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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 37

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

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COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

[See Index of Exhibits, supra pp. 2-4]

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 11

(This exhibit is the book entitled "BATTLE REPORT—Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea," by Commander WALTER KARIG, USNR, and Lieutenant WELBOURN KELLEY, USNR. It was published (1944) for The Council on Books in Wartime, by Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York, N. Y., and is not being reproduced here.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 12

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Rōmaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

T. J. Slowie,
T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN.
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND.
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP.
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST.

The above are the weather messages Maj. Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

Document No. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from Tokyo station JVV3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

Document No. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER
FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4

English

Romaji

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI
KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI-
AGE MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU
NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE
MASU

NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans-
mitted by them between 0002 GMT December 8, 1941.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 13

INDEX

A—Messages relating to Japanese interest in ships-----	1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24
B—Messages relating to "winds code"-----	4
C—Message advising Germany of war between Japan and Anglo-Saxon nations----	5
D—Messages relating to "hidden word" code-----	6, 8, 11, 12, 17, 20
E—Message indicating steps to be taken as to Holland on opening of war with Britain and America-----	21

TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 May 1945.

Op-20-4-mp
Serial 0002020
(SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.

Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent
Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concern-
ing further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are photostatic copies of the following dispatches,
certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by refer-
ence (a) :

JD-1: 1842	JD-1: 7063	JD-1: 7214
JD-1: 5696	JD-1: 7111	JD-1: 7280
JD-1: 5730	JD-1: 7148	JD-1: 7294
JD-1: 6850	JD-1: 7157	JD-1: 7360
JD-1: 6943	JD-1: 7158	JD-1: 7335
JD-1: 6985	JD-1: 7178	JD-1: 7370
JD-1: 7029	JD-1: 7179	JD-1: 7511
JD-1: 7122	JD-1: 7212	JD-1: 8007

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

From: Honolulu (Okuda).
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).
10 March, 1941.
(J18K8)*
#043

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:
Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania class).

Five heavy cruisers (two of the _____ class, one of the _____ class, and two of the _____ class).

Six light cruisers (four of the _____ class and two of the Omaha class).
Yorktown.

25 destroyers (_____)

Two destroyer tenders.

Several submarines.

One submarine tender.

Several transports.

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.

*Note: This is first translation of J18K8, a new system effective 1 March, 1941.

JD-1: 1842 Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Honolulu.
September 24, 1941.
J-19.
#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

JD-1: 5696

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Washington.
29 September 1941.
Circular #041.
Honolulu to Tokyo #178.

Re your #083.*

(Strictly secret.)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): K'T.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.)

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

JD-1: 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)

*Not available.

**Available, dated 21 August.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 19 November 1941.
 (J19).
 Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."
 - (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
 - (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."
- The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
 Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
 JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #985. (Part 1 of 3.)^a
 Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments separately.)

In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25552 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)

^a Part 2 not available.
^b Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple. (CA).
 #985. (Part 3 of 3.)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitudes toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one following.

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25553 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (MR)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 27 November 1941.

(J19)
 Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete).
 Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324.
 (Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message).

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.
 With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.
 Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ARIMURA-----	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI-----	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA-----	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA-----	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA-----	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI-----	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA-----	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)-----	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA-----	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have been severed.
HATTORI-----	Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not in accordance with expectation.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA-----	Japan's and . . . (blank's) . . . military forces have clashed.
HOSINO-----	Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI-----	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAKAKI-----	Have you -?- - the . . . (blank) . . . matter?
ISHIKAWA-----	I have__? the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI-----	We are commencing <i>military action?</i> against . . . (blank)
. . .	
KOBAYAKAWA-----	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA-----	Japan.
KOMIYAMA-----	China.
KOYANAGI-----	England.
KUBOTA-----	U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA-----	France (?).
KUSUNOKI-----	Germany.
MATUTANI-----	Italy.

(Part 4)

MINAMI-----	U. S. A.
MIWATA-----	Canada.
MIYAZAKI-----	Mexico.
MOROKOSI-----	Brazil.
MOTIZUKI-----	Panama.
NAGAMINE-----	Argentina.
NAKAZATO-----	Thailand.
NANGO-----	French Indo-China.
NEGI (?)-----	Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA-----	Burma (?).
OKAMOTO-----	Malaya.
OKUMZRA-----	Australia.
ONIZUKA-----	Union of South Africa (?).
ONODERA-----	Enemy country.
OTANI-----	? (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI-----	Year.
SIMANAKA-----	Day (?).
SAKAKIBARA-----	Tsuki) Month.
SIGENOI-----	(KŌ) Paragraph.
SANZYŌ-----	(Toki) Time.
ITIRŌ-----	1.
NISAKU-----	2.
SANTARŌ-----	3.
YOITI-----	4.
GORŌ-----	5.
MASAROKU-----	6.
SIMETARŌ-----	7.
YASOKITI-----	8.
HISAMATU-----	9.
ATUMI-----	0.

JD-1: 6985 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 November 20, 1941.
 #111. Strictly secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).
 To: Santiago.
 2 December 1941.
 (J19.)

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete).
 Tokyo to Rio as Circular No. 2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular No. 2409*.

The following are added this date to my Circular No. 2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's note: Undelined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ASAHINA-----	From - - (blank) - - (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.
DATE-----	Please telegraph probable amount of - - (blank) - - that can be imported.
KAWAHARA-----	I estimate we can probably import about - - (blank) tons of - - (blank) - -.

*JD-1: 6985. List of code names to be used in plain language messages. with indicator STOP at end.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
NIWAGUCHI..... (Kawaguchi)	It is impossible to carry out - - (blank) - - .
NAKAMUTA..... (Nakamura)	Are in the process of arranging for importation of - - (blank) - - .
SATUNAKATA..... (Munakata)	Send communications via - - (blank) - - (country).
KAZAMA.....	Communications will be through office stationed in - - (blank) - - (country).
TOKUSIMA.....	Japanese ship should arrive in - - (blank) - - (country) on - - (blank) - - (month) - - (blank) - - (day).
TAKENOUTI.....	Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to --(blank)-- (country)?
YA—GI..... (Yanagi)	It is not possible to send Japanese ships to -- (blank) -- (country).
TONEGI.....	It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to --(blank)-- (country).

(Part 2)

TAKAGI.....	Minerals.
SAWAMURA.....	Lead.
—SUMI..... (Kasumi)	Mercury.
IWASAKI.....	Petroleum.
HIROHATA.....	Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI.....	Platinum.
KADA.....	Copper.
NAKAGAWA.....	Carat.
MAEHATA.....	Peru.
MASUKO.....	Chile.
SENEDA.....	Colombia.
TAKENAKA.....	Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
SIMAZU.....	Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
IMAZAWA.....	Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE.....	San QINY.**
HASIMOTO.....	Cuba.
SINDŌ.....	Havana.
TIBA.....	Rio de Janelro.
TOZAWA.....	Sao Paulo.

(Part 3)

HASEGAWA.....	Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE.....	Santos.
ENOMOTO.....	BAURŪ.
BEPPU.....	Curityba.
TIKAMATU.....	Belem.
SUETUGU.....	Buenos Alres.
OKIZUMI.....	Santiago.
YAMATO.....	Lima.
UMEGAWA.....	Bogota.
HARA.....	Caracas.
ISONO.....	Montevideo (?).
FUKAMATI.....	Asuncion.

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo, Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

**Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).

***Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago".

JD-1: 7122 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 November 18, 1941.
 J-19.
 #113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "H", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^a and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

JD-1: 7063 ARMY 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (3)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

From Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 18, 1941.
 J-19.
 #222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
 Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "XB". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.^d

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relay to _____

JD-1: 7111. Middle Loch. SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in WE code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.
 To: (Circular telegram).
 7 December 1941.
 (Plain Japanese language using code names).
 Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
 JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To Honolulu
 November 28, 1941
 J19 (Priority)
 #118.
 Re your #232^a.

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

JD-1: 7157 ARMY 25859 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (5)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25432 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 28, 1941.

#119 Re your message #243^a.

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

^a Available in code under study.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#253 Re the last part of your #123^a.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Fort and Ewa^b, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 JD 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

^a Not available.

^b Kana spelling.

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

Nine battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

From: Honolulu.

To: Tokyo.

November 28, 1941.

#238.

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12;

interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12/8/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Singapore.

December 2, 1941.

J19-19.

Circular #2450.

(5 yards complete.)

Re my Circular #2409^a.

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KIKUTI-----	Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA-----	Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually stopped.
(DE ?)OUTI-----	---(blank)---(blank)--- has been forced backward at ---(blank)---
AYAOKA-----	The Bumese Independents movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this with every resource, however, the movement is gradually growing more fierce.
ITAOISI-----	On the --- the Burma ---(blank)--- was attacked by the Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI-----	On the ---th in the ---(blank)--- area rioting broke out.
MIYAMOTO-----	I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.
<i>PART II</i>	
KITAMURA-----	Recently ---(blank)--- American military planes arrived at ---(blank)---
MUTO-----	---(blank)--- and pilots numbering ---(blank)--- arrived at ---(blank)---
NAGAOKA-----	---(blank)--- divisions of ---(blank)--- troops arrived at ---(blank)--- and left for ---(blank)--- on the ---th.
INABA-----	---(blank)--- divisions of ---(blank)--- troops are reportedly concentrated on the ---(blank)--- border.
YASIROEW-----	The Independents movement at ---(blank)--- and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA-----	At present there is a total of ---(blank)--- enemy merchant men docked at ---(blank)---
NINO-----	Merchant ships now docked at ---(blank)--- are as follows: American ---(blank)---; British ---(blank)---; Netherlands ---(blank)---
NAGAY-----	--- an merchant ships left for ---(blank)--- loaded with arms.
NIOGUTI-----	Our means of communication with Burma and the South Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.
SEGAWA-----	Our resident Nationals have been camped.
<i>PART III</i>	
YASUL-----	It is reported that riots are breaking out.
MARUSE-----	Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.
KUBOTA-----	Oil fields bombed.
NIRA-----	The residents of --- area are preparing to flee.
MOORI-----	Orders issued to residents of ---(blank)--- area to flee.
SEKYA-----	Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO-----	Netherlanders.
OCHIAL-----	Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBAPA-----	Japanese.
SISUYAMA-----	
YAMANOUTI-----	Premier.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
NOSE-----	Specialists' Commission.
KURODA-----	High tide (?).
NIRAI-----	Some officers and private citizens -----
INOYAMA-----	Telegraphy.
ENDOO-----	The Yamashita Agency.
ATUKAX-----	The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI-----	India.
AER-----	Java.
EDOGUTI-----	Sumatra.
HIROSE-----	Celebes.
HUKUI-----	Borneo.
INOCYE-----	-----
FUKA-----	British Indla.
KASAURA-----	Ceylon.
IKAWA-----	-----
<i>PART IV</i>	
HUJIMURA-----	Hainan Island.
IJIMA-----	The Spratleys.
ARIASA-----	Singapore.
HORUTA-----	Pinan.
NIWA-----	Bangkok.
KAMIYA-----	Chien mai* ---- Singora.
ISIDA-----	Saigon.
NINOMIYA-----	-----
HOSOKAWA-----	-----
NEZU-----	Tonkin.
YOKOTA-----	Cambodia.
NUMATA-----	-----
WATAMZAWA-----	Manila.
NOKAKI-----	-----
KERI-----	Batavia.
SEKINE-----	Menado.
SERISAWA-----	Makassar.
SOWE-----	-----
ANDO-----	Pankaran-Brandau*.
DOBASI-----	Pankau Sasu*.
FUKUSIMA-----	Mandalay.
BAKAMATSU-----	Palembang.
<i>PART V</i>	
ISTUMOTO-----	Jambi.
NAKINO-----	Tarakan.
MAKINO-----	Pa-- Pan.
SAKURAI-----	Sagsirinda*.
TAKANO-----	Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA-----	Paura*.
YANAGIYA-----	Banka*.
WATAGI-----	Biriton*.
FOAWA-----	Sunda*.
AIDA-----	Malacca.
BANDO-----	Sumaran*.
FUNARASI-----	Timor.
IKEDA-----	New Guinea.
KATAGIRI-----	Lashie.
MIXOGUYI-----	The Periswisa* region.
NICKADA-----	The Geta* region.
SAWAKARA-----	The Keta Eharu Region.
TAKESITA-----	East.
UTSUMONIYA-----	West.
YAMASE-----	South.
ARAWAKI-----	North.
DOOKY-----	Island.

JD-1: 7214 ARMY 25943 SECRET Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

* See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

*Kena spelling.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 5 December 1941.
 #252.

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
 8 battleships.
 3 light cruisers.
 16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and * * * were in dock.

26029.

JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*Available, dated 29 November.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 1 December 1941.
 #241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119.*

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns can not be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on 50 percent of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

(2) The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

* JD-1: 7158.

**Available, dated 23 November.

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishli).
 To: Santiago.
 2 December 1941.
 (J19).

Circular #328.

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November.

Re my Circular #2409*

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning.</i>
KASIMA-----	Have Japanese living there been interned?
KANŌ-----	Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI-----	Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO-----	Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO-----	The wave length of General Information broadcast will be changed to-----kilocycles from----- (day)----- (month)-----
KAKAO-----	Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please change wave length.
(Kayao)-----	
TUJIKITA-----	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present wave length.
TABUSE-----	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a longer wave length.
(Tabuti)-----	
SATŌ-----	The time of General Information broadcast is to be changed starting on----- (day)----- from----- (time)----- to----- (time)-----
HAYASAKI-----	Please change time of General Information broadcast, starting on----- (day)----- to, from----- (time)----- to----- (time)-----
ISEZAKI-----	100 (hyaku)
WANAMI-----	1,000 (sen)
YASUNO-----	10,000 (man)
UNO-----	100,000 (jyu man)
ITIYOTA-----	1,000,000 (hyaku man)
	(perhaps ITIOKA)
	(probably UTIOKA)

JD-1: 7360 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6985. List of code words similar to above.

From: Tientsin (7) *Peking*

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

(Purple).

#625. (Circular Number.)

To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

JD-1: 7335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)

*Not available.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941.
 #245 (In 2 parts, complete).

(Military secret.)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:
1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie.....	1
A number of carriers.....	Preparing to sortie.....	2
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 1st and 3d.....	3
Carriers.....	Several departed between 1st and 3d.....	4
Carriers.....	All departed between 1st and 3d.....	5
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	6
Carriers.....	Several departed between 4th and 6th.....	7
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	8

26145.

JD-1: 7370 (continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

2. Signals.

- I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	<i>Signal</i>
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....	1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m.....	2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m.....	3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m.....	4
II.—	
Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m.....	5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m.....	6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.....	7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m.....	8

(Part 2.)

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.

- If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

- IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

<i>Times</i>	<i>Signal</i>
1900-2000.....	3
2000-2100.....	4
2100-2200.....	5
2200-2300.....	6
2300-2400.....	7
0000-0100.....	8

V. K. G. M. G. *** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC-_-CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south-

*Between Walmanala and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received.

<i>Time</i>	<i>Signal</i>
From 7-8-----	3 or 6
From 8-9-----	4 or 7
From 9-10-----	5 or 8

JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 24, 1941.
 #234. (Part 0 of 2)

Re your #114.^a
 Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)
 JD-7511.

^a Not available.

From: Honolulu.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 24, 1941.
 #234. (Part 2 of 2.)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in group sf -----, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)
 JD-7511.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 2, 1941.
 J-19.
 #123. (Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications

that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

JD-1: 8007 ARMY 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 14

(Exhibit No. 14 originally consisted of four parts: Exhibits 14A, 14B, 14C, and 14D, being photostatic copies of a Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and locations of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. These photostatic copies are reproduced as a single chart and will be found as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 15

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
25 July 1941.
(Purple).
#571.

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

Please relay this information to the Navy.

JD-1: 4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 14, 1941.
Purple.

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code).

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

* For part 2 see S. I. S. # 23516.

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.
Army 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Washington.
October 16, 1941.
Purple (CA).
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
1 October 1941.
(Purple).
#1198.

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and other concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machina-

tions of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feeling toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what step Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Relayed to Rome.

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 22, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I image that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

23 October 1941.

(Purple-CA).

Unnumbered.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

JD-1: 6016 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 November 1941.

(Purple-CA).

#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of unavailing the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 10, 1941.
 Purple (CA) (Urgent).
 #1066. Part 1 of 2.

1. I sent MOORE* to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

Army 6440 24655 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

* Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 10, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #1066. (Part 2 of 2.)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Army 6440 24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 November 16, 1941.
 Purple (Ca) (Urgent).

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is: therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878. JD-1:6638. SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S).

^b S. I. S. # 24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. # 24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
Purple CA (Urgent).

#812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.^a You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710. 25138. SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S).

^a See S. I. S. # 24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 26, 1941.
Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the

^a See JD 1: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

America Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumako San (Miss Fumako)
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sesu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO:	Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE:	Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence	Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence	Ginza 1022

ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
 - (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
 - (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI"
- The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Nanking.
 15 November 1941.
 (Purple).
 #499.

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.

jd-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 19 November 1941
 (J19)
 Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

- (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*
- (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
- (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT).

*East wind rain.

**North wind cloudy.

***West wind clear.

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent).
 #1180. (Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent).
 #1180. (Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
 #1189. (Part 1 of 2.)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China, and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

ARMY 25441 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Momura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
 #1189. (Part 2 of 2.)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Toyko. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

ARMY 25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 28, 1941.
Purple. (CA.)

#844.

Re your #1189.^a

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.

^b S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple-CA.)

#857.

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).

Telephone Code.

TransPacific Radio Telephone.

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so."

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues; using voice code)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular ---- (one or two words faded out) ----"

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "Yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you: but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see--this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:0 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then--Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 1 December 1941.
 (Purple-CA).
 #865.

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.
 **JD-1: 6710.
 ***Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple.

#986. (Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.) (Part 1 of 2.)
 Secret outside the Department.)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (MR)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Berlin.
 November 30, 1941.
 Purple.
 #986. (Part 2 of 2.)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 28, 1941.

Purple.

#1214.

To be handled in Government Code.
 Re my #1190^a.

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plans to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

^a S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu (Riyoji).
 15 November 1941.
 (J19).

#111.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

SECRET

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 December 2, 1941.
 Purple.

(Completed Translation)

#1232. (Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231 *.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233 *. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

* Not available.

*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

SECRET

From: Washington.
 To: Toyko.
 December 2, 1941.
 Purple.
 #1232. (Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #1231 *.

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1223 *. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too,

_____ the four year incident _____
 ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

* Not available.

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#1232. (Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.^a

ARMY 25660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

^a Not available.

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsinking.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#893.

-----In the event that Manchuria participates in the war----in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that his country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 1 December 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 4, 1941.
 Purple. (Urgent.)
 #891.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256.^a

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.^b I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

^a Not available.
^b S. I. S. # 25725.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 3 December 1941.
 (Purple.)
 #875.

Chief of Office routing.

Re your #1232.*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been

an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

JD-1:7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#1234.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862^a.

I know that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

ARMY 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

^a Not available.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA.)
#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UKHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

JD-1: 7098 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 1 of 3).

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6921.

**Available, Purple dated 30 November.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20S03* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China - - - the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941.

(Purple.)

#1225. (Part 3 of 3.)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions," I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2).

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

November 30, 1941.

Purple.

#1224.

Re your #857.*

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit yours message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

ARMY 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2).

* See S. I. S. # 25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

29 November 1941.

(J19.)

#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo.)
 To: Honolulu.
 November 18, 1941.
 J-19.
 #113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N," Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,* and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S).

* Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #901.

Re my #844*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.
 Purple.
 #902. (Part 1 of 14.)
 Separate telegram.

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 6 of 14.)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple.

#902. (Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories

in disregard to realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 10 of 14.)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr----- (45 letters garbled or missing)----- been compelled to observe the satus quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -----es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n-- (50 letters missed) --sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 6, 1941.

Purple.

#902. (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and

Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as"

**Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 7 December 1941
 (Purple-Eng)
 #902. Part 14 of 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7Dec.1941 (S-TT)

SECRET

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 November 18, 1941.
 J-19.
 #222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
 Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30

^a—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c—East Loch.

^d—Middle Loch.

degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 7, 1941.

Purple (Urgent—Very Important).

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902^a.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3)

^a—S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

SECRET

From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

LA.

#104.

Re my #103^a.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

December 6, 1941.

Purple (Urgent).

#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advise of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us----(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)-----.

ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 2T)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To: Tokyo.
 December 3, 1941.
 Purple (Urgent).
 #1256. Re your #875*.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

ARMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

* See S. I. S. # 25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 6, 1941.
 PA-KZ.
 #128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
 To: Honolulu.
 December 2, 1941.
 J-19.
 #123.

(Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2027	Addressees	Message precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by..... Date: 28 November 1941.	For Action: CINCPAC. OPNAV. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by P. R. WHITE. Paraphrased by.....	Information.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-41.

281510

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Comment Naval attache that *Astalusha Sharda* two seven zero eight three zero X Isuzu (*cl*) in Formosa Straits Sunday X Subtender and four subs probably Subron Six plus Nagoya Maru tender X Last sentence believed to be sendal (*cl*) plus two desdivs XX Other items no comment XX Additional info from CN Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military supplies XX Two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not known ordered mandates XX Unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet X This ship now in Camranh Bay Saigon area XX

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) NAV REGS.

NOTE.—Penned notations in italics.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2027	Addressees	Message precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Leased by..... Date: 1 December 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by WHITE. Paraphrased by.....	Information: CINCPAC. COMFOURTEEN. CINCAF.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41 019913

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date time GCT

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41.

TEXT

From RI X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron five in Natori X Naka to join Desron four X units of number two base force and Chogei X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X All these units now under command Cine third X Cine second in Atago shifted from Kure to Sasebo Comm Zone apparently en route South China waters

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.

Classified U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Incoming

Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same garble cable X No change in shore addresses XX

30 Nov. 41 Crypto-Group 87 CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2

Originator: Information:

COM 16 CINCAF

Action: CINPAC

OPNAV COM 14

Authenticated:

F. S. Lockard,
 F. S. LOCKARD, *Ens. USNR.*

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 17

(Exhibit No. 17 is a photostat of a captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plan V of "Battle Report". This chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 107, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 18

RADIO LOG

of

BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION

7 December 1941

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE

BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.

Watch	Receiver & Controls O. K.
C. E. Gibson, Supervisor	Freq.: 2670 KCS.
R. B. Moyle, Operator	Date: 7 December 1941 R. W. H.

1445	DZ5Y DN3L DZ5Y DB1L DN3L DN3L DZ5Y DZ5Y	DB1L V V DZ5Y DB1L V DZ5Y V V DZ5Y V DB1L V DN3L V DN3L	DN3L AR K DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY DN3L AR COME IN K WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K
1450	DN3L	V DZ5Y	THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT THE TIME 0200 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE EN- RANCE K
1451	DZ5Y	V DN3L	R
1456	DZ5Y DN3L DZ5Y DN3L	V DN3L V DZ5Y V DN3L V DZ5Y	BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE SUB K NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU SAW THE SUBMARINE K APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
1458	V DN3L	R	
1505	DZ5Y DN3L DZ5Y	V DN3L V DZ5Y V DN3L	AR PLEASE K BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF YOU HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CON- TINUE SEARCH K

RADIO LOG—Continued

SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.—Continued

1508	V DZ5Y		R
1524	DB1L	V DZ5Y	AR
	DZ5Y	V DB1L	K
	V DZ5Y		WE ARE FINISHED K
1525	V DB1L		R
1535	DR7Y	V DJ8A	PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K
1538	V DJ8A		R
1539	DW2X	V DB1L	AR
	DB1L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DB1L	CLEAR K
	V DW2X		R
1555	DJ8A	V DR7Y	AR
	DR6Y	V DJ8A	K
	DR8A	V DR7Y	S15 FEMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID YOU
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K
1557	DJ8A	V DR7Y	R
1630	DE2A	V DW2X	AR
	DW2X	V DR9Q	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	K
	V DZ5I		K
	DE2A	V DW2X	Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K
1641	V DN3L		R
	V DZ5I		R
	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
1642	DW2X	V DN3L	ZCD DZ5I R AR
1643	DN3L	V DW2X	R
1647	DW2X	V DZ5I	AR
1650	DW2X	V DR9Q	ZCE DZ5I K
	DR9Q	V DZ5I	ZSF K
	DZ5I	V DR9Q	S3 K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZCE DZ5I AR
	DZ5I	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DZ5I	ZSF K
	V DW2X		S5 K5 K
165	V DZ5I		R
1714	DR7Y	V DJ8A	HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME
	DJ8A	V DR7Y	YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA
1715	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R

6 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey,
RICHARD WILMOT HUMPHREY,
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N. R.

This copy was certified in my presence :

Walter H. Kozacko,
WALTER H. KOZACKO,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

RADIO LOG

SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.

Watch
G. E. Gibson, Supervisor
R. B. Moyle, Operator

Receiver & Controls O. K.
Freq. 2670 Kcs.
Date: December 1942 1941 R. W. H.

			TIME OF LAST ENTRY
1715			
1721	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	P BK WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS
			OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES
	DNRL	V DW2X	IM1 YOUR LAST PRIORITY K
1723	DW2X	V DN3L	WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH
			CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE
			SEA AREA AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K
	V DW2X		R
	V DN3L		STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES

RADIO LOG—Continued

SECTION BASE, BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T. H.—Continued

1727	V DW2X		R
1749	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY AR
	V DW2X		R
1755	DW2X	V DN3L	AR
	V DW2X		K
	DW2X	V DN3L	ZMA Ø BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR
1756	V DW2X		R
1803	DJ8A	V DN3L	P P AR PLEASE
	DR9Q	V DN3L	ZCG DJ8A AR
	AJ8A	V DR9Q	AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	P AR
	V DW2X		K
	V DN3L		BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN AR
1805	V DW2X		R P K
	V DN3L		AS 1 MINUTE
	V DJ8A		K
	V DN3L		BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN AR
	DN3L	V DW2X	Z DW2X 071807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN SVDER LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQX BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K
1810	DR7Y	V DJ8A	IMI OR 1
1813	DJ8A	V DR7Y	GR 1 402
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	R
			MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY.....
1817	DE1T	V DW2X	AR
1821	DN3L	V DW2X	AR
	DW2X	V DN3L	K
	V DW2X		Z DW2X 071820 DE1T Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD AR
1826	DW2X	V DN3L	R
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	AR
	DJ8A	V DR7Y	K
	DR7Y	V DJ8A	HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK3K 071801 DR7Y GR 4 BT PROCEED CONTACT HARBOR PATROL
	DJ8A	V DN3L	IMI THAT LAST MESSAGE
1830	DW2X	V DR6K	ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DU1P
	DJ8A	V DN3L	
1830			RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT—POWER OFF
1830			AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES

6 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.

Richard Wilmot Humphrey,
RICHARD WILMOT HUMPHREY,
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N. R.

This copy was certified in my presence:

Walter H. Kozacko,
WALTER H. KOZACKO,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 19

14 MAY 1945.

Received the following secret material from Captain L. F. Safford, USN, for official use in the Pearl Harbor Investigation:

- (1) Three copies of Com 14 Daily RI Summaries (at Pearl Harbor) from 1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
- (2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
- (3) Photos of the following (3 copies):

OpNav to CinCAF 242239
Com 14 to OpNav 260110
Com 16 to OpNav 261331
OpNav to Alusna Tokyo 040330

Com 13 031825
 Com 16 to OpNav 010245
 Foote's message
 Com 16 to OpNav 041502
 Hidden message of December 7
 Bainbridge Island 051830
 Com 14 052200

(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl. (JD-1 No. 7148).

JOHN L. SONNETT.

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
 1 NOVEMBER 1941-6 DECEMBER 1941

SECRET

Communication Intelligence Summary—1 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little less than normal. Receiving condition fair, traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged, but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared, but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

Combined Fleet.—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

Carriers.—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

Submarines.—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

Third Fleet.—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC, is very busy with Tokyo.

China.—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

Communication Intelligence Summary—2 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair, but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Forces originating many despatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating many despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence despatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

Communication Intelligence Summary—3 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to eliminate from TOYKO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of

this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

Combined Fleet.—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

Third Fleet.—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by IATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

Air.—1. WE address, today broke down as "TIKOUKU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct; it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicated that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before, but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can be easily accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

Communication Intelligence Summary—4 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

Air.—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the aid dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

Mandates.—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

Submarines.—No activity noted.

Communication Intelligence Summary—5 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff Car Divs and TIYA 44 (Unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many dispatches passing between the two.

Third Fleet.—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today.

The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Comanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many dispatches from TOKYO. Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

Communication Intelligence Summary—6 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon, all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

Takao-Bako Area.—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprised practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

Combined Fleet.—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

Mandates.—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO Paloa continue to be the most active units.

Communication Intelligence Summary—7 November 1941

General.—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentration in that area.

Air.—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

Fleet.—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

Communication Intelligence Summary—8 November 1941

General.—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a dispatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined *INFO* S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

Fleet.—Chief of Staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with the Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

Air.—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC, Combined Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

Communication Intelligence Summary—9 November 1941

General.—Traffic column heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area, but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

Communication Intelligence Summary—10 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

Combined Fleet.—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A Staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The Cinc, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

Third Fleet.—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. Cinc Three originated one movement report for information of Cinc Fourth Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—Little activity. Cinc Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the Cinc Fourth for information of Jaluit.

Fifth Fleet.—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

Air.—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. Cinc Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

Communication Intelligence Summary—12 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities, in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

Combined Fleet.—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is borne out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with the BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

Air.—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

Fifth Fleet.—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

China.—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INRO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 Messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. At 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO Intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

Combined Fleet.—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

Third Fleet.—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of

Air.—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

China.—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor air receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AINav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN175S (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China Area in near future.

Third Fleet.—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

Fourth Fleet.—No movement yet from the Truk area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

Submarines.—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

Air.—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U #9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No Messages of the D. F. type were detected so it presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of BatDiv Three flagship.

Combined Fleet.—Same as yesterday, same units (BatDiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC. Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

Third Fleet.—Inactive.

Fourth Fleet.—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

Submarine Force.—Little activity detected. It is believed that some activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

Air.—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 16, November 1941

General.—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

“Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all

officers and men of Army Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

First and Second Fleets.—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airron Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, these appear to an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates.

It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

Third Fleet.—Believed inactive in Sasebo—Kure area.

Fourth Fleet.—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (Men 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

Fifth Fleet.—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite, but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet, but is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus area.

Submarines.—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different, but all fitting the same line on the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going into Tokyo, it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Salpan controlling.

Combined Fleet.—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

Fourth Fleet.—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

Air.—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

China.—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad-

ressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC, South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

Third Fleet.—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps awhile ago and may be transporting air units for equipment.

Fourth Fleet.—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic still interested in Jaluit.

Communication Intelligence Summary 19 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some technical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of

Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

Third Fleet.—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

Fourth Fleet.—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

Fifth Fleet.—Flagship located Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

Communication Intelligence Summary—20-21 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNIWIVI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo became very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder Net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

Combined Fleet.—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in the Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three)	ENO 7 (Unidentified)
TAE 1 (Airron 7)	AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6)	KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5)	SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7)	KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
RESE 4 (Desron 3)	OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4)	KOA 8 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)	NOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)	NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desro 5)	NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)	SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo)	YAYU 1 (Unidentified)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit)	MARE 5 (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified)	Plus 11 Marus

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

Communications Intelligence Summary—20-21 November 1941

Mandates and Fourth Fleet.—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with

the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

Communication Intelligence Summary—22 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETES (Crudiv?), KOO2 (Subron5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force) MIRA 9 (CarDiv3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collection), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure) META O/ (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?) NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

Third Fleet.—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI" and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jalnit and AirRon 24 now in Jalnit area. Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

China.—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

Communication Intelligence Summary—23 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo Address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
NIKA-WIWI Southern Expeditionary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information
NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary
Force Chief of Staff.

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
WIWI
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, information Radio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.
NIKA
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.
KIJU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI. RENGO. RI. SI."

An unidentified fleet unit (SUITE 1) listed recently in KURE appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

- KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?
- HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
- MUSE 4—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

Combined Fleet.—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but not important messages originated by him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated, but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. Fr) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addresses were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit, to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

AIR.—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

CHINA.—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

Communication Intelligence Summary—24 November 1941

GENERAL.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and

the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "Share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addressees with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

First and Second Fleets.—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

Third Fleet.—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet and Mandates.—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truff. Aid Squadron Twenty-Four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

Submarines.—Comparatively little activity.

Comparatively quiet.

Carriers.—No definite indications of location.

Combined Air Force.—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

Communication Intelligence Summary—25 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet, and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an origination, addressing Third Fleet, Air Force and South China units. A second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicated the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC. Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

Air.—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past

week. Intra-Fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AINavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR 15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the Cinc. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

Combined Fleet.—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATONO appeared in several of CinC second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Hainan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and Cinc. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

Fifth Fleet.—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

Submarines.—As noted above, Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch being doubted because of the indication of their arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

China.—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

Third Fleet.—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kes. Tokyo-Tako circuit unreadable on midwatch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sana, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who send five dispatches to the major commanders. *The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.*

Combined Fleet.—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to still be with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. *There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately.* Cinc. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

Third Fleet.—Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITISIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in canteen of RYUJO)

"URIZEUBAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and Cinc Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the

Marshalls. *No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.*

Air.—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers ate still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any combined air force units to Hainan.

Submarines.—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

Communication Intelligence Summary 28 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to WREØ (The Tokyo D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS.*

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent two Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

Combined Fleet.—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO, (CA).

Third Fleet.—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

Fourth Fleet.—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at TUOTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-four and KAMOI.

South China.—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, and the French Indo-China and Combined air force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBRO and KURE. The Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

Submarines.—Except for the mention of Subrons Five and Six in two dispatches there was no submarine activity today.

Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commander both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message from Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec-

ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. On address was "juitikoukukantai" 11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

Combined Fleet.—The arrival of Air-Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of Cin C. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE
SUBRON FIVE
SUBRON SIX
CRUDIV FIVE
CRUDIV SEVEN
DESRON TWO
DESRON FOUR
THIRD FLEET
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

Fourth Fleet.—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

Submarines.—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

South China.—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARU'S. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chief of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

Combined Fleet.—The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the Same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (Taiwan Army Headquarters).

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON two, Four and Five, COMCRUDIV five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second

Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

Fourth Fleet.—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater day than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and A IRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (STI14) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet Submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

BAKO Active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941

General.—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of despatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic to deliver all despatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered despatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pay the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

First fleet.—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role.

Second Fleet.—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

Fourth fleet.—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

Fifth Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Submarines.—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in this general area.

Carriers.—No change.

Combined Air Force.—No change;

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941

General.—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it has previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets.

Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. Comsixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camrauh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

First Fleet.—Dispite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. *From inconclusive evidence it appears as if there may be been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs.* As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet Call associated with Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet calls appears not associated with the second and Third Fleets.

Second Fleet.—*No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company.* Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

Mandates.—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

Carriers.—*Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December, and not one carrier call is at a low ebb.*

Combined Air Force.—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the Major Commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same address.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Unites in the Marshall Island area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Unites were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the BNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on Submarines or Carriers.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so

that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among other Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Saka. In all, This activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and Cinc. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which Cinc. Second Fleet is still Copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, Cinc. Second Fleet and Cinc. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-Four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (Which is believed to be an oil tanker).

South China.—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed conditions of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

Combined Fleet.—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarines Force has been seen either.

Third Fleet.—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet."

HITOYONGUN SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing the Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.

South China.—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

Communication Intelligence Summary 6 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OIMAUTO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

Combined Fleet.—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

Fifth Fleet.—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

Submarines.—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

South China.—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task force.

SECRET

Station H, 1 December, 1941.

CHRONOLOGY

South China Area: No change in location of flagships assigned to the China area was observed. Subron 6 is at Takao and is probably going South. Airron 7 is in the vicinity of Hainan Island. Comdr. Combined Air Force is still at Takao.

Sheet #95431. RMO Tuihoku originated a message with prefix, MIN—highest priority, action Bako, information Sama, Takao and Chiefs of Staff of five unidentified calls. Sheet #95451 CinC South China Fleet originated a despatch with prefix, KIU NIKA WIWI—Urgent-special cipher, action three unidentified calls.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined, First and Second Fleets are all believed to be in the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet sent a code movement report it is possible that this Command will go to South China or Indo-China.

Very little activity was observed in the Kure or Casebo area. Most of the activity seemed to be in South China, but this might have been caused by more thorough coverage of South China circuits, with less coverage of Empire circuits.

Submarines: No activity noted in Subforce. Comdr. Subforce is in the Mandates, probably with a number of submarines. Some submarine units are still based at Yokosuka and Kure.

Fourth Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk.

No unusual activity noted in the Mandates, except that Comdr. Subforce is in the vicinity of Saipan and will probably go to Truk to join CinC Fourth Fleet.

General: Service calls for units afloat were changed on 1 December. The first new calls were noticed about 1100. Old calls were used by some units until evening. The "WE" (enciphered) addresses were also changed. The only shore call observed to be changed was OASI4 (Sama, Hainan) to YUII.

Three kana authenticators were used after the message NRs on several despatches but were not used on others. This was begun after the change of calls.

A large number of DF despatches, originated by MENU1 (Jaluit), were sent on the UTU broadcast, information IKA1 (unidentified). These messages were originated several days ago. Several messages, originated by Comsubforce, were also sent on the UTU broadcast for action of Subforce. These were also several days old.

Saipan, using the call HOKO, called FUHO (Tokyo) and NUKU (Takao) on

13013 Kcs during the day. On 14310A Kcs (Takao to ships) NUKU (Takao) called RIKU once and then secured.

A considerable number of messages that had been originated several days ago were noted in traffic intercepted. This might have been done to keep the volume of traffic up to cover-up for a decrease in the amount of traffic originated.

Station H, 2 December, 1941.

South China Area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai; CinC South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in Canton area; Comdr. Indo-China Force is at Saigon; CinC Central China Fleet is at Shanghai.

Takao continues to accept traffic for delivery to Comdr. Combined Air Force and Commanding Officer Kanoya Air Station. Desrons 4 and 5 and Chogei (flagship Subron —) are in Takao area and are probably going South.

Several high precedence despatches were originated by South China units, indicating increased activity in that area.

The following units normally based in Japan have gone South to Hainan or Indo-China areas: Desrons 2, 4 and 5, Subrons 5 and 6, Airron 7 and Crudiv 7.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have remained at Kure with the First Fleet and most of the Second Fleet. CinC Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire.

No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. Cardiv 4 is believed to still be at Sasebo. Cardiv 3 has not shown any activity during the last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce has been observed. Comdr. Subforce is in the Mandates. Several submarine units are still at Yokosuka and Kure. Several despatches originated by Mandate units were given to Comsubforce for information.

Fourth Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet remains at Truk.

Several high precedence despatches were originated by Fourth Fleet units, indicating activity of some sort is taking place in the Mandates.

General: Takao Air Station (MERO6) was heard sending traffic (broadcast), formerly sent on the UTU broadcast, to REHES (Combined Air Force) on 11500M Kcs during the evening watch.

Addition to "WE" table: YO=A.

Station H, 3 December, 1941.

South China Area: No change in location of major flagships assigned to South China waters was observed.

Takao was acting as radio guard for CinC Second Fleet, Comdr CAF and Comdg. Officer Kanoya Air Corps. Bako was much more active than usual and was probably acting as relay station for vessels going South. Bako was heard working Takao on 3705A Kcs during the evening; this station stopped working Tako on the hour to hold schedule with ships.

Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A Kcs (night) and 14310A Kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broadcast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's Combined, Second and Third Fleets, Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-China Force and several unidentified afloat calls.

NUKU (Takao) and MAYA were heard working each other on 6762 Kcs during the evening.

Considerable high precedence traffic was originated by South China or Indo-China units indicating unusual activity in this area.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to be in the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and is probably going South.

There were no indications that CinC Third Fleet had moved South, except that Takao was heard broadcasting traffic for that command. It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo.

Very little activity was observed in the Empire.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was noted. Comdr. Subforce is believed to still be in the Mandates. Submarine units are believed to be in port at Yokosuka and Kure.

Fourth Fleet: Very little activity observed in the Fourth Fleet. CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk. Normal activity was indicated in traffic intercepted in this area. Several ships were in the Truk and Jaluit areas. No activity of any kind was noticed in the Palao area.

General: Tokyo (FUHO), Takao (NUKU) and Saipan (HOKO) were heard working each other on 13000A Kcs during the day and early evening. Takao relayed traffic from Saipan to Tokyo.

Station H, 4 December, 1941.

South China Area: CinC China Fleet is at Shanghai; CinC South China is in the vicinity of Amoy; Comdr Indo-China Force is at Saigon.

Takao continues to broadcast traffic on 7155A (night) and 14310A Kcs (day) to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call, NUKU and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?).

NUKU (Takao), TAI (Sama) and TANU (Saigon?) were heard working each other on 7008N Kcs during the evening. TANU sent traffic to Takao, originated by KORUØ (Kanoya Air Corps), indicating this unit is at Saigon.

Note sheet #96819 sent by TANU (Saigon?) to TAI (Sama) for delivery to "WE" address, (TONUSIUDANSANJIUTEU—Army?). The text of the message consisted of 3 numeral groups. Sheet #96829 was similar, except that the text consisted of 4 numeral groups.

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have remained in the Kure area. CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the vicinity of Takao and might be going South. Takao broadcasted traffic addressed to CinC's Second and Third Fleets.

Very little activity was observed in the Sasabo or Kure areas. The Carriers are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu.

Submarines: No activity among the submarines was observed. Comdr. Subforce is still in the Mandates. Several submarine units remain at Yokosuka and Kure.

Fourth Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is believed to have remained at Truk. CinC Fifth Fleet is probably at Chichijima.

Very little activity was noted in the Mandates. Several messages were exchanged between CinC Fourth Fleet and Commanders in South China waters.

General: KUNIWI (Tokyo Naval Intelligence) sent a 7 part SUU WIWI despatch to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second, Third, China, South China, Indo-China Fleets and to Sama. A number of high precedence messages were also sent to the above addresses, to general collective calls and to KANKA (All ships and stations) by Naval Intelligence and Communication Division, Tokyo. The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action.

Station H, 5 December, 1941.

South China Area: No change in location of major units in South China has been observed.

Increased activity in South China and Indo-China indicates that a move of some sort in that area is imminent.

Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 Kcs to units in that area. From all indications CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao area or have moved even farther South from Takao.

Tokyo Naval Intelligence and Communication Division continue sending high precedence messages for general distribution and especially to CinC's Combined, Second, Third, South China Fleets and Comdrs Indo-China and Combined Air Forces. From all indications CinC Second Fleet is in command of operations in Indo-China and South China areas.

Combined Fleet: It is believed that CinC's Combined and First Fleets remain at Kure. Very little activity was observed in the Empire.

CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the Takao area or in South China. No indication as to location of the Carriers was noted in today's traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu.

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was observed. Comdr. Subforce is in the Mandates. It is believed that one Subron is at Yokosuka and another at Kure.

Fourth Fleet: Very little activity was observed in the Mandated Islands. CinC Fourth Fleet seems to have moved from Truk to the Jaluit area. Consufor is probably in company with CinC Fourth Fleet.

There has been quite an exchange of messages between units in the Fourth Fleet and in the South China or Indo-China areas. This indicates closer cooperation between the Mandate and South China forces.

General: Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 Kcs in addition to his regular UTU broadcast. At 0430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 Kcs for an UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 Kcs. Signals were very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo. —?—4 (Saigon?), LU3 (Palao) and HAKUG (Tokyo) were heard working each other on 4746M Kcs at midnight.

Ominato, Chichijima and Tokyo were heard on 6020 and 4010 Kcs during the evening watch. Chichijima called Yokosuka, but that station was not heard. Kanoyu Air, Yokosuka Air and 9NUU (Plane ?) were also on this frequency.

Ominato was heard sending traffic to UFU1 (5th fleet) on 4010 Kcs. This command has probably split, with part of it at Chichijima and the rest at Ominato.

Station H 6 December, 1941.

South China area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai. CinC South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in the vicinity of Amoy. Comdr. Indo-China Force (aboard Kashi) is at Saigon. CinC Central China Fleet is at or near Hankow and CinC North China Fleet is in vicinity of Tsingtao.

Considerable activity in the South China and Indo-China areas was indicated by the large amount of high precedence traffic originated by and sent to units in these areas. Most of the traffic sent to units in Southern waters was originated by Tokyo.

CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets are still in the vicinity of Takao or farther south. Comdr. Combined Air Force is at Takao Air. Traffic for Kanova Air Corps, Shiogama Air Corps, Genzan Air Corps, 11th Air Corps, Takao Air Corps and other units believed to be Air Corps or squadrons was handled by Takao, indicating they are in the South China or Indo-China area.

Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 Kcs (A) (night) and on 14310 Kcs (A) (day).

Combined Fleet: CinC's Combined and 1st Fleets are believed to still be in the Kure area.

Very little activity in the Empire was observed. Most of the traffic addressed to CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets and Comdrs. Combined Air Force and Indo-China Force is also given to CinC Combined Fleet—probably to keep that command informed of operations being carried out in Indo-China.

Submarines: No activity of importance was observed in the SubForce. ComSubForce originated several messages addressed to the entire Submarine force. This command is in the Mandates, but it is not known whether he is at Jaluit or Truk. Several indications lead to the belief that ComSubForce is at Jaluit.

At least two Subrons are believed to have remained in home waters, with one at Yokosuka and the other at Kure.

Fourth Fleet: It has been definitely established by traffic study that CinC 4th Fleet is in the Truk area. Several times traffic routing indicated that part of the Staff of CinC 4th Fleet was at Jaluit. It is possible that this command has been split-up for better administration of all operations in the South Seas. The Kamoi (with Commanding Officer, Chitose Air Corps aboard) is in the Jaluit area.

Traffic continues to be exchanged between several 4th Fleet units and Commands in the Indo-China area.

Fifth Fleet: Ominato has been heard working the flagship and at least one other unit of the 5th Fleet for the last few days. This fleet has been based at Chichijima for some time. It is probable that part of this force has remained at Chichijima; it is known that KEO6 (Airron attached to 5th Fleet) is there.

General: At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 Kcs, dual with 12330 Kcs, for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 Kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted traffic on 6665 Kcs (A) during the evening.

Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps toward placing the operations of the Navy on a war-time basis.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 20

TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 24 May 1945.

OP-20-4-mp
Serial 0002720
(SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.
Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are the following, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a) :

(a) Photostatic copy of station "S" intercept sheets 5651, 5652 and 5653 (Tokyo Circular # 2492, 7 December 1941) ; and

(b) Photographic print of JD-1 : 714S, Circular #2494, 7 December 1941.

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these documents are classified TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these documents to this office is directed.

James Forrestal.
JAMES FORRESTAL.

S 7 DEC 41

SF DE JAH
621 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG
KOSHI PANAMA

Urgent 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HATTORI MINAMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASI STOP—TOGO

12ØS JP
763Ø

S. 387/7 85ØS GR23

Obese ovals RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO gnome

SF DE JAH
622 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 85Ø JG RIYOJI NEW YORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 85ØS JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
626 S TOKYO 22 7 85Ø S JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)

122Ø JP
763Ø

SF DE JAH
627 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI SAN FRANCISCO
628 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE
629 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
63Ø S TOKYO 19 7 85Ø S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA
631 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 85ØS JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CAL
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)

1243 JP
763Ø

From: Tokyo.
To: (Circular telegram).
7 December 1941.
(Plain Japanese language using code names.)
Circular #2494.

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 21

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #45-41, 27 NOVEMBER 1941

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

HRK

Cincpac File No.
A8/FF1/(25)
Serial 01954

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
November 27, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE *CONFIDENTIAL* NATURE OF BOTH THE *SOURCE* AND *INFORMATION* CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE *CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER* OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or correction) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
By direction.

DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)

List I, Case 3; P, X.

Atlantic Fleet A1;

Asiatic Fleet A1;

One copy each to:

FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,

NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

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Fourth Fleet	" 5 and 6.
Fifth Fleet	" 7.
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Sketch of MALAKAI Harbor, etc.	
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[1] (A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEET. OCTOBER 30, 1941. (10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O. N. I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet		
1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons.
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc. Small craft.
4. Fourth Fleet		
5. Fifth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
6. Sixth Fleet	?	?
7. Carrier Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons.
8. Combined Air Force	(Aircraft Carriers) (Seaplane tenders, etc.)	5 Cardivs. 4 Airrons, & shore based planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China. (Staff Headquarters)		
1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

[2] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-wartime footing.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

NAGATO, Flagship

FIRST FLEET

Batdiv One
NAGATO (F)
MUTSU
YAMASHIRO

Batdiv Two
FUSO (F)
ISE
HYUGA

Batdiv Three
HIYEI (F)
KONGO
KIRISHIMA
*HARUNA

Crudiv Six
KAKO (F)
FURUTAKA
AOBA
KINUGASA

Desron One
ABUKUMA (F)

Desdiv 6
IKAZUCHI (F)
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
HIBIKI

Desdiv 21
NENOHI (F)
HATSUHARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA

Desdiv 27
SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE

*NOTE: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET—Continued

Desron Three

SENDAI (F)

Desdiv 11

FUBUKI (F)

SHIRAYUKI

HATSUYUKI

Desdiv 12

SHIRAKUMO (F)

SHINONOME

USUGOMO

MURAKUMO

*Desron Three—Continued**Desdiv 19*

ISONAMI (F)

SHIKINAMI

AYANAMI

URANAMI

Desdiv 20

AMAGIRI (F)

ASAGIRI

YUGIRI

SAGIRI

Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2CL, 27 DD.

[3]

COMBINED FLEET

SECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

Crudiv Four

TAKAO (F)

ATAGO

CHOKAI

MAYA

*Crudiv Five**

MYOKO (F)

NACHI

HAGURO

Crudiv Seven

KUMANO (F)

MOGAMI

MIKUMA

SUZUYA

Crudiv Eight

TONE (F)

CHIKUMA

Desron Two

JINTSU (F)

Desdiv 8

ASASHIO (F)

ARASHIO

OSHIO

MICHISHIO

Desdiv 15

KUROSHIO

OYASHIO

NATSUSHIO

HAYASHIO

*Desron Two (Cont'd)**Desdiv 16*

HATSUKAZE

YUKIKAZE

AMATSUKAZE

TOKITSUKAZE

Desdiv 18

KASUMI

ARARE

KAGERO

SHIRANUHI

*Desron Four**Desdiv 2*

NAKA (F)

Desdiv 2

YUDACHI (F)

MURASAME

HARUSAME

SAMIDARE

Desdiv 9

ASAGUMO

YAMAGUMO

MINEGUMO

NATSUGUMO

Desdiv 24

KAWAKAZE (F)

YAMAKAZE

SUZUKAZE

UMIKAZE

Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.

*NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.

[4]

THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo—Vice Admiral

NAGARA, Flagship

NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE

CHOGEI (F)
 Subdiv -----

 Subdiv -----

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE

Desron Five
 NATORI (F)
 Desdiv 5
 ASAKAZE
 HARUKAZE
 MATSUKAZE
 HATAKAZE
 Desdiv 12
 SATSUKI
 FUMITSUKI
 MINATSUKI
 NAGATSUKI
 Desdiv 34
 HAKAZE
 AKIKAZE
 YUKAZE
 TACHIKAZE

1st BASE FORCE
 ----- Maru (F)

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 merchant ships.

Total, 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM, 12 AM, 6 XPG, 12 PC, 46 AP.

Minelayer Division

ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
 AOTAKA
 HATSUTAKA
Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21
 AM-1 AM-7
 AM-2 AM-8
 AM-3 AM-9
 AM-4 AM-10
 AM-5 AM-11
 AM-6 AM-12

Gunboat Division 1

6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing Vessels)

SUBCHASER SQUADRON
 ----- (F)
Subchaser Division 1 and 11
 PC-1 PC-7
 PC-2 PC-8
 PC-3 PC-9
Subchaser Division 21 and 31
 PC-4 PC-10
 PC-5 PC-11
 PC-6 PC-12
 27 AP—Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

----- Maru, (F)
Minelayer Division 17
 SHIRATAKA
 YAEYAMA
 KUNAJIRI

[5]

FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA—Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudiv Eighteen
 TENRYU (F)
 TATSUTA
 KASHIMA

Desron Six
 YUBARI (F)

Desdiv 29
 QITE
 HAYATE
 ASANAGI
 YUNAGI

Desdiv 30
 MITSUKI (F)
 KISARAGI
 YAYOI
 MOCHITSUKI

Subron Seven

JINGEI
Subdiv 26
 RO-60
 RO-61
 RO-62
Subdiv 27
 RO-65
 RO-66
 RO-67
Subdiv 33
 RO-63
 RO-64
 RO-68
Subdiv -----

 8 XPG

FOURTH FLEET—Continued

Survey and Patrol Division
 KOSHU
 KATSURIKI (CM)
 KOMABASHI (AS)
Repair and Salvage Division
 MATSUEI MARU
 NAGAURA (MARU)

3rd BASE FORCE
 Palao, Headquarters
 ----- Maru (F)
Guard Division 3
 ----- Maru

Subdiv 6
 RO-56
 RO-57
 RO-58
 RO-59
Subchaser Division 55
 ----- Maru (F)
 XPG 551 (?)
 XPG 552 (?)
 XPG 553 (?)
 XPG 554 (?)
 9 AP or AK

THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALAO)
 Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force
 ----- Detach. 4th Def. Force
 ----- " " " "
 ----- " " " "
 ----- " " " "
 ----- " " " "
 ----- " " " "
 (Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROL, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

[6] 4th BASE FORCE
 Truk, Headquarters
 ----- Maru (F)
Guard Division 4
 ----- Maru (F)

 4 AP or AK

FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-TRUK)
 Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #17 and Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Greenwich Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Mortlock Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Pinglap Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Lamotrek Detachment of 4th Def. Force, ----- (Hall ?) Detachment of 4th Def. Force.

5th BASE FORCE
 Saipan, Headquarters
 SHOEI MARU (F)
Guard Division 5
 Composition unknown
Mine-layer Division 19
 OKINOSHIMA (F)
 TOKIWA
Subchaser Division 56
 KASHI (F)
 XPG 561 (?)
 XPG 562 (?)
 XPG 563 (?)
Gunboat Division 8
 Composition unknown
 9 AP or AK

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—SAIPAN)
 Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #18
 Tenian Detachment, 5th Defence Force PAGAN

6th BASE FORCE
 Jaluit, Headquarters
 TAKUHAN MARU (F)
Mine Sweeper Division 16
 NAGATA MARU (F)
 CHOKAI MARU
 DAIDO MARU
 IKUTA MARU

? ----- Maru
 ----- Maru
 ----- Maru
 (This may be the SALVAGE Unit known to be in 6th Base Force)

Subchaser Division 5
 PC-51
 PC-52
 PC-53

SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—JALUIT)
 KAIKEI Maru
 #5 FUKU Maru
 ----- Maru
 Miscellaneous Forces ashore including AIR GROUP #19 at IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and probable Air Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajalein Atoll)—Detachment 6th Defence Force KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll), ENIWETOK Is (Eniwetok Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE Atol—Detach. of 6th Def. Force, UTIRIK Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force

Total : 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Survey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 41 AP or AK.

[7]

FIFTH FLEET

CL----- (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maisuru.

SIXTH FLEET

(Subarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

Subron One

TAIGEI (F)

Subdiv 1

I-9

I-15

I-16

I-17

Subdiv 2

I-18

I-19

I-20

Subron Two

KITAGAMI (F)

Subdiv 7

I-1

I-2

I-3

I-7

Subdiv 8

I-4

I-5

I-6

Subron Three

NAGOYA MARU (F)

Subdiv 11

I-74

I-75

Subdiv 12

I-8

I-68

I-69

I-70

Subdiv 20

I-71

I-72

I-73

Subron Five

YURA (F)

Subdiv 28

I-59

I-60

Subdiv 29

I-61 (Sank 10-2-41)

I-62

I-64

Subdiv 30

I-65

I-66

Subron Six

KINU (F)

Subdiv 9

I-123

I-124

Subdiv 13

I-121

I-122

Subron Ten

KARASAKI (F) *

Subdiv 18

I-53

I-54

I-55

Subdiv 19

I-56

I-57

I-58

Subdiv 21

RO-33

RO-34

TOTAL: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.

*NOTE: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.

[8]

CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

CV KAGA, Flagship

Cardiv 1

AKAGI

KAGA (F)

Desdiv 7

OBORO (F)

USHIO

AKEBONO

AKATSUKI

Cardiv 2

SORYU (F)

HIRYU

Desdiv 23

UZUKI

KIKUTSUKI

MIKATSUKI

YUZUKI

CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)—Continued

<i>Cardiv 3</i>	RYUJO (F)	<i>Cardiv 4—Continued</i>
	HOSHO	<i>Desdiv 3</i>
<i>Desdiv 17</i>	ISOKAZE	HOKAZE
	URAKAZE	SHIOKAZE
	HAMAKAZE	NAMIKAZE
<i>Cardiv 4</i>	ZUIKAKU	<i>Cardiv</i>
	SHOKANU	CV KORYU
		CV KASUGA (MARU)

TOTAL: 10 CV, 16 DD.

[9] COMBINED AIR FORCE

Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS	SHORE-BASED GROUPS
<i>Air Ron 6</i>	5th Air Group
KAMIKAWA MARU (F)	10th Air Group
FUJIKAWA MARU	11th Air Group
KENJO MARU	12th Air Group
(Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)	14th Air Group
	16th Air Group
<i>Air Ron 7</i>	17th Air Group
CHITOSE (F)	18th Air Group
CHIYODA	19th Air Group
MIZUHO	23rd Air Group
(Has been working with the 1st Fleet)	Chichijima
	Chinkai
<i>Air Ron 24</i>	Genzan
KAMOJ (F)	Hyakurihara (or Moriibara)
1 XAV	Iwakuni
Yokohama Air Group	Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Chitose Air Group	Kashima
(Has been working with the 4th Fleet)	Kasumigaura
	Sasebo
<i>Patrol Squadron 2</i>	Kisarazu
NOTORO	Kure
(Formerly with Air Ron 6)	Maizuru
	Oita
	Ominato
	Omura
	Saeki
	Suzuka
	Takao
	Tateyama
	Tsukuba
	Usa
	Yatabe
	Yokosuka

Total: 5 AV, 3 XAV, 35 Air Groups.

[10] TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SHIRETOKO	ONDO	AKASHI
SATA	HAYATOMO	MUROTO
TSURUMI	NARUTO	OTOMARU
SHIRIYA	MAMIYA	SETTSU
IRO	ASAHI	

Total: 8 AO, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.

[11]

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi—Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

ASUGA KURI
 TSUGA HASU
Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai
Nanking Base Force
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking

TOTAL: 1 OCA, 1 PG, 3 DD.

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KOMATSU, Teruhisa—Vice Admiral
 UJI, Flagship

Partol Division 11

ATAKA ATAMI
 SETA FUTAMI
 KATADA FUSHIMI
 HIRA SUMIDA
 HOZU HASHIDATE
 TOBA

Air Group 10

Hankow Base Force

Kiukiang Base Force

Gunboat Division ? ?

SHINFUKU MARU (F)
 HITONOSE
 CHIKUBU

TOTAL: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral

ISUZU, Flagship

Crudiv 15

ISUZU (F)
 ASHIGARA

Patrol Division 14

SAGA
 AM-17
 AM-18

TOTAL: 1 OCA, 1DD, 8.TB, 1 AP.

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET—Continued

Torpedo Boat Division 1

OTORI
 HAYABUSA
 HIYODORI
 KASASAGI

Guard Division 15

Guard Division 16

Canton Base Force

Amoy Base Force

Hainan Is. Base Force

13 Special Service Ships

TOTAL: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG,
 2 AM, 13 Misc.

[12]

NORTH CHINA FLEET, OR THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

SUGIYAMA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
 IWATE, Flagship

Patrol Division 12

IWATE (F)
 MANRI MARU

Torpedo Boat Division 11

HATO KARI
 SAGI KIJI

Torpedo Boat Division 21

CHIDORI
 MANAZURU
 TOMOZURU
 HATSUKARI
 KARUKAYA

Gunboat Division 1

Gunboat Division 2

Gunboat Division 13

Gunboat Division 14

Tsingtao Base Force

SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KASHII (F) (CL)
 SHIMUSHU (CM)
 AP

[13] (B JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS)

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandate Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in

conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ—YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

[14] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers, and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARI-TARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency basis or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

<i>Identification</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Includes</i>
Airron 24	Marshall Area	(AV) KAMOI (AV?) ----- Maru ex-CHITOSE Air Group ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group	PALAO Area	
16th Air Group	PALAO Area	
17th Air Group	TRUK	
18th Air Group	SAIPAN	
19th Air Group	IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	WOTJE	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	KWAJALEIN	
? AIR GROUP	TRUK	

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes.

(Table A, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, consisting of pages 1 and 2 reflecting the distribution of Japanese material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 108 and 109, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

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(At this point in Exhibit No. 21 there appear two sketch maps of Palao Islands and of Malakal Harbor and approaches. These maps will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 110 and 111, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. *Aviation Facilities*—Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imleji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. *Headquarters*—Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bitumen and powdered coral roads.

3. *Radio towers*—Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. *Shore Batteries*—Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

Mobile Batteries—Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. *Government Pier*—600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. *Mole*—150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner of JABOR (1933).

7. *Conspicuous red building* (may be red-roofed building) (1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. *PIER* (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. *Two buildings* (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?—small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings (1936).

(The sketch of Jaluit, to which the foregoing notes apply, will be found reproduced as Item No. 112, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 22

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 October 1941

D F Bearings—

30 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions—

FUI 5 (M)	Communication—	Sama (SASI 4) to Takao (FUWI 4)
KURU 8 (M)	do	—Ponape (RESU 0) to Truk (YUMI 0)
WINI 5 (M)	do	—Sama (SASI 4) to MENU 3 (Maru)
KONA 9 (M)	34.7	139.5
SIKA 4 (M)	14.1	156.6
TEE 5 (M)	21.2	141.5
TEFU 0 (M)	17.1	136.2
MESU 4 (M)	19.0	144.2
YOHA 6 (M)	08.8	165.0
SUWI 4 (M)	11.3	139.3
SAYU 5 (M)	14.3	162.0

OCTOBER 15, 1941.

Vessels in Mandates October 14-15

Call	Type	Location
E ME 5.	M under CNO	In Mandates
EKO 0.	Sub Div in 4th Flt.	In Mandates
HAKI 3.	Maru.	In Mandates (Comdr MINO 2 onboard)
HI I 5.	DesRon in 4th Flt.	In Mandates
HIKO 9.	Maru.	Jaluit—Chichijima area?
HOME 1.	Maru.	In Mandates
FUNE 9.	Maru.	In Mandates
I KI 3.	In 4th Flt.	In Mandates
KARI 3.	Maru.	In Mandates
KA O 7.	Maru.	In Mandates
KERO 8.	KATSURIKI	In Mandates
KENO 2.	KOSHU	In radio company with RIYU 6 who contacts RDO YOKOSUKA
KINI 5.	Maru.	Posit—163-29, 11-34N
KONA 9.	Maru.	“ 139-31, 34-45
KAMA 6.	Maru.	In Mandates
KURU 8.	Maru.	(14th) Between Ponape (going to) Truk.
MESA 0.	Maru.	Posit—157-47, 07-58
MENE 5.	TAMA, 4th Flt.	In Mandates
MESU 4.	Maru.	Enroute Saipan ? 144-11, 19-00
MENA 6.	Maru.	In Mandates
MINO 2.	Minesweep Div, 4th Flt.	In Mandates
MITA 5.	Air Tender, 4th Flt.	Not in Jaluit area (wherc generally).
MURU 3.	Maru.	Posit—164-47, 09-40
MUTU 1.	Des Div in 4th Flt.	In Mandates
NAU 5.	Maru.	In Mandates
NINO 058.	CofS., 4th Flt.	In Truk area.
NOSA 2.	Maru.	Jaluit area.
NURO 4.	JINGEI, 4th Flt/	In Mandates
O SO 8.	SubRon, 4th Flt.	In Mandates
O YO 8.	KAMO I, 4th Flt.	In Mandates.
RARU 5.	Maru	In Mandates (Call doubtful)
RASE 0.	Maru.	In Mandates
RATU 5.	Maru.	In Mandates
RIRO 5.	Maru.	In Mandates
RISI 6.	Maru, Air Tender, CAF	In Mandates
RISA 2.	HAYATOMO, 4th Flt.	In Mandates
RIYU 6.	MUROTO, 4th Flt.	In Mandates
SAYU 5.	Maru.	Yokosuka to Truk or Ponape, 162-00 14-30
SEKA 4.	MARU	Saipan to Jaluit, 153-36, 1406
SEWA 4.	Maru.	In Mandates
SETO 1.	Maru.	In Mandates
SUWI 4.	Maru.	Near Yap, 139-18 11-16
SOYO 9.	4th Flt.	In Mandates
TE E 5.	Maru.	Posit—141-32 21-09
TEFU 7.	Flt Unit, 4th Flt.	In Mandates.
TEFU 2.	Unidentified.	In Truk area.
TEFU 0.	Maru.	Posit—136-13 17-05
TOHI 1.	KOMOBASHI	Jaluit area.
TOWA 2.	4th Flt Vessel	In Mandates.
TOYA 3.	“ “	In Mandates.
TUHO 33.	“ “	In Jaluit—Chichijima area.
TUYU 00.	CinC 4th Flt.	In Mandates.
WINI 5.	Maru.	Hainan to MENU 3 (In Mandates)?
YAYI 6.	Maru.	In Mandates.
YOHA 6.	Maru.	Posit—164-58 08-47.
YOKU 5.	SHIRETOKO	In Mandates.
YUHO 8.	Maru.	Saipan area.
YUMO 3.	Maru.	In Mandates.
MOTO 6.	Maru.	Japan or outside Mandates.
SEWI 7.	Maru.	In Yokosuka zone—may be going Mandates.

Communication intelligence summary, 15 October 1941

General.—Traffic above normal. Several more new radio calls representing shore stations and Naval auxiliaries appeared lately. Bureau of Personnel traffic again reached a high peak. Many general despatches (addressed to “all hands” or large collective addresses) appeared. It is worthy of note to list the radio stations called by Radio TOKYO to deliver general despatches originated by Tokio Personnel, Tokio Naval Minister, Tokio Communication and Tokio Bureau Military Affairs.

Radio Yokosuka	and	Flagships S. China Fleets
Radio Kure	“ “	1st Fleet
Radio Sasebo	“ “	2nd Fleet
Radio Maizuru	“ “	3rd Fleet

Radio Ominato	“ “	4th Fleet
Radio Takao	“ “	Subforce
Radio Shanghai	“ “	CarDivs.
Radio Saipan	“ “	Combined Fleet.
Radio Palao		
Radio Kanoya		
Radio Spratley Island		

Tokyo Communications also originated a despatch addressed to “all hands” information to a Naval auxiliary (SITU 1) indicating possible future operations of this vessel. A large number of vessels appear to be in Saseho area. However, the Commander First Base Force, Third Fleet at Saseho addressed units of his command at Kure and Yokosuka. Some maneuvering traffic observed on 7024 (using 3 kano calls) and 5897 kcs.

First and Second Fleets.—2nd Fleet units observed at Kure. A New Naval auxiliary (NIHA 8) reported to the 1st Fleet Secretary. Relatively little activity among 1st and 2nd Fleet vessels indicated in radio traffic. A vessel identified as YAMASHIRO (BB) originated one despatch to the KOMOBASHI in Jaluit Area.

Submarines.—Continued activity on submarine frequency (6385) by vessels using secret calls. DF bearings indicate they are approximately in the Chichijima Yokosuka-Kagoshima area.

Air Activities.—Kaga continues as flagship of Cardivs. The SHOKAKU and Commander of the Cardiv are in the NAHA-Takao area. Also it is believed one of the large airons in Combined Air Force (TOME 2) is also in same vicinity and that Commander Cardiv 3 (NUYA 88) and the HOSHO are connected with these vessels in some maneuver going on or planned as all were associated in despatch headings. Indications are that two or three large groups of Combined Air Force are in the Genzan-Chinkai Area. (YUMO 8, YOME 7, MOO 0?). Ashigara originated despatch to 11th Air Base which was forwarded to Maizuru for delivery.

Fourth Fleet.—Traffic above normal. Many new calls observed, some of which are undoubtedly garbled.

Fifth Fleet?—The new fleet or force which has been mentioned at various times in the past (NARE (6) appeared in despatch headings frequently today. The call was associated with 4th fleet units and some Naval auxiliaries which appear to be new or newly commissioned. One despatch originated by Communication Officer 5th Fleet was addressed for action to the 5th Fleet, a new fleet unit in parenthesis (TOYU 5) and for information to Radio Takao, Tokyo, Saipan, Palao, Truk, Jaluit and to Communication Officers 2nd, 4th Fleets, Sub-Force, Cardivs and Combined Air Force.

D F Bearings.—27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions.—NESU 5 (M) Comm-Kure #4 SLF (SIKA 8) to Shanghai (KAMO 0)

YOKE 7 (M)	06.4	155.1
KIMO 5 (KASHI)	20.9	112.0
KENO 2 (KOSHU ?)		

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

General.—Average amount of traffic intercepted, with complete absence of “dummy” traffic for the first time since early October. All forces active in originated and addressed traffic except South China. A considerable number of WE addresses appeared, usually associated with air activities. One broke as “Chinkai Defense Force” indicating newly organized activity at that location. Ominato transmitted a despatch with three WE addresses, which broke as Chief A Area, Chief B Area and Chief C Area. Stations addressed in this despatch fit the call table line designated tentatively as “Temporary Shore” or “Advanced Base” stations, which were most commonly associated with the South China activities up to and including the Indo China campaign. Stations fitting this classification are increasing in the Chinkai-Chosen area, one unidentified unit (TAWI 7) which was formerly connected with So China Forces, has reappeared in the Chosen area, with line of bearing from Oahu D/F passing thru the Rashin, Seisin area. Units of 12th Air Corps are apparently embarked on two unidentified Marus and probably proceeding to join the 12 A. C. Commander at Genzan Air.

Combined Fleet.—CinC Combined, possibly back on NAGATO, appears to be acting as radio guard for an increasing number of units from 1st. 2nd. Carriers.

and Subfor. The tentatively identified 5th Fleet appeared as action and information addressee in several despatches concerning addressees in the Mandates, Chichijima, and major force commanders. The 2nd Fleet was a heavier originator with traffic addressed to major units of the Combined. No indication of change of location of 1st or 2nd fleets. Third fleet continued actively originating and receiving traffic from Sasebo area. Flagship of #2 Base Force, 3rd Fleet, with commander aboard at Sasebo.

Carriers.—Active in exchange of traffic as yesterday. No indicated change of location. Planes from Kasanohara Air are operating aboard or with the HIRYU. Commander Carriers still aboard KAGA in area between Sasebo and Taiwan. AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka.

Air Force.—Chitose Air enroute to Mandates, probably to Marshall area, with Yokohama Air at or near Truk. Indications that Yokosuka Air is, or will be, moving to the Mandates, possibly to the Palau area.

Sub Force.—Same activity on Subfor frequencies as previously reported, bearings remaining the same.

China.—Activity appears confined Takao, and North China areas, with Shanghai continuing normal. A despatch addressed to China Fleet collective exempted the North China Force from delivery, thus placing N. China Force as part of CINC CHINA FLEET (on Idzumo) Command.

Miscellaneous.—Many new calls appearing, including MARUS, which have been very recently taken over, as they are not equipped with call books and use WE addresses for activities which have assigned calls. One new unit apparently containing both Marus and Combatan vessels appeared today without indication of which Force he is attached.

D F Bearings.—31 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions.—

KINE 9 (?) Comm. KURE RETI 3 to YOKOSUKA HOMI 3.

ERO 6 (?) Comm. Takao FUWI 4 to Bako NOTI 7.

YUKO 9 (?) Comm. Canton RUYO 6 to Bako NOTI 7.

MURU 3 (M) Comm. Remain with Ponape and establish with Truk RESU
ø to YUMI ø

MISE 5 (Fleet Unit)—Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to KINU 7 (Maru)

KARO 9 (ERIMO)—Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to Kure RETI 3

NIRI ø (M) Comm. Yokosuka HOMI 3 to Saipan OSI ø

RETI 5 (M) Comm. Remain with Shanghai (KAMO/ø) establish with
SIKA 8.

KUNA 1 (M) 10.7 166.7

TEFU ø (M) 23.0 137.4

TIWI 1 (M) 28.5 140.9

JAPANESE NAVY—OCT 16TH

1st. Fleet:

BB's believed in INLAND SEA-SASEBO area.

AIRON 7 and a CARDIV in NAHA-TAKAO area.

KONGO and HIYE had busy traffic with SAEKI AIR.

2nd. Fleet:

Some units are definitely at KURE.

3rd. Fleet:

Concentrated with few exceptions in general SASEBO area.

ASHIGARA is mentioned in 3rd. Fleet traffic with major units of that Fleet.

CHOGEI (Flag of NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE) appears with NAGARA (3rd. Fleet Flag).

4th. Fleet:

Definitely in TRUK area. Large air concentration in the MARSHALLS.

5th. Fleet:

Still in process of organizing. CHICHIJIMA RADIO, 4th FLEET and CINC COMBINED are interested parties in traffic which includes this hypothetical fleet.

SUBMARINES:

Many units definitely in KURE area. Perhaps a dozen are operating in exercises in the general CHICHIJIMA-YOKOSUKA area. With a few as far south as the MANDATES.

From one indication it appears that COMSUBFORCE is at SASEBO.

Air:

A large part of COMBINED AIR FORCE appears to be in CHINKAI-SASEBO-GENZAN area. One section of CAF operating with a CARDIV of 1st. FLEET in TAKAO area. CARRIER LOCATIONS: AKAGI and ZUIKAKU in YOKOSUKA area. KORYU at KURE. KAGA at SASEBO.

General:

Several fleet auxiliaries (tankers etc.) appear to be in SASEBO area. KASHII near SAIGON. ISUZU (Acting Flag South China) in HAINAN-SOUTH CHINA area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 October, 1941

General.—Traffic volume about normal. (Traffic flow now being analyzed by statistical machinery and normals are established for all major and secondary stations). Dummy traffic again absent from TOKYO—Fleet broadcast. Spratley Islands radio sent a message to TAKAO. This message must have been relayed to TOKYO because TOKYO repeated the message under a priority procedure sign to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Comcardiv 4 (SUTU 7) ESARO (believed to be their Radio Intelligence unit) BAKO, Chief of Staff South China Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Forces, RNO TAIHOKU, Commander 11th Air Corps and Chief of Staff of South China Air Forces. It seems that the Spratley report caused considerable excitement. The resignation of the Cabinet was reported to the fleet by plain language today.

Combined Fleet.—The impressions grow that there is underway a concentration of units upon the Combined Fleet Flagships. Subrons 5 and 6 appear with him today.

The following is what is believed to be the circumstances surrounding the relief of the Combined Fleet Flags. On September 23 the MUTSU was in Kure Navy Yard. On September 27th or 28th she joined the Second Fleet. On October 1 CinC 2nd Fleet relieved as CinC Combined Fleet and hoisted Flag in MUTSU. He was active today in addressing messages to general calls. The CinC Second Fleet also originated many dispatches. One message, originated on the 14th of October was repeated again today. It was addressed as follows:

2nd Fleet Collective
 3rd Fleet Collective
 Combined Air Force
 Subron 5
 Subron 6
 Airron 7
 BatDiv 3
 Information to
 Comcardivs.
 C in C Combined Fleet
 Radio Takao
 Radio Palao
 Radio Tokyo.

South China.—Traffic to this area with special reference to TAKAO was higher today than usual. The movement of the ZUIKAKU to Taiwan as reported by Com. 16 today is only partially confirmed here. A call (SIHA 5) identified here as the SHOKAKU of Cardiv 4 appeared today in care of the Combined Air Force at TAKAO and was routed to that station for delivery. No indication of any other units in her company. Direction Finder bearings place some Carriers together in the area east of TAIWAN and south of KYUSHU. These units could and probably will establish radio Communication with TAKAO. While they may move to TAKAO it is expected that they will not but will remain in the area east of TAIWAN. Some slight indications exist that the Flagship of the Combined Fleet is with these carriers but is not confirmed.

Submarines.—KATORI and submarines are still in area southward and east of KYUSHU.

Fourth Fleet.—Very little fourth Fleet activity.

D/J Bearings.—38 Naval auxiliaries in Mandates including:

HAKI 3	07. 5 N	165 E
KENO 2	26	153
KERO 8	18	155
MESU 4	18	148. 5
MEMU 7	06	170. 5
NIRI 0	30. 5	134. 5
NOTA 4	05. 5	165
OYO 8	05. 5	164. 5
ORU 6	11. 5	163. 5
TEE 5	16. 5	140
TOHI 1	12. 5	165
KIME 3	08.	154

Positions.—

NORU 6	11. 5 N	102. 0 E
TIWI 1	24. 7 N	142. 4 E
TUU 5	33. 2 N	142-3 E
MAO 5	16. 2 N	144. 4 E
YOHA 6	3. 5 N	160. 4 E
SEWI 7	32. 3 N	140. 9 E
MURU 3	TRUK to SAIPAN	CZ
OMI MARU	18. 8 N	145. 1 E
SINI 2	22. 0 N	116. 0 E
FURI 6	26. 7 N	123. 3 E
KUSU 9	Estab. Comm. with YOKOSUKA.	
TIKA 9	AMOY to TAKAO.	CZ
RIRO 5	19. 8 N	159. 4 E
KURU 8	Saipan to Chiehijima.	CZ
YOHA 6	Jaluit to Saipan.	CZ

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume about normal. Traffic consisted largely of administrative traffic. There was one WIWI message from TOKYO to CinC Combined Fleet for information of CinC China Fleet, CinC South China Fleet and an unidentified unit in the French Indo China Force. Naval Communications TOKYO has originated several messages of general address. These may indicate a coming change of call or cipher systems. The Secretary to the Navy Minister sent out a plain language message announcing the appointment of Admiral Shimada Shigetaro in Tojo's Cabinet. This message was given a general distribution as is usual with messages of this character but also included was "ZAIGAITAIKOUS-~~IKANTUKIBUKAN~~". While it is understood that the Attache to Thailand would be interested, yet the inclusion of him as an addressee on an otherwise strictly naval despatch will make it appear that there was some sort of a military tie-up between Japan and Thailand. Another plain language despatch from the Secretary China Fleet to INOUE, Head of the Military Mens Association, thanks him for message to newly appointed Commander in Chief of the China Seas Fleet. This is the first intelligence of the relief of the China Command.

Combined Fleet.—No information received today to check location of First Fleet The flagship is still acting as guard for units previously reported as being in company. One Cardiv (UYU 3) had its traffic accepted by the MUTSU today. The CHITOSE also joined the flagship. Desron 3 is in SASEHO area. HAGURO is in KURE area. 2nd Fleet traffic is being routed thru KURE.

Third Fleet.—Still in SASEHO area, little activity except for the Commander 2nd Base Force who addressed several MARUS of his unit.

Fourth Fleet.—Mandates traffic largely concerns air activities. The impression is that there is a considerable amount of air movement between the Mandates and the Empire. CHITOSE air is very active in the MARSHALS. KATSURIKI is at JALUIT.

Submarines.—The Chief of Staff of SubForce is receiving his traffic via SASEHO. There were fewer submarine calls on tactical circuits than for the past few days. It is believed that all submarines are nearing SASEHO.

Carriers.—AKAGI and SORYU are at Yokosuka. From traffic it appears that SORYU is finished with whatever she was doing at SASEHO and is about to join her division which is in company with CinC Combined. Cardiv 4 is definitely in TAKAO area.

China.—Little activity save for the Spratley Islands Radio Station which originated several messages today.

D/F Bearings.—None.

Positions.—

SIHI 2	22.0 N	115.0 E
TUYA 2	From RETI 3 to SUKA 2 C. Z.	
HIRE 4	20.4 N	114.4 E
YOHA 6	15.7 N	158.4 E
TIWI 1	21.7 N	145.2 E
RUTI 2	22.8 N	146.1 E
NOSA 2	11.6 N	169.0 E
TEFU Ø	Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3)	
TIWI 1	18.7 N	145.2 E
TUU 5	29.1 N	147.1 E

Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume below normal. Less traffic was copied at Heeia due to poor receiving conditions but since there were numerous dummy messages among those intercepted, the traffic volume is considered below the daily average attained in the last two months. There has been a perceptible increase in the use of secret (or tactical) calls and addresses with not only drill and maneuvering traffic but in administrative despatches as well. Today's traffic included some maneuvering type (4 kana nigori) traffic with HE one and two letter calls being broadcasted by Tokyo Radio to presumably submarine units. Kanoya Air was also employing tactical calls on 8915 kcs with a call 1 MIA. Tokyo Radio in delivering an "all hands" despatch called all Major Fleet Flagships less the call identified as FIFTH FLEET. Tokyo Radio originated one despatch for action to Radio Sasebo, Kure, Takao, Maizuru, Chichijima, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Jaluit, FUMU 44 (may be new Chinkai Station), Ominato, TAU 77, KUMO 66, Indo-China and "HOROMUSIRO Air Corps Base. This list just above covers all outlying stations. KUMO 66 is believed to be Shanghai and TAU 77 definitely is in the far North (Kuriles). The WE addresses included the No. 2 and No. 61 Air Corps Commanders associated with Kanoya Air.

First & Second Fleets.—Very little activity among 1st Fleet Units as far as traffic is concerned. Some traffic for second Fleet units was handled by Kure Radio. Combined Fleet Flagship was guard for Suzuya, Midzubo and SUBRON 5 among others. Combined Fleet frequency (6775kcs) was active with secret calls.

Submarines.—Radio Saipan accepted a despatch for SUBDIV 29 (UFU 11). While this one instance may represent a garble, it matches fairly well the past reports that some of the units using secret calls on 6385 kcs lately were submarines in the general Mandate area. Some of the Submarine service calls were associated in despatch headings with CARDIV and COMBINED AIR FORCE Units.

Air.—Continued indications that a large part of the Combined Air Force is spread from Takao area to Genzan. Shokaku ("C" calls him Zuikaku) definitely associated with this concentration in the Takao area with at least one additional unit SUYO 8 (probably DesDiv plane guards). Also RYUJO appears to be associated with same operation but may be as far North as the Sasebo area. Chinkai radio guard for a few additional fleet vessels associated with China Air activities formerly. AKAGI and SORYU definitely in Yokosuka area. All other Carriers appear to be in the general Sasebo area except for SHOKAKU.

Third Fleet.—Slight decrease in THIRD FLEET traffic observed.

Fourth Fleet & Mandates.—Very few 4th Fleet Units appear outside of Mandates. Bearings of the KOMABASHI place this unit between Ellice and Gilbert Islands but one bearing was labeled poor so that it is believed this vessel still in Jaluit vicinity. Thirteen new Naval auxiliaries reported by GUAM in Mandates; some of these verified by COM-14 reports.

<i>Positions</i> .—TUU 5 (M)	27.8	150.3
YOHA 6 (M)	18.0	155.7

Communication Intelligence Summary 20 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume far below normal. Receiving conditions good but traffic light on all circuits. In the early evening the major circuits were quite active but all traffic was cleared by midnight. The TOKYO broadcast carried a good percentage of dummy traffic. Maneuvering traffic intercepted on 13560

Kcs. and 8710 Kcs. That intercepted on 8710 Kcs. indicates that a tactical problem is being worked out. The traffic usually carries an EN in the heading, has an additional number at the beginning of the text, and all originator numbers are fairly close together. Numbers being in proximity indicate that all series were started at the same time, i. e. the beginning of the exercise. The secret calls used are mostly unidentified but MUTSU (9 HEFU), a submarine unit (3 TEI), and TOKYO RADIO (7 MARI) were among those heard. The type traffic which is believed to be Direction Finder or Radio Intelligence has been received from CHINKAI and an unidentified station in the CHOSEN or MAN-CHUKUO area. Other identified stations sending it are TAKAO (TAIWAN), JALUIT, and three other stations in the MANDATES. JALUIT sends these messages singly but CHINKAI combines several at a time in one transmission. The amount of this traffic is increasing.

Combined Fleet.—Little traffic concerning the First and Second Fleets seen. What traffic did appear was handled via KURE radio. A staff officer of the French Indo China Force is aboard NEGATO. JALUIT addressed a message to Commanding Officer, Batdiv 3.

Submarines.—The Staff Communication Officer of Subron 1 addressed a message to TRUK. The number of submarines operating with Combined Fleet is not known but is believed to comprise the greater part of the Submarine Force.

Air.—Air traffic in Mandates centers about CHITOSE AIR and Airron 24. No change in status of carriers as previously reported.

Mandates.—Except for air activities and civil engineering traffic, 4th Fleet and Mandates very quiet.

China.—No change in dispositions. The China Fleet Intelligence Bureau addressed one of their members at MACAO. The Commander of the French Indo China Forces originated several despatches to an unidentified unit which was addressed by TOKYO in a WIWI message two days ago.

D/F Bearings.—27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions.—

KINO 5 (KASA 11)	SAIGON—Base 217	
TUU 5 (M)	24. 7	153. 5
RUTI 2 (M)	15. 3	149. 0

Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 October, 1941

General.—Traffic volume returned to about normal today. There was no dummy messages in the TOKYO broadcast. Last night this TOKYO to Fleet Circuit was interfered with by station KTK (Mussel Rock, California, Globe Wireless). This interference also bothered the Japanese for TOKYO shifted his frequency down 10 Kcs. to avoid it. Statistical analysis of total navy traffic for period 15-19 October shows a close agreement with the normal established for the past 3 months. CinC Combined Fleet originated about 50% more traffic than normal and CinC 1st Fleet originated far less than his normal. These were the only variations noted. The major shore stations are not now experiencing as many difficulties as before in the routing of traffic, the whereabouts of all units being apparently better known. Sasebo radio today sent traffic identified as direction finder bearings. The stations now sending this traffic are CHINKAI, ORU 4 (in Manchuko), FUMU 4 (in Chosen ?), JALUIT and SASEBO. The amount of this traffic is still increasing. All High North Circuits checked but little activity.

Combined Fleet.—Little traffic concerning these fleets. The Commander in Chief appears as an addressee but did not originate much to his command. It is known that Subron 5 is in company with MUTSU but the flagship of Subron 5 (YURA) is in CHINKAI area. This leaves doubt as to the location of his command. If with him there MUTSU must also be in that area. The Second Fleet has been quiet for some time.

Third Fleet.—Apparently inactive in Sasebo area. Comairron 6 made a movement report to CinC 3rd Fleet. The Commander 1st Base Force is fairly active with his Marus.

Fourth Fleet.—Inactive in Truk area. SAIPAN was in communication with KAGOSHIMA Air and Commander Cardivs.

Fifth Fleet.—No indication yet of any attempt to organize and concentrate this vague unit. The Commander 5th Fleet sent a despatch to CinC Combined today.

Submarines.—Submarines tactical circuits heard today. A Staff Officer of

Commander Submarine Force addressed a message to the SubForce collective and for information to all major Fleet flags.

Air.—The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message as follows:

Action to: MINISTER OF NAVY.

CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

COMBINED AIRFORCE.

CINC COMBINED FLEET.

CARDIV 4 less HOSHO and ORU 4 (unidentified).

CARDIV 3.

Information to: CINC CHINA FLEET.

CINC SOUTH CHINA FLEET.

ALL MAJOR FLEET FLAGSHIPS.

It would appear from this message that whatever the combined Air Force intends to do will interest the China Fleet. It is apparent that he has all ready located parts of his command from TAIWAN northward at least as far as GENZAN. The fact that he has had Carriers added to his force (Carriers are not normally part of the Combined Air Force) indicates a large scale operation over a long distance.

D/F Bearings.—33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions.—

9 (M) Comm—Takao (FUWI 4) to SAMA (SASI 4)		
4 (M) Comm—Palao (MISE 8) to Yap (INE 6)		
8 (M) Comm—Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3)		
4 (M) Comm—Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)		
5 (M) Comm—Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)		
2 (M) Comm—Establish with Sasebo (KIMU 9)		
6 (M)	22.5	151.5
8 (Katsuriki)	10.0	169.0
2 (M)	12.8	150.5
6 (M)	27.5	124.2
7 (M)	22.7	149.0
7 (M)	16.3	147.5
2 (M)	19.2	159.9
6 (M)	24.3	122.1

Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 October 1941

General.—Larger volume of traffic intercepted than normal, with no "dummy" traffic appearing. The traffic was dominated by exchanges between Staff Communication Officers of all major forces, with highly significant increase in China and South China activities. UNI WIWI from a Tokio originator was addressed action to CinC Combined, info to CinC's Com. Air Force China, South China Air Command (at Sama, Hainan) KORYU (CV) plus Yokosuka and Bako addresses. The use of tactical (numeral two-kana) calls is increasing with despatches coming through on regular shore channels carrying NR and SMS of identified service calls. Air activities, afloat and ashore, in all areas, were heavy traffic originators, with greatest emphasis on the Whole mandate area, Takao-China-Hainan. 11 Marus yesterday and today were noted using the suffix denoting "C. O. Naval Detachment aboard" without definite indication of affiliations, though most appeared connected with the Takao-Hainan air movement.

Combined Fleet.—Most traffic from CinC Staff was from Staff Comm. Officer, with suffix "Secretary" second in volume. Many general address despatches were originated, embracing all areas in specific callups and leading to believe that a call change may be impending or that some communication change is scheduled. The D/F net collective appeared with most general address messages. No indication of movement of CinC from Kure-Sasebo area.

First Fleet.—Addressed frequently but little originated. No area change indicated.

Second Fleet.—Same as First.

Third Fleet.—Apparently still in Sasebo area.

Fourth Fleet.—Communications to and from CinC continue through TRUK. Originates several collectively addressed to 4th Fleet. NIKA WIWI (Special key URGENT) from Naval Intelligence Tokio addressed for action Ch. of St. 4th Fleet info Combined and Maizuru address. SUU UNA WIWI from MAYURU (Tokio) to Ch. of St. 4th, info all air and base forces in the Mandates.

Fifth Fleet.—This nebulous unit is very elusive. The tentatively identified Commander was exempted in a general address message and again appeared in the proper order between 4th Fleet and Subfor in an address. Delivery routing and guard stations have never been determined.

Submarines.—Some activity with tactical calls on Subfor frequencies as reported all October. No detectable change in operating areas previously reported.

Carriers.—Cardiv 4 addressed care Takao Radio and included with China and Hainan addresses, indicating probable operating area South of Taiwan. Cardiv 5 (UYU 3) with the Koryu and Zuikaku are operating with Yokosuka and Omura air stations. AKAGI and SORYU appear to be preparing to leave Yokosuka and resume operations. Carrier Comdr. still aboard KAGA in company HIRYU and traffic still appears through Sasebo routing.

Combined Air Force.—Air Force and communications most active in today's traffic. The reshuffling of air units which was underway in September and the first half of October is apparently completed and large scale operations in the Mandates, Chosen-Manchukuo, and Taiwan-Hainan-Amoy areas are in prospect or progressing. The Special Task Force or Southern Expeditionary Force of which the KASHII is Flagship is assuming considerable importance in despatch headings and is connected with the Combined Air Force and CARDIV 4 in forthcoming maneuvers or operations. A call tentatively identified as Spratley Island (NRE 9) is addressed in several general collective despatches originated by Tokyo Communication Division and Tokyo Plotting and DF Sections and is called directly from Tokyo for delivery, indicating probable DF activity in that area.

With nothing definite to point to, the impression grows that a large scale screening maneuver or operation, at least, is in progress, involving mainly air units in the Mandates, Takao-Hainan Indo-China area, the Kuriles, and Submarines Marcus and Chichijima to the Kuriles. Identification of Horomushiro as an Air Base the other day places air operations up to the Northern Kuriles.

D F Bearings.—33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

Positions.—

HONA 6 (M)	Communication—Chinkai (SUTI 5) to Tsingtao (UYO 5).
SAHO 2 (M)	Communication—sasebo (KIMU 9) to TIKU 0 (shore).
KIMO 5 (Kashii)	—Base 217—Saigon.
KENO 2 (Koshu?)	09.3 151.1.
KERO 8 (Katsuriki)	10.0 169.0.
HAO 7 (M)	13.5 149.4.
YOHA 6 (M)	25.0 148.7.
FURI 6 (M)	27.3 124.4.
SATE 0 (M)	23.1 148.3.
SEMI MARU	13.7 144.6.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 October 1941

General.—Traffic interception about normal volume with continuing absence of dummy traffic. The collective address communication messages continue, either presaging a call change or correcting communication publication to conform with organization changes. There was less exchange of traffic between Empire and Mandate areas due to confusion on the Orange circuits but it was indicated that the volume and character was similar to yesterday. Expansion of the China activity into the Indo-China area was indicated by increasing traffic to and from the Southern Expeditionary Force, in the Saigon area, with information addressees including all forces attached to China waters northward to Chinkai.

Fleet.—No changes in locations previously reported except that traffic routing places the tentative Fifth Fleet as at or near Yokosuka and traffic headings with information addressees may indicate that this force is charged with operations in the area from Chichijima northward. Tentatively, this would place task areas for various forces as below:

Combined, 1st, 2nd and Subforce nucleus plus some carriers Yokosuka to Sasebo.

3rd Fleet, Sasebo, Japan Sea, Maizuru.

4th Fleet, Marshalls to Palau to Chichijima.

5th Fleet, Chichijima to Kuriles (vague).

Southern Expeditionary Force (KASHII Flag) Indo China, South China Sea.

South China Force (ISUZU Flag) Hainan-Taiwan.

Combined Air with Carriers, Taiwan-Naha, Chichijima.

Fourth Fleet.—Cinc Truk area as before.

Significant despatches included six URGENTS plus several routines as below:
 UNI—Cinc CombFlt to Comdr. CombAirFor INFO: Cinc China, SoChina, Ch. NavGenSt, Tokyo, plus Yokosuka, Bako and Hainan addressees.

NIKA WIWI—Tokyo origin to CinC Combined, CinC 4th.

UNI—Cinc CombFlt to St. Comm. Officer CombAirFor *infor* St. Comm. Officers China Flt., SoChinaForce, SoChAirFor, Comm. Div. Tokyo, plus Sasebo and Bako addressees.

UNI—Chief of Staff China Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo. Retransmitted by Communication Division Tokyo for information to Staff Communication Officer, Combined Fleet.

Routine—Chief of Staff South China Force—same as above.

WIWI—Naval Intelligence Tokyo to Chief of Staff China Fleet information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, South China Force.

Routine—Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, and Maizuru address.

SUU WIWI—Chief Navy General Staff Tokyo to Staff Communication Officer Fourth Fleet.

Routine—Chief of Staff Submarine Force to Collective ALL FORCES COMBINED FLEET, Collective Submarine Force, information DF headquarters Tokyo and new station in South China sea area. (NRE Ø)

Routine—Long 3 part despatch from DF headquarters Tokyo to Collective ALL MAJOR FLAGSHIPS information Tokyo Tracking Section, Stations of DF Net.

Routine SUU—Short 5 numeral despatch from joint origin Bureau Military Affairs—Navy General Staff Tokyo to Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions, Combined Air Force, China Fleet, North China Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Force, Sasebo, Bako, Chinkai addresses—information—unidentified addresses plus collective shore. In this it is noted that CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE is omitted but the Southern Expeditionary Force is included. This is similar to operations in Indo-China occupation when the Third Fleet assumed major importance with CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE apparently subordinated.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume light due to very poor receiving conditions obtaining here. Heavy static and fading ruined reception on the night watches when most traffic is copied. The TOKYO broadcast carried no dummy traffic. The number of general messages emanating from Tokyo continues to be high. Most of these today came from the Communications activities of the Ministry. There were a few from the double originator, Navy Minister and Chief of the General Staff. Especially prominent today was the activity of the SUTU 7 and ESARO combination, thought by this Unit to be radio intelligence and direction finding activities. ESARO received frequent reports from Chinkai and ORU 4 (station in that area), JALUIT, and PALAO. He in turn originated messages to the CINC COMBINED and CINC SECOND AND was, more frequently than not, at least an information addressee in all messages between the major commanders. The interest in the South China Activities continues. There has been much traffic directed to the French Indo China Force, to HAINAN activities and to NREØ (identified as Spratley Islands but thought to be in vicinity of Camranh Bay). This particular wave of South China interest seems to date from the 15th of October when NREØ sent a dispatch to Takao which was then reported to all major commanders.

First Fleet.—Little activity by fleet units except as noted under Second Fleet. CinC Combined Fleet received a KIU from C. N. G. S. and from the Commander of Direction Finder Activities (SUTU 77). He sent one to a general collective call, SUTU 7 and NREO (Spratley? Camranh?).

Second Fleet.—After a long period of comparative inactivity the CinC Second Fleet today sent a message with the following heading:

Third Fleet (Collective) (Now in

Sasebo area)

Combined Air Force (Collective)

Second Fleet (Collective),

BatDiv Three,

Desron Three,

Information :

Palao Radio	French Indo China Force
NERO (Spratley ?, Camranh ?)	Subron Six
SUTU 77 (D/F)	Subron Five
Tokyo Radio	Takao Radio
ComsubFor	CinC Combined Fleet
	ComCarDiv Five

Attention is invited to the action addressees of this message. They have appeared separately in the traffic for weeks and are here grouped in one message a single commander. Secondly, the units named are not normally under the Command of the Second Fleet. The geographic area indicated is to the south (Palao, Takao, Spratley).

Third Fleet.—Same activity by Second Base Fleet but little traffic from this unit.

Fourth Fleet.—Comairron Twenty-four addressed a message to 6 Tokyo addressees and part of his unit at Yokohama Air Station, less the Chitose Air Corps. No other activity in Fourth Fleet.

Air.—The Communication Officer CarDivs sent a message with the following heading :

Com.Off. SubFor.
 " " Desron One.
 " " BatDiv Three.
 " " CruDiv 8.

Cardivs less *Cardiv 3*.

Information :

Tokyo Radio.
 SUTU 749.
 ComOff Combined Fleet.

The air activities of the Air Force and the Cardivs continues as previously reported.

Submarines.—Comsubfor addressed a message to Jaluit, Tokyo Radio and Communication Officer Carrier Divisions.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 October, 1941

General.—Traffic volume about normal. All circuits heard well except for the Yokosuka-Saipan circuit which was poor. At 0730 Tokyo radio began transmitting traffic with tactical calls, from that time until noon these calls were of the single and double KANA variety. At 1200 he worked apparently the same people but sent only the numeral kana hand variety. In all cases these messages began a new numbering series for each originator. The normal or administrative traffic continued on in the old series. The conclusion is drawn that these new number series while continuing the old indicator the beginning of tactics akin to a fleet problem with that traffic to form separate files. Activity of the direction Finder net was indicated by transmissions from the Chinkai and ORU 4 stations. None was received from the mandates Stations but this was due to the poor reception of the Saipan circuit. Tokyo Communication originated several more messages of general address. One NIKA WIVI was originated by Tokyo and sent to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions, Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Carrier Division Two.

First Fleet.—Little information relative this fleet but at sea in the Kyushu area. Practically the only traffic concerning it was in the tactical systems mentioned above.

Second Fleet.—No activity.

Third Fleet.—Commander Second Base Force originated a movement report which went for information to Maizuru. Bumil sent one to Chief of Staff Third Fleet for information of Commander First and Second Base Forces.

Fourth Fleet.—Air Squadron Twenty-fourth is still very active with Jaluit and Truk.

China.—Little activity. Spratley Island addressed a message to NRE0 (Camranh) for information of a First Fleet Unit, Saipan, Chichijima, Hainan and Takao. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force sent one to CinC Combined Fleet for information of all Combined Fleet Commanders.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 October, 1941

General.—Large amount of tactical call traffic intercepted on frequencies used for communication between Tokyo and Mandate Stations. Identifications of calls showed that Tokyo, Saipan, Palau, Truk, Jaluit and two or three unplaced shore calls handled the bulk of the traffic. Guards for all forces of the Combined Fleet were also present, using a large number of alternate calls and addresses. Analysis of the routing and handling of this type of traffic leads to the belief that the activity is largely concerned with a major communication drill or test, combined with possible maneuvers of the Fourth Fleet and air units in the Mandates. Control of the operation appears to rest with Tokyo Radio, who transmitted several high precedence-urgent despatches in abbreviated procedure on the UTU, calling collective Combined Fleet for delivery. The prefix "Jitsu" appeared occasionally, meaning that the despatch was bona fide, indicating that the bulk of the traffic was drill. This is reverse of the usual procedure of indicating the drill traffic by the prefix "Enshu" when normal traffic constitutes the bulk of the load. Possible active participation of the Fourth in maneuvers is indicated by exemption of this force in several messages under normal addresses and general collectives. Contradictory routing to tactical addresses previously identified as major force flagships and commanders and the lack of "jigs" and repeats tends to confirm the primary communication nature of the exercise. This may be preliminary to a major call change in the near future. Normal administrative traffic intercepted indicates that there has been no movement of major units into areas in which the tactical traffic would place them.

Combined Fleet.—Flags of Combined, First, Second and Submarine Force appear to still be located in the Kyushu area, with Air Force commander and Carrier Division Four in Takao. Preparations for an unidentified air command (YOME 7) to move from Taiwan to South China appear to be under way. It is believed that Carrier Division Three (NUYA 8) is proceeding to join Carrier Division Four to operate under Air Force Commander. One despatch heading indicates that the HOSHO may also be rejoining Carrier Division Four. Commanding Officers of the SORYU and KORYU were aboard the KAGA (Commander Carriers Flagship) yesterday. The AKAGI has left Yokosuka Navy Yard and will probably rejoin the KAGA. The Fifth Fleet is assuming a slightly more tangible form, with an additional alternate recovered and a movement report involving a new fleet unit with this force (?). Yokosuka continues to accept traffic addressed to Fifth Fleet.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume below normal attributed to weekend and possible non coverage. A few despatches in tactical systems using new types of calls observed; these were undoubtedly late deliveries of the previous day's heavy traffic in tactical communications. A survey of the past few days traffic and location sheets reveals the definite association of certain naval auxiliaries with several component parts of the Combined Fleet. Some of these naval auxiliaries are known to be tankers. Examples (1) Commanding Officer KYOKUTO Maru that made two or three fast tanker trips to California last spring is aboard the KAGA, (2) the NARUTO and another new auxiliary (YUMA θ) appeared at least twice with those first fleet units most likely to move.

First and Second Fleets.—COM-16 reports the majority of First and Second Fleets in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. Also that the YAMASHIRO is in Yokosuka while KONGO is in Maizuru. The units of the First Fleet that appear to be involved in movements, present or immediate future, include:

SENDAI—CL.

MIDZUHO—AV.

HYUGA—BB.

1 other BB—(WAFU θ) with HYUGA.

BatDiv 3—(Includes KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, HIYEI).

Desron 1 and 3.

Submarines.—COM-16 reports ComSubForce and large part of the Submarine Force in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. One important Submarine Squadron (NASU4) has appeared frequently associated with Cruiser Division 8 in the Second Fleet and Destroyer Squadron 1 in First Fleet. There is a slight indication that a part of Carrier Divisions and these forces will operate in the Mandates. Several despatches forwarded to ComSubForce and ComCarDivs have also in-

cluded JALUIT and TRUK Radio Stations. Additionally Tokio Radio originated a despatch to Communication Officer Cruiser Division 8 information to COMOFFS CAF, Second Fleet, BatDiv 3, CARDIVS and JALUIT Radio. While SubForce is exempted in this last despatch, there seems to be a tie-in between these forces and the Mandates.

Air.—The following units appear to comprise all air activities of Combined Fleet now operating in Takao-South China Area :

MOOØ—11th Air Corps.
 NTI4—CAF (Comdr., and COMOFF).
 OTO6—KANOYA Air Corps.
 REA2—SHIOGAMA Air Corps.
 SIHA5—ZUIKAKU.
 SUYOS—Plane guards for ZUIKAKO.
 TOME2—Large AIRON in CAF.
 YUHI7—KASUGA MARU (new Converted carrier)?

Also CarDiv 3, HOSHO, and RYUJO appear to be in Takao general area but not with the above forces.

Mandates.—A considerable concentration of air activities continues in the Mandates. One Mandate naval auxiliary YUHOS originated a despatch to a FUSAN (Korea) address. Fourth Fleet and Chitose Air Corps both appear at TRUK.

China.—North and South China appear relatively quiet if Takao is placed outside of this category.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 28 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with good reception on all circuits except Tokyo to Shanghai which was poor. The direction finder stations throughout the Mandates were active indicating an exercise of this net. The types of tactical traffic previously reported as being very heavy has now been reduced to very light. It is now apparent that such traffic was in the nature of a drill embracing the entire Communication System. A few tactical circuits heard, Carriers were heard on 9606 kes., Central China Forces on 4690 kcs. and the Direction Finder Net on 4955 kcs.

First Fleet.—No indication of movement of this fleet. Today a message addressed to Chief of Staff Second Fleet and Battleship Division One was sent to the Second Fleet for delivery. Another message originated by CinC. Combined Fleet was intercepted on Jaluit radio station frequency. This last message is discounted as being a communication error of some description. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is aboard the Combined Fleet Flagship today. It will be recalled that the Radio Officer of this force was aboard the Flagship several days ago.

Second Fleet.—No comment.

Third Fleet.—Except for some activity among units of the First Base Force, Third Fleet very quiet.

Fourth Fleet and Mandates.—Indications are growing stronger that the Fourth Fleet is preparing for operations. The CinC. Fourth Fleet has been originating considerable traffic for the past two days and this has been addressed to the Combined Fleet, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions and several Tokyo addressees. The Base Forces at Saipan, Jaluit, Truk and Imieji have become active in traffic. The air activity in the Marshals is increasing although there have been no reinforcements of the air units all ready there. Truk radio has been active in transmitting weather originated by stations at Mortlock, Ololo, Kwajalang, and one unidentified station. His frequent communication with Commander Carrier Divisions plus above weather may indicate coming augmentation of the air forces there.

Submarines.—Little activity.

China.—Tokyo originators are still addressing much traffic to Sama, Takao, Bako, Saigon and the South China Fleet. The latter made a movement report today but the movement is believed to be a local one.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 October 1941

General.—Less volume of intercepted traffic today. The heavy use of tactical calls and addresses on the Tokyo-Mandate Fleet general circuit which commenced on 25 October and was tagged as a communication test-drill, was completed early on the 28th. Use of tactical calls with maneuvering traffic on

various Fleet frequencies, with Combined, First, Second Fleet flagships and units of these Fleets participating continues and a revival of tactical traffic on submarine frequencies indicates that portions of these forces are at sea. Carriers were also heard working. The Third Fleet was especially prominent as an originator with code movement reports from Comdesron Five, Comairron Six, Number Two Base Force, First Defense Division of Third Fleet indicating preparations for some activity on the part of this force. The Fifth Fleet is daily assuming more tangible form and it is believed that it will shortly appear as an active unit of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet.—Continued operations with First, Second Fleet Units, AKAGI, SORYU and SHOKAKU apparently in same south Kyushu area. It is believed the Commander Submarine Force is also operating in the same area.

Third Fleet.—This unit apparently preparing to move from Sasebo area. The CinC Third Fleet is not aboard his usual flagship, NAGARA, today. Various Third Fleet units initiated movement reports as reported above under general notes.

Fourth Fleet.—Remains Truk area, with general air activity continuing throughout Mandate area but especially Siapan-Truk-Jaluit areas.

Submarine Force.—Jaluit Radio came up under tactical call on Submarine Force frequency working three previously unheard ships with D/F bearings running through the Marshalls.

China.—Carrier Divisions Three and Four continue association with Combined Air Force Commander in the Takao area, with HIKOI (Unidentified Sasebo Office) apparently having cognizance over forces in Taiwan, South China and Hainan areas, as well as the South Expeditionary Force in Indo China area.

It is still felt that the areas of operations of the various forces as outlined in the summary of 23 October is substantially correct.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 October 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little above normal. TOKYO Communication is continuing to originate messages for general distribution. This activity has covered a considerable period now and is, I believe, unprecedented. The subject matter is unknown because of the general address always involved. The only conclusions are that a major change in the communication system is imminent or that regular reports are being made to the Navy concerning communications. Very little tactical traffic intercepted. The High North circuits continue to be quiet. Base HO 4 heard calling HO 1 and exchanged signal strengths but no traffic sent. Jaluit, Saipan, and Truk heard working each other. Direction Finder activities quiet; Jaluit did not send in any bearings, Saipan sent two and Chinkai sent four.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity evidenced by either the 1st or 2nd Fleets. The CINC COMBINED Fleet was prominent as an addressee but originated very little traffic. The greater part of these Fleets appear to be in Kure area but CINC is indicated as being in Sasebo.

Third Fleet.—This Fleet very active in radio traffic. The Commander in Chief originated much traffic as did the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Base Forces. Yesterday the despatches seemed to be of the movement report variety while those today appear to be regarding organizations. Some typical headings are:

From: TIYA 77 (Comdr 1st Base Force)

To: CINC COMBINED FLEET

Chief of Naval General Staff

Info: All Major Unit Commanders (less 4th Fleet, French Indo-China Force, 1st Defense Division and COMAIRRON 6)

CINC THIRD FLEET sent one as follows:

Action: CINC COMBINED FLEET

Chief of Naval General Staff.

Info: MESA 1 (unidentified); All Major Commanders (less 4th Fleet); AIRRON 6; NITU 7 (A Division in 3rd Fleet); Defense Division 1; NAGARA; Comdr 2nd Base Force; Comdr 1st Base Force.

There has been no confirmation of movement of this Fleet by other means than traffic headings. Normal delivery of traffic via Sasebo continues. No confirmation by DF bearings. It is therefore believed that the movement is imminent. The directive is not evident but Cavite reports that the ASHIGARA has departed for South. BuMil is in active touch with Bako and the RNO Taihoku.

Fourth Fleet.—One despatch today addressed the Commander in Chief of the 4th Fleet in care of Naval Intelligence at Tokyo. For the past two days all 4th Fleet Traffic has been addressed to the Chief of Staff rather than the CINC. Most of the activity in this Fleet still centers about the 4th, 5th and 6th Defense Divisions. Today both Saipan and Truk sent messages to MOMU/Ø (a new Carrier identified here as KORYU). The association of the KORYU, SAIPAN, TRUK and YOKOSUKA Air Corps leads to the belief that KORYU and YOKOSUKA Air will move toward Saipan soon.

Submarines.—Nothing to report.

China.—The traffic load on the South China circuits has greatly increased. SAMA, HAINAN is quite prominent as an addressee and has originated far more traffic recently than for the past few months.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 31 October, 1941

General.—at 0000, 31 October, Japanese Navy service calls changed in all fleet and air units, as expected. Shore station calls and addresses remain unchanged. Insufficient data is at hand at time of writing to determine whether tactical calls in the fleet were also switched; however these shifted on 20 September and may carry over. Traffic intercepted on 31st about normal volume with continuation of general address messages from Communication Division Tokyo, Naval Ministry and China Fleet Intelligence. Increasing traffic involving the Fifth Fleet appeared, including communication officers of this force and of the Fourth, probably indicating early activity of the Fifth Fleet in connection with, or in areas adjacent to, the Fourth Fleet. Naval Ministry originated a despatch to CinCs Fourth, Fifth, Yokosuka addressee. Information to Saipan Base Force, Jaluit Base Force, Fifth Defense Force (at Saipan), Sixth Defense Force (at Wotje), unidentified activity associated with Fifth Fleet organization (NEO 6), and unidentified activity (SETA 6).

CinC Second to Second Fleet (collective Suffix 38), Batdiv 3, Subrons Five and Six, Desrons One and Three, Unidentified Maru, Second Fleet (Suffix 29). Information to Commanders Combined Fleet, Cardivs, Subfor, and movement offices at Tokyo, Kure, Yokosuka and Sasebo. Significance of this address is obscure, possibly indicating organization or movement.

Combined Fleet.—Bearings place combined flagship, First fleet flag, carriers and subfor units previous mentioned in the same general area Kure to south and southeast of Kyushu.

First Fleet.—Inactive as traffic originator.

Second Fleet.—No indication of area from traffic, but it is believed that some units of this force in connection BatDiv Three and units mentioned in the heading of the despatch quoted above are preparing to operate.

Third Fleet.—Continued movement reports from units and individual ships as noted past three days, but no direction indicated.

Fourth Fleet.—Flagship remains in Truk area. Activity among air units and shore based forces continues, with increasing emphasis on the Jaluit area. Jaluit exchanged communication officer despatches with Combined and Fourth Fleets. No D/F activity from this area was noted today.

Fifth Fleet.—As mentioned under general.

Submarine Force.—Exchange of despatches by communication officers of Commander Carriers and Submarine Force indicate arrangements being made for coordination of operations.

China.—Taiwan continues to be the center of Combined Air Force activity with communications between Air units concentrated in that area and bases in Palao and Truk areas in one direction and China, South China, Hainan and Indo China Southern Expeditionary Force on the other. Commanders Eleventh and Twelfth Air Corps, Shioyama Air, Takao area. This is a concentration of practically the same units which were together at Hankow Air during latter July and August. First Base Defense Force of the China Fleet (TIFU Ø) is included as an action addressee in practically all despatches originated by China force commanders, including China Fleet, North China Force, Central China, South China, South China Air Force, China Fleet Intelligence and South Expeditionary Force. Carrier Divisions Three and Four traffic still goes via Takao.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume is a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It

is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

Combined Fleet.—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

Carriers.—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

Submarines.—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

Third Fleet.—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

China.—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

Combined Fleet.—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

Third Fleet.—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RAT166 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

Air.—A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a

command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

Air.—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

Mandates.—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No Change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

Submarines.—No activity noted.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

Third Fleet.—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YAO2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOF ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the *specific call-up* on the Tokyo broadcast was *eliminated*. Formerly

Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a *single call* without regard to the *addressee of the message*. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the *address* and *originator* were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

Takao-Bako Area.—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.

Combined Fleet.—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

Mandates.—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November 1941

General.—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

Air.—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

Fleet.—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

— Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941

General.—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively

identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

Fleet.—Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, Cardiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

Air.—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include Cardiv Four, and possibly Cardiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

Combined Fleet.—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

Third Fleet.—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.

Fifth Fleet.—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

Air.—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

Combined Fleet.—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

Air.—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

Fifth Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Fourth Fleet.—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

China.—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIFI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIFI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIFI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIFI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

Combined Fleet.—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of

BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and *may* be in that area.

Third Fleet.—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASE FORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

Air.—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIR FORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

China.—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AINav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

Third Fleet.—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

Fourth Fleet.—No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

Submarines.—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

Air.—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U E 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to

D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.

Combined Fleet.—Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

Third Fleet.—Inactive.

Fourth Fleet.—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airon Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

Submarine Force.—Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

Air.—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airon (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.

2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

First and Second Fleets.—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kura area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four

Destroyer Squadron Seven
 Destroyer Squadron Three
 Battleship Division Three
 Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakui Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

Third Fleet.—Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area.

Fourth Fleet.—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC, Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

Fifth Fleet.—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

Submarines.—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet commands continues.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic have been found going into Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few vessels of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

Combined Fleet.—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

Fourth Fleet.—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

Air.—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

China.—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taihoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address

emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

Third Fleet.—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

Fourth Fleet.—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet.⁹ The Navy Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. Cinc. Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

Third Fleet.—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

Fourth Fleet.—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

Fifth Fleet.—Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

Combined Fleet.—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Eure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three)

TAE 1 (Airron 7)

KAME 5 (Airron 6)

YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5)

KENU 3 (Crudiv 7)

RESE 4 (Desron 3)

AKI 0 (Desron 4)

TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)

SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)

YOMO 9 (Desron 5)

REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)

KUNO 9 (Erimo)

MIMO 3 (Air Unit?)

TUE 7 (Unidentified)

ENO 7 (Unidentified)

AKU 8 (Air Unit)

KUSU 7 (Unidentified)

SATU 88 (Unidentified)

KUNI 88 (Unidentified)

OYU 9 (Unidentified)

KONA 0 (Unidentified)

MOTU 6 (Unidentified)

NETE 5 (Unidentified)

NSI 3 (Unidentified)

SUTE 1 (Unidentified)

YAYU 1 (Unidentified)

MARE 5 (Unidentified)

Plus 11 Marus.

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or at Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

Mandates and Fourth Fleet.—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron

of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI (at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

Third Fleet.—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN-BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

China.—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st,
 NIKA-WIWI 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expeditionary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information
 NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary
 Force Chief of Staff.
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern
 WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-
 KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship
 NIKA NWA 2, information Radio Tokyo and
 Second Fleet flagship.
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure,
 KIU Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RISI".

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?
 HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
 EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
 MUSE 5—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

Combined Fleet.—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio Has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

Air.—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

China.—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third, Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

Communication intelligence summary, 24 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

First and Second Fleets.—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

Third Fleet.—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet and Mandates.—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

Submarines.—Comparatively little activity.

China.—Comparatively quiet.

Carriers.—No definite indications of location.

Combined Air Force.—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

Communication Intelligence Summary 25 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC. Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

Air.—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

Communication Intelligence Summary 26 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AINavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

Combined Fleet.—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indica-

tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

Fifth Fleet.—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

Submarines.—As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

China.—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

Third Fleet.—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

Combined Fleet.—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

Third Fleet.—Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIEUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITSIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)

"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

These is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

Air.—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

Submarines.—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is

becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NREØ (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

Combined Fleet.—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CRUDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

Third Fleet.—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

Fourth Fleet.—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

South China.—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

Submarines.—Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two Alnavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

Combined Fleet.—The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor

denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE CF 2CV	DESRON TWO-1 CL-12DD
SUBRON FIVE CL+10SS	DESRON FOUR-1 CL-12DD
SUBRON SIX CL+4SM	THIRD FLEET
CRUDIV FIVE 3CA	FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE
CRUDIV SEVEN 4CA	

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Forces, CRUDIV Four and LUMIL-AFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number *Two* Base Force. Number *One* Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron *Two* and *Four*. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

Fourth Fleet.—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

Submarines.—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

South China.—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

Communication Intelligence Summary November 30, 1941.

General.—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with *AKAGI* and several *MARUS*. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIVI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

Combined Fleet.—The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces but also included *KONGO* and *HIYEI*, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON *Two*, *Four* and *Five*; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

Fourth Fleet.—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (STI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet

submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

South China.—BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief, China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941

General.—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

First Fleet.—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters.

Second Fleet.—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

Fifth Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Submarines.—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Flagship somewhere in this general area.

Carriers.—No change.

Combined Air Force.—No change.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941

General.—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons Five and Six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

First Fleet.—Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

Second Fleet.—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

Mandates.—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

Carriers.—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

Combined Air Force.—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sana. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes-

sages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

South China.—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

Communication intelligence summary, December 5, 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".

Combined Fleet.—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

Third Fleet.—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN, SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio, the RNO PALAO and the Commander Second Fleet.

South China.—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941

General.—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

Combined Fleet.—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

Fifth Fleet.—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

Submarines.—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

South China.—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 December 1941

Combined Fleet.—The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are believed to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as initiated by Second Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South East Asia or elsewhere.

First Fleet.—First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Divisions. Battle Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HIYE I and KIRISHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA and KONGO are probably with the or a #2 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likely that Striking Force #1 is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32 N Long. 164 W).

Second Fleet.—Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with Striking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief, Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force are under one command; also that Indo-China Force and South China Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination, probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China Coast and Indo-China.

Third Fleet.—Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this assumption.

Fourth Fleet.—Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of operations of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close connection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north; on the other hand Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar to Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the primary duties of a radio intelligence unit and is assumed to be headquarters in the "Field".

Fifth Fleet.—Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area continues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from the Fifth Fleet units. This fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka north to Ominato area shortly before war opened. The composition of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed to have very few so called fleet vessels. Probably as large percentage of fleet auxiliaries and converted air tenders?

Carriers.—#1 *Striking Force*, operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to comprise Carrier Division One—AKAGI (Flagship *Cardiv*)

KAEA
Carrier Division Two—HIRYU
SORYU

Carrier Division
Four (or Five) —SHOKAKU
ZUIKAKU

Cruiser Division Eight
Destroyer Squadron One
KIRISHIMA— —First Section BatDiv Three.
HIYEL.

By deduction #2 *Striking Force*, if such an organization exists, comprises Carrier Division Three—RYUJO
HOSHO

Carrier Division
Five (or four) —KORYU

and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three and RYUJO were definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war.

Submarines.—A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions.

China.—China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traffic intercepted at Heeia has not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all known circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the immediate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two days in the sector 295–300 true from Oahu; since most calls involved have been tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broadcasted from Takao Radio:

"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all hands (?).

"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men".

Combined Fleet.—No change.

First Fleet.—No indications of any change. The calls identified as First Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this.

Second and Third Fleets.—Appear to be "intact" in the Southeastern Asia area.

Fourth Fleets.—Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet, is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination.

Fifth Fleet.—No apparent change in the available information on this fleet. Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore stations.

Submarines.—Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area. From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength were lower than actual numbers.

Carriers.—Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship, AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received for the First Air Fleet during the period 7-10 December. To this office, the inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 December 1941

General.—Intercepted traffic volume lower than normal due to employment of receivers in search watch. The amount intercepted was however, indicative that the traffic volume for the Fleet was high, Jaluit and Saipan broadcast overloaded and the Yokosuka to Saipan was in continuous operation.

Local Operations.—Continuous search watch was maintained on all known Air and Submarine frequencies during the day. No air circuits heard. It was expected that after dark the submarines circuit 6385 kcs. would liven up but there was very little activity. Two bearings of submarines in this vicinity were obtained. HEHIYA was heard and a bearing of 050° True was obtained. HIMI was heard on 180.2° True. Other submarine calls were faintly heard and bearings were all to the westward.

First Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Second Fleet.—Together with Third Fleet in the Malay Area.

