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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

▲ CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 33

PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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Mrs R. E. Wells

Jan 16, 1952

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HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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[a]

[SECRET]

**Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U. S. N.**

[1]

INTRODUCTION

This summary will point out what we consider to be the most important aspects of this Inquiry insofar as they affect the interests of Admiral Stark, designated an Interested Party by this Court. It is not our purpose to comment on testimony developed by this Inquiry which affects only one or more of the other persons designated as Interested Parties.

I. MOBILIZATION FOR WORLD WAR II

1. Mobilization meant building up the forces and distributing them, prior to hostilities if possible. On 7 December 1941 there were shortages of ships, planes and personnel, in the Pacific Fleet as well as in the other Naval Commands. We have had shortages at the beginning of all our wars.

2. Beginning soon after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, we began the time-consuming task of building up our Naval Forces and they were very considerably increased by the end of 1941. The testimony concerning Admiral Stark's part in this effort is brief but, with what is common knowledge, does indicate his zeal and his accomplishments despite the difficulties which always attend such progress during peace. The overall result was, to state it conservatively, a much higher degree of readiness, in late 1941, than had been the [2] case in our previous naval war history. Moreover, every ship available had been placed in commission.

3. The Distribution of Forces among the various Naval Commands was Admiral Stark's responsibility subject, however, to concepts and policies either passed to him from higher levels or which resulted from cooperative agreements with our Army. The entire world theatre had to be considered and the available forces spread in two oceans, even if in spots they thus appeared to be thin. Some mention has been made of the transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic during 1941. It must be remembered that 1941 began as a critical year in the European phase of the war and any realistic plan had to take into account the fact that our help in the Atlantic was deemed essential to stave off the defeat of Britain, a defeat which would probably have been disastrous in the European theater and also have seriously hampered our ability to successfully defend ourselves against the Japanese. The testimony indicates little if any fault in the overall distribution of our available forces, and indeed, no authoritative criticism on the point seems to have come from any source. The distribution which was in effect was realistic, as fitting

the situation of late 1941. Mobilization was, in fact, as nearly complete as any effort of the Chief of Naval Operations could make it.

4. The War Plans of 1941 were likewise realistic. Those Plans were no longer development projects but were tailored to correspond to the forces available. Insofar as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the initial tasks fitted the offensive power of that Fleet. However, as long as peace endured [3] we could not use that power offensively, because the Government had decided, as a matter of policy, that we would not commit a first overt act. The Japanese had the initiative. Therefore, our forces which were within reach of the Japanese, anywhere, had to expect attack—with or without a prior declaration of war—and their security, while in such situation, had to be the primary consideration. These considerations of security have not been shown to be incompatible with maintaining a suitable readiness of our forces to execute the War Plan.

5. How the security of the exposed forces was to be guarded, Admiral Stark left to the several Commanders-in-Chief. He did not attempt to tell them how to accomplish security and he did not harass them by calling for reports on what they had done or why they had not done something else. Such had long been Admiral Stark's command method. It was not questioned by the several Commanders-in-Chief prior to 7 December 1941—in fact, CINCPAC pointed out (in Exhibit 33) that because of the time and distance factors involved, the Navy Department was not always too well informed of the local situation, "thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions."

II. INFORMATION AND DIRECTIVES

6. Pursuant to his policy of informing the Commanders-in-Chief of broad policy and objectives, Admiral Stark devoted considerable personal effort and [4] time toward informing the CinC, Pacific Fleet, of his conception of our situation vis à vis Japan. Our position was uncertain, in varying degrees, right up to the closing months of 1941 and was more or less bound to be so because of the nature of our governmental processes. However, Admiral Stark employed much effort toward opening his mind to the Fleet Commanders, and keeping them in touch with our policies and the current situation in the Pacific as he viewed it. Those views proved to be generally correct and, even today, appear to have been properly set forth.

7. As regards the flow of information to CinC, Pacific Fleet, from the Department's machinery, by employing routine methods: Such information as concerned Japan is properly divided into two categories:

a. The first constituted the primary function of the Navy's Intelligence agencies and concerned the strength, disposition and activities of Japanese forces. That class of information was always scant but such as was obtained was known to Pacific Fleet Commanders. As a matter of fact, one of the principal gatherers of such intelligence was stationed in Pearl Harbor.

b. The other category originated in Japanese political and diplomatic sources and was mainly gathered by joint effort of War and Navy Departments. The volume of such intelligence was very great and only a fraction carried significance of direct naval or military

value. It was not routine to transmit this class of information, from day to day, as it came in, to the CinC, Pacific [5] Fleet. Certain items of it have been brought before this Court and many questions put with the indicated intention of proving serious failure in duty by the Chief of Naval Operations in not transmitting this category of intelligence to CinC, Pacific Fleet, as the various items became available. In studying the items of this category which are in the record, it is well to keep in mind that one, or several of them, lifted from their place amid a great number can, in the light of hindsight, be made to appear far more significant than would have been the case at the time.

c. To have transmitted even a fraction of this category to Fleet Commanders, as a matter of routine, was quite inadvisable for two reasons: Personnel was limited and more important work would have been displaced. Such practice would have tended to compromise intelligence agencies which were a highly important part of our preparations for war. The information and directives which were sent did reflect intelligence from such sources.

8. Admiral Stark did keep CinC, Pacific Fleet, informed of the gradual deterioration of our relations with Japan throughout 1941 and, in late November, he warned both the Commanders-in-Chief in the Pacific of the probability that we ourselves would be one of the objectives of a Japanese surprise attack which was then expected. He gave out all that was known of the disposition of Japanese Naval units. He indicated in his despatch of 24 November 1941 that Japanese forces might make a surprise aggressive movement *in any direction*. He issued an unequivocal war warning in good time—on 27 November 1941. In [6] this despatch, he stated: "This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan * * * have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." He pointed out that the Japanese distribution indicated an *amphibious expedition* against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo, which was all that was *new* concerning Japanese dispositions. That estimate of objectives did not cancel out the despatch of 24 November 1941 in which Admiral Stark warned of a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*. Thereafter, he gave CinC, Pacific Fleet, most significant information and directives concerning the destruction of codes and cyphers. These despatches represented the best judgment of the CNO and his principal advisors and were based on the best intelligence available. Subsequent events proved the information and conclusions given in these despatches to be correct. They did not specifically predict an attack in the Hawaiian area. There was not sufficient basis for such prediction, for the amphibious expedition in the Far East was not pointed at Hawaii. However, its composition did not include all the Japanese Fleet.

III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEARL HARBOR

9. It is entirely clear that, under the policies of many years, and as laid down in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935", the Army was fully responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air attack. That responsibility extended not only to the permanent installations at the base, [7] but also to ships within the Pearl Harbor area. The Naval Base was and still is the seat of our

power over the Pacific and in the last analysis the Army forces, Oahu, were stationed there for its defense—and for that alone.

10. In January, 1941, the Navy Department (in Exhibit 9) pointed out to the War Department considerable deficiencies in the Army's readiness to meet its commitments for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack. The War Department (in Exhibit 24) acknowledged those deficiencies and undertook to remedy them. At that time, both the Army and the Navy were cognizant of the material and operational developments whereby the British had defeated German air attack upon England. Those developments did include close-in defense by anti-aircraft artillery, but the main feature was fighter aircraft, made effective by radar and the directive control of the fighters from the ground. By those methods, all of which had been disclosed to the U. S. officers in England, a relatively small force of fighter planes had repeatedly broken up heavy German bombing attacks. The same methods are still in use today.

11. For the defense of the Pearl Harbor Area against air attack, the Navy's sole responsibility was to support the Army's effort through the use of such elements as happened to be available, whether belonging to the local defense forces or units which were parts of the Pacific Fleet itself. Since Pearl Harbor was our one large naval base in the Pacific, some units of the Fleet were normally expected to be present. The defense of the Pearl Harbor Area, and of any Fleet units which happened to be there, against air attack, was not a direct responsibility of the Navy which had no authority over the [8] main defensive agency—the aircraft warning system, the fighter planes and their direction in combat.

12. Even had no important Fleet units been in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, there were plenty of lucrative targets for the Japanese aircraft. For example, the Court will have noted the location of the fuel tanks, up-hill from the all-important Submarine Base. The testimony shows that those tanks were practically filled to capacity (4,000,000 barrels). They could have been blown up and fired by a very few planes attacking unopposed. The Court can estimate how long our effort in the Pacific might have been delayed if the Japanese raid, on 7 December, had found no Fleet units present and had been directed against various Pearl Harbor installations on shore.

13. There was, from early in 1941, nothing new about defense against air raids by means of fighter aircraft made effective by radar and a ground control system. Such defense is comparatively simple, requires only a small number of personnel, is self-contained and is adaptable for readiness round the clock because it has only one single, well-defined function. The elements for such defense became available on Oahu in the summer of 1941, and they were supplied for the one purpose of defense against an air raid. The evidence discloses that there was nearly complete failure by Army Fighter Planes to oppose the attack of 7 December.

14. Counsel submits that whatever may have been Navy failures, on or before 7 December 1941, failures in judgment, of commission, or of omission, [9] all of those failures combined constitute something quite minor as compared with the failure of the Army Interceptor Command on Oahu.

H. R. STARK.

[1] **Statement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, before the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigating the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, read before the Court on 27 September 1944.**

It is not necessary for me to make this first part of my statement to the members of this Court. However, since the rumor has been widely circulated during the last two years and a half that I was a friend or intimate associate of the President of the United States, I desire to take this opportunity to place on the record a categorical denial of that story. The only meetings I ever had with the President, prior to my official visit to Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet in June of 1941, approximately six months after my appointment, were in the course of official routine duties and occurred more than twenty years prior to my taking command in the Pacific. During more than forty years of service in the Navy, I have never sought or owed advancement to any political connection of any nature or description.

The following are the circumstances in connection with my retirement. I set them forth because this matter has been so frequently misrepresented in the press.

On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U. S. N., Commandant 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., had telephoned an official message to be delivered to me which stated that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the [2] Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26 January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for retirement.

On 28 January I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement was not meant to influence me.

I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service."

Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, I stated in part: "I submitted this request solely to permit the Department to take whatever action they deemed best for the

interest of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment."

The approval of my request for retirement included the statement: "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

[3] I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 1942 that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specifications be prepared to bring me to trial by General Court Martial at some future time.

When I took command of the fleet, it was based in Pearl Harbor. The decision to base the fleet there was made prior to my taking command. I do not propose now to debate the wisdom or unwisdom of that decision. The reason assigned for the presence of the fleet in Hawaiian waters by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to Admiral Richardson dated 27 May 1940 (Exhibit 26) was, "the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japanese going into the East Indies." My predecessor, Admiral Richardson, took up all phases of the decision to base the fleet in Pearl Harbor with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.

That decision, however, created fundamental problems for my consideration as Commander-in-Chief, among many other problems with which I had to deal.

There were certain weaknesses in Pearl Harbor as a fleet base. They were well known to the Department. They had been pointed out by Admiral Richardson both to the Navy Department and to the President. On my own official trip to Washington in June of 1941, in conversation with Admiral Stark and the President, I pointed out the following facts:

1. The fleet base at Pearl Harbor, due to the congestion of ships, fuel oil storage, and repair facilities, was exposed to attack, particularly from the air.

[4] 2. The single entrance channel, which must be used by all ships, exposed them to submarine attack.

3. The danger of blocking this single entrance channel must be constantly considered.

4. In case of attack by air or otherwise with the fleet in port, it would take at least three hours to complete a sortie.

5. That Pearl Harbor is the only refueling, replacement, and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area.

6. That ships must spend considerable time in Pearl Harbor for these purposes, for relaxation for the crews, and to complete the considerable number of alterations and additions required due to war experience.

7. That the only real answer was for the fleet not to be in Pearl Harbor when the attack came.

I mention these matters to indicate the basic problems created by the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor. It is not possible to draw a comparison between the security of such a base immediately prior to the out-break of hostilities, and its security in war time. After hostilities commence and the fleet is not restricted by any policy of waiting for the potential enemy to commit the first overt act, our own offensive operations afford a large measure of protection to the base. In peace time the condition and movement of the fleet at Pearl

Harbor could scarcely be concealed from the watchful eyes of enemy agents. The very topography of Pearl Harbor and the large Japanese population of the islands created that danger. [5] ger. Once the fleet was placed there, for the assumed purpose of exerting a deterrent effect upon Japan, it was not maintaining a consistent policy thereafter to weaken the fleet, visibly and plainly, by diversion of powerful units to the Atlantic.

Other Harbors besides Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands could not be used because of their extreme vulnerability to submarine attack. About a month before I became Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored at Lahaina because he considered it was no longer safe against submarine attack. I fully agreed with and continued in effect this policy.

Apart from the inherent handicaps of Pearl Harbor as a base, there were obvious deficiencies in the equipment necessary for its protection. The postulate in Joint Action Army-Navy 1935 (Exhibit 6), was "Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. *The fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base.*" Unfortunately this was the merest theory in Pearl Harbor in the year 1941. The efforts made by me and my predecessor to strengthen the base defense are a matter of record in voluminous correspondence with the Department which is already before this Court. Time and again there were pointed out to the Navy Department in Washington, the weaknesses in the Army's equipment and material available for the exercise of its specifically assigned and assumed functions of base defense. The letter of January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70) addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, written by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, and prepared as stated therein [6] with my collaboration, in paragraph 7 (a), (b), (d), emphasizes "the critical inadequacy of AA guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor." "the small number and obsolete condition of land based aircraft detection devices ashore." The letter stated that "it is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program and material aid to Great Britain." Again in my official letter of 26 May 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 33) in paragraph 5 (b) I said, "The defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes and radar equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over continental and expanding Army needs."

The deficiencies in the equipment which the Army needed to exercise its proper functions in the defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, pointed out by Admiral Richardson and myself during the year prior to December 7, 1941, had not been remedied at the time of the Japanese attack.

One important and necessary element in the ability of the naval forces to exercise their appropriate duties in connection with the defense of the base was patrol planes. Plans of the Navy Department provided that ultimately there would be supplied to the Pacific fleet sufficient planes to cover operations of the fleet, with planes based

on Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Oahu, and still have a sufficient number to establish a continuous search around Oahu when the fleet was [7] operating in distant waters. My recollection is that the plan allocated approximately 108 patrol planes to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District for such searching and defensive operations as came within his sphere and also allocated more than 160 patrol planes for the use of the fleet. These patrol planes were to be based on outlying islands, which we were developing as rapidly as conditions permitted to insure an adequate supply of fuel, bombs and other ammunition for patrol planes operating therefrom. In addition, our seaplane tenders would permit the supply of seaplanes from any harbor where they could be landed and refueled. The total number of patrol planes assigned to the Pacific fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District on December 7, 1941, was 81.

Perhaps of more interest to this Court than our many deficiencies in equipment for base defense, were the plans made for the best utilization of what we had. There has been introduced in evidence Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL41 (Exhibit 8) originally promulgated about two weeks after I took command, and revised under date of October 14, 1941. A study of this letter shows our plan for berthing ships in Pearl Harbor by sectors so that they would develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector consistent with the total number of ships of all types in port. The same security order designated the Commandant of the 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense Officer. His selection as Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely in harmony with the general purpose of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan worked out by the General commanding the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. [8] By joint agreement between the War and Navy Departments (Exhibit 6) and by the provision of war plans and existing instructions, the Army was charged with and made responsible for the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. No orders or instructions issued at any time lessened or mitigated the Army's responsibility for such defense. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was charged with the direction of the naval force made available by me to assist the Army. The Army did not have a sufficient GHQ Air Force available to assume fully its responsibilities. The Commandant was charged with the coordination of the naval force with the Army effort to defend the fleet base at Pearl Harbor.

As a part of the plan for coordinating the Army and Navy activities for the defense of the base, there was approved on April 2, 1941, a plan dated March 28, 1941, entitled, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan," (Exhibit 7). This plan dealt with joint air operations, joint communications, joint antiaircraft measures and joint use of munitions. There was also promulgated on March 31, 1941, Addendum 1 to Naval Base Defense Air Forces Operation Plan No. A-1-41 signed by the Major General who commanded the Hawaiian air force and the Rear Admiral who was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. (Exhibit 53). This document was followed by Addendum II Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 dated April 9, 1941 (Exhibit 53, Document 6). The plans for joint air operations by the Army and Navy in Oahu constituted in the minds of the Navy Department an outstanding example of prog-

ress in coordination between the services. Since these plans have been introduced in evidence before the Court, it is hardly necessary for me to describe them in detail. Copies of these documents were promptly furnished the Navy Department and were accepted.

[9] As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I had a fleet to prepare for war. I had an international situation, always of grave portent, to evaluate. It was my task to meet each situation which presented itself within the broad reaches of the Pacific and deal with it by appropriate action.

One of my principal concerns was, of course, the men and ships of the fleet. After all, one does not train ships, but rather the men who man the ships. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the look-outs, to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary, and numerous other billets had to be trained before they were competent. A breakdown or inefficiency in any one of these categories might well be very costly, in time of war. Constantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. At times during my tenure as Commander-in-Chief, as high as 70% of the men on board individual ships had never heard a gun fired. Considerably more than 50% of the officers were newly commissioned.

One great handicap was the constant and very large turn-over of enlisted men and officers. This was caused by the necessity of sending trained men to new construction and the expiration of enlistments, which necessitated the supply of large numbers of untrained personnel. This situation extended up to and including December 7. The situation was thoroughly presented to the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of May [10] 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33) entitled, "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." I refer the Court to paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of that letter wherein this condition is exhaustively treated. The training program extended to the air arm of the Navy. For example, we were directed to transfer about twelve trained patrol plane crews per month to the mainland.

As to the fleet, itself, on December 7, 1941, the Naval forces of the Pacific Fleet were inferior to the Japanese Navy in every category of fighting ship, inferior in cargo and troop transports and in tankers and other supply vessels. This fact was recognized in Washington. The joint memorandum of 5 November 1941 to the President signed by both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, a copy of which is in evidence (Exhibit 39A), states unqualifiedly that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet. As I read that memorandum the inferiority of the Pacific Fleet was the basic reason supporting the ultimate recommendation that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan.

Specifically, there were only 11 tankers in the entire Pacific. We were particularly deficient in land-based and carrier-based planes. The Japanese at the outbreak of hostilities had between 11 and 15 aircraft carriers in commission and operating, 4 or 5 of which represented converted merchant ships. We had 3 carriers in the Pacific. Although the battleships of the fleet were of approximately the same

age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, they were particularly deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons. In general, all ships in the fleet were woefully deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons as [11] we had been unsuccessful in producing in quantity enough anti-aircraft artillery for mounting. This last mentioned deficiency we were engaged in remedying at the time of Pearl Harbor, but our task was only 10% completed. Anti-aircraft control gear for these and larger guns was not adequate. Our surface gunnery and our surface weapons because of constant care and attention were in excellent condition.

There was an imperative need for an extensive training and target practice program for every ship's crew and every plane crew. By the early spring of 1941, target and base facilities to permit the prosecution of an intensive fleet training program had been transferred from the West Coast to Hawaii. To tow the considerable number of target rafts, to transport the utility and transport planes, and to bring the other training auxiliaries and fleet fueling facilities from the West Coast to Hawaii especially when we were short of auxiliary vessels was, in itself, a major task. Nor was the training program permitted to go on without diversion of sizable fleet units to other theaters. In May and June of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four 10,000 ton light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, six transports, with practically all the trained and equipped marines on the West Coast, several small transports and some other small craft, were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The details of this transfer must have been quickly known in Japan. This transfer took away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet, and resulted in a very substantial reduction in the potentialities of the Pacific Fleet. This same action which [12] took all the transports and the trained marines from the West Coast, left us only the marines required to man the outlying islands plus the garrison at Pearl Harbor.

By December 7, 1941, some additional marines had been trained at San Diego and one transport out of a total of four under conversion on the West Coast had been commissioned. The training of marines in landing operations had of necessity been incomplete and their equipment was entirely inadequate.

When I was in Washington in June, 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made.

In carrying out the training program, it was necessary for me to have precise and accurate knowledge of the appropriate time to interrupt training by making strategic dispositions. The international situation was grave from the moment I took command. I had to consider at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the fleet of long periods of watch standing in port in peace time and the result that such demands might destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to attain.

Admiral Richardson has testified to the frequent communications he received from Washington emphasizing the possibility of war. (See, for example, Exhibit 76, Document 3). My official correspondence from the Chief of Naval Operations, which is before the Court, in effect plots a graph of recurrent tension in the international situation

from February on. It is studded with expressions that, "what will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess"; "that peace hangs by a slender thread"; [13] "that the situation is serious." An "open rupture" was described as a possibility on July 24 (Exhibit 71); the situation was described on July 31 as continuing to deteriorate (Exhibit 72); on September 23rd the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me that "conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse." (Exhibit 37). It was never expected that these insistent, ominous predictions required, each time they were made, an abrupt discontinuance of essential training measures for all-out security dispositions. Any such action would have seriously interfered with training and in a relatively short time, reduced the efficiency of individual ships to a dangerous degree. In fact, in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) the Chief of Naval Operations cautioned specifically, "I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into War.

I expressed my own needs to the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of May 26, 1941 (Exhibit 33), in which I stated "Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his present course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessities for intensive [14] training of a partly trained fleet must be carefully weighed against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventualities." I concluded with the suggestion "that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I fully expected to receive such information. I now believe that this record will show the failure of the Navy Department to inform me of known "impending eventualities" in the week immediately preceding December 7. I shall discuss in more detail hereafter, my own estimate of the situation made at the time in the light of the information which was given me prior to the attack.

The fleet was divided into three main task forces and the schedule of operations required at least one task force at sea at all times, available to strike in the event of surprise. Often two task forces were at sea at the same time but never three except for concentrated fleet maneuvers. Each of the task forces had its mission and training was conducted with a view to its attaining maximum efficiency, in carrying out its mission. However, it was necessary to afford time in port for all ships in order to provide for the overhauling of machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for action against the enemy. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short-range anti-aircraft guns, aircraft detection devices, look-out equipment, splinter protection, additional personnel accommodations

and other alterations. It was also necessary to limit operations to the availability of replacement fuel. We were applying to the Fleet the lessons of war which were being supplied us. Each installation and alteration, whether it was splinter protection, degaussing, or the installation of listening gear, required work on the ship in port.

[15] Naturally the ship's force was engaged in many tasks of installation, repair and alteration to the limit of their capacity while in port. It was my policy to prevent breakdowns rather than run the risk of breakdowns, and to have the Fleet in the best material condition possible at the outbreak of hostilities. It goes without saying, of course, that the necessity for refueling in port in and of itself, prevented keeping task forces at sea at all times. The eleven tankers were required to operate continuously between Pearl Harbor and the West Coast in order that the fuel at Pearl Harbor should not be depleted.

Submarines constituted a menace in the operating area around Hawaii. During the first week of February and the first week of my command of the Fleet, a submerged submarine contact was reported about eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours after which contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in our operating area around Hawaii. I was directed by despatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the three mile limit.

[16] A similar contact in approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers engaged in trailing were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted. During the ensuing several months there were several more reports of strange submerged submarine contacts in the Hawaiian area. As late as 23 September 1941 (Exhibit 12) the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to me in part, "the existing orders, that is, not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat, conclusive evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step." Such conclusive evidence was not obtained until the attack of December 7th. However, upon receipt of the despatch of November 27, 1941 (Exhibit 17), I issued orders to depth bomb all strange submarine contacts in the Fleet operating area and informed the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch and letter of the action I had taken.

On October 16, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me the despatch which has been introduced in evidence before the Court (Exhibit 13). This despatch indicated a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia; a possibility that Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain. It directed me to take due precautions including such preparatory deployment as would not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

[17] I particularly invite the Court's attention to the directive in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13). I urge a comparison of

this directive with the language contained in the later despatches of November 24th and November 27th (Exhibits 15 and 17). The admonition against disclosure of strategic intention and provocative action contained in the despatch of October 16 (Exhibit 13) has its echo in the despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on November 29 (Exhibit 19) directing my attention to the Army despatch which stated, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and which required that measures taken should not alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The despatch of October 16th spoke of "preparatory deployments." The so-called War Warning of November 27th directed an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46".

Upon receipt of the despatch of October 16th, (Exhibit 13) I made the following dispositions; I continued to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway; despatched 12 patrol planes to Midway and two submarines to Wake to arrive on October 23rd. I despatched the *Castor* and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores. The *Curtis* was to arrive at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs. I prepared to send six patrol planes to Midway from Pearl Harbor. I despatched additional marines, to Palmyra. Admiral Pye who was on the West Coast, making a cruise, was placed on 12 hours notice after 20 October. I had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. [18] I put some additional security measures into effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor and delayed the sailing of the *West Virginia* until about 17 November when she was due to go for an overhaul at Puget Sound.

All these dispositions which I made as a result of the despatch of October 16 were specifically brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in my letter of 22 October which is in evidence. (Exhibit 14.) In a letter of November 7th, the Chief of Naval Operations specifically approved these dispositions (Exhibit 74). This specific approval of my dispositions makes it unnecessary for this Court to consider whether they conformed to what Admiral R. K. Turner testified he thinks the Department intended me to do after the October 16 despatch.

In the despatch of 16 October 1941 I was formally advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. That phrase was given a definitive meaning in the Chief of Naval Operations letter to me of 17 October 1941, (Exhibit 38) in which he said, "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and in the message merely stated the possibility." To me that meant that when the word "possibility" was used, its connotation was limited—and that, when used, the meaning of the Chief of Naval Operations was that "possibility" was not "probability."

The despatch of October 16th indicated a strong possibility of a Japanese attack upon Russia. In this connection my correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations shows that the Department had envisaged such a Japanese movement as [19] possible as early as the summer of 1941. At that time I repeatedly endeavored, without success, as my letters show, to find out the probable attitude of the United States in the event of Russo-Japanese hostilities.

On November 24th (Exhibit 15) I received a despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which is before the Court, which stated that the chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful, and that in the Department's opinion, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. However, in a letter of November 25th (Exhibit 16), to which the Chief of Naval Operations added a post-scrip after a presumably informative conference with the President and Mr. Hull, he stated, "I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China-Burma area as the most likely." And the Chief of Naval Operations added, "I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be 'anything'."

I interpreted the *possibility* of attack on the Philippines and Guam in the same vein that I had been advised the word was used in the despatch, viz. a possibility but by no means a probability. The letter of 25 November (Exhibit 16) fortified my belief that this interpretation was correct. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified that he did not intend that I should discontinue the training program for "all-out" security [20] measures upon receipt of the despatch of November 24. (Exhibit 15) (See Record, pages 50-53).

I was completely out of touch with the details of the negotiations proceeding between the Japanese representatives in Washington and our Government. The Chief of Naval Operations in a letter of October 17, 1941 (Exhibit 38) had told me that the Chinese incident was "The stumbling block." In a letter of November 14 (Exhibit 39), the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall which advised against direct armed United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan," (Exhibit 39A). This represented my general information as to how much of a "stumbling block" China might prove to be in the negotiations. I did not know at that time, nor did I learn until I read the official published State Department papers long afterwards, that the outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan handed to the Japanese ambassador by my Government on 26 November contained the following passages under steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capitot temporarily at Chungking.

These passages in the note of November 26 were most significant. It is not within my sphere to decide whether [21] they are consonant with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to the President, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. The historians of the future may ponder the question of whether diplomacy took a more venturesome approach than the judgment of the military deemed prudent. Suffice it to say that I did not know of the delivery of this significant document of No-

vember 26th to the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States, and because I did not know this, the Japanese had vital information originated by my own Government which was denied me. Consequently, any possible logical connection in the sequence of events between the note of November 26th and the so-called "War Warning" of November 27th (Exhibit 17) was lost to me.

The so-called, "War Warning" of November 27th has been introduced in evidence before this Court (Exhibit 17). I ask the Court to view it not with any meaning attached to it by hindsight after the event, but as it would appear to a responsible Commander at the time it was received. In the first place, it will be noted that the despatch states at the outset that the negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilizing of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased. In the second place, it will be observed that the time for expected Japanese movements is stated to be "within the next few days" and the territory against which such movements are directed is specifically stated to be "the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and possibly Boreno." In specifically mentioning these places as objectives of a Japanese amphibious expedition, the Department appeared to be limiting [22] the phrase in its despatch of November 24th which mentioned as a possibility, "a surprise aggressive movement *in any direction.*" The only American Territory against which Japanese operations are expected is the Philippines. I was not in a position to evaluate the probable American action in the event of initial Japanese attack was made against Dutch or British Territory. Any commitments made by the United States with regard to the protection of the territories of these nations were not known to me. From the Chief of Naval Operations' post script to his letter of November 25th (Exhibit 16) I gathered he had no more definite knowledge in this respect than I did.

I did not know of the conversation of Mr. Dooman, the Counsellor of the United States Embassy at Tokio, with Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, relative to what the United States would do if Japan attacked Singapore. (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan Vol. II, p. 137). I did not know of Ambassador Grew's statement to Mr. Matsuoka on February 15, 1941 (ibid 138). This information was in the State Department on March 17, 1941. I was likewise denied the information of the statement by the Secretary of State to Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 16, 1941, that "this Government could not remain silent in the face of such a threat, —," (ibid 553). I was also denied whatever information was behind the despatch from Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations of 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 76, Document 4) sent to me for information and received after the attack, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic had learned from Singapore that the United States had [23] assured Britain armed support under several eventualities, but concerning which the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet had not been advised.

My reaction and the reaction of my staff to the so-called "War Warning" of November 27 was naturally affected by two despatches from the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibits 18 and 40), sent about the same time, which together with similar despatches from the War

Department to General Short, proposed the relief of the garrisons at Midway and Wake, with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes on the islands by Army Pursuit planes. Exhibits 50 and 51, my personal and official letters to the Chief of Naval Operations of December 2, 1941 contain a clear contemporaneous account of the problems involved in this proposal. These letters show that the Army's despatches to General Short went beyond the suggested reinforcement by the Army of the Marine garrisons, and indicated that the Army would take over the defenses of the islands. The despatches from the War and Navy Departments indicate that the exchange of planes and troops was of an urgent nature. This proposal did not originate with me or with General Short. The members of my staff did not know why the exchange had to be made. Obviously the sending of some fifty per cent of the Army Fighter Pursuit strength on Oahu (as was proposed by the War and Navy Departments) affected materially the defensive strength of Pearl Harbor. It appeared to us at the scene, that such a proposal would not be made by the Departments in Washington, if they anticipated the imminent impact of hostilities upon Oahu. Moreover, the proposed relief of the Marine Garrisons by Army troops necessarily entailed disruption of the defense of those islands during the entire time that one [24] Garrison was preparing to depart and the other becoming installed. The Army had nothing comparable to a Marine Defense Battalion so that the Army Garrison would have had to have a new table of organization. Likewise, Marine and Army Fighter Squadrons were differently organized. The proposed change which emanated from Washington, on or about the time of the despatch of the so-called "War Warning" did not simply entail a change of personnel; it involved also a complicated logistic problem.

Furthermore at Wake there were no harbor facilities. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships practically in an open seaway. Wake was the most westerly and advanced of the two islands. Such an operation had no protection from the elements. The defense from enemy action could not be more ineffective.

It seemed to us that a project of this nature would not have been planned or proposed by responsible authorities in Washington under any situation where the defense of Pearl Harbor was a matter of immediate concern. We recommended against sending the Army Fighters to the islands; first, because once landed, they could not be removed and; second, because at conferences on the subject, Major General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, informed us that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land.

On November 29 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me, as an information addressee, a message (Exhibit 19) which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch to General Short, of November 27 which General Short had previously [25] brought to my attention. This despatch stated that "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated, with only the barest possibility of resumption." It stated that "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." It insisted that measures be taken, should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. The Chief of Naval Operations added to the substance of the Army

message of November 27, direct instructions that, WPL52 is not applicable to the Pacific area and the further direction to "undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an over act." It reiterated the need for preparation to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan.

The recurrent note in these Army and Navy despatches of caution against alarming the civil population, of emphasis upon the necessity that the Japanese commit the first overt act tended to create a state of mind which prevented any action except that consistent with a passive defense. I still had no explicit authorization to depth bomb submarine contacts in the fleet operating areas. Indeed, under a literal interpretation of our orders, if a Japanese naval force were to be encountered at sea, we were, in effect, directed to wait until they opened fire.

The "few days" stated by the Navy Department on November 27 to be the time for an aggressive move by Japan went by without event. The negotiations which on November 27th were stated to be terminated, and on November 29 to be terminated with the barest possibility of resumption, were in fact resumed. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that the negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after [26] November 29. I took into account this public information as to diplomatic development in the absence of more authoritative information. Indeed Admiral Turner testified that the Navy Department anticipated and expected I should.

In fact, I now know that the Japanese were continuing negotiations only as a device to cover up their plans. In fact, the Japanese considered that the negotiations were ruptured after the American Note of November 26. The real situation was then known to the Navy Department in Washington. But I was never advised that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese trick, as official Washington knew it to be. The public resumption of negotiations after the despatch of November 27, which was predicated on this termination naturally affected my evaluation of the international situation. It suggested a mitigation of the emergency which prompted the so-called "warning." In a public address in London on December 8, 1941, Mr. Churchill stated: "Japanese envoys Nomura and Kurusu were ordered to prolong their missions in the United States in order to keep conversations going while the surprise attack was being prepared, to be made before the declaration of war could be delivered." As Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was not permitted to know what Mr. Churchill apparently knew, and the Navy Department certainly knew, that the resumption of negotiations was a Japanese stratagem.

The denial to me of knowledge of certain material facts, is not cited as an excuse for inaction on my part after November 27th, for I was by no means inactive after November 27th. After full consultation with my staff—all experienced and responsible officers—I undertook to comply with the directive [27] to make an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

I took the following action, on receipt of the so-called "War Warning." I ordered to Wake one Patrol Squadron, then at Mid-

way, and it proceeded on 1 December conducting reconnaissance sweep enroute. Patron at Midway was replaced by Patron from Pearl and left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting a reconnaissance sweep enroute Johnston and enroute Johnston to Midway. This squadron made daily search from Midway on three, four, five and six December. I sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF squadron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landing planes at Wake on 3 December. The Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes. Patron at Wake was then withdrawn; it conducted reconnaissance sweep enroute Wake to Midway and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor. The Lexington proceeded to Midway with VMF squadron departing Pearl 5 December. It conducted daily reconnaissance flights with its own planes enroute, and was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke. The Burroughs was despatched to Wake with additional forces and supplies including Radar, but was short of Wake when war broke. She departed Pearl 29 November. I directed daily reconnaissance flights of VP planes, based on Pearl Harbor, to cover the fleet operating areas and approaches thereto. I also issued an order that any Japanese submarine found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be depth bombed, and so informed the chief of Naval Operations, as I have previously noted. Submarine patrols were continued at Wake and Midway.

[28] It is almost unnecessary to point out that the Department knew the operating schedule governing the particular time our three task forces were in and out of port. The Department at no time prior to December 7, criticized my dispositions or indicated that I was not complying with its wishes. These dispositions were calculated to strengthen our outposts to the South and West against the time when they should face the call of all-out hostilities.

Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, (who were in command of the forces carrying reinforcement planes to Midway and Wake) were empowered to take appropriate action against any hostile attacking planes.

Beginning latter part of November, a memorandum to show what the initial steps would be were war to come was kept up to date. The last provision was made on the 5th of December and was gone over by me on the morning of December 6th. These memoranda outlined steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war and are in evidence before the Court as Exhibits 69A and 69B.

On 30 November, I received a despatch (Exhibit 76) stating that there were indications Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.

On 3 December the Department sent a despatch stating that it had received highly reliable information that certain Japanese consular posts were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers. This despatch (Exhibit 20) was not a clear cut warning of any Japanese intention to strike the United States. It stated that the Japanese instructions were to destroy "most" of their codes—not all their codes, a point noted by me and my staff at that time. It was entirely consistent [29] with routine diplomatic precautions by Japan against the contingency that the United States and Britain might declare war against her and take over diplomatic residences if she took

aggressive action against the Kra Isthmus. The significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by the publication of this information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu. Both Admiral Pye and Admiral Smith testified that they read of this fact in the press before the receipt of the despatch from the Navy Department. The wide publicity given this certainly removed it from the category of secret intelligence information.

On 6 December, the Department sent a despatch authorizing the destruction by the outlying Pacific Islands of secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency," (Exhibit 22). In the report of the Robert's Commission this despatch is mentioned, and a significant word is added in this paraphrase of the despatch in the Commission's report. That word is the adjective "tense", modifying the noun "situation". The adjective "tense" was not in the original despatch sent to me.

In no despatch sent to me was there any warning of a probable or imminent air attack upon Pearl Harbor. The "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations," issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated on page 1, "Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand." The same publication on page 9, under the heading, "The Japanese Naval Situation", stated definitely "the major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." Intelligence available to me located other Japanese [30] carriers in waters far distant from Hawaii. We knew that a raiding expedition would have to leave Japanese waters approximately two weeks before they could make an attack on Pearl Harbor. From our information therefore we had every reason to believe that the attack would not be made at the time it was made.

At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese inflicted upon the United States a tactical reverse. But Japan made a fatal strategic blunder. Had they sought to accomplish their program of Southern expansion, without frontal assault upon American interest or territory, American entry into the war might have been in doubt for some considerable time. Our people were not united upon the issue of the advisability of American entrance into the world conflict. The blow at Pearl Harbor instantly unified the nation. It precipitated the nation into the world conflict. In the long run, it was bound to be a colossal blunder from the Japanese viewpoint. Responsible officers in the Pacific could not entirely exclude from their minds the fatal long term folly of such action by Japan. This was a factor that we discussed and weighed with other elements in evaluating the situation as Admiral Pye testified. This did not diminish our war readiness but it was bound to be a factor in any sober estimate of the situation. We did not know, of course, that Mr. Hull had told the Navy Department on or about December third, that he considered that the Japanese were in an irrational, mad dog state of mind.

From November 27th to December 7th, 1941, General Short and I conferred frequently. Present at these conferences were Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, my Chief of Staff; Captain C. H. [31] McMorris, my War Plans Officer; Captain Walter S. DeLany, my Operations Officer; and Read Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commandant 14th Naval District. Others who were probably present were Lieutenant Commander

Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, and Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, an assistant War Plans Officer in Charge of Marine Plans for outlying islands; also Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. Navy, my Aviation Aide; Rear Admiral Calhoun, Commander of the Base Force; Major General Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force; his aide; and General Short's aide.

Our relations then, as ever, were cordial and cooperative. One of my first acts after my appointment as Commander-in-Chief was to make a call upon General Short to establish our relations on that firm and friendly basis which characterized them throughout our tenures of office. On the afternoon of November 27th the Army despatch from the Chief of Staff to General Short was delivered to me by Captain J. B. Earle, USN, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff. On the same afternoon, I caused to be delivered to General Short a paraphrase of OP NAV secret despatch of that date. On November 28th the messages from the War and Navy Departments were discussed. We arrived at the conclusion at this and succeeding conferences that probable Japanese actions would be confined to the Far East with Thailand most probably and Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines the next most probable objectives in the order named. In general, we arrived at the conclusion that no immediate activity beyond possible sabotage was to be expected in Hawaii. I believe that at the conference of November 28th, some discussion arose as to what action the United States would take in case the Japanese attacked [32] Thailand, the Kra Peninsula and Malaya without making war upon the United States. We knew that Admiral Hart's staff in the Asiatic had held staff conferences with the British and the Dutch and that information had been exchanged. However, we had not been informed of what action was to be taken in case the British and Dutch were attacked and the Philippines were not attacked.

I was very much concerned over my orders not to take any hostile action and the emphasis placed upon this in both messages. I realized the enormous handicap this placed upon the Fleet. We had known many instances of the swift and deadly action of attacking aircraft both from the incidents in actual war abroad and in our own maneuvers. All of the information given us by the Navy Department and our estimates led to the conclusion that an air raid on Pearl Harbor was neither imminent nor probable. General Short and I had many times discussed the possibility of a surprise air attack against Pearl Harbor. We made frequent representations to Washington pointing out the inadequacy of the forces furnished to repel such an attack. Washington evidently discounted heavily the probability of an air attack against Hawaii for the means supplied to repel such an attack were inadequate up to and including December 7th.

Of course, it must not be overlooked that General Short's total concerns and duties did not completely dove-tail with mine. General Short was not charged with any joint responsibility with me for the operation of the Pacific Fleet. So far as the Navy's part in supporting the Army's defense of Pearl Harbor detailed plans were made by the Naval Base Defense Officer.

[33] Among the topics which were discussed at the conference with General Short to which I have referred, in addition to the despatches of November 27th were the following:

1. The defense of Pearl Harbor.
2. Garrisons and reliefs for the outlying islands.
3. The transfer of fighter pursuit planes to the outlying islands.
4. The transfer of flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines by way of Midway, Wake, Port Moresby and Darwin.
5. The development of alternative land plane route to Australia via Palmyra, Canton, Christmas, Samoa, Fiji, Noumea.

With regard to the defense of the base at Pearl Harbor, the evidence before this Court shows that the estimates and operating plans approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch had set forth in detail the steps to be taken by the Army and the Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor. The responsibility was fixed and the various elements of the Army and Navy knew their assigned tasks. The only action required was a decision to take one of the alerts or conditions of readiness. All available forces were to be employed.

So far as the Army was concerned I knew in general the measures adopted by General Short as a result of the despatch of November 27th. General Short had orders to report in detail to the Chief of Staff the measures he had taken. He did this. I knew he had orders to make such a report. General Short went on his alert No. 1 and I understand that through his liaison with the 14th Naval District, the Navy had formal information that he was on such an alert.

For the sake of rounding out the picture, the Court will note that on November 28th, General Short was sent a message [34] by the Adjutant General directing in effect that all necessary measures be taken to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage. The War Department knew he was on an alert against sabotage. Undoubtedly General Marshall satisfied the Robert's Commission by explaining, as he did before this Court, that General Short's reply to the War Department's despatch of November 27th was stapled to a message from the Philippines, which was on top of it, that he initialed the reply from the Philippines but did not initial the reply from General Short which he could not recall seeing. (See Record of this Court, p. 880). Under these circumstances, nothing is more fantastic than to attempt by some obscure reasoning to fasten upon the Comander-in-Cheif of the Pacific Fleet some criticism because General Short prescribed the form of alert which appeared to be required by his orders and with which the War Department was perfectly familiar and I might add, the Navy Department as well.

The Robert's Report specifically charges that General Short and I failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27th and to adopt and use the existing plans to meet the emergency. And again, "It was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of (the Commanders) not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities." I solemnly deny the truth of these charges. I am satisfied that the evidence before this Court establishes beyond doubt the inaccuracy of those charges. In fact the Court will find that the Roberts Report itself contains findings on this subject which are self-contradictory.

[35] General Short had every reason to know with reasonable accuracy the operation of distant air reconnaissance from Oahu. General Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force received a daily availability report of Navy planes and made a similar report to Admiral Bellinger. There were only six Army bombers on Oahu capable of performing distant reconnaissance, a fact specifically called to the attention of the Navy Department by me in a despatch of November 27th (Exhibit 76, Document 4). The Navy carried out a daily reconnaissance of the operating areas which was well known to General Short and Admiral Bloch.

On March 31, 1941, appropriate representatives of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands in cooperation and coordination of their activities, had executed a plan for the AIR DEFENSE of the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 53). This plan, Addendum I, to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, specifically discussed the possibility of a hostile air raid at dawn. Under the heading, "ACTION OPEN TO US" there is the following decision:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable, but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure can not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

This plan was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this decision. They had done nothing to change or alter the basic deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.

[36] There was no intelligence in the messages of November 27th or in later messages available to me and General Short to indicate that "a surface raid was probable within rather narrow time limits." (Exhibit 53, Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.) Our estimate of the situation, made after frank and full discussion of the intelligence we received with our staffs at the meetings I have referred to, was that an air raid on Oahu was neither probable nor imminent. The appropriate representatives of the Army and Navy in Hawaii had by a coordinated decision made months before, concluded that distant air reconnaissance through 360° could not be undertaken. The factors underlying this decision with respect to material and personnel had not changed. We had no basis for altering it on and after November 27th.

I knew the Army's portable radar sets were operable. Some months before General Short had informed me that he could give an all around coverage of at least 150 miles and probably 200 miles. The Army's aircraft warning service including the information net was still incomplete on December 7, 1941. Public telephones and special temporary communication methods were usable but slow and inefficient.

The failure to man the radar after 7:00 A. M. Sunday, 7 December was apparently due to a peculiar lapse. Prior to that date, these temporary stations had been working from about 4:00 in the morning carrying on training operations for the greater part of the day. Of course, the maintenance of aircraft warning service was specifically the Army's function. The unfortunate last minute deviation from

the apparent Army routine with respect to its operation was unknown to me.

[37] *Distant Reconnaissance:* To insure Pearl Harbor against a surprise attack from airplanes based on a fast carrier, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require about three times this number. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. 100 patrol planes would be required for the pool for this dawn patrol. This dawn patrol is necessary because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter, daily, many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Roughly speaking, in a 360 degree search of 800 miles radius in the Hawaiian area we cannot count, on an average, of more than a seventy-five percent coverage.

Any distant search which we could have made over an extended period would have been incomplete and ineffective.

The Roberts Report charges me with dereliction of duty for failure to operate a distant reconnaissance. Vice Admiral Bellinger has testified exhaustively on this subject. To discuss it in detail would involve repetition of statistics of available planes and operational problems now in evidence before the Court. Now it will suffice to say that Admiral Bellinger, charged with the direct responsibility of this phase of the Navy's participation in that defense, testified that with the material and personnel available any adequate search was impossible for more than a few days. For a period of ten days, as from 27 November until 7 December, approximately 30 planes were available for a 700 mile daily search—not an 800 mile search. This could at best cover about one-third of the 360 [38] degrees of the circumference. Such a search would be ineffective. Having covered the operating areas by air patrols, it was not prudent in my judgment and that of my staff, to fritter away our slim resources in patrol planes in token searches and thus seriously impair their required availability to carry out their functions with the Fleet under approved War Plans. I deny that the charge in the Roberts Report is supported by any rational and intelligent evidence before this Court.

I wish particularly to invite the attention of the Court to Fleet letter 2CL41 of 14 October 1941 (Exhibit 8). This letter deals with the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. It provides for all foreseeable contingencies. This, and other official documents, provided for the use of all available forces, both of the Army and the Navy in case of an attack on Pearl Harbor. As Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet I appreciated thoroughly the inadequacy of the forces available to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. By my orders, all naval forces in port at the time of an attack were made available and allocated to add to the forces defending Pearl Harbor.

I had many difficult decisions to make but none which required more accurate timing than the decision as to when to drastically curtail training and to utilize all my forces in the highest form of alert status. The warnings I received prior to 7 December 1941, were of such a nature that I felt training could still continue. I felt that I was en-

titled and would receive further warnings before the actual outbreak of war. I am convinced now that my estimate based upon the intelligence received was correct.

[39] An attempt is made to read into the phrase "War Warning" a significance broader than the specific intelligence which the message contained. I submit that it should not be construed as a "catch all" for the contingencies hindsight may suggest. The specific intelligence in the message did not indicate that an attack on the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. The rest of the dispatch after the phrase, "This is a war warning," at most states in substance that an attack is expected on the Philippines and some foreign territory in a few days. The edge of this message, so far as it affected the Philippines, was somewhat blunted by the passage of the few days without such an event and by the apparent continuing of negotiations during and after the next few days had passed.

The proper procedure for placing the fleets on a war basis is prescribed in Chapter II, section 2 of WPL46. This provides for mobilizing the fleet in whole or in part or for executing this war plan in whole or in part prior to a declaration of war. This prescribed procedure is definite and understandable, by all elements of the naval service. The prescribed procedure was not used prior to December 7, 1941.

In these circumstances I attempted to use the means at hand to take care of the most likely present dangers and the most probable future needs. I did not deem it wise, for reasons, I have pointed out at length, to expend at that time the limited number of patrol planes available in partial and ineffective distant reconnaissance. An attack in the localities indicated in the dispatch would require practically all types except submarines and I therefore directed extreme vigilance against submarine attack in the Hawaiian area. The promptness with [40] which the ships opened fire the morning of the Seventh speaks volumes for the readiness of the fleet in port.

In brief, in the light of the information I had, and the means at hand, I adopted the measures I did, not lightly, but in the exercise of my most considered judgment, supported and sustained by a group of distinguished and experienced officers who represented a cross-section of the best naval brains in the world. The subsequent accomplishments of these officers demonstrates their outstanding abilities.

So far, I have analyzed my actions in the light of the information which was available to me. But the Pearl Harbor incident can not be understood or accurately depicted without an account of the information which was available in the Navy Department and not given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

I knew nothing of the American note of November 26th to Japan. I did not know that the terms of that note were considered by some of the best informed officers in the Navy Department, to be utterly unacceptable to the Japanese, prior to any indication of the Japanese attitude after its receipt.

I was told on November 27 that "negotiations have ceased". However on November 28 a weaker statement of the status of negotiations was sent me by the Navy Department. This was the quotation of the Army dispatch, setting forth that "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with *only the barest pos-*

sibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue." From this point on, I was left on my own by the Department to get such information about official conversations with Japan as I could from the press and radio—a source which the Director of War Plans, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has testified he [41] deemed to be one of my most valuable sources of information regarding enemy "intentions and movements".

Contrast the information available to me in the Pacific, in this connection with the information available to responsible officers in the Navy Department in Washington, indeed with the information available the President and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

[a] **Statement of the Interested Party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N.**

[1] For these many days all of us have been striving to reconstruct the facts surrounding an unique event in the annals of the military history of our country—the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor early in the forenoon of December 7, 1941. It was a surprise to the nation. It was no less a surprise to every witness who has appeared before this Court.

The reconstruction of the situation, undertaken more than 2½ years later, is difficult. That it has been accomplished at all and so well reflects great credit on this Court and its Judge Advocate.

In attempting to assemble in proper relation parts of documents and recollections of varying degrees of clearness, our task has been far simpler than that of this Court. For the task of the Court is to fit all these pieces of evidence together so that the Court's findings will reconstruct the situation as it existed, and not as it may now appear to have been. Hindsight, acquired after the event, cannot be permitted to influence the factual reconstruction. Speculation now, 2½ years later, as to what any one believes he would have done at the time, should not distort our perspective.

It is quite certain that there is not a man in this room, who, granted the choice, would not have cheerfully traded his life to have prevented—indeed, even to have minimized—the tragic events of that forenoon. I do not believe that there was a naval officer of high or low rank at Pearl Harbor who would not have made the same choice.

Any criticism or blame, if there be any, must be predicated upon this difficult reconstruction which has been derived from memories blurred by the many war problems and circumstances occurring since December 7, 1941. It goes without saying, that the findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, which leads exclusively to and is consistent with but a single conclusion. We know the evils of drawing a critical inference from conflicting and unclear evidence, or in using one inference to support a further inference which then is not supported by any proof at all. Your report will be public opinion; public opinion can strip an individual of his reputation and his honor.

Hence, the preparation of your report is a serious duty and when completed and approved the Service, and ultimately the public, will recognize that “the moving finger writes, and having writ, moves on; nor all our piety nor wit shall lure it back to cancel half a line, nor all our tears wash out a word of it.”

[2] How then can we best aid the Court? Probably by attempting to recapture in proper perspective the condition of things at the time. It was 1940. The greatest military holocaust of history was blazing in Europe. The United States was formally at peace; but concerned by the repercussions from the dictators' victories in Europe, it had thrown, into this maelstrom on the side of those resisting the dictators, its full weight and such legislated help and resources as it could give or lend. The point of anxiety was Europe. The Japanese

American political and military situation then was not materially worse than it had been for some time—nor was it worse than it was to be at various times during 1941.

At that time, Rear Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. There, he was the head, as he was during the entire period, of the large and expanding industrial and service establishment at Pearl Harbor, confronted with administrative problems measurable only by the size of the enterprise and the tempo of its expansion. The United States Pacific Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.

The Army defenses of Oahu and the naval base, and the naval local defense forces were inadequate. They continued to be inadequate until after December 7, 1941.

Recognizing that he independently could not correct the situation, and that remedies could only come from an informed higher authority, the Commandant 14th Naval District on December 30, 1940, by confidential letter, communicated with the Navy Department, via the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson.¹ In considerable detail, he reviewed the matter of defenses of Pearl Harbor, pointed out its many substantial deficiencies, and recommended increases in types and numbers of A. A. guns, pursuit and patrol planes, vessels, and other craft for local defense forces, required for an adequate defense. He suggested in effect that in the high level discussions on this subject with the War Department nothing be done which might in any way destroy the cooperation between the Army and Navy in Hawaii.²

Not only were Rear Admiral Bloch's recommendations approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, but Admiral Richardson on January 7, 1941, vigorously endorsed them [13] to the Navy Department.³ It was following receipt of this letter that the Navy Department apprised the War Department of the gravity of the situation as to the defenses at Pearl Harbor in its letter of January 24, 1941.⁴ This was answered by the War Department February 7, 1941.⁵ And while the specific enumeration by the Commandant 14th Naval District of defense material required was not set forth in this high level correspondence, nor categorically insisted upon by the Navy Department,⁶ the representations of the War Department in this regard were accepted by the Navy Department.

So that the matter of the conditions of defenses at Pearl Harbor would not be minimized or unconsciously deferred in the high command because of the increasing gravity of European events, Rear Admiral Bloch from time to time during 1941 set forth in communications to the Navy Department, through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet the material and personnel conditions as he saw them, and requested remedial action.⁷ Admiral Kimmel saw to it

¹ Exhibit 28—Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCUS: SEE paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

² Exhibit 28—Confidential letter dated 30 December 1940 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCUS: SEE paragraph 11.

³ Exhibit 28—First endorsement by CINCPAC to Com 14 Confidential letter of 30 December 1940.

⁴ Exhibit 9—Secret letter dated 24 January 1941 from Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

⁵ Exhibit 24—Secret letter dated 7 February 1941 from Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy.

⁶ RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 743 to 760, page 172 to 175.

⁷ Exhibit 41—Confidential letter dated 7 May 1941 from Com 14 to CNO copy to CINCPAC: SEE paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6.

Exhibit 42—Secret letter dated 20 May 1941 from CINCPAC to CNO referencing among others Com 14 confidential letter of 7 May 1941 (Exhibit 41), Com 14 secret letter of 13

that this information and these recommendations went on to the Navy Department, with realistic and vigorous endorsements of the senior officer present, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.⁸ Consequently, the Navy Department was fully aware of the deficiencies in the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District and the [14] seriousness of the situation in general.⁹

This effort of the Commandant 14th Naval District to get that which he could not obtain independently is summed up in his letter of October 17, 1941, where he enumerated the meager local defense forces at hand, and recalled the British statement of the causes of their 1940 disasters epitomized as "too little—too late".¹⁰

It is significant that, right in the midst of the receipt of the dispatches, sometimes characterized as "warnings," namely those of October 16, November 24, 27, and 28, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District also received from the Navy Department under date of November 25, 1941, a reply to the Commandant 14th Naval District's October 17th letter, advising that there were no additional local defense forces available for the 14th Naval District—no surface craft—no aircraft.¹¹

It thus appears that, notwithstanding his efforts during the year to and including December 7, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District had as local defense forces: 4 old destroyers—which were being used on inshore patrol; 4 small minesweepers—which were engaged in sweeping channels; 3 Coast Guard cutters—which were engaged in patrolling off Honolulu in addition to performing their regular Coast Guard duties; and the old SACRAMENTO, which had neither fire power with which to fight nor speed with which to run.¹²

Reverting now to early 1941, a series of war plans were developed and issued by the Navy Department in cooperation with the War Department. These plans beginning with Rainbow 1, revised in particulars which do not concern us here, became Rainbow 5—WPL-46.¹³ To insure complete understanding, the Navy Department sent an informed officer out to Pearl Harbor and Manila so that the commanders-in-chief of the Pacific and Asiatic fleets would see and understand this war plan eye to eye with the Department.¹⁴ To be sure, this plan has little application to the Commandant 14th Naval District except in certain particulars.

May 1940, Com 14 secret letter of 31 October 1941 and Com 14 confidential letter of 30 December 1940 (Exhibit 28).

Exhibit 46—Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC together with first endorsement thereto of CINCPAC to CNO.

⁸ Exhibit 42—described in note 7 supra.

Exhibit 46—described in note 7 supra.

Exhibit 44—Annual report of CINCPAC to Secretary of the Navy via CNO dated 15 August 1941: SEE at page 20 under paragraph (3) "Hawaiian Area"—"Pearl Harbor"—subparagraphs a, b (1) (2) (3). (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 768, page 177).

Exhibit 10—Memorandum for Admiral Stark, signed H. E. Kimmel, dated 4 June 1941, copies to General Marshall, Admiral King, Admiral Towers: SEE paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. (Also appears: RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 70 and 71, pages 28 and 29).

⁹ Exhibit 45—Confidential letter dated August 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC.

Exhibit 47—Secret ltr. dated 25 November 1941 from CNO jointly to CINCPAC and Com 14 referencing among others Com 14 secret ltr. of 17 Oct. 1941 (Exhibit 46).

RECORD, witness KIMMEL—Q. 350 and 351, page 361.

¹⁰ Exhibit 46—described in note 7 supra.

¹¹ Exhibit 47—described in note 9 supra.

¹² RECORD, Witness STAR—Q. 774 to 776, page 180;

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 352, page 361;

Witness BLOCH—Q. 9, 10, 11, page 386.

¹³ Exhibit 4—WPL 46.

¹⁴ RECORD, Witness Stark—Q. 17, page 16.

[5] In the first place the plan provided a particular and definite procedure to be followed by the Navy Department in case of strained relations, whereby mobilization or partial mobilization might be effected prior to actual hostilities without authorizing acts of war by naval forces.¹⁵

The direction of mobilization or partial mobilization during a period of strained relations is an important means of effectuating the transition from peace to a war footing. By such directive for mobilization or partial mobilization, M-day is designated. Furthermore, many subsidiary plans become operative automatically on M-day.¹⁶

It now appears extremely unfortunate—that for reasons best known to the Navy Department, which was in possession of all available political and military information and intelligence—the established and well understood procedures for meeting conditions of strained relations between the United States and Japan, for designating M-day, and for placing all concerned on a full war footing,¹⁷ were not used.¹⁸ And yet, strangely enough, there have been implications during this inquiry that, because of these strained relations, and notwithstanding that only fragmentary information was available in Hawaii, nevertheless those in Pearl Harbor should have done those things which better informed higher authority did not find expedient to do.¹⁹ Howbeit—at no time prior to December 7, 1941, were these understood procedures used; the Rainbow plans were not executed; and M-day was not designated.¹⁸

In the second place, prior to December 7, 1941, it was necessary that local plans based upon the basic war plan be prepared and issued. In addition, by virtue of the general Army-Navy agreement for joint defense embodied in the publication Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935,²⁰ it was necessary that local plans based upon it be prepared and [6] issued. We have found that both of these requirements were accomplished by the joint promulgation in April 1941 of JCD-42 by Lieutenant General Short on the part of the Army and by Rear Admiral Bloch on the part of the Navy.²¹

It may be well to bear in mind that plans or no plans, whether executed or not, it had been, was then, and continued to be at all times the undiluted primary responsibility of the Army to defend and protect Pearl Harbor, from land, sea and air,²² so that the fleet might be rested, refitted, refueled and provisioned in security. It was never more than a limited responsibility of the Navy to support the Army with what it happened to have present at the base in case of attack.

¹⁵ Exhibit 4—WPL-46: SEE Chapter II Section 1 "Execution of the Entire Plan," paragraph 0211 a and b, page 6; SEE also Chapter II Section 2 "Execution of a Part of This Plan", paragraphs 0221, 0222, 0223, page 7.

¹⁶ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 780, 781, 782, page 181.

¹⁷ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 38, 39, 40, page 19; Q. 41, page 20.

¹⁸ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 44, page 21; Q. 387, page 102; Q. 799, page 184.

¹⁹ Witness DELANY—Q. 51, page 504.

²⁰ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 783, page 181; Q. 792, page 182; Q. 131, 132, page 797.

²¹ Witness INGERSOLL—Q. 127, page 845.

²² Exhibit 6—Publication "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935."

²³ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, and Fourteenth Naval District", original April 1941: SEE paragraph 2, "Basis", page 2.

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 211, page 260.

²⁴ Exhibit 6—"Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935"—SEE paragraph a (2), heading "General Functions of the Army in Peace and War."

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 45, page 227.

Witness STARK—Q. 824 and 825, page 188.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 7, page 385 (A).

Witness MARSHALL—Q. 12, page 855; Q. 34, page 863.

To return, this plan JCD-42 was based upon and was in conformity with the Rainbow war plan.²¹ And, as we have seen, it encompassed those principles and measures stated in Joint Action which had applicability to the defense of the Hawaiian area.²³ JCD-4 set forth with particularity the individual tasks of the Army and Navy, the joint ones, and the particular defense measures which each service engaged to perform *if, as, and when* this plan JCD-42 was executed.²⁴ So in this matter, the Commandant 14th Naval District fully satisfied the local burden indicated in both the war plan and Joint Action in respect of the preparation of local plans. Local plans had been prepared.²⁵

[I] And now a third consideration. Were they proper plans? Most assuredly. They were approved by Lieutenant General Short, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department²⁶—and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet—Admiral Kimmel.²⁷ They were then transmitted to the Navy Department, and the joint air defense plans were so well regarded that they were sent out by the Department to other commands.²⁸ These plans were not materially changed after December 7, 1941.²⁹

The activation of JCD-42 was contingent upon the designation of M-day or the agreement of the local commanders. And like the war plans, JCD-42 could be executed by the common action of the War and Navy Departments.³⁰

And that brings us to a fourth consideration. It has been implied in some of the questions asked before the Court that the local commander of the Navy ought to have placed JCD-42 in execution prior to December 7, 1941. Now, when it is considered that, notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have executed the war plan in whole or in part which would have automatically executed JCD-42—but did not do so—and notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Departments could have designated M-day which would have automatically executed JCD-42—but did not do so—and notwithstanding the fact that the War and Navy Department could have independently executed JCD-42³¹—but did not do so—it is obvious that no responsible person in Hawaii would have reason then and there to place JCD-42 in execution. And when we go down the chain of command as far as Rear Admiral Bloch, in view of the command relations existing at the time in Pearl Harbor, and in view of the circumstances just reviewed, any implication that he ought to have, or could have, put JCD-42 in execution is not reasonable. And the same can be said for establishment of unity of command for which [8] a well understood *modus operandi* had been promulgated.³²

²³ Aside from comparison of Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7, SEE also RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 200 to 208, page 259.

²⁴ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, described in note 21 supra: SEE—For Army see paragraph 17, page 9; for Navy see paragraph 18, page 10.

²⁵ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, described in note 21 supra.

Exhibit 23—containing annexes to JCD-42.

²⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 15, page 211.

²⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 96, page 302 at 6th line from top page 303.

²⁸ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 68, page 28; A. 268, page 82.

²⁹ RECORD, Witness KITTS—Statement page 527.

Witness SHORT—Q. 87, 88, page 234.

³⁰ Exhibit 7—JCD-42: SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8.

RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 212 and 213, page 260.

³¹ Exhibit 7—JCD-42: SEE paragraph (2), middle page 8.

RECORD, witness STARK—Q. 777 to 782, page 181.

Witness SHORT—Q. 212 and 213, page 260.

³² RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 67, page 27 and 28, specifically paragraph 9 b (1) (2) and (3), page 28; Q. 73 and 74, page 29; Q. 817 to 823, page 187 and 188.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 75 to 77, page 296.

Witness SHORT—Q. 7, page 220.

Witness INGERSOLL—Q. 140, page 848.

Now a fifth consideration. In anticipation of possible execution of these plans, there was a need for drills, the correction of defects, and the making of improvements. Furthermore, material deficiencies must be noted and competent authority informed of conditions, to the end that corrective action could be initiated. This was done.³³ In similar anticipation, cooperation between Army and Navy should be genuine and complete. This it was.³⁴ Each of these things were continuing procedures—not only at the level of Rear Admiral Bloch, but in the higher and lower naval commands in the Hawaiian area as well.³⁵

This brings us to a sixth matter. On July 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a directive³⁶ whereby certain organizational and command relations were changed. This resulted in a number of things, the most important being, first, notwithstanding General Order No. 143 establishing the organization of the naval forces, the Naval Coastal Frontier forces would not be formed;³⁷ and, second, in addition to General Order No. 142, under which the Commandant 14th Naval District became an officer of the fleet under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch as the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and the local defense forces became subject to the [9] orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet "in all circumstances."³⁸ The net effect of all this was that if there had existed a suggestion that, in defense and military matters, Rear Admiral Bloch had a status independent of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, there was no doubt that from the date of the directive, July 1, 1941, he was a direct subordinate³⁹ of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from February 1941 to and including December 7, 1941, except for a few days in the summer and early fall, was physically present and ashore at Pearl Harbor.⁴⁰

While, as we have seen, JCD-42 was never made operational prior to December 7, 1941, and as the expression "distant reconnaissance" does not elsewhere appear in the documents before the Court, it may be discussed here. We should keep clearly in mind that in no directive or executed operational procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was there any duty or responsibility prescribed in relation to Rear Admiral Bloch in any capacity to conduct "distant reconnaissance." "Distant reconnaissance" was set forth *only* in JCD-42 as a measure to be undertaken *if, as, and when* JCD-42 became operational.⁴¹

³³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 18, page 388.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 80, 81, 82, 83, page 592.

³⁴ RECORD, Witness DELANY—Q. 68, page 507.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 23, page 936.

³⁵ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 72, page 232; Q. 183, page 257.

Witness ROCHEFORT—Q. 5, page 471.

³⁶ Exhibit 4—WPL-46—(appearing as 9th page from cover page—not numbered) Directive dated July 1, 1941 from CNO to Distribution List for WPL-46—serial 071912, subject "The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers."

³⁷ RECORD, Witness STAR—Also appears: Q. 111 and 112, pages 39 and 41.

³⁸ Exhibit 4—Described in note 36 supra: SEE specifically at paragraph 4, first sentence, of CNO directive dated July 1, 1941.

³⁹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 324, page 358.

⁴⁰ Exhibit 4—Described in note 36 supra. SEE: specifically at paragraph 3 of CNO directive dated 1 July 1941, which by its terms puts into effect at that time certain parts of WPL-46 (Exhibit 4), and specifically those concerning command relations in Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, at pages 36 and 37, which are paragraphs 3241 and 3242 as applies to Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Exhibit 1—General Order No. 142.

Exhibit 2—General Order No. 143.

⁴¹ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 17, page 388.

⁴² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 261 to 266, pages 349-350.

⁴³ Exhibit 7—JCD-42—SEE paragraph 18 i, page 10, providing for "distant reconnaissance" which by paragraph (2), middle of page 8, becomes operational on M-day or when the plan or part of it was executed.

The essence of the "distant reconnaissance" matter is this.⁴² Rear Admiral Bloch as Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Naval Base Defense Officer, or under any of his titles, did not have and never did have any long range planes under his direct command.⁴³ While he had requested a firm force of patrol planes in order that his local defense forces might be adequate to the tasks with which they would be confronted,⁴⁴ he never did get them.⁴⁵ The only [10] planes suitable for distant reconnaissance existent in the Hawaiian area during the entire period in question prior to December 7th were 81 patrol planes encompassed in the Fleet Patrol Wings ONE and TWO and at the same time comprising Task Force NINE, plus 6 or 8 Army B-17's.⁴⁶ The Army bombers never were under Navy command⁴⁷ except for drills, because the shift of those B-17's from Army to Navy command under plans approved by higher authority never was to occur, unless and until the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was to become an actual force in being under Rear Admiral Bellinger as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, *at the time and only at the time* that the Naval Base Defense Air Force was activated.⁴⁸

The naval patrol planes—the 81—not all of which ever were at any time simultaneously capable of "distant reconnaissance"—were a part of the fleet. As such, they were under the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger, either as Commander Patrol Wing TWO or as Commander Task Force NINE. Except upon activation for air raid drills, those planes never became a part of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. It had never been planned or intended that activation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force should occur, unless and until there was a hostile air attack,⁴⁹ or until there was positive information of the immediate imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor within narrow time limits, i. e., "threat of hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action."⁵⁰ Prior to December 7, 1941, there never was an attack, nor did [11] there exist positive information of the immediate imminence of an attack on Pearl Harbor.⁵¹ Thus, prior

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 312, page 356.

⁴² RECORD, Witness BELLINGER—Q. 2, page 660 to 664.

Witness McMORRIS—Q. 22, page 890.

⁴³ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 775, page 180.

⁴⁴ Exhibit 46—Secret letter dated 17 October 1941 from Com 14 to CNO via CINCPAC: SEE paragraph 4.

⁴⁵ Exhibit 47—Secret letter dated 25 November 1941 from CNO to CINCPAC and Com 14; SEE paragraph 5 (e).

⁴⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 23, page 222 at lines 18 to 21, page 223; Q. 65, page 230.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 43, page 583.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 46, page 676.

⁴⁷ RECORD, Witness PHILLIPS—Q. 52, page 483.

Witness SHORT—Q. 59, page 230.

⁴⁸ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 5 and 6, page 575; Q. 37 to 39, page 581-582.

⁴⁹ Exhibit 8—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941. Exhibit 23—Enclosure B "addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41", SEE page 4 at Section IV, heading "Action Open to Us", paragraph (a) and page 5 at paragraph (e), also pages 5-6 at Section V, heading "Decisions" paragraphs 2 (a) (1) (2) and 2 (b) (1) (2)—(Note same document appears in Exhibit 53).

⁵⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 57, page 289—last sentence bottom of page.

⁵¹ Exhibit 23—Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, JCD-42; SEE Article II, paragraph 2, page 1.

RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 77, page 591; Q. 85, page 592.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 66 to 69, page 678.

⁵¹ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 601, page 154.

to December 7, 1941, except for simulated emergencies, that is drills, the Army bombers and the naval patrol planes were never a part of any continuing firm Naval Base Defense Air Force.⁵² Hence, except for drills, these planes capable of long range reconnaissance were never under Rear Admiral Bellinger in his capacity as Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.⁵³ Consequently, neither he nor the planes were ever under command of Rear Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer or under his command in any capacity, except at planes.⁵⁴

For these same reasons, the smaller aircraft, the short legged planes, the remaining naval shore based aircraft, had a similar status, and were circumscribed by the same restrictions of activation and employment in the naval Base Defense Air Force as were the long range planes.⁵⁵

Prior to December 7, 1941, there never were enough planes, crews or spare parts, to establish and continue a daily distant reconnaissance over a protracted period.⁵⁶ Furthermore, high authority had put all the available long range naval planes in Task Force NINE some weeks prior to December 7, 1941, under Rear Admiral Bellinger.⁵⁷ Task Force NINE had been assigned directly certain missions, one being "to conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in order to improve security of fleet units and bases."⁵⁸ High authority had approved the [I] operating, expansion training, intertype training, and upkeep schedules for the period on and after November 15, 1941, for these patrol planes;⁵⁹ high authority had decided not to interrupt training,⁶⁰ and had determined, and I quote, that "a continuous patrol over long periods of time was out of the question."⁶¹

"Distant reconnaissance", insofar as Rear Admiral Bloch is concerned, under whatever title you consider him, can be summarized thus:—he had no planes for distant reconnaissance, and he had no surface vessels to accomplish it otherwise.⁶² Having no information over and above or differing from that of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁶³ he had no basis for dissenting from the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief in regard to distant reconnaissance. Fi-

⁵² RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 69 to 72, page 398-399.

⁵³ RECORD, Witness BELLINGER—Q. 2, page 660.

⁵⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 297, page 354.

⁵⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 14, page 277; Q. 73, page 295; Q. 290 to 294, page 353.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 113, page 685.

⁵⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 156, page 329; Q. 286 and 287, page 353.

Witness DELANY—Q. 25, page 499.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 59, page 538.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 44, page 583; Q. 72, page 590.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 36, page 672.

⁵⁸ Exhibit 52—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 dated October 31, 1941, effective 15 November 1941: SEE page 2, heading "Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)".

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 272 and 280, page 351.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 125 to 130, page 599.

⁵⁹ Exhibit 52—14CL-41—described in note 57 supra: SEE top of page 3.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 285, page 352.

⁶⁰ Exhibit 52—14CL-41—described in note 57 supra: SEE at page 4, paragraph 11.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 288 and 289, page 353.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 131 to 133, page 600.

⁶¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43 at page 285, last sentence of answer; Q. 295 and 296, page 353.

⁶² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43, page 284, at line 8 of answer.

⁶³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 310, page 356.

RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 35 and 38, page 281; Q. 102 to 104, page 304.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 38, page 393; Q. 39 and 44, page 394.

nally, Rear Admiral Bloch had neither authority,⁶⁴ nor reason—there being no hostile air attack nor positive information of the imminence of one within narrow time limits⁶⁵—to independently direct the activation of the Naval Base Defense Air Force contrary to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁶⁶ or the requirements of the operating and training schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who was the immediate superior in command.⁶⁷

And that brings us to the matter of conditions of readiness for both ships and aircraft. While something more will be said later about it, we do know this: first, existing conditions of readiness conformed to the state required by operating, training, upkeep and employment schedules approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, [13] and were sensible and appropriate for these purposes;⁶⁸ second, a protracted state of complete readiness to meet a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor would have completely disrupted training, upkeep, and maintenance;⁶⁹ and third, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had made and maintained unaltered his decision to make no changes in his schedules and to continue such training.⁷⁰ Without quibbling as to whether Rear Admiral Bloch's authority was that of "advising" or "prescribing" conditions of readiness,⁷¹ he neither possessed any information or intelligence over and above that possessed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,⁶³ who was present at the time; nor did he possess information or intelligence that would lead, or for that matter logically should have led, him to differ from the decisions made.

And here it may be well to examine the matter of the submarine reported by the WARD immediately prior to the air attack on December 7th. First, there had been many false contacts in the Hawaiian area. Next, on 27 November 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had directed the depth charging of any submarine running submerged outside the sanctuaries and not accompanied by a surface guard vessel.⁷² The WARD was operating under such orders.⁷³ Finally, no one ashore prior to the air attack knew whether a real submarine had actually been seen, nor did anyone ashore know whose submarine it was. Nor did anyone ashore know if the submarine had attacked the WARD, or whether pursuant to standing orders the WARD had made a sound contact and had depth charged the area.⁷⁴ The later information from the WARD that it was towing in a sampan [14] to Honolulu did not contribute to clarifying the occurrence. Now, what was done about it? The WARD's message

⁶⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 411, page 374; Q. 446, page 380.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 89, page 402.

⁶⁵ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 601, page 154.

⁶⁶ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 77, page 400.

⁶⁷ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 135, page 600.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 7, page 665; Q. 54 to 61, page 677.

⁶⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 19, 20, 21, 22, page 390.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 102, page 547.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 91, page 594.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 65, page 678.

⁶⁹ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 90, page 593.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 25, page 669; Q. 64, page 678; Q. 75, page 679.

⁷⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 43 at page 285; last sentence of answer; Q. 295 and 296, page 353.

⁷¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 45, page 285; Q. 46, 47, 48, page 286; Q. 365 to 368, page 364 and 365.

⁷² RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 600, page 154, line 13 of answer.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 90 at last sentence, bottom page 300.

⁷³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 46, page 395.

⁷⁴ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 173, page 332.

was transmitted to the headquarters of both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District. A senior officer of the 14th Naval District went to headquarters to investigate and verify the situation, and in accordance with doctrine, immediately sent the ready duty destroyer to back up the WARD. Before the situation could be clarified, the air attack was on. The soundness of the "doctrine" was proven, inasmuch as the ready duty destroyer while proceeding out of harbor sank an enemy submarine.⁷⁵ On this matter of the WARD's contact, it is certain no one could have done more and it is probable some might have done less. But you can be sure that, at that time and upon the facts then at hand, no one reasonably would have or should have been expected to sound an air raid alarm.

There has been testimony concerning letter 2CL-41, revised, of October 14, 1941,⁷⁶ which in various places mentions the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commandant 14th Naval District as Naval Defense Officer. Terming Rear Admiral Bloch "Naval Base Defense Officer" does not make his duties something more than or different from the particular duties as stated in 2CL-41.⁷⁷ The expression "Naval Base Defense Officer" is just a name, and abbreviating it to initial letters as N. B. D. O. neither expended nor contracted the duties of Rear Admiral Bloch.

When we consider the particular provisions of Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41, revised, and what was done about them prior to December 7, 1941, the essential facts are these:⁷⁸

As to paragraph 3 (A), "Continuous Patrols,"—To the extent of material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did administer and furnish the instore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor patrol.⁷⁹

As to paragraph 3 (B) (3)—To the extent of material at hand, the Commandant 14th Naval District did operate the mine sweepers.

The discussion of torpedo baffles may here be mentioned. This subject was [15] considered fully both in Pearl Harbor and in the Navy Department. On the basis of the best technical advice available in the Department—which in effect was that aerial torpedoes could not be successfully launched in depths obtaining in Pearl Harbor—the action taken by those at Pearl Harbor seemed correct at the time.⁸⁰ The Department was informed of that action. It is safe to say that, if the Navy Department at any time prior to December 7, 1941, had known that aerial torpedoes could be successfully launched in Pearl Harbor, or had believed that baffles were advisable,

⁷⁵ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 86, page 401; Q. 94, page 403.

⁷⁶ Exhibit 8—Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2LC-41 (revised) dated 14 Oct. 1941.

⁷⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 11, page 276.

⁷⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 18, page 388 to 390.

⁷⁹ RECORD, Witness PYE—Q. 9, page 418.

⁸⁰ Exhibit 49—Confidential Letter CNO to CINCPAC, copy to CINCLANT, CINCAF, dated 15 February 1941.

Exhibit 54—Confidential Letter CNO to Commandants of Naval Districts, copies to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 17 February 1941.

Exhibit 55—Confidential Letter CNO to Commandant of Naval Districts, copies to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, etc., dated 13 June 1941.

RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 41, page 394; Q. 139, page 410.

Witness PYE—Q. 83, page 436.

Witness DELANY—Q. 15, page 498.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 22, page 669.

the Navy Department would have directed their shipment and installation.⁸¹

Reverting to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (a) of 2CL-41, "Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack"—This was effectuated by an agreement in regard to the use of Army planes by the Navy and naval planes by the Army in case of attack, which agreement was implemented by holding frequent drills, determining difficulties, and applying remedies. Further, any Marine anti-aircraft artillery present was made available to the Army, under the designated Army command.⁸² The Army was assisted in their training of aircraft warning service men by sending them to the Fleet for instruction.

Rather confused mention has been made of some kind of Navy liaison officer in connection with the air raid warning service, which was a responsibility of the Army.⁸³ General Short asked the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for such a liaison officer on August 7, 1941, and on August 19, 1941,⁸⁴ Commander Curts was designated as such [16] liaison officer. In addition to that, we know that Commander Taylor transiently present, was detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with the Army on aircraft warning system matters.⁸⁵ Finally, the provision for a Navy liaison officer that Lieutenant General Short had written in his tentative operating procedure never became effective because the system was never officially established,⁸⁶ nor did General Short ever order it established. In this matter of a Navy liaison officer—who was only a facility for the exchange of information⁸⁷—sight should not be lost of the fact that several liaison officers from the various Army commands were required to be present when the AWS was established,⁸⁸ and we know positively that on December 6-7, 1941, none were there.⁸⁹ The only Army officer on duty that morning was a then First Lieutenant Tyler, who, inexperienced and without benefit of instruction from the Army, had been stationed in the Army's aircraft warning service information control center, for the second time in his life—for a few hours self-training.⁹⁰ The plain fact of the matter is that the Army's AWS was in a very limited training status, and not at all on an operating basis up to and including December 7, 1941.⁹¹

Reverting to 2CL-41, paragraph 3(G) (6) (b). "Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced"—Actually the matter of shore based anti-aircraft guns was the exclusive responsibility of the Army.⁹² However, in carrying out his coordination duties, about February 20, 1941, the Commandant 14th Naval District had a conference with Lieutenant General Short and emphasized the necessity of emplacing the mobile anti-aircraft guns in the field. On February 23rd,

⁸¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 65 and 66, page 291 to 293.

⁸² RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 194 to 197, page 258.

⁸³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 344, page 360.

⁸⁴ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 222 to 230; pages 261 and 262.

⁸⁵ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 11, page 611; Q. 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, page 622.

⁸⁶ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 233 and 234, pages 262 and 263.

⁸⁷ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 74, page 620.

⁸⁸ RECORD, Witness TAYLOR—Q. 19 and 21, page 612.

⁸⁹ RECORD, Witness TYLER—Q. 14, page 447.

⁹⁰ RECORD, Witness TYLER—Q. 7, 11, 14, page 447; Q. 36, 37, page 450; Q. 69, page 453.

⁹¹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 27, page 224; Q. 105, page 238.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 24, 25, page 391.

Witness TAYLOR—Q. 80, page 621.

⁹² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 343, page 360.

the Commandant 14th Naval District was informed by the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department that Lieutenant General Short had given orders that the mobile anti-aircraft artillery be kept in place as close to their point of emplacement as possible, having due regard for the ownership of land. In [17] the intervening period until October, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally examined the plans for the location of all Army anti-aircraft weapons that were to be emplaced, particularly those that were to be sited on naval reservations. Subordinates of the Commandant 14th Naval District were in constant touch with Army representatives, endeavoring to have guns emplaced. Actually, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy was making plans to mess and quarter Army gun crews on naval reservations so that Army objections would be removed.⁹³ At some date between October 15th and November 1st, or thereabouts, the Commandant 14th Naval District personally talked to Lieutenant General Short about this matter. General Short advised that he could not emplace these guns for several reasons, namely, the sites were not on Government land, their communications would have to be out in the open—usually in cane fields and irrigation ditches—and subject to deterioration, and that it would be extremely difficult for the personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted. There were approximately 30 3-inch anti-aircraft guns in fixed emplacements, about 20 of them being in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.⁹⁴

As to paragraph 3(G) (6) (c), "Exercise supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy"—The matter of joint air operations has been heretofore discussed in detail. In addition—the Commander Patrol Wing TWO was a flyer, was senior aviation officer present ashore, and as such, understood all the technicalities and was qualified to command aircraft forces. Control was exercised through him and coordination with the Army was planned and practiced in drills. Detailed operating plans were prepared.⁹⁵ Drills were held, difficulties discovered, and improvements made.

On paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (1), "Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense by advising the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain"—In addition to the previous remarks on condition of readiness—We know that arrangements for antiaircraft [18] fire had been established by the Fleet;⁹⁶ sector and sector commanders had been designated.⁹⁷ Furthermore, as to general conditions of readiness during the period prior to December 7, 1941, they were as we now know something higher than Condition III.⁹⁸ It was believed by the Commander-in-

⁹³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 24 and 25, page 417.

⁹⁴ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 2, 3, 4, 5, page 412, 413.

⁹⁵ Exhibit 7—JCD-42, Annex VII.

Exhibit 53—Operational Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941: SEE Annex B, Base Defense Air Force Plan.

⁹⁶ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 18, page 278.

⁹⁷ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 346, page 360.

Witness PYE—Q. 11, page 419; Q. 21, page 422.

Witness KITTS—Q. 77, page 523.

⁹⁸ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 19, page 278.

Witness PYE—Q. 14, page 419; Q. 15, 16, page 420; Q. 18, 19, page 422; Q. 66, page 433.

Witness KITTS—Q. 11, 12, 13, 14, page 513.

Chief, Pacific Fleet, to be sufficient.⁹⁹ Communication channels had been provided whereby this measure could be quickly effected. Anti-sabotage measures had long been in effect. Having no information other than that had by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and having no information that would lead the Commandant, 14th Naval District, to differ with the decisions in this respect made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, no change in existing conditions of readiness was advised.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (2), "Hold necessary drills"—Drills were held weekly until autumn, when they were changed to be held every two weeks and in these bi-weekly drills arrangements were made to always have the Army participate. Prior to changing to bi-weekly drills, difficulty had been experienced in obtaining Army participation and also, due to their frequency, there were absentees. The bi-weekly drills were always arranged well in advance and insured the Army participation and everybody being in each drill.¹⁰⁰

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (3), "Giving alarms for: attack, black-out signal, all clear signal"—Procedures had been established and drills had. All signals were contained in the communication annex to the operating plan.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (4), "Informing the task force commander at sea of the type of attacking aircraft"—This was practiced in all drills and a communication channel was provided for the purpose.

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (5), "Arranging communication plan"—A communication plan was promulgated prior to December 7th, and was used in drills.¹⁰¹

As to paragraph 3 (G) (6) (d) (6), "Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed"—the air alarm signal prescribed was contained in the communication plan.

[19] The remaining occasions in 2CL-41 where either the Commandant 14th Naval District or the Naval Base Defense Officer is mentioned, have no bearing on the matter in hand, because those instances were not responsibilities and could not become responsibilities until an attack in fact had taken place. We know that at the time of attack they were done in the way and at the time they should have been.¹⁰²

That these duties of coordination and preparation were conscientiously attended to is made quite evident from the testimony¹⁰³ and plans promulgated on this subject which are contained in Exhibit 53.¹⁰⁴ And these had the approval of Rear Admiral Bloch's immediate superior in command, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,¹⁰⁵ on the spot at the time.

⁹⁹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 27, page 280; Q. 143, page 326.

¹⁰⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 74, page 296.

¹⁰¹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 28, page 225.

¹⁰² RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 23, page 390.

Witness RAMSEY—Q. 57, page 586.

¹⁰³ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 15, page 387; Q. 16, page 388.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 48 and 49, page 944.

¹⁰⁴ Exhibit 53—Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941.

ANNEX A—Inshore Patrol Plan.

ANNEX B—Base Defense Air Force Plan with Addendum I, Joint Estimate. Addendum II, Aircraft Readiness.

ANNEX C—Anti-aircraft Defense Plan.

ANNEX D—Harbor Control Post Plan.

ANNEX E—Communication Plan.

¹⁰⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 202, page 338-339.

In connection with this assigned task of Rear Admiral Bloch, which Admiral Kimmel has summarized as "coordinating the naval effort with the Army,"¹⁰⁶ there is considerable and detailed testimony as to the cordial, frequent and intimate conferences and discussions on matters of defense that took place during the period between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short and their respective staffs.¹⁰⁷ There is no gainsaying the fact that each headquarters knew its opposite problems, conditions, policies, and views.¹⁰⁸ Frequently, Rear Admiral Bloch was present at such conferences,¹⁰⁹ or if not present was presumed to be later informed of what was considered pertinent to him.

[20] By close and frequent personal contact¹¹⁰ and exchange of information with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch naturally came to know his wishes, policies, views and decisions as to the current tasks and problems.¹¹¹

The measure of performance of Rear Admiral Bloch's duties and responsibilities can best be summarized in the words of the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I quote: "was in general satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief . . . If it had not been so performed, I would not have hesitated at any time to call his attention to the fact.¹¹² . . . under the handicaps which he was laboring, I considered his performance of duty highly satisfactory."¹¹³

On December 7, 1941, the practical planning, the training and the drilling, all designed to assure that the initiation of defense measures would be automatic¹¹⁴—the development of a high state of discipline and morale—and the material upkeep—each paid substantial dividends.

And that brings us to one final thing that might pertain to Rear Admiral Bloch, namely the various dispatches of the Navy Department from October 16, 1941 on. While they were not all addressed to him, he did see them or come to know of their contents. Others did the same.¹¹⁵ In discussing these dispatches in relation to Rear Admiral Bloch, the question may be asked: Why did not Rear Admiral Bloch interpret these dispatches differently from the others at Pearl Harbor? Disposition of this question has been made amply by evidence before this Court. In the first place, there was nothing in these messages which so much as implied an air attack on Pearl Harbor, for the very good reason that even the originators of the dispatches had no such suspicion.¹¹⁶ [21] In the second place, although other specific

¹⁰⁶ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 386, page 369; Q. 392, 393, 394, page 370, 371, 372.

¹⁰⁷ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 10, 11, page 221; Q. 124, 125, page 242; Q. 152, page 250.

Witness PYE—Q. 111, page 441.

Witness KIMMEL—Q. 39, page 282; Q. 40, page 283; Q. 380, page 367.

Witness PHILLIPS—Q. 32, 36, page 481; Q. 154, page 494.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 52, page 536.

¹⁰⁸ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 40 and 42, page 283; Q. 69, page 294; Q. 106, page 304; Q. 229, page 344.

¹⁰⁹ RECORD, Witness SHORT—Q. 8 and 9, page 220.

¹¹⁰ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 32 to 34, page 392.

¹¹¹ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 250 to 262, page 348 to 349.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 60 to 63, page 397.

¹¹² RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 44, page 285.

¹¹³ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 471 and 472, page 384.

¹¹⁴ RECORD, Witness RAMSEY—Q. 84, page 592.

Witness BELLINGER—Q. 70, 71, 72, page 679.

¹¹⁵ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 240 to 259, page 348 to 349.

Witness PYE—Q. 63, 64, page 432; Q. 77, page 435.

¹¹⁶ RECORD, Witness STARK—Q. 142, 143, page 799.

Witness INGERSOL—Q. 136, page 847; Q. 137, page 848.

Witness MARSHALL—Q. 31, 32, page 863.

geographic objectives are mentioned, never in any dispatch is the Hawaiian area so designated. Nor do the dispatches designate M-day, nor do they direct total or partial execution of the Rainbow plan. So far as Rear Admiral Bloch was concerned, it is beside the point that during the critical period before December 7, 1941, there existed in the Navy Department a considerable volume of positive, specific information, because the Commandant 14th Naval District never received any such information. None of the dispatches to Pearl Harbor gave sufficient information upon which evaluations could be made and all evaluations sent by the Navy Department related to either general possibilities, or specified the scene of probable Japanese activities to be in the Far East. The Commandant 14th Naval District's opinion was that an air attack by the Japanese in the Hawaiian area prior to a declaration of war was a remote possibility,¹¹⁷ and he believed that attack would be made in order of probability as follows:¹¹⁸ (1) submarine attack against ships in operating areas, security against which was in effect; (2) blocking Pearl Harbor entrance channel, security against which was in effect; (3) laying magnetic or other mines off the entrance channel and in the approaches to the entrances to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu, security against which was in effect; (4) sabotage, security against which was in effect. As to surprise air attack prior to the declaration of war, he considered it a remote possibility,¹¹⁷ and even for this he had prepared defense plans and held drills. And finally, Rear Admiral Bloch lived in the same atmosphere, saw the same conditions, was at the same remote distance, had the same horizon and had the same dependency upon the Navy Department.¹¹⁹ He had neither information nor prophetic vision that would lead him to any different opinion from that of his immediate superior in command, nor from that of Lieutenant General Short, nor that of the informed task force commanders, nor of those of responsible officers on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.¹²⁰

[22] I have addressed myself to the consideration of all those matters which, as far as I can recall, might, however remotely, be associated with Rear Admiral Bloch. If during your deliberations some question arises which touches upon him, I feel assured that you will be able to satisfactorily dispose of it from the evidence before you. During the period in question Rear Admiral Bloch did not seek to avoid responsibilities which were his. He does not do so now. With what he had at the time, Rear Admiral Bloch did all that anyone could do. Of the courses of action open to him, he took those prompted by good judgment—and he fully and conscientiously performed his every duty.

C. C. BLOCH.

¹¹⁷ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 40, page 394; Q. 136, 137, page 409.

¹¹⁸ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 138, page 409.

¹¹⁹ RECORD, Witness BLOCH—Q. 141, page 410.

¹²⁰ RECORD, Witness KIMMEL—Q. 112, page 306; Q. 151, page 327; Q. 456, page 381.

Witness DELANY—Q. 9, 10, 11, page 497; Q. 62, 63, 64, page 506.

Witness W. W. SMITH—Q. 35 to 40, page 533-534; Q. 91, page 545; Q. 153; page 561.

Witness BLOCH—Q. 133, 134, 135, page 409.

Witness McMORRIS—Q. 18, page 889; Q. 61, page 900.

Witness LAYTON—Q. 40, page 911; Q. 47, page 912; Q. 70, page 917.

Witness CALHOUN—Q. 21, page 935; Q. 31 and 34, page 938; Q. 37, page 939.

[TOP SECRET]

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY
CONVENED AT THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVYTO INQUIRE INTO THE ATTACK MADE BY JAPANESE ARMED FORCES ON
PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

24 July 1944

NOTICE

The pages included in this binder are classified as "Top-Secret" and by orders of the Secretary of the Navy are not to be inserted in the original record nor is the information contained therein to be released to any person whatsoever, until specific authorization has been granted for such insertion or such release by the Secretary of the Navy. This action has been taken in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

Extracted part of the record containing proceedings relative to a statement by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), page 58-A.

[58-A] With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), made the following statement: In the report submitted by Admiral Hart I learned—that is, in the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, on page 429—that he knew of a special Japanese code by means of which, on or about December 4, 1941, he learned the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States.

The statement was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that the evidence referred to might be introduced before the court in the regular manner.

With the permission of the court, the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that his purpose in making the statement was only to show the reason why he had been endeavoring to obtain access to the secret messages in the Navy Department, and to appeal to the court for assistance in obtaining such access.

The judge advocate withdrew his objection.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 159-A through 162.

[159-A] 633. Q. On or about November 12, 1941, did you receive information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as an absolute immovable deadline for the negotiations then being conducted between Japan and America?

A. No; I don't remember that. I remember something about a date and then postponing it, but the details of that I have forgotten,

and I have not refreshed on it. There was, I believe, a postponement, but I have forgotten the deadline, and remember only that there was a deadline.

634. Q. Would it refresh your memory if I told you that Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, testified before Admiral Hart on Page 358 of the transcript of the record—

A. What record are you referring to?

635. Q. The Hart record.

This question was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that it was an attempt to show in the form of a question that there was certain evidence before the Hart examination, what the evidence was, and the fact that the evidence was given under oath.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), replied.

The court announced that the objection was sustained.

636. Q. You say, Admiral, that you did have some information relative to the fixing of a deadline on Japanese-United States negotiations?

A. I recall, but rather vaguely, something about a date having been set and then having been advanced, but it is not clear in my memory.

637. Q. Have you any recollection as to when you received that information, within reasonable limits?

A. Some time, I would say, after the middle of November, but I do not recall when it was. I would say some time from November on.

638. Q. Do you recall whether it was prior to your dispatch of November 24?

A. No, I couldn't remember a date. I wish I could. I don't recall it.

639. Q. You cannot identify it with reference to that incident, that is, the dispatch of November 24?

A. No; I am just hazy on it.

[160] 640. Q. How did you evaluate that information which you did receive about the dead line?

A. I don't recall just what impression it made at that time.

641. Q. Do you recall whether it indicated aggressive action on the part of Japan against this country?

A. No; I don't recall that.

642. Q. Do you recall having any discussion over this information with anyone outside the department?

A. No. I have stated that the matter is hazy in my memory, and I have no distinct remembrance of the matter at all, except that some such thing came up.

643. Q. Do you recall whether you then considered it an important item of information?

A. No; I can only repeat that the whole incident is hazy in my memory.

644. Q. You do recall that the information you had fixing a dead line was subsequently extended to another date?

A. That is about what I remember. There was some talk about a dead line, and then about its having been extended. That is about the extent of it. I'm not just clear on the thing.

645. Q. Do you recall whether you personally sent any information to Admiral Kimmel concerning this item of information?

A. I don't recall that I did.

646. Q. Do you recall whether you directed any of your subordinates to do so?

A. The entire incident, including what I did or may not have done remains hazy. I don't remember the issue clearly at all, or the action taken.

647. Q. I am only trying to assist you.

A. I wish I could help you, but I just don't recall it. That's about where it winds up. I mean, I don't recall it clearly.

648. Q. You do not recall whether or not that indicated in your mind offensive action by Japan in the Southwest Pacific?

A. My memory with regard to the thing and conclusions and so forth, if any, does not carry to the point of anything definite. I recall some such incident, and that's about all.

[161] 649. Q. What was the stimulating motive on your part in sending to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch of November 24?

A. The dispatch states very clearly: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements, their naval and military forces, indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction"—

650. Q. Do you recall what the statements of the Japanese Government were to which you made reference?

A. I have already testified that I don't recall them.

651. Q. On November 26 did you receive intelligence indicating a Japanese intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States?

A. No, I don't recall that.

652. Q. You have no recollection of that whatever?

A. No.

653. Q. Between December 1 and December 4 did you receive information that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States and maintain peace with Russia?

A. Not that I recall.

[161-A] 654. Q. Do you recall the phrase "Winds Message"?

A. I don't recall that at that time. I don't recall such a message.

655. Q. Do you recall such a message at any time?

A. During the period you mention I don't recall such a message.

656. Q. Do you recall it at any time?

A. If you will produce the message, I don't know whether it would serve to recall my memory or not.

657. Q. Would the production of the message assist you in refreshing your recollection?

A. I don't know. I don't recall having seen the so-called "Winds Message" or having heard of it at that time.

658. Q. Well, do you recall having seen or heard of the "Winds Message" at any other time?

A. I don't recall ever having seen it.

[162] 659. Q. Do you recall having participated in any discussion concerning the Winds Message then or at any other time?

A. Not the slightest recollection of a discussion of the so-called Winds Message.

660. Q. Do you recall having heard the phrase "Winds Message" in connection with Japanese-United States relations during the period of two weeks preceding December 7, 1941?

A. No, I do not.

661. Q. Do you recall having had any conferences or discussions with Admiral Ingersoll concerning the Winds Message?

A. No.

662. Q. Do you recall having received any information during the first three or four days of December, 1941, indicating that Japan would attack both the United States and Britain and maintain peace with Russia?

A. No.

663. Q. No information or discussion of that whatever?

A. Well, we discussed every phase of that situation. If you mean with reference to any document, I don't recall it. We had been discussing for a year the Russian situation and as to what would happen. There was guess work.

664. Q. Do I understand you to say that you never heard the phrase, "Winds Message" as applied to United States-Japanese relations during the month preceding December 7, 1941, until I mentioned it a few moments ago?

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of the so-called Winds Message for a month preceding Pearl Harbor or any time around that time.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

This line of questioning was objected to by the judge advocate on the ground that there is no evidence laid before the court of anything with reference to a Winds Message.

The interested party, Read Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret), replied.

The court announced that the objection was overruled.

665. Q. Consequently, of course, having no knowledge yourself about it, you sent no word to Admiral Kimmel?

A. No, nor to anyone else.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Page 164-A.

[164-A] 666. Q. Admiral Stark, during the two weeks prior to 7 December, 1941, do you recall any information of a false weather broadcast in plain Japanese language emanating from Japan as a signal for an attack on the beginning of war by Japan against the United States?

A. No, I do not recall anything of that sort at that time.

667. Q. Do you recall during the week prior to 7 December, 1941, receiving information that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was reporting twice daily the number of American warships in Pearl Harbor and the berth at which they were located?

A. No.

668. Q. You remember receiving no such information?

A. I do not recall receiving any such information.

669. Q. Or anything of that character?

A. No, I don't recall it.

670. Q. During the week preceding 7 December 1941, do you recall Commander McCollum originating and presenting to you a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel which was never sent?

A. No, I don't recall it.

671. Q. Do you recall any conversations with Commander McCollum the middle or latter part of the week preceding 7 December 1941 relative to a dispatch which he had drafted to Admiral Kimmel concerning information received in Commander McCollum's division?

A. No.

672. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Commander McCollum during the week prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, I do not at this time. I do not recall it.

[209-A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann:)

89. Q. Along in the middle of November, do you recall receiving from Naval Intelligence any information relative to the establishment of a deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United States?

A. I don't know whether the information came from Naval Intelligence, or where it came from. I remember the question of various deadlines on occasions, yes, sir. I don't know whether the information came to me from Naval Intelligence, or what the source of the information was. I do remember that we had information that deadlines had been established.

[210-A] 98. Q. Now, what was the information that was communicated to you relative to the deadline?

A. I don't remember the exact information that was communicated on the deadline.

99. Q. Would it have been that November 25th was regarded as a deadline for all negotiations between the Japanese and the United States?

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

Examined by the court:

100. Q. Does this cover the same line of questioning that you made your objection to this morning?

A. That is correct, sir.

101. Q. Do you mean your personal security, or—

A. I mean the security which is vital to the furtherance of the war effort of the United States.

102. Q. Vital to the war effort at that time, or at present?

A. At present.

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

[211] Cross-examination by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) (Continued):

103. Q. Do you recall whether you had information from Naval Intelligence that the deadline originally determined or fixed, was extended at some later date?

A. That is the same line of questioning and the same objection to it.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated as follows: I feel that Admiral Kimmel is entitled to have indicated on this record the fact that he seeks information from this witness, not once but as to the several items of information; that the cross-examination of this witness is being precluded to Admiral Kimmel on that ground and I see no way of accomplishing that other than by asking several questions on different lines of information more or less on the line that I asked Admiral Stark yesterday afternoon.

The court announced that in view of the fact that this line of questioning has been objected to by the witness on the ground of security to the war effort at present, that that line of questioning cannot be pursued; that the court had no objection to putting in all the questions desired.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), stated that he wanted to ask enough questions to ascertain the specific information which he was being denied.

The court granted permission to ask further questions.

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had information that the deadline on negotiations between Japan and the United States was extended to the 29th of November?

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

105. Q. Do you recall whether on or about 26 November you received information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that it had specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States?

[212] The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The judge advocate objected to this question on the ground that it went beyond the scope of the direct examination.

The court announced that it recognized that fact, that it was not cross-examination on the direct examination, but in the interests of saving time, if there was no specific objection, the questioning may continue; but that the witness's claim of privilege to this question was honored and that he need not answer the question.

106. Q. During the early part of December, December 3rd or December 4th, do you recall receiving information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that Japan would wage an offensive war against both the United States and Britain?

To this question the judge advocate made the following objection: I must object to that question on the ground that counsel is getting into the record the specific sort of information that he is trying to get, although he knows that it is objectionable on two grounds, one of them being national security, and the other being that it is beyond the scope of the direct examination.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.), replied.

The judge advocate requested that the court be cleared.

The court was cleared.

The court was opened.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

The witness announced that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness's claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

107. Q. On December 4th or 5th, do you recall receiving information from the Office of Naval Intelligence that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was furnishing Tokyo with information as to the number of United States warships in Pearl Harbor, and their location in the harbor?

The judge advocate objected to this question on the same grounds as before.

[212-A] The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

The witness stated that to answer the question would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest and that he claimed his privilege against revealing state secrets.

The court announced that the witness' claim of privilege was honored and that he need not answer the question.

[251-A] (Extracted question from the testimony of Lieutenant General Walter E. Short:)

163. Q. Subsequent to the receipt of the dispatch number 472, that you have given considerable testimony on, what was the next information you received that indicated that there was any change in the worsening of relations between Japan and the United States?

A. Seven hours after the attack, at 2: 58 p. m., on the 7th.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Page 314-A.

[314-A] 18. Q. Did you know of a definitive date fixed by Japan for the conclusion of diplomatic relations with the United States?

A. Yes, there were various dates; the first one, November 25, the second one November 29, and thereafter there was no definitive date.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Page 318-A.

[318-A] 43. Q. Did you discuss with Admiral Stark the definite date which you have stated as November 25, and later November 29, of termination of diplomatic relations with Japan?

A. I have no definite recollection of having discussed the question with him. I knew he was informed of it and there may have been discussions as to the significance or what significance would be attached to it.

44. Q. When the note of 26 November 1941 was presented by the State Department to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the Japanese government, was there much discussion in the Navy Department and those concerned regarding that note?

A. The note of November 26th?

45. Q. Yes, sir.

A. As I recollect, there was discussion, and the general effect was that this would be entirely unacceptable to Japan.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy.
Page 320.

[320] Examined by the JUDGE ADVOCATE:

1. Q. Admiral, an official State Department document entitled "Peace and War" has been taken judicial notice of by this court of inquiry. There has been read into the record by a previous witness a section of a memorandum regarding a conversation between the Under Secretary of State (Welles), the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) and Mr. Kurusu of December 2, 1941. I would ask you to look at this note and then I shall ask you a question. Having read this portion of the document which relates to a statement made by Mr. Welles to the Japanese Ambassador, and a partial reply of the Japanese Ambassador, I will ask you to state whether or not prior to 7 December 1941 you had any knowledge of this conversation as reported in this document?

A. I do not recall that particular conversation. I do recall, as I have testified, some conversations on the subject of Japanese strength in Indo-China.

2. Q. My understanding is that you have no present recollection of having knowledge of this particular conversation prior to December 7, 1941?

A. That is correct.

Examined by the court:

3. Q. Admiral, it has been testified before this court that there was a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Do you have any knowledge of this date?

A. I have previously testified that my dispatch of 27 November was based on information which I had to the effect that negotiations with Japan had ceased.

4. Q. The testimony to which the court refers is that subsequent to 26 November 1941 or about that time there was a date given out as to the termination of diplomatic relations, which date, at first, was 25 November, 1941; then later 29 November, 1941. Were you aware of these dates?

A. I do not recall specifically these dates. I do recall, although my remembrance is rather hazy on it, that there was a date mentioned which was later postponed. I don't remember the original date or just what the postponement was.

5. Q. As we understand, you stated that there were no negotiations between Japan and the United States representatives in Washington subsequent to 27 November 1941 and up until 7 December 1941. Is that correct?

A. I stated that I did not recall any. Subsequent to that statement counsel for one of the parties showed me a note which had been dispatched to Japan which I had not seen but which made it evident that conversations were still going on.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits), and

testimony of Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy. Pages 691-732, inclusive.

[691] The judge advocate made the following statement: The judge advocate has requested the introduction of certain documents into the record. If there be no objection to the introduction of these documents, they should be offered at this time.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared at the request of the judge advocate of this court? If so, produce it and state what it is.

A. I am. I produce the file of copies, duly authenticated under official seal, of documents on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, which was made and assembled at the request of the judge advocate of this court.

The file of copies of the documents was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following objection: We object to bringing those documents in on the ground that the use which may be made of them in these proceedings may disclose secrets which should be held inviolate for the best prosecution of the war. Our objection is not because of what the documents themselves may contain but because their use here may compromise many years of hard work the results of which are most important to the Nation's future interest. We can have no assurance that wide publicity of parts of even all of these proceedings will not eventuate.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

None of the other parties to the inquiry made objection to the introduction of the documents. They were received in evidence, marked "EXHIBIT 63", for reference, description appended.

2. Q. Are you the authorized custodian of a file of papers prepared at the request of the judge advocate of the court? If so, please produce this file.

A. I am. I produce another file which contains certain dispatches—copies of certain dispatches—duly authenticated under official seal, which are on file in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., which was assembled at the request of the judge [692] advocate of this court.

The file of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence for the purpose of reading therefrom such extracts as may be pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, repeated the same objection he had heretofore made in the matter.

The court announced that the objection was not sustained.

None of the other interested parties made objection to the introduction of the file of documents consisting of copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal. It was received in evidence, marked "EXHIBIT 64", for reference, description appended.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, a witness for the judge advocate, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Admiral, I show you a file of documents which is Exhibit 63 before this court, and refer you to document No. 7 in this file, and ask you if you recognize it, and if so, state what it is.

A. I identify it to the extent of stating that it is a decoded translation of a message originating in Tokyo addressed to the Japanese Embassy, Washington.

2. Q. Will you read the document, please?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokio.

To: Washington.

5 November 1941.

#736

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

[693] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

3. Q. I ask you, Admiral, if you have ever seen this document, or had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I was aware of the fact that such a message had been received and that Kurusu and Nomura had instructions to wind up conversations on the 25th of November.

4. Q. Adverting to this document, you will note that the document speaks about the signing of "this agreement". Do you know what the words, "this agreement" refer to?

A. I presume that they referred to an agreement which was under discussion between the State Department and the representatives of the Japanese Government at that time.

5. Q. If you know what this agreement was, will you so state?

A. As I would interpret it, it would be instead of "this agreement", "an agreement". I don't know whether it is the translation. That is the way I would interpret the message. I do not know what this agreement was.

6. Q. What agreement was under discussion at the time this dispatch was written which involved the State Department and the Imperial Government at Tokyo?

A. There were conversations then in progress which are matters of public records whereby the United States and Japan were attempting to reach some agreement whereby their differences in the Pacific could be ironed out.

7. Q. The date of origin to this dispatch as read was 5 November 1941. Do you know from your duties as liaison officer in the Navy Department whether or not this dispatch or the substance thereof was communicated to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. From my own personal knowledge, no. The system was that the material of this nature was delivered by a representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence who was, I believe, at the same time liaison with the Division of Naval Communications. I do remember that I knew that there had been certain dates set for the completion of the conversations then in progress, and that the State Department did know of these dates. May I add, as a possible assistance to the court, I believe the person best qualified to answer the questions as to who received the information contained in the exhibit, and the time it was conveyed to them, is Commander Kramer, as it was not my responsibility to either convey this information to anyone else, including the State Department.

[694] 8. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 11 from Exhibit 63, and ask you if you can identify it.

A. I can identify it to the extent that it is a similar translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese representatives in Washington, dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941, as shown on the photostatic copy.

9. Q. Admiral, I ask you to read this document to the court.

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
#612.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.^a You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relation by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

10. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document or had you been apprised of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I had seen the document or not. I knew this information was in the Navy Department and [695] I don't remember specifically the phrase, "after that things are automatically going to happen", but it is possible that I did see the document. Having examined these documents, in the last couple of weeks, it is hard for

me to tell just when I did see them or whether I saw them at all; but I did know that this information was in the Department.

11. Q. Can you state whether or not in the performance of your duties in the Navy Department, you showed this message or communicated the contents thereof to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No, I did not communicate it in the ordinary discharge of my duties. I would not be the one to communicate it.

12. Q. I show you a document from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Toyko to Washington, a circular number 2353, and ask you whether or not you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

13. Q. Will you please read the dispatch.

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations; NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

Voice broadcasts.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.

**North wind cloudy.

***West wind clear.

[696] 14. Q. Had you, prior to 7 December 1941, seen this document or had you been appraised of its contents?

A. To the best of my recollection, which is quite hazy on this particular message, I did know that a message of this nature was in the Department.

15. Q. Did you have any communications with the Chief of Naval Operations with reference to this message?

A. No.

16. Q. Admiral, I show you a document, No. 16 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. Yes, I recognize it.

17. Q. Will you please read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

1180. (Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure

and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[697]

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

1180. (Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

18. Q. Admiral, prior to 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had you been apprised of its contents?

A. I don't remember. I probably had been apprised of its contents.

19. Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing the contents of this dispatch that was just read, with the Chief of Naval Operations, prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

20. Q. Admiral, I show you document No. 17 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941. I ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo.

21. Q. Will you read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 26, 1941.

[698] 1189. (Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

ARMY 6S96 25441 Page 1. SECRET

SECRET

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

ARMY 25441 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

22. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember. I believe I was acquainted with the contents of the dispatch, whether I learned it from the State Department or by seeing the dispatch. It reports a conversation with Mr. Hull.

23. Q. In your previous testimony, when you were on the stand before, I believe you were asked a question about a note presented by the Secretary of State to the Japanese diplomats on November 26, 1941. Do you recall any such testimony?

A. Yes.

[699] 24. Q. After having read this dispatch, do you identify the contents of this dispatch as being similar to the note which Mr. Hull presented the Japanese diplomats?

A. Apparently so. Possibly information could be obtained by comparing that with the copy of the note.

25. Q. Do you recall having discussed the subject matter of this dispatch with the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not remember specifically, but I believe that I probably did inform Admiral Stark that a note was being dispatched to the Japanese, and its contents.

26. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 18 from Exhibit 63 which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, No. 844. Do you recognize it as such?

A. This is from Tokyo to Washington, correct.

27. Q. I ask you to read the document.

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 28, 1941.

#644.

Re your #1189^a.

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.

Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

The man is the Navy Minister.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^b S. I. S. #25435, #25436.

28. Q. Admiral, adverting to the dispatch you have just read, can you identify from any date on here, to what the dispatch you have just read refers—to what subject matter does it refer?

A. Undoubtedly it refers to the dispatch of November 26.

29. Q. And that is identified how?

A. By reference to 1189; also its contents.

30. Q. I ask you, did you see this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember; it probably was.

31. Q. In that event you probably do not remember whether you had any conversations with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject matter of this dispatch prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

32. Q. Adverting to the fourth sentence of this dispatch, which I will ask you to read to the court—

A. (Reading:)

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.

33. Q. What is your interpretation of this sentence as regards the Japanese intention as to the negotiations at hand?

A. I interpret it to mean that they are going to reply to the American proposal, but the reply will be such that no further negotiations will take place.

34. Q. And how do you interpret by the clause, "negotiations will be de facto ruptured"?

A. I suppose it, translated—the negotiations will in fact be ruptured. Either that or that they are temporarily—probably in fact ruptured, or temporarily ruptured.

35. Q. I show you Document 19 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 857, and ask you if you identify it as such?

A. Yes, I identify it as such.

[701] 36. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

29 November 1941.

#857.

Re my #844.*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 nav. 1941 (S-11)

37. Q. Had you seen or had you been made acquainted with the contents of this document No. 19 prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I was aware that they were told to make another attempt.

[702] 38. Q. Can you recall whether or not you communicated this dispatch or the subject matter of its contents to the Chief of Naval Operations prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No. I would not be the one to communicate the contents.

39. Q. Admiral, I show you Document No. 21 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington. No. 865, and ask you if you identify it as such?

A. I identify it as such.

40. Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

1 December 1941.

865.

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.

**JD-1: 6710.

***Not available.

41. Q. Admiral, I ask you if you had seen or been made acquainted with the contents of this dispatch you have just read prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not remember; I probably was.

[703] 42. Q. I show you Document No. 22 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30, 1941, and ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

43. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

November 30, 1941.

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United

ARMY 6944 25554 Page 1.

[704] States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days has it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 Page 2. SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

44. Q. Admiral, had you seen this dispatch or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't remember. I probably was.

45. Q. I show you a document No. 38 from Exhibit 63 which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 901, and ask you if you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as such.

46. Q. I ask you to read the document?

SECRET

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#901.

Re my #844^a.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts

^a See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

[705] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 2583S SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

47. Q. Admiral, had you seen this document prior to 7 December 1941, or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I knew on the morning of the 7th that such a message had been received.

48. Q. Did you have any discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject matter of this dispatch prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I believe, as I related in my previous testimony, somewhere around 9:30 we discussed the question that this note was to be delivered that day to the State Department. Whether we discussed the actual contents of the message, I do not remember.

49. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 39 from Exhibit 63 which purports to a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington under date of 6 December 1941, numbered 902. I ask you if you recognize this document as such?

A. I recognize the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington.

50. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902 (Part 1 of 14.)
Separate telegram.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that [706] the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establish-

ment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they [707] enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902. (Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

902. (Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an [708] equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 902. (Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and [709] in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 902. (Part 6 of 14.)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principal of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[710] From Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 4, 1941.
 902. (Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

[711] The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S) SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-14 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
902. (Part 10 of 14.)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great [712] Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country ----- (45 letters garbled or missing) ----- been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the ----- es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
#902. (Part 11 of 14.)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality in treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six coun-

tries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n----(50 letters missed)---sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#902. (Part 12 of 14.)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The [713] attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

#902. (Part 13 of 14.)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD: 1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as".

**Probably "China, can but".

[714] From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

7 December 1941.

#902. (Part 14 of 14.)

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase, "VERY IMPORTANT".)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-

ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

51. Q. Admiral, advertng to Document 39 which you have just read: I ask you to note particularly for the record that the date upon which the first 13 points of this dispatch were translated in the Navy Department?

A. All 13 parts were translated on December 6, 1941. The hour is not shown. Part 14 was translated on the 7th of December, 1941, according to the photostatic copy.

52. Q. Is the hour of the translation shown?

A. The hour of translation is not shown.

53. Q. I ask you, advertng to these first 13 points of Document No. 3 of Exhibit 63, whether or not you had been made acquainted with the contents of these first 13 points on 6 December 1941?

A. I was not acquainted with the contents on the 6th of December, 1941.

54. Q. When did you first become acquainted with the substance of these first 13 points of this Document 39?

A. I don't remember when I read, or if I read the message in its entirety. I knew on the morning of December [715] 7th that a sharply worded note or reply to the State Department's note of November 26th was in the Department and was scheduled for delivery, or that the Japanese Ambassadors had been requested by the Japanese Government to deliver it at 1:00 o'clock that afternoon.

55. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with the subject matter contained in Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63?

A. I do not remember, but the earliest that I could have possibly been informed of it was between somewhere around 9:00 or 9:30 on the morning of 7 December.

56. Q. Did you become acquainted with all 14 parts at or about the same time, or the subject matter of all 14 parts at or about the same time?

A. I cannot say. I cannot recollect but to the best of my recollection I did not read the note in its entirety that day. The extent of my knowledge was that the sharply worded note had been received, which was due for presentation to the State Department that day.

57. Q. In connection with this sharply worded note of which you speak, did you interpret this note as being connected with any other exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries, the United States and Japan?

A. I naturally assumed that it was a continuation of the previous series of notes which had been exchanged during the course of the conversations which had extended over a period of a month or so.

58. Q. That being the case, this sharply worded note would be in reply to what United States note?

A. The last United States note, I believe, of any importance, was dated November 26th.

59. Q. I show you Document 41 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907. Do you identify this document as such?

A. I identify it as a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, No. 907.

60. Q. Will you read the dispatch?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 7, 1941
 #907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., [716] on the 7th, your time.

JD-1: 7143

43—text of Japanese reply.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

61. Q. At what time did you first become acquainted with this document or the contents thereof?

A. I received information which was probably based on this document that the Japanese were going to present their reply to the State Department at 1:00 o'clock December 7th, at about 9:30 December 7th.

62. Q. Where were you at the time you were apprised of the contents as you have just testified?

A. I was somewhere around the CNO's office. I believe that I saw Commander Kramer and he told me verbally that such instructions were in.

63. Q. Did you communicate this information to the Chief of Naval Operations at about 0930 on 7 December 1941, or at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Whether I personally conveyed it, I do not know. I met or was in Admiral Stark's outer office, I believe, when he came in, and I may have told him the message was there or the officer who ordinarily delivered them, Commander Kramer, may have been there with the message itself. However, I believe at about that time he received the information contained in that message.

64. Q. I show you Document No. 46 from Exhibit 63, which purports to be a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu numbered 123. Do you recognize it as such?

A. I recognize it as a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, 123.

65. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 2, 1941.
 J-19.
 #123. (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets.

[717] NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 27065 8007 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of the circumstances of the receipt of Document No. 46 which you have just read, by the Navy?

A. None except that appearing in the note, "This message was re-

ceived here on December 23rd", and that it was translated on December 30, 1941.

The court then, at 3:30 p. m., took a recess until 3:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

67. Q. Admiral, when you were before the court previously you testified, as shown on page 217, Question 144: "Did you consider at that time that this note of 26 November was an ultimatum to Japan? Answer: To all intents and purposes, yes. The terms of the note were such that there was no hope in anybody's mind—at least nobody with whom I discussed the question in the Navy Department—that the Japanese would or could under the circumstances agree to the terms of the note." Since that time, Admiral, there has been considerable discussion about this note, and on occasions it has been referred to both by counsel and by the court and by witnesses before the court as an ultimatum. I hand you a volume entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", of which this court has taken judicial notice. I ask you to notice particularly Document 257, which is the note of November 26 handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador, Nomura, and also document 258, which is the oral statement of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador at the same time.

The witness looked at the volume referred to.

68. Q. Have you finished, Admiral?

A. Yes.

[718] 69. Q. Having had a chance to look at these two documents again, isn't it true that the tone of the oral statement and of the note handed the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State is not threatening in any respect and that it is not to be considered an ultimatum?

A. Well, since the term "ultimatum" is apparently connected in popular mind with a threat of action if terms are not accepted, this may be an unfortunate choice of words. Taking into account the background information which has been now introduced in evidence in the form of these messages that the Japanese Ambassadors had to end the conversations on the 29th, as far as I can remember, the general impression of the Navy Department was that the terms of the notes would prove unacceptable to the Japanese, and that there probably would be a discontinuance of the conversations, although the note and the oral statement of the Secretary still left the gate open in case the Japanese desired to surrender some of the principles for which they had stood.

70. Q. Admiral, is it correct to say that when this note was presented the State Department may have considered that negotiations had about ceased but that, nevertheless, this note which they presented on the 26th was not to be considered an ultimatum in the sense that that term is popularly used?

A. As the term is popularly used, as implying a threat, it is not an ultimatum. I believe "ultimatum" actually means an end to negotiations rather than any implied threat that there will be force used as a result of such end.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

71. Q. That note, however, in Section 2, paragraph 3, proposed that the Government of Japan would withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and Indo-China?

A. That is correct.

72. Q. It was not anticipated in the Navy Department or anywhere else by high authorities that that provision would be acceptable to Japan, was it?

A. Not so far as I know, no.

73. Q. Paragraph 4 of Section 2 provided: "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking." That was the Chiang Kai-Shek government?

A. That is correct.

[719] 74. Q. It was not anticipated that that situation would be acceptable to Japan?

A. Not so far as I know in the Navy Department. However, the note speaks for itself.

75. Q. Document 46 of Exhibit 63 was the last numbered message which you read at the suggestion of the judge advocate, being a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu. I now ask you whether you can identify Document 40.

A. Document 40 is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo dated November 18, 1941, and translated on December 6, 1941.

76. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.^d

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance

^a Available in MC code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

[720] 77. Q. That would indicate that it was translated on the 6th of December?

A. That is correct.

78. Q. Were you aware of the translation of that message on the 6th of December?

A. To the best of my knowledge, I was not. I do not remember having seen the message prior to December 7.

79. Q. I now call your attention to Document 37 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether you can identify it?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 18, 1941, and translated on December 5, 1941.

80. Q. Will you read it?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^a and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

81. Q. That indicates that it was translated on the 5th of December?

A. Yes.

82. Q. Were you aware of the receipt of the information in the Navy Department on or about December 5?

A. No, I do not remember having seen that information. I might have received information that the Japanese Consul was asking about the location of United States ships. Since it was not a direct question of State Department information but more or less military, or State-Navy information, I may not have.

83. Q. I now ask whether you can identify Document 36 of Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941. Date of translation: 12/5/41.

[721] 84. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19).

#122

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

85. Q. That was translated on 12/5/41, which, I assume, means the 5th of December?

A. Correct.

86. Q. Since that is not a direct message concerning the State Department, I presume that you did not have specific information of it at the time it was received?

A. That is correct.

87. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 24 in Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 15 November 1941, translated on December 3, 1941.

88. Q. Will you read it, please?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu (Riyoji).
15 November 1941.
(J19).
#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6994 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

89. Q. Were you aware of that?

A. No, sir, I was not aware of it, to the best of my knowledge.

90. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 10 of Exhibit 63?

A. This is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 16, 1941, and translated November 17, 1941.

91. Q. Will you read that document, Admiral?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

[722] From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 16, 1941.
#—

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,^a and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

^a For Part 1, see S.I.S. 24877. For Part 2, see S.I.S. 24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24375 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

JD-1: 6553 ARMY 24878 J1-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

92. Q. I ask whether you can identify Document 13 of Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 19, 1941, and translated on November 26, 1941.

[723] 93. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "Nishi".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

94. Q. Did you have knowledge of that at or about the time of its translation?

A. I had general knowledge that such a message had been received in the department. I am extremely hazy on whether the voice broadcast mentioned in the message was received and if there was an agreed-upon translation of the broadcast or when the broadcast was received, if it was.

95. Q. Do you now have any memory of whether the broadcast message referred to was received in the Document you just read, Document 13 of Exhibit 63.

A. Nothing but hearsay knowledge. I understand a broadcast was intercepted.

96. Q. Do you remember now whether you knew of it prior to December 7?

A. To the best of my recollection, a broadcast was received, but there was a lack of agreement among the intelligence people concerned as to whether that broadcast was the one described in the message; either that or that there was a lack of agreement among the Japanese intelligence people as to the translation of the Japanese phrase contained in the broadcast.

[724] 97. Q. Do you recall when that was?

A. I don't remember.

98. Q. I now show you Document 26 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether you can identify it?

A. The message is from Tokyo to Hsingking, dated 1 December 1941, translated on December 4.

99. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsingking.

1 December 1941.

#893.

----- In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ----- in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as

having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

[725] 100. Q. That indicates it was translated on the 4th of December?

A. That is correct.

101. Q. Were you aware of the information in that message on or about the date of its translation?

A. I do not remember the message specifically, but I probably was aware of it.

102. Q. Do you remember the information in it?

A. No, I don't recall of having had previous knowledge of the information.

103. Q. I ask if you can identify Document 42 in Exhibit 63?

A. It is a message from Budapest to Tokyo, dated December 7, 1941, and translated on December 7, 1941.

104. Q. Will you read that?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

IA.

104.

Re my #103.^a

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

105. Q. That was translated on the 7th of December?

A. Yes.

106. Q. Did you see this message, Admiral?

A. I do not remember having seen that message until considerably after December 7.

107. Q. How would the American minister on the 6th of December know about war breaking out?

A. I have no idea how he would know that war was going to break out on the 7th. If I were evaluating the report, I would evaluate it as a guess by the man reporting. I haven't the faintest idea how he would get such information.

[726] 108. Q. You don't know of any direct dispatch from the American Minister to Washington?

A. No, sir.

109. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether you can identify that?

A. It is a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations with the information addressees: Commandant, 16th Naval District; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant, 14th Naval District, dated 28 November 1941.

110. Q. I ask you to read it.

A. (Reading:)

From: CINCAF.

Date: 28 November 1941.

Decoded by P R WHITE.

(Addresses for action:) OPNAV.

(Addresses for information:) COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN.

(Date time group:) 281430. (Deferred precedence.)

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X higashi higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX American higashi no kaze kumori XX England X nishi no kaze hare X unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

111. Q. I show you Document 3 or Exhibit 64 and ask you whether you can identify it.

A. It is a message from the Naval Attaché at Batavia to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 5 December 1941.

112. Q. Will you read it?

A. (Reading:)

From: Alusna Batavia.

Date: 5 Dec 1941.

Decoded by KALAJDZIAN.

Paraphrased by PURDY.

[727] (Addresses for action:) OPNAV.

(Priority:) RRRRR.

(Date time group.) CR0222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States: North wind cloudy Russia: West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[728] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. Admiral, you stated that Commander Kramer was the liaison officer between ONI and the Chief of Naval Operations; is that correct?

A. For this certain type of material; he delivered it as a special precaution.

114. Q. Was there anyone else in the Department of Naval Intelligence who had similar information as to time and place of delivery of such messages?

A. Not that I know of. Possibly Captain McCollum but I believe, in my opinion, he would not have the exact facts.

115. Q. Admiral Wilkinson was the Chief of ONI at that time; is that right?

A. That is correct, sir.

116. Q. Is there any official record kept in Naval Intelligence as to time of receipt and time of delivery of such messages as these to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I have been unable to locate any such record.

117. Q. You don't know whether one exists or not, though, do you?

A. No, sir. I have had a search made for such a record and can locate none.

118. Q. In that message, your No. 11, which contains the phrase, "Things are going to happen automatically", did you give any special significance to this phrase, or did you hear it discussed?

A. As I remember it, there were discussions as to what in the world this phrase meant as to what things were going to happen automatically. It is difficult to reconstruct now but at that time, as I remember, the general thought of people whom I came in contact with was that if the Japanese moved they would move into Indo-China, Malaya, and perhaps the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines.

119. Q. These messages to which the judge advocate referred, regarding some of which he asked you if you knew or had any knowledge or whether or not Admiral Stark had any knowledge of the specific question, in some instances you said you did not know; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

[729] 120. Q. In other exhibits, he did not ask you that specific question. Now, taking all of these messages which were received from November 26 to December 7, at any time during that period did you discuss any message or any of this situation viz-a-viz Japan with Admiral Stark?

A. Yes, sir. I did discuss the situation but when it came down to pointing out certain messages, you ask if I made a particular point of discussing that particular message with the Admiral and I just don't remember.

121. Q. Well, in your discussions with Admiral Stark these messages evidently were the basis of the discussion weren't they?

A. The basis of discussion were the contents of these messages, plus what information we were getting from the State Department as to what was going on here. As you will note, the substance of many of these messages we might have already received before we got the message.

122. Q. But as a general rule, the contents of a great many of these messages were the subject of discussion; is that your answer?

A. Yes.

123. Q. On the morning of 7 December when you entered the office of the Chief of Naval Operations—and as the court remembers the testimony you entered that office about 9:30; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

124. Q. (Continuing.) —was Admiral Stark there at that time?

A. I believe I waited for Admiral Stark; waited for him to come down. I may have gone down to Communications to see if anything had come in during that time.

125. Q. He did, or you did?

A. I did.

126. Q. And what time did he arrive, to the best of your recollection?

A. To my best knowledge, about 9:30.

127. Q. When you arrived at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had you been informed as to the contents of the message which outlined the reply of the Japanese to be delivered at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th of December?

A. No, sir. When you say "the contents", I did not read the message.

128. Q. That is why I said "contents".

A. Yes. I did know, or was verbally informed, that this message was in and that it was a very sharp note.

[730] 129. Q. And were you informed that this message was a reply to the message of 26 November?

A. I believe so; yes, sir.

130. Q. And did you so inform Admiral Stark when he came in that that was the information you had?

A. Yes, sir.

131. Q. So Admiral Stark, when he came in and you met him, was informed as to the general situation up to that moment?

A. He was informed of that general situation. I think shortly afterwards—speaking again from memory—that Commander Kramer—when I say "shortly", it may have been half an hour or 45 minutes—delivered to him what they call "the book", which was a book of messages received from this source the previous night.

132. Q. In other words, a complete file of what had happened since he had seen the book; is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

133. Q. Was that book of files or messages which Kramer brought in, prior to his telephonic communication with General Marshall?

A. I'm not certain whether it was, or not, but I think when he telephoned General Marshall, or General Marshall telephoned him, that Admiral Stark knew that a sharp reply was being delivered to our note of November 26th, and that it was timed for delivery—that the Japanese had instructions to request the Secretary of State to deliver the note at 1:00 o'clock.

134. Q. Was this message received on 6-7 December in reply to the message of 26 November, received by the Army simultaneously with its receipt by the Navy?

A. I am unable to say about that.

135. Q. In other words, what I am trying to ask is, did the Army have the same information that you had on the morning of 7 December?

A. I'm positive that it did.

136. Q. In these messages which have been introduced by the interested party, linked with the messages which were previously presented by the judge advocate, and having all of that information contained therein in your mind, did you feel that on 6-7 December the Japanese were going to attack this country without declaration of war?

A. No, I did not. I described the general feeling that everybody recognized that there was a very tense situation; that diplomatic relations were in danger of being severed, but that a severance of diplo-

matic relations did not necessarily mean that war was going to result. I cannot speak for anybody else but my own opinion, I must admit, was that Japan would go her own way in East Asia and would put up to the United States the onus of using force to oppose her, and in the light of subsequent events, maybe a [731] concentration on that idea—

137. Q. None of the information received in these messages changed that opinion with you; is that correct?

A. Well, certain of the military messages weren't received; also, some of them came in very late, those received on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th. I had never seen the so-called war warning before it was sent out but I did know or was told that one had been sent out. Those things, coupled with the message that General Marshall was going to get off—which unfortunately never arrived until too late—seemed to be about everything that could be done.

138. Q. Well, your estimate as of the morning of the 7th: did that change your viewpoint which you had had prior to that time, the information that you had, say, up to 10:00 o'clock on the morning of the 7th of December?

A. Not necessarily that Japan was going to attack the United States in the immediate future.

139. Q. In your opinion, were there continual negotiations and conversations going on between November 27th and December 7th as evidenced by these reports and these messages?

A. Well, having the background information that is revealed in the messages on the 27th of November, wherein they said the relations were de facto, or ruptured, plus my belief that the note that we dispatched on the 26th would be totally unacceptable, I thought that the small conversations that would continue to go on were just for the purpose of the record, just to keep the subject boiling rather than with any hope of getting anywhere.

140. Q. But in your opinion there were important messages sent back and forth between Tokio and this country between 27 November and 7 December; is that correct?

A. I don't recollect off-hand but I don't recall any what I would term important. All the messages were important but there were no important changes in the negotiations. They had received our note on the 26th and we were awaiting a reply.

141. Q. You include in your statement the messages received on 6-7 December?

A. The message received, naturally, on 6-7 December was a very important message.

142. Q. In your numerous conferences as you have stated, with the State Department officials, did you bring back to the Navy Department or to the Chief of Naval Operations, or messages which would be relayed to him, the thought of the State Department or any considerations which you thought were important for the Chief of Naval Operations to have?

A. Yes, sir.

[732] 143. Q. And during this period from 27 November to 7 December, that was daily conveyed to him; is that correct?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, sir.

144. Q. Have you any idea as to what the State Department thought as to the possible attack without declaration of war? Was that ever expressed?

A. None other than the conversation with Mr. Hull which I have previously related in which he said these people might bite anyone but I didn't at that time take it to mean that he was talking about striking without declaration of war, although that is susceptible to that interpretation.

Recross-examination by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

145. Q. In forming the estimate that you did no the morning of 7 December as to the probability of what Japan would do, you did not have available to you the information contained in the messages read this afternoon relative to the inquiries from Tokyo to Honolulu concerning the United States warships at Pearl Harbor, and the answer of the Japanese consul to Tokyo in response to those messages, did you?

A. No, sir. If I did, I didn't evaluate it.

146. Q. I understood that you didn't see those messages if they came in?

A. I don't believe I saw them, no.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

147. Adverting to Exhibit 63 and the documents which you read to the court therefrom, and particularly adverting to those documents which treated of subject matter relating to negotiations between the Japanese and the United States which these dispatches indicate the Navy Department had: Can you recall whether or not in your capacity as liaison officer between the State Department and the Navy Department you conveyed this information as a matter of general principle or rule to the State Department? In other words, did you keep the State Department informed of what the Navy Department had in the way of information relating to the negotiations between the Japanese and the United States?

A. The same book that was delivered to Admiral Stark, or certainly the messages bearing on diplomatic relations, were always delivered to the Secretary of State.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve; Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve (relative introduction of exhibits); Captain L. F. Saford, U. S. Navy. Pages 734-762, inclusive.

[734] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. George W. Lynn, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communications.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7 December 1941?

A. I was the Senior Watch Officer of the watch maintained in OPNav 20GW; the primary duty of this was the decrypting of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.

3. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court. Exhibit 63 contains some forty or fifty documents. Will you tell the court if you have recently examined the documents contained in this exhibit?

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not in detail; but still I have looked at them in a general way.

4. Q. Are you, in a general way, acquainted with the information that is contained in these documents?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

5. Q. In the performance of your duties between October 1 and 7 December 1941, were you at that time acquainted in a general way with the dates and times in these documents, when they received in the Navy Department?

A. I am acquainted with the dates and times by merely the raw material. It wasn't part of my duties to inspect the finished product. They were available at the time, but normally I didn't have time to see them. I was interested particularly in the ones that applied to the cryptographic system and I did see those. I am familiar with the time that the raw material came in before processing it, the time it was received from our various points throughout the world.

6. Q. You mean by processing exactly what?

A. Decrypting, the various processes that we had to go through in order to make the information available.

7. Q. Adverting to the document, that is, Exhibit 63, with which you say you are in a general way familiar, will you tell the court what the set-up was in your division as regards the translation of these documents?

A. I think possibly in order to give the story on that I should go back to the interception of traffic, because it is all more or less linked from that point on. The Army maintained a series of interception stations. The Navy had the same. The Army intercepts were cleared through the War Department, and the Navy intercepts were cleared through the Navy Department. The division was made on the basis of [735] cryptographic dates. It was necessary to do some checking for that. The Army was responsible for the even dates. The Navy was responsible for the odd dates. The cryptographic date was merely the date it was intercepted: the filing time in the dispatch was something that had to be established. Each service would then translate its own traffic. That is, the Navy would translate the traffic of odd cryptographic dates, and the Army would do the same thing with the even dates, so translation was based—was divided—upon the cryptographic date of the material.

8. Q. Adverting to Exhibit 63, I ask you if there is not noted on the bottom of these documents the date on which translation is purported to have taken place?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. Will you tell the court whether or not the dates so inscribed on these documents is the actual day of the month that it was translated, or does this date also relate to the cryptographic date—was that the word you used?

A. No. My understanding of all those documents—which weren't prepared in my section—has always been that the date is the actual date of translation. The date appearing at the top is the cryptographic date.

10. Q. Have you recently examined any memoranda, logs, or records prepared at the time of the receipt of these documents, which show the dates and times these documents were received in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, I have, but not all of the documents in detail. I have on certain ones.

