules for approval by 1 December; print and distribute by 10 December. The following procedure is prescribed:

[2] (a) Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE inform other Task Force and Type Commanders and Commander Base Force, as soon as practicable, of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces.

(b) Type Commanders submit to Task Force Commanders, information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in exercises.

(c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.

4. Naval units in the Hawaiian area are divided for training and operations between the following Forces:

TASK FORCE ONE—Commander Battle Force:

Batdivs TWO and FOUR.

SARATOGA and planes.

Crudiv. NINE.

Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE.

Mindiv ONE, OGLALA.

TASK FORCE TWO—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force:

Batdiv ONE.

ENTERPRISE and planes.

Crudiv FIVE.

Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY.

Mindiv TWO.

TASK FORCE THREE—Commander Scouting Force :

Crudivs FOUR and SIX.

LEXINGTON and planes plus Marine Air Group 21.

Desron FIVE.

Minron TWO.

Transports, Base Force (when present).

Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less Patwings ONE and TWO.

[3] **TASK FORCE FOUR**—Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

TASK FORCE SEVEN—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

TASK FORCE NINE—Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

Patrol Wing ONE.

Patrol Wing TWO.

BASE FORCE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports when present.

Task Force FIFTEEN.

5. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

6. Task Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

7. One surface Task Force will be at sea at all times. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the sortie force will clear before the entry begins.

8. Reference (c) is cancelled. Enclosure (B) is effective immediately.

9. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practicable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 9-13 March, 1942.

10. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE will recommend to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet the assignment of cruisers to Task Force FIFTEEN in accordance with paragraphs six and eleven of reference (b).

[4] 11. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	<i>Operating</i>	<i>Upkeep</i>
TASK FORCE ONE-----	31 Dec-8 Jan-----	9-20 Jan
	21-29 Jan-----	30 Jan-10 Feb
	11-18 Feb-----	19 Feb-3 Mar
	4-13 Mar-----	14-24 Mar
	25 Mar-2 Apr-----	
TASK FORCE TWO-----		27 Dec-7 Jan
	8-16 Jan-----	17-28 Jan
	29 Jan-6 Feb-----	7-17 Feb
	18-25 Feb-----	26 Feb-8 Mar
TASK FORCE THREE-----	9-18 Mar-----	19 Mar
		1-12 Jan
	13-21 Jan-----	22 Jan-5 Feb
	6-14 Feb-----	15-24 Feb
	25 Feb-4 Mar-----	5-8 Mar
	9-13 Mar-----	14-17 Mar
	18-25 Mar-----	26 Mar-

12. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics :

TASK FORCES TWO and THREE----- 13-16 Jan

TASK FORCES ONE and THREE----- 11-14 Feb

*TASK FORCES ONE, TWO & THREE----- 9-13 Mar

*Advanced Light Force and Advanced Submarine Force Practices.

H. E. KIMMEL

Copy to: Opnav (50), CincLant, CincAF, Combatships, Comcrubatfor, Cominbatfor, Comcruscofor, Comdesbatfor, Comairscofor, Cominron TWO, Compatwing ONE.

P. C. Crosley,

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

(At this point in exhibit No. 26 there appears a copy of the Fleet Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, third quarter, fiscal year

1942, being Enclosure A, supra. This schedule will be found reproduced as Item No. 2, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B) to CINCPAC Serial 01820

MINIMUM NUMBER OF UNITS REQUIRED IN TASK FORCES ONE, TWO AND THREE WHEN OPERATING AT SEA

1. Task Force Commanders are hereby authorized to reduce the operating time for individual units of their Forces in order to economize in fuel expenditures and minimize normal wear on ships.

2. The Task Force at sea will not be reduced below the following unless it is absolutely necessary.

TASK FORCE ONE	TASK FORCE TWO	TASK FORCE THREE
3BB	1BB	4CA
1CV	1CV	1CV
3CL	2CA	4DD
8DD	8DD	5DMS (not to include high-speed tows)
2DM	2DM	

3. Units of a Task Force in Pearl Harbor during part of a scheduled operating period, (1) will retain their Task Force Organization, (2) will not assume upkeep status nor break down any machinery which cannot be restored in the time normally required to raise steam, and (3) in the event of an emergency sortie, will sortie at once, on order from the Senior Officer Present of that Task Force in port.

4. The Senior Commander of Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, in Pearl Harbor, shall issue an emergency sortie plan for the Task Forces in Pearl Harbor.

EXHIBIT No. 27 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE ONE EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER 1942

A4-3/FF1(1)/(0896) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Task Force One

U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 13 September 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander Task Force ONE.

To: Task Force ONE.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincpac conf. ltr. A2-11/FF1-1/A3/A16/(0690) of 30 April 1941.

(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13)/(01254) of 13 August, 1941.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. The Train services required for this schedule will be furnished by Commander Base Force.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

4. If unforeseen circumstances arise that make it apparent that changes in this approved schedule within a type would be advantageous, Type Commanders

are responsible for making such changes without reference to higher authority; provided, these changes do not modify Fleet or Task Force directive schedules.

W. S. PYE.

Distribution:

List II, Case 1: A, B (less B4, B5).

List I, Case 2: B4, B5, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, JO, K, X1, X2, X4, X5, X6, X7, AAI, AAAI.

Special: BD10 (1); EN3 (50); EN3-6 (2); EN4 (20); EN5 (3); EN6 (5); EN7 (5); EN9 (6); EN9-24 (1); EN10 (3); EN11 (5); FPO (2); ND11 (3); ND12 (3); ND13 (3); ND14 (3); ND15 (2); NM12 (1); NM13 (1); NT1-9 (1); NT1-10 (1); NT4-4 (1); NT7-5 (1); NYS (3); NY9 (4); NY10 (3); BatFor Mail Clerk (2); QA (1).