Fourth Fleet.—Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Mandates with most of the Fourth Fleet. He is believed to be in the Truk area but is maintaining close liaison with the Marshalls in which is stationed Air Squadron Twenty-four and KAMOI. Jaluit radio is handling all traffic for the Submarine Fleet which indicates this place as the base for the submarine operating in the Hawaiian area.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 December 1941

General.—No apparent change in traffic volume or high precedence traffic. No material change in fleet locations has been definitely established. However, it is apparent that several minor units have altered positions and, after combining several British conflicting reports, many units are more definitely located than heretofore.

Combined Fleet.—Singapore reported Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet at Sama Bay in Hainan. Both Corregidor and Pearl Harbor report the Supreme Commander today in the Chichijima-Mandate area. If it is assumed that there is a split in the command, which possibility was brought up recently by this office, then both British and our reports may be correct. Our evidence here points to Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet very closely associated with Mandate addresses and possibly in the general Saipan area.

First Fleet.—First fleet calls showed again after a period of obscurity. Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet originated one despatch to Chief of Staff, *First Air Fleet* (recently near Oahu); Chief of Staff, *First Fleet*; Yokosuka Air Group; Chichijima Air Group? Chief of Staff, Fifth Fleet; Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet? and other commands.

Second and Third Fleets.—There appears to be a difference of opinion as to locations of these forces. The only definite point of agreement between British and United States reports is that the entire Second and Third Fleets are in the Luzon-Singapore-Saigon triangle. The best estimate of locations is as follows:

Saigon-Malaya Area

CinC, Second Fleet (Singapore?)
 Second Fleet (Singapore area ?)
 First Fleet Units operating with
 Second Fleet: 2 BB of Batdiv 3
 (less sunk ship), Desron 3, 3 CL (flag-
 ship Subrons and Desron) (N. E.
 coast of Malaya)
 CinC. Southern Exp. Force (Saigon)
 Comdr. Combined Air Force (Saigon)
 CarDiv. 3—HOSHIO-RYUJO (Siam)
 Subrons Five and Six

In Philadelphia Area

CinC, Third Fleet
 Third Fleet
 Second Base Force of Third Fleet
 AKASHI (Repair Ship)
 Possibly Air outfits from Takao area.

Fourth Fleet.—There appears to be little change in location of Fourth Fleet—still in Truk-Saipan-Marshall area. Fourth Fleet addresses and First Air Fleet appeared together in several despatch headings. This is submitted as possible clue to the present disposition of the Striking Force against Oahu. Air Squadron Twenty-four normally in Marshalls and unidentified Fourth Fleet command (RATA9) also included in this same association.

Fifth Fleet.—Little change or information.

Submarines.—During the past twelve hours, there have been four to five single bearings of submarines in the Oahu area bearing 302 True to 49 True from Oahu Direction Finder Stations. Bearings were equally spread. One bearing of submarine unit from Dutch Harbor provided a possible fix in L. 30 N, 146 W. Additionally six bearings of submarine units were received from West Coast stations—these were also somewhat spread over North Pacific area. Since west coast stations are untrained to copy Japanese, no calls were given, consequently no fixes obtained. Evidence is conclusive that majority of submarine units in Eastern Pacific are widely spread in the Dutch Harbor-Oahu-San Diego area, perhaps several in immediate vicinity of Hawaiian Islands. Tokyo Radio came up on 17 Kcs. with a powerful broadcast on the 11th December. This is believed to be an additional safeguard for widespread submarine units communications as practically all addressees have been identified as submarine units. The best estimate from Direction Finder bearings of the of the number of submarines in the Northeast Pacific including the immediate Hawaiian area is 8 to 12 submarines. There appears to be a split in serial numbers of Submarine Force Commanders despatches. The assumption is that perhaps one serial series is for submarines in the Pacific and the other for Submarine units in the South Eastern Asia area. Commander Submarine Force is believed to continue in the Marshall area.

China.—Report received of part of South China Fleet in Jaluit area. This is not believed to be correct. From inconclusive evidence, China's depleted fleet and South China Fleets are still spread between Shanghai and Canton-Haian area.

The address "OKASHUDANSO.SATI" originated despatch to CinC. Second Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force using a four numeral code. The originator appears to be the OKA army division headquarters-location, except as to association addresses, not evident.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 December 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy with a great number of high precedence messages. Practically all traffic being handled by broadcast. Large parts of intercepted traffic addressed to submarine units but this is due to our concentration on submarine frequencies.

Combined Fleet.—Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet is still taking his traffic from Saipan. Tokyo gives some traffic for Combined Fleet units to Chichijima for delivery showing that some units are in that vicinity. In several dispatches the Commander-in-Chief, First Fleet was associated with Commander Striking Force, Commander First Air Fleet and Commander Submarine Fleet. Tokyo Intelligence addressed messages to this group of commands. The Commander of the Second and Third Fleets are still closely associated in the traffic. It is not possible to definitely separate them in areas as yet but it is still believed that Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet is concerned with operations in Malaya while Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet appears to be situated a little farther north, making him concerned in Philippine operations. Since the Second Base Force is associated with Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet it is probable that this unit is in the Philippine area.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander, Fourth Fleet is indicated at Truk or Saipan. He is not in the Marshalls. Air Squadron 24 and KAMOI in Marshalls with Air Squadron 24 basing on the northern-most ATOLL (radio call HII5) and is beyond a doubt the unit raiding Wake. Yokohama Air Corps has moved to a base established in the Gilberts.

Fifth Fleet.—Commander-in-Chief, Fifth Fleet in communication with OMI-NATO radio. He has a number of units with him as indicated by his radio activity on 4640 kcs. These units furnished the greater part of the radio activity last night. This force appears to be guarding the northern approach to Japan.

Submarines.—Little submarine activity last night. Some traffic heard on 6385 kcs. but no bearings outside of the 250-300 sector obtained. One unit (GR1) fixed

by Direction Finder bearings from Dutch Harbor and Oahu. At a position just N. E. of Wake Island. Commander Submarine Fleet at Jaluit and is continually broadcasting.

Air.—The Commander, First Air Fleet has appeared in dispatches as mentioned above but no other carrier traffic found.

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 December 1941

General.—High traffic volume continues. An increase in tactical traffic over the past two days was evident in the Siam-Philippine area. Also radio activity was on the increase in the North China Area and the Yokosuka sector. Dispatch headings and radio activity on 5350 kcs. indicated a grouping of several Naval auxiliaries (MARU's) with a few fleet vessels. Only bearings on this group placed them in the Northern sector—Chinkai or Japan Sea area? To take one case, Chinkai Radio was very active on 6345 kcs. with about 16 units. All these indications point to reinforcements organizing or proceeding from the Japan area to other locations. In another area, a bearing of the Fourth Base Force Detachment at Greenwich Island (YOME6) showed 270 degrees which is 15 degrees above Greenwich Island, and associated traffic indicated this force was probably afloat in the Saipan area since several Naval Auxiliaries were included in the traffic. Another significant despatch heading which was repeated several times contained the action address "Communication Officers of Major Fleet units (or Forces) less Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, and First Air Fleet". These three organizations seem to be the ones on the "loose" at the present date.

Combined and First Fleet.—First Fleet showed a little in the dispatch headings. Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet appeared to be associated with Yokosuka Radio and the calls believed to represent Yokosuka Air, Tateyama Air, and Chichijima Air.

Second, Third Fleets, Combined Air Force.—No indications of any material changes in locations these fleets. Tactical traffic was particularly heavy among the major units operating the Siam-Philippine area. Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District reported an identity of Air Corps 22 which has figured prominently in the S. E. Asia sector. It is believed this group may be shore based in Hainan or Siam. Several air units showed at Takao which have been inconspicuous lately—Kanoya Air, Takao Air, Shiogama Air, and Staff Combined Air Force. This may or may not indicate change in dispositions due to the fact that the traffic routing through Takao Radio has never been clearly defined or understood.

Fourth Fleet.—The 17th Air Corps, Air Squadron 24, and possibly Kisaratsu Air was represented at a Marshall Island Station (HII5). This group was very busy with tactical traffic and apparently was operating, possibly in Wake area. Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet remains at Truk. Palao was not prominent.

Fifth Fleet.—No indication of locations or plans.

Submarines.—Traffic to submarine units particularly heavy. No bearings of submarine units in the Hawaiian area were obtained. Traffic to some submarine units are repeated several times indicating difficulties of communicating with distant locations. The tactical call ITO, which from Direction Finder bearings passed from west to east of Hawaii on the 12th, 13, appears to be a Submarine Squadron Commander. No bearings on ITO obtained since 13th.

Carriers.—Remarks on First Air Fleet contained in above. Only indication as to present location is the associations in traffic with three air activities in the general Yokosuka area.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 23

PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM OF 1 DECEMBER 1941

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 1, 1941.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M

From: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

To: Admiral.

Subject: ORANGE FLEET—Location of.

1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are *thought* to be located as listed below:—

Yokosuka Area

TAKAO (CA)-----	1 CA	
3rd Fleet HQ-----	?	
#1 Patrol Force-----	?	
AIR GROUP of 5th Fleet (Chichijima?)-----	36 planes ?	

Total—1 CA plus ? 36 planes.

Kure—Sasebo Area

CinC Combined Fleet

CinC First Fleet

BatDiv 1 & 2-----	6 BB ?	
Crudiv 6—may head for Mandates (?)-----	4 CA ?	
Desron 1-----	1 CL	

12 DD

<i>CinC 3rd Fleet in NAGARA</i> -----	1 CL	
+ CL-----	1 CL	
Desdiv 12 (?)-----	4 CL	

4 DD

<i>Cruiser Division EIGHT</i> -----	2 CA	
-------------------------------------	------	--

Total—6 BB—6 CA—1 CL—16 DD.

Shanghai Area

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO----- 1-OCA

Shanghai Base Force----- 1-PG

3-ODD

plus miscellaneous craft

#10 Air Group----- 36 planes (?)

Total—1 OCA—1 PG—3 ODD—36 planes, etc.

Bako—Takao Area

THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons----- 1 AS
6 SS (I)

Subron-5----- 1 CL

6 SS

Subron-6----- 1 CL

4 SM

Desron-5 less Desdiv 22----- 1 CL

8 DD

#2 Base Force----- 3 CM

5 XPG or XPC

17 AP or AK

Desron-4----- 1 CL

12 DD

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS—Continued

*Baco—Takao Area—Continued**Comdr. Combined Air Force*

5th Air Battalion (Army ?)	
11th Air Group.....	36 planes
Air Squadron 6.....	3 XAV
	30 planes
Air Squadron 7.....	3 AV
	48 planes
23rd Air Group.....	36 planes
“ Air Group.....	36 planes
“ Air Group.....	36 planes
“ Air Group.....	36 planes
Genzan Air Group.....	36 planes
Shiogama Air Group.....	36 planes
Kanoya Air Group.....	36 planes
Kasuga Maru.....	1 XCV
	36 planes

at

CinC 2nd Fleet with units enroute TAKAO

plus Crudiv-5.....	4 CA possibly 5 CA
Desron-2.....	1 CL
	16 DD
Cardiv-4.....	2 CV & 4 DD
Cardiv-3.....	2 CV & 3 DD
Batdiv-3 less HARUNA.....	3 BB (maybe 2 BB)

Total—3 BB—4 CV—7 CL—47 DD—4 SM—3 AV—4 XAV—4 CA—
3 CM—17 XAP—5 XPC—450 planes.

Hainan—Canton Area

CinC South China (in ISUZU).....	1 CL
CinC Sm Exp Force.....	1 CA
Crudiv-7.....	4 CA
Desron-3.....	1 CL
	15 DD
1st Base Force (?).....	3 CM
(part of this may be in Formosan waters).	12 AM's
	6 XPG
	12 PC
	27 AP

Total—5 CA—2 CL—15 DD—3 CM—12 AM's—6 XPG—12 PC—
27 AP.

French Indo China

CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI.....	1 CA
	1 CL
	1 CM
	9 Torpedo Boats
	? XPG

Total—1 CL—1 CM—9 Torp. Boats & Miscellaneous.

Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force are may be here (?)

OMURA AIR GROUP.....	36 planes	
12 Air Group {	Some may be on Hainan... {	36 planes (?)
13 Air Group {		36 planes (?)
14 Air Group {		36 planes (?)

*Mandate Area**PALAO*

16th Air Group.....	36 planes
3rd Base Force.....	10 XPG
	4 SS (Ro)

Total—36 planes—10 XPG—4 SS.

Truk

CinC 4th Fleet.....	1 CL
	2 OCL
	1 CL
	8 DD

LOCATION OF JAPANESE FLEET UNITS—Continued!

Mandate Area—Continued

4th Base Force----- 4 XPG
 4 XAP
 17th Air Group----- 4 XAM's
 36 planes

Total—36 planes—2 CL—2 OCL—8 DD—4 XPG—4 XAP—4 XAM.

Saipan

CinC Submarine Force----- 1 CL
 plus subs (?) 1 Suron (?)----- 1 AS
 7 SS
 Chitose Air Group----- 36 planes
 18th Air Group----- 36 planes
 5th Base Force----- 2CM
 8 XPG
 5 XAP

Total—78 planes—1 CL—1 AS—7 SS—2 CM—8 XPG—5 XAP.

Marshall Area

19th Air Group----- 36 planes
 Yokohama Air Group----- 36 planes
 Wotje Air Group----- 34 planes
 Kwajalein Air Group----- 24 planes
 Air Squadron 24----- 2 XAV
 KORYU (?) plus plane guards----- 20 planes
 1 CV
 4 DD
 Submarine Squadron 7----- 1 AS
 9 SS (Ro)
 Sudiv (?)----- 4 SS (I)
 Submarine Squadron 3----- 9 SS (I)
 6th Base Force----- 4 XAM's
 8 XPG
 3 PC
 KATSURIKI----- 1 AG (survey)

Total—140 planes—2 XAV—1 CV—4 DD—1 AS—22 SS—4 XAM—
 8 XPG—3 PG—3 PC—1 AG.

Respectfully,

E. T. LAYTON
 Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N.,
 Fleet Intelligence Officer.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 24

SEALED—SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992	Addressees	Message Precedence
R17R From: Chief of Naval Operations-----	Action: To CinCaf. CinCpac Com11. Com12. Com13. Com15.	Priority. Routine. Deferred.
Released by: Ingersoll----- Date: November 24, 1941-----	Info: Spenavo London. Cinclant.	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

242005CR0443.

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time GCT.
 [Hand written]: Cincaf Cinpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action spenavo London and Cinclant for infcox.

TEXT

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Aedes to inform senior Army Officers ^{their} ~~your~~ areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately

Copy to (WPD, War Dept.) and to OP-12 *but no other distribution.*

[Handwritten:] plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

NOTE.—Linetype and italics denote change.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 25

SEALED—SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone extension number: Op-12, Ext. 2992	Addressees	Message precedence
From: Chief of Naval Operation. Released by Date: November 27, 1941.	For action: CINCAF. CINCPAC.	Priority X. Routine. Deferred.
TOR Coderoom..... Decoded by..... Paraphrased by.....	Information: CINCLANT. SPENAVO.	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

GKVJL BVKLV 2723379921

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward Stabilization of Conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition ~~probably~~ against either the Philippines [Written: Thai] or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X

[Handwritten:] Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD War Dept.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 26

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BY PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 October 1941-2 December 1941

Confidential
Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: B3. Serial No. 82. Date: October 6, 1941

Anchored in a Bay near HAKODATE on 26 September:

7 SS
2 CL
2 CA

Underway headed South in Japan Sea night of 26th: 5 CA.

29th departed YOKOHAMA: 1 CL (NAKA) Class.

29th Located South of Hong Kong (CL) ISUZI & (DM) SHUMUSHU.

26th departed Shanghai (OCA): IZUMO.

26th departed Shanghai (PG): TOBA.

26th arrived CHEFOO: 1 TB.

Week ending 27th: Mouth Pearl River—

12 AP upstream.
14 AP downstream.

Serial No. 83

Air Groups are reported at: Takao, Hoilow, Taichu (?) and Kagi (?).

ASHIGARA is reported to have left Sasebo with probable destination South China.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 85. Date: 27 October 1941

Latest information of locations of units of Orange Fleet is:

Takao Area:

<i>CVs</i>	<i>AVs</i>
RYUJO	NOTORO
ZUIKAKU	KENJO MARU
unidentified	Maru Type
	Maru Type
	DD (Plane Guards)
	DD " "

Takao: Commander Combined Air Force

Inland Sea & Ariake Bay Area: FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCE

except:

Yokosuka: YAMASHIRO.

Maizuru: KONGO.

Kanoya-Eastern Kyushu Area:

CVs: AKAGI HIRYU
KAGA HOSHO
Unidentified
Unidentified
Unidentified

Sasebo Area: THIRD FLEET

(continued)

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 84. Date: 4 November, 1941

The following information is from a source which has been thoroughly reliable in the past:

From 1 Nov. the navigation through URAGA CHANNEL is restricted as follows. Seven fixed buoys are in the channel.

(1) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 136 degrees, 6050 meters (3.27 miles). Lighted painted black.

(2) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters (3.55 miles). Painted black.

(3) Lighted buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6700 meters (3.66 miles). Painted red.

(4) Flag buoy: From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 87 degrees, 6600 meters (3.61 miles).

(5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190(170?) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).

(6) Flag buoy: From KANNONSAKI LIGHT 88 degrees, 4900 meters (2.67 miles).

(7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).

NAVIGATION

Sail to the east of lighted buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3). Sail to the east of the northern four buoys because the sea area to west of them is dangerous. Do not enter (this area).

When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3), the ship leaving port is to wait.

There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout station on the northwest point of NOKOGIRI YAMA.

Take care!

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 85. Date: 10 November 1941

Reliable information indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru Tenders have returned to the Sasebo-Kure Area. RYUJO is still in Taiwan. The KENJO MARU is in the Saigon-Camanh Bay Area.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 86. Date: 12 November 1941

It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: (?). Serial No. 87. Date: 22 Nov. 1941

Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese Expeditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI or Portugese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past a line through Davao-Waigea-Equator the Governor General of the NEI will regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 88. Date: 23 Nov. 1941

CinCAF has no information confirming the Dutch report of a Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palau. His information does not indicate the presence of

units other than the Fourth Fleet in the mandates and no unusual concentration of that force. It is possible that there may be an increase in the number of transports and marus. There has been a concentration of 30-40 marus in the Saipan area since the middle of October. CinC Fourth is at Saipan as of the 22nd and it is possible that Airon 24 may also be present. Slight indications are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the mandates but so far there has been no signs that the movement has begun.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 89. Date: 23 Nov. 1941

CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk-Saipan area. The following increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus; Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing force (?); Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders.

The activity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps is believed to be at Palao and Airon Twenty four is concentrated in the Marshalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: ---- Serial No. 90. Date: 25 November 1941

The U. S. N. Shipping Adviser in Batavia reports that the Dutch report concerning the Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao originated from the Dutch Army in Timor. Portugese Timor was named as the objective of the Expedition. The information was classed as doubtful and no further confirmation has been obtained.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: ---- Serial No. 91. Date: 25 Nov. 1941

The British report that Germany is obtaining rubber from Saigon in the following shipments. All routing is from Saigon to Bordeaux around Cape Horn. Six thousand tons was shipped in two Japanese ships on 15 October and 14 November respectfully. Five thousand tons is to be shipped in a German ship on about one December. The Jap ships may be German vessels under Japanese charter. The ships have not yet been identified.

TOP SECRET

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 12. Date: 25 November 1941

Opanv reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

TOP SECRET

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 13. Date: 25 Nov. 1941

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force composed of the following:

Second Fleet—Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st Defense Division)—Combined Air Force—Desron Three—Airron 7—Subron 5—possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet).

These units are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that certain units have moved on to Hainan.

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

The Second Base Force appears to be transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and may be en route South China. A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and one third of the submarine force.

Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

TOP SECRET

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A. Serial No. 94. Date: November 26, 1941

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few days as follows. He considers it reliable:

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being directed by CinC 2nd Flt in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects:

Section I to operate in South China Area.

Section II to operate in the Mandates.

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

SECTION I

CruDiv 7 (From 2nd Flt) (4 CA's—KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMA, SUZUYA)

Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's—KAMIKAWA MARU, FUJIKAWA MARU, KENJO MARU)

1st Defense Division (From 3rd Flt)

Subron 6 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4 ss)) (note 4 SMs)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Crudiv 6* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 CA's—KAKO, FURUTAKA, KOBA, KINUGASA)

SECTION II

Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Flt) (3 CA's (maybe 4)—MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO)

Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Flt) (2 CV's—RYUJO?, HOSHO) RYUJO and 1 MARU

Desron 2 (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12 DD's))

Desron 2 (From 2nd Flt) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs (12 DD's))

Subron 5 (From 6th Flt) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's))

Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Flt) (4 DD's)

1st Base Force (From 3rd Flt)

3rd Base Force (At PALAO)

5th Base Force (At SAIPAN)

Other lesser units (Names not known)

It is possible but not known for sure that *Batdiv 3* may be included herein. (From 1st Flt) (4 BB's—HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) (HARUNA may be undergoing major repairs)

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Flt in doubt but it is assumed they will be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.

4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) *Desron 3* (1st Flt), *Crudiv 7* (2nd Flt) and *Subron 6* (6th Flt) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air Forces from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOCHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Flts are still in the KURE-SASEBO area.

6. He believes that:

CinC Combined Flt is in	NAGATO (BB)
“ 1st “ “ “	HYUGA (BB)
“ 2nd “ “ “	ATAGO (CA) (In KURE area)
“ 3rd “ “ “	ASHIGARA (CA) (In SASEBO area)
“ 5th “ “ “	CHICHIJIMA area
“ 6th “ “ “	KASHIMA (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this is unreliable)

7. CinC 2nd Flt, CinC 3rd Flt and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force apparently have the major roles.

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet (probably torpedo boats).

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expeditionary Force.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A. Serial No. 95. Date: November 27, 1941

A reliable agent states that there appears to be ORANGE Army activity in the air that involves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Commander OPTION KING AFIRM. Commander OPTION KING AFIRM and Combined Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sama.

Confidential

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: B-3. Serial No. 96. Date: 27 November 1941

Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states:

Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the KRA Isthmus, Thailand, with the *objective* of interposing between Bangkok and Singapore.

Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA).

Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) and HAINAN Is.

TOP SECRET

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 97. Date: 28 Nov. 41

Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at the beginning and the end will have this significance:

HIGASHI HIGASHI: Japanese-American.

KITA KITA: Russia.

NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thal or invasion of Malaya and NEI).

On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used:

“HIGASHI NO KAZE AME” (America).

“KITA NO KAZE KUMORI” (Russia).

“NISHI NO KAZE HARE” (England).

The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 98. Date: 28 Nov. 1941

Com 16 reports location of following units:

In Formosa Straits:

ISUZU

SubTender

4 Subs (probably Subron 6)

NAGOYA MARU

NITTA MARU sailing Yogosuka to Takao on 29th with military supplies.

Two senior construction officers and 4000 men (status unknown) order to the Mandates.

Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relieved KASHWI as flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is now in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 99. Date: 29 Nov. 1941

Com 16 reports recent developments noted:

“COMDR FIRST PATROL FORCE” has headquarters apparently in Palao or Yokosuka along with other forces of this nature.

“FIFTH AIR BATTALION” is at Takao.

“COMDR AIR BORNE TROOPS” (location unknown).

“FRENCH INDO-CHINA BILLETING DETACHMENT” in Saigon Area.

“THIRD FLEET HEADQUARTERS” probably at Yokosuka.

CinC Third has shifted flag from ASHIGARA to NAGARA.

CinC Southern Expeditionary Force shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI.

New additions to the *First Section* (Ser. # 94):

DESRON 4.

SUBRON (?).

AIRRON 7 (CHITOSE type).

The HIYEI and KONGO now appear to be definitely in the First Section but no movement has been noted.

Completely reliable information indicates that CinC Combined will leave Kure Zone at 0400 today, leave Sasebo Zone at midnight on the 1st and enter Bako Zone at midnight on the 2nd.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 100. Date: 1 Dec. 41

There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days: ComDesRon 5 in the NATORI; NAKA to join DesRon4; Units of Number Two Base Force; CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdivs). All of these units are under command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area in the ATAGO apparently en route South China Waters.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 101. Date: 1 Dec 1941

Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai,

at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments.

Secret

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 102. Date: 2 December 1941

CinC Second Fleet [handwritten: in ATAGO] and the Cinc Third Fleet have put in their appearance in the TAKAO Area. The Commander Southern Expeditionary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAMA, HAINAN.

The U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of Codes.

Three I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from SAIGON, course 180 speed 15.

Nine (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10, longitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.

Reported at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol overhead.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 27

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

In Tokyo Yokohama area at present time, Kamakura and Nitta Marus X Yokohama Dock Yard finished, not long ago, 2 escort ships X 2 transports left Yokohama last Thursday in November one carrying aircraft, the other Navy men

CBO HRF Date 5 December 41 Serial No. 12-129

Originator: NAVATT TOKYO

Action: OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Nazis from Shanghai who are of military age are being transferred to Japan for training thought for purpose of serving on German ships which are now in Japan. In this connection 80 have departed in last 10 days average age of these men 30 years. A great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on French Concession by 9 Shanghai officials to bring about the discharge of Anglo American civilian volunteer members of police reserves for the purpose of replacing them with Italians and Germans. The following information from British In-

telligence who gave it a reliability classification of B2: Kamakura, Nitta and Argentina Maru carrying personnel, oil, supplies, and building material have visited Caroline Islands since September; Majuro, Mejit, and Katherine Islands are being specially developed; laborers numbering 30000 have been landed at Jaluit.

CBO S Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-102

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

NAVATT CHUNGKING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification): *Confidential*.

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

In response to the reference (Cincpac Serial No. given below). The unidentified modern vessel was a 10,000 ton cargo ship which has been converted into a sea-plane carrier.

Characteristics: Flush deck, with raised foc's'l, with raked bow and cruiser stern, mounting 14.7" gun on elevated platform forward, and 14.7 gun on poop deck.

~~RAISED FORE CASTLE AND FLUSH DECK.~~

Ref: No. 11-827

Subref: No. 11-759

CBO MRQ Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-103

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification): *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

State Department advises:

Jap troop and supply ships commenced making Saigon November 21, and have disembarked approximately 20,000 men, using all wharves possible. From Friday to Wednesday, 10,000 further troops came by train from the north. Present concentration of troops in South Indo China believed about 70,000 with estimates as high as 125,000 although latter figure discredited as being too high. Large number of trucks landed, carrying materials and men inland, in a large movement, of such size that it appears to point to immediate action against Siam. All above received from Saigon, following from Hanoi, all reports on November 26 unless otherwise noted.

On the morning of November 25, the mayor of Haiphong notified all affected parties the Japs were going to commandeered all stores being shipped to China and to this end ordered that they must have all keys to all bonded storehouses prior to noon that day, despite the fact that protest was made by the French. He advised also that those concerned should exercise their own judgment as to compliance with the order. Report from Hanoi further stated that recently augmented stores and military gear, landed at Haiphong, (consisting principally

of gasoline and railway equipment, including rolling stock) are being further shipped south.

It is said Nipponese intend to buy as many as 5000 native boats, and have, in fact, acquired a great many along the coast of Tongking Province, which they have moved south. Tuesday, the U. S. Consul at Hanoi obtained report from dependable sources, stemming from Governor General's Office to the effect that the latter had learned from an agent of proposed Japanese move. This movement was said to be contemplated in the form of simultaneous Army-Navy action, sea forces to open hostilities on Isthmus Kra, while land forces attacked Thailand. Same information was credited with statement that the above advances would be made without advance warning in form of ultimatum or declaration of war.

Wednesday report from Hanoi stated that there has been considerably more activity in the way of landing and movement south of armed forces, 4000 men having been disembarked in the last few days. A special train will carry about 1500 south on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. Tongking is said to contain some 25000 (estimated) Nipponese troops with 90 planes present at Gialam.

CBO HRF Date 29 November 41 Serial No. 11-891

Originator:	Information:
OPNAV	CINCPAC
Action:	COM 16
CINCAF	COM 14

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

During period mentioned in your 182250 United States merchant vessels were in the vicinity of Ellice and Gilbert.

CBO FWR Date 29 Nov '41 Serial No. 11-879

Originator:	Information:
OPNAV	CINCPAC
Action:	
NAVOBS AT WELINGTON	

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Kamakura Nitta and Argentia Marus have been engaged since September in hauling materials in the form of supplies, oil, construction supplies, as well as personnel to the mandate islands X On one trip to the Marshall group, 3000 workmen were carried and disembarked at Jaluit X Two trips have been made to the Caroline Islands X Awaiting transportation, seemingly, at Yokahama Naval pier, is approximately 8000 Wadts gasoline in drums X Development of the Marshall group is proceeding on the following islands: Katherine (Ujae Atoll), Majuro X Mejit X Watt (Ailuk)

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-823

Originator:	Information:
NAVATT TOKYO	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF
OPNAV	COM 16
CINCPAC	COM 14

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following report received from commanding officer of a foreign merchant ship by the office of the Naval attache at Shanghai: Left Hongkong for Shanghai, Sunday, November 23. While on the way, saw numerous transports. There were approximately 3 or 4 ships sighted during each watch the first three days of this week. They were travelling in a general southerly direction. Transports were sailing either alone or in groups of few ships.

Following is also noted by the Shanghai attache's office: There is an unusually small amount of supplies on the military docks in Shanghai.

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-834

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT CHUNGKING

NAVATT TOKYO

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following Jap naval ships sighted:

Northeast Amoy 20th course southwest 10,000 ton modern ship fitted as sea-plane carrier with catapult. On deck 8 seaplanes Navy type 95.

Off Swatow: 19th; course South, light cruiser and destroyer Hoihow 17th: 20 merchant type ships left heading for Formosa off Saigon 15th: 7 transports.

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-759

Originator:

ASST NAVATT

SHANGHAI

Action:

CINCAF

Information:

CINCPAC

NAVATT TOKYO

NAVATT CHUNGKING

OPNAV

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following 5 ships, previously Japanese merchant motor ships, arrived here with names blocked out and painted grey—Atutasan, Mitsui line. 1 more same type.

Sato Nyk.

2 sister ships Tekasii Maru, Ockshima Steamship Co.

They were armed with 10 to 16 AA guns apiece. The ships with 10 guns have mounts placed for 6 more machine guns. They had an average of 7 3-inch dual purpose guns with the other guns being automatic and seemed to be approximately 50 caliber.

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-751

Originator:

ASST NAVATT

SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

NAVATT TOKYO

NAVATT CHUNGKING

COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Shipping here is now normal. No large movements seen either north or south along coast to date. About 24,000 troops with large amount of military equipment sailed from Woosung between the 15th and 23rd. Several trucks leaving were seen to be newly camouflaged, mostly green in color. This type of camouflage is unusual in this locality. 184 landing boats besides others on 5 vessels were included in the above equipment. Could not obtain exact check.

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 41 Serial No. 11-761

Originator:

ASST NAVATT
 SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC
 CINCAF

NAVATT CHUNGKING
 NAVATT TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

At 2115 November 24 about 1,000 miles east of Guam, the ANSAC clipper sighted 4 Japanese seaplanes flying south at 10,000 feet.

CBO WBM Date Nov 25 41 Serial No. 11-766

Originator

MARDET WAKE
 COM 14

Action:

COM 14
 INFORMATION:
 CINCPAC

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Five transports departed Woosung Saturday with undetermined number of troops and small boats X Present at Woosung on the same day were eight other transports of from four to twelve thousand tons each.

No activity was noted between Shanghai and Darien X 2000 troops arrived Shanghai from Nanking by rail Thursday night.

Some observers believe that the transports which left Woosung last week were possibly going to northern Formosa avoiding shipping lanes. Upon leaving Woosung these vessels did not change course until out of sight of the pilot boat. No convoys were seen along coast and foreign vessels from Hong Kong report only a few scattered transports south-bound with troops and landing boats.

One 10,000 ton special landing craft carrier which departed Shanghai 18th was sighted 20th off Wenchow on southwesterly course.

CBO WJE Date 24 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-725

Originator:

ASST NAVAL ATTACHE SHANG-
 HAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC
 CINCAF

NAV ATT CHUNGKING AND
 TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Reliable report at Singapore of monoplane with two engines and one rudder making reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15th X Repeated on the 16th November by single wing silver flying boat number of engines undetermined

CBO S Date 22 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-686

Originator:	Information:
NAVATT SINGAPORE	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF
OPNAV	

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Transports with limited number horses troops and roughly 115 landing boats assorted equipment trucks and anti-aircraft guns sailed from Shanghai from 14th to 17th X 7 ships of similar type are present X Hasidate sailed Canton 14th Nov X 1 minelayer transport 6 destroyers 3 torpedo boats departed Amoy X 2 destroyers 1 troop ship and cruiser of the Natori class were anchored off Bias Bay 15th Nov X 2 destroyers sighted on southerly course south of Hongkong on 16th Nov X Night of 17th Italian escort vessel Eritrea departed Shanghai with 190 tons Diesel oil bound Okon X 14th observed 12 transports downstream and 18 upstream at mouth Pearl River X From 10 to 14 Nov master sighted 17 transports southbound at intervals between Crown Colony and Woosung

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-626

Originator:	Information:
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	CINCPAC
Action:	OPNAV
CINCAF	NAVATT TOKYO
	NAVATT CHUNGKING
	COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use

Close to 14000 Japanese troops with about 80 tanks and 20 field pieces have arrived here from Nanking during the past 5 days by rail believed awaiting water transportation from this point X During the first part of November lesser number of young recruits were sent inland from Shanghai after their arrival from Japan.

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-627

Originator:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	OPNAV		CINCAF
			NAVATT TOKYO
			NAVATT CHUNGKING
			COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential* Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

1000 troops left Swatow 15th Nov X Installation machine gun mounts being completed here after arrival on several vessels which appear to have been only recently taken over X 3 outbound ships Shanghai were observed to carry sections of trestles on deck sections were 60 feet long by 8 feet high by 8 feet wide and made of creosoted heavy timbers X Woosung military base has shown intense activity since Nov 15th X There are an unusual number of ships present which include former merchant vessels of 10000 tons and up average X 10 transports departed 19th 8 of these were carrying troops 32 more transports anchored lower Whangpoo X Landing boats still constitute part of outgoing equipment.

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-630

Originator:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	OPNAV		CINCAF
			COM 16
			NAVATT TOKYO
			NAVATT CHUNGKING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential* Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

On 16 and 17 November, planes, apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. On the 16th the plane was a twin engine monoplane and on the 17th a flying boat. The flying boat was on a generally north and south course, speed 125. These flights indicate a daily patrol from Jaluit, over Gilberts, to an area south near shipping routes.

Truk and Saipan were each recently reinforced with half a squadron of bombers and half a squadron of fighters.

Several unknown ships have been reported near Ellice and Gilbert. Also, reports have been received of Japanese liners carrying either troops or laborers to Mandates.

NOTE.—The source of the above report is the New Zealand Naval Intelligence.

CBO MRQ Date 19 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-550

Originator:	ALUSNOB	Action:	OPNAV
	WELLINGTON	Information:	CINCPAC

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Strict regulations being enforced in Camranh Bay area. The following from a responsible foreign traveler on an orange ship which anchored in Camranh Bay last month while riding out a typhoon: Japanese building activity being rushed. Freighters observed in harbor discharging cargo. French 75's on surrounding hills, 4 long range rifles on hills over looking outer bays with a number if minor caliber guns. Island inner bay has 4 small guns.

CBO 19 Nov '41 Date FWR Serial No. 11-564

Originator:
 ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
 Action:
 OPNAV

Information:
 CINCPAC
 CINCAF
 NAVATT TOKYO
 NAVATT CHUNGKING
 COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following obtained from supposedly accurate French military source regarding military situation in Indo-China as of Nov 12 X Amassing of great amount of gasoline, ammunition and oil X Japanese forces present reported to be as follows X Cambodia-Saigon area 31,000 X Tongking 24,700 X South part of Annam 2,500 X It is reported by reliable traveller from that vicinity that large amount of heavy artillery has been landed at Saigon and Haiphong during past thirty days.

CBO HRF Date 17 November 41 Serial No. 11-498

Originator:
 ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
 Action:
 OPNAV

Information:
 CINCPAC
 CINCAF
 NAV ATT TOKYO
 COM 16
 NAV ATT CHUNGKING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Mouth of Pearl River 18 cargo vessels upstream 29 down Sunday to Thursday X 6 transports present at Shanghai Friday X Same day Canton minesweeper with vice admiral's flag departed gun boat Saga X Minelayer Yaeyama class sighted 9th Canton outbound X Kuma type cruiser and 2 torpedo boats Tuesday Bias Bay X 6 destroyers X 3 torpedo boats X 1 transport arrived at Amoy Wednesday X 1 Sendia class south of turnabout Island Tuesday.

CBO HRF Date 16 November 41 Serial No. 11-486

Originator:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF		OPNAV
			COM 16
			NAVATT CHUNGKING
			NAVATT TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential* Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Below Hongkong Nov 6 13 transports 2 trawlers 28 motor boats on southerly course X Off Turnabout Island Nov 4 17 ships ranging from 2000 tons to 10,000 tons in a convoy headed southwesterly X Departed Saturday Nov 2 fram Canton, Shimushu X Following day gunboat Saga was seen at Pearl River X Monday Nov 4, cruiser Natori departed Amoy X In period between 1 and 4 Nov 7 transports left Shanghai X Loaded as follows X 2 with railway trucks and coaches one each old locomotives X Tanks and trucks remainder with miscellaneous military gear including 49 landing boats

CBO HRF DATE 10 November 41 Serial No. 11-245

Originator:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF		NAVATT CHUNGKING
			NAVATT TOKYO
			OPNAV
			COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential* Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

During the last two weeks Jap troop trains passing through Tehchow and Shihnei from North Pingham Line enroute Tsingtao total approximately 40 or 50 trains X Movement has now been carried out X No indications of Nip divisions being transported north China to Manchuria during the month of October X Movement of 20 trains Taiyuanfu Shansi to Tsingtao via Shihnei and Tehchow just commencing

CBO JMS Date 9 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-235

Originator:	ASST NAVATT PIEKING	Information:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
Action:	OPNAV		NAVATT CHUNGKING
			CINCPAC
			CINCAF
			COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Supposedly accurate report from sources in Hongkong X Left outward bound Monday on Pearl River, 28 trawlers and 35 transports for undetermined points X Haiphong, today, Japanese forces to the extent of 12,000 men disembarked, with more ready

CBO HRF Date 8 November 41 Serial No. 11-194

Originator:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC

CINCAF

COM 16

NAVATT CHUNGKING

NAVATT TOKYO

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Please forward brief summary by dispatch ahead of full report on information requested below X For your information, there is now being sent you by mail 14th N D intelligence report 1027 of 30 October concerning Edward John Coquelle, who is confined in Honolulu X He was according to his statement, born French and is a naturalized U S citizen (1930) having taken papers in San Francisco X Coquelle's avowed nephew, Alfred Munson, now on Midway, is involved in confession made by the former in which he admits addressing secret plans to Mrs. Alice Coquelle at 3229 21st Ave., San Francisco X Plans were intercepted here, and were contained in a suitcase sent by Coquelle from Midway in the sirius during October X U S attorney wishes C N O to have investigation of Coquelle's service record made X Also desires San Francisco authorities study records to ascertain whether or not Mrs. Coquelle has been naturalized and check on her personally X Coquelle avers he was a member of Army Intelligence and was with overseas armed forces in first world war

CBO HRF Date 7 November 41 Serial No. 11-172

Originator:

COM 14

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

COM 12

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

16 destroyers and 14 other naval vessels, probably transports or auxiliaries were observed far away, anchored in Wakasa Bay, Obama Harbor area X Above are Japanese and were sighted on the thirtieth of October.

CBO HRF Date 6 November 41 Serial No. 11-153

Originator:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF		NAVATT CHUNGKING
			OPNAV
			COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification:) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following Japanese naval craft have been observed: Monday the 27th 10 transports in ballast averaging 6000 tons each anchored off Namow Island Swatow X Tuesday 10 small transports south Hongkong course southwest loaded with cargo X Sailed Amoy 1 destroyer and cruiser Kuma X A vessel departed Shanghai with 600 troops X Sighted at the mouth of the Pearl River during the past week 34 transports have passed upstream and 21 downstream.

At Shanghai the Italian escort vessel Eritrea continued to load oil in drums small lots as obtainable X

German ship Quito left Shanghai night of 31st escorted by 2 Jap gunboats X Its cargo included large quantity of Diesel oil and antifouling paint X Its destination is believed to be Kobe

CBO DCG Date 5 Nov Serial No. 11-118

Originator:	ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI	Information:	CINCPAC
Action:	CINCAF		NAV ATT CHUNGKING
			NAV ATT TOKYO
			OPNAV
			COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Following information from Navatt Chungking relaying from chief of SRKO intelligence:

Report from private agent Hongkong states that Orange Fleet has been mobilized at Sasebo since 20 October, although he is in doubt as to the reliability of the above information X Probable origin British X London notified local attache of a general mobilization recently, and he, it is believed, repeated information X He has been asked to check through the naval attache at Hongkong X Original report from London did not give date or place X Chinese claim of Japanese naval concentration at Chainan or Gulf of Siam is without confirmation, although there is the usual local unit activity in those places.

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-734

Originator:	NAVATT CHUNGKING	Information:	ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
Action:	CINCAF		CINCPAC
			OPNAV
			COM 16
			COMSOPAT

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

Although the Chinese maintain claims that the Japanese intend to attack Siberia in the near future, foreign observers claim this hinges upon Russian failure in the West X Chungking Russian Attache refuses to make statement concerning Russian strength in the East, although suggesting that severe weather handicaps Japanese action as well as sufficient Russian strength to give Nipponese severe punishment X Chinese also insist the Japs are sending four unidentified divisions into Manchuria and are holding four more in readiness in Northern China X British Naval Attache doubts this latter since he claims the Chinese obtained it via backdoor, information being originally transmitted by me to the Soviet Embassy in my 62/4 Oct. for checking, and by the British Attache to London also for cross check.

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-736

Originator:

NAVATT CHUNGKING

Action:

CINCAF

Information:

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
 CINCPAC
 COMSOPAT
 OPNAV
 COM 16
 NAVATT PEIPING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) *Confidential*

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

The following were sighted:

Thursday—10 trawlers heading south, near turn about island.

Thursday—Orange convoy, course southwest, consisting of 11 cargo ships and 4 tankers sighted off Amoy.

Monday—20 trawlers proceeding southwest off Wenchow with destroyer, 1 transport.

Saturday—2 transports loading small boats at Woosung X Yangtze entrance 2 transports outbound with landing craft and few troops on board.

Sharps Peak Jap naval garrison below Foochow for past 2 weeks abandoned station on the morning of the 25th.

FOR25/

CBO FWR Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-750

Originator:

ASNAVAT SHANGHAI

Action:

CINCPAC
 CINCAF

NAVAT CHUNGKING
 NAVAT TOKYO
 OPNAV
 COM 16

Information:

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

2300 Thursday 13 orange transports were seen off Wenchow Tuesday on a southwest course X A hospital ship departed Shanghai from upriver with 2000 wounded X Seen off Wenchow on Wednesday afternoon 9 transport averaging 3000 tons moderately loaded, with no troops reported.

CBO EBR Date 27 Oct. 41 Serial No. 10-703

Originator:

ASST NAV AT SHANGHAI

Action:

CINCAF

Information:

CINCPAC NAVATTS
 CHUNGKING, TOKYO
 OPNAV, COM 16

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(Classification.) Confidential

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

It is reported that all Jap tankers are being armed with 2 guns. Izumo, converted carrier, was launched at Kobe October 30th and was moved to the dock formerly occupied by the Zuikaku.

The main Japanese Fleet departed on 28 October for the Kure area.

Master of foreign vessel order charter to Nips states that a guard ship is now stationed at Tsucaru strait and signals all passing ships for name, nationality, and destination.

CBO MRQ Date 5 Oct. 41 Serial No. 11-117

Originator:

ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI

Action:

OPNAV

Information:

CINCPAC
 CINCAF
 NAV ATT CHUNGKING
 COM 16

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 28

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

S-e-c-r-e-t

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., November 28, 1941.

Memorandum for: Admiral.

Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430.

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the Marshalls, Truk and Ponape was stressed with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajelien, Rongelap, Wotje and Maloelap.

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from Wake on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the Mandates it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes Jaluit and Truk respectively. The Jaluit plane returning via Maloelap, Wotje, Kwajelien, Rongelap and Pokaakku. The Truk plane returning via Ujelang and Eniwetok. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over Ponape enroute to Port Moresby was assigned Ujelang, Ponape and Kapingamarangi (Greenwich Island).

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their takeoff.

[s] E. T. LAYTON.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 29

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming
From: Togo, Foreign Minister.
To: Consul Honolulu.

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th.

Togo.

Date: 6 Dec. 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

1. The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning the 5th entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th.

2. On the same day the LEXINGTON and 5 heavy cruisers departed.

3. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 Battleships

3 Light cruisers

16 Destroyers

Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

KITA.

Date: 5 Dec. 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming
From: Foreign Minister.
To: Kita, Consul, Honolulu.
Strictly Secret.

Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect.

Togo.

Date: 3 Dec 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming
 From: Kita.
 To: Foreign Minister.

On the afternoon of the 3rd a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the 4th about 1100 tons; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

KITA.

Date: 4 Dec. 41.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming
 From: Kita.
 To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.

KITA.

Date: 4 Dec. 41.

Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Consul Kita in Honolulu sent following as #245 on 3 December, 1941.
 From: Ichihiro Fujii.
 To: Chief of 3rd Section of General Staff.

1. I wish to change method of communication by signal to following:

Signal #	
1.	Battleship divisions including screen----- Preparing to sortie.
2.	Aircraft carriers----- Preparing to sortie.
3.	Battleship divisions including screen----- All dep. 1-3 Dec.
4.	Aircraft carriers----- Several dep. 1-3 Dec.
5.	Aircraft carriers----- All dep. 1-3 Dec.
6.	Battleship divisions including screen----- All dep. 4-6 Dec.
7.	Aircraft carriers----- Several dep. 4-6 Dec.
8.	Aircraft carriers----- All dep. 4-6 Dec.

2. (A and B.)

Lanakai beach house will show one light before midnight and two after midnight during the hour number representing the signal:

Hour	Signal #
2000-2100-----	1
2100-2200-----	2
2200-2300-----	3
2300-2400-----	4
2400-0100-----	5
0100-0200-----	6
0200-0300-----	7
0300-0400-----	8

(C) During daylight star bot at Lanakai showing masthead star indicates signals 1-4. Star and roman numeral three indicates signals 5-8:

Signal	
1-----	*
2-----	*
3-----	*
4-----	*
5-----	*III
6-----	*III
7-----	*III
8-----	*III

(D) At the times indicated a one hour light in the attic window of Kalama house indicates the corresponding signal:

<i>Hours</i>	<i>Signal #</i>
1900-2000.....	3
2000-2100.....	4
2100-2200.....	5
2200-2300.....	6
2300-2400.....	7
2400-0100.....	8

(E) In the KGMB Want Ads at 0945, these ads have following signal meaning:

<i>Want Ad</i>	<i>Signal #</i>
Chinese rug for sale. Apply P. O. Box 1476.....	3 or 6
Chicken farm for sale. " " " ".....	4 or 7
Beauty Operator wanted. " " " ".....	5 or 8

2. If the above signals cannot be made from Oahu a bonfire on Maui about 6 miles north of Kula Sanatorium between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road at point Lat. 20-40 and Long. 156-19 will be made for several days between 1900 and 2200. It can be seen from the south west or south east of Maui and the hour at which it is shown will have the following signal meaning:

<i>Hour</i>	<i>Signal #</i>
19-2000.....	3 or 6
20-2100.....	4 or 7
21-2200.....	5 or 8

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30

(Exhibit No. 30 consisted of two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on the reverse side recovered from a Japanese submarine. These items were returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30A

(This exhibit consists of a photostat of a Japanese log which appeared on the reverse side of Exhibit No. 30. This photostat will be found reproduced as Item No. 113, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 30B

LOG OF ATTACK

- 1300 Completed last work on the tube (TN: midget sub?). Went aboard. Waves fairly high.
 - 1500 OAHU I. sighted. Radio station, red light, and surf (?) sighted. L 20°. This ship 90°.
 - 1615 Barbers Point Light seen operating. L 40°.
 - 1800 Cruising submerged, depth 25 meters.
 - 1815 According to intelligence reports, ships present in the harbor on the 5th are as follows:
 - 5 BB's, 3 CL's, 16 DD's docked.
 - 4 HONOLULU Class CL's, 5 DD's.
- | | |
|------|-------|
| 1 m | |
| 5 Lt | 180 m |
| 7 | 220 m |
| 12 | 430 m |

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 31

(Exhibit No. 31 consisted of a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from positions five miles south of Pearl Harbor, which was recovered from a Japanese submarine. This sketch was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 31A

(Exhibit No. 31A consists of two photostats of Exhibit No. 31, being a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from a position five miles south of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from a Japanese submarine. These photostats will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 114 and 115, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 32

(Exhibit No. 32 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese midget submarine. This chart was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 32A

(Exhibit No. 32A consists of three photostatic copies of Exhibit No. 32, as follows:

1. Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, bearing the original Japanese characters.
2. *Ibid*, with the English translations of the Japanese characters.
3. Photostatic copy of the reverse side of the Japanese chart mentioned in Item No. 1 above.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 116, 117, and 118, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 33

(Exhibit No. 33 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese submarine showing defensive installations. This chart was returned to Captain Layton.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 33A

(Exhibit No. 33A is a photostatic copy of Exhibit No. 33, being an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations. This photostatic copy will be found reproduced as Item No. 119, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 34

RESTRICTED

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, 1941

A2-12(05)
Serial 1525UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 14, 1941.

The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, while both commands are administered jointly.

The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby superseded and all copies should be destroyed.

W. W. SMITH,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.

Approved:

H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

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STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941

DISTRIBUTION LIST

COMMAND	No Copies
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.....	40
Opnav.....	10
Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.....	5
Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.....	5
Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	5
Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.....	5
Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each).....	6
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.....	1
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.....	1
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Compatwing Two.....	1
Commander Mine Squadron THREE.....	1
Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet.....	2
Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force.....	5
Commandants 11th, 12th, & 14th Naval Districts (each 2).....	2
Fleet Flagship.....	5
Fleet Personnel Officer.....	1
Total.....	107
Spares.....	40
Grand total.....	147

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION I. COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTY

111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.

113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each column; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified:

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—00

Chief of Staff—01. Assistant Chief of Staff—02.		Personal Aides—01, 05, 15. Staff Duty Officer—14.	
(a) OPERATIONS	(b) ADMINISTRATION	(c) WAR PLANS	(d) MAINTENANCE
11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.	01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75, 90, 95, 96.	16, 17, 18, 19, 86.	50, 90, 95.
Estimates, Plans, Orders, Instructions. 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 95.	Correspondence Files, Records, Legal Matters, Flag Allocation and Office, Print Shop, Flag Personnel. 05.	Estimates, Plans Orders. 16, 17, 18, 19.	Overhauls, Docking. 50.
Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.	Communications. 20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 30.	Marine Corps matters. 86.	Repairs, Alterations. 50, 90, 95.
Schedules, Training, Exercises, Reports of Exercises. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90, 95.	Secret and Confidential Registered Publications. 20, 21, 33.	Landing Force. 86.	Technical Services. 50, 18, 20, 90, 95.
Tactics. 11, 12, 13, 15.	Guard Duty, Uniforms, Calls, Celebrations, Ceremonies, Band, Boats, Official Cars. 15.	Mobilization plans. 16, 17, 18, 19, 86.	Bureau of Ships Activities. 50.
Anchorage, Anchoring, Getting Underway, Operating Areas. 11, 12, 13, 15.	Characteristic Cards. 50, 18, 90, 95.	Joint Army and Navy Operations. 16, 17, 18, 86, 11.	Navigation. 50, 12. Bureau of Ordnance. 90, 95.
Joint Army and Navy Operations. 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86.	Athletics and Recreation. 15, 96.	Logistic Readiness for War. 16, 17, 18, 19, 50, 86, 90, 95.	Aviation. 95.
Ship and Airplane Movements. 11, 12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50, 90.	Requisitions, Surveys, Ship's Service. 50.	Radio and Sound (Signal Equipment. 18, 20, 50, 22, 15.	Aerological. 96.
Navigation. 12.	Landing Force and Parades. 86, 15, 90.	Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.	Mines, Chemical Equipment. 90.
Logistics. 50, 12, 90, 95.	Annual Report. 05. (Assisted by each member of the Staff).		Base Hospitals. 75.
Intelligence. 11, 25.	Intelligence. 25, 26, 20, 05.		
Censorship. 25, 05.	Censorship. 25, 26, 05, 20.		
Aerological. 96, 95.	Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.		
Navy Relief Force. 11, 12, 13, 86.	Aerological and Personnel. 96.		
Security. 21.	Security. 21.		
Propaganda. 05, 25, 26.	Medical (Sanitation, etc.) and Religious Activities. 75.		
Damage Control. 50, 11, 90, 75.	Public Relations. 27, 25, 26, 05.		
Chemical Warfare and Mines. 90.	Damage Control. 50, 90, 75.		
Base Hospitals. 11, 75.	Base Hospitals. 75.		
	Customs and Agricultural Inspection Liaison. 75, 96.		

NOTE: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II.

COGNIZANCE AND DUTY

114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers attached to the Staff:

- 01—Chief of Staff.
- 02—Assistant Chief of Staff.
- 05—Flag Secretary.
- 11—Operations Officer.
- 12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.
- 13—2nd. Assistant Operations Officer.
- 14—Staff Duty Officer.
- 15—Flag Lieutenant.
- 16—War Plans Officer.
- 17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
- 20—Communication Officer.
- 21—Communication Security Officer.
- 22—Radio Officer.
- 23—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 24—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 25—Intelligence Officer.
- 26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.
- 27—Public Relations.
- 30—Assistant Communication Officer.
- 31 to 43—Communication Duty and Coding Officers.
- 50—Maintenance Officer.
- 75—Medical Officer.
- 86—Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer).
- 90—Gunnery Officer.
- 95—Aviation Officer.
- 96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.

115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who may be absent for any reason:

<u>PRIMARY DUTY</u>	<u>RELIEF</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
01—Chief of Staff.	02—Assistant Chief of Staff.	(02 is same as 11.)
05—Flag Secretary.	25—Intelligence Officer.	
11—Operations Officer.	16—War Plans Officer.	16—Relieves if available, otherwise 12 relieves 11.
12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	
13—2nd Assistant Operations Officer.	12—1st. Assistant Operations Officer.	
15—Flag Lieutenant and Athletic Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	20—Relieves for visual communications.
16—War Plans Officer.	17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
17—1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
19—3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	18—2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.	
20—Communication Officer.	22—Radio Officer.	
21—Communication Security Officer.	30—Assistant Communication Officer.	
22—Radio Officer.	20—Communication Officer.	
23—Assistant Communication Officer.	24—Assistant Communication Officer.	
24—Assistant Communication Officer.	23—Assistant Communication Officer.	
25—Intelligence Officer.	26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	
26—Assistant Intelligence Officer.	25—Intelligence Officer.	
27—Public Relations Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	
30—Assistant Communication Officer.	31—Assistant Communication Officer.	Senior CWO.
31 to 43 inclusive—Communication	Watch Officers and Coding Board.	
50—Maintenance Officer.	13—Assistant Operations Officer.	
75—Medical Officer.	05—Flag Secretary.	
86—Marine Officer.	05—Flag Secretary; (and Gunnery Officer for Landing Force etc.)	War Plans Section by 16, 17, 18, 19.
90—Gunnery Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 12.
95—Aviation Officer.	90—Gunnery Officer.	Assisted by 96.
96—Aerological and Personnel Officer.	95—Aviation Officer.	Assisted by 05 for personnel.

SECTION II. INDIVIDUAL COGNIZANCE OF DUTIES

200. *Chief of Staff—01—Personal Aide.*

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785—786).

- (a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.
- (c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
- (d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
- (e) Signs correspondence as follows:
 - (1) Routine Matters.
 - (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.
 - (3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
 - (4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
 - (5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.
 - (6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.

201. *Assistant Chief of Staff—02—See Operations Officer (11).*202. *Flag Secretary—05—Personal Aide.*

- (a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
- (b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
- (c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected therewith.
- (d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current instructions and properly distributed.
- (e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent or overdue communications.
- (f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.
- (g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet.
- (h) Printing.
- (i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
- (j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:
 - (1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
 - (2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action only.
 - (3) Receipts and tracers.
 - (4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
 - (5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel.
- (k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
- (l) War Diary.

203. *Operations Officer—11—(Assistant Chief of Staff 02).*

- (a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in his absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".
- (b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment activities.
- (c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for revision of same.
- (d) Prepares problems and exercises.
- (e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
- (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, and plans and movement orders.
- (g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises.
- (h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation plans.

- (i) Navy Relief Force.
- (j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.

204. *First Assistant Operations Officer—12.*

- (a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational equipment, charts, etc.
- (b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Officer.
- (c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans Section.
- (d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.
- (e) Commander-in-Chief's Night Order Book.

205. *Second Assistant Operations Officer—13.*

- (a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.
- (b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system for vessels of the Fleet.
- (c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.

205A. *Staff Duty Officer—14.*

(See paragraph 226).

206. *Flag Lieutenant—15—Personal Aide.*

- (a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency of Fleet signalling operations and material.
- (b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale Officer based ashore.
- (c) Boarding officer.
- (d) Has cognizance of:
 - (1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.
 - (2) Entertainments.
 - (3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.
 - (4) Uniform.
 - (5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.
 - (6) Military and Medical Guard Dpties.
 - (7) Band or orchestra.
- (e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.
- (f) Maintains flag combat bill.
- (g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.
- (h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.

207. *War Plans Officer—16.*

- (a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.
- (b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
- (c) Member of Schedule Board.
- (d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.
- (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters,—via District Commandant if appropriate.
- (f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
- (g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.
- (h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.
- (i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet.

208. *Assistant War Plans—17.*

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
 - (1) Fleet estimates and plans.
 - (2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of

Naval Districts.

- (3) Liaison with Army on War Plans matters.
- (4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.

209. *Assistant War Plans—18.*

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
 - (1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Naval Districts.
 - (2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.
 - (3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War Plans has an interest.
 - (4) Logistic studies and data.

210. *Assistant War Plans—19.*

- (a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
 - (1) Office administration and correspondence.
 - (2) Compilation and assembly of data.
 - (3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.

Fleet Marine Officer—86. (See paragraph 222).

211. *Fleet Communication Officer—20.*

- (a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.
- (b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.
- (c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic operations and with war plans.
- (d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.
- (e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
- (f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assignments of communication personnel.
- (g) Supervises activities ashore of communication stations when manned by Fleet personnel.
- (h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies.
- (i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material.
- (j) Responsible for registered publications.
- (k) Supervises communication watch officers.
- (l) Cryptographic and radio security, with "21".

212. *Communication Security Officer—21.*

- (a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of Fleet flagship:
 - (1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.
 - (2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate commanders.
 - (3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.
 - (4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.
 - (5) Recommendations for improvement of cryptographic aids.
 - (6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of cryptographic aids.
 - (7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communications.
- (c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.
- (d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library. Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "by direction".
- (e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (f) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confidential correspondence.
- (g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.

213. *Fleet Radio Officer—22.*

- (a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
- (b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.
- (c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.
- (d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material installations of the Fleet.

- (e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.
- (f) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.
- (g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.
- (h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet.
- (i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.

214. *Intelligence Officer—25.*

- (a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
- (b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).
- (c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
- (d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
- (e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
- (f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
- (g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.
- (h) In charge of censorship.
- (i) Internal Security of ships.
- (j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. *Assistant Intelligence Officer—26*

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

- (a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
- (b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.
- (c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
- (d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

216. *Public Relations Officer—27.*

- (a) Liaison officer with the Press.
- (b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.
- (c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.
- (d) Maintains photographic file.
- (e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.
- (f) Cognizance of Staff library.
- (g) Motion Picture Officer.
- (h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of Navigation.
- (i) In charge of Staff photographer.
- (j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press releases for visitors, visits, social activities, athletics, and other recreational subjects.
- (k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.
- (l) Propaganda in time of war.
- (m) When directed assist "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in intelligence matters as necessary.
- (n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.
- (o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.

217. *Assistant Communication Officer—30.*

(a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as directed.

- (m) Is in charge of internal distribution and conduct of Flag rapid communications within the Flagship.
- (c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, routine operations, files, forms, and publications.
- (d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding Watch Officers.
- (e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing, custody, and dispatch of secret mail.
- (f) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office and communication spaces.

218. *Communication Watch Officers—31, 32, 33, 34.*

(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the provisions of the Communication Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.

(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure. In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned coding board duties at a battle station.

(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-registered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.

(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Registered Publications which he shall keep corrected.

219. *Coding Board Officers—35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40).*

(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use and become proficient in their proper use.

(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Cryptographic Security.

(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer watches when required.

(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correction, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.

(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding Board functions, as directed.

220. *Fleet Engineer and Maintenance Officer—50.*

(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.

(b) Engineering performances.

(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.

(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.

(e) Tests and upkeep of material.

(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing instructions.

(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections.

(h) Damage Control.

(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys.

(j) Ship's Service store activities.

(k) Training of engineering personnel.

(l) Member of Schedule Board.

(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules.

(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics.

(o) Supply Department matters.

(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans.

(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships cognizance).

(r) Degaussing.

221. *Fleet Medical Officer—75.*

(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet.

(b) Prepares a periodic Fleet Medical News Letter.

(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.

(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases as may not be otherwise provided for.

(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.

(f) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health regulations.

(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the

purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.

(b) Has cognizance of religious activities.

(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

222. *Fleet Marine Officer—86.*

(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine Force.

(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions, Defense Battalions, and Detachments.

(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:

(1) Plans for amphibious operations.

(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.

(3) Demolition and related operations.

(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army).

(5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.

223. *Fleet Gunnery Officer—90.*

(a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep of the armament of the Fleet.

(b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the armament of the Fleet.

(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.

(d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.

(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.

(f) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft gunnery.

(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer regarding tactical aspects:

(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.

(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.

(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.

(4) Chemical warfare service—Material and training of personnel. (In collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).

(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of the Fleet.

(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of liaison with Army.

(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.

(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.

(l) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to "Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnery Instructions" and other ordnance, gunnery and fire control publications.

(m) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships (Bureau of Ordnance cognizance).

(n) Member of Schedule Board.

(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.

(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.

(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).

224. *Fleet Aviation Officer—95.*

(a) Advises with reference to:

(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining to policy with respect to:

(A) Material.

(B) Personnel.

(C) Gunnery and Bombing.

(D) Radio.

(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities.

(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.

(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports thereon.

(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.

(6) Naval air operating policy.

- (b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.
- (c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.
- (d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.
- (e) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.
- (f) Member of Schedule Board.
- (g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters.

225. *Fleet Aerological and Personnel Officer—96.*

(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.

(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in matters concerning:

- (1) Equipment.
- (2) Personnel.
- (3) Weather information required.

(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:

- (1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports.
- (2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.
- (3) Aerological research.

(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological personnel.

(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with orders for Fleet Problems and Tactics.

(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic information pertaining to gunnery.

(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorological facilities.

(h) In charge of all matters relating to:

- (1) Orders for officers and enlisted personnel.
- (2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.
- (3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.
- (4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.
- (5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorsements for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depending upon the rank of officer requesting leave.
- (6) Examinations and promotions.
- (7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.

(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.

(j) Shore Patrol.

(k) Liberty for the Fleet.

226. *Staff Duty Officer—14.*

(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is established.

(b) The officer having the day's duty shall:

- (1) Receive routine reports.
- (2) Act on routine matters.

(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as possible.

(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The procedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instructions.

(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff boats in absence of Flag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and Staff Duty boats.

(6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship.

(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visiting men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.

(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.

(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is not on board.

(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept informed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed promptly upon their return to the ship of all important matters that occur during their absence; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of all ship movements observed by the signal watch.

(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be taken.

(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea when regular watches are set.

(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in-Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which may arise.

(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action as may be necessary. Instructions should be obtained by the most expeditious manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully informed of the situation.

(f) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.

(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following:

(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.

(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.

(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission.

(h) *Assignment of Berths.* Requests for berths are received occasionally by the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart is kept in the Operations Office, together with a copy of current instructions. See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assignments.

(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an adverse reflection on the Fleet.

(j) *Leave—Relief for Day's Duty.* (1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on duty, illness or leave.

(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."

(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff Duty Officer of the arrangements made.

SEA WATCHES

(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet flagship is underway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.

(1) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in

whatever disposition or formation the Fleet is at the time; whatever land or lights are in sight; whether either are likely to be seen; and of all other particulars which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the formation out of danger.

(l) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circumstances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer. **ACT FIRST, REPORT AFTERWARDS.** Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required—otherwise those officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will be required and the reasons therefor.

(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, vessels, or wrecks sighted; all changes of weather or shifts of wind; all signals made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all occurrences worthy of notice.

(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer having the day's Staff duty.

(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.

(p) *Record of events.*—A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial and submarine activity, weather information, etc. **THE RECORD OF EVENTS** will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be kept in Flag Plot until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch). At 0800 each day the three copies of the **RECORD OF EVENTS** covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following distribution: one copy to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations Officer.)

(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the right of way.

(r) When fog closes in:

- (1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.
- (2) Order fog buoys streamed.
- (3) Order fog searchlights manned.
- (4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter—2RL-41 summarized briefly as follows:

- (a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the formation.
- (b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain bearings from shore radio direction finder stations, and radio bearings of ships in company.
- (c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.
- (d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress frequency).
- (e) Provided Radio, restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language followed by International Code; visibility conditions, names of ships in company, position, and time of origin GCT. If other ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and exchange information.

227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12).

228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to preclude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.

SECTION III. BATTLE STATIONS

300. The Combat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only.

SECTION IV. FLAG OFFICE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is:

Chief Yeoman.....	3
Yeoman 1st class.....	4
Yeoman 2nd class.....	5
Yeoman 3rd class.....	6
	<hr/>
Total.....	18

Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows:

- 1 Yeoman—In general charge.
- 1 Yeoman—Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.
- 1 Yeoman—Flag Secretary and Division Officer.
- 3 Yeomen—Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.
- 2 Yeomen—War Plans Officers.
- 2 Yeomen—Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.
- 1 Yeoman—Intelligence Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Aviation Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Gunnery Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Aerological Officer.
- 1 Yeoman—Files and Correspondence Classification.
- 1 Yeoman—Outgoing Mail Desk.
- 1 Yeoman—Communication Office.

These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc.

402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer. One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.

403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance, he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the routine of the office.

404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office supplies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care that expenditures are kept within requirements.

405. *Routine Duty.* (a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop are as follows:

Daily.....	0800 to 1600
Half Holidays.....	0800 to 1130

(b) *Handling of work outside regular office hours.* Routine work outside of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section. There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.

(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.

406. *Handling of mail upon arrival in port.* The taking up and distribution of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job. All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail received. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.

407. *Liberty and Leave.* (a) Liberty and leave for the flag office personnel will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.

(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secretary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Executive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.

408. *Cleanliness of Offices.* (a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800, and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday.

(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the daily schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the inspecting officers.

409. *Flag Office Duty Section.* (a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a competent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours:

Daily-----	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 1300
	1600 to 2200
Half Holidays-----	0730 to 0815
	1130 to 2200
Whole Holidays-----	0730 to 2200

(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular working hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:

- (1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.
- (2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call; however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc.

(3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following hours:

Daily-----	1600 to 0800
Half-holidays-----	1200 to 0800
Holidays-----	0800 to 0800

This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours. The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at any time.

(c) *Handling of mail and correspondence.* Before going on liberty the incoming and outgoing mail yeomen will inform the senior duty yeoman of any special instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be:— To watch for special correspondence expected in the incoming mail—to see that certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent

nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and file yeoman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Officer with minimum delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. *On board ship*, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Office overnight, distributing it immediately after 0800 the following working day. *In offices ashore*, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers' desks.

(d) *Security of Flag Offices.* The duty section will stand watch in the main flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any urgent reason, it is desired to keep offices open after 2200, permission should be requested from the Staff Duty Officer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded. Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff personnel, or locked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty, the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting a note on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as possible.

(e) *Visitors to flag offices.* No general visitors will be permitted. Other than flag personnel admitted by senior duty yeoman, only officers and men on duty, or persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices outside of working hours.

(f) *Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms.* Waste paper baskets in Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff's Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the following times:

Regular working days.....	1500
Half and Whole Holidays.....	1115

410. *Security of Classified Matter.* All personnel of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the security of classified matter.

(a) *Offices, Print Shop, Multilith Shop, Flag Plot Officers' Staterooms.* Flag personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. *Attended, as employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by unauthorized persons, or that it is under lock.*

(b) *Trash and waste.* Will be removed from flag activities and burned at times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag offices, flag plot, print or multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out in 409 (f). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(c) *Keys.* The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag office key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their possession.

(d) *Files, Lockers, Storerooms.* Access to the flag storeroom by other than

regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secretary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.

(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.

(f) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classified matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.

SECTION V. HANDLING OF CORRESPONDENCE

501. (a) *Incoming Mail*, is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.

(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Communication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked "SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be obtained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET" mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose, and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer at the first opportunity.

(c) Incoming *personal* mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's return to the ship.

(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.

502. *Urgent Correspondence*. When URGENT correspondence is received on board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer, a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeomen are not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No correspondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the correspondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag.

503. *Routine Correspondence*.

(a) *Incoming Mail Yeoman*. Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with subparagraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered U. S. mail by receiving officers.)

Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.

Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under separate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.

Passes correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAILGRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Communication office without being taken up on routing slips.

After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and delivers mail to Chief Mail Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form.

This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will show:

Date of receipt.

Office of origin.

File and serial number of office of origin.

Date of correspondence.

Subject.

Circus file number of jacket in which permanently filed.

Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.

(b) *File Yeoman*. Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505.)

(c) *Chief Yeoman in Charge*. Routes correspondence.

(d) *Flag Secretary*. Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing where required.

(e) *Tracer Yeoman*. Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing basket of the Flag Secretary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of delivery to first officer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspondence, (except URGENT—see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing.

Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in the office.

(f) *Yeoman Concerned*. Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as directed.

When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspondence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Action correspondence to the assigned relief officer.

(g) *Officer Concerned*. In general, papers will pass from one officer to another via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.

Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.

Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers checked for information.

Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.

Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports, etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when needed.

A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they have in their possession.

(h) *Yeoman Concerned*. Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed (See Article 504).

Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty—delivering routed correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.

Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other than a letter or endorsement.

(i) *Tracer Yeoman*. Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence on which routing is incomplete.

Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.

The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into three classes:

(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.

(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional correspondence.

(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming correspondence attached.

When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space pro-

vided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman. However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.

When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Commander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this correspondence to the File Yeoman.

504. *Outgoing Mail.*

(a) *General.*—Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of correspondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.

The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in the upper left hand corner.

Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of correspondence.

(b) Correspondence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:

(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.

(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic correspondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.

(3) In preparing a letter, the original shall: Indicate the distribution, acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeoman or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number.

Ascertain that there is a:

(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the incoming correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom.)

(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of correspondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all officers. After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.

(C) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the correspondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.

(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number immediately following the file number.

(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green); information copy (yellow); pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator (indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated by pencil diagonal mark).

(c) *Correspondence to be printed.* Four copies shall be typed, original on green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy and one pink copy. The word "PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBUTION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a printing order.

(d) *Correspondence to be mimeographed.* In order to reduce the amount of typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus, and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10)).

(e) *Multiple Address Letters.* Multiple address letters are those addressed to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be

made on green paper, and one onion skin copy shall be made for each addressee. These onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the correspondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed. All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is kept as the file copy.

(f) When a letter is required to be rewritten, the pink copy shall be removed from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally prepared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of letters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made and rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspondence files unless retention in the file is indicated.

(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeoman in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile returning to him the pink copy.

(h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief, the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer signing:

SIGNED BY	SIGNATURE Typewritten	
Chief of Staff	—	NAME
		Chief of Staff
Operations Officer when Chief of Staff is absent	—	NAME
		Acting Chief of Staff
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (Authentication of multiple address letters).	—	NAME
		NAME
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (for single address letters).	—	NAME
		by direction
		Flag Lieutenant
		(or Acting Flag Secretary)

(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.

(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall be followed:

(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman.

(2) *Tracer Yeoman*. Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulating through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(3) *Chief Yeoman in Charge*. Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

(4) *Flag Secretary*. Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.

Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent orders or instructions.

Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorsements directing action. Signs single address letters.

Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing.

(5) *Tracer Yeoman*. Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of Flag Secretary.

Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pink.

Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing.

(6) *Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman*. Removes correspondence from Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials or signature.

Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers to Tracer Desk.

(7) *Tracer Yeoman*. When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff, places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by

notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed on Commander-in-Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.

(8) *Flag Secretary*. Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.

(9) *Tracer Yeoman*. When correspondence has been signed by the Commander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

Makes daily check on pink copies where letters are outstanding.

(10) *Outgoing Mail Yeoman*. Insures that correspondence is complete; enclosures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b)); initialed by Flag Secretary; signed; that there are sufficient copies for all action and information addressees; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so marked; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.

Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action.

Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and all copies; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and initials file copy.

Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other correspondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each register number is used.

Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags.

Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent when several of the vessels under their command are present with the Commander-in-Chief.

Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribution and number of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.

Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and considered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the printing order to the originating officer, who shall, if he approves for printing, initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing correspondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely attached thereto, shall be sent to file.

NOTE: The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum.

A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Commander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled in the same manner as other "Information" copies.

When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secretary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution; stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum; sends file copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached thereto.

Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc.

Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the correspondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).

Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.

Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regulations. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming registered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are made to the Commandant's Office.

At the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:

- (1) Serial number of letter.
- (2) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed.
- (3) To whom sent.
- (4) Date of letter.
- (5) Subject.

The above data shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note "Mailed on -----" shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed.

Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.

When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman).

Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.

(11) *Tracer Yeoman.* Takes appropriate action being governed by the preceding provisions of this Article.

(12) *File Yeoman.* Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1.

505. FILE NUMBERS. The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all correspondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assigning file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for each new number so assigned.

506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspondence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number will be used. The originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each January 1st, and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFIDENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".

506-1. The File Yeoman shall:

Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action has been taken; that routing sheet has been initiated by all officers and the Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.

Prepare correspondence for file, retain spare copies in the spare copy file when action is so indicated on routing sheet.

File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants for filing correspondence of a lower classification.

Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.

Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.

Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding Correspondence.

507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed on white paper.

508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and

the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.

509. *FILING OF PRINTED MATTER.* Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled "file for ready reference" in addition to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.

None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. Whenever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.

510. *WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE.* On Tuesdays of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an officer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such officer showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A notation will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of correspondence in his possession on that date.

511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the Flag Secretary with a report of the search.

512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary.

SECTION VI.—CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE

601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the following:

(a) All correspondence classified as CONFIDENTIAL will have the word "CONFIDENTIAL" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under file number, of each sheet.

(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue paper and are plainly marked "CONFIDENTIAL".

(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known as "the CONFIDENTIAL files".

(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "CONFIDENTIAL". Confidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.

602. SECRET correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) *Stowage and Handling.* (1) SECRET correspondence files shall be kept in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer; except correspondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the Fleet Security Officer.

(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of the personal custody of staff officers at any time.

(b) *Incoming Mail.* (1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his authorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence to the Staff Duty Officer.

(2) Incoming mail marked SECRET will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.

(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer, shall log all incoming SECRET correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.

(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the SECRET correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all

SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having authorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.

(c) **Outgoing Mail.** (1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman authorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for initialing and signature.

(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.

(3) SECRET correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article 76(4), U. S. Navy Regulations.

(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.

SECTION VII. LIBRARIES

701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publications required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.

The office library consists of various books and pamphlets such as:—Annual Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions as to their disposition.

Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to that number.

The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of the library.

702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction although some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in book cases in the Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Relations Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander-in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Commander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.

SECTION VIII. RAPID COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

PART A—GENERAL

801. *Drafting of Despatches.* (a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch be made without the consent of the originating officer.

(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the message typed by his own yeoman, or duty seaman. After it has been initialed by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and supervise the transmission of the despatch.

(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted and supervise its transmission.

(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be released by other members of the Staff.

(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of originating, information and releasing officers.

802. *Security of Communications.* (a) Visual methods or landline will be used for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. *The use of radio for transmission of administrative despatches shall be kept at a minimum.*

(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mailgrams should be used particularly for transmission of despatches to information addresses when it is desirable that their radio calls do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.

803. *Distribution of Despatches.* (a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Communication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originating officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two information copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff.

(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative despatches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted for in the same manner as registered publications.

(c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made for distribution to appropriate boards.

804. *Routing and Delivery of Despatches.* (Internal) (a) Correct and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer.

(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter will accept responsibility for the message or whether it should be held for the action officer.

(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing the designated action officer of the action taken.

805. *Movement Reports.* (a) The movement report sheets and cards will be corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer.

(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.

806. *Fleet Coding Board.* (a) The fleet coding board will consist of four officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Flagship.

(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as directed by the Fleet Communication Officer.

(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organization and training of the fleet coding board.

807. *Shutting Down Transmitters.* Except in case of emergency, permission for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.

PART B—INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL

808. *Administrative Communication Organization.* (a) The following stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main radio room;
- (2) Signal bridge;
- (3) Main communication station;
- (4) Flag communication office;
- (5) Coding room.

(b) The communication watch will normally consist of:

- (1) Communication Watch Officer
- (2) Coding Board Officer
- (3) Communication Supervisor

- (4) Communication Yeoman
- (5) Communication Orderly
- (6) Radio Supervisor
- (7) Signal Supervisor
- (8) Radio Operators
- (9) Signalmen

(c) The communication watch officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions, and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(d) The coding board officer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.

(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief communication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office during working hours. The second relief communication watch officer will stand watch for 0800 until after lunch. The first relief communication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(f) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.

(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication supervisors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively.

(i) Communication Yeoman. Communication yeomen will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged by the Senior Communication Yeoman and approved by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge. Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant Communication Officer.

(k) Watches prescribed in the preceding articles will not be exchanged without permission of the officers concerned.

809. *Tactical Communication Organization.* (a) The following Stations will normally be manned:

- (1) Main Radio Room;
- (2) Signal Bridge
- (3) Main Communication Station;
- (4) Flag Communication Office
- (5) Flag Bridge Radio Station;
- (6) Flag Bridge Communication Office;
- (7) Coding Room.

(b) The communication watch normally consists of:

- (1) Communication watch officer;
- (2) Coding board officer;
- (3) Two communication yeomen;
- (4) Two communication orderlies;
- (5) Communication Supervisor;
- (6) Radio Supervisor;
- (7) Signal Supervisor;
- (8) Radio Operators;
- (9) Signalmen;
- (10) Additional members of coding board as necessary.

(c) Communication watch offices shall maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation requires.

(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding Room. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the situation requires.

(e) The Chief Radiomen assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.

(f) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.

(g) Communication yeomen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.

(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge.

810. Duties of Communication Watch Officer. (a) The communication watch officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all communication personnel.

(c) The communication watch officer is responsible for complete and rapid internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing traffic.

(d) The communication watch officer is responsible for the handling of encrypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.

(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the communication channels required by the organization.

811. Duties of Coding Board Officers. (a) The coding board officer is in charge of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room.

(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.

(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for cryptographic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic aids, publications and devices in the coding room.

812. Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers. Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be considered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must:

(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Communication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions;

(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book and Signal Vocabulary;

(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff Organization;

(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant of the Fleet Flagship;

(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Commander-in-Chief.

(f) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication and cryptographic security and their application.

813. Routing of Despatches. (a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this knowledge to each despatch.

(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Admiral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for disposition.

(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of

Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of Staff shall be the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further delivery. When the Chief of Staff is not available despatches may be shown to the action officer prior to final approval of the routing.

(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship. Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addressed to, but which are of interest to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communication office for internal distribution.

814. *Delivery of despatches.* (a) The communication watch officer will be responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between 0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communication watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer immediately.

(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by 0900 daily.

(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.

815. *Emergencies.* (a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an emergency is the primary consideration.

(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let the system delay action.

(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and retain them on watch as long as required.

(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any unusual occurrence.

816. *Encrypted Despatches.* (a) If time permits, the encryption of each outgoing encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.

817. *Intercepted Traffic.* Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information."

818. *Radio Logs.* Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413-1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for intercepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascertain that circuit discipline is being maintained.

19. *Transmitting and Receiving Data.* Transmitting and receiving data will be recorded by the radio operator or signalman as indicated below:

Radio

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) Frequency
- (3) Operator's sign.

Visual

- (1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
- (2) System
- (3) Signalman's sign.

820. *Communication Files.* (a) General File. The general file includes one copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except despatches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall

be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified mailgrams (other than restricted) shall be filed in the classified files and a tickler filed in the general file.

(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.

(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.

(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or written up for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.

(e) Alnav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in order of alnav number.

(f) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this file in order of fleet number.

(g) Classified Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.

(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files contain one copy of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order of date time groups.

§21. Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:

(a) Outgoing Circuit

Front Cover	—	General File
First copy	—	Station File
Second copy	—	Flag File
Third copy	—	Originator
Back copy	—	Ship

(b) Outgoing Administrative

Front cover	—	General File
First copy	—	Flag File
Second copy	—	Originator
Third copy	—	Admiral
Fourth copy	—	Chief of Staff
Fifth copy	—	Operations Officer
Sixth copy	—	Flag Secretary
Seventh copy	—	Staff Duty Officer
Eighth copy	—	Communication Officer
Ninth copy	—	Station File
Back cover	—	Ship

(c) Outgoing Tactical

Front cover	—	Translation File
First copy	—	Flag Plot
Second copy	—	Flag Plot
Back cover	—	Coding Board

(d) Outgoing Umpire

Front cover	—	Translation File
First copy	—	Umpire
Back cover	—	Coding Board

(e) Incoming Circuit

Front cover	—	General File
First copy	—	Spare copy
Second copy	—	Advance action
Back copy	—	Check copy

(f) Incoming Administrative

Front cover	—	Flag File
First copy	—	Action
Second copy	—	Admiral
Third copy	—	Chief of Staff
Fourth copy	—	Operations Officer
Fifth copy	—	Flag Secretary
Sixth copy	—	Staff Duty Officer
Seventh copy	—	Information
Eighth copy	—	Information
Back cover	—	Communication Officer

(g) Incoming Tactical		
Front cover	—	Translation File
First copy	—	Flag Plot
Second copy	—	Flag Plot
Back copy	—	Coding Board
(h) Incoming Contact Report		
Front cover	—	Translation File
First copy	—	Flag Plot
Second copy	—	Flag Plot
Back cover	—	Ship
(i) Incoming Empire		
Front cover	—	Translation File
First copy	—	Empire
Back cover	—	Coding Board

SECTION IX. REGISTERED AND OTHER SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS

901. The Communication Security Officer is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.

902. A Communication Watch Officer, designated as Registered Publications Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential publications. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.

903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered publication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual, which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar manner.

904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns, each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory.

905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized stowages.

906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publications in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.

907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered publications, except for: (a) communication office safes; (b) War plans safe; (c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.

908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combination of all safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another officer.

909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members of the staff correct their own publications; but even though they do so, their work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible for their being corrected.

910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes especially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered Publication Officer.

SECTION X. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLAG AND SHIP.

A — Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship.

1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation.

1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, verbally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or position.

1003. When, for any reason, the movements of the flagship are no longer to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which he is expected to act independently.

1004. When in position, the commanding officer is responsible for the station keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate.

B — Honors.

1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer.

C — Personnel

1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The Admiral desires you-----Etc."

1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Division Officers will be the Communication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.

1008. Leave and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407(a)). The flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining to flag personnel:

(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.

(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).

(c) Disciplinary matters.

(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.

1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster or flag personnel:

(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quarters with the flagship.

(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's marine detachment.

1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills and general quarters, Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.

1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compartments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats; the signal force, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Signal Bridge and Flag Conning Tower.

1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. Enlisted men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will not stand ship cruising watches.

1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur, signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and

Orchestra is assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.

1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing regulations and instructions.

D—Routine Reports

1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to promulgate the following instructions:

(a) *AT ANCHOR*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as follows:

- (a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
- (b) Ship's Movements.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) Display of storm signals.
- (e) All occurrences worthy of notice.

(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls, shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lieutenant to the Staff Duty Officer.

(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required in attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside.

(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes, and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.

(5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken.

(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Office, prior to 0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.

(b) *UNDERWAY*

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge:

- (a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and discolored water.
- (b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
- (c) All marked changes in the weather.
- (d) All occurrences worthy of notice.

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff Duty.

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff Duty Officer on watch.

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 35

My

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063W

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KIMMEL.

[i]

SECRET

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.

Enclosures:

- (A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and the Registered Publication Manual.

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

6. SPECIAL WARNING—the contents of this publication shall be given the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the subordinate plans.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSELY,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Flag Secretary.

[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES—WPPac-46

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List of Effective Pages, WPPac-46.....	ii.....	"
Table of Corrections.....	iii.....	"
Distribution List.....	iv.....	"
Title Page.....	1.....	"
Table of Contents.....	2, 2a, 2b.....	"
Parts I to V (incl.).....	3-52 incl.....	"
	52a-52h incl.....	"
	53-56 incl.....	"
	56a-56d incl.....	"
	57-74 incl.....	"
Annex I.....	I-1 to I-11 incl.....	"
Annex II.....	II-1 to II-9 incl.....	"
Annex III.....	III-1 to III-5 incl.....	"
Annex IV.....	IV-1 to IV-3 incl.....	"

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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.....
.....
.....

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

Official to Whom Issued	Registered Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations.....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	7, 8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.....	9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.....	10, 11
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Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in reserve.

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

WPPac-46

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[3]

SECRET

*U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN (RAINBOW FIVE)

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.

[4]

CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemination on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:

a. In Part I the order of presentation is:

- Chapter I—Task Organization.
- Chapter II—Assumptions.
- Chapter III—Information.

b. In Part II are incorporated:

- Chapter I —Task assigned by Basic Plan.
- Chapter II—Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accomplishing the assigned mission together with (in a few instances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried out.

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Pertinent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this O-1 Plan. Where a task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time, and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five), are considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures of Phase I and Phase IA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes [5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional form with which all concerned are familiar.

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occasion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order by despatch or letter.

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.

[6]

CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared as follows:

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operating Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task assigned at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.

Task Force One.....	A-1, etc.
Task Force Two.....	B-1, "
Task Force Three.....	C-1, "
Aircraft Scouting Force.....	D-1, "
Submarines Scouting Force.....	E-1, "
Minecraft Battle Force.....	F-1, "
Base Force.....	G-1, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.....	H-1, "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	J-1, "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.....	K-1, "

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a brief and summarized estimate of the situation as an addendum to his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be appended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group commanders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to the task force commander for acceptance.

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal system of numbering subdivisions.

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One will be "a-1".

[8]

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.

[9]

PART I. TASK ORGANIZATION, ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:

Task Force One.—for covering operations—Commander Battle Force in command.

Task Force Two.—for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations—Commander Aircraft Battle Force in command.

Task Force Three.—for landing attack operations—Commander Scouting Force in command.

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to accomplish the assigned task.

[10]

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show the task organizations at that time.

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organization that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassignment is made by competent authority.

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:

1. *TASK FORCE ONE* Commander Battle Force

Batdivs 2, 4	6 BB
SARATOGA	1 CV
Crudivs 3, 9	5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9	4 OCL#
	2 DL
	16 DD#
	2 AD

(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)

2. *TASK FORCE TWO* Commander Aircraft Battle Force

Batdiv 1	3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN	1 CV
Crudiv 5	4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50	1 OCL
	8 DD
	2 AD

(#Includes Atlantic Reinforcement of 4 CA.)

3. *TASK FORCE THREE* Commander Scouting Force

Crudivs 4, 6	8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA	1 CV
Desrons 4, 5	2 DL
	16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6	5 DM
Available Transports Base Force	— AP
	— APD

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.

2d Marine Air Group.

[12] 4. *TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force)* Commander Aircraft Scouting Force

All units of Aircraft Scouting Force.....	107 VP
	2 AV
	2 AVP
	4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force.....	10 VJR

5. *TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force)* Commander Submarines Scouting Force

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School..	30 SS
	2 OSS
	1 SM
	1 ODD
	3 AS
	2 ASR
	1 AM

6. *TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force)* Commander Minecraft Battle Force

All units of Minecraft Battle Force.....	1 CM
	8 DM

7. *TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force)* Commander Base Force

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less	8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ.	4 AF
	6 AT
	1 AH
	13 AO
	2 AR
	1 ARD
	2 AK
	2 AE
	1 AKS
	10 AM
	4 AG
	Utility Wing

[13] 8. *TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

9. *TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Coastal and local defense forces.

10. *TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)* Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Local defense forces.

[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reinforcement, composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.

[15] CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

Section 1. General Assumptions

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive

elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so conducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional transfers may become necessary.

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reinforcements will be made in the Far East.

[16] *Section 2. Special Assumption*

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces immediately available by about one-fifth.

[17]

CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 1. General Information

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces.

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of Mexico.

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, and, in addition, Alaska.

f. The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western borders of that zone.

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1).

Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being made.

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. [20] The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

Section 2. Enemy Information

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the execution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.

[21] *Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action*

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reinforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reinforcement of the Mandates.

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area.

[23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas of lines of communication.

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of usual routes.

[24]

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. Defend Samoa in category "D";

f. Defend Guam in category "F";

g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

- c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M.day.
- g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
- h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- [26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
- k. Continue training operations as practicable.
 - 1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
- m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

Phase IA

2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
- b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
- c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the northern Pacific.
- d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the associated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering operations.
 - e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
 - 2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
- f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
- g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
- [27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian reas and the West Coast.
 - i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
 - j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.
 - k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.
 - l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.

Phase II and subsequent phases

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at this time are:

- a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island Area.
- b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary for further advance to the westward.
- c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
- d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
- e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase IA.

[28]

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3111. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[29] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3121. *Task Force Two* will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[30] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3131. *Task Force Three* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

c. 1. *Special Information.*

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are as follows:

MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5''/51 caliber guns
12 3''/50 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.

JOHNSTON—18 men
2 5''/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
4 3''/50 caliber AA guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns

[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5''/51 caliber guns
8 3''/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns

NOTE: The above personnel are defense battalion personnel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard duty, barracks duty, etc.

WAKE —None.

2. *Task*

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

[32] *Section 4. TALK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3141. *Task Force Nine* will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

[33] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3151. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3152. a. *Special Information.*

1. There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall area.

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deployment suitable for this eventuality.

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.

b. *Task.*

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.

3153. Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

[34] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3161. *Task Force Eight* will:

Continue operations and training under commanders *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

[35] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3171. *Task Force Six* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander *Task Force Nine*.

[36] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

3181. *Special Information.*

The *Basic Plan* assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category "D"—May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3182. By this *Fleet Plan*, *Task Force Four* is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I.

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)

3183. Commanders *Task Forces Five* and *Ten* perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[38] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal Frontiers will perform the following tasks:

a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief may direct.

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the commander-in-chief.

[39] CHAPTER II. PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3211. *Task Force One* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

3213. Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[40] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3221. *Task Force Two* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

[41] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3231. *Task Force Three* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs of this section.

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

3233. Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II).

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[42] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3241. *Task Force Nine* will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

3242. a. *Special Information.*

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence.

Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has been approved.

2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 1. Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol plane operations.

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.

[43] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.

b. *Tasks.*

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same general area.

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at discretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

c. *Special Logistics.*

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways facilities.

[45] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3251. *Task Force Seven* will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.

3252a. 1. *Special Information.*

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas and the Japanese Homeland.

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and Johnston Islands.

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloelap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami Oshima.

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is believed that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the Inland Sea.

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be expected.

[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are very important.

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

b. *Tasks*

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving Stations the following priority.

YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

c. *Special Logistics.*

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.

[48] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3261. *Task Force Eight* will:

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this phase.

[49] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)*

3271. *Task Force Six* will:

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (annex II).

[50] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3281. *Task Force Five* (Pacific Northern) and *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

3282. *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:

Continue tasks assigned for phase I.

[51] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3291. *All task forces concerned:*

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE

3311. *Task Force One* will:

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex —), and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52a] *Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO*

3321. *Task Force Two* will:

Reinforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.

[52b] *Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE*

3331. *Task Force Three* will:

- a. Continue training for landing attacks.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations involving landing attacks.
- c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
- d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.

[52c] *Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)*

3341. *Task Force Nine* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
- b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

[52d] *Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)*

3351. *Task Force Seven* will:

- a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
- b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.

*U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN O-1, RAINBOW FIVE)*

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE IA

[52e] *Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)*

3361. *Task Force Eight* will:

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex —) and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.

[52f] *Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL FORCE)*

3371. *Task Force Six* will:

- a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
- b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.

[52g] *Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS*

3381. *Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten* will:

Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.

[52h] *Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE*

3391. *All task forces concerned:*

Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE".

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE PHASE ONE AFIRM".

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once.

[54] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be

made when the execution of Phase IA is ordered. Units concerned will report by despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.

From	To	Unit transferred	Transfer effected	Remarks
Taskfor 1.....	Southeastern Pacific For.	{ 2 OCL.....	} When directed..	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
Taskfor 3.....		{ 1 Desdiv.....		
		1 CL.....	W-Day.....	
Taskfor 2.....	Taskfor 3.....	1 CA.....	W-Day.....	For rotation on patrol until J-Day.
	Atlantic Reen.....	4 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
Taskfor 3.....	Taskfor 2.....	2 CA.....	When directed..	If Atlantic Reen. is detached.
	PSNCF.....	{ 12 VPB.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
		{ 1 AVD.....		
		1 AVP.....		
Taskfor 9 (Patrol Plane Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 12 VPB.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
		{ 1 AVD.....		
		1 AVP.....		
Taskfor 7 (Undersea Force).	PNNCF.....	{ 2 SS.....	} W-Day.....	{ Administration remains. Units may be rotated.
		1 ASR.....		
	Taskfor 3.....	NARWHAL or NAUTILUS.	W-Day.....	Base Samoa. Released on J-Day.
[56]				
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).	Hawaiian NCF.....	{ 1 CM.....	} J-Day.....	Until further orders.
		{ 8 DM.....		
Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control For).	Taskfor 3.....	1 AO.....	W-Day.....	Base Samoa, released on J-Day.
		1 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial sweep. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 2.....	2 AO.....	J-Day.....	For fueling at sea ships in initial reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. To revert when released.
	Taskfor 9.....	10 VJR.....	J-Day.....	Until further orders.
All Forces.....	Hawaiian NCF.....	As directed.....	When directed..	
	Taskfor 6 (Logistic and Control Force).	Any ship passing between West Coast and Hawaii.	Prior to scheduled date of departure.	For escort duty. To revert on completion.

[56]

PART IV. LOGISTICS

CHAPTER I. GENERAL

4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present outlying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transportation facilities available.

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic requirements as far as they can be foreseen.

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.

[56a]

CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and personnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the supply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel.

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospital space available.

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.

[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific Fleet—8; Southeast Pacific Force—8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

[56d] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore establishment.

[57] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time will be used in carrying out this Plan.

[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by Annex III to this Plan.

[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-Chief.

[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.

[61] Section 1. Phase I

United States Pacific Fleet
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Operation Plan No. 1-R5

Initial Task Organization

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)

(a) *Task Force One*—Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus ½ minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(b) *Task Force Two*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus $\frac{1}{2}$ mincraft less one cruiser in rotation to *Task Force Three* patrol pool.

(c) *Task Force Three*—Commander Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 cruiser each from *Task Forces One* and *Two* for cruiser patrol pool plus 1 SS from *Task Force Seven*, 1 AO from *Task Force Six*, and (on request) 1 patron and tender from *Task Force Seven* for South Pacific operations.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscorfor Hawaiian Area).—Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal Frontiers, and (if requested by *Commander Task Force Three*) 1 patron and tender to *Task Force Three*.

[62] (e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force)—Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.—Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to *Task Force Ten* and 1 SS to *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).—Non-operative as such; normal units thereof being divided between *Task Forces One* and *Two*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force)—Commander Base Force.—Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus units from other fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine*.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)—Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.—Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from *Task Force Nine* plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from *Task Force Seven*.

[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.—(1) When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the Navy Basic Plan.

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(b) *Task Force Two*.—(1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok.

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).—(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—(1) Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).

(2) Assign one submarine division to *Task Force Three* as required for landing attack training.

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.

(f) *Task Force Eight*. (Mining Force).—(1) Continue training under *Commander Task Force One*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).—(1) Provide logistic services to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.

- [65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
- (3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
- (h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.
- (2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.
- (3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).
- (4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.
- (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).—(1) Perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
- [66] (j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).—
- (1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
- (x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.
- (2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- (3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.
- (4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.
- (5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
- (6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief.
4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by Annex III.
- (b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.
- (c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

Tentative

United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.

Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.

Initial task organization

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)

(a) *Task Force One*. Commander Battle Force.—Normal units this task force less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three* less 1 CV and all other large CL's to *Task Force Two* for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.

(b) *Task Force Two*. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.—Normal units this task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from *Task Force One*

plus 1 CV from *Task Force Three* less any cruiser absent on patrol with *Task Force Three*.

(c) *Task Force Three*. Commander Scouting Force.—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to *Task Force Two* less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from *Task Force Six* for fueling at sea.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).—Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

[69]

PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS—PHASES I AND IA

Section 2. Phase IA

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from *Task Force Three*.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force)
Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from *Task Forces One and Two* at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase IA being transferred to *Task Force Four*.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from *Task Force Three*
less 2 AO transferred to *Task Force Two*
less 1 AO transferred to *Task Force Three*.

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.

(i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.

1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East, will:

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy merchant ships and raiders.

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with cruisers.

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.

3. (a) *Task Force One*.

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce and support operations of *Task Force Two* as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(b) *Task Force Two*.

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

[71] (c) *Task Force Three*.

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(2) Reinforce *Task Force Two* as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENIWETOK.

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid disproportionate losses.

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be temporarily transferred to Commander *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating conditions, giving stations the following priority:

YOKOHAMA
 BUNGO CHANNEL
 KII CHANNEL
 TSUSHIMA
 NAGASAKI
 SHIMONOSEKI
 TSUGARU

[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining will be issued later.

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.

(f) *Task Force Eight* (Mining Force).

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the local defense forces during this Phase.

(g) *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force).

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.
 (2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(h) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

[74] (i) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(j) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the probable increase in enemy activities.

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as specially provided for in the Annexes.

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
 (b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
 (c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.

[I-1]

ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
 Place
 Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan
 No.

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force One.
 - (b) Task Force Two.
 - (c) Task Force Three.
 - (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
 - (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
 - (f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
 - (g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
 - (i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
- (Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

2.

Phase I

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- [I-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
 (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
 (c) Covering.
 (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
 (e) Routing shipping.

Phase IA

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later.

3. (a) *Task Force One.*

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.

[I-3] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(b) *Task Force Two.*

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to *Task Force Three* for cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reinforcement this subparagraph is inapplicable).

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of *Task Force Three* are not within supporting distance of such contacts.

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) conduct such sweep as information and circumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.

(c) *Task Force Three*, reinforced with one cruiser each from *Task Forces One and Two* (for cruiser patrol pool), *NARWHAL* or *NAUTILUS* from *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force), and one oiler from *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force), also further reinforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander *Task Force Nine*) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication lines, operating in general as follows:

[I-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reinforcement is detached) on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred miles from land. Reserve such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, request from Commander *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives as may from time to time be issued.

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the Midway-Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.

(2) Upon commencement of Phase IA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with Commander *Task Force Six* for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on outward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.

[I-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase IA, discontinue patrols required by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the following general lines:

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, rendezvous with oiler supplied by *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) in latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join *Task Force Two* (Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan O-1) on twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining *Task Force Two*, advise the commander thereof as to the extent of the delay.

[I-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces within striking distance take precedence over joining *Task Force Two*.

(5) If Atlantic Reinforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to *Task Force Two*. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from *Task Force Two* to *Task Force Three*, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander *Task Force Three*, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

[I-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).

(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gaining information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.

(3) At commencement of Phase IA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised as to location and routes of own submarines.

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to *Task Force Three* for operations in South Pacific during Phase I.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern) and *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian [I-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Commander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander *Task Force Three*.

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of *Task Force Three* on eight J-Day in latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).

(g) *Task Force Four* (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area.

[I-9] (h) *Task Force Five* (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(3) In the initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.

(i) *Task Force Ten* (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.

(2) In initial stages of Phase IA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will permit.

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

[I-10] (2) All task forces make available to Commander *Task Force Six* (Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii and West Coast.

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare").

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy, modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan O-1.

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic Reinforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.

[I-11] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five apply.

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[II-1]

ANNEX II

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. _____

Initial Task Organization.

- (a). *Task Force One.*
- (b). *Task Force Two.*
- (c). *Task Force Three.*
- (d). *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force).
- (e). *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).
- (f). *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force).

Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.

1. (a) *Information.*—(1) This plan covers the initial operations in the MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions in the MARSHALLS.

2. This force will:

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land defenses and material installations therein.

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.

[II-2] 3. (a) *Task Force One.*—(1) Transfer available large light cruisers and carrier to *Task Force Two* on J-Day.

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and proceed to rendezvous with *Task Force Two* at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, *Task Force Two*, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five).

(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, Commander *Task Force One* assume general charge of all further operations in connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander *Task Force Two* to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of *Task Force Two*.

(5) Cover operations of *Task Force Two*, as reinforced, from the area to the northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as developments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of *Task Force One*. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of *Task Force Two* which it may be necessary to return to base.

(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.

[II-3] (7) After *Task Force Two* has completed raids and rejoined, if the Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander *Task Force One* carry out further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL HARBOR at discretion.

(b) *Task Force Two*, reinforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with reinforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to *Task Force One*. Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or other designated rendezvous.

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and developments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGELAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Reconnoiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.

[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular places may be attacked.

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable and feasible.

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accurately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular interest are:

- ships and aircraft;
- storage tanks;
- power plants and radio installations;
- docks;
- air fields;
- storehouses and other buildings;

guns and observation posts;
mines;
channel and beach obstructions;
other defense installations;
beaches suitable for landing operations;
extent of anchorage area;
hydrographic, topographic, and
meteorological features.

(v) Retire on own battleships or *Task Force One* for assistance should circumstances require.

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making initial flights over enemy territory.

[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join *Task Forces One* and *Three*. Transfer battleships to *Task Force One*. *Task Force Three* will merge into *Task Force Two* at this time.

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, *Task Force One* and the Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs obtained, and copy of raiding plan.

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Commander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, *Task Force One*, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best meets the existing situation.

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of attack being at the discretion of the *Task Force* Commander and designed to provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance to the objectives of attack.

[II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:

combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
other ships;
fuel tanks;
power and radio installations;
troop concentrations;
storehouses;
other installations.

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five per cent of bombs or ammunition on *fixed* objectives.

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installations and eliminate enemy personnel.

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of damaged ships, requesting escorts from *Task Force One*.

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join *Task Force One*.

(c) *Task Force Three*.—(1) If Atlantic Reinforcement has been detached, transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to *Task Force Two*.

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to *Task Force Two* for this operation beginning J-Day.

[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each cruiser which will eventually join *Task Force Two*.

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on about Ten J-Day, join *Task Force Two* with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of *Task Force Two* until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength

to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

[II-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint Commander *Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Undersea Force).—No primary tasks in connection with this plan are assigned but:

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) report enemy information obtained.

(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of submarines.

(f) *Task Force Six* (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry out the following:

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander *Task Force Two* to rendezvous with the advance group of *Task Force Two* on Five J-Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Commander *Task Force Two*.

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging at a disadvantage.

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase IIA of U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.

(c) Rendezvous Tare; Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred seventy-seven degrees East.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.

Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.

[III-1]

ANNEX III

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.

1110. Effective.

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effective coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan O-1 Rainbow Five.

1170 to 1178. Effective.

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.

No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a carrier from its oscillating circuit.

1180. Effective.

1190. Effective.

1212. Effective.

1220. Effective.

1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.

[III-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.

2131. Effective.

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of the O. T. C. of a Task Force.

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maximum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force Commanders.

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operating area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-3] for inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline exists or may be established.

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.

2300. Effective.

2400. Effective.

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for administrative traffic.

2540. Effective.

2720. Effective.

2740. Effective.

3000. Effective.

4120. Effective.

5000. Effective.

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days (GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when the sun is low.

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as follows:

(a) *Daytime.*—On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course,

dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.

(b) *Nighttime*.—Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show *green* colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise designated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.

0131. Effective.

6200. Effective.

6400. Effective.

6500. Effective.

6610. Effective.

7000 (less 7100). Effective.

[IV-1]

ANNEX IV

Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may consist, broadly, of the following:

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile attack.

(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with other operations.

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the following:

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform to and be guided by the local regulations.

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the information available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further the broad operating plan in effect.

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the command and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases concerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations (unless specifically directed otherwise).

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.

(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as soon as possible after arrival.

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the Base plans.

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between such forces and the local defense commander.

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organization commanders.

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization commanders present.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 36

Sep 9, 1941.

[IH]
Op-12B-2-djm
(SC) A16/EF12
Serial 098912
D-33956

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

ROUTING AND TRANSFER SLIP—NAVY DEPT., ROOM 2055

(SC) A16/FF12

Document No. 33956

SUBJECT: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46)

Date received 8-12-41

Parcel or Postal No. Five

From—	To—	File	Serial	Date	Copy No.	With enclosures	Without enclosure
ltr: CinCPac	CNO	A16/WPPac-46 (16)	064W	7-25-41	1-5	-----	A Encls. received direct by 20-P

Routed to—	Copy No.	With enclosures	No. Cy. enclosures	SECRET	Remarks	CONFIDENTIAL
12	1-5	-----	-----			

[2H]

WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR ACTION OR IMMEDIATE REFERENCE PLEASE RETURN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) TO ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

IF IT IS DESIRED TO RETAIN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) INDEFINITELY PLEASE REMOVE ORIGINAL OF THIS ROUTING AND TRANSFER SLIP AND RETURN SAME TO ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF C. N. O.

Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	
With enclosures	With enclosures	
9 Received	(Date)	Received	(Date)	10
Op.	(Signature)	Op.	(Signature)	
GPO	GPO	
Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	
With enclosures	With enclosures	
7 Received	(Date)	Received	(Date)	8
Op.	(Signature)	Op.	(Signature)	
GPO	GPO	
Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	
With enclosures	With enclosures	
5 Received	(Date)	Received	(Date)	6
Op.	(Signature)	Op.	(Signature)	
GPO	GPO	
Doc. No. 33956	Copy No. 1-4	Doc. No. 33956	Copy No.	
With enclosures	With enclosures	
3 Received 9-9-41	(Date)	Received	(Date)	4
Op. 12	W. C. Blaine	Op.	(Signature)	
GPO	(Signature)	GPO	
Doc. No. 33956	Copy No. 1-5	Doc. No. 33956	Copy No. 1-4	
With enclosures	With enclosures	
1 Received 8-12-41	(Date)	Received 9-6-41	(Date)	2
Op. 12	W. C. Blaine	Op. 10C	A. Meek	
GPO	(Signature)	GPO 16-15240	(Signature)	

[3H] [Stamped:] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug 12 1941. Route to:
 12. Op File No. (SC) A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 1 of 5.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

CinC File No.
 A16/WPPac-46(16)
 Serial 064W

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).
 Reference: (a) WPL-46.

Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.
2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted when completed.
4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as they are developed.
5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine

vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.

6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 36A

[4H] [Stamped:] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug. 12, 1941. Route to:
12. Op File No. (SC A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 2 of 5.

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

A16/WPPac-46(16)

Serial 064W

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).

Reference: (a) WPL-46.

Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.

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6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[7H]

CHARGE SLIP

C. N. O. FILES

File No. (SC) A16/FF12

Serial No. 098912 D-33956

Date Sep. 3, 1941

From CNO

To. CincPac.

Subject U. S. Pac. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Enclosures Doc. 33956—CincPac Ltr. of July 25, 1941 to CNO on same subject.
(Orig. & 3 copies.)

Charged to Comdr. Griswold

For Admiral Hewitt.

Charged by Lt. N. M. Blake

Date May 26, 1945.

Received by

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 37

Date 22 November, 1941.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

OUTGOING

From CINCPAC [11 PAC]	Info To:	Classification: Plain	Originator: 12	HO
To COMPATWING 2		Precedence: Routine	Release: 01	
		System: LL	Show to: 13 95	

Heading: Z F5L 220130 M9U GR3

[1J]

URSER 0780 AFFIRMATIVE
Ref: CLASSIFIED.PW #2 0131A/22
MHASent at 0131/TT
Flag file. TS 01976

(At this point in Exhibit No. 37 there appears:

1. A copy of a routing slip bearing Cincus routing No. 10548 and date 19 November 1941.
2. A memorandum form bearing handwritten notations.

This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 120 and 121, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[4J]

[Endorsed:] A4-3/FF12-7 A4-3/VZ
PW2/A4-3/0780PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 19 Nov. 1941.*Confidential*

From: The Commander Task Force NINE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule.

1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter.
2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested.

P. N. L. Bellinger
P. N. L. BELLINGER.
10543(The enclosures mentioned *supra*, being two copies of proposed revised schedule for November and December 1941 for the Commander of Task Force Nine, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 122 and 123, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT EXHIBIT No. 38

(This exhibit consists of two parts, viz, Exhibit Nos. 38A and 38B.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 38A

INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE CONSUL-GENERAL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41-12/2/41

SECRET

1-466

WEDNESDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.—Out.—Have him call.
 0912 i NJ to OG for birth date. NI.
 1108 i Man to MURAOKA re sports.
 1115 i MIKAMI to SAKAI. NI.
 1255 o MURAOKA asks Tamako /female name/ to come to see them next week.
 /This has all the earmarks of straight social talk./
 1257 o SAKAI tells wife /?/ that they won't need the car this Sunday.
 1305 o Man asks HBD for thick drawing paper and a fountain pen. NI.
 1310 i XX to MIKAMI ordering a car for 2.15.
 1320 o SEKI to NAKAMURA of HBD re paper and maps. /No localities indicated./
 1324 o To HBD for supplies.

End

1-467

THURSDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 o To NISHIKAWA.—Out.—Have him call.
 1028 i Universal Motors says the parts are ready at any time.
 1042 i MURAOKA to NISHIKAWA /commercial; NI/.
 1055 i Man to SAKAI re XP. Routine info.
 1115 o To MIKAMI asking him to call XX.
 1121 o To RCA for messenger.
 1121 i For closing hours.
 1134 i TAKAGISHI to XX inviting him for next Monday, the 6th, at about 2:00.
 T. also thanks XX and apologizes for keeping him up late. T. remarks that XX was "high" at the /wedding/ party /of Sumida's son/ and yelled a lot and XX says he remembers having a good time, but doesn't remember yelling. T. will call for him.
 1140 o XX to Mrs. ? saying he has just learned from Mr. TAKAGISHI that he was pretty bad the other night. He apologizes for his behavior and seems to be sincerely remorseful. She says that the incident T. referred to was quite late when XX entered the maid's room and got tangled with the maid. He says he learned about it from T. She giggles and is amused at his contrite heart. He asks what time the Incident /not War/ took place.—About 1:30. /It seems that MIKAMI failed to show up when he was supposed to and XX got beyond his depth in *sake*. He forgot somethink there that night, and Mrs. ? /Sumida?/ asks when she may return it to him. They both laugh unroariously at the "missing link" of his evening's adventure. She asks whether he is at home and learns that he is at the office. She refers to it as "that", which leads to more merriment, and says she will send "that" up this afternoon.
 1145 o NI.
 1330 o O. G. to Rev. IKEZAKI re girl that lives at Koloa, born 7 Feb. 1916.

1-468

FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX.—Not in.
 0905 i NAKATSUKA to XX re the Advertiser spread about Senator Gillette's remarks on the subversive activities of X. N. asks XX whether the accusations are just.—No, they are only rumors.—Do you have any idea how the rumor started?—No. I don't know at all what activities are referred to as leading to the X in Hawaii.—Have you heard anyone from the American Government asking you questions? According to Senator Gillette, the FBI and Army and Navy Intelligence services desire such an inquiry. He gives the idea that they are more or less following the activities of X. /They both agree that very foolish state-

ments often get into the papers./ . . . Have you heard anything about the Japanese on the Pacific Coast?—No, I don't think so.—You feel they are just as loyal as the Js. in Hawaii, then?—Yes, I think so.—They, of course, you deny all what he says.—Yes, I deny it.—Categorically deny it?—Oh, yes.—He mentions here that some organizations send funds to Japan or help distribute propaganda films in the U. S. Do you feel that these allegations are true or not?—No, I've never heard about the Army /apparently misunderstood N. to say the Army was sending them/ sending films here.—You deny that X is taking part in any subversive activity, of course?—Yes. /N. will let XX look over whatever he writes on this matter./

- 0911 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to SAKAI re data on man named NITTA. NI.
 0938 i NAKATSUKA to XX reading his story re Senator Gillette's allegations of "unconsular" activities on the part of X. XX then asks N. to wait a moment.—What for?—I am preparing a statement for you.—You mean you are translating your J. statement into English?—Yes.—Are you writing a long statement?—No. /N. then continues reading his story. XX asks for his phone number and says he will call him back./
- 0949 o SEKI TO NAKAMURA of HBD for paper.
 0959 o XX to NAKATSUKA saying he put the matter in very simple Japanese, but believes N.'s story covers it very well. XX adds that he has heard for the first time of the Japanese military league in the U. S. which is accused of subversive activities on the West Coast. XX requests N. to look at his paper of 4 and 5 January. VX called XX's attention to the fact that Gillette made a statement on the 4th and the following day a S-B editorial referred to him. XX approves N.'s story including XX's denial that the J. War Office distributed films in America.
- 1008 o SAKAI to KAWAMOTO at NJ.—Out at a meeting.—Have him call.
 1053 i /FPM/ Man tells OG he has received a letter which indicates that the Federal Govt. is going to treat all dual citizens as aliens beginning 1 October. Can X do anything about it?—No.—Thanks.
- 1139 i KONISHI to SAKAI. Routine request for data.
 1355 i NAWATANI to YUGE. /A very cryptic brief conversation in which great surprise was expressed at some telegram or wireless message received. No details given./

1-470

SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1941

- 0952 i KATSUNUMA asks OG re Nakazo FUJII. He has died in Hilo and his friends have phoned to find out what *ken* he is from. They are all embarrassed about the funeral /i.e., they don't know which *kenjin-kai* will take charge/. Call 98310.
- 1037 o OG to KATSUNUMA saying he is not listed, but his younger brother, Nobuta, is given. Yamaguchi.
- 1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. XX approves N.'s story re Gillette's accusations. N. asks whether XX has had any communication re the two NYK ships coming here.—No; none; I have read about them in the paper. I wonder where they got the information. I haven't received any letters from Japan since July. I haven't received any information at all about this.
- 1050 i KONISHI to MURAOKA re XP of a Korean.—That's impossible. The Koreans are in the same position as the British or Germans with regard to dual citizenship.—This is a student at the University who has been told he must XP before he can be eligible for an exchange scholarship.—After a check, I find that it is impossible for a Korean to XP.

End

1-471

SUNDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1941

Not Covered

1-472

MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1941

- 0945 i NAKATSUKA asks XX about ships. They agree that the rumors are persistent, but no official confirmation has been received.

- 0957 i NOMURA /f/ to MURAOKA re passport issued in 1889 (28 Nov.) to Sanzuchi IWASAKI. Proof of arrival and date of marriage of parents lacking.
- 1012 o KOTOSHIRODO /?/ to man. /Very brief, indistinct./
- 1047 o SAKAI to MIHO.—He's at National Mortgage; call 6221.—Have him call. He sent a check to cover some fees. We asked him to send cash.—Alright. /A sign of the times. Fees paid in cash are not subject to control or are easily kept out of reach of the controllers. X refuses all checks now./
- 1053 o No answer. NR.
- 1102 o NOMURA to MURAOKA again.—We find we have the record. He came in 1887 on the 11th of December on the Wakaura Maru, ship No. 4.
- 1120 i Man /possibly Dr. _____ of Maui/ to LG arranging to see her /at X?/ this afternoon.
- 1127 o XX to cook saying he will not require lunch. /He also went to hear Bowles at PPU./
- 1137 o /NR/ No answer.
- 1205 o SAHARA to Mr. BEERLY /?/.—He's busy.
- 1207 i Woman to MURAOKA re picnic.
- 1300 o SEKI to NAKAMURA.—Out.—When will he be back?—He's gone to McCully.—I'll call again.—Shall I have him call?—No, I'd rather call myself for it may be evening before I call.
- 1303 o OG to friend re picnic this Saturday. NC.
- 1316 o ? to KOGO.—Out.—When will he be back?—Probably about 4:30.—I'll call.

1-473

- 1359 o SAKAI for ?—He's left.
- 1404 o OI to his OG for ?'s number.—6361, local 105.
- 1405 o OI to Mr. AUSTIN /?/ at 6361, local 105. OI says the secretary of X returned here in 1940 on a diplomatic passport. Is he a blocked national?—I think he probably would be.—You do?—Sure, no doubt . . . What's his name?—Mr. YUGE. He has over \$1,000 in one of those three banks.
- 1410 o YUGE to SUZUKI at YSB saying he made deposits the 14th June and 26th July of this year. YUGE's balance at beginning of business 26th July was \$7.51; on 14th June, \$562.87.
- 1420 o MURAOKA to woman saying the letter is ready. This evening MURAOKA will be out till about 7:30 this evening.—I'll see you tomorrow.

End

1-474

TUESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1941

- 0932 i YSB To TSUKIKAWA re balance. On 1 June of last year your balance was \$642.44. On 14 May of this year it was \$730.02. On 26 July it was zero.
- 0936 o TSUKIKAWA to OI giving the data of the preceding.—If you have no balance, it can't be frozen.
- 1026 i Man asks for date of his XP.
- 1031 o NI.
- 1203 o SAKAI to his wife. NI.

End

1-475

Wednesday, 8 October 1941

- 1147 i NAKATSUKA to XX re simplified XP procedure. N. asks whether "Stimson's bill" seems to XX to be a good one. XX has a stock answer to any and every question: I don't know.—N.: Do you think that will eliminate a lot of trouble?—I don't know.—Do you think it will help us eliminate the dual citizenship problem?—I don't know what the attitude of the J. Govt. will be.—What is your personal opinion then?—"I can't have my personal opinion if I do not know the attitude of our Government."—Don't you know for yourself whether it would help or not?—No, I can't say.—I think it would be a good thing for both sides to know

which side of the fence the dual citizens are going to be on.—Anyway, I will wait and see whether our Government has “an attitude to this law or not”.—Do you have any word on J. ships’ being scheduled?—None, except in the newspapers.

- 1315 ? NI.
 1355 i /FPM/. Too brief.
 1400 i /FPM/. Girl to SAKAI re XP applied for around New Year’s. Yoshito HIROTA. NC.
 1406 i /Cont. of 1400 conversation./ SAKAI: Your XP arrived 3 July, #433.—I had heard nothing about it.—The details aren’t here yet, but I will look them up by tomorrow.

End

1-476

Thursday, 9 October 1941

- 0918 o XX to woman at NATSUNOYA TEA HOUSE, saying he forgot to bring home the *syohin* /could be ‘trophy, prize’; ‘stolen goods’; ‘commodity, merchandise’./ last night. Please put the smaller package of photographs in an envelope. I am sending some one to pick them up.—Alright.
 1028 i Man at NATSUNOYA /?/ to SAKAI saying that he will send his KT to X by mail.
 1040 i Man re deferment of J. military service. He asks OG whether the request must be sent to the village office in Japan.—Yes.—But if the P. O. here should “open” these requests for deferment, wouldn’t there be a lot of trouble?—Why don’t you come up to the office with it? /It developed later that was for advice only. The forms must be sent in by the individual direct to the village office and should reach that office as soon after 1 December as practicable, especially in view of the uncertainty of mail connections with Japan./
 1130 i Brief. NI.
 1140 o MURAOKA to GOTO re arrival of XP permits for several members of the Goto family. Please come up for them and we will take the final step in XP procedure.
 1253 i Re XP; NC; NI.
 1322 o ? to NAKAMURA of HBD asking him to come to X this afternoon.
 1325 o /A thing that never fails to impress me is the fact that N. is not only “familiar” with higher members of X staff, but he tells them he will not come up when they ask him to or picks his own hour. No one else is so discourteous, to X, as N. is./—I can’t make it today.
 1328 i Woman asks OG whether she can get money through to Japan.—We don’t know. /Later switched to SAKAI./—Is it hard for people born here who do not hold J. citizenship but who are now studying in Japan to be naturalized Japanese?—They will have to follow the regular procedure and apply to the Minister of the Interior. Sometimes it takes 2 months, sometimes it takes longer.—You see, I have children in school there and they won’t pay money out to them because they are American citizens. Aren’t they Japanese?—No, they are foreigners. They will not release funds to them.—Can they acquire J. citizenship here?—No, they must be in Japan to be eligible for naturalization.—Where can I take steps to have them naturalized?—Do all this in Japan. It cannot be done here.
 1435 o SEKI to NYK.—We have word that a ship is coming here about the 20th.—Is it bound for Mexico?—I suppose so.—Are you free Saturday?—Yes.—Then let’s have a game. /Golf./

End

1-478

FRIDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1941

- 1305 o OG to woman. NI.
 1400 i Man to VX.—Call 5243.
 1457 i Re XP of KONO. SAKAI had to send the \$3.00 check back and request cash. Caller wondered why he wasn’t trusted. S. explained that it was the “freeze” that made the new plan necessary.