11. Q. I show you a document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is in evidence before this court, and which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington containing some fourteen parts. Will you state whether you saw this document prior to 7 December 1941, and if so, under what circumstances?

A. I saw some of the parts; I did see all of the raw material. I was present while the finished product was being made up, and I can't say in detail that I have seen all fourteen parts, but I was present while they were being processed, and I was present while they were being written up in the smooth form.

12. Q. Can you state from your examination of these official documents or records, what was the chronological order of arrival in the Navy Department of the documents that composed document 39 of Exhibit 63, to which you have just adverted?

A. I'd like to make one correction to my answer to the previous question. I did not see part fourteen. I think [736] we should consider this 902, from this point on, as possibly two separate dispatches. I did not see part fourteen: that came in after I left. Now, I have the parts grouped in the order that they were received from the interceptor station at Bainbridge Island, Washington. They came into Washington, D. C., by teletype. Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 arrived here at 1649 GCT on December 6, Greenwich time. That is the time shown on the dispatches; and incidentally, part two was from Cheltenham, Maryland, and sent in, and I did not know which actual part was used. Nine and 10 were received sometime after 1649 and sometime before 1951, both GCT—I can't establish the exact time on December 6. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1951 GCT on December 6. Now, part 14 came in sometime in the morning of December 7. The time that it was intercepted at Station S was 0305 on the 7th, GCT. That would place it about five minutes after 3:00 in the morning of the 7th, Washington time. Now that material was sent in by teletype and with the punched tape, so there was some time taken at the other end to punch the tape so that 60 words could be sent and reduce the cost of line charges; and there may be twenty or thirty minutes required to do that. My reason for saying that it arrived before 7:00 o'clock, the work sheet for this particular document, part 14, shows that it was processed by an operator that went off watch at 7:00 o'clock. That was the time we changed watches, and the work sheet bears his initials, so it was received before 7:00 o'clock.

13. Q. You say part 14 was processed prior to 0700, Washington time, on 7 December 1941. Will you state in detail what you mean by this part 14 being processed?

A. Well, yes, this part fourteen did not require translation; these dispatches were in English. However, there were certain symbols that were used for punctuation, and the dispatches required writing up in smooth form before being passed on. That was done with the first thirteen parts. I don't know whether it was done at the time

with the fourteenth part. I wasn't here at that particular time. I wasn't on watch at that particular time.

14. Q. In cases before you have mentioned GCT. Will you convert it into Washington time for the purpose of clarifying the record.

A. Assuming that Washington was on plus-5, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be 1149 Washington time. This will be on the 24-hour basis. I won't indicate a. m. 1149 on December 6. Parts 9 and 10 were received after 1149, Washington time, and before 1451, Washington time. Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13, were received at 1451, Washington time.

15. Q. You have stated that part fourteen was received in [737] The Navy Department at or around 0305, Washington time, on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. Sometime after that and before 0700.

16. Q. Do the records show what happened to this part fourteen after its arrival in the Navy Department? I mean, as to the time that it was processed, for example.

A. Yes, the logs will show and the work sheets will show the initials of the operator that processed it.

17. Q. This message was not translated, you say?

A. No, sir, it didn't require translation.

18. Q. What service processed the document, that is, part fourteen, the Army or the Navy?

A. I can't answer that. I really don't know. The Army had a translator on duty that night, apparently by a pre-arrangement with the Navy, and anything that arrived during the night of the 7th—was to be sent over to the Army. Now, I don't know whether part fourteen was sent over to the Army.

19. Q. Can you state whether part fourteen was completely processed and ready for delivery in your section on the morning of 7 December, and if so, at what hour?

A. Our part of the processing was completed before 0700. I don't know when the smooth translation was made up. I have talked to the watch officer at that time, and he informs me—and he is in Washington at the present time—that the material was all handed to Commander Kramer between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the morning. That is the part fourteen. We haven't covered the first thirteen parts, which were in Commander Kramer's hands at between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock, p. m., on the previous evening, of the 6th, Washington time.

20. Q. You don't know of your own knowledge what happened to these processed documents after they came into the possession of Commander Kramer?

A. Commander Kramer had been pressing us for the documents all afternoon. He was there while they were being processed and as soon as the last one was finished he put them in a brief case and left the Navy Department.

21. Q. You don't know, of your own knowledge, where he went to deliver these processed documents?

A. No, sir, I do not.

22. Q. I show you document No. 41 from Exhibit 63, and ask you to examine it. Can you state what time this document arrived in the Navy Department in its original form?

A. It arrived, as far as I am able to reconstruct the situation, at the same time that part fourteen arrived—in the same teletype transmission. It was their custom to send in batches of messages; sometimes it would be a single one, sometimes it might be five or six. The number assigned to [738] this—station serial number of Station S, assigned to this part—is No. 381. The number assigned to part 14 was No. 380, and from examining the copies of the original teletype, I am fairly certain that they both were in the same transmission, in arriving here in Washington.

23. Q. Can you state whether the records show the time that document 41 was finally processed in the Navy Department or the War Department, as it might have been done?

A. That, too, was processed before 0700. It was processed by the same man that processed part fourteen, and as I recall seeing the work sheet now in possession of the Army sometime ago, it had a priority sticker attached to it, and was sent over to the Army. I have since talked to Lieutenant Commander Perring. When he relieved the watch at 0700 on the morning of the 7th, the watch officer told him that the Army had some material over there and he went over and picked it up. They were in the Munitions Building at that time.

24. Q. Is this officer a Lieutenant Perring?

A. Lieutenant Commander Perring.

25. Q. Is he on duty in Washington now?

A. He is on duty in Washington, yes, sir.

26. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether a document, 41, was processed and ready for distribution at 0700 on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir, according to the records. I wasn't there.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

27. Q. On Saturday night, were you on duty?

A. I was on duty from 1600 to 2400 on the 6th.

28. Q. How many copies did Lieutenant Commander Kramer take with him when he left on the errand of distribution?

A. I can't answer that. I don't know. I don't even know the number that was customary to make up. That was a different section. I am not familiar with the number that he normally made up.

29. Q. And you didn't supervise the preparation of the copies?

A. Oh, incidentally, we had some help from the Army, some typists, and to rush up the material back and forth. I knew it was being typed up, but that is all I know.

30. Q. I call your attention to document 35, of Exhibit [739] 63, which was read in evidence yesterday. Can you tell when that document was ready for delivery, in the form in which it there appears?

A. No, sir; I haven't been able to obtain the work sheet on that. I can tell about when it came in, but I can't give the whole story on that particular dispatch. The work sheet is in the custody of the Army. I think I may be able to place it with respect to some of the others, however—say, with part fourteen. That was intercepted at Station S at 0720 on the morning of the 6th.

31. Q. Is that Greenwich time or—

A. That is Washington time.

32. Q. But you can't reconstruct when it was processed here?

A. No, sir; without the work sheet. As a matter of fact, I don't know whether we processed the document, or the Army did.

33. Q. Now will you look at document 13.

A. I don't have any particular information on that one; I haven't covered this period at all.

34. Q. Do you know whether the execution of that document was received, and when?

A. I did not see the execution of that document: At the time apparently it just by-passed me, and an effort was made to keep those things as quiet as possible. It is quite possible that it came in and I didn't see it. I didn't have it at the time. I might say, however, that our watch was looking for the expressions in the news broadcast. It didn't come in while I was on watch.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

35. Q. In order to clear up this dispatch, 39, does the court understand that the thirteen parts were received in English?

A. Yes, sir.

36. Q. And you received those at 2:51 p. m., Washington time, on 6 December.

A. Yes, sir; we had all thirteen parts in by 1451 on 6 December.

37. Q. And all in English?

A. Oh, no; I am afraid I am giving the wrong impression. There was English under encipherment, and they enciphered what they required. That was English, rather, and the Japanese under the encipherment—so it took considerable time to process them.

[740] 38. Q. When were the thirteen parts in English readable and ready for somebody to see?

A. I would say that processing was completed sometime between 8:00 and 9:00 and that the finished documents were ready between 8:00 and 10:00 p. m., Washington time, on the night of the 6th. They were in Commander Kramer's hands at that time. Commander Kramer was there during the whole time the information was in the process of being processed. He was there when I came on watch, and I imagine he stayed all day, although I don't know. He was there right up until 9:00 o'clock, supervising the preparation of the documents.

39. Q. And the part 14 was processed and ready by 7:00 o'clock Washington time on the morning of 7 December?

A. Yes, sir. To clear that, It had been deciphered and was reduced to English in the copies—that is, in the work sheet form. I have no knowledge of the smooth copy as you see it here, or whether it was made at that time.

40. Q. Now this No. 38, which gives information as to when this note is going to come through; that was received and processed and ready on the morning of 6 December?

A. Yes, sir. As I say, the Army has the work sheet. I haven't seen it, but in all likelihood it was processed, because we had whatever cryptographic information we needed to do the work, and the Army had it similarly; and I am fairly certain that it was.

41. Q. The only thing we are trying to get straight is that on the morning of the 6th you got notification here of that on the 6th—our 6th, this note would come through, a final answer to the note of November 26?

A. I didn't have that information myself.

42. Q. It is a matter of record?

A. It is a matter of record. Yes, sir; that is an Army translation. The Army apparently processed that; they translated it. I don't know when the information was made available to us.

None of the parties to the investigation desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement :

I would just like to ask that anything I said be given the same handling, as far as security is concerned, as the original document.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[741] The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the judge advocate, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the judge advocate :

1. Q. I show you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I identify it as a file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission at the request of the judge advocate of this court. It is certified over the signature of the Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official seal, assembled on August 18, 1944.

The file of documents assembled by the Federal Communications Commission, on August 18, 1944, certified over the signature of the Secretary of the Commission, and duly authenticated under official seal, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 65," for reference, description appended.

2. Q. Will you read the document?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows :

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's

monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather [742] messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

(Signed) T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

SECRET

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUP REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF
BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

SECRET

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE
WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GM, December 4, 1941.

[743]

SECRET

Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN

CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM
SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

SECRET

"Document No. 4

English

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Romaji

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness; the witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

[744] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Captain, please state your name, rank, and present station?

A. L. F. Safford, Captain, United States Navy, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the second half of the calendar year 1941?

A. I was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications. The Communications Security Section included security proper, that is, codes and ciphers, and surveillance over their use. That also included Communications Intelligence. The name was used in peace-time purely to mask the major mission of the section, which is collecting information from enemy or prospective enemy nations through their communications, and most of our effort was concentrated on Japan at that time. I was in charge of the intercept stations, direction finder exchanges, and decrypting units.

3. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this examination. Can you identify that document?

A. I can identify it.

4. Q. Captain, what is the tenor of this message that you have before you?

A. That the Japanese government would announce to their diplomatic officials overseas a prospective break in diplomatic relations or war against the United States, against England, including the Netherlands East Indies, and against Russia, by means of false weather reports broadcast in the middle and at the end of their daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts.

5. Q. On what date was this information translated and available in the Navy Department?

A. November 28, 1941.

6. Q. Was any other confirmation of the establishment of that code by the Japanese received in the Navy Department?

A. We received confirmation a few hours later from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station who had received it from the British at Singapore. We received double confirmation about the 4th of December from the Dutch at Batavia. They gave the information to Consul General Foote, who sent it to the State Department. They also gave it to Colonel Thorpe, the senior military observer, who passed it on to the War Department via the Navy Department and the naval observer in Batavia.

[745] 7. Q. Sir, I hand you Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64 before this examination. Are these the confirmations about which you have just testified?

A. They are two of them. The message from Mr. Foote is not here.

8. Q. Is the first of those from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet?

A. The first is from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. And the second is from Colonel Thorpe, originated from Batavia.

9. Q. Captain, I invite your attention to the fact that in the message which was intercepted here, that is, Document 15 of Exhibit 63, and in the message from Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, Document 2, Exhibit 64, there is a discrepancy in the code words which would indicate a break with the United States. Can you explain that difference between the two codes? I specifically refer to the point that in the intercept from Tokio received in Washington, a United States-Japanese break would be indicated by "Higashi No Kazeame". In the version received via CinAF, this same meaning would be expressed by "Higashi No Kaze Kumori". Is there any significance to this difference in the last word of the code message?

A. There is no significance; only an indication of an error in coding. The coding officer left out a whole line with reference to Russia. The first part ties it together where it says "Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England", and in the second part where it describes the Japanese language in the Morse code broadcast, there is no reference to Russia at all except the last word, which is "Kumori".

10. Q. In other words, Captain, the point of my last question is this: There were only three sentences that were being looked out for; that this apparent discrepancy in the CinCAF dispatch was understood here

and that was not a separate sentence that was being looked for at that time?

A. That is correct. It was only a mistake and the Dutch version clarified it in case there had been any question in our minds.

The court then, at 10:45 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the interested parties and their counsel; except the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, whose counsel were present. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

[746] Examination by the judge advocate (continued):

12. Q. After the receipt of these three dispatches about which you have testified, what steps were taken by the Communications Intelligence Unit in Washington to monitor Japanese broadcasts to intercept any possible use of this code?

A. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor the Japanese stations for the prospective winds message. We sent teletype instructions to our intercept stations at Bainbridge Island, Washington, Winter Harbor, Maine, and other East Coast points, to guard for this message and send it in. Bainbridge Island was ordered to send in all plain language intercepts by teletype. We also sent a radio message to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts giving them the latest information we had on Tokio's broadcast schedules.

13. Q. In other words, Captain, were the C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and at Cavite also monitoring for this broadcast?

A. They were also monitoring. They were listening for the voice broadcasts. Our stations in the continental United States were listening for the Morse broadcasts. At the time Bainbridge Island was guarding the Trans-Pacific telephone circuit both ways and that tied up both recording sets and they could not listen for the voice broadcasts.

14. Q. When was the first information received in the Communications Intelligence Section here in Washington of the Japanese using this code?

A. My first information was in the morning of Thursday, December 4, at 8:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter. Lieutenant Murray, I believe—possibly Lieutenant Commander Kramer—came in with a yellow teletype sheet in his hand and he said, "Here it is", and he held it up. This was typed in Japanese language, and had the significant words of the winds underscored, and below was a translation in pencil, and the translation said "War with America; War with England; and peace with Russia", to the best of my recollection after almost three years. I have never seen a copy of this translation since about the 15th of December, 1941.

15. Q. What intercept station had received this information that you saw that morning?

A. I believe it came from one of the East Coast stations, but we cannot run that down because all the messages from all these East

Coast stations have been destroyed. Bainbridge Island files were intact for this period and Bainbridge Island is eliminated.

[747] 16. Q. Were there any confirmations of the interception of this type of message from any other sources, either Navy, Army, or other Federal agencies?

A. No. I have a vague recollection of a second winds message but was unable to find any trace of it up until the time that I testified before Admiral Hart's investigation. Since then I received word that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted a winds message at Portland, Oregon. I saw the message itself for the first time this morning and I do not recognize it.

17. Q. Captain, I hand you Exhibit 65 before this examination, which are copies certified under seal of the Federal Communications Commission of the intercept of the Winds message which they conveyed to the Navy Department. Were you familiar with this prior to December 7, 1941?

A. If I was I have completely forgotten it. The F. C. C. had the telephone number of the G. W. watch officer and it is possible that one of my subordinates made arrangements with Colonel Guest at the time the F. C. C. were requested to monitor this message. I do not recall any of the documents which I see here in Exhibit 65.

18. Q. Concerning the messages as conveyed by F. C. C. as shown by this certified copy, Exhibit 65: What meaning as regards a break in diplomatic relations between any one of the three nations concerned is shown there?

A. Document No. 2 on December 4, 1941, would indicate a break with Russia. Document No. 3 on December 5, 1941, would also indicate a break with Russia. Document No. 4 on the early morning of December 8—that is about 10 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor—would indicate a break with England.

19. Q. Is it shown anywhere in these messages received from F. C. C. that a break of relations between the United States and Japan was anticipated?

A. Not in these F. C. C. documents.

20. Q. Adverting back several questions to your answer that you saw on the morning of December 4th an intercept of the use of the winds code which clearly indicated a break in relations between the United States and Japan, Great Britain and Japan, and no break with Russia. Are copies of these intercepts now on file in the unit of which you were the head?

A. They are not on file. Repeated search has been made since middle of November, 1943, and no trace of them could be found. The Army have been requested to furnish copies and repeated search by the S. I. S. has also failed to reveal a single copy.

21. Q. Do you have any explanation for their absence or do you have any information as to where they might be since they are not in files of the C. I. Unit?

A. I made many discreet inquiries. Lieutenant Commander Broth-erhood states that he knows their disposition but [748] did not care to tell me. I also know what happened to the Army copies, through very second-hand and devious sources.

22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of

4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of the code originally which would indicate that a use of that code would indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations?

A. The Dutch translation said "war". The Japanese language is very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpretations or translations on the same message. In very important documents it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent translations and the differences were sometimes surprising; that is, a difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war plans.

23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which is an English language translation of the Dutch intercept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this code would indicate "a war decision" which is the wording used by the attaché in Batavia?

A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. East wind rain—war with United States. 2. North wind cloudy—war with Russia. 3. West wind clear—war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quotation from the Dutch translation.

24. Q. In other words, the state of the record based on the information you had was that two sources indicated that the use of that code would be a break in diplomatic relations, and to others indicated stronger language such as "war decision"?

A. Yes, and we also had to take into account Japanese psychology. They had a gift for understatement and the language officers who lived in Japan could interpret the meaning of a message better than people who were not familiar with the Japanese mentality.

25. Q. Captain, from your own personal knowledge, to whom in the Navy Department was the information in regard to [749] the use of the winds code distributed? I refer to the information that you have just testified about that you knew about and saw on the morning of December 4th?

A. I'm very certain that an immediate distribution was made to the regular people before 9:00 a. m., that morning, that is, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Communications for his information, so he could keep track of what we were doing, the assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and of course, the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to that, copies were sent to the State Department, to the White House, and to the War Department. This same message was also included in the routine distribution, which was made around noon each day. Kramer can tell that exactly. I can't.

26. Q. Just to clarify the record, Is your last answer from your own personal knowledge, or from what was told you by other parties?

A. I know that Kramer made an immediate distribution that morning and I know what officers saw these messages every day. It is possible that any individual may have been absent from his office and might not have seen that message early in the morning.

27. Q. Was this information, to-wit, that an intercept of an execution of the winds code had been received, passed to either the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or the Combat Intelligence Unit of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor?

A. It was not.

28. Q. Was any attempt made so to do?

A. There was.

29. Q. Will you testify what you know from your own personal knowledge as to any attempt that was made to disseminate this information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commandant, 14th Naval District?

A. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, Commander McCollum, wrote up a long message about 4 or 5 or 6 pages long, approximately 500 words, giving a complete and brief and very forceful summary of developments up to that time, up to 4 December, 1941. I saw this message in the afternoon of the 4th. I was in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications; had submitted several dispatches to him for release or for reference to higher authority. All these messages were based on the presumption that war was imminent, and the information taken from the winds message. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, came in with this message and he gave it to Admiral Noyes and said, "I have a message here for the Commander-in-Chief which I wish you would read." Admiral Noyes said, "That's fine; I have several going out there [750] myself I would like you to see before they go out and I want to get them out this afternoon." They exchanged messages, and as Admiral Noyes finished a page he handed it over to me and I read it. I just happened to be there by chance. It was a very complete summary of what had happened. It began with the withdrawal of Japanese merchant ships from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in July. It mentioned the evacuation of Japanese Nationals from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. It included the fact that diplomatic relations were at an impasse; that neither party would yield, and it had a direct reference to the winds message, I believe a quotation, and said that we considered that this was the execute of the Japanese war plans, the signal of execute of the Japanese war plans: that we expected that war was imminent. Exactly everything I cannot recall at the end of nearly three years but I do know it was very complete and that nothing important had been left out of it. McCollum had been working several hours on it and had done a very thorough job. When they got done looking at it, Admiral Wilkinson said, "What do you think of it, Lee?" And Admiral Noyes said, "I think it's an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson said, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man and may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this information and I am going to send it if I can get it released by the front office." Admiral Wilkinson then took the message and left, and I presume went to Admiral Ingersoll

to have the message released. I left Admiral Noyes' office a few minutes later. The exact time is associated with other messages which were sent at that time, or a few minutes later, and I do have the filing times with me.

30. Q. Captain, is your answer that that message was not sent? Am I correct in saying that this message was not sent?

A. That message was not sent but I did not even suspect it had not been sent until November, 1943.

31. Q. Are you aware of the existence of a copy of that rough draft anywhere?

A. So far as I know there is no copy in existence.

32. Q. What other information, if any, was received in the C. I. Unit in Washington prior to the evening of December 6th that indicated a break in relations between the United States and Japan?

A. On November 5, 1941, Tokio sent Ambassador Nomura a dispatch "JD No. 6254" stating that it was absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month, and added "of utmost secrecy".

[751] 33. Q. I hand you Document 7 of Exhibit 63. Is this the message to which you have just referred?

A. It is.

34. Q. Please continue with your answer.

A. The day before Tokio had sent JD No. 6248 to Nomura stating that counter-proposals would be given in Tokio No. 726 and 727, and added, "Conditions both within and without our empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort. The success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan". On November 12th, Tokio informed Nomura in JD 6415, "The United States is still not fully aware of the exceeding criticalness of the situation here. The date set in Message No. 736 is a definite deadline. The situation is nearing a climax. Time is indeed becoming short." On November 17, Tokio told Ambassador Nomura in JD 6638, in reply to a long message from him in which he begged Tokio to at least wait a month or two to get a clear view of the world situation. "The fate of our empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. There will be no change."

[752] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

35. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 10 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. It is.

36. Q. Please continue.

A. On November 22 Tokyo advised Nomura in JD 6710: "There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th."

37. Q. I hand you Document 11 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you refer?

A. Yes.

38. Q. Please continue.

A. On November 24 Tokyo advised in JD 6744: "Advise Nomura the time limit set in my number 812 is in Tokyo time." On November 26

in JD 6801 we learned that Tokyo advised Nomura: "Should negotiations collapse, we will completely destroy British and American power in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions." This is a circular. It was sent on November 14, 1941. We were delayed twelve days in getting this information. On November 28 we learned in JD 6890, which is a translation of a Washington-Tokyo telephone conversation: "A crisis does appear imminent regarding negotiations. Do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand, and the Army is champing at the bit." This is from Kurusu to Yamamoto in Tokyo. On November 26 we learned of a Washington-Tokyo telephone conversation. On November 26 in JD 6891 Kurusu and Nomura, in commenting on the American note which Secretary Hull had delivered to them that date, stated: "Our failure and humiliation are complete."

39. Q. I hand you Document 16 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. It is. Have you got 6898 on November 28?

40. Q. Yes.

A. On November 28 we received information contained in Document 18 of Exhibit 63, which I identified. On December 1 in JD 6942 we received information of Germany's promise to aid Japan in case Japan would declare war against the United States. On December 1 in JD 6943 Tokyo advised Ambassador Oshima in Berlin: "The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is." [753] That is December 1, and the message was dated November 30, 1941. On December 1 we also received the information contained in JD 6944, which I believe you have.

41. Q. Captain, I hand you Document 22 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the document to which you just referred?

A. Yes. On December 2 in JD 6974 we learned that Hsingking advised Tokyo: "In the event that war breaks out with England and the United States, persons to be interned: British Nationals, 339; American citizens, 81; Nationals of Soviet observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American learnings are to be suitably taken care of."

42. Q. Captain, in your future answers please limit yourself only to the documents which gave new and additional information regarding a possible war with Japan or a possible break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. On December 1 in JD 6983 Tokyo advised Washington to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious—

43. Q. We have that. I hand you Document 21 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the dispatch about which you are testifying?

A. It is. Do you have 6984?

44. Q. No, sir.

A. On December 1 in JD 6984 Tokyo advised: "The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed

to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan."

45. Q. Was there any indication of which one of the code machines was being destroyed there?

A. It was very definite to us. It is describing technical terms. On December 2 in JD 6985 Tokyo sent a circular message to consular officials all over the world establishing a hidden-word code for use after they had destroyed their other code books and normal telegraphic communications were not available. The message itself was dated November 27. We were five days late in translation. On December 3 we learned from JD 6991 that Tokyo had told the Consul General in Honolulu: "Make your ships in harbor, report irregularly but twice a week."

46. Q. I hand you Document 64 of Exhibit 63. Is this the document to which you refer?

A. It is. On December 3 we learned in JD 7017 that Tokyo had instructed Washington to burn all codes except two, stop using the machine and destroy completely, destroy all message files and all secret documents. The message was dated the 2nd. On December 4 in JD 7029 we learned that Tokyo had instructed the consulate in Honolulu to investigate bases in Hawaiian reservation. The message was dated November 20.

[754] 47. Q. Please continue.

A. On December 5 in JD 7063 we learned that Tokyo instructed Honolulu to report ships in Pearl Harbor and Maunaloa Bay and so forth. That message was dated November 18.

48. Q. I hand you Document 37 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the message of November 18 to which you just referred?

A. It is. On December 5 in JD 7086 we learned that Tokyo had instructed Honolulu: "In the future, report even when there are no ship movements." The message was dated November 29.

49. Q. I hand you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Is this the message of November 29 to which you have just referred?

A. It is. On the 4th of December in JD 7092 Tokyo instructed Hsinking: "Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. Great care should be taken not to antagonize Russia." That was sent December 1. On December 6 in JD 7111—I think you have that—Honolulu reported on naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

50. Q. Yes.

A. That takes me through the afternoon and evening of December 6.

51. Q. In addition to the foregoing, was there any information available to the Navy Department indicating the imminence of hostilities, as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations prior to the evening of December 6, 1941?

A. We regarded the breaking of diplomatic relations with Japan and active hostilities as being synonymous, going on Japan's past record. We began standing continuous watches on the Japanese diplomatic watches the 1st of February, 1941 as soon as we had enough officers and men to do it, because we expected that the break would come over a week-end, the way all Hitler's coups had been made in Europe against the British and other European cabinets, and we did

not want to be caught off guard. We knew it would take two or three months until we got into an efficient watch list. When the break actually came, it was just one more week-end as far as the men on watch were concerned.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

52. Q. When Lieutenant Commander Kramer left your unit to distribute information, with how many copies of such information did he start?

A. Normally he had only one copy which was showed but not [755] given anybody. The one exception to that, which I know of, was on the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, when he made numerous copies, so that each party concerned could be given a copy. We always gave two copies of everything we had to the Army to handle their own filing and distribution. The Army gave us two copies, one for file by JD number and the other for distribution and file by dates.

53. Q. You implied in your testimony that you gave high evaluations of the news coming from Batavia concerning the Winds Code. How long had you been giving that evaluation as to what came from Java?

A. That was the only message we ever received from Java.

54. Q. You stated at the end of your direct examination that the feeling in your unit was that a severance of diplomatic relations was equivalent to a declaration of war. Will you expand that answer a little more and tell us why you had such an interpretation?

A. Historically speaking, Japan commenced hostilities against China in the Chinese-Japanese war—I think in 1890—without any formal breaking of diplomatic relations. The attack on the Fleet was itself the severance of diplomatic relations. The same thing occurred at Port Arthur at the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war. Because we were largely influenced by people who lived in Japan and studied the language out there, we had no faith in the Japanese at all and considered them a very tricky, underhanded bunch of dirty fighters who would try to hit us behind our back if they could.

55. Q. You stated that in your unit a message about the severance of diplomatic relations was akin to the signal to execute the Japanese war plans. Upon what reason did you base that?

A. For one thing, we were largely influenced by the importance that Admiral Wilkinson attributed to it before it came in. We had all manner of things pointing up to the beginning of the war, including the messages which I read off. The last one came in just about the same time as the message from Hsinking, telling them, above all, not to antagonize Russia and referring to the possibility of war against England and the United States. There were the messages to Berlin, but all these things pointed, more or less, to promises, but there was nothing specific in regard to time other than this ultimatum or the time limit of the 29th. The Army people expected that we were going to be hit on the 29th or 30th. They were very positive and could not understand why they waited that long. We figured that they had some complicated move involved. It was all a question of timing, and they would somehow have to give a signal [756] to execute, and this was one way to give it. There was no way we could see for

giving this information to the consuls. We thought it meant more than to the consuls and that it was going to the military force. It was our belief and that is all we had.

56. Q. Then, that feeling was not so much contained in your unit as it was the feeling of the Director of Naval Intelligence?

A. We thought it was his feeling. We thought it was McCollum's feeling and it was our own. We shared that view.

57. Q. Do you recall Commander Kramer's ever leaving your unit with one or more documents when he was about to present to higher authority the feeling that a signal for the execution of the Japanese war plans had been given?

A. Yes, sir, I believe that he left twice that day, once early in the morning to take that around at least as far as Admiral Wilkinson, and he may have been asked by Admiral Wilkinson to carry it farther. Then, again he made his regular distribution trip on which he took it to everybody and ended up by giving it to the aide of the President.

58. Q. Were those words used?

A. No, sir, we were very careful not to intrude our opinions upon things we were reporting. As for the set-up of the war plans: Communications obtained this information, and it was the duty and responsibility of Naval Intelligence to collate it and disseminate it, and we felt that we would have been over-stepping the bounds if we attempted to put our interpretations in.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

59. Q. Do you know what your unit did Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7?

A. I know that very well, because I talked with all the officers who were on watch during that period, as well as seeing the written record.

60. Q. Will you tell the court, in general, what your unit did on the 6th and 7th of December in regard to this matter?

A. On a week-end traffic usually fell off to nothing. On this week-end we handled about three times the normal messages for a busy day. The most important was a very long, 14-part message which contained the Japanese declaration of war, which was delivered Sunday afternoon around, I believe it was, 2:15 or 2:30 p. m. to the Secretary of State. We had the first thirteen parts of that and had them translated or decoded by 7 p. m. Saturday night, December 6, 1941. Then we spent about two hours making smooth copies and numerous [757] other copies. The Army came over and helped us. They did some of the translation and also furnished a copy. The Army was given three copies about nine o'clock. At nine o'clock Kramer got on the telephone and told Admiral Wilkinson what he had and asked for instructions. Wilkinson told him to come right out and leave a copy at the White House en route. That was done. Kramer went out to Admiral Wilkinson's, and I believe Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining the Naval Aide to the President. He got a station wagon, stopped at the White House en route, and left these copies with the White House Aide. At the time, the President was entertaining and could not be seen immediately.

The judge advocate objected to the answer of the witness on the ground that it was hearsay.

Examined by the court :

61. Q. Is that an official report ?

A. That is what Kramer told me officially as his commanding officer, to account for his movements. I asked him some very searching questions.

The judge adocate withdrew the objection.

62. Q. Continue with your answer.

A. As well as I can recollect, Admiral Wilkinson telephoned to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and also to Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans. I know that Admiral Turner was informed that night. My recollections have been hazy. He may have been a guest of Admiral Wilkinson, and Kramer may have sent Admiral Turner a copy of the message, and Turner may have talked to Stark over the telephone. I asked Kramer about the Secretary of State, and he said that he understood that Colonel Bratton, or somebody else in the Army, had delivered to Secretary Hull a copy of the message by 10:30 and that Secretary Hull called Secretary Knox and Stimson on the 'phone and made appointments for them, plus Kramer and Bratton, to be present at a conference in the State Department in Secretary Hull's office at 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. They all attended. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. on December 7 to see if part 14 had come in or any other news. Then he went home and left word he was going to be down early the next morning, because he had instructions to give these documents to Admiral Stark in his office at 9 o'clock. About 4 or 5 a. m. December 7, 1941, two other important messages came in by teletype from the West Coast. One was part 14 of the long message which was a declaration of war. This was decoded immediately and was ready for distribution by 7 a. m. of December 7, 1941. [758] The other message was Tokyo's serial No. 907, and when decoded it proved to be in Japanese. That was sent over to the War Department for translation about 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941. The translation came back from the War Department a little after 10 a. m. on Sunday, December 7. That was the message which instructed Kurusu and Nomura to deliver the declaration of war to the Secretary of State, if possible, at 1 p. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Washington time. Specifically, it was to deliver Tokyo serial No. 902.

63. Q. That was the message of which there were fourteen parts?

A. That was the 14-part message.

64. Q. Do you know anything about the dissemination of the 14th part and the second message to which you just referred that came in on the morning of Sunday, December 7?

A. Kramer came into the Navy Department somewhere about 8 a. m., by the recollection of himself, December 7, 1941, and took that message—and there were some other inconsequential translations at the same time, plus the other 13 parts—up to Admiral Stark's office first. He either gave them to Admiral Stark personally or left them with his aide. My memory is not clear on that point. Then he went to the White House and left a copy with Admiral Beardall, who was at the White House. Then he went to the State Department and arrived in time for his 10 a. m. appointment with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Colonel Bratton was there, and so was Secretary Stimson.

The judge adocate moved to strike from the record the testimony of this witness relating to information which had been told him.

The court announced that it did not sustain the motion to strike out the testimony.

65. You may proceed.

A. Kramer delivered the material and stayed a few minutes and then went back to the Navy Department. About the time he got back, the translation of Tokyo's serial No. 907 came in, which Kramer saw immediately was very important. There also came a message in the hidden-word code, which I have referred to and which was translated very hurriedly. The translation, as circulated, said, "Relations with England are not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste, as I discovered later, they left out one of the hidden words, and the message should have read—

[759] 66. Q. What was reported to you?

A. Those two messages were redistributed immediately by Kramer. He first went to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There was a conference in progress there. He gave them to Admiral Stark's aide. Then he went to the White House and gave them to the Aide of the President. Then he got to the State Department, arriving there about 11 a. m. and gave copies to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy; and to the copy he gave the Secretary of the Navy there was a note appended which stated the time of delivery was sunrise in Honolulu and nearly midnight in Manila, and it undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours.

The judge advocate moved that the entire answer to this question be stricken from the record on the ground that it is hearsay.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, joined in the motion.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge what you have stated in that answer?

A. I only know from what Kramer told me.

The court announced that the motion to strike out the answer was sustained.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

68. Q. Captain, from your general knowledge of messages received and passing through your office, did you have the impression and did your office have the impression that they were important messages being received from sources, subsequent to November 27, which had a direct bearing on this war condition you mentioned?

A. Yes, sir, they were.

69. Q. You said that the messages were distributed when they were received. Did you have a list of distribution in your office, or did you know where those messages or copies of messages were being sent?

A. There were written orders confining the distribution of these messages to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the Far Eastern [760] Section, plus the cryptanalysts and the translators working on them. If anybody else in the Navy Department saw them, it was done on the orders of higher authority.

70. Q. Have you any knowledge that any information concerning the messages which you have outlined was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District?

A. The only information sent him was with reference to the Japanese destroying their code machines.

71. Q. The message of December 1, which contained an important message to Berlin stating that war with the United States and Great Britain might come sooner than expected, was not sent?

A. That was not sent.

72. Q. As information to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Neither to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet nor the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

73. Q. Has it been customary at any time within your experience in Communications or in the Navy Department to find that a message has been taken out of the files or has been misplaced from the files?

A. It has not. A great many messages and other material were misplaced during frequent moves consequent to the growth of the Naval Intelligence organization, but subsequently, I think, everything was located or accounted for, and this Winds Message is very conspicuous by its absence.

74. Q. You know of no other messages which have disappeared similar to this one?

A. No other message that I knew about and wanted have we failed to find eventually. In some cases it took two or three months and they were found.

75. Q. Has a diligent search been made for these messages?

A. A diligent search was made by 20-G, and later I borrowed the files where they should have been. Commander Lynn assisted me, but we couldn't find any trace of them.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

76. Q. Captain, can you find the communication which you had in reference to orders to Japanese diplomats to destroy their codes? Can you get that?

A. Here it is; December 1 is the first one.

[761] 77. Q. The substance of that information was what?

A. (Reading) "The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of code machines and dispose of them. The machine at Batavia has been returned to Japan."

78. Q. You had another one prior to December 3 on that same subject?

A. Yes. That one was the first. On the second one—a similar message was sent, but in more detail, to Washington.

79. Q. I call your attention to Exhibit 20, the communication of December 3, 1941. I observe that Exhibit 20 states that only some of the codes and some of the material is being destroyed. That was not your information at the time, was it? Your information at the time was that all the codes were being destroyed?

A. I did not write this.

80. Q. I am not asking you that.

A. The exhibit you refer to is incomplete and ambiguous.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

81. Q. Captain, some of these documents of Exhibit 63 bear a stamp like the one on No. 1 and a great many have no stamp whatever. Will you explain to the court the significance of that stamp and what the omission may mean?

A. I cannot explain what the stamp means or the significance of the stamp or the lack of it. Kramer might be able to.

82. Q. Captain, referring again to No. 39 of this exhibit, which is the 14-part message of December 6, will you glance at it and explain why you repeatedly refer to that dispatch from Tokyo as a declaration of war?

A. Tokyo serial No. 901 stated that their 902 in English would be the answer to the American note of November 26, 1941. Up to this time, the language implied had been very courteous. Because of the harsh and abusive language used throughout this, there was no doubt in the minds of the men who were on watch at the time that the Japanese meant war and that this was their declaration.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

[762] The witness made the following statement: The translation date of JD 7469 is December 15, 1941. The message itself was dated December 11 and gives Tokyo's explanation of the presentation of serial No. 902 and the fact that they considered it their declaration of war.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Doctor Stanley K. Hornbeck. Pages 767-772, inclusive.

[767] 24. Q. Do you remember receiving, or having knowledge of, information on 26 November 1941, setting forth the Japanese official views as to the successful outcome of the agreement under consideration between the United States and Japan?

A. I think we had something on that from intercept material.

25. Q. Did you know the source of this information?

A. I knew the approximate source, at least.

26. Q. Between the dates, November 27 and December 7, 1941, were negotiations continuing with Japan?

A. Well, there was some further conversation, and then there was the President's message to the Emperor, but that is all in the record, also.

27. Q. But there were conversations and parleys going on in that period of time?

A. Yes.

28. Q. Did you, being aware of that information that came in to you, or flowed into the State Department during this period, November 27 to December 7, consider that information, received at that time, had an important bearing on the negotiations?

A. During those few days?

29. Q. Yes, sir; that is, practically subsequent to the note of 26 November.

A. I doubt whether it had.

30. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 7, which is now before this court, and which purports to be a communication from the Japanese Government dated 5 November 1941, to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and which urges the agreement be completed by November 25, '41, will you please state whether or not you had been informed of the contents of this document, and about the time you received this information?

A. I have no recollection of having seen this particular document.

31. Q. And naturally you would not know whether or not the State Department had discussed it with the officials of the Navy Department, including the Secretary of the Navy?

A. No, sir.

32. Q. Referring to Exhibit 63, document 18, which is now before this court, which document is a communication from the Japanese Government to the Japanese representatives in Washington, and which sets out views as to the de facto termination of negotiations, would you please refer to this document stating whether or not you have seen it, or whether or not [768] you had been informed as to its contents?

A. Yes, sir, I think I had seen that document.

33. Q. Do you remember, Doctor Hornbeck, about the time you got that information or saw it?

A. No, sir, I could not say when. These things were coming to us with reasonable promptness at that time, but I couldn't possible say at what moment I had seen it.

34. Q. You know approximately what is the date of the document?

A. The document is dated November 28.

35. Q. You couldn't have seen it prior to the 28th, could you?

A. That is clear.

36. Q. Isn't this very important information which showed the trend of events and really showed rather concisely the position of Japan?

A. Had the United States been in the position of the affirmant, that is, of the party pressing for an agreement, I should say, yes. Inasmuch as the United States was not in that position, it was Japan that was pressing for the agreement, I should say this does not give a clear indication.

37. Q. But in your opinion, by reason of this telegram and other information at that time, were the negotiations in de facto terminated on the date of that telegram, 28 November 1941?

A. I should say the telegram indicated that there would be no further negotiations.

38. Q. During the period 26 November to 7 December 1941, did you keep familiar with information being published in the press with relation to the progress of negotiations between Japan and the United States?

A. Far more so, I think, than the average reader; yes, sir.

39. Q. Could you give in general your thought of this, I mean as your memory serves, as to what this press information consisted of?

A. Well, the press was discussing the question of the meaning of

the latest developments, the developments between the 20th and the 26th. In some parts of the press they were talking of the possibility of war. Editorial writers were discussing the wisdom or the unwisdom of the position which had been taken by this Government in delivering the note of the 26th. I do not remember that there was any definite trend or any definite balance of opinion or prognostication or of speculation. It was still a scattering thing.

[769] 40. Q. At what time did you become familiar with the note which was the Japanese reply to the note of 26 November to them?

A. Well, their official reply was made on December 7.

41. Q. Did you have any information prior to the handing of this note by the Japanese to the Secretary of State, as to the contents of this reply?

A. My recollection is that we had intercept material on that subject.

42. Q. Was there any conference held with naval officials on the morning of the 7th, in regard to this reply, prior to its actual delivery?

A. To my recollection, there were naval officers at the Department that morning when I went down at about 10:30.

43. Q. Did you attend the conference?

A. No, sir.

44. Q. Do you have any recollection as to the officers who were there?

A. No, I couldn't tell you that.

45. Q. Doctor Hornbeck, in the general set-up of the State Department relative to conferences and so on, who was the representative, the State Department official, who actually handled these matters with the Navy Department, as to the delivery of information, as to the flow of information between the two departments, the liaison?

A. There had been set up an arrangement whereby Mr. Welles and the Chiefs of Staffs met from time to time.

46. Q. Pardon me, by "Chiefs of Staff" you mean?

A. I mean Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations; and there were periods in which they met frequently, and periods in which they met rather infrequently. Sometimes I was informed of their having had a meeting and what had transpired. Sometimes I was not. Mr. Welles would be the only man of our establishment who could tell you how often those meetings had been held or could give you any record of dates and so forth. Other than that, there were these meetings in the office of the Secretary of State, where, at times, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were present, and then there would be officers of the Navy and of the Army, and sometimes some of us in the Department were called in and sometimes it would be one group, sometimes another group, depending on what parts of the word or what problem was being discussed. Those were the principal [770] points of contact there at high level. I have never known what officers of the Department, or of your department, or the War Department, actually engaged in the physical handing back and forth of telegraphic and other material at a much lower level.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[771] 47. Q. Aside from the actual handling of information, dispatches and so on, was there any representative of the State Department which acted as liaison officer with the Navy Department? In other words, in discussing certain matters which would be carried to higher authorities, the Secretary of State, for instance?

A. Well, in a later period. I do not think it was in the case as it was in 1941. Mr. Orme Wilson was the liaison officer of the Department of State with the Navy Department and the War Department.

48. Q. I am speaking for the purpose of exchange in dispatches and information of that kind. In other words, suppose the State Department receives an important dispatch relative to Japan, and similarly, suppose the Navy Department receives it. Now, was there an official in the State Department who said, "This is important for the Navy," and the Secretary of State has this man to confer with the Navy and see that this dispatch is transmitted to the Navy?

A. I had always understood there was some man engaged in that, but who it was I do not know. Mr. Hamilton would probably be able to tell you. Officers immediately attached to the Secretary of State and officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs gave instant attention to this matter.

49. Q. Mr. Hamilton isn't here, is he?

A. No.

Neither the judge advocate nor the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, desired to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

50. Q. I understood you to say, Dr. Hornbeck, that in the days following the 26th of November after the delivery of the note that day, there were newspaper discussions concerning the note and its contents?

A. I think so.

51. Q. Isn't it true that that note was released to the news press for the first time on the 7th of December, in the afternoon? I read a paragraph from "Foreign Relations", Volume 2, of which this court has taken judicial notice, page 793, a statement by the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941. I read the third paragraph: "I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peace settlement covering the entire Pacific area which I handed to Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941." Does that refresh your recollection as to when that statement, the note of November 26th, was released to the press?

A. That relates to the text. The text was released on December 7. But on evening of November 26 the press was informed that reply had been made. On next day, in a conference with the press, the Secretary stressed the gravity of the [772] situation both in Europe and in the Far East. During the next few days, in conferences with the Secretary and with the Under Secretary, and in their contacts with diplomatic missions, the correspondents continued to

ask questions about developments in the 'exploratory conversation' and about various features of the international situation, especially about American-Japanese relations; and the press, piecing bits together and making surmises and engaging in speculation, discussed a variety of possibilities and made comments from many angles. They talked about the American-Japanese exchange of communications rather than about the exact contents of the communications. I do not recall that what appeared in the press indicated any special, new or peculiar trend of thought beyond giving evidence of an increasing realization that this country was confronted with a very serious problem in our foreign relations both in Europe and in the Far East. In the news as such, President Roosevelt's return to Washington, statements of Japanese officials, and developments in and around Indo-China were among the important items.

52. Q. Does that appear in either "Peace and War" or the book entitled "Foreign Relations?"

A. No, I think not.

53. Q. That is, the release that was prior to December 7th and following the 26th of November?

A. It may or may not have been a release but there was a press conference in which the press was informed of the general situation.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which he had not fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 774-792, inclusive.

[774] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. There is evidence before the court that an established procedure in the Navy Department had been set up whereby certain classified information was delivered to you as Chief of Naval Operations daily. Will you state, briefly, what this procedure was during the period from about November, 1941, to 7 December, 1941?

A. The procedure of giving me classified information, generally, was that of bringing it to my Flag Secretary, Commander Wellborn, who would bring it in to me, although at the time if I were free, it might have come in directly by the officer who brought it, in Naval Intelligence.

2. Q. Who was the officer that normally brought it from Naval Intelligence?

A. Kramer.

3. Q. Was the information that was delivered to you by the office of Naval Intelligence evaluated before it came to your hands, or not?

A. Sometimes information was evaluated, and sometimes dispatches may have come to me direct before I received the evaluation; but

there was a running evaluation kept by those agencies who were in Operations who were designated to do it.

4. Q. What agencies in Operations were designated to evaluate intelligence for you?

A. The Office of Naval Intelligence, and also War Plans; also they were usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

5. Q. If information arrived in the Navy Department outside of office hours was there any established procedure for getting it to you at the earliest practicable moment?

A. Yes, there was. It would go to the watch officer, Operations Watch Officer, who in turn, using his judgment, would send it to the duty officer, who was usually a Captain out in town who was regularly designated. He in turn would exercise his judgment as to whether or not I was to be called and given the information.

6. Q. Was the system of distributing military intelligence in the Navy Department during the critical period preceding 7 December 1941, such that you feel that you received all important information on Japanese-United States relationships?

A. I felt that I was receiving it.

7. Q. I show you document No. 11, of Exhibit 63, which purports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 November. Before 7 December 1941, had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I do not recall exactly this message, but I undoubtedly- [775] ly was acquainted with it, either as it is, or brought to me and talked over verbally.

8. Q. It bears translation date of November 22, 1941. Can you state when it probably came to your knowledge in the routine course of office procedure?

A. Well, it might very well have come on that date or the day following, which would have been the 23rd.

9. Q. Did you send the substance of this information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 24th, which very well may have been based upon or certainly had taken into consideration this Exhibit.

10. Q. The word "agreement" is used in this document, No. 11. What agreement in your opinion was there being discussed?

A. I would say that it was the agreement pending between the negotiators for Japan and our State Department.

11. Q. Did the deadline of 29 November, as stated in document No. 11, have any special significance to you?

A. The date of 29th of November and the previous date of the 25th, did have a significance, as a break in the negotiations might come at that time. I may state that I did not send, as noted from our dispatches, information to either of the Pacific commands, as to the specific dates given herein. I had become leery of dates. We had sources of information which looked authentic, from time to time, as to when Italy would come in, and frequently they were changed. If I had set a date of the 25th, for example, and nothing happened on the 25th, it would have, in my opinion, been bad ball. Again, if I had sent a date of the 29th, which I could not be sure of it, and it must be

remembered that this message had to be evaluated not just as it stands but in connection with a lot of other information—but if I had sent that date of the 29th and nothing had happened, again it would probably have weakened the dispatch which we did send, and which, in my opinion, covered the situation. Judging by what is now perhaps hindsight, I am glad that I did not include the dates.

12. Q. Of what dispatch are you speaking, Admiral, in your answer to the question?

A. I am speaking of our dispatch which was sent on the 24th.

13. Q. I show you Exhibit 15, Admiral, and ask you if this is the dispatch to which you refer as bearing date of 24 November 1941?

A. Yes, and I may state further that in our dispatch [776] of three days later, any reference to specific dates was left out, and we confined ourselves in that later dispatch to the expression, "In the next few days." That is the dispatch that was sent on the 27th.

14. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, in evidence before the court, and ask you if this dispatch is the one of 27 November 1941, to which you refer in your last answer?

A. Yes.

15. Q. I show you Exhibit 63, and point our document 15 contained therein. This document 15 has been popularly referred to in testimony as the "winds code." Had you seen this document, or had you been informed of its contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. As I have previously testified, I do not recall having seen this document. I assume that if received it was evaluated. It adds nothing to my dispatch of the 27th. It covers the cutting off of international communications. I stated in my dispatch of the 27th that negotiations had ceased. Certainly I do not think this dispatch would have strengthened my dispatch of the 27th; it might possibly have weakened it.

16. Q. I show you document No. 18 from Exhibit 63, which states in substance that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents prior to 7 December 1941—or did you see this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I may have seen it, or its evaluation. He had already covered it. It added nothing to what I had already sent in the dispatch of the 27th.

17. Q. Did you inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the contents of this document?

A. No, nothing in addition to what I had sent on the 27th.

18. Q. Document No. 18 speaks of "negotiations." What negotiations, in your opinion, were being referred to therein?

A. Negotiations between the representatives of the Japanese Government and our State Department.

19. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63. This document sets out in substance the Secretary of State's note of 26 November 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the subject matter contained therein, on [777] or before 7 December 1941?

A. I have previously testified that I did not recall seeing the document. It may very well have been discussed.

20. Q. Had the Japanese made a reply to the Secretary of State's note of 26 November? That is document 17—prior to 6 December 1941?

A. No.

21. Q. Adverting back to the words in the document, 18, which you testified to in the question before this—"with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days." What views did you think they would referring to in that document, by the views of the Imperial Government?

A. I assume that it was the views of the Imperial Government, which were to be sent.

22. Q. And these views of the Imperial Government—would they be in reply to this note of 26 November?

A. Yes, that would be my interpretation.

23. Q. The language of document 18 is that with the receipt of the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Is not this statement in your opinion tantamount to an assertion that negotiations were broken as of the time of making the document?

A. I would say, as I now see it, looking at this dispatch, yes; but I would also state that our dispatch of the 27th had also so stated. It will be recalled that the dispatch of the 27th stated negotiations had ceased.

24. Q. Your dispatch of November 27 is Exhibit 17, is it not?

A. Yes.

25. Q. This document, No. 18, was translated on 28 November 1941. That is more than a week before the actual attack on Pearl Harbor, is it not?

A. Yes.

26. Q. Between 28 November and 7 December 1941, were any directives for fleet dispositions made?

A. No directives additional to the directive contained in our dispatch of the 27th.

27. Q. Were any additional security measures directed by the Chief of Naval Operations during this period of time, [778] as they applied to the United States Pacific Fleet or the Hawaiian area?

A. No. The code message was sent, regarding destruction of codes, but nothing else as regards security.

28. Q. You have testified that the language of document No. 18, which is to the effect that on receipt of the views of the Imperial Government in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured—that looking back on it you considered that they were then ruptured as of the date of the dispatch?

A. Yes.

29. Q. Was there any reason why the United States Pacific Fleet should not have been immediately moved from Pearl Harbor?

A. Do you mean as to any reasons why I should not have moved it?

30. Q. That is correct, Sir.

A. Well, if I had ordered the Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, I would probably have had to have given a destination, as for example, bringing them back to the coast, something which I just considered out of the cards. But I left matters of this sort to the commanders in the field. I had two fleets in the Pacific. One in the Asiatic, and one in

the Hawaiian area, and I left it up to the commanders on the spot as to what to do, after I had given them the information that I had, my interpretation of it, and the directive contained in the dispatch of 27 November.

31. Q. I show you document 21. from Exhibit 63, which states in substance, that "they are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Had you seen this document, or had you been advised of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I do not recall having seen this document in just this form, but it may very well have been discussed at that time. I might state in general in connection with these dispatches—this document, for example—it is just one of a great many that were coming in along with a lot of other material. It was physically impossible for me to read them all or to see them all. Some of them I saw directly. Some came to me with evaluations. Sometimes some came to me with a general picture—sometimes orally, sometimes on a written memorandum. To take a single dispatch with a specific question, we may read into it now, in the light of hindsight, what we couldn't see then. We didn't have hindsight to guide us, and we had to evaluate without it. I can only say I [779] was in complete touch—at least that I assumed I was in complete touch—with the broad general trend; that our conclusions we aimed to keep the commanders in the field advised of, we did not send them every specific document. I think to have done so would have been prejudicial to the larger picture. For example, a good deal has been stated as to what happened between late November and December 7. We unquestionably were continually talking things over, but I should like to state that no evaluations or opinions were brought to me as a result of the study by those whose business it was to study everything which came in, which in any way altered the considered opinion and directive which we sent out on the 27th. On the contrary, as I have testified before, what was highly confirmatory evidence to me was the burning of the codes, and again our action in our dispatch to Guam and again to CinCPac on this subject, showing that we had not changed in any way our opinion regarding the message of the 27th—but if anything were strengthening it.

32. Q. In several instances in your answer, Admiral, you referred to your dispatch of 27 November. Do you mean Exhibit 17?

A. Yes.

33. Q. The document 21, about which you have been testifying, states: "We are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Who was this message set out in document 21 from?

A. It is from Tokyo to Washington, and I assume that "we" means the Japanese.

34. Q. Did you advise the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the substance contained in document 21?

A. No. As I have stated, it added nothing, in my opinion, to what had been sent. It was typical of Japan to carry on material of this sort right up to rupture.

35. Q. Referring to document 11, about which you have testified, which was received on or about 22 November, 1941, and which sets out that the absolute deadline for the negotiations was 29 November; also the statement contained in document 21, which was received in

the Navy Department about 1 December, 1941, and which asserts that "we are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing"—how did you evaluate the information that they were simulating a continuance of negotiations after a deadline for concluding them had passed?

A. Well, I think I have already answered that question. They may have changed their date again. We had the deadline of the 25th passed. We had the deadline of the 29th passed; and as I have stated, it was typical of them to keep talking [780] and giving an idea that negotiations might be continuing right up to the point of rupture. This in no way changed the estimate which we made, that negotiations had ceased, or alters what we had sent in any respect.

36. Q. Referring to document 38 of Exhibit 63, translated on December 6, 1941, which sets out in substance that a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November will be sent on December 7. That is to be kept secret and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message. Had you seen this document or had you been made cognizant of its contents prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. I do not recall seeing this document. However, I again would point out that we had covered the contingency in our dispatch of the 27th.

37. Q. Referring to document 39 of Exhibit 63, this document contains fourteen points which are apparently in reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November, 1941. The draft indicates the first thirteen points to have been translated on 6 December 1941. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941, see this document, or had you been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I had not seen it, and I haven't the slightest recollection of having seen its contents. The message which was sent by the Army on the forenoon of the 7th, of course, covered it, so far as its general effect was concerned, and to that extent I was familiar.

38. Q. A witness before this court testified at great length concerning a memorandum which had been prepared by Commander McCollum. This was about a five hundred word summary of his own estimate, probably, of the military situation that existed on or about 4 December, 1941—up to the time of 4 December 1941. The witness stated that this summary had been passed along in the echelon through Admiral Noyes, who was then the director of Naval Communications, who had made the comment that he felt that "to send it to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet would be in effect an insult, that he believes that this 500-word summary of the estimate of the situation was carried by Admiral Wilkinson further up the echelon of command, and that later he discovered that the dispatch so prepared had never been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet—some months later he discovered that this dispatch had never been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet." Do you have any knowledge of this dispatch that the witness was talking about?

A. No.

[781] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

39. Q. Exhibit 13 before this court, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October 1941 directs, among other things, "Take

due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan"; and Exhibit 19, which is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of November 28, 1941, purports to set out a dispatch from the Army to Commander, Western Defense. In this dispatch there appears the language: "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent." In your dispatch of 16 October 1941, Exhibit 13, and the Army's dispatch which was quoted to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Exhibit 19 of 28 November, was it your intention in your injunction with regard to alarming the populace as set out in these two dispatches should be a continuing one?

A. The dispatch of the 16th of October was still in effect. The dispatch of 28 November was a dispatch of information to CinCPac. It was to our coastal forces giving them information which their Army opposite had and directing them, in case of hostilities, to carry out their part of WPL-46. I gave no directive regarding reconnaissance measures in that dispatch. I was quoting a dispatch of the War Department to the Commander, Western Defense Command.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

40. Q. I call your attention, Admiral, to Document 24 of Exhibit 63. That, in substance, was the inquiry or request from Tokyo to Honolulu to make reports relative to ships in Pearl Harbor. That appears to have been translated on December 3rd. Did you see that document on or about December 3rd?

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. We knew and had long known that the Japs were reporting a great mass of information and assumed that every move we were making in that area or on the Pacific Coast or in the Far East was known, and we had already sent our dispatch giving the gravity of the situation.

41. Q. Will you look at Document 36. That is another document from Tokyo to Honolulu relative to ships in Pearl [782] Harbor and was translated on the 5th of December. Did you see that on or about December 5th?

A. I may have. I do not recall it specifically. As I have stated, these reports were evaluated, taken into consideration with everything else. I may have had conversations on it but it in no way changed anything I had sent. It affirms the other dispatch for negative information.

42. Q. Now, will you look at Document 37 of Exhibit 63. That is a request from Tokyo to Honolulu for information as to particular areas in Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, and Manila Bay.

43. Q. That was translated when, please?

A. That was translated on the 5th.

44. Q. Did you see that document?

A. I do not recall it at this time.

45. Q. Well, do you recall any discussions about the information contained therein?

A. No, I do not. They may have taken place but I do not remember discussing this message.

46. Q. Will you look at Document 40, please, in Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, I have it.

47. Q. That is information from Honolulu to Tokyo relative to the movements of American warships in Pearl Harbor, the courses taken and speeds maintained, is it not?

A. Yes.

48. Q. When was that translated?

A. That was translated by the Army on the 6th of December.

49. Q. Do you recall seeing that document?

A. No, I do not.

50. Q. Or learning of the information contained therein?

A. No, I can't recall that document at this time.

51. Q. I call your attention to Document 2 in Exhibit 64, which was a dispatch from Chief of Asiatic to yourself under date of 28 November?

A. Yes.

52. Q. Did you receive that dispatch?

A. No. This again refers to the winds message which I do not recall. I note, however, that it was sent to Com16, C-in-C Pacific, and Com14, so that it may possibly have accounted for my not seeing it because it had already been sent to the Hawaiian area, but I have no clear recollection, as I have stated before, of the winds message.

[783] 53. Q. Now, will you look at Document 3 in Exhibit 64. This is a dispatch from Alusna, Batavia, to OpNav under date of 5 December and is a general reference to the winds message?

A. Yes.

54. Q. Did you see that dispatch to you?

A. No, I do not recall any dispatches in this connection. Our dispatch—of course, again referring to our own war warning—had been sent. That fact, together with the fact that this dispatch had been sent to the Hawaiian area, was known in the Far East and may have accounted for its not having been brought to me, and again it referred to rupture of relations in the original one which was presented to me this morning.

55. Q. Document 3 from Alusna, Batavia, puts a different interpretation on the message, referring to war rather than a break in relations?

A. Yes, it does; from Alusna, Batavia.

56. Q. Not having seen any of the first part of the winds message, I assume you heard nothing of anything connected with its execution?

A. No, I have no recollection of it.

57. Q. Referring back to these documents relative to the ships in Pearl Harbor and information back and forth between Honolulu and Japan: Was any information concerning that sent by you to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. No I think not.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret):

58. Q. Admiral, with reference to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which you read: You say that a copy of it had gone to Com14?

A. Document No. 2 here. It was from C-in-C, Asiatic Fleet, to OpNav, info Com16, CinCPac, Com14. It is one of the winds messages.

59. Q. But you are unable to say in that connection as to whether or not Com14 was ever informed by anyone of the execution of the winds message; you don't know that?

A. No, I do not.

The court then, at 10:53 a. m., took a recess until 11:10 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

[784] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as witness. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the court:

60. Q. Admiral, you have testified to the general effect that there were many, many messages—and I think you used the expression “thousands of messages”—coming into the Department, and that you naturally couldn't remember or take cognizance of all of them, but weren't many of these messages simply routine things?

A. Weren't many of them what, sir?

61. Q. Weren't many of these messages that you say were coming in daily, routine messages?

A. Yes.

62. Q. Now, weren't some of them perhaps of unusual importance?

A. Yes.

63. Q. What orders had you issued by which these could be distinguished so that certain ones could be brought direct to you without waiting for an evaluation, and to whose judgment was that left?

A. Well, I don't recollect having issued any orders but it certainly was the understanding that if there was anything important or demanded immediate attention, I assume that it would have been brought to me.

64. Q. Who, down the echelon of officers in Operations immediately below you would have the authority to decide whether a message could be stopped before it got to you, or whether it had to be taken to you? It wasn't left to the Communications Division itself, was it? Who would have that authority?

A. Well, messages might have been handled by Admiral Ingersoll. He had full discretion to answer what he saw necessary. When messages went to War Plans where they were evaluated I was in constant touch with War Plans. Intelligence was in much the same condition, and I just felt that they were keeping me informed or bringing me really important messages.

65. Q. Well, specifically, referring back to the one question asked you in which the question covered a long dispatch of 500 words or so which had been prepared by Communications and which, the testimony showed, they considered of intense value and that it not only served the purpose of giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific

[785] Fleet the evaluation of dispatches that had come in over a period of time, in other words, bringing him up to date with the conception you had; and further, it served the advantage of filling a blank of messages that perhaps never got to him; if that was so important in the opinion of the people who prepared it and it got up as far as Admirals Wilkinson and Noyes, who would have stopped that message from coming to you to decide whether it should go to the Commander-in-Chief, or not, in view of the importance given it a little further down the echelon?

A. I don't know. It may have been gone over with War Plans and have been decided—I am not saying whether rightly or wrongly—that the situation had been covered, or it might have been talked over between War Plans and Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall the slightest recollection of ever having seen or read that message.

66. Q. Well, it never got to you?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it did not.

67. Q. If it got to you and you didn't send it, was it because somebody above you stopped it?

A. No, sir. No, I would have accepted the full responsibility.

68. Q. In that file of documents in Exhibit 63, there are many messages which would seem to cast the shadows of what's coming, and it is your testimony that you have no recollection of ever having seen any of the ones we have shown you. Now, are we to assume that it is a matter of recollection, or that you never saw them?

A. It is a matter of recollection. For example, I would like to quote a paragraph in my letter to Admiral Kimmel a month before Pearl Harbor, written on November 7th, and after looking at some of these dispatches and assuming that they were talked over, they undoubtedly had a bearing on this. I quote, "Things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before. It continually gets worse and worse. A month may see literally most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever, particularly if one party cannot live with the set-up. It doesn't look good." Then again, I think the dispatches we did send reflect the information in some of the dispatches which were brought to my attention this morning and which, while I don't clearly remember the dispatch as I see it, they were undoubtedly subjects which we were talking about and which I think my letters and dispatches did cover. It is nearly three years, and to pick out a single dispatch and recognize it as is, unless it is something very outstanding, is difficult. Again, with reference to the material which was brought together after the dispatch of the 27th, my feeling is that if there had been anything brought to me which in any way altered what I had said, I would have remembered it and would have changed it, but we had a big area on our hands. The Atlantic was in a turmoil, if you remember, about that time. I was continually being [786] pressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic because he lacked forces. Along late in October and early November, as I recall, we had three ships sunk. We were at our wits end for escort vessels in the Atlantic. I was being pressed to bring escort vessels from the Pacific into the Atlantic. Colonel Knox pressed me for it, and I resisted. There is one other point in that connection which I might

bring up with reference to the transfer of vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic, a question which was asked me by Admiral Kimmel's counsel and which seemed rather strange that I might not have remembered because he put the question so clearly, but that was with reference to taking three more battleships from the Pacific into the Atlantic, and that Admiral Kimmel, when he was here in early June, went to the White House and got this straightened out. I wrote Admiral Kimmel on the 25th of May, which was very close to his arrival here, that we had no intention of taking anything further from the Pacific Fleet. I confirmed it in September. In the memorandum of November 5th, we again reiterated our adherence to the plan and the only suggestions of possible transfers were those in accordance with WPL-46, which was another division of heavy cruisers and which didn't take place at that time.

69. Q. Well, Admiral, that is all very pertinent, but my line of questioning is entirely on the question of these various messages and whether or not they got to you and the evaluation and so forth.

A. Well, my feeling was that my letters and my dispatch covered in general the dispatches which had been sent.

70. Q. Well, it doesn't even mean that; it means about the messages getting to you. I am trying to find out where they were stopped before they got to you, in view of your statement that you have no recollection of seeing them. The court wants more information now at this particular point and we are trying to bring out the procedure for these messages and why they didn't get to you, if they didn't.

A. Well, some of these messages, as I stated, I think their meaning has been covered by what I wrote or what we put in dispatches. I may have seen them. I may have talked over their substance. They may have been brought to me for evaluation. I feel they were covered. But to look at a single dispatch and definitely recall that dispatch at that time is difficult. Nevertheless, some of those that I say I can't recall specifically having seen have been covered.

71. Q. Well, with the danger of war hovering around, wouldn't messages that were intercepted from a government with which our relations were getting in a very critical condition have been of sufficient importance that those [787] down the echelon of command should have had orders that all of those dispatches should come to you? I am not questioning your not having issued the order but I am trying to find out if any such directive or orders were issued?

A. I don't recall having issued any orders as to a line of demarcation. It was just procedure that anything of importance would have been brought to me.

72. Q. Admiral, is it correct to state that each day a booklet or a compilation of all of these secret messages having an important bearing on Japan were brought in to you by either Commander Kramer—as I understand, he was probably the liaison officer—or some other officer?

A. The general routine, as I recall, on important messages of that nature, was that they would be brought to my office. If I were busy they might be left with Wellborn to bring in to me as soon as I was free.

73. Q. But they were brought in, weren't they?

A. Yes, I assume that anything that was set up as of sufficient importance down the line for me to see was brought in. I either saw them

or saw their evaluation or talked them over. Many were brought in.

74. Q. Weren't all of them bearing on this question brought in? I don't mean routine messages, but messages of importance bearing on the Japanese situation which, we understand from testimony before this court, were daily brought in to you by an officer for your perusal. Is that not correct?

A. Important messages were brought in to me by an officer.

75. Q. Then in that event if they were brought in, did you look at them?

A. Yes, if they were brought in to me, of course.

76. Q. Then if that is the case, you were conversant, or should have been, with all important messages that came through daily; is that correct?

A. Yes, but again, what may appear important now may not have at that time to those who were to bring it in to me, if they considered it had been covered in some other way. I can't say that everything was brought in. I endeavored to cover that in the general statement.

77. Q. But in all of this time did you consider the relationship between this country and Japan of primary importance to this government?

A. Yes.

78. Q. Therefore, you naturally would take an interest in the dispatches relative to Japan; isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

[788] 79. Q. And you would have kept yourself informed as to those conditions?

A. Right.

80. Q. That leads to this question of this note which was handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese on 26 November which set forth the conditions under which the United States would consider an agreement or further conversations with Japan. Had you ever heard of that note? You said that you didn't see it, and one time in your previous testimony you said you had never heard of such a note. Is that a correct assumption?

A. Well, I didn't see it. I don't recall it. Its contents may have been talked over but as to the specific note sent on the 26th, I don't recall it. I was given to understand that negotiations had ceased. This may have been talked over or mentioned to me by Admiral Schuirmann—then Captain Schuirmann—but I don't recall as I saw it when it was brought to me here.

81. Q. As you see it now, however, that was probably a very important note, wasn't it?

A. Yes, it was a very important note.

82. Q. A most important one?

A. It was a summary and a set-up that did not, in my opinion, in any way change the thought that we had and that we had been given to understand that negotiations had ceased. Marshall put it "practically ceased". It was my opinion they had ceased and my opinion was borne out and I was in close touch with Mr. Hull.

83. Q. Admiral, with all of these secret messages, these very secret messages which flowed in to you from 27 November to 7 December, didn't you conceive by those notes that this activity was continuing and that the negotiations and parleys were still going on?

A. I didn't consider that anything I saw gave any hope of a renewal of negotiations or that led me to the slightest conclusion that what I had said, namely, "negotiations have ceased", that that statement was incorrect. We were talking things over constantly but I had nothing to the contrary, and as I have stated, what does stand out in my memory is the confirmation of it.

84. Q. Referring to the night of 6-7 December, and the morning of 7 December; in your testimony you stated that your information was confined to the fact that a note was to be delivered at 1:00 o'clock the next day?

A. Yes.

[789] 85. Q. And that is all you knew about it. The note or the answer to the note of the Secretary of State to Japan of 26 November was received in the Department on 6 December in the afternoon, was translated, 13 parts, and was distributed—according to testimony—at 9:00 o'clock p. m., or 2100 on the night of 6 December; is that correct?

A. Well, I assume that it is.

86. Q. Did you see those?

A. No, I did not.

87. Q. In other words, you had no information whatsoever, with all of this coming in, regarding what was going to be done at 1:00 o'clock on 7 December, except that that note was going to be delivered; is that correct.

A. That is correct. When I got in the office, I learned that Sunday morning.

88. Q. But when you arrived in the office Sunday morning, 7 December, weren't you informed upon your arrival as to the receipt and translation of this answer to the note of 26 November?

A. Well, the outstanding thing in my mind that morning is that the Japs were to deliver a note which shut things off, and the time of 1300 sticks in my memory. I don't remember the conversation about the rest of it.

[790] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

89. Q. You do not remember Admiral Schuirmann's coming in to report on this to you?

A. No, I remember very clearly talking to Admiral Schuirmann about the picture and about the one o'clock business, but just what the thirteen points gave, I have no clear remembrance. We realized it was a turn-down, but what it was I don't recall. The outstanding thing that stands out in my memory is that things were off and that Mr. Hull was to be told at 1300.

90. Q. When Admiral Schuirmann arrived at your office, you do not remember whether he gave you a full picture of things which happened up to that time?

A. He may have.

91. Q. It is reasonable to suppose that he did?

A. Yes, it is reasonable to suppose that he did, if we were talking there.

92. Q. With reference to those secret messages sent from Honolulu to Japan and from Japan to Honolulu asking about the ships in harbor

and where the ships were anchored, all of which came in here on December 5—

A. Yes.

93. Q. Didn't those messages impress you with the fact that something was going on specifically relative to Honolulu?

A. They were specifically with regard to Honolulu. Of course, we knew the Japs had intensively, for years before the present war, been getting everything they could from anywhere, including diagrams of underground lines on the West Coast, but those particular messages did not impress me with the necessity of sending anything beyond what I had sent—if I saw them. I do not recollect just what we talked over with reference to them or having seen the specific dispatches.

94. Q. Don't you think at that time that Japan's asking Honolulu for specific information regarding ships had a very definite bearing on Honolulu?

A. Well, if you take the message in the light of hind sight, standing out by itself and coupled with everything, and again if you forget the fact that we had said that war may be expected within the next few days or that Japan may make an aggressive movement, well, then that stands out quite clearly; but if you take the fact that it was routine for the Japs to report practically everything—and we knew that they were reporting practically everything— [791] it might not have had the same significance at that time which can be read into it now.

95. Q. In your opinion, would it have been of value to send those messages to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific for his evaluation?

A. I do not know just what they would have meant to him if he had gotten them, in addition to what we had sent.

96. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them?

A. I don't know; I can't tell what his reaction would have been.

97. Q. Wouldn't that be a good reason for your sending them, since you didn't know how he would take them, and let him make his own evaluation?

A. We had made our broad evaluation of the picture and had sent it. Whether or not this additional information would have been useful to him, I am not prepared to state.

98. Q. But with this information coming in on December 5, as it did, specifying the getting of special information regarding Honolulu, did it occur to any one of your subordinates that they may be planning to strike by air or some other means on Honolulu? Didn't it emphasize and bring out prominently the Hawaiian area?

A. There was no evaluation and no recommendation to make regarding the transmitting of this information.

99. Q. I refer you again to this Winds Message. Your recollection is that you never heard of any message, regardless of its name, "Wind" or otherwise, to the effect that a message from Japan had been intercepted, showing conclusively that at some time in the future they were going to send out a secret execute for conditions for breaking off diplomatic relations or designating war with the United States and Great Britain; is that correct?

A. I stated I have no recollection of it.

100. Q. You realize that was a very important message in the light of present conditions?

A. I may question the statement that it was a very important message. Except for the Batavia end of it, the reliability of which I could not say, the Winds Message spoke of breaking off negotiations, and we had covered that.

101. Q. Are you aware of the fact that information was received that there were different interpretations and different translations wherein the breaking of diplomatic relations was interpreted by some as war?

A. I am not, but with regard to the war part of it, we had stated that Japan might make an aggressive movement within the next few days—in a late November dispatch.

[792] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

102. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 15 in Exhibit 63, which establishes the Winds Code, and I will ask you to say what the document shows with respect to the date of translation?

A. The date of translation is November 28, 1941.

103. Q. Is it true, then, that that document was not available to the Navy Department until after CNO had sent this dispatch to CincPac, saying that negotiations had ceased?

A. That is true.

104. Q. There seems to be some confusion as to whether you received on the night of December 6 information to the effect that the Japanese ambassadors would ask for a conference with the Secretary of State at 1300, December 7. In order to clear up the record on that point, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to state what that document shows as to the date of translation?

A. December 7, 1941.

105. Q. Did you have any information on the evening or during the night of December 6 and 7th to the effect that the Japanese ambassadors would ask the Secretary of State for an appointment at 1300, Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note?

A. No, not at that time.

106. Q. You had no information concerning that appointment until you arrived at your office about 10:30, I believe you said, on Sunday morning?

A. That is correct.

The interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy. Pages 807-808, inclusive.

[807] 178. Q. I just want to be quite certain about this Saturday situation. As I understand it, at no time on Saturday, the 6th of December, did you know, either directly or indirectly, by telephone or visual examination, or otherwise, that there was in the Navy Department thirteen parts of a Japanese message that was at some time to be delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States Government?

A. That is correct. I did not know it.

179. Q. And that at no time on Saturday, the 6th of December, did you know, directly or indirectly, or by telephone or otherwise, that the Navy Department had information that the precise hour of delivery of the message, of which the thirteen parts constituted a portion, was to be sent shortly, within the next day?

A. No, I did not know that.

180. Q. You had no information concerning that on Saturday?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

181. Q. Admiral Stark, the documents, the messages contained in Exhibits 63 and 64—those are the secret messages—I take it none of those were sent, as far as you know, to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, other than the one you mentioned this morning?

A. You mean contained in that Exhibit 63, or 64?

182. Q. Of the ones that you have looked at in that Exhibit—none of those was sent to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District except one that you mentioned this morning?

A. I think that is correct. Without checking back, I assume it is correct.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

183. Q. Did you ever see the report that Secretary Knox made to the President after his return the week following 7 December, after his return from Oahu?

A. I remember his report? Do you mean the report that was subsequently published?

184. Q. No, I don't think it was published. It was introduced as an Exhibit before the Roberts Commission.

A. I don't recall it at the moment. I think I saw it. I mean if it was introduced in the Roberts Commission I probably saw it.

185. Q. Assuming that in that report of Secretary Knox to [808] the President, he stated that the War Department, as distinguished from the Navy Department, sent a special war warning to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Saturday night, the 6th of December. Have you any information as to where he might have learned that—"he", Secretary Knox?

A. No. I remember his published report. There was quite an article published by him in the press. As to the official report, of course I knew his thought. He talked it over with all of us, but to your question, I do not remember any such information.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 812-815, inclusive.

[812] Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, U. S. Naval Reserve, presently assigned to the Naval Communications, Naval Operations.

2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?

A. I was the watch officer for Op 20-G.

3. Q. Were you on watch on Op 20-G on the night of December 6, 1941?

A. No.

4. Q. What time on the morning of December 7, 1941, did you come on watch?

A. At 7 a. m.

5. Q. I hand you Document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Can you identify this document?

A. Yes, I recall this document.

6. Q. Attention is invited to the fact that this document is in 14 parts. At the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock in the morning of December 7, 1941, were you advised as to the disposition that had been made of the first 13 parts of this dispatch?

A. They had been previously delivered to Commander Kramer during the evening of December 6.

7. Q. Had part 14 been received and delivered to Kramer at the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock?

A. No, it hadn't.

8. Q. What stage of processing was part 14 in at the time you came on watch?

A. Part 14 was completed and ready for delivery to Commander Kramer at 7 a. m., December 7.

9. Q. At what time was this part 14 delivered to Commander Kramer?

A. It was delivered to Commander Kramer between 9 and 10. I don't recall the exact hour, but it was between 9 and 10, December 7.

10. Q. Was that the time of his arrival at 20-G?

A. Right.

11. Q. I hand you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 before this examination. Can you identify this dispatch?

A. Yes, I can identify that dispatch.

[813] 12. Q. Had that message been received in 20-G at the time you came on watch at 7 o'clock?

A. No, it hadn't.

13. Q. At what time was that message received?

A. About 7:15 a. m., December 7, 1941.

14. Q. From what source was it received at 7:15?

A. From the Army translator.

15. Q. Had the Army initially intercepted that message or had it been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy?

A. It had been passed to the Army for translation by the Navy.

16. Q. When you came on watch at 7 o'clock, was any report made to you of the fact that this message was then in the hands of the Army for translation?

A. Yes.

17. Q. Was it reported to you at what time it had been received in the Navy?

A. I can't recall exactly. It was during the mid watch of December 7, 1941.

18. Q. After you received this message from the Army translators at approximately 7:15 a. m., December 7, 1941, what disposition was made of it?

A. It was held in abeyance until Commander Kramer arrived.

19. Q. Under the then existing instructions in the section of Communications on which you were on watch, was any other procedure possible?

A. No, that was our general order: to deliver all translations to G-Z, that is Commander Kramer and his group, if there were any of them there. Of course, that morning he was the only one available.

20. Q. Did you have any authority to go over their heads in their absence if urgent information was received?

A. No authority.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, N. S. Navy (Ret.):

21. Q. I call your attention to Document 15 of Exhibit 63. Some witnesses have referred to that as the Winds Message. Do you know whether any execution of that document was received by the Navy Department?

A. I have no knowledge of anything in regard to the execution of this particular message. I knew of it but of no execution.

[814] 22. Q. As far as you knew?

A. That is right. As far as I was concerned, it had not been executed. I had never seen any execution.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

23. Q. Was there any provision for communicating with Commander Kramer in his absence and advising him that an important message was ready for delivery?

A. He had been advised by telephone by the previous watch officer, Mr. Brotherhood.

24. Q. That this particular message was ready?

A. The Winds Message or the other?

25. Q. No, the other one.

A. Yes, he had been advised of that.

26. Q. You state that there was no provision made, in the case of the absence of Commander Kramer, for you or any of your officers to go direct to some higher authority?

A. No, there was no provision.

27. Q. No matter how urgent the message was, it had to await delivery to Commander Kramer?

A. In some cases we couldn't tell the urgency, because being in Japanese, it would have to go through a translator, and since the Army was the only one who had translators on at that time I had no power to go to anybody else.

28. Q. Were these Army translators physically in the Army War Department or here?

A. No, they were actually in the other building in the War Department.

29. Q. In the War Department building?

A. That is right.

30. Q. Was Commander Kramer the only man in that section who could handle a message of that sort. In other words, if he were out

of town for a week, would you have to hold the message until he got back?

A. No, there were other officers who could act. He was the only one in this particular case, and he had been there until midnight watching this stuff come out and was fully cognizant of what it was. He had seen the first 13 parts.

[815] 31. Q. The fact that he was the only one to handle it that night was because he had handled it until midnight and had went away for a little rest, I assume, and he was the one selected because of the continuity of the whole affair?

A. Yes, because of his tie-up with the State and the rest of the Navy Department.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy. Pages 824-842, inclusive.

[824] 29. Q. You have testified, Admiral, that you remember an officer in the Navy Department by the name of Kramer, whom you believe was the officer who processed the information between the Office of Director of Naval Communications and the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Did you, as a general rule, see the information that this officer brought for the Chief of Naval Operations? In other words, did he show it to you as a matter of custom?

A. Yes. I recall, of course, definitely, that an officer, Lieutenant Kramer or some other officer in a similar capacity, frequently, possibly almost daily, brought a small sheaf of dispatches to my office. Sometimes there were only a very few messages and at other times there were quite a number. By "quite a number", I mean maybe 20 or 30. These messages were of every conceivable character. Some pertained to the United States-Japanese diplomatic relations and other pertained to Japanese relations with other capitals. There was sometimes information regarding Japanese merchant ships and numerous other subjects. Whether these were all of the messages that were received by this means, I do not know. These messages, so far as I know, were shown or were given to one of the aides of the Chief of Naval Operations, to show to Admiral Stark. I believe they were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy, possibly to the Assistant Secretaries, although I am not certain on that point. They were also, I believe, shown to the President and to the Secretary of State, possibly to other officers in the State Department. They were shown to the Director of the War Plans Division, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, and I think Captain Schuirmann also saw them.

30. Q. I am interested in particular as to whether or not you, as a matter of custom, saw these dispatches when they were delivered by Lieutenant Kramer or any other liaison officer detailed by the Director of Naval Communications.

A. I saw a number of dispatches almost daily, as a matter of routine, but whether or not they were all the messages that were received in this manner, I do not know, or whether they were only selected messages.

31. Q. Admiral, I show you document 11 of Exhibit 63, which purports to set the deadline as absolute for signing an agreement, as 29 November. I would ask you to examine this document and state whether on 7 December or prior thereto, you had seen it or had been made acquainted with its contents?

A. I cannot state definitely whether or not I saw this message. The date, November 29, rings no bell in my memory.

32. Q. Can you state whether or not you had been informed of its contents?

A. I do not recall now of being aware that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to set a deadline on any date.

[825] 33. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds code." State whether on or before December 7 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of this document?

A. Yes, I had been. I remember a message of this character.

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within your cognizance?

A. This document bears the inscription, "translated on November 28." According to the system, I probably saw that on the following day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was received, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message, that there was some difference of opinion among the translators as to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did know definitely that they were setting up a code to be used in a weather broadcast.

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document 15?

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

A. No, I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?

A. No, I don't remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the action contemplated by the so-called "winds" message?

A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that some time I did see the messages [826] which were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterward. If I saw them prior to December 7, I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December, 1941.

43. Q. I show you document 18 of Exhibit 63, which states in substance, that "with the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." "However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off." Had you seen this document or had you been informed of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I may or may not have seen it. In the dispatch it bears the date of translation of November 28. If I saw it, I saw it on November 29. On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commanders of all fleets the war warning message which stated that negotiations with the Japanese had broken off. This dispatch merely confirms that, but tells them to keep up a pretense.

44. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether the information contained in this dispatch was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. It was not transmitted.

[827] 45. Q. Adverting to document 18, what negotiations in your opinion are being referred to in this document?

A. They refer to the negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese Ambassador.

46. Q. I show you document 17, Exhibit 63. This document sets out in the substance the Secretary of State's note of the 26th of November, 1941. Had you seen this document or had you been informed of the subject matter it contained on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. My answer to the question is similar to the foregoing one. This

document bears the date of translation of the 28th of November. If I saw it at all, I saw it on the 29th. I do not recall. However, this document simply relates what the Secretary of State had told the Japanese Ambassador, and the date of the dispatch from the Japanese was the 26th of November. It simply was confirmed by the Navy Department's dispatch of the 27th, which stated that negotiations with the Japanese had stopped. This simply recounts terms which Japan could not accept, probably we knew they would not accept when it was submitted.

47. Q. Adverting to the words in document 18, which I quote, "With the views of the Imperial Government, which will be sent in a few days,"—what views did you think were being referred to in this document?

A. As I do not recall definitely whether or not I saw the document, I don't know what views were being referred to.

48. Q. Between the date of 28 November 1941 and 7 December, were any directives for security of the Fleet issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. May I see the exhibit which contains the war warning?

49. Q. Yes, sir.

A. On the 27th of November, a dispatch was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. This dispatch contained the words, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46". Except for those words, I do not recall that any dispatch directing that specific security measures be taken was sent.

50. Q. I show you document 21 from Exhibit 63, which states, "We are advising the press that negotiations are still continuing." Had you seen this document or had you been advised of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I may or may not have seen this dispatch. It bears the date of translation of December 1. If I saw it at all, I probably saw it on the 2nd of December. I do not now recall the particular thing in the dispatch; that is, "that we are advising the press and others to state that negotiations are continuing." I do not recall seeing the part about the President's return to the capital.

[828] Q. That being the case, you probably have no recollection of whether this information was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet?

A. In my recollection of the dispatches that were sent to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet as well as Asiatic Fleet, I do not recall a dispatch along these lines being sent to either of them.

52. Q. Adverting to document 38 of Exhibit 63, which was translated on December 6, 1941, and which sets out that a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November will be sent on December 7, that it is to be kept secret and the time to present the reply will be in a separate message, had you seen this document 38 or had you been made cognizant of its contents on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I saw this particular dispatch or not. It refers to the very long message which I did see very late on December 6 or very early in the morning of December 7, and whether or not I saw this dispatch I do not recall.

53. Q. Well, now, the message refers to a reply which is to be sent on 7 December. Were you on the alert prior to 7 December for some incoming message that would set out the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull's note of 26 November?

A. Some time during the night of December 6-7, there was brought to my house a very long message from the Japanese Government to the Ambassador in Washington, which set forth the Japanese position. The message was not complete, and I believe that the last part of the message was missing. Whether or not I saw this preliminary message at that time or not, I do not recall. The long message was a re-statement of the Japanese position and contained nothing new in it at all, except the tone was a little bit different.

54. Q. I believe my question was, Admiral, were you on the alert for this long message by virtue of any notice you had had prior to its receipt.

A. No.

[829] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

55. Q. I believe my question was, Were you on the alert for this long message by virtue of any notice you had had prior to its receipt?

A. No.

56. Q. You have testified that you did see a rather long dispatch. Did you say it was on the night of December 6?

A. It was some time during the night of December 6 or 7th. I don't know whether it was before or after midnight.

57. Q. You do not mean the night of December 7?

A. It was some time during the very late evening of December 6 or the early morning of December 7. Whether or not it was before or after midnight, I don't recall.

58. Q. You have also testified that, as you remember, the latter portion of this rather long message was missing?

A. As I remember, the officer who brought the dispatch to the house stated that there was a part of the message missing. I think he told me it was the latter part.

59. Q. Did the tone of this rather long message which you say you received on the night of 6th-7th of December, 1941, indicate a friendly or conciliatory spirit on the part of the Japanese?

A. No, because it merely confirmed the whole course of negotiations from the very beginning. This message was nothing but a smoke screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the record.

60. Q. Did you have any opinion at the time you saw this dispatch that diplomatic negotiations were then broken off officially?

A. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, negotiations with the Japanese had stopped about the 27th of November.

61. Q. I do not think your answer is responsive to the question.

The question was repeated to the witness.

A. On December 4, or just prior to December 4, we knew instructions had been sent to Japanese missions in various countries to destroy their codes and ciphers immediately and to destroy confidential publications. That was an indication [830] that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off in the very near future. As I did not

know when this note was to be presented, I did not know exactly when diplomatic negotiations were going to be ruptured.

62. Q. When you saw this long message and the tone of the note which the message contained, did you not at that point think that diplomatic negotiations were then officially broken off, as contrasted with other information which you had had previously and which you knew had broken them off de facto?

A. I could not tell when the Japanese were going to inform the State Department that they had broken off diplomatic relations. This long dispatch simply indicated the situation was very, very tense and that the break might come at any time, which we had previously stated some time ago to our Fleets.

63. Q. A witness has stated in testimony substantially that Commander McCollum, who was then on duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had prepared about a 500-word summary of the international situation as it had developed up to about December 4, 1941. He further stated that this message was presented, along with a number of others, to Admiral Leigh Noyes, then D. N. C., who made a comment when this long message was to be released to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet something to the effect, "I think you are insulting the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief. He is a busy man." The testimony shows further that this long summary of information was passed somewhere up the echelon of command. Admiral Stark testified that he had never seen this dispatch before its release. I am asking you, Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, can you recall whether or not such a summary was presented to you on or prior to December 7, 1941, for release to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not recall any such alleged message, nor do I recall any circumstances of the incident which you have related.

The court then, at 10:50 a. m., took a recess until 11:00 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

[831] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

64. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was available in the Navy Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor any information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed by his government to seek an appointment with the Secretary of State at 1300 Sunday, December 7, for the purpose of presenting a note? tain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.

A. Yes, some time on the morning of December 7 I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State that afternoon, but just what hour I heard it and just how I heard it, I don't recall now.

65. Do you know from whom you first learned it?

A. No.

66. Q. Do you recall whether or not Commander Wellborn, the Flag Secretary, was in the office on the morning of December 7?

A. Admiral Stark's aides were usually in the Navy Department whenever Admiral Stark was there, and I don't recall whether Captain Wellborn was in the department that morning or not.

67. Q. I suppose you do not recall Lieutenant Commander Smedberg or Captain McCrea?

A. No.

68. Q. Do you know with whom Admiral Stark discussed this information that morning about the Japanese Ambassador's appointment?

A. At some time he told me he had discussed this matter with General Marshall during the forenoon of December 7, but just when I learned that I don't recall now.

69. Q. Do you recall his mentioning anyone else with whom he discussed it?

A. No.

70. Q. Did Admiral Stark mention to you during the morning of December 7 or at any time immediately thereafter that he had received this information about the prospective appointment the night of December 6?

A. No.

71. Q. Did he tell you when he did first learn of it?

A. No, I don't recall that. Of course, we learned of the attack at Pearl Harbor that day, which practically took everything out of our mind as to what had happened in regard to hours and minutes, and I don't recall that now.

[832] 72. Q. Admiral, I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63, which is the document instructing the Japanese Ambassador to submit to the United States Government the reply of the Japanese Government to the United States note at 1300 on the 7th of December. Will you please look at that document and tell the court what it shows as to the time of translation?

A. This document bears the date "translated 12/7/41."

73. Q. And was it an Army or Navy translation?

A. I presume it is Army, because it bears the word "Army" with the No. 7145.

74. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before this court that Colonel Knox on his visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack told certain members of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that this information concerning the prospective appointment was available to to him (Colonel Knox) on the night of Saturday, December 6. Did you ever hear, either from Colonel Knox or from Admiral Stark, any indication that Colonel Knox knew of this information on the night of December 6?

A. I have no knowledge that Colonel Knox ever saw the dispatch.

75. Q. Do you have any knowledge of his ever having this information, whether or not he saw the dispatch?

A. I have stated, in answer to one of my questions, that dispatches received from this source were shown to the Secretary of the Navy. If that dispatch was included in one of the folders which were shown to various officers in the Navy Department, he might have, as a matter of routine, seen it.

76. Q. Did you ever hear Admiral Stark mention that he had heard Secretary Knox say that he knew of this prospective appointment on the night before, that is, Saturday night?

A. No.

77. Q. I assume that you, as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, received much of the same information which the Chief of Naval Operations received, particularly with respect to estimates on the Far Eastern situation and intelligence concerning it; is that correct?

A. With regard to military and naval information, I think I received practically the same information that the Chief of Naval Operations received. With regard to political information, that which I received, in many cases, was second-hand, because the Chief of Naval Operations saw the President and the Secretary of State personally. I never attended those conferences, and what I knew about such conferences was what he told me. He probably had more information regarding the political situation, from first-hand knowledge, than I did.

[383] 78. Q. But you usually knew what Admiral Stark knew concerning these conferences which he attended? He usually recounted them to you?

A. I felt Admiral Stark kept me informed of everything that I should know. I do not recall anything now that I thought he should have told me that he did not tell me.

79. Q. Admiral Stark has testified that he does not remember seeing many of these documents which are included in Exhibit 63 in the form presented here. Your testimony is much to the same effect concerning certain of these documents. Do you consider the fact that you did not see these documents in the same form in which they are now presented to you particularly significant?

A. I am not quite sure that I know what you mean by "in the same form."

80. Q. They have been shown you as documents which are part of that exhibit. You say that you do not recall having seen them as a message in that form. Do you consider the fact that you did not see them, perhaps, in the same form as they are now presented to you particularly significant? Would you have gotten that information in other ways, for example?

A. Those messages which I saw, which were received from the source about which you are speaking, were typed on flimsy paper or were carbon copies of messages typed on flimsy paper. May I see the exhibit?

The witness was handed Exhibit 63.

A. These messages appear to be in the form in which I saw them, and the first message I turn to bears my initials, so I must have seen this particular dispatch in this form.

81. Q. Admiral, what I mean is that you have testified and Admiral Stark has testified that some of those messages shown you this morning you do not recall having seen at the time. Is it possible, however, that the information which is contained in those messages might have come to you in some other way, as, for example, the morning conferences in the Secretary's office or reports of memoranda made by the head of War Plans or ONI; so it is not particularly important if you did not see the basic information from which those estimates were drawn?

A. I see what you are driving at. As I stated before, I am not certain that I saw every dispatch which was received from this source. It is not particularly significant that I either did not see them or that I do not recall them, because [834] during the course of any one day there were hundreds of dispatches regarding every conceivable subject—our own operations, administrative dispatches. There were written reports of every character, not to mention the pounds of correspondence. There was a conference in the Secretary's office each morning at which the whole world situation, not only in the Pacific but in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and the Far East was explained. There was a discussion following these presentations, which was usually made by the Director of Naval Intelligence, in which the situation as of that day was threshed out. So it is quite probable that some of these dispatches might not have been shown to us, or if they were shown to us, we did not consider each one individually, because we knew we would get the general tenor of it after it had been evaluated by the sections of War Plans, Communications, and Naval Intelligence, who were charged with the details of such matters.

82. Q. It has been testified that, with the exception of the information concerning the destruction of codes, concerning which a dispatch was sent on December 3, none of the information which is included in Exhibit 63, which you have before you, was sent to CinCPac. Did the Navy Department ordinarily send all the information received of this type to CinCPac or any other of its commanders-in-chief?

A. No, the information was not sent in this exact form to any of the commanders-in-chief. I know it was the aim of the Chief of Naval Operations to keep the commanders-in-chief informed of the situation as he saw it. Some of it he did by personal letters and from time to time he sent dispatches which related to the international situation and to the military situation. I think it would have been an unusual burden on Communications in general and on the staffs of the commanders-in-chief to have had to translate all of these messages, and I think that there were better facilities in Washington for evaluating the messages than there were in any of the Fleets. I know that would be the case in the Atlantic Fleet today if I had to receive all these things. I have neither the staff nor the facilities for evaluating information of that kind. I think that the summaries which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations with regard to the political situation—and most of these dispatches do refer to the political situation—were accurate.

8. Q. Do you feel that you were reasonably well informed during the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, with respect to the Japanese situation either through seeing these basic sources of information or through the estimates which were given you by War Plans and Intelligence?

A. I have answered that same question in considerable detail in regard to the political situation and in a different [835] degree as to the military-naval situation. Yes, I think I was as well informed as it was possible to be informed, generally speaking.

84. Q. Did you concur in the dispatch of November 27, which is known as the "war warning" dispatch and which was sent by the

Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic?

A. This dispatch was prepared by Op. 12, which means it was prepared in the War Plans Division. I remember distinctly that this dispatch was under discussion, and I remember particularly the use of the words, "This dispatch is to be considered as a war warning." Words of that kind had never been used in any dispatch before. The words which have been inserted in pencil in this dispatch are in my handwriting, and I am absolutely sure I concurred in this dispatch, and I know it was released only after I knew Admiral Stark had concurred and approved of every word in it.

85. Q. Was any information brought to your attention during the period from November 27 to December 7 either from sources outside the Navy Department, such as the State Department, for example, or from C. N. O. subordinates within the department, which indicated to you that the war warning dispatch and the directive which it contained should be modified or strengthened in any respect?

A. The tenor of this dispatch was never modified by any subsequent dispatches nor was it relaxed in any way. The only subsequent information which I considered important and which was sent to the commanders-in-chief was the one on December 3 informing them that the Japanese diplomatic missions had been directed to destroy their codes and ciphers. That message and the "war warning" message, I thought, were the two most important messages which were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations, and they are the two which I remember very distinctly.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

86. Q. I show you Document 24 in Exhibit 63 and ask whether you recall seeing that or learning of its contents? Document 24 is one of those from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ships in Pearl Harbor.

A. No, I have no recollection of ever seeing that dispatch.

87. Q. Or learning of its contents?

A. I am not certain whether I learned of its contents at some time after December 7 or not. I recall being very much surprised when Mr. Knox returned from his visit to [836] Honolulu and said that the Japanese aviators had little maps which showed the location of the ships, which indicated that they must have known where individual ships were moored. I remember being astonished by that exhibit which he brought back.

88. Q. You do not recall having seen Document 24 prior to December 7 or having learned of its contents?

A. Definitely not. Whether I saw it later or whether I was told about it, I do not recall now.

89. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63, which is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu respecting ship movements. I ask you whether you saw that on or prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. No.

90. Q. You did neither?

A. No. I would not have attached any particular importance to this dispatch regarding movements, because it was so easy to see what

movements were being made in the Hawaiian Islands that I presumed they were being made as a matter of routine anyway.

91. Q. I call your attention to Document 37 from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated on December 5, relative to locations of ships in Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document on or prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. I do not remember this one at all. Area "N" rings no bell in my memory.

92. Q. It appears to have been translated on the 5th of December.

A. The document states that it was translated on the 5th of December, and, according to the system, unless it was taken around especially, it would have been seen by those to whom it had been shown on the 6th.

93. Q. I call your attention to Document 40 from Honolulu to Tokyo, translated on December 6, which reports courses and speeds of American war ships coming into Pearl Harbor. I ask you whether you saw that document prior to December 7 or learned of its contents?

A. I am absolutely positive I never saw this document before this moment.

94. Q. Was there any record kept of who did see these documents which were carried around by officer messenger and shown to you and to various other people who have testified?

A. I don't know. I have apparently initialed some dispatches. I note my initials on one of them in this [837] exhibit. I also recall that when a dispatch was brought to my house, I was required to sign that I had seen it, and I think I recall having signed for the dispatch which was delivered at my house on the night of December 6-7.

95. Q. It was one which was taken around and shown, as I understand it?

A. I recall definitely having seen that particular dispatch. It was usually my custom to put an "I" on messages that I saw.

96. Q. At what time did you get to the office on Sunday morning, December 7?

A. I do not recall now the exact hour at which I arrived at the Navy Department on the morning of December 7. I had gone to the Navy Department every Sunday morning for the last year, and I probably got there somewhere between 8 and 9 o'clock. The exact hour I do not now recall.

97. Q. Do you recall how long after you got to the Navy Department you were apprised of the information in these dispatches which were available that morning?

A. Are you referring to the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their message to the Secretary of State at a particular time?

98. Q. Not only to that but also to the 14th part of the long message which you had seen the night before?

A. I don't know at what time I became aware of the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to see the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that day. I do not recall whether or not I discussed the long message with Admiral Stark that morning. I do not recall that I ever saw the 14th part or the last part of the very long message.

99. Q. Do you recall whether there were discussions about the Japanese situation shortly after you arrived in the Department that morning?

A. I do not recall that I had any discussions with anybody regarding the Japanese situation that morning until I was informed by Admiral Stark that he and General Marshall had discussed the dispatch which directed the Japanese ambassadors to present their reply to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock that afternoon.

100. Q. Do you recall whether you had been in conference with Admiral Stark on that morning prior to his telling you that?

A. I don't recall now whether I saw Admiral Stark before he told me that or not. I probably saw him coming into the office—I couldn't have helped it—but what he [838] said prior to that I don't recall now.

101. Q. You have testified in direct examination that these documents, the character of which are in Exhibit 63, were, as a matter of routine, shown to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the War Plans officer, the Director of Naval Intelligence, possibly to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and possibly to Captain Schuirmann, who is now Admiral Schuirmann. Have I mentioned the complete list?

A. I admire your memory. I think you have enumerated every person I stated.

102. Q. Do you know whether the information was also shown to the War Department?

A. I am quite certain that it was, but I don't know what officials in the War Department received such dispatches. As I recall now, the messages received in code were translated on one day by the Navy Department and on the following day were translated by the War Department, and they were charged with keeping the other department informed of what had been received and translated. Just what the process of distributing these messages to the War Department was I don't know. It wasn't my detailed responsibility to see that that was done.

103. Q. If my arithmetic is correct, the list I have enumerated comes to either nine or ten, the difference being my doubt as to whether the Assistant Secretary received one.

A. I think I said secretaries.

[839] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

104. Q. And yet it was the specific policy of the Office of Naval Operations to deny this information to responsible commanders-in-chief in the Pacific and in the Asiatic; is that correct?

A. I did not say it was the policy of the Navy Department to deny this information to the commanders-in-chief in the Pacific. I stated that it would have been a burden on communications to have transmitted every dispatch of this character to have transmitted every dispatch of this character which was received to the commanders-in-chief afloat.

105. Q. If a selected process had been used the burden on communications would have been correspondingly relieved, would it not?

A. That is correct.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

106. Q. In that connection, Admiral, may I show you, please, Exhibit 17, which is the war warning dispatch dated November 27, 1941. You mentioned that the pencil marks on the document are in your handwriting, sir?

A. The pencil insertion of the word "Thai" and all that follows, beginning "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. Copy to War Plans Division, War Department" are in my handwriting.

107. Q. And this word "probably" that is stricken out, is that your handwriting, sir?

A. I can't identify a straight line as being done by me, and I do not remember having struck it out.

108. Q. To complete the document which has not yet been read in evidence because it has only at this point been identified, is the last passage to the November 27th message which reads, "Continental Districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." I invite your attention to Exhibit 20, Admiral, which is the December 3rd dispatch. Can you recall whether the last line was stricken out by yourself or someone else, or do you know anything about it.

A. Unfortunately, the punch has gone through the number indicating the Office of Operations in which this dispatch originated, but due to the fact that it has typed "Released by T. S. Wilkinson" it was undoubtedly prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I remember this dispatch very clearly. It is perfectly obvious that the words which were stricken out were not desired to be sent. I released this dispatch and just the reason for not wanting to send those words I do not now recall but looking at the [840] dispatch now, the directions to burn codes at the places mentioned, which included Washington, Manila and London, did not necessarily mean that "From foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." It was simply confined to giving them the definite information that the codes were to be destroyed in those places.

109. Q. Admiral, sir, in connection with that last line, and in relation to the message, would it be a fair statement that that line that was stricken out amounted to an evaluation of the message?

A. All I can saw now is that we did not want those words sent at that time.

110. Q. Would the words "From foregoing infer that orange plans early action in Southeast Asia" indicate an evaluation of the other information that is in it?

A. I have stated that it was not necessarily the correct evaluation to be placed upon the destruction of codes in the places enumerated in that dispatch.

111. Q. Admiral, just one other question, sir: Was there anything in this message that evaluated that information? It was just the raw information, was it not, sir?

A. The inference to be inferred from this dispatch was that Japan was assumed to be at war with Britain, the Dutch, and the United States, because they were directed to destroy their codes at places in the countries of those nations, including the capitals. The capital of Holland was then in the possession of the Germans.

112. Q. Do you recall, sir, whether or not the information that was in the possession of the Navy Department at the time when this December 3rd message was written, was to the effect that the Japanese instructions were to burn, as I recall, all their codes and destroy their cipher machines? Do you recall whether that was the information on which this was based? That is, this document only says "some of their codes" and I don't think it means their machines.

A. That dispatch was undoubtedly prepared from information received from the secret source about which we have been talking for some time. Whether it is an exact quotation of a Japanese dispatch, I cannot tell without seeing the dispatch on which it is based.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. Admiral, with reference to your answers in which you stated that the breaking off of negotiations, and so forth, simply confirmed your previous information. In that connection you also referred a number of times to "indicated war was imminent". Isn't the breaking off of negotiations an indication of imminence of breaking out of war, in your [841] opinion?

A. Not necessarily, but the fact that the Japanese were massing large numbers of ships in Southeastern China, in Formosa, and in Hainan; that they had large numbers of landing craft there, indicated that they were getting ready for a military movement of large proportions. At just what time we received information that those forces were on the move to the south I cannot now recall but it was within the week prior to December 7th. They were followed by planes from the Asiatic Fleet around the southeast corner of Siam and we were not sure when they got there just what direction they would take, whether they would go up into Siam proper, or whether they would go towards the Kra Peninsula. It was also quite evident that if the Japanese were going to go to war with the United States the Philippines were a probable objective. We expected that Guam would drop like a ripe plum.

114. Q. Just to complete that picture, would a movement in the South Pacific around Thailand and the Gulf of Siam area and so forth necessarily mean war with the United States? In your opinion, I mean.

A. The fact that we expected it would be war with the United States was indicated in the dispatch which told them to destroy their codes in Washington. The political and military situations were in perfect concert, which indicated that they were going to go to war with us shortly. That was the estimate made by Admiral Stark on the 27th of November and proved to be true.

115. Q. Well, can you state, then, if that was Admiral Stark's opinion why did he merely emphasize a message by calling it a war warning and then naming certain areas in which they might attack and he did not name the Hawaiian area? And further, why he didn't definitely stop with "this is a war warning" instead of complicating it by referring to certain areas and leaving out the Hawaiian area?

A. There was placed in the dispatch that there were certain objectives in the Far East which we felt were reasonably certain would be objectives because the massing of ships and troops in that area indicated that there was an aggressive movement in that area. We

had no definite information of an aggressive movement in any other area.

116. Q. I am putting so much emphasis on this war warning message because you have put so much emphasis on it. Don't you believe that if they were so certain of their estimate it would have been better to stop and say "War is imminent; this is a war warning" and forget everything else where they were going to operate?

A. That was the intention of the war message, that he wanted to state that he felt war was likely to come at any moment. On the other hand, there was a wish not to take any step on the part of the United States which would provoke war with Japan.

[842] 117. Q. Well, the message I speak of, if you had simply stopped with "This is a war warning", that wouldn't have started anything necessarily, any more than the one that was sent?

A. So far as I know, Admiral, no commander-in-chief afloat ever told the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch or otherwise that he didn't understand any of the directives that were sent to him or he never asked for an amplification or elaboration on any of the instructions that he received. In the absence of any such you could only assume that they were understood.

Extracted testimony of General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army. Pages 869-884, inclusive.

[869] 41. Q. After November 6, 1941, when did you have information that negotiations, so far as the Japanese were concerned, had been terminated?

A. On the morning of November 27 the Secretary of State, as I recall, told General Gerow, the head of the War Plans Division of the War Department, that the conversation had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. I was out of the city at the time and did not reach the War Department until the following morning, November 28. I assume I was given this information at that time.

42. Q. Did you, after the release of the dispatch which is referred to in Exhibit 19, send a further directive as to the action to be taken in the Hawaiian Department relative to any security measures there?

A. Yes, on December 7.

43. Q. I show you Exhibit 48 before this court and ask you if that is the directive to which you refer and which you sent on December 7, 1941?

A. Yes. However, the message was sent from a longhand pencil draft of mine. This is a formal copy of the latter, typed.

44. Q. Then, between the time of your dispatch, which is Exhibit 19 and at which you have just been looking, and the dispatch of December 7, 1941, you had sent no directives as to security measures in the Hawaiian area?

A. On November 28, 1941, two additional measures warning against the possibility of sabotage were sent to the Hawaiian Department, one to the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, the Western Department, the Panama Canal—That, of course, includes Alaska—and the other to the Army at large in the continental United States as well as overseas. The first one was sent by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Sherman Miles, which went to the various overseas Western Defense Commanders, and was a reminder of the

sabotage problem. I didn't see that myself until, I think, the time of the Roberts Commission. The other message which went to the continental United States, as well as overseas, had been prepared by General Arnold's staff, and then the G-2 staff involved themselves in it to make certain it clearly stated the case, and it was sent, but it related to sabotage, suspicions or beliefs, that occurred here in the United States rather than overseas and perhaps of German or Japanese origin. The Air Corps at that time felt they were having accidents to planes which could be explained only by some form of sabotage, and they felt that they had fairly concrete evidence of this. Therefore, those were two War Department messages which I personally was not involved in, but mine was sent on December 7.

[870] 45. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63, which purports to state the deadline of November 29, 1941, as being absolute for signing the agreement. State whether you saw the contents of this document, or had been informed of the subject matter contained therein, on or about November 22, 1941, the date when it was purported to have been translated.

A. I don't recall. These were highly secret matters and papers. The papers were carefully guarded, and our War Department copies today do not indicate when I saw them. I am reasonably certain, however, that I did see them or was informed concerning these papers at the time. I learned finally what had happened was that in order to safeguard this material, they would keep one record, which was their basic paper, in the Intelligence or G-2 section. The result of that has been that the duplicate copy comes to me. All of those have been destroyed. Therefore, on those particular papers there is no existing record of my initials on any of them, because they had only one paper which they received and destroyed each day, as they do now. I see them each day and then they are destroyed. In this case I am not certain that I saw or knew about this message.

[871] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

46. Q. This document mentions 29 November as an absolute deadline for signing the agreement. Did this absolute deadline have any special significance to you at that time?

A. Well, to go to the original date, which I think was November 25th, we conjectured at that time what that meant, and the only solution that could be offered—which was not accepted; it was merely considered—was that that was the anniversary of the signing of the anti-Comintern pact and that they wanted the negotiations to get cleared to a certain point in relation to the renewal of that pact. However, when the message came in to which you just referred, and gave a new date, that, of course, brushed aside, apparently, the possibility that these dates referred to anything of that nature, and left us with merely a guess as to how critical the matter was. I might interject now and say that when the final message came in that indicated the 7th, and an hour, that, of course, was quite a different matter. That was a specific hour of Washington time, as well as a day. That meant something, somewhere, very definitely was related to that hour. There was no doubt in our mind about that.

47. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63 which transmits Mr. Hull's note of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese government. Were you shown this document, or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or about the date of its translation, which is set out as 28 November, 1941?

A. I do not recall.

48. Q. I show you Document No. 18 of Exhibit 63, which is purported to have been translated on 28 November 1941, and which sets out in substance that with the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days the negotiations will be ruptured. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that negotiations are broken off. Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or before the day of its translation, 28 November 1941?

A. I have no recollection of seeing that specific message but I am reasonably certain that I must have seen it.

49. Q. The message says "with the views of the Imperial Government which are forthcoming." What did you consider those views were that they were going to send?

A. I don't know quite how to answer that at the moment. I know what they are now and I don't know what I thought.

50. Q. In the dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department concerning which you have testified already and which expressed the view that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated for all practical purposes, did the language of Document 18 contain that view on the progress of negotiations?

A. I don't recall that.

[872] 51. Q. It is noted that these views, which are, "To terminate de facto the negotiations will be sent in two or three days." Did you consider the de facto termination of the negotiations had any connection with the Japanese military operations?

A. I imagine that I did.

52. Q. Do you recall whether or not you associated that with any particular operation?

A. No, other than we had definite evidence of what appeared to be to us hostile preparations in the Far East.

53. Q. Did the words "These views which are to be sent in two or three days" have any significance in connection with the expected reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November?

A. I don't recall.

54. Q. Do you recall whether or not before 6 December 1941 you were on the alert for the receipt of any views or a reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November?

A. I have no definite recollection. I presume that I was because this thing was going along all the time.

55. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 which is purported to have been translated on 28 November, 1941. This document has been popularly termed in circles where known as the Winds code. Had you seen this document or had you been made acquainted with its contents on or about the day of its translation, that is, 28 November 1941?

A. My very dim recollection is that that was referred to in a Joint Board meeting. I'm quite certain that I was aware of it; I'm quite certain of that.

56. Q. Did you, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 receive any information which put any part of this code in effect?

A. I don't recall that.

57. I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63. This document contains the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November 1941. Will you state when you first saw this document or were made aware of its contents?

A. I went to the War Department on Sunday morning, December 7th. I don't just recall at what time. And I was given this document. I read it through, naturally carefully, and some parts of it several times to get the full significance of it. As I finished it I found another page which was the message referring to 1:00 p. m. Incidentally, I was told that that had been monitored at 6:30 that morning, Western Time, Northwest, the Puget Sound area, I believe. But I did not reach that until some 10 or 15 minutes after 11:00, I think, I spent quite a long time reading this thing. It is quite a remarkable document. Therefore, I lost quite a lot of time reading that. I will go ahead with the procedure if you want me to.

[873] 58. Q. Please continue. I think that will be better.

A. So I called up Admiral Stark on the 'phone—he was at his desk—and proposed that we send a message. One or the other of us always tried to avoid, to safeguard the codes, both sending a message about the same things, to the various commanders concerned at Panama, Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. At first, he thought it might be inadvisable; that they would be confused with too many of these messages. I then wrote out in longhand the message that you have here, and just as it was leaving the room he called me back and asked me if I had sent any message yet, and I said it was just going, and he said he would like to have added to it the usual thing, "Notify naval opposite." So I added that to it and sent it in that form with Colonel Bracken, I think his name is, who is the man who has charge of these special papers. When he came back I queried him as to the time of dispatch and all. I didn't get a very clear understanding of the thing so I sent him back with Colonel Bundy, who was the member of the War Plans Division who was in charge of matters pertaining to the Philippines and Hawaii and Panama. He and Colonel Bundy then went back to the message center, the coding room, and came back—I've forgotten what time they came back—and told me. It had to do with how long it took to deliver the message, and as I recall, when they came back they said it was 30 minutes, or that it took 30 minutes and it would be in the hands of the recipients. At that time there was something still further unclarified to me so I had them return the second time—which meant the third time for Bracken—and they came back and answered me, apparently, to my entire satisfaction. At least I understood what the thing was. The actual time, I think, of the departure of the message was about noon, something of that sort, Washington time, and I believe the records will show that it reached Hawaii at 7:32, I think on the morning of the 7th. I have no time for the reading of this big long document, or the time I talked to Stark. The interval between the talks with Stark couldn't have been over two or three minutes because it was a very short message and I wrote it off in long-

hand. I think I have some notes here. It says, "And at 11:45 Eastern Standard Time, Admiral Stark asked that the various Army commanders who had received the message be instructed to convey it to the naval opposites" and it was sent to that effect. It was received in the message center at 11:50 and it was sent by radio to all points except Hawaii and they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station; therefore, they sent it on a straight Western Union circuit into San Francisco and they had something out to Hawaii. I didn't know that until afterwards. It went everywhere else on straight Army radio without any delay. They couldn't raise Hawaii by the radio. It went everywhere else, the Philippines it went right through; Panama and San Francisco, but they couldn't raise the Hawaiian station for some reason [874] on the radio. They then sent it through the Western Union through a connection they had into San Francisco. They can tell you out there what happened; I don't know. This is pure hearsay on my part. I know at the time I was told they had a teletype from the Western Union station in Honolulu to the Commanding General of the Army forces, but that didn't function.

59. Q. Did I understand you to state, General, that you had not received any part of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's note, that is, the 14 points, until Sunday morning, January 7, 1941?

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

60. Q. General, you have before you Exhibit 63, the document that contains the various documents that you have been looking at. I want to ask you some questions about that. I take it that you are familiar in a general way with the type of material that is contained in that exhibit, whether or not you are familiar with the exact messages that are in there, I don't know, but you are familiar with the general type of information?

A. Quite familiar.

61. Q. You are familiar with the fact that during the period immediately preceding 7 December those messages indicate that they were broken partly by the Army and partly by the Navy; that there was a joint arrangement in existence between the two services that, I believe, one day the Army broke them and the next day the Navy broke them?

A. I don't know about that but I know they were both involved in it.

62. Q. And that they had a method for exchanging the information that they got from the messages which each service broke?

A. I believe so.

63. Q. Now, would you tell the court how the messages were handled in the War Department as nearly as you can, from their initial breaking and translation by the S. I. S? In other words, we have had explained to the court here by the Navy representatives how these things were handled in the Navy Department and I think it would help to establish the picture.

A. You will have to get one of the people that handled it. I get it in my hands under a special cover. I read it and sign it and it is taken out very specially and nobody else sees it, and then it goes back to its source. I couldn't give you the minutia of its arrangement, but it would be very simple to have someone come in and report on it.

[875] 64. Q. Do you understand that all the messages that are received of this type are brought to you personally for inspection, or is there some screening that is set up some place in the War Department where they decide which of these messages are considered important enough for you to be bothered with or for you to see?

A. I know that there is screening at the present time because I have directed it.

65. Q. Do you recall what the situation was before December 7th?

A. I don't recall at that particular moment what it was. In other words, it was entirely too voluminous for me; I would retire as Chief of Staff and read every day.

66. Q. You have no present recollection as to what the situation was at that time?

A. I know they were too long; there was too much of it.

67. Do you recall whether prior to 7 December these messages were being passed to the appropriate field commanders who might be concerned with the subject matter?

A. I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of it. As I understood it at the time, the source of most of these came in from naval monitoring stations. I had thought at the time that the commander in the Philippines and the Commander in Hawaii got part of the information because the monitoring stations are there. I have been told since, I believe, that they did not, but that is a matter of fact which conjecture on my part isn't suitable testimony.

68. Q. More specifically, then, General, did you decide when you saw a particular message, or did you feel called upon to decide when you saw a particular message, whether or not it should be passed to an appropriate field commander, or where the messages only passed to you for information and whatever decision should be made in that respect made by some one of your subordinates?

A. Well, you are going now into the whole operation of any commander. I see the thing. These people make proposals. Again I direct without waiting for the proposals. That would apply in this particular case. They go through the things very carefully and accurately because they are concentrated on everything that pertains to this particular thing. I am related to that and also the matters on the Hill and to matters all over the world. In an example I have just testified to here, I read the message and wrote the reply immediately. I didn't consult anybody other than Admiral Stark about that. It was perfectly clear-cut. I knew what should be done immediately. The preceding message that we sent of November 27th which I stated General Gerow thought that I did not see, I'm pretty certain I did not see it, and I'm reasonably certain that I was concerned in the drafting of the message of warning, the alert, because that would be something that would indicate to me that very positive action was necessary. Now, the very positive action [876] probably would be done in the War Plans Division, General Gerow for example, or I might act direct or they might bring it to me. The same thing applies to your question about screening. They go through all of it. I can't possibly do that. And they bring to me the most essential portions that refer to things that are of a critical nature. If they fail, why, I change the man, that's all.

69. Q. General, I call your attention to Document 40 of Exhibit 63, which contains information sent from Kita, in Honolulu, to Tokyo, dated November 18, 1941, and showing on its face that it was handled by the Army and was translated on December 6, 1941, and I ask you whether or not you recall having seen that message prior to 7 December, 1941?

A. I am not certain but I think I saw this message after the event.

70. Q. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, General, which is a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated November 18, 1941, bearing the notation that it was handled by the Army and was translated on 5 December 1941. Do you recall having seen that message prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I don't recall that.

71. Q. As I understand your testimony, then, General, in most cases involving material of this type, the decision as to whether it should be passed on to the appropriate Army commander might have been your decision in some cases, or might have been the decision of the Chief of War Plans Division, I believe you said, or some other appropriate subordinate whose duty it was to read and evaluate these messages?

A. Normally, it wouldn't be his decision but it would be his proposal to me for me to approve.

72. Q. And did you personally approve those proposals? That is, in the event that it was decided to send a message to the appropriate field commanders forwarding this information, did you personally approve the forwarding of that message, or was it just sent in your name as is ordinarily the case?

A. Well, that isn't an ordinary message, as a rule. I should imagine that in most instances, I did. Of course, I was away a great deal myself. I might add that I was traveling about 60,000 miles a year then and I was traveling a great deal. We were making an army.

73. Q. Then does it sum up the situation accurately, General, to say that the information of this type and the other information which you had in the War Department on 27 November was considered by you to be generally summarized and sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in your war warning dispatch of 27 November? That is, that that dispatch reflected the entire picture that you had at that time, including information of this type, and other elements?

A. I wouldn't say that it reflected the entire picture. [877] It gave the state of a crisis and the direction for action.

74. Q. In that sense, though, it did reflect certain information which you had in the War Department but had not passed on in its original form to the Commanding General?

A. That's it.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :

75. Q. On the 6th of December, Saturday, General, were you acquainted with the fact that Japan had sent to her ambassadors 13 of 14 parts of a message or note to be delivered or transmitted at some later date to our Secretary of State?

A. I do not recall that I was aware of such information.

76. Q. There has been evidence adduced before this court indicating that information to that effect was available in the Navy Department in Washington in readable English and smooth form not later than

9:15 to 9:30 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, on Saturday, the 6th of December. If you did not get the information on Saturday, the 6th of December, General, that would be due, would it not, to some failure in the echelons of command in transmitting the information to you?

A. I couldn't say that offhand. It would depend on where I was, which I do not recall on that particular Saturday. I might have been quite a number of places. I don't know now where I actually was. I have this recollection of the day of December 7th: that when I came to the War Department I was told by the officer in charge of this special type of information that they had been working all night, as I understood him to express it at the time, on this matter; that the deciphering had taken a long time; that quite a bit of the Japanese deciphered thing was sent over to the War Department to be translated into English, and as I gathered at the time—I am just speaking from a dim recollection of that time—this had gone on during the night; the deciphering had been done on the Navy side but the translation into English, on account of the length of this thing, had bogged them down and they had called on the War Department's similar agency to assist in the translation from Japanese into English. Then, as I said, this final message—I am merely giving my recollection now—had been monitored at 6:30 that morning on the West Coast; I presume Washington. That, again, had to come in, be deciphered and be translated. I got the impression at this time that they got all this thing together and they sent for me. As I recall, I had been horseback riding and I came in immediately after the ride and went straight to the War Department and ran into this long message. That is my only recollection of the affair.

[878] 77. Q. I have only asked about Saturday at the moment. There has been evidence adduced before this court that the underlying language of the long message which was to be delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to our State Department was English rather than Japanese.

A. I don't know about that. I would suggest this: You are asking me to guess about something that I have not the facts concerning and I have not investigated and we have the officer that knows and you can call him here and he can testify.

78. Q. I have only been trying to direct my questions generally to the time when you acquired a knowledge.

A. Mine was very specifically on Sunday morning.

79. Q. And you had no knowledge of the fact that another message was coming designating the time of delivery, on Saturday?

A. That is my recollection.

80. Q. And you have no recollection of where you were on Saturday night?

A. No, I haven't.

81. Q. Whether you were at home, or whether you were in the Department, or where you were?

A. I don't know where I was. I never thought of it until this instant.

82. Q. Do you have any recollection as to whether you talked to Admiral Stark on Saturday?

A. Saturday evening?

83. Q. Yes.

A. I have no recollection whatever of that. The probability is that I did not.

84. Q. There is evidence before the court that the full 14 parts of the long message to which you have made reference and a shorter message indicating 1:00 o'clock as the time of delivery had been processed and were in smooth, readable English form before 8:00 o'clock on Sunday morning, 7 December. Can you fix more definitely the hour that you learned of those facts?

A. No, other than the time that was given here that I spoke to Admiral Stark over the 'phone would have to be used as the finish of the affair and then we would have to estimate how long it took me to digest this thing before I came to this 1:00 o'clock affair at the end of it. I read fairly rapidly. This was a most unusual message, of course. I recall distinctly re-reading parts of it and reflecting on it when I was reading, but I think I read much more rapidly than the average man. That is all I could give you on it, which would indicate that probably [879] I arrived there about half-past 10:00; I'm just guessing.

85. Q. Well, assuming the fact to be as I stated of the evidence here, General, that this information was available to the Navy Department by 8:00 o'clock, what is the explanation for there being a 2-hour delay of that information getting to you?

A. All I can think of at the moment is that if it came across—when it did come across—the officer who was in charge of it, because it was very secret, whether he sat down and read it before he gave it to me. If he did, you would have to add on his time of reading on it.

86. Q. In your conversation with Admiral Stark—this is after you had finished reading it, you called him as I understood it?

A. I called him on the White House 'phone.

87. Q. (Continuing.)—did Admiral Stark in any form of words inquire of you as to the rapidity of the means of communication that were available to you for the transmission of this message?

A. No, our conversation was very brief and entirely confined to whether or not the message should be sent, and then to having it referred to the naval opposite.

88. Q. There was no conversation in which you in effect said that you thought you could get it out as quickly as the Navy Department?

A. None whatever.

89. Q. Prior to the sending of the message that you dispatched, or that was dispatched by the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, among others, on the 27th of November, had you learned of the delivery by the State Department to the Japanese Government of a diplomatic note dated the 26th of November? It is a long document.

A. Yes. I don't recall. I imagine I knew something about it. I don't recall.

90. Q. You have no recollection as to whether you then regarded that note as an ultimatum, or not?

A. No.

91. Q. Did you learn from the Navy Department of the dispatch sent by it—the Navy Department—on the even date, that is, the 27th of November, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. What is the question?

92. Q. When did you learn from the Navy Department the fact that they had sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the 27th of November?

A. I don't recall that.

[880] 93. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conversation with any Navy people about it, about the coincident message?

A. I don't recall that. I wasn't here on the 27th, for one thing.

94. Q. Or the 26th?

A. I left the War Department about noon of the 26th and didn't get back to the War Department until the morning of the 28th.

95. Q. Do you recall any conversation with the Navy Department on the 26th about sending some message of that character?

A. No, I don't recall any specific conversation about it. I don't mean to imply that I didn't have it; I just don't recall it.

96. Do you recall having any conversations with Admiral Stark relative to the diplomatic note of the 26th of November?

A. I don't recall that.

97. Q. Either one way or the other?

A. No.

98. Q. You made a joint recommendation to the President with Admiral Stark including, among other things, the affirmative recommendation that no ultimatum should be sent. That is in evidence here. It was dated, I believe, on the 5th of November. Did you regard the note of the 26th of November as sympathetic and parallel with your joint recommendation to the President?

A. I don't recall.

99. Q. Do you recall having any conversation with Admiral Stark on that phase of the case?

A. No, I don't. I must explain to you gentlemen, if I saw these things I saw them this morning. It is a long time.

100. Q. I am talking about this diplomatic note.

A. Yes. Well, I am talking about this thing. My reminder was this morning. Some things I have a very clear recollection of, and others I do not.

101. Q. Do you recall seeing the answers that General Short sent to your dispatch, or the War Department's dispatch, of the 27th and the subsequent one on the 28th?

A. No, I don't know about that. What actually shows, so far as we can determine, is that the reply from the Philippines and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were fastened with one of these staples that go through. I initialed the one from the Philippines which was on top, and I did not initial the one from Hawaii. This was the one I was referring to (indicating).

[881] 102. Q. You don't recall having seen that (indicating)?

A. Well, I am explaining. I have no recollection one way or the other. The message in the records came with a staple fastened to the one from the Philippines, and this was on the bottom. I have initialed the Philippines one but I haven't initialed this one. The trouble in this connection is, I had a conversation regarding its meaning with Colonel Bundy, who is the officer in charge of that thing, I think the afternoon of December 7th after we knew the attack was on; that is my recollection of it. My recollection of that is, Bundy was explaining his interpretation of the message. The unfortunate part of the thing is that he was killed right after that when I sent him out to Hawaii. He left about two days later, I think, and was killed en route out there, so I don't recall this and I am confused in the conver-

sation that I had—I'm pretty certain after the event—in relation to what I might have been thinking about before the event.

103. Q. Do you have any recollection of knowing between the 27th of November and the 7th of December what precautions General Short had actually inaugurated?

A. No, I don't recall that. I was away two or three times in that particular period and the War Plans people were checking all these things from the various departments that came in.

104. Q. Do you recall whether you had any conferences with Admiral Stark in that 10-day period from the 27th of November until the 7th of December?

A. On any subject?

105. Q. Well, on any subject in connection with the Pacific and Japanese situation?

A. No, I don't. I suppose the records would show. We were having very frequent meetings of the Joint Board and he and I were having even more frequent meetings and were talking over the telephone almost every day.

106. Q. You were both members of the Joint Board?

A. Yes. He was the senior member.

107. Q. Well it is your recollection that during the days that you were in Washington in this interval from the 27th of November to the 7th of December that you did confer with Admiral Stark?

A. I couldn't say that I did every day, but we were in frequent conference and had a habit of telephoning almost daily about this and that. I might add also that we were going to frequent meetings with Mr. Hull.

108. Q. Do you recall whether any of these talks that you had just prior to the 7th of December with Admiral Stark dealt with the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier?

A. No, I don't recall that. I might say that my recollection would be that we thought they had been working on [882] defense plans in Hawaii through the years. They had just reached what seemed to be a very workable arrangement and the normal assumption would be that they were pretty well coordinated. Our great problems were out in the Philippines where the means were no slack that it was quite a problem what they were going to do out there.

109. Q. But you have no recollection of any specific talk one way or the other?

A. No, I have not.

110. Q. Did you have any conferences with Admiral Stark at any time relative to the transmission to the responsible commanders in Hawaii of any of the information contained in Document 63?

A. I don't recall that.

111. Q. One way or the other, or do you recall that there was none?

A. I don't recall that there was any conversation of that nature.

112. Q. Do you recall whether you and Admiral Stark at any time shortly prior to the 7th of December conferred relative to the impact of the information contained in Exhibit 63 on the defense of the Hawaiian Frontier?

A. I don't recall that.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

113. Q. None of the evidence that has been presented before this court indicates that the attack on Pearl Harbor was other than a surprise. Does the court understand that the attack came as a surprise to you?

A. Yes.

114. Q. General, could you express to the court your general opinion as to the probability of attack by air on Hawaii on December 7th as you gathered from general conversation here. In other words, what was the general opinion as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu?

A. Well, in the first place, as far as I can recall my conception at the present time, which was partly in the letter I showed you in February, I had thought the possibilities in Hawaii in the way of attack were a combined sabotage and air attack, and I assumed that air attack was much more easy to deal with than the sabotage attack because unless we were all disposed in advance to meet the latter, it meant a deployment of the troops. In a way, it is very hard to maintain deployments over a long period of time, although they had made very intricate plans for managing it. To go further, it appeared to me, as I recall at the time, that [883] there was a strong probability—really a certainty—that there was a definite evil intent immediately in the cards in the Far East. There could be little doubt about that. The question was, When it would blow, or explode; to what extent it would be on this infiltration basis where they would virtually surround the victim with all their arrangements before they pounced. By that I mean, it was not beyond the possibilities, considering what the Japanese had already been permitted to do, and our own limitations at the time, that they might go into Siam and just set up all the rear and dominate the whole Malaya Peninsula even up to Rangoon. Whether or not they were going to make an open assault immediately was a matter of conjecture. But to our minds that was a certainty. I referred earlier in my testimony to the indications of a peculiar nature with relation to the Canal. We always felt a great sensitivity with regard to the Canal and hearing something very peculiar merely fortified us in our fears always that again you could commit a sabotage act there that would be quite fatal to us for quite a time. But those things took priority, in my opinion, to the probability of the attack on Hawaii. We had there, as I say, more resources than we had anywhere else, and they had labored long, and apparently diligently, over various plans and preparations of one kind and another.

115. Q. On the morning of December 7th, General, in your phone conversation with Admiral Stark relative to sending this message to Hawaii, did Admiral Stark impress upon you, or did you impress upon him, the urgency of quick transit of this message?

A. No. I think that was implied in what we both said. The only issue between us at the moment was whether we would confuse these people still further inasmuch as there had been so many messages sent, and the decision was that one should be sent immediately and I

don't know how long it was between our two conversations but I should imagine it was about three or four minutes when he came back and the message was then leaving the room, which indicated the immediacy of the action. As I told you, he was leaving the room when I called him back, because I had written it very hurriedly in longhand after I spoke to Admiral Stark the first time. I took, I should say, from the time I read the message until I wrote the message I sent, I don't imagine there was more than five or six minutes involved, including my conversations with Admiral Stark.

116. Q. Did you consider the proposed severance or the contemplated severance of the diplomatic relations practically a declaration of war?

A. My recollection of that today is that I was not [884] certain of that. They have so many devious ways of doing things nowadays that whether or not their first move would be an out-and-out act of war was not any certainty in my mind. I was certain that they were going ahead in the Far East but whether they would do it overtly or whether they would do it over some severance of diplomatic relations or moves of that kind, I wasn't clear in my mind. I might say that we had had a number of discussions, particularly Admiral Stark with members of the State Department and with the President at which I was present, with relation to the imposing of economic sanctions against the Japanese, particularly in regard to fuel oil and gasoline, and it was the opinion that if you moved so far you provoked them to the point where something overt would happen right away. I musn't speak for him but this was discussed by him very often as to what would happen if you caught them on the fuel oil business cold; whether or not they would be provoked into action, all of which meant, in my mind, whether they moved directly—as they did—or whether they moved more circuitously under the cover of various diplomatic ruptures and things of that sort.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior (relative to introduction of exhibit); and Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. Pages 903-910, inclusive.

[903] Robert D. Powers, Jr., counsel for the judge advocate, was recalled by the judge advocate and was warned that his oath was still binding.

Examination by the judge advocate:

1. Q. I hand you a document. Can you identify it?

A. I can. It is a copy, duly authenticated under official seal, of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Com16 for action; and to CinCPac and Com14 for information.

The only authenticated copy of a dispatch dated 3 December 1941 from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic and Com16 for action; and to CinCPac and Com14 for information, was submitted to the interested parties and to the court, and by the judge advocate offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, marked "EXHIBIT 66".

SECRET

A. (Reading:)

Q. Will you please read the dispatch?

From: OPNAV.

Date: 3 December 1941.

Action Addressees. To: CINCAF.
COM SIXTEEN.Info: CINPAC
COM FOURTEEN.

Priority.

Date time group: 031855.

Text: Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy purple X all but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate.

[904] A witness called by the judge advocate, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present station.

A. Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. I am Intelligence Officer, Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the first of October and 7 December 1941?

A. Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

3. Q. Will you state in general what were the sources of information available to you during that time?

A. The main sources of information were from Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, who forwarded us reports from naval observers, naval attachés, other competent observers, State Department, consular agents. Also from Chief of Naval Operations via Office of Naval Intelligence or Office of Naval Communications certain highly secret information under the classification of communication intelligence. Also local reports from the local district intelligence office here regarding local security conditions; through liaison with British Intelligence of the Secret Intelligence Service; intelligence as to Japan's activities in the Far East. Also from the commandants of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Naval Districts and Panama Sea Frontier regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels; reports also from the Commandant of the Third Naval District regarding movements of Japanese merchant vessels. I think that is all.

4. Q. What method did you employ in passing this information along to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I passed it to him by hand.

5. Q. Was this information that you received evaluated before you passed it to him, or did you give it to him direct in the form in which received?

A. I gave it to him in the original form. If the original message were an intelligence report and it was long, I would write a short brief of it, appending that to the original report.

6. Q. I show you Exhibit 66, which has just been introduced into evidence before this court and ask you to read it to yourself. Will you state whether you saw the contents of this message on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I did.

7. Q. Did this message have any special significance to you when you read it?

A. This message, like many others received at that time having to do with the Japanese activities, could only be read [905] and considered along with the rest of them as it tended to indicate Japan's intentions and activities.

8. Q. The fact that the message mentioned destroying a certain type of machine, did that have any special significance to you?

A. Only insofar as I knew that was the cipher machine.

9. Q. Did it have any more significance to you by designating a machine by this particular name than if it had been any other sort of a cipher machine?

A. I asked the security officer, Lieutenant Coleman, who had come from Washington, just what was meant by the word "purple machine" and he explained that it was an electrical coding machine, roughly similar to the type we used, that was used in the passing of messages between Japanese consuls and diplomats and the home office. The word "purple" was to designate the type of the machine as an improvement over the old one called the "red".

10. Q. Then am I to understand that the fact that they used this particular name had no special significance to you regarding the security of the type of messages it was designed to handle?

A. Well, we know that the Japanese Navy had an electrical coding machine, that the Japanese naval attaché had a coding machine, that this was a diplomatic coding machine, and therefore the diplomatic machines were being broken, or destroyed, but other than the fact that it was a diplomatic machine, no, it had no special significance.

11. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you whether or not you had seen this document on or before 7 December 1941, or had you been informed of its contents?

A. I did not see this original document. The message we received stated this same thing in substance but to my recollection this exact document was not translated verbatim. The use of the winds and the code for relations was in the message but the verbatim, word-for-word, was not as we received it in the telegraph.