H. S. COVINGTON,
Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship

1VOS
BATTLESHIPS—TASK FORCE ONE
WEST VIRGINIA (F)

Batdiv TWO	TENNESSEE (F)	Batdiv FOUR	WEST VIRGINIA (F)
	CALIFORNIA (FF)		COLORADO
	PENNSYLVANIA (FF)		MARYLAND
	VO-2 (9 VOS)		VO-4 (9 VOS)

AIRCRAFT—TASK FORCE ONE

SARATOGA (F)
2VM Planes—Flag Unit
1 VSB (Group Com. Plane)
VB-3 (21 VSB)
VF-3 18 VF, 2VM)
VS-3 (21 VSB)
VT-3 (12 VTB)
Utility Unit (3 VSO, 2 VJ)

CRUISERS—TASK FORCE ONE

HONOLULU (F)
Crudiv NINE
HONOLULU (F)
PHOENIX
BOISE (RF)
HELENA
ST. LOUIS
RICHMOND
VCS-9 (22 VSO)

DESTROYERS—TASK FORCE ONE

RALEIGH (F)
2 VSO Planes
DOBBIN (Tender)
WHITNEY (Tender)

DESTROYER SQUADRON ONE	DESTROYER SQUADRON THREE
360 PHELPS—Squadron Flagship	361 CLARK—Squadron Flagship
DESDIV ONE	DESDIV FIVE
349 DEWEY (F)	372 CASSIN (F)
351 MACDONOUGH (RF)	371 CONYNGHAM
352 WORDEN	369 REID
350 HULL	375 DOWNES (RF)
DESDIV TWO	DESDIV SIX
355 AYLWIN (F)	370 CASE (F)
348 FARRAGUT (RF)	365 CUMMINGS (RF)
353 DALE	373 SHAW
354 MONAGHAN	374 TUCKER

MINECRAFT—TASK FORCE ONE

OGLALA (F)
Mindiv ONE
FRUITT (F)
TRACY
PREBLE
SICARD

PATROL PLANES—TASK FORCE ONE

(VY-23) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Three—(12 VPB)
(VP-22) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two—(12 VPB)
(VP-24) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Four—(12 VPB)

SUBMARINE—TASK FORCE ONE

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY-TWO	SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE
185 SNAPPER	198 TAMBOR
186 STINGRAY	199 TAUTOG
187 STURGEON	200 THRESHER
191 SCULPIN (F)	206 GAR
192 SAILFISH	207 GRAMPUS
193 SWORDFISH	208 GRAYBACK

(At this point in exhibit No. 27, there appear five Employment Schedules, second quarter, fiscal year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Aircraft, and Submarines, respectively, of Task Force One of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. These Schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 28 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE TWO EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

SECOND QUARTER 1942

A4-3/12-Hc/FF2-3 (0738)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TASK FORCE TWO

U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander Task Force TWO.

To: Task Force TWO.

Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.

Reference: (a) Cinpac Conf. Serial 01254 of August 13, 1941.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the appended Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and guidance.

2. Type Commanders will make own arrangements for services required.

3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all commands.

W. F. HALSEY.

Distribution:

Basis:

List II, Case 1.—Fleet Force and Type Commanders, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Units of Task Force TWO less DD's, DM's, and Airons.

List I, Case 2.—DD's, DM's, and Airons of Task Force TWO.

List I, Case 1.—B2-2; B3-9; B4-01; B4-1; B4-3; B4-5; B5-1; C1-01; D2-4; D2-6; E1-1; F2; G4; H2-0; H2-1; H2-2; H4-1; H4-3; H6-0; H6-1; I4; I6; I6-2; I6-4; I8; I9; I10.

Special:

AA-1; AB-1; AAA-1; EN-1; EN-3; EN-4; EN-6; EN-11; FATU; FPO; NA-8; NA-11; NA-12; NA-37; ND-11; ND-12; ND-13; ND-14; H4-0; Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept.; Fleet Post Office.

H. D. MOULTON,

Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(CV6) U. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

BATTLESHIPS—TASK FORCE TWO

CARRIER—TASK FORCE TWO

BatDiv ONE

(BB39) ARIZONA (F)
(BB36) NEVADA
(BB37) OKLAHOMA

CarDiv TWO

(CV6) ENTERPRISE (F)

CRUISERS—TASK FORCE TWO

CruDiv FIVE
 (CA26) NORTHAMPTON (F)
 (CA25) SALT LAKE CITY
 (CA24) PENSACOLA
 (CA27) CHESTER

DESTROYERS—TASK FORCE TWO

(CL8) DETROIT (F)
 (AD11) ALTAIR
 (AD14) DIXIE

DESTROYER SQUADRON FOUR

(DD357) SELFRIDGE (F)

DesDiv EIGHT

(DD389) MUGFORD (F)
 (DD393) JARVIS (RF)
 (DD392) PATTERSON
 (DD390) RALPH TALBOT

DesDiv SEVEN

(DD391) HENLEY (F)
 (DD386) BAGLEY
 (DD388) HELM
 (DD387) BLUE (RF)

DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX

(DD363) BALCH (F)

DesDiv TWELVE

(DD384) DUNLAP (F)
 (DD398) ELLET
 (DD385) FANNING (RF)
 (DD397) BENHAM

DesDiv ELEVEN

(DD380) GRIDLEY (F)
 (DD401) MAURY (RF)
 (DD382) CRAVEN
 (DD400) MC CALL

¹ DESTROYER DIVISION FIFTY

(DD113) RATHBURN (F)
 (DD114) TALBOT
 (DD115) WATERS
 (DD116) DENT (RF)

MINECRAFT—TASK FORCE TWO PATROL SQUADRONS—TASK FORCE TWO

MinDiv TWO

(DM15) GAMBLE (F)
 (DM18) BREESE
 (DM16) RAMSAY
 (DM17) MONTGOMERY

(VP12) Patrol Squadron TWELVE
 (VP14) Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN

SUBMARINES—TASK FORCE TWO

SubDiv FORTY-TWO

(SS167) NARWHAL (F)
 (SS168) NAUTILUS
 (SS169) DOLPHIN
 (SM 1) ARGONAUT (FF)

SubDiv SIXTY-TWO

(SS201) TRITON (F)
 (SS202) TROUT
 (SS203) TUNA
² (SS209) GRAYLING
² (SS210) GRENADIER
² (SS211) GUDGEON

(At this point in exhibit No. 28, there appear four Employment Schedules, second quarter, fiscal year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Mine Craft, and Submarines and Patrol Planes, respectively, of Task Force Two of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

¹ In reduced commission. Operates with underwater sound training school.