End

1-479

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

- 0930 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying the J. short-wave broadcast this morning /6:30-?/ reported that some ships were definitely going to be sent to America to bring passengers from Japan and to pick up some to take back.
- 0932 o SEKI to restaurant reserving places for lunch for four: TSUKIKAWA, YUGE, SEKI, and one other. About 1 o'clock.
- 0933 o NI.
- 0934 o SEKI to ISHIZAKA arranging to meet in front /of X-?/ at a little before 1:00. They are going to lunch together and plan to play /golf/ about 2:30. ISHIZAKA then tells SEKI that both AP and UP news indicates that on the 15th the Tatuta Maru will sail, on the 22nd the Taiyo Maru will sail for Honolulu from Kobe. From San Francisco the Tatuta Maru will sail direct for Japan while the Taiyo Maru will come to Honolulu and return. The Nitta Maru will proceed to Seattle. Today is Sunday in Japan and I have had no wire from the head office.
- 0939 i NI.
- 0955 i NI.
- 0957 i /FPM/ To OG. Very brief.
- 1000 o /FPM/ Re picnic. NC; NI.
- 1012 i Girl to OG, arranging picnic. NC; NI.

End

1-480

SUNDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1941

No activity

1-481

MONDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.—Out.—Have him call.
- 0930 i Woman says she wants to send parcels on the ship that is coming to Honolulu, but supposes that is not permitted.—We can't say about that.
- 0932 o SEKI to MIKAMI re football and tennis tickets /apparently the police game/.
- 1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. The first edition of the H. S.—B. Saturday reflected that X had had no word re the ships, but this was changed in the second edition after receipt of official news from Tokyo. No news since Saturday.
- 1049 i Woman re request for deferment of J. military service which she wishes to send on the steamer leaving here the 15th. He suggests that she send it registered. Rest NI. If she sends it through X, however, he requests her not to send it before December, for the dates are 1 December to 31 January of the following year. /Time and again I have observed that 9 out of 10 calls connected with deferment are from women. Apparently they look after this detail of keeping their husbands or sons out of the J. Army./
- 1135 o MURAOKA to Mrs. FUKUMOTO, a language school principal, re a questionnaire which he will send her by mail since he hasn't time to bring it down. It may be that he had a child at her school, /Makiki J. L. S./?, but no real clues are given.
- 1144 o MURAOKA to Mrs. KIRIHARA asking her to telephone X tomorrow morning after 9:00.
- 1320 o OG orders tickets in Japanese for VX as a private individual, not as VX /to what?/.
- 1433 i KANEKO to YUGE asking whether it is alright to give the wording of the cable from the F. O. to X to the press as received.—Yes, I think so. /YUGE starts to ask a question put as K. hangs up on him./

—END—

1-482

TUESDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1941

- 0910 i For?—Still at home.
- 0940 i KIRIHARA to MURAOKA. Mostly about arranging a social affair early enough in the day to permit children to attend. Later M. tells K. that Saturday is a holiday because of the great ceremony at the Yasukuni Shrine /enshrinement of war dead/. They will get together then.
- 1003 i NAKATSUKA to XX saying there are 800 J. residents who are going to leave the Pacific Coast. Have you heard how many are leaving here?—The NYK is making all arrangements and I can't say what the whole number is. — Do J. nationals have to clear any papers with you first before leaving for Japan?—No.
- 1026 i HBD to NAKAMURA of HBD. — He's left here.
- 1307 i Castle & Cooke re pensioners. — Person in question not here yet.
- 1330 o SEKI re some printing jobs.
- 1343 o Re camphor and formalin.
- 1420 i "Have NAKASUJI call 91043 if he comes in."
- 1430 o /FPM/ Man calls re passport. Matanosuke MURAKAMI. Routine check if arrival.
- 1443 i MacNaughton /?/ of Castle & Cooke asks SAKAI for addresses of these persons who are C&C pensioners now living in Japan. Under General License No. 32, C&C are permitted to make these monthly remittances to them, but the Bank of Hawaii has no J. funds available. Should we approach the YSB or Sumitomo direct? — The secretary in charge will call you back tomorrow. He has left for today.

End

1-483

WEDNESDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1941

- 0913 i Kiichi KUWAHARA applied for XP in August. He is expecting a new KT on the next ship. Shall he bring it in?—Yes.
- 0925 i DATE to SAHARA, reporting death of SHINJIRO SHINO. He wonders whether it has been reported.
- 0927 o SAHARA to DATE. Yes, it was reported on the day he died.
- 1152 i Re application for deferment of J. military service. Routine.
- 1206 i /FPM/ Sports talk. They will play Saturday afternoon. /One of the junior members of the staff and a friend./

End

1-484

THURSDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

- 0853 o Sakai to ISHIHARA.—Out.
- 0858 o Sakai to OHIRA at NJ.—Out.—Have him call. /Iehimatsu OHIRA is NJ collector./
- 0902 i Nakatsuka to XX.—Not in; call back.
- 0913 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying he will be up in 15 or 20 minutes to see XX.
- 0915 i KUWATA to Sakai re application for deferment. Routine.
- 0918 i Woman asks whether she can get her /son's or husband's?/ application for deferment off on the Taiyo Maru. OG thinks so. The woman is worried for fear the J. Govt. will not grant deferment. OG thinks everything will be alright.
- 0928 i /FPM/ Man to X, saying something is at 5 o'clock today, or something at 9 o'clock.
- 1000 i Calling in to ask about the draft deferment request.—He should send it in.
- 1024 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reading to him in English interview for S-B 10/16 re his ideas for the consular probe suggested by Senator Gillette.—"How do I say about the Hawaii-born Japanese?"—No. I make little reference to the Hawaiian born Japanese. The talk is all more or less all pertaining to the when I say the Japanese people of Hawaii, I take it for granted that that's the older people.—Yes.—Because otherwise I

I would say Americans of Japanese ancestry.—Yes. And you remember, one place I said: "The elder Japanese also gladly send their American born sons into the Army".—"Oh, yes, yes" /rapidly expressing understanding/.—That gives the impression that all along I've been talking about the older Japanese.—Yes, that's alright.—Because the younger Japanese, well, everybody would take it for granted that they are loyal. /Hearty laughter by XX in which N. soon joins. XX breaks in with:/ "Yes, yes; quite natural." /More laughter by XX, of a polite sort./—N: Do you want to mention anything about your X here? I have omitted it because I knew it is very delicate.—I think it alright just as you say now. Thank you. Goodbye.

- 1039 o To HBD for supplies. NI.
 1-485
 1043 o To a pharmacy for a substitute for medicine formerly gotten from Japan.—Will send up ½ lb.—If OK, may get more.
 1045 i Dr. ————— to XX, inviting him to dinner on the 19th at YMCA /?/? at 6:30.
 1053 i To Sakai re request for deferment.
 1055 i NC; NI.
 1135 o OG to Mackay Radio /FPM/. OG: message received this morning.—What number is it?—HC 169 SN /?/?—169, one moment . . . yes, here it is.—It's the third word.—Third word? OG: The first.—The first?—First.—1 uh 09 930.—Yes.—Do you want that word checked?—I want this tenth word checked.—Tenth?—Yes.—That's J U U G.—The next one.—The next one, G O N A N I G O N I T E?—Yes. I wish to have you check if it is G O N A N A.—It should be G O N A N A. OG: So we'd like to check on that.—Yes. I'll check that up.—And who is calling?—The Japanese Consulate /no particular person/.
 1200 i From Mackay Radio: This morning you got a message from Toko by Mackay Radio and you wanted a confirmation of the next to the last word. That's G O N A N A N I G O O N I T E.—I see /repeating it/.
 1310 i To Sakai about the draft deferment, whether he needs to report. NI.
 1320 i. NI.
 1434 o NI.
 1440 o Lee for taxi right away to go up to X.

End

1-486

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 i YAMASHIRO no other name given, but X understands/ to X. Y. sent off a letter concerning the deferment for Tomimatsu SHIGETOSHI. Received under date of August 5 from Japanese city or town hall a noisy or vigorous letter, saying he was to return to take his physical exam for conscription. What is the best way to reply? Native village is Takaoka Prefecture, Hikujo Country, Kurotsuchi Village. He was born August 8, 1920. X will see. Please wait. X tells him to send off something as soon as possible and then wait until January anyhow.
 0905 i Girl in English: "Ah wanta inquire where to have where the Japanese go to see about th' expatriation papers. Can you tell me?" /Apparently someone who wants to have her maid expatriated. Accent mainland American, probably Southern. Calls in long distance./—At this office.
 0925 i Inquiry whether OK to forward draft deferment by mail.—OK, but tomorrow is a holiday, so if you get stuck don't come in then.
 0937 i NI.
 1000 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reporting the latest news just in "that U. S. merchant ships have been ordered from the Chinese and Japanese waters. Of course, this isn't straight from the Navy Department, but it's what some people Have you received any word to that effect?" /No answer. Perhaps XX doesn't quite understand./ N: We have some word even in Honolulu that ships down here have been ordered to stay away from the Asiatic waters The only reason is that the Navy considers the situation in the Pacific quite serious. I think that's the only interpretation.—XX replies that he hasn't heard anything about it.

. . . wants to know when it came in /as he didn't quite get it the first time, when conversation was in English/.

- 1017 i To Muraoka /private; NI/
 1027 o Muraoka to someone in connection with private plans. NI.
 1047 i Evidently a mistake.
 1203 i NI.

1-487

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1941

No Activity

(Japanese Holiday)

1-488

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1941

Out of commission

1-488

MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1941

- 0840 o /FPM/ Muraoka /?/ to /?/ re: sports. NI
 0845 o Muraoka /?/ to Nishimoto. Is out.
 0846 o Muraoka /?/ to Suzuki. re: tennis. NI
 0847 o Muraoka /?/ to /?/ who is out.
 0848 o Muraoka to Fujikawa. Are you coming to the party? NI
 0855 o Muraoka to Sasaki. NI.
 0856 i NI
 0857 o Muraoka to another Muraoka. FPM
 0859 o To Mr. YOKOTA of Occidental Life. Not in yet. Have him call 2243, Mr. MURAOKA.
 0859 i To VX. Not in yet, but soon.
 0904 i OI calling re: a conscription deferment for someone.
 0908 i To MURAOKA. NI /about the party and getting geishas/
 0956 o To RCA for messenger.
 1003 i Man asks how soon he must hand in his application for deferment.
 1028 o MURAOKA to NISHIMOTO inviting him to a party at the Natsunoya the 26th.
 1030 o MURAOKA to TOMIKO (?) inviting him to dinner Sunday. Apparently not private invitation for the price of \$2.00 is mentioned.
 1031 o NC; NI
 1035 i . . . Call 5243 (Line #2)
 1100 i Woman to Muraoka. NI.
 1120 i YSB to TSUKIKAWA saying a draft has come for him.
 1126 i KURISHIMA to Muraoka re tennis and other sporting events. Later there was mention of 5 cases of liquor for the big event. There will be exhibition game.
 1-489
 1136 o MURAOKA to Mrs. HIROKOTO (?) re tennis next Sunday. NI
 1147 i NI
 1248 i re office hours.
 1249 i Re XP. The man XP'ed a number of years ago and then later had his J. citizenship restored. His father or an elder man wants to get his status with regard to (J. ?) military service cleared up. SAIKI asks him to come to the office to talk it over. (It seems that the boy is now trying to dodge J. military service after becoming a Japanese citizen. "Restoration" of J. citizenship should automatically XP from American nationality, because "restoration" requires an act on the part of the individual and is not on a par with the accidental citizenship acquired by birth. This dual citizen lost his J. citizenship when he XP'ed and then lost (or should have) his American citizenship when he had the J. citizenship restored.)
 1305 o An outsider calls out for information re a form he is filling out. NI.
 1325 o KUNIYOSHI of K. store in Moiliili to old man. He had asked for his KT in connection with XP. Call 8323 and ask for Takazu.
 1328 o KUNIYOSHI to ? complaining that his XP has not come yet.

1334 o KUNIYOSHI to 4221 re his BC (Birth Certificate). There is a discrepancy in the birthdate. K. is much perturbed but J. girl at 4221 tells him not to worry. The old man was probably late in registering K's birth with X and didn't wish a scolding or fine for late registration, so gave a later date. The Board of Health date is here taken as the correct one.

1448 ? (FPM) NI

End

1-490

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1941

0910 o NI (Maraoka about beer for the party!)

0915 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.

0917 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.

0918 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. In! NI. /More about the beer. 4 or 5 cases?/

0926 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA. NI. /a geisha—to arrange for THE party/

1003 o MURAOKA to FUJIKAMA. NI.

1004 o MURAOKA /?/ to SAKATA Bon Ton. Out.

1016 i NISHI of NYK to YUGE reporting that they have received a definite telegram that the ship will be off port 10 a. m. day after tomorrow /i. e. Thursday/

1019 i NAKATSUKA to XX—has he had any word as to the exact arrival time of the Tatsuta. Yes. It will arrive on the 23rd and not on the 24th. But he doesn't know the exact time of its arrival (!). Can't think of anything else.

1045 o MURAOKA to Sec of Hawaii re SHIOMATSU (or CHIYOMATSU or CHINOMATSU). Secretary's man wants "everything on the card."

"His birth September 5, 1873.

"Arrival November 2, 1906."

"Is that the only arrival?"

"I see several times he went back to Japan."

He will have to check and find out just when he first came. Continues re wife Hina, now dead.

Also re one SUZUKI.

1059 o Muraoka to pal. NI.

1103 o Muraoka to ----- NI.

1121 o Muraoka to Mr. Medeiros re Yamashiro' CHIYOMATSU (Chiyomatsu YAMASHIRO?) when he came etc.

1-491

1145 i KANEKO to VX saying the prospective repatriates are very numerous and the accounts connected therewith are most troublesome. Many of them are trying to get permission from Washington to get money from New York and so on etc. we are having an awful time with them.

VX—How about sending them up here to pay their fare?

K—That's all right, but there are immigration problems too.

VX—Let's take the whole matter up with Mr. Strench.

K—You mena with Coleman?

VX—Yes. With Coleman.

K—What about white passengers?

VX—White passengers?

K—Yes. The head office has arranged for some haole musicians to sail with us. A Mr. Si— Si—

VX—Mr. SIROTA?

K—Yes. Mr. and Mrs. There is a group going first class to Shanghai. They are Americans.

VX—People going to Shanghai must take a transport. There is no other way.

K—These people are "foreign correspondents" of some "news service". They must be newspapermen.

VX—The name is not NEWMAN, is it?

K—No.

End

1-492

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1941

Out of commission

1-493

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1941

- 1400 o Muraoka to — tai (female). M.—“The person is not a passenger.”
 “He didn’t come back then.” “No. He didn’t.”
- 1413 i Inquiring “one information about my girl friend.” NI
- 1414 i Inquiry. Hard to hear. NI.
- 1427 o To RCA for messenger.
- 1434 i fragment. NI.
- 1534 i F.P.M. NI
- 1603 i KATO to KANEKO. “How late will you be open?”
 Planning details, beds etc. NI.
- 1618 i Dialogue between KANEKO and XX re: who is to issue the tickets and
 how they will be paid for. Apparently the rates are much lower for
 this trip than the usual ones. Kaneko is worried because many of the
 passengers have paid in yen and the company keeps its books in dollars.
 Kaneko says taking into account the discount they will get only about
 \$69.75 for \$85.00 and suggests that the “simplify” the system perhaps
 keep receipts in dollars or yen/ and cable to the main office for authority
 to do so.
- 1816 i Seki to KOTOSHIRODO asking him to come over. He will.
- 2032 o N.R. Man (not VX) asks for taxi.

End

1-494

FRIDAY 24 OCTOBER 1941

- 0900 ? (FPM) Re sailing of TATUTA.
- 0912 o
- 0934 i Re deferment. Routine.
- 0943 o Re deferment.
- 0947 i NI
- 1010 i Man to MURAOKA re meeting at NATSUNOYA (Tea House) Sunday
 morning early, which they wish to postpone a week.
- 1020 o Seki to MIKAMI asking him to come to take XX to ship in very few
 minutes. He wants to be there before 1100.
- 1048 i Redeferment. NI
- 1112 i Re BC; NC; NI.
- 1105 o Seki to SAKAMOTO re cameras. Have your cameras all gone up
 15%?—No, only 10%—One of my friends wants to buy but they had
 sold all—we’re out of those foreign made ones too. No new ones come
 in, and everyone bought before the price rise on 1 Oct. We have
 super DX and super-6 with meter—How much are the Super-6’s?—
 \$176—Is that the best one you have?—No we also have some for \$219—
 Does that include the case?—No.—I may be in soon to look them over.
- 1110 i FUJITA of YSB to X saying he would like passage on the TAIYO.
 A letter has come from the Yokohama office ordering me home. X prom-
 ises to arrange passage.
- 1130 o To NAKAMURA. Out.
- 1138 i Very noisy. NI.
- 1153 i Re deferment. NI.
- 1255 i Some sort of query. Very faint/ NI.

1-495

- 1345 i For xx. Mr. NEWMAN calling. N. arrived yesterday on the Tatsuta.
 Mr. MAEDA said he would speak to XX re NEWMAN’s going back on
 the Taiyo. XX saw Maeda—but hedges when asked if anything had
 been arranged. He hasn’t “approached” the NYK yet, but he will “have
 a talk” with them. N. dropped around to see XX but got to his office a
 little too late today, so missed him. N. is busy this afternoon having
 eyes examined—is getting new glasses made here before he goes back.
 N. won’t be able to make it before XX goes home at 3. Could he (N.)
 see him early tomorrow morning. He has a letter from Mr. KISHI of
 of the Joho Kyoku. “He has a few things that he wants you to get for
 him so I can take them back. Also N. has to get a reentry visa to

Tokyo. He spoke to Mr. Kishi, and also to Mr. Yokoyama and also to some of the people in the foreign office and they said the best thing would be first to start it thru here and the application has to be made and it will have to go thru the regular channels but they may facilitate it from the other side. XX thinks that in that case they will have to refer the matter to the Foreign Office. Says that in fact "about anybody that came thru now we have to refer it back." Laughter by XX/ Does XX think tomorrow would be all right to do that? He does. N. says they know all about him over there and thinks approval will be just a routine matter. He will drop around tomorrow morning ok.

1312 o To KANEKO NYK from SEKI of X who will come to the point at once re a long cable which KIMURA came and sent on the 8th of August to the tune of \$45.82. The cable was sent to Tokyo to NYK main office. X would like payment please. OK.

1315 o To XX HAKUBUNDO from X to order some small swords (or small trees) for some of the people sailing on the boat today. OK. Apparently left addresses during earlier personal call.

1330 i Some inquiry re Japanese made products or Japanese nationality /?/. X doesn't know either. NI/

End

1-496

SATURDAY, 25 OCTOBER, 1941

0925 i Man discusses entering his son in a J. school. The boy is without J. citizenship and the authorities in Japan will not admit him. Caller wonders whether X cannot write a letter to the authorities that will explain the situation in Hawaii and facilitate the boy's admission. S. says the boy must go thru the regular procedure of having his J. citizenship restored. He must apply to the foreign minister for naturalization. As a person of J. descent, the procedure applied is different and simpler. It is called the "restoration of citizenship" instead of "naturalization" even in cases such as this one where the boy never was a J. citizen because he was not registered at X (born subsequent to 1 December, 1924). XP procedure must be instituted here, while citizenship restoration proceedings must be instituted in Japan.

0920 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to Sakai saying the FBI is investigating the consular agents and also the members of the NJ branch office (for Kauai). They are accused of being Army or Navy officers. K. suggests the giving the NJ men identification cards to prove they are members of Domei News Agency.

0955 o SEKI to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.

1013 o Sakai to Mr. Creighton at S-B. Creighton sent the money yesterday with Mr. Newman. The amount was \$20. N. has an appointment with Mr. Kishi (error for Kita?) this morning. The secretary must have the money before he can send the wire (for permission for Creighton and Newman to travel on the Taiyo). S. can't send the wire without the money, and it has been mislaid somewhere. C. promises to get it into X's hands by noon.

End

1-497

1427 o Yuge to IKEZAWA at YSB. /This line got deep in the rain. Very hard to catch/. What the main trend of the conversation is I don't know, tho the conversation sounds important. Something is "funny—strange." Whether a man / one of the three getting off the Harrison? / is from Tokyo or Yokohama. Also mention of the "situation being bad." Some mention of the Pensicola Hotel having something. The following sequence cannot be vouched for, but the words *sounded* like the following:

"You're not returning."

"No."

"Keep pistol, eh." /This line in English?/

"Yes I have, because the situation is so bad." /The last sentence in a very grave voice, and clear./

End

1-498

SUNDAY 26 OCTOBER 1941

NO ACTIVITY

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1941

- 0855 i NI. Wrong number.
 0900 i MURATA of Waialae to inquire about the notification of arrival at military age. Is referred to book stores or newspapers, advised to mail it on the Taiyo.
 0915 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA retennis. NI
 0926 i Inquiry about method of forwarding military age attainment forms. Either thru X or personally is ok.
 0943 i Inquiry about expatriation procedure. Is advised to visit X for help
 1026 i Inquiry regarding first steps in expatriation procedure. Is informed takes about 3 months.
 1030 i Pan Pacific Union callion. NC. Not able to come to lunch today.
 1117 o To Hakubundo from Muraoka re engraving on trophy cup. NI.
 1130 o NC/ Ran out of blank cylinders at this point until 1420.
 1135 o To RCA. (NR) On 25th of this month 33 word telegram in code was sent. How much is cost of telegram? \$4.79.
 1424 o Seki to OI discussing some sort of "applicants" /for passage on the Taiyo?/ until the 31st. Apparently the X doesn't want to handle them.
 1437 o To RCA. "Will you send a messenger boy?"
 1443 o XX to RCA. Your message #154 /poss. 164?/ which we received today has two pages. We received one page. She will send the other right over. Now XX says they have received three pages already! It's all right!
 1450 i To OG. Very brief.
 1458 o NI.

End

1-500

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1941

- 0820 o NI
 0828 i To Sakai?/ Not in.
 0907 o Conversation with YANE wanted to write it, but hasn't a pen or anything, so can't /a country woman/ NI.
 0921 i NAKATSUKA to SAKAI ?Also asks if Kita is there. No./ Asking about IIZUKA, his dates etc. SAKAI was working there but "doesn't keep track of the dates."
 0928 i NAKATSUKA for XX—Not in. "What's happened to him this morning?" Gets phone #4416.
 0929 i For Muraoka. Inquiry from KONISHI re FUKUDA, Michizo of Yamaguchi prefecture, Oshima county, Okika village. M. will phone him after he has looked it up.
 0940 o To KANEKO from SEKI at X. Is K. returning? He is. Then he must be busy, but S. will trouble him with a little business re: the forthcoming Taiyo call. S. has received a cable that the Taiyo will be here on the 1st instead of the 31st. Also a cable that there is on board a man Taro TOKUNAGA who was on the Asama Maru /and of course had to go back/ who wants to get off here and take an American boat to S. F. Doesn't know whether he is a man of wealth or influence or not. They aren't clear if there are two of them or only one. If S. finds out he will call.
 0956 o SEKO to KANEKO?/ regarding 2 passengers on the Taiyo, one from San Juan, the other from Philadelphia. American(s?) and honorary consul(s?) Pardin is a high personage who was returned to port on order of the government as he is going to the mainland on the Taiyo. They have orders from the Foreign Ministry?/ to put them off and take care of them. Doesn't know how old. They?/ are Roman Catholics. Then the problem arises about the money the said passengers will need. Will arrange about it later.
 1000 o To Rosecrans for Taxi.
 1004 i FPM. Very brief.
 1008 o To Secy. of Hawaii. Line is busy.

1012 i KONISHI TO MURAOKA request for information on RIKIZO and his wife—how long have they been on Kauai.

1-501

They came September 9, 1898. Re: OYAMA. M. doesn't know. Re: SAITO, Kuishi and Fukuishi; get their dates also.

1020 i SHIMOKURI re: filing of report on conscription attainment of military age. Will they receive it? They will. He'll bring it.

1022 o To NAKAMURA at /YSB?/ inquiry about yesterdays rates. N. says they are changing all the remittances for Japan into dollars, and they are paid in Yokohama. The price is about \$24—24 points. /This?/ is to pay for a telegram so what will \$5.93 be in yen? N. says the rate is about \$24 for ¥100 / then giggles and opines that \$24 is quite a bit to pay tho that is the rate they give their guests!/
 1058 i NAKATSUKA reads long rebuttal by Kita denying acquaintance with Tadaake IIZUKA /see papers for 10-28-41/ N. at one point says he wants "to clear (Kita) from this case" by pointing out that IIZUKA was here in 1935, long before Kita.

1110 o TUGE to OI. NI.

1131 i Family talk. NI.

1140 o To RCA for messenger.

1141 o For time.

1150 ? (FPM) NI.

1152 i NISHI to Sakai. NI.

1200 o No answer.

1201 o MURAOKA to HIGA (girl) asking for her father. He invites him to come to the office this afternoon about 3.30.

1415 o (FPM) The ship will be in on the 31st.

1420 o Sakai to ITAGAKI re one cloisonne vase belonging to to the honorary J. consul at San Juan, probably an American, but whose name we do not know. Things could be handled infinitely better if we knew the other man's (recipients?) name. (It is from the present or the previous Foreign Minister to the honorary consul at San Juan. There is no price indicated.) Itagaki: I think we had better wait till it arrives and then see how to handle it.

1-502

1432 o Sahara to YOKOYAMA /?/ Out. Have him call if he gets back by 3 o'clock.

1434 o Seki to SATO. Out. (To MIYAMOTO) Seki wishes to talk over with SATO the question of 4 yards of some kind of cloth.

1440 i Re various children of a man who died on Kauai.

1441 i Re office hours. Up to three. Caller then asks whether a child born two months ago, but of whose birth the family had just learned, cannot be registered immediately with X and thereby acquire Japanese citizenship—No. It is absolutely impossible.—Isn't there any way it can be done?—No. None whatever—(as a matter of fact there is a way called "restoration" of J. citizenship, but the child would have to be in Japan in order to have his previously non existing J. citizenship "restored".)

1445 i An eldest son wishes to return to Japan and asks what steps he must take as an eldest son who has an eldest son born here who was not registered at X within the prescribed period. He wants the child to be a J. citizen—After two weeks it is impossible to give the child J. citizenship if not registered at X.—Isn't there any way?—If you return to Japan with the child "restoration" proceedings may be inaugurated—You can't restore J. citizenship here?—No. there is absolutely no way of doing it here. After two weeks have elapsed the child is an American and nothing else.—Even if my ignorance of the child's birth until today prevented registration at X?—That has nothing to do with it. If the child's birth was registered with the Board of Health, take documentary proof along with you and the whole thing can be arranged in Japan.

1447 o —to UEDA. Out. Have him call tomorrow morning for a correction.

1448 o Sahara to KAWAMOTO re mistake in data. Please bring for correction.

1450 o To RCA for messenger.

1451 i Woman to OG re XP procedure. Routine.

1459 i Same woman for further details. She asks whether she has to have her parent's consent. They are opposed; she is 19—You will have to have their consent if you are under 20, for you will have to have them sign

the petition (Caller is under considerable strain. Her parents want her to return to Japan and want her to keep her J. citizenship but she wants to cut loose from it entirely.).

End

1-504

WEDNESDAY, 29 OCTOBER, 1941

- 0905 i (FPM) Woman asks whether it is true that all baggage must be on the docks early—Yes (She then asks about deferment of military service.).
- 0945 i Inquiry as to the meaning of "Maru".
- 0946 i /can't hear it because of noise in record—something about a chokusen—straight line/.
- 0947 i NISHIMURA, Mataso, asking something about enlistment.
- 1021 i To SAKAI re: Conscription levies. Routine.
- 1022 o to NYK. YUGE calling for "Take" YOSHIOKA giving information re CHRICHTON, Colvil M. directing him to issue a ticket for him. He is on the Taiyo. Also re: a NEWMAN /to take care of him?/.
- 1034 i Fragment.
- 1035 o To S. B. to Mr. CHRICHTON—will he come up and fill in the application for a visa. They hear he is trying to go to Japan and /they?/ have received a wire from Japan. C. will come in this afternoon.
- 1103 i Inquiry whether there is time to get an exemption claim back for the conscription summons. This boat will be okay.
- 1105 i To MURAOKA. NC. Somebody too busy to play today.
- 1111 o For Mrs. SMYTHE of the Senate chamber. Call 59471.
- 1111 o To 59471. Mrs. Smythe speaking. Would like a copy of the M-day bill. Doesn't know if they have any more. Will check and mail one.
- 1302 i Inquiry as to hours of business.
- 1318 i Inquiry about conscription. deferment.
- 1326 i Inquiry about conscription deferment.
- 1333 i Inquiry about conscription deferment. X will receive them.
- 1341 i Inquiry about sending money to Japan. Country person. NI.

1-505

- 1540 o to RCA. Will you send a M. B.
- 1712 i No answer

1-505

THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER 1941

- 0845 o Staff member to sister (or sister-in-law) about groceries. NI.
- 0901 i Man to Sakai. NI.
- 0926 i to MURAOKA re something he wishes to send to Japan by Parcel Post/ Will there be duty levied on it?—We can't say. A great deal depends on the man inspecting the particular parcel in question. Old or new, one or many—all these considerations enter in.
- 0927 o to Mr. Hallett ABEND at RH Hotel. (Connection with Abend not made.)
- 0935 o OG to Nakatsuka for address of ABEND, who is supposed to be living at the RH Hotel., OG reports he wasn't there this morning/ N. suggests she try the Moana. (Then to XX) SB wants a list of the Taiyo Maru's departing passengers. We haven't a complete list yet. There may be further applications. We have turned the matter over to NYK. Would you permit us to publish the list Monday?—I think it is all right.
- 0944 i A haole at our place wants to send some chocolate candy to Japan. Is that permitted?—I imagine so but I don't know.
- 0945 o OG to Moana for ABEND—Not in. Have him call 2243.
- 1002 i FPM. Man re deferment. Routine.
- 1020 o XX to ABEND at Moana. Not in. Shall I page him? Tell XX called. —I left that message for him. He will call you when he comes in.—When do you think he will come in?—I don't have the information when he will come back. The message is in his box and under his door and he will receive it as soon as he comes into the hotel. I have not any urgent need (XX interrupts for a long laugh) but I am one of his old friends and would like to hear his voice.
- 1030 o KAWAMOTO of NJ re deadline for applications for passage. Saturday noon.
- 1033 i SATO to Seki. NI.

1-506

- 1100 i Man asks whether he can send 5# sugar and 2 or 3# nails to his parents. Yes, but there may be duty to pay. NC; NI.
- 1105 o Seki to merchant re bill. NI.
- 1107 o NI
- 1108 o Seki to MIKAMI. Out. Have him call.
- 1114 i Dr. Wickerson at Moana Hotel to XX. OG says XX is out and she can't make out Wickerson's name. W. insists he found a message requesting him to call XX. (Could Dr. Wickerson be Hallet Abend's nom d'exile? Or was the note to Abend put in the wrong box?) Call 4416.
- 1116 i MIKAMI to Seki asking him to come over.
- 1120 i Elderly man to Sakai re XP ed deferment.
- ? i Dr. Wickerson to XX. XX wanted ABEND, not W.
- 1205 i Komatsuya Hotel to YUGE re the allotment (of space on the Taiyo) according to *ken*. Is there any distinction made with regard to citizenship status?—All circumstances are taken into consideration. The fundamental division is into *kens*.
- 1210 i Girl to X. He's left. Re XP.
- 1252 i Re application for passage on the Taiyo. The usual system. (What is the usual system? Via NYK).
- 1255 KANEKO to VX. Out. Have him call 6198.
- 1315 i To MURAOKA re number of declarations of applications. Quite a number left.
- 1340 i Miss IMAMURA to Muraoka. NI.
- 1355 i Girl asks for YAGI, ABE, AND HORI. None of them there. (The three lads who transferred from the Harrison to the Taiyo here last week.)
- 1413 i FPM. TOGASHI mentioned, but this conversation was interrupted by the next one. NC.
- 1500 o NI
- 1-507
- 1502 o NI

End

1-508

FRIDAY, 31 OCTOBER, 1941

- 0848 o Muraoka to ? saying the tennis matches will start at 10 o'clock Sunday.
- 0849 ABEND to XX. Out. When will he be in? In a few minutes—When I got in yesterday your office was closed. I am going out this morning, but I will call him later in the day.
- 0851 o Muraoka. NI.
- 0855 i Woman to Muraoka re deferment. Routine except that M. tells her X will be closed Monday, a holiday.
- 0902 i Re deferment. Routine.
- 0913 o Seki to OI of JCC. Out; I'll have him call.
- 0923 o To Glabe wireless for ISHII. Out.
- 0934 i Re deferment.
- 0935 i Re deferment.
- 0940 o Seki to HARADA. He left a few minutes ago. Then to Mrs. H. asking about a cool room for a (Mr?) TAKEMURA arriving the next day or so (presumably on the Taiyo) who will be here a week before proceeding to the states. She has already had word from XX to this effect and is going to give him a cool room being vacated very shortly.
- 0945 i Re deferment. Question by woman as usual.
- 0946 i SHINAGAWA to Seki re deferment (First re office supplies). Seki mentions ABE and his prices. (ABE appliance Co.?) NI/
- 0950 o Muraoka to INADA ordering groceries.
- 1108 o XX to KIMURA re necessary supplies. Replenishment of the oil is the main thing. (Long discussion but nothing of interest. K. seems very cooperative. He is trying to make arrangements for cleaning a place for the customs searches. He expects the ship to dock about 0800. He expects to be down at the dock at 0730. Both are in good spirits.)
- 1116 o Yuge to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.
- 1123 o NI
- 1-509
- 1127 i SAKAMOTO requests information as to data of his family.

- 1145 i Query re an application for XP.
 1148 o Muraoka to friend.
 1152 o Muraoka to Toshio (first name). Sports. NI.
 1154 o Muraoka NI.
 1155 o Muraoka NI.
 1155 i Seki to Yuge re some financial matters and how to treat the public funds collected /for the Taiyo/.
- 1238 i Query re conscription.
 1239 i for SEKI. Out /?/.
 1244 i Inquiry for someone—Not in.
 1305 o Muraoka to NAKAMURA. Sports. NI.
 1306 o Muraoka. NI.
 1308 i Inquiring re afternoon hours.
 1308 o Muraoka to KIMURA. Out. Left message. NI.
 1315 o KITA to someone re Monday being a holiday. v. brief.
 1320 i OTANI (woman) to SAKAI. Something about a copy of the census register. She wants to take it home and he'll get it that evening or something. She has to make the proper moves it seems to re-register the fishing boats previously confiscated. He is explaining to her the difference between having the boat owned by one's own son who is a citizen and having it owned by a stranger or mere acquaintance who acts as a dummy. /But they agree that it amounts to the same thing./ He asks her to be sure to return the papers he is lending her and she promises to—she probably won't work at it after 9 PM this evening.
- 1341 o YUGE for SEKI. His superior over there /in Japan/ says that /it/ is good. IWANAGA is /on?/ the boat. Yes. probably. So there is only TOKUNAGA. Something about loading /chocolate?/ onto the boat. The words hachi hachi are mentioned toward the end of the talk. One says hachi hachi /literally eight eight/ and the other says "I understand." /The recorder doesn't!/ This expression is used for a game of cards. Also for a squadron of 8 battleships or 8 cruisers.
- 1407 o X to Mr. NEWMAN. Can he come tomorrow or Tuesday since Monday is a Japanese holiday. He'll try to come tomorrow.
- 1448 o to NYK for Mrs. Nishi? Asks where KANEKO is. He is phoning. Here he comes. K. is so distorted I can't understand him at all.

End

1-511

SATURDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 1941

- 1038 o NI.
 1110 o To Yamashiro Hotel for a children's room, (for whom?)
 1128 i Man asks for correct spelling (in Japanese) of new premier's name.
 1140 i NI.
 1149 i to Seki. FPM. Caller went down to the ship to see if he could locate the cosignee thru the purser's office, but no such message had been left there at all. As a matter of fact? did come—I made enquiry thinking one of the passengers might have brought it in his baggage, but again the quest was unsuccessful.—Is that so?—The Embassy (probably J. embassy in Washington) intervened with the treasury to facilitate entry. I don't think there would have been any trouble—Is it a big thing?—Yes. Rather. (In the part recorded no name was mentioned, no article was specified. I have no clue as to the nature of the article.)
- 1241 o NR.
 1306 o Seki to Kyorakkan (hotel) asking for one room up to the departure of the Taiyo on the 4th. She tells him to wait. (Cut off in the rush, but gist elsewhere in log as monitored direct.
- 1300 i NR.
 1309 ? FPM Re mail on Taiyo.
 1310 i Kyorakkan (a hotel) (a call-back) to Seki asking how many guests there are.—One.—When?—Right away.—What food? Probably occidental.—(K. will take him. Not sure who it is, but probably one of the diplomats or other leading man from the ship.)
- 1315 i Man wants to send a package on the Taiyo but has heard that she will take no mail. He wonders whether this was a J. govt. decision.—No. It was the American Govt's decision.—I heard that the P. O. was turning down and returning packages already mailed. There are mobs

of Japanese at the P. O. who want to mail letters and parcels.—They can't get anything very definite out of the P. O. The P. O. apparently doesn't know itself what it can accept and what reject.

1-512

1317 o Seki to Mrs. Harada asking her how the matter of the room was finally decided this morning. When they came back from the ship this morning Mr. IWANAGA alone (of the diplomats?) came here. A little later Mr. TOKUNAGA called in about a room and I had to report that matters were a little hard to manage just then. FUJITA is leaving shortly and his room will be free then. Mr. TOKUNAGA said he has a *futon* of his own and would be glad to sleep in the closet or anywhere if space could be spared. Food can be arranged for them, but the main thing is a place to sleep—I discussed this with Mrs. Yuge and she thought they could stay at XX's house—but it would be not quite proper for a married couple to stay there (Does Seki think XX would neglect to observe the canons of diplomatic immunity as he did the night of the Sumida wedding when he got drunk and chased the Sumida maid round and round the bedpost?)—Fujita's room would be free on the 4th and the Tokunagas could take it then. How long would they want a room?—Till Friday—If they could stay somewhere till Tuesday we could take care of them—If they were an older couple they could stay at XX's without hesitation, but they are a newly married (or young married) couple which complicates matters. (They both laugh knowingly). In full realization of the risks involved in a young woman's staying at XX's. Mrs. H. agrees to ask Mr. HASYIYA to move to a small room for two nights to make way for the TOKUNAGAS if no other suitable place can be found.

1325 o Seki to Kyorakkan re the young couple. Seki tries to be sure a married couple will be welcome there. (The hotel is often used by people less interested in the enduring bonds of life.) She says it will.

1452 o NA. Fragment while caller was waiting for XX.

1545 o to ? for messenger boy.

1547 o NI.

1605 o To Pensecola Hotel. NR; NA.

16-? i re; Age for draft /American/.

1-512-A

(Addition entries missed on first log)

0907 i Inquiring re passenger on Taiyo. Haven't got list yet.

? ? To 6907. The awful nes breaks. The Taiyo will not take any mail! The P. O. says so. Washington has sent a cable to the postmaster.

0945 o To Mackay radio for messenger.

0950 i What time did Taiyo get in?

1000 i Personal call for Sakai?

1007 i Fro Sakai in good english from Alice YONENAKA. Could I come and see you this morning. Wants to bring her copy of certified census registra rather her mothers. /Probably getting expatriated/. He tells her to bring her sheet and he'll look it over.

1047 i Wrong number.

1050 i FPM/ Inquiry re; report of residence abroad for deferment of J. military conscription.

1108 i NI.

1135 o for HIROKAWA of registry department of P. O./different Hirokama no doubt/ to check on the mail situation. H. only knows what he heard and picked up. Refers X to P. M.

1137 o To P. M. Not in. Asst. P. M. will be in about 1230.

1159 ? Fragment re XP.

1202 o To NYK. Message from Minister of Communications via XX which is referred to TAKASAMA at 2772 /?/. Gives his own number as 4416.

1213 o XX to KUSUNOBU /?/ his cook /?/. Wants lunch for four people at his residence. /Probably KIMURA is one.

1215 o XX to /maid at home?/ In about 10 minutes 4 guests will be coming. But no one is there and cook is out!

1217 o XX to /another kitchen?/ Today is a *wedding day*. Therefore SO SORRY! /Poor Kimura?/

1218 o He tries again. Hooray! Success. Orders a simple meal not party style since he planned to have them at his home originally, he says.

1-512-B

0956 i OI calling about "educational films" /?/. Afterward talking about a Kwanto style doll /?/ /Wasn't there some question whether one could be carried as an "award" to some American commission or something? Apparently the verdict was negative from the tone of the voices.

—End—

1-513

SUNDAY, NOV. 2, 1941

1510 i Rang a long time; finally answered but callee not there.

End

1-514

MONDAY, 3 NOVEMBER, 1941

0909 i from SOGA. Recently Mr. TOKUNAGA has come from the Foreign Office and Japan. Am inviting him for dinner, also Dr. Motokazu MORI and VX/& others?/6 P. M. tonight. Some possibility of another farewell at the boat. Invitee will have to excuse himself from that if he can. At the first part of the conversation SOGA explains, I think, that he knows, or knows of TOKUNAGA thru Mr. Ken HARADA, his son's wife's brother, who is in the Foreign Office, tho born in Hawaii. Not very sure of this tho.

0934 i From OMI Shoten. When will the Hikama get to Yokohama?

0955 i NI

1004 i Conscription. Routine.

1024 i NI

1026 i NI

1221 o Routine. NI.

1224 o to HARADA /?/. If he comes in have him call X.

1355 i HARADA asking about Taiyo mail situation as concerns the notification of attainment of conscription age reports which have to arrive by Nov. 31 in order to comply with Japanese law. Is asked to call tomorrow since today is a Japanese holiday. They say that since the Taiyo is out, another boat will probably be all right.

1400 i NEWMAN to XX. Would like to come up for a few minutes right away.

1508 i Inquiry. Woman with no passport is worried /lest the boat return to Hawaii?/ She introduces herself as an ordinary woman. Probably interesting but not urgent just now.

1611 i NI.

1-515

#2 log

0820 i NR. Star Bulletin calling. Call after 9:00.

0939 i NI

1046 i NI. Re deferment.

1047 o OI of JCC to Chamber of Commerce (Hamilton) asking whether there has been word on mail situation. No word from Sam King either. The postal inspectors expect word this afternoon.

End

1-516

TUESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER, 1941

0918 i Man to Muraoka re 3 games (tennis?) tomorrow.

0927 i FPM. NAKATSUKA to XX. XX has no news from Washington re mail situation. XX wanted the Taiyo Maru to take mail to Japan. (See the S-B.) XX "Mr. King knows (the character of) Mr. Haan." This in answer to N's remark about the "fight" between the two.

0936 i /VX and YOSHIOKA/ YOSHIOKA seems *furios* at something. Sounds as tho he thinks he is being cheated. Perfectly *enraged*. Something about /the authorities?/ not thinking it worth while to telegraph on the advice /or request or for the sake of/ a nikkei* or a whole boat load of them. (*nikkei American citizen of J. ancestry.). YOSHIOKA cites the discrimination shown towards the nikkei—the numerous personal questions asked etc. etc. compared with the treatment accorded other Americans and VX /?/ replies that it is discrimination, isn't it? Perhaps

he is talking about the questions asked of the incoming Taiyo passengers. Anyhow he is still furious and very indignant. Also something about the mail being held up. Towards the end of this long harrangue Y. suggests that VX intercede—just how is not clear—possibly thru the Federal courts, for the nordsai bansho is mentioned. Probably the effects of red tape plus extra work, worry and anxiety have added fuel to Yoshioka's rage. He is very disturbed to say the least. They cool down enough to laugh a bit toward the end.

- 1028 i TAKAYANAGI. NI.
 1002 i Re deferment.
 1003 i Re deferment.
 1045 i From a fellow returning to Japan regarding military service there. Is advised to explain to Japanese authorities his real address (in Japan), and they will understand.
 1053 i KANEKO to VX re baggage. Inspected yesterday at 7 and today again—they have been trying to get cigarettes. Will VX help as they can't get enough? He will. Discuss sailing time etc.
 1126 o SEKI to TOKUNAGA /?/ to say that DOI is waiting for him at X. /A little other talk—can't get it easily./
 1-517
 1142 i VX to XX—He's busy with someone in "that room" (the lowered-to-inaudibility voice indicated that it was a conference which she had instructions not to interrupt). Tell him when he finishes to please wait on the matter of the (NYK?) company's telegrams.
 1144 o /to RCA?/ "Your messenger just came in here and and took 3 messages back. We'd like you to hold them, return them, if you will please. O. K.
 1203 i To SEKI to inquire as to a reasonable price for stockings, eh! Bought 1 dozen.
 1327 i FPM. For TAKAGISHI. Out. Gone to Ala Wai.
 1345 i to SEKI from TOKUNAGA. /very blurred, but something about a car, probably asking SEKI to have him driven somewhere either by taxi or by X car.
 1350 o To Hiberly. XX would like to come down. Make date for 2:10.
 1405 o to KYORAKKAN asking if TOKUNAGA has gone out yet. No—not yet. Well, the car is "dry", so please have him wait a little please.
 1407 i for SAKAI. He's out till 3.
 1407 i Wrong number for Easy Appliances.
 1435 i Fragment
 1450 o XX Will you send a messenger boy.

End

1-518

WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 0917 ? NC; NI
 1002 i Re deferment.
 1005 i WEST of UH wants name of XX.
 1007 i JARAKI of Mitsukoshi to VX.
 1023 i NI; NC
 1038 i Re expatriation; NI
 1058 i Inquiry re mail
 1005 i HARADA to IWANAGA; wanted to invite him to dinner tonight, but since it is an hour earlier than usual will invite him for lunch. Did. Something about HACHIYA and Nov. 24th. Can't get last part at all.
 1113 i For /VX?/ from YOSHI at NYK.
 1115 o NI.
 1343 o For messenger boy.
 1449 i NAKATSUKA to XX re KURUSO. Is XX planning any reception? Hasn't yet decided. XX has received a message. It will take about 5 days from Hong Kong. Foreign Office message said he would arrive by clipper, but didn't say when he would arrive here. XX doesn't know much about KURNSO. Wife is real Caucasian. Oh! Oh! Oh! Ah! Ah; "She's quite a Japanese lady. She eats Japanese food and is very polite and looking very nice.
 1457 i NC; NI.
 1459 o NI.

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- 1636 o to (4)? YUGE to Mrs. NISHI. She asks him to call and gives him the number 67182 /that of the boat/
 1640 i KANEKO to YUGE arranging about working and the tickets etc. tomorrow morning. /A lot of accounting still to do. Long discussion./
 1711 i About sailing.
 1-519

THURSDAY, 6 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 1000 i NI.
 1020 Seki to Nakamura of HBD. NI.
 1035 i NAKAMURA to Seki. NI.
 1045 o Routine data call. Very lengthy.
 1055 o Sakai to George SAKAMOTO re deferment.

End

1-520

FRIDAY, SATURDAY, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 7 TO 9

Out of Commission.

1-521

MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 0905 o Sakai to PAA asking about arrival of clipper. About 1700 tomorrow.
 0910 i NAKATSUKA to XX re delay in arrival of KURUSU—VX and I will go out to meet him—The N. J. says he is going to stay at the R. H. Hotel—That's right.—Are you going to have a lunch for him?—No. I'm not organizing any parties—Will there be a private party at X?—Yes. I think so.—When is he leaving?—He will stay overnight.
 0915 i Komatsuya Hotel to Sakai re XP. NI
 0916 i Girl for VX re KURUSU. Not in yet. Please have him call to let us know when the Ambassador is arriving.
 0918 o Muraoka to friend re cup (athletic trophy). NI. Very lengthy. Sports chatter.
 0925 o Muraoka to friend re sport. NI.
 0927 i Nakatsuka to XX asking whether KURUSU will call on governor and army and navy leaders here—I don't know. No word yet—Are any of the leaders of the J. community going with you to meet him?—SATO [pres. of JCC and UJS] may go. On Saturday morning he was sure whether he would be allowed to go to the landing at Pearl City. He will check with the authorities today.—Who is going to be at the dinner?—Not decided yet; we are still discussing the matter—There will be about 10 guests. XX—Any haoles?—No. A strictly Japanese gathering.—What time will it start?—About 6.30.
 0930 i ITAGAKI to Seki re the possibility of sending parcels to the Embassy re American Railway Express.
 0936 i For XX; busy; for VX; "You'll have to call him" "Oh shux. What's the number." "5243".
 0943 o To tell—?—that tho tomorrow is a holiday the stores will probably be open. Will he make preparations to get in touch with them and have them stay closed.
 0951 o To ONOH to Sumitomo Bank. Tell him that party is postponed till tomorrow at 6.30 because of delay of clipper etc. Will be at official residence.
 1030 i To XX from Pan Pacific telling him about Education week and that Mr. Long is speaking. She is hoping XX and VX could come. Sorry—today they both have to attend to "my friend's luncheon."—Yes. VX too. Too bad.

End

1-522

TUESDAY, 11 NOVEMBER, 1941

Holiday; closed.

- 1207 o Seki to Morimura saying KURUSU has been delayed a day and as a result XX's kitchen help has been driven crazy. Seki then asks M. to come over with KIKAWA /?/ this evening about 1800 for dinner with XX [to help eat up the excess food prepared.]
 1208 i Seki to ? announcing delay and inviting him to XX's house.

1-523

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1941

- 0839 o For MASASHIMA. Shall she have him call? He's out, will be back about 10. He's at the corner of Kukui and Hall where /he/ just sent a blacksmith. Something about-No. 2 /house beyond a Chinese family's? She finally has X call at 10.
- 0845 i Wrong No.
- 0855 o Yuge /?/ calling Bob. Not in.
- 0915 i FPM Routine inquiry
- 0930 i For XX from Mr. FORE /?/ of the Airlines. Wants to come up this morning. OG says OK. /Probably going to explain what happened to the plane!/
 0933 o To SASAKI at YSB. Muraoka re sports.
 0935 o Muraoka re sports.
 0937 o For cigarettes. NI
 0939 i Re Illumination for the party. NI.
 0954 i To Seki. The party is off. Much laughter about something.
 0958 o To "Jimmy" from NAKATA. "You tell one of my boys come get me at the Japanese Consul right away." NI.
 1000 i Routine re J. conscription.
 1015 o to ? No come down yet. NI
 1035 o From MORIOKA. NI
 1048 o to KUSANOBU /?/ re seating arrangements. 15 persons can't be divided well. How about 16? Also about times etc.
 1130 i Lt. Riddick to XX reporting clipper left Midway at 7.30 this morning.
 1133 o To S/B/ to NAKATSUKA. Not in.
 1145 i Inquiry on KURUSU. OG doesn't exactly know. Inquisitor gets hot at such ignorance. 5:10 she says.
 1150 o To HBD for NAKAMURA from Seki to ask how the photographs turned out. Be careful of them.

1-524

- 1325 o To Royal Hawaiian Hotel. SEKI went down yesterday to make a reservation and asked XX to tell hotel that plane is coming in this afternoon.
 1345 o Inquiry re China Clipper. 5:15

End

1-525

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1941

- 0925 o To P.A.A. from X. What time is the China Clipper leaving for the coast? . . . "Three o'clock." X thought it was 1 or 5. Mr. KURUSU must be there at 2.
 0935 o NI. XX asking when plane is leaving for S. F.
 0942 i NAKATSUKA of S. B. to OG. XX did give KURUSU a private party last night (according to OG).
 1001 o to II airways re China Clipper.
 1025 o Wrong no.
 1030 i KAWAZOE to VX. He's phoning. Call on other phone.
 1045 i KAWAZOE to SSKI tho he really wants VX.
 1147 o NI
 1155 i From a man from Royal Hawaiian who has called SEKI's home and can't make himself understood there. "The ambassador is putting up a real fight to pay his own bill. He's not to pay it, eh?" "Yes (!) Mr. YOUKI is to get the bill and he will pay.

End

1-526

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941

- 1045 o For someone who is out.
 1048 o For TSUSHIMA—out. For FUJIKAWA. Morioka calling.
 1050 i For MORIOKA from TSUSHIMA. The cup is finished. NI.
 1103 o To HBD. Fragment.
 1302 o MURAOKA. NI.

End

1-527

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

- 0930 o Official at X wants someone to call him.
 0948 o To Mackay radio. "Will you send a messenger boy?" XX.
 1058 i To SAKAI from CLAUDUS /?/ who will come tonight to his house about 6. One asks the other if he has seen the new Shimpo /weekly/. There is a discussion of the necessity /of having or of not having/ bonds. Asks whether he has studied the problem in relation to the freeze. They are worried about the future possibility of war and especially something that ABEND has lately written /probably Shimpo has quoted from the last "Life"/ also worried about the future of commerce.
 0915 o To Mackay Radio. XX has received message #233, but has received only page 1, not page 2. M. says last night they sent two pages at about 7 o'clock. Then, at 7.25, he sent corrected copy of page 1. Seattle made a mistake, so they sent a corrected copy of page one. Page 2 is all right.
 1115 i To XX. Busy. Nakatsuka.

End

1-528

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1941

No activity

1-529

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1941

- 0946 i Inquiry re expatriation.
 1005 o to — KANE from SEKI. This morning they are paying bills.
 1045 i TAKAHASHI /woman/ re; the fate of a 25 year old U. of H. graduate of dual citizenship who has become a public school teacher. He has never been registered as a Japanese citizen. First step is to get registered etc.
 1316 i From KOMATSIYA about "yesterday's case" / The hotel is apparently handling the deferment petitions of KOICHI and FUJIKAWA. NI.
 1340 o SEKI to OI. Something about paying /?/ for registration. Instructions have come by cable from the minister. There is some other problem to it tho. They were advised, after conversations with the American government, that there might not be any necessity of registering /the money?/. So SEKI thinks it is ok. /Some diggerel about somebody from X marrying a fatty /?/ Seems to be between a Miss DO and KIMURA of the bank.

End

1-530

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1941

- 0905 i FPM. Muraoka on tennis.
 0910 o To HBD. MORIOKA to NAKAMURA whom he asks for FUJIMURA with whom he discusses tennis at length.
 0915 o MURAOKA—tennis
 0917 i from a man who wants to speak to the "one who uses cables." Caller is Elgo CHIROMA—a senior at U. H. who is making a sociological study of the Okinawas in Hawaii. Would like to get statistical material about their occupation status, distribution, numbers, how many have left for Okinawa etc. X doesn't have those facts. C. says the Jiji Annual has some information—he thought they had got it from X. X says they don't keep record of how many come and go, and especially this was a long time ago—They keep "just if they come and report—but don't keep track of the numbers. C. asks how he'd get the materials. X says to ask the Okinawa people "they have some sort of club you know?"—but he doesn't think they have such records. But X thinks he can get the general idea. Refers him to immigration.
 0928 i To SAKAI re hospital bill.
 0954 o To SATO Music Store saying the radio at the official residence of XX last evening and for some time past has been so when you listen there is freekune /?/ —something the matter with it anyway. Asks him to come up and look at it.
 1007 o For Mr. /UE?/ MASE. Out. Call 2634.
 1008 o To OYAMA. Out. Try 6311 /?/.
 1120 i From Mrs. NISHI to say goodbye.

End

1-531

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1941

- 1009 o Fragment
 1028 o MURAOKA to girl. Someone is to bring "bron paper" (birth certificate) in within two weeks.
 1127 i to MORIMURA /?/ frag.
 1415 o YUGE to N. Y. K.'s TAKEI. NI
 1437 i From ONODA of Sumitomo who supplies or is supplied some data on addresses and names in Japan.

End

1-532

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941

No activity—Holiday

Friday, November 21, 1941

- 0930 i FPM./ Mistake in log?/ Sounds like UEMURA to maud. "They haven't come yet, have they?" "No."
 0934 i Routine. NI
 0955 o Asking YAMAMOTO about a souvenir for a deceased friend. /Has he/ received it? Yes.
 1011 o URAOKA to YAMAGUCHI. Wants to get some information re him or his mother. Y. apologizes—he has received the letter from X but has been too busy to answer. Will answer in 2 or 3 days. M. says Saturday till noon, other days till three /for him to come in?/
 1022 o Something is at 6 tonight. gurōbu?
 1027 i to MURAOKA re club affairs.
 1033 i From OAHU JUNK CO. re matter called about previously. the YAMAMOTOT business. No one is around now. This evening /we?/ will inform /him?/ and tomorrow a. m. he will let you know how much it is.
 1347 i to SAKAI from MACHIDA. The pictures are finished. Shall she bring them? No. He'll pick them up.
 1420 i to SAKAI from KOMATSUYA with a new ——? Paketto HIROSHIMA on August 23. "I don't remember attaching and due /paper?/ on it." Probably NI.

1-533

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

- 0050 o X for U. S. Coast Guard for Mr. Anthony. (Someone speaking for Mr. VX.) re letter rec'd from CG. CG is preparing new passes for everyone who has legitimate business on the waterfront and has requested list of such people from X.

End

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941

- 1008 o FPM re the evening KURUSU was here—asks for the bill for photographs of the occasion. \$27.50.
 1128 i NAKATSUKA to XX telling him about a Frederick Kuh U. P. report from London of a provisional agreement between J. and U. S. in Washington. XX:—"Is it from London?/!/ It is! N. also reports that the new dual citizenship bill has been approved by the House sub-committee. Provides for compulsory renunciation of foreign citizenship by persons in U. S. Gov't. or armed forces, and voluntary renunciation of foreign citizenship by all others holding dual citizenship. XX heard on the Tokyo radio about the Tatsuta, but hasn't received any official word—he says. He doesn't know if there will be a ship to Hawaii.
 1157 i From applicant for XP. "For a person in the government service it is very inconvenient to be a Japanese citizen." Wants to hurry.
 1402 o To Mackay for messenger.
 1410 o To HBD. Muraoka for either NAKAMURA or FUJIWARA. Gets F. re tennis.

End

1-535

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941

- 0931 o From SAHARA /?/ Something about Saturday. NI. Not regular X call.
- 1025 i For SEKI from SATO SHOTEN about a bill.
- 1102 i To SAKAI from YAMAMOTO. Something about an order for 2,000 cases of something Friday, and about the price, and about a wire in connection with them.
- 1131 o To AKAYAMA (girl) from MURAOKA. NI
- 1140 o to MACKAY. X for messenger.
- 1258 o for ? Out. If he returns have him call SAKAI
- 1317 o re Sa to Kinjiro and Saito Karoku /to a girl/ The place isn't written in. Please drop in and sign them.
- 1357 o To Mackay for messenger.

End

1-536

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941

- 0924 i to SAKAI from /Seiichi/ HAYAMA /Pharmacist of Honolulu Pharmacy Co./ Your photographs are finished. OK. I'll get them tomorrow or the next day.
- 1014 i girl /INAGE?/ asking for a census registration person. She was registered /in Japan/ 2+ years ago, but the receipt has been lost. What to do? Girl explains she is calling for a girl whose /parents?/ have died and because of her job it has become inconvenient not to have it /XP/ Finally some satisfactory arrangement is made.
- 1041 o MURAOKA to girl, ISHIURA giving an address and family information in Japan. Also re some relative in Paho. NI
- 1045 i Fro SEKI from YSB re some "usual bills". YSB wants to write a letter about it.
- 1342 i To SEKI from MIYAMOTO of YSB. It is \$14.00. They have finished the investigation of cash on hand; will bring it up.
- 1343 i NAKATSUKA to XX. N asks him to answer Sen. GILLETTE'S charges. XX says he has heard from the Japanese radio that the Tatuta is coming to L. A. and Balboa. "I received no information at all from Tokyo. I was very sorry."
- 1502 o to NAKASHIMA or ? MOKIOKA? for a date. She puts him off till Tues. of next week.

End

1-537

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941

- 0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX asking for a reaction to Sen Gilette. Asks XX if he knows that Jack Wakayama has said that the Hawaiian Japanese Civic Association would welcome an investigation. XX asks if he is here in Honolulu! /XX is well uninformed on most subjects!/ XX says he has repeated that same statement many times already and thinks that is enough. He feels that if there were an investigation things would be more than 100 percent OK. N. says if they do find some un-American activity going on, the sooner the better so they /the U. S./ can get rid of them. /Friendly agreement and polite laughter Curtain/.
- 0922 i About date for some dinner in past. NI
- 0950 o Private call by someone from Star Bulletin. Everybody /at X?/ is out. What to do? They'll be there in a few minutes.
- 0952 o Man to girl. NI
- 1005 i for SAKAI from man. Lunch date.
- 1030 i FPM Routine inquiry re nationality
- 1038 o Short conversation but can't get it. Something about "three o'clock."
- 1052 i From ONO of Osaka Shoten re attainment of military age form.
- 1100 o to RCA re message received this morning. No. 1070 want to check. "On first page, second line, 8th word: CCFGR; 10th word, ITLJS; on page two, line 2, 9th word: P(B?) MEDZ; last line, first word, IRWPB and third word ZZGRO, and the ninth, FPOEN.
- 1125 i Is SAKAI there? This afternoon at 1.30 I'm coming to your /house/.

- 1328 i FPM about something /someone has left?/ in a drawer.
 1338 o SAKAI asking about films. They (the store?) called about them this morning whether to send them or not. They agree that someone is to bring them over.

1-538

- 1442 i to MURAOKA from MIKAMI re deferment of conscription blanks. If born in August 6, 1905 you don't need to fill out the blank do you. No, you don't. Or if born in 1925 you do not need to, do you. No. Thank you.

End

1-539

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1941

- 0905 o SAKAI to ? about doing something on a commission basis. Also wants him to take some pictures of the graduation /or a member of the graduates?/ Wants 2 pictures. /Personal NI
 0925 i Pro VX. "Will you call his other phone?"
 0936 o FPM from VX. Sounds important, but very hard to get because of faulty recording./ Mention of a /black?/ smith's shop of Fort St, and a few isolated words, but no other clue.
 0950 i For SAKAI from HAYASHI /can't get this message but tone sounds legitimate and innocent./
 1015 o to OKUMURA /having something to do with/ children. His "card" in the X is incomplete. Will he come in and finish filling it out? He will.
 1025 o for NAKASHIMA. Out. Have him call 2243. Caller not or VX. Man.
 1150 o For Yoshino, a girl /from MURAOKA/ This is the same girl that put him off before. Sample talk:
 Yoshino?
 Yes.
 How about it?
 I don't know what you're talking about.
 Don't say that!
 Have you some matter to talk about?
 Of course.
 What is it?
 etc. NI
 1200 o XX /home?/ wants to eat right away.

End

1-540

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

- 1000 o to RCA, for messenger
 1045 o to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. \$45.82. They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. (Doubt is S does either!)
 1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi despatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not had any information from TOKYO to prepare for possible closing (he says). He saw "a few lines," in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.
 1150 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. This morning /it was set?/ at 9.30, -- no 10. At X? Yes. /This conversation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./
 1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.

- 1326 o YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the office.
/Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/
1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.
1352 o to a girl. NI
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please
/have him call me? First part was missing/.

End

1-541

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

- 1429 o to TANAKA. Has he sent the things. Yes. The price will be about \$30
since prices are going up. Too bad. NI
1429 i MURAKAMI to SAKAI re Fujino. "Is it all right or do we have to
send a letter first? The latter M. will come over. XP. NI.

Discontinued

/! Sic transit gloria mundi!/
RX
R. P. P.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 3SB

INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE VICE-CONSUL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41—12/2/41

SECRET

2-247

WEDNESDAY, 1 OCTOBER 1941

- 0915 o VX to MIKAMI for a car at 3:45.
1143 i XX to VX. XX is going to Waikiki at about 2:30.

End

2-248

THURSDAY, 2 OCTOBER 1941

- 1027 o VX to KIMURA.—He's out.—I'll call again.

End

2-249

FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1941

- 1011 o VX to KAWAZOE at NJ dictating a statement in reply to Gillette's state-
ment. /See NJ for text./ Interrupted.
1016 o VX to KAWAZOE, continuing the statement. K. reads it back as a check.
1020 o VX to KAWAZOE /?/ of the HH with the same statement on the Gillette
question.
1030 o VX to KAWAZOE at HH /?/ adding that the S-B carried on 4 January a
statement by Senator Gillette, followed the next day by a S-B editorial.

End

2-250

SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-251

SUNDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1941

Not Covered

2-252

MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1941

- 0925 o /To #4./ VX tells wife that he will have lunch at the Pan-Pacific.
/Gilbert Bowles, Sr., spoke./

End

2-253

TUESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1941

- 0913 i Woman to VX.—Out. /Woman speaks in English at first and then later in Japanese. It was probably MORIMURA who answered./—When will he be back, do you know?—Very shortly. And what is your name, please?—/She falters a little in her embarrassment and says:/ I just wanted to talk to him personally.—I see.—I suppose that's all right, isn't it? /M. hangs up without answering or giving her a chance to finish./
- 1000 i /FPM/ /Verbatim, woman speaking:/ It is the second street toward the sea from King. It's just in front of this Castle Church. You probably know it, don't you? The Makiki Church that looks like *o-shiro* /Japanese for "castle"/. It's just the other side of McKinley High.—Oh, is that so? I think I can find it quite easily.—Between Pensacola and Piikoi.—Oh, I see.—Most anybody knows it, because it's just this side. There are several apartments around a court. The entrance to the court is just across the street from the entrance to Makiki Church, this *o-shiro* church.—I see.—So I think you will find it easily. 1116-A Elm Street.—Is there any indication at the gate of the house or . . .?—Well, the number is out on the . . . /indistinct/.—You see, 1116-A faces Palm /?/ Street and 1116-A is inside the court.—Alright, quite right.—I'll look for you tomorrow, then. Thank you very much.—Shall I take Mr. XX?—Ah ha, please.—And my wife?—Please. Thank you very much.—Not at all.—Goodbye.
- 1121 i /From #4/. /Due to technical difficulties I couldn't understand anything. Neither could the principals./

End

2-254

WEDNESDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1941

- 1405 o VX to MIKAMI /?/ to send a car to X. Do you know Elm Street?—No, but I'll check it.—The number is 1116-A Elm Street.

End

2-255

THURSDAY, 9 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-256

FRIDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1941

- 1125 ? /FPM/ VX and woman. It is apparent that a picnic is being planned for this weekend. Woman reports there will be 5 or 6 to a car.
- 1401 i MIKAMI to VX.—Send a taxi over.
- 1415 i /FPM/ From #4: Mrs. VX to VX. NI.
- 1427 o To #4: VX to wife. VX will soon be home.

End

2-257

SATURDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1941

- 0958 i YAMADA asks VX whether XX and VX can come to Shunchoro on Monday evening, the 13th, at 6:00.—Yes.

End

2-258

SUNDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

2-259

MONDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1941

- 0925 i /FPM/ ? to VX re nature of the ships being sent. The word *hikiage* /evacuation/ is to be avoided, and "temporary relief" used in connection with these ships.
- 0940 o VX to *Kimura*.—Out.—Have him call.

0947 o VX to KUCHIBA.—Not in.
 0950 ? /FPM/? and VX. A few remarks about mail just received after a long delay.

End

2-260

TUESDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1941

0952 o VX to KAWAMURA of HH. The Nitta Maru is being replaced by the Hikawa. /K. thinks this is "very interesting."/
 1000 o OG to "Trouble".
 1000 o OG to Repair Service, wondering why 5243 cannot be connected with 6091.—Try again, and dial slowly.
 1005 o VX to KAWAZOE, saying the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru. /Probably this *Kawazoe* is at NJ./
 1010 o /To #4:/ VX to wife saying a cable has come for him. He has talked the matter over with the NYK. /No clue given here as to the nature of the discussion, but it may be that VX and family will return to Japan on the "evacuation ship"./
 1020 i Mrs. HAMAMOTO to VX, who can hardly understand her at all. She is one of the fastest chatters ever heard here./ At 5 o'clock Saturday she invites herself up to see him.—How about 7 Thursday evening?—If business should make it impossible for me to see you, how may I reach you by phone?—8428. /She jumbles it so in pidgin English that neither VX nor I could understand her. After long shots wide of the mark, he finally asks her to give it in plain Japanese. It turned out to be 8429./
 1040 o VX tells ? that the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru.
 1203 i Castle & Cooke to VX re three pensioners of the Waiialua Ag. Co.—The person in charge of these matters has just gone home. Will you call 2243 after 1:00?
 1430 i KANEKO to VX notifying him of the arrival of a cable re the ships being sent. Passengers and mail; no cargo. There are to be 1000 persons on the Tatuta Maru and 500 or 600 on the others. There are no reductions from the full rate. Third class is \$165. There are so many uncertainties that the rest of the conversation was conjecture of little interest.

End

2-261

WEDNESDAY, 15 OCTOBER 1941

No activity

2-262

THURSDAY, 16 OCTOBER 1941

0943 i xxxxxxxx VX to /Mikami?/ re the October 6th issue of Life; buy 5 copies. /Note: issue contains two articles of possible interest./
 1130 o To OI re the Women's Club /Fujin Kai/ something-or other wants to find out if it is today or tomorrow.—It is today. /He finds this out after a pause in which he apparently asks someone./
 1148 i KANEKO to VX to speak of what they discussed before; quotes rates: 1st Class, \$205; 2nd Class, \$105; 3rd Class, \$58; Children ?/, \$49. Says if they lowered "compartments" to \$165 they would be losing about \$40 per person; also, the rates are set; says he'd like to have an order to do that.—VX says not X's business to decide. The practical details are up to the Company; also, the money allotted to X is Govt. money and the Govt. /Japanese/ is responsible for spending it. All that will have to be decided in Japan. /Apparently K. has hinted that X might make up the difference. K. then brings up the practical problem of provisioning the ship /with fuel?/. They have already applied for it, I hear. There are about 800 /feet?/ of pier. They go on talking about problems apparently connected with the ship.—K: Well, it (Taiyo Maru) will get in on the 31st, won't it? One week before that /. . . ./ Something about leaving the matter until the 22nd—about a week before the ship comes in, I think./

End

2-263

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1941

- 0921 i Mrs. GADDIS to VX. Finds out that it is the same TOJO they knew. /This was former War Minister in Japan/. Mrs. G: "Didn't he have something to do with aviation once, sometime ago?"—VX: Well /laughing a little/ I don't know about that. /Then VX confirms that Eichi TOJO and Hideki TOJO are one and the same person./
- 1101 o VX to KAWAZOE of NJ, dictating newspaper release. See NJ.
- 1105 o Ditto to other KAWAZOE, of HH. /After dictation, K, asks if VX has heard anything special about the Tatuta or the Taiyo. VX has not, so they agree that everything probably is alright./
- 1126 o VX to Sumitomo Bank for Ono-san /manager/ to ask about *Hatte no ken* /?/. Ono says will tomorrow a little before 8:00 be alright. It is.
- 1348 i From HARADA to make a date for a conference about 1:20 tomorrow.

End

2-264

SATURDAY, 18 OCTOBER 1941

No Activity

(Japanese Holiday)

SUNDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1941

Out of Commission

2-266

MONDAY, 20 OCTOBER, 1941

- 1018 i KANEKO to VX. VX explains that it is not true that X is deprived of all funds. X is permitted to draw out money to provide necessary food and shelter for the staff. VX explains to K the difference between a diplomat and a consul. K implies that some of his staff may be transferred to China, especially Nanking.
- 1031 i KANEKO to VX asking whether he thinks the Taiyo and Tatsuta Maru will get here. VX thinks so. Then K. mentions that there is someone who wants to pay for his passage here, but VX says it cannot be sent out of the U. S. if paid here. (The inference is that fares should be paid at the other end to avoid the freeze.)
- 1035 i TAKEO of NYK to VX. T. says the accounts (connected with the special trips of J. vessels) will be handled at X. T. will handle all the details as usual except that all expenditures and receipts from whatever source must be entered in a separate set of books. T. will go up this afternoon to talk it over with XX, VX, and company.
- 1112 o /Technical disturbances/. VX to TAKEI (?) re difficulties in making the arrangements.
- 1520 o VX to KIMURA re a dinner for the crew. XX thinks it may be possible in the case of the Taiyo, but there will be no time in the case of the Tatuta. XX thinks it may be all right to have the purser, the (merchant marine) captain, and the Engineering officer to dinner. We could even limit it to the (merchant) captain and the engineering officer if the others are busy.
- 1525 o VX to KANEKO, apparently a call back. K asks what the word "permit" means (on the ticket issued by X). "This transportation ticket is issued for THE Imperial Japanese Government." Is *for* correct? — Yes. — It seems to me it should be *by* or *through*. — No. This is for the Customs (U. S. or Japanese?) K. continues to find fault with the ticket, but VX defends it legally. Finally VX comes around to K's view that it should have been *by*, not *for*. No sooner does he make this admission than he reverts to his old position that *for* stands for "in the interest of", "for the benefit of," "on behalf of."

End

2-266 A

1550 i F.F.W.M. Probably NYK.
 NYK "This passage ticket is issued for and on behalf of the Imperial Japanese Government."
 VX—"O. K. I think."
 NYK—"Consul General for Japan . . . no Japanese consulate general at Honolulu—is that wrong."
 VX—All right I think /repeats/.
 NYK—Then the X will do the Japanese part?"
 VX—"Yes."
 / Apparently the N.Y.K. is printing special tickets for the 3 forthcoming trips to make clear that the government is in charge./

2-267

TUESDAY, 21 OCTOBER 1941

0956 i Request in pidgin about deferment. VX refers her to 2243. /W. N.?
 0956 i Above caller. Girl at X explains that since this is a case of re-deferment she has from Dec. 1 till Jan. 31. If it were for the first time it ought to be gotten in quickly, this month.
 1029 o VX to —. Saw — (?) yesterday re the bond procedure. The money will be released from the X funds in the Y. Specie Bank and the treasury department has OKed this.
 1031 o VX to YSB. Miyamoto—tells him the treasury in Washington has OKed the money proposition the release of funds. /But I'm not clear who got the message in the first place/.
 1142 o VX to Matsuda. He's out. This is Miyamoto. Have Matsuda call when he comes in please.
 1155 o VX to Mrs. UYETAR for Mrs. MATSUDA, wife of YSB's MATSUDA. Not here. I'll call her later then.

End

2-268

WEDNESDAY, 22 OCTOBER, 1941

Out of commission

2-269

THURSDAY, 23 OCTOBER, 1941

No activity

2-270

FRIDAY, 24 OCTOBER, 1941

0916 i re deferment. Routine.
 1135 i Woman to VX. Please call 2243 (X)
 1152 i To VX—Call 2243.
 1325 i Fragment.
 1326 i From KANEKO to VX asks him if he (VX) sent the cable for him about the Taiyo Maru business. VX did, for it was necessary. VX says they are negotiating with the State Dept. about the money they have taken in. Thinks it will be ok. Some mention of the "search" by the immigration officials /?/ Apparently that is ok too.
 1355 o VX to KANEKO—out; for HIRADA /?/ also out; for KIMURA—call 58234. Re the estimate of receipts from the Taiyo. They are 3rd class 417 (before from 200 to 400). First class about 23. Second class, 33. Won't exceed \$1000 /what?/.
 1405 i Fragment.

End

2-271

SATURDAY, 25 OCTOBER, 1941

0929 i NI
 0935 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to VX saying the FBI is conducting an investigation on Kauai of Consular Agents according to a letter received today from the Branch Office (of the NJ) on Kauai. It seems that HAMADAYO and FUNAGAYO (in May) and HAKAMA (?) are in question. Please let me have names. The people are scared; I will let you have the names (apparently by mail or messenger, for nothing more was said).

End

2-272

SUNDAY, 26 OCTOBER, 1941

No activity

MONDAY, 27 OCTOBER, 1941

2-273

0916 i To VX from KANEKO /?/, Discussion of the various details of the forthcoming Taiyo visit; licenses, the issuance of tickets; the collection of fares; about someone who is a nikkei—a woman, and that there is time to settle the thing /about her/ because there is still four days / the Taiyo comes four days after this conversation/; how /to send?/ something that is quite heavy; about a further "conference". They agree to take in money from the 27th on, and think they can collect it under the special license.

1025 i FPM/ From NYK? Still talking about special licenses, etc.

1108 i Very brief.

1420 i Mrs. VX to VX /recording extremely bad/

XXXXXXXXXX

End

2-274

TUESDAY, 28 OCTOBER, 1941

0945 o VX /?/ to NIO /? phon./ wants to consult with him about —— Re. the X's ambition to hold an examination this month (until the 31st of Oct.). The Minister without Portfolio, then the Minister of Education is conferring an award of honor to the Commissioner(s?) for Japanese Affairs/? not positive that this is right/.

0952 o to 4. NC. NI.

1005 i YOSHIOKA to VX, No reply yet to telegram sent to —— Inchikau /?/ in Washington on 22nd. Y. has heard nothing of the extent of understanding reached by the negotiations there, and has heard that they have broken down. VX says that there has been a reply by cable re certain frozen funds. The Foreign office has received a reply from the State Department which amounted to (question about the following) "Get them (the particular funds in question?) out of the country."

Y—Is there anything especially interesting about this contract situation?

VX—/Interrupting hurriedly/ "Wait . . . that is . . . that is . . . that is . . . wait a moment . . . that is right."

Y—Something has come here, hasn't it?

VX—I think so. XX has (unable to make out.)

1355 i FPM YOSHIOKA of NYK to ? re a matter that had been taken up with the collector of Customs. The matter concerns the X clerk, MORIMURA. (Switched to VX). Y. to VX re license for oil for the Taiyo. When she gets in her tank will inspected and checked against the log. That's all right.

End

2-275

WEDNESDAY, 29 OCTOBER, 1941

1055 o VX to TOYAMA /Edt. of Jitsugyo No Hawaii/. He has just stepped out to the barber's. VX asks about a serial text of the M-day law being published in the English section. VX wants 5 or 6 copies since X hasn't received and from the legislature yet.

1105 i FPM. Information wanted re /Joe Gin Gee/ phone clerk in a store they say. Allen D. Smythe, Chief Clerk Territorial Senate.

End

2-276

THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER, 1941

0927 i KANEKO to VX re the method of counting passengers. Are children to be counted as half or as full passengers?—As adults if unaccompanied—A lot of these are dual citizens—Many of them have no passports at all and may have trouble when they reach Japan. Then, since they have no reentry permits they will have trouble when they attempt to come

- back here later. (This is the very problem that Mrs. NISHI scolded her husband of spilling to Sumitomo bank employees the other day). To facilitate the landing of these passengers in Japan each child should have an excerpt from his KT as proof of at least his parent's Japanese citizenship. They should also have BCs along. The passengers will be classified on the passenger list as Japanese and as American citizens.
- 0956 o VX to TAKEI. KANEKO answers saying T. is out. T. is sick and took yesterday afternoon off.
- 1050 ? VX to KANEKO. They will meet at official residence at 6.30. K—Goro TAKAYANAGI (Manager of Honolulu Fire Insurance Co., whom VX does *not* know), TAKAGISHI, TAKAHASHI, IMAZAWA, Hiroshi(?) KODAMA, SHIRAKAWA, and somebody's wife (whose name I could not catch) were all going to Japan together on the Taiyo.
- 1146 o VX to wife. She hasn't got back yet.
- 1332 i Mrs. VX tells VX that KANEKO called him.
- 1414 o VX to KANEKO re the plans for the search etc. Both seem perfectly satisfied. Taiyo will sail at 5PM Tuesday. VX says the alien registration blanks have to be filled out if not previously registered. (NC due to shortage of blanks.)

End

2-277

FRIDAY, 31 OCTOBER 1941

- 1135 i KANEKO to VX. They discuss putting the names of arrivals in the newspapers. They think customs inspections will take quite a long time and that many will read in the papers of their relatives and friends before they are able to debark.
- 1425 o VX says it's a civil case and he doesn't know much about it. About something that is in the newspapers.

End

2-278

SATURDAY, NOV. 1, 1941

- 1140 o VX to KAWAZOE saying he has heard that the Taiyo is taking no mail. Is that true?—Yes. It is.—Is there to be an inspection of the mail?—Yes.—Who ordered it?—The postmaster—Has word to this effect come from J. Embassy?—No.

End

2-279

SUNDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1941

- 1048 o Seki to ? re: something that has come from Washington.

End

2-280

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1941

- 0859 i NAKATSUKA wants a complete list of passengers, Come down in person.
- 1044 i Routine re NYK. Something from Washington. XX is out.
- 1045 i VX to someone re mail situation.
- 1146 o VX asks for MIKAMI—out.
- 1218 o VX asks where HIROSHI is. Calee says didn't he go somewhere with XX. Isn't he at X now? VX seems perplexed. Does calee know SAKAI /name uncertain/ of X? He does. Does he know his house? Yes. Then please come up to X now.
- 1226 i /from taxi? VX asks to take him to dock at 2PM. He wants to see 1. the immigration station. 2. The harbor master. 3. Hibberly. VX also him to go to the P. Hotel at 1.30 / A moment later he changes this, since apparently the P. hotel is considered too hot—and says he is to take VX to the three places previously planned.
- 1655 o To NYK. VX calling to get Hibberly's number.
- 1658 o To Hibberly home, but H. is down at boat. She advises him to call the customs inspector. VX—"Thank you for my troubling you!" Mrs. H. "Bye bye."

End

2-281

TUESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER, 1941

- 1052 o to Hiberly's office /from XX?/. Call 2458.
 1054 i From (4). Re: Conscription notification. Routine. X says such notices will probably go on an American boat since the P. O. is receiving mail.
 1106 i From (4). KANEKO to VX re overtime of customs. K. wanted them to work to ten, but Hiberly thought they should work shorter hours Rest NI.
 1110 o VX to wife. NI.
 1112 i Wife to VX. NI.
 1138 i From Nippu Jiji (which calls us first and keeps them waiting) to X.X. /Not SOGA—sound like KABO but isn't/ re: the Washington tie-up of the mail. Says Star-Bull reports that X has phoned the J. ambassador about it and asks what their (X's) expectation is re the outcome of the protest. XX rather thinks the outcome will be favorable. XX says it was the Ambassador (muko wa) that called him to ask about it. /More details but stopping here./
 1534 o For girl's older brother. Not in. From VX.

End

2-282

WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER, 1941*

- 1009 i ONOH of Sumitomo to VX. Not in.
 1037 i Re expatriation. NI.
 1500 i \$26,000 /approximate receipts?/ from YOSHICKA /?/ Talking about the accounting for the voyage.

2-283

THURSDAY, 6 NOVEMBER, 1941

No activity

FRIDAY TO SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 7 TO 9

Out of commission

2-284

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1941

- 0936 i To VX from OI of JCC. re the welcome for Ambassador KURUSU. The plane will come tomorrow. He has his wife with him. They talk about getting in to the field and the situation in reference to greeting the ambassador. OI says he will inform SATO and ——? The ambassador will stop overnight. X is going to put out a party for him.
 0944 FPM VX (probably) to someone re picture taking in connection with the arrival tomorrow. Decide to have none because of the "big news" that it would be. Re the party, VX wants it to be a formal affair. /Possibly to newspaper editor or reporter?/
 0950 o to /KOMO?/ telling him that clipper is down at Midway with motor trouble and will be 22 hours late. He is very tired so the party will be formal. Wants also to /neglect?/ the newspaper reporters interview. Also talk about taking a picture.
 0952 FPM "Value \$70 for 2 cases freight prepaid,"—substance of telegram being explained to someone. Looks like someone is sending freight to the J. Embassy in Washington. They will go to get them Wednesday. If it is, a thousand and ten kin /or 1000 ten-kins?/. The charge is \$6. Of course they will get it; then take it over there to weight it. "Please erase the address and substitute J. Embassy, Washington."
 ? ? Re the party being simple.
 1002 o VX to KAWADA /?/ asking the president of the company or someone in his place to come to the "pahtee" tomorrow night at X at 6.30. Callee will tell him.
 1005 o VX inviting SOGA of NJ to the "pahtee". There will be 14 or 15 guests in all.

906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 1010 o VX gets girl, asks for father MORI whom he invites to the simple "pahtee". MORI is willin. Asks if KURUSU is going to stay at the R. Hawaiian.
1015 o VX to TSUDA /?/ asking him to "pahtee".
1041 i VX from ? whom he has left word to call him. "Pahtee".

End

2-285

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1941

Holiday; closed

2-286

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1941

- 0940 i To FUKUYA /?/ from MIYA/TO?/ of the YSB re payment of telegraph charges. X will pay tomorrow.
0942 i XX telling NAKATSUKA that he hasn't heard from KURUSU for 2 days so doesn't know. Thinks he is coming at 4 p. m. XX wants to know "if the plane left Midway this morning." N. doesn't know—suggests Pan American can tell. XX says no social events because XX has wired that he is tired.
0945 i from a bank? No statement has come etc.
0947 o To NJ to KAWAZOE from VX. A telegram has just come from KURUSU. He will arrive this afternoon. Left Midway 7:25. According to K's wish a news reporter is not to meet him—only a representative.
1045 o To OI from VX. KURUSU is coming at 5:10 today. The seating order is SATO, SUGIMOTO, MORIFUJI, SUMITA, MORI, MATSUDA, KIMURA, ONOH, SOGA, MAKINO.
1105 i Inquiry re J. census registration. Reporting a death.
1320 i About the plane's arrival /to a guest/.

End

2-287

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1941

- 1015 i KAWAZOE to VX inquiring re KURUSU's movements. Wants to know the Navy's representative. Knows already the army's. X boy has forgotten the Navy's. Wants to know about all other movements of KURUSU.
1030 i NAKATSUKA to VX. NI (See S. B. 11/13/41)
1045 i Is someone there? Girl. NI.
1445 i Hung up.

End

2-288

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941

- 0955 i From Mrs. VX. Domestic business. NI.
1040 o To (4). VX to YOSHI /?/ at NYK re: receipts from the Taiyo Maru. Does he want the cash? No. The figures. They haven't figured out the tax bill yet. They will send it over as soon as finished.

End

2-289

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1941

- 0932 i "trying very hard to get the telephone number of the Nuuanu Sotoshu /Soto sect of Buddhism—a zen sect/ (American woman speaking from the voice). No. is 5120. "It is listed under Rev. Kumagata /?/"

End

2-290

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1941

No activity

2-291

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1941

- 0945 i KAWAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse reactions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K/. K. says /I think/ that previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propaganda. But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. Not in Japanese either.
- 1117 i FPM. Fragment
- 1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. \$10,000, \$12,000 /the amount they have on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they figure the taxes, the bond, and all.
- 1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very brief.

End

2-292

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1941

No activity

2-293

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1941

No activity

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941

No activity—holiday

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1941

- 0900 o /to maid at home?/ telling her there is a wedding for 9 or 10 guests.
- 1037 o for Mr. MORI from VX replying to a communication via his wife yesterday. Re going to NAMIKI's. VX on discussing it with his wife thinks it will be good /to go?/ Something about 6 volumes of books. /Sounds like a social engagement./
- 1408 FPM Since other "has had no opportunity, will mail be o. k.?" VX says it will.

End

2-294

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

No activity

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1941

No activity

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941

No activity

2-295

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941

No activity

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941

- 1109 o VX /?/ coming home quick. OK.
- 1150 o to YAMAMOTO from VX. Has he got some unused congratulations? Y. says the insurance company has them. VX asks how many there were. Y. doesn't know. They're all thru with them.
- 1320 o No ans.

End

2-295

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1941

- 0920 o VX for YAMAMOTO of /YSB?/. Then seems to have FUJITA instead. "The master (Y) is out." VX has something on his mind, but apparently decides not to tell FUJITA. He asks him to have Y. call him when he returns.
- 0926 i from? (KAWA, HARA, ZAWA?) to VX who wants to see him for a minute. ? is busy, how about next week. /Long pause/. VX—"If /the round trip/ takes only about 20 minutes couldn't you come?" He finally will, but it has taken a great deal of persuasion, and he is obviously reluctant for he is alone, it being Saturday.
- 0935 o to SATO (SAITO?) from VX who says he wants to have a conference about the recent daitoto ogikawa's recent request /don't get it. Do you?/
- 0946 o VX to OI. VX has been talking to YAMAMOTO about there being practically no malt (or possibly yeast. Much confusion about this word. Might also mean ostentation, display, a good thing, good news, a bait, a tempting offer) in town. (Y. brought up the question.) Discuss the problem of the difficulties of the J. here.
- 1026 i From ONODA of the Sumitomo Bank to VX inviting him to a meal or something tomorrow. VX is busy except for lunch (There are some others coming, XX and Harada, not many). Can VX come to his place about 1 pm. VX can and will. /Line very noisy/.

End

2-296

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1941

No activity

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

No activity

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1941

No activity

Discontinued

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 39

69512—IC

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

[Handwritten in margin:] Prompted. Reluctant hesitation.

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . ? . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

[Handwritten in margin:] Great surprise at J. end?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about. Strikes attention.

[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are very bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the Japanese conferences.

[Handwritten in the margin:] Then they discuss the Southern advance [of Japanese into French Indo-China] every day.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

[Handwritten in the margin:] Seemed not to understand the question about climate.

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate recently.

[Handwritten in the margin:] Long delay.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he explained for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war.

It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

[Handwritten in margin:] M[ori] tries never to hear about the fleet.

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't [know whether] all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

[Handwritten in margin:] Red Christmas flower with long stems [explanation of poinsettia omitted in translation].

* (J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) has a hard time understanding sake (repeats 4 times).

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) is surprised that British liquor came in.

[Handwritten in margin:] Taishō jijūsho Takagishi (understood as Takaguchi) repeated 5 or 6 times. Sake is in style here, but there is no kazu-no-ko. Last year there was everything.

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamume"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiye Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

[Handwritten in margin:] Who is this "he"—Ogawa? Presumably it is.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone.

[Handwritten in margin:] Tried to raise Tōkyō again.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 40

TWO REPORTS, SUBJECT JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District Date: 9 Feb., 1942

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941—9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending in 14ND.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (See first page of details)

References:

Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3)
CinCPac (1)
Com14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14ND #54A ONI File No.:

Synopsis.—On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, transmitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and submitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the Germany Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dispositions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 1941, no evidence has been found that KUEHN's signal system ever was employed.

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. Efforts to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.

DEDUCTIONS: Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto KUEHN, a German subject.

Approved.

I. H. MAYFIELD
Captain, U. S. Navy
District Intelligence Officer.

[1]

WBS/zw

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities

References:

- (a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
- (b) Com 14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DN1), Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
- (c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
- (d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 5-1-41.
- (e) DIO-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI), 5-31-41.
- (f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, IJN, 7-17-41.
- (g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
- (h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3-42.
- (i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3-42.
- (j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHI-RODO, 2-8-42.

Enclosures:

- (A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800 22-30 November, 1941.
- (B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at Various Times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941.

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential informant furnished the District Intelligence Officer with copies of certain commercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed very important.

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, were effected.)

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive investigation by the three intelligence agencies:

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

(Secret military message No. — by Chief of Consulate's Code)

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.

From: Fujii

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:

(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

- 1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
- 2. All battle force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
- 3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
- 4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
- 5. All battle force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
- 6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
- 8.

(2) Signal

1. Light in Lanikai beach house at night—One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

—When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile head-light and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3", "4". Two pieces linen cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates "5", "6", "7", "8".

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8".

5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9:45 am—

(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale—apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6".

(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".

(c) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates "5" or "8".

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala road which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "Exex" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak—7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6"; 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "4" or "7"; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 December was made:

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 1941.

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units from Pearl Harbor.

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". (The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investigation on Otto KUEHN and members of this family.)

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the indicated markings.

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regarding signalling from a "Lanikai beach house"; and, in addition, to conduct an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and Haleakala, island of Maui.

6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case there.

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been mentioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all available residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 December.

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by Agent McCarthy:

"In compliance with instructions, Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might possibly been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua. It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to Schofield Hospital.

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied "Kuehn's house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any communication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6:45 A. M. on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr. and Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish any additional information concerning his identity.

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing vessels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have recalled the name of the owner.

"Because of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all residences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanksgiving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they

are a very reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. This house is set on a cliff extending over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of further attention to this office."

[8] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 December, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the following incident:

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espionage activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was spending the night at the Kula Sanatorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was telephoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room in the hospital in the Kula Sanatorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will be noted that HAMADA and MATSUDA, who visited FURUKAWA recently at Kulu (DIO-Z/3-#3), have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Following our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no military orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an investigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the outbreak of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN, among whose effects was found, in the summer of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA's name. (References (d) and (f).)

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, regarding investigation of the Haleakala and Kula Sanitarium region:

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance from nightfall to past midnight—actual observation of the area being conducted personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated point and its area under surveillance from their tower stations and are keeping this office advised.

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire which were interpreted as signals:

"At 8:25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite fire signal was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This fire lasted 3 minutes. At 8:40 p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea Bay came on again. Both then went out.

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe fire signal seen.

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week a sampan—"Malsie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by an [10] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island—

where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.

"However, there is one such report of interest: On the night of 11 December, 1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District Intelligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investigate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person signalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our suspect has been scared away or else using another point."

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in part:

". . . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.

[11] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December 1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sanatorium grounds. Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually see subject light any matches."

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sanitarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being prepared on FURUKAWA.

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARUYAMA to determine whether signals had been seen emanating from his house, and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai.

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to MARUYAMA, that "while this Subject's home is strategically situated and could have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships at sea.

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is Ichio FUJII.

[12] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.

17. The records of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Honolulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived at Honolulu, from Japan, board the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special

board of inquiry held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts been discovered.

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with reference to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the case is continuing.

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three investigative agencies: Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division; and, Lieutenant George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from employment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows:

Miss Kimie DOUE
Takaichi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Hiyoshi SHIGEFUJI

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her position as receptionist, Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering questions.

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that Tadasu MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical details of this work were handled by Takaichi SAKAI, one of the clerks above mentioned.

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyard Street, Honolulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate during [14] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTOSHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), also was interrogated on 1 January, 1942. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his frequent departures from the Consulate during business hours.

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth in reference (h), that MORIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORIMURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORIMURA's background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Office publication containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member of the consular service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKAWA, and Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTOSHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together as they came into, or left, the office. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTOSHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTOSHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORIMURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads also will be covered by a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul General and the Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According to Miss DOUE, these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the consular officials.

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, visited the Consulate on what appeared to be other than routine business, Miss DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. The last visit of this man remembered by Miss DOUE was about the end of November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.

33. On 31 December, 1941, the day before the investigation of the former consular clerks was commenced, Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for questioning by Special Agents J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on

31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby room.

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of November, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE was taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she could not be recognized by him.

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned, Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being conducted. She was thereupon asked whether she had ever seen the person who had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Consulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appearance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar and that she thought he was a "spy".

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written statements obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and Allen, is submitted for information:

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu enroute to Japan. In 1936 KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three months' further language study. Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN operated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty shop brought in only about \$80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was rented.

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money from European sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. Friedel KUEHN also received money from inherited property in Germany. According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased the [18] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for \$40,000.00. Part of this consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was \$8,000.00, but his wife, who was questioned later, said it was \$9,000.00. In September, 1940, a payment of \$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942:

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was a request to send the balance of the \$40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN informed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first contacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtaining information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The information which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely fictitious, as far as I knew."

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet movements was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942:

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signaling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in

harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was

accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time."

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard containing \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. The person who made this delivery stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money as follows:

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive MORIMURA and himself to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Malunui Avenue, Kailua, KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along Malunui Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHIRODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty minutes before MORIMURA reappeared, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from

the direction in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a photograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, who stated that it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the money to him; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended that he was of the belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. (It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following day.)

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other than himself and the Japanese who delivered the \$14,000.00 to him, in any of the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in conjunction with KUEHN.

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Consulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated by the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. The despatch designated the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has failed to disclose any record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice.

50. Of the original \$14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, \$5,000.00 in new \$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given \$2,000.00, in similar denominations, to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to determine [26] the persons or agencies through whom they were transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, Honolulu banks.

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following information appeared on the suspect card:

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu (Occupation) None at present

Formerly (1918) officer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among officers in U. S. Navy; at one time received considerable sums of money from European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum of money with her; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"KUEHN, Friedel—Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as contacts of the local Japanese consulate."

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelligence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that the Friedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general requested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they furnished according to its value.

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNS had contacted the Japanese Consulate.

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has prepared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, information to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and furnishing the same to the consular officials; and preparing and submitting to the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully transmitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese Government, through the Consulate.

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would establish as a fact that any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this

office and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title.)

Pending—14ND.

6 February, 1942

ENCLOSURE (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800, 22-30 November 1941

Date	Time	Types of Ships								
		BBs	CAs	CLs	CVs	SSs	DDs	DMs	AVDs	(#)
11/22-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	21	8	2	31
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	22	8	2	32
11/23-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	22	8	2	32
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	22	4	2	28
11/24-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	21	4	1	26
	1800	3	6	1	1	4	21	4	2	27
11/25-----	0800	3	6	1	1	4	24	5	2	31
	1800	3	10	1	2	4	26	8	2	37
11/26-----	0800	3	10	1	2	4	24	8	2	34
	1800	3	11	1	2	4	23	8	3	34
11/27-----	0800	3	11	1	2	4	23	8	3	34
	1800	3	11	1	2	4	28	8	3	39
11/28-----	0800	1	8	0	2	4	11	4	3	18
	1800	6	8	5	1	2	26	4	3	33
11/29-----	0800	6	7	6	1	2	24	4	3	31
	1800	6	7	5	1	2	26	4	3	33
11/30-----	0800	5	7	5	1	2	25	4	3	32
	1800	5	7	5	1	2	26	4	3	33

Key: BB—battleship; CA—heavy cruiser; CL—light cruiser; CV—aircraft carrier; SS—submarine; DD—destroyer; DM—light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD—scaplane tender (destroyer type).
 (#)—Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.

ENCLOSURE (B): Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941

BATTLESHIPS (BBS)

- 0600—At moorings (ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA) ___ 3
- 0658—NEVADA underway_____ 3
- 0705—ARIZONA underway_____ 3
- 0748—NEVADA cleared_____ 2
- 0801—ARIZONA cleared_____ 1
- 1045—PENNSYLVANIA entered ____ 2
- 1053—CALIFORNIA entered ____ 3
- 1102—MARYLAND entered _____ 4
- 1110—TENNESSEE entered _____ 5
- 1123—WEST VIRGINIA entered ____ 6
- 1155—PENNSYLVANIA moored ____ 6
- 1210—CALIFORNIA moored _____ 6
- 1232—MARYLAND moored _____ 6
- 1240—TENNESSEE moored _____ 6
- 1306—WEST VIRGINIA moored ____ 6
- 1547—UTAH moored (#) _____ 7
- 1648—UTAH moored (#) _____ 7
- 1800—At moorings _____ 7

HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)—continued

- 0727—CHESTER cleared_____ 9
- 0735—SALT LAKE CITY cleared__ 8
- LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)
- 0600—Underway in harbor (DETROIT) _____ 1
- 0637—DETROIT cleared _____ 0
- 1138—HELENA entered _____ 1
- 1131—HONOLULU entered _____ 2
- 1148—ST LOUIS entered _____ 3
- 1200—PHOENIX entered _____ 4
- 1212—RALEIGH entered _____ 5
- 1250—HELENA moored _____ 5
- 1300—HONOLULU moored _____ 5
- 1300—RALEIGH moored _____ 5
- 1305—PHOENIX moored _____ 5
- 1328—ST. LOUIS moored _____ 5
- 1350—DETROIT entered _____ 6
- 1510—DETROIT moored _____ 6
- 1800—At moorings _____ 6

HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)

- 0600—At moorings _____ 11
- 0625—NORTHAMPTON underway _ 11
- 0632—CHESTER underway _____ 11
- 0640—SALT LAKE CITY underway 11
- 0718—NORTHAMPTON cleared ____ 10

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)

- 0600—At moorings (LEXINGTON, ENTERPRISE) _____ 2
- 0735—ENTERPRISE underway ____ 2

(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.

ENCLOSURE (B); *Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941—Continued*

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)—continued		DESTROYERS (DDS)—continued	
0838—ENTERPRISE cleared	1	1300—MONAGHAN entered	21
1800—At moorings	1	1308—TUCKER entered	22
SUBMARINES (SSS)		1318—CONYNGHAM moored	22
0600—At moorings	4	1330—FARRAGUT entered	23
1254—ARGONAUT underway	4	1333—CASE entered	24
1300—TROUT underway	4	1336—MacDONOUGH entered	25
1340—ARGONAUT cleared	3	1340—PHELPS entered	26
1350—TROUT cleared	2	1345—CASSIN moored	26
1800—At moorings	2	1350—ALYWIN moored	26
DESTROYERS (DDS)		1350—REID moored	26
0600—At moorings or underway	26	1407—DOWNES moored	26
0602—MUGFORD cleared	25	1412—TUCKER moored	26
0605—GRIDLEY cleared	24	1425—WORDON moored	26
0608—MAURY cleared	23	1435—DALE moored	26
0612—BAGLEY cleared	22	1440—CASE moored	26
0617—HENLEY cleared	21	1446—MONAGHAN moored	26
0620—CRAVEN cleared	20	1446—HULL moored	26
0621—PATTERSON cleared	19	1459—DEWEY moored	26
0623—BALCH cleared	18	1459—FARRAGUT moored	26
0625—HELM cleared	17	1515—PHELPS moored	26
0628—RALPH TALBOT cleared	16	1530—MacDONOUGH moored	26
0630—FANNING cleared	15	1800—At moorings	26
0632—McCALL cleared	14	MINESWEEPERS (DMS)	
0640—DUNLAP cleared	13	0600—At moorings	8
0641—BENHAM cleared	12	0610—GAMBLE underway	8
0647—CONYNGHAM cleared	11	0612—MONTGOMERY underway	8
1205—WORDON entered	12	0615—BREESE underway	8
1221—ALYWIN entered	13	0625—RAMSAY underway	8
1228—CONYNGHAM entered	14	0652—GAMBLE cleared	7
1232—CASSIN entered	15	0655—MONTGOMERY cleared	6
1236—HULL entered	16	0657—BREESE cleared	5
1243—DALE entered	17	0700—RAMSAY cleared	4
1245—REID entered	18	1800—At moorings	4
1247—DOWNES entered	19	SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)	
1254—DEWEY entered	20	0600—At moorings	3
		1800—At moorings	3

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

Report made at: Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District. Date: 14 Feb. 1942.

Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.

Period covered: 5 Dec., 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case: Pending.

Origin of Case: Receipt by DIO-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese Ambassador, Washington.

Character of Investigation: Espionage.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other Consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.

Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3)
CinCPac (1)
Com 14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)

Source File No.: 14 ND #54A. ONI File No.:

Synopsis: During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such

facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has any message been found which ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.

Messages further reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports were accurate as to the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inaccurate as to destroyers.

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard was engaged in this espionage activity.

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.

Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, absence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to protect battleships in the harbor.

Approved: I. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
District Intelligence Officer.

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities.

References:

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHIRODO, 2-8-42.

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAMI, 2-6-42.

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement upon, reference (a). It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence transmitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and (b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those communications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter discussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confidential source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned until 11 December, 1941.

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Harbor, and their entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Consulate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA personally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting observers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently mentioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Consulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores of the Hawaiian Islands), at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings to the Consulate. The *modus operandi* of MORIMURA and other Consulate observers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, entry and departure log for 22 November to 7 December, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above

despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane tenders CURTISS and THORNTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister TOGO by the local Consulate:

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th

From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either entered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, between 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which request has not yet been found in the traffic to the Consulate), the following message was sent by [3] Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same day the Lexington and five heavy cruisers departed. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One (ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch to Tokyo.

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, the same morning.

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, and up until the time of the Japanese air attack on 7 December, there were eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard was, therefore, correct.

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 December reported only half of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none departed, before 1200 the same day, making a total of twenty-seven moored (or underway in the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [4] One destroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers in Pearl Harbor.

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts as to all destroyer-type ships are presented: At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs entered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, and at 1612.

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of interest:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of war-ships after the fourth.

There has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic any indication as to when the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet movements. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington:

On the evening of the fifth the battleship WYOMING and one sweeper entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows: 9 battleships; 3 light cruisers; 17 destroyers; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock: 4 light cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV ALL —) PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet.

The first sentence of the foregoing message is supported by the following facts: The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the following are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYOMING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT.

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 December, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor that day—four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), and three seaplane tenders (AVDs)—which to the untrained observer might have appeared also to be destroyers.

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered at 0830, cleared at 0920. [6] entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the harbor.

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms "moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, as reported in the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was: nineteen at moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo (which also has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic):

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further comment thereon is offered.

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American merchantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately following.

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco:

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.

The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner Lurline is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the following message for transmission to Tokyo:

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu and departed early on the fourth. About 110 tons; one stack; and had a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT's crew went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars:

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 14.)

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONOLULU. (Paragraph 5.)

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and reporting only half the light cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 9.)

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in on 5 December, whereas none arrived. (Paragraph 6.)

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), it is concluded that:

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admissions of KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails [9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made the erroneous reports.)

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the WYOMING (whereas the latest issue of Jane's *Fighting Ships*, readily available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battleships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo was surprisingly inaccurate.

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).

Pending.

[1] ENCLOSURE (A): *Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese consul general, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consuls, concerning military and naval subjects.*

21 MARCH 1941.

(To Tokyo; by code mail to Washington)

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the destroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success, it was reported.

29 APRIL, 1941

(To Tokyo)

The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th [2] via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

14 MAY, 1941

(To Tokyo)

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Emmons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

7 JUNE, 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units [3] of the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

13 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)

Reference San Francisco MSG #92:

SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

26 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.

27 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo)

Chungking—Burma Road—Trucks

28 JUNE 1941

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)

Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China).

8 JULY, 1941

(To Tokyo and Washington)

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China air force: The local Chinese Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspapers reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

15 JULY 1941

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west coast and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.

26 JULY 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspect-

ing the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

2 SEPTEMBER 1941

(To Washington and Tokyo)

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

23 SEPTEMBER, 1941

(To Tokyo)

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

18 NOVEMBER 1941

(To Tokyo)

Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma road trucks 3000—2 ton trucks.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 41

7 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that the annexed pages 1-28 are true and correct photostats of original documents on file in Frupac.*

THO. H. DYAR,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

S I S TRANSLATIONS 1200-1299
DIPLOMATIC "KO", "PA" & "LA" SYSTEMS

	Date	Addressee	GR	Next to last code group	Received	Transmitted
FBI has.....	3 Dec.....	T	165			
	3 Dec.....	T	188			
	3 Dec.....	T	56		1254	1315
	3 Dec.....	SF	59	} Same	1254	1318
	3 Dec.....	W	59		1255	1318
	3 Dec.....	T	18		1657	1707
	3 Dec.....	T	25	} Same	1718	1726
	3 Dec.....	SF	27		1718	1730
	4 Dec.....	T	16	IYJIE	1834	1848
	4 Dec.....	T	41	YUAHE	1833	1850
	5 Dec.....	T	42	BYJVE	1804	1806
	5 Dec.....	SF	45	IHSGZ	1136	1138
	5 Dec.....	Sea	45	IHSGZ	1139	1139
	5 Dec.....	T	43	IHSGZ	1136	1139
	5 Dec.....	W	45	IHSGZ	1132	1132
	6 Dec.....	T	138	OXAQ	1258	1304
	6 Dec.....	T	47	UEVTA	1801	1805
	6 Dec.....	W	49	UEVTA	1801	1807

*(Incorporated into Exhibits 56 and 57—June 27, 1945.)

Secret

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii

WBS/wbs

Memo for: The File.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, Honolulu.

Ref: (a) FBI-Hon. Inv. Rpt., dated 26 Dec. 1941, subject: Japanese Activities Honolulu, T. H.

1. Capt. I. H. Mayfield, USN, former DIO-14ND, was interviewed regarding reference (a) on 17 March 1944, in the presence of Capt. Peyton Harrison, USNR, present DIO-14ND, and the undersigned. Upon reading reference (a) in full, Capt. Mayfield made the following observations, in substance:

(a) Ref. (a), p. 2, 2nd full par.—Statement that the material was not inventoried is correct.

(b) Ref. (a), p. 4, 3rd full par.—I did receive some of the enciphered Consulate traffic from RCA after 1 Dec. 1941 and before 7 Dec. 1941. All was delivered immediately by officer messenger to Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, USN, O-in-C of the combat intelligence "unit" at NYPH. Insofar as Comdr. Rochefort provided me with "clear" versions of portions of that traffic, I furnished FBI-Honolulu with copies thereof.

(c) Ref. (a), p. 6, 1st full indented par.—Meeting of Mr. Shivers, Lt. Col. Bicknell, and myself took place in the DIO office about 1100, 11 Dec. 1941, after the Commandant directed me to get in touch with Mr. Shivers and work on the matter immediately.

(d) Ref. (a), p. 7, top line—To my knowledge, it was never established that anyone ever used the signaling system to communicate with the enemy.

(e) Ref. (a), last page, 2nd and 3rd lines from top—The action taken by me was to notify the appropriate District and Fleet staff officers with whom I had been maintaining liaison on such matters—Comdr. Rochefort, and Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer.

W. B. Stephenson,
W. B. STEPHENSON,
Lieutenant, USNR.

23 January, 1942.

Copies of the within messages given to FBI and MID today by Lt. Kimball.

W. B. S.

1941 DEC 7 AM 3 20

ZL MRHUGS TOKIO JG 19 9 PM 7TH

Urgent 92494 koyanagi rijiyori seirinotu-goo arunituki hattori minami kinen bunko seturitu kidino kyokingaru sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop

Togo.

[Ostensible meaning: Regarding the state of adjustment [of what?] from Director KOYANAGI [stated by a thoroughly reliable source to stand for "England"]. An urgent wire is requested re the sum collected for the establishment of the reference HATTORI [code for "relations strained"] MIANIMI [code for "America"] Memorial Library.]

"Relations strained with U. S. & England" is purport, acc. to the same source. (The document from which this translation was made was not received until after 7 December 1941.)

DENZEL CARR.

6 JUNE 1945.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 42

7 JUNE 1945.

I hereby certify that the amended page is a true and correct copy of an original document on file in Vrupac.

THOS. H. DYER,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

(Exhibit No. 42 consists of a paper showing part of the decryption process of the Japanese "PA" code. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 124, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 43

U. S. NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

Office of the Captain of the Yard

I hereby certify that the attached photostats consisting of four sheets are true copies of part of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officer's Information Sheets, which are a part of the records of the Office of the Captain of the Yard, the originals of which records are on file in the Office of the Captain of the Yard.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Captain of the Yard to be affixed, this seventh day of June, 1945.

S. F. CRAVEN,
*Captain, U. S. N.,
 Captain of the Yard.*

U. S. NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR HAWAII, U. S. A.

Office of the Captain of the Yard

Restricted

DUTY OFFICERS' INFORMATION SHEET NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

1. The following information is furnished for duty officer as of 1200, December 6, 1941:

Prospective Arrivals

2200 Litchfield out.

Ship, ANTARES. Time, 0600. Day, 12-7. Berth, XXX K-3. Pilot, 1. Tug, 142-153. *S. F. W. D. H. L., ARGONE.

Antares will require customs and agricultural inspection.

Prospective arrivals: *PLUNGER to SB 12-7, *POLLACK to SB 12-7, *POMPANO to SB 12-7, 1500 Sunday. Sunday 1400, *NAVAJO towing YC-736 12-8 to M-1 Yardcraft take tow in "Turning Basin".

*"All require agricultural inspection (inspector not notified).

Prospective Departures

Ship, HENLEY. Time, 1645. Day, 12-7. Tug, XX.

Rail, 0840 12-8 Coal dock to K5.

DUTY TUG

SECTION LEADER

12-6 153-Holzhaus, B. M. 1c.; 142-Fielder, C. B. M.

Dispatchers: Kennedy, C. Q. M. & Shepard, B. M. 1c.

12-7 130-Campbell, B. M. 1c.; 38-Lt. Comdr. Boltz; Dispatchers, Jones CQM Vigil, BM1c

Other Information of Interest

1930 12-6 NEOSHO Hickam Buoys to F-4, pilot 4, tugs 142-153, lines NAS.

0100 12-7 COCKATOO & REEDBIRD sweep channel.

0900 12-7 NEOSHO F-4 to M-3, pilot 1, tugs 142-153, lines NAS/CASTOR.

0100 12-8 CONDOR & CROSSBILL sweep channel.

The dredge "TURBINE" is working in the drydock channel and all traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel.

The dredge "WEEBER" is working in the South Channel off Hospital Point. All traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel. Duty Officer can control movements of tugs and mud scows, and getting dredge cleared by telephone 4219.

The Anti-Torpedo Net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty Officer. Can be reached by telephone 3254 or via the Signal Tower.

The Assistant Captain of the Yard (Comdr. H. R. Hayes) 'phone 2141.

Pilot's home phones: Otterson Aiea 63175; Green Aiea 63931; Hannus Aiea 63827; Carlson 714 15th St., Hickam Housing Area.

Inshore patrol—CHEW; Ready duty destroyer—12-6 MONAGHAN; 12-7 RAMSAY; Night flying NAS none reported.

12-6

Duty Officers: Yard Lieut. McIlhenny; Security Lt. (jg) Lewis.

12-7 Lt Comdr. Welden; Ens. Peabody.

*S. F. W. D. H. L.—Ship furnishing working detail for handling lines.

CC: Hull Superintendent, Public Works Officer, Power Plant, Master Rigger, Pilot, File.

H. R. Hayes

H. R. HAYES,

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Assistant Captain of the Navy Yard.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 43 there appears a sketch captioned "Berth Numbers", dated December 6, 1941, relating to Pearl Harbor. This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 125, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CAPTAIN OF THE YARD

LIST OF SHIPS PRESENT AS OF 1130

RESTRICTED
December 6, 1941 1941

B-1 Cachalot	K-1	D-5
B-2 Helena Oglala	K-2	D-6
B-3	K-3	D-7 Zane Washmuth Trever Perry
B-4 Argonne Tern	K-4	D-8
B-5	K-5	D-9
B-6 Mugford Sacramento Jarvis	C-2	T-1
B-7	C-3	T-2
B-8	C-4	T-3
B-9	C-5	T-4
B-10	C-6 Phoenix	XP1
B-11	X-1	XP2
B-12	X-2 Dobbin Wroden McDonough Phelps Dewey Hull	WB1
B-13 Rigel	X-3	WB2
B-15 Cummings Tracy Preble	X-4 Solace	SUBBASE
B-16 New Orleans Ramapo	X-5 Allen Balt. Nava.	Litchfield Narwhal Pelias Gudgeon Dolphin Tautog Sumner Hulbert Widgeon
B-17 Sanfrancisco	X-6	PT 20-30.42
B-18 Pruitt Sicard Ontario	X-7 Blue Helm	
B-20 Secley Grebe	X-8 Reid Case Tucker Whitney Conyngham	
B-21 St Lotuis Honolulu	X-9	DD1 Penna Cassin Downes
B-24 Bagley	X-10	DD2
M-1	X-11 Patterson Talbot	DD3

LIST OF SHIPS PRESENT AS OF 1130—continued

M-2	X-12	YFD2 Shaw
M-3	X-13	MARREY Swan
M-4 Castor	X-1 Monghan Dale Farragut Aylwin	West Loch Pyro Henley
F-1	X-15	HONO
F-2	X-16	HONO
F-3 California	X-17	Hickam: SS Haleakala
F-4	X-18	Coal Dock Bobolink Vireo Turkey
F-5 Maryland Oklahoma	X-19	
F-6 West Va, Tennessee	X-20	Inshore Patrol Chow
F-7 Arizona Vestal	X-21	
F-8 Nevada	X-22 Curtiss	Ready Duty Destroyer Mongghan
F-9	X-23 Medusa	
F-10 Tagier	D-1	Net Depot Reedbird Crossbill Condor Cockatoo Chengho AshYN7 YNgl
F-11 Utah	D-2	YP109 YN53
F-12 Raleigh	D-3 Gamble Breese Montgomery Ramsay	SOPA COMBATFOR CALIFORNIA
F-13 Detroit	D-4	IN:

9:25: Lay out fire hoses.
 9:30: Fire #1 drydock. Out of hand get more men down there.
 9:35: Torpedo at Off Club wharf unexploded. Wilder notify Capt. of Yd. I notified Capt. Yd.—Wood.
 9:40 Fuel off. Lower tank. 1 tank blew up.
 10:00 False alarm.
 4208, 3224, 3287.

Ship Hughes FD—3224

10:25: Murphy called saying: boats Wolse & Miduj have truck.
 10:25: 59591—Hold trucks with in readiness. Can't get thru our lines out.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 44

U. S. S. YNG-17

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached six sheets are true copies of pages of the signal log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

J. D. Robinson,
 JOE D. ROBINSON,
 Lieutenant (jg), USNR,
 Officer in Charge.

YNG-17

(Copies of pages of the signal log of the USS YNG-17, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 126 through 131, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 45

U. S. S. YNG-17

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached seven sheets are true copies of the quartermaster's log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

J. D. Robinson,
JOE D. ROBINSON,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR,
Officer in Charge.

YNG-17

(Copies of the quartermaster's log of *USS YNG-17*, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 132 through 138, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 46

NAVY YARD PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached one page is a true copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard, Pearl Harbor, for the method stated thereon, and that the original log is kept under my custody and command.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Captain of the Yard to be affixed this fifth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

S. F. CRAVEN,
Captain of the Yard,
Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, T. H.

(A copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard, Pearl Harbor, for 6-7 December 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 139, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 47

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0845 dated 4 September 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 0845"), with attached copy of Hawaiian Department ltr. AR 311.5 Rev Of HCF-41, Subject: Annex VII and Enclosure (B) to Annex VII to 14ND-JCD-42.

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 05710 dated 30 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 05710"), Subject: Annex VII to 14ND-JCD13 (Joint Security Measures: Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. WP#5.

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0604 dated 10 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 0604"), with attached copy of CNO Secret ltr. file Op-30B2-BP(SC) A7-2(2)/FF1, Serial 059230, dated 20 June 1941, Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base, and Enclosure (A), copy of Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

R. E. Keeton,
R. E. KEETON,
By direction of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

(A copy of Cincpac Routing Slip No. 0845 dated 4 September 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 140 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
 OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
 FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

AG 311.5—Rev of HCF-41.
 Subject: Revision of HCF-41.
 To: Custodians of HCF-41.

20 AUGUST 1941.

1. Herewith new cover sheet and Inclosure "B" Section VI, ANNEX VII HCF-41 for insertion in Register No. 21 of document now in your possession.
 2. Present cover sheet marked "to be published later" will be destroyed.
- By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

O. M. McDole,
 O. M. McDOLE,
Major, A. G. D.
Assistant Adjutant General.

INCLOSURE A—ANNEX No. VIII HFC-39; 14 ND-JCD-13

AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE, APPROACH, AND RECOGNITION PROCEDURE—OAHU AREA

To be published later.

INCLOSURE B—ANNEX No. VII HCF-39; 14 ND-JCD-13

HARBOR CONTROL POST, HONOLULU AND PEARL HARBORS, OAHU, T. H.

(To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the joint committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.)

(Copies of Cincpac Routing Slips Nos. 0604 and 05710, dated 10 June 1941 and 30 June 1941, respectively, and referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 141 and 142, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1 Serial 059230

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts.
 The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
 The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
 The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
 Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.
 Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.

2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Op-12

[1] HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

1939

28 March 1941

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI JOINT AGREEMENTS. JOINT SECURITY MEASURES,
PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.

I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14ND-JCD-13) are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

ARMY

Hawaiian Air Force
18th Bombardment Wing
14th Pursuit Wing
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade

NAVY

Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
Ewa Landing Field
Waialue Radio Station

b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.	Waialupe Radio Station
Headquarters, HSCA Brigade	Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
18th Bombardment Wing	Marine Air Group, Ewa
14th Pursuit Wing	

[3] **c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:**

ARMY	NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office)	14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B.	14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam)	14th Naval District

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.

b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
CP, PH Gpmt, Ft. Kamehameha	Waialupe
CP, Hon. Gynt, Ft. Ruger	Destroyer Patrol
Additional stations that may be determined to be necessary	Mine Sweepers

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4]

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

*Net Control Station.

IV. JOINT ANTI-AIRCRAFT MEASURES

8. *Arrival and departure procedure, aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inslosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*—Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery.*—When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

[5]

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

VI. SMOKE SCREENS

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area from air attacks.

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 48

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPHA

Heading MUX 031835 GR 10 BT

2 Submarines and tender longitude 159-12 latitude 21-05. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 3 DEC 41. Crypto-Group 740. CBO MRQ. Circ. No. 12-89.

Originator :	Action :	Information :
PLANE 3 VP 12	COMPATWING 1	SOPA
031835	COMTASKFOR 2	CINCPAC, COM 14,
COMPATWING 1		COMPATWING 2,
		PEARL

Classified U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

NPM 823 030040 Priority

Sound contact reported lat 20 30 Long 158 23 at 1000 X Desron 4 investigate X Battleships operate east long 158 X Detroit Victor 123 during night. Confidential. Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. Date 3 Dec 41. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO OCF. Circ. No. 12-73.

Originator :	Action :	Information :
COMTASKFOR 2	DETROIT	COM 14
030040	COMDESRON 4	COMBATFOR
	COMBATDIV 1	CINCPAC

Classified U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

NPM NR 814 Confidential Priority

Gamble in lat 20-30 long 158-23 reports clear metallic echo picked up bearing 097 true distant 2800 yards X Lost echo bearing 191 at 4300 yards about 3 minutes later change of range appeared too rapid for submarine. Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. Date 3 Dec. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO JSM. Circ. No. 12-58.

Originator :	Action :	Information :
NEVADA	COMTASKFOR 2	SOPA PEARL
022336		CINCPAC
		COM 14
		COMBATDIV 1

Classified U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

4205 1845 Priority

Searched western border and most of northern half east 9. No contacts. Confidential. Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR. Date 28 Nov. Crypto-Group 816. CBO DCG. Circ. No. 11-886.