1. Q. What, to your own knowledge, was done to intercept the broadcast which used the words to execute this code?

A. Upon receipt of this, Commander Rochefort, who headed the Com14 intelligence unit, placed special watches on all the Japanese weather and news and other broadcasts, both in the Japanese and English language, and told them to maintain communications with

him by telephone and to call him the instant one of these code words was heard and he was to call either myself or Admiral Kimmel in person in case I happened to be away. He would call me if I were there. Also the intelligence officer, who at that time was monitoring certain news broadcasts, was inferentially warned to watch for any weather reports being put on the end of news broadcasts and to inform him or me—that is, Rochefort or myself—of any such appendage or insertion in a regular broadcast.

[906] 13. Q. Did you ever receive any information prior to 7 December 1941 which executed any portion of this document 15 that you have just read?

A. We did not.

14. Q. Prior to 7 December 7 1941 were you aware of any messages sent between the Hawaiian Islands and the Japanese Government which contained military information relative to the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor or the location of ships there?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. I show you Documents 36, 37 and 40 of Exhibit 63 which are communications between Japan and the Japanese authorities in Honolulu and which either request or give information concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. I will ask you to look at these documents and state whether or not you had seen them or been appraised of their contents prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I will state categorically that none of these were received here, nor were we appraised of their existence.

16. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 did you have any other information other than Exhibit 66 which I showed you first concerning the Japanese destroying codes and confidential documents?

A. On 5 December we received word from the naval observer at Wellington that the Japanese consul at Wellington was destroying his codes and had sent a code word to Tokyo in compliance with instructions.

17. Q. Was this information given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. It was.

18. Q. Do you recall whether any evaluation was placed on the significance of this directive?

A. The significance of these messages was considered along with other messages during that period and were the subject of discussions in the Admiral's cabin. I presumed that when he discussed it with the War Plans Officer and others that it was a matter of discussion because after receiving that he had various officers in for a conference. One particular point of this was the destruction of codes and ciphers, the ones in Hong Kong, Singapore, Wellington, as well as Batavia. I believe, were included along with London and Washington. This seemed to indicate that Japan was preparing for any or all eventualities and at that time we had received messages from the British and from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula scheduled for about 1 December. This seemed to dovetail with the information received and its evaluation, and while all possibilities were not ruled out, it fit like a glove.

[907] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

19. Q. I show you Document No. 2 of Exhibit 64, concerning the winds code, being a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Did you have that at about the same time you had had that other document that was shown you in your direct testimony?

A. It was about the same time; yes, sir.

20. Q. When you examined the two together, did it leave any uncertainty in your mind as to the mechanism of that code which the Japanese were setting up?

A. None whatsoever.

21. Q. Did you at that time take it to mean that one of those code words, say the one which referred to us, was the equivalent of informing the Japanese that they were at war with the United States, or in a state of somewhat lesser importance?

A. It is rather difficult to recall my exact impression but as I recall it now I believe it was more than a rupture of diplomatic relations had taken place and that necessarily, anything else could happen.

Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

[908] 22. Q. Exhibit 66, which you have just been shown, carries the initials, LFS. Do you know who that would be?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. Who?

A. I believe that is Captain Safford.

24. Q. Did you know at the time or did you think at the time that this purple cipher mentioned would be one of their very high class ciphers?

A. Yes, carrying as it did the material from Embassies and Counsel General to the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and vice versa, it was considered to be a high class cipher.

25. Q. Knowing the Japanese as of course you do, was it not rather an extreme measure to destroy anything as expensive as one of those machines?

A. The thought of the cost did not enter my mind. I rather thought that since the one from Bangkok had been removed, it was due to their forces being there; while the ones in Hong Kong, Manila, and Washington, and London, could not be physically transported without some danger of compromise. We know that they take elaborate precautions to move these into foreign countries.

26. Q. Captain, do you know whether or not your opposite number in the Army was obtaining from the War Department any information derived from sources like these that we have been discussing?

A. I do not know, sir. He at least did not pass any on to me, or to Admiral Kimmel, to my knowledge and I am sure that if any were passed on to Admiral Kimmel, I would have seen them. The liaison between the G-2, Hawaiian Department, was maintained through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Railey, who, when he established the liaison, said that he was doing this on the instructions of G-2, since the air force and the Navy would operate in the closest conjunction while the Army was a defensive garrison. Colonel Railey passed on to me no such information, and since I did inform him of the contents, in general, of some of this highly secret information, I feel positive in my mind that had he known it,

he would have informed us; and therefore he had no such source of information available.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy; (Ret):

27. Q. Did you know prior to 6 December, 1941, that any unit of the Navy Department had intercepted the execution of the winds message?

A. I did not.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

[909] Examined by the court:

28. Q. Captain, were you familiar with the operations of the F. B. I., and Intelligence Service here in Honolulu, during that period of time?

A. I was kept apprised of the general situation ashore, inasmuch as it influenced the security of the Fleet, which was here based. I knew in general their set-up, how they operated, and the general situation, but did not concern myself with details.

29. Q. Do you know of any restrictions placed on the Japanese representatives or Japanese officials of Honolulu, as to the transmission of messages to Tokyo?

A. To my best knowledge and belief, there were no such restrictions at any time.

30. Q. Was there any information—or were any means of obtaining information through the F. B. I., or otherwise, as to the messages flowing to Tokyo from Honolulu?

A. The F. B. I. wouldn't be a party to that, because it is against the laws of the United States. I know that there had been attempts made through various high officials, Naval, Military, and civilian, to obtain files of Japanese outgoing and incoming messages that were handled on American communications systems, and I know that it was refused in many cases. I know in some cases it was done with special permission of some very high authority. I understand that attempts were made locally here to obtain these messages.

31. Q. What I want to know—was this information obtained and in your hand or anyone's hands here in Honolulu?

A. There was no information obtained from any sources, of the Japanese Consul General, or others here—none to my knowledge at all.

32. Q. In other words, you had no information as to what action was being transmitted from the Japanese officials or otherwise here in Honolulu, to Tokyo?

A. No, sir. We had no information. Attempts were made to get it.

33. Q. We have had introduced in this testimony that certain messages were received in Washington whereby the Japanese requested information as to the number of ships in Pearl Harbor, and also the entrance of ships here. Were you familiar with those messages?

A. Not until after December 7.

34. Q. But you did not have them at the time?

A. I did not, sir.

35. Q. And they were not transmitted to you or to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific?

A. They weren't available, sir. They weren't decrypted [910] until after December 7.

36. Q. Does that include the so-called winds message?

A. No, sir, the winds message did not come locally. The winds message originated in Tokyo, saying that they would do a certain thing a certain place at a certain time.

37. Q. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet did not receive the winds message before December 7?

A. He knew of the winds message. These wind messages did not originate here in Honolulu.

Extracted testimony of Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy. Pages 916-918, inclusive.

[916] Reexamined by the judge advocate:

61. Q. You have testified that you did not feel that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had been kept as fully informed as he might have been, in view of the information which you know now was in Washington. Will you tell us some of the information which you think would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific at that time had he known it?

A. I know that there were certain de-crypted messages in the War Department and in the Navy Department in Washington, which by themselves do not mean so much, but, added together, would certainly be more of a warning toward this locality than we received in any other message—the ones you showed me, plus the ones not introduced in this court and which are in the possession of the Army, I understand.

62. Q. Could you give briefly the information which these documents contained? What was the subject matter of them?

A. Further inquiries regarding ship movements in Pearl Harbor and stressing movements of aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor.

63. Q. Do you recall any others?

A. Other messages of the nature of those from the purple machine regarding the situation existing at that time.

64. Q. Could you be just a little more specific?

A. I am trying to phrase this but I can't. Without quoting a document, I can only say I have received the impression from certain documents which I know were available before December 7 that the phraseology of certain passages in there may be considered quite important had that material been at hand. For instance, there was one expression to the effect that Japan must have a settlement of the negotiations in Washington by the 25th and the fact that when the note from Secretary Hull was delivered, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany was told to call on Hitler and get Hitler's promise. The Japanese Ambassador to Italy called on Mussolini and received Mussolini's promise of full aid. Those were definitely warlike indications.

Reexamined by the court:

65. Q. Referring to your last answer, were any of these directed against Pearl Harbor particularly?

A. No, sir.

66. Q. You consider, however, that if they had them here, they would have influenced the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific?

A. I think it would for this reason: The Japanese is [917] an Oriental, and he is a great bargainer. We saw negotiations apparently broken down with Mr. Kurusu suddenly being rushed through so as to inject new blood. The negotiations, we were told,

had broken down and there was little possibility of their being resumed. Yet we have seen in the past that negotiations were resumed, and Japan devised some new formula, some new approach for a problem almost as insoluble as the one facing her then. We received two very fine estimates of the situation from Captain Creighton, the naval resident officer at Singapore, and from the intelligence officer of the Asiatic Fleet, in which they independently of one another, from their wide contacts in the Far East, came to the conclusion that war against America at this time would not be the Japanese decision, but, rather, they would cut across Thailand to cut off the Burma Road and Burma, which was, at best, unstable at that time, in an attempt to find a solution to the so-called China incident without involving America and Great Britain, if possible.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

67. Q. Would not the receipt of the execution of the Winds Message be one of the clues to which you have referred and which would have influenced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief?

A. I feel positive that had one of the Winds messages execute been received, it would have been acted upon with rapidity and aggressively.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

68. Q. Will you state what action you believe would have been taken?

A. I believe all personnel would have been immediately recalled to their ships—This is my belief. I believe all vessels would have been ordered to be prepared to sail at the earliest possible moment. I believe that intense anti-submarine patrol and distant patrol would have been inaugurated. I believe the task force would have sortied and proceeded to sea to perform what missions under the War Plan the Commander-in-Chief deemed appropriate.

69. Q. This would have been upon receipt of the code message which said diplomatic relations with the United States were terminated?

A. Yes, sir.

70. Q. Didn't the "war warning" dispatch say practically the same thing?

A. No, sir, not to my knowledge. The message said negotiations had ceased. The fact that negotiations were then [918] under way in Washington—and which had been under way since, I believe, April or May, 1941—did not necessarily mean that diplomatic relations were going to be ruptured or that a state of war was going to be declared to exist after a rupture.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

[918A] The court then, at 5:25 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., September 11, 1944.

[919] Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. Naval Reserve. Pages 919-A—930, inclusive.

[919-A] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.

A. F. M. Brotherhood, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R. At present, I am attached to FRUPAC under orders to return to Washington.

2. Q. What duty were you performing during the month immediately preceding 7 December 1941?

A. I was one of the watch officers in Op-20-G, in the office of Director of Naval Communications.

[920] 3. Q. I hand you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 before this court. Do you recall having seen this document prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I recall seeing the original of this document prior to 7 December.

4. Q. Do you recall on what date you first saw that document, or were informed as to its contents?

A. I don't remember the date.

5. Q. What is the best approximation you can give as to that date?

A. About November 30th.

6. Q. At the time you saw this document, was it made available to all of the watch officers in Op-20-G?

A. I do not know.

7. Q. As a watch officer in Op-20-G, what instructions were given to you with regard to procedure to be followed if and when any intercept of a Japanese message using this code was received?

A. I recall only that portion which ordered me to call Admiral Noyes on the telephone in the event that any intercept of this type was received.

8. Q. Prior to 7 December 1941 was any message emanating from Japan received in Op-20-G in which this code was used?

A. I know of one that was at the time presumed to be in this code.

9. Q. When was that message that you speak of received?

A. I think of it as a Thursday night before Pearl Harbor.

10. Q. Sir, for the sake of the record, will you compute the day of the month that that Thursday night before Pearl Harbor would have been?

A. The 4th of December.

11. Q. During what hours on the evening of 4 December 1941 were you on watch in Op-20-G?

A. From 4:00 in the evening until midnight.

12. Q. From whom did you receive a message containing these code words? Relate the details pertaining to the receipt of such message.

A. In the course of the evening of December 4th I received a telephone call from the Federal Communications Commission from an officer whose name I don't remember. Unfortunately I don't remember at this time the text of the dispatch but I know what it did not say. I recall, in receiving it, that there seemed to be something missing from what I was looking [921] for and that is, he gave me the first

portion of it. I asked him if there was not more and I made a pencil note of the transmission as he gave it to me over the telephone only for my own records so that I would give it accurately to Admiral Noyes. When I say that the text was not what I was looking for, I mean that it did not contain the phrase in Japanese Higashi no Kazeame, which, to me, would have indicated that diplomatic relations severance, followed by war, would come to the United States. I remember this because of the feeling of relief that I had that it was not that. Immediately upon receipt of this telephone conversation through the very secret channel that we had set up for the purpose of transmitting this information I was able to reach Admiral Noyes by telephone and gave him the dispatch as I had it, and he said to me words which indicated to me that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction and thanked me, and at this time I don't remember whether he gave me oral instructions to ask the F. C. C. to continue to look. That part of it I don't remember. From this distance it seems to me that I called the F. C. C. later, though what I said at that time I don't remember. Those are the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the winds message referred to in this document.

13. Q. Sir, I hand you Document 2 of Exhibit 65 before the court. Can you identify this document as being the information which was passed to you by telephone on the evening of 4 December 1941 from the F. C. C.?

A. I have just said that I had forgotten the text. If I had been asked to quote the text of this dispatch I would have been unable to do so. However, I will say that this appears to me to be the text of the material that I received over the telephone from the Federal Communications Commission.

14. Q. Sir, I ask you to refer again to the first document which you were handed, Document 15 of Exhibit 63 in connection with the document which you now hold, Document 2 of Exhibit 64: Taking those two together, what information is conveyed with regard to a break of diplomatic relations between Japan and any other nation in this intercept message, Document 2 of Exhibit 64?

A. I remember what it meant to me without referring to this document. I will say that it conveyed the impression that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States but with the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that that is what caused Admiral Noyes to say that the wind is blowing from a funny direction.

15. Q. Commander, a few minutes ago, you testified that you made a written memorandum of the oral telephone conversation with an official of the F. C. C. Do you have any information as to whether or not the F. C. C. followed up that telephone call with a confirming letter or memoranda at any time subsequent to the evening of 4 December?

A. I don't have any recollection of such a confirmation.

[922] 16. Q. Was your pencil, written memoranda made a part of the files of Op-20-G at that time?

A. I don't know that either.

17. Q. Do you recall what disposition you did make of your memoranda?

A. Yes. I left it on the —well, we will say on the desk of the watch officer. I turned it over, in fact, to the succeeding watch officer.

18. Q. Since that time have you had any occasion to look in the files of Op-20-G to locate your memorandum or any other written memorandum pertaining to the receipt of the message about which you have been testifying?

A. No.

19. Q. I hand you Document 3 of Exhibit 64 before the court which, according to this exhibit, was intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2130 on the evening of December 5 and which according to the exhibit, was communicated to the Army. Will you look at this document and say what break in diplomatic relations is indicated by that code message?

A. It would indicate to me that the relations had been broken, or were about to be broken with the Soviet Union.

20. Q. In other words, this Document 3, received a day later than the one which you received over the telephone on the 4th, is merely a repetition, in substance, of what had been received on the night of the 4th pertaining only to the Soviet Union?

A. As I see it here, it would appear that way.

21. Q. Do you know whether or not this second intercept pertaining to a break with the Soviet Union was ever received in Op-20-G?

A. I do not.

22. Q. In addition to the intercept pertaining to the Soviet Union about which you have been testifying, did you ever see any other intercepts using the so-called winds code in Op-20-G?

A. No.

23. Q. Did you ever have any information of the receipt of any additional messages?

A. No.

24. Q. Under the set-up in Op-20-G at that time, would it have been likely that you would have known, either by seeing official reports or by informal information from the other watch officers, of the receipt of any additional messages using this code?

A. Very likely.

[923] 25. Q. Will you elaborate on that and give reasons for that last answer?

A. I was part of the group that had the duty of reporting any such message as this. I was one of the three officers who, in the course of a day, would have cognizance if such a message had come in. Further than that, had the message come in while I was not on watch, it seems to me that it would have passed down the chain of the watch officers to the responsible party. Further, my associations with the other watch officers was so close that had there been any rumor of such a dispatch I believe I would have heard about it.

26. Q. Do you know of any attempts that were made to notify the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of the receipt of a message utilizing the winds code?

A. I do not, except that Admiral Noyes said he would see that the proper people were informed of this intercept.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, (Ret), stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret) :

27. Q. Was this message that was received from the F. C. C. given to you in the Japanese language, or in the equivalent English translation?

A. It seems to me that it was given to me, Captain Lavender, as it appears here, in the testimony.

28. Q. By that, I take it, then, that it was given to you in English terms, English words?

A. It seems to me that it was.

29. Q. When you received this dispatch, were you completely satisfied, then, when receiving it, as you remember it, in English terms, as to the translation?

A. I was completely satisfied that I had gotten it correctly and I understood it.

30. Q. Did you at that time communicate with any of the other officers who might be familiar with that system, or a verification of the translation?

A. Captain Lavender, our instructions were very explicit. The person to whom I was to report had sufficient information of what we could expect to receive so that I think had it come in Japanese or English, the recipient of my telephone call would have understood without the assistance of a translator.

31. Q. But did you verify in any way the meaning of the dispatch as it was given to you?

A. Only by consulting the memorandum of instructions which had had been given to me.

[924] 32. Q. What other officers did you refer to when you said there were three officers that were doing routine duties, rotation duties similar to yours?

A. Their names, Captain Lavender?

33. Q. Yes.

A. Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering; Lieutenant Commander Murray, whose initials I don't remember; and Lieutenant Commander Brown. I don't remember his initials.

34. Q. What were your relations with Commander Kramer?

A. Commander Kramer was the officer in charge of the translation section of our group. My relations with him were friendly.

35. Q. I mean your official relations. Do you know what duties Commander Kramer was performing in December, 1941?

A. He was in charge of the translation section of our group, as I have said.

36. Q. Did you consult with him at all on the translation of this dispatch?

A. Not at the time, Captain. Commander Kramer had been pretty busy and he was home getting some needed rest.

37. Q. Did you ask the Federal Communications Commission to send you a confirmation copy?

A. I don't recall.

38. Q. Do you recall whether or not you considered at that time that this message was of some importance?

A. I recall that I considered it of considerable importance.

39. Q. And you made only a memorandum of that message and turned it over to your relief without making any other copies?

A. According to my instructions, I did.

40. Q. Who gave you those instructions?

A. There was a written instruction signed by a responsible officer in my section. I don't recall whether it was Commander Kramer, or whether it was Captain Safford.

41. Q. Do you recall whether the officer that gave you the information over the telephone, that is, in the Federal Communications Commission, mentioned the Japanese words at all?

A. I don't remember that he did.

42. Q. Did you know any Japanese at that time?

A. I knew pretty much the material that was covered in this dispatch. I knew some other diplomatic Japanese.

[925] 43. Q. It has been indicated that there has been no trace of the original message as recorded by you, or any confirmation copy, in the files of the Navy Department. Can you account in any way for the inability of the Navy Department to produce this dispatch?

A. I can account for it from my own viewpoint only and that was, we were instructed to pass the word orally. This matter at the time was considered of greatest urgency and the most important single job we had to do. Each of us was very anxious to be sure that nothing happened to our carrying out our orders. I know this because it was talked informally with the other officers involved since that time regarding this dispatch. For my part, when I received it, my orders left me no alternative but to make my telephone call to Admiral Noyes at once. I was not in the position, nor was I expected, to evaluate or pass on the worth of the contents of this dispatch. I was simply ordered to see that it was speeded on its way.

44. Q. And you were ordered to see that it was speeded on its way and emphasized as to speed and emphasized as to oralness but not emphasized as to any record that would be kept of such an important message?

A. As to the matter of record, I don't believe we were instructed to make a record.

45. Q. Now, coming to the morning of 7 December, what watch did you have?

A. The morning of 7 December I came on duty at 12:01 a. m., and remained until relieved sometime after 7:00 a. m.

46. Q. Do you recall what dispatches came to your attention during that watch?

A. I recall one particular dispatch. There were a number handled by that watch.

47. Q. Do you recall whether or not there was the 14th part of a 14-part ditspatch intercepted between Japan and the ambassador in Washington that was received at that time?

A. Ever since December 7 there has been a question in my mind whether there were 13 or 14 parts. May I refer to the part that you call "14" as the last part?

48. Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

49. Q. Did you receive during that watch a dispatch indicating the time of delivery of all of the parts of that long dispatch to the Secretary of State?

A. At the time I didn't recognize it as such a dispatch, except there was, to me, a certain indication that there was some urgency in connection with the long diplomatic message.

[926] 50. Q. Will you state how the two dispatches just referred to were handled, and trace them in their delivery and distribution as far as you know of your own personal knowledge?

A. The first dispatch which was mentioned, the long diplomatic message, was perfectly clear to me. It was in English and when I finished with it, except for making a record, it would be ready for dissemination through the customary channels. At the time of December 7th we were sharing the work on this diplomatic traffic with the Army. The message regarding time of delivery was in Japanese. It required the services of a translator. I have tried since December 7th to remember whether or not the Army translator was on duty at the time. The reason for that is this: I know the translator was not present at the Navy Department, and for the reason that we were sharing the duties on this diplomatic traffic we worked on odd and even days. At this time I don't remember whether the odd day of the week or the odd day of the month was the Navy's day of duty, or the Army's. I don't remember whether the Army translator was there that early in the morning—I will say by 4:00 o'clock in the morning—but in the exchange of traffic back and forth we made customary trips in which we carried this traffic over by hand ourselves. It was not trusted to an enlisted man, and I believe that prior to 7:00 o'clock on the morning of December 7th I had made one, perhaps two, such trips to the Army. It is quite possible that I would not know whether there was a translator on duty in the Army section because, as I say, these activities were veiled in so much secrecy that I knew very little about the personnel employed by the Army. So far as I was concerned, it meant carrying some documents over to a very impersonal receiver. Does that answer your question, Captain Lavender?

51. Q. Partially. I will bring the rest out by questions. How long did you remain in the Navy Department on the morning of 7 December?

A. I left sometime after 7:00.

52. Q. Did you leave before Commander Kramer came in?

A. I left before Commander Kramer came in, yes, sir.

53. Q. And you left the dispatches there for delivery to Commander Kramer, however?

A. Those dispatches which were supposed to be delivered to him, I don't remember, but I presume that I left them there for him.

Re-examined by the judge advocate:

54. Q. Commander, referring to the testimony that you have just given: At the time you left the Department at 7:00 o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, had the English translation of the Japanese message which you had taken to the Army for translation been returned to you?

A. I wish I could remember that. I have tried to remember whether the original copy had come back, or not. I can't remember. I would like to know if anyone ever finds out.

[927] Examined by the court:

55. Q. Referring again to this winds message: Did you at any time discuss this winds message with Commander Kramer, or with Admiral Noyes?

A. Admiral, I delivered it to Admiral Noyes.

56. Q. By 'phone?

A. By telephone, yes, sir, and since that time I have not discussed it with him.

57. Q. Well, I am speaking of the immediate time of that date. Did you discuss it with him at that time, other than 'phone him?

A. No, sir.

58. Q. When this supposed answer of "execute winds message" came in—and you say that in accordance with your translation or the information you received, it meant that Japan was going to war with the Soviet Union—didn't that seem rather odd to you in view of the critical situation existing at that time between this country and Japan?

A. It did.

59. Q. Did you hear Commander Kramer or Admiral Noyes express any opinion as to the queer interpretation of this message?

A. Admiral, I testified as to something that Admiral Noyes said in regard to it; it is in the record.

60. Q. Were you present or did you hear while on duty there, that Commander Kramer came in with a reply to this question, that said "Here it is"; in reply to this winds message; or, "Here it is, we've got it"?

A. I don't recall that.

61. Q. You have been asked as to how these messages were handled. Now, referring to the winds message. Do you know how that was handled from your office and where it went to? Did it go to the Chief of Naval Operations, or where did it go?

A. I don't know that, Admiral. I only know as far as Admiral Noyes is concerned.

[928] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

62. Q. Were you by chance present when there was a summary of events or a summary of the estimate drawn up and presented to Admiral Noyes for his consideration, to pass on to higher authority?

A. No.

63. Q. Do you remember when you saw the English translation of part 14 of these messages received on the night of 6-7 December?

A. I think it took us about an hour to get that out, to break it out; seems to me we finished it and checked it for accuracy and possible mistakes by 4:00 in the morning.

64. Q. That was the last part?

A. The last part, yes, sir.

65. Q. The last part which came in was in the Japanese language and had been translated?

A. No, sir, that was in English. The last part of the long diplomatic message was in English.

66. Q. The last part that I referred to, you stated in your testimony was in the Japanese language. The other parts were in English.

A. I don't believe I said that.

67. Q. What did you say?

A. I understood Captain Lavender asked me about a dispatch stating that this certain long diplomatic dispatch must be delivered by a given time. If I didn't say that it was that dispatch that was in Japanese, I made a mistake, but I think I did. The long diplomatic dispatch of fourteen parts was in English; that did not require translation.

68. Q. The long part of the message; was that in English?

A. The long diplomatic message was in English.

69. Q. Now the short part was in Japanese, the short and last part?

A. Yes, they were not associated by number. They were only associated by inference.

70. Q. Now, what I asked you—the short part and last part that was in Japanese—when did you see the English translation of that?

A. I didn't see the English translation of the little Japanese dispatch until some time after December 7.

71. Q. Now referring to the long dispatch, do you know what [929] happened to that, where it went to—the long part of the dispatch? Did you have anything to do with the delivery of that long part of the dispatch?

A. Yes, sir.

72. Q. What did you do with it?

A. Those dispatches were carried over by us as officer messenger to the Army.

73. Q. War Department?

A. To the War Department, yes, sir; and I presume at that time—I don't remember, I haven't kept a diary—I presume I carried those over as it was my obligation to do.

74. Q. Did you carry them to any other place: did you carry them to the State Department?

A. No, sir.

75. Q. Did you carry them to OpNav?

A. Not me.

76. Q. What?

A. No, sir.

77. Q. You have stated that you know only few phrases in Japanese?

A. That's correct, sir.

78. Q. You are not a Japanese translator?

A. No, sir.

79. Q. And when these Japanese words came to you—the words of the wind messages—you took the translation as given you by someone else; is that correct? Did you take the word of the translator?

A. I took it as it was given to me by the F. C. C. It says here (indicating) it is in English. If you would have asked me, I would have been unable to tell you before I refreshed my memory. Admiral, I hope I have made clear that I was not entitled, nor was I expected, to evaluate the contents of any messages that would be delivered.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to recross-examine this witness.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

80. Q. Just to bring out my own understanding of some of your testimony, all parts of the long diplomatic dispatch that was received finally on 7 December were in English when decrypted?

A. I said that with this reservation in mind, that there is always at the beginning of one of these dispatches, whether in English or not, certain material that is necessary for the Japanese record. That was in their conventional method of representation, which was a sub-

stitution of cipher below the [930] cipher machine. There was that type of stuff at the beginning, but that had nothing to do with the context.

81. Q. But all of the part of that long dispatch that was to be delivered to the Secretary of State came out in English when it was decrypted?

A. It seems to me that it did.

82. Q. Did the other dispatch which was received at the time and that related to the specific hour at which the long dispatch was to be delivered—when that was decoded it came out in Japanese and required translation; is that true?

A. That is true to the best of my memory.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret), did not desire to recross-examine this witness.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

83. Q. I hand you document 39 of Exhibit 63 before this court, which is a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 902, labelled at the top, "Part 1 of 14 parts." I should say document 39 covers all 14 parts of that. Is part 14 included in this that you have been speaking of as the long message?

A. It is.

84. Q. And what you speak of as the short dispatch is what?

A. This short dispatch carrying instructions to the Ambassador regarding the delivery of the long dispatch.

85. Q. And is this document 41 of Exhibit 63 the message that you referred to as the short dispatch?

A. That is it—41.

86. Q. Part 14 of document 39 of Exhibit 63—is this the part that you mentioned as coming in English?

A. This and others.

87. Q. Is document 41 of Exhibit 63, which you have referred to as the short dispatch giving instructions on the time of delivery—is that the one that you mentioned as coming in Japanese?

A. That is the one that I referred to as coming in Japanese.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. Pages 950-987, inclusive.

[950] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy. I am at present attached at CinCPac. I just reported this morning to CinCPac.

2. Q. What duties are you presently performing other than this temporary duty?

A. I have been permanently attached to SoPac and have now reported to CinCPac and have not yet been assigned to duty.

3. Q. What duties were you performing between 1 October and 7 December 1941?

A. I was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, on loan to OP-20-G, Office of Naval Communications.

4. Q. Will you state the general characteristics of the duties that you were performing in that station?

A. I was head of the translation section of the communication security group. That consisted of translating all decrypted traffic obtained from intercepts and delivering it to the Office of Naval Intelligence and any persons in the Navy Department or outside of the Navy Department that the Director Naval Intelligence or the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy wanted delivery made to.

5. Q. Did you have any routine addressees to whom you were in the custom of delivering all traffic to?

A. Yes.

6. Q. Who were they?

A. We prepared 14 copies of every decrypted translation. Seven copies went to Army. The other 7 were for delivery to senior officers in the Navy Department and also to either the White House or State Department, the responsibility of which rotated between the War Department and the Navy Department. At the time referred to in your earlier question I had responsibility for delivery to the White House; Army to the State Department. The addressees in the Navy Department that normally got copies which I delivered were the aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty, or to the Secretary of the Navy directly; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the head of Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East section, then Commander McCollum; Admiral Noyes as Director of Naval Communications; Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans. Occasionally there were certain other individuals I was directed to show it to.

[951] 7. Q. I note that the specific addresses only add up to six.

A. The seventh copy was a file copy.

8. Q. This intercepted traffic: Was it passed along to the addressees as it was received, or was some sort of summary made for delivery?

A. A complete version of every message went into one of 6 separate folders, delivery being made several times a day, depending on urgency. Earlier in 1941 I had been in the habit of preparing a summary of all the traffic in the day's folder because of its volume. In this summary I briefed the subject of the message, asterisked it with one or two asterisks showing those things which were most important or of urgent character so that the senior addressees to which I delivered it could look through the summary to see what they would want to take time to see. The volume was so heavy that they rarely had time to look through the whole book, volumes running into sometimes as much as 130 messages in one day. I made a point of seeing that the more important ones were seen and read by the senior addressees that I delivered personally to. In some cases, of course, such as the Secre-

tary of the Navy, Captain Beatty would make actual delivery and consequently I do not know just what ones he read.

9. Q. Do I understand your responsibility then to have been that you had in your possession for the purpose of showing to addressees, all intercept traffic and it was a matter of the party's own decision as to whether or not he would look into all the dispatches that you had in your possession, or only to the ones that you had singled out as being of importance; is that correct?

A. That is, in general, correct, yes, sir.

10. Q. Was there any intermediary between you and the decrypting section of the Office of the Director of Naval Communications who made any decision as to whether or not the messages that were received were passed to you? I mean by that, did you have in your possession for delivery all the traffic that came in, or was there some sort of a separation process which enabled you to have only what was probably considered the more important ones?

A. Every bit of traffic that was broken down into Japanese plain language, or partly broken down from those systems and not completely recovered, was passed to my section for translation or further code recovery and for translation and distribution and writing up. The filtering process to which you referred might be intercepted as applying to the partially recovered systems which came in in considerable volume, some of which, however, could not be adequately broken down to get much intelligence out of it.

11. Q. Are you a Japanese language student yourself?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

[952] 12. Q. Did you yourself translate all dispatches, or how was that done?

A. I had a staff of civilian translators, professional Civil Service employees in the Navy Department. Those messages that were of high importance I normally glanced over in the nature of editing before they were typed up. Otherwise, the great majority of the material was translated by my civilian assistants. It was only an occasional message I translated myself.

13. Q. You have testified in effect—and I wish you would correct me if I put the wrong interpretation on your testimony—that there was no filtering process between you and the source of information. In other words, you had in your possession for delivery to addresses all information that was received?

A. I will have to repeat again a reference to the filtering process. When you use the statement "all information" there were many other messages which my section did not get which were in various states of recovery in the G. Y. section, in the decryption or cipher recovery section of Op-20-G, which I did not get or oftentimes got several weeks later. In other words, with the large volume of traffic coming in on a new system, it might be weeks before I would get material from that system. I would not get it until it was sufficiently broken down to start pulling intelligible information out of it.

14. Q. I am assuming, Commander, that there was a pool of intelligence information, and what I am trying to bring out—

A. Intelligence was the word I used. In other words, a sketchily recovered message, you might be able to translate to the extent of a phrase here and a word there, but it would not make sense

enough or would not warrant writing up for distribution to the senior officers in the Navy Department, so a message would have to be in a system that was sufficiently recovered to pull intelligible information out of it before I would get it for translation and distribution.

15. Q. I am assuming that you had such a pool of intelligible intelligence force available to you. Now, what I am trying to find out is, did you take all this intelligence and pass it along, or did you or someone else act as a filter to sort out the information that was passed along?

A. Because of the high volume that we got and the small number of translators we had—there were three at that time—it was not feasible or possible to translate everything that came to us. Consequently, we concentrated on the more secure systems which, in general, had the more important information in them. All the others were looked over and a brief summary made by the translators. Every one of those messages, before going into the file—in other words, before finally being disposed of—was looked at by me as a final check to see whether the information warranted being translated. Everythink that was translated in full that warranted distribution was written up and distributed.

[953] 16. Q. That is what I am trying to get at: Who made the decision as to whether or not information that was received and that was translated and was intelligible from the translation should be passed from this pool to higher authority?

A. That decision was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In making decisions on most points myself, I was simply acting for the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and more directly for the head of the Far East section. That discretion was left to me but I made a point, on occasion, of taking those things up for final confirmation of my decision to Captain McCollum, as a rule. The occasions were rather rare, however.

17. Q. Then as a matter of, let us say, routine procedure, you had on the one hand a pool of intelligence information that had been received and had been translated and was understandable, and on the other hand you had 14 copies of information going up to higher authority everyday?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. As I understand it, you were the officer who, as a routine matter, made the decision of what matter you would take out of this pool and pass along to higher authority; is that correct?

A. That is, in substance, correct; yes, sir.

19. Q. And this matter that you passed along to higher authority, that is, your 7 addressees or 6 addressees, received this information from you directly from this pool as you selected it, without reference to, let us say the Director of Naval Communications or other persons in the Navy Department before you passed it along; is that correct?

A. That is not strictly correct, although in practice it often worked that way. As a rule, an attempt was made to bring the whole book to Captain McCollum as head of the Far East section, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence first because the director oftentimes made a point of taking that into the C. N. O. himself. It occasionally happened during 1941 that the Director would take an item into the

C. N. O. himself, but because of the large volume of that stuff through '41 it was left more and more to me.

20. Q. When you took this volume of traffic that you had assembled yourself, say to Commander McCollum, or to the Director of Naval Intelligence, did they ever detach any of the information, that is, weed it out and throw it away, or did they confirm what you had selected, or just exactly what was done when you referred it to these other people who, in a way, let us say, sat over you?

A. There was no eliminating of anything from this volume of traffic since each of the books were made up in the same way. Occasionally, however, the Director would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to the C. N. O., or the Secretary.

[954] 21. Q. You mean, then, that which you had indicated yourself as being of interest to these addressees?

A. Yes, sir, greater or less than I had indicated. That refers more specifically to the period when I was making the summary of the day's traffic. It usually ran two or three pages with from one to five lines in a summary of the subject matter of the contents of the message. In the case of the latter part of '41, however, because of the large volume again, I used a system of clipping the items of greater importance and actually showing the original translation to the Director.

22. Q. As I understand you, you say that you frequently made some sort of a summary of a subject matter of information and clipped it on to the file yourself; is that correct?

A. That was earlier in the year before the volume got so heavy that we couldn't take time for those summaries.

23. Q. What was your practice the latter part of the year, say the week preceding 7 December 1941? Did you make any summary of important messages at that time for the information of addressees?

A. No, sir, I did not, and had not been doing it since about the middle of '41, because of the very high volume of traffic concerned with the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. The volume was not only high, but individual messages often went to four or five or more, sometimes 15 typewritten pages. It was impracticable to summarize for that reason alone, but also because of the fact that those messages frequently had reference to half a dozen or more earlier messages, diplomatic notes, and so forth. Consequently, in preparing these books my principal objective was to get a brief reference foot-note for each one of those references or break out the originals of those earlier translations, attaching to those current messages, so that the book itself would be as complete as possible, as self-contained as possible, when these senior officers were looking at them.

24. Q. It strikes me, Commander, as a matter of a practical thing, that as the volume of dispatches or separate items increased, the demand for a summary would have been greater than when the dispatches were less?

A. I don't believe that was quite the case, since the earlier summaries were intended to weed out the more important items from a large volume of material covering the whole world. The greatest percentage of the traffic in the fall of '41 had to do with two main types of material: One was the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, and the other was the circuit from Berlin to Tokyo, because of the fact that

those two categories of traffic were being followed with considerable interest and detail by all the senior addressees, almost every message in folders in the latter part of '41 bore on those two subject matters, that is, Japanese relations with the Germans, or German information on their war in Europe being passed to the Japanese, or on the current negotiations going on in Washington in which all these addressees had a [955] direct interest, or hand. They therefore wanted to see those things as promptly as possible, particularly those bearing on the Washington negotiations, because oftentimes it was an item of information that we would be able to break down, have it translated, only an hour or two before the Secretary of State, for example, would be meeting the Japanese ambassador. Hence it was more important to get the material to those people promptly rather than to take time to brief these things, except to the extent of indicating the subject matter of references contained in those messages. Earlier in the year, to go back to those summaries again, it normally took from one to two hours to make up a summary, dictate it, that is, glancing through the book and dictating to the yeoman, followed by his immediately typing it up. That delay was just not permissible during the fall of '41 at many times.

25. Q. The judge advocate understands, and he asks you this as a matter of repetition, to make sure that the record is clear that you did, however, indicate what particular items of information that you were delivering were of importance?

A. That is true, yes, sir, by attaching clips to the messages in the folders that were of most immediate interest in the day's volume.

26. Q. Can you recall from your experience in delivering these dispatches to these addressees—and let us use as an example the Office of Chief of Naval Operations—did the Chief of Naval Operations as a matter of custom usually read the entire file of dispatches that you brought to him for his information?

A. The majority of times the folder was left with his aide. Just how much of that he read, I don't know, but in such cases I made a point of pointing out to his aide, his flag secretary, which were the things of most immediate importance or interest to the Admiral. Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral should see them at once, or as soon as possible. At other times when a particular hot item—if I may use that term—came in, I would request permission to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. That happened quite frequently during the fall of '41. By "frequently" I would say two or three or four times a week.

27. Q. Then am I to understand that your custom of delivering this file of information to the Chief of Naval Operations was by leaving it with his aide?

A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. But when you had items that you considered of great urgency you presented it to the Chief of Naval Operations direct; is that correct?

A. I arranged with his aide to take it directly in, yes, sir, and waited while the Admiral read it.

[956] 29. Q. I suppose if the Chief of Naval Operations were not in his office at the time you arrived to make a delivery, you would have left the information with his aide for later delivery; is that correct?

A. I would normally leave it with his aide for later delivery, yes, sir, but in the meantime, of course, I would have gotten it to the Director of Naval Intelligence and as a rule would indicate whether Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox had seen it yet, or not. Admiral Wilkinson would oftentimes then make a point of following it up to see that the Admiral got the word.

30. Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th of December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is Document 15 from Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

31. Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

32. Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phrases of this code?

A. On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about 6 as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only in OP-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

[957] 33. Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

34. Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kazeame. I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

35. Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kazeame?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

36. Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?

A. I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

37. Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

A. No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy intercept station.

38. Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it; is that correct?

A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

39. Q. Have you seen that communication since?

A. I have had no occasion to; no, sir.

40. Q. The question was, have you seen it since?

A. I have not, no, sir. I have not because I have had no occasion to.

41. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 65, which is in evidence before this court. I will ask you to examine Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this exhibit and state whether or not you had seen or been informed of these documents on or before 7 December 1941?

A. I may have seen one or more of these messages, but since every one of these is of the nature I have earlier described, I didn't handle any of these. I know I saw one which I previously referred to, which was the first one of this category referred to. There may have been others of [958] the same nature come through handled as I indicated that first one was handled, but I have no recollection of such further messages.

42. Q. Can you recall in the distribution of the information which was your custom to do directly, whether or not any matter pertaining to these Japanese words had been taken by you to the list of distributees in the government in Washington?

A. Not by me, no, sir. Special arrangements, as I referred to earlier, had been made for handling this particular type of message.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdraw.

[959] 43. Q. Then adverting to Exhibit 65, which you have just examined, it is the judge advocate's understanding that you do not recall having seen any one of the documents concerned therein, although you may have seen them?

A. That is correct, yes, sir. In fact, I can amplify by saying that I believe I saw at least one and possibly more of those.

44. Q. Would you be able to state to the court which ones you think you saw?

A. I could not be certain; no, sir.

45. Q. I show you exhibit 66, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 3 December 1941, and released by J. R. Redmond, and having to do with the destruction of certain confidential matters; will you state whether or not you saw this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I drafted this message.

46. Q. That message refers to the destruction of purple machines in certain areas. Did that language, the destruction of a particular type of machine in certain places, have any special significance to you?

A. This particular message was not drafted as an interpretation of the decrypted traffic from which it was taken, but simply a brief of that traffic addressed to four addressees who were familiar with the character of that traffic, because of the narrow channel that this traffic, this Kopek message was confined to and the fact that only the addressees on that narrow channel would know what it meant. Normally, in fact I will go further by stating that almost without exception, this channel was not intended or used as a channel for interpreting that traffic. It was a technical channel. Any interpretation or evaluation would normally go from the Office of Naval Intelligence or War Plans, or the CNO's office.

47. Q. Will you tell the court what special significance this message should have to an addressee who understood it?

A. To the four addressees to whom it was sent, the interpretation would presumably be the same as I inferred personally when I drafted the message and indicated the desirability of sending it out; in other words, an interpretation that the destruction of codes normally preceded an intended break in relations or else a serious diplomatic crisis.

48. Q. It that all that message inferred?

A. The fact that only United States, British, and Dutch addressees were included as action addressees by the Japanese traffic, indicated that the nations referred to were very likely one or more of those two. By "indicated", I of course referred to my previous answer, as being the nations most likely involved in a probable diplomatic crisis, or actual break, or possibly even war.

[960] 49. Q. I show you Exhibit 20 before this court, which is a dispatch from OpNav to certain addressees and also sets out information that the Japanese in certain areas are destroying codes and ciphers and burning important confidential and secret documents. I ask you if you were acquainted with that message on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I did see this message, after it went, however.

50. Q. Can you state what the purpose of sending Exhibit 66 was, when Exhibit 20 had been sent on the same day to practically the same addressees; in other words, is there anything added by 66 that was not sent in Exhibit 20?

A. Exhibit 20 was drafted, I believe, by then Commander McCollum, head of the Far East section; and as an example of an interpreting message for this Japanese decrypted traffic being sent out, to which I referred a question or two before, this exhibit here, No. 66—the Kopek channel was purely the technical channel giving a brief of the actual decrypted traffic; 20 was the interpreting message from the Director of Naval Intelligence.

51. Q. Can you state whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had been informed of the information contained in Exhibit 66?

A. I can only state that I am almost certain he was. I can't swear he was, because I am not certain whether the folder with that particular message was shown him by myself or his aide.

52. Q. Do you have any recollection of a dispatch containing about 500 words which is purported to have been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and which dispatch was supposed to have contained a summary of information on late developments in Japanese-United States relationships, and which dispatch was intended to have been sent to certain addressees outside of Washington? I ask you, do you have any knowledge of such a document or dispatch having been prepared?

A. I first heard of that several weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I have never seen the message and have no first-hand knowledge of it.

53. Q. Do you have any first-hand knowledge of what happened to the message; that is, whether it was sent or whether it was not?

A. As I stated, I first heard of its existence only several weeks later and my information is rather sketchy in various ramifications of how it was handled.

54. Q. I am going to show you a series of documents from Exhibit 63, which relate as a matter of general information to [961] an exchange of dispatches between the Japanese home government and the Hawaiian area, and having to do with the location of ships, or a request for information concerning ships. The first is document 24. I will ask you if you saw it on or before 7 December 1941?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

55. Q. Can you recall whether it was referred to the Chief of Naval Operations or not at or about the time of its receipt?

A. Again I am not positive whether the Chief of Naval Operations actually saw it, but I know that it would have been in a folder that was left in his office.

56. Q. I show you document 36 from the same exhibit and ask you whether you saw that document on or before 7 December 1941.

A. Yes, sir, I saw this. I would like to remark on this as well as the previous message that it was not at all an unusual type of message. The same sort of things had been going to Japanese consuls and diplomatic posts all over the world for the past year or more. Furthermore, the United States Government had been sending similar sorts of messages through Navy channels, liaison officers, naval attaches, as well as via diplomatic channels to places where there were no naval representatives—watching ship movements. We know that with the abrogation or termination of the commercial treaty with Japan, and a short time previously with the closing of the canal to Japanese shipping, at about the time we know Japanese shipping was being recalled from the Atlantic, the Japanese were watching ship movements even more closely than they had before. These two messages you have shown me were somewhat more emphatic messages of that nature. Directives were going out from Tokyo periodically; that is, every few months, sometimes indicated as being the request of the Navy Minister, to watch ship movements. We know that the Japanese diplomatic service was doing it, and doing a conscientious

job on it. In fact, I recall the Japanese consul in Seattle stating in one report that he had gone down to the docks and seen certain ships, and so reported.

57. Q. I am going to show you document 39 from Exhibit 63. This document, or certain parts of it, is a message that has been testified was received in the Navy Department on the evening of 6 December 1941. In order to save a lot of categorical questions, I am going to ask you to relate in detail the information that you yourself know about this message from the time it first came to your attention until it was delivered to the various distributees in the government at Washington, to whom you usually made delivery.

A. I recognize this message as the one, the first [962] thirteen parts of which we received on 6 December 1941. I was about to leave the office the middle of Saturday afternoon, 6 December, when I made a final check with the Teletype Watch to see whether there was anything apparently hot coming in, particularly in view of the fact that we had been expecting a reply for a week or ten days to the United States note of 26 November. In view of other developments that we had seen taking place in the diplomatic traffic and otherwise, it was apparent things were shaping up to some sort of a crisis—consequently, the reply should be coming through momentarily. At 3:00 o'clock on the 6th, the message was coming in—so I waited and held my team of translators there, and it turned out to be a part of the reply. We turned to, and by 9:00 o'clock Saturday, the evening of the 6th of December, had received, broken down, translated, and had typed ready for delivery, thirteen of those parts, several of them somewhat garbled. At 9:05 approximately, I phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his home, telling him in guarded language the nature of what I had and what I proposed to do with it. He confirmed, or rather, approved, my plan for distribution. I accordingly proceeded at once to the White House, left a folder with that 13-part message and one or two others with an aide of Admiral Beardall, who was aide to the President, with rather emphatic instructions to get to the President as quickly as possible. The President was entertaining at the moment. I then proceeded at once to Secretary Knox's apartment on Connecticut Avenue, and waited there while he read the message, the traffic. Mrs. Knox was also present, as well as a business associate, I believe acting manager of his newspaper, the Chicago Daily "News". After Secretary Knox read the material, we had a brief discussion in one corner, chiefly because there were a number of references to previous messages in that particular 13-part message, and I remember we discussed certain points about it. He made some phone calls, I believe to Mr. Stimson and to Mr. Hull; and after these calls indicated that there would be a meeting at the State Department at 10:00 o'clock the following morning, Sunday, and he wanted me there with that material and anything else that had come in. From there I went to Admiral Wilkinson's residence in Arlington, where I knew Admiral Beardall, the President's aide, also was at dinner, and was there until about 12:15, past midnight, while he read the material I had, and I indicated who had received it. Admiral Wilkinson made some phone calls which included, I believe, Admiral Stark, and I think Admiral Turner, though I am not certain. I had tried both of these officers' residences earlier in the evening—Stark and Turner's—but neither were at home;

and left Admiral Wilkinson's home about 12:15 a. m. December 7, and went back to the Navy Department about 12:30. My return to the Navy Department was for two reasons: to leave these folders under proper safeguards, safe, as well as to check up on any possible new traffic that might have come in, particularly part 14, which was still missing. Nothing [963] was in of importance at that time, so I went home. I would like to insert parenthetically in connection with that going home, that I was on tap any hour of the day and night by GY Watch Officers, for anything that appeared to be of interest. When we were expecting anything of importance, I made a point of instructing them to call me if messages with a certain originator, such as Tokyo or Berlin, had come in.

58. Q. Is it correct that you did not deliver the 13 parts of this message you have just been testifying about on the night of 6-7 December, to Admiral Stark?

A. I did not deliver that 13-part message to Admiral Stark the night of 6-7 December. I did, however, get the word to Admiral Wilkinson, as I stated earlier, and I am almost certain that Admiral Wilkinson was in touch with Admiral Stark or his aids, because at the time I left Admiral Wilkinson's home he indicated to me that I was to have all that material, as well as any new material that came in, ready for them in the Navy Department the first thing in the morning.

59. Q. It is my understanding that you had been expecting such a dispatch as this Exhibit 39 for some days?

A. That is correct, yes, sir.

60. Q. I show you document 17 of Exhibit 63, and ask you if you were familiar with that document on or prior to 7 December 1941?

A. I am almost certain that this is one of many that I did see. I cannot swear about this particular one, because it is of the same nature as probably 200 others of that form.

61. Q. As you inspect this document, is that the type of document that you would have normally included in your file to show to the distributees in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

62. Q. Adverting again to this message that started to come in on the evening of 6 December, and of which you received thirteen parts, will you state when you again became acquainted with any other matter that related to these thirteen parts—that is a continuation thereof?

A. I received no phone calls during the night, and consequently arrived at the Navy Department not before about 7:30 in the morning. At that time, other material was coming in. That was being translated, checked, written up, and at about 9:00 o'clock the 13-part message, together with the new material, was left at Admiral Stark's office, where there was apparently a meeting. My recollection is that it was about 9:00 o'clock. There was a meeting apparently gathering, not yet in progress. I returned at once to my office to finish preparation of the other folders and get together material for the Secretary, left the Navy Department about 9:30 to make delivery to the White House, for which the Navy Department was at that time responsible, and was at the State Department at about ten minutes to 10:00, waiting for Mr. Knox, to whom I [964] gave that

material. The material concerned in this particular folder was the thirteen parts received the night before plus one or two other ones, plus the fourteenth part, which had arrived early in the morning, plus one or two other ones. This particular delivery did not include the message directing delivery of their note to the United States at 1300. That had arrived at the Navy Department when I got back to my office, and was being translated.

The court then, at 11:00 a. m., took a recess until 11:10 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members; the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, whose counsel were present. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

[965] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

63. Q. You may continue with your testimony.

A. When I had returned to the Navy Department at approximately 1020, a message directing in rather emphatic language that delivery be made to the Secretary of State at 1300 had been received, together with a series of other messages, one of which directed final destruction of Japanese codes still on hand—those remaining after the earlier directive on the destruction of codes the week before. There was another message thanking the ambassador for his services, another addressed to the embassy staff, and one or two others of like nature. That material was delivered within ten to fifteen minutes to Admiral Stark's office—to the meeting then in progress. I then left, very much in a hurry, to go to the White House and to the meeting at the State Department to deliver that new material. The delay between the time I had returned to the Navy Department at 1020 and when I started delivery was simply a clerical detail entailed in typing and putting it in the folder. When I delivered this new material, including the directive of delivery of the Japanese diplomatic note to be made at 1300 to the State Department, I made a point of verbally inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved. The reason I did that was the fact that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, might not have seen at first glance the implications of the times. We had known that for some weeks passed the Japs were negotiating with certain elements in Thailand, specifically the Thailand Chief of Staff, with the view of forcing the hand of the Thai premier, who had stated earlier he was maintaining a neutral position and that if any nation, whether the Japanese or British, crossed his borders, it would mean that he would call on the other party to come to his assistance. The Japs came and apparently involved either a demonstration or an actual landing at Kota Bharu, just below the Thai border on the Malay pen-

insula. Because of the tactical terrain features there, it was expected that the British would cross the Thai border, heading for the rail center of Singora. With that expectation in mind, namely, of forcing the British to cross the Thai border, the Japanese, together with the Thai Chief of Staff, could force the premier to call on the Japanese for help, in line with his earlier statement of policy. In addition, we knew the way the United States-Japanese negotiations had been heading up. We knew that on 30 November the Japanese for the first time during 1941 had opened up on the subject and progress of these negotiations to the Germans, their allies. Up to this message of 30 November, the Germans had been kept largely in the dark, including the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, in Berlin. We received that message, I believe, either the 1st or 2nd of December and distributed it the same date. I emphasize that [966] message, because in that message there was one statement which, in translation, came very close to what we had used in our write-up of the message, namely,—and I quote—“that sooner than anyone imagined Japan would be at war with the Anglo Saxons.” Subsequent to that we had the directive on the partial destruction of codes. We also had a rather urgent message around the 2nd or 3rd directing the Jap Embassy in Washington to have the Second Secretary Takahashi, as I recall his name, leave the country at once. We knew that this Second Secretary, ever since his arrival earlier in the spring, was an especially trained espionage man and he had a number of especially trained men with him. His chief concern during the summer was in setting up an espionage establishment in Latin America. The fact that he was directed to leave was a further straw in the wind. We made a point of seeing that he did not leave before the break. All these things, together with the sighting of a large movement of Japanese ships down the coast of French Indo China about Thursday, its subsequent sightings on Friday and Saturday, and its position on Saturday, December 6, approximately a day's run from Kota Bharu, added up in my mind, at least, to something more than coincidence. In other words, the directive for delivery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu. I simply pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary. I did not feel it necessary to point out such a thing to the officers of the Navy Department, since it would be quite apparent to them. From that point, there was no further traffic.

Examined by the court:

64. Q. Where did you go after you left the Secretary?

A. To my office. The remarks I made at the State Department were not to the Secretary directly—

65. Q. Are you speaking of Hull or Knox?

A. Knox. But to a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull and to whom I made similar remarks inviting attention to the importance of the material I was delivering; and it was this officer who took the folder into Mr. Knox, together with my remarks. I then returned to the Navy Department, and no further traffic on the Japanese system came in. I should amend that. No further traffic to Washington in the Japanese system came in.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

66. Q. Does the judge advocate understand that you delivered in person this document containing the information about the delivery of the Japanese note to the State Department at 1300 to the Chief of Naval Operations in person?

A. When I called at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations between approximately 10:30 and a quarter to eleven—I'm not certain of the time—a meeting was still in progress [967] there with probably fifteen officers present. I asked for Admiral Stark's aide, who came out. I told him I had something else that was highly important and handed it to him and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. What was that?

A. That included the message on the 1300 delivery.

68. Q. Who was it?

A. Admiral Stark's aide, Flag Secretary Wellburn.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

69. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if that is the message to which you refer in connection with delivering a diplomatic reply to the Secretary of State at 1300?

A. Yes, sir, that is. This particular message was translated by Army.

Examined by the court:

70. Q. Will you tell us what time it came to the Navy Department?

A. This was one which had been received by my office when I returned from the first delivery to the State Department and the White House at about 10:20, and I delivered them at about 10:30 to the conference then in Admiral Stark's office. This is the 1 p. m. message.

Examined by the judge advocate (Continued):

71. Q. Do you of your own knowledge know at what time Admiral Stark first got the information contained in document 41?

A. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

72. Q. Would you mind repeating the statement which you just made off the record as to the delivery of this message?

A. As I stated, I have no direct knowledge of whether Admiral Stark had already received that information. It is possible, however, that he had, since the message was written up and distributed by Army. Consequently, General Marshall would very likely have received it some minutes before my office did and General Marshall might very well have 'phoned Admiral Stark.

[968] 73. Q. I direct your attention to Exhibit 63 in this proceeding and particularly call your attention to the fact on some of the documents contained in that exhibit there appears a rubber stamp and on other documents that rubber stamp is absent. On some of the documents which contain the rubber stamp there is a pencil mark surrounding certain of the figures. Will you explain to the court the significance or lack of significance of the stamp on certain of those documents? I am particularly interested in knowing whether or not it represents anything with respect to the routing of those documents.

A. That stamp was made up by my office at the time we stopped making summaries of the day's book around the middle of 1941. The

first two items in the upper left-hand corner are intended to mean a single or double asterisk. In other words, a single asterisk, as I earlier used, indicated an item of interest. A double asterisk indicated items of the highest interest or immediate urgency. "One" referred to Secretary Knox, "Ten" to Admiral Stark, "Twelve" to Admiral Turner of War Plans. I normally used that stamp when we were not too pressed for time. In the fall of 1941, however, there were many occasions when the urgency of delivery was greater than taking time to stamp the half-dozen copies to indicate interest. In other words, I made a point in such cases of verbally indicating interest. As a rule, those items would be only a few in a special, single folder.

74. Q. When there is a pencilled circle around the number, I assume that means that the message was delivered to the persons indicated by the circled figures; is that correct?

A. It indicates that of course, but it does not infer that other messages were not so delivered.

75. Q. With respect to the particular message, does it mean that it was not delivered to others than those whose numbers are circled?

A. No, it does not.

76. Q. What was the purpose of circling the numbers when you did use the stamp?

A. It was a matter of special interest or otherwise to those individuals. In other words, one message might be of much interest to Secretary Knox, who was following the negotiations with Japan very closely. Another message having to do with the change of the Japanese system might be of much interest to Admiral Noyes—the technical aspects of it. Another message might be of much interest to London, not only technical but those directly affecting London. It was purely a matter of interest.

77. Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, possibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States. Would you indicate to [969] the court why you phrased your answer that way, that is, indicating that it might mean any one of those three things rather than one of those three specifically?

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese language in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by indirection and by inference.

78. Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section could not have stated categorically that this message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.

79. Q. In connection with the 14-part message, did you consider the first 13 parts of the message, which you had received up to a particular point when you made your first distribution, particularly significant with respect to the imminence of war, or were you waiting for the information that might be contained in some subsequent parts before making that evaluation?

A. The tone of the first 13 parts was so much stronger than had been the tone of earlier Japanese notes that it was quite apparent that with the delivery of this note the Japanese had in view a termination of the negotiations which had been going on through 1941. Further than that, it was purely a matter of deduction.

80. Q. Would you say that you felt in your own mind that diplomatic relations were being ruptured until you had seen the 14th part of the message?

A. Even seeing the 14th part I could not state definitely that diplomatic relations were ruptured, only that the negotiations reaching an understanding with the United States on trade and so forth were being terminated.

81. Q. In answer to a question you related certain background which you had in mind when you called the attention of the Secretary, through the Foreign Service officer, to the time of delivery of this note. To whom had this information which you have recounted here been given so far as the higher echelons in the Navy Department were concerned, or was this merely a matter of your own personal background which assisted you in the work of your section?

A. Every message I referred to in my earlier statement had been delivered to all the six addressees that I referred to previously.

82. Q. But had the detailed background which you recounted here been assembled in a formal statement and presented, for example, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director [970] of Naval Communications, or the Chief of Naval Operations, or was this matter which you had gathered from these same dispatches?

A. These were simply matters that occurred to me on the way over to the meeting at the State Department at 11:00 o'clock. However, they were all matters of which the other addressees were fully cognizant, having seen the traffic concerned earlier as they were translated and delivered.

The court then, at 11:50 a. m., took a recess until 1:30 p. m., at which time it reconvened.

[971] Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel; all the interested parties and their counsel except Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.

Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

83. Q. Will you please give a very brief statement as to the reasons for the Kopek Channel and the limitations of the type of communications that were sent in that channel?

A. That code word "Kopek" was simply a code designator for material in a crypt channel having to do with technical aspects of

this decryption. Exchange was made in that channel only between the three stations, namely, Navy Department, Washington; Pearl Harbor, and the Asiatic Station in that channel.

84. Q. To what officers were these dispatches particularly directed in the various areas?

A. The purpose of having those stations set up where they were, more specifically at Pearl and in the Asiatic Station, was to service Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, delivery to those stations in that channel involved the presumption that the officers handling that material at those stations would supplement it with any local material they may have picked up by intercept and comparable decrypting activities there and furnish it to the flag officers concerned.

85. Q. I show you Document 38 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you saw this about the 6th of December, 1941, and if so at what time. This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long dispatch would be transmitted shortly and setting forth that a definite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch.

A. I believe that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, along with the first 13 parts.

86. Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your previous testimony as being some of the "other material"?

A. Yes, sir; that is correct.

[972] (sic.) that by stating that I am not positive that this is one of them, although it very probably was. I put it that way because of the fact that the existence of 14 parts of the message would be indicated internally in each one of the 14 parts, so having received just one part we would know there were 14 parts to it because it would be so indicated in that one part, but I believe this is one of the messages received the evening before.

87. Q. Will you give as best you can recall what you told the Secretary of the Navy on the evening of 6 December 1941 at the time that you delivered the first 13 parts of the long message and the other dispatches?

A. Initially I didn't tell him anything, other than to state in my earlier 'phone call and when I appeared in his apartment that I had something that appeared very important. He spent about 15 or 20 minutes reading the material I had and then some minutes more making 'phone calls. And then for about another 10 or 15 minutes there was a rather informal conversation, the first part of which was only between the Secretary and myself, and then later on we talked about diversified things not connected with this but the general political picture in which Mr. Knox and his manager of the Chicago Daily News also joined. The conversation in that more open discussion didn't concern this technical material so much because of the security aspects and the strictness we were under regarding handling and who should know about it. The conversation of mine with Mr. Knox chiefly concerned some of the references appearing and mentioned some of the previous points that were brought up in that long 13-part message.

[Notation in margin:] H B.

88. Q. Do you recall any particular evaluation that was given by the Secretary on these dispatches in the general relations between Japan and the United States?

A. No, I don't. He did not comment particularly on what his views were on the prospects of a break. In other words, that was in line with a characteristic of Mr. Knox, particularly at the end of about a year after he had first been shown this material and had been repeatedly indoctrinated—and I use that word advisedly—by myself and Admiral Wilkinson on the security features in handling this type of material. Mr. Knox was thoroughly conversant with this material and fully backed us up on any measures the Director of Naval Intelligence wanted to take relative to the security of that material. I would say it was with that security feature in mind that he did not express himself in the presence of that business associate of his, and possibly his wife.

89. Q. When you took this same material to Admiral Wilkinson, will you state as best you can recall what reaction or comments that he made on the reading of these dispatches?

A. I couldn't put words in his mouth. Nothing stood out particularly in the course of our conversation. It was obvious, though, that things were reaching a crisis and Admiral Wilkinson expressed himself along those lines as well as myself; that is, in the course of the informal conversation there was a general agreement on the fact that things were shaping up in some sort of a crisis so far as negotiations and [973] relations with Japan were concerned. Admiral Beardall was present, of course, too, and took part in that conversation as well.

90. Q. Who were at the conference in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I was so pressed for time that morning that I'm not certain just who was there. I have a general impression that when I made the hurried delivery at 9:00 o'clock that there was about 12 or 15 officers present. Most of the heads of divisions in the Navy Department and those that attended the Admirals' conference were there. I know that Admiral Wilkinson was there, and in fact I felt a sense of relief that he was there because I was able to deliver a copy of the thing to him and let him carry the ball with Admiral Stark as far as any further explanation or references were concerned.

91. Q. Do you know about what time Admiral Stark came to his office on Sunday morning, the 7th of December, 1941?

A. No, I don't.

92. Q. To whom did you actually deliver the dispatches on the morning of 7 December 1941 at the White House; that is, who received them?

A. I'm not certain of the name but it was one of Admiral Beardall's assistants in the situation room which he had set up around for the White House. I believe—I am again not positive—it was Lieutenant Commander Leahy who was senior assistant to Admiral Beardall.

93. Q. I show you Document 36 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you have seen this dispatch before, and if so, when? This dispatch is from Tokyo to Honolulu and relates to the receiving of reports on ship movements and includes the instructions that Honolulu will report even when there are no movements.

A. Yes, sir, I received that. ,

94. Q. About what time did you see it?

A. The fact that the date 5 December is on here would indicate that I saw it that day; since it was a Navy translation it is one that I would have reviewed before it was written up.

95. I show you Document 37 of Exhibit 63, which is a copy of a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports of ships in definite areas at Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether you have seen that dispatch before, and if so, when?

A. I believe I have seen this also, and the fact that the date 5 December is on this also would indicate that I received it or first saw it about that date. It is an Army translation.

[974] 96. Q. I show you Document 40 of Exhibit 63 which is a dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo giving the location of battleships and other ships in definite areas in Pearl Harbor on the date that the dispatch was sent, and also gives the courses and distances on such courses of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor, and ask you whether or not you have seen this dispatch, and if so, when?

A. Yes, sir, I am quite certain I have seen this also. The only clue I have to the time I saw it would be the date appearing on this thing, namely, 6 December 1941. I might amplify further: This message, as well as those others you have shown me, was only some of quite a few of that category which had been appearing through the year. The Jap Consul had been reporting on our major unit moves about the training grounds in the vicinity of Pearl and any other information on our ship movements that he could get. Sometimes it was on the direction of Tokyo; sometimes on his own initiative.

97. Q. Were these other dispatches to which you have just referred gone into with such meticulous details as to the ships that were going to be in certain definite areas and a certain definite harbor at a certain definite time?

A. No, sir. This is the first one, I believe, in which specific areas in Pearl Harbor were mentioned. They had previously referred to the location of things by names of places such as Ford Island or the Fuel Dock, or things like that, rather than these specific, defined areas.

98. Q. Now, referring to your previous examination as to the interpretation of the winds message in which you have divided the possible interpretation into three general classes: strained relations, a break in diplomatic relations, or war. During the period of, say, from the 2nd or 3rd of December 1941 to the 7th of December 1941 wherein all of these dispatches indicated specific areas in which the Japanese were particularly interested, did you come to any particular deduction at that time as to which of the three meanings was really intended by the winds message?

A. The inference I gained from these was to the effect that the Japanese were concerned about locations of major U. S. Naval units. They had been similarly concerned, however, about locations, types and numbers of planes in the Philippines. They had been similarly concerned about almost all aspects of military establishments, forces and so forth in the Netherlands East Indies.

[975] Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

99. Q. You have previously made reference to an intercepted dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin in which Tokyo had informed Berlin

that there would be war with the Anglo-Saxons in the immediate future.

A. The expression I used, which was the closest we could come to a precise translation of the Japanese, was, "Sooner than anyone imagines."

100. Q. In view of the dispatch between Tokyo and Berlin as to the proximity of war with the Anglo-Saxons, did that dispatch and these other dispatches just now shown you, lead you to any deductions as to whether the wind message really meant a strained relationship or a break in diplomatic relations or war—and the execution of that dispatch would bring about one of those three classes of decisions?

A. To go back first to my interpretation of the sense of that wind message, I did not mean to infer that there was any definite implication of war. What I did mean, what I think I stated, was that it implied a severe straining of relations, which could be inferred to imply as including an actual rupture of relations, or possibly even war. To come back to your specific question now, we knew they were planning something against Britain. I have already referred to the negotiations with the Thai people. We knew, too, that the Japs were very much aware of the fact we were doing a great deal for the British in their war and working closely with them. In fact, it was almost a joint front as regards negotiations with the Japs. That note that we had handed the Japanese on 26 November had only been given to them after consultation, with Japanese knowledge, with the Dutch and Chinese as well as the British. Consequently, the inference on this particular attention to ship movements in Pearl Harbor was that the Japs were very concerned about what action we were taking, where our Fleet might be, what action we might take in case the Japs did make a move against the British. There was no slightest indication at any time of any overt intentions directed against the United States, from this material.

101. Q. But you have testified that it was the first time that there had been any inquiry made as to the exact locations of certain definite ships and certain definite areas in Pearl Harbor, have you not?

A. It was the first time they had used that particular means of identifying areas. They had been getting information and asking for information not only about Pearl but other places—the locations of our ships.

102. Q. But it was the first time, was it not, that they had asked for it in such detail as in these dispatches?

A. Yes, sir, that is true of Pearl Harbor.

[976] Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

103. Q. Referring to Exhibit 20, which is the December 3 message from OpNav to addressees, saying that certain codes were destroyed and also referring to Exhibit 66, which is from OpNav on the Kopek circuit saying approximately the same thing, I refer you to your testimony this morning and ask you if you did not say that in the OpNav message of December 3, it was an example of the evaluation of intelligence information?

A. I believe that is the expression I used.

104. Q. And in connection with that, in Exhibit 20 what portion of the message did you refer to as being an example of the evaluation; could you just repeat the words, or dictate the words?

A. I had nothing to do with the drafting of this message from OpNav. OpNav had been given the same information which I had sent in the Kopek channel, and O. N. I. in this case I happened to know Commander McCollum felt he was warranted in drafting a dispatch on the subject of this destruction of codes. I didn't see this message until some days later, as a matter of fact.

105. Q. Well, the point, Commander, sir—in Exhibit 20 what portion of the message were you referring to when you were referring to the evaluation?

A. Evaluation was perhaps not quite the right word. The more precise statement of their function in that regard would be that Intelligence sent it out as intelligence, rather than simply the technical channel of exchange.

106. Q. In the last portion of this document there are the words, which have a line drawn through them, which say, "From information infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia." Would that be the language of evaluation of that information?

A. That of course is an evaluation of the information appearing earlier in the dispatch.

Examined by the court:

107. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge that Secretary Knox himself received the so-called 1:00 p. m. message while at the State Department, or that the oral interpretation of the situation of the time of delivery—that is, 1:00 p. m.—was transmitted to him personally by the State Department official mentioned?

A. I was not present, so I am not certain of my own knowledge, but as certain as I can be otherwise, because the Secretary to Mr. Hull, who handled that, had only about ten feet to go to deliver that message to those three secretaries sitting around the table there.

108. Q. I was wondering more as to the interpretation orally given about the daylight—the situation as to 1:00 p. m.—whether the man who translated it understood what it was about.

A. I explained that to him so that he would have the [977] picture.

109. Q. But it wasn't written down at all?

A. No, sir.

110. Q. That message was transmitted by the War Department?

A. Yes, sir.

111. Q. And the War Department had the same procedure that you did—they sent copies to the Navy Department, copies to the White House, and copies to the State Department?

A. No, sir. The War Department had responsibility at that time to the State Department, Navy Department, and the White House.

112. Q. So the chances are that that message was sent by the War Department to the Secretary of State at the same time it was sent to the Navy Department?

A. That is correct. Colonel Bratton was at the State Department at 10:00 o'clock with material for Mr. Hull as well as Mr. Stimson. He was again there about 11:00 o'clock—about the same time I was there with new material.

113. Q. So that if the note got to the Secretary of the Navy when he was with the Secretary of State, he perhaps had that at the same time you got it in the Navy Department?

A. Yes, sir, all three secretaries got it about the same time.

114. Q. Commander, you have discussed these different supersecret messages flowing into the Navy Department and being delivered. Do you recall that you delivered personally any of these messages to the Chief of Operations and discussed them with him?

A. No, sir, I did not. I do know that it was delivered at about 9:00 o'clock on December 7, because I was just inside the door of Admiral Stark's office while his aide, Commander Wellborn, took the messages over to his desk.

115. Q. Did you see Admiral Stark at 9:00 o'clock in his office on the morning of December 7?

A. Admiral Stark was there with Admiral Wilkinson.

116. Q. At 9:00 o'clock that morning?

A. It was approximately 9:00 o'clock; I am not positive of that time.

117. Q. And at that time, at 9:00 o'clock, you delivered to his aide, and you are sure you say that Admiral Stark got them—the thirteen parts that you have been discussing; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

118. Q. Then at 10:20 when you came back, and you got this message of 1:00 p. m. time of delivery, you went in and delivered [978] that message—did you go and deliver that message to the Chief of Operations' office?

A. In that case I did not step inside the door, but Commander Wellborn came to the door and I handed it to him.

119. Q. Admiral Stark was there at that time?

A. I believe so, although I can't state positively he was at his desk or in there.

120. Q. In your activities in Washington as delivering these messages, did you at any time, or were you at any time present at conferences with State Department, War Department officials, and with the Chief of Naval Operations, discussing these secret and supersecret messages?

A. No, sir.

121. Q. Referring to the letter of November 26, which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese officials, were you fully cognizant of the contents of that letter?

A. Not until it was sent out in the Japanese circuit.

122. Q. When did it go out on the Japanese circuit?

A. I believe it was the 27th, sir; I am not certain.

123. Q. Did you deliver the substance of this message to the office of Chief of Naval Operations; was that in the daily reports going in to him?

A. I don't believe I ever saw the text of our message, Admiral.

124. Q. It was a plain language message as handed in English by the Secretary of State?

A. Yes, sir.

125. Q. And I asked you if you were familiar with the contents of that message.

A. By stating I knew of it on the 26th, I knew it had gone out—that the Japanese had transmitted such a message.

126. Q. And you were familiar with its contents?

A. Only in a general way, knowing the tenor of the negotiations of the previous week.

127. Q. From November 27 to December 7, did you consider, having been cognizant of these messages flowing in—did you consider that negotiations and conversations were continuing between the State Department and the Japanese representatives?

A. I knew some conversations were continuing, but we also had had a message from Tokyo in which Tokyo directed such conversations continue.

128. Q. To continue?

A. Yes, sir.

129. Q. Referring to document 7 of Exhibit 63, in which [979] Tokyo directs all arrangements for signing of agreement be completed by 25 November, are you familiar with that?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

130. Q. Was this message which you have in hand delivered to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

131. Q. Do you assume that he was cognizant of that message?

A. I assume that he was, yes, sir.

132. Q. Referring to document 11 of Exhibit 63, in which Tokyo regrets signing of agreement can't be made by 25th, are you familiar with that message?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

133. Q. Referring to document 16, from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November and translated on November 28, in which is stated that the Japanese Ambassador states that rupture of negotiations does not necessarily mean war between United States and Japan: are you familiar with that message and have you seen it before?

A. I am quite certain I have, yes, sir.

134. Q. Was that message sent to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

135. Q. You have already testified to document 17, from Washington to Tokyo, giving translation of note of 26 November, haven't you?

A. I believe that came up once before, yes, sir.

136. Q. Referring to document 18, Tokyo to Washington, translated 28 November, stating that Tokyo says the views of the Imperial Government will be sent in two or three days; are you familiar with that message?

A. I am quite certain I saw this too, yes, sir.

[980] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

137. Q. And this message was delivered to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, this would be one that was delivered, as all the negotiation messages were delivered, to the Chief of Naval Operations.

138. Q. In other words, there is no question but that all these important messages were delivered to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am certain as I can be of that, yes, sir.

139. Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some

future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?

A. Yes, sir.

140. Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply? In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer".

141. Q. Well, the execute of the message.

A. Yes, sir, not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization were very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.

142. Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?

A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.

143. Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, "Here it is."

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

144. Q. You had that information then?

A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

145. Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?

A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

146. Q. What did you do with it?

A. As I indicated before, I did not handle it from there on at all.

[981] 147. Q. Who handled it?

A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular plain language code because of his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secretary, all with the view of getting the word to those people promptly, whether it was any time of the day or night.

148. Q. When the original winds message was received, was that to your knowledge sent to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

149. Q. Were you familiar with the rapidity of means of communication between Washington and Honolulu?

A. No, sir, only in a general way from my general communication knowledge.

150. Q. While you were there suppose you had a very important message where the time element was of primary importance. Which way would you have sent it to reach Honolulu at the quickest possible time?

A. That would not have been a decision of mine, sir.

151. Q. Well, I mean in your general information; I know it wasn't your decision.

A. I knew there was the telephone.

152. Q. You were not familiar with the others?

A. No, sir.

153. Q. On the morning of December 7th when you arrived at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9:00 o'clock, as you have testified, was Admiral Wilkinson there?

A. Yes, sir.

154. Q. Did you acquaint him with everything you had up to that time?

A. Yes, sir, I gave him the folder, including the material of the previous night, and indicated that part 14 had been received and left the picture with him and did not take time to explain it to anyone else, since Admiral Wilkinson could do that.

155. Q. In explaining to the State Department official on the morning of December 7th your ideas regarding 1:00 o'clock time in Honolulu and 1:00 o'clock Asiatic, did that seem to impress the State Department official to the extent that you felt certain he would tell that to Secretary Knox?

A. I believe it did, yes, sir.

156. Q. When you arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's house on the night of December 6th, did you ask him if he had given this information with respect to the 13 points to the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone or otherwise?

A. I did not ask him, no, sir. Admiral Wilkinson, as head of Naval Intelligence, of course had the ultimate responsibility of getting it to the Chief of Naval Operations. I was a subordinate of his, and in these deliveries I was [982] acting as his subordinate, and normally always kept him apprised of who got it and attempted, as a rule, to get it to him at first. If he was not immediately available, I made distribution in any case and let him know.

157. Q. You testified that you telephoned Admiral Stark's house and found he was out?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

158. Q. When you went to Admiral Wilkinson we presume you told him that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark?

A. I told him Admiral Stark had not received it. In other words, that was a general practice, to inform each of the recipients who else had received it.

159. Q. When you informed Admiral Wilkinson that you had 'phoned Admiral Stark and found him out, did Admiral Wilkinson say he would call him?

A. No, he did not tell me, but he did make some 'phone calls.

160. Q. To whom?

A. I'm not certain.

161. Q. Reviewing your testimony of your daily routine in connection with the delivery of messages, is the court correct in understanding that each day when messages were received—and there were numerous messages—

A. Yes, sir.

162. Q. Continuing.) You took those messages to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, delivered them, and had marked or clipped those messages in their original translation as to their importance; is that correct?

A. That, in general, is correct. I did not actually use clips. In that case, only a few messages would be of importance; on some days folders were made up of the important ones.

163. Q. Were you familiar with the war warning message sent out by OpNav to the different forces on 27 November?

A. I did not hear about that until after the Roberts Committee. I am familiar, however, with a directive from OpNav to our attaches in Japan and China, as well as to the Governor in Guam, on destructing codes.

164. Q. That was sent sometime about December 3?

A. It was sent the day after we received the Japanese message on the destruction of codes. I think it was Thursday or Friday of that week preceding Pearl Harbor. I was in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted that.

165. Q. Can you recall, or could you let the court know, the name of that State Department official with whom you conferred on the morning of 7 December immediately prior to sending in your messages to Secretary Knox?

A. I can't be certain, sir. Two of the people that [983] took delivery for Mr. Hull had been especially indoctrinated by both Colonel Bratton and me over a period of time on security. One was named Stone and the other Brown. I don't recall, for the moment, the others.

166. Q. Subsequent to November 26, 1941, the date of the important note of the Secretary of State to the Japanese officials, were you and other in the Intelligence Department at the Navy Department awaiting and expecting a reply to that with interest?

A. Very much, yes, sir.

167. Q. In other words, that was the culminating point of the whole business. A note was sent to Japan, and this was going to be the answer?

A. At least my own feeling was that there would be no action taken until a reply came.

168. Q. During that interval there was expectancy as to this important answer?

A. Yes, sir. Of course, during that period of waiting these other developments took place; that dispatch to Berlin, the development in Thailand, and the destruction of codes. That was all during the period of waiting.

169. Q. The information received from Berlin and the dispatch to Berlin from Tokyo were all in your file?

A. Yes, sir.

170. Q. Those files were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. Yes, sir, all those recipients received that. I might amplify my last remark by stating the White House was so interested in that particular message—

171. Q. What particular message? The reply message?

A. No, sir, the one to Berlin. (Continuing)—that on the Naval Aide's instruction I prepared a special paraphrased version of that for Mr. Roosevelt, which he retained; otherwise, neither the State Department nor the White House were ever permitted—I say that advisedly—to retain any of these dispatches.

172. Q. These super-secret dispatches?

A. Yes.

173. Q. Do you know whether the winds message or its execution, or either of them was transmitted in substance to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I don't know, sir.

174. Q. Are you aware of any cryptic messages or their contents, other than the messages with respect to the destruction of codes and so on, being transmitted by the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, between 27 November and 7 December?

A. I am not certain. There may have been one or two others but not more than that.

[984] 175. Q. You don't know of any?

A. No, sir, I don't know of any. If I looked through everything, I might be able to refresh my memory, but I don't know now.

Re-cross examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

176. Q. I show you Document 2 of Exhibit 64 and ask you whether or not you have seen this dispatch before? This is the message of 28 November from CinCAF to OpNav, information of Com16, CinCPac, and Com14, setting forth the net intercept translation received from Singapore concerning the winds code.

A. I believe I did see this.

177. Q. Does that message contain substantially the same information concerning the winds code which you had in your unit in Washington?

A. Yes, it does.

178. Q. That message shows on its face what addressees?

A. Action, OpNav; information, Com16, CinCPac, and Com14.

179. Q. What is the date of that message?

A. 28 November.

180. Q. Would you refer to Document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the intercept that you had in your unit in Washington, and state the date that message first became available to you in intelligible form?

A. I would have to depend on the date appearing on this—28 November.

181. Q. That is the same date as the date of the dispatch from CinCAF to OpNav to which you have just referred?

A. That is true.

182. Q. When you talked to the State Department official with respect to the message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver the note at 1300 and asked him to show it to Secretary Knox, did you do more than suggest to him that 1300 in Washington was dawn at Pearl Harbor and midnight in the Far East; that is, did you discuss with him any significance in that timing, or did you just ask him to inform the Secretary that those were the facts?

A. The expressions I used were that 1:00 o'clock delivery time in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and a few hours before dawn at Kota Bharu. This State Department man was fully cognizant of the significance of that term "Kota Bharu", since he was seeing these dispatches every day. Furthermore, the information on the Jap convoy movement had been toward Kota Bharu around Indo-China, and was also definitely known among high officials in Washington.

[985] 183. Q. You did not suggest to him that 1300 Washington time was dawn at Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack at Pearl Harbor, or ask him to make that suggestion to the Secretary?

A. I did not.

184. Q. Before you went to the State Department that morning with the dispatch, turning over in your mind the background, had you had any discussion with anyone in the Navy Department, particularly in your unit, concerning the significance of this timing?

A. When that particular folder containing that message was being made up, I draw a little circle, as a navigator does, to figure out his hour angles and remarked at the time to some of the people in my office—no one in particular—that this 1:00 o'clock delivery time in Washington was just before dawn at Kota Bharu.

185. Q. You mean Kota Bharu, or Pearl Harbor?

A. Kota Bharu.

186. Q. Before dawn at Kota Bharu?

A. Before dawn at Kota Bharu. I was possibly more specific in stating that it certainly looked as though the Japs were going ahead with that planned enterprise down there.

187. Q. Did you have any thought from this material at that time that this meant a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. From this material which was normally the only source of information I had, there was not the slightest indication at any time to indicate a Japanese overt intention of attacking the United States. From that point of view, I had at various times while I was handling this material pointed out to high officials that this source of information was, of necessity, incomplete, that as far as it went it was highly valuable information, but it was not complete and therefore there might be other things going on of which we were not aware. That was repeated so frequently throughout the couple of years I was handling this material that it was almost automatically inferred. When a particular item of that kind was delivered you had to reach your own deductions and conclusions from just a possible thought fragment of the picture we had in this material. Only a percentage of this traffic was being broken, for one thing. Some days we did not have enough traffic to break a key. Some days keys in certain instances were not broken at all. That is just another item supporting the statement I made that the picture received from this source of intelligence was incomplete. It could, of course, be supplemented and oftentimes was displaced by actual courier crypts.

188. Q. Do you think the Chief of Naval Operations was cognizant of the limitations of this material?

A. I'm sure he was.

[986] 189. Q. And that he must rely on other sources for more precise information with respect to relations between Japan and the United States?

A. I'm quite certain he was.

190. Q. Did you have any discussion with Captain Safford on the morning of 7 December before you went to the State Department?

A. I don't recall any. I was pressed for time that morning making deliveries.

191. Q. How long were you in that section after 7 December 1941?

A. Until June, 1943.

192. Q. Did you ever hear Captain Safford express himself—and this answer I should like to have you divide between 7 December and subsequent to 7 December—as to whether the message concerning the delivery of the note definitely indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor at approximately dawn of December 7th?

A. I can almost positively state that no such statement was made to me or in my presence.

193. Q. Do you feel that if Captain Safford had such thoughts on this important matter you would have heard about them? In other words, were your relations with Captain Safford close enough that you might reasonably expect to receive such an expression from him?

A. I would say yes.

194. Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is", did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?

A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply meant that finally a message in this plain language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

195. Q. To your mind that was of no more significance than "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?

A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

[987] 196. Q. To your mind it did not necessarily mean war?

A. Not necessarily at all.

197. Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either the "Winds" code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the message of execution?

A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the literal translation of these terms.

198. Q. Your section had no difficulty in making the translation?

A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language.

Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy. Pages 994-1008, inclusive.

[994] 22. Q. Were you a regular distributee of information received by way of communication intercepts?

A. Yes. I saw all such dispatches.

23. Q. I show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch of 27 November 1941. I ask you to examine it and state to the court what connection, if any, you had in the preparation of this dispatch?

A. I prepared that dispatch after discussion of the situation with the Chief of Naval Operations and after we had received certain secret information connected with the activities of special Ambassador Kurusu.

24. Q. Will you state what you meant by the first sentence, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

A. I meant just exactly what is said, it is to be considered a warning of approaching war.

25. Q. I show you Document 11 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to examine it.

A. Yes, I am familiar with that.

26. Q. Did you see this document on or about 22 November 1941, the date of its translation?

A. I saw it immediately after it was translated.

27. Q. This document contains the words, referring to the date November 29, "The deadline absolutely cannot be changed." What significance did these words have to you at that time?

A. That the Japanese were going to attack the United States or Great Britain, or both, on or about that date.

28. Q. There are also the words, "After that things are automatically going to happen". What significance did these words have to you at that time?

A. That movements of forces at this time were already under way and they could not be changed. The forces would not be recalled. We knew that they were already under way at that time. We knew that from sightings and from dispatches from China, that very considerable troop convoys were moving south. I think by then some had already moved into Indo-China. We knew that there had been a great activity in radio traffic over a period of two or three weeks and then suddenly at a date prior to this, the thing had ceased. It had been naval traffic and therefore we deduced that the Japanese Fleet had gone to sea. I don't recall the date of that.

29. Q. Can you recall seeing any intercept traffic between Berlin and Tokyo in which the Japanese government was alleged to have said, in effect, that there was going to be war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons sooner than any one thinks?

A. That strikes a familiar chord but I can't specifically recall any such dispatch.

[995] 30. Q. I show you Document 17 of Exhibit 63. It contains the Secretary of State's note to Japan of 26 November 1941.

A. I remember that dispatch.

31. Q. Did this dispatch come to your attention on or about the date of its translation, which is set out in the lower right-hand corner as about 28 November 1941?

A. Yes, immediately.

32. Q. Did you know the substance of this note from any source other than this intercept, if you will remember?

A. As I recall it, Captain Schurmann, who then was head of the Central Division and was liaison officer with the State Department, brought this note over to the Navy Department from Mr. Hull to get Admiral Stark's advice on it. Now, there were several pages but I'm not too clear in my memory on the thing, but that is the way I remember it.

33. Q. Did you discuss the substance of this note of November 26, 1941 with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I did.

34. Q. Do you recall if he expressed any views as to its significance at that time, what it meant?

A. Well, he expressed the view that there wasn't any possibility that Japan would accept it.

35. Q. Adverting again to Exhibit 17, which was that war warning dispatch: This dispatch contains the conclusion, "Negotiations with Japan have ceased". Upon what information was this conclusion based?

A. Mr. Hull told Admiral Stark over the inter-office 'phone, as I recall it—it might have been personally—that to all intents and purposes the thing was all over as far as negotiations were concerned, and I believe he said that he was not going to close them; he was going to keep them open, but for all useful purposes, why the thing was finished.

36. Q. And it is your recollection that Admiral Stark was in on this discussion?

A. Yes; I know he was. Mr. Hull kept Admiral Stark informed at all times. I don't know that he informed him of everything he knew but he kept him very well informed. Their relations were very close and cordial.

37. Q. At the time of drafting this war warning message of 27 November, what was your personal estimate of the Japanese intentions regarding a surprise attack in the Hawaiian area, if you had any?

A. I expected it. I expected they would make some sort of an attack on Hawaii.

38. Q. Was this estimate or expectation communicated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. It was communicated to him here. There is another dispatch dated two or three days before, November 24th I think, which warned against the matter and to take precautions. The Department—and the same applied to the War Department [996] was averse in being too specific as to what they believed might happen for the reason—wisely, I believe—that that might lead the Commanders-in-Chief not to guard other matters under their cognizance, and there were various proposals made in writing this dispatch and in the other as to how to be more specific about it, and it was decided that the Commanders-in-Chief had received full information as to what was in the minds of the Department, and therefore it was their duty to cover their entire field of responsibility.

39. Q. I show you Exhibit 15 which is the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 24 November, 1941, and ask you to examine it. Is that the dispatch about which you have just testified?

A. That is the dispatch I referred to. That dispatch, also, was discussed in the Joint Board. The Joint Board was holding almost daily meetings, as I recall it. Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred daily about the situation. The War Plans Divisions were in constant contact. I prepared that dispatch and it was changed in one or two particulars by Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark, and then was referred to General Marshall, and the War Department made a few changes in it, mainly along the line that I have mentioned, of keeping the thing from being too specific. By this time, why, I was personally convinced that they were going to go into Siam and also into the Malay Peninsula as the initial move and also attack the Philippines; that is, the major strategic moves. Whether that would be simul-

taneous, or not, or follow slightly after, I didn't know and didn't particularly care.

40. Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states, "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." This language is omitted from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally?

A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "An amphibious expedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover the same kind of a subject, and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of amphibious forces but the movement of any forces.

41. Q. In the war warning dispatch of 27 November, there is the the directive, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment". What action was desired of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in complying with this directive?

A. To send scouting forces out of different kinds, to [997] deploy submarines in threatened directions, to put the Fleet to sea and in a covering position for the Hawaiian Islands and a supporting position for Midway.

42. Q. Were these expectations that you have just discussed contained in War Plans or in any other directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. Not in the detail that I have indicated, because the practice of the Navy Department was then and is now to give to the Commander-in-Chief a broad task, to provide him with sufficient forces or such forces and equipment and material as is available, and then to let the Commander-in-Chief do the work. Admiral Stark, in particular, was insistent that we not tell the Commander-in-Chief how to do his job.

43. Q. It is the judge advocate's understanding, then, that with the information and directives contained in the dispatch of 27 November 1941, the Navy Department from there on expected the Commander-in-Chief to take appropriate action in view of the war warning expressed without further orders?

A. That is correct.

44. Q. At any time before 7 December 1941, did you believe an air torpedo attack on ships moored in Pearl Harbor was technically possible of accomplishment?

A. Yes. I always believed it was possible. There had been correspondence, there had been tests made by the Bureau of Ordnance and correspondence initiated by the Bureau of Ordnance and passed on by the Navy Department twch, I think it was in the latter part of 1944 or the first part of 1941, indicated that in their opinion you had to have a 90-foot depth of water before you could make torpedos

successfully run. Well, that was quite true with American torpedoes, but I personally never saw any reason at all why torpedoes couldn't run in 10 feet of water, or maybe, say, 20 feet of water, dropped from airplanes. Now, the Bureau of Ordnance at a subsequent time conducted additional tests, and as I recall it, in June of 1941, a letter went out from the Department stating that they had now changed their mind on that and I think they said that torpedoes could successfully run in 60 feet of water, something on that order.

45. Q. I show you Document 15 of Exhibit 63 and ask you to examine it?

A. Yes, I have seen that.

[998] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

46. Q. This document has been familiarly termed by witnesses before this court as the "Winds" code. Did you discuss this document with the Chief of Naval Operations at or about the time of its translation, as indicated on the document?

A. Yes, very briefly. I think the Chief of Naval Operations mentioned it. I think there was an instruction given to watch for those words.

47. Q. To your knowledge, were any of these code words in English or Japanese ever received in the Navy Department prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to my knowledge.

48. Q. There is evidence before this court that a Commander McCollum in the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship over a period some time preceding the 3rd or 4th of December, 1941, which was for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a dispatch?

A. Yes, we had discussed the advisability of making such a summary, and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the various points and the details of the relationships and their intentions and so on. We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum—I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement—prepared a dispatch—I have forgotten its terms—and brought it to me to check over, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made suggestions of a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I don't remember just what was in the dispatch.

49. Q. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?

A. I don't know. We don't know at this time.

50. Q. To your knowledge, did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I don't know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness on the secret portion of the testimony.

[999] Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.):

51. Q. Admiral, with regard to these intercepted dispatches, were you aware on the night of December 6 of any particular Japanese dispatches which were received in the Department and distributed? I refer particularly to a dispatch the 13 parts of which were received on Saturday afternoon and were ready for distribution at 9 o'clock.

A. That night?

52. Q. That night, and at the same time there was another dispatch which directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver this long dispatch, the first 13 parts of which I have just referred to, together with the rest of the dispatch, at an hour to be designated by a later dispatch. Do you remember having information on Saturday night of the coming in of that long dispatch and the fact that it was to be delivered at a date to be designated later?

A. I don't recall at the moment. I don't recall such a long dispatch.

53. Q. I show you document 39 of Exhibit 63, which is the long dispatch and is the reply of the Japanese to the American note of November 26.

A. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of December. I don't remember when I saw it.

54. Q. I show you document 38 of Exhibit 63, which is a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, in which instructions are given that the time of presenting the memorandum which I have just shown you, Exhibit 39, will be designated later in a separate dispatch. I ask you whether or not you saw that message and if so, at what time, to the best of your recollection?

A. I don't remember when I saw that. • I saw it.

55. Q. Will you please state when you came down to the Navy Department on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. About 10:30 or 11 o'clock the Chief of Naval Operations called me up and said he had a matter concerning something which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet had written and wanted me to come down and see him about it.

56. Q. Were you in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations on that morning at about the time stated, 10 o'clock, and if so, what other officers were present at that conference?

A. I went into the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the exact time I don't recall. He showed me a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and told me to prepare a reply. In addition to that, he showed me a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the ambassador to present [1000] the 14-part note to the Secretary of State on that date, that is, on the 7th. I asked him what, if anything, had been done about warning the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet about this dispatch, and he said he had already talked the matter over with General Marshall and that General Marshall had sent a dispatch out immediately to the Army authorities in Hawaii as soon as he had seen this dispatch, inviting their attention to this matter. I don't recall the terms of the dispatch that he sent. I did not get there in time, anyway. Admiral Stark said that he believed

that the Commander-in-Chief already had the decrypted dispatch in his possession, because they were actually doing more of the decrypting in Pearl Harbor than we were in Washington.

Examined by the court:

57. Q. To which decrypted dispatch are you referring?

A. The decrypted dispatch about the time of presenting the long dispatch, and we felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was himself in possession of both those decrypted dispatches, because we got them from him—not decrypted. We decrypted these diplomatic dispatches in Washington, and my understanding of it is that in Pearl Harbor they decrypted the diplomatic dispatches and also the naval dispatches and made traffic analysis.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Ret.) (Continued):

58. Q. Do you recall the particular hour at which the 14-part message was to be delivered to the Secretary of State?

A. I think it was to be delivered about 10:30 in the morning, but the Secretary of State told Admiral Stark over the 'phone that he had not been able to give the Japanese Ambassador an appointment at that time, and he had set it, I believe, for 2:30 in the afternoon Washington time.

59. Q. I show you document 41 of Exhibit 63, which may refresh your memory somewhat as to the time of delivery of these dispatches.

A. I can state from my own memory it was at 1 o'clock, but I believe the appointment actually was made for 2:30.

60. Q. Did the instructions for delivery of that dispatch at 1 o'clock p. m. Washington time have any particular significance to you at the time you learned it was to be delivered at that hour?

A. Yes, I thought the attack was going to come that day or the next. If I can amend it, I would say I thought the Japanese would make their attack on the British or the United States or both on that day or the day following.

[1001] Q. 61. Were you familiar while in Washington on your tour of duty in December, 1941, of the long distance telephones that were available for talking directly to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

62. Q. Had you used that telephone on any occasion to speak to persons at Pearl Harbor before?

A. I never had. I think the Chief of Naval Operations had, but we had all been warned by the Director of Naval Communications that in his opinion we could not depend on the security of that telephone. Therefore, it was not used by the Navy Department a great deal for secret matters. The War Department used it a great deal then and later, but the scrambler was not supposed to be secure. The one in use at that time was not supposed to be secure.

63. Q. You have testified as to the preparation of a reply to a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, the preparation of which was assigned you by Admiral Stark on 7 December 1941. Did that relate to answering the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, for information as to what assurances had been given Britain as to any armed support under conditions of several eventualities?

A. No, it related primarily to the question of whether the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, would remain in Manila at the out-

break of war with Japan, that is, whether he, with most of his Fleet, would remain in the Manila area at the outbreak of war with Japan or would send the Fleet to the southward initially and later proceed there himself.

64. Q. Did you have any information prior to 7 December 1941 as to a movement of Japanese carriers to the eastward from Japan?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

65. Q. Admiral, I may have misunderstood you, but this has to do with a remark I believe you made about the decrypting of dispatches at Pearl Harbor. My understanding is that all that was ever dealt with in the form of decrypted information at Pearl Harbor had to do with the location of ships and ship movements; am I not correct in that?

A. I don't know. On several occasions I inquired from the Director of Naval Communications as to whether or not in the case of a particular dispatch the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was getting that dispatch or whether we should not send him a dispatch and quote it. On every occasion I was assured that the Commander-in-Chief was getting as much as we were, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, he was getting it sooner than we were.

[1002] 66. Q. That came to you through a second party?

A. That came to me from the Director of Naval Communications. I don't know what the system was.

Examined by the court:

67. Q. In the further amplification of your reply concerning the significance of 1 p. m. time for delivery of the dispatch, you stated that you expected an attack by the Japanese against the United States or Great Britain, or both, on that day, December 7, or the next day. Would you say where you expected that attack to be delivered?

A. Yes, I expected a landing on certainly the Kra Peninsula, a landing in Siam and attacks of one nature or another, air probably, on the Philippines, because we had scouting planes out there, and some form of attack in Hawaii.

68. Q. But I do not gather, then, that there was anything specific in your mind concerning an attack against Pearl Harbor on that day or the next? No indication?

A. Nothing further than that the attack made by the Japanese in the East would be accompanied by one or more of the five forms of attack on our forces in Hawaii, which had been mentioned in the previous correspondence.

69. Q. Did you have knowledge of the dispositions of the Japanese Fleet to the extent that you were able to say whether you considered an attack at a distance across the whole Pacific Ocean to be within the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet, considering the other movements they had under way?

A. We did not know where the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was. Our deductions from what we had seen—not from decrypts but from what we had actually seen—were that there was to be a covering force generally in the Marshalls-Caroline area and that the so-called China Fleet, the Third Fleet, with additions of some sort, would carry on the naval missions in the China Sea.

70. Q. Were you familiar with the bulletin which the Director of Naval Intelligence issued as of December 1, 1941, which is quoted in the Roberts Report and of which this court has judicial notice, concerning the Japanese naval situation?

A. I have forgotten the terms of that dispatch.

71. Q. I refer you particularly to the last sentence (indicating).

A. I remember that and believe that I saw that before it was put out and concurred.

72. Q. Is it not a fact, then, that the information available to the United States concerning the location of the Japanese Fleet was extremely vague?

A. I can't answer that categorically. "Vague" is a relative term. We had a great deal of information about the movements and operations of the Japanese. We never had enough, and we never do have enough.

[1003] 73. Q. Well, inexact and incomplete?

A. I will answer that it was incomplete.

74. Q. Admiral, speaking of these decrypted messages being at hand in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, do we understand that all these messages which had been decrypted and which are before this board, that you had the impression that all the information contained therein was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I had been informed that was the case by the Director of Naval Communications on several occasions.

75. Q. Was that the reason you did not inform the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet as to the contents of these messages?

A. Yes, sir.

76. Q. Was there any check made to see that the Commander-in-Chief had the same information in these decrypted messages he ought to have had?

A. I made none, except I brought the matter up with the Director of Naval Communications on several occasions. The first time was probably March or April.

77. Q. Who was the Director of Naval Communications at that time?

A. Admiral Noyes.

78. Q. The court is speaking of messages which have been reviewed here as super-secret messages and which you stated in your understanding were all decrypted in Honolulu.

A. That was my impression at that time. Now, I have been informed since then that the diplomatic messages were decrypted in Washington. Whether they were sent out to the Commander-in-Chief or not and whether he decrypted them, I don't know of my own knowledge. I understood he also decrypted them out there.

79. Q. That understanding came from Admiral Noyes?

A. Yes, sir.

80. Q. I refer you to document 40, document 37, document 36, and document 24 and ask if you at any time were cognizant of the contents of these documents?

A. I saw document 24. I don't remember document 37. I don't remember document 36.

81. Q. Did you have any information of them?

A. I would like to make a general answer to that question. I don't specifically remember any of these except 24, for the reason that we were getting these reports and had been getting them for months, and I would occasionally glance at them to see the nature of the information which was being sent by the secret agents, but I did not read all of them unless there was some particular thing that was necessary for me to see. [1004] Lieutenant Mott of the Office of Naval Intelligence would bring these dispatches around. There would be a great many dispatches, and he would mark the important ones. I would glance through and look at all the others and see if there was something I wanted to see, but to those movement reports, which had been going on for months, I paid no particular attention.

82. Q. We are well aware of the movement reports, but what we had in mind specifically was the dispatch which requested information from Honolulu as to the exact berthing of different ships in the harbor, which, according to testimony brought out heretofore, was a rather unusual dispatch.

A. No. 37 says, "Please report as to the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Pearl Harbor, Mamola Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto." It wants to know the vessels in Area "N" but not their exact anchorage.

83. Q. There is another dispatch requesting the exact berthing.

A. I don't recall seeing such a dispatch. Number 40—Area "A". A battleship, Oklahoma class, entered and one tanker left port, and then Area "C", but there is no exact anchorage. Area "A" and "C" I know nothing about.

84. Q. Admiral, in this proposed dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific about December 4, giving a summary of information which you stated you discussed with Commander McCollum and that you initialed, did you feel, in going over that dispatch, that this information would be valuable to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific for his information regarding the status as of that date?

A. My memory is quite vague on that subject. I remember at some time in that period discussing with Commander McCollum and reading a dispatch on that subject. I believe I initialed it and returned it to him and expected the Director of Naval Intelligence to send it, but I'm not too sure of it.

85. Q. Your initials would indicate that you concurred in sending it?

A. Yes, sir.

86. Q. Referring to this so-called "Winds" message, are we correct in understanding that you had no knowledge of any execute of that message designating the objective of Japan?

A. I will correct my previous answer on that. Admiral Noyes called me up on the telephone. What day or time of day I don't recall. I think it was on December 6. He said something like this: "The Winds message came in," or something of that sort.

87. Q. Did he report to you what the "Winds" message meant and what it was interpreted as?

A. Yes.

[1005] 88. Q. Was the Chief of Naval Operations aware of that, either from information from you or otherwise?

A. Not from me. I believe Admiral Noyes informed him.

89. Q. Was any discussion had as to the importance of sending that reply to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Not so far as I know. I did not participate in any such discussion. I assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had that.

90. Q. With reference to all of these super-secret decrypted message, was it your understanding, as War Plans officer, that the Chief of Naval Operations was fully conversant with all of them and their contents, and did you discuss some of them or all of them?

A. Frequently we discussed them. I believe he had a special folder with one set of them that was given to him. Then there was another folder that was carried around by Lieutenant Mott and shown to certain other officers in the Department.

91. Q. Did you discuss with the Chief of Naval Operations at any time the importance of transmitting the contents of some of these messages to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, sir. I discussed it on several occasions with the Director of Naval Communications and was assured that he had them.

92. Q. And you were assured that the Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages and had full information?

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

93. Q. Admiral, referring again to document 15 of Exhibit 63, which is the message which set up the so-called Winds code, do you recall whether or not you had any feeling that the execute of the Winds code meant that war would necessarily follow between the United States and Japan or whether the execute of the Winds message merely meant a break in diplomatic relations or a strain in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan?

A. My impression was that it was at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war.

Reexamined by the court:

94. Q. When you heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an execute of the message had been received, did you consider that it was of such high significance that action should be taken immediately to transmit that information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. No, I assumed that he had it. On Friday there was a discussion between Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and me on the general situation—

[1006] 95. Q. Friday, December 5?

A. Yes, sir. There was a discussion among the three of us, and we all felt all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

96. Q. In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execution signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding that it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

A. Yes.

97. Q. Was it at any time before the 7th of December that you received information that the Commander-in-Chief was not receiving this decrypted, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, or was it after December 7, 1941, that you received that information?

A. I have never received such information. I have never been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was not decrypting the diplomatic dispatches.

Reexamined by the court:

98. Q. In your statement with respect to your conference with Admirals Stark and Ingersoll on 5 December you said that you felt that you had all agreed that the Commander-in-Chief had sufficient information; is that correct?

A. And directives.

99. Q. And directives?

A. Yes, sir.

100. Q. Principally, do we understand by that that the war message of November 27 was one of them to which you had reference with respect to directives and instructions?

A. That is one of them. There were quite a number of additional messages that went out about that time and for several days thereafter concerning the destruction of codes at the outlying islands and in China and so on, and then there was, I think, another message of about December 4. It seems to me there was a message of December 4 that may have been with respect to the destruction of codes. We sent some to the islands and some to the Commander-Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet information on all of them, except one or two that primarily concerned the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic.

[1007] 101. Q. But these messages you referred to were destruction of code messages, were they not?

A. Most of the messages I referred to were orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations for the destruction of our own codes. However, there were two other dispatches, Exhibit 66 and Exhibit 20, which informed the Commander-in-Chief that approximately December 1 these officials in London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Batavia, and Washington, have been ordered to destroy their code machines and codes.

102. Q. Admiral, in reply to your former question, where you stated in that and in this conference when you stated that you felt that you three officers—Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and yourself—felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had full information, did the fact that you felt that he had decrypted all of these super-secret messages have an effect upon your approval of that decision?

A. It wasn't so much that we were concerned about the information that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet had. We were concerned as to the instructions he had received for carrying on the war when attacked, and for taking on necessary precautionary measures. We felt that he had been kept informed continuously by the Department as to the major changes in the situation, and that we believed that he had as complete a picture of the situation as we had in Washington. It was always Admiral Stark's endeavor to keep them completely up to date in regard to the situation.

103. Q. But what we are trying to bring out is this: You had certain information in Washington, super secret messages which we have referred to in this testimony. Those messages gave certain information which would or would not have been valuable to the Commander-

in-Chief. In your testimony you stated that you assumed that the Commander-in-Chief had decrypted these messages. Now we tried to ask you the question: that your assuming that he had decrypted these messages had a weight in your feeling that he had full information on the subject?

A. Probably it did, Admiral. I don't recall thinking of that particular point. Probably it did.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

104. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 22, and ask you if that is one of the messages from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet regarding the destruction of codes, to which you referred in your testimony?

A. That is one of them.

105. Q. Do you find anything in that dispatch which directs the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet or any other person to destroy codes?

A. No, there is nothing in that dispatch. My recollection is that there were one or more dispatches to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, concerning some of the [1008] islands—Wake, for example—which directed it. My recollection is that.

106. Q. I draw attention to this exhibit, that the origin number of that dispatch is 061743. What time was that dispatch originated, in Washington time?

A. I don't know. I had nothing to do with preparing that dispatch.

107. Q. Would it refresh your memory any to state that at the time of the origin of that dispatch those numbers referred to Greenwich civil time?

A. I saw the dispatch before it went. I had nothing to do with its preparation nor its sending.

108. Q. I will ask you if you can identify in this dispatch whether or not this dispatch was not sent in the lowest classification of sending dispatches, namely, deferred?

A. I don't know what precedence it was given. I had nothing to do with sending the dispatch.

109. Q. I invite your attention to the fact that on the blanks where "priority," "routine," or "deferred" may be indicated, that there are no X's or checks opposite either priority or routine.

A. What is the question, please?

110. Q. And then from that information, Admiral, you are still unable to state whether or not that dispatch was indicated as to be transmitted as a deferred dispatch?

A. I don't know the precedence it has. It has no marking. I had nothing to do with the preparation or sending of this dispatch.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret):

111. Q. Admiral, you mentioned that you recalled a communication, a dispatch, being sent to the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in respect to the destruction of codes at Wake. I show you Exhibit 21 and ask you if that is the dispatch you had in mind.

A. No, this was with regard to Guam, and it is addressed to NavSta, Guam. My recollection is that a dispatch went to the Commander of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier concerning the destruction of codes on Wake.

112. Q. So such a dispatch as you recall might not have actually been sent? You wouldn't know, first-hand?

A. The answer is, my recollection is that such a message was sent.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy. Pages 1026-1051, inclusive.

[1026] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Leigh Noyes, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Senior Member, Board of Inspection and Survey, Pacific Coast section.

2. Q. What duties were you performing between the dates of 15 October 1941 and December 7, 1941?

A. Director Naval Communications.

3. Q. Will you state in general the organization of your office as of that time as it relates to the function of checking and distributing intelligence information—the organization in general?

A. The handling of communication intelligence was a joint affair between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence, which of course are both divisions of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In general, the Director of Naval Communications was responsible for the mechanics of crypto-analysis, including interception which could be done by naval means, which amounts to intercepting radio transmissions. Crypto-analysis was carried on by the Director of Naval Communications with assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and when such intelligence as developed was turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence to handle according to their usual procedure. Not the usual procedure, because this particular form of intelligence was considered most secret—a much higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary designation, "Secret", due to the fact that it is useless if any inkling reaches the enemy of the fact that we are able in any way to read his communications.

4. Q. Did all intelligence information that was checked in your division pass through your hands before it went to other offices or echelons of command?

A. You mean my personal hands?

5. A. Yes.

A. No, my office was organized like any other office during the emergency. It worked twenty-four hours a day. At various times I had some other duty; someone else was acting head of the division. I was on two or three selection boards. Those were the main times I was away from the office.

6. Q. In the event of your absence from the office, what system was there to release information to other officers or higher authority?

A. In this particular respect you are speaking of communication intelligence?

[1027] 7. Q. Exactly nothing else, sir.

A. Under normal conditions, the Director of Naval Intelligence and I worked together. If one of us wasn't immediately available, the other one acted for him to see that action was taken; and if there was anything that was really hot, you might say, when either one of us was temporarily away, the next acting officer took over, and we had a 24-hour watch, both of us, which handled these matters continuously.

8. Q. Well, in the event that important information came into your office outside of the working hours of the Navy Department, when neither you nor the Director of Naval Intelligence would be in the office, what arrangements were made for the distribution of this information to other officers or higher authority?

A. There was a 24-hour watch of officers in my own especial watch, aside from the ordinary communications watch. Anything that came up that was considered important, during the night, the officer would call me and come up in an automobile to my house and bring me whatever the paper was, and if I considered it important enough I'd go with him to Admiral Stark's quarters or to Anderson or whoever it happened to be. In other words, we covered twenty-four hours a day according to the circumstances. It didn't often happen that things turned out that required that quick action, but that did develop several times.

9. Q. Adverting to this intelligence information that arrived in your office, did you filter out any information before it passed to higher authority, or did you pass along everything that came to your hands of that nature?

A. The material we had to work with, of course, consisted of thousands of messages, and the general trouble was to get action quickly enough to be of value, not to always be working from the bottom of the pile. The usual procedure, in the case of matter that was obviously inconsequential, was to lay it aside, and we never were able to keep up; we always had something to work on, because we could always work back into past history. It was all available to the representatives of the various offices concerned.

10. Q. Exactly what I am trying to get at, Admiral—who did this weeding-out process, of deciding what information was to be sent other officers or higher authority and what was to be kept on file in your office for future reference if that were required?

A. Well, the translators; only a few people read Japanese. The people who read Japanese, when they got as far as to see a thing was obviously something about an allotment for typewriters or something like that, they didn't go any further. It was impossible to cover everything, and when they saw a thing that seemed not to be worth while, they went ahead until they found something that seemed to be of value.

[1028] 11. Q. Having covered the field of when a message was not translated—in the event that a message was completely translated and made available, in the case of this type of message, did you or any other officer in the chain of command weed out any information from there on before it was passed on to other officers or higher authority?

A. No.

12. Q. Now this information that was finally collected and on which a decision was made to pass it on to other officers or higher authority, did you or anyone else that you know of evaluate this information before it went to an officer—say the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. No, the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a mentioned, was responsible for the finished information. It was turned over to him. I was responsible for the mechanics of obtaining it, and after that it was turned over to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who handled it personally, and we only had one book—one copy in a book—and he took that book to the people that he was directed to show it to.

13. Q. As the judge advocate understands the situation from Commander Kramer, who testified before this court in Pearl Harbor, the system was to take all messages that had been translated in the Communications Intercept Division directly to the distributees in the Navy Department and in the government circles without evaluation or without changing the messages in any way except that sometimes he put a note or a clip on important messages. As I understand your testimony now, it was to the effect that sometimes the Director of Naval Intelligence exercised the function of evaluating this information; is that understanding correct?

A. No, I didn't intend to say that. You asked me to say that the Director of Naval Intelligence did, and I wasn't in a position to say exactly what he did. The system was for him to take the book. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was his representative in my office, and he may have carried the book for him some times when he wasn't available—something like that, but generally, the Director of Naval Intelligence handled the matter very much himself.

14. Q. Well, do you know of your own knowledge, from having contact with that officer and with other officers in the Navy Department, whether it was the custom of the Director of Naval Intelligence to evaluate this information before he passed it along? Do you know that of your own knowledge?

A. It is my understanding that he did not, because as I understand it, it was taken immediately. As soon as possible after 8:30 in the morning I used to go over whatever was available, and we made it a matter of minutes to get it through the machinery.

15. Q. In other words, do I understand correctly, that documents were taken directly from the translators, or through [1209] you, to the distributees without delaying or evaluating the information and changing its form?

A. In general, we didn't have distributees. There was a copy in the book, and the book was carried around to the various people who were supposed to see the book.

16. Q. Commander Kramer told this court in Pearl Harbor there were seven copies made for the Navy Department and seven copies for the Army—that these copies were delivered to regularly designated distributees in the Navy Department, and delivered at their offices as a complete copy; is that your understanding of the method of distribution?

A. I think he is talking about a later date myself. I think probably it did develop into that as the war went along. The original plan was to have only one copy. It is true we had to exchange with the Army, because we worked together. We pooled our combined intercept resources, and each took a part of the material, and we exchanged copies.

17. Q. Well, is it your testimony, then, that prior to 7 December 1941, as you remember it, only one booklet or copy was made of decrypted traffic for persons in the government circles that the Navy was responsible for keeping informed?

A. Well, I wouldn't like to contradict Lieutenant Commander Kramer, because he was the one that did the work, and he probably has got a better memory than I have of that subject. I did not mean to convey the impression that only one copy was made. There were file copies, there were copies for the Army, but originally, a book was

made up with one copy to be shown to people outside the people technically concerned with obtaining the information.

18. Q. Would it be your answer, then, that distributees like Admiral Stark, the Secretary of State, and the President, and the Secretary of the Navy, would all see the same copy; is that the meaning you intend to convey by your answer?

A. No, I have to add the President and the Secretary of State; that is part of the seven. I thought you were talking about the Navy Department. I didn't realize you meant the other people concerned.

19. Q. Well, can you recall whether or not the distributing system required that a copy be left with the Chief of Naval Operations for his sole and independent use?

A. He didn't; that is not my memory. I thought the book was taken to him at that time.

20. Q. But you do not know whether he was left a copy?

A. No.

21. Q. I want to show you Exhibit 17, which is the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November 1941, and has been [1030] popularly called by witnesses before this court the "war warning dispatch." Were you acquainted with the contents of this dispatch on or before 7 December 1941?

A. These are my initials on this draft; those are my initials.

22. Q. Were you present at any conference or discussion regarding this dispatch prior to its having been released?

A. As I remember it, Admiral Turner showed me the dispatch before he took it in for release. These are his initials. (Indicating.) These are mine. (Indicating.) It was prepared by Op12, which was War Plans.

23. Q. Do you know what was intended to be conveyed by the first sentence of this dispatch—"This is a war warning?"

A. I understood it to mean that there was a warning to the addressees that war with Japan was imminent.

24. Q. This dispatch also contains another statement: "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased." Do you know what information this sentence was based on?

A. I do not.

25. Q. Well, had negotiations as of 27 November 1941 ceased in fact?

A. I don't remember at this time on what information it was based; it wasn't based on any information that came through me. Whatever the statement was, I assumed at the time it was correct. I hadn't any doubt it was correct. I will be glad to express an opinion. It is purely my recollection—a general recollection; it may not be correct. I think that at that time Nomura and Kurusu stated that they were through. The United States hadn't accepted what they had proposed, and negotiations were supposed to be over. Afterwards, they were reopened, like all diplomatic situations; it was a case of bluff at the time—a diplomatic bluff in regard to the ceasing of negotiations, but that is purely my memory, and that wasn't anything that I had any official knowledge of.

26. Q. Whose duty was it in the Navy Department between 1 October and 7 December 1941 to see that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was supplied with all available intelligence?

A. Well, I should say it was the joint responsibility of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations and—intelligence is a pretty broad subject. It came from a good many sources; this particular thing must have come from the State Department in Washington. Primarily, the Director of Naval Intelligence is concerned with the dissemination of intelligence, but he is a subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations.

27. Q. Admiral, I will be a little more specific; as re- [1031]
gards the intercepted, decrypted intelligence traffic that was received in your office, who was responsible for seeing that the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet was kept informed of information of an important character contained in this category?

A. As I mentioned previously, it came under the specific cognizance of the Director of Naval Intelligence, as a subordinate of the Chief of Naval Operations. We all worked together on this particular matter.

28. Q. I show you Exhibit 21. This is a Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of December 4, 1941, directing the Naval Station, Guam, to destroy all secret and confidential publications. Will you state the reasons that this dispatch was sent, if you know them?

A. This was one of a series of dispatches sent, directing the destruction of all secret publications in the Pacific that could be spared in view of the imminence of war. I prepared it. It was sent on the 4th of December. This is my handwriting (indicating); and I prepared this dispatch, which is one of some others.

29. Q. Imminence of war with what country, Admiral?

A. Japan.

30. Q. Could you set out in brief the information you had as of the time you prepared this dispatch that lead you to believe that a war with Japan was then imminent?

A. Well, I would say that there never was any question in my mind following the dispatch of the 27th of November, that the possibilities of war with Japan were strong.

31. Q. Did you base your dispatch then, directing the destruction of codes and ciphers in Guam, solely on the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 November?

A. No, Admiral Turner and I discussed it, and we decided that the time had come when everything that could be spared had better be destroyed, because we didn't want to have our communications ruined by sudden attack.

32. Q. The judge advocate is trying to get a record of what your concept was of the imminence of war at that time—in other words, what facts, or upon what facts, did you base your opinion that this dispatch was necessary—the one of December 4, 1941?

A. The seriousness of the situation in the Pacific. I couldn't give you the exact items as they came up between the 27th and the 4th. Things had gotten progressively worse; this dispatch directed all possible confidential publications except those essential for current purposes and special intelligence be destroyed. You will notice the original dispatch as written said "for operations", and after we discussed it, we cut out that and said, "current purposes and special intelligence." Those were retained, and they were directed to be [1032] prepared to destroy the ones remaining. They would be prepared to destroy them instantly in event of final emergency. The same dispatch

was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. This one went to Guam.

33. Q. But you have not yet told us the developments since 27 November 1941, which made you think this dispatch was necessary? Between 27 November and 4 December 1941.

A. No, I don't think I could give you the exact sequence of events between those two dates. Ambassador Nomura, and I expect, Ambassador Kurusu, were in Washington, and the negotiations were apparently not proceeding well. There was no specific event that occurred on the morning of the 4th that caused me to send this dispatch.

34. Q. Who was responsible for the decision that the sending of this dispatch, Exhibit 21, was necessary?

A. Chief of Naval Operations. I prepared the dispatch, as released by Admiral Ingersoll. I sent it in to him. I suppose that he took it up, as it was customary for him to do before actually releasing after discussing things, with the Chief of Naval Operations.

35. Q. Did you initiate this dispatch?

A. Yes.

36. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding, then, that you prepared this dispatch for release by the Chief of Naval Operations because you then thought that such a dispatch was advisable?

A. Yes, sir. Is it perfectly clear that on these dispatches where it says, "released", that the authority who released the dispatch in these cases is Ingersoll, who was Assistant Chief of Operations, and customarily did the signing of his name. He conferred with the Chief of Naval Operations, and I suppose got his authority before he released them. I did insist that any important dispatches should be released by the Chief of Naval Operations.

37. Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?

A. Yes.

38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was brought to your attention?

A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations to cover this point.

39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these [1033] steps to get intercepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words as set out in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in plain English?

A. They were not.

40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I ask you whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in these documents prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.

A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.

41. Q. Either 2 or 3—either document?

A. No, sir.

42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an officer in your Division made any telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in this winds code, of document 15, that you have previously been shown?

A. No.

44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Department that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information about winds, and that your reply was, "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a conversation?

A. I do not.

45. Q. I would like to refer you to document 17 of Exhibit 63, which you have before you, and ask you whether you ever saw or had been informed of the contents of this document on or before 7 December 1941. This document is the Secretary of State's note of November 26, 1941.

A. I couldn't say whether I was familiar with this particular paper or not.

46. Q. Can you state whether you knew, on or after November 26, 1941, whether or not Mr. Hull had delivered a note to the Japanese diplomats in Washington with reference to the negotiations that were then in progress?

A. No, I couldn't answer that question. That is three years ago. I can't say on what day. This traffic which has my initials, and things that I prepared, I am glad to testify to, but I cannot say exactly when I saw or if I did see many [1034] of these hundreds of dispatches. No, I cannot state.

47. Q. Before 7 December 1941, had you been expecting to receive any information in the Navy Department with reference to the negotiations that had been in progress between the United States and Japan?

A. I don't understand that question.

At the direction of the court, the question was repeated.

A. During this period we were making every effort to obtain any information possible in regard to the United States-Japanese relations.

48. Q. We have testimony before this court, Admiral, from subordinates who were in your office as of this period immediately preceding 7 December 1941, that all personnel were on the alert for the receipt of some very important—or of a very important answer from the Japanese Government. Do you have any knowledge of this situation?

A. From the time of the 27 of November, gradually getting more acute, we were making every effort to obtain any information possible. I couldn't say that we expected any particular message.

49. Q. Or any particular information?

A. Anything that had to do with the relations between ourselves and Japan was of the highest priority.

50. Q. But were you expecting any information of importance immediately preceding 7 December 1941, from the Japanese Government?

A. I might say we were hoping. I couldn't say we were expecting.
 [1035] Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

51. Q. I want to show you Document No. 39 of Exhibit 63 and refer you to Parts 1 to 13 of this document and ask you whether or not prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 you had seen or been informed of the subject matter contained therein?

A. Not before the 7th of December.

52. Q. Will you state when, if ever, you were made acquainted with the contents of Parts 1 to 13 of this Document 39?

A. No, I couldn't say the day I saw it.

53. Q. Can you state where you were on the night of 6 December 1941, after working hours?

A. I was at my office until about 8:00 o'clock.

54. Q. Can you state where you were between 8:00 o'clock and midnight on 6 December 1941?

A. I don't know whether I came back down to the office or whether I stayed at home.

55. Q. But your present recollection is that you have no knowledge of having seen that document, Parts 1 to 13, on the night of 6 December 1941?

A. That is my recollection.

56. Q. Nor at any time subsequent thereto?

A. No. As I remember it, the next morning, which was the 7th of December, I was down at my office about 9:00 o'clock. The conference was being held of Japanese representatives at the State Department. I imagine the note was delivered before the translation reached me.

57. Q. Were you present in Admiral Stark's office at or about 10:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December 1941?

A. I don't think so.

58. Q. I would like to show you Part 14 of Document 39, Exhibit 63, and ask you to state whether or not this part of this document ever came to your attention, and if so, when?

A. This message wasn't translated until the 7th of December.

59. Q. Had you ever been informed of it at any time, and if so, when?

A. I will have to say I don't remember.

60. Q. I show you Document 41 of Exhibit 63 and ask you if you were ever made acquainted with the contents of this document?

A. Yes.

[1036] 61. Q. Will you state when, and the circumstances surrounding it?

A. I could not, except to make the statement that I did not see it until after the 7th of December. It was handled by the Army, it was an Army message, and I have heard from my colleague, General Mobern, the chief signal officer of the Army, that that was the message which they tried to forward to Pearl Harbor and it was not received until after the attack. That is hearsay on my part.

62. Q. Is it the judge advocate's understanding from your answer that you did not see this document 41 at any time on the date of 7 December 1941?

A. Yes. I spent the forenoon of Sunday, the 7th of December, in my office on various important communication matters, one of which was caused by the reported sighting of a Japanese convoy in the Far East, and I was sitting at my desk at 1:00 o'clock when the report of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was sent out from Pearl Harbor. It was copied direct by the Navy Department and from then on the rest of the afternoon there were very many important communication matters going on. As to when I saw any one of these intelligence messages, I couldn't say.

63. Q. Can you recall ever having informed the Chief of the War Plans Division, then Captain Turner, that the Navy organizations in the Pearl Harbor area were decrypting this Japanese diplomatic cipher about which you have testified in a number of instances this morning, and which is before you now in the form of Exhibit 63?

A. These messages we have discussed came in many different ciphers. I would never have made the statement that all ciphers could be translated in Pearl Harbor.

64. Q. Did you ever inform the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy Department?

A. No.

65. Q. Did the Chief of the War Plans Division, Captain Turner, ever ask you or discuss with you whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was being kept informed on the latest intelligence information that was being received through your division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations?

A. I saw Turner almost daily and we continually discussed the status of matters of interest to him. The work was broken up between different stations which he should have understood.

[1037] 66. Q. But can you recall whether Captain Turner of the War Plans Division had ever raised the question with you as to whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in this period preceding 7 December 1941 was receiving an adequate amount of intelligence information from the Navy Department?

A. So far as I know, Turner, Wilkinson and myself were in entire agreement. This was a matter of continual discussion among the three mentioned and so far as I know there was never any question of this agreement. I can only say that we conferred almost daily on the question of what was being done and I thought that Admiral Turner had a clear understanding of what was being received in Pearl Harbor, as far as we could tell, and what was not.

67. Q. From the testimony of Admiral Turner as he gave it on the stand yesterday, the judge advocate understood that witness to state that he had specifically asked you on one or more occasions whether or not this decrypted information that was received immediately prior to 7 December 1941 was being transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I ask you, Admiral, whether or not Captain Turner did discuss this matter with you?

A. I said I discussed it.

68. Q. Did he ask you that question?

A. It is my remembrance that Admiral Turner asked what was our set-up in regard to intercepted messages and it was fully explained to him.

69. Q. Was your explanation to Captain Turner that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was or was not getting this intercepted traffic?

A. The messages that are in this file and that we have discussed were sent in many different enemy codes. Some of them we could read; some of them we could not. Some days we could read them; some days we could not. There is no such thing as a simple answer as to what was or was not being received. There was an intercept station fully staffed at Pearl Harbor. They specialized in certain codes that were most easily intercepted by them. They forwarded it to Washington, what they were able to make out of their particular task, and the same was true of the Asiatic Station. But to say that any individual message was received, it was also physically impossible to exchange every message. Right here is about two days traffic (indicating Exhibit 63).

70. Q. Do you know how intelligence information was transmitted in the purple code? That is, by radio, cable, or what?

A. Usually by cable.

71. Q. Did the Navy have any facilities in Pearl Harbor for intercepting information sent in the purple code by cable?

A. At the time there were no legal facilities for intercepting cable.

[1038] 72. Q. Can you state whether or not the naval organization in Pearl Harbor was or was not receiving these purple code dispatches sent by cable prior to 7 December 1941?

A. No.

The court then, at 11:06 a. m., took a recess until 11:15 a. m., at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, the reporter, the interested parties and their counsel, except Admiral Harold R. Stark, interested party, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, interested party, whose counsel were present.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy, the witness under examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his testimony.

Examination by the judge advocate (Continued):

73. Q. Do I understand your answer to mean that they were not receiving these cable dispatches transmitted in the purple code?

A. I should say they probably were not.

74. Q. Did you ever give Captain Turner, the Chief of the War Plans, any impression that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was getting information of the type contained in the purple code intercepts?

A. Not intentionally.

75. Q. On 7 December 1941 what was the quickest means of communication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. Direct radio circuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief, if we could raise him; if not, through Com14.

76. Q. Was there telephonic communication between the Navy Department, Washington, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941?

A. Not direct.

77. Q. Will you state what circuits were involved in a telephonic circuit between the Navy Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

A. There is a regular commercial telephone circuit from the United States to Oahu, but as I understood it, the nearest outlet was several miles from the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters at Pearl Harbor.

[1039] 78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been prepared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far Eastern Division in which there was a summary or résumé of intelligence information to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intelligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Operations.

79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was ever transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

A. I do not.

80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department with regard to releasing this dispatch?

A. I cannot, I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except to see that they were properly released.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret):

81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?

A. I do not.

82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the execution signal was received?

A. We had a special 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence matters.

83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of that signal?

A. I couldn't say.

[1040] 84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Department who would

be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was established?

A. No, I couldn't say.

85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execution of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the Navy Department files had failed to reveal a copy of the execution signal. Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which that record would be kept?

A. If it was received by naval means, yes; if not, no.

86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?

A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the Office of Naval Intelligence.

87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Yes.

88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the Director of Naval Communications?

A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such message was received by naval means.

89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on that subject?

A. That is right; yes.

90. Q. In your testimony before this court at the time that you were examining Exhibit 21, which was the dispatch from OpNav to Guam, directing them to destroy confidential publications, you used the expression in your testimony as being contained in this dispatch, "In view of the imminence of war." Is there such an expression in that dispatch?

A. There is not.

91. Q. I show you Exhibit 22 that is before this court which is a dispatch from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, information Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and ask you if you can identify this dispatch, and if so, the approximate time that you saw it, and whether or not you prepared the dispatch?

A. I did.

[1041] 92. Q. Did you prepare that dispatch at your own initiative, or was it prepared by one of your subordinates at his initiative?

A. I would say that I discussed this with Captain Safford in 20-G; as to whether I suggested it to him or he to me, I couldn't say. I discussed it with Admiral Turner, definitely, and with Admiral Wilkinson, and sent it in to the Chief of Operations for release.

[1042] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

93. Q. Do you remember whether or not the wording in this dispatch was the same as proposed by Captain Safford?

A. This is my writing here—that correction.

94. Q. Do you remember whether Captain Safford in discussing this dispatch with you desired to insert the words, "in view of the imminence of war"?

A. I have no such recollection. It might be.

95. Q. Will you please tell the court the Washington time of origin of this dispatch.

A. It would be 12:43 on the 6th.

96. Q. Will you tell the court in what classification that dispatch was transmitted as to priority of sending?

A. It was sent secret in ECM.

97. Q. The preceding question was meant to cover the precedence in forwarding the dispatch, that is, whether or not it was sent priority, routine, or deferred?

A. It doesn't show on the copy. As a matter of fact, messages are transmitted direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

98. Q. But was it not a rule in Communications at that time, in indicating the order in sending dispatches, that if there were "X" marks or checks against "priority" it would be sent in that category, that if the checks were against "routine", it would be so sent, but that if there were no checks against "routine", it would be sent deferred?

A. That was the routine.

99. Q. That was the procedure or rule at that time, was it not?

A. Yes.

100. Q. Then, this dispatch which you have referred to as being sent "in view of the imminence of war," was sent deferred as late as noon of the 6th of December; isn't that so?

A. That is not so.

101. Q. Why not?

A. Because I handled the message personally. The routine was as you say. I was Director of Naval Communications, and I sent messages simply when they were to go specially.

102. Q. After you directed that this message be sent was not its classification deferred, so that it could be delivered at nine o'clock the following working day without violating the communications regulations?

A. No.

[1043] 103. Q. Will you point out in this dispatch where you have directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy any codes?

A. It did not direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to destroy his codes.

104. Q. Did it direct him to have any codes destroyed?

A. The wording was, "You may authorize the destruction."

105. Q. Did you consider that that was an order to destroy?

A. The Chief of Naval Operations did not desire us to use language to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet that was not necessary. I drew this up for the release of the Chief of Naval Operations, and it met with his approval. (Reading) "In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize"——

106. Q. Couldn't the Commander-in-Chief in his own discretion do as much?

A. In an emergency, yes.

107. Q. Then, what was the object of this dispatch?

A. I should say the Commander-in-Chief would have hesitated to do it without some sort of directive from the Navy Department, and it was an appropriate authority to give him.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Examined by the court:

108. Q. Referring to the radio communications system in effect between Washington and Pearl Harbor: How long should it take to uncode a 20-word, special priority dispatch and transmit it from Washington to Pearl Harbor, assuming no delay in reaching the addressee?

A. In the case of any special message, such as this one, if I was given the word in time by someone else who originated the message, in order to let me know it was coming or, as in this case, when I knew it was coming, the procedure was to have the message unciphered before its release, clear the Commander-in-Chief, set up the radio circuit, and just before the message was released it was transmitted. It took time to transmit the message.

109. Q. I was also figuring on the time for uncoding.

A. I handled all these special messages myself. Whenever they had to do with the war, that was the procedure we followed, and that was the reason for no priority appearing on that particular message. It was handled by hand. We also could not get the Commander-in-Chief direct. That meant a [1044] relay through Com14, but when we did get the Commander-in-Chief direct, we cut the tape. We transmitted by tape and the message would go through in about a minute. When the Secretary landed at Pearl Harbor on a trip, Admiral Bloch sent a message reporting his arrival, and it was received in the Navy Department a minute and a half after he landed.

110. Q. Wouldn't an hour be ample allowance, under these special circumstances, for getting the dispatch from the inception of sending it to the uncoding stage, transmission and decoding, and receipt by the addressee?

A. In general, yes, if it was not stopped by something else. There were peaks of traffic.

111. Q. Assuming that the Chief of Naval Operations had written out a dispatch of not more than twenty words and sent it to you directly, designating the special urgency of the circumstances, would not an hour have been ample allowance to get it through either Com14 or the Commander-in-Chief?

A. Get it as far as Com14 or the Commander-in-Chief himself.

112. Q. Admiral, do you know of any message, other than that with respect to the destruction of codes, which was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific from November 27 to December 7, giving him the secret information you had received during that period?

A. Oh, yes, a great deal of this went. I could not tell from memory.

113. Q. Do you know whether any of these deciphered messages went to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Certain messages were sent to the Commander-in-Chief with a cipher on the original message, so that we deciphered there, but I could not say which ones were from here.

114. Q. Do you have any knowledge of having sent any of these decrypted messages, the purple code messages, or any information contained therein, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. I could give you a negative answer. I could say the note was not sent. I could not say just which ones were sent, because when I had finished my responsibility was the mechanics of the crypto-analysis. The messages were turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Who saw them in the Navy Department or whether they went on was primarily a matter for Naval Intelligence.

115. Q. If any one of these messages, or the contents of any of these so-called decrypted messages, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, such message would have been sent through Naval Communications, would it not?

A. Well, it might have been sent by air mail or pouch.

[1045] 116. Q. I am speaking of Naval Communications as such.

A. I would not necessarily have seen it, no.

117. Q. Was there any system in your office by which, generally speaking, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific was kept informed as to the contents of these decrypted messages? I am speaking now of the purple code.

A. The purple code is just one method of communication. To handle that long message, for instance, the 14-part message, to take an extreme case, was a very difficult matter for us. Wherever it happened to be picked up, and we got hold of it, it required first decrypting, for which we often did not have the key.

The court directed that the reporter read the question.

A. The office of Com14 was primarily set up to read naval matters. This so-called purple code, which was quite new, was, as far as we were concerned used primarily for diplomatic matters.

118. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the Commander-in-Chief was kept informed of the contents of these purple code messages?

A. Of all these purple messages?

119. Q. You have heard the question.

A. Not all of these purple messages. It would have been a physical impossibility to do it.

120. Q. Was there any system in your office by which the most important of these purple messages, and the information contained therein, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief for his information?

A. Whenever the Director of Naval Intelligence or War Plans Division or the Chief of Naval Operations himself—Whenever anyone directed or requested that a message be forwarded, it was done.

121. Q. But there was no system in your office by which the important messages were transmitted?

A. Not the diplomatic messages.

122. Q. Or to get checks on them to see that they had been received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Not the diplomatic messages.

123. Q. When these important decrypted messages were received, did you have anything to do with sending them in to the Chief of Naval Operations, or did you insist on some initialing or something to show that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen these particular messages?

A. It goes back to the question of Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who said that he had a separate book, as I understood [1046] it,

for the Chief of Naval Operations. Originally, there was one book for the people in the Navy Department, which was carried by hand, first of all, by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Then it was directed to Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who carried the book himself to the people concerned, first of all, the Chief of Naval Operations.