² On reporting.

EXHIBIT No. 29 (HART INQUIRY)

Confidential

TASK FORCE THREE EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1941

C. S. F. File No.
A4-3/FF3/ (90)
Serial 0670

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Task Force Three

Jn

U. S. S. LOUISVILLE, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *September 11, 1941.**Confidential.*

From: Commander Task Force THREE.

To: Task Force THREE.

Subject: Schedule of Employment, Task Force THREE for the period 1 October-31 December, 1941.

1. Appended is the Employment Schedule for Task Force THREE for the period 1 October-31 December, 1941.

2. This schedule has the effect of orders. Attention is invited to United States Pacific Fleet Regulations, paragraph 146.

3. Commander Base Force is requested to provide the necessary Train services required by this schedule.

4. Fuel and mileage allowances impose the necessity for planning ahead. Type Commanders and Commanding Officers will reduce expenditures and mileage to a minimum consistent with efficient operations and training.

WILSON BROWN.

Distribution:

List I (Case 2): B (less B4-5), C, I (less I6-2), X, A1 (Atlantic). A1 (Asiatic), JO.

List II (Case 1): A-1 (Pacific), E1-0, H (less H2-1, H4-1, H4-3), M.

List III (Case 1): G4-5, D-2, E1 1, F, G, H2-1, H4-1, H4-3, I6-2, K.

Special: EN3 (50), EN4 (20), EN5 (3), EN6 (3), EN7 (5), EN9 (5), EN10 (5), EN11 (5), EN24 (1), EN25 (1), KS3 (3), KS4 (3), NA11 (2), NA12 (2), NA26 (2), ND1-10 (2), ND11-13 (3), ND14 (10), ND15 (3), NM5-12-13 (1ea), NP1, 3, 7, 11, (3ea) NT1-9 to 11 (1ea), NY1 to 10 (3), Des Base, San Diego (2), CO NITRO, SIRIUS, WM W. BURROWS. REGULUS, KAULA, HENDERSON, WHARTON, VEGA, LASSEN, (2ea), Bd I&S, Long Beach (3), Nav. War College, Newport (3), 2nd Asst. Postmaster General, Washington (3), Postmaster, New York, CO USCG Hdqts. Los Angeles, Director and Instructor Naval Reserves, 11th Naval District Navy Civil Liaison Officer, Room 900 Law Bldg. 139 N. Brdy., Los Angeles, Fleet Per. Off., Fed. Bldg., San Francisco, Branch Intelligence Off., Rm 452 Fed. Bldg. Los Angeles, (1ea), Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. G3, Ft. Shafter (1), Lexington (30).

T. J. CASEY,

Flag Secretary.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

CRUISERS

(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS—Flagship
Ship Unit—4VSO (Attached to VCS-4)
1 VSO—Flag Unit

CRUDIV FOUR

(CA29) CHICAGO (F)
(CA28) LOUISVILLE
(CA33) PORTLAND
(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS (FF)
VCS-4 SCOUTING SQUADRON
FOUR-16 VSO

CRUDIV SIX

(CA36) MINNEAPOLIS (F)
(CA34) ASTORIA
(CA32) NEW ORLEANS
(CA38) SAN FRANCISCO
VCS-6 SCOUTING SQUADRON
SIX-16 VSO

CARRIER AND MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY ONE

(CV2) LEXINGTON
 1VSB (Group Com. Plane)
 VB-2 (21VSB)
 VS-2 (21VSB)
 VF-2 (18 VF, 2VM)
 VT-2 (12 VTB)
 Utility Unit (3VS, 2VJ)

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-ONE
 VMSB-231 (18 VSB)
 VMSB-232 (18 VSB)
 VMF-211 (18 VF, 2VM)
 VMJ-252 (3VJ, 3VJR, 6VR)

DESTROYERS

DESRON FIVE

(DD356) PORTER—Flagship

DESDIV NINE

DD366 DRAYTON (F)
 DD368 FLUSSER
 DD367 LAMSON (RF)
 DD364 MAHAN

DESDIV TEN

DD376 CUSHING (F)
 DD378 SMITH
 DD379 PRESTON (RF)
 DD377 PERKINS

MINRON TWO

(DMS13) HOPKINS—Flagship

MINDIV FOUR

DMS17 PERRY (F)
 DMS16 TREVER
 DMS15 WASMUTH
 DMS14 ZANE (RF)

MINDIV FIVE

DMS10 SOUTHARD (F)
 DMS12 LONG
 DMS9 CHANDLER
 DMS11 HOVEY (RF)

MINDIV SIX

DMS1 DORSEY (F)
 DMS4 ELLIOT
 DMS2 LAMBERTON (RF)
 DMS3 BOGGS

TRANSPORTS, BASE, FORCE (When Present)

SECOND MARINE DIVISION

(Less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment)

SUBMARINES

SUBDIV TWENTY ONE

(SS182) SALMON (F)
 (SS183) SEAL
 (SS184) SKIPJACK
 (SS188) SARGO (FF)
 (SS189) SAURY
 (SS190) SPARFISH
 (DD336) LITCHFIELD
 (ASR3) HOLLAND
 (ASR5) ORTOLAN

SUBDIV FORTY THREE

(SS170) CACHALOT
 (SS171) CUTLEFISH
 (SS179) PLUNGER (F)
 (SS180) POLLACK
 (SS181) POMPAÑO
 (AS14) PELIAS
 (AM30) SEAGULL
 (ASR1) WIDGEON

SUBDIV FORTY ONE

(On West Coast)
 (SS123) S-18 (F)
 (SS128) S-23
 (SS132) S-27
 (SS133) S-28
 (SS139) S-34
 (SS140) S-35

PATROL WINGS

PATROL WING ONE

(VP-13) Patrol Squadron Thirteen (5PB
 2Y2)
 (AV1) WRIGHT (Flagship Comairscop-
 for)
 (AVD6) HULBERT (F)
 (AVD10) BALLARD
 (AVP4) AVOCET