Originator :	Action :	Information :
CIG 14	CTF 1	CTF 2 CINCPAC
1845/28		

Classified U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

1704/28 GR 33

Abandon search in time to join Task Group 1.1 by 0900. Confidential. Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR. Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-876.

Originator :	Action :	Information :
COMTASKFOR 1	COMTASKGR 1.4	TASKFOR 1
1704/28		COMTASKFOR 2
		CINCPAC

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

1133/28 GR 17

Keep clear area cast 9 at least 15 miles. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-871.

Originator:	Action:	Information:
COMTASKFOR 1	BOGGS	CINCPAC
1133/28		TASKFOR 1

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

281050 P GR 44

-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y-

Task Group 1.4 with 3 Destroyers search area cast 9 for submarine X Task Group 1.1 and 1.5 keep 50 miles. From area cast nine (9) until daylight approach on point option from west. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 26. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-870.

Originator:	Action:	Information:
COMTASKFOR 1	COMDESIV 6	TASK FOR 2
281050		TASK FOR 1
		CINCPAC

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Secret

280835 P GR 36

-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y-

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a submarine was in area cast 9 during Helena firing approach about 1900.

Ref #11-857 extreme vigilance against subs in operating areas especially during sorties and entrances . . . subs conduct submerged operations only in cast 5 and cast 7 . . . depth bomb all contacts suspected to be hostile except in cast 5 and 7.

Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 137. CBO. FWR.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
HELENA	COMTASKGR 1.5	SERIAL NUMBER
280835	COMTASKFOR 1	11-872
COMTASKGR 1.5		CINCPAC
COMTASKFOR 1		COMTASKFOR 2

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

0042

Priority

Your 2105 investigated scattered slicks character indefinite. Confidential.
Ref.—Investigate and report on oil slick sighted by patrol plane.

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 4 Nov. Crypto-Group 740 CBO DCG Circ. No. 11-70.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
DALE	COMTASKFOR 1	CINCPAC
0042/04		

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

ø323øø

Routine

Found scattered patches and streaks lub oil latitude 2ø-1ø longitude 157-41 sound search result negative. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR

Date Nov 4 41 Crypto-Group 74ø. CBO WBM. Circ. No. 11-66.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
WORDEN	COMTASKFOR 1	CINCPAC
ø323øø		
COMTASKFOR 1		

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

42ø5/Z ø32133 P GR 3ø BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Priority

Task Force One about twelve hours ago crossed area of oil slick reported by patrol plane number five. Light airs prevailed all night.

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ens. USNR.

Date 11/3/41, Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO LJO. Circ. No. 11-63.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
COMBATSHIPS	CINCPAC	
ø32133		

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

MUX

ø32ø35

Searched area 15 mile no result. Priority. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy W. M. Klepper Lt (jg) USNR.

Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 74ø. CBO DCC. Circ. No. 11-59.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
PLANE 5 VP-11	COMTASKFORCE 18	CINCPAC
		COM 14
		SOP AT PEARL
		COMPATWING 2

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Incoming

MUX

ø3192ø

Confidential

Investigating suspicious oil slick position 2ø-15 157-4ø. Priority.

Certified to be a true copy A. S. Gordon Lt (jg) USNR.

Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 74ø. CBO. DCC. Circ. No. 11-58.

ORIGINATOR:	ACTION:	INFORMATION:
PLANE 5	COMTASKFORCE 1	CINCPAC
VP-11		COM 14
ø3192ø		SOP AT PEARL
		COMPATWING 2

CofS X. F Sec X. Fl Lt X. Oper X. Avia. X. Gun X. AOO X. FCO X.
FSO X. AOO X.

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPQA

Z 123C 1932 0G1 Q MIC WING TORY 0F2 BT

PRIORITY

Investigating suspicious vessels lat 21-05 long 159. Confidential.

Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR.

Date Oct 16 1941. Crypto-Group 740. CBOWBM.

ORIGINATOR:

PLANE 3 VP-23
1923/16

ACTION:

COMTASKFORCE 1

INFORMATION:

SERIAL NO. 10-331
SOPA PEARL
CINCPAC

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 49

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS Routing No. 03210"), with attached copy of ComPatWing Two Confidential ltr. file C A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14, Serial 0348 of 9 April 1941, and copy of Com 14 Mailgram DTG 120001 of April 1941, Subject: Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941. are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

[SEAL]

R. E. KEETON,

*By direction of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.*

(A copy of Cincpac Routing slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 143, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Mailgram]

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)
Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H.
120001 April 1941

Action To: CincPac, Pacific Fleet Force
Commanders & Type Commanders
ComPatWing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer,
Capt. Yard, C. O.'S Dist. Activities
& Units as per Distribution List
of N.B.D.O. Operation Plan No.
1-41 with Annexes A,B,C,D, & E.

Information: CincPac
Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with paragraph (X) of Naval Base Defense Officer Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of Annex Baker (Naval Base Defense Air Force Operational Plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of Annex Baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force
(Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)*

Authenticated:

*J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.*

[1]

NAVAL AAI STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. April 9, 1941.

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41
DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941

Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.—Task Organization

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)). The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol Squadrons.
- Shore-based VO—VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander. The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information:* This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile condition of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus

ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1]

COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO,
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Addendum I to naval base defense Air Force operation plan No. A-1-41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of Opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch guns and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a com-

plete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2.: A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) A single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing condi- [4] tions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt despatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. [6] *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Army pursuit squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

- (a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material readiness

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of readiness

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes.

Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—One hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory planes and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commanding Patrol Wing TWO)

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[1]

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (034S)
Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan
No. A-1-41

Conditions of readiness and readiness reports

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness

- A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
- B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
- E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of operational readiness

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

- 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters, fifteen minutes.
 - 2. All types—30 minutes.
 - 3. All types—one hour.
 - 4. All types—two hours.
 - 5. All types—four hours.
2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

[2] 3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 50

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 20 December 1941.

PW2/A16-3/0850

Confidential

From: The Commander Task Force NINE (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Operations on December 7, 1941.

1. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, forces under my command were disposed as follows: Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE at Midway, Patrol Squadrons ELEVEN, TWELVE, FOURTEEN at Kaneohe, TWENTY-ONE, TWENTY-THREE AND TWENTY-FOUR at Pearl Harbor, all tenders except WRIGHT at Pearl Harbor; WRIGHT enroute to Pearl Harbor from Midway.

2. The condition of readiness in force was Baker 5 (50% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. In addition to the above, three squadrons (VP-21 at Midway, VP-23 at Pearl, and VP-11 at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice). This was augmented by specific duty assignments on December 7 which required six planes from Patrol Squadrons FOURTEEN, TWENTY-FOUR and TWELVE to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

The general orders listed above were modified by circumstances and planes actually ready for flight were as follows:

VP-21 7 planes—in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from Midway.
4 planes—on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice.
VP-11 12 planes—ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-12 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-14 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges.
3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-22 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-23 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-24 4 planes in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines.
1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

Total 72 in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less.

In this connection it may be stated that the 4 hours notice was primarily set to permit rest and recreation of personnel and was in no wise, a criterion of material readiness. For example, one plane of VP-23, theoretically on 4 hours notice, was actually in the air 45 minutes after the first bomb dropped.

To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped, aircraft of this command were in the following condition:

14—in the air (7 on a search from Midway).
58—on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less.
9—undergoing repairs.

—
81—Total.

Illustrative of the efforts made by personnel, one of the nine planes undergoing repairs took off for a search at 1335, local time, loaded with 4 one thousand pound bombs.

3. A narrative of events of the day follows:

Time (LCT)

0700 14-P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.
0715 Message coded and transmitted to base.
0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer.
0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer.
0740 Relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief.
0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer.
0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar.

- 0758 Message ordered broadcasted to all ships present quote "AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL" unquote (An identical message was sent by Cincpac).
- 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone (Received by some of the planes in the air at 0805).
- From this time on an accurate chronological account is impracticable.

The Commander Patrol Wing TWO arrived at the Operations Office during the first attack and approved the orders that had been issued. Telephonic communication with the various squadrons at Pearl Harbor was established in order to supplement and possibly accelerate the radio transmissions. As was usually the case, it was difficult to communicate with Kaneohe. The page printer had gone out of commission and it was quite difficult to obtain a telephonic connection. Immediately upon termination of the first attack, an endeavor was made to determine the sectors of the search actually being covered. It was determined, with some difficulty that, of all planes at the bases of Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor, only 3 were still in commission. These were dispatched to fill holidays in what appeared to be the most promising sectors for search. In addition, available planes from the Utility Wing were ordered out. The 2 planes still available for duty at Kaneohe were ordered by telephone to cover the sector between 280 and 300 degrees. The one plane still available at Pearl Harbor had some difficulty in being launched due to the wreckage and fires of other planes in the way. About this time the second attack came in. Fire was opened by tenders of this command and from machine guns mounted in planes on the ground or removed from the planes to extemporized mountings with greater arcs of fire. As a result of this second attack, all communications, radio, telephone and page printer were knocked out of commission. Immediate steps to restore communications were taken while the second attack was still underway and communications personnel, who unfortunately have not yet been identified, proceeded to repair the radio antenna during the height of the attack. Before the end of the second attack, radio communications were established by utilizing all the facilities available, including some of that uninjured on the tenders of this command. Shortly thereafter, telephonic communication was reestablished and information was received that the 2 planes at Kaneohe previously reported as ready for service had been destroyed. Accordingly, orders were issued for the 1 plane at Pearl Harbor, which had somehow escaped uninjured during the second attack, to cover the sector from 280 to 300 degrees. The Commander Patrol Wing ONE at Kaneohe felt that the orders to cover the sector 280 to 300, which had been transmitted to him by telephone for the 2 planes on the ground, required his taking action and he accordingly diverted 14-P-1 and 14-P-3 from the sectors that they had been searching. Information of this action was not received by me.

The Fleet Aviation Officer, Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. N., kept in constant touch by telephone and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of my staff maintained communications with Army information centers and requested that attempts be made to track the retiring Japanese planes by RADAR. Unfortunately, the CURTISS RADAR was placed out of commission by the damage sustained by that vessel. During the mid-afternoon, 14-P-2 reported being attacked by enemy planes and was thereafter not heard from for 2 or 3 hours. As it was felt that this plane had been shot down and a hole thus left in what appeared to be the most promising sector of the search, every effort was made, as additional planes from whatever source became available, to plug the gap.

All hands exerted their utmost efforts to get more planes ready for flight and to arm them for offensive action. Three more patrol planes were reported ready at Pearl Harbor and dispatched, each carrying 4 one thousand pound bombs. Thirteen SED planes, loaded with 500 pound bombs, came in from LEXINGTON and were pressed into service. Nine were dispatched to search a sector to the north, while the remaining 4 were ordered to attack 4 Japanese troop ships reported off Barbers Point. This report proved to be unfounded.

The accompanying charts indicate the search as actually conducted. The urgent necessity for conducting daily searches since December 7 and for putting all planes possible back in commission, together with urgency for immediate operations, have precluded an exhaustive analysis of the events of the day. Certain highlights however may be of interest:

All planes in commission had guns on board together with full allowances of service ammunition. During the first attack, fire was opened from the guns as mounted in the planes, and when it was discovered that these were not effective for fire from the ground due to structural interference, many personnel removed these guns from the planes and set them up on benches in vises and opened up an effective fire against the second attack. As nearly as can be determined, a total of 4 Japanese planes were shot down by personnel of patrol plane squadrons by this method.

Two planes of Utility Squadron One conducted an extensive search although these planes being of a noncombatant type were not equipped with machine guns. Despite the lack of defense against attacks by hostile aircraft, the pilots of these planes persisted in their search until the threatened exhaustion of their fuel forced their return to Pearl Harbor. The devotion to duty of these pilots will be made the subject of a special report.

These and numerous other instances of distinguished conduct occurred which Commander Task Force NINE has not yet had time to investigate.

4. Attention is invited to the following dispatches and mailgrams indicating the extensive searches conducted by units of this command during the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, from Wake and Midway:

Cincpac	280450	} of November.
	280447	
	040237	
ComTaskForce NINE	291124	} of December.
	292101	
	292103	
	302359	
	050323	of November.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to:
Comairscfor.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 50 (A)

Classified outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPGA

From:	CINCPAC	Info To:	COMPATWING 2
To:	COMTASKFOR 2		COMBATFOR
	COM 14		COMBASEFOR

Twelve planes marine fight from two eleven are to base Wake accordance Myser 101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation X After departure Pearl on 28 Nov form Task Force Eight consisting of Enterprise Chester Northhampton Saltlake City and Desron six and pass command task force two to Real Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in Hawaiian area X proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees from Wake at 0700 on 3 Dec X ply off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X enroute to and from Wake pass through point affirm four hundred miles south of Midway X Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake X communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM primary Fox continuously X comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes arrive there X comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight X Wake submarine patrol tabor triton will be advised X Narwhal and Dolphin are enroute Pearl at 1200 get on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake

280447 Nov 41

11-860
Classified outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

From: CINC PAC
To: COMPATWING 2Info To: COMSCOFOR
COMBATFOR
COM 14
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBATFOR

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search enroute X provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X after arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X present intention return Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Secret Mailgram 292103

ORIGINATOR:

CTF 9
292103

ACTION:

COMPATRONS 21, 22
COMTASKGROUP
9.2

INFORMATION:

CINCPAC
COM 14
COMSUBSCOFOR
CO NAS MIDWAY
CO NAS WAKE

Operation order 981 x Information Cincpac 280447 and 280450 x Task Force 8 Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City 6 DD transporting Marine Figron which will base on Wake x Planes will be launched 2000 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 x Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 400 miles south of Midway x Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. x Wright expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December x Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching marine planes x Tasks Patron 21 search as (?) indicated; Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 200-280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 2 sector 200-237 to 525 miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 200-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles using 6 planes x Patron 22 search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec 2 sector 060-102 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles (?) using six planes; one plane be 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual; remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs; unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 x On December four x On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway x On December 5 take off at daylight for Pearl xray critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. x Logistics fuel as required x Special provisions use zone 0 times x Task Force 9 basic communications and aerological plans x Frequency plan fox Comtaskforce 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl x Maintain radio silence except for contact (?) reports and emergencies x Arrange for bases to broadcast Mo's on schedule without request x.

Date 11/30/41. Crypto-Group Mail. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-974

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPQA

Mailgram 292101 Mailgram

Operation Order 982 special provisions use zone plus 12 time x Task force nine basic communication and aerological plans

Frequency plan fox information Cincpac 170429 of October x Comtask force 9 in fairdet at nas Pearl x Mission conduct daily

Patrols from outlying bases in order to locate possible enemy forces threatening their security x Tasks search area within

100 miles of Midway daily using sector search plan number 2 x Be prepared to shift base to Wake x Take offensive action only

If planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from Cincpac x Report all contacts except United States naval

Vessels x Coordinate activities with subs operation from Midway x This order effective upon completion of opord 981 x

Date, 11/30/41. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-973.

Originator, CTF 9, 292101. Action, COM PATRON 21. Information, CINCPAC, COM 14, NAS MIDWAY (VIA VP 21), COMSUBSCOFOR.

Classified

Outgoing

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPQA

Date

Grp. Ct.

From CINCPAC. Mailgram to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COM-PATWING 2.

Info Mailgram to: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, LEXINGTON.

Originator 11. Release 00. 20 21 01. Show to 12.95.

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X on 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force 12 under Comruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland desron five less desdiv ten X task force twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 120 degrees from Midway at 2230 Oct on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight X communications radio condition 19 guard continuously npm primary fox X Com 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8 Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X Com 14 pass this report to Comtaskfor 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised

Classified

Incoming

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPQA

Copy

Secret

AMGM

Deliver to Compatron 21 operation order 983 information Marine scoron 231 will base Midway 18 planes X Taskforce 12 Lexington 3 CA 5 DD will launch 400 miles 130 degrees from Midway on December 7 at GCT 2230 X mission cover launching position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight December 7 X logistics fuel as required tasks 5 planes search section 120 to 170 degrees to distance 450 miles arriving outer limit at 2230 GCT X 2 planes arrive launching position by 2230 and escort Marscoron 231 to Midway X remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs and await orders at Midway unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0200 GCT December 8 X special provisions

Date 6 December '41; Crypto-group pl/MG; CBO HRF/HJG.

Originator Comtaskfor 9, Page 1 of 2 pages 050323. Action, NAS Midway. Information, Cincpac, Lexington, CO Maraigr 21, Commarscoron 231. Serial No. 12-206.

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

Classified

Incoming

Copy

Secret

AMGM

Use zone 0 time X Comtaskfor 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies use task force 9 basic communication and aerological plans frequency plan fox

Copy and return to Adm. Bellinger

MAILGRAM

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

A. S. F. stand. form No. 13

U. S. S. Wright

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for distribution an handling as a regular dispatch

From: Comtaskfor 9

To: NAS Midway

Mailed at: PH TH 1124

To: Compatron 21 (Mail)

291124

Your squadron departs for Wake daylight December first X Detailed orders via Patron 21 X Mission cover Route Taskforce 8 including carrier proceeding westward X Task on thirty November using six planes search sector 153-195 degrees to 500 miles X Patron 21 enroute Midway will search adjacent sector to eastward X For Patron 22 X Present intention return your squadron about 5 December to Pearl X Arrange schedule for base broadcast MO's without request on 364 Kilocycles to cover return your squadron and arrival Patron 21 X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies.

Authenticated: -----
Signature, name and rank.

Copy and return to Admr. Bellinger

A. S. F. Stand. Form No. 13

U. S. S. Wright

MAILGRAM

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for distribution and handling as a regular dispatch

From: COMTASKFOR 9

To: NAS Midway

Date: November 30, 1941

Mailed at: NAS, PH, TH, 2359

To: NAS Johnston

302359

Detailed plans and orders arriving via Patron 21 planes prior sunrise tomorrow minday X First day operations require quote December 1 depart Midway daylight using two plane sections search sector 226-249 degrees to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake unquote if necessary leave one pair planes Midway with orders depart directly for Wake upon receipt of papers from Patron 21 X INFO ADEE deliver to Compatron 21 X Action ADEE to Compatron 22.

Authenticated: -----
Signature, name and rank.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 51

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., 27 Oct. 1941.

Secret

PW2/A16-30027

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

Reference: (a) Compatwing TWO SECRET 1tr. A16-3 serial 0026 of Oct. 22, 1941, with Comairscofor SECRET 1st end. A16-3 of Oct. 23, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. In view of the urgent nature of the subject matter of reference (a), and, in view of the fact that the Commander Scouting Force is now at sea, a copy of reference (a), is being forwarded herewith direct.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comscofor.

A16-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 23, 1941.

Secret

First endorsement to Compatwing TWO SECRET

Letter PW2/A16-3/0026 dated October 22, 1941.

From: The Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Via: The Commander Scouting Force.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendations of the Commander Patrol Wing TWO. This concurrence is emphatic with respect to the employment of carriers of present design.

2. The recommendation for change in Naval Policy to permit inclusion within the Naval Aeronautical Organization of Air Striking Groups of high performance landplane-bombers and landplane interceptor fighters, for the protection of advanced Fleet Air Bases, meets with the hearty endorsement of the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. Landplane bombers and fighters with the characteristics as described are definitely tools that Naval Aviation requires today in its varied missions. Upon enlargement of the scope of Navy Policy, the corresponding procurement and training programs should be prosecuted.

3. The inherent delays in accomplishing the change of policy with its attendant modifications in training and procurement plans, seriously influence the factor of time, which is now not one of our superiorities to be exploited. Accordingly as a stop-gap measure, if not already provided for, the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, considers that the westward movement of the Pacific Fleet must be accorded the full support of an Army Air Striking Force in joint effort under the unified command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

J. S. McCAIN.

Copy to: Compatwing TWO.

Lh

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.

PW2/A16-3/0026

Secret

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.

(2) The Commander Scouting Force.

Subject: Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.

1. In examining the types of aircraft that are listed in the scheme of procurement of the 15,000 plane program, it is noted that, except for those planes based on carriers, there are no types that are considered really valuable as combatant units capable of carrying out offensive action against enemy units afloat, or ashore in the face of efficient enemy opposition. The strategical background of the Pacific indicates that in a war in the Pacific there will be many occasions where Fleet aircraft will have to take offensive action against objectives at islands which are strongly defended by anti-aircraft batteries and by shore-based aircraft. The utilization of carrier aircraft for this purpose involves placing the carriers within range of hostile shore-based aircraft. Carriers of present design are very vulnerable to bomb hits and the value and chances of success of their employment against bases defended by shore-based aircraft must be weighed against the chances and consequences of failure. Patrol Planes, which have the requisite range, are relatively slow and vulnerable to fighter and anti-aircraft opposition. It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in addition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air striking force of high-speed long-range landplane bombers, at least equal in performance to the B-17-E. It is my opinion that such bombers should be available in sufficient numbers to permit continuous effective bombing attacks to be made against shore objectives from Wake, and from such other suitable island bases as are available. In addition, for the protection of bases from which this air striking force would operate, there are needed high performance interceptor fighters in adequate numbers to provide for interception, under RADAR direction, of approaching hostile air attacks.

2. If we are provided with a suitable Air Striking Force of long-range shore-based landplane bombers, it is possible that carriers need not approach within range of hostile shore-based aircraft until hostile air bases have been destroyed or, by sustained attacks, have been made untenable. By such means, and it is believed, only by such means, can a rapid successful Pacific campaign be accomplished without *disproportionate losses to our own forces*. It is undoubtedly the intention of ORANGE initially to fight a war of attrition, utilizing shore-based aircraft, shore batteries, mines, and submarines to inflict maximum damage to our surface forces, while his own fleet is maintained intact in the hope of attaining equality or superiority to our fleet. It is my considered opinion that *our present plan of action gives him a fair chance of succeeding in the attainment of this objective*. He will undoubtedly throw his most modern aircraft into the campaign, sending them to the theatre of operations from the homeland via the chain of island airports in existence, in a steady flow of fresh replacements. It is therefore essential that the fields in the immediate theatre of operations be made untenable at the outbreak of war, and also, successively, his most advanced airports as the campaign progresses.

3. The following courses of action are strongly recommended for accomplishment under unexcelled priority as of the most vital importance to national security:

(a) Obtain the immediate initial assignment of an Army Air Corps Air Striking Force to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is believed that the composition of this force should be approximately as follows:

(1) Three groups, each of sixty (60) long-range high-speed landplane bombers equal or superior to the B-17-E.

(2) Three groups, each of sixty (60) interceptor fighters of the best performance available.

(b) Develop Wake and Midway air fields under highest priority so that each may accommodate not less than one-third of the bombers and fighters simultaneously.

(c) Expedite and expand the RADAR installations at Midway and Wake.

(d) Expedite and expand anti-aircraft defenses at Wake.

(e) As soon as possible, station one group of interceptor fighters at Wake, and one group at Midway. Provide Johnston and Palmyra with smaller detachments of interceptor fighters. Station one group of bombers At Midway. Station two bomber groups and remainder of interceptor fighters in reserve in the Hawaiian Area. This disposition will provide for defense of Wake and Midway, while the bombers at Midway are beyond range of attack from hostile shore-based aircraft, but are in position to proceed immediately to Wake to start offensive operations.

(f) Initiate action to modify Naval Policy to augment the mission of the Navy Aeronautical Organization to provide Air Striking Forces of long-range high-speed landplane bombers to the Fleets, and landplane interceptor fighters for protection of advanced air bases used by Fleet Aircraft.

(g) Initiate action to include in the Navy aircraft procurement program the requisite quantities of long-range high-speed landplane bombers and interceptor fighters.

4. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than SECRET*.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 52

[1]
PW2/A16-3/(022)

Je.

PATROL WING TWO,
January 16, 1941.

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft".

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

[2] (b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

4. It is therefor urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late".

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to above:

(a) For Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.

3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[3] 6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul until March 17, 1941.

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate operating needs both now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.

2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling equipment.

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply personnel (Officer and enlisted, additional facilities for handling supplies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squadrons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary

personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Requirements.

(d) For Keehi Lagoon.

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a patrol plane base.

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage; concrete ramps and parking area.

(f) For Midway.

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.

(g) General.

1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time operations.

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases: Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.

P. N. I. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comairscofor

Com. 14

NAS P. H. TH

Prosp. C. O., NAS Kaneohe.

[1]

Je.

PATROL WING TWO,
January 16, 1941.

PW2/A16-3/(022)

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: Patrol Wing TWO—Readiness of.

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

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3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base and outlying bases.

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

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(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

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(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.

1. Expedite completion; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Requirements.

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P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: Comairscopor
Com. 14
NAS P. H. TH
Prosp. C. O. NAS Kaneohe.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 53

Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by Op Nav
(015723)

PW2/A16-3/
(0003)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 11, 1940.

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
(2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizent of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

<i>Event</i>	<i>Time required</i>
First bomb delivered to squadrons.....	50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons.....	2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons.....	1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four bombs on each plane.....	6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition allowance in each squadron.....	4 to 6 hours

3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

(a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U.S.S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

	NAS PH	Lualualei	Wright	Totals
1000 lb.....	48	573	61	682
500 lb.....	48	1151	81	1280
100 lb.....	48	2446	314	2808

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

Trucks via ferry seems to be far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belting machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct) Comdt. 14th N. D. NAS, PH, TH CincUS Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16

AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

(S1)

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,
Naval Air Station,
San Diego, California.

Confidential

First endorsement to

PW-2 Secret ltr. A16-2/

(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: (1) Commander Scouting Force.

(2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time

and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/
(0202)

(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL By OpNav
015723

Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
Feb. 5, 1941.

Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

Reference:

(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.

(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of
1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places.

It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action *at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor*, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist *now* at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

- Comscofor
- Comairscofor
- Comairbatfor
- Compatwing TWO
- Com-14
- NAS P. H.

[1] PW2/A16-3/
(0003)

Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
(015723)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
December 11, 1940.

Confidential

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

- (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
- (2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
- (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizant of this Exercise in advance and a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition now stored at the Naval Air Station.

2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500 pound type bombs:

<i>Event</i>	<i>Time Required</i>
First bomb delivered to squadrons-----	50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons-----	2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons-----	1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons-----	1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four bombs on each plane-----	6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition allowance in each squadron-----	4 to 6 hours

3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. However, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as follows:

[2] (a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U. S. S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area:

	NAS PH	Lualualei	Wright	Totals
1,000 lb.....	48	573	61	682
500 lb.....	48	1,151	81	1,280
100 lb.....	48	2,446	314	2,808

The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be available at each such base.

(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.

In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transportation by water.

[3] Trucks via ferry seems to be by far the most practical method of transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.

(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.

(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.

(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.

(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve

of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo Skids.

(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belt- ing machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.

(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed with a lifting lug as an integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.

4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than **SECRET**.

P. N. L. BELLINGER.

Copy to: (direct)
Comdt. 14th N. D.
NAS, PH. TH
CincUS
Comscofor

UNITED STATES FLEET
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE

U. S. S. HULBERT, FLAGSHIP,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
San Diego, California.

A16
(S1)
Confidential
First Endorsement to
PW-2 **SECRET** ltr. A16-2/
(0003) of 11 Dec., 1940.

From: The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Via:

- (1) Commander Scouting Force.
- (2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

1. Forwarded.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Adequate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at Ford Island must be provided.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time and cost of procurement. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei

to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.

4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of Mk. III bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simultaneous loading on both wings.

5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommendations contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost importance.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than SECRET.

A. L. BRISTOL.

Copy to: COMPATWING 2.

[1] A16/0054/

UNITED STATES FLEET

(0202)

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP.

(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
015723

Confidential

*Pearl Harbor. T. H.,
Feb. 5, 1941.*

Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.

Reference:

- (a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41 (0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.
- (b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.

1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.

2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.

3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands immediate and direct action.

4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorsement are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places. It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to minimize or delay the needed action at *Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor*, on the recommendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.

5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be permitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that exist *now* at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out

frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.

6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate in this directive.

8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Comscofor
Comairscofor
Comairbatfor
Compatwing TWO
Com-14
NAS P. H.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 54

PATROL WING TWO

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
25 Nov. 1941.

PW2/A4-4/
(3298)

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

To:

The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.

Subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.

1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and Duty Schedule for the period December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.

L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. RAMSEY,
By direction.

Copy to:

Compatwing ONE.
Compatron 21.

Enclosure "A"

	M 1	T 2	W 3	T 4	F 5	S 6	S 7	M 8	T 9	W 10	T 11	F 12	S 13	S 14	M 15	T 16	W 17	T 18	F 19	'S 20	S 21	
Patron 22(1)	W	W	W	W	W	S	S	SST	W	W	W	W	W	DP	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	S
Patron 22(2)	W	WT	W	W	WT	S	S	W	P	DP	W	W	S	P	T	T	T	T	P	DP	S	
Patron 23(1)	DP	P	WT	WT	P	DP	S	W	W	P	SST	W	S	S	P	DP	T	T	T	P	S	
Patron 23(2)	BLD	WT	P	DP	WT	P	SST	W	W	W	P	DP	S	S	T	T	T	T	T	T	P	
Patron 24	BLD	DP	WT	P	WT	S	P	W	W	W	W	P	S	S	T	T	P	T	T	T	S	
Patron 11	BLD	WT	WT	K	DP	S	SST	W	W	K	DP	W	K	S	T	K	DP	T	K	T	S	
Patron 12	BLD	WT	DP	WT	K	SST	S	K	DP	W	K	W	S	K	DP	T	K	T	T	K	DP	
Patron 14	BLD	WT	K	WT	WT	K	DP	W	K	W	W	W	K	S	K	T	T	K	DP	T	K	

T—Fleet or Wing tactics.
 BLD—Bomb loading drill.
 P—Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
 K—Kanehe ready duty division (other division of squadron secured).
 DP—Dawn Patrol; division making dawn patrol secures upon completion; other division normal duty 0700-1300 except Saturday and Sunday.
 S—Secured.
 SST—Tactics with submarines.
 WT—Wing Tactics.
 W—Regular Working Hours.

	M 22	T 23	W 24	T 25	F 26	S 27	S 28	M 29	T 30	W 31	Jan 1
Patron 22(1)	W	P	DP	S	W	S	P	W	W	W	S
Patron 22(2)	W	W	P	S	W	S	S	DP	W	W	S
Patron 23(1)	W	W	W	P	DP	S	W	P	P	W	S
Patron 23(2)	DP	W	W	W	W	DP	W	W	W	W	DP
Patron 24	P	W	W	S	W	S	W	W	W	W	S
Patron 11	K	DP	W	K	W	K	W	W	W	W	S
Patron 12	W	K	W	K	K	W	W	W	W	W	S
Patron 14	W	W	K	DP	W	W	W	W	W	DP	S

PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3288)
Restricted

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PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.

Operation Schedule No. 45-41 (Week of Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)

	26 Wed	27 Thurs	28 Fri	29 Sat	30 Sun	Dec. 1 Mon	2 Tues
Curtiss.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	T1	T1
Tangier.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
Wright.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
McFarland.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	SPH	SPH
Hulbert.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
Swan.....	PG	PG	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
Avocet.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
Patron 11.....	G4 V8 RD	G4 V8 DP	G4 V8	SHW	SHW	F1 V8	F1 V8
Patron 12.....	G2 L1 L2	G2 L1	G2 L1	UK	SHW	F1 V7	F1 V7
Patron 14.....	UK	UK	UK	RD	DP	E1	E1
Patron 21.....	DP G2 F1 V4 VC9	G2 F1 L2 VC9	RD G2 F1 L2 VC9	DP	SHW	L1 VC9	L1 VC9
Patron 22.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Patron 23.....	E1 F1 G3	E1 F1 G3	E1	SHW	RD	E1 F1 G3	E1 F1 G3
Patron 24.....	Y1 VC10	VC10	G1 V4	P1	SHW	V4	V4

- E1 Familiarization.
- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
- G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
- G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
- PG Plane Guard.
- P1 Inspection.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- T1 Tactics.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

Ready Duty Tender: HULBERT.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.

Distribution

- Squadrons (each) 10
- Tenders (each) 10
- NAS PH TH 20
- NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
- NAS Mani 20
- FAD OOD 3
- PatWing TWO Photo. Unit 2

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/
(3287)
RESTRICTED

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.

Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 26. #Patron 24 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VJ-1 (3 landplanes) practice landings 1800-1900. 2 (JRS planes) will operate without lights in areas C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000 feet topline 7000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 27. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (9 planes) will return to Pearl Harbor from operating areas at sea.

Friday, Nov. 28. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 29. VJ-1 (1 PBV) takeoff 1800. Will operate without lights in areas CS, C9, C10 altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet.

Sunday, Nov. 30. NONE.

Monday, Dec. 1. #VCS-9 (8 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

Tuesday, Dec. 2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. Navigation flights to Maui and return. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

L. C. Ramsey,

L. C. RAMSEY,

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution". These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 144 and 145, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/
(3231)

Restricted

PATROL WING TWO,

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 19-25, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 19. #Patrol 21 night bombing 2030-2200 area VS2. Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Thursday, Nov. 20. NONE.

Friday, Nov. 21. Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Saturday, Nov. 22. NONE.

Sunday, Nov. 23. NONE.

Monday, Nov. 24. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.

Tuesday, Nov. 25. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 areas V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. Ramsey,

L. C. RAMSEY.

Commander, U. S. Navy,

Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3230)
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

Operation Schedule No. 44-41 (Week of November 19-25, 1941)

	19 Wed	20 Thurs	21 Fri	22 Sat	23 Sun	24 Mon	25 Tues
Curtiss.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	SPH	SPH
Tangier.....	UK	UK	UK	T1	T1	T1	T1
Wright.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
McFarland.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
Thornton.....	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
Hulbert.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
Swan.....	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
Avocet.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
Patron 11.....	DP	SHW	RD E1	DP	SHW	RD G4 V4	DP G4 V4
Patron 12.....	{ RD F1 V5 V6 }	{ DP F1 V5 V6 }	P1	UK	T1	T1	T1
Patron 14.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	UK	UK
Patron 21.....	{ G2 F1, Y1 L1 VC10 }	{ RD G2 F1 L1 VC10 }	{ DP G2 F1 L1 VC10 }	SHW	{ RD G2 F1 L1 V4 }	{ DP G2 F1 L1 VC10 }	{ RD G2 F1 L1 VC10 }
Patron 22.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Patron 23.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	UK	UK
Patron 24.....	E1	SHW	E1	RD	DP	E1	E1

- E1 Familiarization.
- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- G4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
- PG Plane Guard.
- P1 Inspection.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- T1 Tactics.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

DISTRIBUTION

Squadrons (each).....	10
Tenders (each).....	10
NAS PH TH.....	20
NAS Kaneohe Bay.....	20
NAS Maui.....	20
FAD COD Pearl Harbor.....	3

L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.

Wn

PW2/A4-3(2)/
(3229)
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941.

Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 19-25, 1941)

Patrol Wing Two.....	V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups.....	V1, V2, V3, VS1, L3. Illio Point target, Kahuku
Marine Air Group 21.....	Point Target (except 25 & 26 Nov.)
VO Wing.....	V7, V8.
CA Wing.....	VU3.
CL Wing.....	VA9, VC9.
VCS-5.....	Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.

L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Wn

PW2/A4-3(2)/
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

*Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment
Distribution:*

CinCPac -----	5
Comairbatfor -----	5
Comscofor -----	5
Combatships -----	5
Combatdiv ONE -----	5
Combatdiv FOUR -----	5
Comerubattfor -----	5
Comerusecofor -----	5
Comerudiv THREE -----	5
Comerudiv FOUR -----	5
Comerudiv FIVE -----	5
Comerudiv SIX -----	5
Comerudiv NINE -----	5
PatWing ONE Units (each) --	5
Patwing TWO Units (each) --	5
Lexington Air Group -----	11
Enterprise Air Group -----	11
Saratoga Air Group -----	11
Marine Air Group 21 -----	20
C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGTON --	10
C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE --	10
C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA --	10
C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor --	20
C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay --	20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit -----	5
C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp, Hickam Field -----	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field -----	27
Commander Hawaiian Air Force -----	5
Combatfor -----	4
Comsubscfor -----	4
Comdt. 14 N. D. -----	8
Combasefor -----	2
Cominbatfor -----	2
Comutwing, Basefor -----	5
Subron FOUR -----	5
CG ; KSC, B, Fort DeRussy --	5
Comdesbatfor -----	5
C. O., Harbor Defense, Pearl Harbor -----	2
C. O., Harbor Defense, Fort Ruger -----	2
C. O., U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA -----	5
FAD OOD PH TH -----	3

PW2/A4-3/VZ

*Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying
Schedule Distribution:*

CinCPac -----	5
Comairbatfor -----	5
Comscofor -----	5
Combatships -----	5
Combatdiv ONE -----	5
Combatdiv FOUR -----	5
Comerubattfor -----	5
Comerusecofor -----	5
Comerudiv THREE -----	5
Comerudiv FOUR -----	5
Comerudiv FIVE -----	5
Comerudiv SIX -----	5
Comerudiv NINE -----	5
Comatwing ONE -----	5
Patrol Wing ONE (All units-- each) -----	5
Patrol Wing TWO (All units-- each) -----	5
Lexington Air Group -----	2
Enterprise Air Group -----	2
Saratoga Air Group -----	2
Marine Air Group 21 -----	4
C. O., USS LEXINGTON -----	2
C. O., USS ENTERPRISE -----	2
C. O., USS SARATOGA -----	2
C. O., NAS Pearl Harbor -----	6
C. O., NAS Kaneohe Bay -----	6
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp. Unit -----	4
CG, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hick- am Field -----	27
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler Field -----	27
CG, Hawaiian Air Force -----	5
Combatfor -----	3
F. D. COD PH TH -----	3
VJ-1 -----	5
VJ-2 -----	5

PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3176)
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO, Wn
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 1941.

Operation Schedule No. 43-41 (Week of November 12-18, 1941)

	Wed 12	Thurs 13	Fri 14	Sat 15	Sun 16	Mon 17	Tue 18
Curtiss.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
Tangler.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
Wright.....	UK	UK	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
McFarland.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Thornton.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
Hulbert.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Swan.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	UK	UK	UK	UK
Avocet.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
Patron 11.....	RD V1	DPG2L1	G2 L1	RD	DP	E1	G2 L1
Patron 12.....	E1	RD	DP	UK	RD	E1	E1
Patron 14.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Patron 21.....	{ DP G1 L1 L2 }	{ F1 V1 VC10 }	{ RD F1 VC10 }	DP	SHW	{ G1 L1 L2 }	G2 L2
Patron 22.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Patron 23.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
Patron 24.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SHW	UK	UK

- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- E1 Familiarization.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers,
Qualification Practice.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Night Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

Ready Duty Tender: THORNTON.

L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Distribution

- Squadrons (each) 10
- Tenders (each) 10
- NAS PH TH 20
- NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
- NAS Maui 20
- FAD OOD 3

PW2/A4-3(2)
(3175)
Restricted

PATROL WING TWO Wn
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 1941.

Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 12-18, 1941).

Patrol Wing Two.....	V4, VC10, L1, L2.
Carrier Air Groups, Marine Air Group 21.....	V6, V8, V9, V10, VS1, L3, L5, L6, Kahuku Point and Illio Point targets.
VO Wing.....	V1, V2, V3.
CA Wing.....	A7, A8, A11.
CL Wing.....	VU3, VA3.

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/(3174)
 Restricted

PATROL WING TWO
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 10, 1941.

Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 12-18, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 12. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, VS, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. Patron ELEVEN (Kaneohe) night bombing 1830-2000 in area VS2.

Thursday, Nov. 13. #Patron TWENTY-ONE night bombing 1830-2000. Area VS2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, VS, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Friday, Nov. 14. VJ-2 (6 landplanes) practice landings 1830-2100. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4.

Saturday, Nov. 15. NONE.

Sunday, Nov. 16. NONE.

Monday, Nov. 17. #VCS-9 (10 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, VS, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Tuesday, Nov. 18. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, VS, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. Ramsey
 L. C. RAMSEY,
 Commander, U. S. Navy,
 Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ/

PATROL WING TWO,
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.

RESTRICTED

Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution

CinCPac.....	5	Lexington Air Group.....	2
Comairbatfor.....	5	Enterprise Air Group.....	2
Comscofor.....	5	Saratoga Air Group.....	2
Combatships.....	5	Marine Air Group 21.....	4
Combatdiv ONE.....	5	C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGTON..	2
Combatdiv FOUR.....	5	C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE..	2
Comcrubatfor.....	5	C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA....	2
Comeruscofor.....	5	C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor..	6
Comerudiv THREE.....	5	C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay..	6
Comerudiv FOUR.....	5	Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp.	
Comerudiv FIVE.....	5	Unit.....	4
Comerudiv SIX.....	5	C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp,	
Comerudiv NINE.....	5	Hickam Field.....	27
Compatwing ONE.....	5	Headquarters, 14th Wing,	
Patrol Wing ONE (all units— each).....	5	Wheeler Field.....	27
Patrol Wing TWO (all units— each).....	5	C. G., Hawaiian Air Force....	5
		Combatfor.....	3
		F. A. D., C. O. D., P. H., T. H..	3

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appears a schedule of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution." This schedule will be found reproduced as Item No. 146, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Wn

PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3110)

PATROL WING TWO,
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,

Restricted

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 1941.

Operation Schedule No. 42-41 (Week of November 5-11, 1941)

	5 Wed	6 Thurs	7 Fri	8 Sat	9 Sun	10 Mon	11 Tues
CURTISS.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	SPH	SPH
TANGIER.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
WRIGHT.....	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK	UK
McFARLAND.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
THORNTON.....	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
HULBERT.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	ABE	ABE
SWAN.....	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH	SPH
AVOCET.....	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG	PG
PATRON 11.....	RD G3 Y1 V4	DP G3 Y1 V4	G3 V4	RD UK	DP	RD G3 L2	DP G2 L2
PATRON 14.....	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 21.....	F1 VC10	F1 VC10	RD F1 VC10	DP	RD	DP G1 L1	RD G2 G3 L1 VC10
PATRON 22.....	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 23.....	UK	UK	UK	ABE	ABE	ABE	ABE
PATRON 24.....	DP	RD	DP	UK	SHW	ABE	ABE

- E1 Familiarization.
- F1 Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
- ABE Advance Base Operations.
- G1 Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
- G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
- G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
- PG Plane Guard.
- RD Ready Duty.
- SHW Holiday Routine.
- SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
- UK Upkeep.
- Y1 Right Flying.
- DP Dawn Patrol.

Ready Duty Tender:

HULBERT 5-8 Nov.
SWAN 9-11 Nov.

L. C. Ramsey
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.

Distribution:

Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
FAD OOD 3

Wn

PW2/A4-3/VZ
(3109)

PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION

Restricted

Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 1941.

Fleet Aid Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week November 5-11, 1941)

Wednesday, Nov. 5. *Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Thursday Nov. 6. *Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Friday, Nov. 7. *VO-1 (9 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (12 planes total) will return to Pearl Harbor from operations at sea with Fleet at about 2130.

Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

Saturday, Nov. 8. None.

Sunday, Nov. 9. None.

Monday, Nov. 10. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-1.

Tuesday, Nov. 11. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VS1 above 2000 feet.

*Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).

NOTE: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing, TWO.

PW2/A4-3(2)
(3103)

Restricted

PATROL WING TWO, Wn
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H. November 4, 1941.

Aircraft gunnery area assignment (Week of November 5-11, 1941).

Patrol Wing TWO.....	V4, VC10, L1, L2
Carrier Air Groups.....	} V6, V8, V9, V10, L5, L6. Kahuku Point and Illio Point targets.
Marine Air Group 21.....	
VO Wing.....	V1, V2, V3.
CA Wing.....	VU3, VA3.
CL Wing.....	A7, A8, A11.

L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.

(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution." These schedules will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 147 and 148, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 55

All maps checked in "Blue" pencil are in "PA-K2" transposition system and were taken out, read and translated.

All maps checked in "Red" were thought to be in more complex systems (probably machine) as there were no indicators by which they could be readily identified. No machines held at Honolulu.

Copies of all messages were forwarded to Washington.

(Exhibit No. 55 is a statement of RCA Communications, Inc., Honolulu, T. H. listing certain Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in November and December, 1941. This statement will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 149, 150, 151 and 152, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 56

(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this point in the Exhibit, from Togo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, dated 4 December 1941, will be found reproduced as Item No. 153, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Dec. 4, 1941.

#01250 "La" system.

From: Togo, Jap foreign minister.

To: Jap Consul Honolulu, T. H.

Ki kan ko in tai pi su to nitaí (shi) ru ru hon nen do nen ma tsu shō
yo sí kyū ga ku sanstōri ke tsu tei se ri

Ha i fu ga ku ri nite so ben arita. . . ku na ho yō nin nitaí (shi) te wa kyū
ryō no yū wo ri o sai kō kyō yu seipi to shi kaku jin hi go ro no kin tai o
shin sha ku noue kikan sai ryō niyo (ri) te ki tō ga ku ha i fu ga ku ni te si
kyū aritashi

sa ha ra 80 dollars. 93 dollars. mu ra o ka 83 dollars. ji dai dō 44 dollars.
i zu re nio kan pipi ji tsu pi shi ben

Toco.

The following has been authorized as the annual year-end bonus for employee
typist of your office. It is desired that you stay within the allowances. For
key personnel ten percent is considered the top amount. You may pay a suitable
amount at your own discretion after deducting indebtedness.

Sahara, \$80. \$93.

Muraoka, \$83.

Jidaidō, \$44.

All above chargeable to government expenses.

#125 "LA" System. 4 Dec. 1941.

From: Jap. Foreign Minister—Togo.

To: Jap. Consul, Honolulu, T. H.

[Rec'd on 5 Dec. '41, trans—before 7th]

(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this point in the Exhibit,
from the Japanese Consul at San Francisco, to the Consul at Hono-
lulu, dated 3 December 1941; and a coded message, with translation,
from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo,
and the Consul at San Francisco, dated 3 December 1941, will be found
reproduced as Items Nos. 154 and 155, respectively, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

3 DEC. 1941.

Urgent #321 "LA" System

From: Japanese Consul Muto, San Francisco, Calif.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu, T. H.

Sen si tsu no wa ri a te tsu gō a ru nitsuki ta tu ta ma ru jō sen ki bō
no kan in ka zo ku jū sha sū kaku to be tsu ni shi kyū go kai den kō.

MUTO.

Due to the necessity of arranging accommodations, desire you report by dis-
patch the number of members of the families of officials, by rank, desiring
accommodations on the TATSUTA MARU.

(Two coded messages, with translations, dated 3 December 1941,
from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, bearing Nos. 852
and 1240, appear at this point in the Exhibit. They will be found
reproduced as Items Nos. 156 and 157, respectively, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Rec'd these on afternoon of 5 Dec. '41 along with a few plain language and
some misgs in less secret systems.

Read plain and less secret systems and was nothing but junk.

Immediately set to work making tests against all systems on hand, working
backwards from current system in use.

Nothing coming to light so it was decided to reverse the process of deciphering,
allowing for the encoding party to have either purposely encrypted the misgs in
this manner or possibly to have made an error in using the system employed due
to confusion. This netted results. Ref. Exhibit # 57.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear :

1. No. 2451 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941.
2. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 1.
3. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 2.
4. No. 2452 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941.
5. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 3
6. *Ibid*, showing handwritten decipherment, page 4.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 158 through 163, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

(Military secret).

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941

(PA-K2)

#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

I. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

	Meaning	Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.....	Preparing to sortie.....	1
A number of carriers.....	Preparing to sortie.....	2
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 1st and 3rd.....	3
Carriers.....	Several departed between 1st and 3rd.....	4
Carriers.....	All departed between 1st and 3rd.....	5
Battleship divisions.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	6
Carriers.....	Several departed between 4th and 6th.....	7
Carriers.....	All departed between 4th and 6th.....	8

2. Signals.

I

Lanikai¹ Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.....	1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m.....	2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m.....	3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m.....	4

II

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m.....	5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m.....	6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m.....	7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m.....	8

III

Lanikai¹ Bay, during daylight:

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

¹ Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

IV

Lights in the attic window of Kalama House² will indicate the following:

<i>Times</i>	<i>Signal</i>
1900-2000-----	3
2000-2100-----	4
2100-2200-----	5
2200-2300-----	6
2300-2400-----	7
0000-0100-----	8

V

K. G. M. B.³ Want Ads.

- A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
- B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
- C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium⁴ at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

<i>Time</i>	<i>Signal</i>
From 7-8 -----	3 or 6
From 8-9 -----	4 or 7
From 9-10-----	5 or 8

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded radiograms on forms of RCA appear:

1. No. 246 from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941, with handwritten notations.
2. Another copy of No. 246 without handwritten notations.
3. *Ibid*, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.
4. *Ibid*, being the message sent the Washington Embassy.
5. No. 247 from Kita in Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941.
6. *Ibid*, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 164 through 169, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941 (PA-K2).
 #247

- Ship report.
- 2nd. Military transport (Name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
- 3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

(A copy of the coded radiogram from Kita to Tokyo, No. 248, on form of RCA, dated 3 December 1941, will be found reproduced as Item No. 170, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

02480 3rd [WA I OO MIN GU] Paragraph SU I ZYOO KI BO KAN 2 SE KI SYUTU KOO. SONO TA I.

² A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
³ A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
⁴ At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
 To: Tokyo.
 3 December 1941 (PA-K2).
 #248

Ship report. December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 56A

SECRET

Registered Mail—
 Return Receipt Requested
 Secret

DW/wps

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
 Sixth, Floor, Young Hotel
 Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/A17
 Serial No. 217
 15 June 1945

From: District Intelligence Officer, 14ND
 To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,
 Office of the Secretary of the Navy
 Subj: Pearl Harbor Disaster Investigation.

1. The enclosed copies of material from the files of this office are forwarded herewith as requested by Mr. John Sonnett, Counsel for subject investigation.

2. The urgency of delivery of these documents is such that they will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer messenger. Authority is hereby granted to transmit these documents by registered air mail within the jurisdiction of the United States Mail and Naval Postal Service.

H. S. BURR,
Acting.

Encls.: Sixty-six (66) photostats of miscellaneous material dealing with the decoding and translation of cable messages sent by the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, prior to 7 December 1941.

"KO" SYSTEM

"PA" SYSTEM

SENT FILE

Completed—Tfc. Taken Off

RCA RADIOGRAM FILED AT SF REC HERE 1941 DEC 6 PM 4 39 [HST]

1494 30 SAN FRANCISCO CALIF 6 628P
 L C Shokin Honolulu

Takakuwanoken tesuuryoo beisisuno shookimo keiyenite shookankyoosei konnanto omowaru, American Trust Nitsuki naimitsuni torishirabe tarutokoro dooninwa dookookeyiu oimatsuete suusendoru attosaitobiru torikumi koshoonaku shiharaware orumoyoo tookoonimotsu kawarikin ryuuyoono keisekinakiya.

SHOKIN.

[Suppressed; undelivered in Honolulu.]

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear:

1. No. 252, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo.
2. No. 250, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
3. No. 249, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
4. *Ibid.*, showing decipherment and English translation.
5. No. 248, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
6. *Ibid.*, showing decipherment and English translation.

7. No. 247, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
8. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.
9. No. 246, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
10. *Ibid*, showing decipherment and English translation.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 171 through 180, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

"KO" SYSTEM

"PA" SYSTEM

RECEIVED FILE

Completed—TFC Taken Off

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu appear :

1. No. 128, dated 6 December 1941.
2. No. 126, dated 4 December 1941.
3. No. 92466, dated 4 December 1941.
4. No. 92461, dated 3 December 1941.
5. No. 90094, dated 3 December 1941.
6. No. 278, dated 22 November 1941.
7. No. 360, dated 22 November 1941.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 181 through 187, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

"L A." SYSTEM

RECEIVED FILE

Completed—TFC Taken Off

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear copies of the following coded messages :

1. No. 384, Part 1, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
2. No. 384, Part 2, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.

Parts 1 and 2 of this message will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 188 and 189, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#384

27 November 1941.

From: Ambassador Nomura, Washington, D. C.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu.

Detailed regulations re the proclamation mentioned in my #1042 and 1124 to Tokyo were announced by the State Department on the 19th. They are roughly as follows:

1. The procedure for requesting a permit to depart the country must be at least within 30 days of the day of departing. Exceptions to the above are as follows:

(a) Regular embassy personnel: Consular personnel, other officials and families and their servants, and important personages may get an "exit visa" by going to the State Department.

(b) Persons who can show proof that they are a part of the crew of foreign men of war.

(c) No permit will be required of a wife or child under 4 accompanying the spouse & father.

[2] 2. In the following categories, permits will not be issued for any person, whose departure the U. S. considers would be harmful:

(a) Any person possessing secret information regarding national defense plans, preparations, equipment, or organization.

(b) Any person who might directly or indirectly communicate the information concerning the above to a foreign power.

(c) Any persons who have been engaged in obstructing national plans of the U. S. for the benefit of defense of any third power or U. S. KEIBO.

(d) Any person who has been attempting to interfere with or delay the defense plans or military of any nation of the Western Hemisphere working for the defense of the Hemisphere.

(e) Any persons who have been attempting to incite revolution, [3] bring about a war, or who has been attempting to interfere with U. S. defense plans, or plans for the defense of any third power.

3. Inspecting officials may revoke the departure permit of any person who refuses to permit an examination.

4. In regard to permits for entering the country, the Secretary of State may grant such after inquiring of the Army, Navy, Police, and immigration authorities regarding the person concerned.

5. There is no stipulation which would exempt consular officials if they came under any of the above list of exceptions, and official will when entering or leaving the country be required to produce proof that they are not engaged in any subversive activities.

The full text is being sent air mail.

(Part 1 of 2 Parts)

27 November 1941.

"LA"

From: Nomura—Wash. D. C. # 384

To: Jap. Com—Honolulu

Re my Msf 1042 & 1124 to Tokio.

Migi fu Koku Nimo tozu (Ki) Ku sai so ku wa 19th zu Ke o Motte Koku mu syō yori ha tu pi yoō sera reta . . . ru ga sono gai ryaku sano goto . . . si

1. Syu tu Koku Kyo Ka sin sei tetuzuki wa (begun special code) sukunakutomo OLBY (end sp. cde.) syu tu Koku yo tei hi no 30th i zen ni na subeku Migī no rei gai ta ru be Ki mo no wa

(A) sei si Ki ni Mito (me) ra re ta ru taisikan in. Ryōzi Kan in nō ta no gaikoku seifu Kan ri oyobi sono Ka zo Ku zu i in. Zyn sya Yō nin wa tan ni Koku mu syō sa syō Kyo Ku yori syu to Koku sa syō zi ((begin Eng. sp.) EXIT VISA (end Eng. sp.)) o to ru tu Ku ru on hi tu yō to su ru no mi

(B) Gaikoku seifu syo yū no gun Kan no ri Ku mi in tosite syō Mei sa re ta ru Mo No

(C) o tu to Ni si ta gō tu Ma. O ya kon GC si ta bō zyū 4 sai i Ka No Ko wa Kyo Ka o hi tu yō to sun zu

2. I Ka Ni Ka Ka qu ru zi rei wa United States no ri e Ki o gai su ru Mo No tosite syu tu KoKu Kyō Ka o a ta e zu

(A) United States seifu No Kyo Ka Na Ku si te United States KoKu bō no Ki KaKu. Zyu n bi. Se tu bi. Se tu ri tu bu tu NiKan (si) su ru hi mi tu zyō hō o yū su ru mo no

(B) Migī NiKan (si) su ru hi Mi tu tū sin o hō hō no tyo Ku se tu ta ru to Kan se tu ta ru o to wa zu gaiKoKu seifu e un Ka ten to su ru mo no

(C) United States Kei bō ma ta wa dai 3 KoKu no Kō e Ki ma ta wa bō ei no ta me ni United States ga sai yō se ru sei sa Ku no Kō Ka o so gai si ti en subeKi Ka tu dō Ni zyū zi subeKi mo no

"LA"

(Part 2 of 2 parts)

27 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C. #384

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu, T. H.

(D) Sei han Kyū bō ei no ta me sei han ei nai no koku ka ga to ri ta ru kei kaku ma ta wa hei dan o so gai sen en se si men to su ru mo no.

(E) United States nitai (si) bō dō. Sen sō o zyaku ki si United States koku bō ma ta wa dai 3 koku bō ei no ta me no United States no sei sa ku ni hi tu yō na ru si gen o ha kai sen to su ru mo no.

3. Syu tu koku kan ri kan wa syn tu koku sya ga hi tu yō na ru ken sa o kyo hi su ru to ki wa syu tu koku o tei si su ru ko to o u.

4. Nyū koku nikan (si) te wa 1 tei no syo si ki niyo (ri) ru syu tu gan o na si ta ru no ti kaku syū yori no wa hyō sya 1 mei a te. Ri ku kaigun syō.

Ren pō kei sa tu kyo ku, i min kyu ku no kan ri o Motte k. sei su ru Kaku syō ūnkai no i ken o ki ki ta ru no ti koku mu tyō kan wa kyo ka ha tu kyū kan ni si rei su

5. Ryo kan no ri e ki o gai su to Mito (me) mu ru zi rei sono ta nikan (si) te wa tai yō syu tu koku no baai to dō yō na ru mo nyū koku no sai ni wa gaikō kan ryōzi kan o zyo gai su ru ki tei na ku. Ryo kō ko zin te ki zi mu yū ran ma ta wa tū ka no mo ku te ki o Motte 1 zi et te ki ni nyū koku sen te su ru gaikoku seifu kan ri wa kyo ka sin sei i gai ni kan ri tosite no ti i o syō mei si ka tō kō te ki ka tu dō ni zyū. zi sezaru ko to o a ki ra ka ni su ru o hi tu yō to su

Migi ki so ku [te ki su to] wa o tu te ku ← sō su on

(A copy of the coded message No. 767, dated 26 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 190, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

#767 "LA"

26 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

Betuden (# . . .) Yokohama December 2nd syō go Los Angeles tyaku dō 14th Dō ha wa tū ka no mo ku te ki o Motte 1 zi et te ki ni nyū koku sen te su ru gaikoku seifu kan ri wa kyo ka sin sei i gai ni kan ri tosite no ti i o syō mei si ka tō kō te ki ka tu dō ni zyū. zi sezaru ko to o a ki ra ka ni su ru o hi tu yō to su

Expects depart Yokohama noon 2nd arrive Los Angeles 14th, depart 16th and arrive Balboa 24th.

(A copy of the coded message No. 638, dated 26 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 191, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#638 "LA"

26 November, 1941.

From: Nomura—Washington, D. C. #381.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

No. 6 Nikan (si) Koku mu syō ka ka ri kan yori ta tu ta Ma ru zyō sen syn tu koku hō zin nikan (si) te wa to ku be tu no toriha karan o motte syn tu pan zen sai syō gen do 10th zen no OO sei a yū kō to mito (me) mō ru ko to ni toriha karan

SHU

SHU

to ru nituki migi ni ma ni ō yō sudeni hei tu koku kyo ka sin ei o tei hei tu sesime ra re ta ki mu ne mōsu ko se ri.

I have just learned from an official of the state department that a special procedure will be applied to Japanese who desire to depart via the Tatsuta Maru. Departure permits must be acquired within a period of ten days prior to sailing. Those wishing to make that ship would best put in their request for permits.

(A copy of the coded message No. 302, dated 25 November 1941 from Consul General Muto in San Francisco to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 192, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

25 Nov. 1941.

From: Consul General Muto, San Francisco #302.

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu.

Upon the expiration of the Anti-Commitern pact on the 24th of November, it has been decided to renew the pact for a period of 5 years. Today the 25th it is planned that the emissaries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukoku, Kō, and Spain will affix their names to a 5 year renewal. Furthermore those who will participate in this agreement have been increased by the seven countries of China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and KURENATIA.

"LA"

25 November, 1941.

From: Muto—San Francisco, #302.

To: Jap Consul—Honolulu.

Bō kyō kyō tei wa CH nen November 24th o motte ki kan man ryō su ru o motte sen pan rai kan kei koku kan nisi (te) zi go no kyō ryo ku tai yō nituki kyō gi son ru ke tu ka sa ra ni ko re o 5 ka nen en tyō su ru ko to to na ri hon 25th Berlin nioi (te) hi . Doku . i . man . kō . sei 6 ka koku zen ken niyu (ri) en tyō gi tei syo no tyō in o ko na wa ru ru yo tei na o sin gi tei syo ni a ra ta ni ki tei sera reta ru san ka tetzukī nisi taga (i) sa ra ni tyū ka min koku . Rumania . [Bu ru ga ri ya] . Finland . Denmark . [Su ro bu a ki a] oyobi [Ku ren a ti a] no 7 ka koku wa hon 25th bō kyō kyō tei ni san ka su ru ko to to narita ri.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 345, dated 25 November 1941, from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Washington showing decipherment.
2. Copy of Part 1 of coded message No. 375, dated 18 November 1941, two pages, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
3. *Ibid*, Part 2.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 193 through 196, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received

18 Nov. 1941.

"L A"

From: Washington

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu—Cir. #375 (Part 1).

(Sent to Tokio as #1127)

November 14th zu ke o mette Dai to ryō wa 1918 neu May 22nd kō fu. 1941 neu June 21st shū sei hō ri tsu dai 114 gō nimotozu (ki) yō shi sa nogoto ki shu tsu nyū gu sei gen oyobi kin shi nikan (shi) su ru 1 so ku no sei tei ji tsu shi ka to o mei ze ri

(1) How ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi (te) wa United States shi miu wa United States (Panama un ga chi tai . hi tsu oyobi zeu ryō i ki ryō su i o fukumi mu) ni shu tsu nyū su ru ni sai shi koku mu chō kan sono ta kan kei kan kan ha tsu ku (kō) no ryo ken o hi tsu yō to su sen in mo ma ta a na ji

(2) Gaikokujin no shu tsu koku ni sai shi te wa koku mu chō kan ma ta wa sono shi tei su ru kan ri no ha tsu kō se ru kyō ka o hi tsu yō to si ka tsu taisho 1 — neu chō kan . i miu kan sono no shi tei su ru mi na to ni kagi (ri) ru tadashi koku mu chō kan ga United States no ri e ki o gai su ru to mito (me) ru to ki wa shu tsu koku wa kyo ka sa re ga ru be shi

(3) Hon ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi (te) wa gaikoku jin no nyū koku ni sai shi te wa (2) to dō yō no kyo ka o hi tsu yō to shi United States no ri e ki o gai su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa kyo ka serare yu (new Para)

(4) shu tsu koku ma ta wa nyū koku sen to su ru mo no wa hi tsu yō to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa su be te sono sho ji su ru bun sho, bu tsu pin sono ta o ken sa sa ru be shi.

(5) Gaikoku no mi na to yori United States no mi na to ni nyū kō su ru sen pa ku no gaikokujin ta ru sen in nitai (shi) ha tsu ku serarota ru nyū koku kyo ka wa jō ken zu ki nishite ka tsu gō ri te ki hi tsu yō no baai ni kagi (ri) ka tsu i min kan ga sono nyū koku ga United States no ri e ki ni han se zu to mito (me) ta ru to ki nyū koku no shi kaku o a ta e ra ru be shi tadashi migi wa sen in no shō ko sho ru i tei kyō nikan (shi) su ru 1940 neu June 5th no dai tō ryō rei dai 84 kei 9 gō o hen kō su ru mo no ni a ra zu

(6) Gaikokujin ni ha tsu kō serareta ru shu tsu koku oyohi nyū koku kyō ka no yū kō ki kan wa shu tsu koku oyobi nyū koku kyo ka ha tsu kyū kan ma ta wa koku nu chō kan niyo (ri) sono shu tsu nyū koku ga ga tsu shū koku no ri e ki ni han su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa i tsu ni te mo ko re o shū ryō seshimu ru koto o u

(7) Hon fu koku no kaku ki tei wa to ku be tsu ni ki tei su ru baai monozo (ki) ki ki son no hō rei no tsu i ka ta ru mo nun mishite hen kō shū sei su ru mo no ni a ra zu bei jo

NOMURA.

(Part 2)

(8) kaku kan chō wa hon fu koku oyohi kou go ha tsu pu seraru be ki fu koku ki so ku mei rei nimotozu (ki) ku koku mu chō kau no ken gen shi tsu kō nikan (shi) koku mu chō kan ni kyō ryo ku su ru ko to o yō shi koku mu chō kan no yō kyū a ra ba migi mo ku te ki no ta me to gai kan ri ka ka ri nin no kin mu o tei kyō subeshi (New Para)

Hon pō shi tsu kō o tau tō su ru zen kau ri wa 1918 nen May 22nd no hō ri tsu oyobi 1941 neu June 21st no shū sei hō no i hō bō shi oyobi i hau sha no torishirabe narabini sho ba tsu ni sai ze o tsu ku su ko to o mei zu (New Para)

(9) 1941 nen June 3rd no dai to ryō dai to ryō rei dai 8766 gō dai 6 [pa ra gu ra fu] dai 1 bu wa ko re o ha i shi su (nen Para)

Na o hon ken ki so ku wa imada ha tsu pi yō kō hō o mi za ru mo jō hō niyoreba kokn mu chō kan wa ken ji sō chō to kyō ryo ku shi te dai to ryō fu koku nishitaga (i) 1918 nen May 22nd hō ri tsu oyohi 1941 nen June 21st no dō shū sei hō niyo (ri) dai tō ryō yori fu yu serareta ru ken gen nimotozu (ki) Gaikokuujm no shu tsu nyū kokn nikan (shi) su ru ki so ku o sudemi sei tei shi ahi kaku kan pō ni ha tsu pi yō serau be ki omonmki nishite migi niyoreba shu tsu koku sen to su ru gaikokuujin wa koku mu shō no shu tsu koku kyo ka o hi tsu yō to shi ka tsu shu tsu kokn kyo ka shin sei wa su ku na kn to mo shu tsu koku sen to su ru hi yori 3jū hi i zo ni shō na su ko to o yō su ru omomuki na ri,

NOMURA

On November 14 the President ordered the enforcement of the law #114 of May 22, 1918, as Amended June 21, 1941 regarding the prohibition and restriction of leaving and entering the country. Main points follow:

1. After this law is put in to effect, when American citizen enter or leave the U. S. (including the Canal Zone, all territories, and territorial waters) a passport issued by the Secretary of State and other interested authorities. This applies to ship's crews.

2. Foreigners when leaving the country must obtain permission from the Sec. State or his designated official, and are limited to harbors designated by the Sec. State, the immigration authorities in Taisho I-nen. However, the Sec. State is to refuse permission when he believes it to be against the interests of the U. S.

3. After this law is put into effect, the same sort of permission is required for foreigners entering the country, and when it is considered to be against the interests of the U. S. permission is not granted.

4. When it is considered necessary to enter or leave the country all documents, goods, etc. must be inspected.

5. Foreign crew members of ships entering U. S. ports from foreign ports in cases of reasonable necessity, provided that they have permits to enter and it is not against the interests of the U. S. may enter the country (in the opinion of immigration officials), are entitled to entry. However, the above does not change Presidential order (84 kei 9gō) of June 5, 1940 concerning offering of documentary proof of crew members?

6. The validity of permits for entering or leaving the country received by foreigners may be terminated at any time the Sec. State or (other officials) consider that entry or departure is against interests of U. S.

7. Provisions of this law except in the case of special provisions shall not be changed or amended. (Part not clear—looks like additions to damage law.)

Part II

8. It is necessary for all government officials to cooperate in the enforcement of the Sec. State's authority under this ordinance and all future ordinances, rules and orders. For the purpose of the above aim, if it is requested of the Sec. State he shall offer the services of a competent official.

Former Officials charged with enforcement of (this law Honpō?) are ordered to investigate and punish violaters and prevent violation of the law of May 22, 1918, and ammendments of June 21, 1941.

9. Presidential order #8766 #6 paragraph first part is abolished.

Although this law has not been publicly proclaimed, according to intelligence reports, the Sec. State in cooperation with the Attorney General under authority delegated by the Presidential ordinance based on the law of May 22, 1918, and Amendments of June 21, 1941 are about to publish the rules for entering and leaving the Country in all official publications. According to the above (information?) foreigners desiring to leave the Country will need permission from the State Dept. and, although applications for leaving are few, it is believed that it will take more than 30 days.

(A copy of coded message No. 367, dated 17 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 197, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received
"LA"

17 Nov. 1941

From: Washington.

To: Jap. Con.—Honolulu. Cir. #367.

(Have delivered to: San Francisco; and (Note: 6 other addresses not decoded)

Dai 2313 gō nikan (shi) (new Para)

Zai Bei tei koru ryōji kan ni zo ku su ru fu dō san . bilim . ki ro ku bun syo wa tō ro ku no yō na ki nitsuki sa yō go shō cho ai na ri ta shi —

NOMURA.

Re: #2313. Wish to advise you that registration of real property, furniture, and documents belonging to Consulates in the U. S. not necessary.

(A copy of coded message No. 029, dated 15 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 198, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received
"LA"

15 Nov. 1941.

From: Washington

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu—# 029.

(Sent following to Tokio as #1101.)

SHUTU

Puerto Rico

Kon pan jō in ni tei WOFU serareta ru Hawaii [pu e ru to ri ko] bō ei dō an nai yō gai ryaku sanotori (new Para)

Dai tō ryō wa sono sai ryō niyo (ri) bō dō. shin ryaku tō no yo bō ma ta wa Hawaii

chin a ku tō no ta me ni Nagasaki [pu e ru to ri ko] ryō nai, no United States ri ku kaigun, o, shi su ru ko to, o u, ka tsui ku an, no, ta me, ni, jin, shin, ho go, rei, o, tei shi, shi kai gen rei, o ha tsu su ru ko to o u ———

Nomura

A digest of a bill for the defense of Hawaii and Puerto Rico submitted in the Senate today—

(Last part not clear but general meaning seems to be) That the President may at his discretion for the prevention and suppression of invasion and rioting declare martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rio.

(A copy of coded message No. 110, dated 14 November 1941, from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 199, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received
"LA"

14 November 1941.

From: Tokio.
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu #110.

(Re ys mag. #215 of 11 November)

Hon tsuki 11th tō chi shō kin ha tsu den shō se ri—

Togo.

Money was sent from here by cable on the 11th of this month.
? Denshō-telegraphic inquiring

(A copy of coded message No. 217, dated 13 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 200, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

13 Nov. 1941.

Received
"LA"

From: Washington.
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu.

(Following rec'd from Tokio as #217 on 13th)

11th United States taishikau nitai (shi) zai honpō United States taishi ki kan oyobi sono sho ku in wa taishikau oyobi sono sho ku in kei *ya* honpō tō ke tsu rei nimotozu (ki) zai san hō koku o na subeki mu ne tsū hō se ri mottomo ryōji daifikan nitsuki te wa United States dō yō fu dō san. bi hin oyobi ki ro ku bun sho nikan (shi) su ru hō koku o men jo se ri—

Togo.

NOMURA.

11th. We were informed that, based on the Japanese freezing regulations, the Japanese Ambassador to the U. S. and his staff must make a property report. However, according to a consular representative reports on real property, furniture, and documents belonging to the Embassy are not required.

(A copy of coded message No. 356, dated 10 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 201, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

10 Nov. 1941.

Received
"LA"

From: Washington.
To: Jap. Con. Honolulu (#356 Circular).

Ei ga kaisha yori Ku ru su taishi no [ka me ra in ta bi yū] o ki bō shi ki ta re ru to ko ro dō taishi, ko go i kō, o tashikame, none,

Beg End
EX 1DBO QU

orikaishi kaideri Anitashi.

NOMURA.

A picture company desires a "camera interview" with Ambassador Kurusu. Find out his wishes and reply by telegraph.

(A copy of coded message No. 088, dated 8 November 1941, from Morishima in New York to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 202, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

Received
"LA"

8 Nov. 1941.

From—New York.
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu. Circular #088.

(Sent to Tokio as #496 on 5 Nov.)

Gaikoku . . . jin houpō shu tsu koku tatsuzuki no wa zu ra wa sa o un nun se ru [to ri pyu n] ki ji o sai hau ba ku shi ta ki nitsuki sa ki orika' reshi go kai den kō (new para)

1. Gaikoku . . . jin honpō shu tsu koku ni sai shi nai mu. Okura tō no kan ken yori WA to ku no hi tsu yō a ru kyo ka nai shi shō mei sho (shu tsu pan shin rin ma de no mo no zen bu a fuku (mi) mu) no shu ru i oyobi migi shu no ku ni yō su ru hi sū < long (new para)

JIN

2. kou ji to ku be tsu ha i sen ni bin jō ka ta mōsu i de ta ru United States MC nishite migi kyo ka shō tō no shu to ku ta ni a wa za ri shi ta me jō sen de ki za ri shi mo no a ri

MORISHIMA.

Request information to refute "Tribune" article complaining about troublesome procedure for foreigners leaving Japan by return telegraph—

1. Foreigners at the time of leaving Japan must obtain permission or identification cards from officials of the Home office and the Finance Ministry (includes everything up until sailing ??) this requires days. (Not very clear).

2. Americans who applied as passengers on the special evacuation ship because they had not obtained permission [or, because their permits were not in order] could not go on board—

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Handwritten decipherment of coded message No. 026, dated 7 November 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco; and No. 004, dated 5 November 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York.
2. Copy of coded message No. 027, dated 5 November 1941, from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 203 and 204, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

Received
"LA"

5 Nov. 1941.

From—Washington
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu #027

Zen mei yo ryoji nitai (shi) su ru ki nen hin mu ze i tsu kan ka ta te ha i fu ni no mu ne 3rd koku mu shō yori kai to arita ri

NOMURA

The State Department has replied to the effect that arrangements have been made to pass commemorative articles of previous honorary consuls duty free.

(A copy of coded message No. 364, dated 5 November 1941, from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 205, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received
"LA"

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

From—Tokio
To—Jap. Con. Honolulu #364

Kon pan hi Bei ko sho nikan (shi) Nomura taishi o ho sa se shi mu ru ta me Ku ru su taishi o kyō ha su ru ko to to na re ru to ko ro do taishi wa United States Seifu kō i te ki a tsu sen niyo (ri) 7th Hongkong ha tsu [ku ri tsu pa <] ni te to Bei subeku yū ki shokika taido 5th to chi o shu tsu pa tsu se ri.

tsuitena dō taishi ki chi to cha ku no sai wa shikaru be ku ben gi kyō
yo aritashi—

Togo.

Ambassador Kurusu is being rushed to the U. S. to assist Ambassador Nomura in the present conferences. The Ambassador through the good offices of the U. S. Government will go to the U. S. on the Clipper leaving Hongkong on the 7th, and departed from here with his staff on the 5th. Give him all facilities possible when he arrives there (Honolulu).

Togo.

5 Nov. 1941.

From—Morishima #002 "LA"

To—Jap. Con. Hono. T. H. Ref yr msg. #003

Tō chi chaku ha tsn hi zu ke sai den aritashi

Request you repeat telegram date of arrival and departure this place

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 302, dated 4 November 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York, showing hand-written decipherment.
2. Copy of coded message No. 273, dated 2 November 1941, from the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to the Honolulu Consul.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 206 and 207, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

2 NOVEMBER 1941.

Received

"LA" Urgent—

From—San Francisco

To—Tokio #269 Honolulu Cir. #273

Ta tsu ta ma ru kon 2nd gogo ji bu ji shu tsu nō se ri jyō kyaku 1 tō
164.2 tō 63.3 tō 635 mei na ri u chi doku jin 2. Italy jin 1. France jin 1 mei

MUTO

The Tatutu Maru departed today at 2 P. M. without incident. Passengers: 1st Class, 164; 2nd Class, 63; 3rd Class, 635; including 2 Germans, 1 Italian, and 1 Frenchman.

[SECRET]

MISCELLANEOUS

SENT AND RECEIVED

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear seventeen coded Japanese messages covering the period 19 November 1941 to 2 December 1941. These messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 208 through 224, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

The following are special usages for the "WA" and "WO" (PA) codes:—

1. "WA" Code:—

This usage is primarily for use in encoding messages classified as "strictly secret", is the same as some that have been in use in the past, and is effected by the transposition of letters. There are the following five methods:

(a) Using units of 5 letters: Chose two key words (such as KANDA and KUDAN). Transpose according to these words. From the list chose one of the three letters (C-G-Q) and place this letter in the 2nd and 4th position of your 5-letter indicator. Choose at will a vowel (Y included) to fill in the 1st, 3rd and 5th position and put them together. Examples: ICICI—AGAGA—UQUQU. Since this type of transportation is common in these codes we will not go into detail re the transposition.

(b) Like (a), this method is by using units of 5 letters. Take two words from the key word list (this is SANSO and SUIISO) and transpose the text in accordance with the numerical arrangement of the letters. Make up the indicator of the letters "Z", "J", and "X" with a vowel chosen at random. That is:—IZIZI—EJEJE—OXOXO.

(c) As above, 5 letters form a unit. Take three key words from the list (such as TOKYO—KYOTO—OSAKA) and transpose groups in accordance with the numerical position of the letters in the separate key words. The indicator is formed by choosing one of the two letters "T" or "D" and adding a vowel at random. Thus:—ATATA—UDUDU.

(d) In this method 7 letters will be considered a unit. One key word is taken from the list (such as OTOHIME) and the letters transposed by means of the numerical position of the letters of the key word. To form the indicator group take one of the following ("B"—"V"—"P") and add a random vowel. Thus: ABABA—IVIVI—OPOPO.

(e) Seven letters will be considered as a unit. Take two key words from the list (such as KUMAGAI—NAOZANE) and transpose accordingly. For an indicator choose one of the two ("M" or "N") and add a vowel of choice. Thus: IMIMI—ENENE.

2. Special usage for the "WO" code: This is supplementary to the usages given in above section. These are like paragraph 1, but are used in telegraphic messages only.

(a) Nine letters will be considered as a unit. Take a key word such as (TAGONOURA) and transpose accordingly. For the indicator take one of the two consonants "L" and "R" and put them in positions 1, 3, and 5. Add vowels of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus: LOLOL—RURUR.

(b) Choose a key word of 11 letters (such as ODANOBUNAGA) and transpose accordingly. For an indicator put one of the following two consonants (T or D) in 1, 3, and 5 positions, add a vowel of choice, thus: TOTOT—DIDID.

(c) Choose a key word of 13 letters such as HANAYORIDANGO and transpose accordingly. For a key word place either H or F in positions 1, 3, and 5 and add a vowel of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus: HAHAH—FIFIF.

(d) Choose a key word of 19 letters such as (KINOKUNIYABUNZAEMON) and transpose accordingly. For a key word use (K or G) as above.

(General) Be careful not to use a "WA" indicator on a "WO" message.

3. Method of encoding remainder or supplementary group:—The following method will be in case of both "WA" and "WO" codes.

(a) It is based on 5 letters. On the days listed on the left use the key to its right:—

1st and	6th—	54321
2nd and	7th—	43215
3rd and	8th—	32154
4th and	9th—	21543
5th and	10th—	15432

(more but too abbreviated)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57

Rec'd the attached on night of 7 Dec. 41. Page 19 attached furnished break by which all were read by 11 Dec. '41. (Process of enciphering was reversed by encoding person)

(A copy of the coded message No. 02490, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 225, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#02490 Gaimudaijin Tokio from Kita.

4 DEC. 41

3rd Go Go England Gun kan I Se Ki Honolulu Koo Nyuu Koo 4th soo tyoo syutu koo. Ton suu 1199 ton nai gai. En to tu 1 po n. 4 [in ti] Hoo zen go kaku 1 Mon. Tan kai syoku paragraph Nao Nyuu koo tyoku go zyoo riku su I hei wa ei ryoozi (ryoozi dairi) kan ni te yuu bin bu tu wo u ke to ri.

From: Kita #02490.

12/4.

To: Foreign Minister.

3rd. gogo Eikoku gun kan 1 se ki honoruru kō nyū kō 4th sō chō shutsu kō. ton su 1100 ton nai gai. en to tsu 1 po n. 4 (in chi) hō zen go kaku 1 mon. tan kai shoku.

nao nyū ko choku go jō riku su i hei wa ei ryōji kan ni te yū bin bu, tsu wo u ke to ri itaru

On the afternoon of the 3rd a British Man-of-war entered Honolulu, and departed early on the 4th. About 1100 tons; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.

KITA.

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokio

December 4, 1941

PA-K2

#249

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

(A copy of coded message No. 02500, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 226, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

#02500 Secret "PA" (#365)

4 DEC. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min, Tokyo.

4th gogo gi 1 kei zyun [ho no ru om] niokorn to JJ migi kō. —

From: Kita #02500 12/4.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

4th gogo 1 kei jun (ho no ru ru) Kata hyaku shutsu kō.

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.

Kita

No translation to match this one—Rec'd on night of 7th Dec. '41. 4 copies same way, to 4 different address. Gist: regarding funds

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Copy of coded message No. 02510, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
2. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Consul in Seattle.
3. *Ibid*, to Tokyo.
4. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
5. Copy of coded message No. 02520, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 227 through 231, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

#02520 Urgent.

1. 5 nichi kin yō bi a sa ōden 239 no sen kau 3 nyū kō se ri shutsu dō kikan 8th paragraph.

2. dō jitsu [RE KI SIN TON] oyobi jū jun 5 shutsu kō.

3. Migi niyori 5 nichi gogo zai ha ku kan sen sanotōri.

Sen Kan 8 kei jun 3 ku chi ku Kan 16.

Nyfū kyo chū no mono Honolulu ka ta 4 oyobi ku me shi son 2_ _ _ _ _
chi ku kan 2_ _ _ _ _

5 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

(PA-K2)

"252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message "239" arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.

3 light cruisers.

16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and - - - - were in dock.

*Available, J19 dated 29 29 November.

JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

(A copy of coded message No. 02530, *infra*, dated 6 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 232, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

368

From: Kita

To: F. M. Tokyo

6 DEC. 41.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

Delivered 1248

Transmitted 1304

#02530 Secret "P. A."

(#368)

6 DEC. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio.

Kiden (dai . . . gō) 123 matsudan nikanshi (Para).

1 Bei how do ni a ri te wa October ko . riku gun wa Beg. Eng KE [c] LA [am] EK [p] ZI [-] DI [da] YC [vi] IW [s] ZI [-] VY [N] AA [.] KE [c] AA [.], Iō [End spell] ni oite so sai ki kyū u hei no yō sei ni chaku shu si sū hyaku no ki kyū wo chū mow se shi nominarazu ki kyū ni yoro ha wa i . Panama pō [Bō] ef wo mo kō ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki) na ru to koro tō chi ni 9 [KAN] shi te wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so re to wo mo wa ru ru ba shō no sen tei oyobi kei ryū shi se tsu tō na shi wo ra zu ma ta ki kyū fu yō kun ren mo mi za ru wo niotte i ma no tokoro so sai ki kyū se tsu chi no chō kō su ra mito (me) zu ka tsu sō kyū ni wa ji tsu geu seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata (ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu geu surin to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ku se ru [hi tsu ka mu] [fu ō do] [e wa] hi kō jō no ri chaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra no kai gū wo OU—D—K za—Y beikara (zu) yue (mi) shiu ju wau ki kyū pō ei—E—F geu Y—a ri kore wo A—ze ki suru ki kai wa sō tō ta buw mi mo ko sa raru (ru) mono to —N dau seram (ru) (para) (2) kan 1—ku se ru tokoro sen kan wa gyo rai pō zyo mō wo yū se zu shō sai hikitsuku (ki) chō sa hō—G ran koto to su.

(#368)

#02530 Secret "P.A."

6 Dec. 41.

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

Kilden (dai gō) 123 matsndan nikanishi (Para)

Bei hou do ni a ri to wa October ko. riku gun wa Beg. Eng

c am p — da vi s — N . c . end spell

KE LA EK ZI DI YC IW ZI VY AA KE AA 10 ni oite so sai ki kyū u hei no yō
sei ni chaku shu si sū byaku no ki kyū wo chū mou se shi nominarazu

Bō

ki kyū ni yoru ha wa i. Panama pō ei wo mo kō ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki)

KAN

na ru tokaro tō chi ni 9 shi te wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so
re to wo mo wa ru ru ba sho no sen tei oyobi kei ryū shi se tsu tō na shi wo
ra zu ma ta ki kyū fu yō kun ren mo mi za ru wo wotte i ma no tokoro so sai
ki kyū se tsu no chō kō su ra mito (me) zu ka tsu sō kyū no wa ji tsu
gen seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata (ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu
gen surm to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ten se ru [hi tsu ka mu] [fu ō do]
[e wa] hi kō yō no ri shaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra no kai gū wo OU—D —K za
—y beikara (zu) que(m) shin ju wan hi kyū pō ei -E -F gen y- a ri kore wo A-
ze ki suru ki kai wa sō tō ta bun ni no ko sa raru (ru) moiso to—N dan serau (ru)
(Para)

(2) kau 1-ku se ru tokoro sen kan wa gyo rai pō gyo mō wo yū se zu shō sai
hikitsuku (ki) chō sa hō—G ran koto to su

From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941.

PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123^a.

1. In the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the
us of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii
is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of
Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected
the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training
for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there
are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa^b, there are
limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack
against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

^a Not available.^b Kana spelling.

(Copies of two coded messages No. 02540, dated 6 December 1941,
one from Kita to Washington and the other from Kita to Tokyo will
be found reproduced as Items Nos. 233 and 234, respectively, EXHIB-
ITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

(369)

#02540 Urgent "PA"

6 Dec. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi Wash—Foreign Min. Tokyo

(1) 5th yū koku sen kan [wa i ō min] oyobi su i po 1 nyū kō shi 6th
zai ha ku kan sen Sano tori (Para)

1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

San kan 9 kei jun 3 su i po 3 ku chi ku kan 17 oyobi nyū kyo chū no kei jun 4 ku chi ku kan 2 (jū jun kū po wa zen bu jutsu dō shi a ri). (Para)

(2) kan tai ni i jō no kū ki wo mito (me) zu. (Para)

Zai . . . taishi sano tōri u gi te se tan.

December 6, 1941.

From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

PA-K2

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ----- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

4 DEC. 1941.

From: Togo (Foreign Min. Tokio) #01260 "PA."

To: Jap. Com. Honolulu.

Kan chō fu gō a tsu ka i (Para)

1. i rai shi wo ke rn bu tsu ken ryō hō mo sunniyakani wa ta so re ta shi

2. ō ku ma a te mu su me nyū gaku su chi chi

From: Tokyo.

To: Honolulu.

(Date not given. Approx. Dec. 4, 1941)

PA-K2.

6.

#125.

Restricted distribution.

1. Please turn over immediately both items which I requested.

2. -----

(Japanese)

ARMY 7379

No msg to match this translation.

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

"PA"

4 DEC. 1941.

From: Togo—Foreign Min.—Tokio #92466 Urgent.

To: Jap. Con.—Honolulu.

20

Ki kan in ka do ku ki chō nikaushi te wa tō hō ni oite mo se tsu kaku kō ryao shi wo ru nitsui (tewa) wo tsu te nanibun no gi denpō (dai . . . gō) su ru ma de ma ta re to shi (para)

Hon den a te sa ki zai jo ku wo oyohi DOXO kaku koō XPJVEU

womotte mi

We are now giving consideration to the question of the return home of the families of members of your department. Until you hear further, please hold it up.

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu.

December 4, 1941.

PA-K2.

Circular 2466.

We here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where you are until I wire you at a later date. This message addressed to -----.

(Japanese)

ARMY 7380

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

(At this point in the Exhibit there is a paper on which appears decipherment and plain language Japanese. The numeral notation "851" also appears thereon. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 235, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

From: Foreign Minister 92461
To: Kita, Consul, Honolulu

12/3

Strictly secret #92461

Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect.

Togo.

This msg was an extra, picked up on night of 7th Dec '41. Not dated or numbered.

From: The Foreign Minister 000 See A
To: All Hands

No date.

Well known to you all is the fact that the empire is at this instant confronted with the gravest crisis in its history, and the problem of reducing that crisis is exclusively one of diplomacy. Those within and without the government expect big things of the Foreign Office and indeed I have a deep respect for the activities of the members of this department. The fact that I am so frankly giving you my opinion from the envoy to the head of an office is that I wish to encourage you one and all. Even tho we would rather be at home and even the conditions are bad at this time we are diplomats and if our conduct is such as to disrupt our unity we may not only obstruct the course of diplomatic aims, but may stand in the way of our presenting a solid front; and by so doing place ourselves in a position of having no excuse to give. So at this time especially let us put our best foot forward and present a solid front to the world. "PA"

Tei koku ga | i ma | ya | chō koku | i rai | mi zō | no koku nan | ni | sō gū | shi | wo
ru | koto | go shō chi no tōri | na ru | ga | ko no | (*nan koyoku*) do kai ni wa | mo
tsu pa ra | gai kō | ni yoru | no | hoka | na ku | *chō ya* kyo | wo | gai mu
shō | ni | taishi | ta dai | no | ki tai | wo ka ke | tō shō in | (The personnel of the
said) no kō dō ni | taishi | shin jin | na ru | kan shin | wo | mo chi | wo ru | gen
jō | na ru | ni | tsui (te | wa) te | wa | zai gai | shi (Ambas.; envoy, minis.)
shin | ha ji me | kaku | kō | kan chō | ni oite ki tan | na ki | i ken | wo | gu
shin | seraru (ru) ru wa Nihon | yo ro ko bu | *tokoro* | na ru | mo | konosai i ya
gyakua (NA) ku | mo | gai sei | shoku in | ni | shite | shō zen tai no dan | ke
tsu | wo | *mi da ru* | ga | goto (ki) kyo so

ni | i zu ru | koto | a ra ba | gai kō | shi sa ku | no | shin kō | wo | sa ma ta
gu ru | nominarayu | kyo koku 1 chi sho pan | no | mokutaki | ni | ma i shin | *ZW*
wo ru | sai chō ya no | ki tai | ni | taishi te | mo | mō (shi) wa ke na ki | shi dai
nitsui (tewa) go jo sai | na ki | tō | na ga ra | konosai | tokuni shō | nai gai wo | a
ge te | 1 gan to shi | gai kō | no | ki | no | wo | jū bun | ni | ha tsu ki | suru | sū
tokushu to mo 1 sō | kan in | wo to ku | rei | seraru (ru) yō itaskitashi.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appears on a radiogram form of RCA with the following: 'Japanese Consulate General November-December 1941 Messages' appearing in handwriting. This form will be found reproduced as Item No. 236, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

This message dated 6 Dec. 41 was rec'd on night of 7th and furnished break by which others were read. Break found on night of 8/9 at 0200 9th Dec. '41. No copy of code msg. to match this one.

1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tojo, Foreign Min.
To: Consul Honolulu

01280.

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th.

KE 12/6

(At this point in the Exhibit there appears a paper with decipherment in handwriting and also what appears to be some plain Japanese text. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 237, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Received attached on night of 7 Dec. '41.
Could not immediately identify or decrypt.
Copies sent to Wash, D. C.
Unable to do anything with this one.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear on radiogram forms of RCA:

1. Message dated 1 November 1941 from Kita to Tokyo.
2. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
3. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
4. Message dated 12 November 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
5. *Ibid*, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

The foregoing quoted messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 238 through 242, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

12 Nov. 1941.

#078 "LA" (581-582)

From: Kita To: Jap Consul San Francisco and Minister at Washington,
D. C.

Ku ru su taishi yori.

Honshi tishite wa i zon na ki mo sho han no ji jyō sha hon ken ka hi no ketsu tei wa ki taishi ni o ma ka se—Ku na o honshi no no bu be ki ten to o ki zu ki no ten San Francisco a te shikyūdenjo aritashi.

From: Ambassador Kurusu

I have no objections and will leave the divisions on the various items to your Excellency. Furthermore if you think of any items that I should include in my statement please wire me at San Francisco.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two items, as follow:

1. A receipt form for radiograms of RCA.
2. A coded message dated 1 December 1941 from Kita to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 243 and 244, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

1 DEC. 1941.

#082 J-19 (K-10) transposition (38)
(Enciphered with 30 Nov key)

From: Kita

To: Minister at Washington, D. C.

Gakuki (?) 26th

1 nitsuki G 25th nashi 2 nitsuki zai Bei taishi ate gō jig 29th 2403 no tori ri 24th taki "L" 13th nari CH Beg. Sp. Mochi

Regarding references to items in circular #2403.

Note: Circular #2403 not available.

(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 1 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 245 and 246, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

1 December 1941 (J19)

#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119*

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on;

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on;

(1) Fuel is plentyfull and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring to 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*JD-1: 7158.

JD-1: 7294.

**Available, MEIZI dated 23 November.-----

(A copy of coded message No. 2420, dated 1 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 247, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Unable to do anything with this one.

(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 2 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 248 and 249, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[Received on night of 7 December 1941]

2 DEC. 1941.

#244. J-19 (K10) transportation (362)

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo

(Gai N 17th P 26th) kida gō jig 29th 2437 M 23rd 2 inkanshi ¶ zai shoku nen sū wa hon nen G 6th Beg. date 10th End date zuke 5 shin jig 29th 69 oyohi 0den 152 no tori.

Regarding reference to items in circular #2437 (m)

Note: Circular #2437 (m) not available.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Message dated 2 December 1941 from Kita to Tokyo bearing the one word "Haruna."
2. Copy of a "Skeleton" form for accounting purposes employed by RCA and relating to a message dated 3 December 1941 from the Japanese Consul, Honolulu, to Tokyo.

3. *Ibid*, with respect to another message dated 3 December 1941. The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 250, 251, and 252, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57A

"LA" system.
Received by Kita.
Prior to 7 Dec. '41.
Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us.
To: GAIMUDAIJIN. Tokio.
From: KITA.

#180

"LA" 30 SEPT. 41.

April 28th zu ke ki sin dai 69 Gō nikan (si) paragraph May 29th Yokohama ha tu ni tu ta ma ru tu mi tō kan a te ni mo tu 2 ko no u ti 1 ko wa o ku ri zyō (1460 Gō) ni begin english spelling ō ri na ma] ri ma ga kaku ai tei ma to ma bei] Ryo 9 - to a ru to ko ro ze i kan tetuzuki ni hi tu yō na ru nituki migi nai yō syō sai sikyū go kai den aritasi.

Trace baggage.

To: GAIMUDAIJIN. Tokio.
From: KITA.

#174

"LA" 23 SEPT. 41.

United States yori Chungking ha ken no gun zi si se tu [ma gu ru da long sound] dai (dairi no dai) syō. [Ma ku mo ran] repeat indicator Tyū sa 1st Repeater. [Su gi ne long sound] 1st Repeater. [Su sa long sound ran do] 1st Repeater No 1 kō wa 22nd repeat indicator [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te 2nd repeater tō ti tyaku. Su long sound hi go 2nd repeater Manila kei yu to si no ha zu.

Magruder to Chungking via Manila.

To: KOSHI. Washington.
From: KITA.

(Re yi Cir #278) #055

"LA" 18 SEPT. 41.

1. (1 Ka 3 Dan No Nyō) Sō Ryōzi ki ta na ga o 417 § 56 paragraph.
Fu ku ryōzi o ku da o to zi rō 277 § 65 paragraph
Syokiica . . . Sei yu ge kyō no su ke 252 § 45 paragraph
Syokiica . . . Sei yu ge kyō no su ke 252 § 45 paragraph
Syokiica . . . Sei se ki kō ki ti 209 § 61 paragraph
Syokiica . . . Se mo ri mu ra ta da si 133 § 00 paragraph
2. Migi i zu re mo ko gi tu te kan zyō (ta dasi mo ri mu ra wonozo (ki) ku) paragraph. Yokohama syō kin ginko Honolulu si ten paragraph.
4 period tō kan ka ni sono ta no seifu ki kan na si.
Finance.

To: RIYOJI Shanghai
From: KITA.

17 SEPT. 41.

KA TU YA MA KEN ZI E KI YO HA RA SYOKIKA YORI paragraph [PU RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long sound] Gō NI TE OCTOBER 1st KI TI TU KU PA.

Arrival of Katsyamo here from Shanghai Oct. 1 via Pres. Tyler.

To: GAIMUDA IN TOKIO
RIYOJI Shanghai
(HIPAF QRXM)
#245-LA.
From: Kita

17 SEPT. 41.

GAIMU. . . SYŌ DEN SYO SI 3 MEI (KU GA MI TI SA DA. WA TA NA BE MA KO TO. TA TI MA SA YO SI) [PU RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long sound] GŌ NI TE 16th TŌ TI HA TU OCTOBER 1st KI TI TYAKU NO YO TEI NITKUI SIKARU BE KU GO TE HA I KŌ PA

Kugam, Watanobe, Tajima, sailing on Tyler for Shanghai. Welcome them.

216

To: GAIMUDAIJI TOKIO

From: KITA

#214 "LA"

KIDEN (dai Goo) GOO 1781 NIKANSI paragraph 1. KOKU POO KEN KIN BEI KA 483 Dollars (TOO KE TU REI ZI TU SI GO SYUU NO SE RU MONO) paragraph NAO SYOO KIN KA RI I RE KIN NIKANSI TE WA OODEN (DAI GOO) 133 WO MOI'ITE GO SYOO NIN KA TA RIN SEI \$483 for defense fund

208

"LA" system.

To: Shanghai?

Bakl zeki jū ge ki shi ta to i tsu te o ru za Japan kō ku bu tai wa hyō shī ki a ru ko re ra no hei wa shi se tsu o ba ku ge ki su ru ho do gi ryō se tsu re tsu de nai ko to wa Japan kō kū bu tai no i ma ma de no sen ka yori mi te a ki ra ka de a ru.

Togo.

It is being said that Japan has bombed and strafed (non military establishments) but one has only to think of the war results scored to date by the Japanese air force to realize that our air force is not so unskilfull as to bomb these establishments marked as non-military.

Togo.

140

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#193-LA

30 JULY 41.

Japan hō sō kyō kai e sanotōri paragraph sin ha tyō niyo (ri) ru Hawaii mu ke hō sō tyō syu sei se ki kiwamete fu ryō na ri 19 meters 25 meters 31 meters niyo (ri) ru dō syu mo ku no [te su to] hō sō o o ko nai sei se ki sai ryo na ru mo no 1 o e ra bu ko to to si te wa i kan.

To Japan Broadcasting Co.: Your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii. Please go back to 19-25-31 meters.

#121

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#169-LA

11 JULY 41.

Sin nin syo khi ki ko mon (ki van 6 ka tuki) [ra ti mō a] wa Chungking ni ita (ri) ru to 9th [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te tō ti ki kō Begin English spelling tetnzuki tai man tei—syu sai ban san kai se ki zyo China ga [de mo ku ra si long sound] no ta me zen sen se ru o syō yo si ta ru u e Japan wa gun zi zyo sa te tu o ki ta si tu tu a ru nomi narazu sono bu ryo ku niyo (ri) ru sin ti tu zyo ken se tu wa ta koku no ken ri o ki son si zi ko no syo gai to na ru ku ni ni ku tu zyo o a tō ru mu no nisite zen zen si tu pa i ni kī si tu tu a gi kaette mon zi yū oyobi ryō do syu ken no ta me ta ta kai tu tu a ru China o mei syu to su ru sin no sin ti tu zyo ko ko ni ken se tu o min to si tu tu a ru mu ne en ze tu si ta ru omomuki na ri.

Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser, Latimore.

#120

To: Gaimudawin Tokio

From: Kita

#166-LA

11 JULY 41.

Ta ki den syo si yori paragraph go sin ei . yo se ki yaku ta te 2 sya ku. yo ko 1 sya ku 5 Sun. A tu sa 1 Sun

#112 Night of #028

To: Koshi Washington

Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#155-LA

30 JUNE 41.

Tō ti Germany mei yo ryōzi yori kō bun o motte 30th i kō dō ryōzi daiipkan o hei sa su ru mu ne tū ti arita ri pa

Memo from German Consul. He closes shop for the 30th.

#109

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#151

28 JUNE 41.

To kan ka si da si kin na si (kan Tyō fu gō a tu kai)

#107

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo

From: Kita

#149 "LA"

26 JUNE 41.

[Kin me ru] tai syō wa [ma ku mo ri su] tai sa tai dō 25th [ku ri tu pa long sound] na te tō ri ni ki kan se ri pa

Admiral Kimmel and Capt McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

#105

To: Gaimudaijin Tokio

From: Kita

#147—LA

27 JUNE 1941.

Chungking sei ken gi zyn tu go mon Begin English spelling sō dan ge ma ru man za doku pe 9—wa Washington yu ki no to 22nd [ku ri tu da long sound] ni te tō ti ni ki kō si ta ru ga ei zi si syo hō niyoreba dō nin wa [bi ru ma] dō ro niyo (ri) ru syo ku ryō un pan yō [to ra tu ku] su long sound sen dai kō nyū no yō mu o o bi o ru omomuki na ri kyū sun so ya

Chungking—Burma Rd—Trucks.

"KO" system.

Sent by Kita.

Prior to 7 Dec. '41.

Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us.

#310 "KO"

7 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min.—Tokio.

Nyū man nite ni sashō wo atae tarutokoro sonogo dōnin yari how sha no shi rei niyori (ru) wo motte taiyo maru yō sen wo tori ya ninru muno mōshuide mokka tōchi taizai kyū ———

After granting Newman's visa, he informed us that he has cancelled his passage on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the present.

#287 "KO"

25 Oct. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min. Tokyo.

Kiden (dai 96 zō) nikanski (Para)

"Nyū man" fu November 4th tōchi hatsu no Tai nite ki nin itashitashi omonur (ki) notokoro dōnin nitai (shi) (suru) honpō nyūksku sashō wo hakyu shi (zo) sashitsuka (e) naki ya shi ka chō tomo (o) uchiawa (sei) no ne ori-kaeshi (go) kaiden kō (irai hō).

Re: Your #96. Newman wishes to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving here Nov. 4th. After conferring with with the head of the department concerned, please let me know if you have any objections.

From: Kita (Secret).

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

"in ta < na sho naru. nyū su. sa < bi su" ki sha Beikoku jin *Beg Eng. Sp.* CRICHTON—COLVIN *End Sp.* yori honpō nyūkoku sashō hakyū kata negaide aritaru takaro honnin fu honnen July made Tokyo ni wo (o) ri taru omomu (ki) nite kei shi sō kan hakyū no tai hō (taizai no tai. honpō no hō) kyoka shō (May 19th zu ke *Beg. Sp.* A *End Sp.* dai . . . 476 zō) wo sho ji su (para)

Dōnin fu November 4th tōchi hatsu no Taiyō maru ni jō sen hibō naru omomu (ki) nikuki (tewa) migi sashō hakyū no ka hi shikyū (go) sengi no ne denpō (dai go) nite (go) kaikon kō (irai hō)

Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has requested a visa for a stop-over in Japan. He expects to leave here on the Tatuta Maru sailing Nov. 4th. Instructions requested.

#209 "KO"

7 Aug. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min—Tokio.

Ryō mei tomo sashō tori ya me kata mōshiicle taru nikuki go ryō chi ainaritaski.—

Visas were refused in both case. Your indulgence is requested.

#189 "KO"

28 JULY 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min—Tokio.

Nanibun no gi shi kyū gō kaiden kō bu.—

Some sort of answer requested.

181 (2nd) "KO"

22 JULY 41. System

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, manager of the Shanghai firm of George-McBain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBain for a visa to visit Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have been residing here for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships in Japan, and state that they have visited there many times before. They both have on two previous occasions (19 July 1939 and 25 Aug. 1939) obtained visas in Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you any objections to these visas? Answer to that question requested.

181 "KO" # 130-22nd

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

zai Shanghai Sp. Eng GEORGE-McBAIN-CO. End Sp. (1 Sp. Eng. THE-BUND End Sp. sho zai) shi hai nin England jin Sp. Eng. W. R. B. McBain End Sp. oyo (bi) dōnin tsuma Sp. Eng. V. W. K. McBAIN End. Sp. no ryō nin yori honpō tsū ka sashō hakkyū kata negaiide aritaru tokoro migi ryō mei wa 2 jō 1 nen kan Shanghai ni zai jō seru mono ni shite 6 shū kan zen kyū ka kyū yō notame to fu tōchi ni taizai shi konpan ki nin no to ki sen no ri ka e tō no tsugō niyori (ru) 1 jin honpō ni jō riku itashitashi omomu (ki) nite nao ryō nin tomo jūrai Nippon e wa sū ji tokō sern koto aru mune shiu (mōsu) ta te wo (o) ri sono ryoken niyoreba saikin nioite shō wa jū 4 nen July 19th oyo (bi) dō August 25th tsu ju ke nite so re zo ri Shanghai sōryōji no sashō wo e te dō jū 5 nen honpō myokoku no mune ki myū ari (Para).

Migi nitai (shi) (suru) tsū ka sashō wo tae (go) sashitsuka(e) naki ya orikaeshi (go) kaiden kō (i rai hō).

#165 "KO"

10 JULY 41.

From: Kita. #119 of 10th.

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

Ref: your circular 1381—

9th

Gokuhi (Para) April kyū German jin 1 mei Beikoku jin 1 met Beikoku jin 1 mei (Para)

Migi izure no shuppatsu seru hayu

Strictly secret: 9th. One American and one German should have departed by now.

"KO" #76

29 MARCH 1941.

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijin Tokyo —

WA

Sp. Eng. H O L C O M B E End Eng. fu imada tokan ni shutsu to seyn nao

WA

1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"ha ri son" gō fu honpō nika ki kō seza (ru) nitsuki (tewa) dōnin fu "ma ni ra"
in tyoku kō seru mono to shi ryō seraru (ru).

CHOKKO.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo.

Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison (steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who is going direct to Manila.

"PA-K2" system

Received by Kita

Prior to 7 Dec. 41

Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41—by us 24a

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

RADIO UNIT

Commandant, Navy 128 % Fleet Post Office

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., 15 June 1945.

Top Secret.

From: Captain T. H. Dyer, U. S. Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Exhibit 41, Forwarding of.

Enclosure: (a) Photostatic Copies, Pages 29 to 286 of Exhibit 41.

1. Enclosure (a) is forwarded at the request of Mr. Sonnett.

T. H. Dyer,
T. H. DYER,
Captain U. S. Navy.

Top Secret.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the attached Pages 29 to 286, inclusive, are photostats of original documents contained in the files of FRUPAC.

T. H. Dyer,
T. H. DYER,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

(NOTE—See record page 420)

WB

909S on 22 November 1941.

From: Togo—Foreign Min—Tokio. #278 (PA)

To: Jap. Con. Honolulu.

(su i tō kan ri wa jō sei kyū ten no sai sa ki ji kō denpō (dai gō) arita (shi) shi (Para)

1. sai nyū kin oyobi sai shutsu kin wa sono tō ji ni okeru ti ka mo ku be tsu no chō shū ma ta wa shi shutsu zu mi no ru i kej kin gaku (Para)

2. ho dan kin no shu ru i be tsu kin gaku (Para)

3. ta te ka e kin no chō shaku (Para)

4. kō kin no ho yū zan gaku oyobi shō rai shi to mi ko mi gai yō (Para)

5. kin kyū sho bun kiden (dai go) yō en WT kō no.

GONPWIC

Note: the above msg. was also received here from Ninto—San Francisco with his number #36ø on it, at 456 P on 22 November 1941.

Not translated.

13 Nov. 1941.

From: Consul General Muto, San Francisco, #285

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu (PA)

1. Even tho the Imperial Government has urged strongly that the U. S. reconsider its shipments of aviation gasoline to Vladivostock, it has been of no avail. Recently we called to the attention of the Soviets the fact that one of our ships

was sunk off the Japanese coast by a mine of Soviet manufacture, but the affair is still unsettled. Her main forces are now fighting the Germans and she is trying to follow a policy of procrastination elsewhere. We have since September controlled our military and followed a policy of non-aggravation with the Soviets while there is information to the effect that the Soviet's Far Eastern and Mongolian armies are appearing on her Moscow front. Although she is controlling any activity on the Soviet-Manchukoku border that would give rise to trouble, she also appears to have plans up her sleeve for use in case worse come to worst.

2. Since the establishment of the mutual defense agreement between us and French Indo China we have been progressing with plans to turn the south of French Indo China into a military base. The authorities there have since the middle of September been holding up import and export authorizations and are afraid that we are about to regiment the Annamites through the Greater East Asia policy and pressure is increasing against our rapprochement, and are obstructing many pending measures through a policy of delay. Our policy against this is fast taking form. Ambassador Yosizawa and party had arrived there by the end of October and plans starting several investigations using Hanoi as his headquarters. (Sumita the former official there is assisting).

3. England is hoping for active cooperation from Tailand whom she considers necessary for the defense of Malay, P. Ruma, and Singapore, but Thai appears to be maintaining a strict neutrality as between England and ourselves.

The Dutch East Indies stoutly maintains her stand that we have occupied French Indo China as a base from which to attack them and will not furnish us supplies, and also they have refused to even exchange products ship by ship on the barter system.

The Malay-Singapore areas are hastily strengthening defenses and reports say are nearing completion. On the other hand the Russo-German war will probably draw-out the war between Germany and England and in the end looks like a British victory, while we're stuck in the China incident and as a result of economic pressure from the U. S. will be impoverished, if their plans are realized. So apparent has their Anti-Japan attitude become of late that their attitude toward our ships and our evacuating citizens and our remaining citizens has been greatly stiffened.

13 NOVEMBER 1941.

"PA"

From—Muto—San Francisco #285

To—Jap. Con.—Honolulu

(Part 1 of 2 parts)

(Gakuhi) dai 5 hō (Para)

1. Teikoku Seifu wa U.S.S.R. nitaishi Beikoku yori no kō ku ki yō [ga so rin] no Vladivostock yu sō nikanshi shin jin no han sei wo u na ga shi ta ru mo ra chi a ka zu ma ta ho ku sen Nihon kai gan no U.S.S.R. sei no fu ryū su i rai (ki ken su i i ki se tsu tei ni to mo nai fu se tsu se ru tsu MJ) nikanshi U.S.S.R. ga wa no chū i wo kan ki se ru mo mi taiketsu ri ni hō chi suru tō ji koku no zen gun ji ryoku to Germany ni taisuru tei kō ryoku to wo ta no mi sen en shu gi to ri ki ta re ru ga sai kin ni ita (ri) Nihon wa tai so kō ge ki wo wo ko na wa za ru be shi to no mi tō shi no mo to ni September i rai gun tai wo sei sō shi Moscow zen men ni kyokute gun oyohi Mongolia gun a ra wa re wo ru omonu (ki) no jō hō a ri mau so koku kyō no kin chō ya ya kau wa shi so ga wa mo nichu mau wo shi ge ki suru gagoto (ki) hō dō wa yo ku sei shi wo ru mo mau 1 no baai no himitsu jun hō kō sa ku wa kore wo *kei jo ku* shi wo ru mono nogoto (ki) shi (Para)

2. nichi futsu in kyō dō pō ei sei ritsu go wagahō wa nau bu futsu in wo gun ji ki chi toshite sei pi shi tsu a ru tokoro futsu in tō kyoku wa September chū jesu i kō tai nichu yu shutsu nyū kyo ka wo shi bu ru tō shō kyoku te ki tei kō wo na shi aruiwa wagahō ga ka kyō wo tsū ji te tai au nau jiu kō sa ku wo na sau ko to wo wo so re ka kyō no tai datsu se tsu kiu ni taisuru a tsu pa ku wo kyō ka shi ma ta kaku shu keu au taiketsu no sen en sa ku wo kō ji wo ru mo tai sei toshite wa wagahō no futsu in ni tisuru ha a ku ryoku wa chaku chaku to su su mi tsu tsu a ru *HYMJ* to yū be ku yo shi za wa taishi 1 kō mo October ma tsu shuppatsu fu nin no to ni tsu ke ru ga [Ha no i] wo hou kyo toshite kaku hau no kō sa ku ni no ri da su yo tei na ri (jū rai no su mi ta kikau wa kai shō se ri) tsu zu ku sho un.

#285

Malay

Part 2 of 2 parts

3. England wa [ma re ←] [pi ru ma] oyohi Singapore pō ei jō no yō chi ta ru [tia] koku ga wa ga jin ei ni tō zu du no ki ken wo nō shi sen to se tsu kvoku

te ki se ku dō wo ko ko ro mi [tai] wa ko no kan nichī ei no kan ni a ri te chū ritsu i ji ni kyū kyū ta ru a ri sa ma wo ri (Para)

Ran in wa wa ga ku ni ga futsu in wo ki chī toshite ran in wo kō ge ki suru gagoto (ki) ko to na ki mu ne wo gen ji tsu no kō dō (tatoeba futsu in yori no te tsu pe i) niyori te shi me sa za ru kagi (ri) wagahō no gun ji ryoku wo ma su gagoto (ki) ran in bu tsu shi wo 1 sai kore wo kyō kyū suru a ta wa zu to no tatemae wo ken ji shi wagahō yori no 1 fu ne go to no [ba ← ta ←] sei no tei an mo kyo hi shi wo re ri (Para)

Malay

[ma re ←] Singapore hō men ni oite wa kou shun rai chaku chaku toshite pō pi wo kyō ka shi kan sei nichī ka zu ki tsu tsu a ri to no hō a ri ta hō doku so sen sō no kē tsu ka ei doku sen chō ki ka shi ke tsu kyoku ei ga wa no shō ri to narube (ku) shutsu wo mō shin shi Nibon wa China ji hau ni yoru koku zu shō mō. Beikoku yori no kei zai a tsu pa ku no ke tsu ka hi hei no 1 to wo ri do ru mono to kau dau se ru mono ka ei tō kyoku no gen dō sai kin to mi ni tsu yo go shi to na ri ro ko tsu na ru tai nichī te ki sei wo shi me shi hou pō sen pa ku. hikia (gu) hō jin. zai ryū min tō ni taisuru tai do i chi ji ru shi ku kō ka se ri (kō).

12 Nov.

From: Consul General Muto (San Francisco)

To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu

To be handled with greatest secrecy

1. This latest big campaign of the Germans which started on October 2nd is aimed at the control of European Russia through the occupation of Moscow and later the annihilation of all the remaining field forces of Soviet Russia. This objective has already to a great degree been realized, for the main strength of the Russians has been broken and the occupation of Moscow is merely a matter of time, it would seem.

Along with the defeat of the Russian Army unrest is growing among the people; and with this it would appear that the collapse of the Spanish Government is no longer a matter for worry. (Plans are under way for cutting off British and American supplies for Portugal). It appears that from now on Soviet Russia will hardly be an aggressive competitor.

The order of these events to the conclusion will be to secure the line Leningrad-Moscow-Halikov (?)—Rostov; then to reorganize their mobile units and even tho they are weary occupy the Caucasus.

This tracking down of the Soviet Army should not only deal a heavy blow to the British, but should throw some doubt into the business of bribing the Spanish Government with which is being carried out through the cooperation of the U. S.

Even tho there is the possibility of a quick settlement of the Russo-German conflict, looking at it from a standpoint of the ability of the Russians to resist (as I explained in a previous article), they have already turned down peace through surrender, and the Germans are not likely to take the role of appeasers.

2. England has not been resting since the outbreak of the Russo-German War, but has taken advantage of the respite to concentrate her force, and even tho the Russo-German war has come to the close of one phase already the plans for an invasion of England has been abandoned and it seems that Germany plans to continue her air warfare and blockade and at the same time start operation to occupy certain areas in the Near East and Mediterranean Sea. Even Britain can guess this, and is taking measures to strengthen her positions in the Near East. Because, as before, sea power in the Medit. Sea rests in the hands of the British, she threatens the supply lines of the Axis in North Africa, and it can be guessed that the German Medit. Sea campaign will be aimed at breaking that (?)

After the outbreak of the Russo-German War, sabotage has broken out in the occupied countries of Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia fostered by the Communist party, but the German policy of pressure has reduced this pretty much until we believe it will hardly affect the future course of the war.

The U. S. has progressed toward abandoning her neutrality to the extent of patrolling the waters of certain areas and has issued orders to shoot at German boats within that area. Also she has occupied Iceland and Greenland, and sent troop to certain bases in South America and is approaching a state of participation in the war, and the fact that she is hesitating is due to public opinion at home.

12 Nov. 1941.

"Pa System" ("K-2 transp. reversed")
 From—Muto—San Francisco—#287 (23)
 To—Jap. Con.—Honolulu, T. H.

(Part 1 of 2 parts)

Gokuhi (Para) *ō hei jō hō dai 5 hō* (Para)

1. October 2nd kai shi no how nen do sai go no doku gun dai sa ku sen wa Moscow kō ryaku wo shu gan toshiti a wa se te so ren zan zon ya sen bu tai wo ge chi me tsu shi motte gen tō ki zen ni *ō ro kaku ho wo mokutaki to suru mono na ru tokoro migi mokutaki wa BJPF* tai han ta tu sei seware *ō ro no so gun shu ryoku wa kai me tsu shi Moscow no hō i kan ra ku mo pa tai ji kan no mon dai to mi ra re wo re ri* (Para).

U. S. S. R. min shin wa ji koku gun ha i sen totomoni fu an ta ka ma ri tsu tsu a ru mo migi mo motte tadachini [su] sei ken no hō kai wa ki shi gata (ku) [po ru ga] i tō no shi *ODHS* narabi (ni). Ei Bei yori no bu tsu shi ni ta yori shun ki son e jun jun pi ni sen shin subeku kaku te U. S. S. R. no shō kyoku te ki tei gyo wa ken go to mo kei jo ku seraru (ru) mono to mi raru (ru) (Para).

Hin sa ku sen shū ryō ren doku koto wa [re min gu ra ← do] Moscow [ha ri ko fu] [ro su to fu] no sen wo kaku ho shi jaku CJ [kan] but tai wo no ko si MD ta ru u e riku kō gun no dai ku wa *UYPT* gu be ki mo [ko ← ka sa su] kō ryaku wa hikitsuyu (ki) wo kona wa ru be shi (Para).

Kei no *mō shū* ni so gun mo tsu i en to suru ni a ta ri Ei no rō ba i *ō u* be ku mo na ku Bei to no (go) kyōroku ni yoru bu tsu shi en go wo motte [su] sei ken wo ju bu shi tsu tsu a ru mo sono kō ka utaga (i) wa shi (Para).

Nao 1 bu ni doku so kyū sen se tsu a ru mo zen ki U. S. S. R. no tei kō kei gaku yori mi te U. S. S. R. wa tadachimi ku tsu *WEDC* te ki kō wa wo na sa za ru be ku ma ta doku toshite mo da tō [po ru shi e pi zu mu] no tachiba yori migi no *kyo zen wa ni okeru* de za ru be shi (i ka u me ze.)

Part 2 of 2 parts

#287

("PA" (K2 transp.))

2. Ei wa June doku so sen po tsu pa tsu i rai kyū yō wo na shi u hon do pō
 wa

Ei ryoku wo ma shi te ji shin wo e ta ru tokoro doku mo tai so sen 1 dan ra ku to na ru mo tadachim tai ei jō riku sen wa na sa za ru be ku tai Ei kō shū to fū sa wo kyō ka suru totomoni chi chū kai kin tō kō ryaku wo kai shi subeshi to mi raru (ru) ei toshite mo kore wo yo sō shi Iran Iraq [shi ri a] chaku tsu ra nu ru kin tō hō men no hei ryoku jō taishi totomoni do no da ki ko mi ni kyō hon shi wo re ri 1 pō chi chū kai no sei kai ken wa i zen toshite ei no te ni a ri ta me ni doku i ho ku a en sei gun wa ho kyū ro wo wo pi ya ka sa re ren kyō ni a ru mono nogoto (ki) ku doku no chi chū kai sa ku sen mo ma zu ko no jō tai kai han na mokuteki to subeshi to sō zō *G/NC* (Para)

3. Doku so sen kai shi go doku sen ryō chi no 1 bu (Norway . futsu . [yū gō] Bulgario tō) oyobi [chi e ko] ho go ryō ni wa kyō san tō no an ya ku re zin min no [sa no ta← ju] tō no tame 1 ji sō jō wo ko ri ta ru mo doku no kyō a tsu hō
 oso (ke)

shin to *BOKZ* ryoku nayori migi wa dai tai yo ku a tsu serare doku no kou go no sen sō su i kō no pō gai to na ru gagoto (ki) koto na ki mono to mito (me) raru (ru) (Para)

4. Beikoku wa shō kai ku e ki no se tsu tei . dō chi e ki nai no doku i kau tei kō ge ki mei rei no ha tsu shutsu [gu ri←n ran do] [a i su ran do] no sen ryō tō yori sarani 1 po wo su su me chū ritsu *BB* no ha i ki . shō sen bu sō tō no kyō ni i den to hei wo ri ta hō hei nanbei sho koku ni oite gun ji ki chi kaku to ku . sū zi ku sei ryoku ku chi ku ni do ryoku shi san sen ka mi 1 e no gen jō ni oite nao shun jun hei wo ru wa gun pi to koku nai yo ran to ga kore wo yu ru sa za ru ta me na ru gagoto (ki) shi (kō) nitaishi shoku (wo wa ri).

QA=(
 QE=)

"LA" SYSTEM SENT BY KITA

Prior to 7 Dec. '41. Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 by us 44a.

5 Dec. '41.

Ooden (Dai . . . Goo 221 nikansi (paragraph (Ba n ka Long sound)

Dai kin kan zyoo tyuu seifu kan kei no hi yoo no mi si ha rai mi sai na ru ga migi si ha rai zu mi nove wa zan gaku 16224 dollar(s) 13 cent(s) to na ri poo too ooden (dai . . . goo) dai 1 koo no gaku to ga tu si too kan hon ken tokubetu kan zyoo tyoo zi ri wa 2610.

From Kita FM Tokyo

5 Dec. 41.

In reply to #221 (Banker)

Auditing accounts with government expenditures only not completed. Upon settlement of above will have balance of \$16,224.13.

Special students expenses \$2610??

From: Kita, Jap C. G. Honolulu

To: Jap. Consul, Seattle

(Name)----- (Japanese) formerly a resident of your place, original residence Hiroshima, Ken. As a gun (county) Nakara (village) Azauebara (ward), says he landed in your city 1898-9 with the manager of the Sakamoto Hotel in your place. Question him as to year, month, and date of arrival and name of steamer and inform me.