124. Q. As Director of Naval Communications did you try to keep informed about the very important traffic flowing through?

A. I did.

125. Q. There has been referred to in this testimony the note of 26 November, which was really the beginning, probably, of the message which you state Mr. Hull gave the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to the breaking off of negotiations. Did you have any idea about November 26 as to this note? It is document 17 of Exhibit 63.

A. No.

126. Q. Did you know that the officers in your department were standing by and were anticipating a reply to this note from 26 November to 7 December, 1941?

A. We had set up a continuous watch, established direct telephone communication between the War Department and ourselves and had taken every step to get immediate action on anything important received.

127. Q. But you had no reference to this special note of November 26?

A. No. It was not done on account of that. It was done on account of the general thing. There was no special step in regard to a particular note.

128. Q. But due to the importance of this message, everybody was on the alert awaiting its answer?

A. I gather from the question that somebody had said that they were giving that particular message—In my own mind, it was all important.

129. Q. When the reply of this note of 26 November came in and was received, in accordance with the testimony heretofore given, on the afternoon of December 6, and those thirteen parts were translated and ready for delivery at 9 p. m. on December 6, did you hear at that time anything at all regarding this reply? I am asking this question in view of the fact that you stated in your testimony that if any important reply came in, night or day, the watch officer would immediately inform you.

A. I was there. I was in my own office at 8:30 Sunday morning.

[1047] 130. Q. I am speaking of Saturday, December 6.

A. Not to the best of my recollection at that time.

131. Q. Did you see the reply consisting of those 13 parts on the morning of December 7?

A. I could not say just when I first saw it.

132. Q. You stated that if any of these decrypted messages were received in Honolulu, they were forwarded to Washington; is that correct?

A. No.

133. Q. I meant that anything decrypted was forwarded to Washington or the information contained therein?

A. You have here a very small part of the mass of material that we had. The general plan was that the Commander-in-Chief primarily tried to build up the naval codes.

134. Q. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?

A. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. It was really Com14. Com14 was on shore. It was a long process—a group here and a group there. From all that material they endeavored to get these naval codes in Com14's establishment in readable shape. From time to time they sent their values to Washington, which was behind but kept up as material came in. The same way, there was a return exchange from Washington to Honolulu. A good deal of it was done by air mail and special messenger on account of the bulk of the traffic and the danger of what we were doing being discovered.

135. Q. Admiral, we are discussing these important messages which have a bearing on information which was or was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. We well realize that there were thousands of messages coming in, but these messages had a particular bearing on information which could have been used by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and that is what we are discussing.

A. Those messages are picked out of many other messages.

136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds Message": Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer came in with the execute to the "Winds Message" and said, "Here it is"?

A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be correct.

137. Q. You speak of a naval radio circuit. During your experience in Washington was this Naval radio circuit quicker than the Army's means of communication between Washington and Honolulu?

A. Yes.

[1048] 138. Q. In other words, if you had had a very important message which was to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, for his information, even if originating by the Army, you would have sent it immediately by naval radio circuit; is that correct?

A. Yes.

139. Q. Do you think a considerable time would have been saved thereby?

A. By following the procedure I outlined, that is the fastest that could be done.

140. Q. By naval radio rather than Army circuit?

A. Faster than any means there was available, but that required some preparation.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your attention to the fact that you have just testified that you did receive some information. From where did this information come?

A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, there was a false alarm about it.

142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not? The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from that particular subject, did it?

A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.

143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds Message"; is that right?

A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.

Reexamined by the court:

144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?

A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?

[10/9] 146. Q. Yes.

A. No.

147. Q. Did you give him any information?

A. He got a copy of it.

Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):

148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna, Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether or not you have seen that dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?

A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.

149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?

A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."

150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.

A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."

151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?

A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already been received.

152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Department of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that they had the same words to work from?

A. This was not necessarily—

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the following statement: I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a translation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.

The witness made the following statement: Somebody in Batavia had gained that information.

153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?

A. Probably. We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against the rechecking that was done in Washington.

154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message" was received; that is, who gave it to you?

A. No.

[1050] 155. Q. But you do not recollect that you did hear about the execution of this before 7 December 1941?

A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my recollection for three years back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were my subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.

Reexamined by the judge advocate:

156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this false report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?

A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there must have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found to be correct.

157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report which you received and which later you determined to be false?

A. I don't know.

158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?

A. I don't.

159. Q. Adverting again to document 3 of Exhibit 64, in which counsel for an interested party pointed out to you the words, "Japan will inform her consuls of war decision": His question seems to infer that this was a translation of the Japanese weather code. Might not the words, "war decision", have been an evaluation from other information as well as the weather code, as set up?

A. Except that the message states "code intercept." I don't think that this is an exact translation. It is a paraphrase.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: I would merely like to say that I am sorry not to have been able to answer the questions more specifically. Three years ago I had all the communications business of the Department to handle. This was one part of my duties. I realize that the court considers some of these messages of greater [1051] import than they were considered then. We made every attempt at the time to cull what we could handle. We had thousands of these messages. We had to get the best information we could from them. Messages such as that note we could not have possibly transmitted in a secure means back to the field. It was most important that there should be no inkling of the fact to Japan that we could read any of her codes. There is no better way to have that discovered than to re-cipher a message which has been already sent by somebody. That is exactly what we did do in the ones we considered sufficiently important, but we had

to keep down on the number of messages that were sent for those reasons. Although it was not my decision, I do not think that the details of the purely diplomatic matters were as important as some of the others. There are many more messages which at the time looked very important, but those particular ones were culled. We handled all we could with the personnel and the system we had available. It was very difficult for us to get Japanese translators. There are very few reliable Japanese translators in this country. We worked with the War Department. We split our work with them, and we had a great deal of difficulty in working in a foreign language, plus putting in an enemy secret code. It is not just an open and shut proposition.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Junior, U. S. Naval Reserve (Relative to introduction of exhibit), and Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U. S. Navy. Pages 1091-1108, inclusive.

[1091] Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

The counsel for the judge advocate, Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

1. Q. Have you in your possession a document requested by the interested party, Admiral Stark?

A. I have. It is a document containing intercepted dispatches prepared for the interested party, Admiral Stark, at the request of the judge advocate, by the Director of Naval Communications. It contains sixteen documents, duly authenticated under official seal.

The document referred to was submitted to the judge advocate, to the interested parties, and to the court, and by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, offered in evidence for the purpose of reading into the record such extracts therefrom as may be considered pertinent to the inquiry.

There being no objection, it was so received and marked "EXHIBIT 68" for reference, description appended.

The witness resumed his seat as counsel for the judge advocate, none of the parties to the inquiry desiring further to examine him.

A witness called by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the judge advocate:

1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?

A. Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications, attached to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Examined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of 1941?

A. Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

3. Q. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 68, which contains sixteen separate documents. Do you recognize it?

A. These are extracts from the files of the Communications-Intelligence organization which relate to diplomatic traffic [1092] which had been intercepted and translated by the organization under the Director of Naval Communications.

4. Q. Will you read Document 1?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Seattle (Sato).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

J-19: (Priority.)

#165: (Message to Washington Circular #80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to _____ and Los Angeles.

ARMY 24900 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

5. Q. Will you read Document 2?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

1 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#723. (Re your #318)*

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabatanatuan, San Marcelino _____ (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

[1093] 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between

Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 50 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of *altitude planes* (?) it is said.

Details by mail.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5681: "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

6. Q. Will you read Document 3?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Manila.

5 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#355. For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

[1094] These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

7. Q. Will you read Document 4?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

1 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#722.

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.

2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).

3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

- (a) Military Planes.
 - Large bombers, 29.
 - Scout planes, 324.
 - The same, B type, 62.
 - Fighters, 317.
 - The same, B type, 131.
 - Pursuit planes, 302.
 - The same, D type, 69.
 - Training planes, 49.
 - Total, 1283.

- (b) Naval planes.
 - Large flying boats, 26.

[1095] 4. Ships in port on the 1st; MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI*, PASU*, 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

JD-I: 6335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR)

*Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Office of Naval Intelligence

Washington

In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2.

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

SECRET

U. S. Air Forces in the Philippines

NAVY		<i>Strength</i>
<i>Type</i>		
PBY-4 (Patrol)-----		14
PBY-4 (Patrol)-----		14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation)-----		4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)-----		2
J2F-4 (Utility)-----		3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)-----		2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation)-----		2
O52U-2 (Observation)-----		2
Total -----		43

2 squadrons of OS2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

ARMY

B-18 (Heavy Bomber)-----	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)-----	35
P-35A (VF)-----	52
P-40B (VF)-----	30
P-40E (VF)-----	117
[1096] O-46A (VO)-----	7
O-49 (VO)-----	3
O-52 (VO)-----	10
A-27 (Dive bomber)-----	9
C-39 (Combat)-----	1
C-49 (Combat)-----	1
P-26A (VF)-----	15
Total -----	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 1942.

SUMMARY

<i>Bombers</i>	<i>Fighters</i>	<i>Combat</i>	<i>Patrol</i>	<i>Observation</i>	<i>Utility</i>	<i>Total</i>
62	214	2	28	32	3	341

Japanese Estimates of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines

MILITARY PLANES

<i>Type</i>	<i>Strength</i>
Large bombers-----	29
Scout planes-----	324
The same, B type-----	62
Fighters-----	317
The same, B type-----	131
Pursuit planes-----	302
The same, D type-----	69
Training planes-----	49
Total-----	1, 283

NAVAL PLANES

Large flying boats-----

26

SECRET

8. Q. Will you read Document 5?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Manila.

5 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#349.

Re your #722*.

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.*

JD-1: 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands.

JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR)

[1097] 9. Will you read Document 6?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 8, 1941.

Purple.

#742.

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohotosu*,^a The *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th).

ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

10. Will you read Document 7?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

Purple.

#745.

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing, 2,300 soldiers.

ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

11. Q. Will you read Document 8?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 12, 1941.

Purple.

753.

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on _____. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6)

[1098] 12. Q. Will you read Document 9?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Manila.

November 20, 1941.

Purple.

#372. (Strictly Secret.)

Please advise immediately the results of your investigation as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay^a.

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6)

^a Near Manila, P. I.

13. Q. Will you read Document 10?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 22, 1941.

Purple.

#785.

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu^a; Pisu^a; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Canvite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41. (6)

^a Kana spelling.

14. Q. Will you read Document 11?

A. (Reading:)

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Seattle.

25 November 1941.

(J19.)

#026.

[1099] Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton.

Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.

JD-1: 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

15. Q. Will you read Document 12?

A. (Reading:)

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

25 November 1941.

(Purple.)

#790.

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

* Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000 tons).

16. Q. Will you read Document 13?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#799.

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 7084 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

[1100] 17. Q. Will you read Document 14?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: San Francisco.

29 November 1941.

(J19.)

Circular #2431.

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

18. Q. Will you read Document 15?

A. (Reading:)

From: Tokyo.

To: Singapore.

5 December 1941.

(PA-K2.)

#377

(Abstract)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)

19. Q. Will you read Document 16?

A. (Reading:)

SECRET

From: Seattle.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

PA-K2.

#184. (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[1101] 20. Q. Admiral, from what you remember, as you examined the class of information from which these are extracts during the last few months of the war, were there, in addition to those which you have just read, a considerable number of other reports from Japanese consuls or other agents giving our ship movements and dispositions, which came to your notice?

A. Why, the general tenor of the Japanese traffic was in a searching expedition all over the world as to movements not only in United States ports but also in those of foreign countries.

21. Q. Had that been going on for some time?

A. During the several months preceding December, 1941, it was intensified and had been going on for a considerable period.

22. Q. As you recall, was the physical volume of that traffic which was translated considerable or not?

A. In the early part of 1941 it wasn't so great, but towards December it built up month by month. I refreshed my memory yesterday. There were about 700 of these diplomatic dispatches in our hands during the month of November, 1941.

23. Q. Referring to all the translations made by the Army and the Navy during the last two months of peace in 1941, can you give a fair estimate of the number of those translations which were averaged per day?

A. Well, the diplomatic traffic during that month averaged about 26 messages a day.

24. Q. During the last month?

A. The last month.

25. Q. How was it during the preceding month?

A. September and October were also heavy, but it increased in November. I will say this. It was beyond the capacity of the staff we had to handle all those translations expeditiously.

26. Q. Admiral, there is testimony before the court to the effect that this class of information, which was recovered by the organization under you, was not transmitted to commanders at sea, particularly the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you give the court any reasons why that should not have been transmitted to all commanders in the Pacific, including the coastal frontier commanders on the Pacific Coast?

A. Well, first, I would like to indicate the method in which this [conn intellig] information was handled. It was the function of the Director of the Naval Communications organization to procure it. It was then passed to the Office of Naval [1102] Intelligence, whose function it was to evaluate and disseminate. In regard to our part in it, Naval Communications had always objected, for security reasons, to any of this traffic being passed other than in a secure cryptographic system. Only the intercept traffic itself, which was available to any intercepting agent, was allowed to go by air mail. The rest of it would have to be put in the naval cryptographic systems. That volume was such, with the staff available, that it was not all disseminated, and we would have objected seriously if it had been loaded on the naval communications system. We would have objected to its being passed by air mail, because had it been known and compromised, we would have lost our source of information.

27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your answer, the translations, if passed by the quickest means, would have to be uncoded in one of our own systems before transmission; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

28. Q. Do you mean that the personnel available was not sufficient for that work?

A. Yes, we only had four watch officers to handle the naval traffic coding here before the war without taking on a load of this intelligence information.

29. Q. Well, would such uncoding have been a great increase proportionately in the work of those officers?

A. Yes, I would say at least it would have doubled it.

30. Q. Will you further elaborate your reply, giving the reasons which you mentioned, for not transmitting this information, at least, to Pearl Harbor by air mail?

A. Well, in accordance with the regulations, secret matter is not sent out, even today, beyond the continental limits by air mail, and this information was considered, at least, on a level above our own naval administrative secret, and we would not permit any of this to go by air mail. We do not today transmit any of it by air mail.

31. Q. Just why was the level of required secrecy so high?

A. You jeopardize your source of intelligence if the enemy knows your degree of success.

32. Q. Has it developed that the maintenance of that secrecy has been very important in carrying on the war since December 7, 1941?

A. I would say it has been vital to the war effort.

Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.) :

[1103] 33. Q. There has been testimony before the court, Admiral, relative to what was known as the "Winds Message". Were you Assistant Director of Naval Communications at the time of the "Winds Message"?

A. If you will give me the date in relation to the "Winds Message", I can answer.

34. Q. November and December, 1941.

A. I was the Assistant Director at that time.

35. Q. Do you recall the receipt of the execute of the "Winds Message"? Would you like to see it?

A. Yes, I would. I never have.

36. Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63.

A. Yes, I have seen this message. This is not the one I thought you alluded to that set up the procedure. Yes, I have seen that message.

37. Q. Did you see what has been called the execute?

A. No, that is the one I referred to. I never did see it.

38. Q. Did you hear about it?

A. Yes, I heard about it in discussion.

39. Q. At or about the time it was received?

A. That is right.

40. Q. Do you recall approximately when that was, Admiral?

A. Well, this is just a hazy recollection. It was about the 6th or 7th of December. I would say right in that period. I don't know exactly when the message was sent, but I heard the discussions about it. I never saw it.

41. Q. Can you fix it as being before or after the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. No, I can't. What impresses it upon my mind is that there was some discussion as to the exact meaning of that message, whether it actually applied to this one or not.

42. Q. With whom did you discuss it, Admiral?

A. I really wasn't in the discussion. I heard about it from the Director, who was Admiral Noyes, and the officer who had charge of the folder, who was Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

43. Q. In answer to one of Admiral Hart's questions you said that there were several hundred of these intercepted diplomatic matters during the month of November; is that right?

A. That is right. I obtained that information from the file yesterday.

[1104] 44. Q. That number included all the diplomatic intercepts?

A. All diplomatic that they had.

45. Q. It did not refer only to inquiries concerning ships or ship movements?

A. Oh, no, the diplomatic intercepts for the month.

46. Q. How many of the 700 during the month of November are of the character of those contained in Exhibit 68?

A. I couldn't answer that. I would have to take the file and dig the information out of it.

47. Q. Did you select all of the documents which were included in Exhibit 68?

A. I had nothing to do with it.

48. Q. I note that 11 of the 16 were from here to Manila. Is that a fair portion of the inquiries or answers to inquiries concerning ships which emanated from here and were directed to Japanese representatives in the Philippines?

A. I couldn't answer that either without making a study of the file.

49. Q. Would you look at document 40 of Exhibit 63?

A. I have it here.

50. Q. Insofar as the information in that document purports to place various ships in certain areas, is that an unusual document of the character of which we have been talking?

A. Well, it was more specific than any of the others I saw.

51. Q. It was most specific?

A. Yes.

52. Q. There was nothing specific from any continental ports?

A. No, the continental ones more or less referred to movements in and out of port.

53. Q. It was even more specific than any answer from Manila?

A. Yes, because this apparently referred to some particular chart upon which he was reporting.

54. Q. Now, you told Admiral Hart that it was not feasible to uncode and transmit by our system all the diplomatic intercepts to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor was it secure to do it by any other means.

A. I did not say "any other means." I said by air mail.

55. Q. Were there any other means?

A. You could have put a courier on the job and sent him.

[1105] 56. Q. Was a courier used?

A. No.

57. Q. Was any of the information obtained in this manner transmitted directly or indirectly to those who were vitally interested in acquiring the information?

A. In perusing this file recently, I noticed that there were messages sent from Manila to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, into Washington with information copies to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. They related to the information which was gained out there in that theatre.

58. Q. Was any of the information which was processed in Washington transmitted in any way to the Commander-in-Chief?

A. You are asking me something which I would have to gain from knowledge of the files, because, as I have previously testified, we did not disseminate the information. It was disseminated by ONI, but when it came to translating these exacts, as we call them, we did not transmit them.

59. Q. So far as you know—and I appreciate that your knowledge was limited—was any of it transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief?

60. Q. The exact messages, I don't believe, were transmitted. There were other messages relating to the situation which were sent. They were not, however, originated by the Director of Naval Communications. The only traffic that the Director of Naval Communications originated had to do with the destruction of codes and ciphers and information relating to the code and cipher system of the enemy.

61. Q. Was the reason why the messages could not be transmitted applicable to a condensed digest of the information?

A. That goes back to the functions of ONI. I would say, yes, we could have handled digests.

62. Q. The information would not be of much use unless either it or some evaluation of it was made available to some of those in the field, would it?

A. That is correct, but, again, that was the function of ONI to evaluate information.

The interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.), did not desire to cross-examine this witness.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

63. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in his intelligence organization or his intercept command, have the same facilities for receiving and for translating messages of the type contained in Exhibits 63 and 68?

A. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific had any of [1106] the intercepts, he could not have worked on them, because he did not have the machines to do it. The problem was never assigned to Honolulu, and all the translations were accomplished here in Washington.

Examined by the court:

64. Q. Admiral, in order to clear this question of transmitting information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or other commanders in the field, and having in mind these intercepts of a very secret nature, aren't there means other than by air or courier of sending a brief of such information by dispatch in code?

A. Oh, yes, that is a brief of it, but I was referring to the exact translation, that is, the total.

65. Q. But you could have sent a brief, giving full information?

A. We could have handled that, yes.

66. Q. We have had testimony before this court that on or about December 3 there was a dispatch made up and discussed with the Chief of Naval Communications, which was a summary of information received in Washington. There was a suggestion that this dispatch be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Are you aware of any such dispatch, or were you familiar with the conversation among Admiral Wilkinson, Captain McCollum, and Rear Admiral Noyes regarding the sending of such a dispatch?

A. No, sir, I was not.

67. Q. You have no knowledge of such a dispatch?

A. That is correct.

68. Q. Have you any knowledge of any dispatch reporting a summary of information, having in mind these very secret documents, being sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic?

A. I have not. There were one or two dispatches which originated from the Chief of Naval Operations and which indicated what you might call a situation out there, but they didn't allude to what we call ultra information.

69. Q. Did those dispatches give any information included in the intercepted messages?

A. I think the best way is to let the dispatches speak for themselves. They are in the files.

70. Q. Were the dispatches you referred to based on that information?

A. Oh, partially, yes. I don't know what dispatches this court has before it.

[1107] 71. Q. Do we understand that certain dispatches were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, which gave information contained in these ultra secret dispatches?

A. No, they were based on that information. They were situation dispatches. It is a long time since I saw those dispatches. One was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, which alerted him as to the passage of a Japanese force into China and alerted him as to a possible attack in Manila, and some of these dispatches did include the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and some did not, and the best way I know of is to get those dispatches from the files.

72. Q. Have you in mind any particular dispatch sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, along these lines?

A. There was one, as I remember it, which told him to execute War Plan 46 or 47.

73. Q. Execute it? When?

A. No, that came after it. It said to take measures in accordance with that War Plan.

74. Q. Do you have reference to Exhibit 13?

A. (Referring to Exhibit 13.) It says,

By Japan for her present desperate situation there is a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

That is the background of ultra information.

75. Q. What date was that?

A. That is under the 16th of October. It states:

In view of these possibilities, you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

and so forth.

76. Q. The question had particular reference to information being transmitted from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, between the dates of 27 November and 7 December.

A. I could take the whole file and go through it. Here is one of November 27 which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic. It states, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning."

The question was repeated by the reporter.

A. Well, the only information I have is a recollection of these dispatches which were sent and which were in the files of the office.

77. Q. You have no recollection of anything else?

A. No.

[1108] Reexamined by the interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy:

78. Q. I show you Exhibits 15 and 17 before this court. You have been asked several questions concerning the transmission of summaries, briefs, etc., of the information in the super secret class. Would that serve as a fair example of what you meant in your replies?

A. It would, because it states here, "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." Those statements in there came from ultra sources.

Reexamined by the court:

79. Q. In the Roberts Report it is stated that on December 1 the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated at considerable length the elements of a situation existing at that time. Was that transmitted by radio?

A. That I could not answer. If I saw it, I could tell, I can say off hand it was not transmitted by a dispatch.

None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Pages 1121-1123, inclusive.

[1121] 34. Q. Admiral, you have stated that had you been aware of this information which was not conveyed to you between 27 November and 7 December 1941, you would have had, in all probability, taken the Fleet to sea. Did any of this information to which you refer, and which you state you did not receive, bear any indication that there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I think that the series of messages inquiring as to the disposition of ships inside Pearl Harbor itself, wanting to know which ones were in areas, the report of the Japanese Consul giving in detail the courses taken by those in the harbor, would have indicated to me that they were not only interested in the ships that were in the Pearl Harbor area but that they were interested in exactly where they were in Pearl Harbor proper. There are only two forms of attack that would be effective against the ships inside Pearl Harbor. One is for submarines to come into the harbor, and at that time I did not know that they had any midget submarines, and I would have discounted largely the submarine attack and would have considered that about the only thing that could get in would be a bombing attack. I would also and did

discount the aircraft torpedo attack for reasons which have been presented to this court, and in view of that I would have said, "Well, they probably are going to make an air bombing raid here." I do not see any other conclusion you can draw from it unless you put it down to Japanese stupidity in wanting all this information, and I do not think they were so stupid.

35. Q. In view of the fact they were also making inquiries about the disposition of ships at Puget Sound and Manila Bay, would that have indicated, reading those dispatches collectively, Pearl Harbor particularly or rather a desire for information as to what to do in case hostilities were opened?

A. Well, the dispatches I have seen in regard to Puget Sound and Manila Bay indicate an interest only in the ships that were there, whether the ships were in port or whether they had left. Where they are is something that is of interest always. Every ship located reduces the number of those unknown, and if a carrier and a battleship are located in the Navy Yard at Puget Sound, that is very definite information that they are not in Hawaii. However, they did not ask in Puget Sound nor in Manila, so far as I am informed, whether the ships were tied up in a certain area, or where they were. They did do that, I believe, in Pearl Harbor.

36. Q. What effect would the knowledge of the existence of the Winds Message and so forth have had upon you?

A. Again I must say that I do not want to be so wise now that everything has happened, but still I have a right to an opinion, and I will give it for what it is worth. The definite fact that Japan, at least, was going to break off diplomatic relations and, at most, was going to war with us [1122] would have had a very great effect on me and all my advisors. That would have been something definite. I think that Commander Layton, who was my Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Japanese language student, has already testified that had that come through, he would have advised an all-out alert, to put it briefly.

37. Q. I am interested to know what good that would have done? A. I don't know. That, I think, is open to question also.

Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Cross-examined by the judge advocate:

38. Q. You have testified that had you had the information contained in the "winds message", that you might have taken certain action with regard to security or disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet. What information was contained in the "winds message" as regards the possible relations of the United States and Japan, as you recall it?

A. In that Exhibit 63, there are several messages leading up to the "winds message."

39. Q. I am asking only about the "winds message" at this time.

A. I am trying to answer about the "winds message." The "winds message" contained a statement that at most they were going to declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies; they were going to have peace with Russia; and that at the least, they stated, that Japan was going to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, and maintain diplomatic relations with Russia—and a

very strong belief by most of Japanese students that the translation in fact meant that they were going to declare war, and a definite statement such as that—would have lead me to know that the war was coming, and coming almost immediately.

40. Q. Did not the dispatch, Exhibit 17, say in effect the same thing, for the reason that it sets out that "negotiations have ceased, and an aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days," and it sets out territory of the United States as an objective?

A. It doesn't convey the same thing to me at all, and I have testified at length as to my reactions when I received the message of November 27, and I can add nothing to that now.

Examined by the court:

41. Q. Referring to these Fleet planes, Admiral, if you [1123] had received the message which you did receive several hours subsequent to the attack on 7 December, relative to the delivery of the answer by the Japanese, what would have been your action regarding these planes based on shore?

A. I hate to make statements as to what I would have done under theoretical circumstances. It is difficult for me to answer that. I think I would have taken action. I would have gotten the planes in the air, at least, and taken all the steps possible, at least until a day or two had elapsed, because that definite time for delivery must have meant something. However, I do believe that the message sent by General Marshall to General Short could have been a much clearer message than the one that was sent.

Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.

Extracted testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret). Page 1154.

[1154] The court questioned the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), as follows: To what document did you refer in your preceding answer?

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret), interested party, made the following reply: I referred to the "execute" of the Winds Message. I might further identify the first part of the Winds Message as Documents 13 and 15, Exhibit 63, and Documents 2 and 3 in Exhibit 64.

EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME I

No. 1 to 29 (both inclusive)

NOTE.—Exhibits No. 11 and 29 contain privileged matter, which though not “Top-Secret”, do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in “red”, together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 1

GENERAL ORDER
 No. 142

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., Jan. 10, 1941.

STATUS OF COMMANDANTS FIFTH, TENTH, THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICTS

1. General Orders Nos. 109, 119, and 128 are hereby cancelled, and this order substituted therefor effective February 1, 1941.

2. The Commandants of the Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Naval Districts, the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District in so far as pertains to the United States naval reservations and naval activities in the Islands of Bermuda, and the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in so far as pertains to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands are hereby assigned a dual status as follows:

(a) As Commandants of their respective Naval Districts, operating under the orders of the Navy Department.

(b) As officers of one of the Fleets, operating under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of a Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank makes them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the Fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief.

3. As commandants of their respective districts, they will be governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts. The units under their command will be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and will include the Local Naval Defense Forces as well as the usual shore activities.

4. Their exercise of duties as officers of a Fleet will be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that Fleet may consider desirable.

5. Upon assuming command of their respective districts, commandants will further report to the officers indicated below in order that they may carry out their Fleet duties as indicated above:

(a) The Commandants of the Fifth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts will report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

(b) The commandants of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts will report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

FRANK KNOX.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Bieseimer,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 2

GENERAL ORDER
No. 143

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1941.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this order organized into:

The United States Fleet, comprising:

- (a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
- (b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
- (c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;

The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
Special Task Forces,
Special Duty Ships,
The Naval Transportation Service,
Naval District Craft,

The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the foregoing will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special orders or in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.

4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.

5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as possible, the type commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

6. The Commander-in Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.

7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and task organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders. Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval Coastal Forces" and "Naval Local Defense Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval

Coastal Frontiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces consist only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Commandants of Naval Districts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval Coastal Forces, respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief of Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.

9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or under the Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are performing.

10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the naval district or station to which assigned. They consist of such naval craft and floating equipment of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense Forces."

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

A true copy. Attest:
H. Bieseimer,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 3

GENERAL ORDER
No. 170

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., March 23, 1942.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES FLEET

1. Pursuant to Executive Order of the President the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations have been combined and placed under one officer who has the title "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", with the rank and title of Admiral. This officer is the principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment.

2. As Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, the officer holding the combined offices has supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces, and sea frontier forces of the Navy and is directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President therefor.

3. The staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, is composed of—

(a) A Chief of Staff, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who, in the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations", shall act as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet;

(b) Such deputy and assistant chiefs of staff as may be necessary; and

(c) Such other officers as may be appropriate and necessary to enable the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" to perform the duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

4. As Chief of Naval Operations the officer holding the combined offices is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the preparation, readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the Navy, and with the coordi-

nation and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt. Duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

5. The staff of the Chief of Naval Operations is composed of—

(a) A Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with the rank of Vice Admiral, who has all necessary authority for executing the plans and policies of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" so far as pertains to the duties herein prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations. In the temporary absence or incapacity of the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" he shall act as Chief of Naval Operations;

(b) An Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the title of Sub Chief of Naval Operations and the rank of Rear Admiral, and such additional assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations as may be required; and

(c) Such other officers as may be considered to be appropriate and necessary for the performance of the duties at present prescribed for the Chief of Naval Operations.

6. During the temporary absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations" shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. In the temporary absence of all of these officers the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, United States Fleet, respectively, shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy.

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Biese-meier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

SECRET

[2]

EXHIBIT No. 4

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).

Enclosures:

- (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages.
- (B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL-46.

4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.

5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.

6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning," and in the "Registered Publication Manual".

7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPI-8.

[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual".

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDINATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.

H. R. STARK.

[iii] *Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Subject Matter	Page or Sheet No.	Change in Effect
Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)A16(R-5) of May 26, 1941.	i, ii.....	Original
List of Effective Pages.....	iii.....	Original
Table of Corrections.....	iv.....	Original
Distribution List.....	v, vi.....	Original
Title Page.....	1.....	Original
Table of Contents.....	2 to 4 inc.....	Original
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Part III.....	15 to 60 inc.....	Original
Part IV.....	61 to 80 inc.....	Original
Part V.....	81, 82.....	Original
Appendix I.....	1 to 51 inc.....	Original
Appendix II:		
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Chapter I.....	2, 3.....	Original
Chapter II.....	4, 5.....	Original
Table ATF-1.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
Chapter III.....	6.....	Original
Table PAF-1.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
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Table NACF.....	1 to 5 inc.....	Original
Table SCF.....	1 to 4 inc.....	Original
Table CACF.....	1.....	Original
Table PACF.....	1.....	Original
Table PSCF.....	1 to 3 inc.....	Original
Table PNCF.....	1.....	Original
Table HCF.....	1.....	Original
Table PhCF.....	1.....	Original
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[iv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

R. P. M. or Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change.
1.....	26-7-44	Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 3, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC
(SC) A16(R-5)
Serial 064112

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46.

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:

(a) *On Page 45*

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(g), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(i), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.

(b) *On Page 80*

Paragraph 4601, first line,—after “will be” insert “prepared as”.

(c) *On Page 30 of Appendix I*

Paragraph 51.a.(13), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.

Paragraph 51.a.(14), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.

(d) *On Page 31 of Appendix I*

Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.

2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.

3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting*.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

[V] <i>Official to whom issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1
Commander, Battle Force	2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force	3
Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld)	4
Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld)	5
Commander, Battleship Division Three	6
Commander, Battleship Division Five	7
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force	8
Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force	9
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force	10
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force	11
Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force	12
Commander, Scouting Force	13
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force	14
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force	15
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force	16
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	17
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	18
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet	19
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet	20
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet	21
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet	22
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet	23
Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet	24
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet	25
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	26
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division	27
Commanding General, Second Marine Division	28
Operations—Director, War Plans Division	29, 30, 31
—Director, Naval Intelligence Division	32
—Director, Naval Communications Division	33
—Director, Fleet Maintenance Division	34
—Director, Ship Movements Division	35
—Director, Naval Districts Division	36
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements Division)	37
Chief of Bureau of Navigation	38, 39
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance	40
Chief of Bureau of Ships	41
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks	42
Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics	43
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Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	46
[V] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy	47
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	48
Director, Shore Establishment Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy)	49

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<i>Official to whom issued</i>	<i>Registered Nos.</i>
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President, Naval War College.....	51
Commandant, First Naval District.....	52, 53
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Op-12B-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 071912

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 1, 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.

Reference:

- (a) GO No. 142.
- (b) GO No. 143.
- (c) WPL-46.

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL-46 are hereby established.

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, Appendix I, WPL-46.

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended.

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assignments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense Forces.

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:

- Commandant, 3rd Naval District—Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier;
- Commandant, 6th Naval District—Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier;
- Commandant, 10th Naval District—Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier;
- Commandant, 15th Naval District—Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier;

Commandant, 12th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Frontier;
 Commandant, 13th Naval District—Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Frontier;
 Commandant, 14th Naval District—Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier;
 Commandant, 16th Naval District—Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the commanders thereof, is assigned a *RESTRICTED* classification. The limits of the Naval Coastal Frontiers remain in a *SECRET* classification. Correspondence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] W. P. L.—46

NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES

NAVY

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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[5] INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN

0101. This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is included in this plan as Appendix I.

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

[6] CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5".

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

[7] *Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN*

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.

¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof.

[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and BAHIA.

- a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.
- b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited capacities of the ports.
- c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port.
- d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance are not required.
- e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, through the United States Naval Observer.

[9] PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is prescribed below:

a. *THE OPERATING FORCES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

2. *THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. *THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*, under command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

4. *THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

5. *THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE*, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.

6. *THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*, under the command of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:

(a) *THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES*;

(b) *THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES*.

b. *THE SERVICES*, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. *THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE*.

2. *THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE*.

3. *THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE*.

c. *THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*, under the direction of the appropriate Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.

[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Appendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in Appendix I, "Section V."

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the world showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers." This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBIT-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."

[13] PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."

[14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of Appendix I.

2202. The Navy General Task is as follows:

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, will:

1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;

2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;

3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;

4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and

5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

[15] PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially be organized into task forces as follows:

a. OCEAN ESCORT;

b. STRIKING FORCE;

c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE;

d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE;

e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO;

f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE;

g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;

h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA;

i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:

Section 1. *THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET*—Continueda. *TASK*

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

b. *TASK*

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

[16] c. *TASK*

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

d. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C";

e. *TASK*

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

f. *TASK*

PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direction of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.

3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. *TASK*

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA this force will execute the following task:

1. *TASK*

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.

d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for administrative purposes.

3115. a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE* and *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE* will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. *TASK*

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section I.

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supplemented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States sources.

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and temporary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of available British facilities.

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States sources.

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. *U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. *NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b));

3. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA;

4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.

- b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[21] *Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES*

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are:

- a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
- b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
- c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
- d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.

3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

- a. *TASK*
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

CATEGORY D—THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

- [22] b. *TASK*

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

- c. *TASK*
SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET;

- d. *TASK*
SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIER.

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:

1. *TASK*
SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this plan;

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans*—*RAINBOW No. 5*, including an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, *RAINBOW No. 5*);

3. By Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants, FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

[23] (a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans*—*RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval District Plans 0-5, *RAINBOW No. 5*);

(b) *Joint Embarkation Plans* as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

- b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval Districts.

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operation Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[25] *Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply:

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

[26] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is assigned as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and task purposes.

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the

Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.

[27]

CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

- a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
- b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
- c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA:

a. TASK

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;

b. TASK

PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;

c. TASK

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. TASK

SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST;

[28] e. TASK

DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY "D";

f. TASK

DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY "F";

g. TASK

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

h. TASK

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

i. TASK

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

j. TASK

ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;

k. TASK

ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES.

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, when so directed by that officer.

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired

by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supplemented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may, at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.

[30] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O-1, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M;

3. *NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Naval Station Samoa Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be prepared.

NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5.

[31] Section 2. *THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE*

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

b. *TASK*

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

c. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR;

d. *TASK*

PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.

[32] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan O-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:

a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.

CATEGORY C—THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT UNALASKA.

CATEGORY D—UNALASKA.—THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

[34] b. TASK

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. TASK

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;

d. TASK

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIERS.

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) *Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan*—RAINBOW No. 5, including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

(a) *Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans*—RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

- [35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.
- b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
- (b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.
4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[36] *Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS*

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242):

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

[37] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if this situation arises.

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in

matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, *temporarily*, to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.

[38]

CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:

“Far East Area

“Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

“(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

“(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

“(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES.”

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II).

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

[39] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are defined in “Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935”, as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY AXIS FORCES;

b. *TASK*

SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES.);

c. *TASK*

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. *TASK*

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

[40] e. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER—CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";

f. *TASK*

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from commercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources in the United States.

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that Area.

through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed if available.

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. *THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5* (Navy Plan O-2, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix I, Paragraph 48;

3. *SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5*. (Sixteenth Naval District Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

1. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*;
2. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*.

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*

1. *TASK*

ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN APPROACHES;

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*

1. *TASK*

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.

[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service or from vessels assigned to the task forces.

a. Fuel from United States and British sources.

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from United States sources.

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facilities assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations.

[44]

CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix II) is assigned the following task:

a. *TASK*

PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.

1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(a) *NEW YORK to ICELAND*, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(b) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops embark on 10M.

NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on 10M.

(i) These two forces will move in one convoy.

(c) *NEW YORK to BERMUDA*, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(d) *GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA*, 6,000 troops, embark on 15M.

(e) *GALVESTON to TRINIDAD*, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.

(f) *GALVESTON to PANAMA*, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(g) *GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO*, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(h) *SEATTLE to ALASKA*, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(i) *SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII*, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.

[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[47] *Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE*

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVISION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.

3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:

- a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;
- b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of commanders of forces afloat, including aircraft.

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Communication Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5 which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[48] *Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.*

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT;

b. *TASK*

IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:

- a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence;

- b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and Outlying Naval Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV,

[50] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

- a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to which assigned.

b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.

3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establishments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."

b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will command the Coast Guard units coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organizations as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.

[51] *Section 2. MOBILIZATION*

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2;

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan.

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task.

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be taken over from private sources or other government departments.

[52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

[53] *Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING*

3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";

a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter

within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."

b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, except protection.

Definitions

3732. a. *ROUTING*. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meeting points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a part of routing.

b. *INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.

c. *INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval Coastal Frontier.

d. *INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING*. That shipping of the Associated Powers, not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.

e. *FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING*. All shipping of the Associated Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.

f. *OVERSEAS SHIPPING* is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

Instructions for routing shipping

3733. *INTRA-DISTRICT, INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING*.

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by them.

[55] b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.

3734. *OVERSEAS SHIPPING*.

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:

1. *CLASS A*. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States;

2. *CLASS B*. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United Kingdom.

b. *WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA*.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Districts in which are the ports of assembly of the convoys, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN-

TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders of vessels.

c. *PACIFIC AREA.*

1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, with the following exceptions:

(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;

(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;

(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.

Instructions for the protection of shipping

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the Operating Forces.

[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combination of these methods.

c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.

d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be viewed as having an especial importance.

[58] *Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE*

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare".

3742. Except under extraordinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly notified.

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy.

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategical Areas" as in their opinion are *vital*. They must give wide publicity to the exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be detrimental to our own forces.

[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-

mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief concerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.

[60] *Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD*

3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating matters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.)

[61] **PART IV. LOGISTICS**

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4101. The Shore Establishment is assigned the following tasks:

a. *TASK*

PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;

b. *TASK*

PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;

c. *TASK*

PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.

[62] **CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES**

Section 1. PERSONNEL

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.

"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940".

4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel for such period of time as found to be necessary.

[63] *Section 2. MATERIAL*

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material

will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

[64] *Section 3. TRANSPORTATION*

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:

1. THE OPERATING FORCES;
2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.

b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.

b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transportation may be provided.

c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the District Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).

b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regarding the safety of vessels.

c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered vessels); the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army personnel.

(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

[66] *Section 4. LEGAL SERVICES*

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, necessary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.

4242. These services will include:

a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Establishment;

b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;

c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraph 59).

[67] *Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*

4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks.

4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both government and private requirements.

[68] *Section 6. PRIORITIES*

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERVICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the priorities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.

a. *PRIORITY ONE*

1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial movements to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA, TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.

2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.

3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

b. *PRIORITY TWO*

1. Initial movements to ICELAND.

2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE not specified under PRIORITY ONE.

c. *PRIORITY THREE*

1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.

d. *PRIORITY FOUR*

1. New Construction.

[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR WAR SERVICE

4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing personnel to perform their war tasks.

4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION prescribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4313. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for immediate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4314. *Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in the current Operating Force Plan.*

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobilization Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for mobilization.

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.

[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far in advance as practicable.

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established and other related instructions.

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.

e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except as follows:

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage;

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled;

4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for the installation of batteries and magazines.

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable number of officers and men as follows:

- 1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.....6;
- [72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.....8;
- 3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.....8;
- 4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.....6

[73] Section 2. MAINTENANCE

4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the Services in condition of readiness for war by:

- a. Replacement of personnel and material;
- b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;
- c. Hospitalization of personnel;
- d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and welfare of personnel.

Replacements

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in paragraph 1102 of this plan.

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services, as determined by war experience.

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation to destination.

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until deficiencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replacements of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Establishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transportation Service will submit their requests for replacements.

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows:

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers designated by them;

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Commandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where delivery is desired;

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these units are established.

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replacements obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements made to Shore Establishment activities.

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the Services will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.

Repairs

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment activities.

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work required;

3. The degree of urgency of the work required;

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.

Hospitalization and evacuation

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.

[76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore Establishment activities.

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other available vessels having adequate medical facilities.

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army hospitals or field medical units.

Recreation and welfare

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps personnel.

b. Provisions for these activities will include:

1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Establishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are concentrated, and at Training Stations;

2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.

[77] *Section 3. AUGMENTATION*

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the Services by:

a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;

b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;

c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy from other Government Departments;

d. Acquisition of material.

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.

[78] *CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES*

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with instructions issued in separate directives.

[79] *CHAPTER V. SALVAGE*

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render salvage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas prescribed in paragraph 4101.c.

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.c.

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within the waters of the United States.

4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:

1. *From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY*

PIONEER,
GUIDE,
DISCOVER;

2. *From the COAST GUARD*

REDWING.

b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

[80] *CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT*

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in Part V, WPI-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.

[81]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

5101. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60:

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."

5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.

[82]

CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government.

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

- a. Intelligence Service;
- b. Censorship and Publicity;
- c. Mobilization of Resources."

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Intelligence Service.

b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censorship and Publicity.

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.

[1]

APPENDIX I. TO WPL-46, THE JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5

[2]

SECTION I. DIRECTIVE

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in paragraph 2 of this paper.

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of drafting.

[3]

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as including all such Powers.

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia.

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

[4]

SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

[5]

SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941.

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) *United States*

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(b) *British Commonwealth*

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) *Sea Communications*

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

[6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplishment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air operations against the sources of Axis military power.

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."

13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will be governed by the following:

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces.

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort.

[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM
RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to war operations.

In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and ABC-22).

15. *Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United Kingdom.* a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

f. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth in paragraph 16.

[11] 16. *Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces.* a. *United States Areas.* Upon entering the war, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, except:

(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements.

(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[12] b. *The Far East Area.* Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

[13] *c. Joint Land Offensives.* Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.

d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other areas not described in sub-paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* next above. These areas as initially delimited are:

(1) *The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA* comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.

(2) *The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA* comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.

(3) *The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.*

(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,

(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,

[14] (c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,

(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:

To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.

To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.

(f) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

(4) *The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA* comprises:

(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

(5) *The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS* comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.

[15] (6) *The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA* comprises:

(a) India.

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.

(c) The islands in the above ocean area.

17. *Collaboration in Planning.* *a.* The High Commands of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will

similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these Missions will be as follows:

(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

f. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

[17]

Communications

18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:

a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military Mission in London.

b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

Control and Protection of Shipping

20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment

of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

23. *Special Relationship between Canada and the United States.* Joint Agreements are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will be incorporated in this plan.

[19]

SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS

24. *Joint General Task.* In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

[20]

SECTION VII. TASKS

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.

The Western Atlantic Area

27. *Definition.* The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

28. *Army Tasks.* a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.

e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.

[21] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany.

h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if such garrisons have been established.

29. *Army Forces.* a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detachments.

b. Local defense forces.

c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and Latin American Republics.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

30. *Navy Tasks.* a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

[22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.

f. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

31. *Navy Forces.* a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Pacific Area.

32. *Definition.* The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:

a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast and Longitude 74° West.

33. *Army Tasks.* a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in that Hemisphere.

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

[23] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

34. *Army Forces.* a. Local defense forces.

b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the West Coast of South America.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

35. *Navy Tasks.* a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.

36. *Navy Forces.* a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.

b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Far East Area

37. *Army Tasks.* In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

38. *Army Forces.* Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.

39. *Navy Tasks.* a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.

b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues.)

[25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense "E".

40. *Navy Forces.* a. The Asiatic Fleet.

United Kingdom and British Home Waters

41. *Definition.* a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North.

b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.

42. *Army Tasks.* a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.

[26] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in cooperation with the Navy defend that island—Category of Defense "D".

43. *Army Forces.* Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces:

a. *British Isles.*

3 Heavy Bombardment Groups

2 Medium Bombardment Groups

3 Pursuit Groups

Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments

Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)

One reinforced Regiment (Token Force)

b. *Iceland.*

One reinforced Division.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.

44. *Navy Tasks and Forces.* a. *Northwest Escort Force.*

Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.

b. *Submarine Force Three.*

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

North Atlantic Area.

[27] 45. *Definition.* The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:

a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North.

b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North.

c. Western boundary, Longitude 40° West.

d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West.

46. *Navy Tasks and Forces.* a. *Submarine Force Two.*

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.

Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision.

b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

[28] 47. *Categories of Defense.* The Categories of Defense listed in this paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions.

Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, except United States Bases in Newfoundland.....	Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland.....	Category C
Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier.....	Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers.....	Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except Alaska.....	Category B
Alaska, Less Unalaska.....	Category C
Unalaska.....	Category D
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.....	Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier.....	Category E
<i>Note:</i> No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine Coastal Frontier.	
Bermuda.....	Category C
Iceland.....	Category D
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra.....	Category D
Guam.....	Category F

48. *Joint Plans to be prepared.* The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will be disregarded.

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as required by ABC-22.

c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.

d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports are located.

[29] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS

49. *Army Tasks.* Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.

50. *Navy Tasks.* Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transport Service.

51. *Overseas Movements of Army Troops.* The plan in this paragraph 51 is based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless M-day has occurred before such date.

a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop movements specified in this subparagraph a.

(1) *NEW YORK to ICELAND*, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.

First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24-M.

Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57-M.

These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(2) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M.

(3) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M.

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.

(4) *NEW YORK to BERMUDA*, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[30] (5) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to destination.

(6) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(7) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported. These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.

(8) *NEW YORK to IRELAND*, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(9) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.

(10) *NEW YORK to ENGLAND*, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be transported.

(11) *GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA*, 6,000 troops, embark on 15-M.

(12) *GALVESTON to TRINIDAD*, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M.

(13) *GALVESTON to PANAMA*, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(14) *GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO*, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

[31] (15) *SEATTLE to ALASKA*, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(16) *SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII*, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day.

(1) *GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA*, 24,000 troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.

(2) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN AMERICA*, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The 56 aircraft may be flown to destination.

(3) *NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINATIONS*, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum rate of movement 60,000 troops per month.

(4) *EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M.

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES

[32] 52. *Theaters of Operation.* The designation and delimitation of additional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.

53. *Time of Execution.* M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

54. *Personnel.* The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

55. *Ports of Embarkation.* The Army will establish, when required, additional ports of embarkation at:

New Orleans, La.

Galveston, Texas

Boston, Mass.

Charleston, S. C.

56. *Material.* The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject

o the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from production sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other with the material involved.

57. *Supply Levels.* Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this paragraph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved.

a. *Supplies other than ammunition.*

- (1) Iceland..... 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
- (2) British Isles..... Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
Pursuit Aircraft
60 days, build up to 120 days within six months.
- (3) Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers. 30 days, build up to 45 days within six months.
- (4) Newfoundland and Alaska (Less Unalaska). 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
- (5) Unalaska..... 60 days, build up to 90 days within six months.
- (6) Bermuda..... Maintain at 30 days.
- (7) Hawaii..... Maintain at 70 days.
- [34] (8) Philippines..... As the situation may permit, the desirable standard being the maintenance of stocks at 90 days' supply.

b. *Ammunition for places listed under 57 a:*

- (1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then maintain at that level.
- (2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then maintain five times the mobilization allowance.
- (3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days within six months.
- (4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' operations; build up to 120 days within six months.

58. *Industrial Planning.* For industrial planning purposes, and with due regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with the following general policy:

a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial needs.

b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as necessary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with national policy.

[35] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.

59. *Supporting Legislative Program.* The War and Navy Departments jointly shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan.

60. *Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.* The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained

through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships and all related means.

61. *Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government.* The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

- a. Intelligence Service.
- b. Censorship and Publicity.
- c. Mobilization of Resources.

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemisphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases.

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the Island of Fernando do Noronha.

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage opposition to the Axis Powers.

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.

37]

ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

“33. Joint organization and command.

“a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces; respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below.

NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies

Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a).

“b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

“c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

[38] “d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b."

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States, but including United States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22.

Southern.—Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River, Virginia—North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an officer, designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[39] "c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Newfoundland sector.

(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22.

The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

(2) New England sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, First Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors:

Northern boundary of Massachusetts.

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

(3) New York sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

Southern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

(4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector.

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton exclusive.

[41] Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.). Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.

Navy.—There is no naval commander of this sector. The Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval District, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts."

4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"35. Southern coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

[42] Southern.—The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south-eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that boundary.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

"c. Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively."

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded as follows:

[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a line direct to the place of beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"c. Sectors.—The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Guantanamo sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, Hispaniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal frontier boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

[44] Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.

(2) Puerto Rico sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

(3) Trinidad sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad."

6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35B. Panama coastal frontier.

[45] "a. Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South, longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

"c. Sectors.

The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Atlantic sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continental divide.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

(2) Pacific sector.

(a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District."

7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:

"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama coastal frontier."

8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:

"36. Pacific coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required by ABC-22.

[47] Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.

(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.—The Pacific coastal frontier is divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern boundary of California.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—

(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also designated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.

(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.

(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands the naval local defense force assigned to his district.

(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[48] "c. Sectors.—This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:

(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.

(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of California.

(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of Washington.

(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.

"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.

(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to Moelips, Wash., inclusive.

(6) Seattle subsector: Moelips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington.

[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West.

(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West.

9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

"36B. Philippine coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.

The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.

[50] "b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Philippine Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 4 there appears a map of the United States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex I. Coastal Frontiers". This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 2, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[1] APPENDIX II TO WPL-46, COMPOSITION OF FORCES

[2] CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.

2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number.

b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.

c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning purposes, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYe 20, etc.).

2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.

b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature (AP 60, AK 90, PY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.

2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and aircraft belong, as follows:

A—Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;

B—Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under construction;

C—Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government to be commissioned in the Navy;

[3] D—Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;

E—Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;

CG—Coast Guard vessels.

[4] CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, submarine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE

TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE BASE, COCO SOLO.

b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.

2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE.
18 VPB and necessary tenders;
2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders;
3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

[5] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, for the transportation of Army troops.

2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and submarines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE ATF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>BATTLESHIPS</i>			
Batdiv 3	BB	3	
Batdiv 5	BB	3	
<i>CRUISERS</i>			
CA 31	CA	1	
Crudiv 7	CA	4	
Crudiv 8	CL	4	
Crudiv 2	CL	4	
<i>DESTROYERS</i>			
AD 2, 12	AD	2	
DD 141, 187, 343	ODD	3	
Desdiv 54	ODD	4	
Desdiv 22	DD	4	
Desron 2	DD	9	
Desron 8	DD	9	
Desron 9	DD	8	1,850 tons.
Desron 13	DD	8	
<i>AIRCRAFT</i>			
Cardiv 3	CV	2	
CV 5	CV	1	
<i>Patwing 3</i>			
VP 31	VPB	12	
VP 32	VPB	12	
AVD 4, 9	AVD	2	
AVP 1, 9	AVP	2	
<i>Patwing 5</i>			
VP 51	VPB	12	
VP 52	VPB	12	
AVD 13	AVD	1	
AVP 3, 8	AVP	2	
<i>SUBMARINES</i>			
PG 53	PG	1	
<i>Subron 1</i>			
S/M Base, New London			
ASR 2	ASR	1	
Subdiv 11	OSS	8	
Subdiv 12	OSS	7	
<i>Exdiv 1</i>			
AG 24	AG	1	
SS 20, 48	OSS	2	
SS 204	SS	1	

TABLE ATF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>SUBMARINE—Continued.</i>			
<i>Subron 3</i>			
S/M Base, Coco Solo			
ASR 4	ASR	1	
Subdiv 31	OSS	6	
Subdiv 32	OSS	6	
<i>Subron 7</i>			
AS 5, 21	AS	2	
Subdiv 71	OSS	3	
Subdiv 72	OSS	7	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2			
S/M Base, St. Thomas			
<i>TRAIN VESSELS</i>			
AF 1, 9	AF	2	AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941.
AG 17	AG	1	
AKS 3	AKS	1	AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941.
AO 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26	AO	8	
AT 37, 66	AT	2	
AE 2	AE	1	To be assigned in August, 1941.
<i>MINECRAFT</i>			
<i>Minron 7</i>			
Mindiv 13	DMS	4	
Mindiv 14	AM	7	
<i>TRANSPORTS</i>			
Transdiv 1	AP	4	
Transdiv 11	APD	2	
<i>PATROL CRAFT</i>			
Subchaserdiv 31	PC	5	
DUANE (CG)	XPG	1	
INGHAM (CG)	XPG	1	
CAMPBELL (CG)	XPG	1	
SPENCER (CG)	XPG	1	
HAMILTON (CG)	XPG	1	
BIBB (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTH STAR (CG)	XPG	1	
NORTHLAND (CG)	XPG	1	
AG 29	AG	1	
<i>UNCLASSIFIED</i>			
IX 20	IX	1	
<i>NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA</i>			
<i>MOBILE BASE HOSPITAL NO. 1</i>			
<i>MARINE CORPS FORCES</i>			
First Marine Division			
First Marine Aircraft Group			
Fifth Defense Battalion			

[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

2-302. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE

- 12 VPB and necessary tenders,
- 2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR);

2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE

- 12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE PAF-1

Unit—Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
BATTLESHIPS			
Batdiv 1.....	BB	3	
Batdiv 2.....	BB	3	
Batdiv 4.....	BB	3	
CRUISERS			
Crudiv 4.....	CA	4	
Crudiv 6.....	CA	4	
Crudiv 9.....	CL	5	
DESTROYERS			
<i>Desflot 1</i>			
CL 7.....	CL	1	
AD 3, 4.....	AD	2	
Desron 1 (less one Desdiv).....	DD	5	
Desron 3, 5.....	DD	18	
<i>Desflot 2</i>			
CL 8.....	CL	1	
AD 11, 14.....	AD	2	
Desron 4, 6.....	DD	18	
Desdiv 50.....	ODD	4	
MINECRAFT			
CM 4.....	CM	1	
Mindiv 1, 2.....	DM	8	
AIRCRAFT			
Cardiv 1.....	CV	2	
Cardiv 2 (less CV 5).....	CV	1	
<i>Patwing 1</i>			
VP 11.....	VPB	12	
VP 12.....	VPB	6	
VP 13.....	VPB	5	
VP 14.....	VPB	12	
AV 1.....	AV	1	
AVD 6, 10.....	AVD	2	
AVP 4.....	AVP	1	
<i>Patwing 2</i>			
VP 21.....	VPB	12	
VP 22.....	VPB	12	
VP 23.....	VPB	12	
VP 24.....	VPB	12	
AV 4.....	AV	1	
AVD 11, 14.....	AVD	2	
AVP 7.....	AVP	1	
<i>Patwing 4</i>			
VP 41.....	VPB	6	
VP 42.....	VPB	6	
VP 43.....	VPB	6	To be formed about October 1, 1941.
VP 44.....	VPB	6	
AVD 2, 12.....	AVD	2	
AVP 5, 6.....	AVP	2	
SUBMARINES			
CL 9.....	CL	1	
<i>Subron 2</i>			
AS 3.....	AS	1	
ASR 5.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 21.....	SS	6	
Subdiv 22.....	SS	6	
<i>Subron 4</i>			
S/M Base, Pearl Harbor.....			
DD 336.....	ODD	1	
AM 30.....	AM	1	
ASR 1.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 41.....	OSS	6	
Subdiv 42.....	SS	4	Includes SM 1.
Subdiv 43.....	SS	5	
<i>Subron 6</i>			
Subdiv 61.....	SS	3	
Subdiv 62.....	SS	3	
BASE FORCE			
TRAIN VESSELS			
AE 1.....	AE	1	To be assigned in August, 1941.
AF 7, 8, 11.....	AF	3	
AG 16, 31.....	AG	2	
AH 1.....	AH	1	
AKS 1, 2.....	AKS	2	
AM 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43, 52.....	AM	10	
AO 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29.....	AO	14	
AR 1, 4.....	AR	2	
ARb 1.....	ARb	1	EXAD 13.
ARD 1.....	ARD	1	
AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65.....	AT	6	
TRANSPORTS			
Transdiv 2.....	AP	2	
Transdiv 4.....	AP	2	
Transdiv 12.....	APD	4	

TABLE PAF-1—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
<i>BASE FORCE—Continued</i>			
<i>MINE SQUADRON 3</i>			
DMS 13	DMS	1	
Mindiv 4	DMS	4	
Mindiv 5	DMS	4	
Mindiv 6	DMS	4	
<i>NAVAL STATION, GUAM</i>			
<i>NAVAL STATION, SAMOA</i>			
Seventh Defense Battalion			
<i>MARINE CORPS FORCES</i>			
Second Marine Division			
Second Marine Aircraft Group			
Second Defense Battalion			
Sixth Defense Battalion			

TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>CRUISERS</i>			
Crudiv 5	CA	4	

CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE

2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.

TABLE SEP-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>CRUISERS</i>			
Crudiv 3	CL	2	
<i>DESTROYERS</i>			
Desdiv 1 or 2	DD	4	As assigned by CinCpac.

CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET

2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

TABLE ASF-1

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>CRUISERS</i>			
CA 30	CA	1	
CL 12	CL	1	
<i>DESTROYERS</i>			
AD 9	AD	1	
Desron 29	ODD	13	
<i>AIRCRAFT</i>			
<i>Patwing 10</i>			
VP 101	VPB	12	
VP 102	VPB	12	
AV 3	AV	1	
AVD 1, 7	AVD	2	
AVP 2	AVP	1	
<i>SUBMARINES</i>			
<i>Subron 20</i>			
AS 9, 20	AS	2	
ASR 6	ASR	1	
Subdiv 201	OSS	6	
Subdiv 202	SS	4	
Subdiv 203	SS	7	
<i>PATROL CRAFT</i>			
PG 21, 22	PG	2	
PR 3, 4, 6, 7, 8	PR	5	
PY 10	PY	1	

TABLE ASF—Continued

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>TRAIN</i>			
AO 6, 13.....	AO	2	
AT 32.....	AT	1	
Mindiv 3.....	AM	2	
Mindiv 9.....	AM	4	
<i>MARINE CORPS FORCES</i>			
Marine Detachments			
Fourth Marines (Shanghai).....			
Marine Detachments (North China).....			
Marine Detachments (Philippines).....			

[7] CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, show the initial composition as of July 1, 1941.

a. *THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE*—TABLE NE-1.

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material preparation.

b. *SUBMARINE FORCE THREE*—TABLE NE-2.

TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>DESTROYERS</i>			
AD 15.....	AD	1	
Desron 7.....	DD	9	
Desrons 30, 31.....	ODD	18	
DD 341, Desdiv 53.....	ODD	5	
Desdiv 21.....	DD	4	
Mobile Destroyer Repair Units 1, 2.....			
<i>AIRCRAFT</i>			
<i>Patwing 7</i>			
VP 71.....	VPB	12	
VP 72.....	VPB	12	
VP 73.....	VPB	9	
VP 74.....	VPB	9	
AV 5.....	AV	1	
AVD 3, 8.....	AVD	2	
<i>Patwing 8</i>			
VP 81.....	VPB	12	
VP 82.....	VPB	12	
VP 83.....	VPB	12	
VP 84.....	VPB	12	
AVD 5.....	AVD	1	
<i>Patwing 9</i>			
VP 91.....	VPB	12	
VP 92.....	VPB	12	} This wing will be formed following completion of Patwing 8.
VP 93.....	VPB	12	
VP 94.....	VPB	12	
<i>Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, 2.....</i>			
<i>TRAIN VESSELS</i>			
AM 73, 74, 75, 77.....	AM	4	
AMc 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50.....	AMc	6	
<i>MARINE CORPS FORCES</i>			
Eleventh Provisional Marine Company.....			

TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE

Unit—Vessel	Symbol	No.	Notes
<i>SUBMARINES</i>			
<i>Subron 5</i>			
AS 13.....	AS	1	
ASR 3.....	ASR	1	
Subdiv 51.....	OSS	7	
Subdiv 52.....	OSS	4	
Subdiv 53.....	OSS	6	
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3.....			

CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the Chief of Naval Operations.

TABLE CNO-1.

Unit - Vessel	Sym- bol	No.	Notes
AG 1	AG	1	
AG 23	AG	1	SeeNav Yacht.
AG 25, 26	AG	2	President's Yacht and tender.
AG 30, 32	AG	2	Survey vessels.
AM 40	AM	1	BuOrd duty.
PG 52	PG	1	Tender for PT's and PTC's.
MTB Squadron 1	PT	6	
MTB Squadron 2	PT	7	
Subchaser Squadron 1	PTC	4	
COMANCHE (CG)	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
ALGONQUIN (CG)	XPY	1	Greenland Patrol.
MODOC (CG)	XPG	1	Greenland Patrol.
RARITAN (CG)	XYT	1	Greenland Patrol.
IX 50	IX	1	Greenland Patrol.
SS 206 to 211 incl.	SS	6	In commission or to be commis- sioned and to operate either un- der the CNO or CimClant for temporary duty. To be assigned to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

[8]

CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following general rules:

a. *TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES*

1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels").

2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval Local Defense Forces.

3. District Craft (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.

b. *TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT*

1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.

c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or in the status "in commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are operating.

[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy.

2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces in tabular form.

- 1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit)----- Column (1).
- 2. Sub-group----- Column (2).
- 3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations)----- Column (3).
- 4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which the vessel is to be mobilized)----- Column (4).

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.

2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in Column (4), where mobilization will take place.

[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration of the following:

- a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the Mobilization;
- b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;
- c. Equipment available;
- d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;
- e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no conversion.

2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
PE 19, 27, 48, 55, 56.....	5 PE	A		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
PY 12, 13, 15, 16.....	4 PY	A		
PG 17, 18, 54.....	3 PG	A		
VPB.....	18 VPB	A	USAF	
AV or AVD or AVP.....	number as required..	A	USAF	
ZNP.....	6 ZNP	A	IV ND	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, Salem, Mass.....				
Air Station, New York, N. Y.....				
Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C.....				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 1.....	1 XPG	D	CNO	I
XPG 2, 3.....	2 XPG	D	CNO	III
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 1 to 30 incl.....	30 XYP	D	I ND	I
XAGs 1, 2.....	2 XAGs	D	I ND	I
XAM 1 to 4 incl.....	4 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 1 to 9 incl.....	9 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 1, 2.....	2 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in I ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 31.....	1 XYP	D	III ND	III
XAM 5 to 13 incl.....	9 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 10 to 14 incl.....	5 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 3 to 16 incl.....	14 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in III ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 1.....	1 XCMc	D	I ND	I
XPYc 1, 2.....	2 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 3, 4.....	2 XPYc	D	IV ND	IV
XAGs 3.....	1 XAGs	D	IV ND	IV
XAM 14 to 21 incl.....	8 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 15 to 24 incl.....	10 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 17 to 19 incl.....	3 XAMc	D	IV ND	IV
XAMc 20.....	1 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in IV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 2.....	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V
XYP 32 to 38 incl.....	7 XYP	D	V ND	V
XAGs 4.....	1 XAGs	D	V ND	V
XAM 22, 23.....	2 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMc 21 to 31 incl.....	11 XAMc	D	V ND	V
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in V ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
<i>NAVAL COASTAL FORCE</i>				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
None				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
MOJAVE, TAMPA	240' 2 XPG	CG	VI ND	VI
TALLAPOOSA	Misc. 1 XPY	CG	VI ND	VI
MOHAWK	167' 1 XPY	CG	IV ND	VI
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, Charleston, S. C.				
Air Station, Miami, Fla.				
Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla.				
Air Station, Biloxi, Miss.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 4	1 XPG	D	CNO	VI
XPY 1 to 4 incl	4 XPY	D	III ND	III
<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT</i>				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 3	1 XCMc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 5, 6	2 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XYP 39 to 44 incl	6 XYP	D	VI ND	VI
XAGs 5, 6	2 XAGs	D	VI ND	VI
XAM 24 to 27 incl	4 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 25 to 31 incl	7 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMb 32 to 34 incl	3 XAMb	D	VI ND	VI
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in VI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</i>				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPYc 7, 8	2 XPYc	D	I ND	I
XPYc 9, 10	2 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XAGs 7, 8	2 XAGs	D	VII ND	VII
XAM 28, 29	2 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 35, 36	2 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 32 to 35 incl	4 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in VII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT</i>				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMc 4	1 XCMc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 11 to 18 incl	8 XPYc	D	IX ND	VIII
XYP 45 to 50 incl	6 XYP	D	VIII ND	VIII
XYP 51 to 55 incl	5 XYP	D	V ND	V
XAGs 9 to 11 incl	3 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII
XAMb 37 to 40 incl	4 XAMb	D	VIII ND	VIII
XAMc 36 to 40 incl	5 XAMc	D	I ND	I
XAMc 41 to 43 incl	3 XAMc	D	VI ND	VI

TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued				
<i>Units Ashore</i> As indicated in VIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i> Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE CACF.—CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67.....	5 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
PY 18.....	1 PY	A		
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USAF	
AV or AVP or AVD.....	number as required	A	USAF	
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 6, 7.....	2 XPG	D	CNO	X
XPC 2, 3, 4.....	3 XPC	D	III ND	III
XPY 8.....	1 XPY	D	V ND	V
XPY 9, 10.....	2 XPY	D	III ND	III
XPYc 24 to 27 incl.....	4 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 28 to 31 incl.....	4 XPYc	D	I ND	I
XYP 128 to 131 incl.....	4 XYP	D	IV ND	IV
XAM 42 to 47 incl.....	6 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 61 to 66 incl.....	6 XAMb	D	V ND	V
XAMb 67 to 70 incl.....	4 XAMb	D	I ND	I
XAMc 93 to 102 incl.....	10 XAMc	D	I ND	I
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in X ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.				

TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 67.....	4 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
PG 50.....	1 PG	A		
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USAF	
AV or AVP or AVD.....	number as required.....	A	USAF	
<i>Coast Guard Vessels:</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources.</i>				
XCMc 6.....	1 XCMc	D	V ND	V
XPC 5, 6.....	2 XPC	D	III ND	III
XPY 11 to 14 incl.....	4 XPY	D	IX ND	VIII
XPYc 32 to 43 incl.....	12 XPYc	D	III ND	III
XPYc 44 to 46 incl.....	3 XPYc	D	V ND	V
XPYc 47.....	1 XPYc	D	VI ND	VI
XYP 132 to 141.....	10 XYP	D	IV ND	IV
XAGs 16, 17.....	2 XAGs	D	VIII ND	VIII
XAM 48 to 50 incl.....	3 XAM	D	I ND	I
XAMb 71, 72.....	2 XAMb	D	V ND	V
XAMc 103 to 116 incl.....	14 XAMc	D	V ND	V
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE PSCF.—PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub- group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
ODD Desdiv 70, 83.....	8 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
PE 32, 38.....	2 PE	A		
PY 14.....	1 PY	A		
VPB.....	12 VPB	A		
AV or AVD or AVP number as required.....		A	USPF USFF	
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
TANEY.....	327' 1 XPG	CG	IXV ND	XI
SHAWNEE.....	Misc. 1 XPY	CG	XII ND	XII
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, San Francisco, Calif.....				
Air Station, San Diego, Calif.....				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPG 5.....	1 XPG	D	CNO	XII
XPY 5, 6, 7.....	3 XPY	D	XI ND	XI
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:				
<i>Navy Vessels:</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels:</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources:</i>				
XCMe 5.....	1 XCMe	D	III ND	III
XPC 1.....	1 XPC	D	XI ND	XI
XYP 93 to 97 incl.....	5 XYP	D	XI ND	XI
XAGs 14.....	1 XAGs	D	XI ND	XI
XAM 39 to 41 incl.....	3 XAM	D	XI ND	XI
XAMb 51 to 60 incl.....	10 XAMb	D	XI ND	XI
XAMc 65 to 86 incl.....	22 XAMc	D	XI ND	XI
<i>Units Ashore:</i>				
As indicated in XI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces:</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.				
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XYP 98 to 127 incl.....	30 XYP	D	XII ND	XII
XAGs 15.....	1 XAGs	D	XII ND	XII
XAMc 87 to 92 incl.....	6 XAMc	D	XII ND	XII
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE PNCF.—PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 82.....	5 ODD	A		Administration in U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
PG 51.....	1 PG	A		
PE 57.....	1 PE	A		
SS.....	2 SS	A	USPF	
ASR.....	1 ASR	A	USPF	
VPB.....	12 VPB	A	USPF	
AV or AVD or AVP number as required.....		A	USPF	

TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
AURORA 165' B 1 XPC	CG	XI ND	XIII	
<i>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</i>				
Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.				
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XPYe 19 to 23 incl. 5 XPYe	D	XI ND	XIII	
XYP 56 to 92 incl. 37 XYP	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAGs 12, 13 2 XAGs	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAM 30 to 38 incl. 9 XAM	D	XI ND	XIII	
XAMb 41 to 50 incl. 10 XAMb	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAMc 44 to 64 incl. 21 XAMc	D	XIII ND	XIII	
XAOB 1, 2 2 XAOB	D	CNO	XIII	
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XIII ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

TABLE HCF.—HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

Unit—Vessel (1)	Sub-group (2)	From (3)	Mob. Dist. (4)	Notes (5)
<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE</i>				
<i>Navy Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.				
ODD Desdiv 80 4 ODD	A			
PG 19 1 PG	A			
<i>Coast Guard Vessels</i>				
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.				
DAPHNE 165' B 1 XPC	CG	XII ND	XII	
<i>Vessels from Other Sources</i>				
XCMe 7 1 XCMe	D	V ND	V	
XYP 142 to 167 incl. 26 XYP	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAM 51 to 55 incl. 5 XAM	D	I ND	I	
XAM 56 1 XAM	D	XII ND	XII	
XAMc 117 to 119 incl. 3 XAMc	D	XIV ND	XIV	
XAOB 3, 4 2 XAOB	D	CNO	XIV	
XYF 1 to 5 incl. 5 XYF	D	XIV ND	XIV	
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XIV ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				
First Defense Battalion				
Third Defense Battalion				

TABLE PhCF.—PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

<i>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</i>				
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.				
<i>Units Ashore</i>				
As indicated in XVI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.				
<i>Marine Corps Forces</i>				
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.				

[11]

CHAPTER XI. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.

EXHIBIT No. 5

My

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 21, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[ii] *U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)*

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac-46

Subject Matter	Page Number	Change in Effect
Promulgating letter: CincPac file A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W of July 21, 1941.	i.....	Original
List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46	ii.....	"
Table of Corrections	iii.....	"
Distribution List	iv.....	"
Title Page	1.....	"
Table of Contents	2, 2a, 2b.....	"
Parts I to V (incl.)	3-52 incl.....	"
	52a-52b incl.....	"
	53-56 incl.....	"
	56a-56d incl.....	"
	57-74 incl.....	"
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Annex II	II-1 to II-9 incl.....	"
Annex III	III-1 to III-5 incl.....	"
Annex IV	IV-1 to IV-3 incl.....	"

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Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of officer entering change
.....
.....
.....

DISTRIBUTION LIST

[iv]

Official to Whom Issued	Registered Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	10, 11
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor)	12, 13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comarbatfor)	14, 15
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Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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SECRET

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

Chapter I—Task Organization.

Chapter II—Assumptions.

Chapter III—Information.

b. In Part II are incorporated:

Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.

Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One.....	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two.....	B-1, "
Task Force Three.....	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force.....	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force.....	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force.....	F-1, "
Base Force.....	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9]

PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. *TASK FORCE ONE* Commander Battle Force

Batdivs 2, 4.....	6 BB
SARATOGA.....	1 CV
Crudiv 3, 9.....	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9.....	4 OCL#
	2 DL
	16 DD#
	2 AD

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. *TASK FORCE TWO* Commander Aircraft Battle Force

Batdiv 1.....	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN.....	1 CV
Crudiv 5.....	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50.....	1 OCL
	8 DD
	2 AD

(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

3. *TASK FORCE THREE* Commander Scouting Force

Crudiv 4, 6.....	8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA.....	1 CV
Desrons 4, 5.....	2 DL
	16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindiv 5, 6.....	5 DM
Available Transports Base Force.....	— AP
	— APD
2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.	
2d Marine Air Group.	

[12]	4. <i>TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)</i> Commander Aircraft Scouting Force	
	All units of Aircraft Scouting Force.....	107 VP 2 AV 2 AVP 4 AVD
	Utility Squadron from Base Force.....	10 VJR
	5. <i>TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)</i> Commander Submarines Scouting Force	
	All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School..	30 SS 2 OSS 1 SM 1 ODD 3 AS 2 ASR 1 AM
	6. <i>TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)</i> Commander Minecraft Battle Force	
	All units of Minecraft Battle Force.....	1 CM 8 DM
	7. <i>TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)</i> Commander Base Force	
	All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.	8 DMS 4 AF 6 AT 1 AH 13 AO 2 AR 1 ARD 2 AK 2 AE 1 AKS 10 AM 4 AG Utility Wing

- [13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reinforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. *General Assumptions*

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.

4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con-

tained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1). Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] *Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

- e. Capture of Northern Borneo.
 - d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
 - e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
 - f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
 - b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reinforcement of the Mandates.
 - c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
 - d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
 - e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
 - f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.
- [23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.
- h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

- a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
- b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
- c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
- d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;
- e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
- f. Defend Guam in category "F";
- g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces:
- h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
- i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
- j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;
- k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSION

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
 - b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
 - c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
 - d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
 - e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
 - f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
 - g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
 - h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- (26) 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
 - k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
 - m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
 - b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
 - c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
 - d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
 - e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
 - f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
 - g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
- i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
 - j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
 - k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
 - l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy basic plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[29] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
 750 men
 6 5''/51 caliber guns
 12 3''/50 caliber AA guns
 30 0.50 caliber machine guns
 30 0.30 caliber machine guns
 4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
 2 5''/51 caliber guns
 4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
 101 men
 4 5''/51 caliber guns
 4 3''/50 caliber AA guns
 4 0.50 caliber machine guns
 4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
 620 men
 4 5''/51 caliber guns
 8 3''/50 caliber AA guns
 20 0.50 caliber machine guns
 16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE);

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task.*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* and *Two*

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect.)

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

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CHAPTER I. PHASE I

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five and Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39] CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the

defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be V. J. Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252. a. 1. *Special Information*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*3331. *Task Force Three* will:

- a. Continue training for landing attacks.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.
- c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
- d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

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[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] *CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN*

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and thenational interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54]

CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For.	{ 2 OCL..... 1 Desdiv.....	} When directed..	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CL.....	W-Day.....	
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB..... 1 AVD..... 1 AVP.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS..... 1 ASR.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
	Taskfor 3.....	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[55]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM..... 8 DM.....	} J-Day.....	Until further orders.
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
All Forces.....	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.....	When directed..	
	Task for 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	For escort duty. To revert on completion.

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b]

CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c]

CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d]

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58]

CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59]

CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60]

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] *Section 1. Phase I*

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ mincraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ mincraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from *Task Force Six*, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from *Task Force Seven* for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Aircofer Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to *Task Force Three*.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under Commander *Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—

(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One.* Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two.* Commander Aircraft, Battle Force — Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One* plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three.* Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

[69]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three.*

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reenforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

- (2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).
- 4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.
- 5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
- (b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
- (c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan
No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 - (b) Task Force Two.
 - (c) Task Force Three.
 - (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 - (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 - (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 - (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan I-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2. *Phase I*

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- [I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

- (b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;
- (c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

- 3. (a) *Task Force One.*
- (1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.
- [I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reinforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reinforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reinforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reinforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

 Admiral, U. S. Navy,
 Commander-in-Chief,
 United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. _____

Initial Task Organization.

(a). *Task Force One*.

(b). *Task Force Two*.

(c). *Task Force Three*.

- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information*.—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reenforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing

parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;
- guns and observation posts;
- mines;
- channel and beach obstructions;
- other defense installations;
- beaches suitable for landing operations;
- extent of anchorage area;
- hydrographic, topographic, and meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

- combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
- other ships;
- fuel tanks;
- power and radio installations;
- troop concentrations;
- storehouses;
- other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on fixed objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two*, to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.

No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kes. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 ke) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 ke series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 ke, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime*.—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show *green* colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders

of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-3] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

EXHIBIT No. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

Prepared by the Joint Board, 1927; revised by the Joint Board, 1935. [J. B. No. 350 (Serial No. 514)] (Confidential)

[SEAL] Approved by the Acting Secretary of War, September 16, 1935.

[SEAL] Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, September 19, 1935.

[iii] 1. The policies and procedure enunciated herein are published for the information and guidance of the Army and the Navy.

2. It is vital to success in war that the Army and the Navy so coordinate their action as to produce the most effective mutual support. To accomplish this, it is essential that both services have a common, definite understanding of their respective functions in national defense and of the approved methods for attaining coordination in operations.

3. The aim of this publication is to assemble in one volume all joint policies, agreements, or instructions which have been approved by the War and Navy Departments, with a view to securing effective coordination. It is divided into two parts:

PART I.—Policies to govern joint action of the Army and the Navy.

PART II.—Policies, agreements, and joint instructions which, by providing effective organization and agencies for coordination, and by enunciating standard practice, promote harmonious joint action.

4. The loose-leaf form is adopted, in order to facilitate revision and to permit the addition of new subject matter.

5. This publication supersedes "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" published April 23, 1927, which is rescinded. The pamphlets entitled "Joint Overseas Expeditions" and "Regulations, Maneuver Rules and Umpire Instructions for Joint Army and Navy Exercises" are incorporated in this publication as Chapters VI and VII, respectively, and their classification changed to "Confidential."

GEORGE H. DERN,
Secretary of War.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
Secretary of the Navy.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1935.

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PART I

POLICIES TO GOVERN JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

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POLICY GOVERNING THE RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

1. *Purposes of statement of policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to distinguish between the functions of the Army and the Navy in such a manner as to establish an authoritative and adequate basis for developing, planning, procurement, and training of each service; and for their guidance in joint operations.

2. *Constitutional basis.*

a. The Army and Navy are maintained to secure the objectives stated in the Preamble to the Constitution:

“* * in insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare * * *”

They are required by the national need for political and territorial security; for the support of our national policies; and for the assurance of the supply of materials vital to the existence of the Nation.

b. The Army and Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President, either expressed or implied, and are directed to a common end.

3. *Common mission of Army and Navy.*—Jointly and in cooperation, to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States in peace and in war.

4. *General functions of the Army and the Navy.*

a. To accomplish the above mission, the Army performs functions that normally pertain to land operations, the Navy performs functions that normally pertain to sea operations. The air forces of the Army are an integral part of the land forces. The air forces of the [2] Navy are an integral part of the sea forces. The Marine Corps is likewise an integral part of the sea forces. Land and sea operations each include air operations connected and coordinated therewith. The President has the power to make exceptions to any general allocation of functions; and, in some cases, due to the nature of the forces available, the functions of one service may be performed temporarily by the other service; but sea operations by the Army are proper only when immediately auxiliary to or in support of normal Army functions, and, similarly, land operations by the Navy are proper only when immediately auxiliary to or in support of normal Navy functions.

b. The Army and the Navy have joint responsibilities in joint operations. In such operations, it is the duty of the commander of the service which is not invested with the primary responsibility for the conduct of an operation, to render every possible assistance to the commander of the service which is invested with such primary responsibility, to the end that ultimate success will rest with our arms. The spirit of this paragraph should also govern in the preparation of war plans.

c. In order that the most effective cooperation may be attained, the following general principles will govern:

(1) Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and weapons used by the other service in carrying out its functions.

(2) Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the area of operations of the other service in carrying out its functions.

(3) Each service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other service in carrying out its functions.

5. *General functions of the Army.*a. *General functions of the Army in peace and war.*

(1) To provide for and to prepare the land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the land forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To defend the continental United States and its overseas possessions, to include the defense of all permanent naval bases.

[3] (3) To support the national policies of the United States and to furnish land forces for the occupation of foreign territory in protection of the interests of the United States.

(4) To protect the United States from internal disorder or insurrection.

b. *Additional general functions of the Army in war.*

(1) To conduct effective military operations.

(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases.

(3) To provide such forces as may be necessary for joint overseas expeditions.

6. *General functions of the Navy.*

a. *General functions of the Navy in peace and war.*

(1) To provide for and to prepare the sea forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the sea forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.

(3) To support the national policies and commerce of the United States.

(4) To assist the Army in the suppression of internal disorder or insurrection.

b. *Additional general functions of the Navy in war.*

(1) To conduct effective naval operations.

(2) to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States.

[5]

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

7. *Coordination—General considerations.*

a. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires that the efforts of the Army and the Navy be properly coordinated.

b. The method employed for coordinating the operations of forces of the Army and of the Navy depends upon the geographical location of the theaters of operations, the character and relative strength of our own and enemy forces, and the consequent nature of the contemplated operations, whether these be independent or joint operations.

c. Independent operations of forces of the Army and of the Navy are those in which the forces of one service can give no tactical support to the forces of the other service. When independent operations are conducted by both services simultaneously within the same or strategically interdependent theaters of operations, coordination may be required in the assignment of missions or objectives, or in timing the operations.

d. Joint operations are those usually requiring tactical coordination of forces of the Army and of the Navy for the accomplishment of a common mission.

e. Under all conditions, coordination is primarily ensured by assigning missions in the joint basic war plan to the Army and to the Navy.

f. When coordination is required in the conduct of independent operations, it will be effected by the commander of each service working in close cooperation with the commander of the other service.

[6] g. Under conditions requiring joint operations, coordination is effected either by the exercise of unity of command, or by the exercise of limited unity of command, as determined by paramount interest.

8. *Paramount interest.*

a. The service whose operations are of the greater importance for the accomplishment of a joint mission in a joint operation has paramount interest in such an operation.

b. The fact that one service has paramount interest in a joint operation does not automatically confer paramount interest upon that service in all subordinate operations thereunder. The senior officer of the service having paramount interest in the main operation shall designate the service to have paramount interest in subordinate operations as far as the necessity for this designation can be foreseen. In case paramount interest has not been determined and announced for subordinate or local operations, the senior officer present of the service which has paramount interest in the operation to which such subordinate or local operation is immediately subordinate shall determine and announce it.

c. The commander of the force invested with paramount interest in a joint operation is charged with the authority and responsibility for coordinating the operation of the forces employed therein. Coordination under paramount interest will be effected as outlined below.

9. *Coordination by the exercise of unity of command.*

a. Unity of command in a joint operation vests in one commander the authority and responsibility for designating the missions and for controlling the action of the Army and the Navy forces participating.

b. The President as Commander in Chief may appoint an Army or a naval officer to exercise unity of command over forces of the Army and the Navy engaged in joint operations.

c. Where the magnitude and character of the operations warrant, a commander exercising unity of command shall have a headquarters separate and distinct from those of the commanders of the forces of the two services, and shall deal with these forces as coordinate elements of his command.

[7] d. Unity of command empowers the commander to coordinate the operations of the forces of both services assigned to his command, by the organization of task, forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the provision of logistic support; and to exercise such control during the progress of the operations as will insure the most effective effort toward the accomplishment of the common mission.

e. Unity of command does not contemplate the issue by the commander of instructions as to dispositions for, or methods of, operation in the accomplishment of missions assigned solely to forces of the service to which the commander does not belong, nor control of the administration, discipline, or technique of the operations of such forces.

f. The appointment of a commander authorized to exercise unity of command carries with it the power further to delegate this authority, whenever in the opinion of such commander such action is necessary. When this is the case, such commander will determine which service has paramount interest in subordinate joint operations under his control and will appoint a subordinate commander, either Army or Navy, to exercise unity of command or limited unity of command over task forces organized for the purpose of conducting the subordinate joint operations.

10. *Coordination by the exercise of limited unity of command.*

a. Limited unity of command in a joint operation vests in the commander of the force having paramount interest, the authority and responsibility for designating the missions of the Army and the Navy forces participating. It does not include the authority and responsibility to control the action of the forces of the service not having paramount interest.

b. In the exercise of limited unity of command in a joint operation:

(1) The commander of the force of the service having paramount interest is authorized and required to designate the missions of the Army force and the Navy force participating in the joint operation.

(2) The commander of the force of the service not having paramount interest is required to execute the mission assigned by the commander of the service having paramount interest and to render all possible assistance to that commander. In executing such mission the commander of the service not having paramount interest does not yield the actual command of his force. He shall, however, be held responsible by the next superior in command in his own service for properly and wholeheartedly coordinating his activities with those of the commander having paramount interest.

11. *Joint basic war plans, joint operation plans, and joint operation orders to state method of coordination.*—Each joint basic war plan, joint operation plan or joint operation order shall assign paramount interest and shall prescribe for each phase of a campaign or phase of an operation how the operations of the forces of the Army and the Navy are to be coordinated. Where unity of command is specified, the plan or order will state whether an Army officer or a naval officer is to be designated to exercise such command.

12. *Coordination of air operations.*

a. When a force of one service supports by aircraft only a force of the service having paramount interest in the particular operation, unity of command for the conduct of the participating air forces shall be immediately vested in the commander of the force to be supported.

b. In other cases, when air units of the Army and the Navy are combined into one task force for the accomplishment of a common mission, the commander assigning the mission shall determine paramount interest and shall designate an officer to exercise unity of command over such task force during the conduct of the operation.

13. *Coordination in coastal frontier defense.*

a. In coastal frontier defense the Navy is responsible for the patrol of the coastal zone and for the control and protection of shipping therein; the Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. Subject to the provisions of

subparagraphs *b*, *c*, *d*, and *e* below, the Army's responsibility for the direct defense of the coast includes the operations necessary to repel attacks directed against the land frontiers or coasts of the continental United States or against its overseas possessions; and to repel enemy movements directed against adjacent foreign territory on the continent from which such attacks could be launched.

[9] *b*. In operations against enemy forces approaching the coast, but still outside of defensive coastal areas, paramount interest will be vested initially in the Navy, but will pass to the Army when it is apparent that the enemy forces intend to attack a shore objective.

c. In operations within a defensive coastal area, paramount interest will be vested in the Army, except when it is apparent that the objective of the enemy force is shipping within the coastal zone.

d. When the Fleet, as distinguished from naval local defense forces, is strategically present and free to act, paramount interest in operations at sea rests with the Navy. If any Army air force joins in such operations, it will be in conjunction with and under the temporary command of the naval commander as outlined in paragraph 12.

e. When enemy forces approach close enough to threaten or to launch a direct attack against our territory, and the Fleet, as distinguished from naval local defense forces, is not strategically present, or is not free to act, paramount interest shifts to the Army and the function of the Navy is to support the Army. In this case, except in joint air operations connected therewith, coordination will be under limited unity of command. Coordination of joint air operations will be as outlined in paragraph 12.

14. *Coordination in joint overseas expeditions.*—The method of coordination, whether under unity of command or limited unity of command, for joint overseas expeditions will be prescribed in joint Army and Navy basic war plans or by the authority ordering a joint overseas expedition under the principles outlined above.

15. *Coordination in special situations.*

a. Special situations may arise in which the forces of one service will be acting tactically with forces of the other service in operations, the character of which would normally make them distinctive operations of but one service. These special situations would include such operations as:

(1) The operations of Army forces in a country in which the character and extent of waterways make it practicable and desirable to utilize naval means in support of the Army operations.

(2) Employment of air forces of the Army in support of naval forces engaged in operations such as those connected with the control of coastal zones and sea lanes.

[10] *b*. In such special situations the organization of the forces of the assisting service should be maintained intact and the operations coordinated by the exercise of unity of command. The commander who exercises unity of command should be selected from the service which is conducting the operation.

[11]

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION

16. *Types.*

a. Independent operations.

b. Joint operations which are generally of two classes:

(1) Joint overseas expeditions.

(2) Coastal frontier defense.

17. *Tasks of Army and Navy forces in joint operations.*—The normal Army and Navy tasks enumerated below are to serve as guides in the planning and execution of operations in which Army and Navy forces jointly participate. This statement of tasks also indicates in which service authority for coordination should be vested for various forms of joint operations. When Army forces participating in joint operations move overland, tactical coordination of the Army and Navy forces will be exercised when the forces of the two services approach the objective to within supporting distance of each other.

18. *Joint overseas expeditions.*

a. *Joint overseas expeditions include:*

(1) Joint overseas movements.

(2) Landing attacks against shore objectives.

b. *Joint overseas movements.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To provide and operate all vessels for the Army, except when naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case they are provided and operated by the Navy.

(b) To assemble the Army troops, together with their equipment and supplies, at designated ports of embarkation.

[12] (c) To provide and operate the Army ports of embarkation.

(d) To load transports, whether these are provided by the Army or the Navy, for the transportation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies, subject to Navy approval as to stability of vessels.

(e) To load in readiness for operation such aircraft and armament as can be made available to assist the Navy during the movement at sea or in landing operations.

(f) To organize and operate shore installations used primarily for debarkation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint overseas movements are:

(a) To maintain sea lines of supply.

(b) When naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected—

1. To procure, man, equip, and operate the vessels necessary to transport Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

2. To assemble the necessary transports at designated ports of embarkation at the times specified by the commanders of the ports of embarkation.

3. To provide for security of transports at sea.

4. To provide in outlying ports means for the embarkation, or debarkation, of Army troops, equipment and supplies, when such means cannot be provided or obtained by the Army.

c. *Landing attacks against shore objectives.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in landing attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are:

(a) The deployment into boats used for landing, these boats being operated by the Navy.

(b) The delivery of rifle and machine-gun fire from landing boats, except from such machine guns as are parts of the naval equipment of the boats.

[13] (c) The deployment from the landing boats and the gaining of a foothold on shore.

(d) The organization of a beachhead.

(e) The organization and conduct of operations to extend the beachhead.

(f) The conduct of operations beyond the beachhead for the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are:

(a) Naval forces.

1. To provide adequate reconnaissance.

2. To provide the defense against enemy naval forces during landing operations.

3. To provide, man, equip, and operate the small craft required for landing operations.

4. To cover the landing by mine sweeping, gunfire, aircraft, and screening operations.

5. To provide signal communications between ships and shore.

6. To organize and operate the necessary sea lines of supply for forces on shore.

(b) *Marine forces.*—Marines organized as landing forces perform the same functions as above stated for the Army, whether operating with the Navy alone or in conjunction with the Army and Navy.

13. *Coastal frontier defense.*

a. Attacks against our coastal frontiers may be classified as follows:

(1) Major operations, i. e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and

(2) Minor operations, i. e., raids against shipping or shore objectives.

b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory.

[14] c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are:

(1) To provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the direct defense of the coast.

(2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor defenses.

d. In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain—

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

(3) A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

(4) Controlled mines and their appurtenances, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(5) A system of underwater listening posts.

(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol.

(7) Fixed underwater obstructions in connection with controlled mine barrages.

(8) Additional mobile forces required in accordance with the situation.

e. The general function of the Navy in coastal frontier defense is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

f. The specific functions of the Navy in coastal frontier defense are:

(1) To control and protect shipping in the coastal zones.

(2) To conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast.

(3) To support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

[15] *g.* In carrying out these functions the Navy will:

(1) Provide and operate—

(*a*) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(*b*) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instruction with the Army.

(*c*) Contact mines, nets, and booms, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(*d*) Inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater obstructions other than beach defenses; for the control and protection of shipping in passage through defensive sea areas; for the control of shipping in defensive coastal areas, and for the prevention of enemy mining and submarine operations.

(*e*) Underwater listening posts for naval use where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts.

(*f*) Through the Lighthouse Service, when turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation, and to change them as necessary.

(*g*) An information system through the Coast Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses and light vessels.

(*h*) Necessary mine-sweeping vessels.

(2) Provide and maintain such fixed underwater obstructions as are component parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(3) Operate gates through nets.

(4) Conduct shipping through channels in mine fields or obstructions.

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CHAPTER IV

FUNCTIONS OF ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS

20. General functions.

a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy stated in chapter I, Policy Governing the Respective Functions of the Army and of the Navy. Under this policy:

(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

b. Aircraft, by their nature, are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions. Available air strength should therefore be used whenever possible by either service in support of the other.

c. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may temporarily execute Army functions under like conditions.

21. *Primary functions.*

a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

b. These primary functions are:

(1) The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

[18] (2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

22. *Secondary functions.*

a. Second functions of the air component of the Army are:

(1) Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

(3) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

(2) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

23. *Provisions to minimize duplication.*

a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones.

c. Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.

d. When estimated aircraft production and procurement do not meet the requirements of the Army and the Navy under any specific war plan, The Joint Board will make allocation in numbers and priorities of airplanes to the Army and Navy, respectively.

[19] e. Allocations of production and procurement facilities for airplanes to meet the needs of any joint war plan shall be made to the Army and Navy, respectively, by The Joint Board upon the recommendation of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Allocations may be proposed to the Army and Navy Munitions Board by the Aeronautical Board.

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PART II

POLICIES, AGREEMENTS, JOINT INSTRUCTIONS, AND JOINT AGENCIES

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CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER V

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

Section I

Introduction and Definitions

24. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present the principles and measures necessary for the effective joint organization and conduct of operations in coastal frontier defense and the method of planning involved and the responsibilities of the two services in connection therewith, in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. (See pars. 13 and 19, pt. I, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

25. *Purpose of coastal frontier defense.*

a. A *coastal frontier* is a geographical division of our coastal area established defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
- (2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
- (3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;
- (4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.

[28] 26. *Definitions.*—In order to provide a common basis of understanding between the Army and the Navy in the employment of forces in coastal frontier defense, the following definitions of terms employed are hereby established:

a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors.

b. Coastal frontier defense is the organization of the forces and matériel of the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

c. The naval district is a military and administrative command ashore established for the purpose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities outside the Navy Department proper, and for the further purpose of centralizing under one command within the district and the waters thereof:

(1) For military coordination, all naval activities; and

(2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific exceptions.

The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal zones. The limits of the naval districts are laid down in the Navy Regulations. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the direct representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.

[29] *d. Naval local defense forces* consist of naval forces, including Coast Guard and Lighthouse Service, afloat and ashore, attached to a naval district and under the command of the commandant of the district. These forces are not a part of the Fleet.

e. A naval base is a center from which men-of-war can operate and be maintained.

f. An army is a military organization or unit composed of a headquarters, a body of auxiliary troops and trains called army troops, and two or more corps temporarily assigned, the number of corps depending upon the nature of the service required. To these may be added a special assignment of GHQ aviation, GHQ reserve artillery, cavalry divisions, and other troops varying in number and composition according to the task assigned. As thus constituted, an army has both territorial and tactical functions. It is the largest self-contained military unit and may act independently or may form part of a group of armies or other higher organization.

g. A corps area is a territorial and administrative command within the continental area of the United States, established for purposes of administration, training, and tactical control during peace time and for the conduct of mobilization and other functions of the zone of the interior in war.

h. A coast artillery district is a military command within a certain corps area which contains harbor defenses. It is established for the purpose of decentralizing the corps area commander's functions of discipline, instruction, and routine training of the coast artillery troops within the corps area. When frontier commands, sectors, and subsectors come into active existence, coast artillery districts as such cease to exist and all coast artillery troops, including the district staff, located within the frontier, sector, or subsector automatically become part of the frontier, sector, or subsector command as the case may be. The coast artillery district commander automatically becomes a coastal frontier or sector commander, as prescribed in section IV of this chapter and/or in specific war plans. As frontier commander, he is responsible to the army commander as long as the latter retains tactical responsibility within the area. Upon departure of the army commander, the frontier commander is responsible directly to the commanding general of the field forces.

[30] *A sector* is one of the subdivisions of a coastal frontier command.

j. A subsector is one of the subdivisions of a sector command.

k. Coastwise sea lanes are the water areas adjacent to the seacoast that include all the usually traveled routes of coastwise shipping.

l. The coastal zone is the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to the seacoast and extends seaward to cover the coastwise sea lanes and focal points of shipping approaching the coast.

m. A defensive sea area is a portion of the coastal zone, usually including the approach to an important port, harbor, bay, or sound, within which, if such area be publicly proclaimed and neutrals notified, international practice tacitly permits the belligerent to extend his jurisdiction with a view to the protection of neutral shipping from minefields, obstructions, or the danger of being considered hostile. A defensive sea area is established by proclamation of the President and by notification to neutrals. The limits of the defensive sea area must be contained in the proclamation, and should be such that control of shipping in the area is within the capacity of the available naval local defense forces.

n. A defensive coastal area is a part of a coastal zone and of the land and water area adjacent to and inshore of the coast line within which defense operations will involve both Army and Navy forces, and in consequence require effective coordination. A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *outer harbor area*, the *harbor channel area*, and the *inner harbor area*; its outer limits, which are specified in each case by joint plans, are the outer limits of the ranges of the shore defense batteries. When a defensive sea area and a defensive coastal area coexist in any one locality, the water area of the defensive coastal area which lies between its outer limits and the inner limits of the harbor channel area, shall be considered superimposed upon a like portion of the defensive sea area, without in any way detracting from the Army's responsibility for the direct defense of the coast. Defense activities in that portion of a defensive sea area not included within a defensive coastal area, are essentially naval in character but are of immediate interest to the Army as by such means are disclosed the presence and indicated objectives of enemy forces.

[31] *o. The outer harbor area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries.

p. The harbor channel area is the water area which lies between the outer harbor area and the inner harbor area, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

q. The inner harbor area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor.

r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a defensive sea area.

s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore patrol.

t. An escort force is a part of the naval local defense forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

u. A coastal force is a naval force which may be organized to operate within the coastal zone to meet a special situation in which naval local defense forces are inadequate to carry out the Navy's functions in coastal frontier defense.

v. A harbor defense is an administrative and tactical Army command, comprising the armament and accessories, including anti-aircraft armament, controlled mines and supporting aircraft, with the personnel for manning, provided for the defense of a harbor or other water area. Harbor defenses exist to provide on the outbreak of war an effective seaward defense of important strategic points, such as large centers of population, important commercial centers, navy yards, coaling or fueling stations, locks and dams; to deny the enemy entrance to or occupation of a harbor or other waters which might serve as a base for land or naval operations, or both; and to keep the enemy at such distance from the entrance to a waterway that our naval forces may debouch therefrom and take up a battle formation with the least hostile interference.

w. A beach defense is that part of the Army ground organization for defense against landing attacks which is located at or near the beach for resistance at the water's edge. It consists of a series [32] of organized tactical localities in rear of those sections of the shore line where landings are likely to be made, and includes barbed-wire entanglements and other obstacles below and above the water line. Beach defenses may be organized both within and outside of defensive coastal areas.

x. Army outpost or covering forces are mobile Army forces allotted to sub-sectors or frontiers, to provide security against raiding operations, and to cover the points of landing in a direct attack prior to the assembly of Army reserves, or additional forces.

y. Army reserves are mobile Army forces drawn from any available source and held in readiness to be sent to any part of the frontier or frontiers that may be threatened by an enemy attack.

z. An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

Section II

Possible Enemy Operations

27. Major operations.

a. When control of vital sea areas cannot be maintained due to our inferiority in naval power, destruction of our Fleet, or to its absence in distant waters, serious attacks against our coastal frontiers are possible and may be expected against strategically important areas when the enemy possesses the requisite force and marine transportation. These attacks may be of major proportions and may have as their object any one or more of the followings:

- (1) The securing of a beachhead as a point of departure for an invasion;
- (2) The securing of an area for use in conjunction with other military operations or in connection with the destruction [33] of our shipping and/or our military and/or industrial installations and facilities;
- (3) The securing of an area for use as a naval base;
- (4) The securing of an area in order to deny its use to our forces;
- (5) The securing of an area for use as an air base, for air raids or for the establishment of local air superiority;
- (6) The blockading of our seacoast against shipping and/or against our naval forces.

b. Landing attacks in force—namely, those involving large invading forces—presuppose that the attacker has local control of the sea area, and also that he has the power to establish locally and for the necessary period of time a definite air superiority. The aviation with the enemy fleet may be insufficient for this purpose, so that the enemy may have to resort to the establishment of air bases and the concentration thereof of the necessary land-based aircraft. The enemy will, however, endeavor to make the maximum use of tactical surprise; he may further be expected to avoid fortified areas so far as may be consistent with his mission and objective.

c. Where a landing attack in force involves operations against fortified areas, the following steps, either distinct or merged together, may be anticipated, although the desirability for tactical surprise may cause complete omission of any preliminary reconnaissance:

- (1) Reconnaissance in force, in which all types of ships may be employed with carrier-based aviation either to determine what defense elements are manned and what resistance is to be expected, or to clear the way for heavier ships. It will be a period of intensive reconnaissance, possibly accompanied by mine sweeping, minor raids with limited objectives, and feints.
- (2) Bombardments by aircraft and long-range armament of the heavier ships to neutralize such land artillery as may be effective in opposing the landing.
- (3) Support of the landing by the fire of naval ships, assisted by aviation, to cover debarkation from the transports, approach to the beach and landing thereon.
- [34] (4) Employment of the requisite force to secure harbor facilities suitable for the debarkation of the heavy troop equipment and for the establishment of a base.

d. When a landing attack in force does not involve operations against a fortified area, the enemy may be expected to make the maximum use of tactical surprise, in order to allow his troops to reach the beach with a minimum concentration against them. Such reconnaissance as the enemy may decide to make will probably be on a wide front and be followed without loss of time by debarkation and the attack of the beaches under such supporting fire as may be available. The attacker may be expected to land on a broad front in several waves in an endeavor to establish, as quickly as possible, a beachhead to a depth of the effective range of light artillery.

28. Minor operations.—So long as our Fleet retains command of the sea, or so long as such command remains in dispute, our coastal frontiers bordering upon the sea areas in which our Fleet is operating may be regarded as protected against a major attack. However, neither command of the sea nor

superiority of our air forces, in any given locality, can be counted upon to prevent surprise attacks or raids by minor naval forces for the accomplishment of minor missions. These hostile operations may have as their objectives the following:

- a. Destruction of military and industrial installations and facilities.
- b. Destruction of shipping in the coastal zones.
- c. The gaining of minor advantages incident to controlling the sea, or for reconnaissance, bombardment, mining, countermining, demolition, or in operations preliminary to joint major operations.
- d. The observation or blockade of our naval forces while they are lying under the shelter of fortifications.

29. *General.*

a. The execution of naval missions or the performance of functions of navies in war may lead to offensive operations from the sea against land areas. Such operations will usually be in the nature of joint expeditions of Army and Navy forces.

b. Operations by naval forces against shipping may involve a blockade of certain localities and attacks on shipping in the coastal zone, in approaches to harbors, and even in harbors.

[35] c. The employment of naval forces alone in minor operations against our coastal frontiers, and not incident to joint operations, will, in general, be limited to bombardment from ships or by aircraft of positions not well covered by defensive means, small landing raids for demolition purposes, and feints.

d. The employment of naval forces alone in operations preliminary to joint operations may include all forms of reconnaissance; the seizure of land bases for aviation fields preparatory to supporting a landing; blockading, mining, and countermining operations; attacks on outer defense elements of a fortified area; and feints.

e. Bombardments of land positions by gunfire of naval forces may be undertaken under special circumstances, but any naval force engaging in such bombardment accepts hazards which are so obvious that they have to be justified by circumstances. The employment of capital ships, for instance, in the bombardment of fortified land positions is not likely to be undertaken if such action jeopardizes in any appreciable degree the ability of the bombarding force later to meet on terms of at least equality the enemy naval forces. Ships and their personnel are much more vulnerable to artillery fire than the corresponding material and personnel of land artillery and other defensive shore installations are to fire from ships. The ammunition normally carried by ships is not well suited to the attack of land targets. In addition to the hazards incident to land artillery fire directed against ships engaged in bombarding shore positions, there is the added hazard of attack by land-based aircraft, of submarines, and of mines. Special opportunity is given for the efficient use of these added weapons against the bombarding ships by the fact that the operation is a localized one. Under modern conditions, in an attack upon a fortified harbor, no naval force of capital ships will attempt to force the passage of, or to run by, the fortifications except under most unusual circumstances, when the end in view is vital to the success of the campaign. This applies whether or not enemy land forces are operating on shore against such a fortified harbor.

f. In a discussion of possible enemy naval operations and of possible defensive and offensive air operations, the circumstances of the season and the weather must not be lost sight of, since varying conditions of these two elements have a marked effect on the powers and limitations of naval attacks. During the period of heavy storms, [36] enemy naval operations will probably come to a standstill. Northern winter weather will, as a rule, considerably restrict naval operations, limiting them in the general case to observation and reconnaissance, and to ineffective offensive action against the obstacles of the defense, and precluding any but very minor landing operations. Thick weather may be advantageous to the enemy in covering minor operations against outlying elements of the defense; but heavy fog will generally suspend enemy offensive operations.

g. During periods of heavy storm, low visibility, or low ceiling, air patrol and air observation will probably be unreliable, offensive air operations may be impossible, and air operations may even have to be suspended entirely.

h. Consideration of the preceding paragraphs indicates that the forms of hostile action which an enemy may employ either singly or in combination, against, or in the vicinity of, our coastal frontiers, may include any one or more of the following operations:

- (1) Attacks on shipping in the coastal zone or in approaches to harbors.

(2) Attacks on naval forces of the defender, either off the coast, entering a harbor, while inside the harbor, or while debouching therefrom.

(3) Air bombardments of the seacoast and contiguous areas from forces well out to sea.

(4) Blockading of the seacoast against shipping and/or against our naval forces.

(5) Mine laying off the seacoast or the entrance of harbors.

(6) Naval raids on undefended or lightly defended coastal areas, primarily for demolition purposes and involving air or gun bombardments, or landings with limited objectives of forces composed of sailors and marines without intent to occupy any part of the frontier for any considerable period of time.

(7) Feints, involving part or all of the operations of (3), (4), (5), and (6) above.

(8) A broad general reconnaissance, especially by aircraft, to determine the nature, extent, and location of defending forces.

[37] (9) Local reconnaissance, either—

(a) To determine the practicability of taking advantage of surprise and an unprepared state of defense, in order to secure an area before the defending forces are ready;

(b) As part of an attempted landing; or

(c) In force against a fortified area to determine its state of preparedness, or to clear the way for a major attack.

(10) Seizure of land bases for air fields preliminary to further operations.

(11) Bombardment by gunfire and by aircraft for the neutralization of land artillery and for the destruction of important shore objectives.

(12) Minor attacks, possibly involving small landings, against outlying elements of the defense.

(13) Mine sweeping, countermining, and attempts to destroy nets or other obstacles.

(14) Torpedo fire into harbors.

(15) Blocking action against harbor entrances.

(16) Penetration by naval vessels into a harbor or water area.

(17) Major landing operations supported by rapid-fire guns on ships and by aviation.

(18) Seizure of harbor facilities for debarkation of heavy equipment and for the establishment of a base.

i. The parts played by the different types of naval craft in the above operations include:

(1) *By surface craft.*—Information and reconnaissance; seizure or destruction of shipping; combat with naval vessels; mining or countermining; mine sweeping; launching air operations; blockade; closing harbors or channels; clearing under-water obstacles; attacking nets; cutting cables; torpedo attacks on ships outside or inside harbors; laying smoke screens; gun bombardment; making feints; forcing a passage; and making and covering landings either for demolition purposes or for minor raids or raids in force.

[38] (2) *By submarines.*—Attacks on combatant vessels; information and reconnaissance; blockade; raids on nets or other obstacles; cutting cables; mining; minor bombardments; making feints; and minor landings.

(3) *By aircraft.*—Information and reconnaissance; attacking ships and shore objectives with machine-gun fire and/or high-explosive bombs; destroying obstacles; landing observers or spies; gaining superiority in the air; spotting gun-fire; and laying smoke screens.

Section III

Categories of Defense and Requirements and Means To Be Provided

30. *Degree of preparation.*—The degree of preparation in coastal frontier defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of the forces to be provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature. These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to

the War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means required for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be proclaimed in time of actual or impending war as necessitated by the nature of the war and the probable enemy.

31. *Categories of defense.*

a. Category A.—Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons. Under this category, only a sufficient part of the gunfire elements of harbor defenses will be manned in the strength required to create a show of preparedness. The strength required will be that [39] considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A nominal offshore patrol will be maintained.

b. Category B. Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. Under this category, the harbor defenses will be provided with one manning relief, and a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive sea areas may be established and a limited offshore patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving harbors.

c. Category C.—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack. Under this category, the coastal defense area should be provided, in general, with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet the following enemy naval operations: those incident to controlling the sea; those against shipping; and minor attacks against land areas. The harbor defenses should be fully manned and air support arranged. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces are available, outposts will be established outside of harbor defenses along the sensitive areas of the shore line. The inner mine barrages will, in general, be established; a full inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a rule, be instituted; and certain outer mine barrages and defensive sea areas may be established, and a limited offshore patrol instituted.

d. Category D.—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an anti-aircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

[40] *e. Category E.*—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. Defensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army commander of the theater of operations or frontier.

f. Category F.—Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.

g. General.

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable initially, local defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question, and which can be diverted from the mobilization and concentration of the Army forces, from the United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of operations.

(2) Under all categories of defense, the Army coastal frontier or Army sector commander is responsible for the anti-aircraft defense within the corps area and naval district extending inland from the frontier or sector, such anti-aircraft defense to include an aircraft warning service. Cases involving the anti-aircraft

defense of Army GHQ airdromes and those where one corps area borders on two coastal frontiers, will be specifically covered in appropriate Army strategical plans.

[41] 32. *Requirements and means to be provided.*

a. *General requirements.*

(1) The proximity of important cities and industrial areas to certain of our seacoast and lake frontiers and the consequent vulnerability of these places to attack, as well as the importance to the Nation of our shipping and its related industries, and the fact that our coastal bases are the mainsprings of naval action, make the protection of these frontiers in time of war a highly important part of the national defense.

(2) Positive security, to include harbor defenses, has been provided for certain areas, the fixed armament of which has been or is being installed during peace time. Depending upon the liability of these areas to attack, and upon the character of such attack, defensive coastal areas have been designated and defensive sea areas should be designated in order to ensure the security of these important areas and the security of the shipping within their waters.

(3) In other respects, a minimum land and sea defense should be contemplated for our whole coastal frontier on the outbreak of war, and should involve the employment of only such parts of the means of defense as are required under the situation. In some situations, involving only minor enemy operations, it may be necessary to organize the beach defense for certain localities. Other situations involving more serious enemy attacks will require that the means of defense be successively augmented.

b. *Defensive operations required.*—From a study of possible enemy operations, it appears that the defense of our coastal frontiers should take into consideration the following:

(1) The observation of the coastal frontier and the sea beyond as far as circumstances permit or seem to demand.

(2) The protection of shipping in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

(3) The attack on enemy vessels in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

(4) The resistance to enemy approach to the seacoast.

[42] (5) The protection of the seacoast, and especially strategic harbors, against raids.

(6) The defeat of enemy landing attacks on the seacoast, including the provision of defensive installations on shore and in the waters adjacent thereto.

(7) The initiation of counteroffensive operations to eject a landed enemy.

c. *Means available.*—Under the above conception of defensive operations that may be required for coastal frontier defense, the means that may be made available in time of war include—

(1) *The Fleet*, the employment of which, in accordance with the strategic situation, may keep the enemy away from our coastal frontiers.

(2) *Naval local defense forces*, which control the water areas within a naval district, conduct naval operations against enemy forces in the naval district waters, and cooperate with and support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

(3) *The Army forces.*

(a) *Mobile forces*, including air forces, to provide the covering or outpost forces for the initial coastal frontier defense organization and likewise the additional forces necessary to defeat landing attacks and air attacks and to carry out the Army functions specified in paragraph 13a.

(b) *Harbor defense forces* for maintenance and operation of essential harbor defenses designed to prevent ingress into areas, including the air space thereof covered by these defenses.

d. *Relation of the Fleet to coastal frontier defense.*—The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases. In the case of hostile major overseas movements directed against our coasts, the Fleet, if present and free to act, will be a powerful factor for ensuring the security of its bases and our coasts, and, if it engages the enemy, should be supported by all the land-based aircraft available.

[43] e. *Relation of Army mobile forces to coastal frontier defense.*—The Army, in its responsibility for the direct defense of the coast, must be prepared to meet successfully any attack directed against any part of our coastal frontiers. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand the presence of the Fleet in another theater of operations make it necessary for the Army to provide mobile forces, not only those to be used as covering or outpost

forces in the initial coastal frontier defense organization, but also the additional forces required to defeat enemy landing or air attacks directed against any part of the coast. When any part of a coastal frontier is threatened, these additional mobile forces will be concentrated with a view to defeating the enemy in the affected area.

f. Relation of Army air forces to coastal frontier defense.—In operations against enemy attacks along our coast and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case, no restrictions will be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full power of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile Army forces engaged in the direct defense of the coast. Their functions and operations will be governed by the principles outlined in paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, and 22. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and the following quoted paragraphs from J. B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539) subject, "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force":

"(b) When any sector of a frontier is threatened, units of all arms, including units of the Air Corps, will be concentrated in support of the covering forces and the operations of all components will be in accordance with the general plan and the specific decisions of the frontier and sector commander. The Army Air Corps operates along the coast under the same conditions as in other operations except that occasions may arise when the GHQ air force or units thereof may act in conjunction with naval air forces under temporary direction of naval commanders; or similarly when naval air forces may operate in conjunction with and under temporary direction of Army commanders.

"(c) The Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand [44] the presence of the Fleet in another theater require that joint plans for coastal frontier defense be drawn without counting upon the assistance of the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces. But it should be borne in mind that, when the Fleet is so situated that it can and does operate effectively against enemy forces afloat that are approaching some sector of the coast, the security of such sector against major attack is ensured for the time being.

"(d) In addition to a radio communication system, the Navy maintains shore stations at strategical centers, where scouting and patrolling seaplanes may be concentrated to meet naval situations. These naval forces are important elements in the communications and information service, and would normally be the source of the first notice of the approach of an enemy by the sea. When the Army GHQ air force operates along the coast, it maintains such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency. The coordination and cooperation of these two sources of information are secured by joint plans prepared by frontier, sector, overseas department, and naval district authorities. Such plans should provide for augmentation of one service by the other in gaining and disseminating information of enemy movements offshore.

"(e) When the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces is strategically present and free to act, paramount interest in operations at sea rests with the Navy. If the GHQ air force joins in such operations, it will be in conjunction with and under the temporary command of the naval commander. In the absence of the Fleet, the primary responsibility of securing information of hostile fleet movements rests with naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units. However, in either situation the GHQ air force retains the responsibility for such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency.

"(f) In the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy at sea, a major attack upon the coast may develop so as to require the utilization of the GHQ air force in three phases as follows:

"1st phase—The conduct of reconnaissance over the sea approaches to the coast and (when favorable opportunity presents itself) the attack of enemy elements.

"2d phase—The support of artillery involving both fixed and mobile guns and mines, by aircraft conducting observation, reconnaissance, and offensive operations, from the time the enemy comes within range of ground weapons, until he is driven off or the operation enters the third phase.

"3d phase—Air operations in connection with the use of all arms on our coastal frontier.

Reconnaissance, as outlined for the first phase, will be continued to the extent possible throughout the later phases.

"(g) *War plans.*—In peace-time planning for war-time use under any of our existing war plans, each coastal frontier plan, and where necessary, each sector and subsector plan will include plans for the employ- [45] ment of such air units as may be assigned under the particular war plan involved. In the preparation of these plans, consideration will be given to the category of defense as defined in chapter V, part X (sec. III of 1935 revision), Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and specified in the particular war plan in question. Each specific war plan prepared by the War Department will set forth the initial missions assigned the GHQ air force and, in general terms, the operations to be undertaken. Based upon these missions, the GHQ air force commander will prepare his plan covering the details of concentration, the missions, and the general plan of initial operations to be undertaken by the various elements of the GHQ air force.

"(h) *Defense projects.*—Harbor defense projects will contain a statement of the minimum observation aviation needed for reconnaissance and observation of fire for the harbor defense artillery included in such project.

"(i) *Installations and facilities.*—The most important of these are communications, airdromes, and landing fields. Of the first, the radio systems of the naval districts and of the Coast Guard are available, and joint plans contemplate their utilization in connection with any additional stations found necessary and installed by either service. Harbor defense projects and the plans of coastal frontier commanders will make provision for the airdrome areas and installations and the communications and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the air organizations assigned. In addition, the plans of each coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide, in consultation with the GHQ air force commander, for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of such coastal frontier command, by including in such plans logistical provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate. Civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so as to permit M-day operation.

"(j) In overseas departments, the utilization of the aviation component of the garrison will be as directed by the department commander."

g. Naval local defense forces.

(1) The naval local defense forces are furnished by naval districts from such surface, subsurface, and aircraft as may be made available, including small submarines, old destroyers, mine vessels, and aircraft tenders, with such local vessels as are taken over in time of war for naval district use.

(2) The naval local defense forces of a naval district may comprise any or all of the following task forces:

(a) *The inshore patrol*, which may be composed of section bases, submarine bases, destroyer bases and air [46] stations; coastal lookout system, including lightships, lighthouses, Coast Guard stations, and special lookout stations; motor boats, submarine chasers, yachts, aircraft, mine sweepers, guard ships, aircraft tenders, and additional task forces in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To execute the Navy's part of all joint plans for defensive coastal areas.

2. To search for, locate, report, and attack enemy vessels operating close in to the coast and off harbor entrances.

3. To sweep such channels close in to the coast and off harbor entrances as are necessary for our naval forces and merchant shipping, and to clear mine fields laid by the enemy.

4. To patrol the outer limits of defensive coastal areas in order to convey to the harbor defense commander prompt and full information of the approach of friendly or hostile vessels, including all those of the offshore patrol. This information is to be conveyed directly to the nearest elements of the Army communication system.

5. To patrol the areas of obstacles, especially during thick weather or darkness, to protect the obstacles, and to prevent light craft from going over them.

6. To operate a system of control including piloting in the defensive sea and defensive coastal areas.

7. To maintain a guard ship at or near harbor entrances to see that all vessels leaving or entering port give the proper recognition and clearance signals and to transmit orders to shipping as directed.

8. To furnish with routing instructions all merchant vessels departing without escort.

[47] 9. To maintain a coastal-lookout system along the district coast line by use of the Coast Guard stations and Lighthouse Service, and special look-out stations to prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy.

10. To maintain, through the Lighthouse Service in the district, the system of buoyage, lights, and other aids to navigation regularly established, with such modifications and changes as military necessity may require.

11. To render prompt assistance to merchant shipping and naval units in case of collision, breakdown, or other accident in port or along the coast.

12. To exercise naval control of harbors through the captain of the port, when the Treasury Department requests the Navy to exercise such control.

(b) *The offshore patrol*, which may be composed of destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, gunboats, eagle boats, yachts, aircraft tenders, aircraft, and additional types in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To patrol systematically the coastal zone outside of those parts assigned to the inshore patrol.

2. To develop information of, report, and attack enemy forces sighted, in accordance with the doctrine of the patrol.

3. To supplement and support the main armament gunfire of the harbor defenses.

4. To lay mine fields and sweep against enemy mines outside the field of operations of the inshore patrol.

(c) *The escort force*, which may be composed of any suitable and available naval forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

[48] (d) *A coastal force* may be organized to operate within the coastal zone. It will be organized from suitable and available naval forces. Such coastal force will be in addition in the forces required for each naval district.

(e) In view of the paramount interest of the Army in defensive coastal areas involving existing harbor defenses, the commander of the inshore patrol, who will be stationed ashore, should have his headquarters located as conveniently as possible to the headquarters of the harbor defense commander and at the same location if practicable. In any event he should be in direct communication with the harbor defense commander, as well as in direct connection with all naval activities in the defensive coastal area.

h. *Defensive coastal areas.*

(1) *Extent.*—Defensive coastal areas will be delimited by joint agreement between the Army and the Navy. Each defensive coastal area will cover that part of the coastal zone and adjacent seacoast which will require an intensive joint defense by reason of the inclusion therein of valuable harbors, stretches of the coast where hostile landings can be made in connection with attacks on our harbors or on industrial centers on or near the coast which are subject to attack from the sea. Defensive coastal areas will ordinarily include land and water areas in the vicinity of a fortified harbor, in which will be located in time of peace some personnel and usually a considerable amount of matériel pertaining to the harbor defenses.

(2) *Harbor defenses.*

(a) Harbor defenses are highly organized, permanently defended localities within sectors or subsectors of a coastal frontier whose broad mission is to protect important coastal areas (seaports, naval bases, and anchorages) and utilities primarily against attack from the sea. They are an element of the defensive organization of the subsector or sector in which they are located and they operate under subsector or sector control.

[49] (b) The defensive elements of harbor defenses consist of the fixed and mobile seacoast artillery, the anti-aircraft artillery, searchlights, controlled mines, underwater listening posts, subaqueous sound-ranging system, observation and fire-control system, harbor patrol boats and supporting aircraft with personnel for manning the same.

(c) Harbor defenses provide protected anchorages for naval forces and commercial shipping and support their debouchment therefrom.

(d) The Army is responsible for the defense against aerial attack of all military and naval facilities ashore within a harbor area.

(e) War-time personnel of the Army in these areas will consist essentially of harbor defense troops reinforced by Army air elements. In the usual case mobile troops will be limited to those manning reinforcing mobile artillery, railway and tractor, allotted to seacoast defense. The harbor defense troops themselves will thus have the mission of beach defense in the vicinity of the batteries. A limited number of mobile troops may be assigned to the harbor defense for local beach defense; the further reinforcement of the area by mobile troops will, in general,

not take place until the enemy situation indicates an attack in force involving landings and requiring a considerable mobile force for defense against landing attacks.

(f) The peace-time matériel consists of seacoast and antiaircraft guns of various calibers, the fire-control establishments for these guns, together with searchlights and with mine structures when the hydrography and current conditions render a controlled mine project feasible.

(g) In time of war, other obstacles, such as torpedo-defense nets, antisubmarine nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and contact mines may find employment, primarily in the harbor channel areas, to increase the resistance against enemy penetration into the inner har- [50] bor areas. For the purpose of detecting the presence of enemy underwater vessels or of any vessel during the hours of darkness or in fog or thick weather, a system of underwater listening posts, both fixed and on the vessels assigned to harbor defense activities, may be installed.

(h) In the installation and upkeep of obstacles, full use will have to be made of a considerable part of the available local Government-owned and private floating equipment. Where Army and Navy requirements conflict, agreement as to priorities will be reached between the local commanders of the two services and recommendations made to the War and Navy Departments respecting same.

(i) The defense will extend its operations to seaward as far as possible by the use of the local defense forces and aircraft of both the Army and the naval local defense forces

(3) *Communications.*—The system of communication between elements of the Army and the Navy requires most careful consideration because of the intimate relations existing between the elements of both services on land, on the water, and in the air. The system must give consideration to all the forms of communication that may find employment. It is further vitally important that the two services be trained together in time of peace to insure complete understanding of the system. Provision must be made for bringing all incoming information of the enemy by the quickest possible means into the interested headquarters of both the Army and the Navy, and for disseminating such information rapidly and accurately. Reports from elements of the offshore patrol should, as a rule, be sent to the headquarters of both the senior Army and Navy officers in the area. For reports from elements of the inshore patrol, the most direct communication is desirable by all available means from naval elements to batteries, forts, and command posts of the Army. A system of identification signals for all friendly naval craft approaching defensive coastal areas must be established.

[51] (4) *General.*—The Army is responsible for the development, installation, and operation of the equipment of fixed listening posts, of the listening equipment required for defense vessels under its control, and for the immediate transmission of information received by these posts to the Navy units of the defense.

i. Defensive sea areas.

(1) Since the object of establishing defensive sea areas is to control shipping, the proclaiming of such an area obligates the Navy to control shipping therein and puts the burden to enforce this control upon the naval forces. The number and size of defensive sea areas should be reduced to the minimum consistent with security, in order to minimize the burden upon the naval forces, and interference with shipping.

(2) Authority for the establishment of defensive sea areas is vested in the President of the United States by section 44 of the act entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States, approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine", as amended by the act "Making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes", approved March 4, 1917.

(3) When war with a specific power appears probable, the Secretary of the Navy submits recommendations to the President as to the defensive sea areas to be proclaimed and the time when they shall be proclaimed. If and when the development of the war necessitates, he submits recommendations as to additional defensive sea areas to be proclaimed.

(4) The Secretary of the Navy is charged with the preparation, for the signature of the President, of the proclamation designating defensive sea areas, with their outer definite limits, and with the publication thereof. He is further charged with the preparation and publication of regulations pertaining thereto and with the enforcement of such regulations.

(5) Copies of the local regulations for the guidance of the armed forces issued in time of war by the commandants of naval districts for the defensive sea areas within their districts [52] will be furnished to harbor defense commanders and other Army authorities concerned.

j. Defense against landing attacks.

(1) *Measures and operations demanded of the defense.*

(a) Enemy landing operations in force must be opposed to the utmost. To this end the Army forces within the coastal frontier will be augmented by forces from the strategic or general reserve, the Army GHQ air force, and by other available Army forces. The naval local defense forces will be augmented by any other naval forces available. The successful frustration of the hostile landing operation will depend largely upon the timely concentration of the requisite forces at the locality against which the main attack is being directed. It is therefore of vital importance that everything be done to discover the focal point of this main attack at the earliest possible moment. For this reason the defense must initiate the following operations as early as possible :

1. Location of the hostile force at sea, and maintenance of observation of this force.

2. Interference with the hostile force as far off-shore as practicable to prevent or delay its approach.

3. Resistance in coastal zone waters and at the shore, taking advantage of the adverse situation in which the attacker is placed just prior to and during landing.

(b) In general, the enemy may be expected to attempt to make landings at several places. Some of these attempted landings may be mere feints. The coastline should be carefully studied with a view to determine the places which the enemy is most likely to use for landings, principal or secondary.

(2) *Steps in the joint organization and operations against landing attack.* Complete preparation for opposing an enemy landing in force requires the following steps [53] in correctly organizing and employing all possible means of defense :

(a) Organization of a beach defense for important localities.

(b) The selection and organization of the principal defensive positions in rear and on the flanks of the portion of the shore line to be defended.

(c) Preparation of a complete joint system of signal communications to connect with one another all land, air, and water elements, and to insure intelligence of the enemy getting to the shore posts of command. Organization of an aircraft warning service to warn industrial centers and other important areas of the approach of hostile aircraft.

(d) Distant reconnaissance by available air elements and naval vessels of enemy approach in the coastal zone.

(e) An air offensive by all available Army and Navy aircraft in order to secure superiority in the air and to destroy at sea the approaching hostile elements that are vital to the enemy in making a successful landing.

(f) Employment of the available naval forces to seaward to keep contact with and attack the enemy; patrol of the beach defenses and beach obstacles by the Army with outpost detachments, aircraft, and vessels to give warning of actual landing operations; maintenance of these beach obstacles by vessels of the Army.

(g) Bombardment by heavy land-emplaced artillery and by aircraft to hold hostile vessels at a distance, in order to deny the enemy effective artillery preparation of the landing area and to increase the difficulties of his debarkation and approach to the shore.

(h) Determined resistance by the Army to the enemy's movement in small boats in landing waves to the shore, light and medium artillery fire, together with personnel, bombs and machine-gun fire by aircraft, [54] being used in support of the troops occupying the strong points of the beach defenses.

(i) Resolute resistance at the shore line by troops occupying the first defensive position, coupled with the movement of infantry reserves and artillery, in support of these troops, against the hostile main landing effort as soon as it can be determined.

(j) Counterattack by subsector and larger reserves, supported by all available artillery fire, to destroy enemy forces that have landed or, if this be impossible, to confine the enemy's advance to a limited strip along the beach, while continuing the attacks by air and subsurface craft against transports, supply ships, carriers, and small landing boats.

k. Obstacles—types.

(1) *General*.—The term obstacle as herein used includes any object which is placed in the water to interfere with the movement of ships or their torpedoes. Included under this term are nets, booms, piles, sunken ships, and mines. Obstacles are used to close harbor channel areas completely, to bar direct approach to channels, or to force adoption of ship formations and movements unfavorable to the attacker, but favorable to the defense. To be effective, obstacles must be so designed and so well protected that they cannot be removed entirely or destroyed during periods of poor visibility. They are protected by guns capable of delivering rapid fire against the smaller types of craft which the enemy is likely to employ for their removal. Moreover, certain searchlights are located primarily for the illumination of hostile targets in mine fields. Patrol vessels may be needed in the areas containing obstacles during periods of darkness and in thick weather.

(2) *Obstructions*.—Obstructions such as piles, under water barriers, and sunken vessels are fully effective against all classes of vessels and may be used to help close completely channels or other navigable water areas.

(3) *Torpedo-defense nets*.—Torpedo-defense nets may be used to close the inner harbor to torpedoes fired from seaward.

[55] (4) *Antisubmarine nets*.—Antisubmarine nets may be used to close the inner harbor area to submarines.

(5) *Booms*.—Booms are used for blocking water areas against the entrance of surface craft. They find application primarily to arrest the movement of ships running at high speed into areas that cannot otherwise be blocked; they may be used in lieu of antisubmarine nets in shallow entrances which submarines cannot enter submerged.

(6) *Mines*.—Mines are of two types: Controlled and contact. The former are provided and installed by the Army; the latter by the Navy. Mines, both controlled and contact, employed in any one defensive coastal area constitute the mine barrier for that area. The barrier may consist of two barrages—an inner, or essentially controlled mine barrage which is an integral part of the fixed defenses of most of our important harbors, and an outer barrage of contact mines.

Section IV

Organization and command

33. *Joint organization and command*.—Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peace-time planning therefor, are as stated below. (See map attached showing coastal frontiers, sectors, subsectors, and defensive coastal areas.)

34. *North Atlantic coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle [56] Sound, Chowan River, Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.

b. Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans. The Commanding General, First Army, is responsible for security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) *New England sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.

Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—First Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—Commandant, First Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts.

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Slue Lightship, Mononoy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

(2) *New York sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.

[57] *Southern.*—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—Second Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

(3) *Delaware-Chesapeake sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton, exclusive.

Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, inclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—Third Coast Artillery district commander.

Navy.—The commandants of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

35. *Southern coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

Southern.—The Rio Grande.

[58] b. Commanders.

Army.—Fourth Coast Artillery district commander. The Commanding General, Third Army, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and of supervision of peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of the naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. *Sectors.*—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively.

36. *Pacific coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier.

Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States.

b. Commanders.

Army.—Ninth Coast Artillery district commander. The Commanding General, Fourth Army, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and of supervision of peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—The commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Naval Districts will command the naval forces assigned to their respective districts within the limits of the Pacific coastal frontier. They will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, in case of emergency, of naval forces assigned to their districts.

c. Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into the southern California, northern California, and northwestern sectors, with boundaries based on those of the present naval districts as follows:

(1) Boundary between the southern California and northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.

(2) Boundary between the northern California and the northwestern sectors, northern boundary of California.

[59] *d.* Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.

(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to Moclips, Wash., inclusive.

(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary of Washington.

37. *The Great Lakes coastal frontier.*

a. Boundaries.—The frontier extends from Isle Royal, mouth of Pigeon River, northern shore of Lake Superior, western boundary of Wisconsin, all inclusive, to mouth of Raquette River, N. Y., exclusive.

b. Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans. The Commanding General, Second Army, is responsible for security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

Navy.—To be designated in specific war plans. The commandant, Ninth Naval District, is responsible for coordination of security measures on M-day and for peace-time planning therefor.

c. Sectors.—The Great Lakes coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) *Michigan sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Isle Royal, mouth of Pigeon River, northern shore of Lake Superior, western boundary of Wisconsin, all inclusive.

Eastern.—Western shore of Lake Erie, southern boundary of Michigan, all inclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

[60] (c) The Michigan sector is subdivided into the Sault Ste. Marie and the Detroit subsectors with boundary between subsectors as follows: Drummond Island, Point Detour, northern shore of Lake Huron, northern and western shores of Lake Michigan (all to Sault Ste. Marie subsector).

(2) *Erie sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Western shore of Lake Erie, southern boundary of Michigan, all exclusive.

Eastern.—Niagara River, southern shore of Lake Erie, western boundary of New York.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

(3) *Buffalo sector.*

(a) Boundaries.

Western.—Niagara River, southern shore of Lake Erie, western boundary of New York.

Eastern.—Mouth of Raquette River, N. Y., exclusive.

(b) Commanders.

Army.—To be designated in specific war plans.

Navy.—Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

38. *Defensive coastal areas.*—Defensive coastal areas have been delimited at the localities named below. Commanders will fit defensive coastal areas into the sector and subsector organizations in such a manner as to provide for efficient coastal frontier defense. These defensive coastal areas are—

Portland	[61] Pensacola
Portsmouth	Mobile Bay
Boston	Mississippi River
New Bedford	Sabine Pass
Narragansett Bay	Galveston
Long Island Sound	San Diego
New York (eastern entrance)	Los Angeles
New York (southern entrance)	San Francisco
Delaware Bay and River	Columbia River
Chesapeake Bay	Puget Sound
Baltimore	Cristobal
Washington	Balboa
Cape Fear River	Honolulu and Pearl Harbor
Charleston	Manila Bay
Savannah River	Subic Bay
St. Johns River	
Key West	
Tampa	

39. *Defensive sea areas.*

a. From a naval viewpoint, and depending upon the specific emergency, defensive sea areas may be important in the approaches to the following water areas:

Portland	Sabine Pass
Portsmouth	Galveston
Boston	Puget Sound
Narragansett Bay	Columbia River
Long Island Sound	San Francisco
New York Bay	San Pedro
Delaware Bay	San Diego
Chesapeake Bay	Cristobal
Charleston	Balboa
Key West	Manila Bay
Pensacola	Subic Bay
Mobile	Waters surrounding the Hawaiian
Mississippi River	Islands

b. In addition to the above, the local Army and Navy commanders of coastal districts concerned will study the relationship of defensive sea areas to the defensive coastal areas that may be needed and, in the event that additional defensive sea areas will, in their opinion, be required to meet any specific situation, they will include such additional defensive sea areas in their plans.

Section V

Planning

40. *Means to facilitate joint planning.*

a. In order to facilitate joint planning, a planning representative will be designated for the Army commander and for the Navy commander of each coastal division. The planning and development chain of command in both the Army and the Navy will follow the same lines as for combat. In selecting such planning representatives, officers will be selected who are located conveniently to the area to be defended and whose headquarters have the personnel and other facilities necessary for planning.

b. In addition to the above, the local Army and Navy commanders of coastal areas whose headquarters are in the same vicinity will appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters are widely separated, more than one joint planning committee may be organized.

41. *Collaboration in joint planning.*

a. In the preparation of such joint coastal frontier defense plans as may be required under a joint basic war plan, the following commanders will collaborate:

	Army	Navy
(1) North Atlantic coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, First Army, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Third Naval District.
(2) Southern coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Third Army, or an officer designated by him, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
(3) Pacific coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Fourth Army, or an officer designated by him, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
(4) Great Lakes coastal frontier.....	Commanding General, Second Army, <i>with</i>	Commandant, Ninth Naval District.

b. The sector defense plans of the New England sector and of the Delaware-Chesapeake sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the First and Fifth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Third Naval District and will be formulated to support the North Atlantic coastal frontier defense plans.