PATRON WING TWO

(Less Patrons Assigned Task Forces ONE
 and TWO)
 (VP-11) Patrol Squadron ELEVEN
 (VP-23) (12BPY5)
 (VP-21) Patrol Squadron TWENTY
 ONE (12PY3)
 (VP-24) Patrol Squadron TWENTY
 (OLD VP-12) FOUR (6 PYB5)
 (AV4) CURTISS (F)
 (AV8) TANGIER
 (AVD11) THORNTON
 (AVD14) McFARLAND

PATROL WING FOUR

(VP41) Patrol Squadron FORTY ONE (6PBY5)
 (VP42) Patrol Squadron FORTY TWO (6PBY5)
 (VP43) Patrol Squadron FORTY THREE (6 PBY5)
 (VP44) Patrol Squadron FORTY FOUR (6PBY5)
 (AVP12) CASCO (F)
 (AVD2) WILLIAMSON (F)
 (AVD12) GILLIS
 (AVP5) TEAL
 (AVP6) PELICAN

(At this point in exhibit No. 29, there appear five Employment Schedules for second quarter, fiscal Year 1942, of Cruisers, Carrier and Aircraft Groups, Destroyers, Submarines, and Patrol Wings, respectively, of Task Force Three, U. S. Pacific Fleet. These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hart Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Hart Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 30 (HART INQUIRY)

16 MARCH 1944.

From : Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy.
 To : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.
 Subject : Verification of testimony given by Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, before an examination re Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941, ordered by SecNav Confidential Precept dated 12 February 1944.

Enclosure : (A) Transcript of testimony.

1. Transcript of my testimony before you on 15 March 1944 is returned herewith.

2. I hereby state under oath, the oath given me at said examination recognized as still being binding, that I have read said testimony and pronounce it correct.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

EXHIBIT No. 31 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Washington, D. C., 22 March 1944.

From : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining Officer.
 To : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
 Subject : Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference :

- (a) Precept for subject examination, dated 12 February 1944.
- (b) Examining officer's ltr. of 17 February 1944, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. You are hereby notified that the examination convened by reference (a) will adjourn its meetings in Washington, D. C., for the present, on 23 March 1944 and will depart from that City on or about 27 March 1944 for the purpose of recording the testimony of additional members of the naval forces now stationed elsewhere.

2. As the exact locations where these witnesses will be found, as well as the times and places where meetings will be held while away from Washington, D. C., cannot be now known, I shall be unable to write you as to the time and place of such meetings.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
 THOS. C. HART.

EXHIBIT No. 32 (HART INQUIRY)

[Air mail]

JUNE 4TH, 1941.

The honorable the ATTORNEY GENERAL,
 Washington, D. C.

(Attention : Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General)

SIR: Reference is made to your letter dated May 22, 1941 in which you asked my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same matter.

Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman, who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been aware of this general situation for some time, no reports concerning these matters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated at Honolulu, March 10, 1941, in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a violation of the Registration Act. From my conversation with Mr. Shivers and Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report, I think that a successful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these

cases have been investigated completely and would be ready for immediate prosecution and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.

In a conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain I. H. Mayfield represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and Colonel M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Captain Mayfield stated that it was the opinion of the Admiral that prosecution should be instituted immediately against these Japanese Sub-Consular Agents and that it should be handled in a routine manner so as to cause as little disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is charged with the internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detrimental to the general plans of the Army and would probably have a bad effect on work already done. It is also the Commanding General's opinion that the majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the United States and that prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents would only tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the loyalty of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of the law if they are loyal to the United States.

It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or other Departments of the Government. I think it has been clearly developed from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous influence on the Japanese population in the Territory and all evidence indicates the fact that they are the sources of information for the Consul and the Agents through whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory.

I think that if we ever hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo from the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it should be begun immediately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction.

During the conference with the Army and Navy and other conferences that I have had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is impossible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in the Territory would have to such step, but it is my opinion that the good that would be done would far outweigh any evil that might result.

No further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from you.

Respectfully,

ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr.,
*United States Attorney,
 District of Hawaii.*

AMT:JB

EXHIBIT No. 33 (HART INQUIRY)

5 APRIL 1944.

From: Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, on March 28, 1944, the seventeenth day of subject examination.

1. Enclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the seventeenth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the seventeenth day of said examination and pronounce it correct.

JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT.

EXHIBIT No. 34 (HART INQUIRY)

5 APRIL 1944.

From: Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN, on April 3 and 4, 1944, the twentieth and twenty-first days of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the twentieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the twentieth and twenty-first days of said examination and pronounce it correct.

/s/ R. K. Turner,
R. K. TURNER.

EXHIBIT No. 35 (HART INQUIRY)

U. S. S. IOWA, 6 April 1944.

From: Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy, on April 6, 1944, the twenty-third day of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the twenty-third day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the twenty-third day of said examination and pronounce it correct.

J. L. McCREA.

EXHIBIT No. 36 (HART INQUIRY)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 24 April 1944.

From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.

To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

Subject: Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserving testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Reference:

- (a) Examining Officer's ltr dated 17 Feb. 44, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
- (b) Examining Officer's ltr dated 22 March 44, addressed to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.

1. Having returned to Washington, D. C., after the trip referred to in reference (b), the subject examination will reconvene in Room 2744, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 0930 on 27 April 1944.

2. Your attention is again invited to reference (a) which contains a statement of your rights in the matter should you decide to take advantage thereof.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart.
THOS C. HART.

EXHIBIT No. 37 (HART INQUIRY)

MAKALAPA HEADQUARTERS,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 April 1944.

From: Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, USN.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, USN, on April 17, 1944, the twenty-ninth day of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the twenty-ninth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state

I have read over the testimony given by me on the twenty-ninth day of said examination and pronounce it correct.

/s/ H. F. Kingman.
H. F. KINGMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 38 (HART INQUIRY)

HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER,
90 Church Street, New York, N. Y., 6 May 1944.

Secret

From: Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. N., Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. N. (Ret.), General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Subj: Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941.

Encl.: (A) Transcript of testimony of Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, U. S. N., dated 3 May 1944.

1. In sending this letter, my attitude is that my oath is still binding. I hereby state that I have verified my testimony given on 3 May 1944 and the transcript as it now stands is correct.