KITA.

#346 "LA"

26 Nov. 1941.

From: Kita #001.

To: Jap. Con. Seattle, Wash.

Mo to ki chi zai ryū honpo . . . zin i tsu kan da i chi so ku (i ka ho jo se, FLB TGZ CCV pu or fu a man) (tō 5 zyu 6 sai. Gen se ki begin sp. code Hiroshima ken DA HY QU a sa gun na ka ha ra nu ra a za u e ba ra) wa 1898.9 nen go ro ki chi sa ka mo to [ho te ru] a tsu kai ni te ki chi ni zyō ri ku se ru o momuki no to ko ro zō nin no to rai nen tsuiki hi oyobi sono zyō sen mei o torishirabe no ue go hai den kou (i rai hō).

KITA.

Kenseki, permanent abode.

#233 "LA"

To: Gaimudin Tokio.

24 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

September 16th tō ti ki kō no ko ga den syo si ni bei ka 2 hyaku \$ (kō kin ni a ra zu) tō te ka e oki ta ru to ko ro sei ri no tu gō zyō migi to tu to ma ru bin o motte hen kin sesime gin (se) ra re to si.

Spent \$200.

#224

18 NOVEMBER 41.

To: Gaimudaiyn, Toki.

From: Kita.

United States ha ken repeat indicator [bi ru ma rō do] 1st repeater [to ra tu ku] un yu si dō gi zyu tu sya no sen pa tu tai tosite [ri tya long sound do . E mu. Zyo n zu | tō i ni in so tu seraru ru 4 zyu 6 mei wa 16th tō ti ni ki kō se ri na o 1st repeater ni si yō tyū no [to ra tu ku] wa mo tu ka 3 zen 5 hyaku dai dai bu bun 2 ton han zu mi sin ga ta sya na ru yo si.

CAPT. RICHARD M. JONES.

Etc.—Burma Road-Truck,
3500—2 Ton Truck.

#331-LA

18 NOVEMBER 41.

223

From: Kita.

To: Ryōji S. F., Koshi Wash. #069.

Gaimudaiyn in Tokio. #223.

[Kuritupa-] oyobi [Hawaii kaku tō ken syū kō sen paku wo not(ki) ku] tō tisyuntunyū kō sen paku no hatu tyaku wa kongo 1 sai ha tu pi yō serare taru mune 17th tō ti yūmukensakan yori hatu pi yō aritari (?)

Local postal inspectors (Yūmukensakan) announced on the 17th that from now on arrivals and departures of Clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian (local) mail ships?) will not be published.

#321-LA

12 Nov. 41.

078 (1)

From: Kita.

To: Kashi—Wash. #078.

Kyoji—S. F.—#027 (Re yr Cir #356).

Kurusu taisi yori † Honsi tosite wa izon naki mo syohan no zi zyō yori honken kabi no ketutei wa ki taisi ni omakase itasitaku | nao honsi no nobubeki tentō okizukinoten San Francisco ate sikyū denpo aritashi.

Following from Ambassador Kurusu:

Although I have no objections, for various reasons, I would like you to take care of Washington's decision in this affair.

Wants same thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco. (Maybe the results of above.)

#316-LA

11 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington. #075
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #213

[Su tin son] rikugun tyō kan wa 3rd gi kai nitaishi Hawaii ni gaikokujin wa zen | zin kō | no | wa ri ni | ta tu si | tai gyō ma ta wa ha kai te ki | kō i | no | ki ken | sei dai | na ru | ten o si te | ki si | hi zyō zi | zyō tai | son zai si ma ta wa | sin ryaku | no kyō i | a ru baai Hawaii oyobi [po ru to ri ko] no ki kai gen rei | fu koku | no ken gen | OK o | dai tō ryō | ni fu yo | ka ta | yō sei | se ru omomuki na ru ga 4th Washington | ha tu | tū sin | niyoriba [kin gu] dai gi si | wa migi wa | kan min | no tyū zi tu | to | ai koku sin | nitaishi | su ru | ha zyo ku | na ri to no kō gi te ki [su tei to meu to] o | ha tu pi yō | si ma ta | tō ken ti zi | mo sudeni 1st R wa dō ti zi ni | fu yo serare o ru o motte | ka ka ru | ri tu pō | no hi tu yō | na ki mu ne | ka ta ri ta ru | omomuki na ri.

Yō su ru ni kon pan rikugun | ga wa | no | tei an | wa | dai tō ryō | yori | tyo ku se tu | tō ti | rikugun so rei kan | ni | si rei | su ru | to niyori kai gen rei o si kō | seshime N to suru ni ori.

#316-LA

11 Nov 41.

Secy of War Stimson on the 3rd pointed out to Congress that the aliens in Hawaii amount to one tenth of the total population and emphasizing the danger of strikes and sabotage *destructive activity* he demanded that in case of the existence of an emergency or an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism the [local] government and people. The territorial governor also retorted that since the power to declare martial law was already vested in the governor of the territory there was no necessity for such legislation.

In short, the recent army proposal was to permit the President to directly order the local military commander to put martial law into effect.

#305-LA

6 Nov. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Ryoji, Seattle, Wash, #060
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #206

Tai yō ma ru 5th go go 7 zi 40 fun bu zi syu tu pan se ri na o dai 3 syu yū bin bu tu 2 zyū 3 tai tu mi ko mi ta ri.

Do i kan to ku kan yori kan sen kyo ku tyō ni mo migi no syu si dentatsu ka ta i rai arita ri.

The Taiyō Maru departed safely at 7: 40 pm on the fifth carrying 23 bags of 3rd class mail.

The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the chief of the Marine Bureau (Harbormaster?)

#299-LA

1 Nov. 44

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington. #072
Gaimndaijin, Toklo. #203

Tai yō ma ru 1st bu zi nyū kō se ri bei ga wa toriatsukan bu ri dai tai Tatsuta Maru nitaisi su ru to dō yō na ri. Na o dō i zimushokan yori kan sen kyo ku tyō ni mo migi no syn si dentatu ka ta i rai arita ri.

The Taiyō Maru arrived safely on the 1st. It is being handled by the Americans in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru.

The above information was received from both Doi, an official in the office, and from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.

#285-LA

25 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington. #065
Gaimndaijin, Tokyo. #196

Hō koku ki gen se tu pa ku se ru to ko ro tō kan oyobi kan in no hō koku wa ko re o na subeki ya hō koku zyō no honkan ko ko ro e to tomoni sikyū go kai den aritashi.

Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report? Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.

#279-A

24 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #101

Ka han zi niu no [fu i ra de ru fu i a] oyobi [san, zyu a n] tyū zai tei koku mei yo ryōzi nitaisi hon daizin yori ki neu hin (7 hō ya ki ka bin 1 ko zu tu) o | so re zo re | zō tei su ko to to na ri mizi wa zai bei taisikan a te | ki ba ko 2 ko to si 22nd syu tu pan no tai yō sen | i wa na ga | yōzi ni | ta ku sō se ru nitsuki tū kan oyobi ten sō ka ta o toribakarai aritashi.

The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to the recently designed honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (cloissonné flower vase each). These are being sent in two wooden boxes addressed to the Embassy (Wash.) in the case of Consul Iwanaga who is a passenger on the Taiyō Maru sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be made for their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.

22 OCT. 41

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #100
Ryozi, San Francisco #053

Tei koku seifu | tyō yō sen | tai yō ma ru | hon 22nd | gogo 3 zi Yokohoma a syu tu pan | si ri | na o | dō sen ni wa kan to ku | no ta me | i wa na ga | hi ra ku | (ho zyo B M B) ryōji oyobi do it to mo yo si (ho zyo zen on () | tie sin syō | zimusyoku (do i wa | kai un | kan to ku kan | no | si kaku | ni te) o zyō sen | sesime ta ri.

The Taiyō maru, requisitioned by the Imperial government, sailed from Yokohama today the 22nd. Consul Iwanaga Hiraku (——) and Doi Tomoyoshi (——) an official in the Communications Department were given passage by the Kantoku. (Doi is qualified as a shipping Kantoku).

22 Oct. 41

#275-LA

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #099
Ryōzi, San Francisco #052

Tai yō ma ru zyō kyaku sano tōri: (I ka 5 dan 6 gyō no hyō):

Koku se ki	1 tō	2 tō	3 tō	Gō kei.
Japan zin.....	5	20	124	149
Hi kei bei zin.....	1	28	150	179
XYZE zin.....	2	11	Nashi	13
England zin.....	1	Nashi	Nashi	1
Gō kei.....	9	59	274	342

The passengers on the Taiyō Maru are as follows (Table below of columns and 6 rows):

Nationality	1st class	2nd class	3rd class	Total
Japanese.....	5	20	124	149
Americans of Jap. extraction.....	1	28	150	179
Americans (?).....	2	11	None	13
English.....	1	None	None	1
Total.....	9	59	274	342

#274-LA

22 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #051

Gaimudaijin, Tokio

Ryōji, Sanfrancisco #028

Tai yō ma ru ni 1 to 5 zyū mei 2 to 8 zyū mei gu rai no yo yū a ru nituki o mi ko mi niyori ta tu ta ma ru no brin o ben gi tō ti ni ti tai yō ma ru zyō sen ni fu ri mu ke ra re ta si / na o kaidenaritashi.

Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the Taiyō Marn, it is suggested that the Tatsuta Marn allotment be made use of and transfered to the Taiyō Marn here. Please reply by telegraph.

#272-LA

20 Oct. 41

From: Kita

To: Ryōji, San Francisco from Tokio #094

#022

Koku mu shō wa ma e da jimmushokau no Honolulu oyobi San Francisco zyō riku / sasitukae na ko re ga tetsuzuki o ryō se ru mu ne 20th zai kyō bei taishikan yori tū ti ko se ru nituki migi ta tu ta ma ru/nyū kō/no sai dō zimushakan e den ta tu aritashi.

The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (jimushokan) at either Honolulu or San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th. Please transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatuta Marn.

#266-LA

10 Oct. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington #058.

Gaimudayin, Tokyo #187.

Sinbun hō dō niyoubu mo tu ka | tō ti ni a ru [kin gu] dai gi si wa hon kau koku se ki hō | kai sei hō an wa United States ga | pō te ki ni 2 zyū koku se ki mondai o kai ke tu sen to su ru mo no ni te sono kau zen na ru kai ke tu wa | kan kei koku | to no | kō syō | noyo (ri) ra za ru kagiri ki tai si e zu | yotte dō dai gi si wa Washington | ki kan go | rikugun syō | ga wa | to ron kyō gi noue kan kei koku nitaisi su ru kou se ki | ri da tu kan i ka | yō sei no | ke tu gi an | o | gi kai ni | tei syu tu | su ru | i kō | na ru | mu ne ka ta ri ta ru omomuki na ri.

According to information in the newspaper, Delegate King who is here at present says that as for the plan for a revision of the territorial nationality law, the United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a complete settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot be expected. Consequently after the Delegate return to Washington, and has conferred with the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Congress a resolution requesting provisions for the breaking off of nationality from the countries concerned.

#264-LA

4 Oct. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington, #058.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #185.

Sen zi so ti hō an. ([e mu dē. bi ru]) sin gi no ta me September 15th yori hi ra ka re ta ru Hawaii ken rin zi ken kai wa dō hō an o tu ka si 3rd ken ti zi wa ko, re ni syo mei o ryō se ri dō hō wa sen zi niote ke ru so ti tosite | to ku be tu | kei sa tu tai. syō bō tai. i ryō han tō no so si ki. bō kū se tu bi. ko kyō si | se tū oyobi dō ro no ri yō. syo ku ryō oyobi bu tu ka no tō sei. ryū gen torisime tō nikansi omomuki su ru kō han | na ru | ken gen o | ken ti zi ri | fu yo se ru mo no nisite | migi so ti | ji tu si | no ta me no yo san hyaku 5 zyū man \$ o | kei zyō | se ru mo no na ri | several Jap characters su.

The Special Session of the Legislative of Hawaii which opened from September 15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action "M-Day Bill", passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature to it on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial Governor in case of war, chief provisions of which are: the organization of special police and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the utilization of community installations and highways, the regulation of food supplies and commodity prices, the control of rumors, etc. In order to put the above measures into effect a budget of \$500,000 is being appropriated. Details by mail.

#262-LA

From: Kita.

2 Oct. 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Ryoji, San Francisco #044.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #183.

September 30th sa ra ni ta no 2 se ki mo | bō tō | ōden dō yō | ko re | o Hawaii
kan zu me | kaisya ni ba i hyaku si | sai ban syo no tetsuzuki o ryō se ri.

Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as explained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Co., court procedures being followed.

#256-LA

From: Kita

29 SEPT. 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Ryoji San Francisco #040
Gaimidaijin, Tokyo #177

Re my #156

Zyō ken | tu ki | sya ku hō | no mu ne | ke ru tei | o mi to ru 7 se ki no u ti 2
se ki wa 26th hyō ka ga ku ni | sō tō | su ru | ka haku | o motte ko re o | gyo
seu | to mi tu se tu ma ru | kan kei | a ru | bei zin | kei ei | no Hawaii | kan zu
me | kaisya ni | ba i kyaku | si sai ban syo | no tetsuzuki o ryō se ri.

Migi niyori gyo | sen kyū syo yū sya wa bō tō | ōden notōri | ba | kyaku | ka
kaku tyū yori hyō ka ga ku no 2 wa ri (1 se ki wa \$2,110 ta wa \$1,017) oyobi
sai ban hi yō (1 se ki wa (\$178.86) sen to. Ta wa 185\$80 sen to) o | sai ban syo |
ni | nō nyū | no ha zu.

Na o | ta no 5 se ki mo dai migi ni na ra u Ko to to na ru mi ko mi na ri.

Na o ma ta migi wa min zi zi ken tosite wa kai ke tu | o mi ta ru si dai ni te |
kei zi | mondai wa na o no ko sa re o ru mo ko no hō mo dai tai kandai ni | so
ti | seraru ru | mi ko mi.

released
appraised value
value, price

29 SEPT. 41.

Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations were sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the Hawaii Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats, and court proceedings were dispensed with.

In connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning, as in my telegram, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised value (\$2,110 for one boat and \$1,017 for the other) and also court costs (\$178.86 for one and \$185.80 for the other).

It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the other five boats.

However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected, but criminal procedure still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of with leniency.

15 SEPT. 41.

#232-LA

From: Kita

To: Ryoji, San Francisco.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.

Honpō kan ri | ha ya ka wa ki yo si | na ru mo no hon non April ki ti ni | nyū
kō | si ta ru omonuki na ru | to ko ro | hon nin imada ki ti | tai zai tyū | na ra ba |
gaikoku seifu kan ri | koku mu syō | tō ro ku | o na sa si te ra re ta si | sudeni | ki
ti | o ha na re ta ru | nioite (te) wa sono | syu tu kō | nen tuki hi | oyobi | sen mei | ki
sono ta san kō | to narube ki | zi kō | go kai den aritaski.

Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a gov't official of this country, intends to enter your port in April of this year. If he is still in your city, please register him with the State Department as a foreign gov't official. If he has already left your city please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and day of departure and as many other details as possible.

#229-LA

2 SEPT. 41.

From: Kita

To: Koshi, Washington #050
Gaimudaijin Tokyo #159

2nd ei zi si wa 1st tō yō mu ke tō ti ki kō no gaikoku sen (sa ki ni doku ki ni | syū ge ki | serareta ru Egypt sen [za mu za mu] gō no si ma | i sen to syō si koku se ki oyobi sen mei o ha tu pi yō se zu) ni yaku 5 zyu mei no bei zin hi kō ki sō zyū sya oyobi gi si bin zyō si o ru to ko ro | kō wa sono yu ki | sa ki | o hi si o ru mo seno sen pa tu tai wa sudeni [bi ru ma] koku kyō oyobi [bi ru ma . rō do] no kei kai hi kō ni a ta ri o ri ma ta migi | kō wa kyō | ka o e te gun syo ku o si ri zo ki ta ru mo no na ru mu ne hō dō si o re ri

2 SEPT. 41.

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzan which was recently attacked by German planes, but this name and nationality was not announced) entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although this group declined to reveal their destination, they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

#226-LA

28 Aug. 41.

From: Kita.

To: Koshi Washington #027
Ryoji San Francisco
Gainudojin, Tokyo #156

Sono go sa ra ni | se ki nitaishi R1 bo tu syū | han ke tu 1st R (kei 9 se ki) ta no 1 se ki nitaishi sya ku hō | no | han ke tu | arita ru to ko ro bō tō ōden | ken ti ji tō | no | un dō sō kō se ru mo no no | ko ko hu | 26th Washington ha tu | fū sin niyoreba | si hō hō syō | nioite wa migi 1st R arita ru | mo no | ro | u ti 7 se hi nitaishi na ra ta me te | dō syō | no mau zo ku | subiki United States si min rai | ba i kyaku su ru | ko to o | zyō keu ni | i zu re mo | hyō ka ga ku | no 2 wa ri oyobi sai ban hi yō narabini sin pa ku | zi tai | no | fu sai ga ku | o motten ko re o | kyū | syo yū sya | ni hon kyaku | su ru | mu ne | ke tu tei | o mi ta ru omomuki na ri.

28 Aug. 41.

Subsequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegram, and after the effective intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information from Washington on the 26th, the Justice Department has decided that seven of the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipulations of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20% of the appraised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats themselves.

2 Aug. 41.

#199 LA

From: Kita.

To: Riyozī, San Francisco #020.
fm Tokio #065.

Ta tu ta | ma ru | Honolulu | ki kō | ka ta | August 1st yū sen | yori | si rei zu mi.

The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to instructions from the NYK.

31 JULY 41.

#195-LA

From: Kita.

To: Koshi, Washington. #019
Riyozī, San Francisco. #018
Gaimudaizui, Tokyo.

Ta tu ta ma ru wa San Francisco yori Japan mu ke | Tyo ku kō | subeki omomuki na ru tokaro, hon 31st nyū kō no | a sa ma | ma ru wa nyū syu tu kō to mo | hei zyō to | ko to na ru to ko ro ni | ki sen rei mo a ri ka tu | ta tu

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ta ma ru no tō ti ki kō ni wa tu mi mondai na ku kitagata Japan mu ki zyo kyaku | 2 hyiku sū zū mei tai ki si o ri ha ta ma ta tō ti ze i kan moite wa dō sen no syu tu nyū kō ni wa nan ra si syō nakarube ki mu ne gen mei si o ru | moite wa dō sen no tō ti ki kō ka ta ko | ha i i | aritasi.

Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the arrival and departure of the Asama Maru entering this 31st will be different from usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be no loading problem. Two hundred and some persons will board, and it has been announced, that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and departure of the ship.

#194-LA

From: Kita

30 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington #044

Gaimudajin, Tokyo #141

30th ei zi si | ha tu pi yō niyoreba tō ti China sōryōzi wa tyū bei taisi yori China gaikō kau oyobi ryōzi kan wa | tō ke tu rei | no ti ki yō o men zyo | sa re ta no | kau ri | nituki te wa kō ryo tyū | na ru mu ne no denpo ni se tu si | o ru omomuki na ri.

According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram has been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American Ambassador to the effect that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplomatic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.

#912-LA

From: Kita.

30 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington, #143.

Gaimudayni Tokyo #139.

Zai bei honpō si kin tō ke tu rei no zi tu si wa hi sa si ki i zen youmoyo ki serare i ta tu to ko ro ni te tō kan oyobi hō zi simibun nioite sono zi to si no baai | pam Ki zai ryū min 1st R ni a tō bi si ei kyō wa kei bi ni te yū ryo no vō na si mu ne si dō s ki ta ri sa ru ta me 26th Ri hon rei no zi, tu si o 2d R mi ru ni oyobi mo 1st R wa sa si ta ru dō ta ru dō yō o mi se zu tu i de | hon rei no te si yō bu ri | ha tu pi yō | saki 1st R no ei gyō Japan, mu ki sō kin Japan hin yu niyū nitaisi te mo | zi tu sai te ki | sei gen kiwamste kan dai na ru o mi to zen zen hoi sei mi ta ti ka e re ri.

Na o 2nd R yo ki se ry Japan mu ke sō kin oyobi bei ka hō sai no sō fu wa sō tō ga ku ni no bo ri o re ri.

Na o ma ta tō ti United States ga wa wa hi bei sai a ku no zi tai ni ta ti, itari ru mo 1st R ga United States hō o | zyu N syu su ru kagin nan ra yū ryo no yō na ki mu ne kyō tyō si o re ri.

#192-LA

Since the enforcement of the law freezing Japanese credits in America has been anticipated for a long time, at this office and through the Japanese language newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it was put into force, and even with the enforcement of the law on the 26th, the residents did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application of the law were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents' businesses, remittances to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were considered quite lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan in anticipation of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has amounted to a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities here have emphasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti American circumstances the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.

#187-LA

From: Kita.

26 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington, #042.

Gaimudajin, Tokyo, #134.

[Fu o re su ta ru] Kaigun zi kan wa kō kū kyo ku tyō [Ta wā zu] syō syō oyobi fu ku kan tai dō. Bei kan tai oyobi kaigun gun zi si se tu si sa tu no ta me 26th [a ra me dō] yori kaigun ki nivorisin zyu wa N to tya ku no ha zu, na o dō, ki ni ti tō ti nioite ki ru hompō oyobi China no | si san | tō ke tu | zi mu syo ri | no ta me | ōkura syō ka ka ri kan 6 mei rai tyaku no ha zu na ri pi Assistant Sec'y of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda in a navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and

military installations. In the same plane 6 officials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.

#174-LA

From: Kita.

15 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington.

Riyoji, San Francisco, #014.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #125.

14th yo | tō ti | hō sō | kyo ku | wa | mo tu ka [So] ren ki sen | 2 zyū sū | se ki sei gan | ni syū tyū | si kanete [So] ren mu ke | yu syu tu | kyo ka arita ru ki kai ru i. Bu bun hin. Ku tu. Kō kyū [ga so rin] tō Vladivostok mu ke | tu mi | da si | no ha zu na ru mu ne hō sō | se ri.

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West Coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline, etc. which had previously been released for export to Russia.

#173-LA

From: Kita.

15 JULY 41.

To: Koshi, Washington #037.

Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #124.

Italy ryojidairikau wa 10th ko re o hei sa se ri | na o dō ryōzi wa honkan nitaisi dō kan kō kin no | bu oyobi kan in si yū kin zen bu wa sai kin ni itari yō yaku hi ki da si kyo ka o e ta ru mu ne oyobi dō ryōzi oyobi shokikansei | mei wa to mo ni zai bunkan zai kin o mei zei ra re dō ryōzi wa New York zai zyū no ha ha hō mon noue 31st San Francisco ha tu Tatsutu Maru (shokikansei wa 18th tō ti ha tu ya wa ta ma ru) ni te fu nin no ha zu na ru mu ne ka ta ri kō bun syo | sono ta | tō kan i ta ku no mōsu i de na si.

The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th. The Consul has at last obtained permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private funds of its staff members. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the resident civil official to take over the post and after the Consul has visited his mother who resides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta Maru sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the Yawata Maru sailing here the 18th).

No agreement was made to entrust official or other documents to that office.

#117

#033

8 JULY 41.

A report regarding the Washington report of the later part of May that American pilots are joining the China Air Force. The local China Consul General on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). Newspaper reports indicate that the China military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?). Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers of the 5th 200 men have already (Toppa sever) gone (?). The Chinese Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.

8 JULY 1941.

#163-"LA"

From: Kita #117 of Sth Re your Msg 539

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—Minister Washington #033

May ma tsu Washington ha tsu tsu wa Bu ku ← gun hi kō shi no China ku ← gun san ka nikau(shi) hō dō se ru to ko ro June 10th tō chi China sōryōji wa migi san ka ka ta dō sōryōjikan nō shu tsu gan se ru mo no hyaku mei in ta tsu shi (dai bu bun tō chi hi kō tai zu ki) Washington China rikugun bu kan ni migi mitai (shi) su ru so chi ka ta shi ji o mo to te tsu tsu a ru mu ne shinbun shi ni ha tsu pi yō se ru ga sa ra ni 5th no ei ji shi niyoreba migi wa sudeni 2 hyaku mei o to tsu pa se ru mo ō naru to koro china sōryōzi wa meirei ni yo(ri) ru omomuici o motte migi nikan(si) su ru genmei o sake taru omomuki nari-

3 JULY 41.

Con't. It has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total 8 ships). [no korizyū 1 seki no uti?] 3 vessels have been released under bond and 2 have already gone fishing.

This matter of seizing fishing vessels is of a difficult nature: it is fishing season (?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities concerned are observing it. (?) [Part not clear—seems to be something about outrage against Japanese.] There is a movement to buy the confiscated ships (by U. S. Gov't?) and to release them under bond. At the same time Delegate King is making endeavors and those in Washington should make representations.

3 JULY 41

#159-LA

From: Kita

Gaimudaijin—Tokyo #114

Koshi—Washington #031

114 (1) 3rd Re My May 084 [Regn Mog (?) 529 (5)]

Sono go sara ni 7 seki ni taishi botusyū no hanketu ari (kei 8 seki) no korizyū ? 1 seki no uti 3 seki wa RI [Bondo] syakuhō RI o yuru sareuti 2 seki wa sude ni syutu gyo seri.

Nao Honken RI Gyosen R2 yoku ryū wa yō ya ku sei gyo kini iri no ku ka mondai ni serare oru tōti syoku ryō mondai ni zyū dai eikyō ari to site kankei tō kyo ku no tyū mo ku su ru tokoro to nari honpōzin kankei sya ga wa kyō bō tō ō den. . . . No botu syū han ketu aritaru R2 Gyosen no harai sage oyobi yoku ryū R2 Gyosen no RI [Bondo] skahuhō kata undō tyū naru to tomo ni [kingu] daigisi ni oi y (te) honken do ryoka tyū naru hoka tōkentizimoti kaku Washington ni oi (te) toku ni setu syō no hazu nari.

28 JUNE 41

152-LA

From: kita

To: Ryoji Hongkong # (?)

Gaimudaijin—Tokyo # 110

110 (1) 8th Re. yr. msg 459 (Zyōkō)

United States tō bu ni oite yūryoku naru [toratuku] kōtūzigyō o keiei saru, yosi naru Daniel—Arnstein, Harold—Davis, Marco—Hellman no, 3 me i wa 28th [kuritupa—] nite Hongkong ni mukai taru ga dō nin ra wa mazu koumei ni itaritaisi enzyo butu si yu sō so ku sin no kenti yori [biruma ⊙ ro—do] kōtū zyō tai tyō sano hazu naru omomuki nari—

Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis & Maco Hellman, transportation managers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via clipper for Hongkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of speeding help (to China)

#114-LA

17 JUNE 41

From: Kita

To: action Min. Wash. D. C. #025

Info: Foreign Min. Tokio #103

Mei dai ya kyū bu 1 kō 2 jū mei wa Hawaii ya kyū reu mei | no shō hei ni ō ji ya kyū si ai no ta me 21st Yokohama ha tsu | ya wa ta ma ru ni te | tō chi rai kō no yo tei na ri shi to ko ro United States ga wa wa 1 kō no sa shō o kyo ze tsa shi ta ru omomuki ni te | tū chi shō shu sha ga wa yori how kew wa hotondo ma i new honpō oyobi Hawaii sō go ni o ko na wa re o ri sudei jer n. bi o to to no e o ru shi dai ni te mo a ki ka tsu kai neu July kei ō ya kyū bu rai kō no sai mo sa shū 1 ō kyo ze tsu serareta ru nital (shi) tō gi shō hei sha to ri shi hi pu ji ji yori cho ku se tsu zen taishi no a tsu sew o e ta ki mu ne ne gai i de arita . . . nitsuki migi sa shō ka ta nikaw (shi) koku mu shō ni mōsu i re ka ta shikaru be ku go ha i ryo aritashi (i rai hō)

Group is Visas were refused for a Me— U. baseball team. Kita is requesting that Jap. Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.

16 JUNE 41.

#143-LA

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #102

Info: Minister—Wash. D. C. #024

Zai dai Germany ryōji Dairikan sei sa mikan (shi) (para) 16th tō chi Germany mei yo ryōzi [ran ge] (Germany kei United States shi min nishite bo e ki shō) ni tashikame tā ru to ko ro hon ken wa Washington German taishikan yori tsū chi ni se tsu shi ta ru to ko kon go no so chi nikan (shi) te wa 1 ni dō taishikan no shi ji ni ma tsu omomuki na ri

Because of return of honorary German consul have been requested by German Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.

#140—"LA"

13 JUNE 41

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #49

(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco & Manila.)

San Francisco ha tsu ki daiziu a te denpō dai 92 gō ohū dan nikan (shi) (Para) [Pu re shi den to pun pi a su] gō wa hi tō mu ke ri ku hei yaku 9 hyaku mei (kō ku ← in oyobi shu hyū shi kan sa ← hyaku mei o fukumi mu) o tō sai shi 11th tō chi chaku 12th hi chi mu ke shu tsu pan se ri—

Ref. San Francisco msg #92.

S S Pres. Pierce with about 900 army men embarked (including some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.

7 JUNE 41

#134—"LA"

From: Kita

To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio. #074

Info: Ambassador Wash. D. C. # 201

(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle).

1. 4th Washington ha tsu tsū shiu wa [Rpt End] Kimmel [kiu me ru] tai shō Kimmel wa dō hi Washington nioi (te) Kaigun chō kaw to no kai daw o kai shi shi ta ru mu ne oyoai dō tai shō no Washington hū mow wa tei rei te ki no mo no na ru mu ne hō dō se ri (Para.)

2. 6th tō chi Kaigun tō kyo ku ha tsu pi yō niyoroba Kimmel no kei kaku nimo tozu (ki) to chi hō meu ni a ru kaw tai wa ko re o su—ku mi ni wa ka chi ko ri ku mi in kyū yō no ta me chi ku ji tai ri ku mi 1 ji kai kō seshimu ru ko to to na ri ta ru to ko ro sono shū tsu pa tsu ki oyobi kaw mei wa ha tsu pi yō shi e za ru omomuki na ri

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Dept. officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

#133 "LA"

6 JUNE 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Min. Tokio #093

10th tō chi ha tsu ta tsu ta ma ru mi te nai sen jin. kei 8 mei (mi tsu kō sha 2 mei. ho go sō kau sha 6 mei) tō chi i min kyo ku no te niyo (ri) Yokohama oyobi Kobe mu ke (Yokohama nai chi jin 3 mei. Kobe jū che jin 3 mei chō sen jin 2 mei) sō kan seraru ru ha ju na ri (spectable) *wei hai wei*

8. Jap nationals sailed the 10th on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees) having been deported by the immigration authorities bound for Kobe and Yokohama.

Yokohama, 3 Japs.

Kobe, 3 Japs; 2 Koreans.

129 "LA"

3 JUNE 41.

From: Kita

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—#090

Punghou school

Tō chi [pu na ho . su ku — ru] yori tai wa n sei tō kaisha jū yaku to ke chi ta da mi chi nital (shi) 22nd yori kyo kō seraru ru dō kō hyaku new sai ni shu tsu se ki ka ta shō tai jō o ha tsu shi ta ru omomuki na ru to ko ro dō nin no shu tsu se ki ni wa tō kan toshite wa nan ra i zon na ki nitsu ki ryo ken ha tsu kyū ne gai i de ta ru sai war shikaru be ku aritashi—

100th celebration of anniversary of Punahou

The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi, director of the Taiwan Pottery Co. to attend the 100 year birthday celebration. I have no objection to his attending and request you issue necessary passport.

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#126 "LA"

29 MAY 41.

From: Kita —

To: Foreign Min. Tokio—#089.

Info: Hongkong—#001.

[ku re fu en su] gai shō no 1 kō wa ran in gō shū oyobi (spec. table) New Zealand [QU] hō mon o o e Washington yu ki no to 26th [ku ri tsu pa ←] ni te tō Chi ni ki kō se ri—

Cravens of the Foreign Office after visiting N. E. I., Australia, and New Zealand put in here on the clipper en route to Washington, D. C.

#123 "LA"

27 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#087) 7th

To: Foreign Min. Tokio.

(Regarding your msg. to Wash. D. C. #186 of 8th).

(Have forwarded by mail in code to Wash., D. C.).

Reg. Eng. Sp. T RA DE — WI N D [QU] 26th shu tsu kō se ri June ma tsu Yokohama chaku no yo tei—

The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end of June.

#121-LA

24 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#014)

To: Min. San Francisco.

ta ki (ka ju o) den sho sbi ta tsu ta ma ru ni te kichi ni nu ka e ri en sho shi toshite no kaw i tsū kaw ka ta go ha i i o ki kō—

Code clerk TAKI is heading for your office via the TATWTA MARU. Your good offices are requested in helping him through customs.

#120 "LA"

23 MAY 1941.

From: Kita (#085) 3rd

To: Foreign Min. Tokio (Re. your msg. #281)

Info: Wash., D. C.

(Spec. table) New Zealand End. sp. table Sp. Eng. mi ni ster—of—la nd s, f ra n k—la n g stone End Eng oyohi zen shu shō Sp. Eng. J. go r do n—coat es End Eng tō 8 mei wa 21st Washington yu ni no to ji [ku ri tsu pa ←] ni te tō chi ni ki kō se ru to ko ro 1 kō wa Washington nioi (te) England kai gai ryō do oyobi United States kaku dai hyō to kai gō. bu ki tai yo hō nimotozu (ki) ku kai gai ryō do en jo mondai kyō gi no ha zu na ru omonuki na ri—

The New Zealand's Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former premier G. Gordon Coates and party of 8 put in here on the 21st by clipper enroute to Washington. They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British and U. S. territory.

115-LA

14 MAY 41.

January 8th Futū 10 Ōshin Nikanshi

Tō ti ku gun zō kyō no tame B17 gata bakugeki ki 2 zū 1 dai wa [e mon su] tyū zyō si ki no moto ni 13th go go 3 zi 5 zū 9 fun San Francisco hatu hentai hi kō o motte 14th gozen 5 zi zū 8 fun tō ti [hitu kamu] hikō zyō nitōtyaku seri sei migi— si

From: kita

To: Gaimudianjin—Tokyo

With respect to message #10 of January 8th. For the purpose of reenforcing of the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General (Emmons)

(Emmonds), departed San Francisco at 1559 the thirteen flying in formation and arrived Hickham field at 0558 the 14th.

#114-A

14 MAY 41.

079 (1) 0400

From: kita

To: Gaimudaijin—Toklo

When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin missionary bishop (?) of the *Hikashi Honganji* (a temple) (home address: Niigata, go?

Nishibori Dōri 7 Banti, 7 Banko), if there is no objection from the investigation of his record, please forward passport at once. He has applied (Tofu Suru?) as a successor to Okiji (奥吉) who returned home every November. (Request message)

14 MAY 41.

Ø79(1) Ø4ØØ

From: Kita

To: Gaimudaijū Tokyo—

Higa si hon gan zi ha kan to ku *fu kyō si* ku su da kaku sin (hon se ki ni—ga ta si ni si bo ri dō ri 2 ban ti 7 ban ko) yori Hawaii kuki ryo ken ka fu ka ta ne gai ide aritaru baai hon nin no mimoto otorishirabe no ue sasitukai naki ni oite wa dō ryo ken hatu kyū ka ta sikyū Tonhakanai ainamtashi—{ex'xaby'qu} dō nin wa kaku nen November kikoku se ru oki zi (fu ku kō no kō ☉ toti noti) fukyō so no *ketu in hozyū* to site to *fu* su ru mo no na ri (i rai hō).

Ø74 (1) Ø1ØØ

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister Tokyo #074.

1 MAY 1941.

(ga u su) shin niu beikoku Chū shi taishi wa fu nin no to 30th (pu re shi den to ga—fu i—ru do) gō ni te. dō chi ni ki kō se ru ga dō taishi wa cho ku se tsu Chungking ni O mo mu ku yo kei na ru omomuki na ri.

Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to China, en route to his new duty put in here on the 30th on the President Garfield. He plans going direct to Chungking.

Ø721 ØØØØ

From: Kita

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #072

Infor: Minila #004

30 APRIL 41.

Za tsu shi (tai mu) (rai fu) (fu ō chū n) shu hi tsu narabini ha tsu kō nin (hen ri — . ru — su) wa dō nin tsu ma (ku re a . bu — su) [(pen . ne — mu)] dō han 30th (ku ri tsu pa —) ni te Manila ni mu kai ta ru ga dō nin tō wa Hongkong kei yu Chungking ni itari — Yaku 2 ka getsu kan tō yō ryo kō no we ki bei kaku chi kō en ryo kō O O ko nō ha zu na ru omomuki Shinbuu ni hō ze ra ru

Mr. Henry Buse (Luce) Managing editor and publisher of Time, Fortune and Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila on the 30th. They plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong. After a trip of about two months they plan, upon returning to the states, to conduct a series of lectures at various places. This information from the news papers.

#104-LH

Ø71(1)2100

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaijin—Tokyo.

29 APRIL 41.

The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th—

It is believed that this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

#Ø71

From: kita.

To: Gai—

29 APRIL 41.

Bei rikugun yūsōsen [Washington] gō wa riku hei z ☉ 5ØØ gunyō kamotu 24, 3ØØ ton otōsai 11th New York Hatu Panama San Francisco kei yu 26th sōtyō tōti tyaku rikuhai 2,ØØØ kōkū gaku sei 12 mei oyori gunyō kamotu oriku age sita runoti no korino hi tōyu kiriku hei 5ØØ o no se 27th syutu patu seri.

Nao dōsen wa kowro taiseiyō hōmen ni syū kō siguntai narabini zaitō yōhikiage beizin noyu sō ni zyū fi su ru omomuki nami (kyū).

26 APRIL 41.

#101-LA

From: Kita.

To: #011 Consul General, San Francisco.

#004 Infor. Consul, Los Angeles.

Shi mi zu narahini ya ma ji ryō tai gi shi 25th (ra — rin) gō ni ti Los Angeles mu ki shu tsu pa tsu se ri Los Angeles yori ki chi ni o mo nui ku ha zu go san kō ma di

For your information Shimiju and Yarnaji, members of the diet, departed here the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles. From Los Angeles they plan to proceed to your city.

#96-6A

Ø67(1)Ø1ØØ

From: Kita.

To: Gaimudaisin—Tokyo.

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt, together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st. The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington. Perhaps it is Chungking—

21 APRIL 41.

21 APRIL 41.

[Ro Daitōyō tyōnan [marin] tai [zieimusu rōzuberuto] wa [tōmasu[syō syo totomoni 20th [kuritupa—] nite tōti tyaku 21st Manila muke syutupatu sitaruga tōti sinbun wa sono yuki saki simei nitsuki ryōnin tomo genmei o sake o riotu te Washington yori hatu piyō aru hazu naru motabun Chungking Naru mune hōzl o re ri sei mi gi de sl

#94-LA

Ø1Ø

From: Kita.

To: Consul, San Francisco.

fu kn da *deu sho shi*, 18th tō chi ha tsu ya wa ta ma ru ni te ki chi ni mu ka e ri *deu sho shi*, toshite no kau i tsū kau ka ta go ha i ryo kō

Radio *Industry employee* (?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city. Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through Customs.

19 APRIL 41.

From: Kita #84.

To: Foreign Minister.

Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other 18 of the 19 ships mentioned in my previous dispatch. After considerable deliberation a court judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was confiscated by the U. S. Government. Even tho it was to be put up at auction, judging from examples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by sale at auction the owner gets nothing.

Furthermore the parties concerned get quite a blow from the customs as a result of this seizure. Already steps are being take to claim loss of a standpoint of damage to the boats, and in one case authoritz has been gained for a release from bond. Later on such steps will be taken in all cases.

Ø841 (1400) Re My MSG Ø62X

From: Kita #84.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Sono go jū 9 se ki chū no jū 8 se ki nitaishi te mo bō tō ōden dō yō no bo tsu shū (so) shō tei ki sa re ta ru to ko ro taishi ta no kō ran nioite sai sho no 1 se ki nitaishi dō sen wo ga tsu shū koku seifu ni bo tsu shū no me ne han ke tsu arita ri

ha
dō sen wa tsu i de kyō ba i ni fu seraru be ki wa zu na ru mo dai tai tai ri ku nioite ke ru sen rei dō ri kau kei sha no shin sei niyori sono tsū sen ka ga ku kei gen noue sho yū sha ni wa rai sa ge ra ru ru ko to to na ru mi ko mi na ri.

No o ze i kau no gyo sen yo ku ryū niyori kau kei sha wa ei gyō jō ta tai no da ge ki o u ke gyo seu ni mo son shō o shō zu ru to ko ro yori kanete shin sei chū no to ko ro sono u chi 1 se ki nitaishi (bond do) sha ku hō kyo ka sa re ta ru ga o tsu te ta sen mo dō yō kyo ka sa ru ru mi ko mi

[Have forwarded by mail by code to: Ambass. in U. S.; S. F.; L. A.; Seattle;]

#82-"LA"

From: Kita (re yr 019).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

5 APRIL 41.

Sono go hi Kuku tyū 2 zyu 6 mei wa repeat indicator kyō Cō zai tosite no koku ha tu 1st repeater nitai (si) yū zai o syō fu ku si . ta wa kō ben mosikuwa mu zai o mōsu ta te ta ru to ko ro ga tu syū koku hō tei ken zi wa kō sya nitai (si) sa ki no Kyō Cō zai tosite no koku ha tu tu o korike (si) (rpt ind koku ha tu 2nd rpt ri yu ni fu bi no ten a ri si ta me) a ra ta me te gi syō zai oyobi kyō Cō zai tosite koku ha tu i zu re mo mo tu ka sin ri tyū na ri hon ken sai ban no ke tu ka wa ma tu ta ku yo sō o yu ru sa za ru mo (koto ni ba i sin in no dai ta su ← wa bei zin ni te sō tō fu ri o ma nu ka re zu) koku, ha tu sono mo no wa ko re ma de no kei ka ni tyō si kanarazu si mo honpō zin gyo gyō o ku ti ku sen to su ru sei zi te ki ha i kei nimo tozu (ki) ku mo no to wa mitō (me) ra re zu

Na o i sai wa March 4th zu ke futū (#-----) kō 68. dō hi zu ke Kimitu (#-----) kō 75 oyobi April 2nd zu ke futu (#-----) kō 103 nituki go syō to ai na ri ta ku kon go no sin ten bu ri zu i zi denpo su.

Re charges against the owners of the confiscated fishing boats.

#81-LA

059 (1) 1500

From: Kitu.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Consulate—Manila.

3 APRIL 41.

Holand's Foreign Minister, his wife, and the Colonial Minister (Tokumu Gaimuken daijin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via clipper and departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd. Local newspapers stated that this inspection of the Netherlands Indies at this time is noteworthy.

#059.

3 APRIL 41.

Holland foreign minister [fu on. Kure fuensu] wa fuzin oyobi takumu Gaimuken *ex puevou* [Tya-rusu. Ueruta—] dō han 2nd.

San Francisco yori raityaku 3rd [Kuritupa—] nite Manila keiyu Batavia ni mukai taru ga tōti sinbun wa sono ranin sisatu wa zisetu ga ratyū moku o yō su ru mune hōdō sioreri migi desu.

#78-LA

1 APRIL 41.

March 7th Zuke bei 1 Futū 29 kisin nikansi.

Irainin yori ne gai ide aritaru nituki *ki sōri no ki gō* wa go murito wa zon zu ru mo April 10th Yokohama Syutupan Yawata Maru bin nite gosō fuai nari uru yō kaku betu no go hairyoiōgitasi (Iraihō).

#78

058 (1) 1st.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ref: #29 of March 7.

With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the ya Wata Maru which departs from Yokohama on the 10th of April. I appreciate your special efforts.

#77-"LA".

29 MARCH 41.

From: Kita.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Tō ti ki kō no honpo sen no ri ku mi in tyū kaku Nen October 26th zu ke tū 2 futū (#. . . .) 144 ki sin go tū da tu niyo (ri) ru si mon syō mei o honpo syū | tu pa tu kō nioi (te) u ke zu si te rai kō migi syō mei ka ta ne gai i zu ru mo no a ri migi nitai (si) (tō kan nioi) (te) wa kaku nen ki daizin ha tu San Francisco a te denpo dai 99 gō go kun da tu niyo (ri) syō mei ryō tositate bei ka kin 1 \$ o tyō syū si ki ta ri ta ru to ko ro fu ne ga wa no se tu mei niyoreba honpo kan kai kan tyō nioi (te) wa hon ken syō mei o mu ryō ni te a tu kai o ru omomuki na ru ga | dō syō mei ryō wa bō tō ki sin no syu si ni mi ru mo kan kai kan tyō zi mu tositate o toriatukan u be ki mo no na ru ya ni kai serare katagata zen ki 1 \$ no syō mei ryō wa hon ken toriatukau bu ri kaku tei zen no go ke tu tei na ru ten ni mo ka e ri ni hon syō mei ryō wa honpo dō yō mu ryō to su ru ko to da tō na ru ya ni si ryō seraru ru nituki te wa hon ken i ma 1 o go sen gi none migi ni toriatukau sikaru . . . be ki ya.

Answer requested by the return despatch.
re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the Port of Honolulu and other U. S. Ports.

#72-"LA" 27 MARCH 41.
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

mo ri mu ra siyokika—sei 27th tyaku nin se ri
Moumura reported for duty on the 27th.

#66-LA 21 MARCH 41.
From: Kita (forwarded by mailing code to Washington).
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

According to dispatches from Auckland and Sydney. The light cruisers *Brooklyn* and *Savannah*, the destroyers *Case*, *Shaw*, *Cummings*, *Tucker* arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers *Chicago* and *Portland*, the destroyers *Clark*, *Cassin*, *Cunningham*, *Downs*, *Reid* arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed from there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" (gaibu) until they arrived. The maintainance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

#66-"LA" 21 MARCH 41.
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

(have forwarded by mail in code to Washington)

[ō ku ran do] oyobi Sydney ha tu tū sin niyoreba kei zyu n [bu ru tsu ku rin] oyobi [sa ba na] ku ti ku kan [kei su] [syō] [ka min gu su] [ta tsu Ka←] wa 17th [ō ku ran do] ni. Ma ta zyu kyu n Chicago oyobi Portland ku to ku kan [ku ra←ku] [ka sin] [ka ni gu ha mu] [da un zu] [rei do] wa 20th Sydney ni i zu re mo sin zen hō mon no ta me nyū kō. Zen sya wa 20th [ō ku ran do] ha to ta bun sin zyn wa n mu ke' ki kan no to ni tu ki kō sya wa sa ra ni [bu ri su ben] ni mu kō be ki mu ne hō zi o ru to ko ro tō ti sinbun wa migi kan tai wa syū tu kō no sai fu←syo i ri no mei rei o a ta e ra re ta ru ga to hyū March 9th [pa go ←pa go] tyaku 11th yo ru syu tu kō se ru mo mo ku te ki' ti tō tyaku ma de zen zen gai bu ni si ra re zu yo ku sono kō dō no hi mi tu o ho go si e ta ru wa dai sei kō na ri to hō zi o re ri

#64-LA 18 MAR. 41.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

When the two Honganji missionaries: *Azakawato Mitanigiin* (?) home address: Shimane kin, jti gun, kamata muna and okamoto taiyū, home address: Tokyo, Suginami ku, kamiogi ku bo (?) #730 request passports from there to Hawaii (from Washington (?)), if there is no objection after an examination of their records, please expedite the forwarding of the passports. Both men are coming to fill vacancies.

From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Hon gan zi ha fu kyō si gen se ki shimane ken ō ti gun ka wa to mu ra a za ka wa to. mi ta ni gi in oyolei gen se ki Tokyo si su gi na mi ku ka mi o gi ku bo 730 o ka mo to tai yū no ryō migi yori Hawaii yu ki ryo ken ka fu ne gai i de arita . . . ru baai so re zo re mi mo to o torisirabi none sasi tukae na ki niō (te) wa dō ryo ken ha tu kyū ka ta ontorihakarai aritashi migi ryō mei to mo ke tu in ho zyū no ta me to rai su ru mo no na ri (i rai hō).

15 MAR. 41.

Tomii taisi yori sono tōri.

Honsi oyobi Ikegawa Siyokika. Sei December Tatu ta Maru nite ki to tō tyaku no hazu. Dōhi gogo 11 ji kiti hatu [san taufue←] sen [nanba←] 24

oyobi [spell eng.] *chief* ni Chicago made [konda—to mento] mata wa [Daburu. Betudo. Ru←mu] 1 oyobi [Rōwa←Ba←su] 1 ryū ho aritashi.

Nao 23rd (hiyō) Chicago hatu liberty kankaku ltd ni Washington made dōyō no [atukomode—syon] go ryū ho kōse |

The following from Ambassador Tomii:

I and Ikegawa, 1st secretary to embassy, expect to arrive your place (San Francisco) on the December Tatura Maru. Will depart [San Francisco] the same day at 2300—by Santa Fe Chief #24 request that you reserve 1 double bed room compartment and 1 lower berth.

Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty Limited departing Chicago on the 23rd for Washington.

From: Kita #062.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ga tsu shū koku hō rai ken ji wa 4th ze i kan no kan ri ni u tsu sa re a ru kan kei gyo sen jū 9 se ki chū no 1 si ki nitaishi 1 sei to 2 sei to ji sha kan ni o ko na wa re ta ru u ri ra ta shi wa dō sen nitaishi su ru kau sa tsu o shu to ku sen ga tame fu sei shu dan o motte ra o ko na. Wa re ta ri to no ri jū so shō o rai ki se ri. O tsu te ta no jū 8 se ki mo dō yō tetsuzuki to ra ru ru mo no to su i so ku sa ru.

Suit has been instituted to confiscate. One of the 19 fishing boats taken into custody. Other suits in the 18 other boats will probably follow.

Gaimudaijin Tokyo.

Koshi Washington 90072.

Riyoji San Francisco 60072.

Daiate #58—"LA".

Kiden (dai goo) 124 nikansi paragraph. Ryo hi tyuu fu na tin wa too ti ni te si ba rai no baai wa too kan ta tu ta ma ru tai yoo ma ru tokubetu kan zyoo ni ku ri i re kekkyoku wa too ke tu seraru (ru) koto to a i na ru nitui (tewa) Migi ryo hi mi soo fu na ra ba kiden (dai go) goo dai 2437 goo matudan no syu si ni zyun zi fu na tin wo nai ti ba rai to si migi wo koo zyo se ru gai san gaku no mi go soo kin arita (si) paragraph. Zai taisi bei San Francisco ni ten den se ri. (Wo wo)

Steamer Pares eyedred.

6 DEC. 41.

From: Shokun.

In the Takakuwa case it seems difficult to force payment of the fee, the business being conducted with American capital. The American Trust is secretly conducting an investigation. It appears that the same person through a partner paid several thousand dollars addressed to Oimatsu, drawing on an "at sight bill." Is there no evidence of misappropriation of the funds held at that (your?) bank?

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Ambassador Kurusu delayed two days by clipper engine trouble left Midway and arrived here safety 1700/12.

KITA.

#320

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 57B

MESSAGES ENCODED AND RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941

"PA"

27 JAN. 42

From: Chengoai Thia #010

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

OB

Ho ku hei koku kyō [WH an fu an] hon shun no tai gun wa ka shu hei ka wo tokoro Nishite tai keisateu tai zoo a in se ya ku 1 man sū FIUM 1 bu wa 21st St [pi ru ma] ga wa e shiu shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki VV a hi koku kyō sen ni hi ki ka he

shi tai ji tsū. Ma ta *sei bu koku kyō* [mei sa ta ya] do i pi 8 wa 22nd te ki no
 IK AU MI JE NI YO RJ.
 kū ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kei gi.

HARADA

(in bad shape)

KIERU

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 100. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. --- At ME - SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.

"LA"

15 JAN 1942

From: Foreign Minister #001

To: Ryōji Hanoi

Kaku new ki shi shu 1475 nikan (shi) (new Para) Kin 3 sen 3 hyaku jū en- / na ri / kan pi / wa ta shi / ki ri / hi / yori zō ga ku den sō su—

Togo.

Note

(No copy of coded msg. on hand—obtained from Army).

?

Re your (claim) of last year 1475

I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310 yen gov't expenses from private fund.
 Togo

"PA" (Army) #012

From: Harada

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Thailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanese, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

28 JAN. 1942

"PA" (Army)

From: Harada # 012 (Re your Msg. # 431).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio—

1. kon kai | ken kyo | no | ka kyū | wa | en shō | ha | no | kyo tō | ni | shite | sa
 ku | kow | shikirini | ryū gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | kō i | no |
 kō | na ru | kakawara (zu) | tai ga wa wa | hō nin | shi zen | ta ru | mono | na
 ri | (new para)

2. fu ryō | ka kyō | no ni jū | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |
 ni
 nyō | te ki | kō i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen | torishima (ri) | wo |
 tsu

yō su | i wan ya | kō nichi ka ni mi VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi
 ho wo

FULW | (mi tsu pi shi) shutsu | chō in | son po n) | No | goto (ki) | wo | ko ma ma
 ni suru wa | a ku | rei | wo | no ko su | mono | ma ru | | miyori shu kai | ei tai ko
 (sei ma i gyō mi A — | mi | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri) no | rei | ba |
 byo

| ku | wo | ou tsu te | tsu i kyū | suru | yo tei | na ri | on riu pyo tei i —

HARADA

28 JAN. '42

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061)

To: Minister Saigon

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including
 --- to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19
 January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal
 entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau)

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime ministers' broadcast #43) tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto & Buddhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music. (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo

"LA" (Army)

28 JAN. 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokio. 038.0 (Re yr msg. 061) (Re My Circular 590 (f)).
To: Koshi Saigon—

January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi(te)
ke shu sen shō | gun ku ga | gyō | ji | ji tsu shi yō kō ke tsu tei se ru | to ko ro |
sono SYD | I°B | U L gu no | tōri | ni | tsuki | | o | fukumi | o ki no | ne | hi tsu yō |
ko sai wa shikaru tsu ku shi dō serarota shi (new para)

1. gyō ji no ji tsu shi | wa | Singapore nyū jō su ki Kōshi hi ni kagi (ri)
(ki hi wa jō hō | kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yō | su) hi bo tsu MA de ni shū ryo |
seshimu ru ko to (new para)

2. kan ra ku | no | hi | yori | nuū | jō | shi ki tō hi MA de kaku ko ni koku ki |
o | kei yō | su ru | ko to (new para)

Nyū jō | shi ki | tō hi wa (1) shō go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu te
ei rei narabim | kō gun ko ta HE ki nen o | sa sa ge | sōri -- daijin | no
kan | wa hō sō go no ban 43 shō ni shō wa shi (ro) jin ja ji in tō wo | kan ra ku |
hō koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru . tsu ge ru) Ozobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai | o | o ko
nai (ha) kan kō sho ga ku kō . sho dan tai tō | nioi(te) wa | shu ku ga | shi
ki | o | o ko nō | ho ka kō gun i | ka zo ku no i mon. jin ja | san pa. bu dō i. | tai | i
ku | tai kai . kō en kai . bu sō . on ga ku kō shin . cho chi ku sono ta koku sa ku kyō
ryo ku | no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi | ji tsu shi | su ru ko to

Na o | shu ku ga gyō | ji ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zō sau o so gai shi . shi
zai | o | ran pi | shi | hō kū ni kyo ge ke | o | shō seshimu ru ko to | o | sa ku ru |
shu shi yori | nai chi | mi oi (te) wa | chō chin | gyō re tsu . ha ta | gyō re tsu |
tō wa | o ko na wa a ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China | man shū
| no oi (te) | wa | chi hō to ku shu | ji jō | ni ō ji | o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni | o chi
i ra za ru gen do | nioi(te) | kan kei | ki kan | to | kyō gi | no | ne | te ki gi | so
chi | serare | sashitsukae | na shi—

Togo.

000 26 JAN 42

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

000—Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "Pa"
Gaimudaijin Tokyo

Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so syuu kei hoo soo u ke u ri no a ----- si tu
no de ma kiden (dai ---- goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokoro zyuui rai
too ha no ei. Bei zin kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosite i zen zyuui ni ki kyo si wo
nyoo. Na ka ni mo zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo -- NT -- mono a ru mo yoo
ni te poo tyoo zyoō hakarigata (si) za nitui (tewa) tai ga wa ni tyuu i si ke ri on
zei syu tei i kei gi pe?

HARADA
Chiengoai

From: Tokyo
To: Shaghai #710
Net #1947

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 There is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's — despatch — in the same fashion as an enemy country's despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian intrests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve — of your secret message — there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to

22 DEC. 1941.

"PA" (Army)
From: Tokio.
To: Shanghai 710
Net 1947

842

kiden (dai-----gō) nikanshi (new Para)

fu

Belguim tai shi ji gyō 940 tej deupō (da gō V A F A V G I N G O K wal ta ki koku ni taisung nichu to dō yō no tariatsuka(i) mo na shi G I J O (go) sashitsuka na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa nai chi oite wa tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za ru mo China gen chi mi oite kimtsu (dai go) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokuni nan ra ka no so chi wo to ru no ki tsu yō a ru baai ni oite wa to ki koku mi okom jun ji teriatsuka(i) wa re (go) sashitsuka(e) na shi.

(New para) Naw dai Shanghai zai ho toshite shi kō kan chō chō ka kō e ten den se ri ni tsui (tewa)

C K I O Q

method handling banking:
gold silver deposits etc.

31 DEC. 1941.

"PA" (Army)
From: Peiping
To: (no heading #759)

Kon a kai sen mi to mo nai China ni oite te ki koku gin kō. jū kei kei gin kō tō nitsui (tewo) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin ozohi gin koō ken ho jo ka narabi (ni mi ha tsu kō ken wo (e) fuku (mi mu) wa kaku chi BYYM Tsinan) no to ku shu ji jō tsū mi miyori te sho bun suru koto na ku kon go ni okeru tei koku no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite sō gō te ki kewchi ni ta chi te kore wo wo hi no ha i i ni mo to ni FIGL Manchukuo miyori sho nyō suru mono to su

(New para) ki (Para)

1. sa shi mo sa e a ru kin gin ozobi gin kō kew wa sashiatari gun no kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon go wa gin kō (shō kin wo you tei su) ni you nyō suru koto za
2. Migi 1. # no kin gin oyobi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite you nyū sa ki gin kō wo shite wagahō ni yū ri mi un yō she shi mu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyō mi ō ji ki mo yo nyū wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e gin hō mitaishi ka shi tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo suru ta me yo nyū no ha rai tō do shi doku jō su koto wo mito (me) su bu ru koto # (new para.)

ō ku ra shō wa yō su re ba yo nyū sa ki gin kō nitaishu ryū ga new sho (new) no ta me no nen kaku wo kō fu suru koto # (new para)

3. gun wa kyaku kan ri tō wo gen chi kō a in kikan no chō mi i nin suru koto # (new para)

Migil ji mu nikanshi jū yō na ru mono wa chū ō no shi zu wo ma chi te kore rei wo ko no koto to shi nai yō sureba gen chi ni oite sho ri iin kai wo so shi ki pan koto # (new para)

—H kō ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui (tewa) te wa hon ken to wa shutsu (su ko RZ. so chi wo to ru oyobi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to su gyaku ka u BN AMRI

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one month's wages, and future matters will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.

"PA" (Army)

22 DEC. 1941.

From: Tokio
To: Net #1950

China ni okern te ki koku gai kō kan (ryōji kan wo (e) fuku (mi) mu |) oyobi wagahō ni oite ei gyō nai shi shū shoku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shū nyū no mi chi w-o to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben nikanshi te wa shu ju kan kei chō to kyō gi no kekka | izure baai niyori te wa Nihon seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jō suru yō a ru koto to narube (ka) ki mo sashiatari no sochi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui (tewa) migi niyori so chi serareta (shi) (para)

2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [bu← hyō] shi yo kin na ki shun MJ ni mo kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo kō ryo shi ta ru ga wagahō ga shi yū zai san wo sho bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yō a pa wo motte te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni sō go fu jō se shi mu ru yō go shi doku arita (shi) # (new para)

3. Wagahō su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no jū kei kei gin kō no na ma gin oyobi gin kō ken tō wa sa QI ni kō a in YY se tsu lin kai no (go) kettei su kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin kō ni yo nyū suru koto to na ha wo ru tokoro mi ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyū gin kō na ki chi ni oite wa migi son zai suru kō kan to renraku noue sho LD serareta (shi) CURB go

Rest garbled—

RECEIVED FROM U. S. ARMY—HONO—SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941 COPIES OF THEIR TRANSLATION

From: CHEFOO
To: TOKIO
Sano Tori.

(KYU BA) 10 ---- CHINA IO SE. PERU O ---- GERMANY ITO SE -----
SE BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL. S
END ENGLISH O ---- EN ---- NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA ---- MAN
SYU KOKU KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA ---- HA
ENGLAND NI. FUTU KOKU ISEI.---- ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA.
ARGENTINA GORU UN (NYU ---- NEA) NI IHA. NE ---- NYU ----
KYO ---- 1 NIIHA 1 (NYU ZI ---- DO) NO 2 NI IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO)
NO 3 ---- I ---- (---- KA ----GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI KAN) IHENI
I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA. URUGUAY NI
IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KU KAN 1 HYO KANA RE.
(ARA SUKA) KARU EN.

#663 A

JAN 19

From: Tokio
To: Shanghai

KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO
ARITASI

#634 A

JAN 19

From: Tokio
To: Shanghai

JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSIN
FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REI NIYO (RI) DENPO
ARITASI PA

#635 A

JAN 21 1942

From: ?

To: Tokio

ENGLAND NINITO

KEL. NASEKA.

GERMANY NAOK NA HE.

BELGIUM ---- INI SO IHA. ROITO. OIHE MO ----

NANAHA ANA NARU ---- RO ---- K HESETO. POLAND KA ---- HA

GEN SEL. KAKA SEI SA ---- KA HENAS ---- RU ---- KUN KE

HE OHENA KORUKA.

///Ø

CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU ---- HETO SEAKA TOKA

HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. IOSE.

TAI KOKU NAO.

CANADA ISE SEI ISE NI.

BAI SESEMI SENI ZI ---- S NIRUNI.

MEXICO RU.

PERU NANA ---- NARU HEO HEHE ARU I, ---- KAONI IKA

BOLIVIA TONI.

EGYPT NISE

MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.

SPECIAL CODE . . . TIHA OK IOI

(NIKARA GA) IHAO ---- INOI

KOSUTA RIKA) IHA OA IOI

SPEC. CODE . . . -O (C SI ZIGO HYO KA. ZEN ---- YO ---- O)

(NYU I NE 4) I NA HE I IHE HA.

SPEC. CODE . . . I NAHE KI HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE . . O TO

PARAGUY O TO

URUGUY I HENI MI HENA

PANAMA KATO ---- S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO ---- RON HASU

ZI (SON DAI 1 KA ---- NASA SU ---- HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK

KANAHA)

DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI ---- 5 SATU)

NORWAY KAKA HANA ---- KA IIA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO

KA HANA. KA HA HE.

(ARA SUKA) RUNI.

KASI ---- IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.

HI ZOKU ---- NIKA. NINA

TUBAKI ---- HETO. HENA.

KA ---- DE ---- RO HETO. HE NA

YANA GI ---- HARU

Rest of msg lost due to station interference.

From: Kalgan

To: Tokio

1-20-42

CANADA KARU HE

(KYU BA) KARU HE

PERU ISEO

HOLLAND O O

ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKA NA ANIKA HE LST
REPEATER

FRANCE KAKA HA

BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI

HUNGARY HATO

EGYPT HERU) ---- I IRU

TURKEY HA IHA UHA IO

CHINA KASEI

PORTUGAL KANASE

MAN SYU KOKU HEO

ARGENTINA NII

SIAM NINA
 (KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER
 (NIKA RAGA) 2ND REPEATER
 (KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER
 (NYU GI NEÁ 1ST REPEATER
 NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER
 (HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA
 (ARA SUKA) KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU
 KANAMO ZI)

#643

From: Chefoo
 To: Tokyo

JAN 20.

As follows: (KYŪ BA) May mean emergency, -- emergency code? -- or may be the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.

The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken in connection with # 647 A, which shows a similar list of names of countries with varying ~~w~~e letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in use, or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to be used for the countries in future -- the latter, however, seems pretty crude.

In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider # 635 A, which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th, the date of this message?

RSS

663 A

From: Kalgan to Tokyo

JAN 20

(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)

Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows:

Line 2. Cuba

Last line. Colombia

Second page:

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

New Guinea

New Zealand

Honduras

Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries are all in Kana)

1/23/42

#643 A

FUNADA

Canada—KARN HE

Cuba—KARN HE

Peru—ISEO

Holland—OO

England—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

France—KAKA HA

Belgium—OHE IKO HENI

Hungary—HATO

Egypt—I IRU

Turkey—HA IHA UHA IO

China—KASEI

Portugal—KANASE

Manchukuo—SYU KOKU HEO

Argentina—NII

Siam—NINA

Columbia—INA NAKI NAHE

Nicaragua—INA NAKI NAHE

Costa Rica—INA NAKI NAHE

New Guinea—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

New Zealand—NIKA NA ANIKA HE

Honduras—KASEHA

Alaska—KAKA SE (IZYŌ KOKN MEINO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)

MARCH 9

From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent)

Your wire No. 160 says, "Official Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately". Is this not a mistake? Please investigate and reply immediately.

1254 A

MARCH 9

From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping

With regard to our wire #718 of last year.

1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have MOSU SEI KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts of this message also, be something else, such as IDE or SUSUMI? The only translation which would fit the context in any way would be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i. e., "reported") are as follows. If the arrangements of all the offices are completed, we expect to put the establishment (of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have received reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and KAISHUU, we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please arrange to have these reports in first.

2. With regard to governmental orders; in the case of colonies only, it will be alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous experience, and after sufficient leadership.

3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the Regulations of Establishment. SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; however, honorary position).

2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.

3. TAAKUU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report. However, no report regarding governmental order.

4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul General.

5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning governmental order.

6. Paotao (Settlement Chief System. However, honorary) No report from KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report x x x x regarding governmental order.

1255 A

funada

MARCH 9

From Peiping

#229 to Tokyo

Regarding your message #157.

Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) and Yen ----- 805.30; making a total appropriation* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary or else the work cannot be completed, we are informed by the workmen. This situation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that the difference amounting to Yen 8,212.50 may be sent as a supplementary appropriation. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no recourse (here) but to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.

#1260 A

*There seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not work out properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the difficulties being encountered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.

RSS

From Peiping #220 to Tokyo

Circ #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.

MARCH 9

With regard to our wire Extra No. 56

The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have carried out temporary enactment, and there being considerations to make in con-

nection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO (?) the rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paoting, Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haichow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO, Chefoo and Kaifeng, totalling 11.

Further, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of names which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th of that month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In Article 83 of tax regulations: the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of the business tax; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes by virtue of their having paid a business tax. Therefore, ----- elections are not to be held ----- will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment of colonies, the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and their period of service will be until there is an election which will take place in accordance with regulations. The question of whether or not these three points are necessary is being considered.

(NOTE: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message might be a mistake for some previous year)

1261 A

FUNADA

MARCH 10

From Peiping #136 to Tokyo
Circ. #181 Tientsin

There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it has been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and consulates (?), on the 18th. (only one day) at 9 a. m. a conference of consuls having charge of military affairs (Note: HEIJI which has been translated "military affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place. Above for your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch offices and heads of dispatched offices (might be instead "Higher officials of consulates, branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are. From office (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul (s) so kindly include this SPECIAL CODE.

1262 A

MARCH 11

From Shanghai to Hankow
Extra

----- there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know when the order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail.

1263 A

FUNADA

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent)

Circ. #455 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankow. Canton.

With regard to No. 1, our wire. A 3 GOKUHI (?)

Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL CODE.

1265 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister
Re: my message No. 017

Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and xxx KAKOO xxxx are at hand. However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.

1266 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister
Re your wire No. 169.

Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of governmental orders.

1267 A

FUNADA

MARCH 11

From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping
#183 to ?

Re; your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect.)

1268 A

MARCH 11

From Tokyo to Peiping

Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regarding your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received _____ in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to _____ as has been done thus far.

1269 A

FUNADA

MARCH 11

From Taiyuan *Urgent*

#028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.

Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.

Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organization of the colony, official business, and the putting into operation of the new tax for the colony, are all pressing duties _____. If (in addition) this man is expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher?), we expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the official business. Further, this man's wife is at present pregnant and the doctor has forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation --RU FUTU GAN this interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony (organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on to his new post in Kalgan early in June _____ regarding which, after an examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be postponed until the end of May

#1270 A

RSS

Urgent

MARCH 12

From: Tokyo

To: Peiping Consul General

Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)

1—The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in the settlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the Law regarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions shall be made by a special order). But this section does not apply to subordinate consular offices and sub-stations.

2—Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a subordinate consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in which unreasonable situations _____ with regard to the resident head. In such situations there is no other way but to act in the name of the head (consul) of the main consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads) of the department, we wish to send you a further message regarding the practical method of handling such situations.

#1274 A

MARCH 12

From: Peiping
#028 to Nanking MINISTER,

Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total of all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum received was YEN 15,000. The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for which we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go forward to you by air.

#1275 A RSS

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo #191
To: Peking.
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador.

With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of people (officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, housing, etc.), please bear in mind the following and instruct appropriately SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the settlement will be considered wrong.

2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary, in connection with the business of the Settlement, (based on the ----- restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.

3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection; the treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered merely from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status, (rank) of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is understood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too much).

(Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and directors and the treatment of these ----- should be, it is considered, arranged after your approval is given.

4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors, consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for long periods.

1276 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo
#163 to Canton

Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3,408.90 and being sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

Items

Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozeki, Yen 171.50; Return expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel expense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00; Sato, going to his post, Yen 111.70; Expense of transferring Shirotto, Yen 167.00.

#1277 A

In the humble judgment of the translator, the balance of the message is not worth bothering about.

MARCH 12.

From: Peiping
#002 Nanking Minister,
Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.

Regarding your circular #020.

In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's Defense Association, and have not set up a New Women's Organization as yet. The

SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the Army, which is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of the association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife of the head of the Settlement being the president, and the wife of the Consul advisor.

#1278 A RSS

From: Shanghai

MARCH 12.

498 cut in to Nanking, Peiping.

Following the recent sudden drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts from the sale of stamps etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy) has been announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAI KOO Communications Department, who is in the city on a trip).

120779 A

From: Manchuli.

023 to TOKYO Hsingking.

Although we fully understand that the matter of the arrangement for a train on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the Home Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter merely that we may have the information, in this office.

1280 A

From: Tokyo

MARCH 12.

036 to Harbin

Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 34 should be approved, should not the completion of the work be done according to the estimate for the building submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI (?) (definitely settled?)

1281 A RSS

From: Tokyo

MARCH 12.

053 to HANKOW

Regarding your message HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement of the regulations regarding promotion (or, advance in salary) was completed in our Out-bound message # 18 of last December 31st.

1282 A

From: Tokyo

MARCH 12.

182 to Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your message # 169.

As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad ----- FOREIGN ----- MO KU ----- Yen 8.200 special supplementation has been made, and will be sent in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).

1283 A RSS

MARCH 13

From: Tokyo

To: Hsingking Minister

Extra-numeral message.

To Communications Official Ogawa, from Nomura.

Replying to your extra-numeral message, both of the gentlemen are going along with the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the 13th, in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you again.

#1286 Q A

MARCH 13

From: Shanghai

To #065 To: Canton

To: Consul Kimura, in Hongkong, from Sone

With regard to your humble servant's message of the 10th. Ryuu Suu Ketsu (parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from

Hongkong on the ----- boat of the 15th. The Ryu family have again and again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble to make the arrangements.

#1287 A RSS

MARCH 13

From: Nanking
 #002 to Peiping.
 Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.

Regarding your Circ. #186 (A)

At present they are engaged in urging the ----- organization of a real Women's Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general (we are proceeding) under the direction of this Office, the Chief of the Department of Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Commandant of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military police being advisors. Matters having to do with defense, and related to military matters, are first taken up by our office, with the military department involved, and then we proceed to guide them; this is the plan under which we are working.

#1288 A

MARCH 8.

From: Tokyo
 To: Hankow

We desire that you send a message to Daiya.

#1289 A RSS

MARCH 9.

From CANTON

To # 195 to Tokyo

Circ. # 069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai

Regarding my message # 182.

In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently received from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of a definite plan for caring for enemy aliens living, and causing them to do their cooking for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have been making preparations as far as was possible to carry this out in accordance with your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines), and especially in accordance with column (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former) part of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something approximating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interesting). In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the exception of those subject to exchange) should be encouraged of their own accord to form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual. This is sent to keep you informed.

1256 A

The above message seems to be connected with # 1214 A.

MARCH 10.

From: Nanking Minister

266 to TOKYO

Cir. # 146 to Hsingking, Canton, Hankow and 1 other.

Chungking Broadcast (8th).

1. The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer encouragement in the matter of the protection of India and the construction of a route for transportation of supplies to China. This information comes from a source with direct contact with the White House.

2. The Chungking government has dispatched their ~~Ambassador~~ Minister to Turkey, Choo I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to Iran to conclude a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of ministers.

3. According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th., and the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, -----TAI MI, German Ambassador, is reported to be returning to his country for consultation with his government.

4. The Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador on the 7th.

5. After the arrival of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Bay, on the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jō. (Wu Tieh-cheng), Ō Bun Kō (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast to the Burmese people.

1257 A RSS

MARCH 9.

From: Peiping Minister

037 to Tokyo

Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germany, resident here, (at present 62 years of age) in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO SOO FU KO DOO HEI 6 ZYUU GOO (believed to be the name of an institution, Possible, P(eking) his U(niversity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average of about sixty students ?) has expressed the request that we confer with the Home Office regarding and secure a vise that he may attending a meeting of the Yale Students Abroad, to be held in the building of the K. K. Laygold Company, Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City. We request that you will send us instructions in reply by wire.

1258 A

MARCH (

From: Peiping

221 to Tokyo

Regarding my message # 220

In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or sub-consular area, the head of the mindan shall, has formerly, according to the fifth article of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO JIKOO (literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations, and has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing body on their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether this method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions in reply.

1259 A RSS

MARCH 11.

From: Nanking

#276 to Peiping,

Circ. #2450 to Tokyo, Hsinking, Canton.

Chunking Broadcast (10th)

1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial, but contact with several Chinese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.

"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome from the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in agreement with each other(?) and are great countries. With the nobility and the leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and without regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now decided to fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and that the power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that India should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian people and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently. I believe firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability to destroy Japan.

2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Australian Minister (Igston).
1264 A

FUNADA.

From: Tokyo (Urgent)
#032 to Peiping
#183 to ?
Re; your wire No. 90.

MARCH 11.

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).
1268 A

From: Tokyo
To: Peiping
Extra

MARCH 11.

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.
Regarding your wire No. 175.
From Yosano to Harada.
The Spanish Legation in Tokyo ah sat least, recently, received ----- in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire down to ----- as has been done thus far.
1269 A

FUNADA.

From: Tokyo
To: Hsingking Minister.

MARCH 12.

Regarding your extra-numeral message:
The wire forwarded [Handwritten:] (forwarding will be completed) by the night of the 11th.
#1271 A

From: Tokyo
To: Harbin

MARCH 12.

Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th:
Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no evidence of larceny.
#1272 A

MARCH 12.

From: Peiping
#186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan

Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was carried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up, so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform us by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your area.
#1273 A RSS

From: Canton

MARCH 12.

#210 to TOKYO
Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.
Regarding your circular #181

At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony, reverence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer

before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the Colony, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined in the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair in celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting of every class (of people) is planned to celebrate the second occasion of victory in the war.

#1284 A

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo
To: Peiping
Extra-numeral.

To Telegraphic official, Kato, from Nomura.

Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish. Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.

#1285 A RSS

22 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Tokio.
To: Net #1950.

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.

(rest garbled)

Decrypted traffic.

31 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Peiping
To: (no heading) #759.

Method handling banking; gold silver deposits, etc.

Decrypted traffic.

22 DECEMBER 1942.

From: Tokio.
To: Shanghai #710
Net #1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the Belgian Embassy's ----- despatch #----- in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve ----- of you secret message ----- there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to

Decrypted traffic.

JANUARY 26—PM—#009.

Gaimualjin Tokyo

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

HARADA.

Decrypted traffic.

28 JANUARY 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your m-s-g #061)
 To: Minister Saigon

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including-----to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau).

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony—

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime Minister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.

(b) Have shinto and Bud-d-hist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips), celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music, (emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo.

27 JAN. 1942.

From: Chengoai Thia #010
 To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo
 -----(-garbled)-----

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma ----- at me ----- Sataya they were bombed by the enemy.

HARADA.

28 JAN. 1942.

From Harada #012 (Re your msg #431).
 To: Foreign Minister, Tokio.

-----1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Thailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Thailanders who have become Japanese, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

JAN. 21.
 681 A

From: Canton
 To: Naking, Peking, Shanghai

Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using transports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at first) only to those who were actually engaged in carrying on the fighting, but from the 15th of this month, the SHIROGANE MARU, GUYO MARY and 6 other bottoms, scrapped ships of the NAI KA-----Transport Co., have been put into operation from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights are being carried.

However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and Makao, traffic has not yet been opened up.

17 JAN. 1942.

603A

From: Tokyo
To: Hsingking

-----When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of Russia, the context shows,) on the 13th., (we said that) from the news which came to this office from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the authority of a Chinese-----telegram in November that an American vessel had been sunk as the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some difficulties, had ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he did not think this was an American tanker: also, we asked if there were absolutely no case of Russian vessels sinking after striking a mine. The diplomatic representative denied absolutely that there was any truth in the former statement; regarding the latter statement he said that last year-----government-----a Soviet vessel struck a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and received injuries, but was able to make port safely. Aside from this, there had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines, and this he wished received as his reply.

604 A

From: Tokyo
To: Hsingking

17 JAN. 1942.

----- The Soviet newspapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption "From the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under dateline of the 12th the public announcement of the United States that since the opening of hostilities that country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 minesweeper, 10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. ----- The losses of the American Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 target ship, total ----- (All lost in the attack on Hawaii.)

131 A

From: Peking
To: Nanking
Shanghai
Canton
Hsingking

19 DEC. 1941.

News from Yen-an-Fu (Communist Headquarters)

----- Chungking broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon Japan should be attempted. The Yen-an-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in point of fact we are allies with Great Britain and the United States. The war against Japan is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an opportunity for the Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis Powers, which is something we should find it important to realize at this time. Among the Axis Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of Germany is the main purpose of the world-wide strategems. That is to say, taking advantage of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expansion of the line of operations on the Continent is most important. The importance of the war in the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Imperial command for China in this connection is the pressing of war against aggressor nations regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of Hitler will be victory for China (?) so at the present time cooperation with the Allies plus the greater and greater extension of the policy of long-time resistance, is the method of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers ----- This is the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.

130A

From: Peking
To: Nanking
Shanghai
Hankow

19 DEC. 1941.

Yenan-fu report -----

The official newspaper of the Chinese communist party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho Jih Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present

war are to incite peoples of all of the south sea areas in order to secure the resources (of that area), expel British and American interests—act in union ----- Germany and Italy ----- to increase her power. Japan's southward advance is, at the same time, the strengthening of the policy of encircling southwestern China, and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable from the China Japanese war.

On this critical occasion you (?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must attack actively; together with this the 8th Route Army, and the new Fourth Army must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border friction, stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese. Make most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people of Formosa, and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.

(FUNADA)

II
100 A

DEC 18 0443

From: Buenos Aires
To: Tokyo

Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the Navy Minister before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been reported, so I ask your honorable inquiry into the matter.

/s/ HORIKIRI,
Japanese Ambassador.

77 A

DEC 16.

From: Nanking
To: Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.

Regarding the rejection by the British military in Hongkong of the well intentioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made the announcement; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by Japan lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibility of the exposure of a million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our compatriots (?) in Hongkong, Yotai, notice of subjugation compatriots ----- in line with the ----- national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with the greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you people to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out (expunge) the humiliation of your country which has been practised by the English for a hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the revival of East Asia ----- along this line he gave out his interview.

From: Tsinan
To: Tientsin
Peking
Nanking

DEC 16 81 A.

In the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the local maintainence guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?) have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possible been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent (coiling up—the word used of snakes coiling to spring). About a month and a half have passed since the beginning of these tactics and the efficacy ----- carrying out was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began and again there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl about again.

The army lines of communication ----- and the regular communication systems are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri (25 miles, if Japanese "ri"; 39.30 kilometers. If Chinese "li" is intended, then the distance would be 6.54 kilometers). South of Daimon station, on the Shimpo line, and attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought); on the ----- Kosai line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was

wrecked: and the like. This chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been warned that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot escape punishment. According to ----- Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had applied appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese, while not showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless, steadily shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the news of Japanese victories. This information is sent for your information.

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Manchuli

Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi and Yuhashi and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.

1200 A

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tientsin. Peiping ?

The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21 of which 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.

1201 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (*-----) approved (or "understood"). However, ----- (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunderstanding" and so please explain to ----- that the ----- is not higher than the starting point.

1202 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From ? to Canton

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been Special Code as from 2nd (first name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

1203 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Shanghai

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippai") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

1204 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot

----- (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, ----- have been decided.

1205 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From ? to Canton

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

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MARCH 2.

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Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

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From Tokyo to ?

Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot

----- (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, ----- have been decided.

1205 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tokyo

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Paotao

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same basis as a special employee ----- if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Peiping

Former Special Code, Konji Hasegawa has been Special Code as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 2.

From Shanghai to Tokyo

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Paotao

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same basis as a special employee ----- if it is different to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Peiping

Former Special Code, Kanji Hawegawa has been Special Code as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

FUNADA.

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 2.

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Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same basis as a special employee——if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

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From Tokyo to Peiping

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Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

FUNADA.

From Tokio to Hsinking

MARCH 2.

Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that there is a necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report on your examination along with papers relating to this affair.

1209 A

3-5-42

YAMASHIRO.

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 4, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From Canton to Tokyo

MARCH 3.

Extra

With regard to your wire (extra) (#---) of the 3rd.

Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern Station") to this office should have been replied to in General Wire No. 48 of February 20th, but we are sending again by way of assurance.

1210 A

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 3.

Extra

From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akiyama: How is the (previous) question coming? Please reply as to progress made.

1211 A

From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo

MARCH 4.

With regard to taxation in China as assessed at the present time, it is thought that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been decided, in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose of studying this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be formed through the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders?") meet-

ing, with the local Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Importers and Distributors as a center, and that this agency would be made an agency of inquiry (perhaps "on tax matters").

1212 A

FUNADA.

From Amoy to Tokyo

MARCH 4.

And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.

Police Chief ----- TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi, Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman. RYUU TEN SIN (?) (above -----) Chief of Police, Zempei Yamashita, Takashi Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties).

1213 A

FUNADA.

From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoihow

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.

Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information set forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually) have to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or "petition") has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtaining loans as dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of repetitions. Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should cover at least a period of about 6 months, in order that control and business may be facilitated.

Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400: the proclamation on this question has been considered in this city since quite early ----- The leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to continue as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different than previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these people merely by means of leadership (encouragement). In our area, (therefore) a study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the enemy nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting them cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these people will fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire as aforementioned ("-----").

1214 A

FUNADA.

From: Canton

MAR. 4.

To: Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking

The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to us ----- for the preservation of peace and ----- Therefore, measures to meet this should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on the authorized (legal) lists as well as with the under-cover transactions, it is necessary to strengthen control of the market as much as possible. Also to effect reforms in currency (?), and to contrive measures of ----- Concrete measures will be effected in Davao in the near future.

Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent than those concerning mobilization; however, locally measures will be taken to counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.

1215 A

MAR. 4.

From: Nanking

To: Tokyo

Please remit by cable the sum of 36,703.48 yen to cover costs of the following: 31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as per agreement; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants; and 80 sen to cover shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.

1216

From: Tokyo
To: Hankow

MARCH 4.

The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO as an error for FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuji, proclamation—a not unusual tautology in Japanese), the setting up of a Branch office of the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch office on the 28th., as well as the ----- order Number 4 regarding the superintendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially published in the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be assigned) — It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recognition of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.

#1217 A

From: Tokyo
To: Shanghai

MARCH 4.

Regarding your telegram number 4:

Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the price of implements and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama (a pleated skirt-like garment). Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from the WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments can be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (Men = cotton; some kind of a cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).

Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your telegrams giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.

#1218 A

From: Canton
To: Tokyo

MARCH 4.

WA----- of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we presume to be a place name). Since the situation in that place is not clear to us, we desire to send En Kido, the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a two weeks trip (The exigencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary) to investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools and for this trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "contact" (renraku) something.)?

March 4.

#1219 A

From: Peiping
To: Tokyo

MARCH 4.

(We have found this message practically undecipherable)

Line 1__1 your wire number__57 and the same number 385 SOO (School RAI SA YOO KOKU subject) In regard to __ RA Kai __ being, original document ____BOO number in N__ ____ GO PYU have do not have__ ____ GI RYOO SERARURU TO ____ KO ____ next (or succeeding) message number ____S7 GOO TYOO ____ and regular report regarding the residences, regarding ____ FUN __ Within this month should be sent in.

#1220 A

From: Tokyo
To: Shanghai

MARCH 4.

Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth department of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air route on the 4th, we desire to advance temporarily (or perhaps, he desires us to advance temporarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase cost of supplies.

#1221 A RSS

From Tokyo to Nanking

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wire No. 190.

Please wire contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire. Further, NO. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire) No. 3800.

1222 A

From : Tokyo to Shanghai

MARCH 4.

188 bundles (rolls, or batches) of EKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for "steel rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 298 kilograms have been shipped on Taiei Maru which left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN

1223 A

From : Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 4.

-----your wire No. 1329 of last year.

As yet----- please----- after-----.

1224 A

FUNADA.

SECRETS

SIGNAL OFFICE,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 6, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From Tokyo to Hoihow

MARCH 5.

With regard to your wire No. 19.

Will send upon issuance of permits, 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Government Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) from Special relief and control fund, Miscellaneous, as follows:

Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real Government Expenditure).

Three sets of equipment, their number and use as follows:

Reception room hat racks, 3.

Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.

Inside Chair, 4, out of 6, 2 will be ones used at present.

Round table, 3.

Tea Table, 3.

Dining table for dining room, 3.

Side board for Dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desk for library, 3.

Chair for Library, 3.

Bookshelves for Library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelf for living room, 3.

Inspector Fujii, Assistant inspector Imai, and -----Omura (for three people) from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.

Following are three sets of equipment, their numbers and use.

Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fujii.

Long chair for reception room, 1, the one presently in use.

Inside chair, 2, same as above.

Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Dining tables for dining room, 3.

Sideboards for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.

Chairs for library, 3.
 Bookshelves for library, 3.
 Miscellaneous shelves for living room, 3.
 1225 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 5.

From: Shanghai
 To: Canton, Tokyo

Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Kiukiang to his excellency.

Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty, when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in the condition of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again to Kiukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires nursing, so this office has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of his shift of post for the present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to us, so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial permission.

#1126A

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo
 To: Kalgan

Referring to your message number 127.

While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the Consul's residence HAMA (MA=room, and this may refer to some special room in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident in the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this we desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police Outright Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards the portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an especial grant this once only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, the necessary repairs expense shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.

#1227A RSS

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo
 To: Swatow

March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA SPECIAL CODE (is this not probably Vice-Consul, as in following message?) Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family allowance); Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,998.13 which will be sent (by wire=the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your excellency as agent.

#1128A

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo
 To: Amoy

March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

Items:

Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi-----, 285.09; Tadashi, and Aoki, each Yen 212.49; Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 28.68 and his special allowance are earmarked for repayment); Morii, Yen 247.70. The end.

#1229A RSS

From: Tokyo
To: Hsingking

MARCH 5.

This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsingking Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers. There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there is such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the Soviet Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in somewhat, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.

#1230 A

From: Tokyo
To: Canton
Extra numeral message.

MARCH 6.

Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing, we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory answer").

#1231 A

From Shanghai to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo, Nanking

MARCH 6.

Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan, and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same period last year. (details will be sent by mail).

Tax collections 8169

Sur-taxes (assessments and SUISAI (probably, "collections of delinquent taxes"). 443

Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.

Tonnage taxes, 20

Total 9363 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)

1232 A

From Peiping to Tokyo

MARCH 6.

Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Constructions"), the repairs necessary through the houses in order to make them usable will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a few people who are being transferred here and are arriving with their families, the situation is such that there are no houses in which to place these people. Therefore, as a temporary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate situation") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182, are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals after arranging for permission to rent said houses.

1233 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Manchuli to cut in Tokyo, Hsinking

ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old German National, who arrived in Manchuria from Berlin in December of 1939 and has been head of the -----, a German transportation firm, here, wishes to evacuate to Dairen together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine daughters). We find that the situation (political) is alright, and that (this person's records (?) are authentic, but would like to know if we may issue a visa (would like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to them). Please reply immediately.

1234 A

MARCH 6.

From Shanghai to Canton
From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.

Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the Funds Chief (chief of the department of capital) that gets at the present time

a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets, it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you search for another suitable man.

1235 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Canton

We have already sent your wire No. 165 by means of our wire No. 139.

Regarding No. 167 we are now ----- (probably "carrying on consultation with -----")

Regarding No. 171, although there has been no ----- (maybe "objections") from all the ----- (maybe "department heads"), it is believed that the message has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).

1236 A

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Nanking

There is a supply of 58 thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for your office ----- The Minister (of cabinet) ----- that plans be made within the year ----- and a part of the land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and that enactment be carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in this case ----- the training room (or "area") ----- the plan ----- is desired.

1237 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Nanking

Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, ----- (probably "1140 Yen") out of the fund for ----- police offices under Consulates in China, as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year -----

1238 A

MARCH 6.

From Tokyo to Shanghai

With regard to your wire Regular No. 463

The BAN NOO,—("Bannoo" means omnipotent, Bannooyaku, a cureall) according to our experience is not very efficient and goes out of commission very often, and so we have not been giving permits on it. It is difficult therefore to approve of it and ask that the 825 Yen be sent back.

1239 A

FUNADA.

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 7, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1240-1253 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From: Tokyo

MARCH 6.

To: Nanking

March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being sent by wire to your excellency as follows:

(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance, Yen 1,062.50; (2) Takemitsu, ----- DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese, usually begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.

#1240A

From : Tokyo
To : Shanghai

MARCH 6.

The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the 17th, and everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the responsibility of the Contact Department of your office.

#1241A

From : Tokyo
To : Nanking

MARCH 6.

To Councillor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.

Mr. Yasuoka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.

#1242A RSS

From : Tokyo
To : Kalgan

MARCH 6.

KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Regarding (your reply wire) #124:

SA -- POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)

Yen 6,000 Special Code. (KIN comes before and NARI after a statement of a sum of money, in Japanese).

Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.

Yen 2,000 From the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of the City Police (dept ?) resident in the Consulate.

(KAN=official, KOO=public; indicate the general classifications in the Japanese governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).

#1243 A

From : Tokyo
To : Shanghai #257

MARCH 6.

We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date of sailing.

(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was to be forwarded to another point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent from Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter, or else "Shanghai is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the purpose of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).

#1244 A

From : Kalgan
To : Tokyo

MARCH 6.

Regarding your message #72 of last year:

As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident abroad, we ask that you send one half year's rental, Yen 1,200, by wire.

#1254 A RSS

From Kalgan to Tokyo

MARCH 6.

And with regard to No. 33

Please send 3, AI BOO YEN (?) (3,000 Yen) Special Code XXXXXXXX the amount of expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO III (might be "housing", "expropriation" as in "land expropriation", "training").

1246 A

From Tokyo to Nanking
Extra

MARCH 7.

As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send again.

(NOTE: ----- happens to be UTAGAI)

1247 A

From Shanghai to Tokyo

MARCH 7.

With regard to your wire (-----) Extra.

Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing number" or "a combination"). No. 3 from the Minister has not been sent because of a mistake here ----- it has been was sent on 7th of this month, (today).

1248 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

From Peiping to Tokyo

Extra

From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura

I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has been 'drawn to'") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the action mentioned) be carried out immediately.

1249 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

From Tokyo to Hsinking

At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU, name of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of the Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party Organ dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassador), through having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjuro Hayashi, Premier Feb. to May 1937) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side. To this, I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Ambassador) had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that the Soviet Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is somewhat indefinite), that we believe that the Soviet Union well understands just where the purpose of the Japanese government lies, in having especially picked this new Ambassador who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer) in the diplomatic field, and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs, that we here, on this occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under discussion such as regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange", "freight accumulation" or "compensation"), petitions between Japan and Russia (?), Visas, and floating docks, and that another forward step would thus be taken in the friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU replied that he understood, and that everything will be done towards the solving of the problems as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as (I) had mentioned.

1250 A

FUNADA.

From Tientsin to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo, Peiping, Thingtao, and Tsinan.

MARCH 7.

According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect on business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn and cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the rural areas (probably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies of speculators (?).

Rates falling; Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460 Yen. MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that this might be a mistake for MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour) the import of Shanghai powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps "stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of low rates in the interior, the rates weaken-----25.903 Yen IJRUSHI (?) 24.85 Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled com-

modities in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency of 1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior, Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar, 188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai through lull in the year's exports, Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also highest on 6th).

1251 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

Tokyo to Kalgan

With regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (perhaps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mongolia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out temporarily in accordance with your wire, Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month. Please reply on following points:

1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to especially make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?

2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the rules and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial workers" Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines, "the Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation")?

3. What were the characteristics of the League(s) of Mongolian Engineering and Construction companies in the past?

4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above corporation?

5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujishima arrived there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the direction of your office; is this true? (Note: The last might be a confirmation rather than a question.)

1252 A

FUNADA.

MARCH 7.

From: Tokyo

To: Hankow

To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.

The expense appropriations for your office for the current year are as follows below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow ?) and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the Organization (or, Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for repairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within the current year.

Government Expense, Actual Expense, Yen 60.

Ditto, Outright Expense, Yen 250.

Telegraphic Expenses for a diplomatic office abroad, Yen 25.

Expense for the Foundation of a diplomatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya branch office, and equipment fund, Yen 8,000.

Further, employees daily (wage) GEN 0 Yen. (Gen is probably an error for some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.

1253 A RSS

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 58

TOP SECRET

Op-20-4-mp
Serial 0003520
(SC)A17-24(1)

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington 25, D. C., 28 Jun 1945.

From: The Secretary of the Navy,
To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant,
Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

COM 14 260110	COM 16 291028	COM 16 021100
COM 16 261331	COM 16 30 Nov 41 Ser 12-2	COM 16 041502
COM 16 270355	COM 16 010245	COM 16 051402
COM 14 280240	COM 16 010913	CINCAF 060006
CINCAF 281430	COM 16 011422	COM 14 060114
COM 16 281510	COM 16 020355	COM 16 071025
ASTNAYATTACHE SHANGHAI 270830		

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 27 Jun 1945.

Op-20-G-mg
Serial 000751520
(SC) AG-1(10)

Memorandum

From: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).
To: Mr. John F. Sonnett, Rm. 1083-A, Navy Bldg.
Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbacher (Op-20-4).
Subj: Dispatches—Forwarding of.
Ref: Secret Letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 23 June 1945, signed by H. Kent Hewitt/John F. Sonnett.
Encl: Duplicates of dispatches requested in subject reference.

1. In compliance with subject reference, the files of this office were searched and duplicates, copies of which are enclosed, made of the following list of dispatches:

COM 14* 260110	COM 16* 010913
COM 16* 261331	COM 16 011422
COM 16 270355	COM 16 020355
COM 14* 280240	COM 16* 021100
CINCAF 281430	COM 16 041502
COM 16* 281510	COM 16 051402
COM 16* 291029	CINCAF 060006
COM 16 Certified typed copy	COM 14 060114
COM 16 010245	COM 16 071025

2. Asterisked items contain information requested in subject reference. Unasterisked items are included as considered of interest by you in conversation with Lt. Comdr. G. E. Boone this morning.

3. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.

4. In accordance with current practice, these materials have been upgraded in classification.

J. N. Wenger
 J. N. WENGER.
Captain, U. S. Navy.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
 COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Classified Incoming

Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X.
 Same garble table X no change in shore addresses XX.

Date 30 Nov 41 Crypto group 87
 Originator: Ccm 16 Action: Opnav.
 CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2

Information:

Cincaf
 Cincpac
 Com 14

Authenticated:

F. S. LOCKARD,
Ens., USNR.

Certified to be a true copy to the original.

/S/ P. W. Cann,
 P. W. CANN,
Commander, USN.

Naval Message—

SECRET

Navy Department

Drafter	Extension number	Addressee	Precedence
From: COM 14. Released by Date: 26 NOVEMBER 1941		Asterisk (*) mailgram addressee For action: OPNAV.	Priority. X Routine. Deferred.
TOR Coderoom Decoded by A. V. PERING. Paraphrased by Routed by		Information: CINCPAC. CINCAF. COM 16.	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Unless otherwise indicated this despatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 If operational check below.
 Original held by GI 260116
 Originator fill in date and time:

TEXT

For past month commander second fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second fleet, third fleet including first and second base forces and first defense divisions, combined air force, desron three airron seven, subron five and possible units of batdiv three from first fleet

In message concerning these units South China fleet and French Indochina force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao

Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with second fleet commander

Combined air force has been assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved to Hainan

Third fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako

Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified second fleet unit and submarine division or squadron

Crudiv seven and desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China

1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise airron twenty four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls

SECRET

Naval Message--Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2927	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 26 November 1941.	For Action: CINCPAC. OPNAV. COMFOURTEEN. CINCAF.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by: P. R. White. Paraphrased by:	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

Reported by ONI by

Serial 23-41

261331

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GGT

TEXT

Morning comment comfourteen two one ten of twentysixth X traffic analysis past few days indicate cinc second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and Subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X for purposes of clarity units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in mandates will be referred to as Second Section X estimated units in first section are crudiv seven X airron six defense division one X desron three and subron six XX second section crudiv five X cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X desrons two and four X subron five X desdiv twentythree X first base force of Third Fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including desron five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X there are slight indications today that desron three crudiv seven and subron six are in Takao area X combined airforce units from empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X *our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area* X our lists indicate cinc combined in Nagato X cinc first in Hyuga and cinc second in Atago in Kure area X cinc third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X cinc fifth in Chichijima area X comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from central or north China probably torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X cinc second X Third and cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X traffic from navyminister and engs to cincs of fleet appear normal X *evaluation is considered reliable.*

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone extension number	Addresses	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 27 November 1941.	For action: CINC AF. CINC PAC. OPNAV. COM 14.	Priority. X Routine. Deferred.
TOR Coderoom Decoded by A. V. PERING. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

27/0355
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.

TEXT

Last two days several despatches in four numeral Army cipher handled on Navy circuit involving Commander Oka combined Army Forces Imperial Headquarters.

Commander Oka combined Army Taiwan.
Vice commander combined Army forces Sama.

Make original only, deliver to Communications Watch Officer in person. (See Art 7G (4) NAVREGS.)

SECRET

Naval Message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Addresses	Message Precedence
From COM 14. Released by Date: November 28, 1941.	For action: OPNAV.	Priority X. Routine. Deferred.
TOR Coderoom Decoded by A. L. BRAUN. Paraphrased by	Information: CINCPAC.	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

28/249
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.

TEXT

Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhala XX.

(Singora)
Passed to Code Room for routing. LWP
Only incorrect detail was date.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV. REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number 2927.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 28 November 1942.	For Action: CINPAC. OPNAV. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by P. R. WHITE. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT.
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-41 281510

TEXT

Comment artolusoa Shanghai two seven zero eight three zero x Isuzu (cl) in Formosa Straits Sunday x subtender and four subs probably subron six plus Magoya Maru tender x last sentence believed to be sendai (cl) plus two desdlivs xx other items no comment xx additional info from CI Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military supplies xx two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not known ordered mandates xx unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet x this ship now in Camranh Bay Saigon area xx

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

Naval message in Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: ASTNAVATTACHE SHANGHAI. Released by Date: 28 Nov. 41.	For action: COM 16.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by Paraphrased by	Information: N A V A T T A C H E CHUNGKING.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in
Serial 26-41
279830C R0554
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

TEXT

C orange naval craft sighted by master foreign vessels X Saturday Canton departed Hasidate and one torpedo boat Otori class X Chinwang Tao arrived two armed trawlers with depth charges on decks one auxiliary three thousand ton fitted for mine laying X Sunday Amoy sailed cruiser Natori class X Monday afternoon off Turnabout Island four submarines and large sub tender course south XO Tuesday position twenty one north and one hundred fifteen east unstated number transports with troops course southwest X Many transports this week between Hongkong and Shanghai heading south number with troops X Wednesday observed by passenger from Shanghai Maru one hour before entering Nagasaki Harbor 8 warships believed lead by cruiser Naka proceeding south good speed.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Article 76 (4) NAV Regs.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2027.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 29 November 1941.	For Action: CINCPAC. CINCAF. COMFOURTEEN. OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by WHITE. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
 [Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 24-41. 291029
 Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Recent developments from RI X Encrypted addresses noted in traffic past two days quote "Comdr First Patrol Force" unquote X This force headquarters apparently in Yokosuka or Palao X Other addresses of same nature X Quote "Fifth Air Battalion" unquote at Takao X Quote "Comdr Airborne Troops" unquote X [hand written: (probably Takao—FN)] Location undetermined X Quote "French Indochina billeting detachment" unquote in Saigon Area X Quote "Third Fleet headquarters" unquote probably at Yokosuka X cinc Third shifted flag from Ashigara to Nagara X cinc Southern Expeditionary shifted flag from Kashii to Chokai X tentative identification X New arrivals Takao Area that may be placed in first section my Two Six One Three Three One X Desron Four X Airron Seven Chitose type and one command that appears to be a Subron XX Hiyei and Kongo now appear definitely associated with these units in First Section but no movement noted on these XX Following from CI translation today from Cine Second Fleet to key radio stations and Cine Combined indicates he will leave Kure Zone four hundred today leave Sasebo Zone midnight first and enter Bako Zone midnight second X Remainder message not clear.

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2027	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 1 December 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority XX Routine Deferred
FOR Coderoom Decoded by A. L. BRAUN. Paraphrased by	Information: CINCAF. CINCPAC. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk Addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
 [Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 25-41. 010245.
 Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GOT

TEXT

Please cancel my One Fifty today XX Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same Garble Table X No change in Shore addresses

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number .2027.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 1 December 1941.	For action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by WHITE. Paraphrased by	Information: CINCPAC. COMFOURTEEN. CINCAF.	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in. Serial 25-41.

010913

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

From Ri X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron Five in Natori X Naka to join Desron Four X Units of number two base force and Chogei X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X All these units now under command Cinc third X Cinc second in atago shifted from Kure to Sasebo comm zone apparently en route South China waters

*Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone Extension Number	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COM SIXTEEN. Released by Date: 2 December 1941.	For action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine XXXXX Deferred
FOR Coderoom Decoded by A. A. MURRAY. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

020955

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Need sequences for Twentynine Thirty November purple

[Handwritten:] Have been sent: 29 Nov. at 2129 on 29 Nov. 30 Nov. at 2200 on 1 Dec.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (14) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2927.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 2 December 1941.	For action: OPNAV;	Priority XX Routine Deferred
To: Coderoom Decoded by WHITE. Paraphrased by	Information: CINCPAC. CINCAF. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority XX Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
 021100
 Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Cinc Second and Third in Takao Area X Comdr Southern Expeditionary Force in same Area X Broadcasts to fleet units now being sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition Tokio XX Alusna Tokio Six hundred and Shanghai Twenty three hundred both of the first no comment XX Ambassador Bangkok Thirtieth requested permission destroy all but limited number codes
 [Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by CY 27-41

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number: 2927.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 4 December 1941.	For action: OPNAV. COMFOURTEEN.	Priority: XXXXXX. Routine. Deferred.
FOR Coderoom Decoded by Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority. Routine. Deferred.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
 041502
 Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time SCT

TEXT

Five numeral intercepts subsequent to Zero Six Hundred today indicate change of cipher system including complete change differentials and indicator subtractors X All intercepts received since time indicated checked against all differentials three previous systems X No dupes

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone Extension Number 2027.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 5 December 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by WHITE. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

051402

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Fuji key for twenty-nine November indicator: Baker Yoke King Dog inter Three Fifteen Nineteen Twenty Sixteen Five Twentyone Seven Seventeen Eighteen Six Two Four One Twelve Eight Thirteen Eleven Nine Fourteen Ten X Form third period November two affirm Baker Cast Dog easy six affirm George hypo inter Seven affirm Eight affirm Nine affirm Baker Cast Ten Baker Thirteen affirm Dog easy Fox George fourteen affirm Baker Cast Dog Seventeen affirm Baker Cast Eighteen Baker Twenty Dog Twentyone Cast Twentytwo Cast Twentythree Cast XX Tokyo circular Twentyfour Thirtythree requires additional blanks in four love and five love X Key for Two December Baker Yoke Netat George Prep Fourteen Six One Twentytwo Eleven Thirteen four Twenty Twelve Five Nineteen Twentyone Seventeen Nine Three Sixteen Eighteen Eight Two Fifteen Ten Seven X Following form correct for Tokyo circular Twentyfour Fifty only One Baker Dog easy Two Baker Three Baker Four Baker Dog easy Fox George hypo Five Baker Six Baker Seven Baker Cast Eight Cast Nine Cast Ten Cast George Dog easy Eleven Cast Twelve Cast Fifteen Cast Sixteen Cast George hypo inter Seventeen Cast Dog Twentytwo affirm X Note SGPT repeat SGST is Maru Maru X Advise if you want circular Twentyfour Fifty Singapore attaches great importance to two messages mentioned above XX Tokyo circular Twentyfour Thirtythree of Twentyninth apparently in purple machine X Again request you furnish twentyninth sequence

[Handwritten:] sent in 29/2129

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Extension number	Addressees	Precedence
From: CINCAF. Released by Date: 6 Dec. 1941.	For action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Coderoom: 1311. Decoded by CANNING. Paraphrased by PURDY.	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

060006 CR 0132

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

TEXT

To differentiate C I traffic from others recommend you assign additional external indicator this use with RIP 66. This is necessary in order that decoding be done by proper personnel.

2nd Copy to 20G----

Distribution: 20G-----Action.
 Record copy: 20P-----20T-----
 Files: General-----CNO-----20A-----

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

SECRET

Naval message—Navy Department

Phone Extension Number 2027.	Addressees	Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN. Released by Date: 7 December 1941.	For Action: OPNAV.	Priority Routine XX Deferred
TOR Coderoom Decoded by WATCH OFFICER. Paraphrased by	Information:	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

071025

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
 Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date.....Time.....GCT

TEXT

New code for emergency use given in Tokyo serials Twentyfour Zero Nine X Two Four Twenty Three Question X and Twentyfour Fifty X Messages in p'ain language will contain one or more code words sufficient to communicate secret message X Example XX Quote "Japanese and blank troops clashed" end quote represented by code word Hijikata comma and Russia by Kubota XX A message similar to following would be sent X On fifteenth Secretaries Hijikata and Kubota have been appointed to duty in your office Stop XX All messages in this system to have word Stop Repeat Stop at the end instead of Owari X Forwarding you first two above despatches third sent this morning QX Key for Twentyseventh indicator Baker Yoke Hypo Baker Dog X Twelve Fourteen Seven Thirteen Nine One Nineteen Six Eight Seventeen Two Sixteen Eleven Three Fifteen Eighteen Four Ten Five total Nineteen X Where Singapore referenced Tokyo circular Twentyfour Thirtythree they apparently meant above Twentyfour Twentythree

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4) NAV REGS.

TOP SECRET ULTRA

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington 25, D. C., 4 Jul 1945.

Op-20-G-mg
 Serial 000761820
 (SC)AG-1(10)

MEMORANDUM

From: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).
 To: Adm. H. Kent Hewitt—Rm. 2750, Navy Bldg.
 Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbacher (Op-20-4).
 Subj: Dispatches—Forwarding of.
 Ref: Secret letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 3 July 1945, signed by H. Kent Hewitt.
 Encl: Duplicates of dispatches requested in the reference.

- In compliance with the reference, the following dispatches are forwarded:
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28)

CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28)
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23)
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F)
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun. 29)

Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches Intercepted Station S

2. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.

J. N. Wenger
 J. N. WENGER,
 Captain, U. S. Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
 Washington 25, D. C., 6 Jul. 1945.

Op-20-4-mp
 Serial 0003720
 (SC)A17-24(1)

From: The Secretary of the Navy
 To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant
 Subj: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
 Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
 Encl: (A) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive; Nos. 5257 to 5267, inclusive).
 (B) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing documents, CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23); and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F).
 (C) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing document, CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun 29).

1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C), containing the following documents, certified in jacket forms NJA 24, are forwarded herewith for use in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

Enclosure (A)
 Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive; Nos. 5257 to 5267, inclusive).

Enclosure (B)
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28); CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23); and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, encl. F).

Enclosure (C)
 CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jan 29).

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that enclosures (B) and (C) are classified TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these documents to this office is directed.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 59

CQ DE JVJ JUD
 PRESS DE JVJ/JUD HR NW
 BC AT 0800 DEC 3RD
 (The first part is missing)
 KYOOSANGUN KOOGKIO MEIZESIJJITU IJOONOGTOKU GENTI-
 NIOKERU
 SHOOKYOONO SOOKOKUWA IZENSINKOKUO KIWAME JIMII JUUDA-
 IKA SITUTUARUMO BIMYOONARU KOKUSAIKANKYOONI SIHAISARE
 KAROOJITE KEISIKIJOONO SHOOKYOO GASSAKUNO HATANWO
 BIHOOSITUTUARU JOOKYOODEARU TUGINI JUITIMATUCHUU WA-
 GAHOONO JISSISERU SHUYOOAKUSENJO MIRUNI MOTTOMO DAI-
 KIBIBONARUWA SANTOONANBUNI BANKYOSURU KYOOSANGUN
 SANTOOJU...OYOBI DAISYAKUJUGOSI (YAKUNIMAN) NITAISURU
 MONONISITE GOHIMIMEIYORI KAKANNARU SOOTOOSENWO

KYOOKOOSI SUDENI SONOSHURYOKUO HOTTONDOYAKUSI SALANI
 KONKYOTI FUKUME---SIKISHOKU TIKASOSIKINO EKIKETUNADO
 MOKKA SAKUSENWO KIZOKUCHUU DE---JUGATUGEJUNYO---JIS-
 SICHUUNO SADSEISHOO NA UNJARJ CHUUNO DAIKYUUJUGUN
 OYOBI DAIITISINI TAISURU FUNSE---SAKNAWA SONOGOCHAKU-
 CHAKU HNKAO KAKUDAICHUUDE ATTAGA WAGAGUNWA JUITI-
 GATUJUHI UMONKOONO DOOKUTUJINTINI YOTTE KESSITEKI
 TEKOOWO TUZUKERU TEKINII---KOOSI TEKISI SENGOHYAKU-
 GOJU HORYO NISENNIHYAKA SANJOUHATINO DAISENKAOGETA
 IPPCOWAGA KUUGUNWA KYOZETUSANAJU HI IRAIRENHI CHUUN
 ---OKERU OKUTIBAKUZEINI KOWOOSI HEAN. SOOKEI RE---O
 (TAMASITTAOARA) BUKOO (BUSITEGARA) KANYOO (ME---
 YOOSHOOO KAN---NI WAGAHOOYOKUK ANI SESTUSTUTUURU
 MATA HOKUSINOKEWU DAISNJI TIANKYOOKA UNDOOWA JUITI-
 GATUIT---I YOAI N WASTALI TENKAI---ALITUTU DAITJI DA
 --- MINSHUUNO JIELAYOKUNO KYOOKUTO SOOKYOO SISOOSENNO
 JUNBIKAN---O OOKUHYOOTO SERUNITAISU SALANI TAEKI KEI-
 ZAISENJO FUKASS---KANMI STINOJITOO A--- OUNI SASUME-
 RARE TUTUARI HOKUSSNO TIANNO KAKURITUTO KESZAIK-
 ETUNO TAMENI HONWUDOC---U IKAKUNARU JIKKOOWO MSAM
 ---KIKOTO KITISARRU RA AN JU---TUUKWASOREZKRE CEN-
 CHONA BOOKHOOJOSIMESI NITTBKNENWO GUKUMETE JUUITI-
 TUKI MATUNOENKEI TUUKANZAKKOO SOOGAKUWA GUSAN---JU
 ENWOSANSURUNI SOATTASU NAJA SEGINKENWA ROKUWOKUISEN
 GOHYAKLUMANEN (HAKUNENMATU GOWOKUHASSEN M NDN)
 TOKYUUZOKSETAIGIKENWA NIWOKUSSEN NADHYUJOUNE (SAKU-
 NENMATU ITIWOKUKYUUSNKYUUSYAKUMANEN) WOSEMESEMENTA
 MANSUU CHUUGINKENWA JUUITIKUI NIJUUIHIGENZAI JUUJO-
 UINANSEN GOHYAKUMANEN (SAKUNENMATU KYUUOKU NANASE-
 NYONHYAKUMANTMEN) NIEKIZOOSI CHUGOKURUGO JUNBI JUNBI-
 GINKOKENWA NIJUGOHI GENZAI KYUOKUNISEN MANYENI
 NODORI SAKUNENMATUNO NANAOKU ISSENMANWO HARUKANI
 UWAMAWATTA MYOOGI---KENWA NIJUHIENZAI IMOKU GOHYA-
 KUMAN (HAKUNENMATU KYUSENSANBYAKUKAN TONNA) KONOHO-
 KANI CHUUSINI OKERU GUMPYONO RYUTUDANAGA SOOTONI
 NOBORUTO MURLAREWUNODE JUITIGANA MATUNO ENKEITUUKA
 RYUTUDAKA HATIJUOKU TOPPAWA UGOKANUTOKORODEARI HON-
 NENMATUNO HAKKODAKAWA NAITEIDI---OOKEIHYAKUOKUYENNI
 NOBORUNO DEWANAIAKAA CHOMKUSAETEIRU AR DE JVJ

Bad echo and interference causing bad copy.

2338 P RD
 12275 KC

CQ DE JVJ

PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 0830 DEC 3RD.

DOMEI GAIKEI MUGI 164 217 224 746 782 794 WATAMI 285 294

294 KAWARAZU PARA KAWARAZU BEIMENSIKYOO NITIBEI KAIDANNO
 KEJZOKUWO KOOKANSITE BOOSEKISUJI NYUURURINZU SUOIKABU-
 SIKI SUJINOKAINI JOOSINSITA RONDONHATU KABUITIBAWA KYOKU-
 TOJOSEI NITAISITE YAYARAKKAN TEKITONARI KIHAIWA SIKKARITO
 NATTAGA JITUKADUHUSOKU NTORIKIKIWA IZENSHOORYOO KINBUTI
 SHOOKENRUI -WA KENCHOO KOOGYOOKABU KYOOCHOO KOKUNAI
 TETUDOOKABU UWAMUKI SEKIYUKABUWA SIKKARI NANAKINKOO
 KABUWA GAIEITEKENCHOO. KOOJOOGINKO KABUWANIPPOINTO HAN-
 GATAJOOKSIN GAIKOKUSAINO NAKADEWA NIHONSAITO SINASAIGA
 SANPOINTO NAIGAIKOOTOO SITANOGA MEDATTEA MATAI SA TOLA
 KIHAI RUPEE NAMARI KABU KOOSAI DORU TIRIKU KOMUGIKABU
 SIKYOMICHAKU DORU SANJIGENZAI 40324 524 IMI 40324 534 ATTOTA-
 TAZU AR NM TU DE JVJ VA VA

2350 G RD
 12275

Bad echo and interference plus weak sig.

0100 SKED

HR BC AT 1900 3 DEC. 1941

DOMEI HAMAITOMAERYORI 1500 NASI NASI 1538 1544 PARA
 GAIKEI ASA 5900 5900 URITES MATAI 3612 4008 3608 2404 NAMA-
 RI 5700 TOLA KIHAI RUPEE KABU MICHAKU DORU 40324 534 ATOTAT
 AZU TAIRIKU KAWARAZU PARA

004 WASINTONNI KAWAKAMIHATU NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISIWA
 UERUZO KOKUMUJIKANNO YOOSEINIYORI NIHIGOZENJUJI NIJUPPUN
 (NIHONJIKAN SANHIGOZENREIJI NIJUGOFUN) KOKUMUSHOOWO
 HOOMON DOOJIKANTO SANJUGOFUNNI WATATTE K AidANWOTOGETA
 MIGIKAIDANWA RUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOONO MUNEOUKE UERU-
 ZUJIKANGA SHOMONDAINI TUKI NIHONSEIFUNO SETUMEIOMOTO-
 META MONOTOMIRARERU UERUZUJIKI TONO K AidANWOOETA NO-
 MURA KURUSU RYOOTAISIWA KISHADANNI TORIKAKOMARE NAGARA
 TAKUMINI YOOTENWO HAZUSITE TUGINOGOTOKU NOBETA K AidAN-
 NO NAIYOONI TUITEWA NANIMO MOOSIAGERU WAKENIWAIKANAI
 WAREWAREWA TADA UERUZUJIKANNO GOWOKEICHOOSITANI SUGIN-
 AINODA

005 WASINTON NIHI KAWAKAMIHATU KOKUMUSHOO TOOKYOKUWA
 UERUZU JIKAN NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISI K AidAN ---- KATAT-
 UERUZUJIKANWA DAITOORYOONO MEINIYORI NOMURAKURUSU
 RYOOTAISIA NO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORYOONI HOOKOKUSURU-
 TAME NIHONSEIFUNI TAISI ARUSHUNO SHOOGOOWO NASITAMONOD-
 EARU

006 WASHINGTONNIHI KAW----KIHATU NOMURAKURUSO RYOOTAI-
 HI OYOBI UERUZUJIKANNO K AidANWA NIHUNOZEN JUJIGOGOFUN
 SHUURYOO KORENITUZUITE RUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOOWA SHOOGO
 SUTIMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKAN OYOBI
 KAZEDE IHIKIMORICHUUNO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO DAIRITO-
 SITE URERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI HOWAITOHAUSUNI SANSHUO MOTO-
 META MIGINIKANSI HOWAITOHAUSI TOOKYOKUWA (KAIGOOWA
 TANNI SHOHANNO UTLAWASE NARABINI KYOKUTOO JOOSEINO KEN-
 TOOWO OKONAUTAMEDE ARU) TOHAPPYOOSITA

007 SINGAPOORUNIHI SINGAPOORU SEIHOOWA NIHI EIKAIUNWA
 ARATANI KYOKUTOO KANTAIOHENSEI KOREFOMOTTE KATTENO SI-
 NAKANTAIO MO HOGANISHIME EIHONGOKU KANTAIOYOBI EITI-
 CHUUKAI KANTAITO DOOYOONOTIHO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA
 NAO KONOKANTAIWA EISINAKANTAI HARABINI HIGASHINDO KAN-
 TAINIKAWATTE KYOKUTOO HOOMENBOOBINI ATARUBEKI MONO-
 DEARI JIJITUJO GOOSYU NARABINI NYUJIHRANDO KANTAIMOK-
 ORENI HENNYUU SERABERUONOTO KAISERARERU

008 NYUUYOOKUNIHI EEPHI SINGAPOORU DENNICOREBA SINNINNO
 EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FUIRIPPUSU TOMASU
 FUIRIPPUSU TAISHOOWO NOSETA SINEISENTOOKAN PURINSU OBU
 UERUSUGOOWA SIREICHOOKANKIO KAKAGE JAKKANSEKINO YUURY-
 OKUNARU GUNKANTOTOMONI NIHI SINGAPOORUNI NYUUKOOSITA
 EIKOKUGA SENSOOJUNBINO TAME SHURYOKUKANWO KYIKUTOONI
 HAKENSITANOWA PURINSU OBU UERUSUGOOWA SAISHODEARU IPPOO
 SINGAPOORU TOOKYOKUWA HOKANIGUNKAN SUUSEKIGATIKAKU
 NYUUKOOSURU YOTEIDEARUTO HAPPYOOSITA
 NM TU DE JVJ/JUD.