[63] (c) The subsector or defensive coastal area defense plans of the Delaware subsector or Delaware Bay defensive coastal area will be forwarded by the commandant, Fourth Naval District, to the commandant, Fifth Naval District, and will be formulated to support the Delaware-Chesapeake sector defense plans.

d. The sector defense plans of the Florida sector and of the Gulf sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Sixth Naval District and will be formulated to support the southern coastal frontier defense plans.

e. The sector defense plans of the southern California sector and of the northwestern sector will be forwarded by the commandants of the Eleventh and Thirteenth Naval Districts, respectively, to the commandant of the Twelfth Naval District and will be formulated to support the Pacific coastal frontier defense plans.

f. The commandant, Ninth Naval District, will confer with the commandants, Third and Fourth Naval Districts, as to the naval means which may be available for defense in the Erie and Buffalo sectors.

42. *Details of joint coastal frontier defense plans.*

a. Each specific war plan will provide for the organization of the defense of the land and coastal frontiers and will designate theaters of operations and the task forces to be employed therein. Actual limiting points and boundary lines between coastal divisions will be modified to the extent necessary to meet the needs of the situation assumed for the specific plan. The covering forces and the initial concentrations made for frontier defense in each plan will be based on the protection of probable objectives of enemy attack, the projected offensive operations, and the combined use of Army and Navy forces. A flexible organization of frontiers is required for tactical operations and the boundaries of coastal divisions may be changed in specific war plans or during the progress of operations.

b. Under the directive of each joint basic war plan and based on the allocation of forces under Army and Navy supporting defense plans, each frontier, sector, and subsector command of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense will develop and will revise annually joint coastal frontier defense plans applicable—

(1) To the defense to be instituted on M-day.

[64] (2) To later defense steps, should such be indicated as desirable to insure frontier defense as the war progresses.

c. Joint coastal frontier, joint sector, and joint subsector defense plans (or defense coastal area plans when joint subsector plans are not required) will, in general, under the specified category of defense, consider what can be done with the means available; these plans may include or refer to a project for a desired development of means which should also be available on the outbreak of war. In the event that other categories have been indicated as probable later steps in coastal frontier defense, these plans should include what can be done with the means of defense then available; they may also include a project for further desired development.

d. Joint coastal frontier, joint sector, and joint subsector (or defensive coastal area) defense plans will be supported by such Army and Navy operating defense plans as may be necessary. Army and Navy supporting operating defense plans will be prepared to support the joint plan of lowest sequence required to be prepared by a joint basic war plan. The joint coastal frontier defense plans will be submitted to both the War and Navy Departments by the commanders under the joint organization for coast defense immediately subordinate to their respective Departments. All joint coastal frontier defense plans will be authenticated by the signatures of the two commanders who submit them. Supporting Army and Navy operating defense plans will be submitted by the commanders who formulate them to their respective next higher commanders within their respective Departments.

e. (1) Joint coastal frontier defense plans for the North Atlantic coastal frontier will be prepared only for situations included under Categories C, D, and E, as indicated under specific war plans. For situations included under Categories A and B, only joint sector plans for this coastal frontier with their supporting plans will be prepared.

(2) I view of the restricted operations contemplated under a Category A or B defense, subsector plans, in general, will not be required for coastal frontiers to which these categories initially apply.

[65] (3) The sequence to be followed in the preparation of joint defense plans is as follows:

(a) Joint coastal frontier plan.

(b) Joint sector plan.

(c) Joint subsector plan or joint defensive coastal area plan.

Generally, the lowest sequence of plans required for the Navy will be that pertaining to a naval district, whether the naval district is a sector or subsector.

f. The plan of higher sequence will contain the directives for the plan of next lower sequence. The lower sequence plan will be formulated to support the plan of next higher sequence.

g. Army and Navy operating defense plans will obtain their directives from the joint plan they are required to support. They will provide the means and organizations and will insure the Army's and/or Navy's effective operation thereunder.

h. Joint coastal frontier and joint sector defense plans will cover the category of defense, the delimitation of areas (including subsector, defensive sea and coastal areas included therein), assignment of missions, allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops, the air and ground antiaircraft defense measures to be instituted, the designation of areas of responsibility, paramount interest and method of command, the details of joint communications and intelligence services to include the censorship and supervision of cables and wire lines in accordance with approved policy, and an aircraft warning service. These plans or their supporting projects will also make provision for the Army airdrome areas and installations necessary in connection therewith and the communication and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the Army air organization assigned. In addition, the plans of each Army coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of his command by including in such plans logistic provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate; civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so that M-day operation will be possible.

[66] *i.* Joint plans of the lowest sequence, such as joint subsector or joint defensive coastal area plans, should contain, either in the plans proper, in appendices or annexes thereto, or in supporting plans or projects—so much of the following as is appropriate:

(1) The relationship of the defensive coastal area to the subsector organization and/or of the subsector to the sector organization.

(2) The category of defense and such delimitation of the area as may be necessary for the coordination of the Army and the Navy forces operating in the area, to include areas of responsibility and paramount interest.

(3) The assignment of missions and allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops or additional forces required for later defense steps.

(4) The relationship of the area to such defensive sea areas as have been designated for the vicinity, with special reference to methods of keeping the

Army informed of movements of all vessels in the coastal zone and the composition, mission, and methods of operation of the offshore patrol.

(5) Such general plan of the forts, batteries, searchlights, underwater listening posts, air installations, and areas of gunfire and illumination as may be necessary to define the areas of Army responsibility for defense and naval assistance to the Army in this defense, including areas available to the enemy from which he can deliver bombardment fire without effective interference from the land armament.

(6) Definite assignment to the Navy of responsibility and tasks for offensive action in such areas as are covered by the fire of the land armament.

(7) General plan of the part of the underwater defense to be prepared or installed, including the character of the mine barrages, nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and other obstacles, their location, priority of installation, definite responsibility of the Army and the Navy for their provision, estimate of time of installation, definite indication of free passages through mines and openings in nets, navigation range installations required and responsibility for their establishment. Decisions as to which service and what commander in [67] this service shall determine when these elements shall be placed.

(8) Allocation to the Army and the Navy of locally procurable means, particularly vessels and material required for the installation and maintenance of the underwater defense, together with an estimate of the availability of such means, the nature of the alteration required, and the probable cost and time involved.

(9) Composition, mission, and method of operation of the inshore patrol, with particular reference to method of protection of underwater defense elements and identification of elements of the patrol with land elements of the defense at night and in thick weather, including a definite decision as to the conditions under which doubtful vessels should be fired upon by the armament of fortifications.

(10) The air, the ground anti-aircraft, and the close-in defense measures; the measures for defense against landing attacks to be instituted on M-day and for the later defense steps to be instituted as the war progresses.

(11) The details of joint communication and intelligence services and an aircraft warning service. These details for the joint communication and intelligence services to include the location of headquarters of the several commanders, communications nets of both services, with the additional means, both military and commercial, required and the frequencies allotted to Army and Navy radio nets, responsibilities of Army and Navy commanders as to communication, censorship, and supervision of cables and wire lines as prescribed by higher commanders.

(12) General method of operation of the inshore patrol in sweeping and mining operations and in conducting and controlling maritime traffic, including designation and location of entrances and exits to defensive sea areas and of guard ships and methods of control of shipping within the harbor.

(13) Composition, mission, and method of employment of other naval local defense task groups, in sufficient detail to indicate the character and degree of cooperation required of Army and Navy air units.

[68] (14) Definite establishment of factors controlling the passing of paramount interest from the Navy to the Army in the coastal zone adjacent to the area.

(15) Detail of at least one liaison officer by name from each service to represent his commander at the headquarters of the other service and such other liaison officers as may be decided upon jointly.

j. A highly important part in each joint defense plan and project, and in the supporting defense plans and projects developed therefrom, is a definite statement of the time of accomplishment of the individual items under the plans and projects. For plans, these statements of times should be for the means and forces actually available and a consideration of the condition of the means and state of training of the forces. For projects, these statements of times should consider both the time of procurement and the time of installation or training after procurement.

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Introduction and Definitions

43. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present a set of general principal for the planning and conduct of joint overseas expeditions in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. This publication will form the basis for any training instructions or regulations issued by the War or the Navy Department for the guidance of the forces which may be engaged in such operations. The subject matter is designed to apply to joint operations of considerable forces of both the Army and the Navy, involving landings against opposition, but also to lesser efforts, which as a rule are simpler of execution.

44. *Purpose of an overseas expedition.*—A joint overseas expedition should be undertaken only as a part of a campaign designed as a phase of operations having in view the accomplishment of the purpose of the war. Hence, its success should weaken the enemy and gain for us an advantage in the next step to be undertaken. The land operations to be undertaken in a joint expedition may involve all or any of the following: (a) The securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations; (b) the seizure and securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; (c) the seizure and securing of an area for use as a naval base from [74] which naval forces will carry out further operations of the campaign; (d) the seizure and securing of an area in order to deny the use of that area to the enemy; (e) a raid to destroy enemy military or industrial installations and facilities or to draw enemy forces away from another area.

45. *Advantages inherent in landing operations.*—A joint overseas expedition has many of the advantages inherent in offensive warfare. In particular, it has the initiative with a wide choice of objectives and lines of approach toward them. Its extreme mobility, combined with the use of feints, frequently will conceal the objectives selected until the coast is approached. Through the mobility of its reserves retained afloat, it has an excellent opportunity to exploit initial successes ashore.

46. *Disadvantages inherent in landing operations.*—On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages. In particular, it requires a longer time to launch an attack by troops from transports than from a position already established on shore. While the troops are being brought ashore in boats they are unable to take any effective part in the combat, but offer a particularly vulnerable target to all enemy weapons. Usually, troops must land on and fight over comparatively unfamiliar ground where information of hostile dispositions will be more difficult to obtain than in other types of operations. Difficulties of supply are greatly increased. The artillery support in the initial stages of the attack must be furnished by naval guns; and, finally, success depends to a great degree upon the proper coordination and intimate cooperation of two distinct services.

47. *Superiority of force essential.*

a. An overseas expedition presupposes marked superiority on the sea and in the air within the area of, and during the time required for, the operations. Such superiority does not necessarily preclude all possible damage to vessels of the expedition by enemy action, but it must be sufficient to ensure a reasonable degree of protection for all transports accompanying the expedition while in passage and during the progress of the landing operations. Large ships stopping in the open ocean and troops disembarking in small boats are extremely vulnerable to attack by submarines and aircraft. Careful consideration therefore must be given to the removal of the sub- [75] marine and air menace prior to the actual landing of the expeditionary forces. The possibility of enemy air and naval reinforcements arriving during the operation and the further possibility of enemy use of chemical agents to oppose a landing should be given due weight in the estimate of relative strength.

b. Unless the landing forces available for the expedition are unquestionably superior to the enemy forces that may be expected to oppose the landings and operations on shore subsequent thereto, the initiation of such operation is not justified. Numbers alone cannot afford this superiority. There must also be that effectiveness which is obtained by proper organization, equipment, and training of the forces for the special type of operations to be undertaken.

48. *Definitions.*

a. *A joint overseas expedition* is a combined Army and Navy force dispatched to a theater of operations by sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations on shore.

b. Phases.—The execution of a joint overseas expedition divides itself naturally into the three following phases, and plans are made accordingly:

(1) *The embarkation phase* consists of all preparatory measures taken to assemble the troops and their equipment, the supplies, and the transportation at or near the port of embarkation; it also includes the actual loading of the troops and supplies on the transports.

(2) *The movement overseas phase* is the period from the time the expedition sorties from the port of embarkation until the joint attack forces rendezvous within their landing areas.

(3) *The landing phase* begins with the movement of the expedition from the rendezvous within the landing area, and continues until the landing forces are securely established on shore.

c. A naval attack force is the naval unit in landing operations, consisting of transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels, operating against a continuous shore line, usually designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the terms "right", "left", "center", etc.

[76] *d. A landing force* consists of the Army organizations which are to carry out landing operations from the transports of a naval attack force.

e. A joint attack force includes a naval attack force and the landing force associated therewith.

f. A landing area is the area within which are included the operations of a joint attack force and comprises the shore and sea area involved in the landing operations. A large joint overseas expedition may require the use of more than one landing area.

g. A transport area is the water area assigned for debarking troops from the transports.

h. A naval support area is the sea area assigned to naval vessels detailed to support a landing.

i. A beach is that portion of the shore line of a landing area normally required for the landing of a force approximating a combat team. A combat team is defined in subparagraph *m* below.

j. A beachhead is a position organized in depth, with a view to offensive or defensive operations, which protects the beach initially from enemy light artillery fire (range about 10,000 yards) and eventually from medium artillery (range about 15,000 yards).

k. A beachmaster is a naval officer detailed to control the beach from the high-water mark seaward.

l. A shore party commander is an Army officer detailed to control Army administrative activities at the beach.

m. A combat team is the basic Army unit in landing operations, consisting normally of an infantry battalion and supporting troops including any or all of the following, depending on the requirements of the situation and the availability of transportation: A platoon of the howitzer company; the battalion medical detachment; a battery of field artillery; a company of engineers; necessary liaison and communication agencies.

n. An artillery concentration is artillery fire placed on an area.

o. Counterbattery is fire delivered by naval vessels or the Army's artillery, on enemy artillery, for the purpose of neutralizing or destroying it.

p. A boat group is a group of boats organized for transporting a combat team or some other similar tactical unit.

[77] *q. A wave* is one boat group, or two or more boat groups landing abreast, when operating in a tactical formation for landing.

r. A subwave is each line of boats in a wave.

s. Commercial loading utilizes to the maximum the ship space and does not contemplate tactical employment of the troops on landing until their equipment, other than personal equipment, has been issued to them. This method of loading is applicable to movements from an established port to an established and well-secured port. Troops moved by this method are not available for tactical employment in landing operations against hostile forces.

t. Unit loading gives primary consideration to the availability of the troops for combat purposes on landing, rather than utilization of ship space.

The degree of readiness for employment depends upon the degree to which organizations are unit loaded as follows:

(1) *Combat unit landing*, in which certain units, selected because of their probable destination and employment in landing on hostile shores, are completely loaded on one ship with at least their essential combat equipment and supplies immediately available for debarkation with the troops, together with

the animals for the organization when this is practicable. This method of unit loading is particularly applicable to units which probably will be required for an assault on hostile shores by a landing from small boats. Such an operation against any one beach will require an army combat team. This, of course, is subject to modification to meet special requirements. Combat teams will be loaded in such manner as to permit simultaneous debarkation.

(2) *Organizational unit loading*, in which organizations with their equipment and supplies are loaded on the same transport, but not so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. This is somewhat more economical in ship capacity than is combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units available for employment as soon as the troops and their equipment have been assembled on land. Like combat unit loading, this method permits diversion en route by complete ship loads, from the destination originally intended.

[78] (3) *Convoy unit loading*, in which the troops with their equipment and supplies are loaded on transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same transport. This allows a considerable utilization of ship space, particularly by using this method of loading to fill in space on transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary to assemble them on land, with their equipment and supplies.

Section II

Command

49. *Method of coordination*.—The joint Army and Navy basic war plans, or the authority directing the undertaking of a joint overseas expedition, will prescribe whether coordination will be by the exercise of unity of command or by the exercise of limited unity of command. (See ch. II, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

50. *Commanders to embark on same ship*.—The Army and the Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should also the respective Army and Navy commanders of a joint attack force. This method should be applied, where practicable, through all echelons of command.

51. *Liaison agents and staffs*.—The mutual exchange of liaison agents assures a degree of cooperation between the Army and the Navy not otherwise readily obtainable. Wherever joint operations are undertaken the commander of one service should have on his staff members of the other service.

52. *Communication with subordinate units*.—It is highly important that all landing force commanders should land with their units or as soon thereafter as possible, establish communication with subordinates who have already landed, and issue orders for subsequent operations based on personal knowledge of the situation and the terrain. The senior commander ashore must act with vigor and initiative.

[79]

Section III

Plans

53. *The joint basic decision and directive*.

a. *The decision* to undertake a joint overseas expedition will be derived from a joint Army and Navy estimate. Such a decision may be contained in a joint Army and Navy basic war plan, or it may be reached at any time during the progress of the war.

b. *A directive* will be issued by the authority arriving at the decision to undertake a joint overseas expedition, to the commander designated to command the combined forces, or to the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces which constitute the joint overseas expedition. This directive will generally include:

(1) Digest of available information of the enemy.

(2) Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon the proposed operations.

(3) Information of any supporting operations contemplated.

(4) The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the Navy.

(5) The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the mission or missions, with designation of the initial theater of operations.

(6) The forces assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of concentration and availability for embarkation.

(7) The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.

(8) The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement and operation.

(9) The method of coordination. The designation of the commander in chief under the method of unity of command; or the designation of the service in which paramount interest will be vested during each phase, with the designation of the respective commanders of the Army and the Navy forces.

(10) Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in order to give the commander in [80] chief or the respective commanders of the Army forces and the Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the success of the expedition.

54. *Expeditionary force joint estimate and joint plan.*

a. Upon receipt of the above directive, the commander in chief, or the commander of the service in which paramount interest is initially vested, will prepare such an estimate as may be desirable and, after full discussion with the respective Army and Navy commanders, or the commander of the other services, will issue instructions based on the directive and in amplification thereof; these instructions, particularly when prepared prior to the war, will ordinarily be in the form of a joint plan. Such instructions will generally include:

(1) Decision.

(2) Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.

(3) Operations to be undertaken, including both joint operations and such separate Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to insure the success of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces required and their commanders.

(4) Announcement of selected landing areas.

(5) Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.

(6) Provision for joint training.

(7) Provision for logistic support of the expedition.

(8) Provision for communications (signal) between forces.

(9) Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until shortly before the landing forces are ready to debark.

(10) Alternative plans.

b. It should be emphasized that the plans for embarkation and movement overseas should be based upon the requirements of the plan covering the actual landing operations.

55. *Cooperation in planning.*—In the preparation of these plans and of the subordinate plans it is essential that there be the closest cooperation between all Army and Navy commanders who are to be associated in the projected operations. Officers of each service [81] should have a clear understanding of the problems confronting the other service and the limitations incident to the employment of the facilities of both services. The staffs of both services should study the problem together. This applies not only to the staffs of the higher commanders, but also to the staffs of the subordinate commanders who are to be associated in each operation. Technical details relating to each service are to be worked out by the service concerned.

56. *Development of plans by Army and Navy commanders.*—On receipt of the instructions set forth in paragraphs 53 and 54, the respective commanders of the Army forces and of the Navy forces will proceed to develop the detailed plans to carry out the projected operations and will issue the necessary orders to their respective forces.

57. *Plans of subordinate units.*—Based on the orders of the commanders, Army and Navy, there will be prepared detailed plans covering the employment of subordinate units which, in the case of operations that are unfamiliar to the forces involved, will go into great detail. Orders of subordinate units, like those of higher units, will be prepared in close cooperation between commanders of the two services who are to be associated in the operations.

58. *Flexibility of the plans.*—In the preparation of all plans and orders, it must be borne in mind that one which fails to provide for flexibility has little chance of success. Therefore, provision will be made for necessary modifications due to weather conditions, enemy action, the strength of enemy resistance encountered at any of the landing beaches, and changes in the situation that may occur between departure and arrival at destination. Alternative landing areas will be selected and alternative plans providing for landing at these areas will be pre-

pared before embarkation. However, as the plan of embarkation cannot be changed in case an alternative plan is used, the plan of embarkation must be the same for, and should support, both the preferred and alternative plans. The alternative plans must be drawn so as to make this possible.

59. *Details to be perfected before sailing.*—It is necessary that all possible details of each plan of landing and orders for subordinate units be determined upon as far as may be practicable before the joint expedition sails, or at the latest before it departs from the [82] last port which it will touch before arrival in the landing area. All commanders should familiarize themselves as far as possession of information will permit with the nature of the beaches and the terrain over which operations are to be projected. A draft of the order initiating the landing contemplated must also be prepared and distributed for study during the voyage.

Section IV

Embarkation and measures preparatory thereto

60. *Plans and orders.*—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. For the Army forces:

- (1) Organization and equipment of the Army forces for the operation.
- (2) Special training of troops for the proposed operations.
- (3) Date on which loading of troops will commence.
- (4) Movement of troops from the concentration centers to ports of embarkation, in accordance with loading priority.
- (5) Directions covering requisition for supplies for delivery at ports as requested by the Navy.

(6) Subdivision of the Army forces for assignment to transports in accordance with the tactical plan.

(7) Embarkation tables for troops, and the necessary loading tables for general cargo to accompany troops.

(8) Loading of troops and equipment on board ship in accordance with the tactical plans and the Navy assignment of ships.

b. For the naval forces:

- (1) Organization of the naval forces for the operation.
- (2) Arrangements for procurement of boats, lighters, and other special equipment required to land the Army forces, their equipment, and supplies.
- (3) Allocation of available transport and ship space and tonnage as required to meet Army grouping of troops and unloading requirements.
- (4) Special training of naval personnel for the proposed operations.

[83] 61. *Procurement of sea transportation.*—The joint basic plan or directive (see par. 53 b (8)) will state which service is responsible for procurement and assembly of the sea transportation required for the Army forces. Transportation required by the Navy will be procured by that service. Unless stated in the plan or directive, the commander in chief or the commander of the force having paramount interest will decide when and where the necessary sea transportation is required and will request the War or Navy Department, as the case may be, to have it so assembled.

62. *Ports of embarkation.*—Regardless of whether the transportation employed for the movement of the Army forces overseas is under the control of the Army or Navy, the necessary ports required for embarking the Army forces are selected, organized, and operated by agencies of the War Department not included in the forces to be employed overseas. The Army embarkation service includes the employment of experienced riggers, longshoremen, and stevedores; harbor floating equipment, etc., for loading ships.

63. *Special organization.*

a. Army forces are restricted by the necessarily limited facilities available for transportation, not only in the transports, but in the boats and small craft available to transfer them to the shore, and the facilities, or lack of them, for debarkation from the boats. For support in the first stage of attack the landing of tanks is difficult and the landing of heavy artillery is impracticable. It is ordinarily impracticable to employ Army air units before and during the early stages of the landing. Special organization is, therefore, required to facilitate debarkation of intact combat units, reduce ship cargo requirements, provide increased small arms and machine-gun fire in lieu of normal artillery support, and insure mobility of the first units ashore.

b. Special naval organization is required to embark, escort, debark, and land the Army forces, including provision for the most effective possible artillery,

communications, and air support until the Army can establish its own artillery and air units on shore. This involves the organization and provision of boat officers and crews for the landing boats and lighters; organization for covering landing operations by gunfire on land targets; organization to provide air- [84] craft support and observation to serve the needs of ground troops, including observation of the fire of the Army's artillery; and organization to provide ship-to-shore communications.

64. *Special equipment.*

a. In general, in order to meet the requirements and limitations mentioned, the Army must reduce equipment to absolute essentials. Wherever practicable, motor transport will replace animal transport, and the motor transport provided will be of the types (light tractors and light trucks) which can be most easily handled, especially into and out of small boats. However, combat efficiency should not be sacrificed to facilitate sea transportation. The amount and kind of transportation is dependent on the terrain and the distance of the advance.

b. Because of the special nature of the operations required in the transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore against enemy opposition and under supporting fire from friendly ships, special equipment must be provided by the Navy. This includes special boats for landing the assault troops, including installation of machine guns therein, and the provision of protection so far as practicable against small arms fire from shore; special boats, barges, and motor lighters for landing all other troops and their equipment, including artillery, tanks, airplanes, and motor and animal transport, and supplies; provision of special ammunition required for the artillery support; and special communications equipment.

c. The maximum number of landing boats which can be transported efficiently should be provided. The number of boats should be at least sufficient to land simultaneously the number of assault battalions to cover the frontage required in the proposed scheme of maneuver, and local reserves sufficient to hold the ground gained until reinforcements are landed in later waves.

d. All boats possible should be carried on the transports. The standard Navy boats on combat vessels are to be used only as necessary to supplement transport equipment and for towing.

65. *Special equipment to be assembled before departure.*—Estimates of the special equipment required will be made well in advance of the date of departure of the expedition in order that it may be procured and some training in its use may be carried out before loading.

[85] 66. *Joint training.*—The difficulties of landing on a hostile shore from small boats, heavily encumbered troops, most of whom have had little or no experience with the sea, and the unfamiliarity of the Navy with attack of land objectives, and with firing over friendly troops, make it necessary that as much preliminary joint training be carried out as time permits. It is particularly necessary that all operations projected be rehearsed in as realistic a manner as the facilities permit prior to the actual landing.

67. *Embarkation plans.*

a. The plans required for the subdivision of the Army forces for assignment to transports constitute the embarkation plans. Embarkation is so intimately related to and dependent upon debarkation that the details of embarkation plans cannot be completed until decision has been reached as to the method of debarkation. The debarkation plan itself is dependent upon the tactical plan of employment of the Army forces.

b. The orders directing embarkation will be based upon the debarkation plan for the preferred tactical plan and the details of embarkation will be contained in embarkation tables and special equipment tables prepared by the Army as a part of the embarkation order.

c. The data to be contained in the embarkation and special equipment tables will be as follows:

(1) Whether or not the organization is to be unit loaded and if so the degree of unit loading desired. (See par. 48 *l*.)

(2) The number of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men; total personnel; total number of animals; the number and kind of each article, and space required in cubic feet to store, and the weight in long tons; the dimensions, length, breadth and height of each separate package of equipment; the total space required to store and the total tonnage in long tons of the supplies and equipment pertaining to the unit.

d. When the sea transportation is under the control of the Navy, this information will be furnished to the Navy as far in advance of the embarkation as possible.

68. *Joint planning.*—Embarkation tables cannot, of course, be finally prepared until the transports which will be available are [86] definitely known. Joint study and planning for embarkation of expeditionary forces are absolutely necessary.

69. *Loading.*

a. For the movement overseas of joint expeditionary forces, two general methods of loading troops and their equipment on transports are applicable. These two methods are termed *commercial loading* and *unit loading*. (See subpars. 48 s and 48 t.)

b. The determination of the method of loading for embarkation is primarily dependent upon an estimate as to the probable employment of the organizations upon debarkation. While economy of ship's space will be a highly important factor in planning for a joint overseas expedition, and combat unit loading is somewhat less economical in this respect, yet the all important factor of combat efficiency can not be sacrificed. Minimum requirements to secure combat efficiency may be stated as:

(1) Each combat team, combat unit loaded, will be complete on one ship.

(2) There will be at least as many such teams, one or more per ship, as there are beaches to be assaulted.

(3) Infantry battalions required as local reserves for assault echelons will be combat unit loaded.

c. To secure the best use of ship's space and at the same time provide the combat unit loading required by the situation, combinations of the different methods of unit loading on the same transport may often be made. Thus, the same transport may contain a combat team, combat unit loaded; the infantry regimental headquarters, and possibly other elements, organizational unit loaded; and freight, equipment, and supplies, together with other units designated to debark early in the operations, convoy unit loaded.

70. *Loading aviation units.*

a. The most desirable unit loading for Army aviation units is to have them loaded on carriers so that the planes can take off therefrom to operate in support of the landing; and to have sufficient airdrome personnel and equipment on the carrier to permit the early establishment of facilities for the operation of the units on shore. This is the ideal condition to be attained, but it is probable that lack of available carriers for this purpose will necessitate the acceptance [87] of a lesser degree of readiness, which will preclude the use of Army aviation units in support of the landing.

b. If Army aviation units cannot be unit-loaded on carriers, transports should be selected which will permit the planes to be stowed between decks, almost completely set up, and the loading on the same ship of the airdrome personnel and equipment necessary to permit prompt establishment on shore of the facilities required for the operation of the units.

c. It may be necessary to employ transports of such restricted space between decks as to require that the planes be shipped knocked-down and crated. This is the least desirable method of loading, due to the docking facilities necessary for unloading and the time element involved in getting the planes ashore and ready for flying.

Section V

The movement overseas

71. *Plans and orders.*—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. *For the Army forces:*

Designation of such landing areas as may have been concurred in by the Navy, and announcement of the plan for establishment of the Army forces on shore.

b. *For the Naval forces:*

(1) Information of time of departure, in accordance with paragraph 72, following.

(2) Concurrence with the Army in selection of the landing areas and plan for the establishment of the Army forces on shore.

(3) Safe escort of the expedition to the landing areas and organization therefor.

72. *Time of departure.*—The time of departure from the ports of embarkation of the expedition and assembly at the designated rendezvous will be decided by

the commander in chief or the commander of the service having paramount interest.

73. *Convoy and escort.*

a. Prior to departure of the overseas expedition, the naval commander will organize all noncombat vessels, such as troop and [88] animal transports and cargo ships, into such convoy groups as may be advisable, the basis for organization being the retention in one group of the ships carrying the troops and equipment to be landed at any one beach. Each convoy group will be commanded by an officer of the Navy of suitable rank, designated by the naval commander. The naval commander will furthermore organize and station the escort for the convoy groups, whether these convoy groups are proceeding in one, or more than one formation.

b. In the event that the expedition has for its major objective the establishment of the fleet in a base in a theater of operations normally controlled by the enemy, it is probable that all transports and cargo ships will be incorporated in the fleet train which includes the auxiliary vessels necessary for the logistic support of the fleet.

74. *Navigation and defense.*

a. Whatever the type of landing operations to be undertaken, the navigation and defense of the convoys of troop transports in joint overseas expeditions at sea are entirely under the direction of the Navy, and the Navy is responsible for the safe conduct of all the forces afloat included in the operations.

b. The Army personnel are passengers and do not interfere with the formation, route, or conduct of the expedition. The troops on board may be assigned certain duties such as that of lookouts, as may be directed by the commander of the transport through the commanding officer of troops on board.

75. *Protection of the lines of supply. (lines of communication).*—The Navy is always responsible for the protection of the oversea lines of supply.

Section VI

The Landing (Including Preparations Therefor)

76. *Joint plans.*—Based upon the expeditionary force joint plan, all Army and Navy commanders of larger units operating together will prepare joint plans covering their operations in the landing phase.

77. *Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders.*—The joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders should, in general, include the necessary details concerning:

[89] a. Mission (assigned in the expeditionary force joint plan).

b. Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.

c. Decision as to the joint operation to be undertaken and such separate Army and Navy tasks as are considered to be necessary.

d. Designation of respective task forces required and their commanders.

e. Selection, number, and locations of the beaches within the landing area.

f. The hour of landing.

g. Gunfire and air support, both naval and Army.

h. Maintaining control of the necessary sea area during the operations.

i. Clearing enemy naval forces and obstacles from the landing area.

j. Army debarkation tables for troops, equipment, and supply.

k. Navy transport of troops from ship to shore in accordance with Army debarkation tables.

l. Seizure and organization of designated objectives on shore and exploitation of initial success after landing.

m. Relief of naval forces furnishing gunfire and air support and communication (signal) service.

n. Detail of liaison agents.

o. Communication (signal) service.

p. Establishment of ports of debarkation and supply bases on shore and other logistic details necessary for the landing operations.

q. Protection and maintenance of oversea lines of supply (communication).

78. *Orders.*—The orders of the Army and the Navy commanders will include such details of the "Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders" as are pertinent to their respective commands.

79. *Surprise.*

a. The chances of success in an opposed landing are much improved when surprise is effected.

b. Strategical surprise is difficult to accomplish, as air and surface scouting can be carried a long distance to seaward, and may result in the early discovery of the approaching expedition. Tactical surprise, as regards the commencement of operations, against a particular beach at a particular time, is often possible, and every effort should be made to effect it. [90]

c. The effectiveness of tactical surprise is dependent upon the number of landing places available, the size of the landing force, the secrecy and rapidity of approach, the character of the enemy dispositions and ability to throw the Army reserve rapidly into an area where enemy weakness has been determined by the initial attack. Tactical surprise may also be effected by the use of darkness or smoke to conceal movements, and by means of demonstrations and feints.

80. *Reconnaissance.*

a. In cases where overseas expeditions are under consideration, steps should be taken, before initiating debarkation plans to make such preliminary reconnaissance of the proposed landing areas as may be possible to determine the enemy's preparation for defense, character of the terrain, and hydrographic conditions adjacent to the tentatively selected beaches. After completion of the plan, a further reconnaissance should be made, if practicable, to check the details and soundness of the plans.

b. During the landing phase, continuous reconnaissance should be conducted by all echelons of command. Air forces, submarines, and patrols landed from small boats, as well as the troops when landed, should carry out this reconnaissance.

c. Air reconnaissance of the terrain inland from the beach preliminary to landing is of value in determining the enemy strength in numbers and position, which must be overcome; but to avoid arousing the enemy's suspicions, air reconnaissance should be on a very broad front, or it may be necessary to suspend aerial reconnaissance in such areas for a time preliminary to the attack, unless such reconnaissance can be concealed by including it in other air operations. However, where organized resistance is expected, information obtained by air reconnaissance of enemy positions, with photographs, may prove of far more value to the landing forces than any benefits derived from attempted surprise landings without this information.

[91] 81. *Employment of the Army forces.*

a. A landing against opposition is in effect the assault of an organized defensive position modified by substituting naval gunfire support for divisional, corps, and Army artillery, and generally Navy aircraft support for Army aircraft support. However, every effort will be made to utilize all possible aircraft support, both Army and Navy.

b. Three successive phases in the operations are to be expected, each being marked by an attack or attacks with limited objectives:

(1) *First phase.*—Seizure of the necessary terrain immediately in rear of the beach, followed when sufficient strength has been landed by an advance to secure the beach from enemy light artillery fire. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line about 10,000 yards inland.

(2) *Second phase.*—Operations to insure further advance inland to a position which denies enemy medium artillery fire on the beach. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line at least 15,000 yards inland.

(3) *Third phase.*—Further land and air operations for securing the objectives for which the landing was undertaken.

c. Simultaneous landings will be made by as many combat teams on as broad a front as the boat facilities will permit, but not to the extent of causing undue dispersion.

d. The formation of the waves approximates as closely that of an assault on land as the facilities permit.

e. It is imperative that the landing be made on the beach by tactical units, even down to the squad, in order that tactical team unity may be preserved and the fighting power of the team be at the maximum at the moment of physical contact with the enemy.

f. In the day attack, assault platoons endeavor to develop all fire power practicable, making free use of machine guns while in the boats. In the night assaults, fire of the assaulting troops before reaching the beach will be used only as a last resort.

82. *Employment of the Naval forces.*

a. The commander of the naval attack force is responsible for the preparation of plans for and the actual operation of landing on [92] the beach of all personnel and material pertaining to the Army forces with which he is associated

in accordance with Army debarkation tables; the support of the landing by gunfire; the employment of the Navy air forces in support of the Army; the maintenance of signal communications between the Army and Navy forces both afloat and in the air; all this in addition to the normal functions involved in protecting the forces against hostile naval attack.

b. If the distance from the transports to the beach is considerable, consideration should be given to towing the boats by mine sweepers or light surface craft as close to the beach as the depth of the water permits, in order to minimize confusion due to breakdown and failure to keep to the designated courses. However, every care should be exercised in the methods of handling boats and in boat formations to minimize excessive losses from hostile fire.

83. *Organization of the Army forces.*

a. The Army forces designated to land at each beach or group of beaches and the necessary reserves are organized into subordinate commands adhering to normal formations. In order to effect the closest possible cooperation, Army commanders of the various echelons should be embarked initially on the ships of the commanders of the corresponding naval echelons, as far as practicable.

b. As the beach or group of beaches at which the landing will prove successful cannot be foreseen, the appropriate echelons or command should provide for adequate, highly mobile reserves afloat which may be promptly moved to exploit the situations developing on shore.

84. *Naval organization for landing.*

a. Preparatory to landing, the transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels engaged in a joint overseas expedition will, if not already so organized, be organized into one or more *naval attack forces* and the forces so formed designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the terms "right", "left", "center", etc. A naval officer will be designated to command each attack force. (See par. 48 c.)

b. Such *naval attack force* is further subdivided into *task groups*, which will generally include the following:

(1) *The fire support group*, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned the following fire missions: [93] Against enemy troops opposing the landing or against their probable positions; against reserves; against hostile machine guns and hostile artillery; and on hostile routes of advance or retreat. Effective results may further be obtained by close-in support of light vessels, such as destroyers, delivering direct fire.

(2) *The air group*, consisting of naval aircraft, for observation of gunfire of the fire support group and the Army's artillery, for protection of the attack force against enemy air operations, for reconnaissance of enemy positions, for bombing enemy objectives, and for liaison with the Army forces. Where practicable, observation units should support each division landing. It should be noted, however, that the fleet air forces, in the theater of operations, other than planes carried on battleships and cruisers, are normally organized into a single task force, with the mission of supporting the landing of the expeditionary force and the operations of the attack forces.

(3) *The mine group*, consisting of the mine-laying vessels and mine sweepers for the purpose of sweeping the landing area clear of enemy mines and of laying defensive mines to protect the vessels of the attack force from enemy submarines and night torpedo attack.

(4) *The antisubmarine group*, consisting of the vessels designated to protect the vessels of the attack force from attack by enemy submarines.

(5) *The transport group*, consisting of the transports and all noncombatant vessels carrying troops, equipment, and supplies.

(6) *The screening group*, consisting of those vessels designated to locate and give warning of the approach of enemy vessels attacking same if possible. This group usually includes the submarines accompanying the expedition.

(7) *Salvage group*, consisting of such light craft as may be available for rescuing personnel of distressed boats, hauling off grounded boats, and the recovery of sunken equipment.

c. The above organization is repeated for each separate landing area at which landing operations are to be carried on.

[94] d. The commander of the naval attack force should, so far as possible, take such station that he may control and coordinate most effectively the naval operations in his area and be kept informed of the progress of the operations on shore.

85. *The landing area.*—The selection of the landing area or areas (defined in 48 d) depends primarily upon tactical considerations as to the objective and the enemy opposition likely to be encountered.

86. *Characteristics of a landing area.*

a. The area selected, *from an Army viewpoint*, should offer a maximum of the following advantages:

(1) Permit both approach and landings on a broad front, commensurate with the size of the landing force.

(2) Afford a sufficient number of favorable beaches that are preferably mutually supporting.

(3) Contain no natural obstacles which would prevent or hinder greatly an advance.

(4) Have natural terrain features on which one or both flanks may rest.

(5) Afford sufficient area for the establishment of a beach head.

(6) Afford sufficient area inland for maneuvering the forces employed.

(7) Provide sufficient suitable road running inland to insure movement of troops toward their objectives and the movement of artillery and supplies.

(8) Afford sites permitting the landing of heavy equipment, artillery, and supplies.

(9) Afford suitable ground for the operation of Army aircraft, unless areas outside the landing area are to be used for this purpose.

b. The area selected, *from a Navy viewpoint*, should offer the maximum of the following advantages:

(1) Afford suitable approach, free from obstruction, to the area in which the transports are to debark troops and equipment.

(2) Afford some shelter for the transports, so that ships may complete debarkation with the least possible interference by weather conditions, and in a depth of approximately 10 [95] fathoms, where practicable, as a protection against submarines.

(3) Afford maneuvering space for the naval supporting forces, including hydrographic conditions favorable for the maneuver of accompanying ships, close in to shore.

(4) Provide a few sheltered landing points where temporary or improvised floats or wharves can be employed for unloading that part of army equipment required ashore in the early phases.

(5) Provide suitable waters for anchorage and protection of the convoy as soon as the coast line has been freed from enemy artillery.

(6) Afford ultimately a harbor suitable for the maintenance of the military forces ashore and of the naval forces.

87. *Selection of beaches.*

a. Within any given landing area, the number and locations of the beaches are decided by the Army commander after a careful joint estimate of the situation by Army and Navy commanders, and after a reconnaissance, where practicable.

b. *From the viewpoint of the Army*, the number and location of the beaches to be employed will be based upon—

(1) Freedom from hostile opposition, as that is the most serious obstacle to a successful landing.

(2) Inability of the defenders to concentrate troops opposite each possible beach as compared with the attacker's ability to do so.

(3) Absence of permanent means of defense or obstacles installed by the enemy.

(4) Access to the terrain over which the troops are to operate.

(5) Extent and existence of adjoining beaches permitting landings and approach on a broad front. The shore line need not be suitable throughout its whole extent for landing, provided the various beaches permit the units landing thereon to be mutually supporting.

(6) The character of the terrain inland from the beach. The establishment of a beachhead requires that the landing forces be able to clear rapidly the area inland adjacent to [96] the beach to a depth of at least 10,000 yards, so as to allow the continued landing of troops without interference by light artillery fire. It further requires that, as a next step, the forces ashore be able to establish themselves preparatory to a further advance on a line at least 15,000 yards inland, so as to allow the continued landing of heavy material without interruption by medium-range artillery fire.

c. *From the viewpoint of the Navy*, the water area adjacent to the beaches selected should:

(1) Be free from serious obstructions to navigation.

(2) Be of a slope permitting beaching of boats close to the shore line.

(3) Be firm, particularly where guns and heavy army equipment are to be landed.

(4) Contain some area sheltered from wind and sea so that the troops and equipment may be landed from boats without undue interruption or interference by surf.

(5) Have satisfactory tidal and current conditions. Local currents, particularly those close inshore, rough water, surf, usual weather conditions, and tidal range, must be considered by the Navy in determining which beaches are practicable for landing.

(6) Have satisfactory approaches from seaward, without narrow passages, thus permitting the movement of boats on a broad front.

d. Unfavorable beaches may have to be selected for various reasons. Use of such beaches may be obligatory even at the risk of losses, because better beaches do not exist, or in order to take the overbalancing advantage of surprise, or to gain a flanking fire which will assist the larger landings on more favorable beaches. Successful landings have been made on shore lines thought to be inaccessible.

88. *Final selection of landing areas and beaches.*

a. Final selection of the landing areas and beaches must be based on a reasonable probability of attaining the major objective. The decision must assure the landing of sufficient troops at a place from which they can reach their objective and accomplish the mission for which the operation was undertaken. Landing areas and beaches [97] should be selected with a view of determining the enemy's weakest point.

b. Since tactical considerations governing the employment of the troops on shore are paramount, *final decision* as to the landing area of Army forces, its breadth, beaches to be used, and order of landing of the troops will be made by the Army commander from among those areas and beaches that the Navy commander states are practicable so far as naval considerations are concerned.

89. *Hour of landing.*

a. Decision as to the hour of landing involves several factors which will be considered jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in charge of the operations.

b. *Advantages of landing during darkness.*—A landing before or just at day-break greatly increases the chance of securing some measure of tactical surprise, materially lessens the efficacy of any fire the defense may employ except prearranged fires or defensive barrages, reduces the losses to be anticipated while the troops are in small boats, and prevents the enemy from gaining the necessary information on which to dispose his forces, particularly the reserves. Advantage may be taken of fog or smoke as a protection against searchlights and flares. However, fog and smoke may increase the difficulty of landing at the desired beaches.

c. *Advantages of landing during daylight.*—In a daylight landing the movements of both ships and small boats are made under favorable circumstances, as positions and courses can be accurately fixed and as troops can be loaded into small boats more easily than during darkness. Likewise, the attack is assured of better gunfire and air support, and better defense against mines, submarines, light naval forces, and hostile aviation. The attackers, by means of naval gunfire and aviation, are better able to pin the enemy to the ground and interdict movements of his reserves, thus preventing his exploitation of the fuller and more accurate information which daylight permits him to obtain.

d. *Smoke.*—In case the landing is not made under cover of darkness, the resulting disadvantage may, to some extent, be overcome by the use of smoke. A smoke screen laid by destroyers or aircraft may be utilized to conceal the movements and dispositions [98] of the transport groups, while an airplane smoke screen laid on hostile positions when known or at the shore line may serve to protect the small boats from hostile fire and at the same time keep the enemy in doubt as to the exact strength and point of attack. In planning for the use of smoke the direction and velocity of the wind must be carefully considered.

e. *Daylight essential for exploitation.*—The landing must be made early enough to allow sufficient daylight for the Army forces to reach their first objectives.

f. *Other considerations.*—In addition to the above considerations, a particular combination of tide, wind, fog, or moon may be desirable in selecting the hour as well as the day for the landing.

g. *Final decision* as to the hour of landing rests with the commander in chief, in the case of unity of command, or the commander of the service having paramount interest.

90. *Approach to and occupation of landing area.*

a. The approach to the landing area and the occupation of the sea area included therein are conducted under orders of the commander of the naval attack force or forces. Careful calculation must be made as to the time required to embark the first wave in the boats and the length of time it will require to reach the beach. This result is applied to the previously determined hour for the landing and the approach so conducted that the transports will be in position at the time required. In order to minimize risk of detection as well as torpedo attack by enemy submarines, vessels should not be required to arrive within the landing area until they are needed. Where hydrography allows, transports may be anchored in water of such depth as to afford protection against hostile submarines. It is highly desirable that the submarine danger be eliminated prior to making landings. Submarine nets may be used to protect transport groups.

b. When the waters of the proposed landing area are known or suspected of being mined, breaches must be made before the landings begin. The necessary mine sweeping is performed by the Navy.

c. The Navy is responsible for the demolition or removal, when possible, of underwater obstacles near the beach. Consideration will be given to the possibility of destroying such underwater obstacles as barbed-wire entanglements by cutting devices rigged on the small boats of the assault wave.

[99] d. Enemy submarines and mines may influence the conduct of the convoy, the approach to the landing area and the beaches, naval gunfire support, or the method of debarkation, thus requiring changes in the details of the plan.

91. *Transport and naval support areas.*

a. The transport area is defined in paragraph 48 g. The commander of the Navy forces is responsible for the selection of the transport area.

b. The area assigned to each transport group should be as close to the beach as possible without coming under effective enemy artillery fire. The desirability of utilizing smooth water for the purpose of debarking the troops into the small boats is an important consideration. The transport area should not be crowded.

c. The naval support area, defined in paragraph 48 h, should be sufficient in depth and breadth to permit free maneuvering of the supporting ships, with deep water close enough in to permit them to cover effectively with gunfire the land objectives step by step up to the extreme ranges. If practicable, it will be separate and distinct from the transport area.

92. *Employment of air forces.*

a. The plan for employment of the air forces, Army and Navy, depends upon the time during the operations at which the Army air forces can be made available for service. Factors which affect early employment of Army air units are:

(1) The selection of landing fields for use by the Army air forces; their location with reference to the landing area.

(2) The time required for preparation of necessary landing fields and the amount of labor available for this purpose.

(3) Whether land bases for Army aviation are to be seized prior to main landing.

(4) Whether land bases for Army aviation are to be seized at the same time of the main landing.

(5) The difficulty of transporting airplanes uncrated, the amount of ship's space available for this purpose, and the difficulty of transporting airplanes from ship to shore and to places where they can take off.

(6) The time to assemble airplanes that are transported in crates.

[100] (7) The practicability of flying a portion of the Army air forces to temporary landing fields within operating distance of the landing area.

b. When the enemy is provided with an air force, the hostile observation is almost certain to learn of the approach of the expedition, and the hostile air force, unless neutralized, may prevent the convoy from approaching the coast or the successful debarkation and landing of the troops without serious losses. The convoy must be assisted by an air force strong enough to protect the convoy and the landing area from effective air attack. This is the function of the naval air forces, with such assistance from the Army air forces as may be practicable.

c. While the Army air units will enter into the action as early as possible, Army air activities will be restricted until suitable land bases are secured. Hence, in addition to reconnaissance and air spotting of naval gunfire during the early phases of the landing operations, the Navy air forces will be prepared to take over, or at least to assist in other missions usually assigned to the Army air units. Naval assistance in such missions, which include infantry liaison, artillery

adjustment, reconnaissance, and attack in support of ground operations, will continue until the various classes of Army air units are available. Army observers will be utilized, if practicable, in naval planes in such operations prior to the arrival of Army planes.

93. Naval gunfire support.

a. As artillery support, at least in the initial stages, must be given by naval gunfire exclusively, the maximum effectiveness of its use must be assured by very careful prearrangement. Liaison and communications between advancing troops and their supporting artillery should be provided.

b. Naval artillery being of the high velocity, flat trajectory type, the objectives selected for it to fire upon must be large, well defined, and farther ahead of our infantry for safety reasons, than is usually the case. Due to the limited supply of ammunition available for all types of naval guns, barrages and firing on minor or suspected targets will not be feasible. Instead of this the best method of support will be by short intense concentrations fired according to a [101] Prearranged schedule on targets visible from the firing ships, from observation points on land, or from spotting aircraft. Concentrations should be placed on other targets as they disclose themselves by groups specially designated beforehand. Although possible, map firing should be employed only as a last resort; observed firing is always to be preferred. However, liberal use should be made of maps in the designation of artillery objectives in the plan of fire support.

c. Reduced charges may be used to advantage in cases where the design of the gun permits this. High angle fire may be obtained by the design, manufacture, and supply of artillery for the particular purpose of supporting a landing force in joint operations. Naval antiaircraft guns will be used throughout against enemy air operations, but if not needed for this purpose they may be used advantageously against shore objectives.

d. The gunfire support furnished by the naval forces should be continuous. It will usually start with a preparation fire and continue throughout the successive stages of the landing until the limit of range of guns is reached or until the Army's own artillery is in a position to furnish adequate support. During the time the first wave is embarking in small boats from the transports and until the first of these boats reach the beach, the fire will be placed on known hostile artillery positions, organized strong points, machine-gun nests, defiles on routes over which supports and reserves must pass and, generally, on such other objectives the neutralization of which will lessen the enemy's defense. Artillery support plans will provide for effective fire on the beach to cover the movement of the first wave ashore. Just before our troops reach the shore the fire will lift to targets farther inland. The terrain beyond the beach will influence the amount of lifting of the fire. In any event it must be kept far enough in advance of our infantry to assure against losses from our own fire.

e. There are two general methods which may be employed by naval forces in affording artillery support in a forced landing where two or more Army divisions land simultaneously. One is to keep all firing units centralized under the highest commander; the other is to decentralize naval support groups to support subordinate Army [102] units. The following are examples of the second method: When two infantry divisions land simultaneously and the naval units have been divided into two naval attack forces, it might be desirable to have the naval vessels of one naval attack force support one division, and the naval vessels of the other naval attack force support the other division, or to divide the naval force into three supporting groups—one being assigned to support each division and one to support the operation as a whole; or a division might be made by calibers, the large caliber main batteries of large ships being assigned to general support while the smaller caliber secondary batteries are assigned to support subordinate units to include divisions, and sometimes brigades.

94. Cooperation in gunfire support.

a. Complete plans for gunfire support should be worked out prior to embarkation between the commanders of the naval groups which are to give the support and of the respective Army units they are to support. Army commanders will indicate the objectives upon which they desire fire, the purpose of the fire, and the times they are to be fired upon. The naval commander concerned will indicate exactly how much of the desired support he can give. In case the Navy has not sufficient guns to cover the desired objectives, every effort will be made to secure additional ships rather than defeat the Army plan by reducing below the minimum the artillery support required by it.

b. Since the effectiveness with which naval gunfire support plans and orders are carried out is largely dependent upon the maintenance of adequate liaison

and communications between shore and ship, such plans and orders should include adequate provisions for the installation and maintenance of all means necessary to assure this. To assist in securing effective support, liaison officers will be interchanged between Army and Navy units. Advantageous use may be made of Army officers of artillery organizations which do not debark initially. All liaison officers should report to the headquarters to which assigned in plenty of time—probably prior to embarkation—to become thoroughly familiar with their duties. They should be sufficiently familiar with the other service as to be able to interpret the desires and needs of the commanders of the units whom they represent in the case of Army liaison officers and the capabilities of naval firing groups in the case of naval liaison officers.

c. In addition to normal communication through the beach master as provided in paragraph 101 a, each naval liaison officer should have direct communication with his commander whom he represents. For this purpose each should be accompanied by a signal party with facilities for maintaining radio and visual communications with his commander.

95. *Debarcation of troops.*

a. A wave is defined in paragraph 48 g. The organization of the troops of each wave, with the time of arrival at the beach, is determined by the debarkation tables which are prepared by the Army officer commanding the unit. Such organization is based on best information on hand and upon information received from the naval attack force commander as to availability and capacity of boats.

b. The tactical requirement of deployment in depth will cause the debarkation to be made in successive waves.

c. The number of waves to be under way at the same time will depend upon the tactical plan and the number and kind of boats available. After the initial tactical force has been carried ashore by successive waves, the remaining Army units will be sent ashore in as orderly and expeditious a manner as is feasible by the use of such boats and lighters as remain available, unless the necessity for tactical formations demands continuation of movement by waves.

d. The Navy is responsible that the waves are so spaced that they will arrive at the beach in the order and at the time intervals requested by the Army.

e. In order to reduce the time that the troops may be under fire in the boats, it is desirable that the first wave, at least, be debarked in fast motorboats, the larger and slower boats being reserved for succeeding waves in which larger groupings are not objectionable. The provision of special boats for the purpose of landing the troops is highly desirable and is a duty of the Navy.

f. All boats of an assault wave should mount machine guns to be manned by either the Army or Navy, and should be provided with as much protection as possible against the effects of small-arms and machine-gun fire directed at them from the beaches and from aircraft.

[104] g. All boats used for landing troops, equipment, or supplies will be manned by Navy crews and commanded by Navy personnel.

96. *Debarcation of supplies and light equipment.*

a. The plan covering the landing phase will provide for the supply of the troops on shore. Their needs must be foreseen and transports loaded in accordance with the plan of supply. The first administrative orders to be issued after landing will be prepared, at least in tentative draft form, before the expedition sails.

b. Troops usually carry only enough rations and ammunition upon landing to last 1 or 2 days. However, a beach reserve of rations and ammunition for at least 10 days should be built up as soon as possible, preferably from supplies carried in the transports for this purpose. Ordinarily, few stores other than ammunition and water can be unloaded and landed on the first day.

c. The troops of each wave should carry the signal communication equipment appropriate to the units involved.

d. Debarcation of supplies and equipment and the priorities therefor should be provided in the Army debarkation tables.

97. *Debarcation of artillery and other heavy equipment.*

a. The plan of debarkation should avoid encumbering early waves with non-essential equipment. Field artillery, though difficult to land, is essential. The landing of field artillery heavier in weight than light artillery upon open beaches is difficult, and the terrain may be such as to make the prompt movement or employment of such artillery, after landing, impracticable. In favorable situations, on a good beach, a small amount of light artillery and tanks may be landed early. Such artillery will usually have to be moved into position by

hand. Light tractors suitable for moving field guns into position can be debarked more easily than animals.

b. There are no suitable boats at present carried by vessels of war or merchant ships for transporting a large amount of army supplies or the heavier army equipment, such as medium field artillery pieces, tanks, motor trucks, airplanes. Special barges or lighters, preferably self-propelled, should be provided by the Navy for this purpose prior to embarkation.

c. All equipment and supplies which cannot be handled easily from boats to shore require improvised ramps and piers and some special naval equipment for handling. For landing a limited [105] amount of light equipment and supplies to accompany troops, the Navy will require small sheltered bights or inlets along the coast, and for handling the bulk of supplies and heavier Army equipment, fairly well protected harbors with temporary piers and wharves and appliances for unloading.

98. *Debarcation of animals.*—The number of animals that can be debarked or handled on an open beach is limited, yet provision will have to be made for transportation, debarkation, and landing of some animals, probably early in the operations. The Army will provide for the supply of proper slings, transportation stalls, and such other equipment as will facilitate the handling of the animals to be landed. Tidal currents should be considered in swimming animals ashore. Animals may be debarked as follows: From the transport to small boats by using flying stalls; from the boats into the water by ducking ramps; from the transports into mine sweepers or similar light craft, by flying stalls or slings; from mine sweepers or similar light craft into the water by slings or a ducking ramp; from the transport into the water by slings.

99. *Debarcation of air forces.*

a. The method of debarking Army air units will depend upon the plans for their initial employment and the manner in which transported.

b. When the situation is such that it has been planned to transport Army aircraft crated, and not to use them until a suitable landing field has been secured as a result of the seizure of a beach head, the aircraft will not be debarked until suitable means for transferring them from ship to shore are available. Such a situation would exist when the operation was directed against an enemy known to be unable to offer effective air opposition to the landing operation.

c. However, the normal situation will require a maximum employment of all available air force, Army and Navy. Every effort should be made to transport Army aircraft so that they can participate in the initial operations. Navy aircraft carriers are taxed to capacity to care for their own planes and usually would not be available for handling Army aircraft; but if available should be used.

[106] d. Often it will be possible to debark aircraft at some distance from the landing area of the main operation, but within flight reach. The seizure and protection of a suitable area may constitute a secondary landing operation. Such an operation might be carried out in advance of the main operation, in order to make additional aircraft available to participate in the latter, but at the possible sacrifice of secrecy.

e. A favorable situation is one in which the area selected for the operation is within flight distance of friendly territory, thus permitting Army air units, flying from such territory, to participate in the initial phase of the operation.

100. *Supply of water to the troops.*—If the landing is made during hot weather or in a tropical climate, the amount of water that can be carried may be considerably less than the landing troops require. When there are no facilities for supply of water ashore in the landing area, arrangements must be made by the Navy to furnish water for the troops ashore. The Army's estimate and the Navy's arrangements for the water supply must be liberal. Allowance will be made for loss of water and containers, including damage by hostile fire. Until the tactical situation ashore permits water being delivered by water boats to be provided by the Navy, at least one cask of water will be placed in each boat going ashore. Plans will provide for the continuous supply of water by the Navy until the Army has developed its supply ashore.

101. *Organization of the beach.*

a. *The beachmaster* is a naval officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The beachmaster has complete control of the beach from the high-water mark seaward; of all naval operations thereat, together with all landing facilities. He causes the beach to be promptly marked to facilitate its recognition by approaching waves; organizes, maintains, and controls all communication with

the Navy; transmits all Army messages from shore to ship, and receives and transmits to the shore party commander all messages from ship to shore which apply to the Army except as provided in paragraph 94 c; and cooperates with the shore party commander. The beachmaster and a few of his principal assistants land with the first wave. [107] The beachmaster's headquarters should be provided with such protection from enemy fire as may be practicable. Previously trained Army artillery and Army air corps liaison personnel, in addition to competent naval communication personnel, will be established at the beachmaster's communication center, so that messages may be transmitted in terms and manner to which each service is accustomed.

b. The shore party commander is an Army officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The shore party commander takes charge of all engineer and labor troops, equipment, and supplies on arrival at the beach; organizes the beach facilities, such as the establishment of dumps, collecting stations, and prisoners' inclosures; establishes information and message centers; facilitates the movement of all troops inland; and cooperates with the beachmaster. The shore party commander lands with the first wave.

c. Military police.—Confusion is likely to occur at the beaches, due to the irregular arrival of troops and supplies, hostile fire, movement of wounded and stragglers to the rear, and to the arrival of runners with messages. It is necessary, therefore, to have the beach well policed, and a sufficient number of military police should be detailed to assist the shore party commander.

d. An engineer party will be landed with or soon after the first troops. The shore party commander will detail necessary engineers to assist the beachmaster in establishing at once improved landing places for boats and in removing obstructions. A wharf of some kind is usually the next work, and it must be completed with the least possible delay. Army ponton equipment may be valuable for this purpose, and such equipment should be loaded with a view to its early use. The shore party commander will arrange for the construction of routes of communication to the interior. The location of these routes of communication may be determined by a study of maps beforehand, and this will be done wherever practicable.

e. Boat repair party.—Casualties to the hulls of boats and to the machinery of power boats due to enemy fire, sea conditions, and the hazards of landing on open beaches will likely occur at a high rate. It is desirable, therefore, to land as soon as practicable a repair party, including carpenters' mates, machinists' mates, and electricians' mates, under competent leadership, to assist the beachmaster in salvaging and repairing damaged boats. [108]

f. Medical service.

(1) The Army evacuates to the shore line; the Navy is responsible from the shore line to the shore line at the base port, where the Army again becomes responsible.

(2) Attached medical troops will accompany combat units, taking with them the necessary supplies to meet initial requirements. Such mobile medical installations as are established at the beachhead do not carry out definitive treatment. This will be carried out on shore after fixed hospital units have been landed and established. As soon as sufficient terrain has been secured to afford protection, additional medical facilities, such as collecting stations, ambulances, hospital stations, and evacuation hospitals, in the order named, will be landed. Until a systematic service is provided, such evacuation as is practicable will be handled by the beachmaster from shore to ship in such manner as will not interfere with landing of essential troops and supplies. Systematic evacuation of all cases to hospital ships or transports will be established as early as practicable. A plan of evacuation will be prepared prior to debarkation of the expeditionary forces.

g. Marking routes inland.—It is highly important that all Army units thoroughly understand and have identified routes inland. Each unit will mark promptly and plainly its routes inland, together with location of message and information centers. This marking will be displayed so as to be visible from seaward only.

102. *Subsidiary landings.*

a. In addition to the main landing, certain subsidiary landings may be advantageous, namely, those pertaining to demonstrations or feints, and those which may be termed secondary landings.

b. Demonstrations or feints have as their missions the diversion of enemy reserves from the area of the main effort, or the retarding of the movement of enemy reserves thereto. To be effective they must be directed against objectives of importance to the enemy. They also should be so coordinated as to time and directed

against points at such a distance from the area of the main landing that they will insure, to a reasonable degree, the containing of the forces [109] stationed at or drawn to such points, and prevent them from participating in the opposition to the main landing. Unless they are conducted on the scale of a landing in force, so as to be convincing to the enemy, they probably will fail of their purpose.

c. *Secondary landings* are operations which only indirectly support the main landing; they may be for the purpose of seizing and holding areas, such as sites for air bases, which are desirable for operations in connection with the main landing.

d. It must be borne in mind that in some situations the further developments of the operations may result in that which was initially planned as a subsidiary landing becoming a main landing and, therefore, plans should provide for the necessary flexibility to meet such a contingency. In any event, sufficient force must be employed to accomplish the object sought; failure of such an operation wastes strength and has an adverse effect on morale.

Section VII

Withdrawal and Reembarkation

103. *Plans for withdrawal.*

a. Withdrawal of troops engaged in landing operations, with consequent evacuation of positions on shore which have been occupied, may be required by strategical considerations or may be necessary by reason of unsuccessful tactical operations.

b. The withdrawal and reembarkation of the forces in close contact with an enemy in relatively greater strength is an exceedingly difficult and hazardous operation.

c. Decision to withdraw having been approved by the authority having responsibility for the expedition as a whole, the necessary plans in as great detail as possible are drawn up by the commander of the Army forces in consultation with the commander of the Navy forces.

d. The means available to the Navy for clearing the reembarkation points will determine the stages of the withdrawal. The direction of withdrawal is closely limited by the location of the embarkation points, and such withdrawal involves the passing of troops, material, and supplies through the embarkation points, which are defiles of the most constricted nature.

[110] e. When the situation permits an orderly withdrawal, the plan will usually provide for evacuation in the following sequence: Animals, supplies, artillery matériel, troops. However, when in close contact with a superior enemy, it may be necessary to establish the following priorities for evacuation: Troops, artillery, supplies, animals, in which case provision will be made for the destruction of such artillery, equipment, supplies, and animals as cannot be evacuated.

104. *Secrecy.*—The importance of secrecy in the final stages, at least of the withdrawal, cannot be overemphasized. An attack delivered on the covering force at its last adequate covering position by the enemy during the withdrawal of the main body, would probably produce consequences of the most serious nature. For this reason, this stage of the withdrawal should be conducted under the cover of darkness or a smoke screen, and every possible precaution must be taken to conceal the movements of the forces and other activities indicative of a withdrawal. When the force had been in contact with the enemy for an appreciable time, and conditions are more or less stabilized, evidence of any change in conditions will be avoided with scrupulous care. Ruses to convey to the enemy impressions of such normal conditions are desirable, but such ruses must be carefully planned and executed in order not to arouse the curiosity or suspicions of the hostile force.

105. *Air superiority.*—As long as the enemy is able to maintain air reconnaissance, concealment of the operations involved in withdrawal is difficult, and therefore necessitates a maximum use of darkness, smoke screens, and camouflage. For this reason it is desirable that at least a temporary local air superiority be obtained prior to the last stages of the withdrawal. Plans to obtain such superiority include coordinated effort by both the Army and Navy air forces. Every effort will be made to retain such temporary air control until the forces have been reembarked.

106. *Weather conditions.*—Favorable weather conditions, at least during the last stages of the withdrawal and reembarkation, are requisite to the success

of the operations. The Navy will, through its aerological service, furnish the Army with weather predictions. The utmost effort must be made by the Navy to take advantage of favorable weather conditions during the reembarkation.

[111] 107. *Naval support.*

a. The operations of the Navy forces during a withdrawal of the Army forces from the shore are similar to those during a landing operation, the phases occurring in reverse order.

b. In addition to providing the sea transportation and the small boats to reembark the Army forces, including crews to man the boats, the Navy will be prepared to furnish gunfire and air support during the withdrawal. The Navy will, as in the case of the initial stages of the landing operation, provide for signal communications between ship and shore until the last unit is evacuated.

Section VIII
Communications

108. *Plans.*

a. In accordance with paragraph 54a (8), the commander in chief, or the commander of the service in which paramount interest is initially vested, is required to provide joint plans for communication between forces. While the particular situation and the designated directive will greatly influence the preparation of specific instructions, the following general directive should apply to all such plans, in order that advance preparations, including training, may be accomplished and any obstacles to the successful culmination of the plans may be avoided.

b. The joint communication plan and the communication plans of subordinate commanders of both the Army and the Navy shall cover the following phases:

- (1) Movement overseas.
 - (2) Landing.
 - (3) Operations subsequent to landing.
- c. All communication plans shall include.
- (1) Frequency plans.
 - (2) Provisions for communication security.
 - (3) Provisions for radio intelligence.
 - (4) Designation of procedure to be followed.
 - (5) Requirement that portable radio sets and other communication material

be tested prior to embarkation.

[112] 109. *Communications between ship and shore.*—Efficient signal communications between ship and shore are of primary importance. It is the duty of the Navy to establish and maintain, through the beachmaster, necessary signal communications facilities for both Navy and Army requirements. The Army communication net ashore will be connected up with the Navy's communication center at the beachmaster's headquarters. The Army prolongs its axis of signal communications inland as the attack progresses. In this connection see paragraph 94 c.

110. *General.*—In drawing up communication plans reference should be made to paragraphs 63 b; 77 o; 82 a; 93 a; 94 c; 98 c; 101 a, b, c, d, and g; 104; 107 b; 108; and 109.

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CHAPTER VII

REGULATIONS, MANEUVER RULES, AND UMPIRE INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOINT ARMY AND NAVY EXERCISES
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Section I

Introduction

111. *Object of joint exercises.*—The object of joint exercises is to train Army and Navy forces in joint operations and to test existing joint war plans, Army and Navy war plans predicated thereon, the sufficiency of means provided for the defense of various localities, and the adequacy of plans for their employment, under conditions as closely approximating those of war as possible.

112. *Classes of joint exercises.*

a. Joint Army and Navy exercises are divided into two classes—

- (1) Grand joint exercises, and
- (2) Minor joint exercises.

b. *Grand joint exercises* are joint exercises that involve the United States Fleet as a whole or one or more of its major subdivisions and equivalent Army forces, and which require Joint Board coordination.

c. *Minor joint exercises* are joint exercises other than grand joint exercises.

Section II

Regulations

113. *Instructions for joint exercises.*

a. *Prior to the commencement of a grand joint exercise.*

(1) The Joint Board shall formulate such general instructions as are necessary to assure adequate and properly co- [116] ordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the grand joint exercise. Any question arising in connection with the foregoing instructions that requires interpretation, amplification, or modification shall be referred to The Joint Board for decision. Copies of these instructions sufficient in number for all Army and Navy forces and agencies concerned shall be furnished by The Joint Board to the War and Navy Departments for distribution. A separate copy for transmittal to the Governor of the Panama Canal shall be furnished by The Joint Board to the Secretary of War in the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone.

(2) The War and Navy Department shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces under their respective jurisdictions, to the end that the grand joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions formulated by The Joint Board. Copies of detailed instructions issued by one Department that are of interest to the other Department shall be furnished to the Department thus affected for its information. In the case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Navy Department shall furnish the Secretary of War for transmittal to the Governor of the Panama Canal so much of the instructions issued by the Navy Department as are of interest to the authorities of the Panama Canal.

(3) In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone the Secretary of War will issue such instructions to the Governor of the Panama Canal as he may deem necessary.

b. *Prior to the commencement of minor joint exercise.*

(1) The Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold a minor joint exercise shall jointly formulate such general instructions as are necessary to

assure adequate and properly coordinated action, both in preparing for and in conducting the exercise, and shall issue them to those concerned in their respective commands.

(2) The Army and Navy commanders referred to in the preceding paragraph shall formulate and issue detailed instructions affecting the forces concerned in their respective [117] commands, to the end that the minor joint exercise shall be carried out in accordance with the problem and the general instructions jointly formulated by them. Copies of detailed instructions issued by either commander that are of interest to the other commander shall be furnished to the commander thus affected for his information.

c. Subsequent to the commencement of any joint exercise.—Subsequent to the commencement of any joint exercise and until its termination all instructions in connection with the conduct of the exercise, including definite directions as to commencement and termination of a temporary general or local suspension of the exercise, shall be prepared and issued by The Joint Board or by the chief umpires in case of a grand joint exercise, and by the commanders concerned in case of a minor joint exercise.

d. Instructions to include commencement and termination of joint exercise.—The instructions issued in preparation for a joint exercise shall include the following:

(1) The date and hour when the exercise is to commence.

(2) The date and hour when the exercise is to terminate, or merely the approximate date when it is to terminate, when determination of the actual date and hour of its termination is to be left to the discretion of the chief umpires, in which case this fact will be stated.

(3) A description of the signal or an indication of the method by which the chief umpires will terminate the exercise in case its termination is left to their discretion.

114. *Designation of forces engaged.*

a. The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall habitually be divided into—

(1) *Blue forces*, representing those of the United States, and

(2) *Black forces*, representing those of the enemy.

b. The Army and Navy forces that are to participate as Blue and Black forces in a joint exercise shall be indicated either in the problem or in the instructions issued in connection therewith—

(1) In general terms, in case of a grand joint exercise, by The Joint Board.

[118] (2) In case of a minor joint exercise, by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such an exercise.

c. The forces engaged in any joint exercise shall, insofar as practicable, be actual forces. Constructive armament and means shall not be used, except that field works, shelter, obstacles, and other structures that could not be built except at considerable expense and labor may be used constructively but must in every case be outlined clearly and indicated by markers or other contrivances, and material therefor must be actually available.

115. *Problems for joint exercises.*

a. The problem for a joint exercise shall habitually consist of the following:

(1) The *general situation*, which shall embody information assumed to be known to both sides.

(2) The *special situation—Blue*, which shall embody full information in regard to the Blue forces and such information of the Black forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

(3) The *special situation—Black*, which shall embody full information in regard to the Black forces and such information of the Blue forces as might have been obtained in actual war and shall include a statement of requirements which shall indicate definitely what is required and of whom it is required.

b. The problem for a grand joint exercise shall habitually be prepared by The Joint Board, which shall furnish a sufficient number of copies thereof to the War and Navy Departments for issue by them, respectively, to the Army and Navy forces concerned. In case of a grand joint exercise in the Panama Canal Zone The Joint Board shall furnish a separate copy of the problem to the Secretary of War for transmission to the Governor of the Panama Canal.

c. In case grand joint exercises are to be held in the Hawaiian Islands or in the Philippine Islands, The Joint Board will prepare a letter for transmittal by the War Department through official channels to the respective governors, containing such information as may be necessary to inform them of the operations contemplated.

[119] *d.* The problem for a minor joint exercise shall be prepared jointly by the Army and Navy commanders who have agreed to hold such exercise and shall be promulgated by them to those concerned in their respective commands.

116. *Conduct of joint exercises.*

a. The conduct of a joint exercise shall habitually be supervised by—

- (1) The chief umpires.
- (2) A senior umpire—Blue.
- (3) A senior umpire—Black, and
- (4) Such umpires and assistant umpires as may be necessary.

b. For a grand joint exercise, 1 Army and 1 Navy member of The Joint Board or 1 Army and 1 Navy officer of high rank, recommended by The Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act jointly as the chief umpires, and 1 or more Army or Navy officers, preferably members of the joint planning committee, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to the chief umpires.

c. For a grand joint exercise, 1 Army or Navy Officer, preferably a member of the joint planning committee, recommended by The Joint Board and detailed therefor by the War and Navy Departments, shall act as senior umpire—Blue, and 1 as senior umpire—Black, and 1 or more Army or Navy Officers, similarly recommended and detailed, shall act as assistants to each senior umpire. Such number of other Army and Navy officers as The Joint Board may recommend shall be detailed by the War and Navy Departments, or by their authority, to act as umpires for major subdivisions and as assistant umpires for important elements of such subdivisions, it being understood that if this number does not suffice additional umpires and assistant umpires shall be designated by the Army or Navy commander concerned upon call by the senior umpire concerned.

d. For a minor joint exercise the chief umpires, the senior umpire—Blue, the senior umpire—Black, such assistants to the foregoing as may be necessary, and such umpires and assistant umpires as may be required shall be designated by mutual agreement between the Army and Navy commanders who desire to hold such an exercise.

e. The offices of the chief umpires shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the senior umpires, and the office of each [120] of the latter shall be so located as to permit easy communication with the Blue or Black umpires and the Blue or Black forces, as the case may be, and with the chief umpires.

f. Unless specifically directed otherwise in the problem or instructions issued in connection therewith, the commander of the Army forces and the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise shall each furnish the chief umpires, prior to the commencement of the exercise, with a copy, in triplicate, of his estimate of the situation, plans, or synopsis thereof and initial orders. The chief umpires shall retain 1 copy of each document and shall furnish 1 copy to the senior umpire—Blue, and 1 to the senior umpire—Black.

g. After a joint exercise begins any new estimates made and all orders issued shall be immediately communicated by the commanders indicated in subparagraph *f* above to the senior umpire—Blue or Black, as the case may be, through the umpire assigned to their staffs, or directly in case there is no umpire so assigned.

h. Commanders other than those referred to in subparagraphs *f* and *g* above shall similarly communicate their initial estimates and orders and all subsequent estimates and orders to the umpire or assistant umpire assigned to their staffs.

i. All reports and messages that would in an actual case be dispatched by commanders to the Blue War and Navy Departments, the Black War and Navy Departments, or to other forces that are not represented in the exercise, shall be sent to the senior umpire—Blue or Black, as the case may be, for transmission to the chief umpires, who will represent those agencies or forces.

j. All action taken by commanders and all events occurring within the realm of a command shall be promptly communicated by the assistant umpire, or umpire concerned, to his umpire or senior umpire, as the case may be, of the side (Blue or Black) to which he is assigned.

117. *Communication between umpires.*

a. So far as practicable, separate telegraph, telephone, visual signal, radio, or other communications shall be provided for the use of the umpires.

[121] *b.* All messages passing between umpires shall be preceded by the word "umpire" in plain language. Such messages are to be given to the senior umpire at the station addressed, or to the nearest umpire. The information contained in such messages shall not be given to persons other than umpires.

Neither side shall attempt to decode or decipher messages preceded by this prefix, nor shall radiocompass bearings be taken on any station transmitting an umpire's message. No attempt shall be made to jam the radio-frequency assigned for the transmission of umpires' messages. All stations are prohibited from shifting to the umpire's frequency for the purpose of avoiding radio interference on their own assigned frequencies.

118. *Critique.*—At the conclusion of the exercise the commanders and staffs of all units participating, or at least those of the major units, shall be assembled for a discussion of the exercise as a whole. This discussion shall be held under the direction of the chief umpires and shall consist essentially of a brief résumé of the situation and progress of the exercise and of a critique thereof, and shall conclude with a statement of the lessons to be learned from the exercise.

119. *Reports.*—As soon as practicable after the termination of a joint exercise, the following reports thereon, embodying pertinent conclusions and recommendations, shall be rendered:

a. In case of a grand joint exercise—

(1) By the chief umpires, to the War and Navy Departments.

(2) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. In case of a minor joint exercise—

(1) By the chief umpires, to the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held.

(2) By the commander of the Army forces and by the commander of the Navy forces participating on each side in the exercise, to the Army and Navy commanders, respectively, by whose authority the exercise was held.

(3) By the Army and Navy commanders by whose authority the exercise was held, to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

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Section III

Maneuver Rules

120. *Distinguishing marks.*

a. Blue forces shall have no special distinguishing marks other than those authorized to be worn and displayed by United States land and sea forces.

b. Black forces shall be distinguished as follows:

(1) *Ships* shall fly the international K flag (a square flag divided vertically into two equal parts, the half nearest the mast being yellow and the other half blue) at the port yardarm.

(2) *Launches and boats* shall fly the same flag (international K) at the stern.

(3) *Planes* shall have the following white stripes, each 12 inches wide, painted on them with water paint as indicated below:

Two vertical stripes, 12 inches apart, on each side of the fuselage, about 3 feet in rear of the rear edge of the wings, and extending from top to bottom of the fuselage.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the upper surface of the upper wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

One horizontal stripe on each side of and about 5 feet from the center line of the under surface of the lower wing and extending entirely across the width of the wing.

(4) *Personnel.*—Each officer and enlisted man shall wear a white band at least 1½ inches wide around his headdress.

c. Umpires shall wear a red band 4 inches in width on the left arm above the elbow.

d. Such changes as the chief umpires deem desirable may be made in the distinguishing marks of the Blue and Black forces.

121. *Simulation of fire.*

a. The fire of small arms and light field artillery and of boat guns shall be simulated with blank cartridges. Shore batteries, where [123] practicable, will simulate fire by the use of blank ammunition fired from field guns located near batteries.

b. The fire of all ships shall be simulated during daylight by turning a searchlight upon the target or targets, if visible, during such times as the target is being fired upon. Care must be taken that searchlights are not thus used when the force in question is unable to deliver an effective fire against the target so

indicated. In addition to the use of searchlights, ships may use ex-caliber or sub-caliber rifles and one-pounder blanks when simulating fire.

c. Such additional rules as in their judgment are necessary shall be prescribed by the chief umpires.

Section IV

Umpire Instructions

122. *General duties of umpires.*

a. Senior umpires shall constantly keep the chief umpires informed of all that occurs on their side in order that an accurate picture may be had by the chief umpires of the progress of the exercise, this being essential to the making of intelligent decisions.

b. The chief umpires shall similarly keep each senior umpire informed of the situation on the opposing side, and each senior umpire shall similarly keep his umpires and assistant umpires informed of the progress of the exercise. A senior umpire, umpire, or assistant umpire, as the case may be, shall similarly give a commander or commanders concerned such information of the situation, of the effect produced by any action taken by them, and of the action of the enemy as those commanders would possess or be able to obtain in an actual case. Information that commanders should and would in an actual case obtain only through the medium of an agency represented in the exercise shall in no circumstances be furnished by an umpire to any commander.

c. To illustrate: The commander, Black Fleet, decides to bombard the land defenses in the locality where the exercise is being held and informs the senior umpire, Black, of his decision and of the character of fire to be delivered and the time and period of delivery. The senior umpire, Black, communicates this information promptly to the chief umpires, who in turn inform the senior umpire, Blue, who com- [124] municates it to his umpires, in particular to the umpire assigned to the defenses in question. The reaction of the commander of those defenses is then reported by the umpire of those defenses to the senior umpire—Blue, who communicates it to the chief umpires. The latter then makes a decision in the premises and communicates it to both senior umpires, who in turn communicate it to the umpires concerned and to the interested commanders.

d. The chief umpires shall prepare and promulgate adequate safety precautions for the use of the forces participating in the exercise.

123. *Umpires' decisions.*

a. All umpires' decisions shall be made by the chief umpires directly, or by the chief umpires' authority, by either senior umpire or by an umpire or assistant umpire, such decisions being promptly communicated to those concerned. Local decisions that may have to be made by a senior umpire must be immediately communicated to the chief umpires; if made by an umpire or assistant umpire, they must be immediately communicated to the senior umpire concerned and by him to the chief umpires. Wherever it is feasible, as, for example, in the case of an attack made by a landing party against land troops or positions, the umpires or assistant umpires on opposite sides on the spot should, if practicable, confer on the situation before making a decision.

b. When it is contemplated holding a grand joint exercise, such additional umpire instructions and maneuver rules as may be necessary and as are not already prescribed herein shall be prepared by The Joint Board. In case such additional rules are prepared, The Joint Board shall furnish a sufficient number of copies thereof to the War and Navy Departments for issue by them, respectively, to the Army and Navy forces concerned.

c. In general, the instructions listed below will be used in joint exercises and by The Joint Board as the basis for the preparation of any additional instructions which may be necessary:

(1) Fleet Umpire Instructions or such other instructions and regulations as may be in use by the United States Fleet to determine damage to ships from naval gunfire, torpedoes, mines, or air attack.

[125] (2) Current rules in use by the Coast Artillery Corps to determine damage to ships from seacoast artillery.

(3) Current rules in use by the Coast Artillery Corps in case airplanes fly over land-based antiaircraft guns and the current rules in use by the United States Fleet in case airplanes fly over ship-based antiaircraft guns to determine damage to airplanes from antiaircraft gunfire.

(4) Current rules in use by the Army Air Corps, or those in use by the United States Fleet, or special rules, will be used to determine damage to airplanes from attack by other airplanes, but in any case the same set of rules will be applied to the aviation of both services.

(5) War Department Manual for Umpires of Field Maneuvers and other current War Department documents to determine damage to troops from small-arms fire, artillery fire, aviation attack, and naval gunfire and damage to fortifications and Army installations generally.

d. In the revision of current rules in use by both services and in the preparation of any additional rules that may be necessary, consideration will be given to the maneuver rules and umpire instructions used in preceding grand joint exercises and to the pertinent comments received thereon from the senior Army and Navy commanders and umpires, to the end that damage results from attacks of various kinds will simulate actual war conditions as nearly as possible and that the capabilities and limitations of offensive and defensive instrumentalities and measures may be truly represented.

e. The chief umpires shall have full latitude in changing umpire instructions and maneuver rules, or in prescribing additional ones.

124. *Journal of events.*—The chief umpires shall keep a complete journal of events covering all occurrences of the joint exercise. Each senior umpire and each umpire and assistant umpire shall keep a similar journal of all events coming under his cognizance. The journals kept by umpires and assistant umpires shall be turned in to their senior umpire, and by him with his journal of events to the chief umpires, at the conclusion of the exercise.

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CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 24, 1921, as amended by G. O. No. 162, 1927. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Opera- [130] tions. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the joint planning committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 24, 1921. The committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 2, 1927, as amended by G. O. No. 5, 1932, and Navy Department G. O. No. 227, 1932. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the [131] Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Chief of Planning Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the joint planning committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The purpose of the board is to prevent duplication of effort and to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development and employment of the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation. It is also charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when, in its judgment, it is necessary, and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army Air Corps and Naval Aviation. The board investigates, studies, and renders reports to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy upon all questions affecting jointly the development and employment of aviation of both services referred to it by the Secretary of War, by the Secretary of the Navy, by The Joint Board, by the Chief of the Army Air Corps, or by the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint policies or joint plans for the tactical or strategical employment of aircraft or for the location of air stations are addressed to The Joint Board for consideration and recommendation to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The board also is required to formulate and submit to

The Joint Board for approval suitable joint Army and Navy aircraft problems to be carried out each year.

132. In the execution of the foregoing the board is governed by the following: The development of new types of aircraft and accessories is, so far as practicable, assigned to the Army or Navy and is carried on only by the service to which assigned. Either service may employ any types of aircraft or weapons after their development. The board prepares plans to prevent competition in the procurement of material, when the chiefs of the two services have been unable to come to an agreement concerning procurement. Joint plans for the procurement of material in time of war will be submitted to the [132] Army and Navy Munitions Board. The board is specifically charged with the consideration and recommendation of all projects for experimental stations on shore, for coastal air stations, and for stations to be used jointly by the Army and Navy, or for extensive additions thereto, and with consideration of and recommendation in regard to all estimates of appropriations for the aeronautical programs of the Army and Navy before such estimates are submitted to Congress.

Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of The Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national [133] defense are required to be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

Section V

Joint Merchant Vessel Board

136. The Joint Army and Navy Board of Survey of Merchant Vessels was established August 21, 1916, as the result of an agreement entered into by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy approved the final form of the agreement on August 2, 1916, and the Secretary of War on August 19, 1916. In order to simplify the name of the board it was changed to "The Joint Merchant Vessel Board." This change in name was approved by the Secretary of War April 30, 1917, and by the Secretary of the Navy May 5, 1917. The board consists of one Army officer and three Navy officers as members, with one of the latter acting as recorder.

137. The board inspects and classifies merchant vessels with a view to their possible use in war. The board is assisted by local sections consisting of Army and Navy officers who conduct the actual inspection.

Section VI

Local Joint Planning Committees

138. The authority for agencies for cooperation between Army and Navy activities within departments, armies, and corps areas of the Army and naval

districts is War Department G. O. No. 19, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 103, 1923. Commanding generals of departments, armies, and/or corps areas, and commandants of naval districts whose headquarters are in the same vicinity, appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a permanent local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters for a given department, army, corps area, or district are widely separated, more than one planning committee may be organized. In addition, the commanding general and the commandant of the naval district [134] designate one or more officers on their staffs through whom close contact with other services is maintained.

139. The local joint planning committee takes cognizance of questions referred to it by proper authority and originates questions on such local subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. Its reports and recommendations are made jointly to the commanding general and commandant of the naval district concerned.

Section VII

Joint Economy Board

140. The authority for the Joint Economy Board is contained in War Department, G. O. No. 11, 1933, and Navy Department G. O. No. 237, 1933. The board is charged with the continuing responsibility of investigating and reporting to The Joint Board on economies which can be effected, from time to time, without loss of efficiency, by the elimination of overlap or the simplification of functioning in those activities of the War and Navy Departments concerned with joint operations of the two services or which have approximately parallel functions.

141. The membership of the Joint Economy Board will comprise five or more officers from each service and will include the following:

a. For the Army.—The Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch and four other officers of the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department.

b. For the Navy.—The Assistant Budget Officer, Navy Department; the Director, Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Director, Material Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Assistant Director, Navy Yard Division, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and an officer from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (not below the rank of commander).

142. The Secretary of The Joint Board will be the Secretary of the Joint Economy Board.

143. Reports and recommendations of the Joint Economy Board will be presented to The Joint Board for action.

[135] 144. Each chief of arm, service, or bureau will designate a liaison officer whose name shall be furnished to the Joint Economy Board and who will maintain contact between his office and the corresponding activity of the other service and with the board. Liaison officers will bring to the attention of the Joint Economy Board any matter which their respective chiefs shall deem to come within the purview of the Board. Each liaison officer will furnish such aid to the Board in securing information and data from his particular arm, service, or bureau as the board shall request. The Joint Economy Board will have authority over the liaison officers insofar as their duties pertain to the work of the Board.

[137]

CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section A

Policy for Coordination of Radio Activities of the Army and Navy

1. Joint Board reports, J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 183), of January 16, 1923, "Utilization of the radio services of the War and Navy Departments for the transmission of Government dispatches," and J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 253), "Proposed draft of Executive Orders re regulation of radio in the event of war or national

¹ NOTE.—Ch. IX—Communications—is a reprint of ch. VI—Communications, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1927, and is effective until completion of revision now in progress. Paragraph numbering of old ch. VI is retained pending revision.

emergency," are rescinded. The following policy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is published for information and guidance:

I. Purpose of Radio Policy.

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and Navy in the development of radio material, the establishment of radio stations, and in the conduct of radio activities.

II. Basic Policy.

3. The Army and Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations as, augmented by private and [138] other Government-owned radio facilities, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of a militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated radio system adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation on expenditure imposed by economy.

III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time paramount interest in certain areas or theaters of operation will be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service having paramount interest.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

(a) To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

(b) To the Army in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Army wherever operating.

[139] (c) To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea, exclusive of Army vessels, except such of the latter as may have been placed under Navy control in case of war or national emergency.

(4) For the establishment and operation of radio-compass stations along the coasts of the United States, Alaska, overseas possessions, or occupied foreign territory.

(d) To the Navy in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Navy wherever operating.

V. War-time Jurisdiction over Nonmilitary Radio.

6. In time of national emergency, when directed by the President according to law, the Army and the Navy will assume jurisdiction as follows:

(a) The Army and Navy shall each assume complete control over such non-military radio stations as may be allocated to them by the President to augment their peace-time facilities.

(b) For purposes of censorship and supervision over such nonmilitary radio stations as are permitted to operate:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to the Navy in the following paragraph:

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

[140] (c) For the purpose of suppression of unauthorized radio:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama, and in insular possessions or foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions or foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

VI. Principles to be Observed in Radio Coordination.

7. Coordination in radio operation will be effected:

(a) In the development of types of radio equipment suitable for intercommunication.

(b) By the assignment of call letters, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption of a common procedure, and the formulation of codes and ciphers for joint Army and Navy communication.

(c) All air radio stations of the Navy and air radio stations of the Army along the coast and in the insular and outlying possessions shall be equipped to send and receive on a common intermediate frequency and a common high frequency, and all aircraft carrying radio, except fighting and pursuit planes, shall as soon as practicable, consistent with proper economy, be equipped to send and receive on one of these common frequencies.

(d) The radio field sets provided for the use of the Marine Corps on shore shall be capable of intercommunication with the radio provided for the operation of similarly equipped units of the Army.

(e) The radio communication equipment provided for the vessels of the Army Transport Service shall be of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class and shall be capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication.

VII. Coordination with Radio Stations of Other Departments and Civilian Stations During Peace.

8. Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the radio act of 1927 (secs. 6, 8, and 25).

[141] *VIII. Coordination of Development Programs.*

9. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peace-time radio operation and operational development of the two services. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendation for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy and will coordinate technical radio matters of joint concern to the two services.

Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 24, 1927.

Section B

Joint Army and Navy Radiotelegraph Procedure

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I. General.

1. Details for intercommunication by radio between the Army and the Navy shall be made by the senior officers of the two services in the area concerned.

2. Address and signature.

(a) Address and signature codes will not be used between the Army and the Navy.

(b) Messages intended for an addressee on board ship or in a unit of command will be routed by call letters of the station concerned. Delivery to proper officer or office is a function of the command addressed. When believed necessary to secure proper delivery, more complete address may be included in the body of the message.

(c) All official messages will be authenticated in the name of the commanding officer. This signature is not ordinarily transmitted.

[142] 3. Use of clear and secret language.

(a) In time of peace, messages are transmitted in clear or in secret language as directed by the writer.

(b) (1) In time of emergency, all messages, except as noted below, are transmitted in secret language.

(2) When the tactical situation is such that time cannot be spared for cryptographing, and when the information to be transmitted if intercepted by the enemy could not be acted upon in time to influence the situation in question, a commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language by a radio station serving his headquarters.

II. Call Up.

4. (a) The call up shall consist of the call sign(s) of the receiving station(s) transmitted not more than three times, the letter "V" and the call sign of the calling station transmitted not more than three times. This may be followed by certain signals to indicate the purpose of the call up.

(b) The call up may be:

(1) Single-station, as NA V BA K.

(2) Collective, as DAB DAB DAB V BA BA BA K. DAB in this example might be the "net call," in which case all nonsilent stations in the net would answer; or it might be a "group call," in which case all nonsilent stations in a particular preassigned group would answer.

(3) Multiple, as NA NA NB NB V BA K, in which case NA and NB both answer.

(4) *General.*—The general call for Navy and Marine Corps stations shall be USN, and for Army stations USA. The general call shall be used to establish communication in case the call letters of the station with which communication is desired are not known. Example: USN USN USN V BA K.

5. In order to avoid undue interference with other communications, the following rules will be observed in calling:

(a) The call signs of the receiving and transmitting stations are made once only except when great distance or poor transmitting conditions make repetition desirable.

[143] (b) If the receiving station fails to answer, the first call up may be repeated once.

(c) If the second call up is not answered, the transmitting station will wait at least two minutes before repeating the call.

(d) If the receiving station still fails to answer after this further call up, it may be called at intervals, but not more frequently than once in five minutes, except for the transmission of an urgent or priority message, in which case no restriction is placed upon the repetition of the call up.

(e) When two stations are known to be within easy radio range of one another, it is unnecessary first to call up such station before sending the message.

6. If the calling station has an urgent or a priority message for the called station it shall indicate that fact by adding the signal O or P to the call up. Example: NA V BA O K.

III. Answering the Call Up.

7. (a) The station called shall reply by transmitting not more than three times the call sign of the calling station, the letter V, its own call sign, and, if it is ready to receive traffic, the letter K.

(b) A net, group, or general call up requiring an answer is answered by the called stations in the alphabetical order of their call signs; a multiple call up requiring an answer is answered in the order in which the stations were called. If a called station fails to answer in its turn, the next station in the order of

answering, after waiting 15 seconds, will answer and the delinquent station will not answer until all other stations have finished.

8. If the station is busy or is otherwise unable to take the message, it shall replace the letter **K** in the reply formula by the signal **AS** followed if desirable by a number indicating in minutes the probable duration of the wait.

9. (a) If the calling station has indicated that it has an urgent message for the called station, the latter will answer as indicated in (b) below even if by so doing it must interrupt traffic of lower priority.

(b) Example of answering the call up: **BA V NA K.**

[144] *IV. Normal Form of Message.*

10. The normal form of message for transmission between Army and Navy stations shall be as follows:

Part	Example	When used	Para- graph
Call.....	NA V BA.....	Always.....	11
Number.....	NR 3.....	Usually.....	12
Operating instructions.....		Special cases only.....	13
Class.....		Urgent or priority messages only.....	14
Check.....	GR 7.....	Usually.....	15
Break.....	BT.....	Always.....	16
Text.....	The message in secret or clear language.....	do.....	17
Time of origin.....	0923.....	Usually.....	18
Ending signal.....	AR (followed by K, B, VA, etc.)..	Always.....	19

11. *Call.*—The call consists of the call sign(s) of the station(s) called (in alphabetical order), followed by “**V**” and the call sign of the station calling, each call sign being made once.

12. *Number.*—(a) The message number is a serial number of a separate series, beginning at midnight, for transmission to each station worked and another separate series for reception from each station worked. Thus, since midnight on a certain day BA has transmitted three messages to NA and has received five messages from him. His next message to NA is NR 4 and his next message from NA is NR 6.

(b) The message serial number is a material aid in the handling of traffic. Its primary purpose is to prevent the omission of messages; it is also useful in identifying messages for repetitions, omissions, etc.

(c) The message number may be omitted at the discretion of the transmitting office, which, however, assumes responsibility for any error which may occur thereby. The message number is usually unnecessary in fire control and aircraft work, and in messages consisting of procedure signals. It may also be omitted in the case described in paragraph 3 (b) (2) above.

13. *Operating instructions.*—Operating instructions are special instructions for operating and for relaying the message when relay is necessary. (See F, par. 27; G, par. 28; T, par. 38.)

14. *Class.*—(a) Messages are classified to show the relative order in which they shall be transmitted. This order is as follows:

	CLASS	Symbol
Urgent.....		O
Priority.....		P
Routine.....		None

(b) The *urgent* classification is reserved for messages requiring the greatest speed of handling. Urgent messages will be sent immediately upon receipt, except when communication involving another urgent message is being carried on. The urgent classification is used only in combat or when combat is imminent, real or simulated, to indicate that the message following conveys most urgent orders, information or request pertaining to the combat.

(c) The *priority* classification is used for messages of less urgency than those entitled to urgent classification but of such nature as to warrant precedence over routine messages. Priority messages will be transmitted before such routine messages as may be waiting to be sent but communication of a message will usually not be interrupted to send a priority message.

(d) The *routine* classification is used for messages which require no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic in the shortest time. No signal to indicate routine classification is transmitted.

(e) In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, messages of the same class, whether they originate in Army or Navy, will be handled in order of filing or of receipt for retransmission.

15. *Check*.—(a) In plain-language messages, each dictionary word of the text is counted. The writer's message number is counted as one word; the time or origin or any continuous group of letters, numerals, or of letters and numerals is counted as one word.

(b) In code or cipher messages each group of the text, whether numeral, letter, or mixed numerals and letters, is counted, including, [146] when sent, the writer's message number, the code or cipher indicator, and the time of origin.

(c) When a message is to be transferred to or from a communication system which uses a method of word count other than that prescribed in (a) and (b) above, the military or naval office which handles the transfer is responsible that the text of the message is correctly transferred. The check in the other system will be made by the office of that system which first receives the message.

(d) The purpose of transmitting the check of a message is to prevent the omission of any word or part of the message.

(e) The check may be omitted under the same circumstances as the message serial number. (See par. 12 (c).)

16. *Break*.—The break sign BT will be used to separate the heading from the text of the message.

17. *Text*.—(a) The text of the message will be transmitted as written in secret or clear language (without space signs separating the words).

(b) The writer's message number, if given, and the code or cipher indicator, if the message is in secret language, are transmitted in the order named as the first words of the text.

18. *Time of origin*.—(a) The time of origin is the time at which the message is signed by the writer, unless the writer fails to note the time on his message, in which case time of origin is the time at which the message is filed at the first message center or communication office through which it passes.

(b) Time of origin is transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour. Examples 0600 is 6 a. m.; 1943 is 7.43 p. m.

(c) The time of origin usually appears in official messages. It is not used, however, with messages consisting of—

- (1) Procedure signals.
- (2) Corrections to messages.
- (3) The executive signal.
- (4) Messages which are going to be followed by the executive signal.

[147] 19. *Ending signal*.—An ending signal will be used to terminate each transmission and will indicate the transmitting operator's desire with respect to the transmission which is to follow.

V. Procedure Signals.

20. The following procedure signals are prescribed for communication between the Army and Navy:

Sign	Meaning	Para-graph
AAA.....	Blank, representing missing or doubtful portions.....	24
AA.....	All after (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 31
AB.....	All before (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 34
AR.....	End of message.....	22
AS.....	Wait.....	8, 23
B.....	There is more to follow.....	24
BN.....	All between (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 34
BT.....	Break, separating heading and text.....	16
C.....	You are correct.....	25
E.....	Error.....	26
F.....	Do not answer.....	27
G.....	Repeat back.....	28
GR.....	Group(s).....	29
HM.....	Silence.....	30

Sign	Meaning	Para-graph
II.....	Space.....	31
IMI.....	Repeat; I will repeat; Interrogatory.....	32
INT.....	Is this correct?.....	33
IX.....	Message following is a preparatory command; not to be carried out until the signal (command) of execution is received.	47
5-second dash.....	Signal (command) of execution.....	48
2-second dash.....	Salvo mark (battery fired, i. e., on the way).....	49
J.....	Verify and repeat.....	34
K.....	Go ahead (i. e., answer—an ending signal).....	35
N.....	Nothing (or not) received.....	36
NR.....	Number.....	12
O.....	Urgent.....	14
P.....	Priority.....	14
[148]		
R.....	Received or readability (according to context).....	37, 52
S.....	Signal strength.....	51
T.....	Transmit to.....	38
T of O.....	Time or origin.....	39
TOR.....	Time of receipt.....	40
U.....	Radio guard (Navy); net control station (Army).....	41
UO.....	Negative silence.....	30
V.....	From.....	4, 11, 38
VA.....	End of communication; finished (an ending signal).....	42
W.....	Interference.....	43
WA.....	Word after (to be used in requesting a repetition or verification).....	32, 34
X.....	Static interference.....	44

AAA

21. AAA is used in conjunction with "ZCL," the groups missed being indicated by AAA. Use is made of this signal when the receiving station is unable to get a repetition.

Example: BA has sent a message to NA for relay to NB but NA failed to receive two groups and was unable to obtain a repetition from BA. In order not to delay the message, NA sends it to NB as follows:

NB V NA NR7 NB V BA ZCL GR 11 BT
 NR2 DFC4 JOFX RABU AAA
 RUHG MILZ YSIP AAA XUBO
 1433 AR K.

AR

22. AR is used at the end of every message. It means: "This is the end of this particular message." It is used at the end of all other transmissions in normal radio procedure which do not conclude with one of the procedure signals "B," "C," or "R." The signal AR is followed by another message or by AS, K, or VA, which signals indicate the operator's desire with respect to the transmission which is to follow. AR may be written thus: +

[149]

AS

23. (a) AS is an ending signal meaning "wait." It may be used in answer to a call up (see paragraph 8); to stop transmission because part of the message has been missed or because there is interference or other reason requiring delay, or to notify the receiving station that the transmitting station is unable to continue.

(b) The station receiving this signal does not answer.

(c) Whenever a transmitting station has been asked to wait it resumes transmission at the signal "K."

B

24. (a) B is an ending signal meaning "There is more to follow."

(b) When transmitting a long message, it may be convenient to send it in

portions. In order to insure that each portion has been received before proceeding with the next, the letter "B" is made at the end of each portion.

Example: NA V BA NR3 GR137 BT

First 50 groups in text II B 50 K

NA answers: BA V NA R 50 K

BA continues: NA V BA II Next portion of text.

(c) When a message is sent in portions, the "B" is followed immediately by figures indicating the number of groups thus far transmitted.

(d) Long radio messages in plain language (i. e. press dispatches, etc.) made by ship and shore stations when not broadcasting on schedule and not employing the break system will be sent in portions, each of which will not exceed six minutes' duration.

C

25. (a) C is an ending signal meaning "You are correct."

(b) It is used in connection with G, INT, and J to signify the correctness of the message or portion of a message which has been repeated back or the coding of which has been checked and correctly repeated.

Example: NA, having repeated back correctly a message from BA, which was prefixed with "G," BA transmits: NA V BA C.

[150]

EEEEEEEEEE

26. *E (ten times).*—This signal is used to erase a word or group which has been incorrectly transmitted. Should a station while transmitting a message make a mistake in a word, group, or letter, it must immediately make the "erase" sign; then make the last word or group which was correctly transmitted, and continue the message. The repeat signal (IMI) is *not* to be made when a mistake is made in transmission. The "erase" signal will be used exclusively to correct these mistakes.

F

27. *F.*—(a) The letter "F" used in the heading signifies "Message following is *not* to be answered."

(b) When the letter "F" is used in the heading of messages, the groups of the message are invariably to be made through twice.

(c) When the letter "F" is used in the heading, stations are not to ask for repetitions or corrections of the message without the authority of the commanding officer in each case.

(d) The VA sign is *always* used to indicate the end of a message or series of messages sent by the "F" method.

Example: BA has a message for NA, but does not wish NA to answer.

BA makes:

NA NA V BA BA NR1 NR1 F F GR2 GR2 BT BT

VOBU VOBV 1235 VA VA

NA does not answer.

G

28. (a) The signal "G" used in the heading means "Repeat back." When repeating back or correcting repetitions, the text or groups concerned are made only once, notwithstanding that the original message may have been made twice.

Example: BA has a message VUBO ABYZ 1010 for NA and wishes the message to be repeated back.

NA V BA NR1 G GR3 BT VUBO ABYZ 1010 AR K

NA, having received the message correctly, transmits:

BA V NA NR1 G GR3 BT VUBO ABYZ 1010 AR K

BA answers: NA V BA C VA

NA does not answer.

[151] (b) When G occurs in the heading of a long message which is sent in sections, each section is acknowledged by the receiving station by R followed by the number of the last group or word received, as R 50, R 100, etc. When the last portion of the message has been received, the entire message is repeated back.

GR

29. *GR.*—The group signal followed by a number is used in the heading of a message to signify: "The text contains the number of words or groups indicated." (See par. 15 for check.)

HM and Uo

30. When necessary a station may silence a whole net, certain stations in a net, or all stations on a certain frequency, by use of the silence signal HM. The silence signal is a command and must be obeyed. Its use is confined to those stations in authority such as airplanes and net control stations. It will not be used until other less drastic methods of obtaining order have been tried. *It will be annulled as soon as the emergency has ceased to exist.*

Example: (1) PL, an airplane, working in a net whose net call is DAB, wishes to silent the net. PL sends: DAB DAB V PL HM HM HM HM HM HM VA.

All stations in the net stop transmitting and remain silent. They will not transmit again except to send urgent traffic or to answer a call from the silencing station or the U station until the silence signal is annulled. To annul the silence signal PL sends:

DAB DAB V PL UO UO UO UO UO UO VA

NOTE.—A single station may be silenced, and the silence annulled by substituting the station's call sign for the net call of the examples above.

II

31. The space signal (the letters "II" made separately) is used for the separation of procedure signals or other parts of the transmission when it is feared that confusion of the signals might otherwise result. Space signals are not used to separate the words or groups of the text; they are sometimes useful in the heading of a message or in messages [152] consisting of procedure signals. A common use of the space signal is shown by the example under B, paragraph 24.

IMI

32. (a) When the reception of a part of a message is doubtful or completely missed, the receiving station may request repetition of the doubtful portion by the use of IMI followed by AA, AB, BN, WA, GR —, or GR — to GR —, and the doubtful or missing passage.

Example: BA has transmitted a plain-language message to NA containing the following sentence in the text: "Prepare to sail for Constantinople at ten a. m. Monday twentieth August." NA having entirely missed the word "Constantinople" transmits:

BA V NA IMI WA for K.
BA replies:
NA V BA WA for Constantinople K.

(b) Repetition of an entire message may be requested by the use of IMI followed by the number of the message as:

BA V NA IMI NR6 K.

INT

33. When the reception of a part of a message is doubtful, the receiving station may question his reception by the use of INT followed by the questioned word or passage.

Example: Same as that of 32 (a) above except that NA has received but is not quite satisfied with the accuracy of the word "Constantinople." He transmits: BA V NA INT for Constantinople K. BA replies: NA V BA CK.

J

34 When the cryptographing office finds difficulty in decryptographing a received message, verification of the cryptographing may be requested of the originator by the use of J followed by AA, AB, BN, WA, GR —, GR — to GR —, and the passage to be checked. (If the entire message is to be checked, J is simply followed by the number of the message.)

[153] Example: NA has received the following message from BA:

NA V BA NR7 GR14 BT NR2 DFC4 YSIP NAWU LEGT ERUV LIOP
OHIO RAEQ LATU JOFX GISN TUVI 1150 AR.

The cryptographing office at NA finding it impossible to decode "OHIO," NA transmits:

BA V NA J NR7 GR8 K.

The cryptographing office at BA checks the encoding, finds "OHIO" erroneously written for "OHIG" and BA transmits:

NA V BA C NR7 GR8 OHIG II OHIG K.

K

35. K is an ending signal meaning "Go ahead"; "answer."

N

36. (a) When a station does not immediately answer a message which requires an answer or does not proceed with a message after "K" has been made in answer to a call up, the signal "N" may be used. Example: BA calls up NA:

NA V BA K.

NA replies:

BA V NA K.

But BA fails to proceed. NA transmits:

BA V NA N K.

(b) The signal "N" followed by a serial number means "Message NR—has not been received."

Example: BA V NA N NR16 K.

R

37. (a) The signal "R" used by itself means "last message" or "last transmission" received. Example: NA having received a transmission from BA answers BA V NA R. If NA has a message for BA, he follows the "R" by "B" or "ZAR." BA does not answer (unless he desires NA to wait) and NA proceeds to transmit his message.

(b) The signal "R" followed by NR and a serial number means "Message number — has been received." This form is preferable to [154] that of (a) above to receipt for a numbered message. Example: BA V NA R NR16 VA. (For use of R to indicate readability of signals see par. 52.)

T

38. The signal "T" is used in the heading and means "Transmit the following to -----"

Example: BA has a message for NB, and as he can not communicate directly with NB he sends it to NA for retransmission to NB. BA transmits thus:

NA V BA NR5 T NB V BA GR2 BT PLOP 0845 AR K

NA having receipted for the message calls NB and being given the "go ahead" signal transmits:

NB V NA NR10 NB V BA GR2 BT PLOP 0845 AR K

Note that T is omitted when the message is being transmitted to the station of the addressee. Note also that NR5 is BA's number to NA while NR10 is NA's number to NB, the number being reassigned in its own series by each relaying station.

T of O

39. "Time of Origin" is transmitted as a four-figure group, the last word of the message. (See par. 18.) The abbreviation "T of O" is not used in the original message but is employed in conjunction with the signals IMI and INT in connection with repetitions and corrections.

TOR

40. The "time of receipt" signal, the letters "TOR" made separately (— — — — . — .), is used in conjunction with a four-figure group similar in composition to the time of origin number, to denote the time at which the message is received. It is written TOR.

The time of receipt is entered in the proper space on the message blank, but is *not* transmitted except upon request. The time of receipt is entered when the message is received at a station, whether it is received by radio, land line, visual, messenger, telephone, or any other means.

A message received at station A by messenger at 10.40 a. m. would immediately be noted by the proper person as being received at 1040, [155] and he would enter on the blank "1040." This message is transmitted by radio to station B at 1045. The operator at B enters on the blank "1045." If the operator at B then sends the same message to station C by land line at 1050, the land line operator at C enters "1050" in the proper place.

The time of receipt is never used in referring to messages in the same way as is done with serial numbers and the time of origin. The time of receipt is useful in tracing delays.

When transmitted by radio the "time of receipt" signal follows the time of origin. In cases where the radio procedure requires that messages be transmitted twice in succession, the time of receipt signal (when used) follows the last transmission only.

U

41. The signal "U" following a station's call letters indicates that that station is being announced as the net control station (Army) or radio guard (Navy).

VA

42. VA is an ending signal meaning "end of communication"; "finished." When used, it indicates that the transmitting operator expects no answer, that he believes the series of transmissions completed.

W

43. (a) The signal "W" by itself signifies "Am being interfered with by other stations." A call signal following W denotes that the interference is being caused by the station indicated. Examples: NA is prevented from receiving a message from BA owing to interference from other ships or stations. NA transmits:

BA V NA \overline{IM} I W K

Again NA is being interfered with by transmissions from NB. NA transmits:

BA V NA \overline{IM} I W NB K

(b) Such steps as are possible are taken by the transmitting station to overcome the interference.

X

[156] 44. (a) The signal X signifies "Am being interfered with by static." It is used in a manner similar to that of W in the first example, paragraph 43.

(b) It rests with the transmitting station to take such steps as are possible to assist the receiving station (i. e., by changing power, note, or frequency; by sending in portions; or by using "G" in the heading).

VI. Control of Artillery Fire by Radio.

45. An abbreviated form of message is authorized for the exchange of communications controlling or directing the fire of artillery. Its use makes possible the control of fire by radio, when the radio station of the observer and the radio station of the battery are in direct touch. It is practically impossible to relay fire-control messages through linking radio stations. The term "radio station of the battery" is used to indicate the battalion radio station which will be in direct communication with the battery firing, either by voice or telephone.

Example: NA V BA \overline{BT} Text \overline{AR} K.

46. When the nature of the answer to a fire-control message is such as to clearly indicate that the previous transmission has been received, the "Received" signal "R" need not be transmitted.

IX

47. The signal "IX" which is inserted just before BT means "Message following is a preparatory command, and is not to be carried out until the signal of execution is given."

Example: NA V BA IX \overline{BT} Text \overline{AR} K.

FIVE-SECOND DASH

48. (a) The five-second dash is the signal of execution and means, "Execute the last preparatory command."

(b) It should be sent by the observer only.

(c) It is always preceded by a call and followed by $\overline{\text{AR}}$. It is never canceled or annulled.

Example: NA V BA five-second dash $\overline{\text{AR}}$.

[157] (d) If the observer desires, he may send the call at any time previous to the five-second dash. He can then keep contact with the battery, by using the "wait" signal $\overline{\text{AS}}$ until in a position to observe, when the five-second dash will be sent.

Example: NA V BA $\overline{\text{AS}}$ $\overline{\text{AS}}$ $\overline{\text{AS}}$ five-second dash.

TWO-SECOND DASH

49. (a) The two-second dash is the salvo mark, and means "Battery fired" (i. e., "On the way"). This is sent by the operator at the battery radio station just as the battery fires.

(b) It may be followed by a numeral indicating the time of flight of the projectile in seconds.

(c) It is never preceded by a call.

Example: Upon receiving the five-second dash, command of execution signal (see par. 48), the battery fires and the operator at the battery makes the two-second dash.

VII. Strength and Readability of Signal.

50. It may facilitate the transmission of message traffic if a station, which is to work with another, knows the strength and readability of his signal at the other station.

51. Strength of signal is indicated by the procedure signal "S" (signal strength) followed by an appropriate figure from the table below. The table may be used also with the procedure signal "X" (static) to indicate strength of static and "W" (interference) to indicate strength of interference.

1. Very weak, hardly audible.
2. Moderately weak.
3. Medium strength.
4. Moderately strong.
5. Strong.

Example: AB V BC S5 K.

52. Readability of signals is indicated after the procedure signal "R" by means of the table below:

1. Unreadable.
2. Poor but readable; plain language twice; code unreadable.
3. Fair; readable; plain language once, slowly; code twice.
- [158] 4. Good; readable; plain language or code once.
5. Perfectly readable.

Example: AB V BC R4 K.

53. Signals may be strong but readability poor for various reasons; conversely signal strength may be moderately weak but readability good. The tables given above can be used to show such cases.

Example: AB V BC S5 II R2 K.

VIII. Z Signals

54. The following signals in addition to the procedure signals listed in paragraph 20 are prescribed for communication between the Army and Navy:

Signal	Meaning
ZAB	Are you in communication by visual with _____?
ZAD	Am in communication by visual with _____ (through _____).
ZAF	Are you in communication by radio with _____?
ZAG	Am in communication by radio with _____ (through _____).
ZAK	Call me again at _____ (on _____-KCS).
ZAL	Can you hear _____? If so what is his signal strength?
ZAM	Can hear _____; his signal strength is _____.
ZAN	Did _____ send anything for me? If so, please repeat.
ZAO	Following is what _____ sent (at _____ o'clock).

Signal	Meaning
ZAP	Have (or ——— has) been calling you since ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZAR	Have ——— messages for ——— (if blanks not filled, means, "Have a message for you").
ZAU	I (or ———) will call you again as soon as I (he) can (or at ——— o'clock) (on ——— KCS).
ZAV	——— is calling you (on ——— KCS).
ZAW	Inform ——— that I am calling him (on ——— KCS).
ZAX	Nothing received from ——— (at ———).
ZAY	Report when you are in communication by visual with ———.
ZAZ	Report when you are in communication by radio with ———.
ZBA	Wait, I must shift to copy another station (or ———) but will call you as soon as I can (or at ——— o'clock).
ZBK	Reception impossible. Send series of six dashes if transmission received or send series of six dots if transmission not received. Send receipt message when communication next established.
ZBM	Fragments only received (from ———).
ZBN	Send each message twice. I have difficulty receiving
ZBO	Send each message once only. Reception is good.
ZBP	Send faster.
ZBQ	Send slower.
ZBR	You are missing dots.

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ZBU	Your Morse is difficult to read.
ZBV	Reception very bad; send each group ——— times.
ZBW	Reception exceptionally bad; send each character ——— times.
ZBX	Reception impossible.
ZBY	Accuracy of reception of message ——— is doubtful.
ZBZ	Are you certain of accuracy of reception of messages(s) ——— (or of group(s) ——— in message ———)?
ZCA	Cease listening in for messages from ———.
ZCB	Groups ——— in message ——— should apparently read as follows: ———.
ZCC	Has executive sign (signal of execution) for last message (or for message following ———) been made?
ZCD	Have you received the signal to execute last message?
ZCF	Have you received SOS just made (by ———) (at ——— o'clock)?
ZCG	Listen in for messages from ——— (on ——— KCS).
ZCJ	Message (——) does not concern you (or ———).
ZCK	Message which you just forwarded was incorrectly transmitted.
ZCL	Message following was incompletely received; groups missed are indicated by the "blank sign" (AAA).
ZCN	Number of groups (in message ———) was ———.
ZCP	Repeat message(s) from ——— (at ——— o'clock).
ZCQ	Reply to message ——— is to be transmitted now.
ZCT	Following is correct version (of message ———).
ZCU	The following is heading of message (——) as received. Check to origin if necessary and repeat.
ZCV	Transmit your messages in strings of ———.
ZCW	Am going to transmit messages in strings of ———.
ZCX	Have you received my message ———?
ZCZ	Delay was due to fault in my receiving apparatus.
ZDA	Delay was due to fault in my transmitting apparatus.
ZDB	You are causing delay by slowness in answering.
ZDC	You are causing delay by answering out of turn.
ZDD	Request immediate reply to my message.
ZDF	Send receipt for message (——) when communication next established.
ZDG	Transmit all of your messages one after the other.
ZDH	When may I expect answer to my message ———?
ZDM	Continuous frequency.
ZDN	Vacuum tube transmission.
ZDP	Land wire or cable.
ZDR	Radio telephone.
ZDV	Tonic train (chopped CW) transmission.
ZDW	Visual.

Signal	Meaning
ZDX	Frequency.
ZDY	Type ——— transmitter.
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ZDZ	Type ——— receiver.
ZFA	Model ——— receiver.
ZFJ	——— is radio guard on ——— KCS (net control station for net whose call is ———).
ZFK	Am ready to take over radio guard (to act as net control station).
ZFL	Are you radio guard (net control station) (for ———)?
ZFM	Indicate ships (stations) for which you are radio guard (net control station).
ZFQ	(———) Act as ——— (until ——— o'clock) (on ——— KCS).
ZFW	Am in your zone. Relay communications for me.
ZFX	Expect to be out of communication for radio until ——— o'clock. Handle radio communication for this ship (station).
ZFZ	Am (or ——— is) unable to ———.
ZGA	Are you (or ——— is) unable to ———?
ZGB	Am going to use (or am shifting to) ———.
ZGC	Am (or ——— is) unable to use ———.
ZGD	Am (or ——— is) using ———.
ZGF	Use ———.
ZGG	My antenna (or antenna of ———) has been damaged (or carried away).
ZGJ	My receiving apparatus is temporarily out of commission.
ZGK	Repairs completed. Am in commission.
ZGL	There appears to be something wrong in your (———) receiving equipment.
ZGM	There appears to be something wrong in your (———) transmitter.
ZGN	My ——— (or ——— of ———) is defective.
ZGO	Your ——— appears to be defective.
ZGP	I can not transmit on ——— KCS.
ZGQ	Your antenna appears to be grounding.
ZGR	At the end of this transmission I (or ———) will transmit on CW.
ZGS	I have increased my radiation.
ZGT	My radiation is good.
ZGU	I can not receive (———).
ZGV	How is my note?
ZGW	Lower your note.
ZGX	Raise your note.
ZGY	Your note is bad.
ZGZ	Your note is clear and musical.
ZJA	Your note is rising and falling.
ZJB	Decrease strength of signals.
ZJC	Increase strength of signals.
ZJD	How are my signals?
ZJF	What is my signal strength?
ZJG	Your signals are unreadable owing to your bad note.
ZJJ	Your spark is broken.
ZJK	Your signals fade.
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ZJL	Cease using ———.
ZJM	Act as relay between me and ———.
ZJN	Give me your message for ———; I will forward it.
ZJQ	Inform me when this message (or message ———) has been received by the addressee (or by ———).
ZJR	Message ——— has been received by the addressee (or by ———).
ZJV	Message(s) ——— has (have) been sent by land wire.
ZJY	Take no further action with regard to forwarding message ——— (to ———).
ZJZ	Transmit this message now (or at ———) by "F" method.
ZKA	Transmit this message now (or at ———) without preliminary call up.

Signal	Meaning
ZKC	Transmit this message (or at ——) by "T" method.
ZKG	Pass following message to destination by dispatch mail system.
ZKH	Distribute this message by dispatch where no charges are involved and to all others by mail.
ZKM	Forward this message by commercial niteletter.
ZKN	Send V's on your present frequency (or —— KCS).
ZKO	Am going to send V's on my present frequency (or —— KCS).
ZKP	Am going to transmit on —— KCS.
ZKQ	Am shifting to receive on —— KCS.
ZKR	Am (or —— is) unable to transmit on —— KCS.
ZKU	Am (or —— is) transmitting on —— KCS.
ZKX	On receiving "K" on —— KCS I shall (or —— will) transmit message to you on —— KCS. Answer on your present frequency (or —— KCS).
ZKY	Shift to receive on —— KCS until further orders.
ZKZ	Shift to —— KCS.
ZLA	Transmit and receive on —— KCS.
ZLB	What frequency are you (or is ——) using?
ZLC	How is my frequency?
ZLD	Your frequency appears to be correct.
ZLF	Increase your frequency a trifle (or —— KCS).
ZLG	Decrease your frequency a trifle (or —— KCS).
ZLH	Your orientation is wrong; check it immediately.
ZLJ	Transmit on —— KCS.
ZLK	Shift from telegraph to compensating frequency or vice versa.
ZLL	Check your frequency.
ZLV	General call; all stations copy.
ZMC	Who is interfering with you?
ZMF	I am being interfered with by —— (on —— KCS).
ZMG	Listen in before transmitting. You are causing unnecessary interference.
ZMJ	Do not interfere, I am receiving from ——.
ZMK	You are causing interference.
ZML	You are causing interference by inattention to order to wait.
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ZMM	You are causing interference. Send on another frequency.
ZMN	You are sending at the same time as ——.
ZNO	Answer —— and take his message(s).
ZNP	Answer calls for me (or for ——).
ZNU	Answer in alphabetical order of call signs.
ZNV	Answer on —— KCS.
ZPA	Negative; no; not. (For use with operating signals only.)
ZPB	Affirmative; yes. (For use with operating signals only.)
ZPF	Send —— (weather, obstruction, storm warnings, press, etc.) Last received (or received at ——) to me (or to ——).
ZPG	Set clocks to —— o'clock upon receiving signal of execution.
ZPH	What time is it?
ZQO	Send report of weather conditions your vicinity.
ZXA	What was station serial number of last message received from this station (or from ——)?
ZXB	Station serial number of last message received from you (or from ——) was ——.
ZXC	What was station serial number of last message you transmitted to me (or to ——)?
ZXD	Station serial number of last message transmitted to you (or to ——) was ——.
ZZO	Broadcast your messages without preliminary call up.
ZZP	Do not broadcast. Call your station first.
ZZX	Close your station.

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Approved by the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy, August 16, 1928.

CONFIDENTIAL

CHANGE NO. 1, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

J. B. No. 350.

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, July 22, 1936.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy recommended by The Joint Board have been approved by order of the Secretary of War and by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

JARVIS BUTLER, *Secretary.*

Cancel list of effective pages of Navy FTIP 155 appearing on page ii, and insert new list of effective pages (Navy copies only).

PARAGRAPH 6. "General Functions of the Navy." Remove and destroy page 3 and substitute new page 3 containing amendment of subparagraph 6. a. (3) and added subparagraph 6. b. (3).

PARAGRAPH 128. Organization of the Joint Planning Committee. Remove and destroy pages 129-130 and substitute new pages 129-130 containing amended paragraph 128.

PARAGRAPHS 131 and 132. "Aeronautical Board." Remove and destroy pages 131-132 and substitute new pages 131-132 containing amendment of paragraphs 131 and 132.

NOTE.—The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publication Section, Navy Department, require no report on receipt of the above changes.

[ii] JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Title page-----	Original
CNO letter of promulgation, dated November 15, 1935 (p. 1)-----	Original
List of effective pages (II)-----	C. J. A. 1
Letter of approval by Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, dated September 11, 1935 (p. III) (p. IV blank)-----	Original
Contents (pp. V, VI, blank, VII, VIII)-----	Original
Text pp. 1-2-----	Original
p. 3 (p. 4 blank)-----	C. J. A. 1
pp. 5-127 inclusive-----	Original
pp. 129-132 inclusive-----	C. J. A. 1
pp. 133-164 inclusive-----	Original
Chart—Joint organization for coastal frontier defense-----	Original
J. B. letter promulgating changes in Joint Action No. 1, dated July 22, 1936-----	Original

[3] (3) To support the national policies of the United States and to furnish land forces for the occupation of foreign territory in protection of the interests of the United States.

(4) To protect the United States from internal disorder or insurrection.

b. Additional general functions of the Army in war.

(1) To conduct effective military operations.

(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases.

(3) To provide such forces as may be necessary for joint overseas expeditions.

6. General functions of the Navy.

a. General functions of the Navy in peace and war.

(1) To provide for and to prepare the sea forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war to include provisions for the expansion of the peace components of the sea forces to meet the needs of war.

(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.

(3) To support the national policies and commerce of the United States and to provide forces for emergency service in foreign territory in support thereof.

(4) To assist the Army in the suppression of internal disorder or insurrection.

b. Additional general functions of the Navy in war.

(1) To conduct effective naval operations.

(2) To gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea lanes vital to the United States.

(3) To seize, establish, and defend, until relieved by Army forces, advanced naval bases; and to conduct such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.

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CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office

of Naval Operations. The [130] board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. [131] No. 81, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Head of Plans Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The function of the Aeronautical Board is to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy. It will investigate, study, and report upon all questions affecting jointly the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy which have been referred to it by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, The Joint Board, the Chief of the Air Corps, or the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In addition, it will also be charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when in its judgment necessary and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army and the Navy as to aviation.

132. In the execution of the foregoing, the Aeronautical Board will be governed by the following. It will hold regular monthly meetings and such extraordinary meetings as may be deemed advisable. It will prescribe its own procedure and will be assisted by working committees, the members of which will be appointed by the Aeronautical Board. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint Army and Navy policies or plans relative to the national defense will be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Matters affecting the procurement of matériel in time of war to meet joint requirements will be submitted to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. All other matters will be submitted direct to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

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Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national

[I] [C. J. A. I.]

CONFIDENTIAL

CHANGE No. 1, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

J. B. No. 350.

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, July 22, 1936.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy recommended by The Joint Board have been approved by order of the Secretary of War and by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

JARVIS BUTLER, *Secretary.*

Cancel list of effective pages of Navy FTP 155 appearing on page ii, and insert new list of effective pages (Navy copies only).

PARAGRAPH 6. "General Functions of the Navy." Remove and destroy page 3 and substitute new page 3 containing amendment of subparagraph 6. a. (3) and added subparagraph 6. b. (3).

PARAGRAPH 128. Organization of the Joint Planning Committee. Remove and destroy pages 129-130 and substitute new pages 129-130 containing amended paragraph 128.

PARAGRAPHS 131 AND 132. "Aeronautical Board." Remove and destroy pages 131-132 and substitute new pages 131-132 containing amendment of paragraphs 131 and 132.

NOTE.—The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publication Section, Navy Department, require no report on receipt of the above changes.

[Ib] C. J. A. 2.

CHANGE No. 2, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 350 (Serials 628, 630, 631, and 635).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, November 30, 1938.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War, the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages.

Page nos.	Subject matter
Ib-Ic II-IIa	Promulgation of Change No. 2. List of effective pages.

1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated.

Old page nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
I-II	Reprint of promulgation of Change No. 1 on pages I-Ia.
V-VI	Title of Chapter II changed.
VII-VIII	Paragraph headings under Chapter II changed.
5-10	Paragraphs 7-15 deleted and new paragraphs 7-10 substituted on pages 5-6.
11-12	Paragraph 17, second sentence deleted.
17-18	Paragraph 23 <i>b</i> , new sentence added.
27-28	Paragraph 24, parenthetical reference changed.
41-42	Paragraph 32 <i>c</i> (3) (a), fifth and sixth lines changed.
43-44	Paragraph 32 <i>f</i> , twelfth line changed; subparagraph (e) changed.
47-48	Paragraph 32 <i>g</i> (2) (e), first sentence changed.
65-66	Paragraph 42 <i>b</i> , sixth and seventh lines changed; paragraph 42 <i>i</i> (2), last line changed.
67-68	Paragraph 42 <i>i</i> (14), changed.
69-70	Items "Wave" and "Subwave" under Definitions changed.
77-78	Paragraphs 48 <i>g</i> and 48 <i>r</i> , changed; paragraph 49 changed.
79-80	Paragraph 53 <i>b</i> , changed; paragraph 54 <i>a</i> , changed.
[<i>c</i>] 83-84	Paragraph 61, last sentence changed; paragraph 64 <i>c</i> , last line changed.
87-88	Paragraph 72, third and fourth lines changed.
91-92	Paragraph 81 <i>d</i> , changed.
97-98	Paragraph 89 <i>g</i> , changed; paragraph 90 <i>a</i> , second sentence changed.
101-102	Paragraph 93 <i>d</i> , third and fourth sentences changed.
103-104	Paragraph 95 <i>a</i> , first sentence changed; paragraph 95 <i>e</i> , first sentence changed; paragraph 95 <i>f</i> , first line changed; paragraph 96 <i>c</i> , first line changed; paragraph 97 <i>a</i> , first sentence changed.
105-106	Paragraph 101 <i>a</i> , last line changed.
107-108	Paragraph 101 <i>b</i> , last line changed.
111-112	Paragraph 17 <i>a</i> , first sentence changed.
129-130	Paragraph 125, fourth line changed; paragraph 126, last sentence changed.
133-134	Paragraphs 141 <i>b</i> and 142, changed.
137-138	Paragraph 4 (b), changed.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

This Change No. 2 includes all changes which have been directed to be made in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, since the promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.

The Office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this Change No. 2.

ROBERT S. CHEW,
Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy,
Acting Secretary, Joint Board.

[11] C. J. A. 2.

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

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Title page	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only)	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936	1	1-Ia
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938	2	1b-1c
List of effective pages	2	II-IIa
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935	Original	III-IV**
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*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

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[VII] C. J. A. 2. PART I

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CHAPTER II

COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY AND OF THE NAVY

7. Coordination—General considerations.

a. Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated.

b. In determining the method to be used in coordinating the operations of the two services, consideration will be given to the respective functions of the Army and of the Navy as defined in this document, the geographical location and nature of the contemplated operations, the character and strength of our own and enemy forces, and the probable intentions of the enemy.

8. Methods of coordination.—Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by one of the following methods:

a. Mutual cooperation.

b. The exercise of unity of command.

9. Determination of the method of coordination.

a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.

b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

(1) When ordered by the President; or

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

[6] **10. Responsibility and authority conferred by unity of command.**

a. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph *b* below, unity of command in an operation vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both services by the organization of task forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary to insure the success of the operation.

b. Unity of command does not authorize the commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the service to which he does not belong, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination.

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CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION

16. *Types.*

a. Independent operations.

b. Joint operations which are generally of two classes :

(1) Joint overseas expeditions.

(2) Coastal frontier defense.

17. *Tasks of Army and Navy forces in joint operations.*—The normal Army and Navy tasks enumerated below are to serve as guides in the planning and execution of operations in which Army and Navy forces jointly participate. When Army forces participating in joint operations move overland, tactical coordination of the Army and Navy forces will be exercised when the forces of the two services approach the objective to within supporting distance of each other.

18. *Joint overseas expeditions.*a. *Joint overseas expeditions include:*

(1) Joint overseas movements.

(2) Landing attacks against shore objectives.

b. *Joint overseas movements.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in joint overseas movements are :

(a) To provide and operate all vessels for the Army, except when naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case they are provided and operated by the Navy.

(b) To assemble the Army troops, together with their equipment and supplies, at designated ports of embarkation.

[12] (c) To provide and operate the Army ports of embarkation.

(d) To load transports, whether these are provided by the Army or the Navy, for the transportation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies, subject to Navy approval as to stability of vessels.

(e) To load in readiness for operation such aircraft and armament as can be made available to assist the Navy during the movement at sea or in landing operations.

(f) To organize and operate shore installations used primarily for debarkation of Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(2) The normal Navy tasks in joint overseas movements are :

(a) To maintain sea lines of supply.

(b) When naval opposition by the enemy is to be expected—

1. To procure, man, equip, and operate the vessels necessary to transport Army personnel, equipment, and supplies.

2. To assemble the necessary transports at designated ports of embarkation at the times specified by the commanders of the ports of embarkation.

3. To provide for security of transports at sea.

4. To provide in outlying ports means for the embarkation, or debarkation, of Army troops, equipment and supplies, when such means cannot be provided or obtained by the Army.

c. *Landing attacks against shore objectives.*

(1) The normal Army tasks in landing attacks directed from the sea against shore objectives are :

(a) The deployment into boats used for landing, these boats being operated by the Navy.

(b) The delivery of rifle and machine-gun fire from landing boats, except from such machine guns as are parts of the naval equipment of the boats.

[17]

CHAPTER IV

FUNCTIONS OF ARMY AND NAVY AIR COMPONENTS

20. *General functions.*

a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions of the Army and Navy stated in chapter I, Policy Governing the Respective Functions of the Army and of the Navy. Under this policy :

(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

b. Aircraft, by their nature, are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions. Available air strength should therefore be used whenever possible by either service in support of the other.

c. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may temporarily execute Army functions under like conditions.

21. *Primary functions.*

a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

b. These primary functions are:

(1) The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

[18] (2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

22. *Secondary functions.*

a. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

(1) Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

(3) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

(2) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

23. *Provisions to minimize duplication.*

a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development.

c. Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.

d. When estimated aircraft production and procurement do not meet the requirements of the Army and the Navy under any specific war plan, The Joint Board will make allocation in numbers and priorities of airplanes to the Army and Navy, respectively.

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CHAPTER V

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

Section I

Introduction and Definitions

24. *Purpose of publication.*—The purpose of this publication is to present the principles and measures necessary for the effective joint organization and conduct of operations in coastal frontier defense and the method of planning involved and the responsibilities of the two services in connection therewith, in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein. (See Ch. II, and par. 19, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.)

25. *Purpose of coastal frontier defense.*

a. The purpose of a joint organization and measures for coastal frontier defense is to provide more effectively for our national defense.

b. Specifically, the measures and operations in coastal frontier defense are for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;
- (2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;
- (3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;
- (4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations.

[28] 26. *Definitions.*—In order to provide a common basis of understanding between the Army and the Navy in the employment of forces in coastal frontier defense, the following definitions of terms employed are hereby established:

a. A *coastal frontier* is a geographical division of our coastal area established for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective co-ordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group or shall include that part of the group which can be organized for defense and command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an Army officer and a naval officer will exercise command over all Army forces and Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided for command purposes into sectors and subsectors.

b. *Coastal frontier defense* is the organization of the forces and matériel of the Army and the Navy assigned to provide security for the coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions.

c. *The naval district* is a military and administrative command ashore established for the purpose of decentralizing the Navy Department's functions with respect to the control of shipping in the coastal zones and the shore activities outside the Navy Department proper, and for the further purpose of centralizing under one command within the district and the waters thereof:

- (1) For military coordination, all naval activities; and
- (2) For administrative coordination, all naval activities with specific exceptions.

The primary purpose in view is to provide for naval mobilization and logistic support of the Fleet and to utilize the district naval forces in the joint organization to provide security for the coast and for shipping in the coastal zones. The limits of the naval districts are laid down in the Navy Regulations. These limits extend to seaward so as to include the coastwise sea lanes. Each naval district is commanded by a designated commandant who is the direct representative of the Navy Department, including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity.

[41] 32. *Requirements and means to be provided.*

a. *General requirements.*

(1) The proximity of important cities and industrial areas to certain of our seacoast and lake frontiers and the consequent vulnerability of these places to attack, as well as the importance to the Nation of our shipping and its related industries, and the fact that our coastal bases are the mainsprings of naval action, make the protection of these frontiers in time of war a highly important part of the national defense.

(2) Positive security, to include harbor defenses, has been provided for certain areas, the fixed armament of which has been or is being installed during peace time. Depending upon the liability of these areas to attack, and upon the character of such attack, defensive coastal areas have been designated and defensive sea areas should be designated in order to ensure the security of these important areas and the security of the shipping within their waters.

(3) In other respects, a minimum land and sea defense should be contemplated for our whole coastal frontier on the outbreak of war, and should involve the employment of only such parts of the means of defense as are required under the situation. In some situations, involving only minor enemy operations, it may be necessary to organize the beach defense for certain localities. Other situations involving more serious enemy attacks will require that the means of defense be successively augmented.

b. *Defensive operations required.*—From a study of possible enemy operations, it appears that the defense of our coastal frontiers should take into consideration the following:

- (1) The observation of the coastal frontier and the sea beyond as far as circumstances permit or seem to demand.

- (2) The protection of shipping in waters adjacent to the seacoast.
 (3) The attack on enemy vessels in waters adjacent to the seacoast.
 (4) The resistance to enemy approach to the seacoast.

[42] (5) The protection of the seacoast, and especially strategic harbors, against raids.

(6) The defeat of enemy landing attacks on the seacoast including the provision of defensive installations on shore and in the waters adjacent thereto.

- (7) The initiation of counteroffensive operations to eject a landed enemy.

c. Means available.—Under the above conception of defensive operations that may be required for coastal frontier defense, the means that may be made available in time of war include—

(1) *The Fleet*, the employment of which, in accordance with the strategic situation, may keep the enemy away from our coastal frontiers.