2. The transmission of this letter, by registered mail, within the Domestic Mail System of the United States is hereby authorized.

/s/ H. F. Leary.
H. F. LEARY.

EXHIBIT No. 39 (HART INQUIRY)

EXHIBIT 39 is Department of State Publication 1853, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. This document may be obtained in printed form from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. It is not reproduced here as it is a public document.

EXHIBIT No. 40 (HART INQUIRY)

JAN. 24, 1941.

Op-12B-9-McC
(SC)A7-2 (2)/FF1
Serial 09112

Secret

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-examination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack .
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactory. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be a primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched.

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the

security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: CINC, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Com14

Op-22

Op-30

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 7, 1941.

SECRET

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquir develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to you other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Memorandum Endorsement

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *February 13, 1941.*Op-30B3-AJ
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI
D-27446

Secret

From: Director, Naval Districts Division.

To: Director, War Plans Division.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr, of Feb. 7, 1941 to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

/s/ Alex Sharp,
ALEX SHARP.

(Pencil Notation: Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)

EXHIBIT No. 41 (HART INQUIRY)

OFFICE OF SUPERVISOR, NEW YORK HARBOR,
17 Battery Place, New York, New York, 6 June 1944.

From: Rear Admiral Joel W. Bunkley, USN (Ret).

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret), examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony given by Rear Admiral Joel W. Bunkley, USN (Ret), on 5 June 1944, the fortieth day of subject examination.

1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the fortieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the fortieth day of said examination and pronounce it correct.

JOEL W. BUNKLEY.

EXHIBIT No. 42 (HART INQUIRY)

U. S. S. VIXEN, *9 June 1944.*

From: Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy.

To: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer.

Subject: Examination to record and preserve testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary of the Navy's confidential precept dated 12 February 1944.

Inclosure: (A) Record of testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, on 5 and 6 June 1944, the fortieth and forty-first days of subject examination.


1. Inclosure (A) is returned herewith. Recognizing that the oath given me on the fortieth day of subject examination is still binding, I hereby state I have read over the testimony given by me on the fortieth and forty-first days of said examination and pronounce it correct.

ROYAL E. INGERSOLL.

INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS HART INQUIRY

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, showing Air Defense Sectors. (Exhibit No. 4)
2.	Fleet Employment Schedule, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Third Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942. (Exhibit No. 26)
3-7.	Employment Schedule, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Aircraft and Submarines of Task Force One, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 27)
8-11.	Employment Schedules, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers and Mine Craft, and Submarines and Patrol Planes of Task Force Two, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 28)
12-16.	Employment Schedules, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, for Cruisers, Carriers and Aircraft Groups, Destroyers, Submarines, and Patrol Wings of Task Force Three, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Exhibit No. 29)






BATTLESHIPS, TASK FORCE ONE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET


CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE


ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER													
	1	5	12	19	26	2	9	16	23	30	7	14	21	28	1	5	12	19	26	2	9	16	23	30	7	14	21	28	1	5	12	19	26	2	9	16	23	30	7	14	21	28
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS — INTERTYPE TACTICS — GUNNERY — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — UPKEEP — TENDER UPKEEP — MATERIAL INSPECTIONS																																									
BATDIV FOUR	WEST VIRGINIA (BB18) UPKEEP PEARL														MISC. AND ENR. NYD PUGET SOUND														AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND													
BATDIV FOUR	COLORADO (BB45) AT NAVY YARD PUGET SOUND														UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL													
BATDIV TWO	MARYLAND (BB46) UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL													
BATDIV TWO	TENNESSEE (BB13) UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL													
BATDIV TWO	CALIFORNIA (BB44) UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL													
BATDIV TWO	PENNSYLVANIA (BB38) UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL														UPKEEP PEARL													
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VO-1	COLORADO UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO UNTIL ABOUT 23 NOVEMBER. WEST VIRGINIA UNIT SHORE BASED AT NAS SAN PEDRO FROM ABOUT 3 NOVEMBER																																									
VO-2																																										

SERVICES REQUIRED	13-18 Oct.	4-10 Nov.	26-28 Nov.	13-17 Dec.
Towing Vessel	4	2	2	4
Battle Raft			1	3
SRP Target				1
Helium Balloons				4
Photo Plane				1
Towing Plane				4
Reference Vessel	5 with Mk XIV sleeve	3 with Mk XIV sleeve	3 with Mk VII sleeve	3 with Mk XIV sleeve
AA Camera Vessel				1
Surface Camera Party				2
Slud Target	4	3 series 60	1	2
VF Pla for IBP (Cam Guns)				









TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

BATTLESHIP'S AND CARRIER

CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Page 1

SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER																																															
	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29																																																			
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BAYDIV ONE	2nd AABP "Bag" T. & F. LCBP		UPKEEP PEARL														11 16 22 23 28 29		14 19 25 26		UPKEEP PEARL														17 18 20 21		24 25		26 27																																					
ARIZONA (BB39)																	Tr. DRP. Fl. 1st NRP (Turrets) Train & Fire AABP G-37/25																		Fire ADV AABP N-2 Tr. DRP. FL NRP (Sec. Bat.)		UPKEEP PEARL Tender Overhaul VESTAL 618		Train & Fire DBP Train NRP (Sec. Bat.)		UPKEEP PEARL																																			
NEVADA (BB36)	IBP "A" Main & Sec. Bat.		UPKEEP PEARL														T. & F. 1st AABP "B-2" Train NRP Fire NRP (M.B.)				UPKEEP PEARL														Train & Fire 2nd AABP "B-2"		UPKEEP PEARL Assist OKLAHOMA AMI - DCP		Train & Fire DBP Train NRP (Sec. Bat.)		UPKEEP PEARL																																			
OKLAHOMA (BB37)	IBP "A" All Batts. Tender Overhaul		UPKEEP PEARL MEDUSA 3-15														T. & F. 1st AABP "B-2" Train NRP Fire NRP (M.B.)				UPKEEP PEARL														Train & Fire 2nd AABP "B-2" T. 1st NRP (Sec. Bat.)		UPKEEP PEARL AMI - DCP		Train & Fire DBP Train NRP (Sec. Bat.)		UPKEEP PEARL																																			
GENERAL DIRECTIVE VO - 1	Embarked. Complete monthly training practices 1, 2, and 3. Train for and fire first two mandatory practices. Navigation, Communication, Night and Instrument Training. Utility services for parent ships as required.																																																																											
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Maintenance. Preparation for Task Force Missions, Training and Preparation of Air Groups. Particular emphasis on Night Operations Embarked. AA Lookout, Identification and Fire Control Training. Gunnery - Upkeep & AA - Services - Tactics - Miscellaneous Underway.																																																																											
ENTERPRISE (CV6)	Operating		UPKEEP PEARL														Gunnery 18-19 MG Training Range MGAABP B-2 RP Calib. Services 20 - 22 Night Qual. FBP (Live Bombs)		FLEET TACTICS FBP (Torpedoes)		UPKEEP PEARL														Operating Gunnery 19-16 AA "Drons" Train for LCBP Services 16-17 Night Qualif.		INTERTYPE TACTICS		UPKEEP PEARL														Operating Gunnery 30-2 Train for LCBP RP Calib. Services 25-27 Night Qualif.		INTERTYPE TACTICS FBP (Torpedoes)		UPKEEP PEARL														Operating Services 21-23 FBP (Torp) 22nd Night Qualif. Gunnery 24-26 LCBP Train Fire NRP "A"		FLEET TACTICS		UPKEEP PEARL Assist SARATOGA AMI - ICP	
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Night Training in Extended Flight, Search, and Attack at Sea. Instrument Flight Training. AA Training Exercises with Fleet Units. Day and Night Photographic Reconnaissance Training. Exercises in Dispersed Attack. Pre-Fleet Training of Newly Graduated Pilots. Rearing Drills. Fleet Tactical Exercises. Continue Individual Qualifications (Bombs and Guns).																																																																											
ENTERPRISE AIR GROUP	Formation Torpedo Practice. VF Conduct IBP (Camera Guns). Training in Laying Smoke Screen Using Game Board (VS-VB). Monthly Training Practice. Bombing and Strafing of Slod Target. FBP (Live Bombs) and Rearing Drill. Instrument Flight Training. Bombing of Maneuvering Target (UTAH). Train Free Gunners on Rifle Range. Master Horizontal Bombers' Qualification Practice.																																																																											



TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISERS.


CONFIDENTIAL
 EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Page 2
 SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER													
	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29	1	8	15	22	29																	
	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS	MTWTFSS																	
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	GUNNERY — UPKEEP — TACTICS — TENDER UPKEEP — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY — MATERIAL INSPECTION																																									
CRUIER FIVE	NORTHAMPTON (CA26)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP (MEDUSA)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP															
	SALT LAKE CITY (CA25)	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP (MEDUSA)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP															
	PENSACOLA (CA24)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	UPKEEP (VESTAL)	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP													
	CHESTER (CA27)	Gunnery	(1) UPKEEP (2)	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP	Gunnery	UPKEEP													
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Search and Communication Exercise - Gunnery - Aircraft Anti-Submarine Exercise - Spotting Drill - Night Training - Instrument Flying - Miscellaneous Services to Parent Vessels. Pre-Fleet and Transition Training.																																									
VCS - 5	Complete Machine Gun. Qual.	Train for and Fire IBF Section Camera Guns	Night Flying Cal. Compass and air Speed Meters	Aircraft Anti-Sub Exercise	FLT. TAC.	Train for and Fire IBF Dive Bombing														UPKEEP Night Flying	Tr. for and FL BFP Live Bombs and re-arming drill	Calibrate Compass and air Speed Meter. Night Flying.	FLT. TAC.	Monthly Train. Prac. Anti-sub Exercise	Night Flying UPKEEP																	

(1) MATERIAL INSPECTIONS: NORTHAMPTON - November 18 - December 17 - SALT LAKE CITY Assist.
 CHESTER - September 20 - October 20 - PENSACOLA Assist.
 PENSACOLA - September 20 - October 20 - NORTHAMPTON Assist.

(2) AMI - DCP PENSACOLA - October 14 - 15 - CHESTER Assist.
 CHESTER - December 11 - 12 - NORTHAMPTON Assist.



TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

DESTROYERS AND MINE CRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Page 3
SECOND QUARTER, 1943

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER																
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14			
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	TACTICS - GUNNERY - SERVICES - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY - UPKEEP & AA																																												
DETROIT (CLF)	Com. To: DET-2	UPKEEP														Com. To: DET-2	UPKEEP														Com. To: DET-2	UPKEEP													
VSO UNIT	Com. To: AASH-2	UPKEEP														Com. To: AASH-2	UPKEEP														Com. To: AASH-2	UPKEEP													
DESIGN FOUR DESIGNER: MIGHTY MIGHTY SEVEN	SELFDRIDGE (DM327)	FLEET TACTICS														SELFDRIDGE (DM327)	FLEET TACTICS														SELFDRIDGE (DM327)	FLEET TACTICS													
DESIGN SIX DESIGNER: SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN	HALCH (DM368)	FLEET TACTICS														HALCH (DM368)	FLEET TACTICS														HALCH (DM368)	FLEET TACTICS													
DESIGN FIVE DESIGNER: FIVE FIVE FIVE FIVE	ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS													
DESIGN THREE DESIGNER: THREE THREE THREE THREE	ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS													
DESIGN ONE DESIGNER: ONE ONE ONE ONE	ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS														ALTAIR (AD11)	MISCELLANEOUS													
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	FLEET TACTICS - INTELLIGENCE TACTICS - GUNNERY - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY - UPKEEP - TENDER OPERATIONS - MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY																																												
MINDL-2	DEERSE (DM328)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														DEERSE (DM328)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														DEERSE (DM328)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR													
	GAMBLE (DM329)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														GAMBLE (DM329)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														GAMBLE (DM329)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR													
	MONTJOREMY (DM330)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														MONTJOREMY (DM330)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														MONTJOREMY (DM330)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR													
	RANSAY (DM331)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														RANSAY (DM331)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR														RANSAY (DM331)	NAVY YARD OPERATIONS, AT PEARL HARBOR													