0126 G TR
 15880
 MANUAL

PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 1030 DEC 3 RD

NOMEI 009 WASINTONNIHI NOMURA KURUHU RYOOTAISIWA
 UERYUZUJIKAI KAIKENNOTAME IHIGOZENJUJI NIJUPPUN KOKOMUSH-
 OONI TOOCHAKUSI TAGA MATIKAMAETA KISHADANNO SITUMONNI
 TAISITTEWA AKUMADE KOOSHONI HAIZENWO TUKUSUMUNE SIN-
 NATAIDODE OOSHUUSTA MAZU NOMURATAISWA IWAKU NIHONSEI-
 FUWA HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO TUE ARAYURU CAKUDOKARA
 SINCHONI JUKURYOSITERU NIHONNOTAIDOWA DEKIREBA SENSO-
 OWO SAKERUKOTONIARU SENSOOWA KESSITE NANIGOTOWOMO KAI-
 KETUSINAI SI NANIBITOMO SENSOOWO NOZOMUMONOWANAI) TUEDE
 KISHADANKARA KURUSUTAISINI IMADA DORYOKUSITE K AidANWO

SEIKOONI MITIBIKIURU KIBOOGA ARUTOWO OUMA TONOSITUMONGA
BETANONITAI SI TAI SIWA MOTIROMTOMOWAL

(Interference local)

RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKANOO SANSHUSU RUUZU
ERUTO DAITOORYOOWO CHUUSINNI ITIJIKAN JUGOFUNNIWATARI
SEV USHUNOUB U KAIGIGA OKONAWARETA MIGIKAIGINO NAIYOONI
TUITWA KANZENNI TINMOKUGA MAMORARETERUGA TAINIISEISAKU
KYOOGITO SINZERARET RU NAO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANWA KAZE-
NOTAME KOKUMUSHOO HOWAITOHA USU IZURE IMO KAOWODASA-
NAKAT #11 RONBONMNIHI EIKAIZUNSHOOWA GOOSHUUKANTAI SHO-
ZOKA OUNYOOKAN SIDONI ZOOGA (6730 TON) TKOUKISHUUKAN SHU-
TAIERUMARUKUGOO (9400 TON) TOGOOSHUU SUITKIDE KOSENSITA
KIEATOMONI TINBOTUSITAMUNE HAPPYOO SI TA SENTOONO JIJITUWA
HAPPYOOSARENAIGA JUITIGATU NIJUROKUCHI IZENXOBOOHITO
IWARE SIDONI GOO JOINWAZENBU UKUEFUMEIDAGA SHUTAIERU-
MARUKUGOO NORIKUMINWA ITIBU KYUJUIARETATO IWA RERU
#12 KANFERANIHI GOOSHUUS NIHIYORU JUNYOOKAN PARAMA-
TOA GOONO GEKITINNIKI TUGINOGOTOKU HAPPYOOSITA GOO
SURUUPU GATA KEIJUNYOOKAN PARAMATTAGOOWA (1060 TON)
SUIRANO KO GEKIOUKE GEKITINSARETA SHOOSAIWA IMADAFUMEI
#13 NYUUYOOKUNIHI NIHIYUUPII GABOOJUSI TA EIKOKUR IONI YO-
REBA HORENWA URAJIOSUTOKKU FUKINSUISUKU KOOKOOKINSI
KUIKI I SITEISITA MUNEHAPPYOOSITA #14 RONDONNIHI EISEIFUWA
SANHIYIGO KYOKUTOONIMUKE TUMIDASARERU EISHOOHINI TAI-
SITEWA SUBETEYUSHUTU KYOKAHEIO JISIURUMUNE NIHI HAP-
PYOO STA

#152 P AN
1588
MANUAL

PRESS DE JVJ HR BC AT 1100 DO

DOMEI #14 WASHINGTON WAGA RYOOTAISINO UERUZUJIKAN
HOOMONA TOKUNI RUUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOONO Y OKYUUGA KISONI
NATYMONODE BEIKOKU DAITOORYOOGA KANSHAIANO KYUUKAO TO-
TUJO TORIYAMETE UOOMUHUPURINGUSUYORI KIKANSURUTOYUU
KEUNO KOTOGQRADEMO SOOZOOTUKUTOORI DAITOORYOOGA NITI-
BEIKAIKANNO SUISINJOO NANRAKA JUUYOOJITAINO SENMEIONOTE
HISSUYOOKENTO SITAKOTOGA UKAGAWARERU SHOOSOKUSUJIMO
KAKU DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA MOND ANOSHORINI NORIDASITA
KOTOWA KAIKANNOSEIHIKI KIWAMET JUUY OOSEIGA ARUTOSI NIHI
TUGIN KNYAIO HYOOEMEISITA DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA KAIBANNI
KAINYUUSITE SAIKINNOJITAI SENNEIO MOTOMETA KOTOWA SONOIZI
SUKOBURU JUUYOODEARU #16 WASHINTONNIHI RUDAITOORYOOWA
NIHINO NITIBEI KAIKANNTUKI UERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI TAI SITO-
KUNI SITASIKUSHUJU ISJIOOKONATTA O TUTAERARERU DAKENI NI-
HINO DAITOORYOO SINUNKISHA KAIKENWA KONOTENNI SITUMONGA
SHUUCHUUSARE KONNITINO KAIKANDE TEISHUTU SARETA TAINITI
SHOOKAIWA SAIGOTUUCHUONO KEISIKIO TOTOAMONO KS MATAWA
KIGENTUKIDE KAITOOWOYOOKYUU SITAMONOKATONO KISH ADEAGA-
WANO SITUMONNITAIHI DAITOORYOOWA SORAWAMOTOOMO BAKA
ETA SITUMONDA BEIKOKUGAWANO TAINITI SHOOKAIWA MATOAKU-
TANNA RU TEICHOONARU SHOOKAINI SUGINAITO KARUKUKOREO IS-
SHUUSITA #17 SHANHAI KAWASEYORITUKI TAI EI TAIBEI KAWARAZU
GAUNPYOO NIJUHATIEN NINOITIURI NIJUKYUEN CHOODOKAI PARA
AKEI INOONS ONO TAKUSOOKENNINWA SENJI KASHOKURYOO SEISA-
KUNO JUUYOOSHNI KANGAMI NAIGAITIWO TUJITE IKYANSERU
SHOKURYOO SEISAKUWO KAKURITU SENTOSURUMONDE KONGO-
NOONDAI TOSITETUGINO GOTOKUKITAI SARETIRU HITOTU NAIGAITI
SHOKURYOO KOORYUONO KAKURITU JUURAINO SHOKURYOO KOORYU-
UGAYAYAMO SUREBAKAKKYO SHUGI WAZAWAI SAREKEIKAKU DOORI-
NOUNYOOGA YINAKATA JIJITUNIKANGAME KONGOWA SHOKURYO-
ONO HAIDUNWAMOTIRON SEISAN NTUITEMO KOORYUUSENTO SURU-
MONODEARU SIKASITE SEISANKEIKA NAI AN JUUIKKANEN
KEIKAKUWO KIJUNTOSI GAITSI MANSHUUKOKUWO TUJIIYAKU NIS-
ENROPPIYAKU MANKOKUZOOSAN KEIK AKUWO JISHISI MOTESHOKU-

RYOO JIKYUURITUNO KYOOKAWO HAKARU MONODEARU FUTATU
 IMINKOKUSAKUNO SUISIN NIJUKKANEN HYAKUMANKO NO TAIMANI-
 MIN KEIKAKUWA MYOONENDOKARA DAINIKI KEIKAKUNI DU
 (GOKANEN) NIJUUNIMANKONO NAITINOOMINWO SOOSITUSUBEKU
 IKIKONDEIRU MITTU NAIGAITI RINSEINOTOOGOO RINSEIGA (HAYA-
 SISEIJI) NOORINSHOO NOMINARAZU NAIMITOKUMU SONOTANIBUN-
 KATU SARETEIRUMONOWO ITIGENKA SURUKOTO YOTOU HIRYOO-
 GENNO TANKYUU CHOONSENSA OYOBIKYOOEI KENNAINOHIR YOO
 SINKYOOGENNO KAITAKUSURUKOTO NADODEARUGA KORENIYORI
 WAGANOO IN TAKUMURYOO GYOOSEIWA SOOGOOTEKINI SONOKOKU-
 SAKU WO JITUGENSIURU KOTOTONAROO PARA TOKYOMAEHIKE 1977
 771 661 NASI 649 526 TAKANE 1993 771 YASUNE 1987 766 578 794 NASI NASI
 897 869 TAKANE 279 798 517 659 811 873 KASUNE 576 793 517 659 897 867
 HAMAITOGENBUTU 1599 PARA

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DOMEI TOKYO WITUBUTUSOO A 141 151 481 299 555 599 319 758 745 576
 PARA 917 HANOISANHI NITIBEI KOOSHOOGA KIWAMETE KINPAKUSITA
 KOTOWA FUTUINCHOOYANO KANSINWOTAKAME TOOTI FURNUGO
 SINBUNWA NITIBEI KOOSHOOWOMEGURU NYUUSUO RENJ U TOPPUNI
 KAYAGETERUGA IPPANNONINKIWA KIWAMETE REISEBE OSI NITI-
 BEIKANYEGA JUUDAIKASI TAIHEIYOONI SAIAKUWITAIGA TOPPATU-
 SITEMO FUTUINNAIBUNIWA NANNO DOOYOOMONAKU MUSIRO NITI
 FUTUIN KYOODOODOOEI KYOOTEIWA SARANITIDANTO SONOTIKA-
 RAO HAKKISURUMONOTO IINERARITERU SUNAWATI ITIBUNIWA
 MADA HIYORI MITEKI TAIDOWO SUTEKIRINU MONGARUGA ZENTAI-
 TEKINI MITE NITIFU TUN KYOODOOBOOEI KYOOTEINO SEISINWO
 NINHIKISI JITAINO JUU AIKANI TOMONATE KYOOTEINO HINKAGA
 HAKKISARU BEIKIMONOTOSITE FUTUINKANPENMO HAKENGUN
 SHUNOODUMO EIBEINO BOORYAKUNI SINCHONARU CHUIOSARAI-
 REISEINI JITAINITAISHO SENTOSITERU YOMDEARU SIKAHITE WAG-
 AENTIGUN OYOBI TOKUHATAISIFUWA KIWAMETE KINMITUNI RENA-
 KUSI KYOKUMENNO SUINISOKUOO BANPANNOSOTINI IKANNAKIO
 KIHITERUGA FUTUINNOITIGA IWAYURU EIISI RAINNO TOKKAKU TIKE-
 INIARI GUNJIJOO SEIPIJOO TOMINI JUUY OOSEIO KAYUFAISITERUN-
 ODE KONGONO JOOSEINITAIBOSI KYOODOOBOOE KYOOTEIWA JISHI-
 TUTEKINI KYOOKASARERU MONOTO KITAISARERU (IKA) OYAKA
 SINGAPOORUNI SINGAPOORU SICHOWA NIHI EIKA I GUNWA ARATANI
 KYOKUTOO KANAIOHENSEISI KORENIKATUTENO EIK OKU SINAKAN-
 TAJOMO HOOGANSESIME EIHOONGOKUKANTAI OYOBI TICHUUKAI KAN-
 TAITO DOOYONOTIHO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA NAO SININ
 EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FIRIP PUSU SHOO-
 OOWO NOSETA SINCEISERTOOKAN PURINSUOBU UBRUSUGOO GA
 JAKKANNO YUURYOKU GUNKANWOHIKIITE NIHI SINGAPOORUNI
 NYUUKOOSITA WUSINTONNIHI NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISIWA NIHI-
 GOZEN JIJINIJUGOFUN KOKUMUSHOONI UERUZUJIKANWO HOOMON
 SANJUGOFU I NATATTE KAIANSITA KOKUMU TOOKYOKUWA MIGI-
 KAIAN SHUURYOOGO (UERUZUJIKANWA) DAITOORYOONO MEINI-
 CORI NOMURAKURUSU RYO OTAISINO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORY-
 OONI HOOKOKUSURUTAME NIHON SIFUNI TAISI ARUSUUNO SHOOK-
 AIONASITA MONODEARU) TOHAPPYOO WAGA RYOOTAISIMO KISHA-
 DANNO SITUMONNI TAISITE) WAREWAREWA TABA UERUZUJIKANNO
 HANASIO KEICHOOSITANI SUGINAI) TOKOTAETA

RUDAITOORYOOWA NIHISHOOGO SUTIMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKA
 N NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKAN UERU U KOKUMUJIKANWO HOWAIT-
 OHAUSU INSHOMTISI ITIJKANYONI WATARI TAINITISAKUO CHUU-
 SINNI KY OOGISITA RONBONNIHI EIKAIGUNHIOOWA GOOSHUUKAN-
 TAI SHOZOKU JUNYOOKAN SIDONIGOOGA (6730) FOKUKISHUUKAN
 SHUTAIERUMARUKU GOOTO (9499) GOOSHUU SUIKIDE KOSENSI-
 TAKEKKA SOOHOM TINBOTU SITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA SENTOONO
 JJITUWA HAPPYOO SARETENAI GA JUITIGATU NIJUROKUI IZENNO
 BOOHITOIWARERU NYUUYOOKUNI YUUPIECA BOOJUSITA EIKOKU

RAJIONIYOREBA SORENWA URAJIOSUTOK FUKINSUEKIO KOOKOO
KINSIKUIKINI SITEISITA MUNESAPPYOOSITA

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DOMEI GAI IS KA S U 521 275 118 BUENOSAIRE TOOTIEIKOKU
TAKSIKANWA HARUNJUUKUHI ITOOCHUUSHOOJI BURAKKURISUTO
NIKUWABRUMUNE HAPPY OSITA CHUUNANBE TUUJITESOOJIN
KAIHSNO KOKUHYOOWA SAIHHODEARU KONOKEKKA ITOCHUUTONO
IDANIKOROBNA UKETUMINIO KEIYAKUSEARU JONSON SHOOKA-
IWA HUTUKA KEIYAKUHAKIO MOOSIURETEKITA PARA
019 RONDONNIHI CHAAIRU SHUSHOOWA NIHINOKAINNI JINTEK-
IHIGEN CHOOYOOREIO TEIANHI JUHATISAIKAR
SUBETENODANSIO HEIEKINI CHOOOCHUURU KENCENWO YOOKY-
UUSIKATU JIJONNIYOTIWA ROKUJUSHAINO DANHIOMO SHOOSHU-
USIRU KOTOARUBEKI UNE FUGENSITA MICIHOOWA DANHINO-
MINARAZU NIUSHAIKARA S ANJUSHAIHADENO MIKONNOJOSINO
CHOOYOOWOMO KITEISITERUGA SENTOMWOYOBISEIMEINI KIKENARU
NINMU IWA MIZUKARA SIGANSITA FUJINOMIO ATERUKOTOTO
RUSAZUDEARU SIKASITE CHAATIRUWA CHOMBOSANYI KAUDAI
TEIANRIYUUTOSITE SANOGOTOKU SETUMEISITA HITOTU SINSETU
KOOJOONO JUUGYOOWA DOSHUUGA KINKYUUMO HITUY OONI SEM-
ARARETERU KOTO HITOTU TOOYONIOKERU GUNTAIOIJSI DOOH-
OOMENNI OKERU DAIKINONO SENTOOKEIZOKUNO JUN IOSITEOKU
HITUYOORUKOTO HITOTU INDONIOITE SHOOSHIUSI KUNRENSITU-
TU ARUTASUNO GUN AINITAISI SINSIKISOOBIO ATAEMA MARANUK-
OTO HITOTU EIKOKUNO ENSOSUSHI SEISANWIO KEIZOKUSESIMERU
ITUYOOR UKOTO HITOTU KUUGUNNARABINI KAIGUNZOOKYOO
KEIKAKUO KANSUISSE HITUYOORUKOTO HITOTU DOKUGUNNO TAIPI
Joorikusakusen Oyobi Kuusakunitaisi TAEZU BOODIOTUZUKIRU
SITUYOORUKO 020 BERURINNIMI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO
(TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU ROSUTOFUTIKUNO SENTOOWA HIKITU-
ZUKI KIEZOKUSANETRU HITOTU MOSUKUWA FUKINDEWA DOKUGU-
BUTAIWA SARANI TEKIJINFUKAKU KOOGHEH IO KIWAET A
RENINGURAADO FUKINDEWA MOONOOGKIO KOOATTANOTI MATA
O DASHHUTUO KITOSITI
OYOSI HYOOKETUSERU RAWOCAKOWOOWO YUKUTEKI YUSOOBUTAI
BA KUGEKISI SENTOOKI BAKUGEKISI
MARABINI SEOK ROKAKU HAKA
SANVEYIKA

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01 Tokyo 2/12 officially announced Yoshiaki Hatta former Minister Commerce Industry appointed new Minister Railways assuming post hitherto held concurrently by Viceadmiral Ken Terajima Communications Minister stop Also announced position Minister Overseas Affairs will be transferred to Hiroya Ino Minister Agriculture Forestry stop Latter hitherto concurrently held by Shigenori Togo Foreign Minister

02 Manilas 2/12 Manila bulletin reports high military authority close United States Far eastern forces emphatically declared quote there's been no general alert unquote in connection with reports United States forces Philippines been ordered standby for action.

03 Hsinking 2/12 five Soviet soldiers crossed border into Manchoukuo territory 1000 yesterday at point forty—South Tungning eastern Manchoukuo twas reported stop Said Japanese garrison troops shot dead two trespassers drove back three into Soviet territory.

04 Bangkok 2/12 Japanese Ambassador Teiji Tsubokami after meeting Thai-premier Luang Pabul Songgram this morning told press Thai premier told him

he regretted quote malicious propoganda spreading rumors Thailand Ha— unfriendly feelings toward Japan unquote

95 Berlins 2/12 high command communique Nazi forces driven deep Moscow defenses at more points however no details revealed sometime claimed more than nine thousand British prisoners including three generals taken in Libya added eight one four British tanks one two seven planes destroyed.

96 Londons 2/12 Admiralty announced six eight three zero ton Australian cruiser Sydney sunk in clash with German raider Seelion which also sunk added action occurred sometime before 26/11

97 Washington 2/12 Japanese Ambassadors Nomura Komsu conferred with Undersecretary State Summer Welles more than thirty-five minutes this morning stop All declined reveal nature todays discussion however learned United States made certain inquiries to Japanese government regarding situation in South seas stop After conference Willes immediately called on President Roosevelt and held lengthy conference.

98 Londons 2/12 Britain Deci—Faded out completely

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13 Tokyo 3/12 United States probably believes she effectively restraining Japan by concentrating her naval force in Pacific but as irony fate would have it result is 80 percent United States Fleet quote immobilized unquote in Pacific while Germany been blessed with golden opportunity to give full play her naval activity in Atlantic writes naval editor Yomiurishimbun in front page today stop. Yomiuri editor thinks some eighty percent United States Navy now concentrated in Pacific consists seven or eight battleships three aircraft carriers some dozen out of fifteen heavy cruisers over fifty destroyers more than thirty submarines and large number auxilliary vessels all which now standing by Hawaii in addition two or three battleships and other units standing by west coast bases stop. Reviewing Japanese American negotiations Yomiuri editor opines United States apparently means to maintain peace in Pacific until 1946 when her two ocean fleet completed stop. Tightening ABCD encirclement against Japan as they do United States and Great Britain now throwing covetous eyes at Soviet fleet Far East which they wait to drag into ABCD camp stop. Yomiurishimbun however asserts quote its problematical whether Soviet Union play into Anglo American hands Soviet naval forces Far East consists more than hundred vessels including one cruiser five destroyers some ninety submarines two submarine bases and several river gunboats torpedo boats and minelayers and special service vessels in estimated Yomiurishimbun editor who outpoints Great Britain and United States paying special attention Soviet underwatercraft and air force stop. Yomiurishimbun declares quote survey Pacific situation clearly shows Japan seriously menaced by ABCD encirclement which United States tightening in order to realize her unholy design stop. But Japanese nation calmly watching situation with implicit confidence reposed in imperial navy and army especially since both Prime Minister and concurrently War Minister General Tojo and Navy Minister Admiral Shimada assured nation before recent Diet session that full preparations been completed unquote Para.

14 Tokyo 3/12 Understood Vice Admiral Seizo Sakouji former minister air force ministry be appointed President semiofficial Imperial Oil Company succeeding Yoshiaki Hatta who appointed minister railways yesterday Para.

15 TOKYO 3/12 Financial experts expect total value yen linked currencies at end this year will top yen ten billiard mark inclusive Yen six billiard worth Bank of Japan notes yen seven hundred fifty million Bank of Korea notes yen two hundred fifty million Bank of Osaka notes yen billiard three hundred million notes Bank of Manchoukuo yen billiard notes Federal Reserve Bank China and yen hundred twenty million Bank of Mongolia notes stop. Incidentally its revealed circulation yen linked currency Japan controlled area East Asia at end of November exceeded yen eight billiard.

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002 SHUUGINGIINO NINKIWA IKKANENKAN ENCHOONO HOORITUNI-
YORI MYOONENSANGAT SANJUITISO MOTE MANRYOOSURU KOTONI
NATTERUNODE JIKYDU KUSERU ORIKARA YOTEINOORI SOOINKY-
OWO SIXOOESRUKA INAKI UTEWA GIMONWO UGA SEIFUTOO-
KYOKUTO SITEWA CCHOYUJINO BAYWNOITWO SHUUGINGIINNO
SOSENKYOWO OKONAUHOOSINDE NOZONDERUKOTO WA CHUUMOKU-
SARERU SUNAW NITROSENYEKIO SALMO SEIN KOKUNO NOTINIOIT
SOOSEKYOWO SIKOOSITA REIGARUNODE SEIFT T OKYOKUTO SITWA
HIJOO JIKYOKU NOITE KOKUMIN SEKATURYOKUO HATUYOOSURU
KOTOWA HITUYOONA KOTODEARUTO YUU TATEM MOTOZUKI
KAKUBETUTNO SISHOONAKI KAGIRI SOSENKYOWO OKOSAUHOOS-
INDE NOZONDERU TADASI SONOIZENNI SOUG G E SENKY-
OHOONO KAISEOOKONAUKA INAKANIUITWA MOKKANOTOKORO ZER
ONGONOJOOSEINE OOJIN RUIKOONOYOUBEAU PARA

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KONGONOJOOSANI OAJTE TADOWO KETIESUR IKOONOYOODEARU
PARA TOKYO YORI 1109 770 NAS 777 744 726 IMI 1109 770 NASI 777 744 526
OOSAKA YORI H 803 519 661 819 872 IMI 585 803 519 661 819 872 PARA AR
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DE C 4 BT DOMEI SARUJUGATU SHOJUN KAISISARAT SAOOSHOO-
NANBU KYOOSANGUN GEKIMIE WA CHAKUCHAKU SUSUMERARE
IMAYA DAINEDANKA HAI UGA JUITIGATU MATUJINUMADENI HAN-
MESSRU SOGOOSEN KWA TEKISE 2446 IMI 2446 50RYO BS IMI 685
ROKUJUKENI JUUNI YOOHOO 1116 IMI 1116 WOKAZOETERU RONDON-
NIHI IMKKGUNSHOO HAPPYOO EI KESUIJOO KANTEIWAS TIKHU-
UKAIDE IGOSOSENDANWO KOOGEDI SYNEYIKUTIKUKAN ISSH
ISOOSENIDS GEKITIO ROOMANIII IGU BU HAPPYOO IRAIGEKI
TOBURUKU OKIDE EIJUNYOOKAN ISSEKIO GEKITOSIA SHANHAISANHI
SHANHA ZAI YUULJIN YAKUYONHYAKU GOJUMEIWA SANI OOTJ
HAYAGG KONKE YE GAJPOORUNI AI HIKIAGENO DAI-
BUBUNWA FUJOSIDE IMADA STO UHYAKU MEINO ZANRYUU-
SINERU SHANHA HI HOO HIKIAGENO MEIIOUKETA ZAIS KAKO

MOKKA SONOJUNBEINO EISGA SINYORI ZERO KOM BA
RANYIN PANAMASENMO KORENITUIZUI SUBU KONOKEK A SHAN-
HAIJW TU YOKU YORI KANZENNI KAKU USARERU KOTONINRA
ZAINI ANT OOWA SINKOKUNA MONOGAAROO NOOFOOKKUNHI
RARUFU BAADO IMI RAA BAADO JI HOWA NIHTOOTIDE
ENZETUTOOKONA HYOONO KIKIO KYOOCHOOSEIA NOTI SANOGOTOKU
NOBETA BEIKEIGUNWA TAI YOO NI FUSHOOJIGA OKOREBA SOREWA
SHOOKIBONA MONODE WANAI KOTOWORIKAIISI BANZENNO JUN-
BIONASSIERU BEKAGUNWA KESSITTENONNO JIBUYOKUO KAS-
HOOHY OOKA SITEW MATA EKN AT TAIESYOONI OITWA MUTJKIO
KGUNDEWANKU KONOTAME BEIKOKUWA SONOKAIUNWO TAIHEYO-
ONI SHUUCH UU AZENKAWO ER KUNATA NYUUYOOKUSAN
SANHINO NYUUYOOKU TAIMUSUWA FGOOSHUU NYUWIRANDEOGA
BEIKOKUNI KUUGUNYI NARABIN KYUUKYUIE KYOYOOSURU KEN-
NIUKI TOOJISHAKANNI RYOOKUAGA SERIUS HOOJITERU AR
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1543 1547 ? 1507 1520 1530 1543 1547 PARA 003 MARUMARUKITIXON WAGA-

ARAWASI MARUMARUKIWA SANHIGOGOMO KAISEIORISITE TAIKYO-SHUTUDOO KANSUIJOORYUU SENSEISHOO ANKOO (HAUSAKA EYA-SUNOYASU) HI OJOOWO KUSSHUUSI HIKOOJOO HOKUTANNO SANROKUNI KOOTIKUHARETA TIKAN ROOOKOTO DANYAKUKONI KYUUKMOKA , , , , , , KYUUKMOKA BAKUGEKIO HANPUKU OBITADASHI KOKUENNO TATINOBORUNOWO KAKUNIN SARANI HIKOOJOONO FUZOKUSEB FUZOKUSETUBIO KANPUNAKIMADE BAKUSAISITE ZENKIYUUYUU KIKANSITA KONOHIGOZENNO HOOKEI BAKUGEKINIMO GOGONO ANKOO BAKUGEKINIMO TEKIKUGUNWA HENYEISAEMISEZU WAGAARAWASINO RAISHUUNI OSORFONASI IZUREMO SEITOHOOUMEN OKUTIHKOOJOONI TONSOOSITA MOYOODEARU 004 OOKURASHO-ODEWA KONKAI HONNEDO KOKUMIN CHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUO KAITEI CHOTIKUNO SHOOREINO KYOOKATETTEINI TUTOMETERUGA KORENITOMONAI HOOKOKUSAIKEN NARABINI CHOTIKUSAICENNO GENKOO HAKKOOGENDONO KAKUCHOOWO KOORYOSI HOOKOKUSAIKEN NITUITEWA GENTKOO GOWOKUENNO GENDOWO BAIGAKUNO JUUKUENNI HIKIAGERU KOTOTOSI MIGINTOMONAI RINJISIKIN CHOOSEIHOO KAINSIKANSURU HOORITUANWO KITARUBEKI KITARUBEKI TUUJOOGIKAINI TEISHUTUSURU KOTONI NAITEISITA SUNAWATI RINJISIKIN CHOOSEIHOONI MOTOZUITE SAKUNIEHARUYORI HAKKOOSARETERU HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOAGAKUWA HONNENJUITIGATU MATUNIOITE SANWOKUISSEN NANAHYAKUMANYEN NITASHI HAKKOORYOKURA ITEMOKUHASSEN SANBYAKU MANYENTO NATTERUGA KOKUMINCHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUNO ZOODANITOMONAI HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOO ZOOKAGA YOSOOSARERUNODE KONKAI HAKKOOGENDONO BAIGAKU KAKUCHOOWO DANKOOSURU KOTONI HOOSINWO NAITEISITA MONODEARU SIKASITE CHOTIKUSAIKENNI TUITEWA DAINANAJURUKU TUUJOOGIKAINI OITE HAKKOOGENDOWO GOWOKUENYORI GENKONO JUUKUENNI HIKIAGE SONOHAKKOOGAKUWA JUITIGATUMATUNI OITE GOWOKUGOSEN HAPPYAKUMANYEN TONATTEORI HAKKOORYOKUWA GENZAINAO YONWOKUYONSEN NIHYAKUMANYEN WONOKOSITERUGA RAINENDONIOKERU CHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUWA HONNENDONO HYAKUNANAJU OKUENYORI SARANIBOOCHOO SURUMONOTO YOSOOSARERUNODE HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOOGENDO KAKUCHOOTO HEIKOOSITE CHOTIKUSAIKENNO HAKKOOGENDONI TUITEMO GENZAINO JUUKUENYORI GOQWOKUENTIDOWO KAKUCHOOSURU KOTOGA KOORYOSARETERU AR NM TU DE JVU/JUD

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DOMEI 005 SUANHAIYONHI KAWAHYORITUK TAIETAIVEI WARAZU GUNPYOO NIJUKYUEN CHOODOURI NIJUKYUEN YONNOITIURI 006 BERURINSANHI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO (TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU MOSUKUWA SENSEDEWA DOKUHOHIE OYOBI SENSABUTAIWA KYOORYOKUNARU BAKUGEKIKI NARABINI KYUUKOOKA BAKUGEKIKITAITO AIKOWOOSITE SEKIGUNNO GANKYONARU TEIKOO OYOBI BUNSANTEKI HANGEKIO HAIJOSITUTU SARANIGENSINNI SEIKOOSITA HITOTU MIGISENTOODE DOKUGUNWA SEKIGUNSENSHA NIJUDAIO GEKIHASITA HITOTU SOREN OOGATAYUSOSEN ISSEKIWA FINARANDOWANDE DOKUFINRANDO RYOOKOKUNO KIRANIFURETE TIMBOTUSITA (TAISEN) HITOTU DOKUKUGUNWA EIHONDO SHUHENNO SUIKIDE EIOOGATASHOSEN ISSEKIOSHUGEKI DAISSNSHOOWO ATAETA HITOTU DOKUKUGUNWA NIHYORUYORI SANHI MIMAINIKAKETE EIKOKU NANSEIKAIGANNO KOOWANSISETUNI MOBAKUOKUWA ETA 007 MOSUKUWASANHI MOSUKUWA HOOSOWA TOKUBETUSENKYOO HAPPYOOE NANSUSENSEN SENKYOONITUKI SANHI TUGINOGOTOKU HOOJITERU ROSUTOFUTIKU NITE DAIHANGEKISENNI DETA SEKIGUNWA TAGANAROOU TAGANROGUNI TOTOMONI FUKIN YONJUKKASONWO DAKKAN-SITA KAKUTE SEKIGUNNO KOOGKIO SOSISENTOOSURU DOKUGUNNO-

KITOWA KOTOGOTOKU FUNSAISARE DOKUGUNAWA SARANI SEIHOO MARIUPORINI ? MARIUBORITIN MUKATTE KAISOCHUUDEARU KONOSENTOODE DOKUGUNWA SISHOOHA ROKUMANYI JOOWO DASITA 008 BERURINSHANHI DOKUOUSIREIBU SANHI HAPPYOONIYOREBA RIBIA SENSENNO SUUJIKUGUNWA TOBURKUTOONANDE NYUJIIRANDOGUN IKKOSIDANWO HOOISENMIETUSI HORYOTASUUOETEA NAO DOKUSIWA RIBIASENKYOONI TUKI MANMANTARU JISINWO HYOOMEISI SUUJIKUGUNWA GANKYONARU KOSENNOKEKKA EIGUNNO KOUGEKISAKUSENWO FUNSAISITATO NOBETERU PARA AKEI SHOKOSHOD-EWA SENYISEIHINNO HAIKYUUKIKOO SEIBIO CHAKUCHAKU SUSUME-TEIRUGA KONOUTI MOOSEISEIHIN BUMONNITUITEWA TUGINOGOTOKU TEAMITO MOOFUKATAKAKE KEORIMONO KEORIKISEIFUKU (SUDENINARU YOOFUKU) NOYONSHUNO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHAO SETURITUSURU KOTONIKETTI REMO KINJITOCHUNI HOKKINKAIWU HIRAITA HONGETUCHUNI SORITUSOKATO KAISAISURU YOTEIKEARU HITOTU NIHON TEAMSITO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA SIHONKIN SANBYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI JUNKEITO JINKENGI-KEITO SUFUGIKEITOWO TORIATUKAU HITOTU MOOFUKATAKAKE CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA SIHONKIN HYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI HITOTU KEORIMONO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA SIHONYISSENMANANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI IPPAN KEORIMONONO HAIKYUO TRIATUKAU HITOTU KEORIMONO KISEIFIKU SEIZOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA GIHOKIN GOYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI KISEIFUKUNO SEIZOTO HAIKYUNIATARU AR NM TU DE JVJ VA

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4 Dec 1941

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PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JVJ JVJ JVJ HR NW BC AT 1100 DEC 4TH DOMEI (GAIKEI) NAMARI 5712 .5712 KOMUGISIKYOO HAJIME KABUITI-BANO KENCHOO KATAGATA GAIKOKUSIKIN TOODEINO KANWANOUWASA KAKOOGYOOSHANO KOOJUOYOB ISEINANGENBUTU GYOO-SHAGA KIROKUTEKINA TAKANEDE KAITUKETERU TONOHIRETE KAIKIIPPAN TEKINIMINAOSI TAGAHIKEGIWA RIGIURINI MIMAWARETE ISSAIHANRAKU PARA 009 WASINTONSANHI BEIKAIN YOSANYIINKAIWA SANHI RIKUKAIGUNHI BUKITAIYOHOO KANKEIGYO-0SEIHI KOKUBOO KANKEIJUUTAKU KOORO (OYAKE MITI) NARABINI DOORYOKUSISETU KENSETUHNADO ISSAINO KOOGI KOKUBOOYOSANWO FUKUMU HATIJUOKUDORUNO TUIKAGUNJI YOSANANWO KAKETUSITA DOOYLLSAN SEIRITUNO AKATUKINIWA 1940 .1940 NEN ROKUGATUIRAI SEIFUNO KOKUBOOKANKEI GENKIN SISHUTUKEIYAKU KENGUNAWA JITUNI ROPPYAKUHATIJU OKUDORUNO KYOGAKUNI TASSURU SINKOKUBOO TUIKAYOSAN UTIWAKE SANOTOORI (TANYI HYAKUMANDORU) HITOTU RIKUGUNSHOYOSAN 5127 ? 5127 HITOTU KAIGUNSHOYOSAN 1129 ? 1129 ITATU BUKITAIYOSAN 1555 ? 1556 HITOTU PANAMAUNGA DAISANKOOMON KENSETUHI 104 ? 104 HITOTU KOKUBOOKOORO KENSETUHI 129 ? 129 HITOTU HIKOOJOO SINSETUHI 50 ? 50 HITOTU KOKUBOOKANNEI JUUTAKU KENSETUHI 10 ? 10 HITOTU GUNJUKOOGYOYOO DOORYOKUSETUBIHI NARABINI TISUKOOJHI 87 ? 87 HITOTU SONOTA 72 ? 72 KEI 8264 ? 8264 010 MOSUKUWANIHI SAKINI KUIVISHAFUNI TOOCHAKUSITA SIKORUSUKI BOOMEI POORANDO DAITOORYOOWA NIHI KUURO MOSUKUWANI TOOCHAKUSITA DODAITOORYOO MOSUKUWA HOLL NO MOKUTEKIWA AS COMMING AS..... 0215 GCT.

0220 HR NW MOSUKUWANI TOOCHAKUSITA DOKAITOORYOO MOSUKUWA HOOMONNO MOKUTEKIWA SUTAARIN GICHOOO KAIWANWO TOGERUTAMETO MIRARITERU PARA HAMAITOGENBUTU 1500 ? 1500 OOSAKAMAHIKE 587 801 516 661 820 874 ? 587 801 516 661 820 874 TAKANE 590 804 519 661 821 874 ? 590 804 519 661 821 874 YASUNE 584 798 516 661 812 870 ? 584 798 516 661 812 870 PARA TOKYO 1113 773 663 767 644 526 ? 1113 773 663 767 644 526 TAKANE 1115 775 ? 1115 775 YASUNE 1105 770 ? 1105 770 PARA AR NM TU DE JVJ

0225 12275 GOOD VS

4 DEC 1941 5262

SOOSAWA AKUTENKOOWO OKASI TUZUKERARETETAGA YONHIASANI-TARI KANTONNO SOOSAHONBUNI (KANTONSHOONANBU TANSUI TOO-HOKUHO SANJUKKIRONO SANSOKUNI KATAYOKUNO SOONANKIRA-SIKI MONOWO HAKKENSITA) TOKYUUDENARI GOO'OOKAHITE YUUR-YOKUNA SOOSATAIGA SITUDOOSITA) KAIKEI) KABUSIKISIKYOO SAKUHIKOOTOO ATOUKETE HAJIMEZITUYONA RIGUIURIGA ARISES-KOOKABU TETUDOOKABU HITTOONI SITAOSITINKI TIJIHUAHTEI NEUGOKIWAYKOOAI KUGUTONATTA KOREWAIPPOOKE TEUDOOHIG-YOONO KAIKETUNARABINI TUYOKITEKINA SENKYOKUJOOHOO TOYU-UTUYO ZAIRYOOGAATA NIMOKAKAWARAZU TAHOOTETUDOO HIGY-OKKAIKETU NITOMONAU TINGINZOOGAKUO MAKANAU TAMENOKAKY-AKU UNTINHIKILAGE GAKYOKASARERU JIKINARABINI SONOTEIDOGA IMADAGIMONDEARI MATASEIHUNO TOOSEIKYOOKA ZOOZEIMONDA-INO NARIYUKIGA HAUNSIARETA TAMEDEARU MOTTOMOSIKYOO SONOGONZENJI KYOOCHOOTONARI IPPARNI ITIDORUMIMAN GATA-HIKIMODOSI NAKANIWAITINAI SI SANDORUGATA KOOTOOSITA MONO-MOATTA NAONIHON KOOSHASAIWA TOOKYOOSI GOBUHANNO ITIDO-RUYASUNO HOKAMEDATTA UGOKINAKATTA PARA HAMAITOMAEHIKE 1510 1524 1535 1544 1549 PARA AR NM TU DE JVJ/JUD

12275 GOOD 0322 VS

0245

JJC DE JYD

HR

DOMEIPRESS DOMEIPRESS DOMEIPRESS

07 TOKYOS 4/12 01 TOKYOS 3/12 TOJO GOVERNMENT INTENDS HOLD GENERAL ELECTION NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRATION OF EXTENDED TENURE OF MEMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 ? 3/31 ASAS 3 CP CP CP DE JJC/JYD

DOMEIPRESS 01 TOKYOS 3/12 TOJO GOVERNMENT INTENDS HOLD GENERAL ELECTION NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRATION OF EXTENDED TENURE OF MEMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 ? 3/31 UNLESS UNFORESEEN SITUATION ARRISES TWAS AUTHORITATIVELY LEARNED PARA 02 WASHINGTON'S 3/12 IN FIRST LENGTHY STATEMENT REGARDING JAPANESE AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS SECRETARY STATE HULL IN PRESSCONFERENCE REVEALED PURPOSE DOCUMENT HANDED JAPANESE ENVOYS LAST WEEK WAS TO CLARIFY BASIC ISSU INVOLVED IN TALKS AS WELLS END CONFUSION ARISING FROM ACTIONS UTTERNCES OTHER GOVERNMENTS STOP ANSWERING FURTHER QUERIES HULL SAID HAD NO INFORMATION WHEN JAPANESE REPLY BE FORTHCOMING STOP ALSO TOLD REPORTERS HE UNABLE GO INTO DETAILS WHEN ASKED IF JAPANESE ANSWER ROOSEVELT INQUIRIES HAVE MAJOR BEARING ON WHETHER TALKS CONTINUE PARA 03 NEWYORKS 3/12 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM INTERCEPTED NAZIRADIO CLAIM GERMAN TROOPS WITHIN TWENTY SEVEN MILES MOSCOW HOWEVER ADMITTED QUOTE STRUGGLING AGAINST COLD INDESCRIBABLY BAD ROADS AS WELLS DESPERATELY FIGHTING ENEMY UNQUOTE PARA

04 TOKYOS 3/12 ALL JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN HONGKONG DECIDED EVACUATE AND RETURN JAPAN WITHIN FEWDAYS ASAHIS HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT REPORTED PARA 05 WASHINGTONS 2/12

DAVY DEPT BRITISH ADMIRALTY ANNOUNCED APPROACHES SINGAPORE MINED NAVY DEPARTMENT SAID MINED AREA EXTENDS OFF SOUTHCOAST JOHORE AND VESSELS MUST ENTER THAT AREA OWN RISK PARA 06 BLTIMORE 2/12

DAVID LAWRENCE WELLKNOWN COMM WITH BALTIMORE SUN ASSETS ALTHOUGH CHANCES JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS COLLAPSING ANY MOMENT CANNOT DISMISSED NEVERTHELESS LONG AS THERE DIPLOMATIC TALKSNG THERE WILL REMAIN HOPE PECE AND AFTER FURTHER XXXXXX EXCANGES DOCUMENTS MEMORANDUMS SOME FORMULA MAY FOUND AND AT END CONVERSATION SOME OTHER

STEP INTERPOSED MAY SUCCEED MAINTAINING PEACEFULL RELATIONS ON DAY TO DAY OR WEEK TO WEEK BASIS PARA 07 TOKYOS 3/12 THAIMBASHY DENIED FOREIGN REPORTS ALLEGING THA MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CONFERRED WITH MALAY MILITARY AUTHORITIES STOP EMBASSY DECLARED QUOTE THER IS NO TAUTH ABOUT THEALAND SENDING MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE WITH BRITISH MALAYSTATES COMMAND UNQUOTE END DOMEI AR.

13640 BOOR
0310 VS

4 Dec 1941.

CQ CQ CQ DE JUP/JAP
0400 TP/ JAP
0407
PRESS PRESS DE JUP/JAP
HR NW BC AT 1300 DEC 4TH

COPYRIGHT DOMEI 09 TOKYO 4/12
KOKUMINSHIMBUN DISCERNs IN AMERICAN MOVES INCRUDEING PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT QUOTE INQUIRIES UNQUOTE MADE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT QUOTE AMERICAN MOTIVES PLAYING FOR TIME TO TIGHTEN ABCD ENCIRCLEMENT AGAINST JAPAN ON ONE HAND ON OTHER TO SHIFT BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN WASHINGTON TALKS TO JAPAN STOP KOKUMINSHIMBUN ASSERTS THERES NO NECESSITY TO MAKE ANY REPLY ROOSEVELTS INQUIRES OUTPOINTING QUOTE THREPOINTS BASIC PRINCIPLE JAPANS FOREIGN POLICY ENUNCIATED BY PRIMEMINISTER TOJO BEFORE RECENT EXTRAORDINARY SESSION DIET AND ALSO SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR FO KURUSU TO WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FORM CALCULATING EXPEDIENCY WORKED OUT OVERNIGHT BUT CONTRARIWISE REPRESENTS WARNING SERVED ON UNITEDESTATES ON BASIS JAPANS LOFTY AIPERATIONS AND FIRM DETERMINATION STOP WHILE JAPANESE AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON WASHINGTON KOKUMINSHIMBUN DECLARES JAPAN CANNOT LET GO UNCHALLENGED MOVES FRANTICALLY PURSUED BY ANGLOAMERICA STOP PAPER ASKS QUOTE WHAT MEANS PRINCEWALES ARRIVAL SINGAPORE QUERY WHAT MEANS MILITARY ARRANGEMENT MADE BETWEEN CHUNGKING AND UNITEDESTATES WITH REGARD T WESTERN CHINA QUERY WHAT MEANS AMERICAN LEASE THREE BRITISH ISLANDS INDIAN OCEAN QUERY WHAT MEANS TIGHTENING OF WARPREPARATIONS AUSTRALIA PHILIPPINES OTHER ANDLAOAMERICAN POSSESSIONS PACIFIC QUERY UNQUOTE KOKUMINSHIMBUN CONCLUDES QUOTE ITS NECESSARY THAT JAPAN KEEP UP STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO DISPEL AMERICAN MISUNDERSTANDING HER INTENTIONS GAT NOLESS NECESSARE IS ON PART JAPAN UNQUOTE STOP ARGUING SIMILAR VEIN HOCHISHIMBUN CON TENSE SITUATION PACIFIC MUST ASTCRIBED ANGLOAMERICAN PREPARATIONS FOR UGORESSIVE WAR THEREFORE ANGLOAMERICAN MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBLETY FOR PACIFIC CRINIS IF ONE EVER COMES TOKYO 4/12
ARENTINE GEOVERNMENT NOT REP JAPANESE WROPOSALS FOR RESEWARL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TWO RICHEISCLOSED UPON RECEIPT OFFICER REPORTSTOP JFFICIALSSAIDINFORMATION FOR DUENO DESCRIBED PRESS PORTS THAT ARGENTINE DECEISED TRADE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN RESULT CONTRACT AUTHORIZING UNITEDESTATES ARRINTINGS ENTIRE SUPPORT PRODUCTS AS QUOTE GAOUNDALES UNQUOTE SINCE QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS FOR RESEPARL STILL JAPENSES ARRIVAL 4/12 FORMATIONS JAPANESE NAVALBOMBERS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON DIVEBOMBED CHINESE AIRFILEDS ANKANGRN SHI PROVIDCE STOP ADDED AN JAPANESE
CQ DE JAU2/JUO
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JAU2/ JUO JAU2/JUO
HR NW BC AT 2100 DEC 4TH BT COPYRIGHT DOWN W TOKYO 4/12
AUTHORITATVES COMMANTNG ON SECRET CORDELL HULL RE CO

REFERENCE 3/12 IMI 3/12 FRANKLY HULLS SAME ONE JA AMERICAN
TALKS ASSERIGN ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONTEN OF
TALKS BETWEEN TOKYO WAS EX EE LY UNTIMELY AT TH I CAL OF
JAPANESE AMERICAN NEGOTIAONAS SOP HULLS REPIE OF PUR-
POSE OF DOCUMENT HANDEL W SE E VOYS THE SE THEURCES WAS
INCOMPRECHENSIBLE ADDED ATHE WHE U
DERSO OUTCOME OF CURRENT TALKS STOP ADEN REVELATON OF
PARLEYS WGECH CONUDD W UNDESTAD MUURL CONFIDENCE
FURTHER THAT D A FUTURE PROSPECT OF TALKS STOP THEY
SAD THAT DESSPOIDTD OVER UNSSANES QUOTE SUPPORT TIME
DOCTR TOACTUALITISE FARST ADDIED MAIT INGRESSID WITH
GREATEST CAUTION PARA

17TOKYO 4/12 PRIEMIER EXPRESSED SHOCKED SURPRISE THAT
EXPRESSIONS REGARDS FUTURE NEGOTIONS AS RESULT HULLS
TALK 3/12 STRESSING UNSTATES CONCERNING BASIC ISSUES AND
CRITIZE GERMANY WARASS ACTIONS STOP ONE PROMINEANCE
WASHINGTON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPENED THREE WAY EAST-
ERN ECONOMY CONFERENCE STOP NEWS PAPERS SAW UNSTATES
WOULD DROP QUOTE UNRELISTIC PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE DEEP
DIFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN UNSTATES JAPAN ARES OUT OF
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE AN POLILIES PHILOSOPHICAL UNQUOTE
STOP PARA TOKYO 4/12 PACIFIC WAS FAST BECOMING INCREASING
SERIOUS FOREIGN MINISTE R TOJO DECLARED IN BRIEF SPEECH
OPENED THREE DAY MEETING STOP QUOTE ANGLO AMERICAN AND
OTHER SO NTRIES STILL PREFER TO STAND JAPANS APEALS AND
FAREAST HAMPERING JAPANS EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW OR-
DER AI MS ATTAINING PERMENANT PEACE AND PROSPERITY
FOR ALL TOJO SAID ADDED QUOTE AT TIMES LIKE THIS TIS MORE
SIGNIFICANTE THAT REPRESENTIVES OF JAPAN MANCHUCKO AND
CHINA GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS AND DECIDE MATTERS 4/12
DETAILS LATTER DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELATIONS EX-
PLAINED BY PREMIER TOJO BT TOJO TO GO AT REGULAR SESSION
PRIVYCOUNCIL 1000 1230 WHEREXXXX ACTIVE OPINIONS EX-
CHANGE BY PRIVYCOUNCILORS PREMIER FORMIMIAS W 20 TOKYO
4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET

7320 FAIR 1230 WF

CQ DE JAU2/JUO
HR NW BC AT 2100 DEC 4

26/12 SINOCOMMUNIST LEADER LISTGNERAL CHUCHANKWEI TO-
GETHER HIS TWENTYEIGHTSTAFF FFICERS BY JAS FORCES
STOP SAID CPTURES DE WHEN JAPANESE FORSE ROUTED THEM
SI OCOMMU AT JPINT SOUTH OAOTINOG CENTAL HOPE I PROVINCE
PARA 21TO KYOS 4/12 IMI 4/12 DE AIALS LATTTS DEVELOPMENTS
SURROUNDS JAPAN AW AMERICANRE JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS
EXPLAINED BY PERIER TOJO FORMNINISA TOGO FOREIGN PRIVY-
COUNCIL 1000 1230 IMI 1000 1230 WHERE ACTIVE OPININS EXCHANGED
BY PRIVY COUNCILORS PREMIER FORMMINISA PAR A 22 TOKYO 4/12
IMI 4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET KOMPLEMENTN
AND CRITCIZE GERMANY JAPANESE STOP OMEPAPERS WASHING-
TON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPEN THREE XXXXXXXXXXXX WAY ECO-
MONIC CONFERENCE STOP NO FURTHER DOMES AR NM TU DE
JAU2/JUO VA

7320 KC. FAIR
1333 WF

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 60

28 JUNE 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COMDR. BOONE

Subject: Japanese Diplomatic Traffic dated 1941.

Encl: (A) Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic messages on the Tokyo to Washington and Washington to Tokyo circuits from 1 January 1941 through 7 December 1941 which were missing or not translated.

1. At the request of Lieut. (jg) Connorton an inquiry has been made as to the sources from which intercepted Japanese Diplomatic traffic was received during 1941.

2. Mr. C. E. Fleming of GW recalls that during 1941 most of the Japanese Diplomatic traffic on the Washington-Tokyo and Tokyo-Washington circuits was intercepted by Station S. Some messages were missed due to static, atmospheric disturbances and incomplete coverage of all frequencies.

3. Other stations intercepting Diplomatic traffic were Stations A, W, S and H. These stations were assigned certain frequencies to cover. GX would have records of which frequencies were assigned to these stations.

4. Until the United States entered the war, little material was received directly from Western Union, Mackay Radio & Telegraph and other commercial concerns. Messages sent via these companies were often intercepted by RCA and forwarded to OP-20-G. After the outbreak of war, solid files were sent from these companies as well as from the All-America Cables & Radio Co. to OP-20-G.

5. It might be possible to trace some of the missing messages to the files held by the Army. During 1941 the Army and the Navy alternated days in processing Diplomatic traffic. It seems logical that the Army would have had a comparable number of unreadable and badly garbled messages as the Navy.

6. Any logs which dealt with the disposition of intercepted traffic and were originally held by GW have since been turned over to Lieut. Comdr. Murray and Lieut. Comdr. Raven.

SALLY T. LIGHTLE,
Lieut. (jg), USNR.

Certified a true copy of a document on file In Op-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

28 JUNE 1944.

[1]

Enclosure (A).

*Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic Messages on the Tokyo-Washington Circuit,
1 January-7 December 1941*

Month	Total msgs sent	Msgs un- account- ed for	Msgs not trans- lated	Total msgs not available	Total msgs available
January.....	45	15	8	23	22
February.....	62	18	15	33	29
March.....	45	29	6	35	10
April.....	35	11	10	21	14
May.....	77	27	14	41	36
June.....	56	18	12	30	26
July.....	116	42	21	63	53
August.....	82	29	22	43	39
September.....	96	33	18	51	45
October.....	103	27	26	53	50
November.....	140	37	15	52	88
December (1-7).....	55	12	11	23	32
Total.....	912	290	178	468	444

1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

*Analysis of Japanese diplomatic messages on the Washington-Tokyo circuit,
1 January-7 December 1941*

Month	Total msgs sent	Msgs un- account- ed for	Msgs not trans- lated	Total msgs not available	Total msgs available
January.....	62	21	15	36	26
February.....	65	22	14	36	29
March.....	65	21	13	34	31
April.....	67	26	10	36	31
May.....	103	35	19	54	49
June.....	90	33	18	51	39
July.....	176	53	41	94	82
August.....	133	44	32	76	57
September.....	121	36	23	59	62
October.....	140	57	30	87	53
November.....	200	42	37	79	121
December (1-7).....	59	17	15	32	27
Total.....	1281	407	267	674	607

28 SEPTEMBER 1944

Following is a rough count of the number of worksheets held by GL-6 in CA, J-19, J-22, LA, PA-K2 and PURPLE diplomatic systems for the period from 1 November 1941 through 8 December 1941.

System	Total # of msgs.	# of msgs translated	# not trans- lated	# partially broken
CA.....	7	1	6	-----
J-19.....	472	75	394	3
J-22.....	192	6	146	40
LA.....	650	12	481	157
PA-K2.....	52	13	23	16
PURPLE.....	628	417	211	-----
Total.....	2,001	524	1,261	216

Most of the worksheets have a teletype or station intercept sheet attached. Some have both the original and carbon of the teletype message attached.

Certified a true copy of a document on file in OP-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

Following is a survey of messages received by OP-20-G from 1-8 December 1941 showing the number received from each Station and the approximate time-lag involved. The information for this survey was taken from the GY Section Log for 1941 December.

Station	# Msgs.	Time Lag
Sta. 1 Monmouth.....	9	2 days
	5	3 "
Sta. 2 San Fran.....	4	3 days
	1	4 "
Sta. 3 Fort Sam Houston.....	1	2 days
	1	3 "
	2	4 "
Sta. 5 Fort Shafter.....	2	1 day
	10	2 days
	1	3 "
	6	4 "
Sta. 6 Fort Mills.....	2	same day
	1	1 day
	3	3 days
	7	6 days
	11	7 "
	8	8 "
Sta. 7 Fort Hunt.....	1	same day
	17	1 day
	3	2 days
Sta. 9 Rio De Janeiro.....	2	11 days

Station	# Msgs.	Time Lag
ALUSNA N. A.-----	2	1 day
	1	2 days
	1	4 "
	1	6 "
	1	11 days
Army-----	2	12 "
	1	1 day
	1	6 days
	2	7 "
CA-----	1	same day
	4	4 days
COM 16 122 SRI (Fort Dix?)-----	3	same day
	59	1 day
	4	2 days
	1	3 days
	5	5 "
	1	9 "
G Amagansett-----	1	same day
M Cheltenham-----	9	same day
	2	1 day
	2	2 days
Photo-----	1	7 days
	1	8 "
S Bainbridge-----	72	same day
	12	1 day
	1	6 days
SISIS Army-----	2	1 day
	1	2 days
	1	7 "
	1	8 "
W Winter Harbor-----	8	same day
	2	1 day
	1	3 days
X Photo-----	2	2 days
	1	7 "

Certified a true copy of a document on file in Op-20-G.

G. E. Boone,
Lt. Comdr. U. S. N. R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.
Washington, 6 January 1944.

Memorandum to GY:

1. Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray and Lieutenant A. L. Braun were Watch Officers on the "Security" or "Purple" watch during the last half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. Lieutenant Commander Lafore was in charge of the watch (later known as GY-2) from about February 1942, (relieving Lieutenant Commander Linn).

2. The security watch worked Purple traffic on alternate days, the Army working the other days.

3. The traffic, besides that received from the Army, was received by teletype. If dated an Army date, it was sent to the Army; if dated our date, we worked it and sent the work sheet with the original message attached to GZ. Therefore, in general, we kept no original teletype traffic. We, however, maintained a file for each originator and into these files we put garbled messages, confirming copies of messages from our intercept stations and duplicate messages. These files also contained messages for earlier periods (1939-40), which had never been worked. It is possible that at intervals the files were reduced by the burning of the older dupes. (Our recollections on this are not clear.)

4. GZ had access to our files and frequently used material from them.

5. All plain text messages which came in were given to GZ. We kept no file of them.

6. When the Army took over the diplomatic system (about June, 1942), these files were turned over to them along with the machine, pertinent aids, forms, etc.

R. W. Lafore,
R. W. LAFORE,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. A. Murray,
A. A. MURRAY,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. L. Braun,
A. L. BRAUN,
Lt., USNR.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 61

[1]

29 JUNE 1945.

JAPANESE PURPLE WORKSHEETS PROCESSED BY NAVY

A survey has been made of the file of purple worksheets held by OP-20-3GL-6 and GY section log for 1941 December in an attempt to determine the complete-ness of files of worksheets and translations and to account for any messages entered in the GY section log for which there are no worksheets on hand.

1941 DEC 7

Circuit	Sms #	Gy Log #	Rec'd from	Date rec'd	JD-1 #
MEXICO-TOKYO.....	474	6842	PHOTO.....	12-13-41	GIST
MEXICO-TOKYO.....	475	6841	PHOTO.....	12-13-41	GIST
MEXICO-TOKYO.....	476	6840	PHOTO.....	12-13-41	7501
TOKYO:					
NET.....	787	6797	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	GIST
HSINKING.....	916				
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2492	6687	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7229
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2493/1#	6791	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7231
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2493/2#	6696	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	"
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2495	6688	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7772
TOKYO:					
CIRCULAR.....	1496	6686	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	GIST
NANKING.....	531				
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2498	6694	ARMY.....	12- 8-41	GIST
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2499/1	6682	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	7210
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	/2	6695	STA. #5.....	12- 8-41	"
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	/3	6681	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	"
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	854	6685	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	?7211?
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	855	6733	STA. #6.....	12-10-41	7281
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	856	6732	STA. #6.....	12-10-41	7282
TOKYO-BERLIN.....	1004	6792	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7232
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	115?	6683	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7265
TOKYO-NANKING.....	532	6697	SISIS.....	12- 8-41	7237
[2]					
TOKYO-VICHY.....	581	6981	ALUSNA.....	12-18-41	GIST
TOKYO:					
VICHY.....	582	6693	SISIS.....	12- 8-41	7230
BANGKOK.....	129	6716	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	"
HANOI.....	129				
TOKYO:					
VICHY.....	583	6715	COM 16.....	12- 8-41	7319
BANGKOK.....	130	6692	STA. #5.....	12- 8-41	"
HANOI.....	130				
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	911	6658	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7205
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	902/1**	6624	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7143
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/2**	6619	STA. M.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/3	6623	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/4	6620	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/5	6633	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/6	6635	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/7	6631	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/8	6634	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/9**	6625	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/10**	6626	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/11	6636	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/12	6632	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/13	6637	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	/14	6649	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	"
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1277	6672	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	N. T.
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1278	6718	STA. S.....	12- 9-41	7299

Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army translations (no worksheets in GL-6 files):

TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	905	6644	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7150
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	906	6641	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7183
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	907	6648	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7145
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	908	6652	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7146
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	909	6651	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7151
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	910	6650	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	7147

** In GY section log listed as sent to Army, but issued as Navy translation and worksheet in GL-6 files

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY

1085

1941 DEC 7

[3] Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but no worksheets in GL-6 files:

Circuit	Sms #	Gy Log #	Rec'd from	Date rec'd	JD-1 #
TOKYO-CIRCULAR.....	GOGAI	6698	STA. #6.....	12- 8-41	
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	GC	6647	STA. S.....	12- 7-41	

(Disposition of this message in GY section log given as follows: "Army/GZ")

1941 DEC 6

TOKYO-BERLIN.....	1002	6654	COM 16.....	12- 7-41	7174
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(Message received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army translation—No worksheet in GL-6 files)

1941 DEC 5

BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	909	6712	STA. #6.....	12- 8-41	7314
BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	910	6714	STA. #6.....	12- 8-41	GIST
BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	911	6713	STA. #6.....	12- 8-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1416	6934	ALUSNA.....	12-16-41	7765
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1417/1	6936	ALUSNA.....	12-16-41	N. T.
	/2	6935	ALUSNA.....	12-16-41	N. T.
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1421	6569	STA. W.....	12- 5-41	7137
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1422	6570	STA. W.....	12- 5-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO 1425.....	1425	6939	STA. #4.....	12-16-41	7836
BERLIN-TOKYO 1427.....	1427	6938	STA. #4.....	12-16-41	7770
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1428	6616	STA. #7.....	12- 6-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	GOGAI	6698	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
B. AIRES-TOKYO.....	515	6614	STA. #7.....	12- 6-41	GIST
B. AIRES-TOKYO.....	516	6615	STA. #7.....	12- 6-41	GIST
-RIO.....	117				
B. AIRES-TOKYO.....	517	6617	STA. #7.....	12- 6-41	GIST
-RIO.....	118				
HSINKING-PEKING.....	31	6600	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7264

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HSINKING-TOKYO.....	805	6595	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7296
HSINKING-TOKYO.....	GOGAI	6592	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7263
MEXICO-TOKYO.....	471	6799	STA. #2.....	12- 8-41	7312
NANKING-TOKYO.....	855	6691	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
PEKING-TOKYO CIRC.....	625	6749	STA. #5.....	12-10-41	7335
PEKING-SHAI CIRC.....	626	6746	STA. #5.....	12-10-41	7334
-TOKYO.....	770				
PEKING-NANKING.....	GOGAI	6599	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
ROME-TOKYO.....	782	6937	ALUSNA.....	12-16-41	7771
ROME-TOKYO.....	784	6710	STA. #5.....	12- 8-41	7228
ROME-TOKYO.....	785	6565	STA. G.....	12- 5-41	7169
ROME-TOKYO.....		6589	STA. M.....	12- 6-41	GIST
SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....	2224	6693	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7236
TOKYO-ANKARA.....	110	6593	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-ANKARA.....	111	6692	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	910	6747	STA. #5.....	12-10-41	7333
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	913	6590	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	GOGAI	6594	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-NANKING.....	325	6598	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7262
TOKYO-PEKING.....	671	6597	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-SHANGHAI.....	1234	6596	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	GIST
TOKYO-VICHY.....	579	6967	COM 16.....	12- 6-41	7298
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	893	6569-41	STA. S.....	12- 5-41	GIST
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	894	6555	STA. S.....	12- 5-41	7235
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	896	6558	STA. S.....	12- 5-41	7149
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1269	6585	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	GIST

[5]

WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1261/1	6586	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7139
	/2	6587	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	"
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1262	6584	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7141
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1264	6582	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7166
WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....	1265	6591	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7167
WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....	1266	6588	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7198
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1268	6581	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7136
WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....	1269	6711	STA. #1.....	12- 8-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-TOYKO.....	GOGAI	6583	STA. S.....	12- 6-41	7168

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1941 DEC 5

Messages received by Navy with no record of disposition made (no worksheets in GL-6 files):

Circuit	Sms #	Gy Log #	Rec'd from	Date rec'd	JD-1 #
TOKYO-NEW YORK.....		6552	STA. S.....	12-5-41	-----
TOKYO-MEXICO.....		6557	STA. S.....	12-5-41	-----
TOKYO-PANAMA.....		6556	STA. S.....	12-5-41	-----
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	SUMMER	6566	STA. M.....	12-5-41	-----

1941 DEC 3

BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	892	6495	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7053
		6729	STA. #6.....	12-9-41	"
BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	894	6496	STA. S.....	12-3-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1407	6522	STA. #7.....	12-4-41	7132
BERLIN-TOKYO 1408.....	1408	6536	STA. #7.....	12-4-41	7138
CANTON:					
NANKING.....	232	6470	COM 16.....	12-3-41	N. T.
SHANGHAI.....	121				
TOKYO.....	115				
PEKING CIRCULAR.....	616/1	6512	COM 16.....	12-4-41	7848
	/2	6513	COM 16.....	12-4-41	"
	/3	6514	COM 16.....	12-4-41	"
TOKYO.....	763				
RIO-MEXICO.....	10	6642	STA. #3.....	12-7-41	7196
[6]					
RIO-TOKYO.....	490	6520	STA. #7.....	12-4-41	GIST
RIO-TOKYO.....	491	6521	STA. #7.....	12-4-41	7129
RIO-WASHINGTON.....	34	6571	PHOTO.....	12-5-41	7131
ROME-TOKYO.....	774	6467	STA. M.....	12-3-41	7016
ROME-TOKYO.....	985	6516	STA. W.....	12-4-41	7133
		6639	ALUSNA.....	12-6-41	7133
SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....	2208	6599	COM 16.....	12-4-41	N. T.
	1048				
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	827	6722	ARMY.....	12-9-41	GIST
TOKYO-BERLIN.....	966	6515	COM 16.....	12-4-41	GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	899	6646	STA. #5.....	12-7-41	7260
TOKYO-ROME.....	322	6472	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7097
TOKYO-SHANGHAI.....	1224	6598	COM 16.....	12-4-41	GIST
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	874	6471	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7048
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	875	6478	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7057
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	876	6475	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7018
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	877	6477	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7019
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	878 /1	6474	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7049
	/2	6476	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7049
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	879	6473	STA. S.....	12-3-41	7020
VICHY-TOKYO.....	109	6894	ALUSNA.....	12-15-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-B. AIRES.....	8	6492	STA. S.....	12- 3-41	7100
WASHINGTON-B. AIRES.....	8	6567	STA. M.....	12- 5-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1241	6577	STA. #1.....	12- 5-41	7261
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1243	6493	STA. S.....	12- 3-41	7050
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1243	6527	STA. #7.....	12- 4-41	7098
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1244	6523	STA. #7.....	12- 4-41	7099
[7]					
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1245	6491	STA. S.....	12- 3-41	7051
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1247	6502	STA. S.....	12- 4-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1250	6578	STA. #1.....	12- 5-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1251	6490	STA. S.....	12- 3-41	7052
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1255	6194	STA. S.....	12- 3-41	GIST
		6519	STA. #7.....	12- 4-41	"

Messages entered in GY section log for which no worksheets in GL-6 files:

HSINKING-TOKYO.....	797	6510	COM 16.....	12- 4-41	7263
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(Not on translation: "Original transmission, dated 3rd available, too badly garbled to read." Issued as JD-1: 7263 under date of 5 Dec 1941)

WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1253	6579	STA. #1.....	12- 5-41	7126
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(Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)

1941 DEC 3—Continued

Circuit	Sms #	Gy Log #	Rec'd from	Date rec'd	JD-1 #
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1256	6576	STA. #1.....	12- 5-41	7128

(Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)

1941 DEC 1

BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	815	6673	ARMY.....	12- 7-41	GIST
BANGKOK-TOKYO.....	888	6678	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1395	6676	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1396	6251	STA. #7.....	12- 2-41	7012
BERLIN-TOKYO.....	1396	6675	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	GIST
BERNE-HANOI.....	No #	6468	STA. M.....	12- 3-41	7044
HARBIN:					
TOKYO.....	161	6573	STA. #5.....	12- 5-41	GIST
HSINKING.....		6458	COM 16.....	12- 2-41	"
HSINKING-TOKYO.....	790	6574	STA. #5.....	12- 5-41	GIST
MANILA-TOKYO.....	812	6671	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	7298
MEXICO-TOKYO.....	461	6545	STA. #2.....	12- 4-41	GIST
		6754	W; U.....	12-10-41	"
MEXICO-WASHINGTON.....	069	6755	W. U.....	12-10-41	7329

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NANKING-TOKYO.....	849	6455	COM 16.....	12- 1-41	7013
RIO-WASHINGTON CIRC.....	334	6453	STA. #7.....	12- 2-41	7043
TOKYO.....	486	6454	STA. #7.....	12- 2-41	"
SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....	2191	6572	STA. #5.....	12- 5-41	7234
SHANGHAI-TOKYO.....	2192	6457	COM 16.....	12- 2-41	7045
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2436	6425	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	6939
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2439	6456	COM 16.....	12- 1-41	GIST
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2443	6561	ALUSNA.....	12- 5-41	7691
		6677	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	"
TOKYO CIRCULAR.....	2444	6432	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	6984
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	814	6797	STA. #6.....	12-11-41	7374
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....	824	6792	STA. #6.....	12-11-41	GIST
TOKYO-BANGKOK.....		6699	ARMY.....	12- 8-41	GIST
TOKYO-BERLIN.....	990	6511	COM 16.....	12- 4-41	GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	892	6580	STA. #5.....	12- 5-41	GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING.....	893	6498	STA. #5.....	12- 3-41	7092
TOKYO-MANILA.....	380	6674	STA. #6.....	12- 7-41	GIST
TOKYO-MEXICO.....	240	6424	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	GIST
TOKYO-SINGAPORE.....	367	6721	STA. #5.....	12- 9-41	GIST
TOKYO-SINGAPORE.....	369	6796	STA. #6.....	12-11-41	GIST
TOKYO-VICHY.....	572	6575	STA. #5.....	12- 5-41	GIST
TOKYO-VICHY.....	573	6479	STA. #5.....	12- 3-41	7040
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	858	6427	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	6940
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	860	6426	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	6941
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	861	6431	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	GIST
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.....	865	6428	STA. S.....	12- 1-41	6983

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WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1223	6458	STA. #1.....	12-3-41	7041
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1225/1	6546	STA. #2.....	12-4-41	7042
	/2	6452	STA. #7.....	12-2-41	7042
	/3	6547	STA. #2.....	12-4-41	7042
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1226	6497	STA. #1.....	12-3-41	7054
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1227	6489	STA. #1.....	12-3-41	7055
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1228	6487	STA. #1.....	12-3-41	GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1230	6480	STA. #1.....	12-3-41	7056
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.....	1231	6544	STA. #1.....	12-4-41	7093

Message received by Navy, entered in GY section log, but no record of disposition made (no worksheet in GL-6 files):

TOKYO-BATAVIA.....		6499	SISIS.....	12-3-41	
		6700	ARMY.....	12-8-41	

(Dupes of same message.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 62

TOP SECRET

Serial 0001391916

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, 9 Jul 1945.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N.

Subject: Testimony and Documentary Evidence to be Presented Concerning Further Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Reference: (a) Top Secret Ltr. from Admiral Hewitt to DNI, dated 5 July 1945, Subj: Files, request for.

Enclosure: (A) Photostatic copy of Top Secret Ltr. from DIO-14ND to DNI dated 19 April 1942, Subj: Encrypted Despatch Traffic of Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, T. H., File 14ND/AS-5/OJ: EF37 (I-95), with Enclosures (A) and (B).

1. Pursuant to Reference (a), Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

JAMES FORRESTAL.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office, Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

WBS/wbs

HONOLULU, HAWAII, April 19, 1942.

14ND/AS-5/OJ

EF 37 (I-95)

Secret

From: The District Intelligence Officer.

To: The Director of Naval Intelligence (Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch).

Subject: ENCRYPTED DESPATCH TRAFFICE OF JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, HONOLULU, T. H.

Enclosures:

(A) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu) Outgoing Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.

(B) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu) Incoming Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.

1. Enclosure (A), which was furnished this office by the Military Intelligence Division, Hawaiian Department, is forwarded for information. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, also supplied this office with two copies of the same enclosure, one of which has been sent to the "Unit" at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and the other retained in the files of the District Intelligence Office.

2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, recently furnished this office with three copies of the incoming despatch log of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, one copy of which is transmitted herewith as enclosure (B), one copy of which has been sent to the Pearl Harbor "Unit", and one copy of which is retained in the files of the District Intelligence Office.

3. Before leaving Honolulu, the Japanese Consul General was given three alternatives in the matter of disposing of papers in his possession: (a) to take them with him; (b) to pack, seal, and store them here; or, (c) to throw them away. He elected to throw away a great deal of written matter, most of which was first torn into pieces. The material from which enclosures (A) and (B) were taken was found among the papers so thrown away and pieced together by translators attached to the Military Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the District Intelligence Office.

4. The urgency of delivery of this letter and enclosures (A) and (B) is such that they will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this letter and enclosures (A) and (B) by registered mail to the continental limits of the United States and by registered airmail within the continental limits of the United States.

I. H. Mayfield,

I. H. MAYFIELD.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure (A)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.

The following is a translation of a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H., were recorded:

OUTGOING MESSAGES

Telegrams, official

Secret ----- Ordinary -----

No. -----

File No. -----

Dispatched ----- month ----- day

From -----

To -----

Attached to -----

Subject: (gist of contents)

Disposal and development:

From -----	To -----	month -----	day -----
" -----	" -----	" -----	" -----
" -----	" -----	" -----	" -----
" -----	" -----	" -----	" -----
" -----	" -----	" -----	" -----

The Archives and Documents section -----
The Telegram Section -----
----- month ----- day

Person in charge -----

Remarks:

Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The symbols, A N (cryptogram?), R Y A K U (code), and H E I (ordinary message), were written over the printed characters for "Official Dispatches" and are represented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were also used in this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?) and M U (a negative term).

DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
1-B-----	1-----	1-4-----	Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society.
2-A-----	4-----	1-6-----	Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
3-A-----	5-----	1-7-----	Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
4-B-----	6-----	1-9-----	Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.
5-A-----	7-----	1-9-----	Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
6-B-----	9-----	1-11-----	Report of gist of conversation with "ABEND".
7-B-----	10-----	1-11-----	Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander KIMMEL.
8-A-----	11-----	1-13-----	Movements of U. S. Fleet.
9-B-----	12-----	1-13-----	Matter re social expenses for third period.
10-B-----	13-----	1-15-----	Matter re invitation to luncheon for Ambassador NOMURA.
11-A-----	14-----	1-16-----	Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
12-A-----	16-----	1-18-----	Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
13-B-----	17-----	1-20-----	Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan. (LACONICUS)
14-A-----	18-----	1-21-----	Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
15-A-----	19-----	1-22-----	Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese ancestry without passports.
16-A-----	20-----	1-23-----	Matter re movement of U. S. warships.
[?] 17-B-----	22-----	1-24-----	Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
18-A-----	24-----	1-28-----	Matter re simplifying clearance of documents carried by Consul General NAKAMURA.
19-A-----	27-----	1-29-----	Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome Ambassador NOMURA.
20-B-----	28-----	1-29-----	Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome Ambassador NOMURA.
21-B-----	32-----	1-30-----	Report of arrival here of Ambassador NOMURA.
22-B-----	34-----	2-1-----	Matter re reporting to Rear Admiral KIMMEL about appointment (NOMURA's).
23-B-----	36-----	2-1-----	Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
24-B-----	37-----	2-3-----	Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
25-A-----	38-----	2-6-----	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.

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DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
26-A	39.	2-7	Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
27-A	40.	2-15	Re sending telegram regarding information to the Military Command.
28-B	42.	2-20	Re designation of naval defense area in "Kaneohe" Bay.
29-A	43.	2-21	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
30-B	44.	2-21	
31-A	45.	2-24	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
32-B	46.	2-25	Re explanation of Minister (Foreign?) in the Diet.
33-B	48.	2-26	Re report of names of persons accompanying Consul-General KITA.
34-A	49.	2-27	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
[3] 35-B	50.	3-1.	Re Consul-General KITA'S cook accompanying him.
36-B	51.	3-1.	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
37-B	52.	3-3.	Re recrossing (of ocean) by CHINEI KANESHIRO.
38-A	54.	3-4.	Movement of U. S. Fleet.
39-A	55.	3-4.	" " " "
40-B	56.	3-5.	Re granting of passport to KENJO KOHARA (or OBARA), missionary of the Hongwanji Sect.
41-B	57.	3-6.	Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.
42-B	58.	3-6*	Re correction of telegram.
43-A	59.	3-10	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
44-A	60.	3-10	" " " "
45-B	62.	3-14	Re report of arrival in office of Consul-General KITA.
46-B	64.	3-18*	Re issuing of passports for traveling to Hawaii to GIEN MITANI and TAIYU OKAMOTO, missionaries of the Hongwanji Sect.
47-A	65.	3-21	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
48-B	66.	3-21*	Visit to New Zealand of U. S. warships.
49-C	67.	3-24	Re information of Consul-General's cook going on board ship.
50-A	69.	3-24	Re movement of U. S. warships.
[4] 51-A	70.	3-25	Re wireless messages and secret documents carried by Courier MORI.
52-A	71.	3-26	Re expenses for development of intelligence for year 1941.
53-B	72.	3-27*	Re report of arrival in office of secretary MORIMURA.
54-A	73.	3-27	Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
55-A	75.	3-28	Re visit to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.
56-A	76.	3-29*	Re passport visa for WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE.
57-B	77.	3-29*	Re verification expenses of Seamen's registration.
58-B	78.	4-1*	Re request to Prince KONOYE and Minister MATSUOKA for articles to be printed in publication commemorating the completion of the extension to the Japanese Hospital.
59-B	81.	4-3*	Re arrival in port of Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.
60-B	82.	4-5*	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
61-A	84.	4-7* (?)	Re arrival in port of Japan Christian Federation.
62-B	85.	4-8.	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
63-A	86.	4-9	Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
64-A	90.	4-14	" " " "
[5] 65-A	92.	4-15	Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
66-A	93.	4-17	" " " "
67-B	96.	4-21*	Re arrival in port of President Roosevelt's eldest son.
68-A	97.	4-21.	Re movement of U. S. warships.
(MU)-B	98.	4-23	Re receipt of decoding book for use on request telegrams.
(MU)-B	99.	4-23	Re receipt of wireless code T.A.
69-A	102.	4-28	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
70-A	103.	4-28.	Re arrival in port of British warship.
71-B	104.	4-29*	Re transport "WASHINGTON."
72-B	105.	4-30*	Re trip of "HENRY LUCE" to Chungking.
73-A	107.	4-30.	Re seizure of crew members of the "COLUMBIA" by British warship.
74-B	108.	5-1*	Re taking of office by Ambassador GAUSS.
75-A	109.	5-1.	Re seizure of German subjects by British warship.
76-A	110.	5-6.	Re movements of U. S. Warships and ships.
77-A	111.	5-8.	The local general emergency situation.
78-A	113.	5-12	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
79-B	114.	5-14*	Re granting of passport to travel to Hawaii to KAKUSHIN KUSUDA, priest of the Higashi Hongwanji Sect.
[6] 80-B	115.	5-14*	Re arrival of B-17 Bombers.
81-A	116.	5-16.	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
82-A	117.	5-20	Re aid fund to "Pan-Pacific Union".
83-A	118.	5-21	General situation.
84-B	119.	5-22	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
85-B	120.	5-23*	Re arrival in port of Labor Minister and party of New Zealand.
86-A	122.	5-26	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
87-B	123.	5-27*	Re departure of "TRADEWIND".
88-B	124.	5-27.	Arrival in port of Foreign Minister KLEFFENS of Holland.
89-B	126.	5-29*	Re passing through of MANUEL FOX.
90-B	129.	6-3*	Re according convenience to ? who is attending the centennial celebration of "PUNAHOU SCHOOL".
91-A	130.	6-3.	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
92-A	132.	6-6.	Re boarding of German subject on TATUTA MARU (Dispatch #15 to San Francisco).
93-B	133.	6-6*	Re deportation of Japanese and Koreans.
94-B	134.	6-7*	Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the U. S. Fleet's visit to the mainland.

DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
[7] 95-A	136	6-9	Re request of German subject MEHNERT KLAUS to board Japanese liner.
96-A	137	6-12	Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.
97-A	138	6-13	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
98-A	139	6-13	Local general emergency situation.
99-B	140	*	Re arrival in port of U. S. transport "PRESIDENT PIERCE".
100-A	141	6-14	Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser. Re arrival in port of British cruiser.
102-B	143	6-16*	Re closing of German Consulate General in the U. S.
103-B	144	6-17*	Re visit here by the baseball team of MEIJI UNIVERSITY (to the Minister #25).
104-A	146	6-20	Conversation of Italian Consul.
105-B	147	6-23*	Re arrival in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS.
106-A	148	6-23	Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
107-B	149	*	Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.
108-A	150	6-27	Re arrival in port of Commander TACHIBANA (to the Minister #27).
109-B	151	6-28	Re money loaned out by this Consulate.
[8] 110-B	152	6-28*	Re arrival in port of Americans on inspection tour of Burma Road.
111-A	153	6-28	Re plot for disorder (riot) on "PENNSYLVANIA".
-C	154	6-30	Re correction in usage of code type TSU.
112-B	155	6-30*	Re closure of German Consulate.
113-A	156	7-1	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
114-B	159	7-3*	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
115-A	161	7-7	Re movement of U. S. warships.
116-B	162	7-8	Re re-telegraphing of telegrams.
117-B	163	7-8*	Re participation of U. S. flyers in the Chinese Air Force.
118-A	164	7-8	Telegram by request of Nippon Yusen Kaisha.
119-A	165	7-10*	Re number of foreigners with visas to pass through Japan.
120-B	166	7-11	Re size of Imperial Portrait.
121-B	169	7-11*	Re report of speech by LATTIMORE, advisor to CHIANG KAI SHEK.
122-A	170	7-14	Re request for instructions regarding returning of the Imperial Portrait.
123-A	171	7-14	Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
124-B	173	7-15*	Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc.
[5] 125-B	174	7-15*	Re commencing of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union.
126-A	176	7-17	Re status of employees. (to the minister #38).
127-A	177	7-18	Re wavelength of KGM B.
128-A	179	7-19	Re return of Imperial Portrait.
129-A	180	7-21	Movement of U. S. Fleet.
130-A	181	7-22*	Re issuing of visa for passing through to McBAIN.
131-A	182	7-22	Re investigation of passengers on board YAWATA MARU.
132-A	185	7-26	Re arrival in port of ASAMA MARU.
133-A	186	7-26	Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
134-B	187	7-26*	Re arrival of the Under-Secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrators.
135-A	188	7-28	Re arrival of Japanese liner.
136-A	189	7-28*	Re visa for Mr. and Mrs. McDAIN (McBAIN ?).
137-B	190	7-29	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
138-B	191	7-29	Re entry into American ports by Japanese liners.
139	192	7-30*	Effect on residence here of enforcement of the Freeze order.
140-B	193	7-30*	Re broadcast to Hawaii.
141-B	194	7-30	Re exception of application of Freeze order to Chinese diplomats and Consulate. (to the Minister #44).
[10] 142-A	196	8-1	Re itinerary of Courier OSHIO (to San Francisco #19).
143-A	197	8-1	Re departure and arrival of ASAMA MARU.
-C	200	8-2	Re receipt of Naval Code Book type S-HE and related charts
-C	201	8-2	Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type YA, etc.
-C	202	8-2	Re receipt of Common Code Book for the three Ministries, the Foreign, the War, and the Foreign (Navy ?).
-C	203	8-2	Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type HEI.
144-A	204	8-2	Telegram by request of Yokohama Specie Bank.
145-A	206	8-4	Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
146-A	207	8-5*	Re placing of the Coast Guard under the Navy.
147-A	209	8-7	Re visa for passing through to the Britisher McBAIN.
148-A	211	8-8	Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
149-A	212	8-11	Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
150-A	213	8-13	Re bank "balance" of official funds. (to the Minister #47.)
151-A	214	8-12*	Re cash in hand of this Consulate.
[11] 152-A	216	8-13	Re employees of this Consulate.
-A	217	8-15	Telegram by request of Branch Office of the Yokohama Specie Bank dated August 15.
153-A	220	8-18	Movements of U. S. warships.
154-A	221	8-19	Condition of Japanese people here.
155-A	225	8-27	Re treatment of Japanese Subjects in the U. S. by the Americans.
156-B	226	8-28*	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
157-A	227	8-30	Re survey regarding DOMEI broadcast.
158-B	228	9-2	Re unrecieved telegram.
159-B	229	9-2*	Re passing through of American pilots.

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DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
160-A	230	9-2	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
161-A	234	9-4	To OGAWA.
162-A	235	9-5	Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago.
-A	236	9-5	Telegram by request of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
163-A	237	9-6	Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
164-A	239	9-9	Re mail to Japan.
165-A	240	9-13	
166-A	241	9-13	Re arrival in port of French warship.
[12] 167-A	242	9-13	Re propaganda "pamphlets" of 5th columnists against Japan.
168-A	243	9-15	Re transfer of official telegrams to this Consulate.
169-A	244	9-15*	Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
170-A	245	9-17*	Re arrival in port of Courier (to Shanghai #1).
171-A	249	9-19	Information concerning the military.
172-A	250	9-22	Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
173-A	251	9-22	Re departure of French warship.
174-B	252	9-23*	Re arrival in port of military mission to Chungking.
175-A	253	8-24	Re problem of U. S. and Japanese ship transportation.
176-A	254	9-25	Re questions pertaining to financial report.
177-B	256	9-29*	Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats.
178-A	257	9-29	Movement of U. S. Fleet.
179-A	258	9-29	" " " "
180-B	259	9-30*	Re contents of baggages sent to this Consulate.
181-A	260	10-1	Re question of the Japanese Language Schools.
[13] 182-A	261	10-2	Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.
183-B	262	10-2*	Re problem of Japanese owned fishing boats.
184-A	263	10-2	Re transportation of British soldiers by American ships.
185-B	264	10-4	Re measures for time of war.
186-A	265	10-6	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
187-B	266	10-10*	Re talks by Delegate KING.
188-A	267	10-13	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
189-A	268	10-15	Re going to the U. S. of Chinese airmen.
190-A	269	10-16	Re training of Chinese airmen by the United States.
191-A	171	10-17	Re payment of boat fare (shipping charges) in Japan.
192-A	273	10-20	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
193-A	273	10-23	Re LEO SIROTA.
194-A	283	10-24	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
195-A	284	10-25*	Re granting of visa to the American, CRICHTON COLVIN.
196-A	285	10-25*	Re report of assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff (to the Ambassador #65).
[14] 197-A	286	10-25	Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance for members of this Consulate (to the Ambassador #66).
198-A	287	10-25*	Re granting of visa for entry into country to NEWMAN.
199-A	289	10-28	Re movements of U. S. warships.
200-A	291	10-28	?
201-A	292	10-29	Re transmission (of message) to?.....
202-A1	295	10-29	Re LEO SIROTA.
203-B	299	11-1*	Re arrival of TAIYO MARU.
204-A	301	11-4	Re delay in departure of TAIYO MARU.
205-	303	11-4	Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU.
206-B	305	11-6*	Re departure of TAIYO MARU.
207-A	306	11-6	Re transmission (of message) to?.....
208-A	307	11-6	Survey of passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.
209-A	308	11-7	Re request for easy clearance for Consul IWANAGA.
210-A	310	11-7*	Re cancellation of trip to Japan of NEWMAN.
MU-C	311	11-8	Re distribution of JIGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.
MU-C	312	11-8	Re sending of TAGO telegraphic code and attached decoding book.
[15] MU-C	313	11-8	Re second receipt of common indicator words and key book.
211-A	314	11-8	Re according of convenience for clearance to passengers on TAIYO MARU and two other ships.
212-A	315	11-10	Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
213-B	316*		Re bounds of application of martial law in Hawaii.
214-A	317	11-11	Re number of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.
215-A	318	11-11	Re easing of freeze applying to Japanese governmental agencies in the United States.
216-C	320*	11-12	Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU.
217	322	11-13	From Ambassador KURUSU.
218-A	324	11-13	From Ambassador KURUSU.
219-A	325	11-14	Re movements of U. S. warships.
220	326	11-14	Re conversation between Ambassador KURUSU and NEWMAN.
221-A	327	11-15	Telegram by request of Vice-Consul OKUDA.
	329	11-18	Revenues in connection with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU.
222-A	330	11-18	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
223-B	331*	11-18	Re suspension of announcement of ship sailings.
224-B	332*	11-18	Re stopping in port of technicians being sent to the Burma Road.
[16] 225-A	333	11-19	To.....
226-A	334	11-19	Re movements of U. S. warships.
227-A	335	11-22	To.....
228-A	336	11-22	Departure of American convoy for Singapore.

DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
229-A	337	11-22	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
230-A	338	11-22	“ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
231-A	339	11-23	Re movements of warships and ships.
232-A	240 (340)	11-23	Re disposition of telegraphic code.
233-A	341*	11-24	Re demand of return of advances to courier KUGA.
234-A	342	11-24	Re Fleet training base.
235-A	343	11-25	Re representation of interests.
236-A	344	11-25	To.....
-A	347	11-26	Telegram by request of the Specie Bank.
237-A	348	11-26	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
238-A	350	11-28	Miscellaneous military information.
239-A	352	11-29	BK (?) (In Roman letters).
240-A	353	11-29	BK (?) “ “ “ “
241-A	355	12-1	BK (?) “ “ “ “
[17] 242-A	356	12-1	Re report of number of Consular staff and their families.
243-A	357	12-3	Movements of warships and ships.
244-A	358	12-2	Re personnel of Consulate.
C	359		Re burning of codes.
245-A	360	12-3	To.....?
246-A	361	12-3	Re remittance of traveling expenses of families.
247-A	362*	12-3	B. S. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
248-A	363*	12-3	B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
249-A	362*	12-4	Re entry in port of foreign warships and ships.
250-A	365*	12-4	B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
251-A	366*?	12-5	Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA MARU.
252-A	367	12-5	Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
253-A	368*	12-6	B. K. (?)
254-A	369*	12-6	Ditto.

TO SEATTLE

[18] 1-B	346*	11-26	Re investigation of date of crossing to United States by ICHISAKU ICHINUKIDA (request Telegram).
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TO LOS ANGELES

1-B	15	1-17	Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe. (request telegram)
2-A	18	1-21	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #14)
3-A	20	1-23	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #16)
4-B	101*	4-26	Departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI. (to San Francisco #11)
5-A	175	7-16	Re re-sending of telegram.

TO SAN FRANCISCO

1-B	2	1-6	Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship. (to New York #1)
2-B	3	1-6	Re date of arrival in and departure from San Francisco of Minister SUMA.
(1)-B	1	1-4 duplication)	Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #1)
3-B	9	1-11	Report of gist of conversation with ABEND. (to the Minister #6)
4-A	19	1-22	Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #15)
[19] 5-B	35	2-1	Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's party. (to the Minister #5).
6-B	63*	3-15	Re journey of Ambassador TOMI.
7-A	83	4-7	Re resending of telegram.
8-A	84*?	4-7	Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #61).
9-(A)	89		Reshifting of telegram(s).
10-B	94*	4-19	Re departure of courier FUKUDA.
11-B	101*	4-26	Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI.
12-A	107	4-30	Re the seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA by British warship. (to the Minister #73).
13-A	109	5-1	Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75).
14-B	121*	5-24	Re request for easy clearance of courier TAGI (or TANOGI or TAKI).
15-A	132	6-6	Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU.
(1)-A-YU	137	6-12	Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #96).
16-C	168	7-11	Telegram of thanks of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.
17-A	182	7-22	Re investigation of passengers of the YAWATA MARU.
18-B	195*	7-31	Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU.

TO SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
19-A	196	8-1	Re journey of courier OSHIO.
[20] 20-B	199*	8-2	Re stopping in port of Honolulu of the TATUTA MARU. (re transfer of telegram #65 received from the Minister).
21-A	224	8-25	Re non-receipt of telegram.
22-B	272*	10-20	Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.
23-B	274*	10-22	Re passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.
24-A	288	10-27	Re delivery to Secretary MAEDA.
25-A	293	10-29	Re physical examination of the passengers on board the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #68)
26-B	309*	11-7	Re departure of Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.
27-B	321*	11-12	Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU? (to the Minister #78).
28-C	323	11-13	
29-A	328	11-17	Re resending of telegram.
30-A	362*	12-3	B. S. (to the Minister #247)
[21] -(C)	21	1-24	Re reception program for Ambassador NOMURA. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
-(C)	27	1-26	
-(C)	26	1-28	Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
-C	29	1-29	Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA).
-C	30	1-29	Re sending of aide-de-camp by Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON. (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
-C	31	1-30	Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn. (to Secretary OKUMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
-C	68		Re meeting the boat by Vice-Consul OKUDA. (to Secretary MORIMURA on NITTA MARU).
-(C)	74	3-27	Private telegram of Consul General. (to FUMIKO TAKAO from OSAKA)
-(C)	80	4-2	To Ambassador KURUSU. (from TATUTA MARU).
-(C)	91	4-15	Private request telegram of Consul General. (to HARUNO OSISE, Tokyo)
	127	6-2	Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to the GAKUYODO in Canton).
[22]	128	6-2	Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General to Mrs. MAKI, Tokyo)
-C	135	6-7	Re declaration of residence of MASAO KADOFUJI. (to Village-master ENBUCHI, Otomari branch office, Karafuto).
-C	145	6-20	Condolatory telegram. (to wife of Councillor AKAGI in Shanghai).
-C	198	8-2	Re son of Consul NAKAUCHI. (to Consul Nakauchi, Los Angeles).
-(C)	219	8-16	Request telegram of Consul General. (to translator MAZAKI from Shanghai).
1-A	1	9-8	Re export of pineapple seedlings. (to Head of Section of Foreign Affairs, Formosa).
	270	10-17	Re inquiry on condition of fuel oil supply. (to Secretary MAEDA on TATUTA MARU).
-C	294	10-29	Re connection of Secretary —naga to American liner, etc. (to Consul IWANAGA on TAIYO MARU).

MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS

[23] (1)-A-YU	4	1-6	Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #2)
(2)-A-YU	7	1-9	Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #3)
1-B	8	1-10	Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila. Re enquiry on advisability of trip to United States by the SUBARU SHOW
(3)-YU-A	14	1-16	Dispatched to: San Francisco and Los Angeles. Re movement of U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #11)
(4)-B-YU	15	1-17	Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI's troupe. (to Los Angeles #1)
(5)-A-YU	24	1-28	Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #18)
2-B	28	1-29	Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Re proposal of Commander-in-chief RICHARDSON for reception of Ambassador NOMURA. (to the Minister #20)
3-B	32	1-30	Dispatched to: Ambassador in U. S., and San Francisco. Re offer of Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON to send aide-de-camp to meet the Ambassador (NOMURA?). (to the Minister #21).
			Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.

MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
[24] 4-B.....	34.....	7-1.....	Conditions of Ambassador NOMURA's stopping in port here (to the Minister #22) Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
(6)-A-YU.....	38.....	2-6.....	Re movement of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #25) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
(7)-A-YU.....	43.....	2-21.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #29) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
(8)-A-YU.....	45.....	2-24.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #31) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(9)-A-YU.....	49.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #34) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
(10)-B-YU.....	51.....	3-1.....	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36) Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
5-A.....	53.....	3-3.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
6-A.....	54.....	3-4.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #38) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(11)-A-YU.....	55.....	3-4.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #39) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
[25] (12)-B-YU..	58.....	3-6.....	Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #12) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(13)-A-YU.....	59.....	3-10.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #13). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(14)-A-YU.....	60.....	3-10.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #44). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(15)-A-YU.....	65.....	3-21.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #47) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle and Los Angeles.
(16)-A-YU.....	69.....	3-24.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #50). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(17)-A-YU.....	73.....	3-27.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #53). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
7-A.....	75.....	3-28.....	Re trip to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU. Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
(18)-B-YU.....	85.....	4-8.....	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
[26] (19)-A-YU..	63*?.....	4-9.....	Re Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #63) Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
(20)-A-YU.....	90.....	4-14.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #64). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(21)-A-YU.....	92.....	4-15.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(22)-A-YU.....	93.....	4-17.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #65). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
8-B.....	96*.....	4-21.....	Re stopping in port of eldest son of President ROOSEVELT. (to the Minister #67). Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.
(23)-A-YU.....	97.....	4-21.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #68). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
9-A.....	100.....	4-24.....	Re transferring of telegram regarding movements of U. S. Fleet. Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(24)-A-YU.....	180.....	4-28.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #69). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(25)-B-YU.....	104*.....	4-29.....	Re transport WASHINGTON. Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
[27] (26)-A-YU..	109.....	5-1.....	Re seizure of German(s) by British warship. (to the Minister #75). Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
(27)-A-YU.....	110.....	5-6.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #76).
(28)-A-YU.....	113.....	5-12.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #78).
(29)-B-YU.....	115*.....	5-14.....	Re arrival of B-17 bombers. (to the Minister #80).

MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
(30)-A-YU.....	116.....	5-16.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #81).
(31)-B-YU.....	119.....	5-22.....	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #84).
(32)-A-YU.....	122.....	5-26.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #86).
10-A.....	125.....	5-29.....	Re check-up and reporting of names of U. S. warships. Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
(33)-YU-A.....	130.....	6-3.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91).
(34)-B-YU.....	134*.....	6-7.....	Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. Re trip to Washington by Admiral KIMMEL and visit to the mainland by the Fleet. (to the Minister #94).
(35)-A-YU.....	138.....	6-13.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #97).
[28] (36)-B-YU.....	140*.....	6-13.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle. Re arrival in port of U. S. Army transport PRESIDENT PIERCE. (to the Minister #99).
(37)-A-YU.....	148.....	6-23.....	Dispatched to: San Francisco and Manila. Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #106).
11-A.....	157.....	7-1.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. Re stoppage of sending of code(s).
12-A.....	160.....	7-5.....	Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. Re survey of assets of Japanese residing within the United States.
13-A.....	171.....	7-14.....	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #123).
14-B.....	174*.....	7-15.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re commencement of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet Union. (to the Minister #125).
15-A.....	180.....	7-21.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #129).
16-A.....	188.....	7-28.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re entry into port of Japanese vessel. (to the Minister #135).
17-A.....	190.....	7-29.....	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #137).
18-C.....	191.....	7-29.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco. Re entry into U. S. port of Japanese vessel(s). (to the Minister #138).
[29] 19-C.....	195*.....	7-31.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU. (to San Francisco #18).
20-A.....	197.....	8-1.....	Re entry into and embarkation from port of the ASAMA MARU. (to the Minister #143).
21-A.....	206.....	8-4.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #145).
22-A.....	208.....	8-6.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re transferring of telegram(s). (telegram from the Minister #66).
23-A.....	211.....	8-8.....	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #148).
24-A.....	220.....	8-18.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #153).
25-A.....	221.....	8-19.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Local Japanese situation. (to the Minister #154).
26-A.....	222.....	8-21.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Ambassador #48).
27-B.....	226*.....	8-28.....	Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #156).
28-A.....	230.....	9-2.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #160).
[30] 29-A.....	231.....	9-3.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re HAYAKAWA. (to the Ambassador #51).
30-B.....	232*.....	9-3.....	Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re HAYAKAWA. (from the Ambassador #29).
31-A.....	237.....	9-6.....	Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #163).
32-A.....	239.....	9-9.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re mail matter to Japan. (to the Minister #164).
33-A.....	241.....	9-13.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re stopping in port of French warship. (to the Minister #166).
34-A.....	242.....	9-13.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re propaganda pamphlets of fifth columnists against Japan. (to the Minister #167).
35-A.....	243.....	9-15.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re transfer of official telegrams sent to this Consulate. (to the Minister #168).
36-A.....	244.....	9-15.....	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #169).
			Dispatched to Ambassador and San Francisco.

MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
37-A	250	9-22	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #172)
[31] 38-A	251	9-22	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re departure of French cessel. (to the Minister #173)
39-A	253	9-24	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re problem of shipping communication. Japan-United States. (to the Minister #175)
40-B	256*	9-29	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re question of fishing boats owned by Japanese. (to the Minister #177)
41-A	257	9-29	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
42-A	258	9-26	Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #178)
43-A	260	10-1	Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #179)
44-B	262*	10-2	Re problem of Japanese Language Schools. (to the Minister #181)
45-A	263	10-2	Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats. (to the Minister #183)
46-A	265	10-6	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re transportation of British soldiers by American vessels. (to the Minister #184)
47-A	267	10-13	Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Vancouver. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #186)
[32] 48-A	268	10-15	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #188)
49-A	271	10-17	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re going to the United States of Chinese airmen. (to the Minister #189)
50-A	273	10-20	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
51-B	274*	10-22	Re payment of boat fare in Japan. (to the Minister #191)
52	275*	10-22	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #192)
53	276*	10-22	Re passengers of the TAIYO MARU. (to San Francisco #23)
54-A	283	10-24	Dispatched to: Ambassador and Minister. Re number of passengers on TAIYO MARU. Telegram transferred. (from the Minister #99)
55-A	289	10-28	Transfer telegram re departure from Yokohama of the TAIYO MARU. (from the Minister #100)
56-A	298	11-1	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #194)
57-A	300	11-1	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #199)
[33] 58-A	301	11-4	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
59-A	303	11-4	Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier. (to the Ambassador #73)
60-B	305*	11-6	Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle. Re delay in sailing of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #204)
61-A1	314	11-8	Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU (to the Minister #205)
62-A	315	11-10	Re departure of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #206)
63-(C)	320*	11-12	Dispatched to: San Francisco and Seattle. Re according of convenience in clearance to TAIYO MARU and two other ships. (to the Minister #211)
64-C	323	11-13	Re movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #212)
65-A	324	11-13	Dispatched to: U. S. and San Francisco.
66-A	325	11-14	Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #216)
67-A	329	11-18	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to San Francisco #28)
68-A	330	11-18	Dispatched to: Minister and Ambassador. From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #218)
[34] 69-A	331*	11-18	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #219)
70-A	334	11-19	Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. Revenues connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #221)
71-A	353	11-29	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #222)
72-A	361	12-3	Re suspension of announcement of arrival and departure of ships. (to the Minister #223)
73-A	366*	12-5	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #226)
			BK. (?) (to the Minister #240)
			Re sending of traveling expenses of family (families). (to the Minister #246)
			Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #251)

End of matching of telegrams.

TO NEW YORK

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
[35] 1-(B).....	2.....	1-6.....	Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship.
2-A.....	210.....	8-7.....	Re telegram to the Specie Bank.
3-B.....	302*.....	11-4.....	Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.
3-B.....	302*.....	11-4.....	Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.
4-B.....	304.....	11-5.....	Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.

TO THE AMBASSADOR

[36] (1)-YU-B.....	5.....	1-7.....	Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #3)
1-B.....	10.....	1-11.....	Interview with Rear Admiral KIMMEL, newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief. (to the Minister #7)
(2)-YU-B.....	11.....	1-13.....	Movements of the U. S. Navy. (to the Minister #8)
2-B.....	22.....	1-24.....	? (To Minister #17)
3-B.....	25.....	1-28.....	Re registration of families and servants of officials of foreign government with the State Department.
4-B.....	33.....	2-1.....	Re expected time (date) of arrival in office of Ambassador NOMURA.
5-B.....	35.....	2-1.....	Re names of Ambassador NOMURA's staff.
6-B.....	36.....	2-1.....	Re reporting to Commander-in-Chief KIMMEL of new appointment.
7-B.....	41.....	2-18.....	Re measure for freezing of foreign assets in the United States.
(3)-B-YU.....	42.....	2-20.....	Re designation of naval defense area in Kaneohe Bay. (to the Minister #28)
(4)-YU-B.....	46.....	2-26.....	Re explanations of the Minister in the Diet.
8-B.....	47.....	2-26.....	Re date when Consul-General KITA will start for his new post. (from the Minister #10—telegram relayed).
[37] 9-B.....	51.....	3-1.....	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #36)
10-B.....	58*.....	3-6.....	Re correction of telegram. (to the Minister #42)
11-B.....	61.....	3-11.....	Re request for refundment of advances.
12-B.....	62?.....	3-14.....	Re report of arrival at post of Consul-General KITA. (to the Minister #45)
(5)-B-YU.....	66*.....	3-21.....	Re visit to New Zealand of U. S. warship(s).
13-A.....	79.....	4-2.....	Re inquiry of name of Consulate to which telegraphic code was transferred.
14-B.....	87.....	4-10.....	Re investigation of code type KETSU telegram(s).
15-A.....	88.....	4-10.....	Re easy clearance of courier MORI.
16-A.....	103.....	4-28.....	Re entry into port of British warship. (to the Minister #70)
17-A.....	111.....	5-7.....	Local general situation. (to the Minister #77)
(6)-A-YU.....	118.....	5-21.....	General situation. (to the Minister #83)
18-B.....	120*.....	5-23.....	Re stopping in port of Minister of Land of New Zealand. (to the Minister #85)
7-B-YU.....	123*.....	5-27.....	Re departure of the TRADE WIND. (to the Minister #87)
19-A.....	130.....	6-3.....	Re movements of the U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #91)
[38] 20-A.....	131.....	6-4.....	Re reply to date of sending of official message (s).
21-B.....	134*.....	6-7.....	Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the visit of the Fleet to the Mainland. (to the Minister #94)
(8)-A-YU.....	139.....	6-13.....	Local general situation. (to the Minister #98)
22-A.....	141.....	6-14.....	Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #100)
23-A.....	142.....	6-16.....	Re entry into port of British converted cruiser. (to the Minister #101)
24-B.....	143*.....	6-16.....	Re closure of German Consulates in the United States. (to the Minister #102)
25-B.....	144*.....	6-17.....	Re coming here of the MEIJI University baseball team. (on request of N. Y. K.)
26-A.....	146.....	6-20.....	Talks with Italian Consul. (to the Minister #104)
(9)-B-YU.....	147*.....	6-23.....	Re stopping in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS. (to the Minister #105)
(10)-B-YU.....	149*.....	6-26.....	Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.
27-A.....	150.....	6-27.....	Re arrival in port of Commander TATIBANA.
28-B.....	155*.....	6-30.....	Re closure of German Consulate (S). (to the Minister #112)
29-A.....	156.....	7-1.....	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #113)
[39] 30-A.....	158.....	7-2.....	Re regular foreign text publications for oversea propaganda use.
(31)-B.....	159*.....	7-3.....	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners. (to the Minister #114)
32-A.....	161.....	7-7.....	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #115)
33-B.....	163*.....	7-8.....	Re participation of American flyers in the Chinese Air Force. (to the Minister #117)
34-C.....	167.....	7-11.....	Telegram of thanks for Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.
35-A.....	170.....	7-14.....	Re instructions for returning the Imperial Portrait. (to the Minister #122)
36-A.....	172.....	7-15.....	Re request for transfer of telegram(s).
37-B.....	173.....	7-15.....	Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc. (to the Minister #124)
38-A.....	176.....	7-17.....	Re status of employees.

TO THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
39-(A)-----	178-----	7-18-----	Re request for transfer of telegrams.
40-C-----	183-----	7-24-----	Re registration of officials and employees of foreign Governments.
41-A-----	184-----	7-24-----	Re returning of the Imperial Portrait.
42-B-----	187*-----	7-26-----	Re arrival of Under-secretary of the Navy and Freeze Administrator. (to the Minister #134)
43-B-----	192*-----	7-30-----	Effect of the enforcement of the Freeze Order on the resident Japanese. (to the Minister #139)
[40] 44-B-----	194*-----	7-30-----	Re exemption of Chinese diplomats and Consulates from application of Freeze Order.
45-A-----	205-----	8-2-----	Re re-sending of telegram.
46-A-----	207*?-----	8-5-----	Re incorporation of the Coast Guard within the Navy. (to the Minister #146)
47-A-----	213-----	8-12-----	Re bank "balance" of official funds, etc.
48-A-----	222-----	8-21-----	Re movements of U. S. warships.
49-A-----	225-----	8-27-----	Re treatment of the Japanese residents in the U. S. by Americans. (to the Minister #155)
50-B-----	229*-----	9-2-----	Re passing through of American airplane "pilots". (to the Minister #159)
51-A-----	230-----	9-3-----	Re HAYAKAWA
52-A-----	233-----	9-3-----	Re HAYAKAWA
53-A-----	235-----	9-5-----	Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago. (to the Minister #162)
54-A-----	247-----	9-17-----	Re reporting of names of Consulate staff members in regard to the Freeze Order.
55-B-----	248*?-----	9-18-----	Re drawing up a name-list under arrangement for the easing of the credit freeze order.
56-A-----	249-----	9-19-----	Military information. (to the Minister #171)
[41] 57-A-----	255-----	9-27-----	Re correction of telegram numbers.
58-B-----	264*-----	10-4-----	Re measure for time of war. (to Minister #185)
59-B-----	266*-----	10-10-----	Re conversation of Delegate KING. (to the Minister #187).
60-A-----	277-----	10-22-----	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
61-B-----	279*-----	10-24-----	Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA. (from the Minister #101—telegram relayed.)
62-A-----	280-----	10-24-----	Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.
63-A-----	281-----	10-24-----	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
64-A-----	282-----	10-24-----	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
65-A-----	285*-----	10-25-----	Re report on assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff.
66-A-1-----	286-----	10-25-----	Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance of Consulate members.
67-A-----	290-----	10-28-----	Re correction of telegram numbers.
68-A-----	293-----	10-29-----	Re physical examination of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.
69-A-----	296-----	10-30-----	Re notification of receipt of telegram. (in connection with courier KUGA.)
70-A-----	297-----	11-1-----	Re allowance for this Consulate members.
[42] 71-A-----	298-----	11-1-----	Re suspension of loading of mail matter on board the TAIYO MARU.
72-B-----	299*-----	11-1-----	Re arrival of the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #203)
73-A-----	300-----	11-1-----	Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier.
74-A-----	307-----	11-6-----	Re investigation of people boarding the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #208)
75-B-----	316*-----	11-10-----	Re bounds of application of the Martial Law in Hawaii. (to the Minister #213)
76-----	317-----		Re number of passengers on the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #214)
77-A-----	319-----	11-11-----	Re easing of the freeze in Japanese governmental agencies in the U. S.
78-B-----	321*-----	11-12-----	Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.
79-A-----	322-----	11-13-----	From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #217)
80-A-----	326-----	11-14-----	Ambassador KURUSU's talk with NEWMAN.
81-A-----	343-----	11-25-----	Re representation of interests. (to the Minister #235.)
82-B-----	345*-----	11-25-----	Re report of names of families of this Consulate's members.
83-A-----	354-----	12-1-----	Re representation of interests.
84-A-----	369*-----	12-6-----	BK (to the Minister #254)

TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS

[43] 1-A-----	76-----		Re passport visa of WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE. (to the Minister #56)
1-B-----	81-----	4-3-----	Dispatched to: New Orleans. Re stopping in port of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. (to the Minister #59). Dispatched to: Manila.
2-A-----	95-----	4-19-----	Re re-sending of telegram. Dispatched to: Manila.
3-B-----	104-----	4-29-----	Re transport WASHINGTON. (to the Minister #71) Dispatched to: Manila.
4-B-----	105-----	4-30-----	Re going to Chungking of HENRY LUCE. (to the Minister #72) Dispatched to: Manila.

1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS—Continued

(Code ? No.)	File No.	Date, 1941	Synopsis of message
2-C.....	112.....	5-12.....	Re mourning on death of Representative YAMAJI. Dispatched to: New Orleans.
1-B.....	126.....	5-29.....	Re passing through of MANUEL FOX. (to the Minister #89) Dispatched to: Hongkong.
2-B.....	152.....	6-28.....	Re stopping in port of American on inspection tour to the Burma Road. (to the Minister #110) Dispatched to: Hongkong.
MU-(C).....	215.....	8-13.....	Re expressing of condolence for death of Mrs. KA (or SO and SO). Dispatched to: Canton.
MU-A.....	218.....	8-16.....	Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate. Dispatched to: Canton.
MU-A.....	223.....	8-22.....	Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate. Dispatched to: Canton.
[44] 1-B.....	245.....	9-17.....	Re stopping in port of courier. Dispatched to: Shanghai.
2-B.....	246.....	9-17.....	From Secretary KIYOHARA. Dispatched to: Shanghai.

TOP SECRET

Enclosure (B)

[1] Translation of form in which were recorded the incoming telegrams to the Consulate.

INCOMING TELEGRAMS

Telegrams, Official Messages

Secret ----- Ordinary -----

No. -----

File No. -----

Dated ----- month ----- day

Received ----- month ----- day

From -----

To -----

Attached to:

Received ----- month ----- day

Subject: (gist of contents)

Channel of Disposition

To ----- month ----- day

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To ----- " ----- "

From ----- " ----- "

To: The Archives and Documents Section -----

Telegram Section (X)

Person in Charge: -----

Remarks: -----

[2]

EXPLANATIONS

Types of Codes:

A ----- AN(GO)

B ----- RYAKU(GO)

C ----- HEI (ordinary)

Abbreviations:

CG ----- CONSUL GENERAL

ADS ----- ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION

TS ----- TELEGRAM SECTION

1. [2a] The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which may mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter—GO or

REI—may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is being attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled TELEGRAM No. & CODE TYPE and CONTENTS.

2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radiogram does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means "outside of number." However, the word may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this may also be a designation of a certain type of code.

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)

[3]

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
1-B.....	19	1/17	Re granting of social allowances.	To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18.
2-(A).....	20	1/17	Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.	To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18.
3-B.....	26	1/24	Re remittance of development (of intelligence) expenses.	To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24.
4-B.....	27	1/24	Re crew members connected with Japan-Russian (?) fishing industry. (to the Ambassador #37)	To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24.
5-B.....	28	1/26	Ditto. (to the Ambassador #38)	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27.
6-B.....	31	1/27	Re invitation of Ambassador Nomura and his party.	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27.
7-B.....	32	1/27	Re delivery of telegram to Ambassador Nomura.	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28.
177-B.....	33	1/27	Re expression of views by the Minister on the speech by Secretary "Hull" against Japan. (to the Ambassador #39)	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28.
8-A.....	69	2/15	Re collecting of information.	To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/14.
9-B.....	78	2/25	Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese (?) fishing.	To the CG 2/25, to the TS 2/25.
10-B.....	80	2/26	Re date when Consul General Kita will start for his new post.	To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26.
[4] 11-B.....	82	2/27	Re invitation to participate in the special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine to MASA NAKAMURA.	To the CG 2/27, to the TS 2/27.
12-B.....	83	3/1	Re Consul General Kita's companion.	To the CG 3/1, to the TS 3/1.
13-B.....	91	3/8	Re recrossing by CHINEI KANE-SHIRO.	To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.
14-B.....	90	Re appointment of Secretary (TADASHI) MORIMURA to service in this Consulate.	To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.
584-A.....	94	3/10	Re disposition of secret documents.... (dated 3/10)	To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11.
15-B.....	111	3/18	Re starting for new post of Secretary Morimura.	To the CG 3/18, to the TS 3/18.
16-A.....	116	3/20	Re granting of visa for transit to "WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE".	To the CG 3/20, to the TS 3/21.
619-A.....	117	3/22	Re Greek vessel heading towards Japan.	To the CG 3/22, to the TS 3/22.
17-A.....	119	3/25	Re radiograms and secret documents to this Consulate carried by courier Mori.	To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25.
18-C.....	120	3/25	Re inquiry on boarding of ship by the Consul General's "cook."	To the CG 3/25, to the TS 3/25.
7-YUGO.....	127	3/27	Re distribution of code type TSU and AN. (type GO #1 type 9) (dated 3/12)	To the CG 3/31, to the TS 4/1.
19-B.....	139	4/5	Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.	To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.
20-B.....	145	4/7	Re verification expense of crewmen's registration.	To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.
[5] 21-B.....	144	4/7	Re request for contribution of article from Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the magazine commemorating the completion of the Memorial Hall of the Japanese Hospital of Honolulu.	To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.
814-ANGO.....	148	4/10	Re departure of Panamanian vessel towards Japan. (to Britain #123)	To the CG 4/10, to the TS 4/10.
819-RYAKUGO.....	152	4/11	Re stopping in port of courier Secretary FUKUDA and his party.	To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12.

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FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
22-A	151 (12)	4/11	Re simplifying procedure for expatriation from Japanese nationality.	To the CG 4/11, to the TS 4/12.
23-B	162	4/18	Re remittance of allowances for rent.	To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/19.
24-C	163	9/18	Re expatriation notices in official gazette.	To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19.
11-B-YUGO	164	4/18	Re supplementary addition of RYAKUGO (code?) to transferred telegram no. E.	To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19.
25-B	179	dated 4/28	Re notice of expatriation of HISAO NAKAZAWA in the official gazette.	To the CG 4/28, to the TS 4/28.
26-B	180	4/30	Re crew members connected with Russo-Japanese(?) fishing (to the Ambassador #186) (dated 4/30)	To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.
963-ANGO	181	dated 4/30	Re change of indicator words in request telegram. (Secret)	To the CG 4/30, to the TS 5/1.
-C	19	5/3	Re notice of expatriation of ----- in the official gazette.	To the CG 5/3, to the TS 5/3.
[6] 28-C	194	5/7	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 5/7, to the TS 5/3.
29-C	199	5/12	Ditto	To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13.
30-A	200	5/12	Re purchase of OKUMA's house (or purchase of house by OKUMA).	To the CG 5/12, to the TS 5/13.
(17)-AN-YUGO	198	5/10	Re method for use of telegraphic code type TSU. (dated 4/12)	To the CG 5/13, to the TS -----
1058-ANGO	201	5/11	Re abstinence from speeches disadvantageous to the Axis.	To the CG 5/14, to the TS 5/14.
31-C	208	5/21	Re expatriation notice in the official gazette.	To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.
32-B	211	5/22	Re transmission of lodging expenses for TSUKIKAWA by wire.	To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22.
33-C	213	5/24	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 5/24 to the TS 5/24.
34-B	226	5/29	Re trip to Hawaii by the Meiji University baseball team.	To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29.
35-C	225	5/29	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 5/29, to the TS 5/29.
36-A	227	5/30	Re transmission by wire of this Consulate's expenses for the development of intelligence for this year.	To the CG 5/30, to the TS 5/31.
37-C	228	5/31	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 5/31, to the TS 5/31.
38-C	230	6/2	Ditto	To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/2.
39-C	238	6/5	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/5.
40-C	243	6/7	Ditto	To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.
[7] 41-A	246	6/9	Re subsidy to the "Pan-Pacific Union". (dated 6/9)	To the CG 6/9, to the TS 7/9.
1211-ANGO	247	6/9	Re establishment of propaganda organ of the League of Nations (from Hankow #186)	To the CG 6/9, to the TS 6/10.
42-C	250	6/11	Re expatriation notice in official gazette	To the CG 6/12, to the TS 6/12.
43-C	254	6/13	Ditto	To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13.
44-B	266	6/21	Ditto	To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/21.
45-(C)	282	6/25	Re expatriation	To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.
46-A	284	6/27	Re investigation of the true facts surrounding discovery of the mutiny plot of the crew on the battleship "Pennsylvania."	To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27.
47-B	289	6/28	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30.
1399-ANGO	300	7/3	Re putting into force the telegraphic code type "TA".	To the CG 7/3, to the TS 7/3.
48-C	301	7/4	Notice of expatriation	To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/6.
49-A	302	7/4	Message from the NYK	To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/5.
50-B	312	7/10	Re resending of radiogram	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
51-C	313	7/10	Notice of expatriation	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.

FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
52-C.....	321	7/12	Notice of expatriation.....	To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.
[8] 53-B.....	322	7/12	Re transmission by wire of salaries(?) for foreign diplomatic establishments.	To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.
54-C.....	325	7/15	Re expatriation notice.....	To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.
55-A.....	329	7/16	Re return of the Imperial portrait.....	To the CG 7/16, to the TS 7/16.
56-A.....	331-330	7/16	Re report of gathering of local information.	To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.
57-B.....	336	7/17	Re arrival in port of courier OSHIO.....	To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.
58-C.....	344	7/21	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/21.
59-C.....	352	7/24	Ditto.....	To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/26.
1631-ANGO.....	395	7/25	Re issuing of instructions on entry into port of Japanese vessels.	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26 (28?)
60-A.....	394	7/28	Re returning of the portraits of the three Imperial Majesties.	To the CG 7/28, to the TS 7/29.
61-A.....	404	7/29	Re..... the secret #2 type UNNUN.....	To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/29.
62-C.....	409	7/30	Notice of expatriation.....	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 7/30.
63-A.....	419	7/31	Re courier OSHIO.....	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.
64-C.....	420	7/31	Expatriation notice in official gazette.....	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.
65.....	432	8/2	Re calling at "Honolulu" of Tatuta Maru.	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
[9] 66-A.....	450	8/6	Re sailing of the Tatuta Maru directly to Japan.	To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.
67-C.....	451	8/6	Re expatriation notice.....	To the CG 8/6, to the TS 8/8.
68-A.....	457	8/8	Re visa for passing through to the Britisher, McBain.	To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.
69-C.....	459	8/9	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.
-A.....	460	8/9	Request telegram from the Yokohama Specie Bank dated Aug. 9.	To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/9.
70-C.....	469	8/13	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.
71-A.....	470	8/13	Re loan from the Specie Bank.....	To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.
1836-ANGO.....	477	8/16	Re movements of foreign warships.....	To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/19.
72-B.....	486	8/22	Re request for permission for inspection tour within the jurisdiction.	To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/22.
73-A.....	492	8/26	Request telegram from Specie Bank.....	To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.
74-C.....	496	8/28	Re expatriation notice.....	To the CG 8/28, to the TS 8/28.
75-A.....	498	8/29	Re telegraphic code.....	To the CG 8/29, to the TS 9/5.
76-A.....	497	8/29	Re loans from Specie Bank to this Consulate.	To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.
1906-ANGO.....	499	Re survey pertaining to Domci broadcasts.	To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.
77-A.....	502	8/30	Re telegraphic code.....	To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.
[10] 78-A.....	507	9/1	Re movements and whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet.	To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.
79-A.....	516	9/5	Request telegram from Specie Bank.....	To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/5.
80-C.....	524	9/10	Expatriation notice in the official gazette.	To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/11.
81-A.....	534	9/12	From OGAWA.....	To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13.
82-A.....	558	9/24	Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.....	To the CG 9/24, to the TS 9/25.
83-A.....	559	9/24	Re report of movements of U. S. Fleet.....	To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.
84-(C).....	561	9/25	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.
85-(C).....	578	9/30	Ditto.....	To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.
86-A.....	579	10/1	Re financial report.....	To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.
87-B.....	582	10/2	Re contents of baggage directed to this Consulate.	To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.
88-C.....	586	10/3	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.

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FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
89-C.....	600	10/9	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.
90-C.....	604	10/11	Ditto.....	To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13.
91-B.....	612	10/14	Re return to Japan of TSUYOKO AYUZAWA.	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14.
92-C.....	613	10/14	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14.
2179-RYAKUGO.....	622	10/15	Re advance of expenses for sojourn to Secretary MAEDA.	To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15.
[11] 93-C.....	625	10/16	Expatriation notice in official gazette.....	To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17.
94-B.....	654	10/20	Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.....	To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21.
95-A.....	656	10/20	Re relaying (of message) to Secretary MAEDA.	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
96-A.....	660	10/21	Re surveillance of movements of "NEWMAN".	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
97-A.....	661	10/21	Re reports of forcible detention of "LEO SIROTA".	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
98-B.....	671	10/22	Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary TOKUNAGA.	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22.
99-B.....	672	10/22	Re number of passengers on the Taiyo Maru.	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22.
100-B.....	673	10/22	Re departure of Taiyo Maru from Yokohama.	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22.
101-B.....	680	10/24	Re clearance of baggage entrusted in care of Consul Iwanaga.	To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25.
102-B.....	690	10/15	Re expatriation notice.....	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
103-?.....	691	10/25	Re investigation of whether the aircraft carrier "Yorktown" is there or not.	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
2231-RYAKUGO.....	693	10/27	Re delay in arrival of Taiyo Maru.....	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27.
104-AN-RYO.....	694	10/27	Re issuing of entry visa to "NEWMAN".	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27.
105-AN-RYO.....	698	10/28	Re issuing of visa to the American "CRICHTON COLVIN".	To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/28.
106-C.....	702	10/29	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/29.
[12] 107-C.....	708	10/31	Re expatriation notice in official gazette.	To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31.
018-A.....	707	10/31	Re transmission of (message?) to REISAN (REI #3).	To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31.
2264-RYAKUGO.....	724	11/5	Re according of conveniences to Ambassador KURUSU.	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.
109-C.....	761	11/12	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14.
2318-A.....	762	11/12	Re according of conveniences to the "Argentine" Ambassador.	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14.
110-B.....	765	11/14	Re easing of the Freze Order.....	To the 11/14, to the TS 11/14.
111-A.....	771	11/15	Re reports pertaining to warships and ships.	To the 11/15, to the TS 11/19.
112-A.....	778	11/17	Re letter(s) sent through Consul IWANAGA.	To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17.
113-A.....	783	11/18	Re reports on movements of U. S. warships and ships.	To the CG 11/19 to the TS 11/19.
114-A.....	789	11/20	Re location of Fleet Training Base.....	To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21.
115-C.....	800	11/22	Expatriation notice in official gazette.....	To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24.
2378-ANGO.....	801	Re reports on matters pertaining to finance.	To the CG 11/22, to the TS 11/24.
116-C.....	804	11/24	Expatriation notice in official gazette.....	To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24.
117-(C).....	807	11/26	Ditto.....	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26.
118-A.....	827	11/28	Re disposal of ANGO (code).....	To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28.
119-A.....	828	11/28	Re reports of movements of U. S. warships and ships.	To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28.
[13] 2420-1-ANGO.....	434	11/29	Re reply telegram as to names of employes and number in their families.	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
120-C.....	835	11/29	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
2422-ANGO.....	836	11/29	Re reports of entrance and exit and other movements of warships and ships.	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
121-A.....	843	Re representation of interests.....	To the CG 11/30, to the TS 12/1.

FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
122-C	844	12/1	Expatriation notice.....	To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1.
2422-GOAN.....	845	12/1	Re entrance and exit and movement of warships and ships.	To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/1.
2437-ANGO.....	846	12/1	Re personal affairs of Consular staff....	To the CG 12/1, to the TS 12/2.
2445-ANGO.....	848	12/2	Re destruction by fire of code books...	To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2.
123-A.....	849	12/2	Re movements of U. S. Fleet.....	To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/3.
2461-ANGO.....	851	12/3	Re ANGO FUGO (Ango code or cryptographic code).	To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3.
124-B.....	852	12/3	Re sending of families' travelling expenses.	To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/3.
125-B.....	858	12/4	Re payment of year-end bonuses to employes.	To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.
126-A.....	857	12/4	Request telegram.....	To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.
2466-ANGO.....	856	12/4	Re return to Japan of families (of Consulate staff?).	To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/4.
128-A.....	863	12/7	Re reports of movements, etc., of warships and ships.	To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6.
127-C.....	862	Expatriation.....	To the CG 12/6, to the TS 12/6.

[14] FROM: THE AMBASSADOR

315-YUANGO.....	1	1/6	Re exchange visas between Japanese and Russians. (dated 12/20)	To the CG 1/7, to the TS 1/7.
2-ANGO.....	27	1/18	Re method of exit (from Japan?) of American citizens to Japanese descent. (from the Minister #25)	To the CG 1/18, to the TS 1/18.
1-B.....	38	1/29	Re entry of nationality of dual citizens.	To the CG 129, to the TS 1/30.
2-B.....	46	2/1	Re inquiry of names of Ambassador NOMURA'S party.	To the CG 2/1, to the TS 2/4.
6-RYAKUGO.....	51	1/4	Newspaper reports concerning forcible detention of Greek vessel. (from Los Angeles to the Minister #18)	To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.
7-RYAKUGO.....	52	2/4	Re denial of rumors of forcible detention of Greek vessel. (from the Minister #53)	To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.
22-RYAKUGO.....	70	2/14	Re arrival at post of Ambassador NOMURA.	To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17.
3-A.....	79	2/25	Re bill for freezing foreign credits in the United States.	To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/26.
6-ANYUGO.....	95	3/10	Re gathering of military information in U. S. and Canada. (from the Minister #73) (dated 2/18)	To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/13.
8-ANYUGO.....	96	3/10	Re handling of visas for foreigners coming to Japan. (to the Minister #109) (dated 2/25)	To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.
[15] 25-HEIGO.....	102	3/11	Re visit of Minister MATSUOKA to Germany and Italy. (from the Minister GO-#599)	To the CG 3/11, to the TS 3/12.
26-RYAKUGO.....	104	3/12	Re official tour of Europe by Minister MATSUOKA and the assumption of superintending of foreign Minister's duties by KONOYE. (from the Minister GO-#629)	To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.
27-ANGO.....	105	3/13	Re telegraphic code..... (from the Minister GO-#633)	To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13.
28-ANGO.....	106	3/13	Re visas of Netherlander(s)..... (from the Minister GO-#643)	To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/13.
29-ANGO.....	109	3/14	Re movements of U. S. Fleet..... (to the Minister #34)	To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17.
20-YU-GO-RYAKU.....	108	3/14	Tenor of arguments concerning the Far Eastern problem. (to the Minister #29) (dated 3/6)	To the CG 3/14, to the TS 3/17.
4-B.....	110	3/15	Re transmission by wire of advances..	To the CG 3/15, to the TS 3/17.
30-RYAKU-YUGO.....	114	3/19	Tenor of press comments on Minister Matsnoka's visit to Europe. (to the Minister #36) (dated 3/14)	To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19.

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FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
31-RYAKU-YUGO.....	118	3/24	Re regulations for survey of Japanese assets abroad. (from the Minister GO-#702)	To the CG 3/24, to the TS 3/24.
33-RYAKU-YU.....	121	3/26	Comments on the President's speech. (to the Minister #39) (dated 3/19)	To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27.
24-YUGO.....	129	4/2	Re text of report of "LOWREY" (to the Minister #41) (dated 3/24)	To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.
[16] 33-ANGO.....	130	4/2	Re movements of the U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #46)	To the CG 4/2, to the TS 4/3.
25-ANGO-YU.....	133	4/3	Re reporting of limits of aid to Britain. (dated 3/28)	To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.
35-RYAKUGO.....	136	4/4	Re change of Minister. (from the Minister #786)	To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.
32-ANGO.....	137	4/4	Re informative telegrams (from the Minister #758)	To the CG 4/4, to the TS 4/5.
36-ANGO.....	138	4/4	Re method of new use of TSUGO (HAGI). (from the Minister GO-#779) (*TSUGO means code type TSU)	To the CG 4/5, to the TS 4/5.
37-ANGO.....	140, 141	4/5	Greater East Asia reports. (from the Minister GO-#759)	To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.
38-ANGO.....	142, 143	4/5	Information on Europe and America. (from the Minister GO-#760)	To the CG 4/7, to the TS 4/8.
GOGAI-A (outside of code-A).	146	4/7	Re indicator words and number of words of telegram(s).	To the CG 4/8, to the TS 4/8.
41-RYAKUGO.....	155	4/14	Re signing of the neutrality pact between Russia and Japan. (from the Minister GO-#833)	To the CG 4/14, to the TS 4/15.
42-ANGO.....	161	4/16	Re continuation of voyage of Panamanian vessel to Japan. (to the Minister #60)	To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/19.
52 (5?)-B.....	165	4/18	Re granting of holiday on Grand Festival of Yasukuni Shrine. (from the Ambassador GO-#72).	To the CG 4/18, to the TS 4/19.
24-A.....	166	4/9	Movements of U. S. Fleet. (to the Minister #61)	To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21.
44-RYAKUGO.....	171	4/22	Re return to Japan of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, etc. (from the Minister GO-#927)	To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/22.
[17] 30-RYAKU-YU-GO.	169	4/21	Tenor of the press. (to the Minister #55) (dated 4/12)	To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23.
KETSU-RYAKU-YUGO	170	4/21	Tenor of press concerning conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact. (to the Minister #57) (dated 4/15)	To the CG 4/22, to the TS 4/23.
46-RYAKUGO.....	176	4/26	Re completion of ratification of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.	To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/26.
45-ANGO.....	177	4/26	Re intelligence strategy versus the U. S. (from the Ambassador GO-#82) (from the Minister #180)	To the CG 4/26, to the TS 4/28.
37-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	178	4/27	Tenor of press in regard to conclusion of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact. (dated 4/21)	To the CG 4/27, to the TS 4/28.
48-ANGO.....	183, 184 (215)	4/30	Greater East Asia reports. NI-(1); NI-(2) (from the Minister GO-#960)	To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/2.
49-ANGO.....	185, 186 187, 188	4/30	Second reports from Europe and America. (from the Minister GO-#959)	To the CG 5/2, to the TS 5/3.
52-ANGO.....	193	5/5	Re seizure of German(s) on board American ship by British warship. (to the Minister #59) (dated 5/2)	To the CG 5/6, to the TS 5/7.
59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	202	5/19	Tenor of press concerning U. S. aid to Britain and American-Japanese relations. (to the Minister #70) (dated 5/6)	To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19.
[18] 42-RYAKU-YU-GO.	204	5/19	Re strikes in munitions factories. (dated 5/13).	To the CG 5/19, to the TS 5/19.
56-RYAKUGO.....	205	5/19	Re enforcement of trade control regulations. (from the Ambassador—Minister?—GO-#1064).	To the CG 5/19, to the TS 9/20.
43-AN-YU-GO.....	203	5/19	Re introduction of bill to control foreign language schools. (to the Minister #74) (dated 5/14)	To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.

FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
61-ANGO.....	215, 217 221, 216	5/27	Third reports from Europe..... (from the Minister GO-#1125) (dated 5/26)	To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28.
60-ANGO.....	218, 219 220.	5/27	Greater East Asia reports..... (from the Minister #1124) (dated 5/26)	To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28.
62-ANGO.....	222	5/27	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #84)	To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/28.
67-ANGO.....	239, 240	6/4	Re introduction of bill to regulate fore- ign language schools. (to the Minister #90)	To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/7.
44-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	236	6/4	Re function of the export control bureau. (to the Minister #78) (dated 5/29)	To the CG 6/5, to the TS 6/6.
68-ANGO.....	241	6/4	Re receipt transit, degree of reliability of intelligence telegrams. (from the Ambassador GO-#116) (from the Minister #1480)	To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.
51-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	237	6/4	Tenor of the press in regard to the President's speech. (to the Minister #88) (dated 5/29)	To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/6.
19] 69-ANGO.....	248	6/10	Re mutual exemption of passport visa fees between Japan and Italy. (from the Minister GO-#1302)	To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/10.
70-ANGO.....	251, 252, 253	6/11	Re suspension of use of temporary terms in naval code book S, and formulation of temporary termi- nology #6. (from the Minister GO-#1217)	To the CG 6/11, to the TS 6/13.
53-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	255	6/12	Re requisitioning of U. S. ships..... (to the Minister #92) (dated 6/5)	To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/13.
72-ANGO.....	257(8)	6/16	Re enrollment of class #2 of the HEI- SHIKAN (a school?) (from the Minister #65)	To the CG 6/16, to the TS 6/17.
74-ANGO.....	260	6/17	Re prohibition of Germans from leaving the country. (to the Ambassador #24)	To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/18.
79-RYAKUGO.....	268	6/23	Re outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. (from the Minister GO-#1293)	To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23.
77-ANGO.....	269	6/23	Re transmitted telegram #28..... (freezing of foreign capital) (Ambassador #29)	To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23.
81-ANGO.....	271	6/23	Re press guidance policy in regard to the Russo-German War. (from the Minister GO-#1293)	To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/23.
83-RYAKUGO.....	274	6/23	Re regulations relative to the applica- tion of the foreign capital freeze order. (to the Ambassador #30)	To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24.
76-RYAKUGO.....	275	6/23	Ditto..... (to the Ambassador #28)	To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24.
[20] 78-ANGO.....	273	6/21	Re inspection of mail matter..... (to the Minister #104)	To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.
84-ANGO.....	281	6/25	Re form of coded radiogram of direc- tor(?). (from the Minister GO-#1308)	To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.
80-ANGO.....	276	6/23	Re change of ANGO code..... (cryptic code) (from the Minister GO-#1295)	To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.
82-ANGO.....	272	6/23	Ditto..... (from the Minister CP-#1305)	To the CG 6/25, to the TS 6/26.
55-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	283	6/26	Re tenor of press in regard to the inci- dent of the "ROBIN MOOR". (to the Minister #100)	To the CG 6/26, to the TS 6/27.
88-RYAKUGO.....	285	-----	Re strikes of machinists in ship- building industries in San Fran- cisco. (to the Minister #108)	To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27.
89-RYAKUGO.....	286	6/27	Re reply telegram concerning total amount of uncollected loans. (from the Minister GO-#1329)	To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/27.
90-RYAKUGO.....	287	6/27	Re according of conveniences to IARUJI TAIHARA, director of the Overseas Japanese Central Society. (from the Minister #71)	To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30.
66-ANGO.....	291	6/28	Re handling of visa for the British..... (from the Minister GO #1161) (dated 6/22)	To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30.

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FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
91-ANGO.....	292, 293	6/28	Re ANGO code (cryptic code)..... (from the Minister #1166)	To the CG 6/30, to the TS 6/30.
86-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	294 295	6/30	Outbreak of the Russo-German war and the tenor of the press. (to the Minister #105)	To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.
[21] 94-ANGO.....	303	7/3	Re survey of number of visa granted for transit through Japan. (from the Minister GO-#1381)	To the CG 7/4, to the TS 7/3.
6-C.....	304	7/5	Re arrival in port of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.	To the CG 7/5, to the TS 7/7.
7-B.....	308	7/9	Re giving a message to courier TAKI (or TAGI).	To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.
95-ANGO.....	307	7/8	Greater East Asia reports (re visit to Japan by Wang Chin-wei and party). (from the Minister GO-#1406)	To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.
8-A.....	310	7/9	Re survey of assets of Japanese residing in U. S.	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
9-A.....	316	7/10	Re transferring of telegram pertaining to movements of U. S. Fleet.	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
97-ANGO.....	317	7/10	U. S. Navy..... (to the Minister #122)	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/14.
100-ANGO.....	323	7/12	Re freezing of Japanese credits in the U. S.	To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/14.
98-ANGO.....	318	7/11	Re steps for preparation for emergency situation. (from the Minister GO-#1366)	To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15.
99-ANGO.....	319	7/11	Re before and after measures on financial matters to be taken in case of emergency. (from the Minister GO-#1367)	To the CG 7/12, to the TS 7/15.
101-ANGO.....	328	7/14	Re movements of U. S. Fleet..... (to the minister #123)	To the CG 7/14, to the TS 7/16.
102-HEIGO.....	333	7/16	Re resignation en bloc of the KO- NOYE Cabinet. (from the Minister GO-#1526)	To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.
[22] 103-HEIGO.....	337	7/18	Re issuance of Imperial command to Premier KONOYE to form another cabinet. (from the Minister GO-#1539)	To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.
104-ANGO.....	338	7/18	Re rigidifying of supervision of tele- graph and telephone..... (from the Minister GO-#1525)	To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/21.
107-HEIGO.....	340	7/19	Re appointment of Foreign Minister TOYOTA. (from the Minister GO-#1550)	To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21.
108-HEIGO.....	341	7/19	Re installation of new cabinet with ceremony. (from the Minister GO-#1551)	To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21.
109-ANGO.....	342	7/19	Re Cabinet shift and Japanese foreign policy. (from the Minister GO-#1560)	To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21.
110-ANGO.....	213	7/19	Re correction in telegram..... (from the Minister GOGAI)	To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21.
57-YUGO.....	339	7/19	Tenor of press..... (to the Minister #119)	To the CG 7/19, to the TS 7/21.
111-RYAKUGO.....	345	7/21	Political change in Japan and the tenor of the press.	To the CG 7/21, to the TS 7/22.
113-ANGO.....	354	7/24	Re Tatuta Maru..... (to the Minister #133)	To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/24.
115-ANGO.....	361	7/25	Re controlling of Japanese shipping..... (from the Minister #93)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
118-ANGO.....	365	7/25	Re wiring instructions to Japanese vessel(s). (to the Minister?-#138)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
114-ANGO.....	362	7/24	Re TAKIZO MATSUMOTO..... (from the Minister?-#92)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
116-ANGO.....	370	7/25	Re situation of entrance into and de- parture from port of Japanese ships. (to the Minister #135)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
[23] 121-ANGO.....	390	7/29	Re entrance of Japanese vessels into American ports. (to the Minister #140)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
120-ANGO.....	375	7/26	Re arrival in Hawaii of Undersecretary of the Navy "FORRESTAL." (to the Minister #139)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
122-ANGO.....	307	7/26	Re developments up to conclusion of arrangements for mutual defense of French Indo-China. (from the Minister GO-#1598)	To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30.
124-ANGO.....	407, 408	7/29	Re war situation..... (from the Minister GO #1642)	To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30.

FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
128-HEIGO.....	412	7/30	Summary of the regulations controlling trade with foreigners. (Minister GO-#1657)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
127-HEIGO.....	413	7/30	Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1656)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
131-ANGO.....	433	8/1	Re postponement of arrival in port of Asama Maru. (to the Minister #148)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
135-RYAKUGO.....	434	8/2	Re seizure of goods on TATUTA MARU.	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
136-ANGO.....	441	8/3	Re the third KOKURA MARU. (to the Minister #152)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/4.
138-RYAKUGO.....	442	8/4	Re departure from San Francisco of the TATUTA MARU. (to the Minister #153)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
137-HEIGO.....	443	8/4	Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1732)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
[24] 132-GO-RYAKU.....	439	8/4	Re manner of enforcement of the freeze order. (to the Minister #151)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
140-ANGO.....	445	8/4	Re TATUTA MARU. (to the Minister #154)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
143-ANGO.....	447	8/4	Re method of investigation of bank examiner. (to the Minister #157)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
146-ANGO.....	452	8/5	Re movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #159)	To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/8.
144-ANGO.....	453, 454	8/6	Re naval code book. (from the Minister GO-#1738)	To the CG 8/7, to the TS 8/8.
148-ANGO.....	458	8/8	Re decrease of telegraphic matter and shortening of the contents. (from the Minister GO-#1766)	To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.
153-ANGO.....	464	8/9	Re British battleship "WARSPITE". (from the Minister #108)	To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.
154-ANGO.....	465	8/9	Re cash held in this Consulate. (from the Minister GO-#1781)	To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.
158-HEIGO.....	472	8/15	Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1818)	To the CG 8/15, to the TS 8/20.
159-ANGO.....	473	8/11	Re amendment of regulations pertaining to entry into and sojourn in country by foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1819)	To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18.
59-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	478	8/15	Drift of argument regarding Japan-U. S. relations. (to the Minister #164) (dated 8/12)	To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/20.
[25] 164-ANGO.....	479, 480	8/18	Re condition of the Japanese residents in San Francisco.	To the CG 8/18.
60-YU-GO-RYAKU.....	489	8/23	Tenor of press in regard to joint declaration by Britain and the U. S. (to the Minister #168) (dated 8/15)	To the CG 8/23, to the TS 8/27.
174-RYAKUGO.....	493	8/25	Re revision of passport visas and passage certification regulations. (from the Minister GO-#1820)	To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.
10-A.....	511	9/2	Re arrival at post of newly-appointed "Bishop SWEENEY" of the "Catholic" parish.	To the CG 9/2, to the TS 9/5.
61-AN-YU-GO.....	514	9/4	Re method of enforcement of the freeze order. (to the Minister #181) (dated 8/25)	To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.
62-AN-YU-GO.....	515	9/4	Re treatment of Japanese residing in U. S. by America. (to the Minister #182) (dated 8/25)	To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.
KETSU-A.....	517	9/5	Movements of U. S. warships. (to the Minister #195)	To the CG 9/5, to the TS 9/8.
191-ANGO.....	518	9/6	Re applicants for class #2 of the HEISHIKAN (a school?)	To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/8.
10-C (11).....	522	9/8	Re enactment of regulations controlling trade connected with foreigners. (from the Minister GO-#1656)	To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.
194-ANGO.....	523	9/8	Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHIKAN (a school?) (to the Minister #200)	To the CG 9/9, to the TS 9/9.
12-B.....	525	9/10	Re stopping in port of courier KUGA..	To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.

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FROM: THE AMBASSADOR--Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
[261] 195-ANGO.....	527	-----	Re forwarding of mail matter between Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #205)	To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15.
200-ANGO.....	537	9/13	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #211)	To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15.
63-YU-GO-RYAKU.....	538	9/15	Tenor of press in regard to the "message" to the President from Premier Konoye. (to the Minister #190) (dated 8/30)	To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16.
202-ANGO.....	545	9/17	Re transmission of letters (documents, records, or notes), (to the Minister #214)	To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18.
218-ANGO.....	549	9/20	Japan-U. S. ship communication problem. (from the Minister #126)	To the CG 9/21, to the TS 9/23.
209-ANGO.....	550	9/20	Re revision in handling of urgent telegrams. (from the Minister GO-#2040)	To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.
211-ANGO.....	555, 556	9/22	Japan-U. S. ship communication problem. (to the Minister #220)	To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/24.
295-ANGO.....	566	9/26	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #127)	To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/30.
216-ANGO.....	570	9/26	Re carrying out of diplomatic policy.... (from the Minister GO-#2077)	To the CG 9/28, to the TS 9/30.
66-RYAKU-YU-GO....	577	9/29	Re expansion of Far Eastern aerial route by Pan-American Airways. (to the Minister #224)	To the CG 9/29, to the TS 10/2.
[27] 220-AN-TOKU-GO.	581	10/1	Re inspection of baggage, etc., when leaving country. (from the Minister #406)	To the CG 10/1, to the TS 10/2.
222-ANGO.....	584	10/2	Re movements of U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #230)	To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/4.
214-GO-AN.....	585	10/9	Re movements of U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #231)	To the CG 10/3, to the TS 10/4.
225-RYAKUGO.....	589	10/4	Re official announcement of temporary postal control order. (from the Minister GO-#2121)	To the CG 10/6, to the TS 10/6.
226-HEIGO.....	590	10/7	Re special festival of the Yasukuni Shrine. (from the Minister GO-#2129)	To the CG 10/7, to the TS 10/3.
228-ANGO.....	592	10/7	Re distribution of propaganda "pamphlets" with aim to alienate Japan from Germany. (to the Minister #234)	To the CG 10/3, to the TS 10/8.
230-ANGO.....	593, 594	10/8	Greater East Asia reports..... (from the Minister GO-#2130)	To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/9.
232-RYAKUGO.....	595, 596 603	10/10	Presidential message regarding amendment of the neutrality act, and tenor of press regarding Japan-U. A. negotiations. (to the Minister #235)	To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13.
234-ANGO.....	614, 620	10/13	Re problem of Japan-America ship communication. (from the Minister #136)	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/15.
237-ANGO.....	621	10/14	Ditto..... (to the Minister #237)	To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15.
238-ANGO.....	623	10/15	Re sailing of the TATUTA MARU.. (from the Minister #139)	To the CG 10/15, to the TS 10/15.
239-ANGO.....	624	10/15	Re problem of Japan-American ship communication.	To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17.
[28] (7)-A 12.....	627, 626	10/16	Problem of Japan-America ship communication. (from the Minister, to various Consulates, GO-#237)	To the CG 10/16, to the TS 10/17.
241-HEIGO.....	633	10/16	Re resignation en masse of KONOYE Cabinet. (from the Minister GO-#2190)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
242-HEIGO.....	634	10/16	Ditto..... (from the Minister GO-#2191)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
243-RYAKUGO.....	637	10/16	Re number of passengers on TATUTA MARU. (from the Minister #142)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/16.
245-HEIGO.....	638	10/17	Re issuance of Imperial command (for formation of Cabinet?) to War Minister TOJO. (from the Minister (GO-#2195)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
246-RYAKUGO.....	639	10/17	Re withdrawal of Ambassador(s) to the Soviet Union from Moscow. (from the Minister GO-#2149)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/19.

FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
252-HEIGO.....	646	10/18	Re installation of Minister TOGO... (from the Minister GO-#2196)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
253-HEIGO.....	647	-----	Re completed selection of members of the TOJO Cabinet. (from the Minister GO-#2197)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
249-ANGO.....	651	10/17	Japan-America ship communication problem.	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
245-ANGO.....	652	10/17	Ditto (to the Minister #245)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
247-ANGO.....	649-650	10/17	Japan-America ship communication problem. (from the Minister #145)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
[29] 255-ANGO.....	658	10/20	Ditto (from the Minister #146)	to the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
258-ANGO.....	663, 664	10/21	Ditto (from the Minister #150)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22.
259-ANGO.....	665 668	10/21	Ditto (to the Minister #252)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22.
261-ANGO.....	670	10/21	Re method of interpreting telegrams.. (to the Ambassador #335)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
257-ANGO.....	666	10/22	Japan-America ship communication problem. (to the Ambassador #72)	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/22.
260-ANGO.....	669	10/21	Re carrying of American dollar bills... (from the Ambassador GO-#310)	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/21.
262-ANGO.....	676	10/22	Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #254)	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/24.
13-B.....	677	10/23	Re passengers boarding TAIYO MARU.	To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24.
264-ANGO.....	678	-----	Japan-America ship communication problem. (to the Minister #255)	To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/24.
265-ANGO.....	684	10/24	Re going to the U. S. of members of the Chungking air force. (to the Minister #258)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
266-ANGO.....	687	10/24	Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S. (from the Minister #154)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
267-ANGO.....	695	10/26	Re progress of warship construction, etc. (to the Minister #260)	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/27.
[30] 268-AN-(1)-GO..	697	10/27	Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S. (from the Minister #159)	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28.
68-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	701	10/29	Tenor of press on change of Cabinet... (to the Minister #249)	To the CG 10/29, to the TS 10/30.
273-RYAKUGO.....	716	11/2	Re departure of TATUTA MARU... (to the Minister #269)	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.
275-ANGO.....	717, 718	11/2	Re mail matter to be loaded on TATUTA MARU. (to the Minister #201).	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.
274-ANGO.....	719	11/2	Problem of ship communication be- tween Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #200)	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.
278-AMGO.....	729	11/5	Re departure of British cruiser..... (to the Minister #278)	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.
280-ANGO.....	732	11/7	Re simplifying of expatriation..... (to the Minister #280)	To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/10.
281-ANGO.....	738	11/8	Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #282)	To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.
69-RYAKU-YU-GO....	743	11/10	Tenor of press on trip to U. S. by Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #280)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12.
283-ANGO.....	740	11/10	Problem of ship communication be- tween Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #287)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10.
14-A.....	752	11/12	Re transmission of message to Am- bassador KURUSU. (from the Minister #168)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12.
284-ANGO.....	755	11/12	Re problem of ship communication between Japan and U. S. (from the Minister #169)	To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15.
[31] 285-ANGO.....	767, 768	11/12	Greater East Asia report #5..... (from the Minister GO-#2292)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/17.
287-ANGO.....	769, 766	11/12	European and American reports #5... (from the Minister GO-#2291)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
292-ANGO.....	773	11/14	Problem of ship communication be- tween Japan and U. S. (to the Minister #292)	To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17.

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FROM: THE AMBASSADOR—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
290-ANGO.....	774, 775	11/13	Condition of progress of warship construction and national defense plans. (to the Minister #289)	To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/17.
291-ANGO.....	772	11/13	Re decision on basic plans for adjustment of relations between Japan and U. S. (from the Minister GO-#2313)	To the CG 11/13, to the TS 11/19.
GOGAI-A.....	780	11/17	Re interpretation of telegram(s).....	To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19.
297-ANGO.....	791	11/19	Re overseas broadcast in case of crisis in Japan's foreign policy. (from the Minister GO-#2353)	To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/21.
298-ANGO.....	794	11/19	Re movements of British warships.... (to the Minister #300)	To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24.
302-RYAKUGO.....	805	11/25	Re extension of time of anti-Comintern pact. (from the Minister GO-#2389)	To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25.
305-HEIGO.....	811	11/26	Re demise of Princess YOSHIKO, wife of the deceased Prince KAYA. (from the Minister GO-#2406)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26.
[52] 303-ANGO.....	812	11/25	Re Japanese employed locally and second generation employes not on regular staff. (to the Minister #304)	To the CG 11/25, to the TS 11/25.
71-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	813	11/26	Re severance of diplomatic relations with Japan by "IRAQ." (from the Ambassador #1181) (dated 11/24)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/28.
307-ANGO.....	818-821	11/27	Re method of telegraphing in connection with the situation. (from the Minister GO-#2409)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28.
310-ANGO.....	829	11/28	Re Japan-America negotiations. (from the Minister GO-#2416)	To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28.
315-ANGO.....	837	11/29	Re reply telegram in regard to foreign merchantmen and warships. (from the Minister GO-#2431)	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
313-ANGO.....	833	11/28	Re vessels requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy. (to the Minister #317)	To the CG 11/28, to the TS 12/1.
318-ANGO.....	847	12/1	Re arrival and departure and movements of warships. (to the Minister #316)	To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/2.
321-RYAKUGO.....	855	12/3	Re number of attendants of families of members of the Consulate wishing to board the TATUTA MARU.	To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.
70-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	860	12/5	Tenor of press..... (dated 11/19)	To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO

218-YU-GO-RYAKU.....	2	1/6	Tenor of American press..... (to the Minister #312) (dated 12/20)	To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.
2-YU-GO-RYAKU.....	11	1/13	Re alien registration..... (to the Ambassador #1) (dated 1/7)	To the CG 1/13, to the TS 1/14.
1-B.....	14	1/14	Re tour of the country by the "Subaru Show" troupe. (dated 1/16)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
4-RYAKUGO.....	15	1/15	Re settling on wearing of every day clothes for various functions. (from the Ambassador GO-#1) (from the Minister GO-#68)	To the CG 1/15, to the TS 1/15.
5-AN-YU-GO.....	16	1/16	Re U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #3) (dated 1/6)	To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17.
2-A.....	22	1/22	Re method of leaving country of American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #11)	To the CG 1/22, to the TS 1/23.
2-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	43	1/30	Re refusal of American freighters to be chartered by Russia. (to the Minister #10) (dated 1/21)	To the CG 1/30, to the TS 2/4.
3-C.....	44	1/31	Re holding of reception for Ambassador NOMURA in San Francisco.	To the CG 1/31, to the TS 2/4.
4-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	47	2/1	Tenor of press in regard to the Minister's speech in the Diet. (to the Minister #13) (dated 1/24)	To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
[54] 7-ANGO-----	53	2/4	Re request for expenses for development of intelligence. (from the Ambassador GO-#15) (from the Minister #45)	To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.
-HEI-YU-GO..	55	2/5	Re mediation in border controversy between Thailand and French Indo-China. (from the Minister GO-#155) (dated 1/25)	To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.
-RYAKU-YU..	54	2/5	Ditto (from the Minister GO-#154) (dated 1/25)	To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.
10-ANGO-----	57	2/5	Re policy of intelligence work against the U. S. (from the Ambassador GO-#13) (from the Minister #43)	To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.
9-ANGO-----	58	2/5	Main points concerning establishment of intelligence organ against the U. S. (from the Ambassador GO-#14) (from the Minister #44)	To the CG 2/5, to the TS 2/6.
10-AN-YU-GO-----	61	2/6	Re careful selection of matters to be telegraphed and making concise the wording of the telegrams. (from the Ambassador KETSU) (from the Minister GO-#185) (dated 1/30)	To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.
11-AN-YU-GO-----	62	2/6	Re sending by wire of expenses for the development of intelligence. (from the Minister GO-#138) (dated 1/23)	To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.
13-ANGO-----	63	2/7	Re alteration of method for using temporary terminology in naval code book S. (from the Minister GO-#242)	To the CG 2/7, to the TS 2/10.
[55] 14-RYAKU-YU-GO	64	2/10	Tenor of press in regard to Minister's speech in the Diet. (to the Minister #16)	To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12.
14-ANGO-----	65	2/10	Re guiding of resident Japanese..... (from the Minister #19)	To the CG 2/10, to the TS 2/12.
16-ANGO-----	71	2/15	Press accounts regarding the Far Eastern situation. (from the Minister GO-#310)	To the CG 2/15, to the TS 2/17.
17-A-----	72	2/17	Re handling of visa for foreigners visiting Japan. (from the Minister GO-#300)	To the CG 2/17, to the TS 2/18.
15-RYAKU-YU-GO....	74	2/20	Tenor of press on arrival of Ambassador NOMURA at his post. (to the Minister #22) (dated 2/10)	To the CG 2/20 to the TS 2/24.
18-ANGO-----	75, 76	2/21	Re telegraphic code..... (from the Minister GO-#367)	To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24.
19-RYAKUGO-----	77	2/21	Re refraining from making official tours within the year. (from the Ambassador KETSUGO) (from the Minister GO-#365)	To the CG 2/21, to the TS 2/24.
19-RYAKU-YU-GO....	81	2/26	Re movements of U. S. Fleet..... (to the Minister #24) (dated 2/15)	To the CG 2/26, to the TS 2/27.
20-RYAKU-YU-GO....	88	3/6	Tenor of press in regard to Japan's southward move question. (to the Minister #27) (dated 2/21)	To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.
2-RYAKU-YU-GO....	87	3/6	Re the "embargo" problem..... (dated 2/24)	To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/7.
23-A-----	97	3/10	Re disposition of secret documents..... (from the Minister GO-#584)	To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11.
[36] 24-----	98	3/10	Re passport visa fees..... (from the Ambassador GO-#30) (from the Minister GO-#555)	To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/11.
4-B-----	103	3/12	Re returning of advances..... (to San Francisco #4)	To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.
11-AN-YU-GO-----	115	3/19	Re investigation of the trend of the U. S. (from the Minister #112) (dated 3/8)	To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/21.
55-ANGO-----	126	3/27	Re reporting of bounds of aid to Britain. (from the Minister #111)	To the CG 3/27, to the TS 3/28.

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
5-A-----	128	3/29	Re telegraphic code kept in the Consulate General in "Chicago," (from Chicago GO-#3) (to the Minister #8)	To the CG 3/29,
6-A-----	147	4/9	Re easy clearance of courier MORI....	To the CG 4/9, to the TS 4/10.
15-AN-YU-GO-----	157	4/16	Re number of Japanese registered and number enlisted. (to the Minister #195) (dated 4/1)	To the CG 4/16, to the TS 4/18.
7-A-----	175	4/24	Re easy clearance of courier MORI....	To the CG 4/24, to the TS 4/26.
96-ANGO-----	207, 206	5/20	Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s). (from the Minister GO-#2337) (to Vladivostok and New York GO-#1086)	To the CG 5/20, to the TS 5/20.
21-RYAKU-YU-GO-----	209	5/20	Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via America. (to the Minister #275) (dated 5/7)	To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.
[37] 103-ANGO-----	212	5/22	Re issuing of visa for direct transit to Russian(s) (from the Minister #246) (to New York and Vladivostok, GO-#1103)	To the CG 5/22, to the TS 5/22.
22-RYAKU-YU-GO-----	214	5/26	Re situation in the U. S. as regards the European war. (GO-#88) (dated 5/12)	To the CG 5/26, to the TS 5/28.
106-ANGO-----	224	5/28	Re movements of the U. S. Fleet..... (to Panama #15)	To the CG 5/28, to the TS 5/29.
114-ANGO-----	229	5/31	Re notification of Japanese shipping in regard to suspension of use of temporary terminology #S. (dated 5/31)	To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/6.
8-A-----	234	6/3	Re reference to date official messages were dispatched.	To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/4.
21-RYAKU-YU-GO-----	235	6/4	Re enforcement of system of sanctioning transit export (?) via U. S. (to the Minister #288) (dated 5/20)	To the CG 6/4, to the TS 6/5.
117-RYAKUGO-----	244	6/7	Re method of seizure of foreign merchantmen. (to the Minister #373) (dated 6/7)	To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/7.
118-RYAKUGO-----	245	6/7	Ditto (to the Minister #374) (special telegram)	To the CG 6/7, to the TS 6/9.
125-ANGO-----	256	6/13	Re arrival in Japan of Wang Chin-Wei. (from the Minister #1251)	To the CG 6/13, to the TS 6/16.
128-ANGO-----	261	6/18	Re giving strict warning for observance of secrecy of this Consulate and related agencies.	To the CG 6/18, to the TS 6/13.
[38] 132-RYAKUGO-----	262	6/19	Re promulgation of detailed regulations, item 402, pertaining to expatriation. (to the Minister #411)	To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/20.
2-B-----	265	6/20	Re refusal of visa for Meiji University baseball team. (to the Minister #413)	To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21.
10-(A)-----	280	6/23	Re delivering of message to Commander TATIBANA on Nitta Maru.	To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24.
11-A-----	277	6/23	Re Commander TATIBANA.....	To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/24.
12-A-----	278, 279	6/23	Ditto.....	To the CG 6/24, to the TS 6/26.
144-ANGO-----	288	6/27	Re regular publications for use in development (of intelligence?) and propaganda.	To the CG 6/27, to the TS 6/30.
148-ANGO-----	290	6/28	Re question of closing Japanese Consulates in the U. S. (to the Minister #437)	To the CG 6/28, to the TS 6/30.
149-RYAKUGO-----	297	6/30	Re concentration of sale of British goods and British-controlled currency. (from the Minister GO-#1198) (dated 6/26)	To the CG 6/30, to the TS 7/2.
142-RYAKUGO (1)-----	298	7/2	Re stopping in port of Lt. Commander (or Major) OKADA and Engineer First Lieutenant YAMADA.	To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
153-RYAKUGO-(1).....	299	7/1	Re gathering of telephone directories and name directories.	To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.
156-ANGO.....	311	7/9	Re returning the Imperial portrait.... (from the Minister #481)	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
[59] 158-ANGO.....	314	7/9	Re report of assets of Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S. (to the Minister #487)	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
26-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	309	7/9	Re concentration of sale of foreign goods. (from the Minister GO-#1276)	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
165-ANGO.....	324	7/14		To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/15.
168-RYAKUGO.....	326	7/15	Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets.	To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/16.
13-A.....	335	7/17	Re resending of telegram(s).....	To the CG 7/18, to the TS 7/18.
177-HEIGO.....	346	7/22	Re registration of foreign government officials and employees.	To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/22.
178-ANGO.....	347-349	7/22	U. S. attitude towards Japan. (to the Minister #548)	To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.
179-ANGO.....	350		Re Consulates on West Coast. (to the Minister #549)	To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/24.
180-GO-RYAKU.....	351	7/23	Steps to be taken by U. S. government in case of occupation of French Indo-China by Japanese troops. (to the Minister #551)	To the CG 7/23, to the TS 7/23.
183-ANGO.....	355 (359)	7/24	Re problem of closure of Consulates... (1) (2) (to the Minister KETSUGO)	To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/24.
182-RYAKUGO.....	356	7/24	Tenor of press in regard to the French Indo-China problem. (to the Minister #561)	To the CG 7/24, to the TS 7/25.
[40] 183-HEIGO.....	357, 358	7/24	Re official announcement of procedure for overruling assumption(?) of expatriation. (to the Minister #562)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
184-HEIGO.....	360		... ? ... in regard to public announcement of retaliatory measures against Japan by the President. (to the Minister #568)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
187-ANGO.....	363	7/25	Re date of announcement of freeze order against Japan. (to the Minister #573)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
189-HEIGO.....	369	7/25	Re announcement of freeze order against Japan. (Minister #576)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26.
192-(HEI)-GO.....	371	7/25	Amendment to regulations..... (Minister #579)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
190-(HEI)-GO.....	372	7/25	Writ. Re freeze order..... (Minister #577)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26.
191-(HEI)-GO.....	373	7/25	Ditto. Revised Presidential order.... (Minister #578)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/25.
185-ANGO.....	364	7/25	Re surveillance of U. S. warships passing through the Panama Canal. (to Panama #22)	To the CG 7/25, to the TS 7/26 (29?).
196-RYAKUGO.....	376	7/26	Re exemption provisions of the freeze order. (to the Minister #586)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
188-ANGO.....	368	7/25	Re holding of assets of the various Consulates (and other Japanese governmental agencies?) in the Embassy. (to the Minister #575)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
193-ANGO.....	376	7/26	Re telegraphic code.....	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
[41] 186-GO.....	366	7/26	Re application of the Freeze Order to Germany and German nationals. (to the Minister #569)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/26.
195-RYAKUGO.....	377	7/26	Gist of the Presidential "statement" on promulgation of the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #585)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
186-ANGO (2).....	367	7/25	Re application of the Freeze Order to German citizens in general. (to the Minister #569)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
-HEIGO.....	378-389		General license No. 11..... (to the Minister #588) (Special telegram #11?)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
194-ANGO.....	391, 392	7/26	Home policy of Finance Commissioner NISHIYAMA in regard to freezing of Japanese credit. (to the Minister #583)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
198-ANGO.....	393, 388	7/26	Re evacuation of resident Japanese.... (to the Minister #587)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/29.
197-ANGO.....	399, 400	7/26	Re moving into French Indo-China and propagandizing Japan's foreign policy. (from the Minister #1587)	To the CG 7/26, to the TS 7/30.
201-ANGO.....	402	7/28	Re exit from and entry into port of shipping. (to the Minister #593)	To the CG 7/29, to the TS 7/30.
200-ANGO.....	401, 403 405, 406	7/28	Re public opinion in the U. S. asso- ciated with the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #590)	To the CG 7/29, to the TS 8/2.
202-ANGO.....	410	7/30	Re reply concerning "balance" in bank of government funds.	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
[42] 205-ANGO.....	411	7/30	Re entry into port of Japanese vessel.. (to the Minister #613)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
206-RYAKUGO.....	416	7/30	Re shipment..... (to the Minister #616)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
204-ANGO.....	418	Re shipment on Japanese vessels..... (to the Minister #661)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
207-ANGO.....	421	7/31	Ditto..... (to the Minister #619)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.
KETSU-B.....	423	7/31	Re specification of main licensed list of articles. (from the Minister #431)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.
201-ANGO.....	424	7/31	Re counter-measure against the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #621)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 7/31.
209-ANGO.....	425	Re American currency bonds held by Japanese residing in U. S. (to the Minister #619)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.
208-ANGO.....	426, 427 428	7/31	Re counter-move towards U. S.-Japan relations. (to the Minister #618)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/4.
214-ANGO.....	431	8/1	Re baggage on TATUTA MARU.... (to the Minister #630)	To the CG 8/1, to the TS 8/4.
218-ANGO.....	442	8/7	Re shipment on Japanese vessels..... (to the Minister #637)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
219-ANGO.....	437	8/2	Re oil embargo act..... (to the Minister #638)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
KETSU-ANGO.....	430	8/2	Re exit from and entry into port of Japanese shipping. (to the Minister #632)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
[43] 220-ANGO.....	436	8/2	Re ASAMA MARU..... (to the Minister #639)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
212-ANGO.....	435	8/2	Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU and IETAN MARU. (to the Minister #636)	To the CG 8/2, to the TS 8/4.
215-ANGO.....	438	8/4	Re effect of the Freeze Order on finances of foreign diplomatic estab- lishments. (to the Minister #631)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
KETSU-ANGO.....	444, 446	8/4	Re problem of shipment on TATUTA MARU. (from the Minister #442)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
224-ANGO.....	448	8/4	Re oil embargo act..... (to the Minister #647)	To the CG 8/4, to the TS 8/6.
233-ANGO.....	461	8/8	Re application of the Freeze Order to diplomatic and consular officials. (to the Minister #670)	To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/9.
.....	462	Re evacuation of resident Japanese.... (from the Minister #453)	To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/11.
14-A.....	463	8/9	Re reply telegram in regard "balance" in bank of government funds.	To the CG 8/9, to the TS 8/11.
KETSU-A.....	471	8/13	Talks (?) of "MOORE" concerning observations on the U. S.-Japan situation.	To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/14.
-ANGO.....	475, 476	8/16	Re counter-measures towards U. S.- Japan relations. (from the Minister #475)	To the CG 8/16, to the TS 8/18.
15-C.....	481	8/18	Re forwarding of exequatur from U. S. President to Consul-General KITA.	To the CG 8/18, to the TS 8/20.
245-ANGO.....	483	8/18	Re allotment of "running expenses".... (to the Minister #712)	To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/20.
[44] 16-A.....	484	8/19	Re movements of U. S. warships.....	To the CG 8/19, to the TS 8/21.
250-ANGO.....	487, 488	8/22	Pe U. S. treatment of Japanese nation- als residing in the U. S. (from the Minister #489)	To the CG 8/22, to the TS 8/28.
255-ANGO.....	490	8/25	Re problem of evacuation of resident Japanese. (to the Minister #742)	To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
254-ANGO.....	491, 494	8/26	Re enforcement of the Freeze Order... (to the Minister #741)	To the CG 8/26, to the TS 8/27.
256-ANGO.....	495	8/26	Re drawing on allowances... (to the Minister #743)	To the CG 8/27, to the TS 8/27.
29-B.....	500	8/29	Re KIYOSHI MA YAKAWA, Japanese government official.	To the CG 8/29, to the TS 8/29.
257-RYAKUGO.....	501	8/29	Re method of disposal of mail matter to U. S. in Japan. (to the Minister #755)	To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.
-A.....	504, 505	8/30	Re evacuation of resident Japanese... (from the Minister #516)	To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.
258-ANGO.....	506, 508	8/30	Re writing of Representative KASAI concerning U. S.-Japan relations. (to the Minister #760)	To the CG 8/30, to the TS 9/2.
GOGAI-A.....	509	9/1	Re correction of telegram... (to the Minister #GOGAI) (re writing of articles by Representative KASAI)	To the CG 9/1, to the TS 9/2.
18-A.....	510	9/2	Re stopping in port of courier.....	To the CG 9/3, to the TS 9/5.
262-ANGO.....	519	9/6	Re registration of wealth by Japanese nationals and commercial firms in the U. S. (to the Minister #787)	To the CG 9/6, to the TS 9/6.
[45] KETSU-B.....	520	9/6	Re mail matter to Japan... (from Mexico GO-#86)	To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.
KETSU-ANGO.....	521	-----	Re method of forwarding mail matter to the U. S. followed in Japan. (from the Minister #541)	To the CG 9/8, to the TS 9/9.
KATSU-ANGO.....	528	9/11	Re evacuation of resident Japanese... (from the Minister #555)	To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/13.
272-ANGO.....	529-533	9/10	Re mutual cancellation of frozen credit towards computation of government funds.	To the CG 9/12, to the TS 9/15.
KETSU-A.....	535	9/13	Re transmission of radiograms addressed to this Consulate. (from the Minister #552)	To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/15.
19-A.....	536	9/13	Re delivery of documents... (to San Francisco #41)	To the CG 9/13, to the TS 9/19.
KETSU-B.....	543	9/16	Re arrangement for alleviation of Freeze Order between Japan and the U. S. (from the Minister #566)	To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18.
KETSU-A.....	542	9/16	Ditto... (from the Minister #567)	To the CG 9/16, to the TS 9/18.
278-RYAKUGO.....	544	9/17	Re drawing up of name-list based on arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order.	To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18.
277-ANGO.....	546	9/17	Re arrangement for alleviation of the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #520)	To the CG 9/17, to the TS 9/18.
279-ANGO.....	547	9/17	Re President Roosevelt's speech... (to the Minister #516, gist (?))	To the CG 9/18, to the TS 9/18.
KETSU-ANGO.....	548	9/19	Re method for replenishment government funds (estimate?) following arrangement for alleviation of the freezing of credit. (from the Minister #575)	To the CG 9/19, to the TS 9/23.
[46] 283-(AN)-GO.....	552	9/19	Re extension of time limit for reporting foreign assets (to the Minister #833)	To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/23.
METSU-A.....	553	9/23	Re arrangement for easing of the credit freeze (from the Minister #578)	To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/23.
285-ANGO.....	557	9/22	Re alleviation of the credit freeze... (to the Minister #540)	To the CG 9/23, to the TS 9/25.
287-ANGO.....	560	9/24	Ditto... (to the Minister #?)	To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.
288-ANGO.....	562, 563	9/25	Ditto... (to the Minister #848)	To the CG 9/25, to the TS 9/26.
KETSU-ANGO.....	564, 567, 568	9/26	Re evacuation of the resident Japanese... (from the Minister #596)	To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27.
291-ANGO.....	565	9/26	Ditto... (to the Minister #854)	To the CG 9/26, to the TS 9/27.
(20)-A.....	571	9/27	Re inquiry in regard to receipt of telegram.	To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.
292-ANGO.....	569, 572	9/26	Re arrangement for alleviation of the credit freeze. (to the Minister #855)	To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.
293-ANGO.....	573, 574	9/27	Japan-U. S. ship communication problem (to the Minister #864)	To the CG 9/27, to the TS 9/30.
-ANGO.....	575	-----	Ditto... (from the Minister #610)	To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
296-ANGO.....	580	9/30	Ditto..... (to the Minister #875)	To the CG 9/30, to the TS 10/2.
297-RYAKUGO.....	583	10/2	Re fees of freeze-affected nationals to banks of deposits (to the Minister #888)	To the CG 10/2, to the TS 10/2.
[47] KETSU-ANGO.....	587, 588	10/3	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #831).	To the CG 10/4, to the TS 10/6.
300-RYAKUGO.....	591	10/7	Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship. (to the Minister #905).	To the CG 10/8, to the TS 10/8.
KETSU-ANGO.....	589	10/8	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #910).	To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.
KETSU-HEIGO.....	597, 598	10/8	Ditto..... (to the Minister #911).	To the CG 10/9, to the TS 10/9.
303-HEIGO.....	601	10/9	Re amendment of nationality laws with object of nullifying dual citizenship. (to the Minister #913).	To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/10.
309-ANGO.....	602	10/10	Re entry permit. (to the Minister #922).	To the CG 10/10, to the TS 10/11.
KETSU-HEIGO.....	605	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #653).	To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13.
KETSU-B.....	606	10/11	Ditto..... (from the Minister #652).	To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13.
KETSU-ANGO.....	607	10/11	Ditto..... (from the Minister #651).	To the CG 10/11, to the TS 10/13.
305-ANGO.....	608, 609	10/11	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #926).	To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13.
KETSU-RYAKUGO.....	617	10/14	Ditto..... (from the Minister #660?).	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14.
KETSU.....	615, 616	10/14	Ditto..... (from the Minister #661).	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14.
[48] —ANGO.....	618, 619	10/13	Ditto..... (to the Minister #938)	To the CG 10/14, to the TS 10/14.
—ANGO.....	629	10/16	Ditto..... (to the Minister #951)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
323-RYAKUGO.....	631	10/16	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
310-ANGO.....	628	10/16	Re carrying of American dollar bills. (from the Minister #670)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
322-A.....	635	10/17	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #953)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.
325-(HEI)-GO.....	636	10/17	Ditto..... (to the Minister #956) (separate telegram)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.
326-GO.....	640	10/17	Ditto..... (to the Minister #963)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.
328-RYAKUGO.....	641	10/17	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #684)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.
327-ANGO.....	642, 643	10/18	Ditto..... (from the Minister #683)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/20.
325-ANGO.....	644	10/17	Ditto..... (from the Minister #685)	To the CG 10/18, to the TS 10/21.
381-ANGO.....	645	10/18	Ditto..... (to the Minister #969)	To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21.
330-ANGO.....	653	10/16	Ditto..... (from the Minister #687)	To the CG 10/20, to the TS 10/21.
332-ANGO.....	657	10/20	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #971)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
KETSU-ANGO.....	655	10/20	Ditto..... (from the Minister #688)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22.
[49] KETSU-ANGO.....	667	10/21	Ditto..... (from the Minister #695)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22.
336-ANGO.....	674, 675	10/22	Ditto..... (to the Minister #982)	To the CG 10/22, to the TS 10/23.
21-A.....	679	10/23	Ditto.....	To the CG 10/23, to the TS 10/25.
340-ANGO.....	681	10/24	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #705)	To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25.
341-ANGO.....	683	10/24	Ditto.....	To the CG 10/24, to the TS 10/25.
342-ANGO.....	689	10/24	Ditto..... (to the Minister #990)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
KETSU-A	686	10/24	Re results of the Japanese overseas broadcasts. (from the Minister GO-#2222)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
22-A	696	10/27	Re inquiry concerning receipt of telegram.	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28.
(23)-B	698	10/27	Re credit report of this Consulate and Consulate staff.	To the CG 10/27, to the TS 10/28.
(24)-A	703	10/30	Re inquiry as to whether articles were entrusted to courier KUGA or not.	To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/29.
347-ANGO	704, 705	10/29	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #1011)	To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/30.
348-ANGO	706	10/30	Re report of foreign assets. (to the Minister #1015)	To the CG 10/30, to the TS 10/31.
KETSU-ANGO	709	10/31	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #715)	To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31.
[50] 349-ANGO	710	-----	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #1018)	To the CG 10/31, to the TS 10/31.
355-ANGO	712	11/1	Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S.	To the CT 11/1, to the TS 11/4.
(25)-A	714, 713	11/2	Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU, and Consul IWANAGA.	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/2.
(26)-A	720	11/4	Ditto	To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/4.
(27)-B	727	11/5	Re tax exemption and clearance of souvenir gifts presented to former honorary Consul.	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.
352-ANGO	721	11/4	Re disapproval of loading of mail matter. (to the Minister #1033)	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/6.
KETSU-ANGO	722	11/4	Ditto (from the Minister #728)	to the TS 11/6.
328-ANGO	728	11/5	Re report of foreign assets	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/7.
(28)-B	730	11/6	Re allowance for members of this Consulate.	To the CG 11/6, to the TS 11/7.
KETSU-ANGO	737	11/8	Re alleviation of freeze affecting our governmental agencies in the U. S. (Minister #749)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11.
356-RYAKUGO	744	11/10	Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12.
355-ANGO	745	11/10	Re alleviation of credit freeze (to the Minister #1067)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/12.
358-ANGO	753	11/12	Re delivery of message to Ambassador KURUSU.	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/12.
[51] GOGAI-A	754	11/12	Re interpretation of telegrams.	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
359-ANGO	756	11/12	Re easing of the Freeze Order.	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
KETSU-(C)	758	11/12	Ditto (from the Minister #761)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
KETSU-A	759	11/12	Ditto (to the Minister #1081)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
(28)-A	757	11/12	Re alleviation of the Freeze Order (from the Minister #744)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/15.
357-ANGO	746-749	11/11	Re present situation in the U. S.	To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15.
362-ANGO	763	11/13	Re alleviation of the Freeze Order	To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15.
KETSU-B	764	11/13	Ditto	To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/15.
29-B	776	11/15	Re resume of contents of bill for defense of Hawaii and "PUERTO RICO." (to the Minister #1101)	To the CG 11/15, to the TS 11/15.
364-ANGO	777	11/15	Re alleviation of the Freeze Order	To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/17.
367-RYAKUGO	779	11/17	Re registration of real property belonging to Consulates in the U. S.	To the CG 11/17, to the TS 11/19.
368-ANGO	781	11/17	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #1120)	To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19.
KETSU-ANGO	782	11/17	Ditto (from the Minister #786)	To the CG 11/18, to the TS 11/19.
[52] 369-HEIGO	784	11/18	Telegram of thanks from Ambassador KURUSU.	To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19.
KETSU-A	785	-----	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #791)	To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19.

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FROM: SAN FRANCISCO—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
370-RYAKUGO.....	786, 787	11/18	Re enforcement of regulations pertaining to restriction and ban of leaving and entering country. (to the Minister #1127)	To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/19.
372-17-ANGO.....	790	11/19	Re alleviation of the Freeze Order....	To the CG 11/19, to the TS 11/21.
371-17-ANGO.....	792, 793	11/19	Ditto.....	To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21.
KETSU-ANGO.....	795	11/21	Re reporting of developments of Japan-U. S. negotiations. (to the Minister #1145)	To the CG 11/21, to the TS 11/21.
375-ANGO.....	802	Re reply on names and competence of members of Consulate, etc.	To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24.
376-ANGO.....	803	11/23	Re personal affairs of members of the Consulate. (to the Minister #1162)	To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24.
374-ANGO.....	797, 798, 799	11/23	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #1152)	To the CG 11/24, to the TS 11/24.
399-ANGO.....	806	11/25	Ditto..... (to San Francisco #66)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26.
380-ANGO.....	809	11/25	Ditto..... (to the Minister #1168)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26.
388-ANGO.....	810	11/25	Re application for permit to leave country. (to the Minister #1182)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 11/26.
[53] 377-ANGO.....	808	11/25	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #819, #820)	To the CG 11/26, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-RYAKUGO.....	815	11/26	Re TATUTA MARU's schedule.... (from the Minister #838)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.
383-RYAKUGO.....	814	11/26	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #1181)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-A.....	817	11/26	Re boarding of TATUTA MARU.... (from the Minister #837)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28.
384-ANGO.....	822, 823	11/27	Re U. S. regulations permitting leaving and entering of country. (to the Minister? #1201)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28.
KETSU-ANGO.....	824, 825	11/27	Present condition of Japan-U. S. negotiations. (from the Minister GO-#2416)	To the CG 11/27, to the TS 11/28.
223-GO-AN.....	826	8/4	Re investigation and reporting of movements of warships.	To the CG 11/28, to the TS 11/28.
387-ANGO.....	830	11/28	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (Minister #1211)	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-A.....	831, 832	11/26	Ditto..... (from the Minister #839)	To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-A.....	839	11/28	Ditto..... (from the Minister #846)	To the 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-A.....	840, 841	11/29	Re disposition of American currency bonds. (from the Minister #850)	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
KETSU-A.....	842	11/26	Re entrusting of rights and interests in the U. S. (from the Minister GO-#2403)	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
[54] KETSU-A.....	850	12/2	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (from the Minister #870)	To the CG 12/2, to the TS 12/3.
KETSU-B.....	854	12/3	Re transmission by wire of secret expenses for third period and temporarily increased amount.	To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.

FROM: SEATTLE

[55] 161-AN-YU-GO..	4	1/8	Re movements of U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #198) (dated 12/24)	To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.
1-AN-YU-GO.....	10	1/13	Ditto..... (to the Minister #1) (dated 1/3)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
2-AN-YU-GO.....	12	1/14	Ditto..... (to the Minister #2) (dated 1/6)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
3-AN-YU-GO.....	17	1/16	Ditto..... (to the Minister #3) (dated 1/8)	To the CG 1/17, to the TS 1/18.

FROM: SEATTLE—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
4-AN-YU-GO.....	25	1/23	Ditto..... (to the Minister #4) (dated 1/16)	To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/24.
5-AN-YU-GO.....	41	1/31	Ditto..... (to the Minister #5) (dated 1/21)	To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.
7-AN-YU-GO.....	49	2/7	Ditto..... (to the Minister #7) (dated 1/24)	To the CG 2/4, to the TS 2/4.
9-AN-YU-GO.....	56	2/5	Ditto..... (to the Minister #9) (dated 1/25)	To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.
12-AN-YU-GO.....	68	2/12	Ditto..... (to the Minister #11) (dated 1/25)	To the CG 2/13, to the TS 2/13.
13-AN-YU-GO.....	73	2/19	Ditto..... (to the Minister #13) (dated 2/10)	To the CG 2/19, to the TS 2/19.
[66] 14-AN-YU-CO.....	84	3/5	Ditto..... (to the Minister #14) (dated 2/24)	To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.
1-A.....	89	3/6	Ditto.....	To the CG 3/6, to the TS 3/6.
15-AN-YU-GO.....	92	3/8	Ditto..... (to the Minister #15) (dated 2/25)	To the CG 3/8, to the TS 3/8.
16-AN-YU-GO.....	100	3/10	Ditto..... (to the Minister #16) (dated 3/4)	To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.
19-AN-YU-GO.....	122	3/20	Ditto..... (to the Minister #20) (dated ?/20)	To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27.
18-AN-YU-GO.....	124	3/27	Ditto..... (to the Minister #18) (dated 3/17)	To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28.
21-AN-YU-GO.....	149	4/10	Ditto..... (to the Minister #23) (dated 4/1)	To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15.
22-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	150	4/10	Re calling attention to enforcement of Nationality Laws. (to the Minister #24) (dated 4/2)	To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/15.
23-AN-YU-GO.....	172	4/23	Re movement of U. S. warships (to the Minister #26) (dated 4/10)	To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.
24-AN-YU-GO.....	174	4/23	Ditto..... (to the Minister #29) (dated 4/16)	To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.
2-A.....	182	4/30	Re U. S. Navy (to the Minister #36)	To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.
[57] 3-A.....	231	6/2	Re U. S. Navy (to the Minister #36)	To the CG 6/2, to the TS 6/3.
37-AN-YU-GO.....	249	6/30	Ditto..... (to the Minister #51) (dated 5/28)	To the CG 6/10, to the TS 6/12.
42-AN-YU-GO.....	296	6/30	Ditto..... (to the Minister #56) (dated 6/23)	To the CG 7/2, to the TS 7/3.
66-RYAKUGO.....	662	10/28	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com- munication. (from the Minister GO #2205)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/22.
70-ANGO.....	692	10/24	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com- munication. (to the Ambassador #34)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
73-ANGO.....	715	11/2	Re registration of property (to the Ambassador #39)	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.
75-ANGO.....	725	11/5	Re sailing of the HIKAWA MARU (to the Minister #158)	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.
78-ANGO.....	738	11/8	Re Japan shipping communication (to the Minister #162)	To the CG 11/8, to the TS 11/11.
79-ANGO.....	739	11/8	Ditto..... (to the Minister #160)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11.
81-ANGO.....	750	11/10	Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com- munication. (to the Minister #166)	To the CG 11/12, to the TS 11/14.
83-ANGO.....	770	11/14	Re adoption of the message associated with the situation by the Council of the League of Organizations of "Seattle."	To the CG 11/14, to the TS 11/17.
85-ANGO.....	796	11/20	Re problem of Japan-U. S. shipping communication. (to the Minister #175)	To the CG 11/20, to the TS 11/24.

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FROM: NEW YORK

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
2-RAKUGO.....	35	1/27	Re restrictions of parcel post to Japan..	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/28.
3-RAKUGO.....	40	1/30	Ditto.....	To the CG 1/30, to the TS 1/30.
1-A.....	154	4/12	Re verbal message to Secretary FU- KUSHIMA.	To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/15.
52-ANGO.....	414, 415 417	7/30	Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #372)	To the CG 7/30, to the TS 8/2.
54-ANGO.....	449	8/5	Re withholding of the cryptograph of the Yokohama Specie Bank branch.	To the CG 8/5, to the TS 8/6.
57-ANGO.....	455, 546	8/8	Re manner of evacuation of the resi- dent Japanese. (to the Minister #391)	To the CG 8/8, to the TS 8/8.
60-ANGO.....	466, 467 468	8/13	Re manner of evacuation of the resi- dent Japanese. (to the Minister #401)	To the CG 8/13, to the TS 8/13.
67-ANGO.....	485	8/20	Re counter-measures against the Freeze Order. (to the Minister #414)	To the CG 8/20, to the TS 8/20.
18-ANGO.....	512, 513	9/4	Re cryptographic code..... (from the Minister GO-#1907)	To the CG 9/4, to the TS 9/5.
83-ANGO.....	685	10/24	Re steps for payment of boat fare for passengers on requisitioned ships in Japan. (to the Minister #487)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
96-ANGO.....	711	10/31	Re report of foreign assets..... (to the Minister #88)	To the CG 11/2, to the TS 11/4.
[59] 2-B.....	726	11/5	Re resending of telegram advising of dates of arrival and departure of Secretary TOKUNAGA and wife.	To the CG 11/5, to the TS 11/5.
88-ANGO.....	733	11/8	Re procedure for foreigners to depart from Japan. (to the Minister #496)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11.
89-ANGO.....	734, 735	11/8	Ditto..... (from the Minister #234)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/11.
90-ANGO.....	816	11/26	Re evacuation of Japanese commercial firms and employes of branch banks in the U. S. (from the Minister #242)	To the CG 11/27.
91-ANGO.....	838	Re cancellation of portion of Freeze Order.	To the CG 11/29, to the TS 12/1.
94-ANGO.....	853	12/3	Ditto..... (from the Minister #271)	To the CG 12/3, to the TS 12/4.
96-ANGO.....	861	12/5	Ditto..... (to the Minister #535)	To the CG 12/5, to the TS 12/6.

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FROM: FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

29-AN-YU-GO.....	6	1/7	Re movements of U. S. warships..... (to the Minister #474) (dated 12/23) (from Manila)	To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.
48-AN-YU-GO.....	8	1/10	Re naval planes of the U. S..... (to the Minister #466) (dated 12/14)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
28-AN-YU-GO.....	9	1/10	Ditto..... (to the Minister #470) (dated 12/16)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
1-B.....	50	2/1	Re Greek ship, "ELENE S. EN- BILICOS".	To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.
2-ANGO.....	66	2/12	Re method of leaving country for American citizens of Japanese parentage. (to the Minister #2) (dated 1/31) (from New Orleans)	To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/12.
4-AN-YU-GO.....	101	3/10	Re telegraphic code in possession of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (to the Minister #4) (dated 3/4) (from New Orleans)	To the CG 3/12, to the TS 3/13.
1-HEI-YU-GO.....	112	3/19	Re opening of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (to the Minister #1) (dated 3/7) (from Houston)	To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19.

FROM; FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
2-HEI-YU-GO.....	113	3/19	Re district under jurisdiction of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (from the Minister #1) (dated 3/8) (from Houston)	To the CG 3/19, to the TS 3/19.
[61] 1.....	153	4/11	Re sending of hard "tennis balls" (from Peking)	To the CG 4/12, to the TS 4/12.
MU-B.....	156	4/15	Re departure of the Panamanian ship to Japan. (from Britain)	To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/17.
11-ANGO.....	167	4/19	Re stopping in port of the American, "BOB COOK." (to the Minister #222) (from Manila)	To the CG 4/19, to the TS 4/21.
1-ANGO.....	168	4/20	Re resending of telegram (from Manila)	To the CG 4/21, to the TS 4/21.
4-HEI-YU-GO.....	195	5/8	Re new "Address" of the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON." (dated 4/25) (from Houston)	To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.
1-B.....	305	7/7	Re interpretation of telegram(s) (from Ambassador to Britain)	To the CG 7/8, to the TS 7/10.
No number-A.....	306	7/7	Delivering message to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. (separate telegram)	To the CG 7/9, to the TS 7/10.
-A.....	474	8/15	Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)	To the CG 8/15.
-A.....	482	8/15	Symbol for the Consulate head (from Canton)	To the CG 8/19.
9-AN-YU-GO.....	539	9/15	Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHIKAN (a school?). (to the Minister #36) (dated 9/10) (from Vancouver)	To the CG 9/15, to the TS 9/16.
GOGAI-C.....	731	11/7	Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister GOGAI) (from Manila)	To the CG 11/7, to the TS 11/8.

[62] FROM: LOS ANGELES

105-AN-YU-GO.....	3	1/6	Re movements of U. S. warships (to the Minister #220) (dated 12/23)	To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.
106-AN-YU-GO.....	5	1/6	Ditto (to the Minister #221) (dated 12/27)	To the CG 1/8, to the TS 1/9.
107-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	7	1/7	Re sending of representatives of the Patriotic Women's Society. (to the Minister #222)	To the CG 1/9, to the TS 1/10.
1-AN-YU-GO.....	13	1/14	Movements of U. S. warships (dated 1/6)	To the CG 1/14, to the TS 1/15.
1-(C).....	18	1/16	Re visit to the U. S. by the "Subaru Show" troupe.	To the CG 1/16, to the TS 1/17.
4-AN-YU-GO.....	24	1/23	Re movements of the U. S. warships (to the Minister #7) (dated 1/13)	To the CG 1/23, to the TS 1/24.
5-AN-YU-GO.....	42	1/30	Ditto (to the Minister #9) (dated 1/21)	To the CG 2/3, to the TS 2/4.
10-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	59	2/6	Re parcel post to Japan (to the Minister #14) (dated 1/26)	To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.
11-AN-YU-GO.....	60	2/6	Re movements of the U. S. Navy (to the Minister #15) (dated 1/27)	To the CG 2/6, to the TS 2/7.
2-AN-YU-GO.....	23	1/23	Re problem of evacuation of the Japanese residents in the U. S. (to the Minister #4) (dated 1/10)	To the CG 1/24, to the TS 1/25.
[63] 13-AN-YU-GO.....	67	2/12	Movements of U. S. Navy (to the Minister #17) (dated 2/1)	To the CG 2/12, to the TS 2/13.
2-A.....	85	3/5	Ditto	To the CG 3/5, to the TS 3/6.
15-AN-YU-GO.....	125	3/27	Ditto (to the Minister #33)	To the CG 3/28, to the TS 3/28.
16-AN-YU-GO.....	132	4/3	Re visit to the U. S. by the Representatives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU. (from the Minister #25) (dated 3/26)	To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/4.

FROM: LOS ANGELES—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
17-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	133	4/3	Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of the Japan Christian Federation. (to the Minister #34) (dated 3/26)	To the CG 4/3 to the TS 4/4.
18-AN-YU-GO.....	159	4/15	Movements of the U. S. Navy..... (to the Minister #38) (dated 4/5)	To the CG 4/15, to the TS 4/18.
20-AN-YU-GO.....	173	4/23	Ditto..... (to the Minister #44) (dated 4/12)	To the CG 4/23, to the TS 4/24.
9-A.....	190	5/1	Ditto..... (to the Minister #59) (dated 5/1)	To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/3.
23-AN-YU-GO.....	196	5/8	Re participation of delegates of the Japan Christian Federation at the special conference of the American Christian Federation. (to the Minister #53) (dated 4/26)	To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.

[64]

FROM: PORTLAND

2-ANGO.....	197	5/28	Re movements of the U. S. Navy..... (to the Minister #66)	To the CG 5/8, to the TS 5/9.
4-A.....	232	6/2	Ditto.....	To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.
7-ANGO.....	233	6/2	Ditto..... (to the Minister #83)	To the CG 6/3, to the TS 6/3.
5-B.....	259	6/17	Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at pier.	To the CG 6/17, to the TS 6/17.
32-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	263	6/19	Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company. (to the Minister #87) (dated 6/6)	To the CG 6/20, to the TS 6/21.
33-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	264	6/15	Re strike by the employees of the "NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane Company. (to the Minister #92) (dated 6/9)	To the CG 6/19, to the TS 6/21.
34-RYAKU-YU-GO.....	270	6/23	Ditto..... (to the Minister #95) (dated 6/11)	To the CG 6/23, to the TS 6/24.
6-A.....	315	7/9	Re survey of assets of Japanese people living on the mainland U. S.	To the CG 7/10, to the TS 7/10.
11-ANGO.....	327	7/15	Re movements of U. S. Warships..... (to the Minister #112)	To the CG 7/15, to the TS 7/18.
7-A.....	334	7/17	Re resending of telegram(s).....	To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/18.
36-ANGO.....	529	9/10	Re movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #176)	To the CG 9/10, to the TS 9/10.
[65] 44-ANGO.....	554	9/20	Ditto..... (to the Minister #190)	To the CG 9/22, to the TS 9/24.
47-ANGO.....	610	10/13	Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication. (to the Minister #201)	To the CG 10/13, to the TS 10/13.
49-RYAKUGO.....	630	10/16	Re notices of attainment of military age for year 1942. (to the Minister #200)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/17.
50-ANGO.....	632	10/17	Ditto..... (Minister #94)	To the CG 10/17, to the TS 10/20.
62-ANGO.....	659	10/20	Movements of U. S. warships and ships. (to the Minister #205)	To the CG 10/21, to the TS 10/21.
65-ANGO.....	684	10/24	Re investigation of Japanese associations by the F. B. I. (to the Minister #207)	To the CG 10/25, to the TS 10/27.
67-ANGO.....	700	10/28	Ditto..... (to the Minister #209)	To the CG 10/28, to the TS 10/29.
60-ANGO.....	723	11/4	Re simplifying of procedure for expatriation. (to the Minister #214)	To the CG 11/4, to the TS 11/7.
313-ANGO.....	833	11/29	Re ships requisitioned by the U. S. Army and the Navy. (to the Minister #317)	To the CG 11/29.
71-RYAKUGO.....	859	12/4	Re procedure for expatriation..... (from the Minister #110)	To the CG 12/4, to the TS 12/5.

[66]

FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
-(C)-----	29	1/26	Re reception dinner for Ambassador NOMURA. (from Ambassador NOMURA, KAMAKURA MARU)	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27.
-C-----	30	1/27	Re delivery of message from Ambassador NOMURA. (from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 1/27, to the TS 1/27.
-C-----	36	1/28	Ditto. (from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 1/28, to the TS 1/28.
-(C)-----	27	1/29	Re inquiry on functions for Ambassador NOMURA. (from Secretary OKUMURA)	To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30.
-C-----	39	1/29	Re reply as to functions for Ambassador NOMURA.	To the CG 1/29, to the TS 1/30.
-C-----	45	2/1	Telegram of thanks from Ambassador NOMURA. (from Ambassador NOMURA on Kamakura Maru)	To the 2/1, to the TS 2/4.
-C-----	86	3/6	Telegram of thanks. (from Secretary MIYAZAKI on Yawata Maru)	To the 3/6, to the TS 3/6.
-(C)-----	93	3/8	Re printing of English name-cards for Consul General KITA. (from Consul General KITA on TATUTA MARU) (dated 3/9)	To the CG 3/10, to the TS 3/10.
-(C)-----	107	3/13	Re stopping in port of Ambassador TOMII. (from Consul General KITA on Tatuta Maru)	To the CG 3/13, to the TS 3/14.
[67] -(C)-----	123	3/26	Re reporting on time of arrival at post of Secretary MORIMURA. (from Secretary MORIMURA on Nitta Maru)	To the CG 3/26, to the TS 3/27.
-(C)-----	131	4/3	Reply telegram from Ambassador KURUSU. (from Ambassador KURUSU on Tatuta Maru)	To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.
-C-----	135	4/3	Re arrival in port of MASABUMI NAKAMURA. (from MASABUMI NAKAMURA on Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 4/3, to the TS 4/3.
-C-----	160	4/17	Re arrival in port of SHIMIZU and YAMAGI. (from SHIMIZU and YAMAGI on Yawata Maru)	To the CG 4/17, to the TS 4/18.
-(C)-----	189	5/1	Re boarding of ship by HANA KUSANOBU. (from the Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 5/1, to the TS 5/1.
	210	5/20	Re calling at port of Representative SHIMIZU. (from Representative SHIMIZU on Asama Maru)	To the CG 5/21, to the TS 5/22.
-(C)-----	223	5/27	Telegram of greeting. (from Minister YAMAGATA on Tatuta Maru)	To the CG 5/27, to the TS 5/28.
-C-----	242	6/6	Re inquiry on completion of draft deferment procedure.	To the CG 6/6, to the TS 6/7.
-C-----	267	6/21	Re stopping in port of Representative TAKAMI. (from Representative TAKAMI on Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 6/21, to the TS 6/23.
-C-----	320	7/12	Telegram of thanks from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. (from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU on Kamakura Maru)	To the CG 7/11, to the TS 7/14.
[68] -C-----	332	7/17	Re stopping in port of Major (or Lt. Commander) YANO. (from Major YANO on Tatuta Maru)	To the CG 7/17, to the TS 7/17.
-A-----	422	7/31	Re purchase of superior grade seed and shoots of "pineapple." (from Head of the Foreign Affairs Section, Formosa)	To the CG 7/31, to the TS 8/2.
-C-----	503	8/30	Re changing of broadcasting wave length to Hawaii. (from Japan Broadcasting Company)	To the CG 8/30, to the TS 8/30.

FROM: MISCELLANEOUS—Continued

Telegram No. & Code Type	File No.	Date Rec'd	Contents	Disposition
-(C).....	576	9/29	Re request in regard to departure of Professor Lee Sireta, (from Professor NORISUGI of the Tokyo Music Academy)	To the CG 9/30, to the TS 9/30.
-(C).....	611	10/12	Re sending of divorce papers..... (from YASUKO KANDA, Tokyo)	To the CG 10/12, to the TS 10/13.
-X.....	648	10/19	Re replenishment of fuel oil of TATUTA MARU.	To the CG 10/19, to the TS 10/21.
	688	10/25	Re changing of broadcasting cycle..... (from Tokyo Japanese Broadcasting)	To the CG 10/25.
GOGAI.....	731	11/7	Redeparture of Ambassador KURUSU (from Manila)	To the CG 11/7.
-C.....	741	11/9	Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU, (from Secretary YUKI at Midway)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10.
-C.....	742	11/10	Re stopping in port of Ambassador KURUSU, (from Ambassador KURUSU at Midway)	To the CG 11/10, to the TS 11/10.
-(C).....	751	11/12	Ditto..... (dated 11/11)	to the TS 11/12.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 63

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12.
Serial 09330.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking

planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between 14 and 15 fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid in approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: CinC Atlantic Fleet
CinC Asiatic Fleet

CinC File No.
381-5/0398

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
At Sea, Hawaiian Area, March 12, 1941.

Confidential

From: Command-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

Reference: (a) CNC Conf. ltr. file Op-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.

1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

H. E. KIMMEL.

C-N20-12/ND14

20 MARCH 1941

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO Classified ltr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.

1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH.

cc: to
CINCPACIFIC
BUORD

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, June 13, 1945.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to: CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12

A16/ND14/(16)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

Serial 086W

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.

Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. ltr. C-A16/H3/ND14(0800) of August 16, 1941.

1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.

2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.

3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to progress.

4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat, assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide. Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in paragraph (3) of reference (a) be made available to Commander Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical facilities be furnished him.

H. E. KIMMEL.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 64

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring

the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37-mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37-mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

[S] HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FEBRUARY 13, 1941.

Op-30B3-AJ
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI
D-27446
Secret

From: Director, Naval Districts Division
To: Director, War Plans Division
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar ltr. of Feb. 7, 1941, to SecNav.)

1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

[s] Alex Sharp
ALEX SHARP

(Pencil Notation: Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 65

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of Cinpac Secret ltr. dated 7 August 1941, Serial 069W, Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands, and copy of Enclosure (A) thereto.

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

R. E. Keeton
R. E. KEETON

*By direction of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas.*

Cincpac File No.
Serial 069W
Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 7, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Battleship Divisions One and Two.
Commander Carrier Division One.
Commander Destroyer Flotilla One.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Cruiser Divisions Three, Five and Six.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Patrol Wing Two.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands.

Reference: (a) Cincpac Secret ltr. A16/ (021W) of April 4, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Information on subject matters as of August 4, 1941.

1. Information furnished herewith is the best available, but by virtue of its very nature is subject to omissions and other inaccuracies.

2. This letter supersedes reference (a), which together with its enclosure is to be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. C. Crosley,
P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

Enclosure A

AUGUST 4, 1941.

[1]

MEMORANDUM:

- (A) ORANGE Naval Organization—FLEETS.
- (B) Material Installations in MANDATES.
- (C) Probable Forces, Naval and others, in MANDATES.
- (C) Summary of Activities in MANDATES.

(A) ORANGE NAVAL ORGANIZATION—FLEETS

COMBINED FLEET

BB MUTSU (F)

FIRST FLEET

BB MUTSU (F)

<i>BATDIV 1</i>	<i>BATDIV 2</i>	<i>BATDIV 3</i>	<i>GRUDIV 6</i>
(BB) MUTSU (F)	(BB) ISE (F)	(BB) HIEI (F)	(CA) AOBA (F)
(BB) NAGATO	(BB) HYUGA	(BB) KIRISHIMA	(CA) KAKO
	(BB) FUSO	(BB) KONGO	(CA) FURUTAKA
		(BB) HARUNA	(CA) KINUGASA

DESRON ONE

(CL) ABUKUMA (F)

<i>DESDIV 6</i>	<i>DESDIV 7</i>	<i>DESDIV 21</i>	<i>DESDIV 22</i>
IKAZUCHI	AKATSUKI	HATSU HARU	ARIAKE
INAZUMA	OBORO	NENOH	YUGURE
SAZANAMI	USHIO	HATSUSHIMO	SHIRATSUYU
AKEBONO	HIBIKI	WAKABA	SHIGURE
9-21	(Same as	(1368-36-5-5''	(1368-36-5-5''
(1700-36-6-5''	Desdiv 6)	9-21'' 3'	8-21'' 3'
$\frac{9-21''}{3}$ 3'		$\frac{9-21''}{3}$ 3'	$\frac{8-21''}{2}$ 3'

[2]

DESRON 3

(CL) SENDAI (F)

<u>DESDIV 11</u>	<u>DESDIV 12</u>	<u>DESDIV 19</u>	<u>DESDIV 20</u>
FUBUKI SHIRAYUKI HATSUYUKI	MURAKUMO SHINONOME SHIRAKUMO	ISO NAMI URANAMI SHIKINAMI AYANAMI	AMAGIRI ASAGIRI YUGIRI SAGIRI
(Same as Desdiv 6)	(Same as Divdiv 6)	(Same as Desdiv 6)	(Same as Desdiv 6)
<u>CARDIV 3</u>	<u>DESDIV 4</u>		<u>AIRRON 7</u>
(CV) HOSHIO (CV) RYUJO (CV) SHOKAKU . . ?	HAKAZE AKIKAZE TACHIKAZE HOKAZE		(AV) CHIYODA (AV) MIZUHO (AV) CHITOSE

(1270-34-4-4.7-6-21'')

$\frac{4}{3}$

SECOND FLEET

(CA) TAKAO (F)

<u>CRUDIV 4</u>	<u>CRUDIV 5</u>	<u>CRUDIV 7 # @</u>	<u>CRUDIV 8</u>
(CA) TAKAO (CA) ATAGO (CA) CHOKAI (CA) MAYA	(CA) MACHI (CA) HAGURO (CA) MYOKO	(CA) KUMANO (F) (CA) SUZUYA (CA) MIKUMA (CA) MOGAMI	(CA) TONE (CA) CHIKUMA

DESRON 2

(CL) JINTSU (F)

<u>DESDIV 8</u>	<u>DESDIV 15</u>	<u>DESDIV 16</u>	<u>DESDIV 18</u>
ASASHIO OSHIO MICHISHIO ARASHIO	OYASHIO HAYASHIO NATSUSHIO KUROSHIO	HATSUKAZE YUKIKAZE AMATSUKAZE ISOKAZE	KASUMI ARARE KAGERO SHIRANUI
(1500-36-6-5' 8-21'') $\frac{3}{2}$	(Same as Desdiv 8)	(Same as Desdiv 8)	(Same as Desdiv 8)

[3]

DESRON 4

(CL) NAKA (F)

<u>DESDIV 2</u>	<u>DESDIV 4</u>	<u>DESDIV 9</u>	<u>DESDIV 24</u>
MURASAME YUDACHI HARUSAME SAMIDARE	(Cardiv 3— Plane Guard— First Fleet)	ASAGUMO NATSUGUMO YAMAGUMO MINEGUMO	UMIKAZE KAWAKAZE SUZUKAZE YAMAKAKE
(1368-36-5-5' 8-21'') $\frac{3}{2}$		(1500-36-6-5' 8-21'') $\frac{3}{2}$	(Same as Desdiv 2)

COMMANDER CARDIVS

(CV) AKAGI (F)

<u>CARDIV 1</u>	<u>CARDIV 2 # @</u>
(CV) KAGA (SHOKAKU?)	(CV) SORYU (CV) HIRYU
<u>DESDIV 3</u>	<u>DESDIV 23 # @</u>
SHIOKAZE HOKAZE (1270-34-4-4.7 6-21'') $\frac{4}{3}$	KIKUTSUKI MIKAZUKI MOCHIZUKI YUZUKI (1315-34-4-4.7' 6-21'') $\frac{4}{2}$

1st BASE FORCE SQUADRON #

DEFENSE DIVI-
SION 1

(CM) SHIRATAKA
(CM) HATSUTAKA
(CM) AOTAKA

MINESWEEP
DIV. 1

Mine Sweep #1
Mine Sweep #2

MINE SWEEP
DIV. 21

Mine Sweep #7
Mine Sweep #12

GUN BOAT DIVI-
SION 1

6 Special gunboats
(Converted Merchantmen?)

S. C. DIV. 1

?

Special Transports

S. C. DIV 11

?

KATSURIKI (F)

S. C. DIV. 21

?

S. C. DIV. 31

?

Now formed into Third Fleet (operating with South China Fleet in Hainan—Indo-China area).

@ Expected to rejoin SECOND FLEET about 10 August 1941.

[1]

THIRD FLEET

(Formed from units of 2nd Fleet and South China Fleet—became active in June-July, 1940 evidently specially organized for SOUTHWARD EXPANSION operations—INDO-CHINA—etc.)

(CL) NAGARA (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)
(CL) or (CM) KUNASHIRI (?)

CRUDIV 7 (ex-2nd Fleet)

(CA) KUMANO
(CA) SUZUYA
(CA) MIKUMA
(CA) MOGAMI

DESRON 5

(CL) NATORI (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)

DESDIV 5

ASAKAZE
HARUKAZE
MATSUKAZE
HATAKAZE (Same as Desdiv 4)

DESDIV 12 (?)

SATSUKI
MINATSUKI
FUMITSUKI
NAGATSUKI

(1315-34-4-4.7-6-21'')

4 2

CARDIV 2 (ex-2nd Fleet)

(CV) SORYU
(CV) HIRYU

DESRON 23

KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
MOCHITSUKI
YUZUKI (Same as Desdiv 12)

1st BASE FORCE SQUADRON (ex-2nd Fleet)

Defence Div. 1

(CM) SHIRATAKA
(CM) HATSUTAKA
(CM) AOTAKA

Mine Sweep Div. 1

M. S. #1
M. S. #2

Mine Sweep Div. 21

M. S. #7
M. S. #12

Gunboat Div. 1

6 Special gunboats
(ex-merchant marine?)

Subchaser Div. 1

?

Subchaser Div. 11

?

Subchaser Div. 21

?

Subchaser Div. 31

?

Special Transports

AIRRON SIX

(AV) NOTORO
(XAV) KAMIKAWA MARU
(XAV) MARU

plus shore based aircraft ex-TAKAO, ex-OITA, ex-GENZAN, ex-TAIHOKU and South China Air Forces.

1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5]

FOURTH (MANDATE) FLEET

(CL) KASHIMA (F)

CRUDIV 18
(CL) KASHIMA
TENRYU
TATSUTA

AIRRON 24
(AVS) KAMOI (F)
(XAVS) ----- MARU
4th AIR CORPS
5th AIR CORPS
11th AIR CORPS
16th AIR CORPS

MINE LAYER DIV. 19
(CM) OKINOSHIMA
(CM) TOKIWA

DESRON 6

(CL) YUBARI (F)

DESDIV 29
OITE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI (same as Desdiv 4)

DESDIV 30
MUTSUKI
KISARAGI
YAYOI
UZUKI (Same as Desdiv 4)

SUBRON 7

(AS) JINGEI (F)

SUBDIV 26
Ro 60
Ro 61
Ro 62

SUBDIV 27
Ro 65
Ro 66
Ro 67

SUBDIV 33
Ro 63
Ro 64
Ro 68

3rd BASE FORCE (HQ-PALAO)
----- MARU (F)

3rd DEFENCE DIVISION
15 Special gunboats operating with Sub-
marine Division (four submarines at-
tached)

Included in above is: S. C. Div. 55

----- MARU
----- MARU
----- MARU
----- MARU

7th AIR SQUADRON (PALAO?)
3rd DEFENSE FORCE (PALAO)

5th BASE FORCE (HQ-Saipan)
SHOEI MARU (F) (5644-1937)

S. C. Div. 56

(ODD) KASHI (F)
4th DEFENCE DIV.

4th DEFENCE FORCE
(Truk and outlying Islands)
5th DEFENCE DIV.
5th DEFENCE FORCE
(SAIPAN area)
8th GUNBOAT DIVISION
8th AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
7th BASE FORCE (HO-JALUIT)
TAKUNAN MARU (F)

15th MINE SWEEP DIV.
NAGATA MARU
IKUTA MARU
CHOKAI MARU
DAIDO MARU
6th DEFENCE DIVISION
6th DEFENCE FORCE
(JALUIT and outlying Islands)
----- AIRCRAFT SQUADRON

[6]

SIXTH FLEET

17th MINE LAYER DIVISION (may be now assigned THIRD FLEET)

(CM) ITUKUSHIMA

(CM) YAEYAMA

SUBDIV 1
(CL) KATORI

SUBRON 1
SUBDIV 2
(F)(AS) TAIGEI (F)

SUBRON 2
(AS) CHOGEI (F)
SUBDIV 8

I-9
I-15
I-16
I-17

I-18
I-19
I-20

I-1
I-2
I-3
I-7

I-4
I-5
I-6

SUBRON 3

SUBDIV 11
(CL) ISUZU (F)
I-74
I-75

SUBDIV 12
(F)(AS) YURA (F)
I-8
I-10
I-69
I-70

SUBDIV 20
I-71
I-72
I-73

SUBRON 6
(CL) KINU (F)
SUBDIV 9
(SM) I-123 (SM) I-121
(SM) I-124 (SM) I-122

SUBRON 5
(CL) YURA (F)
SUBDIV 28 SUBDIV 29 SUBDIV 30
I-59 I-61 I-65
I-60 I-62 I-66
I-64 I-67 (rep. lost)
(may be I-68)

SUBRON 10
(AS) KARASAKI (F)
SUBDIV 18 SUBDIV 19 SUBDIV 21
I-53 I-56 I-23
I-54 I-57 I-24
I-55 I-58

[7] **COMMANDER COMBINED AIR FORCES**

NOTE: For characteristics of ORANGE planes, armament, etc., see Tables in FATU—
Report of Air Operations, Summary #12-41(S) dated 2 June 1941.)

6th AIRCRAFT WING

<p>AIRRON 2$\frac{1}{2}$ (Now with 4th Fleet) (AV) KAMOI (NAV) ----- MARU 1st COMBINED AIR FORCE (Hdqtrs. TAKAO)</p>	<p>AIRRON 6 (Now assigned 3rd Fleet) (AV) NOTORO (NAV) KAMIKAWA MARU (NAV) ----- MARU 2nd COMBINED AIR FORCE (Hdqtrs. SHANGHAI) 12th AIR CORPS (Mixed groups—5 squadrons VF (15/Sq.) and 2 (light) Bomber squadrons (12/Sq.)). 13th AIR CORPS (3 squadrons Heavy Bombard- ment (12/Sq.) plus reserve of 3/Sq. plus 2 Sq. VF. SHANGHAI-HANKOW-ICHANG (DD) OKIKAZE (comm. guard)</p>
<p>TAKAO AIR GROUP (FORMOSA) TOKO AIR GROUP (") TAICHU AIR STATION (") KAGI AIR STATION (") NAHA AIR GROUP (Loochoos) OITA AIR GROUP (Kyushu) KANOYA AIR GROUP (") plus other Shore Groups Misc. "Tenders" (DD) MINEKAZE (comm. guard)</p>	

3rd COMBINED AIR FORCE
(Hdqtrs. SANCHAU Is. (S. China))
16th AIR CORPS (Same as 13th)
Part of 14th at HOIHOW, HAINAN-
SANCHAU IS. AND HANOI (F.I.C.)
Part of 16th at SANYA, HAINAN
and HAIPHONG (F.I.C.)

[8] **JAPANESE FLEET IN CHINA WATERS**

FIRST (CHINA) FLEET
(OCA) IZUMO (F)
11th Squadron
PG ATAKA PR ATAMI
PR SETA PR FUTAMI
PR KATADA PR FUSHIMI
PR HIRA PR SUMIDA
PR HOZU PR IASHIDATE
PR ----- ? PR UJI
10th AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
HANKOW BASE FORCE
KIUKIANG BASE FORCE
SECOND (CHINA) FLEET
1st Squadron
(CA) ASHIGARA (F)
(CL) NAGARA (now assigned THIRD FLEET)
11th Squadron
(PG) SAGA Mine Sweeper #17
----- ? Mine Sweeper #18
DESRON 5 (now assigned THIRD FLEET)
(CL) NATORI (F)
DESRON 5 **DESRON 12**
ASAKAZE SATSUKI
HARUKAZE MINATSUKI
MATSUKAZE FUMITSUKI
HATAKAZE NAGATSUKI
1st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON
OTORI
HAYABUSA
HIYODORI
KASASAGI

[9] **15th DEFENCE DIVISION** **16th DEFENCE DIVISION** **CANTON BASE FORCE**
AMOY BASE FORCE **HAINAN ISLAND BASE FORCE**

Special Service Ships:
Four from YOKOSUKA
Eight from SASEBO
One from MAIZURU

THIRD (CHINA) FLEET

12th DIVISION

(OCA) IWATE

MANRI (?) MARU

11th TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON

KIJI
KARI
SAGI
HATO

1st GUNBOAT DIVISION
13th GUNBOAT DIVISION
SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

(ODD) KURI
TSUGA
HASU

SHANGHAI HARBOR DEPT.
SPECIAL LANDING FORCES

21st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON

CHIDORI
MANAZURU
HATSUKARI
TOMOZURU

2nd GUNBOAT DIVISION
NIHONKAI MARU (F)

14th GUNBOAT DIVISION
TSINGTAO BASE FORCE
NANKING BASE FORCE
AIR CORPS

HIGH NORTH FLEET

There are at least eight to ten men-of-war and three or four naval auxiliaries in the High North Fleet. This Force operates in the KURILES-KAMCHATKA, HOKKAIDO-SAGHALIEN, and Northern HONSHU areas. It is apparent that the Headquarters for this Force is at OMINATO. There has been some air activity in connection with the operations of this Fleet, probably by shore-based seaplane squadrons in the above areas.

[10]

Summation

	Total No.	1st Flt	2nd Flt	3rd Flt	4th Flt	6th Flt	1st China Fleet	2nd China Fleet	3rd China Fleet	Total	Attached to Naval Districts, inactive or at Navy Yards
BB.....	10.....	9.....								9.....	1.....
CA.....	18.....	4.....	9.....	4.....				1.....		18.....	0.....
CL#.....	19.....	2.....	2.....	2.....	4.....	4.....				14.....	5.....
DD#.....	96.....	34.....	30.....	12.....	8.....					84.....	12.....
SS#.....	47.....					43.....				43.....	4.....
ss#.....	25.....				9.....					9.....	16.....
CV.....	8.....		2.....	2.....						7.....	1.....
AV.....	5.....	3.....		1.....	1.....					5.....	0.....
XAV.....	7.....	3.....		2.....	2.....					4.....	7.....
CM.....	8.....			4.....	2.....	2.....				9.....	0.....
AS.....	6.....				1.....	3.....				4.....	2.....

Numbers include some OCL, ODD, OSS and oss.

[11] The above organization is believed to be quite accurate but attention is invited to the fact that ORANGE may (and probably will) regroup Fleets or units of Fleets into special Task Forces (or new Fleets) for special operations or to meet given conditions; for example: when ORANGE wanted to make a show of force in connection with its benevolent mediation in the THAILAND—FRENCH INDO-CHINA Dispute during the latter part of January 1941, a special reinforcement unit was sent from the FIRST and SECOND FLEETS to the SOUTH CHINA FLEET. This unit consisted of CRUDIV 7 (4 CA), DESRON 1 (1 CL-16 DD), CARDIV 2 (2 CV-1 DESRON), 1 AV and 1 or more XAV. The THIRD FLEET was actually organized in April 1941, but did not operate as such until the political situation permitted the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Base question to be forced in June-July 1941. It is of interest to note that the reinforcement of the SOUTH CHINA FLEET in January was a "Rehearsal Run" for the organization of the THIRD FLEET. Although the submarines were organized and operated in a separate Fleet (6th), they have also been split to operate with the 1st and 2nd FLEETS as well. The inclusion of the 3 COMBINED AIR FORCES into the 6th FLEET substantiates past reports of Joint Maneuvers of Submarines and Air Force with stress on their cooperation in Fleet Problems and Exercises.

[12]

(B) MATERIAL INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATES

For many years Japan has effectively prevented observation of activities in the MANDATED ISLANDS. However, it is known that as a result of extensive hydrographic and meteorological surveys, considerable expansion and improvements have been completed in harbor development, "commercial" air facilities, communications and meteorological establishments in the principal islands (JALUIT, PONAPE, KUSAIE, TRUK, PALAO, and SAIPAN). Since late in 1940 ORANGE Naval and Air Operations in this area have increased and some forty to forty-five naval auxiliaries (cargo, transport, supply, and tankers ----- ex-merchant marine) now make continuous shuttle trips to the MANDATES with personnel, material, equipment and supplies. (Places marked # below have been destination for these vessels). The "Material Installations" are listed below to bring up to date the information reported in ONI-49, "Extracts from the Japanese Monograph 1939", pages 127.01 to 127.24 inclusive.

Marshall Islands

JALUIT # (Installations on JARBOR IS., IMIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.) and ENYBOR IS.)

(*JARBOR IS.*)

Naval Radio Station.

High Frequency R. D. F.

Meteorological Station.

Naval Inspector Jaluit.

6th Defence Force Headquarters ("Jaluit Detached Force").

6th Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.

Bases and trunnions for 6" guns are mounted along the Marine Parade (probably 3).

A battery of 4.7 inch field pieces.

Several mobile (pneumatic tired trucks) Searchlights, 10 inch (projector) diameter, 1500 candle power.

Machine guns and A. A. guns. Latter mounted on trailers, towed by Diesel tractors.

Barracks for garrison of 500 men (1940).

Estimate 1000 Army troops arrived in February, 1941.

Lookout towers.

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Gasoline and oil tanks above ground (camouflaged)—1 mile South of JARBOR on reef formerly called "American Town".

Coal Briquette Stowage.

Deep water wharf and smaller jetties.

Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

Branch Office 4th Supply Department.

#3 Branch Military Post Office.

[13] Two landing fields each with hanger capable of handling medium sized planes; adjacent buildings camouflaged. (Jaluit based Fighters and/or carrier planes).

Mitsubishi Machine Shop situated between two air fields.

Power plant (Diesel) for shop and airfields.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

JALUIT

(*IMIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.)*)

Naval Radio Station.

Seaplane base at East Point (reference to IMIEJI BASE).

Air Corps here.

Civil Engineering Section.

Ordnance Officer(s) attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force.

WOTJE #

Naval Radio station.

Meteorological station.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("WOTJE Detached Force").

Fortified (reported).

Lookout towers.

Landing Field (completed 1937-ONI 49). (Air Corps here; June 1941).

Civil Engineer Section.

Ordnance Officers attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Detachment from Yokosuka Navy Yard.

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

"Oil tanks".

Deep water wharf.

Branch Office—4th Supply Department.

Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

MALOELAP #—(TAROA IS.)

Naval radio station.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("TAROA Detached Force").

"TAROA BASE".

Lookout towers.

Landing field under construction (1940).

Civil Engineering Section.

Ordnance Officers attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

"Storage plant".

Sanitary Corps in charge of Medical Officer.

[14] *KWAJELIN* # (establishment on both KWAJELIN and RUOTTO (ROI IS.))

Naval Radio Stations (on KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

"RUOTTO BASE". Air activity—June 1941.

Detachments of 6th Defence Force (on KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on KWAJELIN.

Shore Batteries of 6th Defence Force on RUOTTO.

Civil Engineering Section (RUOTTO).

Ordnance Officers attached (four or more).

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).

Detachments from YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO)

ENIWETOK #

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("ENIWETOK Detached Force").

Fortified (reported).

1935—"Building in progress—submarine base?"

Landing Field here (?).

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (One also on MERIREN IS. (PARRY IS.).)

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

POKAAKKU (TAONGI IS.)

Naval Radio Station.

BIKINI

Fortifications?

Earmarked for ORANGE Base?

RONGELAP #

Naval Radio Station.

"Earmarked for ORANGE Base".

Actually used by ORANGE during maneuvers in past.

RONGERIK

Naval Radio Station (reported).

UTIRIK

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Naval personnel reported here.

WOTTO

Naval Radio Station (reported).

[15] *UJAE*

Naval Radio Station.

MAJURO (Used by Von Spee in 1914)

Naval Radio (?)

Naval personnel here.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

EBON #

Naval Radio (?)
Naval personnel reported here.
"BASE"----(?)

MILLE

Naval Radio Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
ORANGE considers MILLE extremely important.

*Carolines***UJELANG #**

Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.

KUSAIE #

Naval Radio Station.
R. D. F. (reported).
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
Submarine Base (?) (reported).
Fortified (at least two gun emplacements reported).
Lookout towers (day and night sentry watch).
Land Plane field (reported).
Seaplane operating base (reported).
Mine and torpedo storage (reported).
At least two Ordnance officers connected with work underway at KUSAIE.

PINGELAP #

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

[16] SATAWAN

Used by ORANGE SS in 1932.

MORTLOCK

Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

PONAPE #

Naval Radio Station.
R. D. F. reported.
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force ("PONAPE Detached Force").
Army troops reported arrived here in February, 1941--estimated 1000 divided
between PONAPE and TRUK.
Fortified.
"Air Field $\frac{3}{4}$ mile South of the town . . . another base reported on tip of JOKAJ
Island.
Seaplane Facilities . . . "Air Base".
11th Air Corps.
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).
Civil Engineering Section.
At least two ordnance officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (Active on LANGAR Is.).
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
Oil storage (reported).
Branch Office, Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch Office, 4th Supply Department.
4th Branch Military Post Office.

TRUK

Naval Radio Station.

R. D. F. reported.

Meteorological Station.

Headquarters 4th Defence Force.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force (TRUK Detached Force").

"#70 BASE" (probably Air Base).

Army troops arrived here February, 1941—estimated 1000 divided between TRUK and PONAPE.

Fortified.

Land plane field on TOL Is . . . another at South end of DUBLON IS.

Air Corps arrived TRUK (June 1941).

Seaplane facilities.

Mine and Torpedo storage reported.

"Prepared for mine defence".

Mandate Headquarters 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

[17] Civil Engineer Section.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.

Oil storage (reported).

Mandate Headquarters 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.

Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.

Mandate Headquarters 4th Supply Dept.

Branch Office 4th Supply Dept.

Mandate Headquarters of Military Post Offices.

PULUWAT # (POLOOT) (ENDERBY)

Naval Radio Station.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

OLOL #

Naval Radio Station.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

LAMOTREK # (SWEDE)

Naval Radio.

Detachment of 4th Defence Force.

(Naval) "AIR BASE".

WOLEAI #

Naval Radio Station.

Reported earmarked for Seaplane base.

ULITHI #

Naval Radio Station.

Advance Fleet anchorage.

FAIS

"Commercial" Radio Station (JPF).

SOROL

Naval Radio Station.

"Landing field in operation" reported.

[18] YAP #

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

Naval personnel reported here.

Reported fortified.

Land plane field near GAGIL, (reported).

Has been extensively used as seaplane operating base.

Ex-YOKOHAMA Air Corps (?).

Civil Engineering Section.

Branch of the 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

PALAO # (includes PALAO—PELELIU—etc.).

Naval Radio Stations (at least three).

H. F. ---- R. D. F.

Combined Radio and Signal Section.

Meteorological Station.

Headquarters 3rd Defence Division (Base Force).

Headquarters 3rd Defence Force.

Detachment of 3rd Defence Force.

Resident Naval Officer (Mandate Naval Headquarters).

Estimated 5000 Army troops arrived PALAO in February, 1941.

Army resident officers—liaison with Navy.

Observation tower or Battery Control station and artillery emplacements under construction on west side of BABELTHUAP Island (several 6" guns unloaded from transports).

All lighthouses believed used as Observation Posts or Battery Control stations.

Batteries believed emplaced near each lighthouse.

"Aircraft Detecting Device mounted on high hill at East end of KOROR Island.

Ammunition Storage to South of high hill on KOROR Island.

Barracks and Battery emplacements on PELELIU Island.

Barracks on West end of KOROR Island and at Southeast corner of BABELTHUAP Island.

Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on ARAKABESAN Island.

Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on PELELIU Island.

Naval Base on PELELIU Island.

"Fighting Plane Wing—PELELIU".

4th Air Corps-----16th Seaplane Squadron.

4th Aircraft Technical Section.

Ex-CHITOSE Air Corps. (The 4th Air Corps?).

Mine and Torpedo storages (reported).

Civil Engineer Section.

At least four Ordnance Officers attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.

Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.

[19] Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

Branch of 4th Supply Department.

Oil storage ("considerable") on S. W. side of MALAKAL Island.

Advance Fleet Anchorage at KOSSOL Passage.

Submarine Base (?) reported under construction on NGAJANGEL Is.

Branch Hydrographic Office

#2 Branch Military Post Office.

HELEN REEF

Naval Radio Station.

Meteorological Station.

"Helen Reef Seaplane Base".

Construction activity observed.

TOBI # (LORD NORTH)

Naval Radio.

Five oil tanks observed.

GREENWICH # (KAPINGAMARANGI)

Naval Radio Station.

Detachment of 4th Defense Force.

Bonin Island (Ogasawara Group) (not in Mandates).

CHICHIGIMA

Naval Radio Station.

HF—R. D. F. Station.

Army Garrison.

Fortified.

Naval Air Station (seaplane operating base).

Mine Storage (reported).

Civil Engineer Section.

Marcus Island # (Minamitorishima) (not in Mandates)

Naval Radio Station.

R. D. F. Station (?).

Meteorological Station.

"Marcus Island Detached Force".

"Marcus Island Base".

Land plane field (?) . . . (!)

[20]

*Marianas Islands***URACAS**

Land plane field (?) (reported).

MAUG

Seaplane (?) and Submarine Base (?) (reported).

Has been used for seaplane and submarine operations.

Fortified (reported).

Oil Storage (reported).

PAGAN #

Naval Radio Station.

A temporary air field here has been used by carrier planes.

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

SAIPAN #

Naval Radio Station.

H. F.—R. D. F. Station.

Meteorological Station.

Fortified—heavy guns—AA guns—searchlights—(reported).

Combined Lookout Stations and Shore Battery (control) Establishments, (at GARAPAN, NAFUTAN, LAULAU, FINA SUSU, MANIAGAHA (Is.) and others).

Army garrison—barracks—storehouses.

Fifth Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.

Fifth Defence Force Headquarters.

Detachment of Fifth Defence Force.

Saipan Naval Air Station—landplane field at ASLITO.

Seaplane facilities.

Fifth Air Corps (ex-KISARAZU Landplane Squadron(s) included?).

Fifth Aircraft Technical Department.

Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.

Oil Storage reported.

Deep water wharf.

Branch of 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.

SAIPAN SUPPLY DEPARTMENT.

Branch of 4th Supply Department.

#1 Branch Military Post Office.

[21] TENIAN #

Naval Radio Station.

"Combined Lookout and Shore Battery (control) Stations".

Fortified.

Detachment of 5th Defence Force.

Civil Engineering Section.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Ordnance Officer(s) attached.

Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.

Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.

ROTA

Naval Radio Station.

Fortified (reported).

Defence works underway (reported).

Submarine Base (?) (reported).

[22] C. PROBABLE FORCES, NAVAL AND OTHERS IN MANDATES(a) **FOURTH ("Mandate") FLEET.** (See Section A).(b) **Naval Forces Ashore:**

3rd Defence Force (Headquarters PALAO).

5th Defence Force (Headquarters SAIPAN).

Detachment of 5th Defence Force on TENIAN and probably other Islands of MARIANAS (See Section B).

4th Defence Force (Headquarters TRUK).

Detachments of 4th Defence Force on outlying islands of Eastern and Central CAROLINES (See Section B).

6th Defence Force (Headquarters JALUIT).

Detachments of 6th Defence Force on outlying islands of MARSHALLS (See Section B).

(c) Army Forces Ashore:

On PALAO, SAIPAN, TRUK, PONAPE, JALUIT (See Section B).

(d) Navy Yard Detachments (labor and production (See Section B)).
Civil Engineer Detachments " " " (See Section B).

(e) Naval Air Forces:

Considerable activity. Exact composition and numbers not definite. The following table is constructed as a result of an analysis of fragmentary reports of varying degrees of reliability:

Airron 24

	Kamoi (AV)		Maru (XAV)		4th-16th Air (Palao)		5th-8th Air (Saipan)		11th Air (Ponape)		—th Air (Truk?)		—th Air (Jaluit)		Total			
	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.	Sq.	No.		
VF.....					2	24	1	12							1	12		
VOS.....	1	10	1	12	1	12	1	12			1	12			1	12		
YSB.....									1	12								
VTB.....					1	12					1	12						
VB (hy.).....					1	12	1	12	1	12					1	12		
VFB.....					2	16	1	12	1	8	1	8			2	16		
Total....	1	10	1	12	7	76	4	48	3	32	3	32	5	52	24	262		

When present work on expansion and construction of land plane bases is completed it is believed that ORANGE will use these for Type 96/97 twin engine land-plane, long range bombers and for fighters. These will be flown out to these bases in such numbers as to cope with a given situation.

[23]

D. ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS IN THE MANDATES

When BLUE held Fleet XXI, the ORANGE FOURTH FLEET took up stations in the Eastern Mandates and intensified its radio intercept activities in conjunction with ORANGE trans-Pacific naval tankers. In late August—early September, 1940, ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandated areas using the Air arm (carrier and shore-based planes) and Submarine Force to search for, locate, and attack a hypothetical enemy Force (represented by the FOURTH FLEET) advancing to the West from the vicinity of the Northern Gilberts. The general defence line seemed to be PONAPE—TRUK but details or conclusions of the exercises are not known. It may be significant that on the next Fleet reorganization, December, 1940, a separate SUBMARINE (SIXTH) FLEET was formed (See Section A).

ORANGE's decision to speed up the militarization was apparently reached concurrently with the signing of the Tri-Parte Pact, as movements of naval reserve auxiliaries (taken over from the Merchant Marine) to the Mandates became apparent thereafter. Since late in nineteen forty this movement of personnel, materials and supplies has progressively increased until in July, 1941, there were approximately forty to forty-five ships constantly engaged in round trips between ORANGE mainland and the Mandates. An analysis shows about sixty-five percent of this shipping is destined for the Eastern CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

Considerable air activity has been in evidence at SAIPAN, PALAO, TRUK, PONAPE and in the JALUIT area. Foreign steamers nearing these areas have been subjected to aircraft observations and close scrutiny by Patrol Planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy landplane bombers have made reconnaissance flights over the GILBERT ISLANDS (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).

DISCUSSION OF SHORE ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

During the early months of 1941, evidence has shown that an Administrative Organization has been set up for control and expansion of the military developments of the Mandates. This Mandate Organization is taking the line parallel to but separate from the parent organization, YOKOSUKA Administration chain, previously in control. While PALAO has always been the MANDATE Administrative center (and may continue to be) the focus of SUPPLY, CIVIL ENGINEERING and MUNITIONS Administration in the Mandates is now centered at TRUK.

An increase in the number of CIVIL ENGINEER Detachments on the various Islands has been very noticeable and while some are distinctly Detachments of the YOKOSUKA Civil Engineering Section, others are separately and distinctly Detachments of the FOURTH Civil Engineering Section which almost invariably has detachments on the same islands as the YOKOSUKA Branch Detachments. The Headquarters of the FOURTH CIVIL ENGINEERS was formed at KURE in November 1940 and moved to YOKOSUKA the latter part of January 1941, and thence to the Mandates about 20 February. Accompanying it were the 4th MILITARY STORES (MUNITIONS) and the 4th SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION which also have branch offices on the principal islands of the MANDATES.

The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th DEFENCE DIVISIONS (BASE FORCES) have a Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remains ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the Command or of the Flagship. Each DEFENCE DIVISION contains a DEFENCE FORCE which in the case of the 4th and 6th is divided into DETACHED FORCES on the islands in the vicinity of the Command's Headquarters. Close cooperation has been noted between the DEFENCE FORCES and the Aircraft activities at their home bases.

The 3rd DEFENCE DIVISION has four submarines attached, possibly old boats of the "Ro" type. It may be ORANGE intention to similarly organize the other DEFENCE DIVISIONS.

During late May 1941 ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandates in connection with the dispatch of a part of the COMBINED AIR FORCE to that area (indoctrinal training?). The RYUJO (and possibly the HIRYU) and about half of the SUBMARINE FLEET also took part in this exercise. It is believed that the FOURTH FLEET acted as an "Enemy Fleet" attempting to penetrate into the MARSHALLS, with the AIR FORCES plus the SUBMARINE FLEET attempting to intercept them. It was reported that the ORANGE strategic high frequency Direction Finder net was active in this Phase, funnelling information to the AIR and SUBARINE FORCES on a common chain via SAIPAN and there is some evidence that these Forces were under a unified command. After visits at WOTJE, KWAJELIN, and JALUIT the additional forces returned to their normal operating units at the end of June.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 66

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:

Copy of Map of Pearl Harbor, showing the "Ships Moored 0755, 7 December 1941"

is a true and correct photographic copy of the document in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

[SEAL]

R. E. Keeton,

R. E. KEETON,

By direction of the

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,

and Pacific Ocean Areas.

(Two copies of the map referred to *supra*, showing "Ships Moored 0755, 7 December 1941," at Pearl Harbor will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 253 and 254, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 67

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT

COMMANDANT, NAVY 128

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

6 JUNE 1945.

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:

Copy of the record of telephone communications "In and Out" dated

December 7, 1941

are true and correct typewritten copies of the documents in the official files of the United States Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.

This organization has no official seal.

J. S. Harper,
J. S. HARPER,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

RECORD TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS IN AND OUT

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

<i>From</i>	
HEEIA	YUNE 8 at 357 (Rec. of 178) at 1040. YUNE 8 is COMCARDIV3.
CINCPAC	2 CARRIERS, 8 ESCORTS, AND 3 TROOP SHIPS 40 MILES SOUTH OF BARBERS POINT. (Time 1050). Arrangements being made to get direct telephone connection to Radio Heeia. HEEIA informed that RMO truck is on its way out and for them not to send their truck in. (1245).
HEEIA	MU'' HE SARA // HAHO on 4780 BRG 186 (1240—Time) (Believed Sub)
HEEIA	MU'' HE SARA // HAHO on 4580 BRG 181 (Time 1240) (Believed Sub)
CINCPAC	MEN BLUE OVERHAULS RED MARKING LANDING AROUND BARBERS (1255) PARACHUTE TROOPS LANDING. SHIP 4 MILES OFF BARBERS.
CINCPAC	ENEMY SHIP FOUR MILES SOUTH BARBERS POINT. ENEMY LANDING ON NORTH SHORE ALSO PARACHUTE TROOPS LANDING NORTH SHORE—BLUE OVERHAUL, RED EMBLEMS.
HEEIA	Intercepted msg to RERIS (F5L from CSQ PART ENEMY TRANSPORTS 4 MILES OFF BARBERS POINT ATTACK
HEEIA	KANURE (Appears to O. T. C.) on 6581—BRG 183 (time 1200)
HEEIA	SISO on 7033—BRG 167½ (time 1200)
HEEIA	UNKNOWN on 458—low frequency channel.
HEEIA	VOICE on 4450 (time 1200)
RDOLAB	REPORTS HAS SEVERAL RECEIVERS READY FOR USE (time 1310)
KANEOHE	REPORTS (UNAUTHENTICATED) CAPTURED CHART SHOWS POINT 223°—90 MILES FROM FORD ISLAND. (time abt 1130)
CINCPAC	ENEMY SAMPAN ABOUT LAND AT AMMUNITION DEPOT. ENEMY LANDING PARTY LANDING AT NANAKOULI. FRIENDLY PLANE FIRING ON THEM (time 1330)
BAYS	ADMIRAL THEOBALD HAS REPORTED TO AID COM-14 (time 1410)
BAYS	DOBBIN HAS JAPANESE PRISONERS ABOARD. MEN APPROACHED DOBBIN BY BOAT. PRISONER BELIEVED OFF SUBMARINE. (time 1410)

HEEIA KASO seems to be TASK FORCE COMMANDER
 " KANURE is probably Commander in the Air
 " KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR
 10 MINUTES)."
 " KANURE sez at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE
 FUEL".
 " SOMEONE ON 7033 AT 1247 SAID "HAVE NOT BE
 OPPOSED".
 " SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM SISO AT
 1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE?"
 " RUSIS AND YUNES believed to be COMMANDER
 CARRIERS.
 " SUT2 believed to be a CARRIER.
 " SISORE is either another COMDR IN THE AIR or COMDR
 TRANSPORT GROUP.
 " SISO is BOSS OF SISORE.

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

RECORD OF INFORMATION IN AND OUT

DISPATCH 072330 SENT COM14 TO DUTCH HARBOR,
 SAMOA AND MIDWAY (YKBZY). GIVING DOPE UP
 TO 1200.

OPNS JAPANESE VOICE ON 15425 KC. Time 1510
 U. S. S. MAKUA Departed for Honuapo Dec. 6th due day-
 light 8th. Then to Hilo and San Francisco.

HEEIA NAT17 (RF7) Bearing 240-080 (This morning at 0537 on
 5995 kes 9HK DE RF7 RF7 RF7 SOS SOS SOS SOS
 JAPS ATTACKED OAHU

WAILUPE ON 5560 MASEØ Bearing 300.
 On 5370 at 0709 REYA7 bearing 303 (2020 Zone 10½)

COMMOFFICE Relay to HEEIA—From: COM4—To: ALL DISTRICT
 ACTIVITIES BE PREPARED FOR AIR RAID AT
 DAWN . . . (Delivered 2110).
 " " 5370 at 0715 TIFUØ Bearing 300. (2045 Zone 10½).
 " " 5370 at 0721 MIS09 Bearing 300. (2051 Zone 10½).
 Mr. Lagle measured crystal—3820.

COMMOFFICE Coast Guard sez—Strong CW sending MO's on 500 Kcs and
 using calls NPS and M9U. . . .
 " " On 4330 at 0750 SEFU Bearing 255 (2120 Zone 10½).
 Lt. Slonim—Nothing on 9500—2230 . . . Keep listening.
 Tokio Broadcast—from Lt. Slonim . . . Attacked Shanghai
 and Singapore.
 Landing at Ma-
 laya.
 Great damage at
 Philippines.
 Attacked Hong-
 kong Twice.
 Destroyed back-
 bone of Amer-
 ican Fleet.
 Do damage to
 themselves.

WAILUPE TO: COM14 From Capt. Mayfield Naval Intelligence via
 Thru Comm Commercial Pacific Cable . . . M I D W A Y BEING
 Office. BOMBED.

COMM OFFICE On 4900 at 0938 RISUS Bearing 305. (2308 Zone 10½).
 Very Strong Signal . . .

COMM OFFICE On 5370 at 0945 TIFUØ Bearing 301. (2315 Zone 10½).
 THESE BEARINGS COMING FROM LUALUALEI
 THROUGH WAILUPE.

DECEMBER 7, 1941.

RECORD OF INFORMATION IN AND OUT

COMM OFFICE HEEIA	On 5290 at 0950 RAYU4 Bearing 301 (2320 Zone 10½). SIEHI on 6385 (Sub. Freq.) at 125/305 at (1020 GCT) (1150 LOCAL)
COM. OF.	MSG FROM COMDESDIV 80 TO ALL SHIPS AND STA- TIONS "SHIP PREVIOUSLY HEADING NW IS AN UNIDENTIFIED CRUISER" ALSO "CRUISER PRE- VIOUSLY REPORTED IS ON COURSE 330" "UN- KNOWN SHIP CHANGED COURSE TO EAST". "IDENTIFIED AS FRIENDLY". (10½-1045) (1215 HST).
COM. OF.	MSG FROM MIDWAY TO WAILUPE (READDRESSSED) BY WAILUPE TO ALL STATIONS ON THIS CIRCUIT "HANGER TO GO. THIS MAY BE NNE OF NQM
HEEIA	4627 KENERAYOHATU—weak signals Time 1240 HST)
CXK	6400 FUNIØ BEARING 300 Time 1035 GCT)
CXK	6400 HEMIE3 BEARING 295 Time 1038 GCT)



HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 68

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

December 8, 1941.

REPORT OF PRISONER NUMBER ONE

Detailed information concerning this report will be submitted today. Preliminary report indicates the prisoner a Japanese Sub-Lieutenant, aged twenty-four years. Was pulled out of the water off Bellows Field this morning. Was taken prisoner by the Army and is held at Fort Shafter by Colonel Fielder. The officer refused to talk concerning the enemy's composition or disposition and at the present time the only information present is as follows:

1. He swam ashore from a reef one mile off Bellows Field.
2. He and another officer were the only members of a two-man submarine. The reason for his capture was that he was sneaking up on what he thought to be a capital ship and in order to navigate he had to open the hatch of the submarine—whereupon water came into the hatch and swamped the motor. He thereupon drifted upon the reef. This officer was Captain and Navigator. The other officer has not been recovered. Information indicates that there are more of these small submarines in the vicinity and that they were brought here from some type of a mother ship. The prisoner did state that he had to navigate a distance of a hundred miles before running aground upon the reef. At the time of his capture the officer wore a stop watch around his neck which stopped running at 0210. It is not known whether this is GCT or LCT. Although he did not give the enemy's forces or disposition he stated that so far as he knew the attack was a disappointment in that they expected a paralyzing blow to our fleet.
3. In accordance with the samuri code this prisoner has requested that he only be allowed to commit suicide.

It is evident that the officer appreciated the treatment afforded him by the naval questioners to that of the Army, and it is felt that with proper handling, further information *might* be derived from this officer.

Respectfully,

E. T. LAYTON.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

District Intelligence Office

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel

Honolulu, Hawaii, December 8, 1941.

CHC/MB

Memorandum for: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

1. Young, adult Japanese male—muscular build, cropped black hair—apparently in perfect health. Gave his age as 24, sub-Lieutenant in the Japanese Navy and a graduate of the Imperial Naval Academy.

2. He was without clothing of any kind, and seated in a chair wrapped in an army blanket. Before questioning was started it was learned that this prisoner was taken on the beach at Bellows Field. That he had swum ashore and had around his neck, on a lanyard, a stop watch which had salt water inside of it. The watch was stopped at 0210. The watch was inscribed on the reverse in Japanese characters—translated as follows: "Watch 2ND clock, Type 1, Navy #296. Movement No. 3346171." This man stated that he was an officer of the Japanese Navy and gave his name as KAZUO SAKAMAKI of Okayama Prefecture. He had been one of a crew of two in a submarine which had run ashore on a reef approximately one mile off Bellows Field. He stated that he was the Commanding Officer of the submarine and the navigator and that his shipmate was the engineer—entire crew consisted of himself and one shipmate. He admitted that the submarine was of a small type which operated from a mother ship but refused to give the name or tonnage of the mother ship or the distance at sea of his disembarkation from the mother ship. When questioned as to whether the submarine was diesel or electric propelled he refused to answer. He stated that he had navigated "more than a hundred miles" when asked if the distance were as much as one hundred miles. Too much credence should not be placed in this answer as he obviously realized he was being pumped. He stated that he wished to commit suicide and had not done so at the time of landing on shore because of the possibility which remained of making his escape and rejoining the Japanese Navy. He stated that he had now been disgraced and did not want his name or his ship information sent back to Japan. When complimented on the success of which his Naval comrades had made their attack, he stated that it had been much less successful than they had anticipated. We expressed surprise at this and he was asked what they originally expected to accomplish, he replied, in effect, a knock-out blow to your Navy.