(2) *Naval local defense forces*, which control the water areas within a naval district, conduct naval operations against enemy forces in the naval district waters, and cooperate with and support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

- (3) *The Army forces.*

(a) *Mobile forces*, including air forces, to provide the covering or outpost forces for the initial coastal frontier defense organization and likewise the additional forces necessary to defeat landing attacks and air attacks and to carry out the Army functions.

(b) *Harbor defense forces* for maintenance and operation of essential harbor defenses designed to prevent ingress into areas, including the air space thereof covered by these defenses.

d. Relation of the Fleet to coastal frontier defense.—The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases. In the case of hostile major overseas movements directed against our coasts, the Fleet, if present and free to act, will be a powerful factor for ensuring the security of its bases and our coasts, and, if it engages the enemy, should be supported by all the land-based aircraft available.

[43] *e. Relation of Army mobile forces to coastal frontier defense.*—The Army in its responsibility for the direct defense of the coast must be prepared to meet successfully any attack directed against any part of our coastal frontiers. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand the presence of the Fleet in another theater of operations make it necessary for the Army to provide mobile forces, not only those to be used as covering or outpost forces in the initial coastal frontier defense organization, but also the additional forces required to defeat enemy landing or air attacks directed against any part of the coast. When any part of a coastal frontier is threatened, these additional mobile forces will be concentrated with a view to defeating the enemy in the affected area.

f. Relation of Army air forces to coastal frontier defense.—In operations against enemy attacks along our coast and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case, no restrictions will be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full power of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile Army forces engaged in the direct defense of the coast. Their functions and operations will be governed by the principles outlined in Chapter II and in paragraphs 20, 21, and 22, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and the following quoted paragraphs from J. B. No. 349 (Serial No. 539) subject, "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force":

"(b) When any sector of a frontier is threatened, units of all arms, including units of the Air Corps, will be concentrated in support of the covering forces and the operations of all components will be in accordance with the general plan and the specific decisions of the frontier and sector commander. The Army Air Corps operates along the coast under the same conditions as in other operations except that occasions may arise when the GHQ air force or units thereof may act in conjunction with naval air forces under temporary direction of naval commanders; or similarly when naval air forces may operate in conjunction with and under temporary direction of Army commanders.

"(c) The Army is responsible for the direct defense of the coast. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand [44] the

presence of the Fleet in another theater require that joint plans for coastal frontier defense be drawn without counting upon the assistance of the Fleet as distinguished from naval local defense forces. But it should be borne in mind that, when the Fleet is so situated that it can and does operate effectively against enemy forces afloat that are approaching some sector of the coast, the security of such sector against major attack is ensured for the time being.

"(d) In addition to a radio communication system, the Navy maintains shore stations at strategical centers, where scouting and patrolling seaplanes may be concentrated to meet naval situations. These naval forces are important elements in the communications and information service, and would normally be the source of the first notice of the approach of an enemy by the sea. When the Army GHQ air force operates along the coast, it maintains such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency. The coordination and cooperation of these two sources of information are secured by joint plans prepared by frontier, sector, overseas department, and naval district authorities. Such plans should provide for augmentation of one service by the other in gaining and disseminating information of enemy movements offshore.

"(e) In the absence of the Fleet, the primary responsibility of securing information of hostile fleet movements rests with naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units. However, regardless of the presence or absence of the Fleet, the GHQ air force retains the responsibility for such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency.

"(f) In the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy at sea, a major attack upon the coast may develop so as to require the utilization of the GHQ air force in three phases as follows:

"1st phase—The conduct of reconnaissance over the sea approaches to the coast and (when favorable opportunity presents itself) the attack of enemy elements.

"2d phase—The support of artillery, involving both fixed and mobile guns and mines, by aircraft conducting observation, reconnaissance, and offensive operations, from the time the enemy comes within range of ground weapons, until he is driven off or the operation enters the third phase.

"3d phase—Air operations in connection with the use of all arms on our coastal frontier.

"Reconnaissance, as outlined for the first phase, will be continued to the extent possible throughout the later phases.

"(g) *War plans.*—In peace-time planning for war-time use under any of our existing war plans, each coastal frontier plan, and where necessary, each sector and subsector plan will include plans for the employ- [45] ment of such air units as may be assigned under the particular war plan involved. In the preparation of these plans, consideration will be given to the category of defense as defined in chapter V, part X (sec. III of 1935 revision), Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and specified in the particular war plan in question. Each specific war plan prepared by the War Department will set forth the initial missions assigned the GHQ air force and, in general terms, the operations to be undertaken. Based upon these missions, the GHQ air force commander will prepare his plan covering the details of concentration the missions, and the general plan of initial operations to be undertaken by the various elements of the GHQ air force.

"(h) *Defense projects.*—Harbor defense projects will contain a statement of the minimum observation aviation needed for reconnaissance and observation of fire for the harbor defense artillery included in such project.

"(i) *Installations and facilities.*—The most important of these are communications, airdromes, and landing fields. Of the first, the radio systems of the naval districts and of the Coast Guard are available, and joint plans contemplate their utilization in connection with any additional stations found necessary and installed by either service. Harbor defense projects and the plans of coastal frontier commanders will make provision for the airdrome areas and installations and the communications and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the air organizations assigned. In addition, the plans of each coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide, in consultation with the GHQ air force commander, for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of such coastal frontier command, by including in such plans logistical provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate. Civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so as to permit M-day operation.

"(j) In overseas departments, the utilization of the aviation component of the garrison will be as directed by the department commander."

g. Naval local defense forces.

(1) The naval local defense forces are furnished by naval districts from such surface, subsurface, and aircraft as may be made available, including small submarines, old destroyers, mine vessels, and aircraft tenders, with such local vessels as are taken over in time of war for naval district use.

(2) The naval local defense forces of a naval district may comprise any or all of the following task forces:

(a) *The inshore patrol*, which may be composed of section bases, submarine bases, destroyer bases and air [46] stations; coastal lookout system, including lightships, lighthouses, Coast Guard stations, and special lookout stations; motor boats, submarine chasers, yachts, aircraft, mine sweepers, guard ships, aircraft tenders, and additional task forces in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To execute the Navy's part of all joint plans for defensive coastal areas.

2. To search for, locate, report, and attack enemy vessels operating close in to the coast and off harbor entrances.

3. To sweep such channels close in to the coast and off harbor entrances as are necessary for our naval forces and merchant shipping, and to clear mine fields laid by the enemy.

4. To patrol the outer limits of defensive coastal areas in order to convey to the harbor defense commander prompt and full information of the approach of friendly or hostile vessels, including all those of the offshore patrol. This information is to be conveyed directly to the nearest elements of the Army communication system.

5. To patrol the areas for obstacles, especially during thick weather or darkness, to protect the obstacles, and to prevent light craft from going over them.

6. To operate a system of control including piloting in the defensive sea and defensive coastal areas.

7. To maintain a guard ship at or near harbor entrances to see that all vessels leaving or entering port give the proper recognition and clearance signals and to transmit orders to shipping as directed.

8. To furnish with routing instructions all merchant vessels departing without escort.

[47] 9. To maintain a coastal-lookout system along the district coast line by use of the Coast Guard stations and Lighthouse Service, and special lookout stations to prevent communication between persons on shore and the enemy.

10. To maintain, through the Lighthouse Service in the district, the system of buoyage, lights, and other aids to navigation regularly established, with such modifications and changes as military necessity may require.

11. To render prompt assistance to merchant shipping and naval units in case of collision, breakdown, or other accident in port or along the coast.

12. To exercise naval control of harbors through the captain of the port, when the Treasury Department requests the Navy to exercise such control.

(b) *The offshore patrol*, which may be composed of destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, gunboats, eagle boats, yachts, aircraft tenders, aircraft, and additional types in special cases, with the following duties:

1. To patrol systematically the coastal zone outside of those parts assigned to the inshore patrol.

2. To develop information of, report, and attack enemy forces sighted, in accordance with the doctrine of the patrol.

3. To supplement and support the main armament gunfire of the harbor defenses.

4. To lay mine fields and sweep against enemy mines outside the field of operations of the inshore patrol.

(c) *The escort force*, which may be composed of any suitable and available naval forces charged with the duty of protecting convoys within the naval district waters.

[48] (d) *A coastal force* may be organized to operate within the coastal zone. It will be organized from suitable and available naval forces. Such coastal force will be in addition to the forces required for each naval district.

(e) The commander of the inshore patrol, who will be stationed ashore, should have his headquarters located as conveniently as possible to the headquarters of the harbor defense commander and at the same location if practicable. In any event he should be in direct communication with the harbor defense commander, as well as in direct connection with all naval activities in the defensive coastal area.

h. Defensive coastal areas.

(1) *Extent.*—Defensive coastal areas will be delimited by joint agreement between the Army and the Navy. Each defensive coastal area will cover that part of the coastal zone and adjacent seacoast which will require an intensive joint defense by reason of the inclusion therein of valuable harbors, stretches of the coast where hostile landings can be made in connection with attacks on our harbors or on industrial centers on or near the coast which are subject to attack from the sea. Defensive coastal areas will ordinarily include land and water areas in the vicinity of a fortified harbor, in which will be located in time of peace some personnel and usually a considerable amount of the matériel pertaining to the harbor defenses.

(2) *Harbor defenses.*

(a) Harbor defenses are highly organized, permanently defended localities within sectors or subsectors of a coastal frontier whose broad mission is to protect important coastal areas (seaports, naval bases, and anchorages) and utilities primarily against attack from the area. They are an element of the defensive organization of the subsector or sector in which they are located and they operate under subsector or sector control.

[65] (3) The sequence to be followed in the preparation of joint defense plans is as follows:

(a) Joint coastal frontier plan.

(b) Joint sector plan.

(c) Joint subsector plan or joint defensive coastal area plan.

Generally, the lowest sequence of plans required for the Navy will be that pertaining to a naval district, whether the naval district is a sector or subsector.

f. The plan of higher sequence will contain the directives for the plan of next lower sequence. The lower sequence plan will be formulated to support the plan of next higher sequence.

g. Army and Navy operating defense plans will obtain their directives from the joint plan they are required to support. They will provide the means and organizations and will insure the Army's and/or Navy's effective operation thereunder.

h. Joint coastal frontier and joint sector defense plans will cover the category of defense, the delimitation of areas (including subsector, defensive sea and coastal areas included therein), assignment of missions, allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops, the air and ground antiaircraft defense measures to be instituted, the designation of areas of responsibility, the details of joint communications and intelligence services to include the censorship and supervision of cables and wire lines in accordance with approved policy, and an aircraft warning service. These plans or their supporting projects will also make provision for the Army airdrome areas and installations necessary in connection therewith and the communication and supply arrangements for the effective operation in war of the Army air organization assigned. In addition, the plans of each Army coastal frontier commander will contemplate and provide for the possibility of the operation of the entire GHQ air force within the limits of his command by including in such plans logistic provisions for the entire GHQ air force, should it so operate; civilian installations and establishments will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable. Where facilities do not exist, all work possible under current appropriations should be done to prepare them so that M-day operation will be possible.

[66] i. Joint plans of the lowest sequence, such as joint subsector or joint defensive coastal area plans, should contain, either in the plans proper, in appendices or annexes thereto, or in supporting plans or projects—so much of the following as is appropriate:

(1) The relationship of the defensive coastal area to the subsector organization and/or of the subsector to the sector organization.

(2) The category of defense and such delimitation of the area as may be necessary for the coordination of the Army and the Navy forces operating in the area, to include areas of responsibility.

(3) The assignment of missions and allocation of Army forces, to include supporting troops or additional forces required for later defense steps.

(4) The relationship of the area to such defensive sea areas as have been designated for the vicinity, with special reference to methods of keeping the Army informed of movements of all vessels in the coastal zone and the composition, mission, and methods of operation of the offshore patrol.

(5) Such general plan of the forts, batteries, searchlights, underwater listening posts, air installations, and areas of gunfire and illumination as may be necessary to define the areas of Army responsibility for defense and naval assistance to the Army in this defense, including areas available to the enemy from which he can deliver bombardment fire without effective interference from the land armament.

(6) Definite assignment to the Navy of responsibility and tasks for offensive action in such areas as are covered by the fire of the land armament.

(7) General plan of the part of the underwater defense to be prepared or installed, including the character of the mine barrages, nets, booms, built-in obstructions, and other obstacles, their location, priority of installation, definite responsibility of the Army and the Navy for their provision, estimate of time of installation, definite indication of free passages through mines and openings in nets, navigation range installations required and responsibility for their establishment. Decisions as to which service and what commander in [67] this service shall determine when these elements shall be placed.

(8) Allocation to the Army and the Navy of locally procurable means, particularly vessels and material required for the installation and maintenance of the underwater defense, together with an estimate of the availability of such means, the nature of the alteration required, and the probable cost and time involved.

(9) Composition, mission, and method of operation of the inshore patrol, with particular reference to method of protection of underwater defense elements and identification of elements of the patrol with land elements of the defense at night and in thick weather, including a definite decision as to the conditions under which doubtful vessels should be fired upon by the armament of fortifications.

(10) The air, the ground antiaircraft, and the close-in defense measures; the measures for defense against landing attacks to be instituted on M-day and for the later defense steps to be instituted as the war progresses.

(11) The details of joint communication and intelligence services and an aircraft warning service. These details for the joint communication and intelligence services to include the location of headquarters of the several commanders, communications nets of both services, with the additional means, both military and commercial, required and the frequencies allotted to Army and Navy radio nets, responsibilities of Army and Navy commanders as to communication, censorship, and supervision of cables and wire lines as prescribed by higher commanders.

(12) General method of operation of the inshore patrol in sweeping and mining operations and in conducting and controlling maritime traffic, including designation and location of entrances and exits to defensive sea areas and of guard ships and methods of control of shipping within the harbor.

(13) Composition, mission, and method of employment of other naval local defense task groups, in sufficient detail to indicate the character and degree of cooperation required of Army and Navy air units.

[68] (14) Definite consideration of factors which may influence coordination.

(15) Detail of at least one liaison officer by name from each service to represent his commander at the headquarters of the other service and such other liaison officers as may be decided upon jointly.

j. A highly important part in each joint defense plan and project, and in the supporting defense plans and projects developed therefrom, is a definite statement of the time of accomplishment of the individual items under the plans and projects. For plans, these statements of times should be for the means and forces actually available and a consideration of the condition of the means and state of training of the forces. For projects, these statements of times should consider both the time of procurement and the time of installation or training after procurement.

[69]

CHAPTER VI

JOINT OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[77] *g. A boat division* is a subordinate task organization of a boat group, organized for transporting a subordinate unit of a combat team or other similar tactical unit.

r. A *ware* consists of the boats, within a boat group, which carry the troops that are to land approximately simultaneously. It may consist of a single boat division or two or more boat divisions.

s. *Commercial loading* utilizes to the maximum the ship space and does not contemplate tactical employment of the troops on landing until their equipment, other than personal equipment, has been issued to them. This method of loading is applicable to movements from an established port to an established and well-secured port. Troops moved by this method are not available for tactical employment in landing operations against hostile forces.

t. *Unit loading* gives primary consideration to the availability of the troops for combat purposes on landing, rather than utilization of ship space.

The degree of readiness for employment depends upon the degree to which organizations are unit loaded as follows:

(1) *Combat unit loading*, in which certain units, selected because of their probable destination and employment in landing on hostile shores, are completely loaded on one ship with at least their essential combat equipment and supplies immediately available for debarkation with the troops, together with the animals for the organization when this is practicable. This method of unit loading is particularly applicable to units which probably will be required for an assault on hostile shores by a landing from small boats. Such an operation against any one beach will require an army combat team. This, of course, is subject to modification to meet special requirements. Combat teams will be loaded in such manner as to permit simultaneous debarkation.

(2) *Organizational unit loading*, in which organizations with their equipment and supplies are loaded on the same transport, but not so loaded as to allow debarkation of troops and their equipment simultaneously. This is somewhat more economical in ship capacity than is combat unit loading. It permits debarkation of complete units available for employment as soon as the troops and their equipment have been [78] assembled on land. Like combat unit loading, this method permits diversion en route by complete ship loads, from the destination originally intended.

(3) *Convoy unit loading*, in which the troops with their equipment and supplies are loaded on transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same transport. This allows a considerable utilization of ship space, particularly by using this method of loading to fill in space on transports carrying combat unit loaded organizations. Troops which are convoy unit loaded are available for tactical employment only when landed at established beachheads, and after the lapse of time necessary to assemble them on land, with their equipment and supplies.

Section II

Command

49. *Method of coordination*.—The method of coordination will be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

50. *Commanders to embark on same ship*.—The Army and the Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should also the respective Army and Navy commanders of a joint attack force. This method should be applied, were practicable, through all echelons of command.

51. *Liaison agents and staffs*.—The mutual exchange of liaison agents assures a degree of cooperation between the Army and the Navy not otherwise readily obtainable. Wherever joint operations are undertaken the commander of one service should have on his staff members of the other service.

52. *Communication with subordinate units*.—It is highly important that all landing force commanders should land with their units or as soon thereafter as possible, establish communication with subordinates who have already landed, and issue orders for subsequent operations based on personal knowledge of the situation and the terrain. The senior commander ashore must act with vigor and initiative.

[79]

Section III

Plans

53. *The joint basic decision and directive*.

a. *The decision to undertake a joint overseas expedition will be derived from a joint Army and Navy estimate. Such a decision may be contained in a joint Army and Navy basic war plan, or it may be reached at any time during the progress of the war.*

b. A directive will be issued by the authority arriving at the decision to undertake a joint overseas expedition, to the commander designated to command the combined forces, or to the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces which constitute the joint overseas expedition. This directive will generally include:

- (1) Digest of available information of the enemy.
- (2) Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon the proposed operations.
- (3) Information of any supporting operations contemplated.
- (4) The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the Navy.
- (5) The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the mission or missions, with designation of the initial theater of operations.
- (6) The forces assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of concentration and availability for embarkation.
- (7) The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.
- (8) The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement and operation.
- (9) The method of coordination.
- (10) Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in order to give the commander in chief or the respective commanders of the Army forces and the Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the sources of the expedition.

[80] 54. *Expeditionary force joint estimate and joint plan.*

a. Upon receipt of the above directive the commander designated to command the combined forces in the case of coordination by unity of command or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation, will prepare such an estimate as may be desirable and, after full discussion with the interested commanders of the participating forces, will issue instructions based on the directive and in amplification thereof; these instructions, particularly when prepared prior to the war, will ordinarily be in the form of a joint plan. Such instructions will generally include:

- (1) Decision.
- (2) Such additional assignments of Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.
- (3) Operations to be undertaken, including both joint operations and such separate Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to insure the success of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces required and their commanders.
- (4) Announcement of selected landing areas.
- (5) Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.
- (6) Provision for joint training.
- (7) Provision for logistic support of the expedition.
- (8) Provision for communications (signal) between forces.
- (9) Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until shortly before the landing forces are ready to debark.
- (10) Alternative plans.

b. It should be emphasized that the plans for embarkation and movement overseas should be based upon the requirements of the plan covering the actual landing operations.

55. *Cooperation in planning.*—In the preparation of these plans and of the subordinate plans it is essential that there be the closest cooperation between all Army and Navy commanders who are to be associated in the projected operations. Officers of each service

[83] 61. *Procurement of sea transportation.*—The joint basic plan or directive (see par. 53 *b* (8)) will state which service is responsible for procurement and assembly of the sea transportation required for the Army forces. Transportation required by the Navy will be procured by that service. Unless stated in the plan or directive, the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command, or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation, will decide when and where the necessary sea transportation is required and will request the War or Navy Department, as the case may be, to have it so assembled.

62. *Ports of embarkation.*—Regardless of whether the transportation employed for the movement of the Army forces overseas is under the control of the Army

or Navy, the necessary ports required for embarking the Army forces are selected, organized, and operated by agencies of the War Department not included in the forces to be employed overseas. The Army embarkation service includes the employment of experienced riggers, longshoremen, and stevedores; harbor floating equipment, etc., for loading ships.

63. *Special organization.*

a. Army forces are restricted by the necessarily limited facilities available for transportation, not only in the transports, but in the boats and small craft available to transfer them to the shore and the facilities, or lack of them, for debarkation from the boats. For support in the first stage of attack the landing of tanks is difficult and the landing of heavy artillery is impracticable. It is ordinarily impracticable to employ Army air units before and during the early stages of the landing. Special organization is, therefore, required to facilitate debarkation of intact combat units, reduce ship cargo requirements, provide increased small arms and machine-gun fire in lieu of normal artillery support, and insure mobility of the first units ashore.

b. Special naval organization is required to embark, escort, debark, and land the Army forces, including provision for the most effective possible artillery, communications, and air support until the Army can establish its own artillery and air units on shore. This involves the organization and provision of boat officers and crews for the landing boats and lighters; organization for covering landing operations by gunfire on land targets; organization to provide air-[87] craft support and observation to serve the needs of ground troops, including observation of the fire of the Army's artillery; and organization to provide ship-to-shore communications.

64. *Special equipment.*

a. In general, in order to meet the requirements and limitations mentioned, the Army must reduce equipment to absolute essentials. Wherever practicable, motor transport will replace animal transport, and the motor transport provided will be of the types (light tractors and light trucks) which can be most easily handled, especially into and out of small boats. However, combat efficiency should not be sacrificed to facilitate sea transportation. The amount and kind of transportation is dependent on the terrain and the distance of the advance.

b. Because of the special nature of the operations required in the transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore against enemy opposition and under supporting fire from friendly ships, special equipment must be provided by the Navy. This includes special boats for landing the assault troops, including installations of machine guns therein, and the provision of protection so far as practicable against small arms fire from shore; special boats, barges, and motor lighters for landing all other troops and their equipment, including artillery, tanks, airplanes, and motor and animal transport, and supplies; provision of special ammunition required for the artillery support; and special communications equipment.

c. The maximum number of landing boats which can be transported efficiently should be provided. The number of boats should be at least sufficient to land simultaneously the number of assault battalions to cover the frontage required in the proposed scheme of maneuver, and local reserves sufficient to hold the ground gained until reinforcements are landed later.

d. All boats possible should be carried on the transports. The standard Navy boats on combat vessels are to be used only as necessary to supplement transport equipment and for towing.

65. *Special equipment to be assembled before departure.*—Estimates of the special equipment required will be made well in advance of the date of departure of the expedition in order that it may be procured and some training in its use may be carried out before loading.

[87] of a lesser degree of readiness, which will preclude the use of Army aviation units in support of the landing.

b. If Army aviation units cannot be unit-loaded on carriers, transports should be selected which will permit the planes to be stowed between decks, almost completely set up, and the loading on the same ship of the airdrome personnel and equipment necessary to permit prompt establishment on shore of the facilities required for the operation of the units.

c. It may be necessary to employ transports of such restricted space between decks as to require that the planes be shipped knocked-down and crated. This is the least desirable method of loading, due to the docking facilities necessary for unloading and the time element involved in getting the planes ashore and ready for flying.

Section V

The Movement Overseas

71. *Plans and orders.*—The plans and orders of the Army and the Navy commanders under this heading should in general include—

a. For the Army forces:

Designation of such landing areas as may have been concurred in by the Navy, and announcement of the plan for establishment of the Army forces on shore.

b. For the Naval forces:

(1) Information of time of departure, in accordance with paragraph 72, following.

(2) Concurrence with the Army in selection of the landing areas and plan for the establishment of the Army forces on shore.

(3) Safe escort of the expedition to the landing areas and organization therefor.

72. *Time of departure.*—The time of departure from the ports of embarkation of the expedition and assembly at the designated rendezvous will be decided by the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command, or the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation.

73. *Convoy and escort.*

a. Prior to departure of the overseas expedition, the naval commander will organize all noncombatant vessels, such as troop and [88] animal transports and cargo ships, into such convoy groups as may be advisable, the basis for organization being the retention in one group of the ships carrying the troops and equipment to be landed at any one beach. Each convoy group will be commanded by an officer of the Navy of suitable rank, designated by the naval commander. The naval commander will furthermore organize and station the escort for the convoy groups, whether these convoy groups are proceeding in one, or more than one formation.

b. In the event that the expedition has for its major objective the establishment of the fleet in a base in a theater of operations normally controlled by the enemy, it is probable that all transports and cargo ships will be incorporated in the fleet train which includes the auxiliary vessels necessary for the logistic support of the fleet.

74. *Navigation and defense.*

a. Whatever the type of landing operations to be undertaken, the navigation and defense of the convoys of troop transports in joint overseas expeditions at sea are entirely under the direction of the Navy, and the Navy is responsible for the safe conduct of all the forces afloat included in the operations.

b. The Army personnel are passengers and do not interfere with the formation, route, or conduct of the expedition. The troops on board may be assigned certain duties such as that of lookouts, as may be directed by the commander of the transport through the commanding officer of troops on board.

75. *Protection of the lines of supply (lines of communication).*—The Navy is always responsible for the protection of the oversea lines of supply.

Section VI

The Landing (Including Preparations Therefor)

76. *Joint plans.*—Based upon the expeditionary force joint plan, all Army and Navy commanders of larger units operating together will prepare joint plans covering their operations in the landing phase.

77. *Joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders.*—The joint plan of the Army and Navy commanders should, in general, include the necessary details concerning:

[91] 81. *Employment of the Army forces.*

a. A landing against opposition is in effect the assault of an organized defensive position modified by substituting naval gunfire support for divisional, corps, and Army artillery, and generally Navy aircraft support for Army aircraft support. However, every effort will be made to utilize all possible aircraft support, both Army and Navy.

b. Three successive phases in the operations are to be expected, each being marked by an attack or attacks with limited objectives:

(1) *First phase.*—Seizure of the necessary terrain immediately in rear of

the beach, followed when sufficient strength has been landed by an advance to secure the beach from enemy light artillery fire. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line about 10,000 yards inland.

(2) *Second phase.*—Operations to insure further advance inland to a position which denies enemy medium artillery fire on the beach. This requires as the objective for this phase the establishment of a line at least 15,000 yards inland.

(3) *Third phase.*—Further land and air operations for securing the objectives for which the landing was undertaken.

c. Simultaneous landings will be made by as many combat teams on as broad a front as the boat facilities will permit, but not to the extent of causing undue dispersion.

d. So far as practicable, the disposition of the boats within boat divisions and the disposition of boat divisions within boat groups will be such as to land troops in the formations best suited to effect a landing and to seize a suitable beach head.

e. It is imperative that the landing be made on the beach by tactical units, even down to the squad, in order that tactical team unity may be preserved and the fighting power of the team be at the maximum at the moment of physical contact with the enemy.

f. In the day attack, assault platoons endeavor to develop all fire power practicable, making free use of machine guns while in the boats. In the night assaults, fire of the assaulting troops before reaching the beach will be used only as a last resort.

82. *Employment of the Naval forces.*

a. The commander of the naval attack force is responsible for the preparation of plans for and the actual operation of landing on [92] the beach of all personnel and material pertaining to the Army forces with which he is associated in accordance with Army debarkation tables; the support of the landing by gunfire; the employment of the Navy air forces in support of the Army; the maintenance of signal communications between the Army and Navy forces both afloat and in the air; all this in addition to the normal functions involved in protecting the forces against hostile naval attack.

b. If the distance from the transports to the beach is considerable, consideration should be given to towing the boats by mine sweepers or light surface craft as close to the beach as the depth of the water permits, in order to minimize confusion due to breakdown and failure to keep to the designated courses. However, every care should be exercised in the methods of handling boats and in boat formations to minimize excessive losses from hostile fire.

83. *Organization of the Army forces.*

a. The Army forces designated to land at each beach or group of beaches and the necessary reserves are organized into subordinate commands adhering to normal formations. In order to effect the closest possible cooperation, Army commanders of the various echelons should be embarked initially on the ships of the commanders of the corresponding naval echelons, as far as practicable.

b. As the beach or group of beaches at which the landing will prove successful cannot be foreseen, the appropriate echelons or command should provide for adequate, highly mobile reserves afloat which may be promptly moved to exploit the situations developing on shore.

84. *Naval organization for landing.*

a. Preparatory to landing, the transports, cargo ships, and supporting naval vessels engaged in a joint overseas expedition will, if not already so organized, be organized into one or more *naval attack forces* and the forces so formed designated by the geographical name of the locality or by the term "right", "left", "center", etc. A naval officer will be designated to command each attack force. (See par. 4Sc.)

b. Such *naval attack force* is further subdivided into *task groups*, which will generally include the following:

(1) *The fire support group*, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned the following fire missions: [97] should be selected with a view of determining the enemy's weakest point.

b. Since tactical considerations governing the employment of the troops on shore are paramount, final decision as to the landing area of Army forces, its breadth, beaches to be used, and order of landing of the troops, will be made by the Army commander from among those areas and beaches that the Navy commander states are practicable so far as naval considerations are concerned.

a. Decision as to the hour of landing involves several factors which will be considered jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in charge of the operations.

b. Advantages of landing during darkness.—A landing before or just at daybreak greatly increases the chance of securing some measure of tactical surprise, materially lessens the efficacy of any fire the defense may employ except prearranged fires or defensive barrages, reduces the losses to be anticipated while the troops are in small boats, and prevents the enemy from gaining the necessary information on which to dispose his forces, particularly the reserves. Advantage may be taken of fog or smoke as a protection against searchlights and flares. However, fog and smoke may increase the difficulty of landing at the desired beaches.

c. Advantages of landing during daylight.—In a daylight landing the movements of both ships and small boats are made under favorable circumstances, as positions and courses can be accurately fixed and as troops can be loaded into small boats more easily than during darkness. Likewise, the attack is assured of better gunfire and air support, and better defense against mines, submarines, light naval forces, and hostile aviation. The attackers, by means of naval gunfire and aviation, are better able to pin the enemy to the ground and interdict movements of his reserves, thus preventing his exploitation of the fuller and more accurate information which daylight permits him to obtain.

d. Smoke.—In case the landing is not made under cover of darkness, the resulting disadvantage may, to some extent, be overcome by the use of smoke. A smoke screen laid by destroyers or aircraft may be utilized to conceal the movements and dispositions [98] of the transport groups, while an airplane smoke screen laid on hostile positions when known or at the shore line may serve to protect the small boats from hostile fire and at the same time keep the enemy in doubt as to the exact strength and point of attack. In planning for the use of smoke the direction and velocity of the wind must be carefully considered.

e. Daylight essential for exploitation.—The landing must be made early enough to allow sufficient daylight for the Army forces to reach their first objectives.

f. Other considerations.—In addition to the above considerations, a particular combination of tide, wind, fog, or moon may be desirable in selecting the hour as well as the day for the landing.

g. Final decision as to the hour of landing will be made by the designated commander, in the case of coordination by unity of command, or jointly by the commanders of the Army and the Navy forces, in the case of coordination by mutual cooperation.

90. Approach to and occupation of landing area.

a. The approach to the landing area and the occupation of the sea area included therein are conducted under orders of the commander of the naval attack force or forces. Careful calculation must be made as to the time required to embark the troops into the leading boat groups and the length of time required to reach the beach. This result is applied to the previously determined hour for the landing and the approach so conducted that the transports will be in position at the time required. In order to minimize risk of detection as well as torpedo attack by enemy submarines, vessels should not be required to arrive within the landing area until they are needed. Where hydrography allows, transports may be anchored in water of such depth as to afford protection against hostile submarines. It is highly desirable that the submarine danger be eliminated prior to making landings. Submarine nets may be used to protect transport groups.

b. When the waters of the proposed landing area are known or suspected of being mined, breaches must be made before the landings begin. The necessary mine sweeping is performed by the Navy.

c. The Navy is responsible for the demolition or removal, when possible, of underwater obstacles near the beach. Consideration will be given to the possibility of destroying such underwater obstacles as barbed-wire entanglements by cutting devices rigged on the small boats of the assault wave.

[101] prearranged schedule on targets visible from the firing ships, from observation points on land, or from spotting aircraft. Concentrations should be placed on other targets as they disclose themselves by groups specially designated beforehand. Although possible, map firing should be employed only as a last resort; observed firing is always to be preferred. However, liberal use should be made of maps in the designation of artillery objectives in the plan of fire support.

c. Reduced charges may be used to advantage in cases where the design of the gun permits this. High angle fire may be obtained by the design, manu-

facture, and supply of artillery for the particular purpose of supporting a landing force in joint operations. Naval antiaircraft guns will be used throughout against enemy air operations, but if not needed for this purpose they may be used advantageously against shore objectives.

d. The gunfire support furnished by the naval forces should be continuous. It will usually start with a preparation fire and continue throughout the successive stages of the landing until the limit of range of guns is reached or until the Army's own artillery is in a position to furnish adequate support. During the time the troops are disembarking from the transports into the leading boat groups and until the leading boats reach the beach, the fire will be placed on known hostile artillery positions, organized strong points, machine-gun nests, defiles on routes over which supports and reserves must pass and, generally, on such other objectives the neutralization of which will lessen the enemy's defense. Artillery support plans will provide for effective fire on the beach to cover the movement of the leading waves ashore. Just before our troops reach the shore the fire will lift to targets farther inland. The terrain beyond the beach will influence the amount of lifting of the fire. In any event it must be kept far enough in advance of our infantry to assure against losses from our own fire.

e. There are two general methods which may be employed by naval forces in affording artillery support in a forced landing where two or more Army divisions land simultaneously. One is to keep all firing units centralized under the highest commander; the other is to decentralize naval support groups to support subordinate Army [102] units. The following are examples of the second method: When two infantry divisions land simultaneously and the naval units have been divided into two naval attack forces, it might be desirable to have the naval vessels of one naval attack force support one division, and the naval vessels of the other naval attack force support the other division, or to divide the naval force into three supporting groups—one being assigned to support each division and one to support the operation as a whole; or a division might be made by calibers, the large caliber main batteries of large ships being assigned to general support while the smaller caliber secondary batteries are assigned to support subordinate units to include divisions, and sometimes brigades.

94. *Cooperation in gunfire support.*

a. Complete plans for gunfire support should be worked out prior to embarkation between the commanders of the naval groups which are to give the support and of the respective Army units they are to support. Army commanders will indicate the objectives upon which they desire fire, the purpose of the fire, and the times they are to be fired upon. The naval commander concerned will indicate exactly how much of the desired support he can give. In case the Navy has not sufficient guns to cover the desired objectives, every effort will be made to secure additional ships rather than defeat the Army plan by reducing below the minimum the artillery support required by it.

b. Since the effectiveness with which naval gunfire support plans and orders are carried out is largely dependent upon the maintenance of adequate liaison and communications between shore and ship, such plans and orders should include adequate provisions for the installation and maintenance of all means necessary to assure this. To assist in securing effective support, liaison officers will be interchanged between Army and Navy units. Advantageous use may be made of Army officers of artillery organizations which do not debark initially. All liaison officers should report to the headquarters to which assigned in plenty of time—probably prior to embarkation—to become thoroughly familiar with their duties. They should be sufficiently familiar with the other service as to be able to interpret the desires and needs of the commanders of the units whom [103] they represent in the case of Army liaison officers and the capabilities of naval firing groups in the case of naval liaison officers.

c. In addition to normal communication through the beach master as provided in paragraph 101 *a.*, each naval liaison officer should have direct communication with his commander whom he represents. For this purpose each should be accompanied by a signal party with facilities for maintaining radio and visual communications with his commander.

95. *Debarcation of troops.*

a. A wave is defined in paragraph 48*c.* The organization of the troops of each wave, with the time of arrival at the beach, is determined by the debarcation tables which are prepared by the Army officer commanding the unit. Such organization is based on best information on hand and upon information received

from the naval attack force commander as to availability and capacity of boats.

b. The tactical requirement of deployment in depth will cause the debarkation to be made in successive waves.

c. The number of waves to be under way at the same time will depend upon the tactical plan and the number and kind of boats available. After the initial tactical force has been carried ashore by successive waves, the remaining Army units will be sent ashore in an orderly and expeditious a manner as is feasible by the use of such boats and lighters as remain available, unless the necessity for tactical formations demands continuation of movement by waves.

d. The Navy is responsible that the waves are so spaced that they will arrive at the beach in the order and at the time intervals requested by the Army.

e. In order to reduce the time that the troops may be under fire in the boats, it is desirable that small, fast, power boats be used for the leading boat groups, the larger and slower boats being reserved for succeeding boat groups in which larger groupings are not objectionable. The provision of special boats for the purpose of landing the troops is highly desirable and is a duty of the Navy.

f. All boats of the leading boat groups should mount machine guns to be manned by either the Army or Navy, and should be provided with as much protection as possible against the effects of small-arms and machine-gun fire directed at them from the beaches and from aircraft.

[104] g. All boats used for landing troops, equipment, or supplies will be manned by Navy crews and commanded by Navy personnel.

96. *Debarcation of supplies and light equipment.*

a. The plan covering the landing phase will provide for the supply of the troops on shore. Their needs must be foreseen and transports loaded in accordance with the plan of supply. The first administrative orders to be issued after landing will be prepared, at least in tentative draft form before the expedition sails.

b. Troops usually carry only enough rations and ammunition upon landing to last 1 or 2 days. However, a beach reserve of rations and ammunition for at least 10 days should be built up as soon as possible, preferably from supplies carried in the transports for this purpose. Ordinarily, a few stores other than ammunition and water can be unloaded and landed on the first day.

c. The troops embarked in each boat group should carry the signal communication equipment appropriate to the units involved.

d. Debarcation of supplies and equipment and the priorities therefor should be provided in the Army debarcation tables.

97. *Debarcation of artillery and other heavy equipment.*

a. The plan of debarcation should avoid encumbering the troops embarked in the leading boat groups with nonessential equipment. Field artillery, though difficult to land, is essential. The landing of field artillery heavier in weight than light artillery upon open beaches is difficult, and the terrain may be such as to make the prompt movement or employment of such artillery, after landing impracticable. In favorable situations, on a good beach, a small amount of light artillery and tanks may be landed early. Such artillery will usually have to be moved into position by hand. Light tractors suitable for moving field guns into position can be debarked more easily than animals.

b. There are no suitable boats at present carried by vessels of war or merchant ships for transporting a large amount of army supplies or the heavier army equipment, such as medium field artillery pieces, tanks, motor trucks, airplanes. Special barges or lighters, preferably self-propelled, should be provided by the Navy for this purpose prior to embarkation.

c. All equipment and supplies which cannot be handled easily from boats to shore require improvised ramps and piers and some special naval equipment for handling. For landing a limited [105] amount of light equipment and supplies to accompany troops, the Navy will require small sheltered bights or inlets along the coast, and for handling the bulk of supplies and heavier Army equipment, fairly well protected harbors with temporary piers and wharves and appliances for unloading.

98. *Debarcation of animals.*—The number of animals that can be debarked or handled on an open beach is limited, yet provision will have to be made for transportation, debarcation, and landing of some animals, probably early in the operations. The Army will provide for the supply of proper slings, transportation stalls, and such other equipment as will facilitate the handling of the animals to be landed. Tidal currents should be considered in swimming animals ashore. Animals may be debarked as follows: From the transport to small boats by using flying stalls; from the boats into the water by ducking ramps; from the transports into mine sweepers or similar light craft, by flying stalls

or slings; from mine sweepers or similar light craft into the water by slings or a ducking ramp; from the transport into the water by slings.

99. *Debarcation of air forces.*

a. The method of debarking Army air units will depend upon the plans for their initial employment and the manner in which transported.

b. When the situation is such that it has been planned to transport Army aircraft crated, and not to use them until a suitable landing field has been secured as a result of the seizure of a beach head, the aircraft will not be debarked until suitable means for transferring them from ship to shore are available. Such a situation would exist when the operation was directed against an enemy known to be unable to offer effective air opposition to the landing operation.

c. However, the normal situation will require a maximum employment of all available air force, Army and Navy. Every effort should be made to transport Army aircraft so that they can participate in the initial operations. Navy aircraft carriers are taxed to capacity to care for their own planes and usually would not be available for handling Army aircraft; but if available should be used.

[106] d. Often it will be possible to debark aircraft at some distance from the landing area of the main operation, but within flight reach. The seizure and protection of a suitable area may constitute a secondary landing operation. Such an operation might be carried out in advance of the main operation, in order to make additional aircraft available to participate in the latter, but at the possible sacrifice of secrecy.

e. A favorable situation is one in which the area selected for the operation is within flight distance of friendly territory, thus permitting Army air units, flying from such territory, to participate in the initial phase of the operation.

100. *Supply of water to the troops.*—If the landing is made during hot weather or in a tropical climate, the amount of water that can be carried may be considerably less than the landing troops require. When there are no facilities for supply of water ashore in the landing area, arrangements must be made by the Navy to furnish water for the troops ashore. The Army's estimate and the Navy's arrangements for the water supply must be liberal. Allowance will be made for loss of water and containers, including damage by hostile fire. Until the tactical situation ashore permits water being delivered by water boats to be provided by the Navy, at least one cask of water will be placed in each boat going ashore. Plans will provide for the continuous supply of water by the Navy until the Army has developed its supply ashore.

101. *Organization of the beach.*

a. *The beachmaster* is a naval officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The beachmaster has complete control of the beach from the high-water mark seaward; of all naval operations thereat, together with all landing facilities. He causes the beach to be promptly marked to facilitate its recognition by approaching waves; organizes, maintains, and controls all communication with the Navy; transmits all Army messages from shore to ship, and receives and transmits to the shore party commander all messages from ship to shore which apply to the Army except as provided in paragraph 94 c; and cooperates with the shore party commander. The beachmaster and a few of his principal assistants land with the leading boat groups. [107] The beachmasters headquarters should be provided with such protection from enemy fire as may be practicable. Previously

trained Army artillery and Army air corps liaison personnel, in addition to competent naval communication personnel, will be established at the beachmaster's communication center, so that messages may be transmitted in terms and manner to which each service is accustomed.

b. *The shore party commander* is an Army Officer. One will be appointed for each beach where a landing is to be made. He will be provided with ample assistance. The shore party commander takes charge of all engineer and labor troops, equipment, and supplies on arrival at the beach; organizes the beach facilities, such as the establishment of dumps, collecting stations, and prisoners' inclosures; establishes information and message centers; facilitate the movement of all troop inland; and cooperates with the beachmaster. The shore party commander lands with the leading combat team.

c. *Military police.*—Confusion is likely to occur at the beaches, due to the irregular arrival of troops and supplies, hostile fire, movement of wounded and stragglers to the rear, and to the arrival of runners with messages. It is necessary, therefore, to have the beach well policed, and a sufficient number of military police should be detailed to assist the shore party commander.

d. An engineer party will be landed with or soon after the first troops. The shore party commander will detail necessary engineers to assist the beachmaster in establishing at once improved landing places for boats and in removing obstructions. A wharf of some kind is usually the next work, and it must be completed with the least possible delay. Army ponton equipment may be valuable for this purpose, and such equipment should be loaded with a view to its early use. The shore party commander will arrange for the construction of routes of communication to the interior. The location of these routes of communication may be determined by a study of maps beforehand, and this will be done wherever practicable.

e. Boat repair party.—Casualties to the hulls of boats and to the machinery of power boats due to enemy fire, sea conditions, and the hazards of landing on open beaches will likely occur at a high rate. It is desirable, therefore, to land as soon as practicable a repair party, including carpenters' mates, machinists' mates, and electricians' mates, under competent leadership, to assist the beachmaster in salvaging and repairing damaged boats.

f. Medical service.

(1) The Army evacuates to the shore line; the Navy is responsible from the shore line to the shore line at the base port, where the Army again becomes responsible.

(2) Attached medical troops will accompany combat units, taking with them the necessary supplies to meet initial requirements. Such mobile medical installations as are established at the beachhead do not carry out definitive treatment. This will be carried out on shore after fixed hospital units have been landed and established. As soon as sufficient terrain has been secured to afford protection, additional medical facilities, such as collecting stations, ambulances, hospital stations, and evacuation hospitals, in the order named, will be landed. Until a systematic service is provided, such evacuation as is practicable will be handled by the beachmaster from shore to ship in such manner as will not interfere with landing of essential troops and supplies. Systematic evacuation of all cases to hospital ships or transports will be established as early as practicable. A plan of evacuation will be prepared prior to debarkation of the expeditionary forces.

g. Marking routes inland.—It is highly important that all Army units thoroughly understand and have identified routes inland. Each unit will mark promptly and plainly its routes inland, together with location of message and information centers. This marking will be displayed so as to be visible from seaward only.

102. *Subsidiary landings.*

a. In addition to the main landing, certain subsidiary landings may be advantageous, namely, those pertaining to demonstrations or feints, and those which may be termed secondary landings.

b. Demonstrations or feints have as their missions the diversion of enemy reserves from the area of the main effort, or the retarding of the movement of enemy reserves thereto. To be effective they must be directed against objectives of importance to the enemy. They also should be so coordinated as to time and directed against points at such a distance from the area of the main landing that they will insure, to a reasonable degree, the containing of the forces

[111] 107. *Naval support.*

a. The operations of the Navy forces during a withdrawal of the Army forces from the shore are similar to those during a landing operation, the phases occurring in reverse order.

b. In addition to providing the sea transportation and the small boats to reembark the Army forces, including crews to man the boats, the Navy will be prepared to furnish gunfire and air support during the withdrawal. The Navy will, as in the case of the initial stages of the landing operation, provide for signal communications between ship and shore until the last unit is evacuated.

Section VIII

Communications

108. *Plans.*

a. In accordance with paragraph 54a (8), provision must be made for communications between forces. While the particular situation and the designated directive will greatly influence the preparation of specific instructions, the following general directive should apply to all such plans, in order that advance preparations, including training, may be accomplished and any obstacles to the successful culmination of the plans may be avoided.

b. The joint communication plan and the communication plans of subordinate commanders of both the Army and the Navy shall cover the following phases:

- (1) Movement overseas.
- (2) Landing.
- (3) Operations subsequent to landing.

c. All communication plans shall include:

- (1) Frequency plans.
- (2) Provisions for communication security.
- (3) Provisions for radio intelligence.
- (4) Designation of procedure to be followed.
- (5) Requirements that portable radio sets and other communication material

be tested prior to embarkation.

[112] 109. *Communications between ship and shore.*—Efficient signal communications between ship and shore are of primary importance. It is the duty of the Navy to establish and maintain, through the beachmaster, necessary signal communications facilities for both Navy and Army requirements. The Army communication net ashore will be connected up with the Navy's communication center at the beachmaster's headquarters. The Army prolongs its axis of signal communications inland as the attack progresses. In this connection see paragraph 94c.

110. *General.*—In drawing up communication plans reference should be made to paragraphs 63b; 77b; 82a 93a; 94c; 98c; 101a, b, c, d, and g; 104; 107b; 108; and 109.

[129]

CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in paragraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The [139] board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O.

[133] defense are required to be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

Section V

Joint Merchant Vessel Board

136. The Joint Army and Navy Board of Survey of Merchant Vessels was established August 21, 1916, as the result of an agreement entered into by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy approved the final form of the agreement on August 2, 1916, and the Secretary of War on August 19, 1916. In order to simplify the name of the board it was changed to "The Joint Merchant Vessel Board." This change in name was approved by the Secretary of War April 30, 1917, and by the Secretary of the Navy May 5, 1917. The board consists of one Army officer and three Navy officers as members, with one of the latter acting as recorder.

137. The board inspects and classifies merchant vessels with a view to their possible use in war. The board is assisted by local sections consisting of Army and Navy officers who conduct the actual inspection.

Section VI

Local Joint Planning Committees

138. The authority for agencies for cooperation between Army and Navy activities within departments, armies, and corps areas of the Army and naval districts is War Department G. O. No. 19, 1923, and Navy Department G. O. No. 103, 1923. Commanding generals of departments, armies, and/or corps areas, and commandants of naval districts whose headquarters are in the same vicinity, appoint from among their immediately available officer personnel not more than three officers from each service to constitute a permanent local joint planning committee. In cases where superior headquarters for a given department, army, corps area, or district are widely separated, more than one planning committee may be organized. In addition, the commanding general and the commandant of the naval district [134] designate one or more officers on their staffs through whom close contact with other services is maintained.

139. The local joint planning committee takes cognizance of questions referred to it by proper authority and originates questions on such local subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. Its reports and recommendations are made jointly to the commanding general and commandant of the naval district concerned.

Section VII

Joint Economy Board

140. The authority for the Joint Economy Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 11, 1933, and Navy Department G. O. No. 237, 1933. The board is charged with the continuing responsibility of investigating and reporting to The Joint Board on economies which can be effected, from time to time, without loss of efficiency, by the elimination of overlap or the simplification of functioning in those activities of the War and Navy Departments concerned with joint operations of the two services or which have approximately parallel functions.

141. The membership of the Joint Economy Board will comprise five or more officers from each service and will include the following:

a. For the Army.—The Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch and four other officers of the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department.

b. For the Navy.—The Assistant Budget Officer, Navy Department; the Director, Central Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; the Director, Material Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; an officer from the Shore Establishments Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and an officer from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (not below the rank of commander).

142. The Secretary of the Joint Economy Board will be detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

143. Reports and recommendations of the Joint Economy Board will be presented to The Joint Board for action.

[137]

CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section A

Policy for Coordination of Radio Activities of the Army and Navy

1. Joint Board reports, J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 183), of January 16, 1923, "Utilization of the radio services of the War and Navy Departments for the transmission of Government dispatches," and J. B. No. 319 (Serial No. 253), "Proposed draft of Executive Orders re regulation of radio in the event of war or national emergency," are rescinded. The following policy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is published for information and guidance:

I. Purpose of Radio Policy.

2. The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and Navy in the development of radio material, the establishment of radio stations, and in the conduct of radio activities.

II. Basic Policy.

3. The Army and Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations as, augmented by private and [138] other Government-owned radio facilities, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of a militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated radio system adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation on expenditure imposed by economy.

III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

¹ NOTE.—Ch. IX—Communications—is a reprint of ch. VI—Communications, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1927, and is effective until completion of revision now in progress. Paragraph numbering of old ch. VI is retained pending revision.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

(a) To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

(b) To the Army in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Army wherever operating.

[*Id.*] C.J.A.3.

CHANGE NO. 3, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 319-1 (Serial 653).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, June 28, 1940.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages.

Page Nos.	Subject matter
Id-Ic.....	Promulgation of Change No. 3.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated.

Old page Nos.	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa	C. J. A. 3—List of effective pages (revised June 28, 1940) Chapter IX, revised, with diagrams Nos. I and II.
137-164.....	

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
United States Army, Secretary.

1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[II] JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

[Revised June 28, 1940]

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only)	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936	1***	1-1a
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938	2	1b-1c
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940	3	1d-1e
List of effective pages	3	1i-1ia
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935	Original	11i-1v**
Contents	2	v-vi
Contents, Part I	2	vii
Contents, Part I, continued	Original	viii
Chapter I	"	1-2
Chapter I, continued	1	3-4**
Chapter II	2	5-6
Chapter III	2	11
Chapter III, continued	Original	12 to 16**
Chapter IV	"	17
Chapter IV, continued	2	18
Chapter IV, continued	Original	19-20**
Contents, Part II	"	21-22**
Contents, Chapter V	"	23-26
Chapter V	2	27
Chapter V, continued	Original	28 to 41
Chapter V, continued	2	42 to 44
Chapter V, continued	Original	45 to 47
Chapter V, continued	2	48
Chapter V, continued	Original	49 to 64
Chapter V, continued	2	65-66
Chapter V, continued	Original	67
Chapter V, continued	2	68
Contents, Chapter VI	2	69
Contents, Chapter VI, continued	Original	70 to 72
Chapter VI	"	73 to 76
Chapter VI, continued	2	77 to 80
Chapter VI, continued	Original	81-82
Chapter VI, continued	2	83-84

*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[IIa]

C.J.A.3

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Chapter VI, continued	Original	85-86
Chapter VI, continued	2	87
Chapter VI, continued	Original	88 to 90
Chapter VI, continued	2	91
Chapter VI, continued	Original	92 to 97
Chapter VI, continued	2	98
Chapter VI, continued	Original	99-100
Chapter VI, continued	2	101
Chapter VI, continued	Original	102
Chapter VI, continued	2	103-104
Chapter VI, continued	Original	105
Chapter VI, continued	2	106-107
Chapter VI, continued	Original	108 to 110
Chapter VI, continued	2	111
Chapter VI, continued	Original	112
Contents, Chapter VII	"	113-114**
Chapter VII	"	115 to 126**
Contents, Chapter VIII	"	127-128**
Chapter VIII	2	129-130
Chapter VIII, continued	1	131-132
Chapter VIII, continued	Original	133
Chapter VIII, continued	2	134
Chapter VIII, continued	Original	135-136**
Chapter IX	3	137-164
Chart of Organization for Coastal Frontier Defense	Original	No number
Diagram No. I, Coastal Frontier. Joint Radio and Wire Communication	3	No number
Diagram No. II, Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase. Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach	3	No number

**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128 and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[137]

CHAPTER IX¹

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

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[138] III. Primary Responsibility of the Army and the Navy in Radio Activities.

4. (a) The assignment of *primary responsibility* to the Army or to the Navy for radio activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficiency of radio serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use radio to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious radio interference is caused thereby.

(b) In war time unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy, in accordance with the approved War Plans, and radio activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

(c) In order to avoid uneconomical duplication in time of peace:

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts in the antenna or greater).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communications commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska, nor operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits.

IV. Assignment of Primary Responsibility.

5. Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

(a) To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

(b) To the Army in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Army wherever operating.

(c) To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever

¹ Ch. IX—Revised and republished June 28, 1940. Section I of the revised Chapter IX is a republication of old Section A, with a redesignation of the section. Paragraph numbering of old Section A, 1 to 9, is retained pending revision and republication of Section I. Section II is new matter replacing old Section B the contents of which is withdrawn from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and issued as a separate document under a "restricted" classification. Paragraphing in Section II begins with 156.

located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea, exclusive of Army vessels, except such of the latter as may have been placed under Navy control in case of war or national emergency.

[139] (4) For the establishment and operation of radio-compass stations along the coasts of the United States, Alaska, overseas possessions, or occupied foreign territory.

(d) To the Navy in radio intelligence—

(1) For the Navy wherever operating.

V. *War-time Jurisdiction over Nonmilitary Radio.*

6. In time of national emergency, when directed by the President according to law, the Army and the Navy will assume jurisdiction as follows:

(a) The Army and Navy shall each assume complete control over such nonmilitary radio stations as may be allocated to them by the President to augment their peace-time facilities.

(b) For purposes of censorship and supervision over such nonmilitary radio stations as are permitted to operate:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to the Navy in the following paragraph:

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

(c) For the purpose of suppression of unauthorized radio:

(1) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama, and in insular possessions or foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(2) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions or foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

VI. *Principles to be Observed in Radio Coordination.*

7. Coordination in radio operation will be effected:

(a) In the development of types of radio equipment suitable for intercommunication.

(b) By the assignment of call letters, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption of a common procedure, and the formulation of codes and ciphers for joint Army and Navy communication.

(c) All air radio stations of the Navy and air radio stations of the Army along the coast and in the insular and outlying possessions shall be equipped to send and receive on a common intermediate frequency and a common high frequency, and all aircraft carrying radio, except fighting and pursuit planes, shall as soon as practicable, [140] consistent with proper economy, be equipped to send and receive on one of these common frequencies.

(d) The radio field sets provided for the use of the Marine Corps on shore shall be capable of intercommunication with the radio provided for the operation of similarly equipped units of the Army.

(e) The radio communication equipment provided for the vessels of the Army Transport Service shall be of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class and shall be capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication.

VII. *Coordination with Radio Stations of Other Departments and Civilian Stations During Peace.*

8. Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the radio act of 1927 (secs. 6, 8, and 25).

VIII. *Coordination of Development Programs.*

9. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peace-time radio operation and operational

development of the two services. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendation for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy and will coordinate technical radio matters of joint concern to the two services.

Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 24, 1927.

[141]

Section II

Doctrines and Guides Governing Communication (Signal) Effectiveness in Joint Operations of the Army and the Navy

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Subsection I—General

156. Effective signal communication in joint operations of the Army and Navy requires—

a. The interconnection of the appropriate elements of the Army and the Navy by the appropriate means of signal communication.

b. Joint communication (signal) training.

c. The preparation and proper distribution of important items of information and instructions governing signal communication.

d. Appropriate provisions for communication security.

e. Adequate provision for cryptographing.

157. The information presented hereinafter should serve as a guide, to indicate—

a. The elements that are to be interconnected during joint operations.

[142] b. The distribution that should normally be given important items of information and instructions governing signal communication.

c. The cryptographic systems to be employed in joint operations.

d. The essentials of a Joint Communication (Signal) Plan.

158. *Miscellaneous considerations.*—Details for communication between the Army and the Navy shall be made by the senior officers of the two services in the area concerned. The following items are here presented for the guidance of all concerned:

a. *Liaison officers.*—The importance of detailing qualified liaison officers for joint operations is indicated in chapter V, section V, paragraph 42i(15) and in chapter VI, section II, paragraph 51.

b. *Means and methods of communication.*—All suitable means of communication are to be considered available for joint use. When a choice is available, the most reliable means should be selected, with due consideration for speed and security. Attention is particularly invited to the advantages of effecting simultaneous delivery of messages to numerous addressees by radio broadcasting (F-method) without obtaining a receipt, or by teletype in case addressees are all on a teletype net. Scheduled F-method radio transmissions should usually be on an especially prescribed frequency and should be regularly copied by most addressees. Such transmissions should be relayed to those addressees who either are not able to copy, or are not required to copy them. However, F-method

transmissions may be made at any time on the same frequency as that usually employed for the 2-way R-method (i. e., in which receipts are obtained for each message transmitted).

c. Precedence.—In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, messages of the same precedence, whether originating in the Army or the Navy, will be handled in the order of filing for transmission, or of receipt for relaying. Messages are divided into precedence groups to show the relative order in which they shall be transmitted and acted upon. This order is as follows:

(1) The URGENT designation is reserved for messages requiring the greatest speed of handling. Any message designated as URGENT will be sent immediately upon receipt, except when communication involving another URGENT message is being carried on. URGENT precedence is reserved for use during combat, or when combat is imminent, real or simulated, to indicate that the message so designated conveys the most important orders, information or request pertaining to the combat, [143] and thus requires immediate attention. A primary example of this type of message is a so-called Army "flash" message which is employed to report air observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of air forces. For joint communication purposes, an Army "flash" message may be considered to be an urgent message of the highest priority. A primary example of a Navy message of the highest priority is a major contact report.

(2) The PRIORITY designation is reserved for messages of less urgency than those entitled to URGENT precedence, but of such nature as to warrant precedence ahead of messages designated as ROUTINE or DEFERRED. Any message designated as PRIORITY will be transmitted before any routine or deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* routine or deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a PRIORITY message.

(3) The ROUTINE designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic most expeditiously. Any message designated as ROUTINE usually will be transmitted before any deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a ROUTINE message.

(4) The DEFERRED designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence, and whose delivery to the addressee may be delayed until the beginning of office hours following the day on which they are filed. This will sometimes necessitate transmission of Deferred messages ahead of Routine messages, in order to effect delivery before the time indicated.

d. Address and signature.—While all official messages will be sent by authority of the commanding officer, no signature will ordinarily be transmitted. Messages intended for an addressee on board a ship or airplane, or within a command on shore, will be routed by use of the appropriate call sign of the ship, airplane, or shore command. Delivery to any specific addressee within the ship, airplane or shore command is a function of the command to which delivered. [144] If call signs are assigned for joint use to particular commanders, as well as to particular ships, airplanes and shore commands, such commander call signs may also be employed to indicate routing, addressees and originators.

e. Use of clear or cryptographic language.—The general rules governing the use of clear and cryptographic language are set forth in subsection IV of this chapter, wherein communication security is discussed.

f. Operating instructions and procedure.—Operating instructions are special instructions for transmitting, receiving, and when required, for relaying messages. These instructions are set forth in a separate restricted pamphlet entitled, "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure."

g. Time.

(1) The time of origin is the time at which the message is released or authenticated by the originator. If this time does not appear on the message, it will be the time when the message is filed for transmission.

(2) The time of origin in joint communications is expressed in the 24-hour clock system and transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour.

Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 0600 and 7:43 P. M. is 1943.

(3) For communication within the Army, the 12-hour clock system is used.

Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 600 A, and 7:43 P. M. is 743 P.

h. Dates.

(1) The date is expressed for joint communication purposes by two figures preceding the time of origin, indicating the day of the month. If the date number is less than ten, it is always preceded by zero. For example, the first day of the month is 01, and the tenth day is 10. "071626" means date was 7th day of month, and time of origin was 1626.

(2) The month and year may be added to the date and time of origin group when necessary for reference purposes in the text of messages. For example: "Your 071626 DEC 1938" means "Referring to your message, with time of origin 1626 on the 7th day of December 1938 * * *".

[145] (3) In the text of messages, if times indicated are not given particular descriptions, the time prescribed for use by the originator shall be understood.

i. Addressees.—In drafting messages, the various classes of addressees may be indicated:

- (1) Action addressees.
- (2) Information addressees.
- (3) Both action and information addressees.

Subsection II—Coastal Frontier Defense

159. *Joint channels and means of intercommunication* (See ch. V, Sec. III, Par. 32*h* (3) and Diagram I.)—The radio, visual, and wire communication which may be required between the two services in joint coastal frontier defense operations are indicated below. Certain Army-to-Army communication circuits and certain Navy-to-Navy communication circuits are also included where considered desirable to indicate the more important of such circuits. No attempt has been made herein to prescribe the number of separate circuits to be provided between stations. The number and the type of circuits should be determined in each case by the nature and amount of the traffic to be transmitted and by geographical considerations. If practicable, separate wire circuits should be provided for command, intelligence, and administration.

a. Coastal frontier headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Various naval district headquarters within the coastal frontier.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Various naval district headquarters within the coastal frontier.

b. Corps area headquarters.

- (1) Wire to: Nearest naval district headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters.

c. Sector headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Nearest naval district headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters.

d. Subsector headquarters (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Nearest naval district headquarters from those subsector headquarters that are identical with defensive coastal area headquarters and harbor defense headquarters and forts.

[146] (3) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol. This communication will necessarily be on the frequency assigned for communication between ships and inshore patrol headquarters. Subsector headquarters normally only intercepts radio messages from the inshore patrol to inshore patrol headquarters, but may transmit also, when necessary.

- (4) Wire through: Sector headquarters to nearest naval district headquarters—for receiving information from the offshore patrol.

e. Harbor Defense Headquarters.

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol headquarters from harbor defense headquarters that are located at forts.

f. Forts (Army).

- (1) Wire to: Inshore patrol headquarters through subsector headquarters.
- (2) Radio (2)* to: Inshore patrol headquarters.

g. Army aviation headquarters.

- (1) Radio (1)* to: Navy airplanes, when required.
- (2) Wire to: Navy air station (if in coastal frontier).
- (3) Radio (2)* to: Navy air stations.

(1) *See par. 160—Aircraft communication principles.

(2) *Indicates radio two ways—for transmitting and receiving, to be placed in operation if wire is not available, or fails for any reason.

h. Army reconnaissance airplanes (1) (5)**

(1) Radio to: (a) Navy airplanes (in emergencies and/or when jointly engaged in a mission).

(b) Navy air station (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

(c) Inshore patrol (via inshore patrol headquarters when engaged in joint missions with the inshore patrol).

(d) Offshore patrol ships (in emergencies and when Army airplanes are assigned offshore patrol missions).

[147] (2) Visual to: Inshore and offshore patrols.

i. Army and Navy airplanes (combat) (1) (When present in coastal frontier defense).*

(1) Radio (4)* to: (a) (For air command purposes) between squadron, group, and higher commanders of Army and Navy joint task force elements.

(b) (For air and air-ground liaison purposes) between reconnaissance and scouting airplanes, and the commander of the joint task force. Also, between squadron, group, and higher commanders of Army and Navy joint task force elements. Between reconnaissance aviation or bombardment aviation and the following:

1. To elements of the fleet at sea (if present).

2. To the joint task force headquarters—air (Army or Navy). Also, between pursuit, fighter, and bombardment aviation and Navy air station and/or Army aviation headquarters from which operating as well as with the headquarters of antiaircraft regiments and antiaircraft gun battalions (for recognition purposes).

j. Navy airplanes (1) (5)*.*

(1) Radio to: (a) Army airplanes (in emergencies and/or when jointly engaged in a mission).

(b) Army aviation headquarters (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

[148] (2) Visual to: Land antiaircraft defenses

k. Navy air station (If present in coastal frontier).

(1) Radio (1)* (5)* to: Army airplanes (in emergencies and/or when operating therefrom).

(2) Wire to: Army aviation headquarters.

(3) Radio (2)* to: Army aviation headquarters.

l. Offshore patrol ships (Navy).

(1) Radio (1)* (5)* to: Army airplanes (in emergencies and when Army airplanes are assigned offshore patrol missions).

m. Inshore patrol ships (Navy).

(1) Radio (1)* to: (a) Army airplanes, via inshore patrol headquarters when engaged in joint missions with inshore patrol.

(b) Forts.

(c) Subsector headquarters (when identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters).

(2) Visual to: Batteries, forts.

(3) Visual to: Those subsector headquarters which are identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters.

(4) Visual to: Outpost forces (if present).

n. Inshore patrol headquarters.

(1) Wire to: Subsector headquarters.

(2) Wire to: Harbor defense headquarters.

(3) Radio (2)* to: (a) Subsector headquarters (if identical with defensive coastal area and harbor defense headquarters).

(b) Harbor defense headquarters when located at forts having radio facilities.

[149] o. Naval district headquarters (3).*

(1) Wire to: Nearest corps area headquarters.

(2) Wire to: Nearest subsector headquarters.

(3) Wire to: Coastal frontier headquarters.

(4) Wire to: Nearest sector headquarters.

(5) Radio (2)* to: Coastal frontier headquarters.

(6) Radio (2)* to: Nearest corps area headquarters.

(1)*See par. 160—Aircraft communication principles.

(2)*Indicates radio two ways—for transmitting and receiving, to be placed in operation if wire is not available, or fails for any reason.

(3)*In certain areas it may be practicable and desirable for communication purposes to have various shore headquarters located in the same building, or sufficiently close to facilitate intercommunication and cooperation.

(4)*Not shown on diagram I, being too variable.

(5)*Circuits for use in emergencies are not shown on diagram I.

(7) Radio (2)* to: Nearest subsector and sector headquarters.

(8) Wire to: Information Center, Aircraft Warning Service.

p. Coastal force.

(1) Radio to: (a) Naval district headquarters.

(b) Commander offshore patrol.

q. Escort force.

(1) Radio to: (a) Naval district headquarters.

(b) Commander offshore patrol.

(2) Visual to: Army and Navy units as necessary.

160. *Aircraft communication principles.*—The following principles governing aircraft communication should usually be observed in joint coastal frontier defense:

a. When Army or Navy airplanes are used jointly as a part of a task force organization, the frequencies for communication would be as prescribed by the Army or Navy commander of the task force.

b. When not otherwise specifically provided, Army airplanes will work with Army ground stations and Navy airplanes will work with Navy stations afloat or ashore.

c. In emergencies, if the Army wishes to communicate directly with a Navy airplane, the Army will utilize a frequency which is known to be guarded by that Navy airplane. Similarly, when the Navy wishes to communicate directly with an Army airplane, the Navy will utilize a frequency which is known to be guarded by that Army airplane.

d. Airplanes will not be required to shift frequency for joint communication purposes while in the air. Any airplane which is able to communicate on more than one frequency at a time may do so when required.

[150] *e.* It is expected that those various commands of the Army and Navy, which may have need of information to be transmitted by particular aircraft of either service, will, whenever practicable, arrange to receive such information direct, by having receiver (intercept) watches set on the aircraft frequencies involved.

f. Normally, all joint radio communication, except for command purposes between airplanes in flight, should be by radiotelegraph.

161. *Aircraft warning service.*—The various elements of the Army and the Navy involved in joint operations must be interlinked with an Aircraft Warning Service Information Center in a communication net that will insure the prompt receipt and distribution of warnings of the approach of enemy aircraft. While the elements included in this net will vary according to conditions, the information center should usually be connected with the following for the purpose indicated:

The reception of warnings from—

Civilian reporting stations.

Army elements:

Ground reporting stations.

Aviation elements engaged in missions which would enable them to advise of approach of hostile aircraft.*

All Army elements in a position to report the approach of hostile craft.

Naval elements:

Escort Force.*

Coastal Force.*

Offshore patrol:

Airplanes*

Ships*

Inshore patrol:

Airplanes*

Ships*

Naval direction finder stations.*

Coast Guard stations:

Lighthouses.

[151] The distribution of warnings to—

Army aviation headquarters for the warning of: †

Army aviation bases.

†These elements are connected by wire with the Information Center. Aircraft warnings may be distributed by radio broadcast.

*Information Center radio receivers will intercept for this purpose the normal frequencies which these elements are using.

- Army aviation elements.
- Army aviation fields.
- Air defense headquarters.† (When present in coastal frontier.)
- Antiaircraft artillery headquarters.† (When an air defense headquarters is not located in the coastal frontier or when so located, it does not control all antiaircraft artillery defense elements in the coastal frontier.)
- Coastal frontier and/or Army or corps area headquarters (for the warning of civilian population and Army ground elements and establishments).†
- Naval aviation headquarters (for the warning of naval aviation units).†
- Naval district headquarters for warning of:†
 - Navy bases—air, ship, and submarine.
 - Navy yards and other Navy shore establishments.
 - Escort force.
 - Coastal force.
 - Offshore patrol.
 - Inshore patrol.
 - All units of fleet present.

162. *Preparation and distribution of communication (signal) plans and instructions* (See ch. VI, sec VI, par. 77 and sec. VIII, par. 108a).—It will be necessary for each service to have certain items of information and publications pertaining to the other service. The items of information as well as the distribution should be prepared to suit each operation. The importance of early preparation and distribution of these plans and instructions should be impressed upon all concerned. For illustrative "Joint Communication (Signal) Plan," see paragraph 173.

Subsection III—Joint Overseas Expeditions

163. The specific circuits for the movement overseas of a joint overseas expedition are not herein presented diagrammatically, as in the case of joint communication for coastal frontier defense, since each joint overseas expedition presents a varied set of forces and conditions. However, the following discussion is intended to cover all major items concerning communication for any joint overseas ex- [152] pedition, and to serve as a guide therefor. Diagram II should be considered merely as a guide to indicate the joint circuits which *may* be employed during the landing phase of an oversea expedition. The circuits and the number and type thereof should be determined in each case by the nature and amount of traffic to be transmitted and by geographical considerations.

164. *General* (See ch. VI, sec. III, par. 54.).—Many of the measures necessary to insure effective communication (signal) in joint overseas expeditions must usually be completed prior to, and during, the embarkation phase. *Prior* to this phase, the following measures should be undertaken: (1) the design and production of the appropriate equipment and publications which will be required for communication (signal) between the Army and the Navy, and (2) the training of communication officers and enlisted men of both services that will participate in the joint overseas operations in the use of prescribed joint communication procedure and methods. *During* the embarkation phase, the necessary communication (signal) plans and instructions should be prepared, distributed, and studied, and the particular training required for communication and for security should be undertaken.

165. *General principles*.—The following general principles which concern communication have been established:

a. During the movement overseas, the Army and Navy commanders of a joint overseas expedition, with their respective staffs, should be embarked on the same ship, as should the commanders of a joint attack force, and, where practicable, the method should be extended throughout all echelons of command. Each transport should have a communication center operated by Navy personnel. The complement of this center will be augmented by the addition of Army personnel who will remain on duty therewith until their services are no longer required for the routing of messages pertaining to the Army. The communication (signal) officers should be informed of—

(1) The particular ships in which the commanders of their next subordinate and next superior units are embarked.

(2) The naval communication arrangements for handling communications

†These elements are connected by wire with the Information Center. Aircraft warnings may be distributed by radio broadcast.

between the ships, mentioned in (1) above, to the end that they may arrange for the transmission of orders and information under the circumstances.

b. (See ch. VI, sec. II, par. 50-52.) The liaison officers exchanged between the commands of the Army and the Navy should have copies of the cryptographic systems of their own service for handling messages applying particularly to that service. These liaison officers may have messages transmitted in these systems, regardless of the service [153] operating the agencies of communication (signal), provided the restrictions on communication (signal) then in effect, are not violated.

c. *Landing phase* (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 82, and sec. VIII, par. 109.)—The Navy, during the landing phase will—

(1) Have responsibility for shore-ship communication, and communication with Navy boats used for landings.

(2) Have the beachmaster establish a communication center at each landing place to handle communication between ship and shore. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 101a.)

(3) Provide a naval liaison detachment to accompany each combat team to provide the radio and visual communication and operation facilities necessary for effective naval gunfire support of the combat team. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 93a, 94b and c.) (See also par. 163b.)

d. As soon as possible, the Army will establish all of its own signal communication for combat, and, in addition, provide wire communication and messenger service from the command post of each Army combat team to the commander of the naval liaison detachment assigned to accompany that particular unit.

e. The Army shore party commander will establish a message center at each landing place and will connect by wire and messenger service with the Navy beachmaster's communication center at that landing place. (See ch. VI, sec. VI, par. 101a, c, and d, and sec. VIII, par. 109.)

166. *Aircraft communication principles and aircraft warning service.*—So far as they are applicable to communication in a joint overseas expedition, the principles set forth in paragraphs 160 and 161, in connection with joint coastal frontier defense, should usually be observed.

167. *Joint communication (signal) training.*—The various elements of the Army and the Navy to be jointly trained are indicated below. In particular, training during the embarkation phase should include communication between the elements which will have to communicate during the landing phase, the familiarization by all concerned with the cryptographic systems prescribed for all phases.

a. *Army and Navy aviation elements.*

(1) *Navy observation airplanes.*—Even though Army observers may be provided in Navy observation airplanes, it is essential that Navy personnel therein be trained as indicated below, since in the early phases of the landing they will usually be required to undertake liaison, reconnaissance, and Army artillery adjustment missions.

[154] (a) In communication with the ground units to be supported during the landing.

(b) In recognition of Army panel and pyrotechnic signals used in lieu of radio.

(c) In picking up messages from and dropping messages to ground troops.

In addition, such Navy personnel should be cognizant of so much of the communication plans and instructions issued to ground troops as may be necessary for effective operations.

(2) *Navy reconnaissance and spotting airplanes.*—The Navy personnel engaged in air reconnaissance and air spotting of Navy gunfire in support of landing operations should be trained in the pyrotechnic and panel signals displayed by ground troops, particularly those used to indicate:

Location of front lines.

Gunfire is falling short.

Lift gunfire to next objective.

Put down gunfire on a particular objective.

(3) *Navy observation airplanes with Army observers.*—Army observers who may be assigned to Navy observation airplanes during the early phases of a landing on missions involving liaison, reconnaissance, and Army artillery adjustment should be trained in the use of the Navy radio equipment and in Navy spotting procedure.

(4) *Combat aircraft task forces.*—It is especially important that the combat elements of the aviation task forces of both services be jointly trained in communication (signal) methods and procedure to the end that the highest degree of effectiveness may be attained in the operations of such joint task forces as will be required to support the landing operations.

b. Other elements of both services.

(1) *Army ground elements.*—All Army ground elements should be trained to distinguish friendly Naval aircraft from hostile aircraft. In addition, the personnel of those Army radio stations that will be required to communicate with Navy air planes engaged in reconnaissance, liaison, and Army artillery adjustment missions should receive training in communicating with the Navy aviation personnel that will be assigned to cooperate with them in the actual landing. Elements of the anti-aircraft defense forces should be informed of the recognition signals (visual or radio) that will be employed by Navy aircraft operating in support of the landing.

[155] (2) *Naval liaison and communication detachments.*—Naval liaison officers and Naval communication (signal) detachments assigned to accompany the Army assault elements (in order to handle the observation and communication (signal) required to bring about effective Naval gunfire support of the Army assault units) should be trained in the use of—

(a) The mobile field radio equipment required.

(b) The Army visual (including pyrotechnic) signals, particularly those used to indicate—

Landing successful.

Landing not successful.

Reached objectives.

Location of front lines.

Gunfire is falling short; and lift gunfire to next objective.

Put down gunfire on a particular objective.

This liaison and communication personnel through rehearsals in the embarkation phases should be familiarized with the operations of ground troops and the other means of communication that are available in case it is necessary to use the Army Communication (signal) system to get Naval messages back to the commander of the Naval fire support group via the Naval beachmaster (see par. 168b). •

(3) *Liaison officers.*—Liaison officers who are exchanged between the higher elements of command of the two services should be thoroughly familiar with—

(a) Provisions governing responsibility for communications during the various phases of a joint overseas expedition.

(b) Actual command "set-up" of the communication systems.

(c) Rules of both services governing communication security.

(4) *Communication officers.*—All communication officers should be made cognizant of the following, during the embarkation phase:

(a) The three items listed in (3) above under liaison officers.

(b) The communication channel requirements, cryptographic systems and frequency plans for all phases. (See ch. VI, sec. VII, pars. 104 and 107.)

[156] 168. *Special equipment.*—The special communication (signal) equipment that should be provided and with which the personnel concerned should be thoroughly familiarized prior to and during the embarkation phase consists in general of the following items (i. e., when normal equipment of the particular element will not meet the needs of the situation):

a. Radio sets that will permit of intercommunication between the airplanes of such joint task forces as may be established.

b. Radio sets for such Navy liaison detachments as are to accompany the Army combat teams. These sets should be of appropriate size and weight to permit ready transportation to all locations where an infantry battalion command post may be established, and should permit direct communication between the Navy liaison detachment commander and the commander (and ships) of the Navy fire support group which is supporting the operations of the particular Army combat team. As it is probable that radio equipment now available for this purpose may not be effective under all conditions to be encountered, substitute means for this communication should be provided—such as aircraft radio or Army wire back to the beachmaster and thence by radio to ships concerned.

c. Cryptographic systems for joint communications during all phases of the operation, including sufficient Army fire-control and airground liaison codes

to supply copies to all Navy observation airplanes assigned to Army reconnaissance, liaison, and artillery adjustment missions.

d. Radio sets for the beachmaster, for the small boats, used in the landing, and possibly for transports of such characteristics as to permit direct communication between units linked, as shown in Diagram II.

e. Pyrotechnics for use in the landing boats and on the beach.

When Navy airplanes are assigned to Army reconnaissance, liaison, and artillery adjustment missions, arrangements shall be made, if practicable, to permit communication between the Army ground stations and Navy airplanes.

Subsection IV—Communication Security

169. *General*—a. Classified communication between the Army and the Navy will be divided into the following security classes:

(1) *Secret*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked secret when disclosure of the information contained therein might endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation.

[157] (2) *Confidential*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked confidential when disclosure of the information contained therein, although not endangering the national security, might be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, a governmental activity, or an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation.

(3) *Restricted*.—Messages and written communications will be classified and marked restricted when information contained therein is for official use only, or when its disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy or denied the general public.

Secret, confidential, and restricted messages and written communications, plus the information contained therein, will be handled and safeguarded in a manner appropriate to their classification, as defined above, and in accordance with the instructions of the service(s) concerned.

b. The following doctrines will govern in the classification of messages and the use of the various cryptographic systems:

(1) *Reliability, security, and speed*.—Reliability is paramount and shall never be sacrificed for security or speed.

(2) *Use of clear and cryptographic language*.

(a) In time of war or emergency, all messages to be transmitted by radio, or by other means when danger of hostile or unauthorized interception exists, are to be cryptographed except in the following cases: when the tactical situation is such that time cannot be spared for cryptographing or the information to be transmitted if intercepted by the enemy could not be acted upon in time to influence the situation in question, a commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language. Such messages will be marked "Send in clear", over the signature of the commander or his authorized representative.

(b) So far as practicable, during joint exercises and joint communication training exercises, each message will be given the same classification and handling as would be given to the same subject matter in war.

(3) *Mutual observance of classifications*.—The classification of a message with respect to security may be changed only by the originator of the message or by superior authority.

[158] (4) *Rules governing communication security*.

(a) The communications of one service must not be permitted to compromise the operations of the other service.

(b) Radiotelegraph is the preferred method of joint Army-Navy radio communication.

(c) The rules governing cryptographic security in the Army and the Navy are based on the same doctrines and are, in general, similar. Compliance with the rules of either service should insure the necessary cryptographic security.

c. Classified communication between Army and Navy commands or units resolves itself into the following categories or echelons as regards distribution of cryptographic systems:

Category A—Cryptographic systems used in communication between special high commands of the Army and Navy.

Category B—Cryptographic systems used in communication between all high commands of the Army and Navy.

Category C—Cryptographic systems used in communication between intermediate commands of the Army and Navy.

Category D—Cryptographic systems used in communication between smaller units of the Army and Navy.

d. The foregoing categories should, in general, be followed, but may be varied, if necessary, at the discretion of the senior commander of either service in each theatre of operation. The senior commander of the other service shall be immediately notified.

e. The cryptographic systems prescribed for the various categories will be used as circumstances require. For this reason, all commands will be supplied with the cryptographic systems prescribed for lower categories.

f. The cryptographic systems authorized for safeguarding classified communication for each category are prescribed in the documents mentioned in paragraph 171a.

g. Only the prescribed cryptographic system shall be used for classified communication between the Army and the Navy.

h. Classified communication between Army and Navy units of categories A and B will be facilitated by an exchange of liaison and communication (signal) officers between the Army and the Navy elements involved.

[159] 170. *Grouping of Army and Navy units into categories for classified communications.*—The categories authorized for classified communication, and the Army and the Navy units grouped therein, are as stated below:

a. Category A.

Army:

War Department.

Commanders, theatres of operations.

Commanders, field armies.

Any other commanders designated by the War Department.*

Navy:

Navy Department.

Commanders-in-Chief, United States Navy.

Any other commanders designated by the Navy Department.*

b. Category B.

Army:

All commanders listed under category A above.

Coastal frontier commanders.

Commanders, expeditionary task forces.*

Commanders, Hawaiian, Philippine, Panama Canal, and Puerto Rican Departments.

Commander, troops in Alaska.

Commanders, all corps areas.

Commanders, GHQ Air Force and wings.

Commanders, Air Corps wings in oversea departments.

Commanders of major air fields likely to be engaged in joint operations.*

Navy:

All commanders listed under category A above.

Force commanders, United States Fleet.

Type commanders, United States Fleet.

Commanding general, Fleet Marine Force.

Commanders, major detached task forces, United States Fleet.*

Commander, attack force.

Commander, transport group.

Commanders, detached squadrons.*

Commanders, destroyer flotillas.

Commanders, patrol wings.

Commandants, all naval districts.

Commanders, major naval air stations.*

[160] *c. Category C.*

Army:

All commanders listed under categories A and B above.

Commanders, coast artillery districts.

Commanders, sectors (coastal frontier).

Commanders, subsectors (coastal frontier).

*The other Department will be informed of the commanders designated under this provision in order that all concerned may be notified.

Commanders, harbor defenses.
 Commanders, shore parties.
 Commanders of units down to and including brigades which will communicate with Navy units.
 Commanders, Air Corps coastal stations likely to be engaged in joint operations.*
 Commanders, air force groups and squadrons.
 Commanders, ports of embarkation.

Navy:

All commanders listed under categories A and B above.
 Commanders, fire support group.
 Beachmasters.
 Destroyers, light mine layers, all larger combatant surface ships, and division and squadron commanders thereof.
 Squadron commanders of submarines, minecraft, and train vessels.
 Air squadron commanders.
 Commander, inshore patrol.
 Commander, inshore air patrol.
 Commander, offshore patrol.
 Commander, offshore air patrol.
 Commander, escort force.
 Commander, coastal force.
 Commanders, fleet Marine force brigades.
 Naval operating bases.
 Naval advanced bases.
 Naval air stations, air bases, and seaplane tenders.
 Destroyer, submarine, and section bases.

d. Category D.

Army:

All commands listed under categories A, B, and C above.
 Commanders of all mobile ground units down to and including infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons.
 Commanders, landing force combat teams.
 Commanders, individual forts or groups (harbor defenses).
 Army transports and mine planters.
 Aircraft in joint operations.

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Navy:

All commands listed under categories A, B, and C above.
 Vessels of inshore patrol and offshore patrol.
 Aircraft of inshore air patrol and offshore air patrol.
 Coastal force vessels and aircraft.
 Escort vessels and aircraft.
 All vessels and aircraft (not a part of or attached to the local defense forces) engaged in joint operations.
 Commander, Marine Corps units down to and including battalions.

171. General instructions.

a. The authorized cryptographic systems for the categories of classified communication, the distribution of the various systems and the effective publications governing their use are prescribed in the current editions of the following documents:

Army: SIGNAN.

Navy: CSP 817, 818, 819, 820.

b. The communication (signal) plans should normally prescribe the cryptographic systems to be used.

c. Whenever practicable, in joint tactical exercises or communication training exercises simulating coastal frontier defense, oversea expeditions and landing force operations, exercise or training editions of the prescribed cryptographic systems shall be used.

d. For emergency use in peacetime by all categories of command, the cylindrical cipher device (Army: M-94; Navy: CSP 488) shall be used. A universal emergency key for use with this device shall be determined jointly by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communications and shall be communicated to both services from time to time. Cipher keys for use in local emergencies shall

*The other Department will be informed of the commanders designated under this provision in order that all concerned may be notified.

be determined locally and jointly by the senior commanders of the Army and Navy units involved. The United States Coast Guard holds this device and is furnished the universal emergency key by the Director of Naval Communications.

Subsection V—Joint Communication (Signal) Plan

(See ch. VI, sec. VIII, par. 108-110).

172. *General.*—The joint communication (signal) plans (or orders) for joint operations of the Army and the Navy (whether for coastal frontier defense or joint overseas expeditions) will in general include the following items, in the sequence indicated below:

a. Information.

(1) Such information of enemy communication (signal) as may be essential from the point of view of joint operations of the Army and the Navy.

[162] (2) Such information of friendly commercial communication facilities as are to be used (or are available for use) as may be necessary for the coordinated action of the two services in joint operations.

(3) Such information of the communication (signal) systems of the two services as may be necessary for understanding by one service of the capabilities and limitations of the communication (signal) systems of the other service.

(4) Such information of the aircraft warning service communication system as is necessary to insure the prompt reception and distribution of the information of approach of hostile aircraft.

(5) Such information pertaining to the command "set-up" (i. e., location of the headquarters or command posts) of the two services as may be necessary for the effective installation and operation of communication (signal) system.

(6) Designation of the time systems to be used for communication purposes and in the texts of messages.

b. Radio.

(1) General radio instructions, as necessary, including radio silence restrictions, etc.

(2) Call signs and frequencies, to include such instructions covering the assignment and distribution of radio call signs and frequencies as may be necessary—

(a) To insure coordinated action and avoid mutual interference between the two services.

(b) To provide a guide for the two services in distributing the particular items or publications to the interested elements of the two services.

(c) *Time* when call signs and frequencies become effective (see par. 172a (6)).

(3) Instructions for the establishment and operation of such special channels of radio communication as may be required for joint operations include—

(a) The assignment of personnel and special equipment when necessary

(b) Operating schedules, etc.

(c) Authentication instructions.

[163] *c. Radio intelligence* (radio direction finding and radio intercept)—include such information and instructions as to radio intercept and direction finding as may be necessary for—

(1) The coordinated action of the radio intelligence service of the Army and Navy.

(2) The distribution (or exchange) of radio intelligence.

d. Visual.

(1) General instructions, as necessary, including—

(a) Restrictions as to use of visual signal equipment, daylight and darkness.

(b) Priority of various means (flags, searchlights, etc.).

(c) Meanings of special pyrotechnic signals.

(2) Visual call signs.

(a) Call signs needed for communication between the Army and Navy.

(b) Guide for the distribution of call signs to interested elements of the two services.

(c) Designation of such visual codes as may be required for joint operations.

(d) *Time* when call signs are effective. (See par. 172a(6).)

(3) Instructions for the establishment and operation of such special visual channels as may be required between elements of the two services.

e. Wire.—Instructions necessary for the installation, operation, and maintenance of such wire communications as may be needed between the two services should include provisions for a wire teletype (telegraph printer) or telegraph antiaircraft intelligence net and an aircraft warning service net. (See Diagram I.) If required, authentication instructions should be issued.

f. Messenger (or courier) service.—Instructions necessary for the operation of a messenger service between Army and Navy elements when practicable and necessary, should state schedules, means of transportation, and whether officer or enlisted man.

g. Recognition signals.

- (1) Recognition doctrine.
- (2) List of the types to be used—day and night—with statements of time when each becomes effective.
- (3) Guide for distribution.
- (4) Identifying silhouettes of—
Ships: Friendly and enemy.
Aircraft: Friendly and enemy.
- [164] (5) Recognition signals (surface craft, submarines, and aircraft)—
Type or types to be used.
Prescribed signals or maneuvers.
Identifying marks on ships, special flags, lights, etc.

h. Communication security and cryptanalytic activities.—Such instructions should be promulgated as may be necessary to insure the coordination of the communication security activities of the two services and the prompt exchange of technical information between the cryptanalytic elements of the two services.

i. Codes and ciphers.

- (1) Such instructions as are not included in existing regulations and publications concerning the codes, ciphers and cipher keys to be used in joint operations.
- (2) Guide for the distribution of codes and ciphers.

j. Commercial communication facilities.

- (1) Such allocations to the Army and the Navy as may be required.
- (2) Special instructions covering traffic to be handled by commercial stations.
- (3) Special instructions covering supervision of commercial communication facilities.
- (4) Call signs and frequencies.

Subsection VI—Miscellaneous

173. *Other joint communication requirements.*—In addition to the intercommunication necessitated by simulated or real joint coastal frontier defense and joint overseas expeditions, intercommunication may be necessary daily in peacetime for liaison purposes between various units of the Army and the Navy (and the Coast Guard), and when specially required in cases of earthquake, flood, riot, and other emergencies, both natural and man-made. During neutrality, intercommunication may be necessary in the joint maintenance of a patrol in United States coastal waters. For the purposes indicated above, the doctrines set forth herein will, insofar as applicable, govern.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 6 there appear Diagrams I and II bearing captions "Coastal Frontier, Joint Radio and Wire Communication" and "Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase, Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach", respectively. These diagrams will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 3 and 4, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[If] C. J. A. 4.

CHANGE No. 4, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 301 (Serial 671).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 664).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, January 25, 1941.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Add the following new pages:

Page Nos. ¹	Subject matter
II-1g.....	Promulgation of Change No. 4.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated:

Old page Nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa.....	C. J. A. 4—List of effective pages (revised January 25, 1941).
129-130.....	Paragraph 128, sentences added.
137-140.....	Chapter IX, Section I revised.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
United States Army, Secretary

[II] JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

(Revised January 25, 1941)

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page.....	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only).....	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.....	1***	I-1a
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938.....	2	Ib-Ic
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940.....	3	Id-Ie
Promulgation of Chicago No. 4, January 25, 1941.....	4	If-Ig
List of effective pages.....	4	II-IIa
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935.....	Original	III-IV**
Contents.....	2	V-VI
Contents, Part I.....	2	VII
Contents, Part I, continued.....	Original	VIII
Chapter I.....	"	1-2
Chapter I, continued.....	1	3-4**
Chapter II.....	2	5-6
Chapter III.....	2	11
Chapter III, continued.....	Original	12-16**
Chapter IV.....	"	17
Chapter IV, continued.....	2	18
Chapter IV, continued.....	Original	19-20**
Contents, Part II.....	"	21-22**
Contents, Chapter V.....	"	23-26
Chapter V.....	2	27
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	18-41
Chapter V, continued.....	2	42-44
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	45-47
Chapter V, continued.....	2	48
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	49-64
Chapter V, continued.....	2	65-66
Chapter V, continued.....	Original	67
Chapter V, continued.....	2	68
Chapter V, continued.....	2	69
Contents, Chapter VI.....	Original	70-72
Contents, Chapter VI, continued.....	"	73-76
Chapter VI.....	2	77-80
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	81-82

*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[17a]

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	83-84
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	85-86
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	87
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	88-90
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	91
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	92-97
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	98
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	99-100
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	101
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	102
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Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	105
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	106-107
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	108-110
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	111
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	112
Contents, Chapter VII.....	"	113-114**
Chapter VII.....	"	115-126**
Contents, Chapter VIII.....	"	127-128**
Chapter VIII.....	4	129-130
Chapter VIII, continued.....	1	131-132
Chapter VIII, continued.....	Original	133
Chapter VIII, continued.....	2	134
Chapter VIII, continued.....	Original	135-136**
Chapter IX.....	4	137-140d
Chapter IX, continued.....	3	141-164
Chart of Organization for Coastal Frontier Defense.....	Original	No number
Diagram No. I, Coastal Frontier. Joint Radio and Wire Communication.....	3	No number
Diagram No. II, Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase. Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach.....	3	No number

**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128, and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[129]

CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in partgraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

[130] 127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1:23, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations. In the case of technical matters involving cooperation between the two services, the Joint Planning Committee may, upon approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, set up committees of experts to advise upon appropriate action. Each committee of experts shall be composed of such officers of the Army and Navy as may be designated by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, respectively.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O.

[137]

CHAPTER IX

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Policy for the Coordination of Communication Activities of the Army and the Navy

145. *General.*

a. The policy and the proposed actions set forth in this chapter are based on the fact that the Army and the Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President either expressed or implied.

b. The policy for the coordination of communication activities of the Army and the Navy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is set forth herein for information and guidance.

c. Censorship is not considered to be a communication activity.

146. *Purpose of communication policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and the Navy in the development of communication matériel, the establishment of communication stations, and in the conduct of communication activities, in order to insure adequate and efficient intercommunication between the Army and the Navy especially in joint operations, to prevent interference and conflict between the communication services of the Army and the Navy, to provide for the effective physical control of their communications in time of war or other national emergency, or when the United States is likely to become a belligerent, and to indicate the views of the War and Navy Departments as to the extent communications control is to be exercised by other Government agencies under the situations mentioned.

147. *Basic policy.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations, together with the necessary [138] interconnecting equipment as, augmented by nonmilitary communication facilities and services, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other

national emergency of militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated communication systems adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation of expenditure imposed by economy.

b. While the communication requirements of the Army and the Navy for purposes of national defense must be considered paramount, adequate provision also must be made for the needs of other governmental agencies, of industry, and of other civilian activities.

148. *Military and naval communications.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall have full authority respectively over all military and naval communications, and over all other communication facilities allocated in whole or in part to the Army and the Navy.

b. For operation in time of war as may be necessary, it is contemplated that the allocation of additional nonmilitary communication facilities to the Army and the Navy will be recommended by the Defense Communications Board created by Executive Order on September 24, 1940, or by a similar board subsequently created, and that changes in the initial allocation will be similarly recommended. It is further contemplated that all allocations will be made by Executive Order.

c. In order that the Army and the Navy may plan for essential acquisitions of nonmilitary communication facilities and services for wartime or other emergency use, it is assumed that allocations will be based generally upon the following:

(1) The Army assumes prior right to utilize, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army, except the stations over which the Navy is assigned prior right to utilize in the following subparagraph.

(2) The Navy assumes prior right to utilize, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea, and non-military communication stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

149. *Wartime jurisdiction over nonmilitary communications.*

a. The civil authorities, including the established courts, will continue their control of the civil communication agencies in the [139] continental United States in nonmilitary matters, as far as practicable, except in theaters of military or naval operations.

b. If, at some time subsequent to the declaration of war, the President should declare martial law, the control of all communication facilities within the affected area shall devolve upon the Army or the Navy in accordance with the principle of unity of command as set forth in paragraph 151b below.

c. As general policy, whatever essential wartime functions nonmilitary Government communication systems are responsible for performing in peacetime and can continue to perform in wartime, they shall be permitted to continue to perform, provided that such arrangements are compatible with the requirements of the military services for national defense, and provided that all nonmilitary Government communication agencies so conduct the operation of their communication facilities as to render the greatest possible assistance to the Army and the Navy. Accordingly it is contemplated that among others—

(1) The Federal Communications Commission will continue to perform its peacetime functions, including especially the detection, location, and suppression of unauthorized radio stations so far as its jurisdiction, facilities, and personnel permit. Beyond its jurisdiction and the capabilities of its facilities and personnel, such functions may become the responsibilities of the Army and the Navy. When functions normally performed by the Federal Communications Commission devolve upon the Army and the Navy—

(a) The Army will assume jurisdiction over the continental United States, Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, and in insular possessions and foreign territory occupied by the Army.

(b) The Navy will assume jurisdiction over shipping and over insular possessions and foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

(2) The Department of Commerce (Civil Aeronautics) will continue to perform its peacetime functions, and to operate its regular communication facilities, except in areas such as in actual theaters of operation, where national defense may require such facilities to be put under control of the Army or the Navy by Executive Order.

d Although nonmilitary communication agencies will normally operate as

indicated in the preceding subparagraphs, it may be necessary in the interest of national defense for the Army and the Navy [140] temporarily to take over and operate some nonmilitary communication facilities not allocated to the respective services. For example, in case of threatened attack by hostile aircraft, it might be essential summarily to close certain nonmilitary radio stations by order of the military or naval commander having responsibility for the safety or defense of the threatened area. Or, instead of closing certain radio stations, it might be essential for the responsible commander summarily to utilize some or all communication facilities temporarily—for example, to promulgate an air-raid warning and to give notice when the danger has passed. Provision for such actions shall be made by Executive Order, by a Federal Communications Commission Rule or Regulation, or otherwise as appropriate.

e. Whenever necessary in the interests of national defense, and in accordance with existing law, all amateur radio stations not specifically designated by the Army or the Navy for military operation will be closed by Executive Order upon the recommendation of the Defense Communications Board mentioned in paragraph 148 above, or in the absence of such a board, upon the recommendation of the Secretaries of War and Navy. The operation of amateurs on Army and Navy frequencies, under Army and Navy control, shall not be affected by such closing.

f. Nonmilitary radio stations fall into four categories as follows:

(1) Those stations which the Army or the Navy will require in time of war or other national emergency to supplement their peacetime circuits.

(a) These stations would be taken over and operated by the respective services.

(b) It is contemplated that the number of such stations will be kept to a minimum.

(2) Those stations from which the Army or the Navy will require some circuits, or those stations all of whose facilities are required part time.

(a) The Army or the Navy would supervise the operation of such stations with direct control over the circuits serving military needs.

(b) Such circuits as are not utilized by the Army or the Navy would usually remain available to serve nonmilitary purposes.

(3) Those stations which must remain in operation as nonmilitary stations to serve Government procurement, commercial, or civilian needs. These stations would be permitted to continue in operation under jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (or other Government agency normally having jurisdiction), assisted as may be necessary by the Army and the Navy.

[140a] (4) Those stations which are not required by the Army or the Navy, or for other national defense purposes.

(a) These stations may be allowed to continue in operation as in peacetime, or they may be closed.

(b) These stations whether allowed to operate or not would be under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (or other Government agency normally having jurisdiction), assisted as may be necessary by the Army and the Navy.

150. *Authorized nonmilitary communications.*—In the case of nonmilitary communication stations not allocated for utilization in whole or in part to the Army or the Navy, but which are allowed to continue in normal operation, supervision and control may sometimes devolve upon the Army or the Navy. For purposes of such supervision and control—

a. The Army will assume jurisdiction over all such stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army except the stations assigned to Navy jurisdiction in subparagraph b below.

b. The Navy will assume jurisdiction over all nonmilitary stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships, or with aircraft flying over the sea other than Army aircraft, and over all nonmilitary stations in Panama, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy.

151. *Primary responsibility of the Army and the Navy in communication activities.*

a. The assignment of primary responsibility to the Army or to the Navy for communication activities serving a definite area or purpose imposes upon the designated service the responsibility for the establishment and efficient operation of the communications serving such area or purpose, but allows the other service to use communication facilities to serve the same area or its own purposes of a similar nature, provided no serious interference is caused thereby.

b. In wartime, unity of command in certain areas or theaters of operation may be assigned to the Army or the Navy. Communication activities therein will be coordinated by the responsible commander of the service in which such unity of command is vested.

c. In order to avoid uneconomical duplication—

(1) The Navy only shall operate radio apparatus of high power (10 kilowatts or more in the antenna).

(2) The Army shall not handle overseas radio communication commercially or for other Government departments except between the United States and Alaska (unless the Navy is unable to handle the communication), nor [140b] operate upon frequencies which will cause serious interference with Fleet or Navy overseas circuits

152. *Assignment of primary responsibility.*—Subject to the provisions of subparagraphs *a* and *b* of the preceding paragraph, primary responsibility is assigned as follows:

a. To the Army in radio communication—

(1) With and between Army units wherever located.

(2) Within the Territory of Alaska.*

(3) With and between Army vessels, excluding such vessels as may be placed under Navy control.

b. To the Army in radio intelligence, including radio intercept and direction finding for the Army wherever operating.

c. To the Army in landline communication—

(1) Connecting headquarters, units, and establishments of the Army wherever located.

(2) Crossing the international boundaries between the United States and Canada, and between the United States and Mexico.

(3) Within the continental United States when charged therewith in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 149 above.

(4) In Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, and in insular possessions and foreign territory occupied by the Army.

d. To the Army in cable communication—

(1) Connecting headquarters, units, and establishments of the Army within the continental limits of the United States.

(2) Within the continental United States when charged therewith in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 149 above.

(3) Between the continental United States and Alaska.

(4) Within the Territory of Alaska.

(5) At points outside the continental United States occupied exclusively by the Army.

e. To the Army in aircraft warning service (see par. 161)—

For the continental United States, Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, all insular possessions of the United States garrisoned by Army troops, and all foreign territory occupied by the Army

[140c] *f.* To the Navy in radio communication—

(1) For the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service for efficient communication with and between Navy units wherever located; this service to be available to all departments of the Government and for commercial purposes.

(2) For communication with insular possessions, the Panama Canal Zone, and with foreign territory occupied by the Navy.

(3) With and between ships at sea and with and between aircraft which fly over the sea, exclusive of Army vessels and aircraft, except such Army vessels and aircraft as may have been placed under Navy control.

g. To the Navy in radio intelligence, including radio intercept and direction finding for the Navy wherever operating.

h. To the Navy in landline communication—

(1) Connection headquarters, units, and activities of the Navy wherever located.

(2) In insular possessions and foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

i. To the Navy in cable communication—

*NOTE.—Attention is invited to paragraph 151c (2). While the Navy is charged with primary responsibility for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of an overseas radio service, it is agreed that the Army shall not be prevented from handling radio communication, commercially or for other Government departments, between the continental United States and Alaska.

(1) For communication from the United States to all points outside the United States except to Alaska.

(2) At points outside the continental United States occupied by the Navy.

(3) Connecting headquarters, units, and activities of the Navy wherever located.

j. To the Navy in aircraft warning service (see par. 161)—

(1) For all vessels and aircraft of the Navy, including Army vessels and aircraft operating under Navy control.

(2) For all insular possessions garrisoned exclusively by the Navy.

(3) For foreign territory occupied exclusively by the Navy.

153. *Principles to be observed in communication coordination.*—Coordination in communication operation will be effected by—

a. The development of types of communication equipment suitable for intercommunication between the Army and the Navy.

b. The assignment of call signs, frequencies, transmitting time periods, the adoption for joint Army and Navy communication of a common procedure, and the formulation of cryptographic systems.

c. The provision of field radio sets for the use of the Marine Corps on shore which shall be capable of communication with the radio sets used by similarly equipped units of the Army.

[140*d*] *d.* The provision, on vessels of the Army Transport Service, of radio communication equipment of a character normally provided for commercial shipping of the same general class, and by provision of such equipment capable of sending and receiving on at least two frequencies assigned by the Navy Department for Naval Transportation Service communication. (If practicable, vessels of the Army Transport Service should be provided with radio equipment identical with that provided for vessels of the Navy similarly employed.)

e. The preparation of suitable joint communication plans for all joint operations.

f. The conduct of joint communication training exercises.

g. For a more detailed discussion of coordination requirements, see Section II of this Chapter.

154. *Coordination with radio stations of other departments and civilian radio stations during peacetime.*—Coordination of the operation of Government radio stations with each other and with the operation of civilian radio stations in time of peace will be governed by the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

155. *Coordination of development programs.*—The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications will coordinate the peacetime operation of communications and the operational development of the two services to insure adequate and effective joint intercommunication. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Chief of the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department will coordinate their recommendations for the procurement programs of the Army and the Navy, and will coordinate technical communication matters of joint concern to the two services.

[1*h*] C. J. A. 5.

CHANGES NO. 5, JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

J. B. No. 301 (Serial 702).

A. G. 062.1 (5-26-41).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 684).

J. B. No. 319 (Serial 685).

THE JOINT BOARD,
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 14, 1941.

The following changes in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, have been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and should be made in all copies of this publication.

Add the following new pages :

Page Nos.	Subject matter
Ib-II.....	Promulgation of Change No. 5.

Remove and destroy the pages listed below and substitute the reprinted pages containing changes as indicated:

Old page Nos. ¹	Changes on reprinted pages
II-IIa.....	C. J. A. 5.—List of effective pages (revised July 14, 1941).
129-130.....	Paragraph 126, second sentence changed.
131-132.....	Paragraph 133, fourth and fifth lines changed.
137-138.....	Paragraph 148, subparagraphs c (1) and (2) changed and (3) added.
143-144.....	Paragraph 158, subparagraphs g (4) and (5) added.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

The office of The Adjutant General, War Department, and the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, require no report of this change.

WILLIAM P. SCOBAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
United States Army, Secretary.

[III] JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, 1935

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

(Revised July 14, 1941)

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Title page.....	Original	No number
Navy letter of promulgation of November 15, 1935 (Navy copies only).....	"	0-00*
Promulgation of Change No. 1, July 22, 1936.....	1***	I-Ia
Promulgation of Change No. 2, November 30, 1938.....	2	Ib-Ic
Promulgation of Change No. 3, June 28, 1940.....	3	Id-Ie
Promulgation of Change No. 4, January 25, 1941.....	4	If-Ig
Promulgation of Change No. 5, July 14, 1941.....	5	Ih-Ii
List of effective pages.....	5	II-IIa
Joint letter of promulgation of September 11, 1935.....	Original	III-IV**
Contents.....	2	V-VI
Contents, Part I.....	2	VII
Contents, Part I, continued.....	Original	VIII
Chapter I.....	"	1-2
Chapter I, continued.....	1	3-4**
Chapter II.....	2	5-6
Chapter III.....	2	11
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Chapter IV.....	"	17
Chapter IV, continued.....	2	18
Chapter IV, continued.....	Original	19-20**
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Chapter V, continued.....	2	65-66
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Contents, Chapter VI.....	2	69
Contents, Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	70-72
Chapter VI.....	"	73-76
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	77-80
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	81-82

*Should be so numbered in ink in Navy copies only.

**Original blank pages IV, 4, 16, 20, and 22 should be so numbered in ink.

***Navy copies "2."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[11a]

Subject matter	Change in effect	Page Nos. ¹
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	83-84
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Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	99-100
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	101
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	102
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Chapter VI, continued.....	2	106-107
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	108-110
Chapter VI, continued.....	2	111
Chapter VI, continued.....	Original	112
Contents, Chapter VII.....	"	113-114**
Chapter VII.....	"	115-126**
Contents, Chapter VIII.....	"	127-128**
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Chapter VIII, continued.....	2	134
Chapter VIII, continued.....	Original	135-136**
Chapter IX.....	5	137-138
Chapter IX, continued.....	4	139-140d
Chapter IX, continued.....	3	141-142
Chapter IX, continued.....	5	143-144
Chapter IX, continued.....	3	145-164
Chart of Organization for Coastal Frontier Defense.....	Original	No number
Diagram No. I, Coastal Frontier. Joint Radio and Wire Communication.....	3	No number
Diagram No. II, Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase. Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach.....	3	No number

**Original blank pages 114, 126, 128, and 136 should be so numbered in ink.

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[129]

CHAPTER VIII

AGENCIES FOR EFFECTING COORDINATION

Section I

Sanction of Joint Agencies

125. The existing joint agencies for coordination between the Army and the Navy have no legislative nor executive basis for existence. These agencies exist as a result of agreement between the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Except as noted in paragraph 135, below, the recommendations of these joint agencies are advisory only and become effective upon approval by both Secretaries, and in some cases upon further approval by the President.

Section II

The Joint Board

126. The authority for The Joint Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919, as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935, as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; and on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and the Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations. The board is provided with a secretary detailed alternately from officers of the Army and the Navy.

[130] 127. Any matter which, to either the War or the Navy Department, seems to call for consideration as to cooperation between the two services may be referred by that department to The Joint Board. The Joint Board may also

originate consideration of such subjects as in its judgment are necessary. The board confers upon, discusses, and reaches such common conclusions as may be practicable regarding such matters. Proceedings and reports of the board are confidential. Each department receives a copy of the report of the board.

128. The authority for the Joint Planning Committee is contained in War Department G. O. No. 94, 1919 (as amended by G. O. No. 29, 1923, and G. O. No. 10, 1936), and in Navy Department G. O. No. 7, 1935 (as amended by G. O. No. 73, 1935, and G. O. No. 82, 1936). The Committee consists of three or more members of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and three or more members of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations; and, in addition thereto, in cases involving procurement and the allocation of industry, one officer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and one officer from the Office of Naval Operations. In the case of technical matters involving cooperation between the two services, the Joint Planning Committee may, upon approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, set up committees of experts to advise upon appropriate action. Each committee of experts shall be composed of such officers of the Army and Navy as may be designated by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, respectively.

129. The committee is an agency of The Joint Board for the detailed investigation, study, and development of policies, projects, and plans relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and the Navy. The committee may also originate consideration of such subjects as, in its judgment, are necessary. The members are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and the Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. Its procedure is informal; its reports and recommendations are confidential; its reports and recommendations go to The Joint Board.

Section III

The Aeronautical Board

130. The authority for the Aeronautical Board is contained in War Department G. O. No. 6, 1936, and Navy Department G. O. [131] No. 81, 1936. The board consists, on the part of the Army, of the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant to Chief of Air Corps, and one member of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff; on the part of the Navy, of the Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, the Head of Plans Division of his office, and one member of the War Plans Division, office of Chief of Naval Operations. The War Plans Division members are not eligible for duty with The Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee. The board is provided with a secretary detailed from the permanent personnel of either the War Department or the Navy Department.

131. The function of the Aeronautical Board is to secure a more complete measure of cooperation and coordination in the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy. It will investigate, study, and report upon all questions affecting jointly the development of aviation of the Army and of the Navy which have been referred to it by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, The Joint Board, the Chief of the Air Corps, or the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. In addition, it will also be charged with the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when in its judgment necessary and of recommending whatever it considers essential to establish sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army and the Navy as to aviation.

132. In the execution of the foregoing, the Aeronautical Board will be governed by the following. It will hold regular monthly meetings and such extraordinary meetings as may be deemed advisable. It will prescribe its own procedure and will be assisted by working committees, the members of which will be appointed by the Aeronautical Board. All recommendations of the Aeronautical Board affecting joint Army and Navy policies or plans relative to the national defense will be referred to The Joint Board for consideration before submission to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Matters affecting the procurement of matériel in time of war to meet joint requirements will be submitted to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. All other matters will be submitted direct to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

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Section IV

Army and Navy Munitions Board

133. The authority for the Army and Navy Munitions Board is contained in The Joint Board's letter J. B. No. 346 (Serial No. 181), of June 27, 1922, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy June 29, 1922. The board consists of the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy, assisted by an executive committee composed of officers on duty in the War and Navy Departments, as follows:

Three officers of the Army and three officers of the Navy to be selected by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

134. The board is authorized and directed to—

a. Formulate and keep up to date such pertinent plans and policies as in the opinion of the two Departments should be adopted by the Federal Government for coordinating and controlling national industrial effort in emergency.

b. Assure the necessary coordination in the procurement war plans of the two services, and in all plans, studies, and appendices thereto intended to facilitate the Government's efforts in emergency to promote orderly mobilization of industry.

c. Form and direct the activities of such joint committees as may be necessary to consider, investigate, and make recommendations concerning pertinent subjects falling within the purview of the Board's responsibilities.

135. Approval of action taken by the Munitions Board is not required, except that any plans prepared by it that affect joint war plans and joint Army and Navy policy relative to the national

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CHAPTER IX

COMMUNICATIONS

Section I

Policy for the Coordination of Communication Activities of the Army and the Navy

145. *General.*

a. The policy and the proposed actions set forth in this chapter are based on the fact that the Army and the Navy together constitute the Nation's military power of which, under the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief; therefore their acts derive authority from the direction of the President either expressed or implied.

b. The policy for the coordination of communication activities of the Army and the Navy, approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, is set forth herein for information and guidance.

c. Censorship is not considered to be a communication activity.

146. *Purpose of communication policy.*—The purpose of this statement of policy is to establish an authoritative basis for the coordination of the Army and the Navy in the development of communication matériel, the establishment of communication stations, and in the conduct of communication activities, in order to insure adequate and efficient intercommunication between the Army and the Navy especially in joint operations, to prevent interference and conflict between the communication services of the Army and the Navy, to provide for the effective physical control of their communications in time of war or other national emergency, or when the United States is likely to become a belligerent, and to indicate the views of the War and Navy Departments as to the extent communications control is to be exercised by other Government agencies under the situations mentioned.

147. *Basic policy.*

a. The Army and the Navy shall provide, control, and operate such transmitting and receiving stations, together with the necessary interconnecting equipment as, augmented by nonmilitary communication facilities and services, will insure the existence and availability upon the outbreak of war or other national emergency of militarily controlled, thoroughly indoctrinated communication systems adequate to meet the requirements of national defense, having in view the prevention of undesirable duplication and the practical and definite limitation of expenditure imposed by economy.

[138] b. While the communication requirements of the Army and the Navy

for purposes of national defense must be considered paramount, adequate provision also must be made for the needs of other governmental agencies, of industry, and of other civilian activities.

148. *Military and naval communications.*

a. The Army and Navy shall have full authority respectively over all military and naval communications, and over all other communication facilities allocated in whole or in part to the Army and the Navy.

b. For operation in time of war as may be necessary, it is contemplated that the allocation of additional nonmilitary communication facilities to the Army and the Navy will be recommended by the Defense Communications Board created by Executive Order on September 24, 1940, or by a similar board subsequently created, and that changes in the initial allocation will be similarly recommended. It is further contemplated that all allocations will be made by Executive Order.

c. In order that the Army and the Navy may plan for essential acquisitions of nonmilitary communication facilities and services for wartime or other emergency use, it is assumed that allocations will be based generally upon the following:

(1) The Army shall have prior right to use, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations within the United States, Alaska, and foreign territory occupied by the Army, and the stations of the inter-American commercial air routes except the stations which the Navy is assigned prior right to use in the following subparagraph.

(2) The Navy shall have prior right to use, in whole or in part, nonmilitary communication stations wherever located that are permitted to communicate overseas, with ships or with aircraft flying over the sea, exclusive of Army vessels and aircraft, except such Army vessels and aircraft as may have been placed under Navy control, but inclusive of nonmilitary communication stations in Panama and the Canal Zone, the insular possessions, and in foreign territory exclusively occupied by the Navy, except stations of the inter-American commercial air routes.

(3) Stations of the inter-American commercial air routes shall, for the purposes of the two preceding subparagraphs, be deemed to include those land airports in Central and South America, excluding Panama and the Canal Zone, at which nonmilitary facilities have been established at the primary instance of the War Department.

149. *Wartime jurisdiction over nonmilitary communications.*

a. The civil authorities, including the established courts, will continue their control of the civil communication agencies in the

[143] and thus requires immediate attention. A primary example of this type of message is a so-called Army "flash" message which is employed to report air observation of surface or air forces and ground observation of air forces. For joint communication purposes, an Army "flash" message may be considered to be urgent message of the highest priority. A primary example of a Navy message of the highest priority is a major contact report.

(2) The **PRIORITY** designation is reserved for messages of less urgency than those entitled to **URGENT** precedence, but of such nature as to warrant precedence ahead of messages designated as **ROUTINE** or **DEFERRED**. Any message designated as **PRIORITY** will be transmitted before any routine or deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* routine or deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a **PRIORITY** message.

(3) The **ROUTINE** designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence. They are transmitted in the order in which they are received or in such order as will clear the traffic most expeditiously. Any message designated as **ROUTINE** usually will be transmitted before any deferred messages which may be awaiting transmission, but transmission of a *short* deferred message will not usually be interrupted to send a **ROUTINE** message.

(4) The **DEFERRED** designation is reserved for messages requiring no special precedence, and whose delivery to the addressee may be delayed until the beginning of office hours following the day on which they are filed. This will sometimes necessitate transmission of Deferred messages ahead of Routine messages, in order to effect delivery before the time indicated.

d. *Address and signature.*—While all official messages will be sent by authority of the commanding officer, no signature will ordinarily be transmitted. Messages intended for an addressee on board a ship or airplane, or within a command on shore, will be routed by use of the appropriate call sign of the ship, airplane, or shore command. Delivery to any specific addressee within the ship, airplane

or shore command is a function of the command to which delivered. If call signs are assigned for joint use to particular commanders, as well as to particular ships, airplanes and shore commands, such [144] commander call signs may also be employed to indicate routing, addresses and originators.

e. Use of clear or cryptographic language.—The general rules governing the use of clear and cryptographic language are set forth in subsection IV of this chapter, wherein communication security is discussed.

f. Operating instructions and procedure.—Operating instructions are special instructions for transmitting, receiving, and when required, for relaying messages. These instructions are set forth in a separate restricted pamphlet entitled, "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure."

g. Time.

(1) The time of origin is the time at which the message is released or authenticated by the originator. If this time does not appear on the message it will be the time when the message is filed for transmission.

(2) The time of origin in joint communications is expressed in the 24-hour clock system and transmitted as a group of four figures, the first two digits representing the hours from midnight and the last two the minutes past the hour. Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 0600 and 7:43 P. M. is 1943.

(3) For communication within the Army, the 12-hour clock system is used. Examples: 6:00 A. M. is 600 A, and 7:43 P. M. is 743 P.

(4) For communication within the Navy, Greenwich civil time (G. C. T.) is used in headings of messages.

(5) Unless otherwise prescribed, the time of origin in the headings of messages in joint communication will be Greenwich civil time (G. C. T.).

h. Dates.

(1) The date is expressed for joint communication purposes by two figures preceding the time of origin, indicating the day of the month. If the date number is less than ten, it is always preceded by zero. For example, the first day of the month is 01, and the tenth day is 10. "071626" means date was 7th day of month, and time of origin was 1626.

(2) The month and year may be added to the date and time of origin group when necessary for reference purposes in the text of messages. For example: "Your 071626 DEC 1938" means "Referring to your message, with time of origin 1626 on the 7th day of December 1938 * * *".

EXHIBIT No. 7

[i]

SECRET

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 April 1941.

S-A16-1/A7-3(3)/ND14
(0398)

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42.

Subject: Original 14ND-JCD-42.

References:

(a) WPL-42.

(b) FTP 155, Introduction, Chapter II.

Enclosures:

(A) Original 14ND-JCD-42, Reg. No. 19 including List of Effective Pages.

(B) Receipt and Destruction Form, in duplicate.

1. The Original 14ND-JCD-42 (Army Short Title HCF-41) is hereby promulgated to the officers on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-42, including those on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-13. It was signed and placed in effect by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District on 11 April 1941, to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved, in part or in whole, by either the War or Navy Departments.

2. This Original Plan, prepared in accordance with references (a) and (b), supercedes 14ND-JCD-13 (Army Short Title HCF-39) and will be handled as follows:

a. All holders of 14ND-JCD-13 remove and destroy by burning all pages now contained in 14ND-JCD-13.

b. Insert this letter and the pages of Enclosure (A) in their proper places in the old binder, if used, in accordance with the List of Effective Pages contained in Enclosure (A); new holders on the Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42 provide own binders.

c. Report receipt, destruction of superceded pages of 14ND-JCD-13 and check of contents on the form herewith, Enclosure (B). New holders report receipt and check of contents only.

[ii] 3. a. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations and in the Registered Publication Manual.

b. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage, as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

4. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM, OR COPY, PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

C. C. BLOCH.

[iii]¹ *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Coastal Frontier—List of Effective Pages, 14ND-JCD-42*

Subject Matter	Page Nos.	Change in Effect
Com 14 Secret Letr Serial No. (0398) dated 25 April 1941.....	i-ii	Original.
List of Effective Pages.....	iii	"
Title Page.....	1	"
Table of Corrections.....	2	"
Distribution List.....	3	"
Table of Contents.....	4	"
Body of Plan.....	5-14 inclusive	"

¹ Original, April 1941, 14ND-JCD-42
HCF-41

[1]

Register No. 19

[Full Title]

JOINT

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

AND

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

[Short Title]

HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

1152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[2]

Table of Corrections

Change No.	Date of Entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

[3]

Navy distribution list

Official to whom issued	Registered Numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations	18 and 19
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District	20
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	21
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	22
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	23
Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	24
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	25
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	26
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	27
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Commander Submarine Base PEARL HARBOR	34
†Commander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR	35
†Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE	36
†District Intelligence Officer	37
†District Communication Officer	38
†Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR	39
†Inspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU	40

*Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.

†These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original exhibit.

[5]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.,
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN
HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER—
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
and
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a. page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[6]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREA:

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII, KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIHAU, LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. *HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the *HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER* approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for *PEARL HARBOR* and *KANEOHE*.

(1) *DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.* The Defensive Sea Area of the *HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER* includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:—

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at *OPANA POINT, MAUI, KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI, LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI*; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at *KAHUKU POINT, OAHU*, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—*HAWAIIAN D. S. A.*

(2) *PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The *PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area* comprises—

The area of water in *PEARL HARBOR* lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the *PUULO A Naval Reservation*, a line bearing south true from *AHUA POINT LIGHT*, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from *AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE*. This area is given the short title—*PEARL D. S. A.*

(3) *KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The *KANEOHE BAY—Defensive Sea Area* comprises:—

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows:— line bearing northeast true extending three miles from *KAOIO POINT*, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from *KAPOHO POINT*, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—*KANEOHE D. S. A.*

(4) *PALMYRA, KINGMAN REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY and WAKE—DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* These defensive sea areas comprise:—

Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.* The Defensive Coastal Area for *OAHU* comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:—

KEAHI POINT—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards).
KAHUKU POINT }

This area is given the short title—*OAHU D. C. A.*

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Tasks and Forces

12. *CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, *RAINBOW No. 1.*

14. *TASKS.*

a. *JOINT TASK.* To hold *OAHU* as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *ARMY TASK.* To hold *OAHU* against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *NAVY TASK.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[8] 15. *FORCES.*

a. *ARMY FORCES.*

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, *RAINBOW No. 1.*

b. NAVAL FORCES.

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. CIVIL ORGANIZATION. A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. GENERAL.

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] **c.** The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEHOHE area is recognized.

b. An anti-aircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

[10] **j.** An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will

gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i.*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the manpower and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. ARMY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.
 (5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 *d.* above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(1) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

c. NAVY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

Section VI—Joint Agreements

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renoucement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieut. General, U. S. Army,

Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

[1]

EXHIBIT NO. 8

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646
Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised).

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

- (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

- (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by;
 - (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
 - (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
 - (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Continuous patrols*.—(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

- (2) Boom Patrols.
- (3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *Intermittent patrols*.—(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

- (a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
- (b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will

search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) *Sortie and entry.*—(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2)

(b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[3] (D) *Operating areas.*—(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need to be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services of other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall

follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) *Ships at sea.*—(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each Task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[4] (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) *Ships in port.*—(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) *Defense against air attack.*—(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com-

mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plant for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.*—(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task force commander operating at sea.*—(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval base defense officer.*—(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area.*—(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ships attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[6] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based fleet aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval district.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task force commander at sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[7] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. Crosley,

Flag Secretary.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 8 there appears a chart showing the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, being Enclosure "A" to Cincpac 2CL-41-Revised. This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 5, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

Enclosure (B)

Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT No. 9

SECRET

Op-12B-9-McC

(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1

Serial 09112

JAN 24 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful

bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages,

the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy Forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

/s/ FRANK KNOX.

Copies to:

CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com14

Op-22

Op-30

EXHIBIT No. 10

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK

4 JUNE 1941.

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands.

(Signed) H. E. KIMMEL.

Copies to

Gen. Marshall

Adm. King

Adm. Towers

EXHIBIT No. 11

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 28 August 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.

As of today we have about 262,000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of July. Our advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get at least 10,000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or whatnot.

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. Our *small* ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was perfectly delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example:—I ordered an electric heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the effort required.

I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpender, who came down to see me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have heard from Bunav direct.

I am delighted also over your comment about the recreation facilities and hope the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is satisfactory.

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation so will not repeat here.

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling

the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to AMs and ATs.

Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, I am told those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think history has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where you are.

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department.

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great difficulties than they will when things are easy and serence (if they ever were).

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are nearing solution.

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here. Incidentally the Russian Ambassador with his gang is coming down to see me tomorrow. I will not put down on paper my feelings about the visit—I will just leave it to your good imagination.

[Handwritten notation:] This is privileged matter which must not be disclosed without "EXPRESS AUTHORITY SECNAV"

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and best of luck.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

ADMIRAL H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. NAVY,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[NOTE.—The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 11 which is a personal letter dated 28 August 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The last two sentences in the sixth paragraph on page 3.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 11, which the Judge Advocate proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.]

30 AUGUST 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL

Will send a memo from Holcomb by separate letter re defense battalions. He is away for a couple of days and I want him to O. K. anything I send.
Keep cheerful.

H. R. S.

EXHIBIT No. 12

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 23 September 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.

Act. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."

Regarding questions (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or

our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers *about one month after Japan and the United State are at war*. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVEREIGN, RAMILLES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it we can get nowhere

towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL.

P. S. #2. Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

BETTY.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark :

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila.

A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.

A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched.

A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

[Handwritten notation:] You may have had word of this already!

G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

EXHIBIT No. 13

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12 Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message precedence
From CNO Released by Ingersoll Date, October 16, 1941	For action CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (ACKNOWLEDGE)	Priority X Routine Deferred
For coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

162203 CP0534

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly Nationalistic and anti American X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and naval district authorities. Acknowledge.

EXHIBIT No. 14

Cincpac File No.
HRS-1

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY: On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:—

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA unit about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time.

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today.

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of things in the Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want to repeat some of them once more. The

urgency for additional [copy not legible] craft in this area is as great as ever. Such craft are not worthwhile unless they can operate in trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost continually. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Cabu to Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new contract is made. I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening gear by the first of December.

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet made effective we require at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can use many more.

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have only one battleship overhauled at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON would ease the situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will soon be placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of power in the Pacific.

We can use all the long range submarines that you can send us. They can be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send one of these to the Pacific? If so—when? We still find it necessary to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes.

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel are so used they can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 15

SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE—NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992		Addressee		Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations. Released by Ingersoll..... Date November 24, 1941.	ACTION	To.	CinCaf CinCpac Com11 Com12 Com13 Com15	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	INFO.		Spenavo London CinClant	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
 242005 CR0443

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL DELIVERY.

Date Time GCT

TEXT Cincaf, Cincpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action. Spenavo London and Cinclant for info.

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X this situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ADEES to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

Copy to (WPD, War Dept) and to Op-12 *but no other distribution*. Plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, 25 November 1941.

In reply refer to
Initials and No.

HRS/Hu

Sec. #6

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to

authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. It has been my hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air Stations, tugs, net layers, mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to the Fleet.

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are increasing our advertising campaign extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some of the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establishment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. B. KIMMEL, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco,
California.

P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

HRS.

Nov. 25, 1941.

Summary

Type	Comple- ment fiscal yr 1939	Comple- ment recom- mended by fleet BD	Present comple- ment	Number on bd	% on bd as of Oct. 31 where available other- wise September 30	
					To 1939 comple- ment	To present comple- ment
BBs.....	19,351	26,583	22,244	19,870	102.68	89.32
CVs.....	6,990	7,602	7,258	6,902	98.74	91.68
CAs.....	12,164	18,508	15,878	14,067	115.64	88.59
CLs.....	11,490	15,860	14,156	12,896	112.23	91.09
DDs:						
(1850 Ton).....	3,119	3,900	3,119	2,826	90.60	90.60
(1500 Ton)						
(8 at 192).....	1,536	1,920	1,536	1,346	87.63	87.63
(18 at 191).....	3,438	4,392	3,438	3,138	91.27	91.27
(4 at 196).....	784	1,000	784	728	92.85	92.85
(8 at 178).....	1,424	1,952	1,424	1,312	92.13	92.13
(10 at 187).....	1,870	2,480	1,870	1,717	91.82	91.82
(12 at 200).....	2,400	3,000	2,364	2,171	90.46	91.83
(1200 Ton).....	1,644	1,898	1,716	1,673	101.76	97.49
(Asiatic)						
(4 at 132).....	528	584	536	446	84.46	83.20
(33 at 126).....	3,906	4,626	4,209	3,704	94.82	88.00
SSs:						
(4 at 29).....	174	192	180	230	132.18	127.78
(22 at 39).....	858	946	858	891	103.84	103.84
(22).....	1,203	-----	1,203	1,390	115.54	115.54
(6 at 54).....	324	348	324	375	115.74	115.74
Patrol vessels.....	1,062	-----	1,078	1,109	104.42	102.87
OG LALA.....	282	-----	320	290	102.83	90.62
ISABEL.....	84	-----	84	82	97.61	97.61
TOTALS.....	76,631	-----	84,849	77,163	103.39	90.94

EXHIBIT No. 17

SEALED SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number OP 12—Ext. 2992	Addressee	Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations	For action: CINCAF CINCPAC	Priority X Routine Deferred
Released by Ingersoll		
Date November 27, 1941.		
TOR Coderoom.....	Information CINCLANT SPENAVO	Priority Routine Deferred
Decoded by.....		
Paraphrased by.....		

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

GKVVJL BVKLVW 272337 0921

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition ~~probably~~ against either the Philippines or KRA Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD War Dept.

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 18

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number Op-12, Ext. 2992	Addressee	Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations Released by H. R. Stark Date November 26, 1941	For Action CINCPAC	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory

270038 CR0758

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable X.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See art 76 (4) Nav Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 19

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12, Ext. 2992	Addressee	Message precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations..... Released by H. R. Stark. Date November 28, 1941	For action COM PNCF COM PSNCF	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information CINCPAC COM PNCF	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

290110 R066

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Refer to my 272338 X Army has sent following to commander Western Defense Command (quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X

1178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is being sent to G Two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers X unquote) XX WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Orig: Op 12

Copy to: Op 30, 38, WPD ARMY

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 20

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number 3598	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV Released by T. S. Wilkinson Date December 3, 1941.	For action CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16	Priority X Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by Paraphrased by	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

031850 CR0553

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X ~~from foregoing infer that orange plans early action in southeast Asia.~~

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 21

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV..... Released by Ingersoll..... Date DECEMBER 4, 1941.	For action NAVSTA GUAM	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by Pharaphrased by	Information CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory

042017 CR0701

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery

Text.—Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report Crypto channels retained

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs;

EXHIBIT No. 22

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Op-20

'Phone Ext. No. 3313	Addressees	Message precedence
From OPNAV Released by _____ Date 6 December 1941	Action To CINCPAC	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraphased by.....	Info. CINCAF	Priority Routine Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory
061743

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery.

Text.—In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

EXHIBIT No. 23

CONFIDENTIAL

[1]

Headquarters
14th Naval District
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII—SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS.
JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL
HARBOR BASE.

I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39 (14ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that

the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft release to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS.

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
14th Pursuit Wing	Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Waialupe Radio Station

b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.	Waialupe Radio Station
*Headquarters, HSCA Brigade	Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
18th Bombardment Wing	Marine Air Group, Ewa
14th Pursuit Wing	

[3] c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:

ARMY	NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office)	14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B.	14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft Kam)	14th Naval District

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.

* Not control Station.

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.

b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY

NAVY

CP, PH Gpmt, Ft Kamehameha

Waialupe

CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger

Destroyer Patrol

Additional stations that may be determined to be necessary

Mine Sweepers

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4] available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. JOINT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MEASURES.

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to [5] the completion of the

AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF.

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

VI. SMOKE SCREENS.

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor—Hickam Field area from air attacks.

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST.

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(C348)
Confidential
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing Two,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

March 31, 1941.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADDENDUM I TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41

JOINT ESTIMATE COVERING JOINT ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST OAHU OR FLEET UNITS IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA

I. Summary of the Situation.

- (a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.
- (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.
- (c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.
- (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.
- (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8'' guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7,000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and

characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would not would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we would have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us.*

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. *Decisions:*

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft).

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying

from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

- (a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.
- (b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Authenticated:
J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 24

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm. AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm. AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

[2] 5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

/S/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

A true copy. Attest:

H. Biese-meier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate.

[24]

Op-30B3-AJ
(SC) A7-2(2)/FFI

MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

D-27446

Navy Department

February 13, 1941.

From: Director, Naval Districts Division
To: Director, War Plans Division
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr. of Feb. 7, 1941 to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

/s/ Alex Sharp
ALEX SHARP

(Pencil Notation: Done O15712 of 11 Feb. M.)

A true copy. Attest:

H. Biese-meier,
H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Judge Advocate

EXHIBIT No. 25

(Exhibit No. 25 is a fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941. This report is reproduced in four parts and will be found as Items Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 26

SECRET

27 MAY 1940

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow—well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut out short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel:—Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently. I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as—

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.

[3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.

(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.

(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.

(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet:

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies,—I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and home-made recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1,—modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that *now* appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division, possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [4] from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made,—for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic—should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in those areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands:—We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter—as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever.

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. RACHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 27

SECRET

eft/10

CinC File No. A16/01705

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

U. S. NAVY YARD, BREMERTON, WASH.

October 22, 1940

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: War Plans—Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan;

[2] *Third.* That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

(a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient "to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior [3] to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area."

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, denude that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

(b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.

(c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the [4] necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this BASE forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

[5] Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

(d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPL 14 and throughout the O-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period or some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

[6] (a) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear [7] picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;

(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);

(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

[8] (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:

(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;

(2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;

(3) Threats and raids against the enemy;

(4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.

12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. O. RICHARDSON

EXHIBIT No. 28

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/

U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *January 7, 1941.**Confidential**First Endorsement to*

Com 14 Conf. Ltr.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14

(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

1. As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

[2] 3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measure that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detaching important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U. S. Fleet. It is fur-

ther considered that the provision of adequate [3] Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to: Com FOURTEEN

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cincpac.

ENSIGN H. E. RORMAN, USN,
Secret Mail Officer.

[1] OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD,
 PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629)

30 DEC. 1940.

Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References:

- (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
- (b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
- (d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
- (e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. *Aircraft Raids.*

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to [2] the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no

plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. *Defense Against Submarines.*

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other [3] islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. *Defense Against Mines.*

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. *Defense Against Bombardment.*

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. *Sabotage.*

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. *Water and Electric Supply.*

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement [4] has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard

but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the [5] numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH.

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cinepac.

H. E. Norman

ENSIGN H. E. NORMAN, USN.,

Secret Mail Officer.

This is copy of original run of letter.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 29

[SECRET]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long since have learned my habits.

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will continue in future communications of ours similar searching analyses. Just for a moment refresh on your paragraph 3; and permit me to say "check and double check".

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conferences. (*Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time.*¹ Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way.

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter of the 25th (0129) are just signed.

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out S1 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good

¹This matter is Privileged and must not be released for any purpose without "EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF SECNAV."

ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope, too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

[2] Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder; we have distributed them to the outlying stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should be put aboard ship.

Every good wish in the world.

As ever sincerely,

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
*Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

[3] P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the 27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with one or two other things.

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but still objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared to make a quick decision if it is ordered.

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Nimitz and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple of weeks ago, even before I got your letter, the President told me I was overcrowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary with increased complements so we *may* have to ask for the doctors' opinion regarding the new complements.

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satisfactory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a misnomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back on the West Coast.

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral Bloch.

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new

sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agreement with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will inform you of them.

[4] I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday".

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.

All good wishes.

Keep cheerful.

BETTY.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 29 which is a personal letter dated 10 February 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The fourth sentence in the third paragraph on page 1.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 29, which the Judge Advocate purposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

EXHIBITS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME II

No. 30 to 44 (both inclusive)

NOTE—Exhibits Nos. 31 and 39 contain privileged matter, which, though not classified as "Top Secret", do contain matter which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in "red" together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BESEMEIER,
 Captain, U. S. N.,
 Judge Advocate.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 30

UNITED STATES FLEET

CinC File No.

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
18 February 1941.

DEAR BETTY: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interferences with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for \$39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for \$9,000.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor

[2] I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARES to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palmyra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palmyra. I think our recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate correspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regulation proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwarded me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.