TASK FORCE TWO, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
SUBMARINES AND PATROL PLANES

CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

Page 4
SECOND QUARTER, 1942

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER																																																																																																																													
	1				8				15				22				29				1				8				15				22				29																																																																																																																					
	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T																																																																																																														
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	GUNNERY — UPKEEP — TACTICS — MISCELLANEOUS UNDERWAY																																																																																																																																																									
ARGONAUT (SSM)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														MP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
N. BWHAL (SS107)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
NAUTILUS (SS109)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
DOOLHIN (SS109)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
TRITON (SS201)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
TROUT (SS202)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
TUNA (SS205)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
GRAYLING (SS209)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
GRENADEER (SS210)	DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP														DTP "2" UPKEEP																																																																																																															
GUIDEON (SS211)	Enr. and at Ditch, Hattali, Aljara														Enroute Pearl Harbor														At Pearl Harbor														Enroute and at Labama														Enr. and at Bik														Enr. and Kur, and 1 Nav. at Pearl														Enroute Mare Island														At Mare Island														Enr. S. D. At San Diego														Enroute Pearl														UPKEEP													
VP - 12	At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment New Planes														UPKEEP														Flot Tactics														Expansion Training														Expansion Training														UPKEEP														Advanced Base Operations - Palmyra														UPKEEP														UPKEEP																																									
VP - 14	Preparations for Flight UPKEEP to San Diego														At San Diego UPKEEP Re-Equipment of new planes														UPKEEP														Expansion Training														Expansion Training														UPKEEP														Advanced Base Operations - Johnston														UPKEEP														UPKEEP																																									






CARRIER AND AIRCRAFT GROUPS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

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
	OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER																																																							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31																																							
	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S																																			
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	MAINTENANCE - PREPARATION FOR TASK FORCE MISSIONS - TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF AIR GROUPS - NIGHT OPERATIONS EMBARKED - GUNNERY - SERVICES - TACTICS - UPKEEP AA LOOKOUT, IDENTIFICATION AND FIRE CONTROL TRAINING - MISCELLANEOUS.																																																																					
LEXINGTON	ENROUTE PEARL VIA SAN DIEGO COMPLY CINCPAC OF ORD. 27-41							UPKEEP							27-30 Gun-ner 24P DEL MGAA SP. A 28-31 Serv-ice 28 29 F2P (Type) Night Qual.							21-22 Gunner MGAA SP H2 Train DMTEP Services 19-21 Night Qual.							22 Fleet Tactics F2P (Type) (1)							26 UPKEEP							8-11 DSP 5 th DMTEP Train NBPG 12-13 Serv-ice Night Qual. 15-17 F2P (Live Bombs)							14 UPKEEP							26-27 FB Collica-tion Train NBFC 28-29 Services Night Qual.							28-31 FB Collica-tion Train NBFC 28-29 Services Night Qual.						
	NOTES (1) F2P (TORPEDOES) TO BE FIRED DURING FLIGHT TACTICS IF PRACTICABLE - OTHERWISE ON 20 NOVEMBER (2) F2P (TORPEDOES) TO BE FIRED DURING INTERTYPE TACTICS IF PRACTICABLE - OTHERWISE ON 20 NOVEMBER																																																																					
AIRCRAFT GROUPS																																																																						
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	NIGHT TRAINING IN EXTENDED FLIGHT SEARCH AND ATTACK AT SEA - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - AA TRAINING EXERCISES WITH FLEET UNITS - DAY AND NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING - EXERCISES IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS - EXERCISES IN DEFERRED ATTACK - HEARING DRILL - FLEET TACTICAL EXERCISES - INDIVIDUAL QUALIFICATIONS (BOMBS AND GUNS) - SERVICES - FORMATION BOMBING AND TORPEDO TRAINING - DAY QUALIFICATIONS AND REFRESHERS.																																																																					
LEXINGTON AIRCRAFT GROUP	FORMATION TORPEDO PRACTICE - VP CONDUCT IRP CAMERA GUNS - MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICE - BOMBING AND STRAPPING SLID TARGETS - GAME BOARD EXERCISES IN SMOKE LAYING (VS - VB) - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - BOMBING MANEUVERING TARGET (UTAH) - MASTER HORIZONTAL BOMBERS QUALIFICATION PRACTICE - RIFLE RANGE TRAINING FOR FREE GUNNERS - FORMATION BOMBING PRACTICE (LIVE BOMBS) - SERVICES - NIGHT QUALIFICATIONS.																																																																					
MARINE AIR GROUP TWENTY ONE	MONTHLY TRAINING PRACTICE - IRP (CAMERA GUNS AND BOMBS) - INSTRUMENT FLIGHT TRAINING - BOMBING AND STRAPPING EXERCISES - EXERCISES IN SUPPORT OF LANDINGS - BOMBING OF MANEUVERING TARGET (UTAH) - NIGHT FLYING - SERVICES - DAY QUALIFICATIONS AND REFRESHERS.																																																																					
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET																																																																						
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	COMBAT TRAINING - TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING - COMBINED TRAINING - COMMAND POST EXERCISES - GAS PROTECTIVE MEASURES - LANDING OPERATIONS - CAMOUFLAGE - NIGHT OPERATIONS - FIELD TRAINING AND FIRING AT CAMP ELLIOTT - BOAT FORMATIONS - TACTICAL DEBARKATIONS AND LANDING - TROOP LEADING - TRANSPORT LOADING AND UNLOADING AS TRANSPORTS BECOME AVAILABLE.																																																																					
TRANSPORTS, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET																																																																						
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES WILL BE PROMULGATED WHEN TRANSPORTS BECOME AVAILABLE.																																																																						





CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
SUBMARINES, TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER													
	8-6		12-13		19-26		26-27		31-1		8-10		16-17		23-24		30-1		7-8		14-15		21-22		28-29		31															
GENERAL DIRECTIVE	Upkeep	Gunnery	Under Type Tactics	UPKEEP				Fleet Tactics	Gunnery	UPKEEP				Fleet Tactics	Gunnery	Under Type Tactics	Gunnery	UPKEEP				Gunnery	Under Type Tactics																			
BEND-ALABAMA AND WYO	SALMON	NYM ⁴	RFSP	11 ENR ¹⁴ Fuel Serv	14 Service	17 ERGOUTS Sea Disp	21 UPKEEP	25 ENROUTE PEARL					BMPE SRPA Practice MOAABP H								DTPT DTPS DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL				DTPI DTPL																
	SEAL		DTPO DTFD						DTPL DTTP	TENDER OVERHAUL				16 Bunde Sea Disp	22 UPKEEP	30 EN BY	OVERHAUL - NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND																									
	SHIPJACK		DTPT DTPI						DTPD ETFP	TENDER OVERHAUL								DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL				DTPI DTPL																			
	SARGO		DTPO DTFD			TENDER OVERHAUL												DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL				BMPE DTPI DTPL																			
	SAUET		BMPE DTPT			TENDER OVERHAUL													DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL				DTPI DTPL																		
	SPEARFISH		DTPI DTFD						BMPE DTPD DTTP	TENDER OVERHAUL				MCAABP H					DD-SS Practice	TENDER OVERHAUL				DTPI DTPL	DTY-1																	
BEND-ALABAMA AND WYO	CACRALOT	Overhaul SubBase		OVERHAUL - NAVY YARD - PEARL HARBOR																		13	MISC. AT ANCHOR	22	RFSP																	
	CUTTLEFISH																											RWT														
	PLUNGER	R S							E. T. P.	OVERHAUL																		25-DTP G														
	POLLACK	MCAABP "B"							Z-1	SUBMARINE BASE																			Trail Deadw 10													
BEND-ALABAMA AND WYO	S-18																																									
	S-20			NAVY YARD MARE ISLAND																																						
	S-27			SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST - UPKEEP - GUNNERY																																						
	S-30			SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST - UPKEEP - GUNNERY																																						
	S-34			SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST - UPKEEP - GUNNERY																																						
S-38			SERVICES TO SOUND SCHOOL, WEST COAST - UPKEEP - GUNNERY																																							
LITCHFIELD	Services Subdiv 43	Under Type Tactics	11	UPKEEP	23	Fleet Tactics	27	Services Subdiv 43	2	OVERHAUL SUBMARINE BASE				17	SERVICES SUBDIV 43	22	Fleet Tactics	24	Services Subdiv 43	25	UPKEEP	29	Services Subdiv 43	34	S&P	31	OVERHAUL SUBMARINE BASE	36	Under Type Tactics	37	Under Type Tactics											
PELIAS	IF PELIAS JOINS PRIOR TO END OF QUARTER, SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PERIOD WILL BE PREPARED																																									
HOLLAND	TENDER SERVICES														22	Fleet Tactics	TENDER SERVICES																									
OSTOIAN	UPKEEP				13	TRAIN DIVERS - RESCUE VESSEL EXERCISES SERVICES				10	UPKEEP				24	TRAIN DIVERS - RESCUE VESSEL EXERCISES SERVICES				22	UPKEEP																					
SEAGULL	UPKEEP	6	SERVICES				8	UPKEEP				17	SERVICES				15	BASE OVERHAUL				24	SER.																			
WIDGON	TRAIN DIVERS SERVICES	6	BASE OVERHAUL				20	TRAIN DIVERS - SERVICES				17	UPKEEP				1	TRAIN DIVERS - SERVICES				24	SER.																			



CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

PATROL WINGS TASK FORCE THREE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

ACTIVITY	OCTOBER														NOVEMBER														DECEMBER																																										
	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
VP-14	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO. PREFLEET TRAINING PILOTS AND FLIGHT CREWS																																																																						
WEIGHT	ENROUTE SAN DIEGO AT SAN DIEGO ENROUTE HAWAII														ENROUTE ADVANCED BASE														UPKEEP SERVICES UPKEEP																																										
BULBERT	UPKEEP (1) SERVICES														UPKEEP														GUNNERY HQA&P SERVICES SERVICES																																										
BALLARD	UPKEEP (1) SERVICES SAN DIEGO														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES ADVANCED BASE														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES ADVANCED BASE																																										
AVOCY	UPKEEP AND SERVICES														UPKEEP														UPKEEP																																										
VP-11	FERRIES TO TRAINING CENTERS and RETURN SAN DIEGO														EXPANSION TRAINING														EXPANSION TRAINING																																										
VP-41	EXPANSION TRAINING														EXPANSION TRAINING														EXPANSION TRAINING																																										
VP-44 (OH VP-12)	AT SAN DIEGO - TRAINING and EDUCATION														EXPANSION TRAINING														EXPANSION TRAINING																																										
CUSTERS	UPKEEP (1) SERVICES														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES																																										
TROENTON	UPKEEP (1) SERVICES														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES														UPKEEP (1) SERVICES																																										
MCFARLAND	UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP																																										
SWAN	UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP																																										
TANGIER	SCHEDULES TO BE SUBMITTED ON REPORTS																																																																						

NOTES: (1) ANNUAL MILITARY INSPECTION. (2) ANNUAL MATERIAL IN SPECTION. (3) LOAD. (4) UNLOAD. (5) FERRY TO SAN DIEGO (6) FERRY TO HAWAII

VP-41	GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING														GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING - BODIAK														GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING AT BODIAK														LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION													
VP-42	GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING														GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING														GUNNERY - TACTICS EXPANSION TRAINING														LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION													
VP-43	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO																																																							
VP-44	PRE-FLEET TRAINING PILOTS AND FLIGHT CREWS																																																							
CASCO	IF CASCO JOINS PRIOR TO END OF QUARTER, SCHEDULE FOR REMAINING PERIOD WILL BE PREPARED																																																							
WILKINSON	NAVY YARD - FOGG SOUND														NAVY YARD - FOGG SOUND														NAVY YARD - FOGG SOUND														LEAVE LIBERTY RECREATION													
GRUBB	UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP													
TRAL	UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP														UPKEEP													
PERACAN	TEMPORARY DUTY TRANSITION TRAINING SQUADRON, PACIFIC, AT SAN DIEGO.																																																							

NOTES: (1) Bureau Office. (2) Bureau Office. (3) Bureau Office.

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