I come to another question of the highest importance, the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact

in all the aeronautical organizations afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrains" vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Draemel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. We received through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese *trade routes*. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

EXHIBIT No. 31

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-10 Hu

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, 25 February 1941.

Dear Kimmel: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of especial importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog", we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to "Dog" (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your

Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could wish for more.

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids, I hope that you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on the inflammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you unjustified from a profit and loss viewpoint—but, again, you may consider that they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly *SECRET*) *you and I may be ordered* to make them, so it is just as well for you to have considered plans for it.

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on the Hill (*and I might add, all of which is irresponsible*)¹ constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff conversations (and thank the Good Lord there has been *little* no public leak that they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions reached just as soon as we can.

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the office for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I always have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the covering sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, were sound.

Keep cheerful.

All good wishes and Good Luck.

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, *USN*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.

¹ The underlined matter is privileged—It must NOT be released without specific authority SECNV.

[1] [Pencil Notation:] Sent to W. H. by Capt Callaghan

DRAFT

11 FEBRUARY 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) of destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its un wisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southward or into the Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.

[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his submariners which are in urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:—

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

[4] The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plant our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view.

Op-12-CTB Secret

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.

1. The despatches from the Naval Attaché in London concerning prospects of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI to Tokyo indicates to me two things,

- (1) The demands by Japan will be far-reaching, and
- (2) The February 10th date is too soon for an attack, as the negotiations are likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan:

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent of the two governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.

(b) The size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan is insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines. So far as I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move. [2] Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations she will assuredly occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and air bases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land forces in Indo-China in readiness for action against Malaya and British North Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Hainan. I question her readiness to attack the British before June, but this belief is subject to revision.

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can con-

tinue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration.

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's success in the Balkans. If the Germans succeed in conquering the British Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-China.

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reinforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.

H. R. STARK.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to *Exhibit 31* which is a personal letter dated 25 February 1941, from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined to answer as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets:

The words in parenthesis in the second sentence in the first paragraph on page 2.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of *Exhibit 31*, which the Judge Advocate Proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

EXHIBIT No. 32

SECRET

In reply refer to initials and No. Op-10/Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 22, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Your letter of February 18th was handed to me upon my return from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Island; literally, a flying trip.

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to the questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, here goes:

The checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must have had acknowledgments by this time.

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3—a copy of which I have—seems to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not comment

any further on that subject; except that, with regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully understand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.

With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now, have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands. Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra Islands should not exceed the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water, and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new PTC's at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 28 immediately.

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed by the Congress and signed by the President.

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accomplished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.

With respect to paragraph 10 Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you of March 5th, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's letter that all requirements will be completed either in the May, 1941, voyage of the U. S. S. Lassen, or the ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that island and asking you to assist in transporting them from the mainland to Oahu. Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the availability of magazines.

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation; 5,000 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly.

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substitute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the Fleet.

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels; Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may be ready for service.

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with additional destroyers for some months, if then; in fact we may have to take some away soon.

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraphs 14 and 15 relative to complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted:

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all types of ships since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by improved A. A. defence, D. C. equipment, splinter protection and increased ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accordance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way are obtained.

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear, sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approximately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel

Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions as shown by table.

	<i>Over Increase Men</i>	<i>Resulting Weight Added</i>
BBs-----	286	143 tons
CAs-----	228	114 tons
CLs-----	136	78 tons
DDs-----	57	28, 5 tons

(c) While the decision against recommended increases was based on weight and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions on berthing space introduced by sealing of airports on the lower decks has made the space component of more importance than formerly.

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed increased complements for the additional AA batteries installed.

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.

[4] (f) On a comparative basis the complements now allowed are 10-15% greater than those assigned by the British on similar types of ships.

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bureau of Ships requesting comment on the maximum number of men which can be accommodated on the various types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considerations. The reopening of the case depends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.

P. S. The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It is anticipated that it will be recommended for approval to maximum extent permissible within space, weight and stability recommendations of BuShips."

Paragraph 18 of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every possible effort to provide the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate only limited by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by *specific directives* to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out that the Navy Department in the fact of long and determined opposition has been successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models of naval airplanes now on order for the Fleet. This priority (A-1-b) is higher than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the P40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.

VP-----	PBY5-----	197
VSB-----	SBD-2&3-----	262
VF-----	F4F-----	324
VSO-----	SO3e-----	260
VSB-----	SB2c-----	70
VTB-----	TBF-----	108

1, 221

Your paragraph 18 recommends the acquisition of two more "seatrain" vessels. Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's, 2 New Jerseys, 2 Manhattans, was recommended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jerseys as you probably know was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 15, 1941, but *funds have not been made available*. The New Jersey type is now used for ferrying loaded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled airplanes of the scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. I might add that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and stack arrangement are being prosecuted. No provisions will be made for airplane landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying capacity for the Manhattans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded; under these conditions the planes could not, of course, be flown off.

In answer to your comment in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional stores ships and transports, the following obtains:

On 15 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for three additional store ships (AF). The President cut it to two. The status of legislation authorizing and appropriating money for these two vessels is indeterminate at the present moment. It is hoped these vessels will be acquired sometime during the current fiscal year.

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels will report for duty by June or July, 1941. In addition to their intended employment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be necessary for forces afloat to use one or more of those transports to meet transportation requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition, to these ships, negotiations are being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed and ready for service.

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The date appearing on the chart is the date 1939, which was the last complete year for which export and import data on commodities was available at the time the chart was revised.

Every good wish as always.

Keep Cheerful.

Unload all you can on us.

Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong cross currents and tide rips—just as we do you—and,

Best of luck,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
Commauder-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania,
Pearl Harbor, T.

EXHIBIT No. 33

[1] A16/082S of 26 May 1941.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

26 MAY 1941.

From CinC.

To: Opnar

Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pac. fl.

I. PERSONNEL.

(a) *Stability*.—A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel*.—Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There

appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the [2] various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible for correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.*—The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new [3] construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approached 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined. [4] and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.*—The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.*—It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral

Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye, is able, vigorous, and loyal: and is an officer whom I would select above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

(f) *Uniform.*—There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity [5] and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. AVIATION.

(a) *Aviation Training.*—The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.*—The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes [7] and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor.

(c) *Separate Air Force.*—This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition

of the intimate relationship between air and surface [8] sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps [9] would make the situation much worse—for the navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. MATERIAL, GENERAL.

(a) *Priorities*.—The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1', Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the [10] situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's, and those sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR Equipment*.—Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

[11] IV. COMMUNICATIONS.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. OPERATIONS.

(a) *Fleet Operations*.—With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonius that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to “cover” the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid [12] strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having “broken our backs”, so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must [13] be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

(b) *Fourteenth Naval District*.—The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take [14] over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine*.—The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force

in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

[15] (d) *Logistic Support*.—Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. NATIONAL POLICY.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense [16] commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. INFORMATION.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence [17] in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and

time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all [18] important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 34

Our 7971

Via Clipper Mon 28 July

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 26, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY:—When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not know the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been thinkg:—

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of co-operation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:—

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) ne-

cessity for providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—

(a) *Transports and Light Destroyer Transports.*—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. It at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

(b) *Marine Equipment.*—The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) *Ammunition Facilities.*—The condition of ammunition handling and storage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Storage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen

off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

(i) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

(3) *Communications*.—The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

(4) *Aviation Requirements*.—These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:—

(a) *Pre-Fleet Training*. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

(b) *New Torpedo Planes*.—Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

(c) *Conversions for Carrier Landing Training*.—Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots *must* be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

(d) *A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment*.—This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

(e) *I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment*.—This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

(f) *Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's)*. Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

(g) *Landplane Field at Johnston Island*. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to

local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

(h) *Keehi Lagoon Development*. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

(i) *Development of the N.A.S. Barber's Point*. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No 35

SECRET

WRS/mjf

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 WASHINGTON, August 22, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in this next clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic and in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. [Handwritten comment: It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite may-be.]

To your own situation I am giving every though I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District Mate, (Admiral Bloch) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck—wish you were close by

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, *U. S. N.*
USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Perl Harbor, T. H.

[1]

DRAFT

AUGUST 19, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was insufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and

2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers upon my return to the Navy Department.

I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

So far as the Russian situation is concerned, and the degree of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselves if and when we become active participants in the war, little can be said at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers and 200 P-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown to Russia via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the fighters and naval escorts for same. On 11 August 1941, the Russian Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant General of their Army and a Captain of their Navy, was received by Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated that his country had pressing need for all manner of military supplies, planes—and anti-aircraft guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and that there [2] were no reserve stocks in the country from which to draw. The Secretary summarized his remarks by saying that, since the President had made the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counted upon to cooperate to the utmost.

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored." This will be done. The conversations which took place at sea between the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 August somewhat helped to crystallize thought on the matter. Specifically, no decision was ~~reached~~ *announced* as to whether or not England would declare war on Japan if the Japanese attack the Maritime Provinces. Neither can I forecast what our action would be if England declared war on Japan as a result of the latter's attack on the provinces in question. [Handwritten comment: I have done my utmost to get a decision—it can't be had now either here or in London. I make no forecast.]

Of course, Japanese action against the Maritime provinces remains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. However, it is my own thought that if Japan gets embroiled with Russia over the Maritime provinces, such action could hardly react other than to somewhat relieve the pressure now being exerted by Japan to the southward. ~~In such an event, I think there would be many signs of relief.~~

If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are now pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. It is, of course, conceivable that we would lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific. [Handwritten comment: I could not get no plan from the British—They did not have one—ABC and Rainbow V still prevail.]

We are in complete agreement about developing Guam and bolstering the defenses of the Philippines. The Army is sending everything it can out there. As you know, we are sending Tommy some PTs. More aid would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that it is pretty late to start on Guam anything more than we already have in hand. We will make all the progress we can, remembering that "Dollars Cannot Buy Yesterday."

[3] In discussing the priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific War, for your convenience, I shall quote the paragraphs from your letter *in order and follow each with shall then comment on it:*

Paragraph 2 (a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destroyer Transports. During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a *Pacific* campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. If at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it

cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

Comment. We all recognize that the APD's were developed with a Pacific campaign in mind. We withdrew them to the Atlantic with great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Likewise, work is being pushed on the HARRIS and ZEILIN. I must confess that progress on those ships has not been wholly satisfactory.

[Handwritten note at bottom of page:] I more than confess—I admit it. The whole thing has been a headache. It was these old crocks or nothing. Slow as they have been, I am glad I took 'em over. At least we will have 2 we could not get now. Every AP has been a struggle. I am keeping the APD's open—don't give up hope—yet.)

[1]

ROUGH DRAFT FOR ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER

AUGUST 16, 1941

Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter—Marine Equipment.—The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reinforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come, they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

Comment.—In reference to the 3" AA guns, and the .30 caliber machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Headquarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its initial allowances in those weapons since 7 July 1941; that is, 12—3" AA guns, and 30—.30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .50 caliber AA machine guns should be remedied by September, 1941.

An outline of the present situation in reference to Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet about 25 July 1941. It is believed that this presents as complete a picture as is possible at this time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the Army. Existing stocks in the United States are at present much too low to meet the requirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Marine Corps may expect their proportion to be delivered from the manufacturers more steadily and consistently in the future than heretofore.

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are likely to exist for some time, however, mainly due to the fact that quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient ammunition to fill immediate requirements of the Second Division [2] as it exists today may be specially obtained from the Army. We have milked the Army pretty dry now.

The present outlook indicates that sufficient personnel will be available by 1 October 1941, to form for expeditionary duty a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave within the Division a nucleus for training of its remaining units. It is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by January, 1942.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter—Ammunition Facilities. The condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barracaded stowage for live

mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

Comment. The Bureau of Ordnance has had all ammunition storage items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch. Funds have been obtained to extend the ammunition pier from 600 feet to 1500 feet. Since no authorization will be required to extend the pier from 1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to avoid delay. The funds required are \$250,000, which will eventually be obtained from Congress to repay the project robbed.

(b) No funds are available for the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at West Loch. No authorization has been obtained for the construction of these magazines. The Bureau of Ordnance will have these magazines included in the next authorization [hand written comment: supplementary] bill to be presented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at \$210,000.

[3] The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks:

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional land."

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

Comment.—Building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.—The Bureau of Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 1942) to take care of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necessary to repair and maintain the 1946 feet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in the amount of \$20,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of an additional major battleship dock. This dock together with the other facilities which will be accomplished with the money, will bring the yard up to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as follows:

- 12 months for 50% of the facilities,
- 18 months for the remainder of the facilities,
- 22 to 24 months for the dry dock.

Note.—The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Fleet Maintenance—Operations control making ships available for overhauls and set the priority for work at the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this Yard of spare propellers and shafting—it has under procurement, additional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.

[4] The Shore Establishments Division intends to augment the working force as the capacity and work load are increased.

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the Bureau of Yards and Docks has issued instructions to expedite all of this work to the greatest practicable extent.

The recommendation to confine the activities of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to emergency and low priority overhauls can be accomplished by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and Destroyers to West Coast yards but this recommendation is not concurred in for the following reasons:

- (1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Secretary of the Navy on

May 14, 1941, recommended that the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of handling "full overhauls and damage" with simultaneous drydocking facilities for 2 Battleships, 1 CB, 1 CV, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine railway. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shore Establishments Division) dated June 26, 1941 in regard to building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 1943. The third paragraph of this letter is quoted herewith:

"It is believed it is necessary that capital ships be overhauled at Pearl Harbor if that Yard is expected to perform the war task that has been assigned. It is, therefore, recommended that in the next revision of the availability schedule, a start be made toward an equitable diversion of the overhaul of Battleships and Carriers from Puget Sound to Pearl Harbor."

The Director, Fleet Maintenance Division: It is believed that only by actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can the Pearl Harbor organization be trained and made capable of repairing [5] these ships in an emergency, together with development of necessary facilities.

(2) Repairs to British Naval vessels, particularly the larger types of ships, is absorbing a large percentage of the repair facilities of continental U. S. yards and it is expected that the demands will increase. East Coast yards are being used primarily for this work but it has been found necessary—due to full schedules of these yards—to send some British ships to Puget Sound and Mare Island.

If these latter yards are fully scheduled with our own ships (as can be expected if all Battleship, Carrier, Cruiser, and Destroyer overhauls are transferred to them from Pearl Harbor) it is problematical whether British ships can be repaired and overhauled at the rate that this is now being undertaken.

The foregoing comment by Fleet Maintenance is substantially in accord with your letter L9-5 (50) over L9-3 Serial 01176 of 1 August 1941.

Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter.—Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

[Handwritten comment:] I know it—God knows, I wish I could send 'em.

Comment. The present rate of recruiting is about 9,300 men a month. According to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits are required in order to meet the requirements of the service on June 30, 1942 based on present allowances. (This estimate is subject to variables such as changes in dates of commissioning ships and stations.) Therefore the Navy will lack approximately 32,000 men necessary for Navy requirements on June 30, 1942. It is estimated that this will be enough men to [6] fill complements and allowances on that date to an average of about 92%. The Fleets are now filled to about 94% of complements. This percentage will drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron allowances. It is estimated that Navigation can replace losses in the Fleets with recruits to maintain them at about the same percentage of men aboard to complements as at present. Should be 100+.

The recent large withdrawals from the Fleets have been due to the necessity of supplying the crews for the large number of auxiliary vessels recently acquired and for the assembly of men for Advanced Destroyer, Submarine and Aviation Bases. These demands were superimposed upon the demands for the regular building and usual purchasing program.

The above estimates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting of 9,300. Recruiting is now on the increase and additional men over the 9,300 monthly will be furnished to the Fleets.

[Handwritten comment:] We are spending \$1,000,000 in advertising—hope to speed it up.

Paragraph 2 (f) of your letter.—Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

Comment. It is contemplated assigning the SOLACE (AH5), Ex-IRIQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be in the latter part of August, 1941. Further, it is contemplated transporting Mobile Base Hospital No. 2 from New York to Oahu in the U. S. S. PROCYON (AK19) departing New

York early in October; she is a 15-knot ship and will call at San Diego to debark some personnel and stores there en route.

So far as the new hospital is concerned, the contract for this has been let and presumably the work is underway.

Paragraph 2 (g) of your letter. Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

Comment. The project is now underway to send twelve PT's to the 14th Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and transportation provided. This shipment will follow the six MTB's going to the 16th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.

[Handwritten note at bottom of page:] Wish I had more. They will be coming. I know Xmas is too, but we are doing the best we can—and I am kicking all the time.

[6a] *Paragraph 2 (h) of your letter.* The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

Comment. The project of assembling advanced Base Material has been raised to an A-1-a [handwritten note: our highest priority] priority, and the assembling of this material is going ahead satisfactorily.

[7] *Paragraph 2 (i) of your letter.* Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

Comment. In this connection, I quote verbatim the remarks of the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you may have the entire picture:

The status of placing depth charges and under-water sound equipment on light craft is as follows (taken up by classes):

DMs and DMSs—These vessels have depth charges and echo-ranging equipment authorized; some have the equipment installed and those ships that have not yet received their echo-ranging equipment will get Model QC Series commencing in September 1941. [Handwritten note: Too slow I know—but I have been doing my d-st.]

AVDs—Stability conditions on these ships are not good and the addition of depth charges, racks, or Y-guns, and echo-ranging equipment will necessitate compensating weight removal. It is understood that the desired equipment can be installed providing the towing reel on the fan tail is permanently removed. A lightweight echo-ranging and listening gear equipment, Model WEA, has been developed which weighs about 1300 pounds, with deliveries commencing in October 1941.

The following are the requirements for the WEA equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D. C.
- (b) Head room required for hoist-train equipment about 70 inches.
- (c) At least 24 inches between frames of ships to accommodate pedestal.
- (d) Remote control of train by means of cables and sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.

The above equipment is suitable for any installation in AMs (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts. Additionally, this equipment can be installed in any other types of ships having adequate space and power supply.

A lightweight listening equipment (Model JK-9), about 1300 pounds, has been developed and contract awarded for 230 sets; delivery [8] commences in August 1941 at a rate of 10 each week. The following are the requirements for installation of the JK-9 equipment:

- (a) Power supply 115 volts D. C. or 24 volts D. C. (Two types of motor generators available, producing 115 volts, A. C.). Overall dimensions of motor generator set $29\frac{1}{2} \times 13\frac{1}{2} \times 11\frac{3}{4}$ inches.
- (b) Maximum head room required for hoist-train mechanism about 96 inches.
- (c) Only limitation on frame spacing is that it pass the 4-inch projector shaft.
- (d) No remote control—hand hoist and train directly connected to projector shaft.

This equipment is for listening only (no echo-ranging feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship having adequate space and power supply. Space

allotted to the equipment must provide for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7'-9" x 26½" x 20"), receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x 15½") and sufficient space for the operator.

APDs—The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and now carry 24—300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these ships is so unsatisfactory that they will require 50 tons of fixed ballast. The installation of the WEA echo-ranging equipment, described under AVDs, above, can be accommodated in these ships.

AMs and AYPs—The question of installing depth charge and echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has been referred to the Bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practicability of accomplishment.

It should be pointed out that draft and stability conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions are about to be issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau of Ships indicates that compensatory weight reduction must be made on practically a pound-for-pound basis in order to install the desired equipment. The installation of echo-ranging, or listening equipment is dependent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs.

[9] It is to be noted that the lightest depth charge rack now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500 pounds. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs 420 pounds, the total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be about 4000 pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater sound equipment is about 1300 pounds as explained above under AVDs.

PEs, PCs, PYs, PYCs, and YPs. All these vessels have depth charges, the number depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns.

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been authorized and will be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided."

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications. The supply of communications, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

Comment. Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships:

"During the fiscal year 1941 the Bureau of Ships placed contracts for radio and sound material amounting to approximately \$110,000,000. The material contracted for included all of the material listed in the 1941 and 1942 Communication Improvement Plans issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular 1941 budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law on June 11, 1940, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation act in mid September 1940. Considering the time when the necessary funds became available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid, as could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. However, it is recognized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay at [10] all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is objectionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and components have in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care of within the next few months.

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular 1941 appropriation act, which became law on June 11, 1940. Initiation of procurement of radio material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately after the funds became available. Funds for items later added to the allowance became available in September, 1940.

The tabulation below indicates the present situation as regards radio equipment for the Kaneohe Air Station:

Allowed equipment	Installed	To be shipped	Expected date	Remarks
2 TBM	1	1	Jan. 1942	
2 TBP	2			
1 TBU		1	Mar. 1942	
6 TBW		2	Sept. 1941	
		4	Jan. 1942	
2 TCA		2	Sept. 1941	1 TBO-1 in use
2 TCB		2	Nov. 1941	
1 TCC		1	Aug. 1941	1 TBR-1 installed
4 RBA/RBB/RBC		4	Indefinite	New type—other receivers available if urgently required
6 RAS	6			
1 DY		1	11 Aug. 1941	from NY Wash
1 DP		1	11 Aug. 1941	1 DN from NYMI
1 Inst. LDG Equip		1	Sept. 1942	#40 on priority list; deliveries start Sept. 1941
1 RAU		1	Oct. 1941	
1 YA		1	Jan. 1942	

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs at Kaneohe if required. These TBR-1 equipments are not necessarily reserved or intended for advanced base service, but are available for any use at the discretion of the Commandant or the Commander in Chief.

[11] Paragraph 3(b) of your letter. It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

Comment. Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and the Director, Naval Communications Division in order named:

"The Model XAF RADAR equipment developed by Naval Research Laboratory was installed in USS NEW YORK 12-18 December, 1938, and was tested at the same time as the Model XXZ Radar equipment developed by RCA Mfg. Co., and installed in USS TEXAS. These tests continued through March 1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 8 April, 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment was returned to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of the Department as a result of which it was decided to proceed with the procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract was awarded 16 October 1939 to RCA Mfg. Co. The time between the date of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment was shipped by factory May 21, 1940. It will be noted that the time for delivery of the first equipment by contractor was approximately 13 months from the date of completion of tests in USS NEW YORK and 7 months after date of contract. The last equipment was shipped by contractor on June 20, 1940. The dates of installation of this equipment were dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned. A matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment was completed August 24, 1940, and the last on October 14, 1940, and the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the report on NEW YORK tests."

[Handwritten comment:] Read to here in evidence.

[12] "The Model XAF RADAR, built by Naval Research Laboratory, was tested afloat during the late winter and early spring of 1939. This test indicated that additional equipment should be purchased for trial. A study was made to determine the practicability of installing the equipment afloat; this study disclosed that only ten (10) ships could accommodate the large antenna array without first making extensive alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to the radio beam from the ships' structures. Chief of Naval Operations requested procurement of ten (10) production models of the XAF. The earliest that funds could be obtained to manufacture the Model CXAM (copy of NRL Model XAF) was during fiscal 1940. Due to the higher unit cost of the

equipment and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in connection with "neutrality enforcement", the Bureau of Ships could manufacture but six (6) complete units. When additional funds were made available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (14) Model CXAM-1's were ordered as "stop-gap" equipment pending completion of development of an improved detector—the Model SC."

[Handwritten comment:] Long winded—what he wants is radars and more radars.

Paragraph 3 (c) of your letter. For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

Comment. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships states:

"The need for a satisfactory recognition device in the fleet has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest one since the time of the last war and every idea advanced by the fleet, the Naval Research Laboratory or other laboratories that appeared to offer promise has been thoroughly investigated. This research has fully covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound spectrums. Many systems which were developed to a point which warranted service tests have been tested in the fleet and all have been reported unsatisfactory by the fleet even after modification by NRL and other [13] laboratories in accordance with the wishes of the fleet. There has been no lack of funds in this connection. The NRL has been engaged continuously since its establishment in efforts to develop a recognition system. That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by NRL in any form of radio recognition is not one of fact."

[Handwritten comment:] The files of NRL contain a letter so stating!

It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet Radar installations will be made before the end of the calendar year.

[Handwritten comment:] High time.

Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

Comment. In regard to the foregoing, the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks as follows:

[Handwritten comment:] Development—Development—Development—The other fellow has it—

"Currently, the Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the earliest practicable development and procurement of suitable RADAR equipment for aircraft. Recognition equipment will be installed in all service aircraft at the earliest opportunity. One hundred (100) ABA (American recognition) sets are now due for delivery, and they will be distributed to the Fleet in the most effective manner possible. Material is being assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which will be put in production by General Electric as soon as a satisfactory service test is completed. [Handwritten comment: Rush.] 356 British I. F. F. sets have been requested; 56 of these sets are being delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed."

[Handwritten comment:] Here's hopin'

The tentative plan for initial RADAR installations in aircraft is as follows: A brief summary of nomenclature is:

- a. ASV MK II—British search equipments suitable for VPBs.
- b. ASA—American search equipment including high altitude altimeter, suitable for VPB's.
- c. ASB—American search equipment, expected to be suitable for 2 and 3 place planes.

[14] d. ASV—MK II (Fleet Air Arm modified), British search equipment for use in large single engine planes.

- e. ABA—American recognition equipment.
- f. IFF—British recognition equipment.
- g. AYA—American high range altimeter.
- h. AYB—American low range altimeter.

i. AI—MK IV—British Interception equipment—multi-place airplanes.

Search equipment (long range British ASV or American ASA) will be installed in all PBV-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installations are being made.

It is expected to install ASB (small search equipment) with a low range altimeter in one plane of each section of VTB's. All TBF airplanes will have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve space in all new VSB and VSO airplanes for the American ASB, and where practicable install this equipment in current types.

Initial installation is now being made of the experimental model of the ASB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available as soon as the equipment is provided.

[Handwritten comment:] Still experiment.

Steps have been taken to obtain models of the British MK II ASV equipment (modified for Fleet Air Arm) for reproduction purposes. It is expected to supplement manufacture of American ASB equipment with an American version of the modified MK II.

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part of the American search equipment in all VPB airplanes. It is planned to equip one airplane of each section of VTB's with high altitude altimeters and another airplane of each section of VTB's with a low range altimeter for use with the ASB equipment (as indicated in paragraphs above research equipment).

Recognition equipment will be installed in all service airplanes at the earliest opportunity. The first 100 American ABA equipments are now due for delivery.

[15] *Interception equipments.* Provision for these equipments will be made in a certain number of F4U airplanes as soon as the development in the United States and abroad of models suitable for use in single engine, single place airplanes permits. Pending this development, a test installation is being made of a British MK IV equipment in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these planes will be made available for use as interceptors as soon as this equipment can be obtained from either British or American source.

Projects have been initiated to design search and interception antenna structures which are most readily demountable and which are streamlined as much as practicable. Development of American search and interception equipment will stress ready removal provisions in order to result in maximum of operational flexibility.

[Handwritten comment:] Ought to reap some benefit after this intolerable delay.

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser airplanes are dependent on installation difficulties and initial performance. A more comprehensive plan may be expected to be published about January, 1942.

The Bureau of Ships remarks:

"Deliveries have begun on 104 Model ABA IFF equipments for aircraft together with 32 model BE/BF equipments for shipboard use. These will be given service tests in the fleet together with 3 Model BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at NRL September 22, 1941. The contractor is assembling material for 1500 additional ABA equipments and further production will be authorized just as soon as tests justify the step. All of the above is of American design but because of design and operational features it will not operate with corresponding British ship, shore or aircraft types. To provide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore and aircraft equipments are being flown to the United States and will be modified for production in the United States and supplied to all forces likely to operate with British forces. These sample equipments are due within a few days according to advices from the Naval Attache', London. The 56 equipments mentioned in the paragraph to which this comment is directed are for Support Force Aircraft and eight are now in the process of being installed."

[16] *Paragraph 3 (c) of your letter.* Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

[Handwritten comment:] Agree.

Comment. An omni-directional aircraft detection equipment was tested in GRAYLING on 2 August 1941. Although the results of the test were somewhat discouraging, the equipment showed sufficient promise to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a directional antenna system will greatly improve [Handwritten comment: Yea—but when—] the performance of the submarine equipment; this project will be prosecuted.

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm surface-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for delivery about January 1942. The equipment which is being designed for making night attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be capable of taking accurate ranges and bearings on capital ships at distances in the order of 10,000 yards.

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equipment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. [Hand written comment: Thank God—] The delay in procurement of radio and sound equipment is not entirely due to the "elaborate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy Department is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment.

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submarines are equipped with Radar. It is, however, highly probable that they are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much facility at night.

Paragraph 4 (a) of your letter. Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

[17] *Comments.* In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics remarks:

"On 28 July, I signed a letter that embodied measures for the improvement of aviation training of pilots and other members of flight crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary schools and fleet squadrons. I hope the effect will be salutary and beneficial in the immediate future. VP-13 will be held at San Diego to launch an intensive transitional training program in combination with the Training Test and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of pilots for the organization of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every experienced aviation officer in the training establishment ashore will be released for duty in fleet squadrons as soon as he can be replaced. The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons.

Aside from transitional training in the larger patrol planes, pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol squadrons whose primary task is their preparation for duty in active combatant squadrons. Although every squadron on the West Coast may be assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings ONE and TWO in the Hawaiian Area to absorb any excess in personnel that cannot be trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and qualified personnel.

There will be an advanced carrier training organization at San Diego in accordance with my letter of 28 July. Additional new VO/VS pilots will commence reporting to the Fleet during August. Any of these pilots who cannot be trained expeditiously on board ship should be retained in the advanced carrier training squadron at San Diego for more flying, particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet.

[18] The priority accorded to the Army and British heavy bomber programs has been the cause of our most urgent attention. The final action on priorities was decided at a conference between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representatives of the Army Air Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office of Production Management. The net result was an A-1-b award to approximately 2,000 (plus or minus 500) additional naval aircraft, and brings a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest priority classification given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare aircraft are now planned for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare aircraft have been requested for patrol squadrons.

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation remarks:

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter, Op-22-B5, (SC) P11-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to establish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the following units:

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced Carrier Training Group, Atlantic—for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego and for the Atlantic Fleet, in Norfolk, Virginia—Purpose of these groups is to give advanced carrier training to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from training centers, prior to assignment to carrier units in the two fleets.

(b) Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic and Transition Training Squadron, Pacific—Purpose of these squadrons is to give advanced patrol plane train-

ing to newly graduated naval aviators, fresh from the training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two fleets. These squadrons also train experienced aviators in the operation of the model PB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the model PBM airplanes in the Atlantic Fleet.

[19] Experienced Naval Aviators have already been ordered to report to these training groups and squadrons when they are formed by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these units.

By the letter referred to above, Chief of Naval Operations has indicated that during the months of August to December, 1941, inclusive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will be ordered to both fleets. Also, for the same period, 334 carrier pilots and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above mentioned training units for assignment to *each* fleet.

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning pilots out at such a rate that at all times thereafter, we will always have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the operating aviation units to meet all the fleet requirements, including double complements of patrol squadrons.

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV Schools training aviation ratings and radiomen (qualair) will be approximately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942.

Sixty-five (65) percent of the graduates of these Class "A" Schools have been marked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville and Miami, until about 8,170 graduates have been fed into the flight training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by about January 20, 1942.

This will leave an estimated balance of 18,926 Class "A" School graduates for the Forces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 30, 1942.

The allowances of patrol plane squadrons have been increased 220% over the 1941 allowances."

Paragraph 4 (b) of your letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

[20] *Comment.* The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of VTB for the Fleet.

Paragraph 4 (c) of your letter. Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots must be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

Comment. The conversion of the U. S. S. WAKEFIELD and U. S. S. MT. VERNON to auxiliary aircraft carriers with landing features incorporated is contemplated. Steps are now being taken to procure material and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable also that the U. S. S. WEST POINT will be included in the above category.

[Handwritten comment:] and now, if we can get the President to give in—To date the answer is No—

Paragraph 4 (d) of your letter. A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

There is an aircraft RADAR project set up in the Bureau of Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necessary equipment that can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due consideration for other essential equipment. The training of RADAR operators is underway so that by the time the equipment arrives there will be trained personnel who are essential for its successful operation. ASV sets will be provided as alternate installations in all carrier planes that can accommodate them and all patrol planes will be ASV-equipped. Every possible source of supply, including British and Canadian, is being investigated to accelerate the program. Three hundred Canadian ASV

equipment sets are expected at the monthly rate of one hundred sets commencing 1 October, 1941.

[21] *Paragraph 4 (e) of your letter. J. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment.* This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

Comment. This subject has been discussed elsewhere in this letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board is setting up essential requirements for RADAR equipment on board ship. The Board has been advised to incorporate the identification feature in ship control and fire control sets since identification is a very necessary part of the RADAR installation.

Paragraph 4 (f) of your letter. Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's). Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

Comment. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer have been advised of the nose section failures in the engines of VP-14. The loose-coupled shaft in these engines will eliminate the restrictions on operating the engine within the present critical speed range. However, this does not apply to VP-14 but this squadron is being supplied new heavier nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies if engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only three planes outside VP-14 have encountered failures in the light nose sections. The heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.

Paragraph 4 (g) of your letter. Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for land-plane support of expeditions headed westward.

Comment. Funds in the amount of \$750,000 for this project are available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.

Paragraph 4 (h) of your letter. Kechi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

[22] *Comment.* The Navy Department has included Kechi Lagoon as one of the Navy-sponsored developments for commercial seaplanes in the Hawaiian area in its recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The War Department has an appropriation of approximately \$3,330,000 for this project and arrangements are being made for additional funds for the dredging which is expected to commence very soon. Navy patrol plane facilities are not included in the prospective plans for this location. Any special facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must be of a temporary nature.

Paragraph 4 (i) of your letter. Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point. This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

Comment. Your comment on the need for this development is supported wholeheartedly in the Department and will receive the most careful attention until it meets the Fleet's needs. Funds for Barber's Point in the amount of \$18,605,000 will be available in August and work begun immediately if the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House and has been approved by the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate.

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I want you to be fully advised. Don't hesitate to tell us how you think we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, and helpful criticism is always in order.

You no doubt have seen in the press about our conference at sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was most helpful. It is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being present.

With all good wishes, I am

[Hand written:] Too long—Oh Lord—Too Long.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

EXHIBIT No. 36

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., September 12, 1941.

DEAR "BETTY": We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for *surface* raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S.-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?

[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much concern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We cannot carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "status quo" and, if necessary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON. I feel that their movement to the Pacific, now, would have a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that *all* our thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be prepared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased demand for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distances involved and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job properly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that

should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity, *if we have the strength here to meet it*. Do not misunderstand me—I don't discount the Atlantic problem—but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.

Sincerely,

Reg. #293 guard mail. U. S. #282 via 14 Sept. Clipper.

EXHIBIT No. 37

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, 23 September 1941.

Op-10 Hu

DEAR KIMMEL.—This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of the picture as I see it up to that date.

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows:

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

"The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of

self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed."

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed.

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships ROYAL SOVEREIGN, RAMILLES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the RENOWN in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time.

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible.

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally completed and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic to the Far East Area.

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, USN,
 Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
 USS PENNSYLVANIA,
 c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

[4] P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse*. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now—is—or—is not—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Copy to Admiral Hart.

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL:

P. S. #2. Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered our first big convey to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance.

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine thing to have it recorded; the boys will be proud of it always.

BETTY.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of anti-aircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the anti-aircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 12 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila. A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes. A group of pursuit, some

130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G. C. M.,
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

[Hand written:] (You may have had word of this already!)

EXHIBIT No. 38

[1]

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 17 October 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he goes back.

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end.

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons—accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results—decreased sinkings.

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can

maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well as most every other situation affecting everything afloat.

Keep cheerful!

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Will add a P. S. in the a. m. Want this to make the clipper.—H. R. S.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
%Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feeling that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost as soon as I do.

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me.

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and by advice to him was not to worry.

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later.

I have nothing else for the moment.

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch.

H. R. S.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, October 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the C. N. O.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain face is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the *extremists* among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

EXHIBIT No. 39

[1]

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 14, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.

I have not been able to get very much *definite* information about Mr. Hallet Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations has given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a *good* reputation as a correspondent out there. This same source stated that the Japs had beaten him up in Shanghai and destroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was written, one could easily spot it as a "phony".¹

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.¹

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper.

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for the ships you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this gear was caused by *getting* or, rather, *not getting* into production. At last, we are "over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 22 sets. Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, crated, in a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having flight deck merchant ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty:—I agree with you 100%. The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The converted SS MORMACMAIB (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is *far* from satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen (16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She *can* be operated if conditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.

¹These paragraphs are privileged and "must not be disclosed without the "EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF SECNAV."

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which *could* be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an *important mission* (transporting British troops to the Middle East—*obviously most secret*) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot if we had those ships *now* converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat purposes.

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty (20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-McCormicks now engaged in the South American run. We have had our eye on the NORMANDIE. Thus far, State Department and President are adamant. I suppose they *think* that to take her over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. Of course, if Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice—What do you think of going ahead *now* with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which *might* be of service to us. To be sure, we *might* lose it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With all good wishes! Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court of Inquiry to Exhibit 39 which is a personal letter dated 14 November 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, and among the principal cases of privilege are:

"(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter."

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The second, third and fifth paragraphs on page 1.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 39, which the Judge Advocate purposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of his letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 39A

SECRET

Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, November 5, 1941.*Memorandum for the President:*

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

[2] Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operation, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Naval Operations.

Chief of Staff.

EXHIBIT No. 40

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number Op-12 Ext. 2992	Addresses	Message precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations Released by Released by Ingersoll Date November 26, 1941	For action: CINCPAC	Priority Routine X Deferred
TOR coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

270940 CR 0756

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

Text.—Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4), Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 41

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 7 May 1941.

Via Clipper Mail—Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small, fast sea-going vessels equipped with listening gear, depth charges and guns.

(b) Aircraft.

(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the island bases and the other ports of the islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to their anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the coastal frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the island bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this letter will be required at these places.

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship

at Wake is 10 days. Imagine a vessel moored 10 days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1(a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this district at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

C. C. BLOCH.

Copy to: Cinpac

(At this point in Exhibit No. 41 there appears a routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 04122 and date of 7 May 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 10, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

EXHIBIT No. 42

CinC File No. A16/(038W)

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 20 May 1941.

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—Local defense forces.
References:

- (a) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1(WP)(4)/ND14(0430) of May 7, 1941.
- (b) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-3/A4-3(1)/ND14(177) of May 13, 1940.
- (c) Comdt. 14 ND secret ltr. A16-1/A7-3(3)/ND14(510) of Oct. 31, 1940.
- (d) Comdt. 14 ND conf. ltr. A16-1/A7-2/ND14(629) of December 30, 1940.
- (e) CinCus conf. 1st end. A16 (022) of January 7, 1941.
- (f) CinCus secret ltr. A16 (0129) of January 25, 1941.
- (g) CinCus rest. ltr. A4-3/OP (499) of February 17, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Table of assignment of forces to the Fourteenth Naval District.

1. In reference (a), the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has again invited attention to the serious weakness of the local defense forces of his district, particularly in antisubmarine types. This continues to be a matter of grave concern to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. In case of war it seems certain that the Commander-in-Chief must divert important units of the Fleet from their proper function with the Fleet to supplement the inadequate local defense forces now available, or must accept the risk of serious losses to combatant ships, naval auxiliaries, and merchant ships. If the Fleet should be shifted from the Pearl Harbor area, or be temporarily absent, the local defense forces would be lamentably weak for carrying out their assigned tasks.

2. This situation has been the subject of considerable correspondence during the past year. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in order to lend further emphasis to its critical nature, and to clarify [2] the picture, will briefly review that correspondence:

(a) In reference (b), the Commandant recommended the assignment of 36 vessels, including DD's, PG's, XPG's, PC's, and XPC's, for escort and antisubmarine duty; as well as other vessels for harbor patrol, inshore patrol, minesweeping, etc. The Commander-in-Chief concurred in those recommendations.

(b) In reference (c), the Commandant, in response to the Chief of Naval Operations' request of September 23 for his estimate of requirements of certain patrol types, replied with a list by classes, numbers, and contemplated general employment.

(c) W. P. L. 42, when issued, assigned to this district, including the outlying advanced bases, only seven vessels that were at all suitable for escort or anti-submarine work, viz: four destroyers and three Coast Guard vessels—a most inadequate number.

(d) W. P. L. 44 made no change in the assignment.

(e) In reference (d), the Commandant invited the attention of the Department to the weakness of the local defense. The Commander-in-Chief, in reference (e), strongly concurred and pointed out the importance of providing adequate forces that would be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.

[3] (f) In paragraph 7 (e) of reference (f), the Commander-in-Chief again expressed his concern over the situation, particularly as to its effect on the security and operations of the Fleet.

(g) In reference (g), the Commander-in-Chief recommended the assignment of six PT's and eight PTC's to the Hawaiian area.

3. The net accretion to Fourteenth Naval District forces to date, except for the arrival of Destroyer Division 80, is almost negligible, and in so far as the Commander-in-Chief is aware, suitable arrangements have not been made to build those forces up to an adequate state.

4. The tabulation of enclosure (A) shows:

Column 1.—allocation of vessels by W. P. L. 42 (W. P. L. 44 gives the same allocation) plus the number allocated otherwise;

Column 2.—the total requirements considered necessary by the Commandant and the Commander-in-Chief;

Column 3.—the vessels present in the Hawaiian area, whether or not now under naval control;

Column 4.—the additional number of vessels needed;

Column 5.—remarks.

5. The requirements are indicated for specific types of vessels. Where the particular type can not be made available, some other type of more or less similar characteristics should be substituted.

6. Column 3 of the aforementioned tabulation shows the extreme paucity of antisubmarine, escort, and patrol types. The Commander-in-Chief strongly reiterates his previous representations as to correction of this situation and requests that he receive early information in the premises.

7. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Comdt. 14 ND.

Enclosure (A).

	Allocated	Total required	Present	Additional required	Remarks
DD.....	4	8	4	4	Notes (1) (2).
PG & XPG.....	1	8		8	
PC & XPC (165').....		8		8	Coast Guard. 2 C/GC, local sampans & Yachts.
PC & XPC (110' or 125').....		12		12	
PTC.....		8		8	
PYe & XPYe.....	2	2	2		
YP & XYP.....	27	28	27	1	
PT.....		8		8	4 expected end of May.
AM & XAM.....	8	8		8	
AMc & XAMc.....	6	8		8	
AMb & XAMb.....	3	3		3	
CMc & XCMc.....	1	1		1	2 being built.
YMS.....	2	2		2	
YN.....	8	8	2	6	2 being built 1 fitting out.
YNg.....	1	1		1	Being built.
VP.....	84	84		84	15,000-plane program.
VSO.....	48	48		48	15,000-plane program.

NOTE: (1) Assigned XPG is U. S. C. G. TANEY, now on West Coast and C. G. District Commander Honolulu believes she will not return to Honolulu.

(2) PG-19 (SACRAMENTO) designated for special duty, Maui Range, is also assigned.

EXHIBIT No. 43

Op-12B-7-djm. (SC) A16-1/ND14
Serial 070312

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 23, 1941.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—local defense forces.
References: (a) CinCpac secret serial 03SW of May 20, 1941.
(b) WPL-46.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations is aware of the situation in regard to the naval local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District discussed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in reference (a), and realizes the necessity of increasing the strength of these forces.

2. Until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander in Chief can be remedied, the light forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken cognizance of this necessity by providing in reference (b) that the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier act as an officer of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, operating under orders of the Commander in Chief thereof, in command of task groups of that fleet under all circumstances, when so directed.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken action to increase the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District by the immediate acquisition of four purse seiners for conversion to YP. It is also anticipated that at least five (5) sampans, recently condemned, will be available in the District. The SACRAMENTO is under orders to depart from Norfolk for the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941.

4. The construction program of PC's and YMS's will not permit the delivery of vessels of this type to the Fourteenth Naval District before the late fall.

5. The Chief of Naval Operations is considering the acquisition and conversion of a number of the vessels assigned to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in appendix II, of reference (b). The questions of funds and personnel, and the suitability of these vessels will affect the decision reached.

6. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will be kept informed of assignments made.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Com14.

 EXHIBIT No. 44

CONFIDENTIAL

(Rough) 05/paw

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinc File No.
A9/PF12/(05)
Serial 01275A

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 15 August 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the period 1 July 1940, to 30 June 1941.

Reference:

(a) Article 699(4), U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

(b) Opnav ltr. Op-13A/CT, A9-1(330527) dated 27 May 1933.

Enclosure: (A) Thirty-five copies of subject report.

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in references (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. Included therein is data obtained from the annual reports of the Commandants Thirteenth and Fourteenth Naval Districts, and the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, (Second Marine Division).

2. By separate correspondence, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic Fleets were directed to submit annual reports direct to the Navy Department for their respective Fleets, with a copy to this Command. Unless the Department so desires, it is not intended to issue a combined annual report for the entire United States Fleet.

3. As noted in the distribution list below, copies of this report have not been distributed to Bureaus or offices of the Navy Department.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Cinopac File No.
A9/FF12/(05)
Serial 01275A

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES
PACIFIC FLEET FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1940 TO 30 JUNE 1941

Cinopac File No.
A9 FF12 (05)
Serial 01275A

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., August 15, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the period 1 July 1940, to 30 June 1941.

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H. E. KIMMEL.

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P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary

[1]

PART I—ORGANIZATION

(A) EXISTING ORGANIZATION.

(a) Comment on existing organization including suitability and adequacy of the Fleet for accomplishment of its primary war mission:

(1) On 1 February 1941, in accordance with General Order No. 143, the United States Fleet was organized into administrative and task organizations as follows:

(a) The United States Atlantic Fleet.

(b) The United States Pacific Fleet.

(c) The United States Asiatic Fleet.

(2) On 1 June 1941, there was made effective, in the United States Pacific Fleet, a task organization designed to facilitate inter-type training and at the same time provide for a ready transition from a peacetime organization to one more suitable for the most probable operations of war. Three new task forces were created as follows:

Task Force ONE, under Commander Battle Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics of a Covering Force.

Task Force TWO, under Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics of a Reconnaissance and Raiding Force.

Task Force THREE, under Commander Scouting Force, with the primary mission of training and development of tactics for Expeditionary and Amphibian Operations.

The above Task Forces absorb all the battleships, carriers, cruisers and destroyers of the Pacific Fleet. Submarines, patrol planes and minecraft, while operated primarily as separate types, are assigned from time to time to one of the above Task Forces as required for special training or operations. This organization has largely relieved the Commander Battle Force and Commander Scouting Force, as such, of their operational functions, but they retain their responsibility for general supervision of administration, training and material of their respective Forces. As Commanders of Task Force One and Three, respectively, they are given operational functions and responsibilities more adaptable to the probable operations of war.

(3) There is, in process of accomplishment, a general reorganization of the Base Force. This, when completed, will provide a squadron and divisional organization more adaptable to the accomplishment of both peace and war missions of that command. The organization will provide the following:

Squadron Two—Harbor services.

Squadron Four—Transportation of personnel, landing force equipment, etc.

Squadron Six—Offensive and defensive mining and general services.

Squadron Eight—Transportation of bulk cargo.

The final establishment of this organization is awaiting the reporting of squadron commanders and staffs and availability of suitable flagships.

On 12 June 1941, there was established, in the office of the Commander Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier, nucleus personnel of the Base Force Subordinate Command. This step will also place the logistic supply of the Fleet more nearly on a war basis.

(4) The above organization is believed suitable and adequate, at the present time, for the accomplishment of the war mission of the Fleet. The strength of the Pacific Fleet in numbers of ships is adequate for only limited offensive operations in the Pacific because of [2] the distances involved and the known enemy strength and strategic dispositions in that area. There is a serious deficiency in numbers in practically all Types, but particularly in aircraft carriers, improved aircraft of all types, destroyers and light cruisers and also in auxiliary tankers, supply ships, and transports including the destroyer transport.

(5) In addition there are material deficiencies, including radar, close anti-aircraft defense weapons, sonic gear, aircraft radio identification, advance Base equipment and landing equipment.

(6) To all this must be added the total inadequacy of personnel. Deficiencies in the numbers required to man the ships at present in the Fleet are serious enough. When, however, it is realized that the Fleet is now short of personnel, that it will be called upon to further deplete its numbers to furnish its trained personnel to new construction, that even now the losses exceed the replacements, then this personnel deficiency added to the deficiencies in numbers of ships and essential material in ships, leads to the conclusion that the adequacy of the Pacific Fleet for the accomplishment of its war mission leaves much to be desired.

(B) CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION.**(a) Executed.**

Subsequent to organization of the U. S. Pacific Fleet on 1 February, 1941, the following changes have been executed:

(1) Battleship division THREE, YORKTOWN, Destroyer Squadrons EIGHT and NINE, Cruiser Division EIGHT, CINCINNATI, Patrol Squadron SIXTY-ONE, CIMARRON, SANGAMON, SANTEE, RELIEF, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, FULLER, HEYWOOD, LITTLE, MANLEY, STRINGHAM, McKEAN, BRANT, PARTRIDGE, ALGORMA, and KALMIA, were transferred to the Atlantic Fleet.

(2) Mine Division NINE was transferred to the Asiatic Fleet.

(3) New, converted, or recommissioned units were added to the Fleet: SAIL-FISH, TAMBOR, TAUTOG, THRESHER, TUNA, CURTISS, BOREAS, CASTOR, KASKASKIA, PLATTE, RAMAPO, SABINE, SEPULGA, NAVAJO, SEMINOLE, Patrol Squadron FORTY-FOUR.

(4) Submarine divisions and squadrons changed to new numbers on 1 June, 1941. Patrol plane squadrons and mine divisions were renumbered 30 June, 1941 and 1 July, 1941, respectively.

(b) Expected.

No changes in the basic organization of the Pacific Fleet are anticipated. New, converted, and recommissioned units are expected to join as they became available. These additional units are indicated in Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 6CN-1 (Cincpac Serial 01011).

[3]

PART II—OPERATIONS AND TRAINING**(A) EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULES.****(a) Policy regarding Fleet Employment.**

Caused by developments in the international situation, drastic changes have been made in Fleet employment during the fiscal year, 1941. Schedules were initially based on administrative organization and type controlled training, with certain periods set aside for the development of inter-type coordination and Fleet exercises. Under this system, ships averaged four operating weeks (of four or five days underway with week-ends in port for inspections and recreation) to two weeks in upkeep. With increasing necessity for basic war training and security measures in Fleet operating areas, transition to a Task Force operational program was effected. Two Task Forces were employed at first, each at sea and in port alternate weeks. This arrangement proved impracticable because of large fuel expenditures and loss of extended upkeep periods essential to material maintenance. With the organization of the Pacific Fleet, a three Task Force assignment was adopted to insure necessary coordinated Task Force training for war, to provide for instant transition to full war operational status, to conserve fuel, and permit most efficient use of repair ship upkeep facilities. Under this re-assignment, Task Forces averaged eight days at sea to thirteen in port. Of each underway period about five days are devoted to gunnery exercises and type training, three days to Task Force exercises. The time allocation to various activities under the current three Task Force system is satisfactory.

(b) Major changes in approved schedules.

(1) No major Fleet tactical period for an extended Fleet Problem was scheduled during the fiscal year 1941. In lieu thereof, shorter periods during which two or more Task Forces conducted joint exercises were scheduled as follows:

9-16 September 1940

3-5 March 1941

18-20 March 1941

14-26 May 1941

28 June-3 July 1941

(2) During a part of the 14-26 May 1941 period, joint Army-Navy exercises were conducted.

(3) Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1 was conducted by Commander Scouting Force in the San Clemente Area in late May and early June, 1941. This exercise was curtailed by withdrawal of the transports.

(4) The addition of leave, liberty, and recreation cruises from the Hawaiian Area to West Coast ports caused some disruption of schedules, which was more than compensated for by improved morale and reduction in logistic requirements.

(5) Numerous changes in schedules resulted from the degaussing program and restricted availabilities for increased anti-aircraft defense, splinter protection,

and radar installations. Time assignment to these items is decreasing as the program progresses.

(6) CHICAGO, PORTLAND, BROOKLYN, SAVANNAH and Destroyer Squadron THREE made a good will cruise to Australian and New Zealand ports from 3 March to 10 April, 1941. SANGAMON accompanied this force as far as Samoa.

(7) Escort trips to Manila were made by CONCORD and TRENTON, to Samoa by CONCORD, and to Midway by Cruiser Division EIGHT.

(B) *FLEET TRAINING.*

(a) *Phases of strategical and tactical training with review of results.*

Strategical training, other than that undertaken by the Fleet War Plans Section, has been limited to studies by individual commands of probable strategic areas and special situations existing therein. In setting up Fleet minor problems emphasis has been placed on rapid estimates of changing situations.

Tactical training has been based on probable war requirements and instant transition from exercise to full war operational status. To these ends the Fleet has been organized in three primary Task Forces:

[4] *Task Force ONE*—Covering Force.

6 BB, 5 CL, 1 CV, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.

Task Force TWO—Reconnoitering and Raiding Force.

3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CA, 3 CL, 1 OCL, 1 DL, 8 DD.

Task Force THREE—Amphibious Force.

8 CA, 1 CV, 2 DL, 16 DD, 5 SS, 5 DMS, 6 AP, 4 APD, 24 VP, Second

Marine Division less defense battalions and advanced base detachments.

Specific tactical situations have been presented to each of these Task Forces, for study in port, for game board exercises, and for test in the form of inter-type exercises or minor problems during operating periods at sea. Great benefit has accrued in the increased understanding of Task Force and Task Group commanders of the limitations and capabilities of the individual types and development of coordinating doctrines.

Operations have also included the conduct of Advanced Light Force and Submarine Practices; bombardment and landing exercises; photographic reconnaissance; attacks on the Fleet or smaller dispositions by air, submarines, and destroyers, both day and night; fueling at sea exercises in which all types fueled from tankers, and destroyers fueled from battleships, cruisers, and carriers; towing; mining; minesweeping.

Satisfactory doctrines have been developed for concerted action by patrol planes and submarines, patrol planes and destroyers, cruisers and destroyers.

New and more flexible cruising dispositions have been devised. Means of changing the front of a Fleet disposition and deploying during darkness have been developed and tested with all ships darkened.

The use of Radar is causing many changes in tactical ideas. Progressive training is underway in the use of this instrument and its tactical application to defense against day and night air, submarine, and destroyer attack. Training in Radar adaptation to gunnery is also proceeding. To develop the maximum usefulness of this equipment its installation in all ships and planes must be expedited, and the automatic feature for identifying friendly forces must be incorporated.

The change from peacetime to wartime training has been accompanied by unrelenting efforts toward realism. Appropriate material conditions and conditions of readiness are maintained underway, all ships except submarines are habitually darkened, actual anti-aircraft fire is opened on targets towed over Fleet dispositions, starshell have been used to develop night contacts, live depth charges have been used to condition submarine crews against this form of attack, and through cooperation with the Army, battle lookouts have been trained to recognize all types of aircraft now in use in the Hawaiian Area.

The rapid and continuous flow of personnel through the Fleet, transfer of trained men to new assignments, recruit replacements, substitution of reserve for regular officers, all tend to retard the training of the Fleet as a whole. Adjusting operating plans and schedules to accomplish basic training of new personnel, while bringing about a realistic preparation of a Fleet for war has required intense and strenuous efforts of officers and men.

Careful studies have been made of all available intelligence reports of foreign operations. Lessons learned therefrom are being steadily incorporated into the doctrines and training of all Fleet components.

(b) *GUNNERY TRAINING.*

(1) *BASIC AND GENERAL.*

With few exceptions the mandatory practices were completed by all ships of all types. Training was necessarily interrupted for installation of degaussing equipment, but the interruption served ships as a basic training period for new personnel which were received, in most, cases, during installation periods.

All types have tested and effected essential changes in ships' organizations to bring conditions of readiness into proper symmetry. These reorganizations of battle con- [5] ditions of readiness have effected an increase in offensive power for each condition, and, by more efficient use of man power, a decrease in work load per man.

All types have conducted extensive studies of the ammunition service of all batteries, with service ammunition. These studies have isolated faults and determined means for improving the drill requirements for ammunition service.

The necessity for the development and training of all forms of battle lookouts has been emphasized. Exercises both day and night, with increased realism, have been developed and every opportunity is used to conduct them.

The free inter-change of services between types, inter-type exercises, and intelligence bulletins, have brought out weaknesses of gunnery doctrines, with resultant correction and almost constant refinement.

The availability of Army coast defense triangulation stations during the past two quarters, for underway rangefinder calibration, has been especially valuable.

All types conducted successful gunnery schools. The schools emphasized fundamental training. In view of the large number of inexperienced officers in all types, and the increasing responsibility being forced upon all junior officers, these schools were invaluable.

Antiaircraft gunnery has improved in all types during the year. The degree of improvement is not measurable because of the great number of new personnel, both officers, and men, that have been trained, and because of the increased realism and difficulties that have been introduced in antiaircraft practices. It is manifest, however, that the satisfactory development of the antiaircraft batteries may be obtained only by continued emphasis and constant improvement in the methods of training.

Surface firings are in general satisfactory. It is evident in these batteries that performances were affected by the large percentages of inexperienced personnel.

All types have conducted simulated Fire Support and Shore Bombardment exercises. In addition, type doctrines for Fire Support and Shore Bombardment have been developed and promulgated. Heavy Cruisers and Destroyers have actually conducted one bombardment practice during which valuable lessons were learned.

The increasing degree of the emergency and the resultant operational restrictions, differences in the state of training of units of a type, and experiences from abroad, have gradually forced wider divergences from the conventional gunnery cycle. This has been evidenced by the development of new practices to fit conditions experienced abroad, and local restrictions, as well as the requests and recommendations by type commanders for greater latitude of discretion. The need for such latitude is apparent if progressive training is to keep pace with the ever changing and necessary demands of the international situation. Full latitude in the conduct of gunnery training has recently been granted by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(2) *IMPORTANT DETAILS.*

SUBMARINES.

During the past year authority was obtained from the Bureau of Ordnance to fire torpedoes six times between overhauls provided not more than thirty days elapsed between the first and last firings. This has resulted in a great increase in the number of torpedoes fired, especially on practice approaches, with consequent improvements in the condition of all submarines. This force has concentrated on the training of junior officers for command and especially in the art of torpedo firings which has permitted the junior officers to obtain a great deal of experience in actually firing torpedoes. Information from intelligence reports has indicated that a great deal of torpedo and gun firings from submarines by all belligerents has been conducted at night. Therefore the training in night approaches and torpedo firings has been greatly intensified. This training has also included the exercising of night lookouts in picking out and identifying targets. No night gun firings have been conducted this year, but it is planned to conduct them in the near future using remnant ammunition.

All submarines of Submarine Squadron TWO and some submarines of Submarine Squadron FOUR, have made mine plants of 32 mines which appears to be the limiting number than can be made in one continuous plant.

[6] Results obtained from the .50 caliber machine gun firings while better than the previous year are not considered satisfactory. Advantage has been taken of all quotas to the machine gun school assigned this force.

DESTROYERS.

Two Advanced Day Battle practices were conducted. One Squadron of destroyers and two light cruisers participated in each of these practices, which involved both gun and torpedo fire.

Two Advanced Light Force practices were participated in by destroyers. A high standard of torpedo performance was obtained.

Antiaircraft practices against radio controlled targets were fired at every opportunity and with considerable success. A type of surprise antiaircraft practice, which is the most realistic seen to date, was developed in destroyers and has since been adopted by all types.

The reduction of fire because of casualties associated with the loading of the gun continues to be a serious problem. The isolation of material failures from personnel mistakes is difficult in most cases, due primarily to inexperienced and constantly changing personnel. The suggested removal of loading machines from destroyers is considered to be courting disaster.

The lack of a supply of trained enlisted rangefinder operator-spotters, and the lack of time and facilities for selection and fundamental training in destroyers, is probably the largest single factor against attaining desired performance. The establishment of shore based rangefinder operator-spotter training centers, distinct from optical schools, would greatly improve this situation.

The performance of torpedoes over the year has been most satisfactory. The need for depth charge racks, extensions, and throwers, has become increasingly apparent. Particular consideration should be given in new construction to increasing the number of depth charges carried and to improved handling facilities.

The Sound School has produced a large number of competent sound operators during the year. Increased opportunities for sound training have been provided the destroyers in the Hawaiian Area. The results of practices and training runs have been satisfactory.

LIGHT CRUISERS.

10,000-ton Class.—These ships have demonstrated their ability to shoot fast and hit consistently at short and intermediate ranges. Their performances at night have been particularly impressive. There has been an appreciable improvement in spotting and control of gunfire over last year.

7,500-ton Class.—These ships have shown some improvement in hitting with their main batteries during this year. Increasing number of 3" 50 caliber guns from six to nine has improved antiaircraft defense, but lack of suitable control seriously reduces the potential effectiveness of this battery.

HEAVY CRUISERS.

Accuracy of range finders has been considerably improved as the result of frequent rangefinder calibration made possible by the services and cooperation of Harbor Defenses, Pearl Harbor. The value of these calibrations to effective gunners cannot be over emphasized.

Prompt opening salvos and continuous volume of fire have been continually stressed with improved results.

The lack of an adequate allowance of small arms ammunition has been a serious handicap in small arms training and firing, especially with the continual influx of new personnel. Consequently, little improvement has been made in the performance of these weapons.

[7] Heavy Cruisers have been reorganized so that all the anti-aircraft batteries are manned in Condition of Readiness II, and all of the 5" battery and part of the 3" and machine gun batteries in Condition of Readiness III.

CARRIERS.

Carrier gunnery has been affected by a congested schedule of operations. It has not been possible to conduct all mandatory practices, except in ENTERPRISE. Basic training has been stressed and successfully continued. Comprehensive training plans for lookouts have been instituted and progress is being made.

The effectiveness of RADAR equipment was successfully demonstrated in the YORKTOWN firing at a radio controlled target plane.

BATTLESHIPS.

The performance of battleships in gunnery for the past year is summarized:

- (1) Main batteries in general—good.
- (2) Antiaircraft batteries—fair.
- (3) Secondary batteries—poor to fair.

In spite of the considerable reduction in experienced personnel, their replacement by inexperienced personnel, and the increased complements, there has been and is now a progressive improvement apparent in gunnery activities in battleships.

Battleship training exercises have been revised and improved and additional exercises, covering aircraft surprise attack and lookout training, have been added.

An exercise to provide data for analysis and study, as to the cause of "lag on turns", is in effect.

The MISSISSIPPI established means for precise calibration of rangefinders in Pearl Harbor. This development was promulgated to the Pacific Fleet.

GUNNERY OBSERVATIONS.

Both day and night fall of shot observation has been made by available pilots of VO and VCS Wings whenever opportunity offered. Low altitude spotting stations at about 1500 feet were taken by several units for information and training. Carrier scouting squadrons also observed fall of shot as circumstances and heavy schedules permitted. Color identification of 6-inch splashes at long ranges was found difficult. In view of the high rate of fire of the main battery of light cruisers, spotting the individual salvos of the opening ladder proved impracticable after the battery had gone to continuous fire. By spotting the individual salvos of the opening ladder and then spotting only specifically designated salvos aircraft can effectively assist in spotting the main battery six inch fire.

AIRCRAFT.

Type gunnery schools for VF, VSB, and VT were again organized. They were originally scheduled for the San Diego area but it was necessary to establish them at Pearl Harbor as the majority of the Fleet remained in Hawaiian waters. The schools operated under difficulties due to dearth of firing areas, equipment, office, shops, and school room space, and transfer of experienced personnel. However, the value of the schools became more apparent as time progressed and as each squadron and aviation unit became depleted of its experienced personnel.

All mandatory and monthly training practices have been fired. Almost continuous training in IBP (Fixed Guns), IBP (Free Guns), IBP (Dive Bombing), and IBP (Depth Bombing) has been carried on to qualify all possible new personnel. Practically all required personnel have qualified in the above mentioned practices. The Monthly Aircraft Training Practices have been of great benefit in maintaining proficiency of personnel, insuring proper maintenance of material and providing an interesting periodic check-up in all phases of training. Due to the numerous unexpected changes in schedule and the influx of new personnel, less opportunity than formerly for investigation of experimental practices has been afforded, but very favorable progress was made in night bombing, together with night illumination, of UTAH.

[8] In the patrol wings, points of particular interest were the substitution of monthly training exercises for the old methods of concentrated training for various practices in succession, the introduction of low altitude glide bombing against submarines, the use of new delayed action high intensity flares for night bombing and torpedo attacks and the emphasis given torpedoes as a major offensive weapon for patrol planes. Concentrated gunnery training has been greatly curtailed, as it has in other aircraft units, by the exigencies of the expansion program and other operations in connection with security and transfer of units. The effect of this curtailment has been minimized as much as possible by using all available time and facilities for ground training.

ANTIAIRCRAFT.

This form of gunnery and its associated problems have been stressed over the year. Exercises have been placed in effect that provide training in tracking on combatant planes, plane identification, and surprise attacks by combatant aircraft simulating horizontal, dive and glide bombing, and torpedo plane attacks. In addition, units with ship based observation planes have developed exercises simulating the various forms of attack with own planes.

The need for competent antiaircraft control parties and gun crews in each condition watch has been emphasized, and all ships now have in training three or four crews, depending on the type. Exercises promulgated are designed to provide training for all crews.

Two types of practices have been developed which are deemed effective and realistic training. The first, a surprise attack, is by a radio controlled target against a single ship. The attack can take place at any time over an extended period, and serves to stimulate lookout training as well as control and battery

training. It is proposed to extend this practice to small formations of ships to develop the technique of formation aircraft defense.

The second practice developed is an attack by horizontal bombers against a Fleet disposition. The targets are sleeves, or flares, towed by utility wing planes. The ammunition allowance is limited to between ten and four rounds per ship. The exercise has been conducted in conjunction with other Fleet exercises, and in cruising, approach, and battle dispositions. It has served to add interest to the exercises, stimulate antiaircraft batteries and lookouts, and to assist in determining the adequacy, and weaknesses, of dispositions against various forms of attack or combinations of attacks.

UTAH conducted extensive firing in connection with the Fleet elementary and advanced anti-aircraft schools. It is believed that these schools, in 5" 25 caliber, 1" .175 caliber and .50 caliber anti-aircraft fire, provided exceedingly valuable training to the personnel of the Fleet and has led to improved anti-aircraft gunnery. However, with the percentage of hits obtained, ability to knock down drone aircraft is still most disappointing. Small fragmentation of the bursts seem to be a contributing factor. UTAH developed an open sight for the 5" 25 caliber gun which appears to give promise of considerable utility in local control, especially against dive bombing.

The Fleet Machine Gun School has served a most useful purpose, and its continuance is considered vital. In the face of a possible shortage in training and target practice ammunition for fifty-caliber guns, the need for such training, if acceptable efficiency with this gun is to be maintained, cannot be too forcefully stressed. Prior to the opening of the Fleet Machine Gun School at Puuloa, two classes were held aboard UTAH. The Puuloa school was ready for operation in January. Since that time 1003 students have completed the course. Of these 25 qualified as experts, 777 as gunners and 201 failed to qualify. When this school was forced to close because of lack of ammunition, a class in maintenance of machine guns was started. This activity has been most favorably received by the Fleet and much good is being accomplished.

MINING.

(a) *Gunnery.*—Two fifty-caliber machine guns have been installed on each AM and DM. The prescribed practices have been fired by all DM's. Two additional fifty-caliber machine guns are recommended for DM's.

Mine Divisions ONE and TWO have been provided with two portable depth charge racks. Each rack carries four depth charges and four spares are allowed. Each division has con- [9] ducted a depth charge practice and has dropped two live depth charges. Normally, when these divisions are operating as tactical units of the Fleet, the depth charge racks are carried mounted ready for use.

Mine Division NINE has had a depth charge rack installed holding six charges: two spare depth charges are allowed. The rack does not interfere with mining.

(b) *Mining.*—Several slight departures have been made necessary from prescribed practices by restricted use of areas.

A thorough investigation has been made into the causes of premature firings, and recommendations have been made to the Bureau of Ordnance to reduce the percentage of premature firings.

Shortages in material have been remedied, or additional items contracted for. Recommendations have been made for:

(1) The modification of deficient items, such as extender mechanisms, K2 Mod. 2 diaphragm assembly and pellet holder, method of float securing and releasing, and antennae winding.

(2) The distribution of available mines.

(3) Facilities necessary for the preparation of mines.

The Minecraft Mine School has qualified seventy-six men in Mk. VI and Mk. VII mines. The method of mine assembly has been changed to a production assembly line, with a view to preparing a nucleus for wartime assembly. This method of assembly was employed for Battle Mining Practice "Easy", and 285 Mk. VI mines were assembled in 2½ days (159 in the last day).

Minecraft completed the regularly scheduled plants and, in addition, ten experimental plants

MINESWEEPING.

The preliminary tests of the "O" Type and magnetic minesweeping equipment installed in Mine Division NINE appeared satisfactory. The magnetic sweeping equipment limits the time a ship can sweep because of the very rapid rise in battery temperature during the operation.

A semi-permanent mine field has been established off Oahu for training in the detection of mines by underwater sound equipment. The ability of trained operators to detect mines was established and some drill has been accomplished. Tests to determine the practicability of locating mines by aerial photography, or visual aircraft observation, have not given favorable results.

Base Force minesweepers have had more than the normal amount of training in minesweeping. The bird class sweepers conducted regular dawn sweeps of the area off Pearl Harbor. The high speed sweepers have done so less often. However, the high speed sweepers have drilled extensively in the various phases of minesweeping with the Fleet and independently. Their proficiency in the use of the gear provided may be considered as satisfactory. During the past year little improvement in sweeping gear and the technique of using it has been shown.

GENERAL.

Services for gunnery exercises to the Fleet have been provided with great difficulty during the past year. The increased demand for services has taxed facilities to the limit. The necessity for concentrating services in the Hawaiian Area has reduced the availability of these services on the West Coast to almost zero. The shortage of high speed towing ships and series 60 sled targets has been most keenly felt. One result of this has been that the ships of Mine Division SIX (formerly Mobile Target Division ONE) have had very little minesweeping exercise and two ships—BOGGS and LAMBERTON—have been unable to complete any of the prescribed gunnery during the year. Upkeep periods for this division have been shortened and occasionally interrupted. The officers and crews of these ships have done a splendid job.

The Fleet Camera Party has had an increased load incident to the greater number of ships served and the difficulties of services occasioned by operations at sea under conditions approximating those of war. A large number of young officers have received very valuable training while on temporary duty with the Camera Party.

[10] (c) ENGINEERING PERFORMANCES.

Engineering performances were generally satisfactory. A marked increase in hours underway and miles steamed was noted. As might be expected, under the operating conditions imposed, general increases in the fuel per mile were noted. Electric drive battleships were unable to maintain full power under tropical conditions due to limiting temperatures in the motor winding. Increased displacement, excessive fouling, and high injection temperatures combined to prevent a few ships from making the required full power R. P. M. Reliability has been excellent. The Engineering Competition was suspended as of midnight 30 April.

(d) COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) Training Program.

Throughout the year a continuous training program in rapid communications has been prosecuted with accent placed on securing efficient Task Organization command communications within the Fleet in the event of war.

Training in the use of cryptographic aids, military uses of the direction finder, underwater sound signaling, creating and avoiding interference and in radio deception have been actively prosecuted by Type Commanders by frequent standardized and impromptu drills with generally excellent results.

A heavy training load was placed on experienced communication personnel by the rapid influx of new men. Many Naval Reserve Communication ratings joined the Fleet, many, who were not properly qualified to perform the duties of their rate. These men had to be extensively trained before they were able to function in the communication organizations. The Transfer of numerous experienced men outside the Fleet resulted in placing comparatively new and inexperienced men in responsible positions where they were required by necessity to carry their share of the load. Although this resulted in some inefficiency at times, it was found that new men attained a state of efficiency after further training.

Individual training in proficiency in communication ratings has been prosecuted by ships utilizing the striker method, which, though inefficient as compared with shore based schools, has been employed of necessity. Where possible the shipboard striker method of training radio and visual has been augmented by schools at the Destroyer Base, San Diego, SubBase P. H., various air stations, and on tenders. The results of such school training has been excellent and the schools will be continued.

The increased use of voice circuits in the Pacific Fleet indicated the necessity for training of both officers and men in voice procedure. Such training has been

carried out, but further training remains necessary in this field. Particularly successful training and resultant improvement in voice radio circuits has been noted in Aircraft, Battle Force.

(2) *Control and Supervision.*

In order to train commanders afloat in their responsibilities in regard to communications the major responsibility of training program has been entrusted to Task Force and Type Commanders rather than using the standardized communication competition as was used in past years. For the same reasons Task Force Commanders have been required to prepare own communication plans based on standard communication doctrines. It has been emphasized throughout the year that communications are an integral function and responsibility of command.

A system of numerical designations of Task Organizations has become adopted which has simplified command communications and made possible the promulgation of radio frequency plans and call signs for any and all phases of a naval campaign. Particularly gratifying was the acquirement of the ability to organize and operate large or small Task Organizations composed of various type ships from unrelated administrative organizations without confusion or hiatus due to communications.

New administrative organization frequency plans have been issued which in general provide for all ships in any port being on one frequency, and eliminating the previously used system of assignment of frequencies to divisions and squadrons. Type frequencies have been allocated but are seldom used except for drills and exercises.

[11] (3) *Personnel.*

The communication personnel situation has continued to be acute due to transfers to new construction, to converted merchant ships, and to the expanding shore station facilities. The introduction of RADAR has also increased the duties of these men in the fleet units so equipped. The induction of a large number of reserve radiomen and the increased size of service schools has somewhat alleviated this situation so far as numbers are concerned; however, the personnel received from these sources are generally not qualified for the rates held and require from 6 months to a year's training within the Fleet before they are capable of taking the place of experienced personnel being lost to the Fleet. The service school graduate received as Radiomen third class could not in any respect fulfill that rate.

The sound enlisted personnel have suffered in a similar manner. This situation is being alleviated by the increase in the Sound School for Preliminary Training and an increase in the advanced training within the Fleet.

Reserve officers to a large extent have replaced regular officers in communication duties within the Fleet. These officers came to the Fleet untrained, and required extensive instruction before they could take over their duties.

(4) *Material, Visual.*

An urgent need for an improved type of visual blinker signal gun has become apparent since ships of the Fleet have been operating in a darkened condition at night. Bureau of Ships has cooperated with the Greenway Reflector Company in the development of a blinker signal gun which will have a limited arc of visibility and control of range visibility. It is expected that 25 of these signal guns will be received on or about 25 July 1941 for service test in the Pacific Fleet.

Experiments have been conducted in the various types of ships within the Fleet with a low power flashing light mounted on 7 x 50 binoculars. Reports received from forces afloat indicate that this experimental light is practicable and provides greater security than the present blinker gun when ships are operating in a darkened condition, at night. Recommendations will be submitted regarding the manufacture of this light.

New signal halyards have been installed in the ARIZONA, PENNSYLVANIA, NEVADA and OKLAHOMA. These yardarms slope aft at an angle from the athwartship line and give a desirable offset to adjacent flag hoists and tend to keep the signal halyards from fouling the anti-aircraft directors. This arrangement is a decided improvement. In Battleship Division THREE the signal bridge was located on the mainmast and the arrangements for visual signalling in these ships is unsatisfactory. Lack of quick control, the use of exposed and fragile loud speakers, absence of secondary hoists, and obstructions account for the unsatisfactory arrangement. It is considered that the primary signal station should be in the vicinity of the foremast in this division.

There is an urgent need for improved recognition devices at night between surface ships and aircraft and between submarines and aircraft. Much use has been

made of the recognition device in current use on surface ships. In order to use any recognition device quickly and accurately, personnel must be trained constantly in its use. There has been considerable training in the use of the current device during the past year.

(5) *Material—Radio.*

(a) *Underwater Sound.*

Super-sonic depth finders continue to function satisfactorily in all types. During the year the existing modernization program in destroyers for super-sonic echo-ranging equipment was completed. The modification of single-frequency (24 Kcs.) installation in DD's 347-393 by two-frequency installations (20 Kcs. and 24 Kcs.) is now in progress although considerable delay is being experienced in obtaining delivery of material. The installation of echo-ranging equipment in the remaining light minelayers, and high speed minesweepers is sorely needed and when received will increase materially the utility of these types to the Fleet. The delivery of sound equipment is slow and recommendations have been made to speed up this procurement program.

[12] Aircraft. Battle Force, experimented during the year with the development of a combined oxygen-microphone mask for high altitude flights; encouraging results have been attained.

Frequency or amplitude modulated super-frequency equipment, Model CXAB CXAC has been installed in the CALIFORNIA, TENNESSEE, and OKLAHOMA. Tests of this equipment are now in progress. Ultra-high frequency amplitude modulated TCD RAR equipment is being installed in Crudiv SIX.

(b) *Research and Experimental.*

Battleships have continued to experiment with the reception of weak radio signals to determine what improvements are necessary.

Considerable work has been done in submarines to receive low frequency shore station radio signals under water. The results of these experiments have been most gratifying and should prove invaluable for war operations.

Considerable experimenting has been done with RADAR equipment, now installed, to improve its performance and reliability.

The U. S. Naval Radio Laboratory, San Diego, Calif., has cooperated with the Fleet units present in San Diego in essential work, tests and repair beyond the capacities of these units.

During the past year considerable wave propagation data was accumulated covering the frequencies used by patrol planes. A number of clear channel harmonically related series were found to give excellent signals, day and night, during trans-Pacific ferry flights.

Project Baker in Patrol Wing ONE continued experiments and tests with Blind Landing Equipment, together with numerous other tests of ultra-high frequency receivers, antennae, aircraft direction finders, and miscellaneous radio equipment.

(c) *General.*

The frequency coverage of radio equipment within the Fleet, particularly in the smaller units, has proved to be a serious handicap in the working up of frequency plans for the various Task Forces. If all ships were able to use any frequency from 195 to 18,100 Kcs. for transmitting and receiving, considerable simplification would result in the structure of frequency plans for command communications.

As a whole radio equipment is reliable, effective and easy to operate. In some instances crystal control equipment cuts down the necessary flexibility.

During the year the procurement program of new equipment went forward but still the lack of modern equipment was seriously felt in some units.

Installation of ultra-high frequency equipment in destroyers, light minelayers, and high speed minesweepers was completed during the year.

New aircraft homing equipment has been installed in LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. The associated plane equipment, has been received in limited quantities in LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE air groups. Preliminary tests indicate that this equipment is of great value to ship-based aviation, both for military and safety purpose.

The LEXINGTON is in need of modernization of its radio transmitters.

Satisfactory ship board radio direction finding ability above 1000 Kcs. continues to be an unsolved problem.

All radio direction finders on the BROOKLYN class cruisers have been moved from a position immediately abaft the foremast to a position on the searchlight platform. The resultant improvement in operation has been gratifying.

Receiving antennae and correctors for direction finders have been moved to cut down or eliminate interference with anti-aircraft gunfire.

In a large number of ships the old type TAV is still the only portable radio equipment aboard and is inadequate for the use for which it was designed.

[13] Modernization of the radio installation on the NARWHAL, NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT were authorized. The LITCHFIELD will be equipped as a radio relay vessel with a complete new set of radio and sound equipment during its coming overhaul.

There is an urgent need for a voice transmitter, with a frequency range of 2000-18000 Kcs. in a large number of ships, particularly in flagships. This deficiency is being remedied by the Bureau of Ships procurement program.

One of the bottlenecks in outfitting new patrol plane squadrons has been the supply of radio equipment. The practice of making the radio installation after delivery of the plane by the contractor is being discontinued. The contractor will deliver the aircraft complete, and better radio installation may be expected.

Air station efficiency and usefulness to the Fleet have suffered due to poor delivery of essential communication apparatus.

(6) Security.

General:

A marked improvement in Fleet attitude toward security of communication occurred during the year. Senior officers, force, and type commanders evidenced more interest in, and a greater appreciation of the general principles and technical aspects of the subject. This was brought about less by purely communication considerations than by the general atmosphere of the times, by the continuation of the communication mobilization, and by the increasing emphasis which has been placed upon security of ship movements and naval information.

Considerable progress was made toward further reduction of administrative despatch traffic. However, there still exist many administrative procedures for which despatches are used to an excessive degree. These concern principally personnel matters and administration of material between shore activities and the forces afloat.

It has been noted that shore activities frequently send messages to ships with either a specific request, or an inference given by too high a precedence designation, that a radio reply be made immediately. In the case of an individual ship receiving such a message from a senior officer ashore, the radio reply is usually made, even though the importance of the matter involved may not actually warrant such reply. This situation is believed due to a combination of lack of concern by commands ashore with communication security afloat, and to the lack of regular line officer supervision of communications in the shore establishments.

In conformity with the requirement of the communication mobilization that radio traffic shall be reduced to a minimum, ships of the Pacific Fleet were directed to drastically reduce the number of administrative radio messages sent, and to give consideration to the use of mail in replying to despatches received from shore activities.

The presence of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, with attendant lack of rapid and frequent mail service, has caused the origination of many despatches which would otherwise have been unnecessary.

It is emphasized that the question of communication security is a basic one, involving the entire naval establishment. Adequate security requires extensive education and whole hearted cooperation of all hands, plus the setting of a proper example by high commands ashore and afloat.

The change from a "peacetime communication mobilization for training" to an "actual communication mobilization for threatened hostilities" effected on 12 May by Alnav 45, did not produce the desired result. Due principally to the fact that Alnav 45 authorized use of plain language for a number of categories of despatches, some of which have no place in any bona-fide mobilization set up, and at the same time directed reduction of radio traffic to a minimum, confusion inevitably resulted, and an increase of radio traffic (mostly plain language) occurred. Immediate steps were taken to reduce this traffic in the Pacific Fleet.

Cryptographic Security:

The abolition of NRC-3 on 1 April was a notable advance toward achievement of a satisfactory state of cryptographic security. However, this advance was in some measure nullified by certain of the plain language authorizations of Alnav 45.

[14] Cryptographic systems furnished the Fleet were inadequate, especially regarding: (1) Unsatisfactory call sign cipher, (2) Obsolescent contact and air-

craft codes, (3) No joint Army-Navy aircraft and lower command systems, (4) No detailed instructions for cryptographic security, (5) No rapid system for small units (ECM Mk. II is now in production), (6) Obsolete crypto-channel charts, (7) Lack of proper ROB and war reserve editions of all systems, (8) Unconcealed external indicators, (9) Unsatisfactory authenticator and radio Operator's Signal cipher, (10) No fire control code for landing operations.

Due to the large number of untrained communication personnel and the failure to provide the Fleet with proper instructions in cryptographic security, errors and delays increased. Stress was placed on the thorough training of coding boards to counteract these mistakes. No systems were considered compromised through misuse by the Fleet except in the case of the lowest restricted system which is inherently short-lived due to the large volume of traffic and nature of its text. No ROB edition for this cipher has yet been designated. In general, few ROB editions were available for replacement of compromised or out-lived codes and ciphers.

Radio Security:

The number of radio messages sent was materially reduced by increased use of mailgrams. The use of unnecessary information addresses in despatches was discouraged. However, the practice of sending despatches for information to all commands who could conceivably have an interest in the subject matter is a deep-rooted habit of long standing throughout the entire Naval Service. This practice greatly facilitates the process of traffic analysis and is highly detrimental to security. The Pacific Fleet has been directed to inform necessary information addressees by mailgram where practicable, omitting their call signs from radio headings.

Many plain language messages in the categories listed in Alnav 45 have, by their number, headings, and contents, disclosed classified information when taken in the aggregate, although individual messages did not appear to do so. This applies particularly to Class E. personnel, Navy Relief, and certain matériel messages, which have been a fruitful source of information on ship movements. The classification of movement reports as confidential is futile if the information contained therein is to be divulged through plain language messages on other subjects.

The desire of commanders afloat to insure that radio communication with their units unquestionably exists at all times during tactical exercises, has resulted in considerable "testing" and "lining up" of circuits at times when the condition of radio silence in effect actually prohibited such procedure. Consequently, radio security during tactical exercises cannot be said to have been satisfactory. It is obvious that security, and real wartime training in this regard, will not be obtained unless those in command are willing to sacrifice habitual clockwork precision in conducting peacetime training operations, with a view toward studying and analyzing failures in instant radio communication, which are certain to occur during prolonged periods of radio silence.

In Fleet tactical periods, stress was placed upon the use of authenticators and changing call signs.

Radio call signs:

The lack of a rapid, secure, compact and universal method of enciphering radio call signs is the most serious security deficiency in the Fleet today. The adoption of a numerical system of task organization designation, and the corresponding use of visual call signs (which were the only suitable ones available) rendered obsolete the radio call sign device then in effect. The cipher (in reserve status) subsequently issued for encrypting visual call signs is slow and cumbersome. A more rapid-call sign cipher has been developed and submitted to the Navy Department for consideration.

Coding Boards:

At the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, the use of reliable petty officers for coding board duties was authorized for all restricted despatches, as well as for confidential exercise traffic. This has been of inestimable value to the smaller ships. The number of enlisted men assigned to coding duties was limited within the Pacific Fleet to a maximum of four per ship.

It has been obvious from encrypted traffic examined that enlisted personnel and reserve officers assigned to coding duties have been insufficiently trained. Multitudes of inexcusable cryptographic errors, clearly covered by existing instructions, have been noted. The responsibility for this condition is directly that of regular line officer supervisor personnel. Steps have been taken to correct this situation although satisfactory results cannot be expected until the Fleet is furnished adequate instructions for cryptographic security.

[15] Physical Security:

The state of physical security of registered publications in the Pacific Fleet has been unsatisfactory. Many cases have occurred of registered publications being blown overboard, lost from aircraft, removed from staterooms, or otherwise found to be missing. Cases of probable compromise were few. However, nearly all the cases of loss indicated carelessness.

At the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, all registered publications except cryptographic aids and a few tactical publications necessary for training and operations were removed from submarines for the duration of the emergency.

(e) DAMAGE CONTROL.

The merits attained in Damage Control Practices held during the year were not high. This is believed due to a recognition of the necessity for realism, and the general tautening which resulted. Casualties listed in intelligence reports have been studied and solutions worked out. Exercises in shoring have been stressed; also in effecting repairs to carrier flight decks. Security measures dictated the curtailing of the underway portions of the practices toward the latter part of the year. In the older ships, inadequate ventilation when operating for extended periods under required conditions, adversely affects the efficiency of the personnel. Action has been initiated to correct this.

(f) Aviation.**(1) Carriers and Carrier Aircraft.**

New and advanced types of planes, together with the large influx of inexperienced personnel, have resulted in necessity for careful scanning and standardization of carrier operating technique.

The newer types of planes are in general larger than their type predecessors. Difficulty of operating full carrier groups has increased due to this feature. Receipt of folding wing aircraft of all carrier types is expected to ease this difficulty in the future. While the number of accidents in carrier aviation has increased, this is largely due to the large increase in both number of pilots and total flying hours and it is considered that the ratio of accidents to number of pilots or to total flying hours is about the same as for the previous year.

The continuing and increasing flow of new personnel as the aviation expansion program develops has made it mandatory to provide some form of pre-fleet training to bridge the gap between primary qualification and responsible duty in active combat squadrons in the Fleet. Initial steps to fill this need, extending to development of carrier replacement groups, have been taken.

Two very important needs have clearly developed. Both must be met if our limited number of aircraft carriers is to remain sufficiently available for their primary mission of active duty with the Fleet. The first of these is converted merchant vessels for carrier flight deck training in connection with the pre-fleet indoctrination of new personnel. The second is the conversion as necessary of merchant or sea-train vessels for transportation of aircraft, for which duty regular aircraft carriers have, lacking other suitable means, been employed extensively during the past year.

(2) Battleship and Cruiser Aircraft.

The majority of the training effort in battleship and cruiser aircraft during the past year has been devoted to the training and indoctrination of green personnel. The aviation units have been largely drained of experienced pilots, radiomen, and maintenance personnel, and their places have been taken, in the main, by recent graduates from Pensacola and by inexperienced enlisted men. This has resulted in a tendency toward decrease in efficiency. Coincident with efforts to train flight personnel in strictly flying duties, much successful work has been accomplished toward the improvement of their water work and seamanship.

The training of green personnel can best be continued in the ships in which they are required to operate. It has recently become apparent, however, that the only satisfactory way in which to do this is to hold on board the personnel which they replace until the new personnel are suitably qualified for Fleet responsibilities. This must be done if adequate combat readiness is to be maintained.

[16] Increased attention has been directed toward instrument training and night flying. Flight time per pilot and per plane have been increased, and Fleet operating schedules have resulted in increasing the proportion of embarked operations, with consequent marked improvement in shipboard handling of aircraft incident to launching and recovery.

Although two or more squadrons were simultaneously shore-based temporarily at the Naval Air Stations, San Pedro and Pearl Harbor, for short periods, no squadron or wing concentration has been held and it has, therefore, been somewhat more difficult to coordinate the air training of the units. Night recoveries of aircraft have been conducted on one or more occasions by Cruisers, Scouting Force, and by each unit of Cruisers, Battle Force, except the ST. LOUIS, which joined late in the year and shortly thereafter went to the Navy Yard. Night recoveries are feasible, but only under medium sea and wind conditions. Training in navigational flights up to 200 miles has been conducted. Training of new personnel in navigational flights is continually underway. Communications have been generally satisfactory although continuous training must be stressed in view of the fact that new personnel are being received constantly.

The Battle Force and Scouting Force Aviation Repair Units attached to the U. S. S. MEDUSA and KINGFISHER, respectively, operating as one unit at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, were invaluable in services rendered to the VO-VS units in the Hawaiian Area. Without their repair facilities it is doubtful whether the units would have been able to function properly due to the number of planes awaiting repairs, or engine and structural changes impossible of accomplishment aboard ship, or to the overloaded facilities of the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

The use of VO-VS aircraft for anti-submarine patrols has increased during the year and the cooperation of the submarine force has enabled them to receive exceedingly valuable training in actual bombing, with miniature bombs, of submarines at fully extended periscope depth.

Also, the use of VO-VS aircraft for training of A. A. batteries in all types of attacks—horizontal, dive bombing, and even torpedo plane attacks—has increased as has the service of towing of sleeves for machine gun practices.

(3) *Patrol Aircraft.*

There has been an unavoidable trend toward lowering of the state of training of patrol squadrons during the year as a result of reduction of the average experience level with transfers of experienced personnel to meet the demands of the expansion and training programs. The rapid shift of squadrons to other commands, the formation of new squadrons, the high turn-over of personnel and the necessary concentration of effort on the basic training of fresh personnel have all contributed to this.

Patrol squadrons are still functioning on the basis of single crews for flight and maintenance. Recently approved increased complements will eventually correct this deficiency and make it possible to obtain results more nearly approaching the potentialities of the planes.

Action has been initiated to provide for the training of pilot and flight crew personnel in sufficient numbers to meet demands resulting both from increased complements and increased numbers of patrol plane squadrons. Pre-fleet, or transition, training for all concerned is mandatory and requires considerable time for each individual if the patrol squadrons are to be able to perform required Fleet missions. More important than any other feature of the program is the provision of the necessary enlisted personnel in time for adequate training prior to deliveries of the planes they must man.

During the year, training and qualification of patrol plane commanders has been the major mission in Wings ONE, FOUR and SIX. Wing TWO has suffered less turn-over of personnel and consequently has been able to conduct its training more thoroughly, although a heavy patrol schedule in connection with the Fleet's presence in Hawaiian waters has caused some interference with the training program. Patrol ONE has conducted advance base operations from San Pedro. Advanced base operations have been conducted from Hilo, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, French Frigate Shoals, Canton and Funafuti.

Patrol Wing FOUR resumed operations in Alaskan waters commencing March 31, with Patrol Squadron Forty-one basing at Sitka. Advanced base operations were conducted at San Diego, Tongue Point, San Francisco and Kodiak. Patrol Squadron Forty-Three trans- [17] ferred P2Y airplanes to Pensacola, with stops at Magdalena Bay, Acapulco, Carmen and Corpus Christi.

With the delivery of P2Y models to training activities at Pensacola via Mexico (Acapulco to Carmen), deliveries of new models and transfer of PBY models are currently being made in flights overland across the southwestern states.

(4) *Utility Wing.*

Utility Squadrons ONE and TWO provided considerably more services to the Fleet than in the past because of increased Fleet activity. Their services consisted of Towing anti-aircraft targets, photographic flights for gunnery, torpedo

and experimental practices, aerial mapping, mail and rescue flights, recovery of torpedoes and transportation of passengers.

Utility Squadron THREE continued to provide most satisfactorily and increased volume of services assigned by special directives, the results of which have been covered in confidential reports. While operating from Maui airport this squadron has, in addition to providing services, supervised and administered the airport for the greater part of the year.

A detachment of two JRS-1 airplanes, plus two J2F airplanes with personnel from Utility Squadron TWO, continued basing at Norfolk, Virginia, for the purpose of rendering necessary services to Fleet Units based on the East Coast. This unit was designed as Utility Squadron FOUR in November, 1940, and jurisdiction was transferred to Commander Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet. A detachment of six to eight J2F airplanes with personnel from Utility Squadron TWO was based in the Hawaiian area to augment the services available in Utility Squadron ONE.

Utility Squadron TWO at San Diego was occupied in receiving PBV airplanes and training pilots and mechanics in this type. In addition, this squadron rendered services to Fleet Units in the San Diego Area. On June 20, 1941, four PBV type airplanes manned by Utility Squadron TWO personnel, were ferried from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. These planes will provide additional services to the Fleet. Besides the services rendered, every opportunity was taken to train pilots in instrument flying, night flying, and familiarization in the various types of planes.

(5) *Tenders.*

One modern AV (the CURTISS) was assigned in June to Aircraft, Scouting Force. As a newly commissioned vessel, her state of training is therefore not up to that of the rest of the Fleet.

The state of training of the WRIGHT, the AVD's and the AVP's, (all old ships) is very good considering the serious limitations of their age and general unsuitability of design. The well-known features of these types should need no elaboration. They are stop-gaps only, and need replacement.

In addition to providing services at normal and advanced bases, the AVP and AVD tenders have participated as plane guards on the overseas flights to and from Hawaii, and in the southbound flights to Pensacola across Mexico. In the Hawaiian area the tenders have been employed on a considerable scale in the advance base operations at outlying islands and in the transfers of VPB aircraft via air to Manila.

(6) *Aerology:*

Aerological services to the Fleet have been reorganized during the year by the establishment of a Fleet Weather Central located at Ford Island under Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

All Fleet weather and ballistic information emanates from this central. This information is augmented by the aerological units afloat through visual communications.

Aerological officers and enlisted aerographers assist in the operation and development of the Fleet Weather Central when the ships to which their units are attached are anchored in Pearl Harbor. This practice serves to educate personnel and develop the organization.

[18] All aerological reports from vessels of the Pacific Fleet have been limited to Naval addresses and encoded in Navy cipher for reasons of security of ships movements.

Every effort has been made to develop the aerological organization along the lines of complete mobilization of communications.

An exchange of coded analyzed weather maps has been established between the Fleet Weather Central and the weather central attached to the Twelfth Naval District. This exchange has been on a semi-weekly basis. Arrangements have been made to commence a daily exchange of such maps between the weather centrals at San Francisco, Pearl Harbor, and Cavite, P. I. These coded maps will be available to vessels of the Pacific Fleet by interception and will cover the entire North Pacific.

Preliminary arrangements have been made to obtain coded weather reports from South Pacific Islands, New Zealand and Australia. Weather codes have been exchanged between interested agencies, eventually a complete North and South Pacific map will be prepared daily by this Weather Central.

The installation of raysonde equipment on various islands of the north and south Pacific is contemplated in the near future, radio personnel qualified to operate such equipment have been trained and stationed.

The need for additional weather information from the Alaskan Area is marked. With the development of additional air stations in Alaska it is felt that the establishment of a weather central at Kodiak which will eventually exchange coded maps with the three centrals before mentioned, will furnish a detailed composite North Pacific map and thereby completely cover all possible areas of operation in the North Pacific.

(g) *Landing Force Operations.*

(1) *Army-Navy Joint Exercises.*

Units of the Pacific Fleet, Fourteenth Naval District, and all echelons of the Hawaiian Department participated in joint exercises during the period May 14-26, 1941. The exercises involved offense by fleet forces plans for Hawaii. Specific operations carried out by fleet units were air attacks; submarine attacks, including entrance to harbors; mining; bombardment; offensive blocking of channels; and landings, including simulated demolition of installations and capture of outlying airfields. The fleet forces employed in these exercises were Aircraft Carriers, 9 Cruisers, 13 Destroyers, 4 Minelayers, 5 Submarines, 4 Auxiliaries (simulating transports), and a Marine Air Group.

(2) *Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise Number One.*

Pacific Fleet Landing Exercise Number One was conducted in the San Clemente area during the period May 14-June 18, 1941. The exercise consisted of the approach of a Naval Attack Force to San Clemente which was defended by air, surface vessels, submarines, and land forces. Later, bombardment by heavy cruisers and destroyers, using service ammunition, was executed against shore targets. A landing from transports was to have been executed by the Second Marine Division but this had to be abandoned because of the departure of all transports and the Sixth Marines from the San Diego area. A token landing of one motor launch from each heavy cruiser was executed without incident. Despite the curtailment of the exercise, valuable training was obtained from joint staff work, planning, and the phases it was possible to execute.

(3) *Miscellaneous Landing Force Activities.*

(a) On November 7, 1940, Cruiser Division Four, Five and Six participated in an exercise which consisted of furnishing a marine landing force, boats and boats' crews, communication personnel, and simulated naval gunfire support for the landing.

(b) Patrol Wing One conducted elementary air infantry training with the First Battalion, Sixth Marines. Practicability of transporting air infantry by patrol aircraft was demonstrated.

(c) On May 29, 1941, aerial reconnaissance of an atoll, simulated bombardment, and landing for demolition at Johnston Island were conducted.

(d) As part of the Heavy Cruiser Main Battery Gunnery School, U. S. S. PORTLAND bombarded a shore objective at Pakini Military Reservation. This practice was marked by the great accuracy of fire.

[19] (e) Action has been taken to establish in Hawaii a reinforced regiment of the Second Marine Division, in order to advance all phases of landing force training and to have an amphibious force available in an emergency.

(f) The Second Marine Division has conducted field and landing training. Curtailment of efficiency and training activities has resulted from transfer of Sixth Regiment and all transports to the Atlantic area, from limitations on ammunition allowances, from lack of personnel and essential equipment, and from the necessity of maintaining one regiment at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, for guard and police duties.

(h) *BASES.*

(1) *West Coast.*

During the year, the facilities of West Coast bases have been employed only for regularly scheduled Navy Yard overhauls, interim dockings, replenishment of ships present on recreation cruises and for special work such as degaussing, installation of King Board alterations, etc.

The San Pedro—San Diego area continues to offer the best facilities for peacetime training of the Fleet. Except for adequate shore-based A. A. defense (an Army responsibility), and with the completion of the underwater defenses now in process of installation, this area will be a satisfactory base for wartime use should a situation arise that would make its use desirable. It is hoped that continued emphasis on the relative susceptibility in the Army's material and training situation will result in marked improvement in the A. A. defenses.

San Diego.—The recently completed projects of providing four additional carrier berths, the expansion of the Destroyer Base, the air field on San Clemente and

additional outlying fields for the Naval Air Station have greatly added to the potential value of this base. Work on the new patrol plane base is in progress.

San Pedro.—Work on the breakwater extension the new drydock and the underwater defenses of this base is concurrently in progress. The installation of underwater defenses will result in some curtailment of berthing space, but, as the breakwater extension progresses, this situation will correct itself. Private shipbuilding and repair facilities have been more extensively utilized during the past year.

San Francisco.—The Naval Station at Alameda was commissioned November 1, 1940. The Oakland Supply Depot is still in progress of construction. Underwater defenses of the harbor are in process of installation. The acquisition, by the Navy, of Treasure Island, as a base for Local Defense Craft, and of the drydocks at Hunter's Point has added greatly to the value of San Francisco as a Fleet Base. Additions to the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, and the enlargement of the mine assembly plant and loading dock at that place, when completed, will materially improve the stowage and facilities for handling ammunition for the Fleet. Regardless of where the Fleet may be based in the Pacific, San Francisco is and will continue to be of major importance as a source and point of embarkation of supplies, men and material, and Mare Island will continue as an important overhaul yard for cruisers, destroyers, submarines, auxiliaries and smaller craft.

Puget Sound.—The Naval Air Station at Tongue Point, Oregon was commissioned December 10, 1940. It is uncompleted, but facilities for VPB operations are being provided. The facilities at the Naval Air Station, Seattle, are complete for normal operations, but there is need for more accessible ammunition stowage and re-arming arrangements. These are being provided under present projects. When underwater defenses at Port Townsend and Rich Passage are laid, a considerable portion of the Fleet could be based on this area if the necessity should arise.

Barracks and messing accommodations, at the navy yard, for crews of vessels undergoing overhaul are a present important deficiency. It is understood that this is being corrected by new construction.

(2) *Alaska.*

Sitka.—This air station is still in progress of construction. Due for completion about September 1941, it has been used for patrol plane operations and may be considered satisfactory for operations of one squadron at the present time.

[20] *Kodiak.*—This station is due for completion in September 1942. It includes a landplane field for emergency use and will, when completed, provide facilities for operation of 4 squadrons of patrol planes, as well as services to planes operating farther westward in the Aleutian chain. Last estimates received indicated that Kodiak would be useable to a certain degree as a base for one squadron as of May 1, 1941.

Uualaska.—Work on the Naval Air Station at Dutch Harbor is well underway and is being accelerated. It will eventually provide facilities for operation of one squadron of patrol planes. Last estimates received gave June 1, 1941, as the probable date of its being useable to some degree by a limited number of planes.

(3) *Hawaiian Area.*

Pearl Harbor.—Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report either have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facilities for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists. It is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of the work at Barber's Point—sometime in the future.

Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity of the yard will be materially increased.

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other require-

ments of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard to such forces is as follows:

- (1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.
- (2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.
- (3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.
- (c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.

Kaneohe Bay.—The Naval Air Station Kaneohe was commissioned February 15, 1941. It is still uncompleted, but is in operating condition and three squadrons are now based thereon. Communications, ammunition stowage and handling, and provision for night flying are the principal present deficiencies.

Outlying Fields.—Outlying or auxiliary fields are in operating condition at Maui, Molokai, and Ewa.

Maui provides facilities for Utility Squadron Three and for semi-permanent operation of one carrier group. Widening and lengthening of runways is being accomplished by C. A. A. Molokai has limited facilities for day to day operation of one carrier group. Runways are being improved by C. A. A. Ewa has a partial cross runway 300' x 1800' and is in use, in an expeditionary status, by the Second Marine Air Group. Permanent runway and other minor improvements are being provided.

Development of Kechi lagoon as a civil air base has been started, with C. A. A. funds. When completed, this will provide an alternate operating base for VP planes and will be an important contribution to the defense of this area.

Outlying Fields.

Midway.—This station, as originally planned, is now nearing completion. Latest estimates give a date of November 1, 1941, with an additional 18–19 months for completion of the projected Submarine Base. It is useable for two patrol plane squadrons in emer- [21] gencies. A landing strip, now useable in emergency by carrier planes is nearing completion on Eastern Island. No other facilities for land planes are being provided. Shore defenses have been installed at Midway and a Defense Battalion established there. The Naval Air Station, Midway, is scheduled for commissioning on August 1, 1941.

Johnston.—This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is at present useable by one squadron, with tender. Shore defenses have been installed and nucleus Marine personnel established there. Magazines, fresh water distilling apparatus, housing and cold storage facilities for the defense garrison are being provided. A landing strip on Johnston Island has recently been removed from the augmented project for this station. It should be restored. The Naval Air Station, Johnston Island, is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

Palmyra.—This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is useable at present by 6 VPB, with tender. Landplane runway is being provided. Shore defenses and nucleus of defense personnel have been established. The Naval Air Station Palmyra is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

Wake.—Construction at Wake is now well underway and, although work is in initial stages, substantial progress is being made. Presently planned projects are due for completion about December 1942. Landplane runways are a part of the project. In emergency, one squadron, utilizing contractor's and P. A. A. facilities, can conduct limited operations from Wake at the present time. There is no useable channel for tenders into the lagoon at this time. It is contemplated that some shore defenses will soon be established there.

(5) *Samoa.*

Considerable expansion of the establishment at this station is now underway. Fuel oil, diesel and gasoline storage, net depot, seaplane facilities, landing field and barracks and mess hall for defense personnel are being provided. This work is currently estimated for completion January–March 1943. Samoa is not suitable for heavy load operations of VPB's, but is satisfactory for emergency landings and light load take-offs. Marine defenses and a Marine Defense Battalion are established there.

(6) *Guam.*

Some bomb-proofing, construction of fuel oil storage and harbor improvements are underway at Guam. Present projects are scheduled for completion in January 1943.

(C) *TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS.*

(a) The following publications were newly issued or revised and reissued within the Fleet during the year:

- (1) By Commander Battleships, Battle Force:
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 1-40 (Analysis of Tactical Advantage in Battle Line Engagements).
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 2-40 (Instructions Regarding Methods of Changing Battle Line Formation Axis).
 Bulletin of Tactical Information 1-41 (Measures to Decrease the Effectiveness of Enemy Air Attacks).
- (2) By Commander Aircraft, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 74 }
 U. S. F. 75 } Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U. S. Fleet Aircraft and
 U. S. F. 77 } Aircraft Carriers.
 U. S. F. 78 }
- (3) By Commander Destroyers, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 32 (Revised)—Destroyer Tactical Instructions.
 U. S. F. 33 (Revised)—Destroyer Doctrine.
 [22] D. T. B. 2-40—Night Search and Attack (revised).
 D. T. B. 1-41—Joint Operations of Patrol Planes and Destroyers (new).
- (4) By Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, and Commander Cruisers, Battle Force:
 U. S. F. 20—Cruisers Tactical Orders.
 U. S. F. 21—Cruisers Doctrine.
- (5) By all types:
 Revised Training Exercises.
- (b) The following publications were in course of preparation at the end of the year:
- (1) By Commander Destroyers, Battle Force:
 D. T. B. 2-41—Gunnery Doctrine and Fire Control Procedures (5" 38 Gun Destroyers) (Revised).
 D. T. B. 3-41—Destroyer Smoke Screen Tactics (New).
- (c) Fleet Tactical Boards are currently studying the following problems with a view to establishing doctrines and standard procedures:
- (1) Fleet Air Defense.
 (2) Coordinated Cruiser—Destroyer Action in Night Search and Attack.
- (d) Tentative Revised General Tactical Instructions (F. T. P. 183 and 188) have been in effect since 15 September, 1940. These publications are a great improvement over those they replaced, but numerous modifications and corrections are required before final printing. Recommendations in the premises are in preparation.
- (e) Revision of War Instructions, 1934, should be printed and distributed at the earliest practicable date. Comments and recommendations covering the proposed revision were forwarded on 25 January, 1941.

[23]

PART III—MATERIAL

(A) CHARACTERISTICS AND MATERIAL CONDITION OF SHIPS.

GENERAL—The material condition of the ships of the Fleet is very good. The principal deficiencies are the lack of RADAR equipment, the increased displacement, the inadequate ventilation, and the unsatisfactory facilities for fighting fires under conditions of battle damage. The first two items apply to all ships. The latter two to the older ships.

Degaussing gear either temporary or permanent, has been installed on all ships. Replacement of temporary with permanent gear is proceeding. Work to reduce missile hazards is proceeding. A discussion of important items by forces follows:

(a) BATTLE FORCE.

Battleships:

- (a) Sky lookout stations installed.
 (b) Accommodations for additional crew provided.
 (c) Airports at ends of ships welded closed.
 (d) Regunned main batteries NEW MEXICO, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND;
 Secondary batteries MARYLAND and NEVADA.
 (e) Blisters completed on MARYLAND.
 (f) Radar (search) installed on CALIFORNIA.

(g) All ships except ARIZONA and NEVADA had four 3" 50 A.A. guns installed pending the availability of 1.1" machine guns. Two 5" 51 broadside guns were removed to permit this.

(h) Splinter protection was installed around all A.A. gun mounts.

(i) The inability of the electric drive battleships to maintain full power under tropical conditions is a serious matter. It has been taken up in previous correspondence.

Cruisers:

(a) Splinter protection provided around A.A. guns.

(b) Certain airports have been welded closed.

(c) Difficulty experienced with turbo generators BROOKLYN, PHILADELPHIA and HONOLULU. Corrective action is underway.

Carriers:

(a) Radar installed in the YORKTOWN.

(b) Bow arresting gear installed in SARATOGA and flight area increased at bow and stern.

DESTROYERS:

(a) There have been about thirty cases of cracked shell plating in the 1500-ton destroyers during the year, indicating structural weaknesses. Action by the Bureau of Ships to correct this has been initiated.

(b) *SCOUTING FORCE.*

Cruisers:

(a) Splinter protection for A.A. guns has been or will soon be completed on all ships.

(b) Sky lookout stations installed on all but three ships.

(c) Certain airports welded closed.

(d) Cafeteria system and accommodations for additional crew completed on nine ships. Will soon be completed on other three.

[24] (e) Ballistic protection of armored spaces improved.

(f) Renewing of reduction gears NEW ORLEANS Class, completed except for NEW ORLEANS which will get new gears during forthcoming overhaul.

(g) Radars (search) installed on four ships.

(h) Four 3" 50 A.A. guns temporarily installed in CHICAGO, PORTLAND, LOUISVILLE, and SAN FRANCISCO. 1.1" mount foundations were installed in SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON.

(i) Mark XIX Directors modified.

Submarines:

(a) Air conditioning equipment which must be installed before the S Class submarines can be considered ready for war patrol in tropical waters has been authorized and will be completed about December 1941.

(b) Correction of the defective air conditioning system in the ARGONAUT and NARWHAL has been completed. Some work has been accomplished on the DOLPHIN'S system. This should be completed early in October 1941.

(c) ARGONAUT sustained surface speed of 8.9 knots is not satisfactory. This condition will obtain until the ship is reengineered.

(d) Plane fueling facilities have been completed in NARWHAL. These facilities will shortly be completed in ARGONAUT.

(e) The use of contract lubricating oils in submarine main engines has not been satisfactory. Special oils have been resorted to in all H.O.R. engines, and are being experimented with on one set of Winton engines.

(C) *BASE FORCE.*

Oilers:

(a) All oilers have been equipped for fueling heavy ships at sea.

(b) The newly acquired Fleet oilers have certain defects for Naval purposes, most of which will be corrected when conversion is undertaken. The most serious of these is the lack of sufficient evaporator capacity to be self sustaining in fresh water. The matter of exposed ship and cargo control wiring and piping not at present included in conversion items has been taken up in separate correspondence.

(c) The slow speed and antiquated machinery installation of the older ships of the Base Force will seriously handicap the supply of services to Fleet under war conditions.

Mine Vessels:

(a) All ships of the Mine Squadron TWO (formerly Mine Squadron THREE) have been equipped or are now equipped with magnetic sweeping gear.

(b) The lack of depth charge equipment and listening gear in the AMs, DMs and DMSs is a serious defect. Corrective measures have been recommended.

(B) OVERHAULS.

Regular overhauls were carried out as scheduled by the Department. A new and more satisfactory basis for future overhauls was worked out between the Commander-in-Chief and the Department. This reduced the length of overhauls, and limited the numbers of combatant ships of each type permitted to be under overhaul at any one time.

Regular overhauls have been handicapped due to lack of opportunity for advance planning and the difficulty of obtaining deliveries of material for alterations. Improvement in this situation is expected as a result of recent correspondence.

In addition to regular overhauls, wide use of restricted availabilities at Pearl Harbor has been resorted to in order to accomplish in a minimum of time, many alterations of great military importance. It is expected that this procedure will find wide use in the future.

[25] (C) ADVANCE BASE AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE EQUIPMENT.

The present war has demonstrated the urgent need for advance base and expeditionary force equipment in modern warfare. The situation in the Pacific demands not only a large volume of such equipment but also that it be the most modern and the latest kind procurable.

The general situation as to advance base and expeditionary equipment in the Pacific area is most unsatisfactory. Specific deficiencies contributing to this situation are:

(a) Material for advance bases is being assembled in the Twelfth Naval District and an Advance Base Depot with warehouse is in process of development. An exercise for the testing of advance base material has been directed but the amount of material on hand has so far been too small to warrant conducting the exercise. However, improvement in the unsatisfactory delivery situation is expected in the near future.

(b) Aeronautical advance base and expeditionary force equipment was requisitioned about one year ago but has not been received to date. The Bureau of Aeronautics has advised that this equipment is on schedule.

(c) There are no transports now in the Pacific capable of being combat unit loaded. This situation will be relieved, in part, by November 1941, but sufficient transports and cargo vessels should be made available to move the Second Marine Division and at least one Defense Battalion.

(d) All destroyer transports have been transferred from the Pacific area.

(e) No hospital ship is now available to this Fleet. A mobile hospital unit will arrive in the near future, but further steps to relieve the hospitalization situation must be taken.

(f) Landing boats, artillery lighters, tank lighters, amphibian tractors, and rubber boats are not yet available, or are of such insufficient numbers as not to meet even training requirements.

(g) There are serious deficiencies in the equipment and armament of the Second Marine Division, particularly in vehicles and weapons.

(h) Bombardment projectiles are not on hand at mobilization bases in sufficient quantities to meet war plan requirements.

(i) Antisubmarine nets and netlaying vessels for providing adequate defense for advance bases are not yet available in sufficient quantity.

(j) Floating drydocks for light force vessels are a particular necessity.

(k) Portable A. A. guns and fire control equipment must be provided in greater numbers.

(l) Equipment for rapid construction of landing fields should be developed and procured.

(m) Base oilers, provision and ammunition lighters, etc., should be made available.

(n) Distilling ships and distilling units for fresh water for troops are required to maintain troops and air operating personnel in localities where the potable water supply is undeveloped or entirely lacking.

(D) AVIATION.**(a) Tactical Developments.**

Excellent progress has been made in aircraft tactical development as a result of almost continuous tactical exercises with the Fleet or Task Forces thereof. Reports of current war operations have formed a fertile basis for testing and developing new ideas and procedures and there has been general improvement in terms of reduced artificiality and increased realism. In addition, good advance has been made in inter-type tactics between aircraft and surface types, including

submarines, and valuable training has been had in the various forms of coordination along this line that will be essential in action.

The use of aircraft in combination with the Radar for Fleet defense has become a subject of major importance and its further development will be intensively carried on.

War reports have indicated the increasing importance of adequate aerial photographic reconnaissance and its development has been stressed throughout the year. Progress is hampered by the time factor with respect to both material and personnel. Satisfactory results are contingent on the assistance that the Department is able to render.

[26] Aircraft tactics of all kinds must continue to be influenced by the current status of armament and protection of Fleet aircraft. As these characteristics improve with the delivery of newer aircraft, the tactics of aircraft employment can be made more effective.

The Fleet Aircraft Tactical Unit has continued its valuable work, both directly in connection with aircraft tactics and indirectly by its compilations from war reports of aircraft tactical information.

(b) *New Airplanes.*

Although considerable improvement is more immediately in sight, the situation still remains similar to that reported last year in that too few modern or modernized Fleet aircraft have been delivered and the numbers of spare parts and spare planes for those on hand, in all categories, are too few. It is realized that diversions of deliveries to other destinations have necessarily interfered with the program for Fleet aircraft and that various phases of manufacturing priorities have been beyond the Department's control. It cannot be repeated too often, however, that the readiness of Fleet squadrons should not be jeopardized.

It is realized that many replacement planes now being delivered are not intended to be the final word in improvement and that more satisfactory planes are scheduled to replace them shortly. This plan must not be lost sight of, for many of the new airplanes with armament and protection built into designs already existing, have lost thereby altogether too much in the way of performance.

(c) *Material Conditions.*

The material condition of Fleet aircraft is, on the whole, far from satisfactory. The faults are due either to obsolescence and accumulative wear of types not yet replaced or to serious defects that have too frequently become apparent in new types after their exposure to actual service conditions.

The most important examples of the foregoing are:

(1) Failure of the R-1280-32 and 40 engine main bearing and seals which required a major disassembly of the engines to correct.

(2) Failure of rivets in the SBD wings in way of the wheel wells and wing fairing at the fuselage. This necessitated the return to the contractor of those airplanes which were already delivered to west coast units.

(3) Failure of the F2A landing gear struts. This required reworking and strengthening of all F2A main landing gear struts. These failures persist and are currently being experienced regardless of the reinforcements.

(4) Displacement of the wing bulkhead in the F2A airplanes to which landing gear main strut hinges are attached. This failure is progressive and prevents the landing gear from housing and causes failures in the wings. It was found necessary to suspend these airplanes from carrier operations pending correction of this trouble inasmuch as carrier landings aggravated the situation.

(5) Failure of some of the F2A aileron control rods incident to the contractor having installed non-heat treated rods.

(6) Discovery of numerous instances wherein foreign objects such as riveter's bars were left in sealed compartments. This resulted in a few near crashes due to jammed controls and necessitated much labor in opening sealed compartments for inspection.

(7) Elongated wing attachment bolts in numerous SBD airplanes. This trouble required the inspection and replacement of approximately 20,000 bolts.

(8) Nose section failure of the engines of new PBY-5 airplanes. This, unless and until corrected, is extremely serious.

(9) Weakness of main floats and wingtip float struts of OS2U (battleship) aircraft caused numerous failures in operations at sea. New and strengthened floats and struts will, it is hoped, correct this defect.

(10) The extreme obsolescence of SOC, SON (cruiser aircraft), both in terms of material condition and battle suitability. Deliveries of replacement planes have been greatly delayed. The highest priority for these deliveries is none too

good, for the characteristics of aircraft now carried in cruisers will be a serious liability in action.

[27] Perhaps the most serious matter of all has been the concentration on manufacture and delivery of new aircraft, for the sake of total numbers produced, at the expense of concurrent provision of spare parts and spare accessories that are manifestly essential for continued effective operation. Until the Department is able to alter this policy, the readiness of Fleet aviation will be far more apparent than real.

(r) *Overhaul.*

There has been a gratifying increase in total overhaul facilities available. The overhaul situation in the Hawaiian area, however, remains far from satisfactory. As has frequently been stated, it is an unsound and potentially dangerous situation for Pacific Fleet aircraft, other than patrol planes, to have to be overhauled almost entirely on the mainland as a result of current overhaul facilities at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor being limited to the amount necessary for patrol plane overhaul. Transportation for overhaul now necessary between Pearl Harbor and the mainland, in addition to the mis-use of aircraft carriers that is periodically necessitated for this purpose, results in dead-time that, in effect, reduces an already meager supply of spare aircraft. Under war conditions it is altogether too apparent that this transportation for overhaul might be impracticable.

(e) *Miscellaneous Equipment.*

No comment.

(f) *Experimental Development and Tests.*

There have continued to be numerous tests in the various Fleet aircraft units of new equipment, as well as tests for determination of causes and remedies of material troubles. An excellent step toward relief of operating units from a major portion of this load has been the recent establishment of the Acceptance, Test and Training Unit under Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.

The following items, both test and experimental, are of interest:

- (1) Exhaust de-icers.
- (2) Extension of oil draining interval.
- (3) True airspeed meters.
- (4) Solar heating units.
- (5) Camouflage.
- (6) Propeller and engine vibration tests.
- (7) Fuel tank and armor protection.
- (8) Oxygen equipment.
- (9) Blind landing equipment.
- (10) Tractors.
- (11) Parachutes.
- (12) Fuel jettisoning.
- (13) Night photography using flare bombs.
- (14) Numerous other photographic tests and developments, including the development of films while in flight.
- (15) Improved flight clothing.
- (16) Further progress in night recovery of cruiser airplanes.
- (17) Various improvements in hoisting arrangements for ship-based aircraft.

(g) *Aerology.*

Additional raysonde equipment is needed for installation on outlying Pacific Islands as well as regular aerological equipment for four such stations. Preliminary steps have been taken to procure this material and it is expected to be delivered shortly after the commissioning of the air stations at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

Raysonde equipment was temporarily removed from the U. S. S. INDIAN-APOLIS for installation at Kaneohe, where a complete aerological unit has been set up during the year. Necessary radio equipment and instruments needed for the expanding operation of the Fleet Weather Central have been requested but not yet received.

[28] The complete equipment of the aerological unit assigned to Cruisers, Battle Force was removed from the Pacific Fleet due to the transfer of the U. S. S. BROOKLYN to the Atlantic Fleet. Replacement equipment has been requested. (E) *SUPPLY ACTIVITIES.*

The past year has presented exceptional opportunities for improvement in the logistic support of the Fleet. Conditions closely akin to war time supplanted

those of years gone by. The inadequacy of auxiliary vessels of all classifications became quickly apparent.

(a) *Provisions.* The problem of subsisting the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area was attended by greater difficulties than ever before encountered due to:

- (1) Inadequacy of provision stores ships.
- (2) Lack of cold storage facilities at Pearl Harbor.
- (3) Inadequacy of commercial cold storage facilities at Honolulu.
- (4) Inadequacy of refrigerated cargo space in commercial ships serving the Hawaiian Area.

(5) Inadequacy of locally produced meats, vegetables, fruits, and dairy products for the needs of the civilian population, and Army and Navy personnel. Solution was found in the completion of the cold storage plant at Merry Point, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, on 1 June 1940, in furnishing to prospective contractors of guaranteed estimates of purchases to be made, and in the stocking of the cold storage plant at Merry Point means of commercial shipments, and by two shipments in the ALDEBARAN.

Formerly provision stores ships were loaded by totaling individual ship requisitions submitted months in advance. There are now standard loadings controlled by the Fleet Supply Officer. Requisitions are required from the individual ships ten days in advance of the arrival of the provision stores ship in order to prorate the cargo.

The standard loadings of provision ships has worked out advantageously from every angle. The Navy Purchasing Office is given more time in which to contract for requirements. Lengthy radio dispatches are eliminated, and flexibility to meet changes necessitated by turning over stocks at Pearl Harbor and by unscheduled movements of ships is provided for. Even under the difficulties raised by unexpected ship movements it has been possible to operate with less than 4% of error.

To accomplish these results continuous collaboration and cooperation between the Supply Officer, Pearl Harbor and the Fleet Supply Officer were essential. The excellent results obtained are evidence of the collaboration and cooperation which existed.

For many years it had been the rule to require ships to receive from provision ships any excesses remaining after provisioning the Fleet. In theory this was to prevent loss, but in practice it amounted in most cases to a dispersion of surveys of provisions unfit for use among the ships of the Fleet rather than have a large survey which might look bad for the provision ship. This subterfuge fooled no one, and required additional and unnecessary labor and correspondence. Since the rule served no good purpose it was abolished. No forced issues were necessary, nor were any large surveys required. In a few cases transfer of excesses to the cold storage plant at Merry Point prevented loss which might otherwise have occurred.

The need for more provision ships is worthy of serious consideration. There were many times when the disablement of one of the two provision ships assigned to the Base Force would have required the withdrawal of a portion of the Fleet to the Mainland. Had the Fleet operated beyond Pearl Harbor, many of the ships would have had to subsist on dry stores solely, after the first three weeks.

At the close of the period covered by this report the tentative future assignment of provision ships for the Base Force was ARCTIC, BOREAS, ALDEBARAN and POLARIS, the BRIDGE being transferred to the Atlantic Fleet. Based on a Fleet complement of 60,000 officers and men, each of the four ships could carry supplies sufficient to last the Fleet for twenty-three days. It is believed, however, that the ALDEBARAN and POLARIS will be found by experience to have at least 15% greater capacity. The planned operation of these ships presupposed one under overhaul during the next nine months. It was planned to keep one ship at Pearl Harbor at all times, each ship remaining three weeks. This plan would have made a provision ship at once available for an extended cruise if required, would have permitted combatant ships to keep loaded with provisions to 75% of capacity, and would have allowed each ship six weeks for going to and coming from San Francisco, loading and upkeep.

[29] Mention should be made of the approaching need for supplying provisions to Midway, Wake, Guam, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa. Such a task could not be accomplished by the Base Force with only three provisions ships in operation, and with the Fleet complement of 60,000 officers and men.

The Hawaiian Islands could be self-sustaining as to many items and provide for Army and Navy needs. This condition will not, however, be met unless sub-

stantial encouragement is received from the military forces. An excellent grade of potato of fine flavor is being raised by the Oahu Sugar Plantation. It will mature about March. At that time the potatoes available on the Coast are in poor condition, and a considerable portion is lost due to shrivelling, sprouting, dry rot and susceptibility to decay in open storage after being kept in chilled storage. The Oahu potatoes are firm, free from imperfections, thin skinned, and of good keeping quality in open storage. Under these conditions the disparity in price, approximately .015 against .025, is not as great as the figures indicate. Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of the Oahu Sugar Co., intends to experiment with a potato of greater yield with a view to reducing the price.

Many sugar plantations due to sugar quotas now have land not required for cane planting, but they are loathe to go into the potato business unless assured of a local market. If the Navy agreed to buy a given tonnage of island grown potatoes at a price not to exceed a specified figure during the months of March, April, and May, there would be a response from the sugar plantations. The subject merits investigation.

(b) *Fuel.*

The fiscal year of 1941 has seen many changes in the fueling tasks, fueling facilities, and fueling points of the Base Force. The year commenced with inadequate equipment, stocks at low points, and reliance on commercial oilers to meet all the fuel needs of the Fleet. The fuel situation is now satisfactory and well in hand. A few minor desirable improvements remain to be made as time permits.

Early in fiscal year 1941 four hundred thousand barrels of fuel oil per month were required for Fleet use at Pearl Harbor. During the period the major portion of the Fleet concentrated in Pearl Harbor the seven Base Force oilers were not adequate to meet this demand and also replenish the depleted fuel stocks at Pearl Harbor. Commercial deliveries of fuel oil were contracted for with difficulty and during the period July to December \$41,800 barrels of fuel were delivered in commercial bottoms to Pearl Harbor stowage. The price of fuel oil delivered into Pearl Harbor dropped from \$1.44 per barrel in July to \$0.96 per barrel in December. The contract price for Navy fuel oil in Los Angeles Harbor averaged \$0.65 per barrel and \$0.30 per barrel is considered a fair price for transporting fuel oil from Los Angeles to Pearl Harbor. The excess price paid by the Navy for the transportation of oil was due to a world wide demand to increase fuel stocks in storage coincident with German Victories in Europe.

In addition to the reserve stock of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor, (3,495,478 barrels which cannot be used without Presidential authority), there is space available for approximately 500,000 barrels of fuel oil. It was not necessary to use any of the reserve stocks of fuel oil, although at the end of July 1940 there was only 2,165 barrels of fuel oil available for immediate issue to the Fleet. The reserve stock of fuel oil consists of 2,804,540 barrels of Navy fuel oil, and 690,928 barrels of topped crude, a long time storage oil. Arrangements have been completed to deliver an additional 300,000 barrels of topped crude into storage during the months of May and June 1941. It is understood that when the first units of the new underground storage at Pearl Harbor are completed they will be filled with topped crude from present stocks.

During the second quarter, the major part of the Fleet returned to West Coast bases for a two weeks leave and liberty period, and prolonged its stay for well over a month for installation of degaussing equipment and drydocking. While the Fleet was away from Pearl Harbor, issues decreased, and fuel stocks were increased to maximum capacity. At this time word was received that four high speed national defense oilers of the CIMARRON Class would be on the West Coast and available to Base Force by December 1940. Additional Commercial deliveries of fuel oil to Pearl Harbor were not needed as these four new tankers gave Base Force sufficient capacity to provide all fuels required.

By the end of January the major portion of the Fleet was again concentrated in Pearl Harbor. A new Fleet operating policy was instituted whereby half of the Fleet was underway all the time and fuel issues jumped to over 600,000 barrels per month. 703,036 barrels were issued during the month of March. Base Force had no difficulty in keeping pace with the increased fuel demands, although the oilers of the CIMARRON class were required to make the trips from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor in six days instead of the usual seven days, and upkeep periods were [30] omitted. The assignment of the RAMAPO and SEPULGA will not permit Base Force to meet the increased demands for fuel and also assign proper upkeep periods to the high speed oilers.

There are seven oilers of the CIMARRON class assigned to Base Force. Each of these has been assigned a period of final conversion. The CIMARRON returned to Philadelphia in September 1940, and was expected to return to the West Coast prior to the NEOSHO entering the Navy Yard Puget Sound on 1 April. The return of the CIMARRON has been delayed because of delays in receipt of materials, will enter Navy Yard Puget Sound on 15 July. The NEOSHO has encountered difficulties and her return to the Fleet is not expected until after 1 August.

Oilers of the BRAZOS class plus the TIPPECANOE have been used to deliver fuel oil to Pearl Harbor, as well as maintain the full stocks at San Diego and Puget Sound. In addition, the CUYAMA delivered 21,000 barrels of fuel oil to Palmyra both in December and in March for use of the contractor's dredge. The NECHES delivered 20,000 barrels of fuel oil to Dutch Harbor, Alaska for the Coast Guard, and the KANAWHA delivered 20,000 barrels to Navy storage at Wake in May. The fuel oil requirements of the outlying islands, the Alaskan stations and the Canal Zone will probably develop into a full time job for the oilers of the BRAZOS class. The SANGAMON accompanied to Samoa the four cruisers and nine destroyers visiting Australian and New Zealand ports.

The fuel oil requirements at the Canal Zone have been met by oilers transitting the canal. The CIMARRON replenished stocks at Balboa and Cristobal on her trip to Philadelphia, and will again replenish these stocks on her return to the West Coast. The KASKASKIA, SABINE, SANTEE, and SANGAMON filled the Navy storage in Canal Zone to capacity when they transitted in December 1940.

Large combatant ships going to Navy Yard Puget Sound for overhaul from Long Beach have filled to capacity with fuel oil prior to departure and delivered fuel oil into storage at the yard. Fuel oil issues at Puget Sound have increased over 30%, and more frequent trips of oilers to Puget Sound have been required. It is planned to keep fuel stocks at Puget Sound at not less than 80% of capacity by oilers making Alaskan trips discharging available fuel oil to Puget Sound on return, as well as by the large oilers going to the Navy Yard for overhaul.

Base Force oilers have executed many assigned tasks not involving fuel during the course of the year. The PLATTE escorted the floating drydock YFD-2, towed by CAPELLA and NAVAJO, from Balboa to Pearl Harbor. Large quantities of freight have been transported in oilers from Mainland to Pearl Harbor as well as to outlying islands and Alaskan ports. The oilers have towed lighters and oil barges from California to Hawaiian Area and likewise have escorted small craft able to make the trip under their own power. The PLATTE made a special trip from San Diego to Puget Sound in May to transport two artillery lighters. The increase in Navy personnel has resulted in the oilers being filled to capacity with both officers and enlisted men as passengers on every trip.

The distribution of fuel oil at Pearl Harbor was accomplished with difficulty early in the year. One oil barge, the YO-21, was used to capacity but it could not meet the needs of the Fleet. Oilers were used to fuel large combatant ships and destroyers were fueled at Merry Point dock. Ships at Navy Yard piers were fueled by yard lines at every opportunity. This arrangement required a great deal of supervision and caused many inconveniences to the ships being fueled. As time went along and it became apparent that the Fleet would remain in the Hawaiian Area, the three oil barges from San Pedro and one from San Diego were transferred to Pearl Harbor. The five fuel oil barges meet the requirements of the Fleet at the present time, but often have to work twelve to sixteen hours a day. A rapid fueling of the Fleet would necessitate many cruisers, and all destroyers fueling from Navy Yard piers. Each barge has a capacity of 3,500 barrels and 28,000 barrels of fuel oil can be delivered during an eight hour day. Four barges are kept working each day, and one barge is assigned an upkeep period. There is a real need for barges of 10,000 barrel capacity, as the small barges use 62½% of their time on a fueling job going and coming from fuel docks and re-loading. When practicable, barges fuel from oilers at anchor in Pearl Harbor. This procedure shortens the fueling time as oilers can fill the barges in a shorter time than the shore activity, and the barges have a shorter distance to travel.

Commander Base Force is responsible for the scheduling and delivery of fuels to the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. An arrangement whereby the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor assumed the responsibility for these functions was tried for a week, and then rejected.

Base Force is responsible for the delivery of aviation gasoline to Canal Zone, Pearl Harbor, and Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H. It is expected that Base Force will be assigned the responsibility of maintenance of aviation gasoline stocks in

Alaska. Aviation gasoline storage is being constructed on the outlying islands and these points will be filled and replenished by Base Force [37] oilers. Sufficient gasoline space has been available in oilers to meet the operating needs of the Fleet, the short activities as well as the new storage at Naval Air Stations, Pearl Harbor and Kanoche Bay. During the months of January, February, and March 1941, Base Force oilers transported 5,050,469 gallons of aviation gasoline from San Pedro to Pearl Harbor. There was space available for transportation of three times this amount.

The distribution of aviation gasoline at Pearl Harbor was quite unsatisfactory at the beginning of this fiscal year. Commander Base Force had available for duty two old gasoline delivery boats with gasoline bowsters. These boats would often incur material failures at times when delivery schedules were heavy. Gasoline was delivered by gasoline truck to ships at piers. Large oilers would gas ships when alongside for delivery of fuel oil.

The YO-43, a self-propelled barge with a capacity of 150,000 gallons of gasoline and 50,000 gallons of diesel oil, was completed by Navy Yard and made available to Base Force on 1 March 1941. At the same time, the YO-44 (same as YO-43) was transferred to the Hawaiian Area from San Diego. These two gasoline diesel barges have simplified the gasoline distribution problem. In addition they are being used to fill the new gasoline storage at Kanoche Bay. At the present time they are the only means of delivering bulk gasoline to Kanoche other than by truck. Early in April the YO-44 was sent to Johnston Island to deliver 200,000 gallons of diesel oil in order that the contractor could continue dredging work. The gasoline tanks of the YO-44 were filled with diesel oil in order that the desired quantity would be delivered. Some difficulty was experienced in cleaning the gasoline tank of all traces of diesel oil. Another barge similar to the YO-43 will be needed in the Hawaiian Area within the next twelve months to permit proper upkeep of the YO-43 and YO-44, deliver gasoline and diesel oil to the Fleet, and also make deliveries of gasoline and diesel oil to the outlying islands.

No difficulty has been encountered in the transportation of diesel oil to the Canal Zone and Pearl Harbor, but the distribution of diesel oil in Pearl Harbor was unsatisfactory until the YO-43 and YO-44 reported for duty. Diesel oil issues at Pearl Harbor have increased over 50% because of the increase in number of diesel burning ships, the diesel oil burning equipment of contractors and the near completion of dieselization of small boats program. No requests for the delivery of motor gasoline to large ships have been received since January 1941.

To meet fully and expeditiously the needs of the Fleet, as constituted during the past year, and island bases the following ships are required: (1) one base oiler of about 200,000 gallons minimum capacity of aviation gasoline, similar to SAN DIEGAN, the acquisition of which has been previously requested; (2) five 10,000 barrel Fleet oil barges, self-propelled at a speed of ten knots; and (3) two additional oilers of the CIMARRON type as a reserve for casualties, and to provide for a widely scattered disposition of Fleet units.

(c) GENERAL STORES.

The value of stores issue ships to the Fleet was made plain during the past year. This was however little more than a token; indication of what could be done with an adequate number of stores ships of adequate size.

The size and construction of the ANTARES, the sole stores issue ship assigned to the Base Force, her retention in the Hawaiian Area for use as relief flagship for the Base Force, and her diversion to island bases, interfere with the usefulness of the ANTARES to the Fleet. Until the ships of the Fleet can be assured of regular dependable service from stores issue ships, they will continue to rely on Mainland sources of supply.

The planned operation of stores issue ships in time of peace is: (1) to stock bulky items which combatant ships cannot carry in quantity and (2) to stock small items for retail issue to top off the ships of the Fleet to prevent depletion of their stocks below a six month's supply. The first mission has not yet been fulfilled. Ships continue to submit requisitions to Mainland supply points, and to draw from the ANTARES as well. Under these conditions ANTARES has been unable to determine a normal cargo of bulky items or to increase the bin space in order to better provide for retail issues. Even under the above handicaps the ANTARES did increase its efficiency. The number of items carried for general issue was increased from five hundred to seven hundred.

The preparation of stores issue ships to meet their wartime mission will play an important part in enabling the Fleet to perform its task. Without supplies for operation, maintenance and repair, the Fleet would be quickly hamstrung. The

supply, shipment, and delivery of individual ship's requisitions in wartime is not possible. On the other hand, the supply of bulk cargoes to stores issue ships is definitely possible. The supply of all ship's needs of general stores. [32] from stores issue ships, and the replenishment of stores issue ship's stock by bulk shipments in cargo carriers, is the solution.

The Base Force is in immediate need of two modern cargo ships to replenish the stock of stores issue ships, to transport the varied cargoes which the Base Force is called upon to handle in constantly increasing quantity, to do the various odd jobs which have been assigned to the ANTARES in the past, and to transport advance base material.

[33]

PART IV—PERSONNEL.

(A) COMMISSIONED.

(a) Allowances.

In general surface ships have been provided with officers sufficient in numbers but insufficient in training and experience. Regular officers have been and continue to be replaced by reserves of relative inexperience. The rapid turnover of experienced personnel coupled with inexperienced reserve replacement officers has served to lower combat efficiency. Such replacement reserve officers are being trained insofar as possible in one specialty billet in which the individual shows aptitude, thus the beneficial effects of training will be realized much earlier. In time, as such training progresses, it is expected that the above condition will gradually improve and as reserve officers gain in experience, allowances will be adequate in terms of efficiency.

The harmful effect of the withdrawal of a good portion of the experienced gunnery officers from the Fleet for duties ashore to meet the production demands is gradually being overcome by intensive training through the medium of gunnery schools.

Insufficient officers are assigned to submarines from the viewpoint of training to meet the needs of the expanding submarine force. At least six officers should be attached to each fleet type submarine to provide necessary trained submarine officers for war patrols and reserve crews. Reserve officers are being ordered direct from engineering schools to submarines without the benefit of instruction in the Submarine School. This provides numerical relief but delays the state of training of qualified submarine personnel. Additional junior line officers should be ordered to the submarine service after prescribed school instruction in order to provide an adequate supply of young officers qualified for command.

Insufficient Naval Aviators are assigned all types of squadrons from both the point of view of continuous war operations and to meet the requirements of the expansion program. An eight to one expansion in patrol plane personnel is planned within the next several years, which is indicative of the acute need for training of additional officers. Existing deficiencies will not be made good for many months. This situation has been the subject of separate correspondence.

(b) Training.

The Naval building and expansion program will require that additional experienced officer personnel continue to be removed from operating units. Inexperienced reserves must serve as replacements, consequently strong emphasis has been placed upon the training of reserve officers with the end in view of having each experienced officer instruct an understudy along the line of his particular duties, looking to his eventual replacement when he is needed elsewhere in the expansion program. Type gunnery schools were conducted stressing fundamental training and including extensive instructional firings.

Type gunnery schools for the forthcoming year have started and will continue over a longer period than in past years. Officers attending these type gunnery schools are not allowed to be absent from their ships while the ships are underway. This system tends to prolong the school session but it satisfies all conditions of the emergency and, in the long run, it is believed greater benefit will result therefrom.

With an influx of a large number of inexperienced reserve officers, the necessity of more intensive training of junior officers has developed. Some types have prepared syllabi of training for the various duties within departments, and junior officers are required to pursue these courses. Reserve ensigns are trained for duty in one department only.

Although training strives to keep apace with expansion and modern trends, it has been seriously handicapped in some instances because of the rather steady reduction in the number of officers qualified to supervise the inexperienced offi-

cers. Tactical training is emphasized during exercises at sea and tactical schools are held in part.

A school for Prospective Commanding Officers is conducted in each submarine squadron to train the second officer of each submarine for command duties and to serve as a refresher course for officers already qualified for command who have been separated from the submarine service. Junior officers have been required, under the immediate supervision of commanding officers, to handle submarines under all conditions of submerged and surface operations.

In the Patrol Wings, in order to maintain the barest minimum of patrol plane commanders essential for operation of the planes assigned, as well as to train additional pilots it has been [34] necessary to assign first priority to pilot training in Patrol Wings One, Four, and Six. Such action was necessitated by the diversion of a considerable number of qualified patrol plane commanders to duty away from the above named wings.

(c) *Assignments.*

Permanency of personnel has not been in evidence during the past year. There has been considerable shifting of personnel which, in turn, has a tendency to lower efficiency.

The recent establishment by the Bureau of Navigation of a policy whereby each ship maintains an up-to-date list in the Bureau showing the order in which Commanding Officers desire that officers should be detached when and if it becomes necessary, will assist in the future, to retain key personnel on board. It is expected that such a move toward permanency will markedly benefit the Fleet.

In destroyers, a comparatively large number of commanding and executive officers were detached and replaced with more junior officers, which meant the loss of experienced destroyer officers to other types. In addition, a large number of experienced gunnery and engineer officers have been ordered out of destroyers to other duties afloat and ashore.

Insofar as practicable officers are assigned to duties wherein full utilization of their special training is obtained. An abnormal number of changes in assignments of officers have been required in Patrol Wings One, Four, and Six in order to maintain an equitable distribution of officers in those wings, incident to the depletion of officer personnel as mentioned before.

(B) *ENLISTED*

(a) *Allowances.*

Special personnel studies during the past year indicate that allowances are inadequate. The Fleet Personnel Board report as approved by the Commander-in-Chief, indicated need for increased allowances to meet war-time demands in all Types. Such an increase in allowance as recommended would accelerate training and would serve to alleviate the situation of impermanency of assignments. In addition to increasing the allowances, requests have been made to the Bureau of Navigation to provide additional personnel for training to meet the demands of new construction over and above that required to properly man the ships. Actual conditions at the end of the fiscal year find all types seriously undermanned. From this inadequate source huge demands have been and are being made upon the Pacific Fleet. A most critical condition of affairs will soon result unless positive action is quickly taken to furnish the Fleet with men in sufficient numbers who can be started on a training program at a time early enough to anticipate the expansion program demands for trained personnel. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Navy Department the urgent need for men in order to get them at least partially trained for needs elsewhere in the expansion program.

The current lack of raw personnel material to train, for both the ship building program and the expanding aeronautical facilities is considered to be the most obvious and dangerous deficiency in the Navy expansion program. The Naval establishment will find itself confronted with a condition of having ships and planes without sufficient trained personnel to operate the equipment unless early and adequate recruits are provided. The result of such a condition will be that not only new construction will be inadequately manned but trained personnel will have been withdrawn from operating vessels to such an extent that their effectiveness will be unacceptably reduced.

The situation in regard to training the aviation and submarine personnel is especially marked and has been the subject of separate correspondence.

During the past year, in order to more expeditiously handle personnel coming into the Naval Organization and to make a more rapid distribution of this per-

sonnel, the Fleet Personnel Officer moved to the Headquarters, Eleventh Naval District in November, 1940. In order to coordinate with the activities of the Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, the Fleet Personnel Officer moved, in June, 1941, to Headquarters, Twelfth Naval District. These moves accomplished the desired results in reducing the loss of time involved in the handling of incoming and outgoing drafts and reducing radio traffic.

Beginning with January, 1941, the demands for personnel to fill new construction, acquired and converted vessels, newly established shore and outlying stations, were considerably increased over the first six months of the fiscal year. Since January 1, 1941, the Pacific Fleet Personnel Officer was called upon to supply 7,233 men for these activities. Most of these men were rated men. The following table gives some idea of how these men were spread among the various demands:

[35]	To Combatant vessels (new BBs, DDs).....	1172
	To Auxiliaries (New, converted, and acquired).....	2710
	To shore stations.....	1679
	To outlying stations.....	1672

The following table shows the number of recruits received in the Pacific Fleet by quarters for the fiscal year:

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total
School Grad.....	332	1,077	846	1,246	3,501
Gen. Service.....	3,750	10,527	6,190	3,401	23,868

It will be noted that in the 4th quarter the number of recruits fell off very badly.

In October, 1940, complements were made effective in lieu of allowances for all vessels of the U. S. Fleet. On March 31, 1941, new complements were put into effect which were greater than previously. The following table is furnished for information:

	June 1940		December 1940		April 1941 (latest available figures)	
	Allowance	On Board	Complement	On Board	Complement	On Board
BATSHIPS.....	13,931	13,180	17,664	17,515	18,566	17,589
AIRBATFOR.....	7,113	6,645	8,309	8,141	8,525	8,256
MINBATFOR.....	962	974	1,673	1,573	1,676	1,675
CRUBATFOR.....	5,698	5,702	10,640	10,752	10,459	9,469
CRUSCOFOR.....	8,105	7,972	8,234	7,927	11,066	10,016
DESBATFOR.....	14,813	13,686	17,718	16,672	17,472	16,519
SUBSCOFOR.....	4,749	4,498	7,455	6,667	3,414	3,596
AIRSCOFOR ¹	2,110	3,015	1,522	1,673	1,378	1,490
PATWING 2.....	1,210	1,218	1,033	1,078	1,527	1,649
BASEFOR.....	6,183	6,237	7,679	7,379	9,908	9,328
Totals.....	68,874	63,167	81,927	79,377	84,021	79,587

¹Does not include Patrol Wing TWO.

Whenever possible, men on general detail and otherwise becoming available to the Fleet Personnel Officer have been utilized to fill demands for new construction, acquired and converted vessels, etc., but when the limiting date which would permit arrival at their respective destinations approached, it was of course, necessary for the Fleet Personnel Officer to go to the Fleet and make demands upon Type Commanders.

(b) *Training.*

(1) *General.*

The expansion of the Fleet and the increase in personnel has opened up large numbers of ratings. The heavy drain on the Fleet for new construction, recommissioning and conversions, has resulted in a strenuous training program to provide the needed rates without loss of efficiency.

Eligibility for advancement in certain ratings (CRM, CTM, CEM, CFM, CCStd, and CAerog) includes the requirement that the candidates be graduates of certain service schools. Since quotas for these schools are limited, advancement in these

ratings does not keep pace with other unrestricted ratings, and results in considerable hardship to personnel in these ratings.

A serious shortage exists in the fire controlman ratings. Recommendation is being made that class "A" schools lay the ground work for this rating for certain selected recruits before their transfer to the Fleet.

Even though insufficient recruits have been furnished, school training facilities are being utilized fully in order to keep the school organizations intact. Decided handicap has been in evidence due to the Bureau of Navigation ordering away to new construction partially trained seamen when nearly ready for petty officer ratings. The result has been that these men must in effect commence training again on a new ship and thereby lose the benefit of that which has been obtained previously. It has been recommended that new recruits be utilized insofar as possible for such transfer.

[36] (2) *Service Schools.*

The following Fleet schools are being conducted at the Destroyer Base, San Diego, under the administration of Commander Base Force.

- Elementary firecontrol school.
- Torpedo school (elementary and advanced).
- Diesel school.
- Visual signalling.
- Welding school (elementary and advanced).
- Radio striker school.

Requests in excess of the quota are received for all schools except the advanced courses in torpedoes and welding.

Additional torpedo schools (elementary) are at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.; Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, R. I.; and at the Naval Torpedo Station, Keyport, Washington. The latter is being organized and is not yet in operation.

(3) *Special Schools.*

Special schools, such as Minecraft Mine School, have been conducted within types. Special Patrol Wing radio schools have proved to be valuable source of training both elementary and as additional instruction for slower members of the Class "A" radio schools.

(4) *Ships' Schools.*

Systematic schooling to train men in specialist duties and for advancement in rating has been conducted in all ships of the various types. Excessive transfers do not permit the requisite training of sufficient personnel to fill key ratings, in spite of the accelerated program.

(5) *Bureau of Navigation Training Courses.*

Bureau of Navigation Training Courses are satisfactory but courses are lacking for some ratings. To be of value they must be kept revised to date, particularly now when conditions are changing rapidly and large numbers of new men must be trained. Recommendations have been submitted in separate correspondence to bring these courses up to date. The demand for these courses has been heavy. They continue to be most satisfactory for use in training men for advancement in rating. In spite of increased demands, the Bureau of Navigation and its issuing agencies have managed to keep abreast of the number of request.

(C) *ATHLETICS.*

(a) The athletic facilities in the Pearl Harbor—Aiea area (Hawaii) have been greatly increased during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1941. The following facilities are available to the enlisted personnel of the Fleet:

- 5 Baseball diamonds
- 17 Softball fields
- 5 Basketball courts
- 10 Tennis courts
- 6 Handball courts
- 2 Volleyball courts
- 4 Swimming pools
- Golf course at Navy Yard

In addition to the above, a large number of men in swimming parties and overnight camping parties has been accommodated in Camp Andrews, Nanakuli, T. H.

The following facilities are available to officers:

- 7 Tennis courts
- 1 Badminton court
- 1 Paddle Tennis court
- 2 Handball courts
- 2 Swimming pools

[37] (b) On 30 June 1941 the enlisted men's pool and clubhouse at Aiea was ready for opening. The new athletic development at Aiea has done much to increase the athletic facilities available, and has proved to be very popular with the men in the Fleet. It is anticipated that the Fleet Recreation Center will be completed about the middle of August 1941. The Fleet Recreation Center consists of an arena and an enlisted men's clubhouse. The arena will seat approximately 6,000 people. It is planned to use the arena for motion pictures, boxing matches and theatricals. The enlisted men's clubhouse, adjoining the arena, contains reading rooms, writing rooms, canteen, pool tables, and ten bowling alleys.

(c) A project is underway to develop a swimming beach with bathhouse, at Barber's Point Territory of Hawaii for officers and enlisted men. The capacity of Camp Andrews, T. H., is being increased and more modern facilities are being installed.

(d) The Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer reported for duty on 21 May 1941. He is charged with the allocation, maintenance and upkeep of the athletic fields. He is also responsible for arranging swimming meets, boxing matches, and theatricals with the Fleet.

(e) The Fleet athletic policy has been to continue the competitions in various sports within each type in-so-far as operating schedules permit. Every effort is made to get the maximum number of men on the athletic fields.

(f) In the Fall of 1940, three separate Task Forces were sent to the Coast for recreation and liberty. This resulted in athletic schedules being slightly modified. Athletic competitions were handicapped somewhat when the Pacific Fleet was operating as two Task Forces, one Task Force being at sea all the time. This condition is improved now that the Fleet is operating as three separate Task Forces.

(g) During the past year, three athletic groups were established for the purpose of allocating available athletic facilities. This plan has been successful and has tended to provide a more equitable allocation and permit greater use of facilities available.

(D) CHAPLAINS' ACTIVITIES AND WELFARE.

The duties of the Fleet Chaplains have been considerably augmented by the Fleet basing in Hawaiian waters.

Demands have increased for rendering personal services in addition to the religious ones. These have been handled most successfully, and have been a considerable factor in maintaining a high morale.

The usual collateral duties of the Chaplains, such as welfare, recreation, Navy Relief, and Red Cross liaison, have been successfully performed in all worthy cases.

(E) HEALTH & HYGIENE.

With the exception of sharp outbreaks in Measles and Mumps incidental to increased numbers of recruits lacking in "Mass Immunization", an epidemic of Catarrhal Fever and sporadic mild occurrences of gastrointestinal upsets in the Fleet, it is considered the general health has been at normal levels.

The injury rates, and venereal incidence have both decreased perceptibly.

The exanthemata have been reduced to a slightly above normal admission rate which should be stabilized at this level depending always on influx of new personnel. At no time was the situation such as to cause alarm nor require measures prejudicial to the training schedules. However, there was a marked outbreak of Catarrhal Fever in the Fleet which reached its peaks in September and January. This was concomitant with a national situation which unquestionably was the source of our infection. No serious complications appeared except in a few isolated cases. The mortality in these was practically nil. In one instance a battleship was forced to remain at anchor in Lahaina Roads for a few days incidental to the large sick list. Efficient drastic steps were taken in the instance and the schedule was readily resumed.

Various gastrointestinal upsets, mostly of unknown origin, were noted. These were traced in a few instances to food handlers, shore-side foods of questionable quality, et cetera, but as a [38] rule, no definite cause could be detected. The water supply has been suspected wrongly—in all but one case. The repeated weekly and tri-weekly analysis of barge water failed to substantiate any such accusation. Water distilled aboard has been carefully checked especially while in Pearl Harbor. Further precautions were taken in some ships by not distilling drinking water in port, and by chlorination. Several cases were periodically transferred to the Naval Hospital for

thorough study especially whenever the diagnosis of DYSENTERY, BACILLARY, was considered advisable, or indicated by the finding of *Paradysenteriae Shigilla* in the stools.

One theory advanced was the droplet contamination of vegetables transported in spray splashed boats from source of supply to ships. Another was the existence of a "droplet" contamination causing a condition which appeared in Los Angeles epidemically during May and June, also in Honolulu during June and July. The latter has been reported in Los Angeles—1939. Other instances appeared in Denmark—1935, England—1936. Milwaukee reported 120,000 cases in 1936. The symptomatology is practically identical.

However, in the Fleet no deaths occurred, very few cases were severe and though disabling for 2 to 5 days, recovery took place with usual routine treatments. Dehydration and high fevers were the important features in the more severe cases. No one group of ships was affected nor were the instances of localities under suspicion. Breaks in the technique at the dishwashing area, principally low temperature of water and the presence of "carriers" have accounted for many difficulties of this type. Sporadic increases in "sore throats" were traced to defective sterilization or care of scuttlebutts, also to the ubiquitous common drinking cups in some parts of ships.

The injury rates have decreased noticeably and this can only be attributed to the added interest and publicity in prevention by thorough study of each accident followed by remedial steps where possible.

An outstanding improvement has been the lowered venereal disease incidence. This has been truly remarkable. In June, 1939, the rate per 1,000 was 82; in 1940 it was 72. These figures apply to the U. S. Fleet (less Fleet Marine Force and Asiatic Fleet). For the first 5 months of this year the Pacific Fleet showed an admission rate of 41 per 1000 for venereal admissions.

The location of ships has materially affected these statistics, especially when there were sojourns in some of our less supervised Coast ports. Many features concur in the lowering and raising of venereal rates, such as lectures aboard ships, but the excellent measures, supervision and cooperation of the authorities in Honolulu must be given just dues and be pointed out as worthy of attempted emulation by some of our coastal confreges.

There have been very few cases of "food poisoning" per se in the Fleet this year. Only one of moment where over 600 appeared on the "COLORADO" during a gunnery practice. This was traced to a "carrier" of entero-toxic staphylococci in a food handler. No complicated case appeared and the situation fortunately responded to routine medical aid. The necessity for readily available hand washing facilities for food handlers cannot be stressed too much. This is applicable in controlling the fresh water curtailments or "water hours" which manifestly preclude availability to more than a favored portion of the personnel. Efficiency competitions are commendable only until they jeopardize health and comfort.

The increased personnel aboard ships of all types brings problems of sanitation which require constant surveillance, energetic remedial or preventive measures and justifiable concern for the presence of any possible epidemic. This is applicable to the air borne and contaminated food diseases.

Ventilation must be and is being constantly considered, especially in the avoidance of protracted periods of gas attack and other drills. These problems have been given due consideration during the past year with commendatory results. Expediency and necessity in an emergency necessarily control factors in a manner dissimilar to those of placid times. Hygiene and sanitation standards have been modified but have been more carefully watched by that token.

The procurement of drinking fountains at "strategic" areas continues and is relieving a situation which made for problems of sanitation. The sooner our common drinking cups—coffee and otherwise—disappear from their many storerooms, firerooms and the like, the greater will be the decrease of upper respiratory diseases. Most ships have taken substantial steps in this direction.

A dishwashing machine of small restaurant type such as seen in the many "hamburger stands" is urgently needed in officers' pantries. The dishwashing method in these instances has not changed in over thirty years.

[39] Garbage disposal in port remains a problem. Large accumulations over 24 hour periods are detrimental to proper sanitation and fly control. The "lighter" service should be carefully controlled to permit of no breaks, perhaps doubled in frequency.

All personnel have been blood typed excepting an occasional new arrival. The issuance of identification tags in the next few weeks will afford a ready means of information at all times.

Landing Force exercises provided much needed training for the Medical Department personnel and have pointed to some outstanding necessities in equipment and supplies. These latter are applicable to preparation and provisions for casualties more especially in the service of supply and transporting of injured from field of action to evacuating area or ship.

Hospital facilities have been adequate to date. The absence of a hospital ship has thrown a patient increase on the hospital at Pearl Harbor where it has been absorbed efficiently and expeditiously. It now has a bed capacity of 1,000. A mobile hospital of 500 bed capacity is on its way for installation. This is in the area chosen for the erection of a new Naval Hospital at a strategic distance from the industrial and military activities of the Yard. Provided no obstacles arise, this unit should be functioning shortly and furnish components available for installations, if needed, at distant points. The hospital has a daily average patient complement of about 600, leaving a good margin of safety, when the mobile unit and its 500 beds are added. This should be further increased by the expeditious construction of the new permanent hospital. This already has been planned and appropriated for but not started. Possible major catastrophes or large scale casualties make this adjunct urgently needed. With the above situation in mind, a determined successful effort has been made to decrease transfers to hospitals and hospital ship for minor injuries, minor surgery and mild conditions. This accomplishes much towards indoctrination of Medical Department personnel, stimulates resourcefulness and maintains a crew intact while undergoing its scheduled training aboard combatant ships.

(F) *DISCIPLINE AND MORALE.*

The excellent character of Naval personnel continues to be self-evident.

The discipline and morale of the Fleet is considered excellent. This is particularly impressive in view of the existing rapid turn-over in personnel, distance of the Fleet Units from their home bases, and rigorous conditions under which the Fleet operates at sea.

In spite of the rapid personnel expansion program taking place during the year, there appears to have been no corresponding increase in breaches of discipline.

With increased recreational and housing facilities rapidly becoming available, it is anticipated that the present high morale will continue. The only primary unsatisfactory obstacles to morale are the increased cost of living for both officers and enlisted personnel with families, the more lucrative salaries offered civilian workers on "defense" projects, and the uncertainty as to the length of time personnel will be separated from dependents on the Mainland of the United States. This latter feature is compensated for partially by scheduled recreational visits to the West Coast of the United States.

[40]

PART V—INSPECTIONS

The prescribed inspections, military, material, medical supply, and surprise have been conducted in accordance with current instructions. They indicate that the Fleet has generally maintained satisfactory conditions as to material, discipline, efficiency, health, and morale. Wherever conditions requiring remedy were discovered, action was initiated leading to their correction.

The Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, accompanied by Captain M. L. Deyo, U. S. Navy, was present with the U. S. Fleet during the September, 1940, tactical period, and informally inspected various Fleet units, including a battleship, aircraft carrier, light and heavy cruisers, destroyers, and 14th Naval District

EXHIBITS—NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME III

No. 45 to 62 (both inclusive)

and

No. 69 to 77 (both inclusive)

NOTE.—Exhibits No. 63 to 68, both inclusive are filed with the testimony which by direction of the court was extracted from the record in the interest of national security and the successful prosecution of the war.

NOTE.—Exhibit 72 contains privileged matter, which though not classified as "Top-Secret", does contain mater which is against the public interest to release for any purpose whatsoever. This privileged matter has been plainly marked by underlining in "red" together with an appropriate note calling special attention to its classification.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain, U. S. N.,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT No. 45

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, Aug. 13, 1941.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30B3-BP

(SC) A16-1/ND14 D-33960

Serial 079630

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subject: Fourteenth Naval District—Local Defense Forces.

Reference: (a) CinCPac conf. ltr A16/(16) Serial 01231 of August 9, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District as again put forth by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in reference (a). However, at this time it is impossible to *obtain either authority or funds* to acquire or build any craft other than that now under construction.

2. At the present time, mainly due to lack of engines, it does not appear that any patrol craft now under construction will be completed before the middle of October.

3. It is expected that Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 will leave for Hawaii in about two weeks. This squadron will be attached to the Pacific Fleet rather than to the District and consists of twelve motor torpedo boats.

4. The situation as to the sampans which have been seized in Hawaii has not yet been determined although the Department is doing its utmost to obtain at least some of these boats expeditiously.

5. Vessels now available for the Naval Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District include:

4 Old destroyers

Coast Guard Cutter Taney, Tiger, Reliance

2 Coast Guard YPs

4 AMc's

There are also twelve tugs of various types assigned to and in the Fourteenth Naval District which, should the fleet leave, might be used for patrol purposes. In addition to the vessels now actually in the Fourteenth Naval District PG-19 SACRAMENTO should arrive there within two or three days and YT-HOGA and YN-56 WAPELLO are expected to sail from San Pedro for Hawaii on August 17, 1941.

6. When patrol boats now under construction are completed as many as practical will be assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District but as previously stated construction is progressing very slowly.

R. E. Ingersol,
R. E. INGERSOL,
Acting.

EXHIBIT No. 46

UNITED STATES FLEET

(At this point in Exhibit No. 46, there appears a routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 07526 and date of 13 August 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

My
*Pearl Harbor, T. H.,*ND14/(18)
Serial 096W
Secret

First Endorsement to Com-14 Secret ltr. S-A16-1/ND14(01084) of 17 October 1941
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces,
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

1. Forwarded.

2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A Fleet, tied to its bases by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for its security at sea, is, in a real sense, no Fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United States by registered air mail is authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14

S-A16-1/
ND14(01084)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 October 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Reappraisal of Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

References:

- (a) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 30 Dec. 1940, Serial 629.
- (b) CINCUS Conf. 1st end to Com 14 serial 629, CINC file A16 (022) of 7 January 1941.
- (c) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 7 May 1941, Serial 0430.
- (d) CINCPAC Secret ltr. Serial 038 W of 20 May 1941 to Opnav.
- (e) Com 14 Conf. ltr. to Opnav of 31 October 1940, Serial 510

1. All of the above references bear on the local defense forces and security measures of this area.

2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no battery, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the department has been fully informed about the deficiencies in this district, he feels it necessary to again bring this subject to attention.

4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success, from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available

for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate for the purpose.

5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the district are the four destroyers of Destroyer Division EIGHTY, one still being unequipped with listening gear, and three Coast Guard cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and security patrols in a very extensive frontier.

6. It is urged that the department send a number of small, fast craft to this district equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose. It is further urged that the department send to this district at least two squadrons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may be expressed in the cliché "too little and too late." It is hoped that we may profit from their errors.

C. C. BLOCH.

79716—14333—34

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 47

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 25, 1941.

In reply to Initials and No. Op-12B-7-dlm (SC)A16-1/ND14

Serial 0135412 D-37057

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

References:

- (a) CinCpac secret let. A16/(038W) of May 26, 1941, to CNC.
- (b) WPL-46.
- (c) WP Pac-46.
- (d) CNO secret let. Op-12B-7-djm (SC)A16-1/1D14 serial 070312 of June 23, 1941, to CinCpac, copy to Com-14.
- (e) Com-14 secret let. C-A16-1/1D14 (01084) of October 17, 1941.
- (f) CinCpac endorsement ND14/18 serial 096W of no date, to reference (e).
- (g) CNO conf. let. Op-22-A2(SC)A16-3(9) serial 0115422 of October 23, 1941.

1. The request of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSC planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. A previous letter of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his war plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

[2] 4. Neither the Local Defense Force Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan O-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army air forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of joint defense plans.

5. The augmentation of the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of underwater detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned these vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is progressing slowly, and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May, 1942. Eight of these, due for completion in May, 1942, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. sub-chasers (PC) is indefinite due to the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command the Coast Guard of the Fourteenth Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the following are equipped with depth charges and underwater detection gear: TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when available, are tentatively assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District. Two of these are due for completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

[3] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessary and is authorized: within the continental limits of the United States by registered air mail; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A. locked box.

H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT No. 48

[Stamped:] SECRET By Authority of A. C. of S., WPD 12/7/41 CK 7

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, December 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)
Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following *first priority secret radiogram* be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

"MARSHALL."

L. T. Gerow,
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Noted O. C. S. 12/7/41. JW.

Radios as follows dispatched¹ 11:52 AM, 12-7-41, by Code Room, WDMC:

- 12.05 #733 to CG, USAFFE, Manila, P. I.;
- 12.17 #529 to CG, Haw. Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH.
- 12.00 #519 to CG, Crbn. Def. Cmnd., Quarry Heights, CZ.
- 12.11 # 16 to CG, Fourth Army, Pres. of San Fco., Cal. ehb-1705.

I certify that this message was dispatched via facilities of the Western Union Telegraph Company and Radio Corporation of America to RCA Honolulu substantially at the time indicated on the face of the document.

Edward F. French,
EDWARD F. FRENCH,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Chief, Traffic Operations Branch,
Army Communications Service, CCSig.

¹ Code messages sent out D. E. V.

EXHIBIT No. 49

[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30C1-AJ
(3c) N20-12
Serial 09330

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height plane at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

[2] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles

practically surrounding a limited [3] number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet
CinC Asiatic Fleet

EXHIBIT No. 50

(At this point in Exhibit No. 50 there appears a routing slip bearing Cincus Routing No. 01885 and date of 15 February 1941. This routing slip will be found reproduced as Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

[1]

SECRET

Cinepac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *December 2, 1941.*

DEAR BETTY: We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we could send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facil-

ities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient Marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should ease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3"—50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5"—51's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organizations of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, [3] provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that:— (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both surface and anti-aircraft; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes, (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 12-plane pursuant squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete gunds and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces one the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's is an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

My kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may

become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

H. E. KIMMEL.

EXHIBIT No. 51

[1]

SECRET

EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 2 Dec, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.

References:

- (a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
- (b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
- (c) Cincpac despatch 280627 of November 1941.
- (d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
- (e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
- (f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941.
- (g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to *reinforce* defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, *might occupy* but that they could provide no anti-aircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in *support* of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which referred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

[2] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, *trained* assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-

aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7'' and 5'' guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155mm guns from Hawaii the Marine 5'' guns might be replaced but the 155mm guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37mm guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37mm.

[3] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reinforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency, Army personnel might replace casualties or reinforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

[4] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a squadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases make feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[5] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions);

[6] (b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination.

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defenses [7] Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and

the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five-inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

[8] 16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarek Archipelago, and other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

[9] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reinforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g));

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (See paragraph C);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

C. G. Haw. Dept.
Com-14

EXHIBIT No. 52

[1]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cinpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 31, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Task Forces—Organization and Missions.

Reference:

(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL-41

(b) Cinpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/(13) Serial 01254 of 13 Aug. 1941 (Furnished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second Marine Div.).

1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 November 1941.

2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organizations are prescribed:

TASK FORCE ONE, (COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE)

Batdivs TWO, FOUR.....	6 BB
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON.....	1 CV
Crudiv NINE.....	5 CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE.....	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
OGLALA, Mindiv ONE.....	1 CM, 4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient *Covering Force* available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

TASK FORCE TWO, (COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE)

Batdiv ONE.....	3 BB
Cardiv TWO.....	1 CV
Crudiv FIVE.....	4 CA
Desflot TWO.....	1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
Mindiv TWO.....	4 DM

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Reconnoitering and Raiding Force* for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

[2] *TASK FORCE THREE, (COMMANDER SCOUTING FORCE)*

Crudivs FOUR, SIX-----	8 CA
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group 21-----	1 CV
Desron FIVE-----	1 DL, 8 DD
Minron TWO-----	13 DMS
Trainron FOUR-----	6 AP
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment	

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force *in order to* provide an efficient *Amphibious Force* for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

TASK FORCE FOUR, (COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)

That part of Fourteenth
Naval District Activities
which involve the Island
Bases.

Primary Mission:

To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases *in order to* insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

TASK FORCE SEVEN, (COMMANDER SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE)

Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE..	1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD
Subron SIX-----	12 SS, 1 AS
Subron EIGHT ¹ -----	6 SS, 1 AS
Subron TEN ¹ -----	4 SS, 1AS

¹ Upon reporting.

Primary Missions:

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient *Submarine Observation and Attack Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

TASK FORCE NINE, (COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO)

Patwing ONE-----	36 VPB(A), 1 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Patwing TWO-----	42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP

[3] *Primary Missions:*

(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics *in order to* provide an efficient long range *Air Scouting and Air Striking Force* for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet *in order to* improve security of Fleet units and bases.

TASK FORCE FIFTEEN. (COMMANDER BASE FORCE)

Units assigned 4 CA or CL

Primary Mission:

To escort trans-pacific shipping *in order to* protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack.

3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and operations of their respective Task Forces. In addition, they will control the allocation of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise periods of the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of the Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to the above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force Commanders.

4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, and developments of the Island Bases.

5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and operation of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (including type and inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.

6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. For the present, cruisers will be assigned to this Task Force in rotation and, in the proportion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, insofar as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Trans-pacific westbound convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila Area by the Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Commandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN will issue the orders for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.

7. Force and Type Commanders will continue to exercise other functions as now assigned, and as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.

8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.

9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.

[4] 10. *Communications.* Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:

(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor, shall use the effective Task Force frequency plans, except,

(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.

(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of Island Bases guard 4265 series.

(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain *Task Group* designations are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows:

1. Midway.

2. Wake.

3. Johnston

4. Palmyra

in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those areas.

Example:

Task Group

4.1—District Activities at Midway.

7.1—Submarine Patrol at Midway.

9.1—Patrol Planes operating from Midway.

(b) Units of each task organization, when in port, will guard and use harbor circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor circuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the nearest shore command activity.

11. *Schedules.* Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating periods of the surface Task Forces.

H. E. KIMMEL.

DISTRIBUTION: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X, EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC,
ND11-12-13-14, NYS-10, (A1—Asiatic,
A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 53

[11

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 27 February 1941.

File. C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)

Confidential—Operation Plan No. 1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)

Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)

Outer—1 DD

Inner—1 DD

Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)

Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)

A/B Boom

Mine Sweepers—

Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86)

Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)

(b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commanding Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction with Army.

(c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer) In conjunction with Army.

(d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with Army.

1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.—(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
- (2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.
- (3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
- (b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
 - (1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.
 - (2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

[2] (3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet.

(3). (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the Pearl Harbor channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "3".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense.* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

[3] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E". (2) Use zone plus ten and one half time. (3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH,
Naval Base Defense Officer,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes:

- A. Inshore Patrol Plan.
- B. Base Defense Air Force Plan.
- C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan.

- D. Harbor Control Post Plan.
- E. Communication Plan.

Distribution-complete with Annexes.

- CinCPAC (10)
- CG HD (20)
- Dist. Marine Officer 14ND
- Operations Officer 14ND
- Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND
- Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL
- District Intelligence Officer 14ND
- NTS 14ND (10)
- CO NAS PHTH (5)
- CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)
- COMAIRSCOFOR (8)
- CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)
- COMBATFOR (15)

- COMSCOFOR (15)
- Combatships (17)
- COMCRUBATFOR (25)
- COMAIRBATFOR (50)
- COMDESBATFOR (165)
- COMINBATFOR (20)
- COMCRUSCOFOR (25)
- COMSUESCOFOR (40)
- COMPATWINGTWO (20)
- COMBASEFOR (75)
- COMDR. 2ND. AIRFORCMP (10)
- COMDESDIVTWO (05)

[1]

Annex "A"—Revised

File-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0563)

Confidential—Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A-1-41*To Naval Base Defense Force Operating Plan No. 1-41*

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol*: Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line*: Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol*: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEY.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer*: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combase.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(2) *East Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(4) *West Loch Patrol*: Boat Officer—1 Power Boat.

(d) *A/B Boom*: Lieut. Spear. Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft*:

(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Comdr. C. D. Line, D-U, USNR REEDBIRD, CONDOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBILL.

(2) YS-86: C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANQUA, and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1-41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)", are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*".

"The *OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (OAHU D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:

- KEAHI POINT Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
- PUU KAPOLEI Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
- PUUIKI STATION } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards."
- KAHUKU POINT }

"The *Outer Harbor Area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the harbor defense batteries". (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"The *Harbor Channel Area* is the water area which lies between the *Outer Harbor Area* and the *Inner Harbor Area*, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor".

"The *Inner Harbor Area* is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor".

[3] 2. This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEAR HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2670 kes. Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered. (Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness: Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) *A/B Boom* to be maintained and operated as present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, pearl harbor.

(c) *Mincraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operations, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant, Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District "Clear" to mean "The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed".

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of available vessels:

(a) (1) *Picket Line*.

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol*.

(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6-40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol*.

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base Defense Communication Plan, Annex E. Use zone time plus ten and one half. Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

G. B. WOOLEY,

G. B. WOOLEY,

Commander, U. S. N. (Ret).,

Commander Inshore Patrol,

Fourteenth Naval District.

J. W. Bays,

J. W. BAYS,

Aide to Commandant.

Distribution: Same as Basic Plan.

[1] Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 Dated February 27, 1941

C-A16-3/A4-3 (5)/ND14 (0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H. April 9, 1941.

Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information.*—This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secretary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group, who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(C348)
Confidential

MARCH 31, 1941.
COMMANDING GENERAL,
HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

1. *Summary of the Situation.*—(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of Opposing Strengths.*—(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8' guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones

[2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*—(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Middy attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us:* (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. *Decisions:* 1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to

our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile, surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material readiness

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan.

Degree of readiness

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes.

Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is in an all hands condition. CONDITION B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1] C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND READINESS REPORTS

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

- 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
- 2. All types—30 minutes.
- 3. All types—one hour.
- 4. All types—two hours.
- 5. All types—four hours.
- 2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

File C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)

Confidential

OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41, ANNEX "C"

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

Task organizations

(a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.

(b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.

1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1-41 and OCABF-38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".

2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defense of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive*: Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) *Group Five*: Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five*: Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition, except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five: Command Post*: To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,
Commandant, 14th Naval District).

[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)
Confidential

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

OPERATION PLAN No. 1-41, ANNEX "D"

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
5 March 1941.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Harbor Control Post. District Operations Officer.

1. *Information*. As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Army observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operates in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Harbor Control Post*. (1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

- Harbor Control Post to
 - Hqtrs. Haw'n Dept., FT. SHAFTER
 - Hqtrs. HSCAB, FT. DERUSSY
 - Command Post, FT. KAMEHAMEHA
 - Command Post, HICKAM FIELD
 - Commander Patrol Wing TWO
 - SOPE (if at dock)
 - Navy Yard Signal Tower
 - Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft, or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E", and be prepared to direct Power House as to signal to be used (See paragraph 6000, *Special Signals*.)

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.

Condition II Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

NOTE: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508; after working hours on Honolulu 75148.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

H. B. Knowles
H. B. KNOWLES,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
District Operations Officer.

Approved:

C. C. Block,

C. C. BLOCH,

Naval Base Defense Officer,

(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)

Distribution:

In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1-41

[1] ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41 (MODIFICATION NO. 1)

Communication Plan—July 19, 1941

This plan supersedes Annex Easy to Operation Plan No. 1-41.

1100 *General*.

In order that Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, may coordinate the defense, it is necessary that he have a means for instantly communicating with every vessel and shore activity of the district and with responsible senior officers present in Pearl Harbor.

1111 The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade maintains an Army Anti-aircraft information Service centered at A. A. A. Brigade Headquarters, Fort Shafter, which broadcasts information of enemy aircraft by voice on 900 kc. This information is also vital to all activities including Fleet units present in Pearl Harbor. In order to simplify communications and avoid multiplicity of circuits, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), will establish a Fox

series on 900 kc. using radio telegraph with a modulated CW Transmitter. These transmissions can be copied on an ordinary broadcast receiver which even small vessels should be able to provide. For the present only the SOPE and Sector commanders are required to guard this frequency. All other vessels should guard this frequency is practicable, especially those having anti-aircraft batteries.

1112 The destroyer patrol will use the Joint Army and Navy Inshore Patrol frequency of 2550 kc. The commander of the Pearl Harbor Groupment probably will have a radio station on this circuit which will normally receive only.

1113 Information of hostile or potentially hostile forces acquired by Fleet forces in operating areas must be reported to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), promptly. This can most easily be done on the Ship-Shore frequency (355 kc).

1120 This modification effective upon receipt.

1130 USE ZONE PLUS 10 and 1/2 TIMES.

[2] 1150 RADIO SILENCE.

There will be no restriction upon the use of circuits set up herein, prior to an ALERT, except in care of an emergency. During an ALERT or an emergency, radio silence will be maintained except for contact reports, amplifying reports and tactical orders, instructions or reports.

1170 CONTACT REPORTS made by units under this command will be addressed to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), call sign W2X. Fleet units operating outside Pearl Harbor will include Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), as an information addressee. Evaluated information will be placed on Army and Navy Joint teletype or wire loops, and if desirable on Local Fox method circuit. All contact reports concerning hostile aircraft or carriers within 250 miles of Oahu will be made in plain language. Contact reports of enemy surface or submarine forces within 50 miles of Oahu will be made in abbreviated plain language. (See USF 70, Article 1178).

1180 Visual signalling by day will be by searchlight, Flag Hoist or Semaphore. At night use blinker tube if practicable. Ships should refrain from using searchlights at night except in emergencies. Visual signalling prohibited during blackout.

2430 AUTHENTICATORS will be used when challenge is made by receiving station. All contact reports will be challenged. Units directly under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), including Destroyer Patrol will use SOI No. 27-7 (Joint) of December 16, 1940. Fleet units should use these grids when communicating with shore radio stations of Army and Navy. Copies of SOI 27-7 (Joint) herewith.

2500 RADIO CALL SIGNS.

Units operating directly under command of Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), will use call signs provided in Signal Operating Instruction (SOI No. 43-8 (Joint)) effective April 1, 1940. Same call will be used for Visual and Radio. Copies of SOI No. 43-8 (Joint) herewith.

DESTROYER-PATROL

Inner DD Patrol..... N5F
(Inshore Patrol Station #1)

Outer DD Patrol..... J5Y
(Inshore Patrol Station #2)

The following calls from SOI No. 43-8 are assigned. All stations enter under NAVY on Page 5.

[3] ALL SWEEPERS..... V5Z
Sweeper No. 1 (magnetic)..... V1Y
Sweeper No. 2 (Anchored)..... V7P
Sweeper No. 3 (Anchored)..... K2Q

5000 DESTROYER PATROL

(a) When patrol is on station, patrol commander report assumption of patrol to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDC), information to patrol being relieved. Relieved unit will then secure on patrol frequency.

(b) Guard effective Fox schedules when so ordered. Normally, Vailupe guards Fox schedules for destroyer patrol.

(c) Destroyer patrol will use CSP-1023 and CSP-1024.

6600 CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS

1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The following cryptographic aids are authorized for Joint Army and Navy use:

For Use Among—	Contact Code	Aircraft Code	General Cipher	D/F Code
All stations less aircraft-----	CSP 680 CSP 696 CSP 697	----- ----- -----	CSP 642 CSP 645 *CSP 732 *CSP 733	USF 64
Aircraft (plus air-ground communications)-----	CSP 680 CSP 696 CSP 697	USF 66	-----	USF 66

*Army Short Title—"SIG NOG".

NOTE: By special arrangement, Busdefairfor and Hawaiian Air Force are authorized to use CSP-740 when operating jointly.

7000 HARBOR PATROL.

Very pistol signals will be employed by Harbor Patrol (Motor Boats) as follows:

- (1) General Alarm----- One White Star (may be repeated at intervals)
- [4] (2) Require Assistance-----Two White Stars (repeated at intervals until certain it has been observed)
- (3) All Clear----- One White Star Followed by Two White Stars Simultaneously.

8000 SPECIAL SIGNALS.

(1) AIR RAID ALARMS

SIGNAL

MEANING

- (a) *Yard Whistle*
1 long blast 30 sec
Interval 25 sec
1 Short Blast 5 sec

PREPARE for Air Raid—If at night—BLACK OUT (See Blackout procedure 14th ND Order No. 20-40)

This signal to be repeated by one ship in each sector (PACFLT Conf. letter 20L-41) as designated by Sector Commander.

(b) STREET LIGHTS (at night)

- (1) Flashed 3 times
(Simultaneous with start of whistle signal) PREPARE for Air Raid
- (2) Remain dark 5 sec BLACKOUT
- (3) Lighted for 10 sec
- (4) Extinguished

(c) SIGNAL TOWER

Appropriate Emergency hoist (day only) Be prepared for attack by enemy aircraft

RADIO CIRCUITS

Transmit on 900 and 355 kc in plain English Urgent Precedence "AIR RAID" (number and type of planes will be given if possible)

[5] (d) TELEPHONE

Yard duty officer:

- Notify FAD Lualualoi—phone 954
- Notify Radio Lualualoi—phone 976
- Notify Old Naval Station—phone 449

(2) *ALL CLEAR SIGNALS*

SIGNAL	MEANING
(a) <i>Yard Whistle</i> 3 long blasts	All clear
(b) <i>Street Lights</i> Turned on as first long whistle blast is sounded	All clear
(c) <i>Signal Tower</i> Same signal as (1) (c) under negative	All clear

(d) *Radio Circuits*
The all clear signals will be followed by a despatch on all circuits "All Clear".
CAUTION: Radio despatch must not be relied upon unless confirmed by other methods.

8000 *DRILLS*

(a) When drills are held they will be preceded by a despatch "Prepare for air raid drill".

(b) All despatches and orders in conduct of drills will be preceded by word "drill".

(c) The all clear signal terminating the drill will be followed by despatch "Air Raid Drill Completed".

This messages will be transmitted on all air raid circuits.

(d) *CAUTION*.—Radio despatch terminating drill or actual raid must not be relied upon unless confirmed by other methods.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 53 there appears a Radio Frequency Plan for the Fourteenth Naval District, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 13, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS
VERIFICATION GRIDS
No. 27-7 (JOINT)

14th Naval District,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
9 December 1940.

Hawaiian Department,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
9 December 1940.

Effective 0001, 16 December 1940.

Destroy previous issue No. 27-6 and supplement

1. VERIFICATION CODE.

a. All radio stations receiving messages from another radio station must be prepared to challenge or obtain verification as to the authenticity of the transmitting station.

b. Inasmuch as the present verification system becomes unsafe after a few challenges and replies have been intercepted it is necessary to restrict the use of this grid system to challenges when in an emergency situation the station receiving a message, for some reason actually suspects the authenticity of the transmitting station. The verification system should be used in training exercises but not more than once in 24 hours by each station.

c. The transmission of ZWA in joint Army Navy Radio Operations during an actual emergency will be challenged.

d. The method of verification is as follows: Two letters, not on the same line or column, will be selected at random from the daily grid by the receiving station and sent as a challenge. The original transmitting station will take the other two letters which complete the rectangle, the first letter being on the same line as the first letter of the challenge, and reply to the challenge. *EXAMPLE*:—AB receives a message from EF on the first day of the month. If the message has been received without error but AB for some reasons suspects the authenticity of the station AB will select a group at random from the first day grid such as DY. AB will then transmit "R II DY II K". If EF is the authentic station the available grid will disclose that or complete the diagonal, EF will therefore reply "OV VA". If AB transmits: "R II YD II K" the reply on the date in question would be: "VO VA".

2. VERIFICATION GRIDS:

a. The following grids are effective each month of the year at 0001 for the date specified;

1ST				2ND				3RD				4TH				5TH								
S	W	L	R	K	K	H	O	S	L	N	M	U	X	K	L	F	Z	W	G	B	P	Y	A	Q
N	V	B	F	Y	W	H	Q	D	B	P	B	A	L	I	A	X	P	M	B	F	U	W	C	S
T	E	P	C	U	U	Z	A	V	C	O	Y	T	Q	S	N	I	L	K	U	X	C	G	L	N
X	D	I	G	O	P	E	Y	X	G	C	V	D	H	R	Y	T	O	Q	S	D	Z	H	K	I
Q	Z	A	H	M	J	T	M	R	F	E	Z	F	W	G	V	H	D	R	C	H	R	T	D	V

[2]

6TH				7TH				8TH				9TH				10TH								
E	Q	F	B	N	P	B	Q	N	U	W	Q	A	Y	I	C	Z	A	L	S	L	O	X	H	A
V	P	K	A	Y	X	A	F	G	S	O	L	R	V	F	D	V	W	E	G	I	Q	Y	C	R
X	Z	U	C	D	B	V	E	E	W	P	B	T	S	M	D	X	I	C	M	W	K	Z	N	S
L	S	I	H	O	Z	Y	I	C	L	U	Z	K	E	K	P	F	Q	U	H	V	D	B	F	G
R	W	M	T	G	N	T	Q	K	R	C	H	N	G	D	N	X	Y	R	T	E	F	T	O	U

11TH				12TH				13TH				14TH				15TH								
O	G	R	N	Q	D	K	H	X	B	E	M	G	K	A	A	U	Y	Q	M	A	O	H	X	Z
K	F	B	X	Y	P	C	E	U	F	D	N	Y	C	F	O	R	C	S	X	N	R	V	K	C
H	A	D	T	W	A	T	Q	S	Y	P	I	B	X	T	Z	P	F	D	W	Y	E	J	L	T
I	L	C	H	S	M	R	C	Z	I	V	Q	S	R	U	V	I	K	M	L	F	D	Q	U	M
P	L	V	U	Z	V	W	N	G	L	O	Z	L	H	W	N	T	B	G	E	G	D	W	S	F

16TH				17TH				18TH				19TH				20TH								
T	C	E	F	P	Z	S	V	T	X	P	N	Y	V	U	X	R	P	F	V	D	M	V	L	U
O	U	Z	R	N	M	F	O	G	Q	T	K	O	C	Z	Q	Y	Z	I	O	S	N	I	Q	T
L	Q	W	M	V	B	D	W	C	Y	I	L	S	B	E	E	C	W	D	B	O	R	F	A	E
H	Y	D	A	X	H	P	E	I	U	X	P	Q	H	D	T	N	E	H	U	Y	W	B	X	Z
B	S	K	I	G	N	A	K	L	R	A	F	W	H	M	L	G	A	S	K	H	C	G	C	P

21ST				22ND				23RD				24TH				25TH								
L	Z	U	K	V	I	X	F	U	W	B	D	C	T	W	O	B	P	N	U	P	O	B	W	L
R	H	A	O	G	M	Y	L	N	T	G	L	R	Z	U	W	H	E	R	C	M	E	Z	Y	G
Q	D	M	T	P	D	G	Z	O	H	K	N	X	I	M	T	G	K	Z	F	X	C	K	V	U
X	C	S	E	W	S	K	P	R	V	Q	Y	V	H	F	S	D	V	X	Q	D	A	F	H	N
B	I	F	N	Y	Q	A	C	E	B	P	S	C	E	A	Y	M	I	L	A	T	Q	R	I	S

26TH				27TH				28TH				29TH				30TH								
N	E	A	Z	W	O	I	D	F	V	A	H	Q	I	Y	S	F	A	T	R	U	A	G	K	X
R	V	X	Y	Q	P	Y	T	U	E	U	Z	V	R	N	O	Y	D	M	K	P	Z	T	M	I
C	H	L	G	B	N	C	G	A	S	F	C	D	E	B	G	X	E	M	W	R	Y	L	B	E
T	M	D	I	F	X	R	H	G	W	W	S	G	M	P	U	N	I	V	P	V	S	W	D	C
X	U	S	O	P	Z	L	Q	M	B	T	X	L	M	O	C	Q	Z	B	L	O	F	E	Q	N

31ST
S M Q Y P
E U L A K
V T K F R
W M D Z O
D C I N C

b. Only such grids will be furnished as are necessary for a single flight or mission.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General HERRON:

J. W. LEWIS,
Captain, U. S. N.
Chief of Staff.

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps.
Chief of Staff.

Checked by:

W. E. Guitar,
 W. E. GUITAR,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N.

OFFICIAL:

R. C. TIROCKMORTON,
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

[1]

RESTRICTED

SIGNAL OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

RADIO CALL SIGNS

(No. 43-8 Joint)

14th Naval District,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Effective April 1, 1941
 (Destroy all previous copies)

Hawaiian Department
 Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following call signs for tactical Radio Stations and Nets and no others will be used in the Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District unless changed by this or higher Headquarters.

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>	<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Hawaiian Department	DH9	35th Inf. Hdqts.	PW7
Hawaiian Department Net	5CP	35th Inf. Net	7VW
Hawaiian Division Hdqts	3DV	1st Bn. 35th Inf.	YX5
Hawaiian Division Net	7LW	2nd Bn. 35th Inf.	1XQ
21st Brigade Hdqts.	2FC	3rd Bn. 35th Inf.	IQ1
21st Brigade Net	EU7	35th Inf. Motor	
19th Inf. Hdqtrs.	5DK	Patrol & O. P. Net	C24
19th Inf. Net	B88	Patrol or O. P. #1	FK5
1st Bn. 19th Inf.	7FU	Patrol or O. P. #2	JB8
2nd Bn. 19th Inf.	XC2	Patrol or O. P. #3	5LK
3rd Bn. 19th Inf.	HQ1	298th Inf. Hdqtrs.	1MG
19th Inf. Motor		298th Inf. Net	6UN
Patrol & O. P. Net	1TQ	1st Bn. 298th Inf.	G15
Patrol or O. P. #1	MK5	2nd Bn. 298th Inf.	1QG
Patrol or O. P. #2	W76	3rd Bn. 298th Inf.	5ZR
Patrol or O. P. #3	7QW	11th Field Art. Brigade Hdqts.	7YW
21st Inf. Hdqts.	TQ1	11th Field Art. Brigade Net	DW7
21st Inf. Net	2UC	8th Field Art. Hdqts.	7WU
1st Bn. 21st Inf.	SW7	8th Field Art. Net	C29
2nd Bn. 21st Inf.	RB8	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Hdq.	8RB
3rd Bn. 21st Inf.	8QB	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	U75
21st Inf. Motor		1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7EU
Patrol and O. P. Net	U78	1st Bn. 9th F. A. Liaison	QU7
Patrol or O. P. #1	7NU	1st Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	8VB
Patrol or O. P. #2	1HQ	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Hdq.	RC1
Patrol or O. P. #3	M56	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	5BK
Scout Car	5CK	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7CW
299th Inf. Hdqts.	WN6	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	2EC
299th Inf. Net Call	1RG	2nd Bn. 8th F. A. Liaison	7WV
1st Bn. 299th Inf.	AK9	11th Field Art. Hdqts.	BC2
2nd Bn. 299th Inf.	K98	11th Field Art. Net	CC2
3rd Bn. 299th Inf.	5FP	11th F. A. Liaison	7PU
22nd Brigade Hdqts	CU7	11th F. A. Liaison	2AC
22nd Brigade Net	SK5	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	11B8
27th Inf. Hdqts.	OQ1	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	RS3
27th Inf. Net	27C	1st Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	R1E
1st Bn. 27th Inf.	W73	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Hdq.	MU7
2nd Bn. 27th Inf.	CC2	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	JQ1
3rd Bn. 27th Inf.	71W	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	W72
Scout Car	8XB	2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	KU7
		2nd Bn. 11th F. A. Liaison	2ZC

1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
13th Field Art. Hqs.	2NC
13th Field Art. Net	LC2
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Hdq.	B87
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	7GU
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	SYB
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	QBS
1st Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	VQ1
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Hdq.	DK5
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	JKK
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	Q19
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	ABS
2nd Bn. 13th F. A. Liaison	2WC
11th Tank Co. Comd. Car Hq	TK5
Net	C25
1st Plat. Comm Car	7RU
2nd Plat. Comm Car	U77
3rd Plat. Comm Car	1BQ
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Hq.	DR5
Haw. Sep. Coast Art. Brig. Net	9XK
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Hdq 15 CA	KP5
Pearl Harbor Grpmt Net	9GK
Aana Grp Hdq inactive	YM4
Ewa Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 55 CA	4LM
Kamehameha Grp inactive	98K
Puu O Huhu Gr Hq 1st Bn. 41CA	VK9
Puu O Huhu Gt. Net	JK9
A Btry. 41 CA	5PP
Btry. Closson B Bty. 15 CA	FM4
Barrette Grp Hdq 1st Bn. 15 CA	2XZ
Barrette Grp Net	LZ2
Btry. Williston A. bty 15 CA	2TZ
Btry Hatch C Bty 15th CA	G14
Honolulu Grpmt Hq. 16 CA	6VN
Honolulu Grpmt. Net	PN6
Diamond Hd. Hdq. 16 CA	X41
Leaai Grp Hq. inactive	BZ2
Punchbowl Grp. Hq. inactive	9PK
Ulupau Grp. Hd. D bty 16 CA	6IN
North Shore Grpmt Hq. 2nd Bn. 55 CA	RZ2
North Shore Grpmt Net	M41
Haleiwa Grp. inactive	IM4
Kainku inactive	Z21
41 CA	GP5
Provisional AA Brig Hq 64 CA	BG1
Provisional AA Brig Net	68N
AA Gun Grpmt Hq. 64 CA	QP5
AA Gun Grpmt. Net	DN6
North Grp 1st Bn. 64 CA	6YN
South Grp 2nd Bn. 64 CA	G19
East Grp Dia Hd Grp 16 CA	X41
West Grp C bty. 15 CA	G14
Schofield AA Comd Hdq. 251 CA	CM4
Schofield AA Comd Net	I55
Schof. Gun Grp 1st Bn. 251 CA	5EP
Searchlight Grp	5KP
A. W. Grp 2nd Bn. 251 CA	1MG
Dept. Radio School Net	HZ2
Dept. Radio School	2TZ
Dept. Radio School	4DM
Division Radio School	MM4
Division Radio School	TZ2
Division Radio School	Y33
USAT Cochrane	XG1
USAT Tug 91	6LN
USAT Krautoff	1FG
USAT Frank	SM4
Aircraft Warning Co	RQ1
Aircraft Warning Co	VF7
Aircraft Warning Co	ZU7
Aircraft Warning Co	D88
Aircraft Warning Co	2IC
Aircraft Warning Co	7CU
Aircraft Warning Co	6QN
Aircraft Warning Co	6LI
Aircraft Warning Co	8GB
Aircraft Warning Co	7MU
Aircraft Warning Co	3XV
Aircraft Warning Co	1EG
Aircraft Warning Co	UQ1
Aircraft Warning Co	JF7
Hq. Haw. Air Force Com'd.	XL3
Grnd Station	AF7
Net	3FL
Hd. Sqdrn. H. A. F. plane	R52
18th Bomb Wing Com'd.	VH1
Grnd Station	WG1
18th Wing Bomb Wg. Net	3RX
Hdq. & Hdq. Sq. 18th B. W. plane	AV3A

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Hdq. & Hdq. Sq. 18th B. W. plane	AV3B
5th Bom. Grp. Com'd.	UZ2
Bom. Grp. Ground	5WR
Bom. Grp. Net	KH9
Hdq. Sqdr. 5th Grp Com'd	3NX
[8]	
Sqd. Flight Comdr. A	ZP5
Sqd. plane No. 1	LV3A
To plane No. 5 incl	LV3F
LV3A, LV3B, LV3D, LV3F. Omit additional letter E on all Army plane calls as above.	
4th Rec. Sqdr. Com'd.	9JH
Ground	LJ9
Net	E1H
Flight Comdr A	M46
Flight Comdr B	50R
Flight Comdr C	OJ9
Plane No. 1	YV3A
To plane 8 incl	YV3I
23 Bomb. Sqdr. Comd.	3BV
Ground	ZX3
Net	UJ9
Flight Comdr. A	CP5
Flight Comdr. B	H13
Flight Comdr. C	5RP
Plane No. 1	VZ2A
To plane No. 8 incl	VZ2I
31 Bom. Sqdrn. Com'd	V39
Bom. Sqdrn. Ground	MX3
Bom. Sqdrn. Net	IV3
Flight Comdr A	9QK
Flight Comdr B	QH1
Flight Comdr C	3JV
Plane No. 1	3NXA
To plane No. 8 incl	3NXI
72 Bom. Sqdr. Com'd.	1KH
Sqdr. Ground	TH9
31 Bom. Sqdr. Net	3EX
Bom. Flight Comdr. A	1TG
Flight Comdr. B	3TV
Flight Comdr. C	5LR
Plane No. 1	KX3
To plane No. 8 incl	KX3I
11 Bomb. Group Com'd	90U
Bomb. Group Ground	NJ9
Bomb. Group Net	1YH
Hd. Sqdr. 11 B. Grp. Com'd	DM4
Plane No. 1	OV3A
To plane No. 5 incl	OV3F
50th Rec. Sqdr. Comd.	3GX
Rec. Ground	RK9
Rec. Net	9DH
Rec. Flight Comdr. A	YZ2
Rec. Flight Comdr. B	WJ9
Rec. Flight Comdr. C	5IR
Plane No. 1	V31A
To plane No. 8 incl	V31H
14th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.	1VH
Ground	WR5
Net	MH9
Flight Comdr. A	ZM4
Flight Comdr. B	GN3
Flight Comdr. C	9IJ
Plane No. 1	3KXA
To Plane No. 8 incl	3KXI
26th Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd	QK9
Bomb. Ground	AH1
Bomb. Net	TV3
Bomb. Flight Comdr. A	JK9
Bomb. Flight Comdr. B	3FX
Bomb. Flight Comdr. C	J95
Bomb. Plane No. 1	RV3A
To plane No. 8 incl	RV3I
42 Bomb. Sqdr. Com'd.	H17
Ground	CX3
Net	HV3
Flight Comdr. A	6AN
Flight Comdr. B	1PH
Flight Comdr. C	H96
42 Bomb. Sqdr. plane No. 1	3CXA
To plane No. 8 incl	3CXI
Hdq. 14th Pursuit Wg. Comd	3ZK
14th Pursuit Wg. Ground	21Z
Pursuit Wg. Net	9AJ
Hdq. Sqdrn. 14 P. Wg. plane No. 1	9C1H
Plane No. 2	9TJ
15th Pur. Grp. Com'd.	X37

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
15th Pur. Grp. Ground	1QH
Pur. Grp. Net	9ZJ
Hdq. Sq. 15th Pur. Grp. Com'd	H18
Sq. Plane No. 1	HH1A
To plane No. 5 incl	HH1F
45th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd	H91
Pur. Sqdr. Ground	JH1
Pur. Sqdr. Net	9NJ
Pur. Sqdr. Flight Comdr. A	R56
Flight Comdr. B	1XH
Flight Comdr. C	9UJ
Plane No. 1	3MLA
To plane No. 13	3MLN
46th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd	EX3
46th Pur. Sqdr. Ground	J94
46th Pur. Sqdr. Net	9WJ
Flight Comdr. A	X38
Flight Comdr. B	5VR
Flight Comdr. C	9RJ
Plane No. 1	WL3A
To plane No. 13 incl	WL3N
[4]	
47th Pur. Sqdr. Command	DI6
47th Pur. Sqdr. Ground	3WL
Net	UT9
Flight Comdr. A	UL3
Flight Comdr. B	3ZL
Flight Comdr. C	LL3
Plane No. 1	3NLA
To plane No. 13 incl	3NLN
18th Pur. Group Com'd	4JM
Ground	3PX
Net	3HV
Hdq. Sqdr. 18 P. Grp Comm'd	F77
Plane No. 1	BV3A
To plane No. 5	BV3F
6th Pur Sqdr. Com'm'd	LG1
6th Pur Sqdr. Ground	RH1
6th Pur Sqdr. Net	FH9
Flight Commdr. A	4BM
Flight Commdr. B	M42
Flight Commdr. C	FZ2
Plane No. 1	OL3A
To plane No. 13	OL3N
19th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd	K97
19th Pur. Sqdr. Ground	SR5
19th Pur. Sqdr. Net	1GH
Flight Comdr. A	5GP
Flight Comdr. B	1AG
Flight Comdr. C	5MP
Plane No. 1	FI6A
To plane No. 13	FI6N
78th Pur. Sqdr. Comd	HK9
78th Pur. Sqdr. Ground	GJ9
Pur. Sqdr. Net	YH9
Flight Comdr. A	KM4
Flight Comdr. B	6WM
Flight Comdr. C	SN6
Plane No. 1	I62A
To plane No. 13	I62N
44th Pur. Sqdr. Com'd	9MJ
Pur. Sqdr. Ground	T99
Pur. Sqdr. Net	9GZ
Flight Comdr. A	ZZ9
Flight Comdr. B	S82
Flight Comdr. C	EF7
Plane No. 1	6JLA
To plane No. 13	6JLN
86 Obsv. Sqdr. Com'd	5YR
Obsv. Ground	PR5
Obsv. Net	J99
Flight Comdr. A	T94
Plane No. 1	KI6A
To plane No. 13	KI6N
58 Bomb. Sqdr. (L) Com'd	BL3
Bomb. Sqdr. Ground	7HF
Bomb. Sqdr. Net	9FJ
58 Bomb. Sqdr. Flight Comd A	JT9
Flight Comd B	F73
Flight Comd C	9MZ
Plane No. 1	8WSA
To plane No. 13	8WSN

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
19 Trans. Sqdr. Command	X35
Sqdr. Ground	9AJ
Sqdr. Net	53R
Sqdr. Flight Comdr	9RZ
Plane No. 1	80SA
To plane No. 13	80SN
Target Sqdr. Com'd	PJ9
Target Sqdr. Ground	AT9
Target Sqdr. Net	QF7
Flight Comdr. A	VT9
Plane No. 1	XR5A
To plane No. 6	XR5G
17th A. B. Group Command	CH9
Ground	PH1
Net	QX3
18 A. B. Sqdr. Flt. Comdr	9DT
18 A. B. Sqdr. plane No. 1	JV3A
To plane No. 4	JV3D
22 Mat. Sqdrn. Flight Comdr	MZ9
Plane No. 1	3ALA
Plane No. 2	3ALB
Plane No. 3	3ALC
23 Mat. Sqdrn. Flight Comdr	PF7
Plane No. 1	X88A
Plane No. 2	X88B
Plane No. 3	X88C
18 Air Base Group Com'd	FV3
Group Ground	9BH
Group Net	H92
17 A. B. Sqdr. Flight Comdr	8SS
Plane No. 1	8ASA
Plane No. 2	8ASB
Plane No. 3	8ASC
Plane No. 4	8ASD
24 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr	FT9
Plane No. 1	6B1A
Plane No. 2	6B1B
Plane No. 3	6B1C
Plane No. 4	6B1D
25 Mat. Sqdr. Flight Comdr	3EL
Plane No. 1	CI6A
Plane No. 2	CI6B
Plane No. 3	CI6C
[5]	
Haw. Air Depot	BT9
Plane No. 1	Y16A
Plane No. 2	Y16B
Plane No. 3	Y16C
Crash Boat Gen. Westover	UG1
Bellows Field Ground	7GF
14th Naval District Comdt. 14th Naval Dist Com. 14	W2X
Com. Haw.-Naval Def. Force	B2A
Naval Def. Force coll	E1N
Wailupe Radio Station	E3L
All Stations this Circuit	E2A
U. S. S. Keosangua	H1L
U. S. S. Sunnadin	J4M
U. S. S. Ward	N3L
U. S. S. Schley	NSF
U. S. S. Chew	R6K
U. S. S. Allen	R9Q
Comdesdiv 80	U1P
Desdiv 80	U9J
Com. Mine Craft	N3D
Mine Craft	R1Q
Oglala (F)	SSB
Com. Mine Div. 1	V6L
Mine Div. 1 (coll)	W5C
Pruitt (F)	X7J
Preble	Z9Q
Sicard	B6M
Tracy	E7T
Com. Mine Div. 2	H7O
Mine Div 2 (coll)	J9P
Tanager (F)	N7B
Quail	R9L
Lark	S5V
Whipoorwill	U4M
All Mine Sweepers	V5Z
Mine Sweeper No. 1 (Mag)	W1Y
Mine Sweeper No. 2 (Anch)	W7P
Mine Sweeper No. 3 (Anch)	X2Q

1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>	<i>Station or Net</i>	<i>Call</i>
Comdr. Sub. Force	V2J	Com. Patron 21	W1B
Sub. Force (coll)	W7D	Patron 21 (coll)	X20
Litchfield (F)	X2G	Com. Div. 1 Patron 21	Z1A
Com. Subron No. 4	Z2F	Com. Div. 2 Patron 21	B9D
Subron 4 (coll)	B5C	Base Station Patron 21	E10
Sub. Base Radio Station	E8J	Any Plane Patron 21	H1B
Seagull	H4K	21-P-1	J4P
Widecon	J70	21-P-2	N3M
Com. Sub. Div. 7	N4P	21-P-3	R1Z
Sub. Div. 7 (coll)	R60	21-P-4	S7R
S-18	S3T	21-P-5	U5F
S-23 (F)	U1D	21-P-6	V9C
S-34	V4N	21-P-7	W9L
S-35	W7W	21-P-8	Z8F
Com. Sub. Div. 12	X3L	21-P-9	E4L
Sub. Div. 12 (coll)	Z5N	21-P-10	J3U
Argonaut	B9K	21-P-11	R3D
Dolphin	F59	21-P-12	U7R
Narwhal	H3J	21-P-13	W2G
Nautilus (F)	J1B	21-P-14	Z4H
Com. Sub. Div. 13	N1J	21-P-15	B8Z
Sub. Div. 13 (coll)	R3W	Com. Patron 22	J5Q
Shark (F)	S1C	Patron 22 (coll)	R5L
Cachalot	U3K	Com. Div. 1 Patron 22	U7B
Cuttlefish	V8F	Com. Div. 2 Patron 22	W2M
Plunger	W9M	Base Station Patron 22	Z9S
Pollack	X5T	Any Plane Patron 22	E7Y
Pompano	Z6R	22-P-1	J1X
Comdr. offshore Patrol	X8Q	22-P-2	R2G
Offshore Patrol (coll)	Z7W	22-P-3	U3Y
Comdr. Inshore Patrol	B3Q	22-P-4	W1L
Inshore Patrol (coll)	W80	22-P-5	Z1C
Station No.:		22-P-6	E9Q
1	H5F	22-P-7	J9T
2	J5Y	22-P-8	R9B
3	N8A	22-P-9	USV
4	R78	22-P-10	W7N
5	S4N	22-P-11	Z80
6	U3G	22-P-12	E6X
7	V1C	22-P-13	J2G
8	W6R	22-P-14	R50
9	X4D	22-P-15	S5K
10	Z3X	Com. Patron 23	W3A
11	B1C	Patron 23 (coll)	Z7C
12	E2P	Com. Div. 1 Patron 23	E5K
13	H2X	Com. Div. 2 Patron 23	J3L
14	J2Y	Base Station Patron 23	R4C
15	N2L	Any Plane Patron 23	U5W
16	R4V	23-P-1	W6J
17	S6Q	23-P-2	Z6G
18	U6A	23-P-3	E80
19	V5G	23-P-4	J7D
20	W3P	23-P-5	R6T
21	X7V	23-P-6	U90
22	Z8J	23-P-7	W4Y
23	B4G	23-P-8	Z2M
24	E6R	23-P-9	E4B
25	H4D	23-P-10	J8S
Com. Naval Air Station	J6M	23-P-11	R3N
Naval Air Radio Station	N5Y	23-P-12	U5Z
Crash Boat No. 1	R8Z	23-P-13	W8B
[6]		23-P-14	Z4L
		23-P-15	B3R
All Naval Air Station Planes	S4X	Com. Patron 24	E9C
Air Station:		Patron 24	H8B
Plane No. 1	U2N	Com. Div. 1 Patron 24	N7X
Plane No. 2	V3Q	Com. Div. 2 Patron 24	S3P
Plane No. 3	W4F	Base Station Patron 24	V9M
Plane No. 7	X1P	Any Plane Patron 24	X9B
Plane No. 8	Z5Y	24-P-1	Z5P
Plane No. 9	B1L	24-P-2	B2Z
Plane No. 10	E1G	24-P-3	H8M
Com. Pat Wing 2	H3A	24-P-4	J8H
Com. Pat Wing (Admin)	J7Z	24-P-5	N9J
Senior Patron Comdr. Pat Wg. 2	R7M	24-P-6	R8N
All Squadron Comdrs. Pat Wg. 2	U4X	24-P-7	S8U
Pat Wing 2 (coll)	J6K	24-P-8	U8T
Wright	N9C	24-P-9	X6U
Wm. B. Preston	R2U	24-P-10	B7M
Childs	S9G	24-P-11	H3S
Swan	U1L	24-P-12	N1Y
Plane XPBS-1	V1P	24-P-13	S60
		24-P-14	V4Y
		24-P-15	X8L

Station or Net	Call
[7]	
Com. Patron 25.....	E4Z
Patron 25 (coll).....	H2G
Com. Div. 1 Patron 25.....	N4T
Com. Div. 2 Patron 25.....	S7F
Base Station Patron 25.....	V7W
Any Plane Patron 25.....	X4K
25-P-1.....	B4L
25-P-2.....	H5T
25-P-3.....	N2G
25-P-4.....	S2W
25-P-5.....	V2A
25-P-6.....	X1Z
25-P-7.....	B8Y
25-P-8.....	H9Z
25-P-9.....	N9V
25-P-10.....	S9Y
25-P-11.....	V8A
25-P-12.....	X7K
25-P-13.....	B5N
25-P-14.....	H6C
25-P-15.....	N4K
Com. Patron 26.....	U6D
Patron 26 (coll).....	V4K
Com. Div. 1 Patron 26.....	X6B
Com. Div. 2 Patron 26.....	B6X
Base Station Patron 26.....	H6L
Any Plane Patron 26.....	N5T
26-P-1.....	S6G
26-P-2.....	V8X
26-P-3.....	X3Y
26-P-4.....	B6F
26-P-5.....	H9N
26-P-6.....	N2X
26-P-7.....	S4D
26-P-8.....	V3F
26-P-9.....	X3A
26-P-10.....	B2N
26-P-11.....	H7Y
26-P-12.....	N6R
26-P-13.....	S2Z
26-P-14.....	V6R
26-P-15.....	X5F

Station or Net	Call
Com. 2nd Marine Air Grp.....	X5M
VMF2 (Marairgrp).....	X9N
Com. VMF-2.....	X9NØ
Com. Plane No.:	
1.....	X9N1
2.....	X9N2
3.....	X9N3
4.....	X9N4
5.....	X9N5
6.....	X9N6
7.....	X9N7
8.....	X9N8
9.....	X9N9
10.....	X9N10
11.....	X9N11
12.....	X9N12
VMB-2 (2nd Marairgrp).....	Z3D
Com. VMB-2.....	Z3DØ
Com. Plane No.:	
1.....	Z3D1
2.....	Z3D2
3.....	Z3D3
4.....	Z3D4
5.....	Z3D5
6.....	Z3D6
7.....	Z3D7
8.....	Z3D8
9.....	Z3D9
10.....	Z3D10
11.....	Z3D11
12.....	Z3D12
Fleet Air Detachment Shore Based at NAS Pearl Harbor Will use only Navy Calls. Coast Guard:	
CGC Kukui.....	E5Z
Coast Guard Hdqts.....	B79
C Guard Radio Station.....	J8A
Reliance.....	N6C
Taney.....	E3M
Tiger.....	H5F
U. S. C. G. 400.....	R7Y
U. S. C. G. 403.....	S1L
U. S. C. G. 838.....	U2B
U. S. C. G. A B27.....	V7T
All C. G. Vessels.....	X5Q
PAA Radio Station Oahu.....	H1X
PAA Radio Station Canton Is.....	H8U
PAA Radio Station Midway.....	J4A
PAA Radio Station Wake.....	J7K

[8]

USS McFarland.....	R2U
USS Thornton.....	S9G
USS Curtiss.....	B3K
USS Hulbert.....	B8P
USS Avocot.....	E5N
USS Tangier.....	H8R
Comdr Div 1, VP 27.....	W3G
Comdr Div 2, VP 27.....	V2G
Base Station, VP 27.....	U4B
Any plane, VP 27.....	J5O
Patrol Sqdrn 27 (collective).....	J5P
Comdr Patron 27.....	J5PØ
27-P-1.....	J5P1
27-P-2.....	J5P2

ADDITIONS

27-P-3.....	J5P3
27-P-4.....	J5P4
27-P-5.....	J5P5
27-P-6.....	J5P6
27-P-7.....	J5P7
27-P-8.....	J5P8
27-P-9.....	J5P9
27-P-10.....	J5P1Ø
27-P-11.....	J5P11
27-P-12.....	J5P12
27-P-13.....	J5P13
27-P-14.....	J5P14
27-P-15.....	J5P15

Signal Operations Instructions (Joint) No. 43-8.

1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. The Following calls are allocated to units indicated. They may be assigned by the unit Command, but when assigned, report will be made at once to the Department Signal Officer.

Department		Hawaiian Air Force	
-----	MP5	-----	EY3
-----	9HK	-----	HF7
-----	K93	-----	L35
-----	2DZ	-----	I22
-----	Z24	-----	MI6
Navy		-----	OG1
-----	Z3K	-----	RF7
-----	Z6C	-----	UV3
		-----	VV3
Division		-----	W88
-----	ZK5	-----	ZI6
-----	2RC	-----	1HH
-----	8KB	-----	1IG
-----	7ZU	-----	1SH
-----	YQ1	-----	1UG
-----	P57	-----	1ZG
-----	9KK	-----	3IL
-----	2BZ	-----	3MX
-----	TM4	-----	4CM
-----	9YK	-----	5AR
H. S. C. A. B.		-----	5NP
-----	AQ1	-----	5QR
-----	EK9	-----	6DI
-----	XN6	-----	6CI
-----	JZ2	-----	6ON
-----	AZ2	-----	7KF
-----	7SW	-----	7QF
-----	CK5	-----	7YF
		-----	8LS
		-----	8QS

3. Call signs for Radio Sets, types SCR-194 and SCR-195, will be designated by the Commanding Officer of the units using such sets.

By order of Rear Admiral BLOCH and Lieutenant General SHORT.

J. W. LEWIS,
Captain, U. S. N.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps.
Chief of Staff.

R. C. Throckmorton
 R. C. THROCKMORTON,
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

EXHIBIT No. 54

Op-30Cl-AJ
 (SC) N20-12
 Serial 010230

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
February 17, 1941.

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
 The Commandant, Third Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
 The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.
 The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

1. In previous correspondence the Commandants and local Joint Planning Committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making studies of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the Districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and Local Joint Planning Committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the major fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Copy to:

Cinc, Pacific

Cinc, Atlantic

Cinc, Asiatic

C. ONav. Net Depot, Tiburon

C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Newport

Buord

Op-12

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in CincPac.

Ensign H. E. RORMAN, U. S. N.
Secret Mail Officer.

EXHIBIT No. 55

[1] Op-30C1-AJ
 (SC) N20-12
 Serial 055730

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
 Washington, June 13, 1941.

Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Certified to be a true copy of file copy in Cinepac.

H. E. RORMAN,

Ensign H. E. RORMAN, USN.

Secret Mail Officer.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to:

CinCpac

CinClant

CinCaf

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport

Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo

Comdt. NavSta, Samoa

Buord

Op-12

EXHIBIT No. 56

CONFIDENTIAL

OP30C-MD-2/7/41

(SC)N20-12

Serial 07830

FEB. 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance

Subj: Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms

Ref: ALUSNA London Dispatch 041625 of February 5, 1941

1. Ref. (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this Office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT No. 57

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, December 1, 1941.

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Serial No. 25

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T. S. Wilkinson,
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Captain, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

[1] *Confidential*Serial No. 25.
December 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

A. *The Diplomatic Situation*1. *Japan.*

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

2. *Germany.*

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which eventually can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequences." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

[2] 3. *Italy.*

The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet with particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome on October apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating this winter.

4. *France.*

France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Europe on November 15 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin, until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichsmarshal Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.

[3] The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from \$8,000,000 to \$6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air. Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National Defense Ministry all services under the Franco-German armistice formerly administered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new developments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon and the termination of the mandate in the name of France. The new government will be headed by President Alfred Macache.

France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains unchanged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.

[4] 5. *Latin America.*

Mexico.

President Roosevelt has nominated the present Ambassador to Cuba, George S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman, is expected to arrive in mid-December, which is about the same time that Messersmith probably will take up his new duties.

The State Department announced an agreement has been reached with Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a final fair price for American properties taken over in 1933, through experts or through further diplomatic negotiations. Mexico tendered \$9,000,000 in advance as a token payment. (2) General and agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay \$40,000,000 in full settlement. Mexico has already paid \$3,000,000 on these claims and will pay \$3,000,000 upon exchange of ratifications of the conventions covering them. The remaining \$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of \$2,500,000 annually. (3) A reciprocal trade agreement to be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will provide a \$40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintain the peso at its present rate. (5) The United States will purchase up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established a \$30,000,000 credit for the development of roads and highways. The credit will be available in yearly increments up to \$10,000,000 over a three year period. The Mexican Government guarantees payment unconditionally; and additional security is provided, in the form of highway bonds, payable from the Federal gasoline tax.

Costa Rica.

President Calderon has repeated his offer of landing fields, air and naval bases to the United States, as free measures of hemispheric defense.

El Salvador.

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Merino has been replaced by pro-Ally Colonel Monterrosa.

Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards consolidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named Minister to Washington; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Ariaristas, although there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme nationalistic laws passed by Arias are not repealed, but already their application is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

Argentina.

There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile. The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U. S. lend-lease aid promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argentine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.

A new political party, of Fascist character, called *Patria* has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Fresco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Taborca Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in [6] politics, seems firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Democratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist—or totalitarian—factions, under a strong leader, probably would mean the overthrow of the present government.

Brazil.

During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere defense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to *Surinam* by sending a military mission to *Paramaribo*, and strengthening her border forces in that area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialistic in South America, and his good faith in staff discussions should be accepted with grave reservations.

Chile.

The sudden death of President Aguirre Corda, from a bronchial affection, has caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that country's neighbors. Don Tinto as he was affectionately called, because of the red wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front government, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has preserved for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagonistic and immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day period before the election of a new President.

Colombia.

The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.

The Colombia press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized [7] in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

Bolivia.

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in *La Paz*.

Ecuador.

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

Peru.

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announces the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation.

General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U. S. and anti-Axis.

General.

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised; almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

[8] *Trends.*

Military and Naval.

Mexico.—The naval budget for 1942 has been set at 35,000,000 pesos, or about \$8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.

South America.—Nothing to add to summary of November 15.

Economic.

The period under review has been characterized by numerous complaints in the press of the American Republics, and in reports from various local sources, over the growing dearth of materials essential to the support of industries. Deprived of European export markets, the American Republics look to the United States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are: The matter of priorities, and the availability of shipping. Here, as in the lend-lease military and naval material, the patience of the Latin-Americans is about exhausted, and their confidence in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. Few Latin Americans appreciate the magnitude now of the demands upon U. S. industry. Aids to Britain, to Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. production, are widely advertised. Opponents to U. S. and Pan American policies are alert to take advantage of current circumstances. As a measure for the future, no less than for immediate benefit, the allotment to Latin American trade of certain priorities, however limited, and of shipping, appears urgently desirable.

[9] *B. The Japanese Military Situation*

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army strength now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.

[10] E. *The German Military, Naval and Air Situations*1. *Military Strength.*

It has been estimated that Germany now may have 300 divisions. Of these, 28 divisions are unidentified. Of the identified divisions 72 are probably unfitted and not yet ready for field duty. This would leave 200 divisions ready for active service at the present time.

Distribution.

The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows:

<i>Location.</i>	<i>Number of Divisions</i>
Russian Front-----	Total 168 (including 20 motorized, 19 armored, 2 cavalry, and 2 mountain divs.)
Northern Group-----	31
Central Group-----	86
Southern Group-----	51
Italy and Libya-----	3 (including 2 armored)
Balkans and Hungary-----	14 (including 1 mountain)
Poland and East Prussia-----	10
Finland-----	7 (including 1 motorized and 3 mountain)
Germany and Austria-----	33
Holland, Belgium and France-----	27
Norway-----	8
Denmark-----	2

Operations.

(Note: Eastern Front only; see ITALY for Libyan Campaign.)

[11] Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

Finnish Sector.—There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector.—The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

Central Sector.—German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Mozhaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

South-Central Sector.—Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

[12] *Donetz Basin Sector.*—The Russians claim deep advances in a counter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any important industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along a broad front, but have been vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.

Crimean Sector.—According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of

Kerch and the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.

Personalities.

General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

2. Naval.

Distribution.

Ship		Date	Location
Name	Type		
Tirpitz.....	BB	November 9.....	Kiel.
Scharnhorst.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest.
Gneisenau.....	BB	November 21.....	Brest.
Schleswig-Holstein.....	BBB	November 9.....	Hamburg.
Schlesien.....	BBB	October 7.....	Central Baltic.
[13] Graf Zeppelin.....	CV	Prior Nov. 16.....	Departed Stettin.
Admiral Scheer.....	CA	November 19.....	Swinemuende.
Luetzow.....	CA	November 9.....	Kiel.
Seydlitz.....	CA	October 12.....	Bremen.
Prinz Engen.....	CA	November 21.....	Brest.
Admiral Hipper.....	CA	November 5.....	Off Sassnitz.
Nuernberg.....	CL	} November 5.....	{ One of these two ships off Sassnitz.
Leipzig.....	CL		
Koeln.....	CL	September 29.....	Gdynia.
Emden.....	CL	November 9.....	Kiel.
4 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	Northern Norway.
5-7 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	In the Baltic.
1 Unit.....	DD	September 24.....	Bergen.
3 Units.....	DD	September 24.....	North Sea ports.
2 Units.....	DD	October 24.....	Cherbourg.
Remaining Units.....	DD	-----	Unknown.
150 Units (estimated).....	SS	-----	Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports.

Operations.

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

[14] HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases, or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reinforced by five small submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

Personalities.

Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Reschke entered the Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously mentioned in connection with submarine operations.

[15] Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915 and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

3. Air.

Strength and Disposition.

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

	Leningrad	Moscow	South of Kharkov- Kiev	Finland & North Norway
Long range bombers.....	90	200	240	40
Bomber reconnaissance.....	30	30	45	10
Dive bombers.....	0	90	60-75	30
Single-engine fighters.....	30	180	130	30
Two-engine fighters.....	30	35	0	10
Totals.....	180	535	475-490	120

Grand total: 1310-1325.

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 569 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

[16]	Bombers	Dive bombers	Fighters	Recon- naissance	Coastal
Cyrenaica.....	30	70	75	5	-----
Siely.....	10	-----	-----	-----	-----
Crete.....	-----	20	10	-----	-----
South Greece.....	60	-----	-----	20	25

Total: 325.

This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean from the last previously reported figures.

Operations

West. Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.

Russian Front.—According to German claims, the German Air Force has been very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid particular attention to railroad communications; namely, the yards near Moscow and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim that \$3,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

[17] *Mediterranean*.—German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reinforcements of troop-carrying planes.

Personalities

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret weapon. Lt. Col. Moelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Moelders was returning to the front after attending Udet's funeral.

[18] F. *The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations*

1. *Military.*

Libya.

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British launched their long-awaited offensive against the Italian and German forces in the Libyan Desert. The British have been preparing for this drive for many months, and a steady stream of matériel has been flowing to the Middle East. For the first time British forces are meeting the Germans with ample equipment and air superiority.

The main spearhead of the attack began south of Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast at Sollum, and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi el Rezegh. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division apparently was badly mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, including planes and personnel. Further south an Imperial Motorized Force, starting from Giarabub, raced across the desert to Gialo Oasis and captured the Italian outpost of El Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between German and British armored forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides lost heavily in mechanized equipment. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no decision has been reached. However, the British are now in possession of Rezegh; Gambut and Sidi Omar Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German armored forces) have been captured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a juncture with the main Imperial forces at Ed Duda.

East Africa.

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within the next few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been cut off from supplies for the past seven months. British forces are closing in now and are only seven miles from Gondar.

(NOTE: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been announced.)

[19] *Russian Front.*

Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difficulties are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources are available.

2. *Naval.*

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.

German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.

3. *Air.*

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougier, who is

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a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of [20] the sinking of the big convoy on November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fougier is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

EXHIBIT No. 58

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Cincpac File No. A2-11/FF12
A16(1)/P16-3/(90) Serial 01353

Confidential

MAY 6, 1942.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 23CL-42

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Battle Organization and Condition of Readiness Watches at Sea.
References: (a) Cincpac Conf. Ser. 0300 of 21 Feb. 1941.
(b) War Instructions—Chapter 8, Section 2.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A), which discusses in detail and sets forth the basic principles upon which conditions of readiness are established, is herewith issued to the Fleet.

2. With the personnel now on board ships of the Pacific Fleet, the proportion of the armament to be manned in the various types of vessels under the three conditions of readiness for action and based on the principles of enclosure (A) should be as follows:

CONDITION ONE

Type	Main battery	A. A. battery	Automatic weapons
BB.....	All	All	All
CV.....		All	All
CA.....	All	All	All
CL.....	All	All	All
DL.....	All		All
DD.....		All	All
DM & DMS.....	All		All
AUX.....	All	All	All

CONDITION TWO

BB.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CV.....		All	All
CA.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
DL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		All
DD*.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
DM & DMS*.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$
AUX*.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

CONDITION THREE

BB.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CV.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
CA.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CL.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$

*Three section organization. Conditions two and three identical.

3. Although the three conditions of readiness for action provide varying degrees of security, they were devised *primarily to preserve the fighting efficiency of the personnel over extended periods of time.*

4. Responsible Commanders are enjoined to keep the balance between security and rest and to choose that Condition of Readiness, even if it is in effect for only a short period, which will conserve to the maximum the energy and readiness of personnel for battle.

5. The War Instructions set forth the circumstances under which Condition Two is the appropriate Condition of Readiness to be maintained.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet believes that with efficient Radar equipment and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition Three will normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Distribution: (21CM-42)

List II, Case 2, P, NTS, X, Z.

EN3, EN6, NB49,

ND11-15, NYS-10.

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

[1] Cincpac File No.
A16 P16-3 (0300)

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 21 February 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To:

Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force .
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.

1. The problem of battle organization and Conditions of Readiness for Action for all types in the Fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution. The Fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requiring a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.

2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personnel assigned to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed by the Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditions of Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be examined in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, susceptible of great improvement.

3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battle and condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basic and fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may know what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest for the crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Action.

4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined; since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and since, however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attack, the three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental consideration is stressed—these conditions were devised as much to give men adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement is to keep every station manned—to provide maximum security—there can be only one condition, Condition One. The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand or caught unaware on the other.

5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to their various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know where he goes and when, in shifting from one of the conditions to another; to permit these shifts to be made without confusion; and to insure that the maximum number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desired is a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Watches as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by their efficient use.

[2] 6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board reveals that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a Condition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting latest maximum requirements; also that even with complements less than those recommended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. The Commander-in-Chief has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all, instead of half, the A. A. battery being manned in Condition Two.

7. It follows that, if in Condition Two all of the A. A. battery can be manned, in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned. This should be the minimum requirement for Condition Three. However, the number of men available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of a watch in four. When this can be done a measure of security is obtained approaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, without the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.

8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery personnel is obvious. To man all A. A. guns in Condition Three without calling on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on A. A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation at sea permits the setting of Condition Three or the situation in port requires the manning of A. A. guns only over long periods of time, to require the A. A. battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making efficient use of the men and material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized. But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion than to make full use of our men.

9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict adherence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadrilateral organization of two watches and four sections. This is essential, and in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished without confusion and without the imposition of successive double watches on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms

"Watch One" and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing, since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it disguises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated in all ships using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established in port.

10. To permit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the turrets fully manned, in Condition Two; or it may be accomplished by having half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned. Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch. Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return considering the material installations in the individual ships and the difficulty of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby falling far short of the requirement of having one half the battery manned, is not approved.

11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been in effect in some heavy cruisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved feasible. Indications are, since many of the installations in a triple turret are in duplicate rather than triplicate, that fire can be opened with all and continued with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off [3] watch responds to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruisers, should settle this question conclusively for that type.

12. Certain types, such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activities in heavy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend themselves to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three section basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualified personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When the latter is truly the case this situation should be recognized and accepted. When the A. A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequently impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in two. If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient service. However, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis of a watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions Two and Three identical—a straight watch in three.

13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types:

(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches and four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries as cannot meet this requirement).

(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of the ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, mess attendants, etc., for essential services, be placed on watch.

(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and efficient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report made to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirements for Condition Three can be changed in basic directives.

14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Commanders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth principles which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. The end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

CinClant

CinCaf

Compatwing TWO

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 59

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A2-11/FF12

A4-1/VZ

A3?VZ(95)

Serial 059

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 7, 1942.

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Airplane situation, Hawaiian Area.

References:

- (a) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed to Opnav.
- (b) ComAirScoFor Conf. L Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941 addressed to Buairo.
- (c) CinCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.
- (d) CinCPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.

Enclosure. (A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 1941.

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.

2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft requirements here:

(a) *The attack of 7 December will be followed by others.* The enemy has exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not maintained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commercial docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objective the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured with the forces now available to us.

(b) *Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the advantage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of development.* This applies with full force not only to material and to the training, skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, planned and handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) *Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long range search, for striking and for local interception.* All of these are vital for effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate. It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligence reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which provided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning of any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second. As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)), the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) *Carrier aircraft may be launched 300 miles from Oahu.* There is definite evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) *Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.* This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.

(c) *It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) *Air Search visibility is 25 miles.* That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, *which include perfect visibility*, is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when *reliable* radar equipment for airplanes is *available*, for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) here is 42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures). This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B-17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol planes and 12 Army B-17's are being used daily for search (18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force). The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only *four-fifths* of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces

on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.

10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immediately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion now at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBV-3 planes now here, is earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an important immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander-in-Chief concurred in reference (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack, which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided. The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy shore attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose, and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be decisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, *Hawaiian air defense* alone has been considered. Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.

13. Returning to the immediate situation; with present limited numbers of searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is no answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to play the inevitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that *any* immediate increase for either will vitally improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Copy to:

ComAirScoFor
ComPatWing TWO
BuAero
Opnav
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.

[1] PW2/A1b-3/
(0033)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Secret

From: The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; Recommendation for Assignment of.

Reference: (a) Comairsofor Confidential letter A4-1(0755) dated December 18, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.

(B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.

1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth the need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protective searches from Oahu, and stated briefly the advantages and further uses of such aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of this subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wings is vital, not only to defense, but also to future offensive air operations.

2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search operations require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B-17 aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles; or by B-17 aircraft and VO-VS or VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200-300 miles, when the B-17s available for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only partially effective. The lack of experience and training of Army Air Corps flight crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a condition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force, are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the material required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon utilizing PBY aircraft, and [2] upon alternate long range equipment having cruising speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below:

	PBY	150 knot airplane (4 engines)	200 knot Airplane (4 engines)
Radius of daily search.....	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility).....	50	54	54
Flight time per search plane-hrs.....	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month.....	24,750	19,415	14,580
Total number of planes required.....	150	162	162
Number of flight crews required.....	225	243	243
Engine changes per month.....	82.5	129.6	97.2
Spare engines required.....	182	286	214
Fuel consumption per month—gal.....	1,980,000	2,912,250	2,916,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated).....	50%	60%	60-70%

1336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

With A. S. V. (40 mile visibility assumed)

	PBY	150 knot airplane (4 engines)	200 knot Airplane (4 engines)
Radius of daily search	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily	32	34	34
Flight time per search plane-hrs	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month	15,840	11,934	9,180
Total number of planes required	96	102	102
Number of flight crews required	134	153	153
Engine changes per month	52.8	79.5	61.2
Spare engines required	117	175	137
Fuel consumption per month—gal.	1,267,000	1,790,100	1,836,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated)	75%	95%	100%

3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabulations and from the study, enclosure (A), are as follows:

(a) PBY aircraft are *too slow* for the mission required of them. Their lack of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover the required area during daylight hours, but also because the excessive duration of flight increases [3] pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.

(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be increased to near 100%, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined with shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear that A. S. V. equipment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a not-to-delay basis.

(c) The PB2Y-3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adequate range. But the operation of 102 PB2Y-3 airplanes presents more difficulties than the operation of a similar number of landplane bombers. PB2Y-3s are not fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of these planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement for search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.

(d) Surveying the landplane field two types are available; the B-17 and the B-24. Experience with the B-17 on search has been disappointing. Their cruising speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In order to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, precluding the carrying of bombs.

(e) The B-24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective search in this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure (B). Provision of 102 B-24 airplanes would provide not [4] only for effective search but also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed that a number of B-24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion from Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to the defense of Oahu.

(f) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B-17-E aircraft, I am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short order take over the operation of four-engined landplane bombers.

(g) Some fields are available and others can shortly be made available in the Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as necessary to accommodate 102 B-24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fields include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maui, Barking Sands on Kauai, and Hilo Airport at Hawaii.

4. Recommendations:

(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B-24 bombers be allocated to Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.

(b) Immediately equipping with B-24s of the three patrol squadrons now on the West Coast equipping with PBY-5As is recommended as the first increment.

(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBY-3s now in this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B-24s, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the

PBY-3s in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning with B-24s.

(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a *not to delay* basis:

- (1) A. S. V. equipment.
- (2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
- (3) I. F. F. equipment.

/s/ P. N. L. BELLINGER.

[1]

Enclosure A

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DETERMINATION OF SEARCH GROUP REQUIREMENTS

A. PBY AIRCRAFT

Assumptions

1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier—27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBY ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark:

(At Pearl)	Dec. 22	June 22
Daylight.....	11.0 hrs....	13.6 hours.
Dark.....	13.0 hrs....	10.4 hrs.

5. Daily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300 mile launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 300 mile circle.
6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27 x 13).....	(27 x 10.4) 351	281
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle		
$\frac{300}{100} \times 27$	81	81
Radius to cover effective at dark.....	732	662

[2] Let a=hours of daylight remaining when plane starts return leg.

Radius of search required is (r) $732+27$ (a) $662+27$ (a)

Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus a, times plane speed.

$$732+27a+50=(11-a) 100$$

a=2.5 hrs.

$$662+50=(13.6-a) 100$$

a=5.1

Radius of search (r) $732+27$ (2.5) $662+27$ (5.1)
Radius of search r 799.5 799.7

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5 hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is about 60%. On 22 December plane flies last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces to

290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.

4. Plane hrs/mo—24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)—1,980,000 gal.
6. Engine changes per month (at 600 hrs)—82.5
Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes)—182

[3]

B. PBV AIRCRAFT WITH A. S. V. (RADAR)

Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6-41A) stated that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following performance:

Forward antenna system

Range—30 miles.

Cone of search—60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the beam); directly ahead and almost vertically downward.

Lateral antennae system

Range—80 miles on both sides.

Cone of search—18° in azimuth (9° on either side of the beam); 30° in elevation; 30° in depression."

(Weight 290 lbs)

From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our PBV airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected from PBV airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First shipment sunk) Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an effective range of at least 40 miles, the following benefits would result from installation of A. S. V. in PBV aircraft:

For 40 mile A. S. V. "visibility"

1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to 32.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 50% to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce fuel consumption for search from 1,980,000 to 1,267,000 gallons per month; reduce engine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.
- [4] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engines required from 182 to 117.
5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plan crews required.

Conclusions

1. *The immediate installation of A. S. V. in search aircraft is vital to successful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and personnel required for any search.*

C. 150 KNOT 4 ENGINED AIRCRAFT

Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search aircraft.

Work	22 Dec	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	(27×10.4) 351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle		
$\frac{300}{150} \times 27$	54	54
Radius to cover <i>effective at dark</i>	705	635

705 80 $27a=156$ (11-a)

a=4.87

Radius of search r=840

635 80 $27a=150$ (13.6-a)

a=7.5

r=835

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.

[5] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes daily (40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 12 planes; without A. S. V. 54 planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.

- 3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without.
- 4. Plane hrs/mo:
 - With A. S. V.----- 11,934
 - Without A. S. V.----- 19,415
- 5. Fuel consumption/mo: (at 150 gal/hr)
 - With A. S. V.----- 1,790,100
 - Without A. S. V.----- 2,912,250
- 6. Engine changes/mo: (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/pland)
 - With A. S. V.----- 79.5
 - Without A. S. V.----- 129.6
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 - With A. S. V.----- 175
 - Without A. S. V.----- 286

D. 200 KNOT 4 ENGINED AIRCRAFT

Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircraft.

	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius-----	300	300
Enemy's night run-----	351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300-mile circle		
$\frac{300}{200} \times 27$ -----	41	41
Radius to cover <i>effective at dark</i> -----	692	622

692+80+27a = 200 (11-a) 622+80+27a = 200 (13.6-a)

 a 6.3 a 8.9

 r 860 r 862

[6] *Conclusions*

- 1. Radius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
- 2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.
- Total force required:
 - With A. S. V.----- 102 planes
 - Without A. S. V.----- 162 planes
- 3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without. All search made during daylight.
- 4. Plane hours/month.
 - With A. S. V.----- 9,180
 - Without A. S. V.----- 14,580
- 5. Fuel consumption/month (at 200 gallons/hour).
 - With A. S. V.----- 1,836,000
 - Without A. S. V.----- 2,916,000
- 6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours).
 - With A. S. V.----- 61.2
 - Without A. S. V.----- 97.2
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 - With A. S. V.----- 137
 - Without A. S. V.----- 214

[7] E. DETERMINATION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF PLANES AND FLIGHT CREWS REQUIRED

- 1. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day in three: i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.
- 2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sunrise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes are on one hour's notice otherwise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice otherwise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available airplane on the ground.
- 3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.
- 4. Initially a minimum of 150% plane crews will be required. The excess over one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Confidential

Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander COE, U. S. N.

From: Major W. J. Holzapfel, U. S. A.

The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:

B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830 with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during take-off.

The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550 gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Corporation however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.

On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The airplanes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at altitudes of 7-10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumption at these altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, was 150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180-200 statute miles per hour.

This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity of the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of 9 .50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.

The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gross weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,000 pounds. However, conversations with a mechanic who made a trip to England brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pounds and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,000 pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplane.

/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL

EXHIBIT No. 60

(Exhibit No. 60 is, in the main, a work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 14, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Navy Court of Inquiry. These illustrations are bound together following the printed exhibits of the Navy Court of Inquiry.)

SUMMARY OF SHIPS (BY TYPES) AS SHOWN ON EXHIBIT 60.

BB-----	8	(Battleships)
CA-----	2	(Cruisers, heavy)
CL-----	6	(Cruisers, light)
DD-----	29	(Destroyers)
DM-----	8	(Destroyer Minelayers, conv.)
DMS-----	4	(Destroyer Minesweepers, conv.)
SS-----	5	(Submarines)
YFD-----	1	(Floating Drydock)
AH-----	1	(Hospital Ship)
A-----	21	(Auxiliaries)—(2 AO, 2 AVD, 1 AK, 1 AS, 1 PG, 1 Aux. Flag-ship, 3 AR, 2 AG, 2 AD, 2 AVP, 2 AV, 1 CM, 1 AM)

EXHIBIT No. 61

SECRET

Copy

Enclosure C

From: Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Serial 0479

FEBRUARY 15, 1942

REPORT OF JAPANESE RAID ON PEARL HARBOR, 7 DECEMBER 1941

DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY SHIPS AS A RESULT OF THE JAPANESE RAID DECEMBER 7, 1941

(a) *BATTLESHIPS*

ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.

CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.

NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

Certified a true copy. H. Bieseimer, Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

[2] *PENNSYLVANIA* one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb, (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The *TENNESSEE* suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the *ARIZONA*. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side on the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

(b) *CRUISERS*

HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo [31] causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engine room. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through deck and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

(c) *DESTROYERS*

SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The *SHAW* was re-docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

CASSIN and DOWNES: *CASSIN* was struck by one bomb and *DOWNES* by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the *PENNSYLVANIA*. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the *CASSIN* partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the *DOWNES* when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural [4] failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the *DOWNES* were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the *CASSIN* and probably well over 400 in the hull of the *DOWNES*.

Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the *CASSIN* is 98% good and the *DOWNES* about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the *CASSIN* to permit her re-floating about February 5, and similar work is proceeding on the *DOWNES*.

At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first-line destroyers from this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

(d) *AUXILIARY VESSELS*

OG LALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the *HELENA*. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

[5] *VESTAL* struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the *ARIZONA* when the raid commenced and was beached at Aela to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down.

Certified to be a true and exact copy:

ROBERT D. POWERS, JR.,
Lt Cdr. USNR,
Counsel to Judge Advocate.

EXTRACT FROM ENCLOSURE D

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

FEBRUARY 15, 1942

Serial 0479

Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

Extracts from Columns:	2	5	6
Type	Number present Dec. 7	Number on hand after raid	Number usable after raid
Patrol Planes.....	69	45	11
Inshore Patrol Planes.....	0	0	0
Fighters.....	24	15	0
Scout Bombers.....	60	29	14
Torpedo Bombers.....	2	2	0
Battleship and Cruiser Planes.....	92	82	11
Utility and Transport Planes (non-combatant).....	54	48	16
TOTAL.....	301	221	52

Certified to be a true extract:
ROBERT D. POWERS, JR.,
Lt. Cdr. USNR
Counsel to Judge Advocate

EXHIBIT No. 62

I. *General.*—The meeting was called at the Information Center on Monday, 24 November, for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment might be needed to do so.

Those present were:

Colonel Murphy-----	Acting Signal Officer, HHD
Lt. Comdr. Coe-----	Patrol Wing Two
Major Tindal-----	18th Bombardment Wing
Lt. Comdr. Taylor-----	U. S. Navy
Capt. Bergquist-----	14th Pursuit Wing
Lt. White-----	Signal Corps, Hawaiian Dept.
Lt. Harville-----	53rd Coast Artillery
Lt. Thomas-----	86th Obs. Sq. (Support Command)

The following points were discussed and generally agreed upon:

a. Function of the Information Center: It was agreed that Information Center, properly organized and run, would continually have complete information of all activities in the Hawaiian area, and that this information, properly disseminated, would be of great value to all military, naval and civilian activities, at the present time, during actual state of war, and during attacks on the island. It was further agreed that in order to obtain and disseminate all information, a very close liaison between all activities must be maintained, and that liaison watch officers from each activity would have to be trained and present at the Information Center.

In this connection it was pointed out that it would not be the function of the Information Center to order various activities (other than Pursuit Aviation) to carry out particular operations, but rather to give information and warning of imminent hostile raids to these activities so that they might take immediate action according to prearranged plan. As all information is immediately and visually available to all liaison officers, it would be their duty to pass the pertinent information on to their respective units. The duty Controller will be the representative of the Commanding General, Interceptor Command. His primary duty will be the direction of Pursuit activities, and he will act as coordinator of information when this is necessary.

b. Facilities: Although considerable equipment is on order and planned for the operation of the Information Center, this equipment will not be available for some time to come; it is obvious, therefore, that every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by proper coordination of all various military, naval and civilian activities. It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks.

Information would have to be drawn from the following sources:

Detector Stations.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (a) GLRDF; (b) Observation Posts (Artillery).

[2] (5) Naval Aircraft, ships and stations.

(6) Lighthouses.

(7) Coast Guard.

(8) Army and Naval Intelligence.

(9) Bomber Command.

(10) Support Command.

(11) Civilian Agencies (PAA, Inter-Island, CAA, Police and civilians through Police).

(12) Civilian Air Raid Warning Service.

c. Operations.—(1) At the present time, the Information Center is operating from 0700 to 1130. It is desired to operate the Information Center on a full-time daily basis (0600 to 1800) as early as possible, and eventually, when personnel can be made available, on a 24-hour basis. An estimate of the number of personnel required to man the positions will be studied. It was decided that the following watch officers should man the Information Center at all times, in the numbers required to keep a continuous watch:

(a) Controller

(b) Pursuit Officer

(c) Gun Control Officer

(d) Naval Air Liaison Officer (including Coast Guard)

(e) Naval Surface Liaison (including Coast Guard)

(f) Bomber Command

- (g) Support Command
- (h) Department G-2 Liaison
- (i) CAA Liaison
- (j) CARW Officer
- (k) RDF Officer
- (l) Communications Officer

(2) It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the above watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. It is felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.

(3) It is realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It is therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands will be trained.

(4) It was brought out that the Naval Liaison Officer now assigned to the Information Center is attached to Patrol Wing Two. This is not a permanently shore-based unit, and therefore liaison personnel from Patrol Wing Two might be withdrawn at any time, leaving the Information Center without trained Naval Liaison. It is therefore suggested that the Commandant, 14th Naval District be approached with a view to obtaining naval liaison officers and coordinating the information for all naval activities, shore and afloat.

[3] (5) As the present mobile RDF equipment is not all that might be hoped for, it was agreed that the AA RDF might be tied in. This would permit information on heights of incoming raids sufficiently far from the coast to make interceptions. The AAA RDF equipment is already being tied in with the Information Center for this purpose.

(6) It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises has been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the islands at all times; however, after discussion it was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:

(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their operations rooms.

(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.

(c) By requiring all planes approaching the island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before coming in.

In this connection it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.

(7) The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the island were friend or foe. It would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all RDF frequencies; it was therefore decided that this is not a reliable solution for some time to come.

(8) It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible. Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear; however, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy; this was held to be no obstacle, as the information Center should be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.

(9) The question of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

(10) It was decided that in order to avoid dangerous time discrepancies, the Information Center should synchronize its clocks with the U. S. Navy time, and that all other clocks should be synchronized with the Information Center.

[4] Clocks will be synchronized to the second, and all times will be reported to the minute within the nearest 30 seconds.

(11) It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other army, navy, coast guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.

(12) In view of the permanence of its location and operation on the island, and its bombproof position, the question was raised as to whether or not it might be important to use the Information Center as a joint Communications Center, or to have a joint Communications Center adjacent to the Information Center.

(13) The question of teletypes was brought up, and it was considered that in some cases it might be used to advantage but in most cases it was too slow. Direct lines should therefore be used between all manned positions in the Information Center and the various outlying units.

(14) As there has been some difficulty in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits to the Information Center, i. e., requests had to be made by each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits—this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center. Circuits to Kaneohe and Bellows Field are required, and Colonel Murphy agreed that these could be furnished.

(15) It was agreed that all air to ground and air to ship radio procedure, of Fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics Navy Department letter to this effect, it is believed that all naval Fighter squadrons are now using the British system. It was decided, therefore, that all Pursuit squadrons will also use this procedure. It was felt by all that further liaison should be done to insure that the procedure being used is the same.

(16) It was decided that Intercept Tables for use in interceptions are cumbersome and unnecessary, and that therefore interceptions would be accomplished by eye, direct from RDF plots, by the Controller or Pursuit Officer.

(17) It was considered desirable to point out to all aircraft activities that homing and rescue facilities are being made available to all aircraft within the next fourteen days. It was decided that the question of developing this to the highest degree would be worked out with the activities concerned. It was felt that if all information comes in to the Information Center, the Information Center could, with the minimum amount of delay, locate aircraft in distress and send out rescue aircraft or surface craft to the proper position.

(18) It was pointed out also that the Information Center can be used for dissemination of orders, change of policy, or recalling aircraft, immediately, through Information Center direct lines, when this is desired by the Officers commanding the particular activities.

(19) It was decided that communications liaison is vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.

(d) It was decided to investigate the probability and possibility of using naval ship-board RDF (RADAR) to supplement the land-based RDF under various conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.

(e) The facilities of the Information Center can be made available to Army, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons for interception, exercises, by arrangement either by telephone or letter to the Controller, Information Center.

Certified a true copy:

R. D. Powers

R. D. POWERS,

Lt-Comdr., USNR.,

Counsel for Judge Advocate.

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 63

Exhibit 63 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. B. BIESEMEIER,

Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 63.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 64

Exhibit 64 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. B. BIESEMEIER,
Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 64.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 65

Exhibit 65 is a file of copies of messages, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Secretary of the Federal Communications Commission at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 65.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 66

Exhibit 66 is a copy of a dispatch, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 66.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 67

Exhibit 67 is a copy of a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 1 February 1941, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Intelligence at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 67.)

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT 68

Exhibit 68 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. BIESEMEIER,
Captain USN, Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit 68.)

EXHIBIT No. 69A

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Steps to Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within the Next Twenty-Four Hours.

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective.
 - (b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
 - (c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating area) return to PEARL HARBOR.
 - (d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart ----- and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at -----; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost despatch, report expected time of their arrival.
 - (e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
- [2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT, now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
- (b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbatfor (ComTask Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
- (c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
- (d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
- (e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

EXHIBIT No. 69B

[1]

SECRET

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief

Recommended Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours.

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbafor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to joint Task Force Three.

(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to Join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl.

[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(S) C. H. McMorris.

EXHIBIT No. 70

SECRET

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, *Flagship*

CinC File No. A16/0129

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *January 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

References:

(a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-CTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

[2] (b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.

(g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

[3] In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.

(d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

[4] (4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:

(a) Provide escort for important ships.

(b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.

(c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.

(d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.

(e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.

(f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:

(a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.

(b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.

(c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.

(6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

Additional Measures if Japan enters War

[5] (7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.

(9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be

selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes; Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

[6] (a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain.

[7] 9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be dispatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

EXHIBIT No. 71

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 24 July 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: Haven't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else.

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had with his mines firing after having been down several hours.

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having delightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as it is only July.

Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". Be sure and unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said I should make sure you did not overlook it.

All good wishes
Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,

*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, "USS Pennsylvania,"
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.*

[SECRET]

24 JULY 1941.

DEAR TOMMIE: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

Your people who have been laying mines must have had an interesting time, but just about the trouble the cause is in a conundrum still. B—— went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch case you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very appreciative until we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electrolytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not probably had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray Spear on the job. We got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Eastern Lines as agents for the Navy Department), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels enroute, by rail, due to arrive in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite on August 10.

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250, which are destined for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Produce is doing its utmost to get these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite.

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway.

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better material.

I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given way in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't drop you a line.

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. My little brood are all well.

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral T. C. HART, USN,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
USS "HOUSTON",
% Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

EXHIBIT No. 72

[SECRET]

In reply refer to Initials and No.
 OP-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, 2 August 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good summary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "thinking out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are coming along, etc., etc.

We have no one at the front in the Russian-German war though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the press, therefore,

you have about as much information as we have. There is no doubt that the Germans are behind schedule and there is no doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next month or six weeks should clarify the picture.

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occasionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly, having gotten the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it worth while.

Keep cheerful.

Admiral H. E. KIMMEL,
*U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
 USS "Pennsylvania,"
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.*

[SECRET]

Op-10 Hu

31 JULY 1941.

DEAR SAVVY: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will continue to write;—it seems like old times.

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after showing it to Kimmel.

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have.

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc, etc, etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the entrance of Russia into the picture.

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one and hence our consideration.

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation necessary.

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 26 PBYS and 11 modern submarines.

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away.

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every auxiliary ship I get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go around. If we cannot properly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly slowed up in the Atlantic.

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure from there is another thing I have to contend with.

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc. etc. Thank the good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking anything away from the Navy.

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world shipping situation is plain rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and whatnot, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows whatnot. Marshall's troubles in this respect are legical and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc. etc.

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to hear me mention the subject.

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet standpoint and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is something that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work on Lend-lease.

I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBY repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the

training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that." Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get definite answers. God knows I would surrender this job quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. Some generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly not less easy.

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe the people would follow the President in any positive action—such as escort—which he might take.

We shall give aid to Russia. I hope she and Germany may break upon each other. Europe dominated by the Communists is no more an attractive picture, and in fact less so, than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. Here's hoping we have neither, but rather that they both exhaust themselves. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having much more difficulty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost will be crippling. Only time will tell.

I have urged propaganda whenever we could use it, particularly in South America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of independence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that the Germans could have cleared up in the Near East had they gone in that direction instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in the Near East area.

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you think there is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let this partly serve.

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please be charitable as to its lack of continuity, etc. etc.

With all good wishes— and good luck.

Sincerely,

Captain CHARLES M. COOKE, Jr., USN,
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling. P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

Keep cheerful.

One more P. S.—I am sending Kimmel the copy of this letter. When I got to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to whom I am also sending a copy.

H. R. S.

[NOTE.—The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., respectfully directs the attention of the Court to Exhibit 72, which is a personal letter dated 2 August 1941 from Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, enclosing a copy of a letter to Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N. The interested party considers that this letter contains certain matters coming within the purview of Section 261 (a) of Naval Courts and Boards, which provides that a witness may be privileged with respect to certain testimony, among the principal cases of privilege being:

“(a) *State secrets*.—This class of privilege covers all the departments of the Government, and its immunity rests upon the belief that the public interests would suffer by a disclosure of state affairs. The scope of this class is very extended, and the question of the inclusion of a given matter therein is decided by a consideration of the requirements of public policy with reference to such matter.”

If the interested party had been asked to read this letter into his testimony, he would have declined as a matter of personal privilege involving the disclosure of state secrets to read the following:

The second, third and fourth sentences in the fifth paragraph on page 4 of the enclosure to Captain Cooke.

The interested party respectfully requests that this statement be conspicuously attached to the copy of Exhibit 11, which the Judge Advocate proposes to place in the secret files of the Navy Department.

The interested party considers that the disclosure of the parts of this letter mentioned above would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and contrary to public policy.]

EXHIBIT No. 73

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 3, 1941.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Serial 038612.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval development gives adequate security in case the British Isles

should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.

5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.

8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy in about two months, but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility.

11. Your Operating Plans for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders.

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

cc: Rear Admiral Ghormley.

EXHIBIT No. 74

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 7, 1941.

DEAR MUSTAPHA: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in fine fettle.

Ok on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is—What next?

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any *permanent* assignment of either, or both of these ships can be made at this time. *We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training—servicing, etc.*

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high-speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inasmuch as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production.

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delivered to the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.

I note your criticism of the Gummery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only ten production models were manufactured; these were manufactured for the purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models and to act as "stop-gap" equipment until an improved model could be developed and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU Class CLs, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the ranges of the antiaircraft guns.

Relative to the two Seatrain vessels which we recently acquired and which are now undergoing conversion for use in transporting aircraft, they now have readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships for this purpose. *We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of*

planes to Europe—Russia—China—? May have to charter them rather than take them over—in order conserve Navy personnel.

Your study of the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it looked like a very good paper. It will be of such help to us.

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I wrote to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclosing, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.

In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will result from the observations of both of these officers.

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worse and worse"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

All good wishes.

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,

USS PENNSYLVANIA

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

British movement of BB to far east area—I hope—will be completed in December.

[NOTE.—Handwritten matter in italics.]

EXHIBIT No. 75

From: CNO

To: CINCPAC

Released by: H. R. Stark

Date: November 28, 1941

282054

The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept. will instruct COMGEN HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept. will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 mm AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.

Copy: Op 30

MGC

WPD, U. S. Army

BuAero

EXHIBIT No. 76

From: CINCPAC

To: OPNAV

Date: November 28, 1941

280627

Your 270038 and 270040 Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron Marine planes X Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar crews X Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about one December essential ground material for temporary operation

twelve Baker seventeen Army bombers but at present only six such planes of the twelve on Oahu in operating condition X Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy bombs now available there usable by Army with minor alteration X Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over twenty miles offshore radically limits their usefulness for insular defense X Their use possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed X Flexibility dispositions thereby curtailed X Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions X Proper for Army troop reinforcements outlying bases being made however consider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available X All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command X Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake X Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later X On December 1 sending twelve patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl X Will investigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits.

From: OPNAV
 To: CINCAF (action)
 CINCPAC (info)
 Released by: H. R. Stark
 Date: 30 November 1941
 300419

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch X Instruct planes to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharn and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur X British mission here informed X

(Following the above dispatch, there appears in the exhibit a photo-static copy of a handwritten note identical with the above dispatch. It bears the notation that the dispatch is to be sent as "Secret. Priority." It also bears the note "Read to President and be approved," and a further notation "OK H. R. Stark." The handwritten message is not being reproduced as the context is identical with dispatch 300419.)

From: CNO
 To: CINCUS
 CINCAF
 Released by: H. R. Stark
 Date: January 21, 1941
 212155

The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my memorandum to the Secretary X If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan Rainbow Three with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reinforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment X Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan X Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reinforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

From: CINCAF
 To: OPNAV
 Date: 7 Dec. 1941
 070645

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities X Have received no corresponding instructions from you X

EXHIBIT No. 77

From: CINCPAC
 To: OPNAV
 Date: Nov. 30, 1941
 292350

Desire 37 millimeter anti aircraft guns and ammunition mentioned in your 282054 X Urgently recommend shipment minimum 3000 rounds ammunition with guns for familiarization and training X

From: CNO
 To: CINCAF (action)
 CINCPAC (info)
 Date: 30 November 1941
 301709
 Priority

Ref my 300 19 priority dispatch requested of any contacts. In case there are no contacts make report once a day even if information is all negative.

TOP SECRET

EXHIBITS NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

VOLUME IV

No. 63 to 68 (both inclusive)

Note: These exhibits are "Top-Secret" and by direction of the Court have been filed apart from the other exhibits and with extracted matter from the Record of Proceedings. This action was taken in the interest of National Security and the successful prosecution of the war.

/s/ H. BIESEMEIER,
 Captain, U. S. Navy,
 Judge Advocate.

SECRET

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 25 July 1941.
 (Purple).
 #571.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy.

JD-1: 4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 1 of 2)^a (To be handled in Government Code).

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

^a For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyode).

To: Washington.

October 16, 1941.

Purple (CA).

#671.

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

From: Berlin.

To: Tokyo.

1 October 1941.

(Purple).

#1198.

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instruction, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 23859 6017 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

23 October 1941.

(Purple-CA).

Unnumbered.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As

such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

JD-1:6016 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#736.

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 10, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent).
#1066.

(Part 1 of 2)

1. I sent MOORE^a to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

^a Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

SECRET

(Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.
 ARMY 6440 24655-24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 16, 1941.
 Purple (Ca) (Urgent).
 #—.

For you Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,^a and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See JD-1:6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 22, 1941.
 Purple CA (Urgent).
 #812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.^a You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be charged. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 25138 6710 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum, and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Mussabetsu Taiguu Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Ito Kun (Mr. Ito)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO:	Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE:	Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence	Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence	Ginza 1022

ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 19 November 1941.
 (J19).
 Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

1368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Nanking.
15 November 1941.
(Purple).
#499.

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while.

JD-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE KUMORI.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.

**North wind cloudy.

***West wind clear.

SECRET

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

SECRET

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25435-25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple (Extremely urgent).

#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
 #1189. (Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

1370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

ARMY 25441-25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 28, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#844.

Re your #1189.^a

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (8)

^a S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.

^b S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#857.

Re my #844*.

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).

Telephone Code.

TransPacific

Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)

KURUSU. "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

YAMAMOTO. "Yes. I see."

KURUSU. "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—."

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "Yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

K. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 1 December 1941
 (Purple-CA)
 #865

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.

**JD-1: 6710.

***Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple.

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
 (Secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first come to loggerheads with the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 25554-25555 6944 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#1214. To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #1190^a.

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

^a S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu (Riyoji).

15 November 1941.

(J19).

#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (8)

SECRET

(Completed Translation)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231.^a

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned

over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.^a Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. ^b We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

ARMY 7021 SECRET Trans. 12/3/41 (7)

^a Not available.

^b Original translation incomplete from this point on.

SECRET

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231^a.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233^a. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too, _____ the four year incident _____

ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

^a Not available.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand.

Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233^a.

ARMY 25660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

^a Not available.

From: Toyko.
To: Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#893.

—In the event that Manchuria participates in the war—in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to

expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Advisor to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed, Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinion on this matter.

JD-1: 7055 SECRET(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#891.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256.^a

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.^b I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (8)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. # 25725.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#875.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #1232*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

JD-1: 7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 December 2, 1941.
 Purple. (Urgent.)
 #1234.

Strictly Secret.
 Re your #862."

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

ARMY 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

^a Not available.

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #1243.

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Berlin.
 To: Tokyo.
 December 4, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #1243.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

JD-1: 7098 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225. (Part 1 of 3.)

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6921

**Available, Purple dated 30 November.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China ----- the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

(Part 3 of 3)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 30, 1941.

Purple.

#1224.

Re your #857^a.

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

Army 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19).

#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 November 18, 1941.
 J-19.
 #113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay^a, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (8)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #901.

Re my #644^a.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (8)

^a See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #902.

(Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crises in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China

or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(December 4, 1941—Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

(December 6, 1941—Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions,

it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country— (45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the—es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n— (50 letters missed) —sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the

principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD::1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as".

**Probably "China. can but".

(7 December 1941—Part 14 of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that date.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the *Saratoga* was not in the harbor. The carrier, *Enterprise*, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D¹.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

Purple (Urgent—Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902^a.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3)

^a S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

IA.

#104.

Re my #103.^a

On the 6th the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

Army 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

Purple (Urgent).

#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us ----- (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) -----

ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 December 3, 1941.
 Purple (Urgent).
 #1256.

Re your #875^a.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

ARMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

^a See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 6, 1941.
 PA-K2.
 #128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123^a the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

^a Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 2, 1941.
 J-19.
 #123.

(Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

EXHIBIT No. 64

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Asterisk (*) Mailgram Addressee	Precedence
From: COM SIXTEEN. Released by: Date: 19 July 1941 For Coderoom: 200140.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority PP Routine Deferred
Decoded by A. W. PERING. Paraphrased by: Routed by:	Information: CINCPAC. CINCAF.	Priority PP Routine Deferred

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

191514
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT.

If operational
check box

SECRET

JONAB

Tokyo to net number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep airm code states that although Cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that Tripartite Pact forms keystone of Japan's national policy and new Cabinet will also pursue policy of former Cabinet in all other matters.

Handwritten:

BOONE 2975.
KIRK ASHTON 5572.
TURNER.
MCC.

Certified to be a true copy.

F. C. Alexander,
F. C. ALEXANDER, *Lt. Comdr. USNR,*
Communications Officer.

OP-24-G.

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2027	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: CINCAF. Released by: Date: 28 November 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
For Coderoom Decoded by P. R. WHITE. Paraphrased by:	Information: COMSIXTEEN. CINCPAC. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

251439

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery Date Time GCT

TOP SECRET

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words *repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts** Will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita

1388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and nei X X On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person.
 [Hand written:] Copy delivered to Capt. Safford OP-20-N 31 March 1944 DW.

* This is Morse code.

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number.....	Addresses	Message precedence
From: ALUSNA BATAVIA. Released by Date: 5 Dec. 1941.	For Action: OP'NAV.	Priority RRRRR Routine Deferred
For Coderoom Decoded by KALAJDIAN. Paraphrased by PURDY.	Information: [Handwritten:] File.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory
 031090 CR0222

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TOP SECRET

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

[Initialed] GFS

Distribution:

War Dept-----Action. Files: CNO-----20OP-----20A-----
 Record Copy: -----20G-----A Show OPDO-----

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person See Art 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

EXHIBIT No. 65

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
 Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G. Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JWV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941,

which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

On file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

T. J. Slowie,
T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN.
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND.
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP.
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST.

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JWV3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4

English

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Romaji

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 66

Naval message—Navy Department

'Phone Extension No.	Addressees	Precedence of Message
From: OPNAV. Released by Joseph R. Redman. Date: 3 December 1941.	Action: To: CINCAF. COM SIXTEEN.	XPriority XXX. Routine Def'd
TOR Code Room	Info: CINCPAC. COM FOURTEEN.	Priority XXX Routine Def'd
Decoded by		
Paraph's'd by		

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

031885

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time GCT

SECRET

COPEK

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo One December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

[Initialed:]

LFS

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (see Art 76(4) NavRegs.)

EXHIBIT No. 67

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

Feb. 1, 1941

Op16-F-2

(SC) A16-3/EF37

Serial No. 09716

Confidential

10465

From: Chief of Naval Operations

To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."

2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

JULES JAMES,

By direction.

Dictated Jan. 31, 1941

" by Lieut. Comdr. A. H. McCollum

Typed by M. E. Morse

CC-Com 14 10466

HAS BEEN SENT.

EXHIBIT No. 68

SECRET

From: Seattle.
 To: Tokyo.
 Decemehr 6, 1941.
 PA-K2.

#184. (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 7177 25876 SECRET Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Singapore.
 5 December 1941.
 (PA-K2.)

#377. (Abstract.)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

JD-1: 7446 SECRET (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: San Francisco.
 29 November 1941.
 (J19.)
 Circular #2431.

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

JD-1: 7037 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 28, 1941.
 Purple.
 #799.

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 7084 25764 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 25 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #790.

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

*Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons).

1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Seattle.
25 November 1941.
(J19).
#026.

Regarding War Spite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton. Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.
JD-1 7034 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 22, 1941.
Purple.
#785.

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu^a; Pisu^a; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines. Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 6902 25471 SECRET Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Manila.
November 20, 1941.
Purple.
#372. (Strictly Secret.)

Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft ----- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay ^a.

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

ARMY 6805 25314 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (6)

^a Near Manila, P. I.

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo.
November 12, 1941.
Purple.
#753.

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on ——. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

ARMY 6573 24923 SECRET Trans. 11/18/41 (6)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 10, 1941.
 Purple.
 #745.

1. The *Houston* touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
 2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
 3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers.
- ARMY 6487 24755 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

SECRET

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 8, 1941.
 Purple.
 #742.

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The *Marblehead*, the *Black Hawk*, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the *Heron*, the *Wohotosu*,^a the *Isobel*, and the tanker *Trinity* (the latter arrived on the 8th.)

ARMY 6478 24745 SECRET Trans. 11/14/41 (6)

^a Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Manila.
 5 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #349.

Re your #722*

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.*

JD-1: 6423 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (6-AR)

*JD-1: 6335. Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands.

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 November 1941.
 (Purple).
 #722.

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON*, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.

2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).

3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military planes.

Large bombers, 29.
 Scout planes, 324.
 The same, B type, 62.
 Fighters, 317.
 The same, B type, 131.
 Pursuit planes, 302.
 The same, D type, 69.
 Training planes, 49.
 Total, 1283.

(b) Naval planes.

Large flying boats, 26.

1394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI*, PASU*, 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

JD-1: 6335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR)

* Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, November 27, 1941.

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

U. S. Air Forces in the Philippines

<i>Type</i>	NAVY	<i>Strength</i>
PBY-4 (Patrol)-----		14
PBY-4 (Patrol)-----		14
SOC-3 (Scout Observation)-----		4
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)-----		2
J2F-4 (Utility)-----		3
SOC-1 (Scout Observation)-----		2
SOC-2 (Scout Observation)-----		2
052U-2 (Observation)-----		2
Total-----		43

2 squadrons of 062U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

ARMY

B-18 (Heavy Bomber)-----	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)-----	35
P-35A (VF)-----	52
P-40B (VF)-----	30
P-40E (VF)-----	117
O-46A (VO)-----	7
O-49 (VO)-----	3
O-52 (VO)-----	10
A-27 (Dive Bomber)-----	9
C-39 (Combat)-----	1
C-49 (")-----	1
P-26A (VF)-----	15
Total-----	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 1942.

SUMMARY

Bombers-----	62
Fighters-----	214
Combat-----	2
Patrol-----	28
Observation-----	32
Utility-----	3
Total-----	341

Japanese Estimate of U. S. Air Forces in Philippines

<i>Type</i>	MILITARY PLANES	<i>Strength</i>
Large bombers-----		29
Scout planes-----		324
The same, B type-----		62
Fighters-----		317
The same, B type-----		131
Pursuit planes-----		302
The same, D type-----		69
Training planes-----		49
 Total-----		 1283

NAVAL PLANES

Large flying boats-----	26
-------------------------	----

From: Tokyo.
 To: Manila.
 5 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #355.

For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)

From: Manila (Nihro).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 November 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #723.

(Re your #318)*

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino -----
 (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above

place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of *altitude planes* (?) it is said.

Details by mail.

JD-1: 6270 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

SECRET

From: Seattle (Sato).

To: Tokyo.

November 10, 1941.

J-19. (Priority.)

#165.

(Message to Washington Circular #80.)

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.


Relayed to — and Los Angeles.

ARMY 6612 24990 SECRET Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parenthesis following the description)


ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Map of the world showing "Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers". (Exhibit No. 4)
2.	Map of the United States showing the various defense commands, bearing caption "Annex I. Coastal Frontiers". (Exhibit No. 1)
3-4.	These items are Diagrams I and II bearing captions "Coastal Frontier, Joint Radio and Wire Communication" and "Joint Overseas Expedition—Landing Phase, Typical Communication Circuits for One Beach", respectively. (Exhibit No. 6)
5.	Chart showing the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. (Exhibit No. 8)
6-9.	Fitness report on Admiral Husband E. Kimmel from 1 October 1941 to 17 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 25)
10.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 04122 and date of 7 May 1941. (Exhibit No. 41)
11.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 07526 and date of 13 August 1941. (Exhibit No. 46)
12.	Routing slip, bearing Cincus Routing No. 01885 and date of 15 February 1941. (Exhibit No. 50)
13.	Radio Frequency Plan for the Fourteenth Naval District. (Exhibit No. 53)
14.	Work sheet showing dispositions of vessels in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 60)



SECRET




SECRET



SECRET

DIAGRAM No. II
 JOINT OVERSEAS EXPEDITION-LANDING PHASE
 TYPICAL COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS FOR ONE BEACH



- NOTE (1) BOAT MESSENGER (PROVIDED BY NAVY)
 (2) SECONDARY FIRE CONTROL CIRCUIT (THRU THE ESTABLISHED ARMY WIRE SYSTEM)
 (3) IF PROVIDED
 (4) THIS FIRE SUPPORT GROUP SUPPORTS COMBAT TEAMS B & C
 (5) IF PLANE IS FURNISHED BY NAVY
 (6) ADJUSTS ARMY ARTILLERY FIRE NORMALLY CARRIES ARMY OBSERVER
 (7) FOR EMERGENCY RESCUE PURPOSES
 (8) ONE CIRCUIT PER FIRING SHIP AND AT LEAST ONE AIRPLANE PER FIRING SHIP
 (9) REQUIRES PERSONNEL AND FACILITATES TO SPOT FOR EACH SHIP OF ITS FIRE SUPPORT GROUP
 (10) SMALL BOATS FOR LANDING TROOPS ON BEACH

LEGEND

- RADIOTELEGRAPH
 - - - LANDLINE TELEPHONE
 . . . VISUAL
 - · - · - · RUNNER (MESSENGER) (PROVIDED BY ARMY)

CONFIDENTIAL

15

REPORT ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS

1. Name of officer: _____
 2. Position: _____
 3. Branch: _____
 4. Date of report: _____
 5. Name of reporting officer: _____
 6. Position of reporting officer: _____
 7. Name of commanding officer: _____
 8. Position of commanding officer: _____
 9. Name of commanding officer's superior: _____
 10. Position of commanding officer's superior: _____

11. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 12. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 13. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 14. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 15. Description of duty during period of report: _____
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 38. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 39. Description of duty during period of report: _____
 40. Description of duty during period of report: _____

18

EX-25



Form 9-59 may be substituted for following conditions (See instructions in back) Amount of Normal Personnel Available Below 100

Date	Description	Personnel Available									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1954	...										
1955	...										
1956	...										
1957	...										
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2047	...										
2048	...										
2049	...										
2050	...										

BENEFICIARY SLIP

File No. _____

Name _____
(Print in full, reference to last only)

Serial No. _____
(This number, with other numbers)

Year of Issuance _____
(month)

(This space is for the beneficiary's use. It is provided for the purpose of indicating the beneficiary's name, address, and other information. It is not to be filled out by the insured.)

City _____
(State and territory)

Full name of wife, if not married, or child _____

(Address of wife) _____

Child or children, if none, no entry (Name of child) _____

(Address of child) _____

Child or children, if none, no entry (Name of child) _____

(Address of child) _____

Child or children, if none, no entry (Name of child) _____

(Address of child) _____

Child or children, if none, no entry (Name of child) _____

(Address of child) _____

In the event of my leaving no widow or child or of their death before payment in cash, I then designate as my beneficiary under the said contract the following person, my _____

(Relationship) _____

(Name in full) _____

(Address) _____

(Over)



(Name of other; separate slip)

(Check and sign)

(Date)

If your state has changed from "Insolvency" to "Married and Surviving" state, check the box.

REPORT OF DEPENDENTS UNDER ACT OF JUNE 20, 1932

(Over—The Act of June 20, 1932, defines the term "dependent" as a child who, when first elected under 21 years of age, or dependent on other provided also in that dependent on him for his total support.)

Number _____

Mother _____
(Yes or No)

Wife _____
(Yes or No)

Age and sex of each child under 21 years of age:

In the event of the death of the above-named beneficiary before payment is made, I then designate as my beneficiary under said the following relative, my:

(Relationship)

(Name in full)

(Address)

* In case of relative every statement that your parent or brother or sister state hereby should be supported by evidence and regularly thereof.

I certify that I will inform the Bureau of Naval Personnel immediately of any changes in marital status or conditions of dependency.

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the facts stated and disclosed in the foregoing are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Name)

(Rank)

U. S. Navy.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____

day of _____, 19____, I having authority to administer oaths.

INSTRUCTIONS

This form must be sworn to before an officer of the United States Navy or Marine Corps authorized to administer oaths, or before a notary Public.

The full name and address of the beneficiary must be stated carefully. If a married woman, her own given name should be stated (thus: "Mrs. Anna May Smith," not "Mrs. John Smith.")

Your beneficiary also must be designated in all cases of change in status of the grantor or of that of his or her beneficiaries.

In any event, payment will be made to the widow or child, if any, before designated or next, but not to a mother or other relative unless designated.

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SYMBOLS


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REMARKS

W. J. ...
see too brief







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