3. He stated that off Bellows Field this morning he had been approaching a capital ship but that the darkness was so complete that he was forced to open his conning tower and stand in in the open hatch while running half submerged towards his target. As a result of the maneuver in the choppy sea, he shipped a great deal of water down the hatch which crippled his motor and this motor failure resulted, of course, in the loss of control of the submarine and his being dashed into a reef over one mile from Bellows Field. He and his fellow officer stripped, dived into the ocean and attempted to swim ashore. He stated that he last saw his shipmate in the heavy surf. He admitted the possibility that the Navy might examine the submarine, which had run on the reef (because he was not aware that Naval planes had subsequently bombed and sunk his submarine). He stated that there were no papers in the submarine and admitted that this type of submarine represented essentially a sort of enlarged variation of a one man torpedo. He stated "My greatest mistake was being captured. This is the first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan about this. Please kill me." During the course of this questioning, which was begun by the aid of two competent interpreters, it developed that this young officer had some knowledge of English, which he at first did not disclose. Later on he explained his inexpertness in this language by saying that, while in the middle school, he had studied English, but in the Academy, in expectation of duty in the China Seas, he had selected Chinese.

4. A drawing of a petty officer's Navy Pilot's insignia was made by him and he explained the significance of the various details of this device.

5. There remains the possibility, if the Naval authorities so desire, that this submarine may yet be located and raised for examination of mechanical details, etc.

C. H. C.

In Reply
Refer To:

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR

U. S. S. ARGONAUT, Flagship

Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

December 8, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum: Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay.

1. The submarine when first sighted was about six hundred yards from the beach, off the end of the run-way at Bellows Field. At the time of my arrival at the Field, three Navy Utility planes were engaged in dropping what appeared to be either twenty-five or fifty pound bombs, the bombs being dropped in pairs. No direct hits were made and out of about twelve bombs dropped six appeared to land within fifty feet of the submarine. After the bombing the submarine did not appear to have been damaged or to have altered its position.

2. The pilot who first sighted the submarine was interviewed and stated that when he picked it up there was a large oil slick around its stern, also its position had not changed any since the first sighting of it.

3. The operations officer at Bellows Field sent me up in a plane to get a clear view of the submarine and I was able to come within one hundred feet of it. The color was dull black with no distinguishing marks, between thirty and forty feet in length, and about four feet in breadth. There was a small periscope projecting about three feet from what appeared to be periscope shears. The contour followed the general line of all submarines and there was a basket like projection on the bow. At the time, the submarine was down by the stern with the bow and periscope shears coming out of water from time to time due to the action of the waves. Judging from the location of the bomb hits on the coral bottom, which could be seen from the plane, the submarine appeared to be drifting in towards the beach.

4. It is believed that with the minimum amount of effort, the submarine can be towed in and beached.

R. L. RUTTER,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

To a Commanding Officer:
From Japanese Naval Officer
KAZUO SAKAMAKI

I thank you for the kindly visit of yesterday. Now I will write down your requests of yesterday in Japanese. Please pardon my poor writing and composition.

1. BRIEF PERSONAL HISTORY

In August 1940 I was graduated from the Naval Academy and became a midshipman. In April of this year I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the navy, my present rank.

2. RECORD OF BATTLE

Your honorable "have" country instituted an economic blockade of Japan, a "have not" country, refusing to sell us oil, cotton and the like, until we had no choice but natural collapse. Because of this we began diplomatic negotiations with your country, but these ended in failure. Therefore, with a friend, I set out for Pearl Harbor with the purpose of sinking a battleship, but due to-----accident, although we were able to reach the mouth of the harbor by creeping underneath your bombs falling like rain, since the-----accident was fatal to the submarine, we determined to proceed without hesitation on the surface of the water, and dashing into the harbor, and climbing the gang-way ladder, hoped to leap onto the deck and die simultaneously with blowing up the enemy warship just as in olden times, during the Mongol invasion, our Tsuyu Kawano lowered the mast and boarded the enemy ship with it. However, because of the-----accident suffered at the harbor mouth, we struck a reef which given ten seconds we would have safely cleared. My first stratagem had failed. With this difference of ten seconds the fate was decided and one of the warships of your country was saved.

Seeing the success of our sister submarines and the splendid achievements of our air force, I left the mouth of the harbor, compelled to do so due to my submarine being disabled. Later, finally being unable to do anything with the submarine, I swam through the ocean and reached an enemy airport. Due to

my exhaustion, I was captured without having time to even fight. And thus my sad fate began.

Due entirely to my inexpert navigation and strategy, my honor as a soldier has fallen to the ground. Thus I betrayed the expectations of our 100,000,000 (people) and became a sad prisoner of war disloyal to my country.

5. The talk I had with an understanding naval officer in the home of an army man in "Honolulu" was very pleasant. Because I thought about the trouble I would cause your country later on, and because I was unable to endure my shame, committing suicide or being shot to death became impossible, and thus began my sad life as a prisoner of war. Now that things have come to such a pass, I have started the life of a peaceful Japanese naval officer abiding by the rules of international law.

In olden times, Haku and Shukusei of China, refusing to eat millet of a foreign land, went into the mountains and ate grass (?) until they starved, but I, since I began eating your country's bread, have thought what a cause for shame and sorrow it is.

Although I have caused you much annoyance, I have done things right along according to righteousness. However, such incidents as that which happened yesterday which is from the standpoint of your country a sad thing has been continued. My righteousness has made scores of men of your country withdraw all day long with their guns pointed at me and made them afraid, but as a result of this, I must face a death which to me is not too pleasing.

My willingness to die need not be mentioned; to be killed by one of your bullets of your country shall make me very happy. I pray for your country's lasting military success.

An uprighteous pistol has been aimed at me. This is my end. Good-bye.
4. To the Japanese people, especially to officers like ourselves, becoming a prisoner of war is inexcusable. Of course, whether or not there is a record of the incident or not, I will commit suicide upon my return to my native land. Even though we are unarmed, to bite with teeth and fight to the last is the Japanese spirit.

I pray that my death will forgive me for all my failures and I pray that my spirit will be enshrined at the Yasukuni (Shrine).

Please forward the following to the Japanese Navy Department.

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

Although I plunged into the mouth of the harbor, and although I struck terror in the hearts (of the people of the islands?) I arrived at a situation wherein I could do nothing. For this I have no excuse to make. I do not desire to grasp this opportunity of being a prisoner of war. I am about to die after fighting for righteousness till the very end as an officer of the Japanese Navy.

Banzai for his Imperial Majesty.

Showa 16th year (1941), 14th day (Month omitted)

KAZUO SAKAMAKI,
Naval Sub-lieutenant

POEM COMPOSED AMONG THE ENEMY (ON THE UNFORTUNATE DAY THAT I BECAME A PRISONER OF WAR)

When cherry blossoms fall,
Let them fall!
Drenched are the its branches and leaves
With the sorrow of today!

5. I like best "DOWN THE TORPEDO" and "AMONG THE SHOTS THROUGH THE MARGARET". I experienced all these things in this current battle which is the goal of all naval men's ambition, and I manifested the Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit). Last night, again scores of bayonets and muzzles were pointed at me from the front door and from the window and from above my head. However, righteousness won. And although as a result of this a regrettable situation came about, I hope that all would be forgiven with my death. On the eve of my "fairly death" lamenting the many sacrifices of your country due to my "call of righteousness", I earnestly hope that this will be clearly understood, that supreme desire and joy in dying as a soldier by your country's bullets.

I appreciate your many kindness shown me up to now, and I pray for your success in the war.

Respectfully,

KAZUO SAKAMAKI.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 69

Confidential
Vol. 1, No. 48
11 June 1945

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

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Cover Page: Two Coronados of VPB-13, operating from the USS KENNETH WHITING, downed this MAVIS on 10 May in a 17-mile running battle near Fukue Shima, west of Kyushu.

Enclosures: Data Table--Japanese Combat Aircraft.
Count of Operational Aircraft.

Known Your Enemy: Japanese Antitank Warfare.

Two Maps: Japanese Defense Installations on Iwo Jima as plotted from P. I. reports and ground study.

[I] UNEASINESS IN JAPAN

With Okinawa about to be written off, Japan took stock of the situation last week and found the outlook grim. There was a tinge of desperation in various Tokyo announcements as spokesmen sought to condition the public for an expected invasion of the homeland. Like the nervous sleeper in the flat below, Japan sits up nights waiting for the other shoe to drop.

The Japanese public has been told by no less than Premier Suzuki that Okinawa was to be the decisive battle, that Japan itself might rise or fall on the outcome

¹Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and refer to pages of original exhibit.

of the battle in the Ryukyus. Newspapers and commentators were quick to echo the spirit of his fright talk. When the Naha-Shuri defense line was broken, the Japanese public must have known that a decisive phase was at hand. There was Okinawa all but lost; there was the ubiquitous Third Fleet hammering at Kyushu; there was the 11th Army Air Force raiding the northern Kurile Islands, and over all were the B-29s with the power to pick a city and obliterate it.

Tension mounted in Tokyo, or what was left of it. There was the publicly-aired conviction that the next Allied operation would be against the home islands. While the Tokyo Radio talked of elaborate underground structures for "a long war", the Japanese military took the wraps off "the home defense team" of pilots and aircraft. Carrier pilots of the Third Fleet suddenly found they had to beat off "a sky full of Japanese planes", manned by crack pilots who apparently had been saved up for some such final showing. Moreover, U. S. airmen reported the expert Jap flyers were coming up with new fighters which outperformed American Corsairs. (Identity of this new Japanese fighter plane has not been established, but elsewhere in this issue is a discussion of a possible new enemy plane recently shot down over Okinawa.)

Tokyo talked, too, of converting remnants of the Imperial Fleet into a suicide fleet or suicide units. English language broadcasts were beamed to North America pointing out that the recent shakeup in the Japanese Navy was calculated to put that arm on a suicide basis under new commanders who had originated and were versed in suicide tactics. There was even talk of converting the free balloon experiment into a direful threat to the U. S. mainland by means of suicide pilots. Propagandists said the pilotless balloons had demonstrated that such bags could get to the West Coast in 100 hours, so now the Japanese would send them over with pilots to spot targets for bombs in the balloons. Still other propagandists broadcast elaborate descriptions of vast underground fortifications and supply areas in the homeland which, they said, would introduce "a new kind of underground warfare."

It was all reminiscent of Germany's promises to her people of unlimited "secret weapons" before the end of the war in Europe.

Meanwhile, B-29s poured relentless destruction on Japan's principal cities in a terrible, methodical order. Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe—down the Tokaido line with train-like regularity and then back again, went the Superforts. On 5 June they were over Kobe, the end of the line, and two days later they were back at Osaka for the second time in a week. The Kobe raid was the 15th incendiary raid on the Empire. In the subsequent raid on Osaka HE bombs were mixed with 2,500 tons of incendiaries. The HE was aimed at Osaka Arsenal, Japan's largest. Before the Osaka raid, it was computed that a total area of nearly 90 square miles has been burned out or blasted to rubble in Japan's six major cities.

(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Aerial view of Tokyo showing damage effected through incendiary raids.
2. Aerial view of Osaka showing damage effected through incendiary raids.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 255, and 256, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[2]

UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT

From Air Group 9 come gun camera photographs of a possible new Japanese fighter which was shot down on 5 May over Okinawa. This aircraft was first reported to be a GEORGE but an examination of the photos shows that its only GEORGE-like features are general wing shape and twin gun installations. Features not characteristic of GEORGE 11 are:

- Long nose.
- Low wing and excessively long fillets.
- Narrow but tall fuselage aft of fillets.
- Full length rudder similar to TONY's.
- Notched out tail plane with fairly short chord.

While it is reported that the new version of GEORGE has a low wing, there has been no indication that the fuselage and empennage would be redesigned or

that the engine would be set farther forward. GEORGE 11 presents a very stubby, heavy appearance. The aircraft pictured here gives that impression only in side view because of the depth of fuselage; its narrowness from above, if fillets are discounted, is almost like OSCAR. The tail wheel appears to be non-retractable since no cover plates are visible.

Two conclusions may be drawn: (1) that the aircraft is the new GEORGE 21 which seems unlikely for the reasons stated, and (2) that it is a new type Navy fighter hitherto unphotographed—perhaps SAM 11.

(Two photographs, each showing two separate views, of an unidentified Japanese plane over Okinawa, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 257 and 258, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[5]

NEW AIR COMMANDS IDENTIFIED

Identification of two important new Japanese air commands, the 6th Air Army and the 1st Mobile Base Air Force, has been made through recently captured documents.

Prior to the Okinawa campaign, only five air armies were known to exist. Several items recovered on Okinawa, however, mentioned the 6th Air Army. A "Very Secret" order, dated 6 February 1945, issued by the 19th Air Sector Command gave the jurisdiction of the new Army. (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. B-18,287.) The order states:

"Imperial headquarters will plan the execution of Ten Air Operation in the East China Sea area as a joint Army-Navy function. The 6th Air Army, chiefly, will carry out aerial operations north of Okinawa (including Okinawa) and the 8th Air Division, generally, will carry out operations south of Okinawa (Okinawa included)."

Since it is known that an air army is a high echelon of command with a tactical and administrative responsibility over a large area, it is presumed that the jurisdiction of the new army also includes Kyushu. The 8th Air Division is based on Formosa. The Ten ("Sky") operation is apparently the name applied to the air defense of Okinawa and the Ryukyu area.

Japanese air armies previously identified include the 1st in the Empire, 2nd in Manchuria, 3rd in Southeast Asia, 4th in Southwest Pacific, and 5th in China.

Mention of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force (Kido Kichi Kokubutai) and its number designation, 1KFGB was found in a notebook on Okinawa. (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. B-18,066.) A Base Air Force is the tactical equivalent of a Navy Air Fleet and operates under the CinC, Combined Fleet. The area covered by the 1st Mobile Base Air Force and its equivalent administrative air fleet is not known, but it is presumed to be an important sector of the Japanese homeland defense.

[6]

JAPANESE FIGHTER DIRECTION

A description of Japanese fighter director methods, as they existed in April 1944, was captured on Luzon (ADVATIS Translation No. 74, ATIS Current Translations No. 156, 21 March 1945). Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance planes—which should make good targets—and on a constant speed and course of the attacking planes.

The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars reports to a control station which we would call a filter center. At this location plots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of "grid" system.) The Japanese have an organization designated an "intelligence squad" which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicates that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.

Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearing and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.

To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting planes are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow

and report position, type, strength, altitude, etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance planes, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance planes represent an important cog in the intercept system.

Due to the time element required in the filter center, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilized for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the "enemy raids" will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.

After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial "vector" and "range" on the "point of encounter" (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e. g., "03.10" equals "right front ten kilometers."

(Copies of two photographs, each reflecting six views, of a Japanese "George" 11-Fighter, Interim Model, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 259 and 260, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[11]

DEMOLITION SQUADS IN SALLYs

On 24 May six SALLYs carried Japanese "commandos" to Yontan airfield, Okinawa, in attempts to destroy U. S. aircraft and installations. The planes attempted wheels-up, power-off landings, but all except one which landed on the airfield, crashed and burned killing their occupants before any damage could be done. All planes were SALLY 2s, fitted with Type 100 1450 hp engines, the Army counterpart of the Kasei 11.

None of the six aircraft carried guns or armor plate or, as far as could be determined, radio gear. The top turrets had been removed and pieces of corrugated roofing, beaten flat, were nailed to boards 1 by 6 inches and tied over the turret hole with rope to inside structural members. Such aircraft maintenance as could be observed was extremely poor. Screws were cross-threaded or not screwed completely into place or were left out altogether. Ill-fitting pieces of fairing, apparently from other planes of the same model, had been forced into place. Much patchwork was noted and tires were considerably worn. In two of the planes were found small pieces of carboard, 2 by 10 inches. Around the carboard were wound five sizes of plain soldering wire, small pieces of which could be cut off and used as substitutes for burned-out fuses. Fuse boxes had some regular fuses installed and some short pieces of wire as substitutes, a possible indication of a shortage of fuses. Flare release racks were found on two aircraft, the flares doubtless being intended for use in the landings. One light smoke bomb was found, probably to be used to hide the raiders, once they were landed.

Extra bomb bay fuel tanks of approximately 130-gallon capacity were found in all the crashed aircraft. It is not clear why these would be needed, since SALLY's

(Photographs appearing at this point in the Exhibit include:

1. Two views of the Japanese plane, "Sally 2", one showing a tail section after attempted landing on Yontan airfield, Okinawa, and the other showing a plan after "wheels-up" landing on Yontan airfield.
2. View of a Japanese "Sally 2" plane after "wheels-up" landing on Yontan airfield.
3. Two views showing wreckage of two more "Sally 2s" near Yontan airfield.

The foregoing photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 261, 262, and 263, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

normal range (at 75 per cent Vmax) without them is approximately 1200 miles, and from the nature of the operation it would not seem that a return trip for

the planes was anticipated. Oil tanks on one aircraft were only one-quarter full, indicating that the engines were badly worn or that the tanks were intentionally not filled in order to save oil.

The pilot of the one SALLY that landed most nearly intact is believed to have been inexperienced for these reasons: The automatic pilot was in operation and had never been turned off; controls were operational and functioned satisfactorily at the time of inspection, but the pilot had made a poor attempt at leveling off before landing, thereby striking the runway hard and injuring some of his passengers; main line switches and magneto switches were still on at the time of inspection.

The entire operation against Yontan airfield was in the familiar suicide tradition, a move of desperation, neither well-planned nor well-executed. It was not successful even if measured objectively in terms of physical damage done for losses taken.

(An aerial view of destruction wrought by American carrier based planes on Kanoya airfield will be found reproduced as Item No. 264. EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

DUMMY AIRCRAFT

Increased use of dummy aircraft on Japanese homeland fields is evident in many recent reconnaissance photographs. Photographs of three fields are reproduced here to illustrate the trend and to show some of the more obvious differences between the dummies and the real aircraft.

In spite of the painstaking care the Japanese have taken, the dummies look flimsy at best. They seem to warp and twist out of shape, either because of our gunfire or the elements. They are irregular and not precise enough to fool the eye when studied in photographs. Their very construction defeats their purpose, since the three-dimensional effect of solidity and strong shadow is weak. On the other hand, when these dummies are covered with camouflage netting the general effect can be attained and is more convincing.

To give a good idea of the lengths to which the Japanese have gone in the construction of dummy aircraft, a selection of typical drawings is published here. The original drawings were a part of two complete sets of blueprints captured on Okinawa (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 43). The dummies depicted are probably intended to represent NATE, SONIA and SALLY. How many other types of planes have been drawn or constructed is not now known. Several mediocre imitations of FRANK were spotted around Yontan Field on Okinawa (photos in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 43).

Construction of dummies follows a pattern, not unlike stage scenery. The main members are of cedar and are comparable in size to our structural lumber. The lighter bracing and stiffeners are of common pine. All are nailed and spiked in place in a designated order. Structurally, the designs are only fair, as evidenced by their disintegration. Over this rough framework platform is woven the finish "basket". The coarseness of this weave allows the sun to penetrate and thereby to soften shadows cast on the ground. This is particularly noticeable in the Kanoya photograph. The "undercarriage", while elaborate for the SALLY and SONIA types, even including wooden wheels, consists generally of simple posts. Sometimes gasoline drums are used as supports, in much the same manner as they are beneath wrecked aircraft used as decoys.

(The following photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit:

1. Aerial photograph of Kanoya airfield.
2. Aerial photograph of Kikuchi airfield, Kyushu.
3. Aerial photograph of a Japanese airfield showing camouflaged dummy planes.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 265, 266, and 267, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Three rendered sketches have been prepared from these Japanese drawings. Conventional shadows have been cast in an effort to show how these dummies would appear from the air. Gasoline drums have been drawn into each sketch to give scale. The shapes of the "aircraft" are true to the types imitated, but dummies seen to date have fallen far short of the shapes intended in the drawings.

Certain observations are pertinent. Though dummies to date have been flimsy,

are not faithful copies of the drawings, do not cast strong shadows and disintegrate under gunfire, they nevertheless look enough like the real thing from altitude under combat conditions. When covered with camouflage netting they are particularly hard to distinguish from operational aircraft. A recent report based on reconnaissance for mid-May (Report No. 659, InterpRon Two of 28 May 1945) shows that a total of 139 dummies are present on ten fields in Kyushu and Honshu, not including the large number shown in the Kanoya photograph. While these aircraft may be easy to distinguish on a photograph with a high power glass, they present a difficult spotting problem to pilots under combat conditions. For that reason, effort will be made in the future to publish any information on the subject which may be helpful in exposing to air personnel the Japanese use of dummy aircraft.

At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:

1. Sketch of dummy Japanese plane, a "Sally."
2. Two sketches of dummy Japanese planes, a "Nate" and a "Sally."
3. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of "Sally" dummies.
4. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of "Nate" and "Sonia" dummies.
5. TAIC model photos of a "Baka," primarily a Japanese glider and secondarily a powered plane, being released from a Japanese "Betty" and of a "Baka" in flight.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 268 through 272, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

FURTHER ANALYSIS OF BAKA'S PERFORMANCE

Detailed analysis by TAIC of the aerodynamic characteristics of BAKA has led to a revision of the theoretical range, speed and glide angle estimates. BAKA is primarily a glider and *secondarily* a powered plane. The rockets greatly increase its speed for a short time, but cause only a slight range increase over its maximum glide range. Maximum horizontal range when released at 27,000 feet is 55 miles. Fifty-two of these miles would be travelled at a glide speed of 229 mph and at a glide angle of $5^{\circ}35'$; during the other three miles, the use of rockets would accelerate the speed to 535 mph in level flight. At a 50° or greater diving angle, maximum speed would be 618 mph. Whether the rockets were used at the beginning or the end of the run, or, whether they were used to climb would not appreciably affect the maximum range.

Against ships protected by heavy armor, presumably the rockets would be used at the end of the run in a torpedo approach, the pilot attempting to score a hit close to the water line. If launched from a distance, however, BAKA would be vulnerable to attack by fighters before reaching a position to complete effectively its own attack. Lacking maneuverability, BAKA could take but little evasive action in its unpowered glide and its only method of escape would be to fire one or more of its rockets. In this event, the increased velocity secured from the rocket would dissipate before BAKA could reach its target and its final terminal velocity would be substantially decreased.

Destruction of the parent aircraft is *extremely important* inasmuch as special fuselage modifications are necessary, and the available supply of adaptable parent aircraft controls the number of BAKAs that can be launched.

The accompanying range graph can be used to ascertain the estimated theoretical range of BAKA when launched from any determined altitude. It is not believed practical that release of BAKA will be made at altitudes in excess of 20,000 feet, so that the maximum practical range remains approximately 35 miles.

(A graph showing an estimation of the range of "Baka" will be found reproduced as Item No. 273, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

AIRFIELD DAMAGE REPAIR

Extensive damage inflicted upon Japanese airfields by U. S. bombers has led the enemy to issue special orders for the repair and camouflage of the damage. In addition, signals have been arranged to indicate to returning enemy pilots which of the damaged portions have actually been repaired and which have been merely camouflaged.

A Staff Order of the Fourth Air Division, dated 8 September 1944 and recently captured on Okinawa (CINCPAC-CINCPA Item B-17564-F) states that every effort must be made to repair bomb damage but, if it cannot be repaired before morning, it should be camouflaged. An accompanying diagram, reproduced below, illustrates the use of signal panels to indicate camouflaged damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical strip.

A complete translation of the document follows:

"1. All bomb damage to runways by air raids should be repaired if at all possible, overnight.

"2. When the above is impossible, at least a part of the runway should be repaired by the next morning and made serviceable.

"3. Unrepaired bomb damage on runways should be camouflaged by dawn, using camouflage nets and other available materials. Camouflage should convince enemy aerial reconnaissance that the previous day's damage has been completely repaired. Speedy repair should then be undertaken. However, damage repair should not be delayed for purposes of camouflage.

"4. Partial repair described in Item 2 and 3 above should be marked off according to the attached diagram. Red signal panels are placed next to camouflaged bomb damage and facing the repaired runway area. Panels are placed so that the sides of one will be parallel to those of the others."

(A diagram illustrating the use of signal panels to indicate camouflaged damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical strip, referred to *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 274, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

OXYGEN GENERATING APPARATUS

The oxygen generating apparatus now used in FRANK, NICK and other Japanese Army aircraft delivers an unusually large amount of oxygen for its low weight and will not explode if struck by shrapnel or bullets. In these respects it is much superior to conventional oxygen storage installations.

An examination of the equipment discloses that its main components are three generator tubes with individual filter attachments, the enclosing container and the immediate tubing and the necessary electrical connections.

The generator tube is of thin sheet iron or steel construction, plated with rust-proof metal, with soldered side and end plate seams. A socket and suitable electrical contact is provided at its lower end, while the smaller but similarly constructed filter cylinder is soldered in its insert recess at the opposite end. Overall dimensions are: generator length 1 foot 6 $\frac{3}{8}$ inches; overall length including filter 2 feet 3 $\frac{3}{8}$ inches; generator diameter 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches; filter diameter 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches.

The oxygen-producing material is a mixture of potassium chlorate (KClO₃), iron, iron oxide and asbestos fiber. The action of the generator is initiated by an electric current heating a chrome-iron resistance wire, about which is wrapped a paper fuze. The fuze in turn ignites a fuze train which finally ignites the main compound. The mixture of constituents in contact with the fuze is richer in iron and iron oxide than is the remainder of the compound. Oxygen is produced by the heat-decomposition of the KClO₃. The iron oxide is a catalyst which allows the reaction to occur at a lower temperature, and the iron metal may act both as a heat source in reaction with the oxygen produced and as a catalyst.

(A front view of an oxygen generating apparatus with one cylinder missing will be found reproduced as Item No. 275, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The enclosing container for the generator components is constructed of what seems to be aluminum alloy. The components of the case (back panel, doors and base) are apparently formed by a die-stamping process. At the time of the stamping, cooling perforations of about $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch diameter are formed, spaced

at about 1½ inches between centers. Overall dimensions are: length 1 foot 8¾ inches; width 1 foot ⅙ inch; depth 5⅛ inches. Assembly consists of a back panel to which is riveted a base or socket holding section.

Two outward-swinging doors are hinged on each side of the back plate above the base, and are fitted with two bar-and-lever type latches. Other constructional details may be ascertained from photographs. An instruction plate with wiring and tubing diagram is secured to the front of the base.

The gross weight of the equipment (three generator-filter tubes, the container, and part of the tubing) is 25 pounds 4½ ounces. Each tube has a duration of 75 minutes, according to the attached nameplate. No volumetric computations have yet been made but it is believed that the generator delivers ample oxygen for any altitude the airplane may operate. An idea of duration per unit weight may be gained from the results of the quotient of time of delivery over weight, which shows that the equipment delivers 8.95 minutes of O₂ per pound of apparatus. Two disadvantages of the unit are that the generator reaction, once started, cannot be stopped. This, in turn, often necessitates by-passing a large amount of oxygen at lower altitudes. The long duration of oxygen production is apparently intended to counteract this.

(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two views on a plate captioned "Shades of Darius Green," including:

1. View of an oxygen generating apparatus.
2. View of a Japanese aircraft, a photograph of which was capture on Okinawa.

The foregoing will be found reproduced as Item No. 276, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

JAPANESE ELECTRIC TORPEDO

A Japanese electric "wakeless" torpedo, with a possible range greater than any other electrically-driven type known, has been recovered on Saipan.

Only incomplete information is available on the weapon, designated as Type 92, Mod. 1. On the example recovered and examined by MEIU No. 4, the warhead was missing and numerous parts which would have given additional indications of the torpedo's operation and capabilities had been removed, possibly by souvenir hunters.

(A photograph of a Type 92, Model I Japanese Torpedo will be found reproduced as Item No. 277, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The range dial on the weapon is calibrated from 0 to 14000. Although the unit of measurement is not given, it is presumed to be meters, inasmuch as that unit of measurement has always been used by the Japanese to indicate range. If that is the case on this weapon, the maximum setting would give the torpedo a range almost twice as great as any other electric torpedo extant. This maximum range can probably be achieved only at a much reduced speed, however. At the estimated maximum speed of 28 knots, it is believed the torpedo would have an effective range of approximately 3000 yards.

The weapon is apparently modeled after the German G7E electric torpedo. Without the warhead, it is 19 feet, 1⅞ inches long, and 21 inches in diameter. It has two batteries of 52 cells each and each cell has a voltage of 2.05. The batteries are 62 inches long, 14¾ inches wide, and 10 inches high. The motor is driven by direct current. Twin propellers, turning in opposite directions stabilize the torpedo during its run. Four tail vanes with horizontal and vertical rudders are mounted on the trailing end. No information is available on the type of warhead or explosive device used, or on the type of submarine capable of carrying the torpedo. As far as is known, the torpedo has not yet been used in combat by the Japanese.

(A photograph showing two views of a Japanese torpedo, one being of the tail and after body, and the other of the interior of the battery compartment will be found reproduced as Item No. 278, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

VARIATION IN SCS

(Various views of the Japanese Type E Model Vessel referred to as "Sugar Charlie Sugar" and mentioned *infra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 279, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Photographs above are among the first received showing details of the standard economy Type E (mod) Sugar Charlie Sugar with foremast centered on the foredeck and a thin mainmast on the afterdeck. Shown below is a recent good photograph of the Type E (mod) with masts at forecastle and bridge. The two mast arrangements constitute the major variations found on this economy type. In other respects details of the two ships illustrated are very similar but among minor variations which may be observed in the future are placement of lifeboats and size of stack.

The foremast-centered variation of SCS can be distinguished from the larger (2300-ton) three-hatch Sugar Charlie Love by the position of the foremast with respect to hatches. At most, a mast can serve two hatches. If centered, it can serve the entire foredeck, which can have but two hatches—as on a Sugar Charlie Sugar. If the mast is forward of center it can serve only a part of the foredeck and a third hatch must be present—as on a Sugar Charlie Love. (See opposite page.)

(The following photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit:

1. View of a Japanese vessel referred to as "Sugar Charlie Sugar" with foremast at forecastle.
2. Photographs of two types of Japanese cargo vessels referred to as "Sugar Charlie Love" and "Fox Tare Dog."

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 280 and 281, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

I-24, MIDGET SUB CARRIER

The sketch below, reproduced from a drawing by a prisoner who served aboard the Japanese submarine I-24, illustrates how a midget submarine was transported to Pearl Harbor for the sneak attack of 7 December 1941. Other midgets were transported similarly for attacks on Sidney, Australia, and in the Solomons area. In the two years the POW was aboard, from April 1941 to May 1943, seven midget submarines were launched from the I-24. The prisoner's disclosures are contained in ONI Digest of Information from Prisoner of War Sources.

The smaller craft was carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and was secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps, the POW said. One of the clamps was released from within the midget, the rest from within the mother sub. No unusual difficulty was experienced in maintaining trim when diving with the small craft aboard.

Due to the limited range of the small subs, return to the "mother" ship was not planned, and was not accomplished in any of the seven instances. Crews of the midgets were expected to scuttle their boats after accomplishing their missions, and save themselves if possible.

(A sketch showing a Japanese submarine I-24 carrying a midget submarine will be found reproduced as Item No. 282, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

CAMOUFLAGE VS PHOTO INTERPRETATION ON IWO JIMA

Pre-invasion photo interpretation of installations on Iwo Jima compared favorably with later ground studies of the island in areas where vegetation was sparse. In wooded areas, among pandanus trees and in heavy scrub growth, installations frequently were impossible to see and many which were not sheltered by natural growth were so well camouflaged it was impossible to determine whether an object was a military installation or a natural ground formation.

Along the barren beaches of the southern isthmus, interpretation of aerial photographs was comparatively easy, although dummy positions, revealed after-

ward by ground study, were so well constructed they were difficult to distinguish from the authentic.

Near the airfields, 500 to 800 yards from the beaches, blockhouses, covered artillery and large pillboxes, were observed and correctly interpreted. Smaller pillboxes and mortar emplacement, often as effective against our forces as the larger installations, could not be observed in photographs. Even on the ground frequently they could not be spotted from more than 15 yards' distance. Many of the smaller pillboxes used an effective camouflage of wire netting covered with brush over the fire lanes.

Interpretation of antiaircraft defense was more than 95 per cent accurate even though all these positions were well camouflaged. One of the few errors was the classification of a six-gun heavy AA battery as automatic AA. The average diameter of revetments for this heavy gun battery was slightly less than 16 feet. The revetment of a nearby twin-mount automatic AA battery was slightly more than 15 feet. Nets and brush across the revetments obscured characteristics so that positive identification of either battery was impossible.

Approximately 30 percent of the casemated coast artillery and field artillery positions were observed in aerial photographs before heavy gunfire blasted away

(At this point in the Exhibit two items appear, as follows:

1. Photograph showing Japanese camouflage of a pillbox and a spigot mortar position.
2. Five views showing various types of Japanese camouflage technique.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 283 and 284, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

vegetation concealing other positions which allowed for a greater percentage of correct interpretation. Natural vegetation was used extensively on all positions. Camouflage discipline as evaluated from photographs was excellent during construction of positions. Materials used for covering blended into the surrounding terrain and vegetation, while earth from excavations was planted with grass to obliterate traces of military activity. Heavy coast defense guns and field artillery were well concealed under trees.

Emplacements for machine guns and 150-mm mortars have similar characteristics. Consequently, a few of the latter were interpreted as machine gun positions. Small mortar or rocket emplacements were unobserved in photographs.

CINCPAC-CINPOA Bulletin No. 136-45, concerning a ground study of the defense installations of Iwo Jima, points out the limitations of excellent vertical photographs. The two maps enclosed with this issue of "Weekly Intelligence" show (1) a plot of defense installations on Iwo as determined from photo interpretation on D-15, and (2) positions plotted from a ground study of the island.

A review of aerial photographs, supplemented by a ground study knowledge of the island, disclosed most of the larger installations, such as the CD guns at the East Boat Basin. These casemates were discovered by comparing changes in the ground noted in successive sorties dated from 15 June 1944 to 4 February 1945, listed in Supplement to Defense Installations of Iwo Jima, CINCPAC-CINCPAO Bulletin No. 137-45.

Despite excellent camouflage and camouflage discipline, stereo pairs revealed the height of the concrete position in which the CD gun was emplaced. The photographs taught photo interpreters not to rely solely on the best sortie of a strategic area, but to study thoroughly all differences in terrain as revealed at different dates. It is of utmost importance that aerial photographs of strategic areas be obtained at an early date and at frequent intervals thereafter for comparative studies. Low stereo obliques of beach areas were excellent in uncovering camouflaged beach positions.

Operational maps, including contours and terrain features, were made from aerial photographs where there were discrepancies occasioned by absence of ground control. The extremely rugged terrain was not portrayed on the contours of the situation map. Depth of draws and ravines was hidden by tall trees, and stereo comparagrams could not determine heights beneath this vegetation. This resulted in little more than a general picture of the terrain for unit commanders. These limitations serve to point out the need for vectographs or some type of three-dimensional picture covering the area assigned to each tactical commander,

(At this point in the Exhibit two photographs appear, as follows:

1. Photograph showing Casemated CD Guns over East Boat Basin, Iwo Jima.
2. Photograph showing U. S. Marines blowing up a cave harboring Japanese snipers on Okinawa.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 285 and 286, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[33]

OKINAWA DEFENSE DOCTRINE

The situation facing U. S. troops poised for assault against Okinawa appeared to be a formidable one. From seven to eight possible centers of resistance were believed disposed within the immediate area of the proposed zone of action. Photographs revealed prepared defenses around Katchin Hanto on the east side of the island sufficient to indicate a regimental position.

But an agreeable surprise was in store for us. By the evening of the initial landing day our forces were approximately two days ahead of schedule. Fortifications overlooking the Hagushi beaches had been abandoned. Yontan airfield, reputed to be one of the best in the Pacific, had been left practically intact. Antiaircraft emplacements either had dummy guns or were empty. In a sense, the enemy handed U. S. troops their primary objective on a silver platter.

This new "factual reasoning" on the part of the Japanese could not be explained immediately. However, a recent report from the III Phib Corps clarifies the enemy's failure to oppose our landing.

In previous operations, it is pointed out; the enemy defended his important beach areas and airfields with the utmost tenacity, withdrawing to a final defensive line only when he was driven from his forward positions. On Okinawa the Japanese were forced to deviate from such a course because they had insufficient troops available for defense of the island. Consequently, the enemy chose the more important military installations to defend, leaving the others to be destroyed by his retreating forces.

"It is definitely known," the report asserts, "that the Japanese high command issued orders to the forces in the Yontan-Katena area to destroy the airfields should we initiate a landing in that sector. The force was then to join the 62nd Division for a defense of southern Okinawa.

"This indicates that the enemy did not intend to make a concerted stand in the Yontan-Katena area. Instead, he chose the narrow approaches to southern Okinawa where he could concentrate all his defenses in depth and employ the minimum force necessary to halt a further advance. The extensive network of dummy and unoccupied positions in the area further substantiates such plans."

A captured document sheds additional light on the Japanese tactical plan for the defense of other islands in the Nansei Shoto. The document refers to the "Okinawan Type of Defense" as the plan to be followed.

"From an analysis of this document," the report points out, "it would appear that the so called 'Okinawan Type of Defense' is a definite tactical plan or scheme of defense approved by the Japanese High Command. Its primary purpose is the conservation of manpower. Important beach areas and even airfields are temporarily abandoned while the main defense line is held in force.

"This main defense line is organized in depth and makes maximum use of terrain consistent with the size of the force and frontage to be held. It is so designed to enable the defenders to fight a long 'war of attrition', denying the invader use of [34] captured installations."

The enemy's appreciation of terrain and tactical use of weapons on Okinawa was excellent, the report states. First line defenses were prepared on forward slopes where automatic weapons were emplaced. Flat trajectory fire was utilized to its maximum extent. During bombardment the Japanese moved back to prepared defenses on the reverse slope, reoccupying forward positions when the bombardment lifted.

When forced from forward positions, the enemy withdrew to the crest of ridges, from which plunging fire was delivered on advancing troops. Once dislodged from the ridges, he continued his defense in fortified positions on reverse slopes.

Other Japanese tactics, it is pointed out, differed little from those encountered on previous operations. They included night infiltrations, raiding parties, wire cutting and miscellaneous harassing actions.

"The term 'organization' is complimentary to enemy units encountered by the III Corps," the report states. "Miscellaneous air and ground units were thrown together in last-minute confusion and in practically no instance did they carry out the duties assigned them. The lone exception to this was the organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula."

According to the report, Japanese equipment was lacking in quantity. This is substantiated by a 32nd Army order of 23 March 1945 to the 1st Special Infantry Regiment which read: "In view of the limited amount of equipment available, each unit will utilize what it already possesses and devise methods to increase its supply of equipment."

Consistent with the order were various POW statements referring to bamboo spears and hand grenades as the only weapons issued many of the labor troops. These poorly equipped labor units, according to POWs, were nicknamed the Bimbo Butai, or "Poor Unit."

The Japanese made extensive use of Okinawa natives in various branches of the service, and it is assumed that all able-bodied Okinawans were subject to service as reservists.

A captured dispatch dated September 1944, written by the commanding officer of the 24th Division, states: "Reservists can be employed as army troops and with their main strength carry on diversionary (raiding) warfare. They also can be employed to work in rear areas as replacements for front line troops, or in such duties as collecting intelligence, security, guarding and liaison. Care should be taken that the execution of these (training) plans will not seriously interfere with making a livelihood. Such things as arms and uniforms are not specially provided Guard Units (reservists). Therefore, the commanders will use available equipment."

(Two sketches made from a document captured on Okinawa, revealing the organization of "fire points" will be found reproduced as Item No. 287, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[36]

ENEMY CRITICISMS OF OWN ARTILLERY MANEUVERS

Weakness in their own artillery training were described in a Japanese critique of maneuvers held on Iwo Jima before the Allied landings. Details were set forth in a document captured on the island and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPAO Item No. 4569.

Colonel Kaido, who commanded the island's artillery group which was made up of several units of various organizations, presided at the critique, and outlined shortcomings in training as revealed in the maneuvers.

Principal criticism was directed at gun crews who were satisfied to drop shells or barrages merely in an enemy area, and did not score direct hits on the target. Crews were warned that the ammunition supply for the defense of the island was small and there was little hope for replenishment; therefore, they must perfect their work so that they hit every target.

Faulty firing preparations were responsible for their inability to hit desired targets, the critique stated. In many cases calculation of firing data was incorrect and corrections were inaccurate, obstructions to aiming instruments were not cleared away, sighting and aligning points were improperly chosen, and guns which should have fired in battery frequently missed the signal and fired singly. Furthermore, mortar base plates were not firmly embedded, it was said.

Another weakness mentioned in the document was the poor discipline shown officers and men alike during maneuvers. Incidents were brought to light in which gun crews received orders from battery commanders and then acted independently in carrying them out. Liaison suffered because subordinates refused to obey orders from superiors, and many of the officers "lacked spiritual power and bravery, and were unsatisfactory in dress, physical bearing and command."

Several gun squad leaders were unsatisfactory, failing to exhibit proper leadership. Others were said to have stood around their guns like spectators while firing was in progress.

In other instances, squad leaders made errors in firing because they had failed to establish liaison with the platoon commanders. Some squad leaders failed completely to give firing orders, did not understand the method of handling the

gun or how to change from direct to indirect sighting, nor could they direct the fire of the gun or properly designate targets to be brought under fire.

In the Japanese Army, a noncommissioned officer in charge of artillery observation has many duties. Primarily, he must be able to take over the duties of the fire control platoon commander, or even the company commander. He must reconnoiter the enemy situation, calculate some of the firing data, and spot artillery bursts.

Personnel performing this function during the Iwo maneuvers lacked experience and most of them were unaware of their duties. Observation suffered. During actual firing of problems, reports were sent in from observers concerning enemy targets and spotting of bursts without any previous check by noncoms in charge.

[37] Signal NCOs received their share of blame in the critique: "Most of them just stood around as onlookers, leaving liaison to subordinates. They were inexperienced, deficient in their sense of responsibilities, and did not understand their duties."

If a hitch occurs in Japanese artillery liaison, it is the duty of the Signal NCO to go to the scene and take charge. In event of a complete breakdown, he must re-establish contact by previously-arranged methods.

Attached NCOs without specific duties must be given work such as forwarding reports and acting as messengers. They should not, says the report, be allowed just to "sit around putting logs on the fire."

Apparently platoon leaders spent considerable time in dugouts receiving orders from company commanders by telephone or messenger and transmitting the orders to subordinates in a like manner. It was noted that too many of them failed to acquaint themselves with the targets, reconnoiter objectives and determine methods of fire. They delegated these responsibilities to the noncoms. They lacked knowledge of the various duties of the NCOs and many of them knew little of the equipment they were using.

Additional drill on command and technique of fire, was threatened for those officers who "do not call out the sensing of bursts, who deliberate over what to call the sensing, who issue commands slowly, make mistakes in commands, bury themselves in handbooks and firing tables, or busy themselves looking through telescopes".

(A photograph of an open site for a Type I 47 mm. Antitank Gun recovered on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item No. 288, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[38]

WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 25 May 1945 to and including 1 June 1945

Sorties herein listed will be screened for duplicating coverage before distribution is affected.

*Prints only received.

JAPAN

Goto Beto: Good vertical and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
Tri Met.....	153.1 mm	26,700'	Terrain Shoreline		
	153.7 mm		1PRS-5MF48-ITV	17806-4	5/27
	154.5 mm		1PRS-5MF48-IRO	17807-4	
Tri Met.....	153.1 mm	25,000'	1PRS-5MF48-ILO	17808-4	
	153.7 mm		Fukue		
	154.5 mm		1PRS-5MF51-TV	17809-5	4/1
V.....	24'	25,000'	1PRS-5MF51-RO	17810-5	
			1PRS-5MF51-LO	17811-5	
			1PRS-5MF51-IV	17852-6	4/1

JAPAN—Continued

Honsu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jiepoa #	Date taken
			Nagoya		
Tri Met	154.2 mm	31,000'	3PR-5M216-1V-21BC	17473-809	5/17
	152.0 mm		3PR-5M216-1R-21BC	17474-809	
	152.0 mm		3PR-5M216-1L-21BC	17475-809	
V	24"	31,000'	3PR-5M216-2-21BC	17476-810	5/17
Split Vert	40"	31,000'	3PR-5M216-3R-21BC	17477-811	5/17
			3PR-5M216-3L-21BC	17478-811	
			Shoda Shima; Osaka		
Tri Met	154.3 mm	32,000'	3PR-5M217-1V-21BC	17479-812	5/17
	152.7 mm		3PR-5M217-1R-21BC	17480-812	
	153.1 mm		3PR-5M217-1L-21BC	17481-812	
V	24"	32,000'	Kobe; Osaka		
Split Vert	40"	32,000'	3PR-5M217-2-21BC	17482-813	5/17
			3PR-5M217-3R-21BC	17483-814	5/17
			3PR-5M217-3L-21BC	17484-814	
			Numazu; Tokyo		
Tri Met	154.2 mm	32,000'	3PR-5M219-1V-21BC	17503-815	5/17
	153.1 mm		3PR-5M219-1R-21BC	17504-815	
	154.6 mm		3PR-5M219-1L-21BC	17505-815	
V	24"	32,000'	3PR-5M219-2-21BC	17506-816	5/17
			Kushimoto Tomo		
Tri Met	152.3 mm	31,000'	3PR-5M220-1V-21BC	17507-817	5/17
	152.6 mm		3PR-5M220-1R-21BC	17508-817	
	153.1 mm		3PR-5M220-1L-21BC	17509-817	
V	24"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-2-21BC	17510-818	5/17
Split Vert	40"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-3R-21BC	17511-819	5/17
			3PR-5M220-3L-21BC	17512-819	
			Yokkaichi; Nagoya		
Tri Met	151.9 mm	31,600'	3PR-5M223-1V-21BC	17532-826	5/18
	153.7 mm		3PR-5M223-1R-21BC	17533-826	
	154.0 mm		3PR-5M223-1L-21BC	17534-826	
V	24"	31,600'	Yokuska; Nagoya		
Split Vert	40"	31,600'	3PR-5M223-2-21BC	17535-827	5/18
			3PR-5M223-3R-21BC	17536-828	5/18
			3PR-5M223-3L-21BC	17537-828	
			Hiratsuka; Chigasaki		
Tri Met	153.0 mm	32,500'	3PR-5M221-1V-21BC	17513-820	5/18
	153.9 mm		3PR-5M221-1R-21BC	17514-820	
	153.0 mm		3PR-5M221-1L-21BC	17515-820	
V	24"	32,500'	3PR-5M221-2-21BC	17516-821	5/18
Split Vert	40"	32,500'	3PR-5M221-3R-21BC	17517-822	5/18
			3PR-5M221 3L-21BC	17518-822	
			Kuwana; Nagoya		
Tri Met	153.0 mm	30,000'	3PR-5M222-1V-21BC	17519-823	5/18
	154.8 mm		3PR-5M222-1R-21BC	17520-823	
	153.6 mm		3PR-5M222-1L-21BC	17521-823	
V	24"	30,000'	3PR-5M222-3-21BC	17522-824	5/18
Split Vert	40"	30,000'	3PR-5M222-3R-21BC	17523-825	5/18
			3PR-5M222-3L-21BC	17524-825	
			Hitachi		
V	12"	12,000'	5M196-76V-21BC	17663-829	4/2
V	24"	12,000'	5M196-78V-21BC	17664-830	4/2
V	12"	11,500'	5M196-51V-21BC (Shisuoka)	17666-832	4/2
V	12"	11,330'	5M196-27V-21BC (Hitachi A/C)	17667-833	4/2
V	12"	12,100'	5M196-26V-21BC (Shisuoka)	17668-834	4/2
			Hitachi (A/C)		
V	12"	10,900'	5M196-1V-21BC	17669-835	4/2
V	24"	10,500'	5M196-2V-21BC	17670-836	4/2
V	12"	10,500'	5M196-4V-21BC	17671-837	4/2
V	12"	12,500'	5M196-201V-21BC	17672-838	4/2
V	12"	12,500'	5M196-202V-21BC	17673-839	4/2
V	12"	13,000'	5M196-203V-21BC	17674-840	4/2
V	12"	12,000'	5M196-204V-21BC	17675-841	4/2
V	6"	11,500'	5M196-28V-21BC	17676-842	4/2
V	24"	14,000'	5M196-101V-21BC	17677-843	4/2
V	12"	14,000'	5M196-104V-21BC	17679-845	4/2
V	24"	13,500'	5M196-105V-21BC	17680-846	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-106V-21BC	17681-847	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-108V-21BC	17689-849	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-112V-21BC	17690-850	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-113V-21BC	17691-851	4/2
V	6"	13,500'	5M196-114V-21BC	17692-852	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-117V-21BC	17694-854	4/2
V	12"	14,000'	5M196-119V-21BC	17695-855	4/2
V	12"	13,450'	5M196-120V-21BC	17696-856	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-214V-21BC	17697-857	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-213V-21BC	17698-858	4/2
V	12"	13,300'	5M196-212V-21BC	17699-859	4/2
V	12"	13,000'	5M196-211V-21BC	17700-860	4/2
V	12"	13,500'	5M196-210V-21BC	17701-861	4/2
V	12"	13,400'	5M196-208V-21BC	17702-862	4/2

JAPAN—Continued

Honsha: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Ясра #	Date taken
			Hitachi (A/C)		
V	12"	13,000'	5M196-207V-21BC	17703-863	4/24
V	12"	13,000'	5M196-206V-21BC	17704-864	4/24
V	12"	12,300'	5M196-205V-21BC	17705-865	4/24
			A/C Prop. Plant		
V	12"	22,000'	5M126-110V-21BC	17920-866	4/30
V	24"	22,000'	5M126-111V-21BC	17921-867	4/30
V	12"	22,000'	5M126-112V-21BC (Toyahaski)	17922-868	4/30
			A/C Prop. Plant		
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-113V-21BC	17923-869	4/30
V	24"	21,000'	5M126-114V-21BC	17924-870	4/30
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-116V-21BC	17925-871	4/30
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-115V-21BC	17926-872	4/30
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-118V-21BC (Hanamatsu)	17927-873	5/1
			A/C Prop. Plant		
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-117V-21BC	17928-874	4/30
			Tachikawa		
V	12"	20,000'	5M126-101V-21BC	17929-875	4/30
V	6"	20,000'	5M126-102V-21BC	17930-876	4/30
V	12"	20,000'	5M126-103V-21BC	17931-877	4/30
			A/C Prop. Plant		
V	12"	21,000'	5M126-104V-21BC	17932-878	4/30
V	24"	21,000'	5M126-105V-21BC	17933-879	4/30
V	24"	21,000'	5M126-107V-21BC	17934-880	4/30
V	12"	22,000'	5M126-108V-21BC	17935-881	4/30
V	12"	22,000'	5M126-109V-21BC	17936-882	4/30
			Hamamatsu		
V	24"	19,700'	5M126-51V-21BC	17938-884	4/30
V	12"	20,600'	5M126-26V-21BC	17940-886	4/30
V	24"	20,600'	5M126-27V-21BC	17941-887	4/30
V	24"	19,000'	5M126-1V-21BC	17942-888	4/30
V	24"	19,000'	5M126-2V-21BC	17943-889	4/30
V	12"	18,200'	5M126-80V-21BC	17945-891	4/30
V	12"	17,500'	5M126-81V-21BC	17946-892	4/30
V	12"	18,000'	5M126-82V-21BC	17947-893	4/30
V	12"	17,500'	5M126-79V-21BC	17948-894	4/30
V	24"	18,300'	5M126-76V-21BC	17949-895	4/30
V	24"	18,050'	5M126-78V-21BC	17950-896	4/30
V	24"	18,200'	5M126-77V-21BC	17951-897	4/30

Izu Shichito: Good vertical and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

TV	153.0 mm.	32,500'	Torishima 3PR-5M221-1V-21BC	17528-20	5/18
V	24"	32,500'	O-Shima; Sumisu-Jima 3PR-5M221-2-21BC	17529-21	5/18
Split Vert.	40"	32,500'	Sumisu-Jima; Torishima; O-Shima 3PR-5M221-3R-21BC 3PR-5M221-3L-21BC	17530-22 17531-22	5/18

Koshiki Retto: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V	24"	20,000'	VD5-149A	17602-1	5/13
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-149B (1)	17603-2A	5/13
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-149B (2)	17603-2B	5/13
V	153.3 mm.	20,000'	VD5-149D	17604-3	5/13
O	24"	20,000'	VD5-149E	17605-4	5/13

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

Tri	152.3 mm.	31,000'	Jaeki		
Met.	152.6 mm.		3PR-5M220-1V-21BC	17497-499	5/17
	153.1 mm.		3PR-5M220-1R-21BC	17498-499	
V	24"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-1L-21BC	17499-499	
Split Vert.	40"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-2-21BC	17500-500	5/17
			3PR-5M220-3R-21BC	17501-501	5/17
			3PR-5M220-3L-21BC	17502-501	
			Kokubu A/F		
V	12"	16,000'	5M80-21BC-101V	17538-502	4/18
V	12"	16,000'	5M80-21BC-102V	17539-503	4/18
V	12"	16,000'	5M80-21BC-103V	17540-504	4/18
V	24"	18,500'	5M80-21BC-104V	17541-505	4/18
V	12"	17,000'	5M80-21BC-105V	17542-506	4/18
V	24"	16,000'	5M80-21BC-106V	17543-507	4/18
V	24"	16,000'	5M80-21BC-108V	17545-509	4/18
V			5M80-21BC-109V	17546-510	4/18

JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortic No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
[89]			Nittagahara A/F		
V	24''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-207V	F7547-511.	4/18
V	12''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-206V	17548-512.	4/18
V	12''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-205V	17549-513.	4/18
V	24''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-204V	17550-514.	4/18
V	24''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-203V	17551-515.	4/18
V	12''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-202V	17552-516.	4/18
V	12''	18,000'	5M181-21BC-201V	17553-517.	4/18
			Oita		
V	24''	15,500'	5M182-77V-21BC	17554-518.	4/20
V	24''	15,500'	5M182-76V-21BC	17555-519.	4/20
V	12''	15,275'	5M182-78V-21BC	17556-520.	4/20
V	12''	14,200'	5M182-54V-21BC	17557-521.	4/21
V	12''	14,490'	5M182-53V-21BC	17558-522.	4/21
V	12''	14,490'	5M182-52V-21BC	17559-523.	4/21
V	12''	14,300'	5M182-51V-21BC	17560-524.	4/21
V	12''	15,000'	5M182-79V-21BC	17561-525.	4/20
V	12''	14,990'	5M182-55V-21BC	17562-526.	4/21
			Kanoya		
V	12''	16,700'	5M183-113V-21BC	17563-527.	4/21
V	24''	17,000'	5M183-112V-21BC	17564-528.	4/21
V	12''	17,000'	5M183-111V-21BC	17565-529.	4/21
V	24''	17,000'	5M183-108V-21BC	17567-531.	4/21
V	24''	16,550'	5M183-107V-21BC	17568-532.	4/21
V	24''	16,000'	5M183-105V-21BC	17570-534.	4/21
V	12''	16,500'	5M183-104V-21BC	17571-535.	4/21
V	12''	17,000'	5M183-102V-21BC	17572-536.	4/21
V	12''	16,500'	5M183-101V-21BC	17573-537.	4/21
V	24''	17,000'	5M184-211V-21BC	17574-538.	4/21
V	12''	16,500'	5M184-210V-21BC	17575-539.	4/21
V	12''	16,500'	5M184-209V-21BC	17576-540.	4/21
V	12''	16,500'	5M184-208V-21BC	17577-541.	4/21
V	12''	16,000'	5M184-207V-21BC	17578-542.	4/21
V	24''	16,000'	5M184-206V-21BC	17579-543.	4/21
V	12''	16,400'	5M184-205V-21BC	17580-544.	4/21
V	12''	16,050'	5M184-204V-21BC	17581-545.	4/21
V	12''	17,000'	5M184-203V-21BC	17582-546.	4/21
V	12''	17,350'	5M184-202V-21BC	17583-547.	4/21
V	12''	17,100'	5M184-201V-21BC	17584-548.	4/21
			USA A/F		
V	12''	15,800'	5M185-77V-21BC	17585-549.	4/20
V	24''	15,000'	5M185-78V-21BC	17586-550.	4/20
V	12''	15,800'	5M185-76V-21BC	17587-551.	4/20
V	12''	14,000'	5M185-1V-21BC	17589-553.	4/21
V	24''	14,500'	5M185-2V-21BC	17590-554.	4/21
V	12''	15,300'	5M185-4V-21BC	17591-555.	4/21
V	12''	14,500'	5M185-6V-21BC	17593-557.	4/21
V	24''	14,500'	5M185-5V-21BC	17594-558.	4/21
			Kushire		
V	24''	17,000'	5M187-201V-21BC	17595-559.	4/21
V	24''	17,000'	5M187-202V-21BC	17596-560.	4/21
V	12''	16,000'	5M187-203V-21BC	17597-561.	4/21
V	12''	17,000'	5M187-204V-21BC	17598-562.	4/21
V	12''	17,000'	5M187-205V-21BC	17599-563.	4/21
V	24''	16,000'	5M187-206V-21BC	17600-564.	4/21
V	12''	16,800'	5M187-207V-21BC	17601-565.	4/21
			Kanoya A/F		
V	12''	15,200'	5M195-101V-21BC	17634-566.	4/22
V	12''	15,200'	5M195-102V-21BC	17635-567.	4/22
V	12''	15,000'	5M195-103V-21BC	17636-568.	4/22
V	24''	15,000'	5M195-105V-21BC	17638-570.	4/22
V	12''	15,400'	5M195-106V-21BC	17639-571.	4/22
V	24''	15,500'	5M195-108V-21BC	17640-572.	4/22
V	12''	15,300'	5M195-112V-21BC	17643-575.	4/22
V	12''	16,000'	5M195-114V-21BC	17644-576.	4/22
V	12''	16,000'	5M195-115V-21BC	17645-577.	4/22
V	12''	16,000'	5M195-116V-21BC	17646-578.	4/22
V	12''	16,000'	5M1105-201V-21BC (Kushira)	17710-579.	4/26
			Kanoya		
V	12''	16,000'	5M1104-202V-21BC	17711-580.	4/26
V	12''	16,000'	5M1104-201V-21BC	17712-581.	4/26
V	12''	6,500'	5M1104-204V-21BC	17713-582.	4/26
V	12''	16,000'	5M1104-203V-21BC	17714-583.	4/26
			Kokuba		
V	12''	24,300'	5M1106-201V-21BC	17715-584.	4/26
V	6''	16,500'	5M1106-202V-21BC	17716-585.	4/26
V	12''	25,000'	5M1106-203V-21BC	17717-586.	4/26
V	12''	16,500'	5M1106-204V-21BC	17718-587.	4/26
V	12''	16,800'	5M1106-205V-21BC	17719-588.	4/26
V	12''	16,000'	5M1106-206V-21BC	17720-589.	4/26

JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-verticle coverage of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
			Isumi A/F		
V	12"	16,120'	5M108-52V-21BC	17721-590	4/27
V	6"	16,000'	5M108-51V-21BC	17722-591	4/27
V	24"	16,000'	5M108-53V-21BC	17723-592	4/27
V	24"	17,000'	5M108-80V-21BC	17725-594	4/27
V	12"	16,700'	5M108-77V-21BC	17726-595	4/27
			Kokubu		
V	12"	10,000'	5M110-111V-21BC	17727-596	4/27
V	24"	11,000'	5M110-109V-21BC	17728-597	4/27
V	12"	11,000'	5M110-108V-21BC	17729-598	4/27
V	12"	11,000'	5M110-106V-21BC	17731-600	4/27
V	6"	11,000'	5M110-105V-21BC	17732-601	4/27
V	12"	11,000'	5M110-103V-21BC	17734-603	4/27
V	24"	11,000'	5M110-102V-21BC	17735-604	4/27
V	24"	10,000'	5M110-101V-21BC	17736-605	4/27
			USA A/F		
V	12"	22,000'	5M197-6V-21BC	17737-606	4/26
V	12"	22,200'	5M197-7V-21BC	17738-607	4/26
V	12"	17,000'	5M197-5V-21BC	17739-608	4/26
V	6"	25,200'	5M197-2V-21BC	17740-609	4/26
V	12"	11,000'	5M111-107V-21BC (Kokubu)	17741-610	4/27
			Miyakonojo		
V	12"	11,000'	5M111-104V-21BC	17742-611	4/27
V	12"	11,000'	5M111-103V-21BC	17743-612	4/27
V	12"	11,000'	5M111-101V-21BC	17744-613	4/27
V	12"	14,500'	5M103-101V-21BC (Miyasaki)	17746-615	4/26
V	12"	14,000'	5M102-105V-21BC (Nittagahara)	17747-616	4/26
			Kanoya A/F		
V	12"	16,500'	5M112-201V-21BC	17748-617	4/26
V	12"	17,200'	5M112-202V-21BC	17749-618	4/26
V	12"	17,020'	5M112-204V-21BC	17750-619	4/27
V	12"	16,000'	5M112-206V-21BC	17751-620	4/27
V	12"	16,000'	5M112-205V-21BC	17752-621	4/26
V	12"	17,300'	5M112-203V-21BC	17753-622	4/27
			Kushira A/F		
V	12"	16,000'	5M113-201V-21BC	17754-623	4/27
V	12"	14,360'	5M113-202V-21BC	17755-624	4/27
V	12"	16,500'	5M113-203V-21BC	17756-625	4/27
V	12"	15,000'	5M113-204V-21BC	17757-626	4/27
V	12"	15,000'	5M113-206V-21BC	17758-627	4/27
V	12"	15,000'	5M113-205V-21BC	17759-628	4/27
			Isumi A/F		
V	12"	16,200'	5M114-82V-21BC	17760-629	4/28
V	24"	17,100'	5M114-78V-21BC	17761-630	4/28
V	24"	16,400'	5M114-81V-21BC	17762-631	4/28
V	12"	17,400'	5M114-79V-21BC	17763-632	4/28
V	12"	17,200'	5M114-76V-21BC	17764-633	4/28
V	24"	16,390'	5M114-80V-21BC	17765-634	4/28
V	24"	17,200'	5M114-77V-21BC	17766-635	4/28
			Miyasaki A/F		
V	12"	12,000'	5M115-53V-21BC	17773-638	4/28
V	12"	12,000'	5M115-52V-21BC	17774-639	4/28
V	12"	12,700'	5M115-51V-21BC	17775-640	4/28
			Kokubu		
V	24"	12,500'	5M116-105V-21BC	17776-641	4/28
V	24"	12,000'	5M116-104V-21BC	17778-643	4/28
V	12"	12,000'	5M116-103V-21BC	17779-644	4/28
V	12"	12,000'	5M116-102V-21BC	17780-645	4/28
V	12"	12,000'	5M116-101V-21BC	17781-646	4/28
V	24"	12,000'	5M116-106V-21BC	17782-647	4/28
			Miyasaki A/F		
V	12"	13,000'	5M109-28V-21BC	17783-648	4/27
V	12"	12,800'	5M109-30V-21BC	17784-649	4/27
V	24"	12,790'	5M109-26V-21BC	17785-650	4/27
V	12"	12,000'	5M109-4V-21BC	17786-651	4/27
V	24"	12,000'	5M109-3V-21BC	17787-652	4/27
V	12"	12,000'	5M109-1V-21BC	17789-654	4/27
V	6"	13,000'	5PFM109-27V-21BC	17790-655	4/27
V	24"	15,800'	5M109-29V-21BC	17791-656	4/27
			Miyakonojo		
V	12"	11,500'	5M117-110V-21BC	17792-657	4/28
V	12"	11,000'	5M117-102V-21BC	17798-663	4/28
V	12"	11,000'	5M117-101V-21BC	17799-664	4/28
			Kanoya		
V	12"	17,000'	5M118-208V-21BC	17800-665	4/28
V	12"	16,500'	5M118-207V-21BC	17801-666	4/28
V	12"	15,300'	5M118-206V-21BC	17802-667	4/28
V	12"	17,000'	5M118-205V-21BC	17867-668	4/28
V	12"	17,000'	5M118-204V-21BC	17868-669	4/28
V	12"	17,000'	5M118-203V-21BC	17869-670	4/28

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JAPAN—Continued

Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicpoa #	Date taken
			Kanoya		
V	12''	16,500'	5M118-202V-21BC	17870-671	4/28
V	12''	17,000'	5M118-201V-21BC	17871-672	4/28
V	12''	17,000'	5M118-209V-21BC	17872-673	4/28
			Kushira		
V	12''	17,000'	5M119-205V-21BC	17873-674	4/28
V	12''	16,500'	5M119-201V-21BC	17874-675	4/28
V	12''	16,500'	5M119-203V-21BC	17875-676	4/28
V	12''	16,580'	5M119-202V-21BC	17876-677	4/28
V	12''	17,000'	5M119-204V-21BC	17877-678	4/28
			Miyazaki		
V	6''	15,000'	5M120-5V-21BC	17878-679	4/29
V	12''	15,000'	5M120-4V-21BC	17879-680	4/29
V	6''	15,000'	5M120-3V-21BC	17880-681	4/29
V	24''	15,500'	5M120-2V-21BC	17881-682	4/29
V	24''	15,000'	5M121-30V-21BC	17883-684	4/29
V	6''	15,500'	5M121-31V-21BC	17884-685	4/29
V	12''	16,200'	5M121-28V-21BC	17885-686	4/29
V	24''	15,000'	5M121-27V-21BC	17886-687	4/29
			Miyakonojo		
V	24''	15,000'	5M121-26-21BC	17887-688	4/29
V	24''	15,775'	5M121-29V-21BC	17888-689	4/29
			Kokubu		
V	24''	12,000'	5M122-101V-21BC	17889-690	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-102V-21BC	17890-691	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-103V-21BC	17891-692	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-104V-21BC	17892-693	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-105V-21BC	17893-694	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-106V-21BC	17894-695	4/29
V	24''	12,000'	5M122-107V-21BC	17895-696	4/29
V	12''	12,000'	5M122-108V-21BC	17896-697	4/29
[40]			Kanoyo		
V	12''	18,000'	5M124-204V-21BC	17898-699	4/29
V	12''	18,600'	5M124-203V-21BC	17899-700	4/29
V	12''	18,000'	5M124-202V-21BC	17900-701	4/29
V	12''	18,500'	5M124-201V-21BC	17901-702	4/29
			Kushira		
V	12''	18,000'	5M125-204V-21BC	17902-703	4/29
V	12''	17,000'	5M125-203V-21BC	17903-704	4/29
V	12''	17,400'	5M125-202V-21BC	17905-706	4/29
V	12''	18,100'	5M125-205V-21BC	17906-707	4/29
V	12''	17,000'	5M125-201V-21BC	17919-708	4/29
			Kanoya		
V	12''	14,000'	5M123-107V-21BC	17952-709	4/29
V	12''	14,000'	5M123-105V-21BC	17954-711	4/29
V	6''	14,000'	5M123-104V-21BC	17955-712	4/29
V	6''	14,000'	5M123-103V-21BC	17956-713	4/29
V	12''	14,000'	5M123-102V-21BC	17957-714	4/29
V	24''	14,000'	5M123-101V-21BC	17958-715	4/29
V	153.4 mm.	15,000'	CV12-785 (SW Kyushu)	17937-716	5/12
V	24''	13,000'	CV12-788 (Kanoya)	17966-717	5/12
V	24''	12,000'	CV12-783 (Isuni)	17967-718	5/12
V	152.3 mm.	15,000'	CV12-788V (SW Kyushu)	17968-719	5/12
V	24''	15,000'	CV12-800 (Kanoya A/F)	17969-720	5/12
O	24''	13,000'	CV12-811 (Kumanoto)	17970-721	5/14
V	24''	13,000'	CV12-812 (Tachiar)	17971-722	5/14
V	24''	11,400'	CV12-816 (Kumanoto)	17972-723	5/14
V/O	814''	Var.	CV12-781 (Kanoya A/F)	17987-731	5/13
V	152.3 mm.	15,000'	CV12-790V (SW Kyushu)	17988-732	5/13
O	152.6 mm.	15,000'	CV12-790P (SW Kyushu)	17989-732	5/13
V	24''	13,000'	CV12-793 (Kanoya)	17990-733	5/13
V/O	24''	11,000'	CV12-795 (Saeki S/P Base)	17991-734	5/13
			SW Kyushu		
O	24''	1,000'	CV12-805	17992-735	5/14
V	12''	10,000'	CV12-807	17993-736	5/14
V	152.3 mm.	10,000'	CV12-813	17994-737	5/14
V	12''	10,000'	CV12-820	17995-738	5/14
O		Var.	CVL29-74	17996-739	5/15
			Ariake Wan		
O	24''	900'	CVL26-97A	17997-740	5/13
O	24''	1,000'	CVL26-98A	17998-741	5/13
			Tozau to Tomitak		
O	24''	1,000'	CVL26-988	17999-742	5/13
			Nakatsu-Nobeoka		
V	24''	11,800'	CV15-66	18000-743	5/14

JAPAN—Continued

Shikoku: Good vertical, trimetron and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jicopa #	Date taken
Tri Met	152.3 mm 152.6 mm 153.1 mm	31,000'	Matsuyama; Muya 3PR-5M220-1V-21BC 3PR-5M220-1R-21BC 3PR-5M220-1L-21BC	17491-75 17942-75 17493-75	5/17
V	24"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-2-21BC	17494-75	5/17
Split Vert	40"	31,000'	3PR-5M220-3R-21BC 3PR-5M220-3L-21BC	17495-77 17496-77	5/17
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.8 mm 153.6 mm	30,000'	Murto; Kokutu 3PR-5M222-1V-21BC 3PR-5M222-1R-21BC 3PR-5M222-1L-21BC	17525-78 17526-78 17527-78	5/18
V	24"	13,000'	CW20-166A (Matsuyama A/F)	18003-79	5/14
V	24"	13,000'	CW12-819 (Koehi A/F)	18004-80	5/14

Tsu Shima: Good vertical, trimetron and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated

V	24"	15,000'	1PRS-5MF45-2V (Cape Ko)	17817-13	3/24
V	24"	23,800'	1PRS-5MF46-V (Shimond Is.)	17818-14	3/26
Tri Met	153.0 mm 152.6 mm 153.0 mm	23,800'	Tsushima Island 1PRS-5MF46-1TV 1PRS-5MF46-1RO 1PRS-5MF46-1LO	17819-15 17820-15 17821-15	3/26
V	40"	23,800'	1PRS-5MF46-LV Tsushima	17822-16	3/26
Tri Met	153.1 mm 153.7 mm 154.5 mm	26,700'	1PRS-5MF48-1TV 1PRS-5MF48-1RO 1PRS-5MF48-1LO	17823-17 17824-17 17825-17	3/27
Tri Met	153.1 mm 153.7 mm 154.5 mm	26,700'	1PRS-5MF51-TV 1PRS-5MF51-RO 1PRS-5MF51-LO	17826-18 17827-18 17828-18	4/1
V	24"	25,000'	Shipping—Tsushima Island 1PRS-5MF51-2V Tsushima Island	17849-19	4/1
Split Vert	40"	25,000'	1PRS-5MF51-RV 1PRS-5MF51-LV	17850-20 17851-20	4/1

CHINA: Good trimetron coverage of areas indicated

Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	16,500'	Halikiang to Faichuanche 468BG-5MF28-TV 468BG-5MF28-RO 468BG-5MF28-LO	17613-922 17614-922 17615-922	2/14
Tri Met	153.1 mm 153.7 mm 154.5 mm	21,000'	Miuehatun to Lintsaiheng 1PRS-5MF33-2TV 1PRS-5MF33-2RO 1PRS-5MF33-2LO	17616-923 17617-923 17618-923	2/22
Tri Met	154.2 mm 153.8 mm 154.8 mm	31,000'	Tsingtao; Hotse; Haiyang 1PRS-5MF40-TV 1PRS-5MF40-RO 1PRS-5MF40-LO	17619-924 17620-924 17621-924	3/9
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	21,200'	Tungshan; Chinghsien 1PRS-5MF41-TV 1PRS-5MF41-RO 1PRS-5MF41-LO	17622-925 17623-925 17624-925	3/9
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	21,000'	Suning; Shupu; Linghsien 1PRS-5MF41-2TV 1PRS-5MF41-2RO 1PRS-5MF41-2LO	17625-926 17626-926 17627-926	3/9
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	21,000'	Chiayang; Taokowchen 1PRS-5MF41-3TV 1PRS-5MF41-3RO 1PRS-5MF41-3LO	17628-927 17629-927 17630-927	3/9
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	27,200'	Liushuehwang; Yuanping 1PRS-5MF43-1TV 1PRS-5MF43-1RO 1PRS-5MF43-1LO	17647-928 17648-928 17649-928	3/16
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	27,500'	Hsien; Nampotsum 1PRS-5MF43-2TV 1PRS-5MF43-2RO 1PRS-5MF43-2LO	17650-929 17651-929 17652-929	3/16
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	13,500'	Yencheng to Shangtang 1PRS-5MF44-TV 1PRS-5MF44-RO 1PRS-5MF44-LO	17653-930 17654-930 17655-930	3/22
Tri Met	153.0 mm 154.2 mm 154.0 mm	15,000'	Taiyuan; Paoting; Fenyang 1PRS-5MF47-TV 1PRS-5MF47-RO 1PRS-5MF47-LO	17829-931 17830-931 17656-931	3/27

CHINA: Good trimetrogen coverage of area indicated—Continued

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jiepoa #	Date taken
Tri Met.....	153.1 mm. 153.7 mm. 154.8 mm.	15,000'	Tai San; Shsinyang 1PRS-5MF48-1TV 1PRS-5MF48-1RO 1PRS-5MF48-1LO	17657-932 17658-932 17659-932	3/27
Tri Met.....	153.1 mm. 153.7 mm. 154.5 mm.	16,000'	Hsu-I to Taitso Mt. 1PRS-5MF48-2TV 1PRS-5MF48-2RO 1PRS-5MF48-2LO	17660-933 17661-933 17662-933	3/27
Tri Met.....	153.0 mm. 154.2 mm. 154.0 mm.	14,500'	Shen-Men-Kou to Sna Liu Chi 1PRS-5MF50-1TV 1PRS-5MF50-1RO 1PRS-5MF50-1LO	17682-934 17683-934 17684-934	3/30 3/30 3/30
Tri Met.....	153.0 mm. 154.2 mm. 154.0 mm.	14,500'	Ku Shih to Tanpo 1PRS-5MF50-2TV 1PRS-5MF50-2RO 1PRS-5MF50-2LO	17685-935 17686-935 17687-935	3/30

KOREA: Good vertical coverage of Kwan-Ni

V.....	40'	25,000'	1PRS-5MF-RV	17848-49	4/1
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MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

V.....	24'	26,000'	Singapore; Bakun 44BG-5MR60-V	17812-137	4/13
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NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Lingga Archipelago: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

V.....	24'	21,500'	Selat Boeja; Tempah Strait 46SBG-5MR62-V	17813-1	4/16
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Thailand: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

V.....	154.0 mm.	25,000'	Ban Hland Khao; Ban Luk Jang 462BG-5MR45A-1V	17706-146	4/10
V.....	154.0 mm.	25,000'	G. Phiphi 462BG-5MR45A-2V	17707-147	4/10
V.....	152.7 mm.	25,000'	Dbu Rong Jang; Ban Vang Ban 462BG-5MR45A-3V	17708-148	4/10
V.....	152.7 mm.	25,000'	Banna G Muk 462BG-5MR45A-4V	17709-149	4/10

MANSEI SHOTO

Amami O Shima: Good vertical partial coverage

V.....	24'	15,000'	CV9-396A	17853-90	5/17
V.....	24'	12,000'	CV9-396C	17854-91	5/17
V.....	24'	9,700'	CV9-399A	17855-92	5/18
V.....	24'	7,000'	CV9-399F (Nazeko)	17856-93	5/18
V.....	24'	9,000'	CV9-401 (Kakeroma Shima)	17857-94	5/18
V.....	12'	6,500'	CV9-402	17858-95	5/18
V.....	154.0 mm.		CV17-675A (Kakeroma)	17859-96	5/7
V.....	24'		CV17-676P	17860-97	5/7
V.....	24'	10,000'	100 CVL26-1 (Honiya)	17861-98	5/18
V.....	12'	10,000'	100 CVL26-2 (Koniya)	17862-99	5/18
V.....	24'	Var	CVL27-78V	17863-100	5/18
O.....	24'	Var	CVL27-78O	17864-101	5/18
[41] V/O.....	155.0 mm.	Var	CV20-821 (Seso Ko)	17962-102	3/27

MANSEI SHOTO—Continued

Ishigaki: Good vertical partial coverage

V/O	F. L.	Alt.	Sortie No.	Jiepoa #	Date
V.....	24''.....	10,000'.....	CVE28-57A.....	18737-59...	4/29

CORRECTION: Previously reported under Miyako as Jiepoa No. 16737-102 in Bulletin No. 46, dated 28 May 1945. This number is hereby cancelled

Kikaiga: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

V.....	24''.....	9,500'.....	CV9-398A.....	17803-68	5/17
O.....	24''.....	2,500'.....	CV10-458 (Wan A/F).....	17804-69	5/10
V.....	24''.....	7,000'.....	CV12-769 (Wan A/F).....	17939-70	4/20
V.....	24''.....	12,000'.....	CV12-771 (Wan A/F).....	17960-71	4/20
V.....	24''.....	13,000'.....	CV12-775.....	17961-72	4/20
V.....	24''.....	12,000'.....	CV9-399E (Wan A/F).....	18001-73	5/18

Koshiki Retto: Good vertical partial coverage

V.....	153.4 mm.....	20,000'.....	VD5-149C.....	17805-5	5/13
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Minami Daito: Good vertical partial coverage

V.....	24''.....	7,000'.....	CV12-766.....	17814-23	4/17
V.....	153.4 mm.....		CV12-767.....	17815-23	4/17
V.....	154.1 mm.....	5,000'.....	CV124-174 (Minami Jima).....	17963-25	4/21
V.....	12''.....	10,000'.....	CV12-764 (Minami Jima).....	17964-26	4/17

Osumi Gunto: Good vertical and oblique coverage of Kuchinoyerabu

V/O.....	155.0 mm.....	4,300'.....	CV20-106.....	17973-35	4/2
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Tokara Gunto: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated

V.....	24''.....	14,500'.....	Takara Shima		
V.....	12''.....	6,500'.....	CV9-396B.....	17974-4	5/17
V.....	24''.....	6,300'.....	CV9-397A.....	17975-5	5/17
V.....	24''.....	6,300'.....	CV9-399B (Yokoate Shima).....	17976-6	5/18
V.....	24''.....	9,000'.....	CV9-399C (Takara Shima).....	17977-7	5/18
V.....	24''.....	11,000'.....	CV9-399D (Ko-Takara).....	17978-8	5/18
V.....	12''.....	6,300'.....	CV9-400 (Takara).....	17979-9	5/18

Tokuno: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage

O.....	24''.....	2,000'.....	Tokuno A/F		
V.....	24''.....	10,000'.....	CV10-455.....	17767-81	5/10
V.....	24''.....	2,400'.....	CV9-398B.....	17768-82	5/17
V.....	8 1/2''.....	2,400'.....	CV20-129.....	17769-83	4/20
O.....	15''.....		CV20-138.....	17770-84	

WEEKLY PHOTO DISTRIBUTION

Following sorties were given general distribution during week of 28 May to 3 June 1945 and have been previously listed in "Weekly Coverage Report":

Locality	Sortie No.	Jicpos No.	
JAPAN—Honshu.....	3PR-5M113-2-2IBC.....	14597-519	
	3PR-5M78-3L-2IBC.....	13767-341	
	3PR-5M78-3R-2IBC.....	13766-341	
	3PR-5M78-2-2IBC.....	13765-340	
	3PR-5M78-1V-2IBC.....	13762-339	
	—Kyushu.....	3PR-5M147-3.....	15615-282
		3PR-5M147-3.....	15616-282
		3PR-5M147-2.....	15614-281
		3PR-5M117-3R-2IBC.....	14682-190
		3PR-5M117-3R-2IBC.....	14681-189
		3PR-5M121-3R-2IBC.....	14885-204
		3PR-5M121-3L-2IBC.....	14886-204
		40BG-4M7.....	12008-68 (V)
		3PR-5M103-3L-2IBC.....	14517-173
		3PR-5M103-3R-2IBC.....	14516-173
	KOHEA.....	3PR-5M103-2-2IBC.....	14515-172
		42BG-5MF21-TV1.....	13553-6
42BG-5MF21-RO.....		13554-6	
MANSEI SHOTO—Kikaiga.....	42BG-5MF21-LO.....	13555-6	
	VD5-102A.....	16304-36	
	VD5-102B.....	16305-37	
	CV38-18.....	17172-70	
—Tokuno.....			

(A photograph showing the use by Japanese of assorted materials to camouflage a landing craft will be found reproduced as Item No. 289, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

[42]

FLAK OVER JAPAN

During the first ten months of sustained air operations over Japan anti-aircraft fire, while considerable, did not prove as extensive as had been anticipated. As a result of greater concentration of fire power and increasing experience, however, the enemy AA is already improving in both accuracy and intensity.

An analysis of operations extending into May 1945 reports that over cities and industrial areas the fire seemed to come principally from heavy AA guns. Defenses in those areas apparently were designed to combat heavy bombers operating at high altitudes. Airfield defenses, however, in anticipation of low-flying attacks by lighter aircraft, have been characterized by a preponderance of medium and light AA weapons.

Search and fire control radar has been employed with varying success. Accurate tracking by searchlights has been reported in several instances by B-29s. On some occasions, however, after picking up targets and passing them for several seconds successfully from light to light, the searchlight defenses seem to become confused. In other instances, pick-ups were made only after searching, probably indicating the use of sound locators rather than radar. Most accurate of the searchlights were those aboard ships in Tokyo Bay.

Planes illuminated by searchlights were fired upon; those which were not illuminated usually escaped attack. Apparently AA batteries at night are restricted to firing at lighted targets, although it is known that gun-laying radar sometimes is used. Such radar is generally employed with heavy batteries in industrial or other built-up areas. Comparatively poor results with such fire indicate either inferior performance of equipment or effective radar counter measures on the part of attacking aircraft.

The Japanese early warning system is based on the ubiquitous picket boat, land-based radar and visual observation station. Detection by boat crews apparently is either visual or aural, with the warning to the home islands being CW (continuous wave) or by voice, if urgent. Picket boats are generally well equipped with AA medium and light weapons.

In addition to the normal land-based defenses, Japanese are employing various types of supplementary weapons. In harbor cities, ship-based AA usually contributes to the defense of the area. In such cases, the volume, and generally the accuracy and range of AA fire is increased greatly. Vari-colored bursts are generally indications of naval AA fire. Rockets, "balls of fire", phosphorous

projectiles, balloons towed by aircraft, and other novel devices have been used, but none of these has resulted in any appreciable damage to attacking planes.

More complete analysis of Japanese AA defenses and the operational significance of such defenses have been published in Flak Intelligence Memorandum No. 6, entitled "Flak Over Japan". (CINCPAC-CINCPHA Bulletin No. 127-45).

[43]

AA FIRING BY HEAVY NAVAL GUNS

Additional evidence that the Japanese are employing the heavy guns of battleships and cruisers as antiaircraft weapons is contained in a notebook captured and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPHA Item No. 12,170. The use of such guns for AA purposes has been reported previously by naval aviators who have encountered major units of the Japanese fleet.

In late December operations one of our patrol bombers picked up the enemy task force which had shelled Mindoro the day before. With radar control, the bomber let down through the overcast to within eight miles of the Japanese force and broke out on its starboard beam. The task force showed little concern until the plane got within six miles, when each enemy unit started evasive action and began to circle. At this time, two of the larger ships favored the aircraft with one-half broadside each from their main batteries. No purely antiaircraft guns were fired from the force, just these tremendous broadsides of service ammunition. The search plane went off about 75 miles and returned, this time getting to within five miles before the ships broke formation and started evasive circling. Once again, the ships fired a broadside at the one aircraft in the distance. Although the air crew kept a sharp lookout, they could see no bursts, possibly because of the low visibility.

Naval fliers who attacked and sank the Japanese battleship YAMATO in April reported that antiaircraft salvos were fired at them by the main batteries of that vessel. Although the U. S. pilots reported heavy explosions nearby they suffered no damage.

The notebook captured on Saipan reflects the content of a lecture delivered by a Warrant Officer at the Mie Naval Air Group. According to the student who penned the notes: "Each and every type of naval gun is used for antiaircraft firing, including the heaviest weapons on our battleships." Initially, percussion-fuzed projectiles were used in an effort to bring down hostile aircraft, but the obvious ineffectiveness of such shells prompted the development of a special time-fuzed projectile. The notes mention the "Komochi Dan" shell as an example of this type round.

The student made no claims as to the actual ranges at which the heavy guns conduct AA fire, but listed the following classes of ships, showing calibers and ranges:

36 cm (14.1 in.)	ISE Class (BB-XCV)	35,000 meters
20 cm (7.8 in.)	NACHI Class (CA)	27,800 meters

Of these ships, two of the ISE Class, the ISE and the HYUGA, and two NACHI Class cruisers remain.

The student had little to say about methods of fire control except for a vague reference that "the first step in firing is to set the sight for a range of 10,000 meters." This is thought to refer to local control sighting apparatus. The notes add that "four rounds per gun are available for firing at an airplane flying in to bomb and since the NACHI has ten guns, forty rounds can be fired. However, since this will not bring the plane down, we use a method of firing now to bring the planes [44] within a barrage." Just how this is accomplished is not indicated, but in the absence of AA directors, barrage fire is the only feasible type of fire control to be employed by such guns.

In the case of the patrol bomber the ships may have been attempting to "bring the planes within a barrage," as discussed in the notes, either with service ammunition or perhaps with shrapnel rounds which burst far beyond the target aircraft.

The employment of main batteries, particularly of cruisers and destroyers, against aircraft is certainly practicable provided proper time-fuzed high explosive or shrapnel projectiles are developed. So far, this Japanese unorthodox use of main batteries has not proved very effective against our aircraft. It has startled air crews who suddenly find themselves among flak bursts while still miles from the nearest source of AA fire.

AIR COMBAT NOTES

In a recent night interception, a BETTY was observed without exhaust patterns, indicating that the Japanese may have developed an effective exhaust flame damper. Another BETTY vectored by two F6Fs demonstrated excellent evasive action by spiraling in dives, changing air speed radically, changing course and using cloud cover. At the same time, the enemy confused the radar scope by effectively dispensing "window". The armor and damage control were good, judging from the plane's ability to evade fighters, even after taking damaging hits.

Jettisoning of burning objects by Japanese night fighters, presumably to create the illusion of a "plane destroyed", has been reported. By the use of such tactics, the Japanese apparently hope to escape or maneuver for a more favorable attack position. Such deception is not new with the Japanese. As early as 1943, it was reported that enemy pilots, under attack by U. S. interceptors would dive and, at the same time, release black smoke from the nacelle to create the illusion of a fatal hit.

A ZEKE hit several times in a recent action continued straight ahead on the water, without taking evasive action. An F4U following saw the ZEKE strike the water four or five times, each time bouncing up and regaining flying speed. Finally the F4U scored hits and exploded the ZEKE.

An Avenger pilot on a night patrol over Okinawa spotted a bogie, and diving, expended all his ammunition without success. Not wishing to lose his prey, the Avenger pilot turned, engaged the enemy with rockets, and shot the wing off the Jap plane. Two of three rockets fired scored.

[45]

11TH YEAR TYPE 12 CM CD GUN

Eleventh Year Type 12 cm coast defense guns encountered on Luzon and Iwo Jima are believed similar to other types of 12 cm dual purpose and coast defense guns used by the Japanese. Many of these have been naval guns converted for use on land.

The bore characteristics of the 11th year type are identical to those of the 3rd year type 12 cm 45 caliber coast defense gun. Both have a maximum range of approximately 13,000 yards and a maximum muzzle velocity of about 2,090 feet per second when fired with a full propellant charge. Semi-fixed ammunition is used. Besides the HE projectiles with time fuzes recovered, documents mention a "Star" and practice projectile. Fuzes prescribed include the 5th year type nose fuze modification 1, a Type 92 fuze, and another 30 second time fuze.

The recoil tubes, two above and one below the barrel in contrast to the usual three above, simplify identification of the weapon. The breech block, although of the familiar hand-operated horizontal sliding type, does not pass all the way across the breech ring. The slot in the rear of the breech ring is cut in keyhole shape. This saves weight but increases the difficulty of loading.

The gun is of the built-up type with uniform right-hand rifling. It is mounted on a rectangular upper carriage. Its conical base sometimes may be imbedded in a rock foundation. Elevation control is on the left of the piece and traverse on the right with appropriate scales on the sides of the gun. Both the elevation and traverse operators were provided with 15 power, 4-degree sights and had speaking tubes for communication. Besides the normal range scale, a range correction scale is at the left of the piece. It is believed an operator is employed for each, with the elevation handwheel operator normally firing the gun. Firing also may be accomplished by a lanyard attached to the right side of the breech block.

(At this point in the Exhibit, there appears a photograph of a front view of a Japanese 45-caliber Post Defense Gun on Luzon. This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 290, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

The guns recovered on Luzon were manufactured in March 1944 by the Sasebo Naval Ordnance Depot, and it is possible that these 11th Year Type weapons were made to replace the well-known 3rd Year Type 12 cm CD guns.

Both on Iwo Jima and on Luzon, the guns were found in casemated positions and could not be elevated above 25 or 30 degrees. The fields of fire were limited by the firing slits to about 60°. On Luzon the emplacements were oval-shaped, 15 feet wide and 30 feet long, and constructed of coconut logs covered by earth.

On Iwo the emplacements were concrete casemates. Information on this weapon has been collated from reports of Iwo Jima observers, from the 5250th TIC Company and from Item B-3833 which appeared in CINCPAC-CINCP/OA Translations and Interrogations No. 25.

Condensed data on the gun follows:

Bore diameter	120 mm.
Overall length of gun	18 ft. 3/4 in.
Length of tube	17 ft. 3/4 in.
Length of rifling	14 ft. 8 1/2 in.
Number of lands	36
Length of upper recoil cylinders	4 ft. 7 in.
Length of lower recoil cylinder	2 ft. 5/4 in.
Max. elevation (scale reading)	50 degrees
Max. depression (scale reading)	10 degrees
Transverse	350 degrees
Diameter of lower carriage	4 ft. 2 in.
Height of gun	6 ft. 11 in.
Maximum muzzle velocity	2,090 ft. sec.
Maximum range	13,000 yds.

(Two views showing the mechanism of a Japanese 11th Year Type 12 cm. Gun located on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item No. 291, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

RIFLE GRENADE LAUNCHER

(A photograph of a large Spigot-type Grenade Launcher will be found reproduced as Item No. 292, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

A new, spigot-type rifle grenade launcher which is slightly larger (27 mm. in diameter) than the previously encountered type has been recovered in the Philippines.

This launcher may be used with both 6.5 mm. and 7.7 mm. rifles. From its measurements it was found by the 5250th TIC Company that Type 3 high explosive and incendiary rifle grenades might be fired from this launcher. It is likely that the smoke rifle grenade and Type 91 grenade with spigot attachment also may be fired. (For description of grenades see CINCPAC-CINCP/OA Bulletin 135-45, Japanese Grenades).

The new launcher differs also in method of attachment to the rifle. To attach, the knurled sleeve is unscrewed to allow the two prongs of the adapter to slide and catch on the rear of the front sight mount. The sleeve is then tightened, locking the prongs in position behind the sight mount. Two smaller projections fit around the bayonet lug to increase stability.

(A photograph of a Japanese Improved Armored Car captured in the Philippines will be found reproduced as Item No. 293, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

Production of intelligence material in support of an operation invariably strains available printing and reproduction resources. An intelligence activity cannot be judged solely on the quantity of output, nor are there any figures that would represent the total efforts of all hands. The figures here presented are only for the maps produced by Army Engineers and distributed through JICPOA, and the JICPOA production of photographic prints and printed intelligence material. When it is realized that in the periods considered, much more material was originated and distributed by other agencies, the magnitude of the task can be appreciated.

Assault maps, bombardment charts and air support maps produced in the Central Pacific Area since the Gilbert Islands operation in November 1943 totaled 8,375,776 sheets weighing 354.2 tons. The volume for each operation has risen steadily, from 8.7 tons of material for the Gilberts to 121 tons for the Okinawa campaign. Tonnages prepared in this area alone for each major Pacific operation are shown in an accompanying graph. It should be borne in

mind that much additional material in this category, such as air target and shore bombardment charts, was prepared elsewhere.

Printed and mimeographed material in the year beginning 1 June 1944 amounted to 72,909,000 sheets weighing 729 tons. (The standard printed sheet such as that used in "Weekly Intelligence" carries a total of eight pages—four on each side; mimeographed sheets carry two pages). Peak printing load for the year was during the week of 27 January, when 5,200,000 sheets were printed.

The greatest production increase was in the photographic field. The number of contact print turned out jumped from 59,565 in the first quarter of 1943 to an estimated 3,009,000 (weighing 78.75 tons) for the second quarter of 1945. The principal increase occurred after inauguration of aerial reconnaissance flights over Japan and nearby areas, with resultant preparation of mosaics.

(At this point in the Exhibit, three items appear as follows:

1. Two graphs, one illustrating quarterly production of contact print photographs and the other illustrating production of maps and charts for major Pacific operations.
2. A graph illustrating the monthly production of printed and mimeographed intelligence material for the Central Pacific area, 1 June 1944 to 31 May 1945.
3. A photograph showing fire bombs being dropped from B-29's on Yokohama.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 294, 295, and 296, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 70

MESSAGES ENCODED AND RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941

"PA."

27 JAN. 42.

From: Chengoai Thia #010.

To: Foreign Minister—Tokyo.

Ho ku hei [OB] koku kyō [WH an fu an] how shun [EY] no tai gun wa ka shu
 tokoro ni shite
 hei ka wo tai keisatsu tai wo a in se ya ku 1 man sū FIUM 1 bu wa 21st [pi ru
 ma] ga wa e shin shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki VV a hi koku kyō sen ni
 hi ki ka he shi tai ji tsū. Ma ta sei bu koku kyō [mei sa ta ya] dō i pi 8 wa 22nd
 IK AU MI JE NI YO RJ
 te ki no kū ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kei gi.

HARADA.

(in bad shape)

Kieru

The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. ——— At ME-SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.

"LA."

15 JAN. 1942.

From: Foreign Minister #001.

To: Ryōji Hanoi.

Kaku nen ki shi shu 1475 nikan (chi) (new para)
 Kin 3 sen 3 hyaku jū en | na ri | kan pi | wa ta shi | ki ri | hi | yori zō ga ku
 den sō su ———

Togo.

NOTE: (No copy of coded mes. on hand. Obtained from Army).

Re your (claim?) of last year 1475 I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310 yen gov't expenses from private fund.

Togo.

From: Harada

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

1. The lower classes who were rounded-up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Thailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

28 Jan. 1942.

"PA" (Army)

From: Harada #012 (Re your msg. #431).

To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

1. kon kai | ken kyo | no | ka kyū | wa | en shō | ha | no | kyo tō ni | shite
sa ku | kon | shikirimī | ryū gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | kō i
| no | kō | na ru kakawara(zu) | tai ga wa wa | hō nin | shi zen | ta ru
mono | na ri | (new Para)

2. fu ryō | ka kyō | no | ni jū | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |
| nyō | te ki | kō i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen | torishima(ri) | wo | yō
su | i wan ya | kō nichī ka ni mī VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi)
FULW | (mī tsu pi shi | shutsu | chō in | son po n) | no | goto (ki) | wo | ko
ma ma ni surn wa. | a ku | rei | wo | no ko su | mono | na ru | niyori shu kai |
ei tai ko (sei ma i gyō mī A— | mī | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri)
no | rei | ba | ku | wo | on tsu te | tsu i kyū | surn | yo tei | na ri | on rin pyo tei i.

HARADA.

28 JAN. '42.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061).

To: Minister, Saigon.

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including * * * to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19 January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau).

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime minister's broadcast (#43) tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto & Buddhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organization. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets military contests, military music. (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades.

Togo.

"LA" (Army)

From: Foreign Minister Tokio. #038 (Re yr msg. #061.)

28 Jan. 1942.

To: Koshi Saigon. (Re My Circular #590 (f).)

January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi(te)
ke shu sen shō | shu ku ga | gyō | ji | ji tsu shi yō kō ke tsu tei se rue | to ko ro |
sono SYD | IB | UL gu no | tōri | ni | tsuki | o | fukumi | o ki no | ue | hi tsu yō | ko
sai wa shikaru be ku shi dō serarota shi (new para)

1. gyō ji no ji tsu shi wa | Singapore nyū jō su ki kōshi hi ni kagi(ri) (ki hi
wa jō hō | kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yō | su) hi bo tsu da de ni shū rō | seshimu
ru ko to (new para)

2. kan ra ku | no hi yori | nyū jō | shi ki tō hi da de kaku ko ni koku ki | o | kei yō | su ru | ko to (new para)

Nyū jō | shu ki | tō hi wa (i) shō go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu te ei rei narabini | kō gun ko ta me ki neu o | sa sa ge | sōri - - daijin | no kan | wa hō sō go no ban 43 shō ni shō wa shi (ro) jiu ja | ji in to wa | kan ra ku | hō koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru tsu ge ru) oyobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai | o o ko nai (ha) kan kō sho ga ku kō. sho dan tai tō | nioi (te) wa | shu ku ga | shi ki | o | o ko nō ho ka kō gun i | ka zo ku no i mon . jiu ja | san pa i . bu dō | tai i ku | tai kai . kō en kai . bu sō . on ga ku kō shin . cho chi ku sono ta koku sa ku kyō ryō ku | no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi | ji tsu shi | su ru | ko to (new para)

Na o | shu ku ga gyō | ji ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zō san o so gai shi . shi zai | o | ran pi | shi | bō kū ni kyo ge ke | o | shō seshinnu ru ko to | o | sa ku ru | shu shi yori | nai chi | ni | oi (te) wa | chō chin | gyō re tsu . ha ta | gyō re tsu | tō wa | o ko na wa za ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China | man shū | ni | oi (te) | wa | ehi hō to ku shu | ji jō | ni ō ji | o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni | o chi i ra za ru gen dō | nioi (te) | kan kei | ki kan | to | kyō zi | no | ue | te ki gi | so chi | serare | sashitsukae | na shi ———

Toco.

009 26 JAN 42.

HARADA

Report on difficulty in getting building good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

009 Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "PA."
Gaimodaijin Tokyo.

Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so zyuun kei hoo soo u ke u ri no a de si tu no de ma kiden (dai . . . goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokovo zyuun rai too ha no ei. Bei ziu kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosote i zen zyuun ni ki kyo si wo nyoo. Na ke ni no zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo nt mono a ru mo yoo ni te poo tyoo zyoo hakarigata (si) za nitui (tewa) tai ga wa ni tyun i si ke ri on zei syu tei i kei gi pe?

HARADA,
Chiengoa.

"PA."

22 DEC. 1941.

From: Tokio (Army).
To: Shanghai #710.
Net 1947.

kiden (dai 842 gō) nikanshi (new Para)

Belgium tai shi kan ji gyō fu tei denpō (dainingō) V A F AV GI JG OK wa te ki ni taieurū nichī to dō yō no tariatsuka (i) suo na shi GI JU (go) sashitsukai na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa nai chi ni oite wa tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za ru mo China gen chi ni oite kimitsu (dai ungo) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokunū nan ra ka no so chi wo to ru no hi tsu yō a ru baai ni oite wa te ki koku ni okom jun ji toriatsuka (i) wa re (go) sashitsuka (e) na shi (New Para) nan dai Shanghai zai ho toshite shi kō kan chō chō ka kō e ten den se ri ni tsui (te wa) CQIOQ

From: Tokyo.
To: Shanghai #710.
1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's—despatch—in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve — of you secret message — there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.

In relation to method handling banking, gold silver deposits etc.

"PA." (Army)

31 DEC. 1941.

From: Peiping.

To: (No heading) #759.

- Kon a kai sen ni to mo mai China ni oite te ki koku gin kō. jū kei kei gin kō tō nitsui (tewa) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin oyohi gin kō ken (ho jo ka narabi (ni) mi ha tsu kō ken wo (o) fuku (mi) mu) wa kaku chi BYYM (Tsinan) no to ku shu ja jō tsū mi niyori te sho bun suru koto na ku kon go ni okeru tei koku no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite sō gō te ki ken chi ni ta chi te kore wo wo hino ha i i no mo to ni FIGL (Manchukuo) niyori sho nyō suru mono to su (new Para) ki (Para)

1. sa shi mo sa e a ru kin gin oyohi gin kō ken wa sashitari gun no kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihow ga wa gin kō (shō kin wo yo tēi su) ni yo nyū suru koto za

2. Migi 1. no kin gin oyohi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite yo nyū sa ki gin kō wo shite wagahō ni yū ri ni un yō se shi nu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyō ni ō ji ko no yo nyū wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e gin kō nitaishi ka shi tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo suru ta me yo nyū no ha rai tō do shi doku jō su koto wo mito (me) bu (su?) ru koto (new Para)

ō ku ra shō wa yō su re ba yo nyū sa ki gin kō nitaishi ryū ga nen sho (nen no ta me no nen kaku) wo kō fu suru koto (new Para)

3. gun wa kyaku kan ri tō wo gen chi kō a in kikau no chō ni i nin suru koto (new Para)

Migi ji mu nikanshi jū yō no ru mono wa chū ō no shi zu wo ma chi to kore rei wo ko no koto to shi nan yō suraba gen chi ni oite sho ri iin kai wo so shi ki pan koto (new Para)

—H kō ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui (tewa) te wa how ken to wa shutsu tsu ko RZ so chi wo to ru oyohi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to su gyaku ka u *BN AMRI*

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matters will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between The Chung-King Bank and The Japanese Silver bank.

22 DEC. 1941.

"PA." (Army)

From: Tokio.

To: Net #1950.

China ni okeru te ki koku gai kō kan (ryōji kan wo (o) fuku (mi) mu) oyohi wagahō ni oite ei gyō nai shi shū shoku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shū nyū no mi chi wo to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben nikanshi te wa shu ju kan kei chō to kyō gi no kekka izure baai niyori te wa Nihow seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jō suru yō a ru koto to narube (ku) ki mo sashitari no so chi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui (tewa) migi niyori so chi serareta (shi) (Para)

2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [bu <hyō] shi yo kin na ki shun *MJ* ni mo kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo kō ryo shi ta ru ga wagahō ga shi yū zai san wo sho bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yō a pa wo motte te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni sō go fu jo se shi mu ru yō go shi doku arita (shi) (new Para)

3. Wagahō su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no jū kei kei gin kō no na ma gin oyohi gin kō ken tō wa sa *QI* ni kō a in *YY* se tsu iin kai no (go) kettei su kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin kō ni yo nyū suru koto to na ha wo ru tokoro ni ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyū gin kō na ki chi ni oite wa migi son zai suru kō kan to renraku noue sho *LD* serareta (shi) *CURB* go. Rest garbled.

1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RECEIVED FROM U. S. ARMY—HONO.

Subsequent to 7 Dec. 1941 Copies of Their Translations

From: CHEFOO.
To: TOKIO.
SANO TORI.

(KYU BA) IO -- CHINA IO SE. PERU O -- GERMANY ITO SE ----- SE
BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL. S
END ENGLISH O -- EN -- NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA -- MAN SYU KOKU
KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA -- HA ENGLAND NI. FUTU
KOKU ISEL -- ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA. ARGENTINA GORU UN (NYU --
NEA) NI IHA. NE -- NYU -- KYO - 1 NIHA 1 (NYU ZI -- DO) NO 2 NI
IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO) NO 3 -- I -- (-- KA -- GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI
KAN) IHENI I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA.
URAGUAY NI IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KAN I
HYO KANA RE. (ARA SUKA) KARU EN.

#663 A

JAN 19.

From: TOKIO.
To: SHANGHAI.

KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO
ARITASI

#634 A

JAN. 19.

From: TOKIO.
To: SHANGHAI.

JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSHIN
FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REI NIYO (RI) DENPO
ARITASI PA

#635 A

From: ?
To: TOKIO.
ENGLAND NINITO

JAN. 21 1942.

KEINASEKA.

GERMANY NAOK NA HE.

BELGIUM -- INI SO IHA. ROITO. OIHE MO - -.

NANAHANA ANA NARU -- RO -- K HESETO. POLAND KA -- HA GEN KA
SEI. KAKA SEI SA --. KA HENAS -- RU -- KUN KE HE OHENA
KORUKA. // //

CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU -- HETO SEAKA TOKA

HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. IOSE.

TAI KOKU NAO.

CANADA ISE SEI ISE NI.

BAI SESEMI SENI ZI -- S NIRUNI.

MEXICO RU.

PERU NANA -- NARU HEO HEHE ARU I -- KAONI IKA

ONA I ISEHE. ISE RU. NINAI M NI NAHA.

BOLIVIA TONI.

EGYPT NISE

MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.

SPECIAL CODE . . . TIHA OK IOI

(NIKARA GA) IHAO -- INOI

(KOSUTA RIKA) IHA OA IOI

SPEC. CODE . . . - O (C SI ZIGO HYO KA, ZEN -- YO -- O)

NYU 1 NE4) I NA HE I IHE HA.

SPEC. CODE . . . I NAHE KI HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE . . O TO

PARAGUY O TO

URAGUY I HENI MI HENA

PANAMA KATO -- S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO -- RON HASU ZI

(SON DAI 1 KA -- NASA SU -- HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK KANAHA).

DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI -- 5 SATU)

NORWAY KAKU HANA -- KA HA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO KA HANA.

KA HA HE.

(ARA SUKA) RUNI.

KASI -- IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.
 HI ZOKU -- NIKI. NINA
 TUBAKI -- HETO. HENA.
 KA -- DE -- RO HETO. HE NA
 YANA GI -- HARU
 Rest of msg lost due to station interference.

FROM: KALGAN.

1-20-42

To: TOKIO.

CANADA KARU HE

(KYU BA) KARU HE

PERU ISEO

HOLLAND O O

ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKI NA ANIKI HE LST
 REPEATER

FRANCE KAKA HA

BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI

HUNGARY HATO

EGYPT HERU) ---- I IRU

TURKEY HA IHA UHA IO

CHINA KASEI

PORTUGAL KANASE

MAN SYU KOKU HEO

AGENTINA NII

SIAM NINA

(KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER

(NIKA RAGA) 2ND REPEATER

(KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER

(NYU GI NEA 1ST REPEATER

NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER

(HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA

(ARA SUKA) KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU HEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO
 ZI)

#643

From: Chefoo.

To: Tokyo.

JAN 20.

As follows: (KYU BA) May mean emergency,—emergency code?—or may be the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.

The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken in connection with #674A, which shows a similar list of names of countries with varying letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in use, or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to be used for the countries in future—the latter, however, seems pretty crude.

In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider #635A, which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th., the date of this message?

RSS.

663 A

From: Kalgan.

To: Tokyo.

JAN 20.

(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)

Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows:

Line 2. Cuba

Last line. Colombia

Second page:

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

New Guinea

New Zealand

Honduras

Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries are all in Kana)

1/23/42
643 A

FUNADA.

Canada—KARU HE
Cuba—KARU HE
Peru—ISEO
Holland—oo
England—NIKA NA ANIKA HE
France—KAKA HA
Belgium—OHE IKO HENI
Hungary—HATO
Egypt— . . . I IRU
Turkey—IHA IHA UHA IO
China—KASEI
Portugal—KANASE
Manchukuo—HEO
Argentina—NI
SIAM—NINA
Columbia— INA NAKI NAHE
Nicaragua— " "
Costa Rica— " "
New Guinea—NIKA NA ANIKA HE
New Zealand—NIKA NA ANIKA HE
Honduras—KASEHA
Alaska—KAKA SE (IZYŌ KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)

From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent).

MARCH 9.

Your wire No. 160 says, "Official Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately". Is this not a mistake? Please investigate and reply immediately.
1254 A

From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping.
With regard to our wire #718 of last year.

MARCH 9.

1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have MOSU SEI KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts of this message also, be something else, such as IDE? The only translation which would fit the context in any way would be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i.e., "reported") are as follows. If the arrangements of all the offices are completed, we expect to put the establishment (of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have received reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and KAISHUU, we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please arrange to have these reports in first.

2. With regard to governmental orders; in the case of colonies only, it will be alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous experience, and after sufficient leadership.

3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the Regulations of Establishment, SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; however, honorary position)

2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.

3. TAKUU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report.

However, no report regarding governmental order.

4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul General.

5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning governmental order.

6. Paotao (Settlement Chief System, However, honorary) No report from KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report regarding governmental order.

1255 A

funada

MARCH 9.

From Peiping # 229 to Tokyo.
Regarding your message # 157.

Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) Yen ----- 805.30; making a total appropriation* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary or else the work cannot be completed, we are informed by the workmen. This situation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that the difference amounting to Yen 8,212.50 may be sent as a supplementary appropriation. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no recourse (here) but to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.

1260 A

RSS

*There seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not work out properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the difficulties being encountered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.

MARCH 9.

From Peiping #220 to Tokyo.

Circ. #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.

With regard to our wire Extra No. 56.

The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have carried out temporary enactment, and there being considerations to make in connection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO (?) the rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paofing, Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haichow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO, Chefoo and Kaifeng, totalling 11.

Further, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of names which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th of that month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In article 83 of tax regulations; the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of the business tax; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes by virtue of their having paid a business tax. Therefore, ----- elections are not to be held ----- will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment of colonies, the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and their period of service will be until there is an election which will take place in accordance with regulations. The question of whether or not these three points are necessary is being considered.

(NOTE: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message might be a mistake for some previous year)

1261 A

funada

MARCH 10.

From Peiping #136 to Tokyo

Circ. #181 Tientsin

There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it has been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and consulates (?), on the 18th. (only one day) at 9 am. a conference of consuls having charge of military affairs (Note; HEIJI which has been translated "military affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place. Above for your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch offices and heads of dispatched offices (might be instead "Higher officials of consulates, branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are. From office (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul (s) so kindly include this SPECIAL CODE.

1262 A

MARCH 11.

From Shanghai to Hankow

Extra

-----there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know when the order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail.

1263 A

funada

1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent)

Circ. #455 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankon. Canton.
With regard to No. 1, Our wire. A 3 GOKUHI (?)
Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL CODE.
1265 A

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister
Re; my message No. 017

Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and KAKOO are at hand.
However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.
1266 A

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister

Re your wire No. 169.
Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of governmental orders.
1267 A

funada

From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping
#183 to ?

MARCH 11.

Re: your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).

1268 A

From Tokyo to Peiping.

MARCH 11.

Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regard your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received ----- in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to ----- as has been done thus far.

1269 A

funada.

MARCH 11.

From Taiyuan Urgent #028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.

Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.

Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organization of the colony, official business, and the putting into operation of the new tax for the colony, are all pressing duties ----- . If (in addition) this man is expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher ?), we expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the official business. Further, this man's wife is at present pregnant and the doctor has forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation -- RU FUTU GAN this interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony (organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on to his new post in Kalgan early in June ----- regarding which, after an

examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be postponed until the end of May.

#1270 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo *Urgent*
To Peiping Consul General

Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)

1- The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in the settlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the Law regarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions shall be made by a special order). But this section does not apply to subordinate consular offices and sub-stations.

2- Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a subordinate consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in which unreasonable situations ----- with regard to the resident head. In such situations there is no other way but to act in the name of the head (consul) of the main consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads) of the department, we wish to send you a further message regarding the practical method of handling such situations.

#1274 A

MARCH 12.

From Peiping #028 to Nanking Minister,

Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total of all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum received was Yen 15,000. The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for which we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go forward to you by air.

#1275 A

RSS

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo. #191 to Peking
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador

With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of people (officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, housing etc.), please bear in mind the following and instruct appropriately SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.

1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the settlement will be considered wrong.

2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary, in connection with the business of the settlement, (based on the ----- restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.

3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection; the treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered merely from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status, (rank) of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is understood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too much). (Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and directors and the treatment of these ---- should be, it is considered, arranged after your approval is given.

4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors, consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for long periods.

1276 A

funada

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #163 to Canton.

Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3.4 0.89 and being sent by wire to your excellency as agent.

ITEM: Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozeki, Yen 171.50; Return expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel expense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00; Sato, going to his post, Yen 111.70; Expense of transferring Shirote, Yen 167.00- - - - -

1277 A

In the humble judgement of the translator, the balance of the message is not worth bothering about.

MARCH 12.

From Peiping #002 Nanking Minister; Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.

Regarding your circular #020.

In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's Defense Association, and have not set up a New Women's Organization as yet. The SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the Army, which is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of the association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife of the head of the Settlement being the president, and the wife of the Consul advisor.

1278 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Shanghai # 489 cut in to Nanking, Peiping.

Following the recent sudden drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts from the sale of stamps, etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy) has been announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAI KOO Communications Department, who is in the city on a trip).

1279 A

MARCH 12.

From Manchuli # 023 to Tokyo, Hsingking.

Although we fully understand that the matter of the arrangement for a train on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the Home Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter merely that we may have the information, in this office.

1280 A

From Tokyo # 036 to Harbin.

Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 34 should be approved, should not the completion of the work be done according to the estimate for the building submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI(?) (definitely settled?).

1281 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #053 to Hankow.

Regarding your message HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement of the regulations regarding promotion (or, advance in salary) was completed in our Out-bound message #18 of last December 31st.

#1282A

MARCH 12.

From Tokyo #182 to Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your message #169.

As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad - - - FOREIGN - - - - - MO KU --- Yen 8,200 special supplementation has been made, and will be sent in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).

#1283A

RSS.

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo
 To: Hsingking Minister.
 Extra-numeral message.

To Communications Official Ogawa, from Nomura.

Replying to your extra-numeral message both of the gentlemen are going along with the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the 13th, in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you again.

#1286A

MARCH 13.

From Shanghai #065 to Canton; to Consul Kimura, in Hongkong from Sone.

With regard to your humble servant's message of the 10th. Ryuu Sun Ketsu (parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from Hongkong on the - - - - boat of the 15th. The Ryuu family have again and again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble to make the arrangements.

#1287A

RSS.

MARCH 13,

From Nanking #002 to Peiping. Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.

Regarding your Circ. #186 (A).

At present they are engaged in urging the - - - - organization of a real Women's Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general (we are proceeding) under the direction of this Office, the Chief of the Department of Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Commandment of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military police being advisors. Matters having to do with defense, and related to military matters, are first taken up by our office, with the military department involved, and then we proceed to guide them; this is the plan under which we are working.

#1288 A

MARCH \$

From: Tokyo.

To: Hankow.

We desire that you send a message to Daiya.

#1289 A

RSS.

MARCH 9,

From Canton #195 to Tokyo. Circ. #069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.

Regarding my message #182.

In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently received orders from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of a definite plan for caring for enemy aliens living, and causing them to do their cooking for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have been making preparations as far as was possible, to carry this out in accordance with your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines), and especially in accordance with column (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former) part of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something approximating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interesting). In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the exception of those subject to exchange) should be encouraged of their own accord to form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual. This is sent to keep you informed.

#1256 A

The above message seems to be connected with #1214 A.

MARCH 10.

From Nanking Minister #266 to Tokyo; Cir. #146 to Hsingking, Canton, Hankow and 1 other.

Chunking Broadcast (8th).

1—The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer encouragement in the matter of the protection of India and the construction of a route for transportation of supplies to China. This information comes from a source with direct contact with the White House.

2—The Chungking government has dispatched their Minister to Turkey, Choo I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to Iran to conclude a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of ministers.

3—According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th., and the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, - - - - - TAI MI, German Ambassador, is reported to be returning to his country for consultation with his government.

4—Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador on the 7th.

5—After the arrival of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Day, on the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jō, (Wu Tieh-cheng), Ō Bun Kō (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast to the Burmese people.

#1257 A

RSS.

MARCH 9.

From Peiping Minister #037 to Tokyo.

Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germany, resident here, (at present 62 years of age), in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO SOO FU KO DOO HEI 6 ZYUU GOO believed to be the name of institution, Possible, P(eking U(niversity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average or about sixty students ?) has expressed the request that we confer with the Home Office and secure a visa that he may attend a meeting of the Yale Students Abroad, to be held in the building of the K. K. Laygold Company, Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City. We request that you will send us instructions in reply by wire.

#1258 A

MARCH (.

From Peiping #221 to Tokyo.

Regarding my message # 220

In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or subconsular area, the head of the mission has according to the fifth article of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO JIKOO (literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations, and has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing body of their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether this method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions in reply.

1259 A

RSS.

MARCH 11.

From Nanking #276 to Peiping; Circ. #2450 to Tokyo. Hsingking. Canton.

Chunking Broadcast (10th).

1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial, but contact with several Chinese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.

"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome from the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in agreement with each other (?) and are great countries. With the nobility and the leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and without regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now decided to

fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and that the power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that India should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian people, and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently. I believe firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability to destroy Japan.

2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Australian Minister (Igston).

1264 A

Funada

MARCH 11.

From: Tokyo (Urgent) #082 to Peiping.
#183 to ?

Re; your wire No. 90

With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee, please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in effect).

1268 A

MARCH 11.

From Tokyo to Peiping.

Extra

Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.

Regarding your wire No. 175.

From Yosano to Harada.

The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received ----- in Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been complicated and (they) are fed up (distrusted), so that they no longer desire to ----- as has been done thus far.

1269 A

Funada.

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo.

To: Hsingking Minister.

Regarding your extra-numeral message:
(forwarding will be completed)

The wire was forwarded by the night of the 11th.

#1271 A

MARCH 12.

From: Tokyo.

To: Harbin.

Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th:

Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no evidence of larceny.

#1272 A

MARCH 12

From: Peiping. #186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan.

Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was carried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up, so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform us by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your area.

#1273 A

RSS.

MARCH 12.

From: Canton. #210 to Tokyo; Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.

Regarding your circular #181:

At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony, reverence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the Conoly, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined in the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair in celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting of every class (of people) is planned to celebrate the second occasion of victory in the war.

#1284 A

MARCH 13.

From: Tokyo.

To: Peiping.

Extra-numeral. To Telegraphic official, Kato, from Nomura.

Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish. Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.

#1285 A

RSS.

22 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Tokio.

To: Net #1950.

1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and persons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made by the Japanese government.

2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.

3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank. (rest garbled)

Decrypted Traffic.

31 DECEMBER 1941.

From: Peiping.

To: (No heading) #759.

Method handling banking; gold silver deposits, etc.

Decrypted Traffic.

22 DECEMBER 1942.

From: Tokio.

To: Shanghai,

Net #1947.

In relation to your despatch numbered S42 there is no objection to handling the Belgium Embassy's-----despatch X---- in the same fashion as an enemy countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special methods in order to preserve - - - - of you secret message - - - - there is no objection to using same type of handling as for an emey country.

In relation to

Decrypted Traffic

JANUARY 26—PM— 009.

Gaimuajijin Tokyo

Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the publishing of severe laws in papers.

Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on previous residence.

HARADA.

Decrypted Traffic

28 JANUARY 1942.

From: Foreign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your msg #061).
To: Minister Saigon.

Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including - - - - to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special Diet on 19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.

1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau)

2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag will be flown at every door.

On the day of the ceremony—

(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with stories of Imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime Minister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.

(b) Have Shinto and Buddhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" ceremonies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.

(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military music (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.

Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to local circumstances in China and Manchuria as long as they do not result in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern and flag parades/

Togo.

27 JAN 1942.

From: Chengoai Thia #010.
To: Foreign Minister Tokyo.

----- garbled) -----

The Tai Army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over 10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma - - - - at Me - - - Sataya they were bombed by the enemy.

HARADA.

28 JAN 1942.

From: Harada #012 (Re your msg #431).
To: Foreign Minister—Tokio.

- - - - - 1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.

2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.

JAN 21.
681 A

From: Canton.
To: Naking, Peking, Shanghai.

Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using transports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at first) only to those who were actually engaged in carrying on the fighting, but from the 15th of this month, the Shirogane Maru, Guyo Mary and 6 other bottoms, scrapped ships of the Nai Ka - - - Transport Co., have been put into operation from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights are being carried.

However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and Makao, traffic has not yet been opened up.

603A

From: Tokio.
To: Hsingking.

17 JAN 1942.

. . . When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of Russia, the context shows,) on the 13th, (we said that) from the news which came to this office from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the authority of a Chinese - - - telegram in November that an American vessel had been sunk as the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some difficulties, had ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he did not think was an American tanker: Also, we asked if there were absolutely no case of Russian vessels sinking after striking a mine. The diplomatic representative denied absolutely that there was any truth in the former statement; regarding the latter statement he said that last year - - - Government - - - A Soviet vessel struck a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and received injuries, but was able to make port safely. Aside from this, there had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines, and this he wished received as his reply.

17 JAN. 1942.

604 A

From: TOKYO.
To: HSINGKING.

. . . The Soviet newspapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption "From the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under date line of the 12th the public announcement of the United States that since the opening of hostilities that country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 minesweeper, 10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. . . . The losses of the American Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 target ship, total. . . . (All lost in the attack on Hawaii.)

19 DEC. 1941.

131 A

From: PEKING.
To: NANKING, SHANGHAI, CANTON, HSINGKING.
News from Yen-an-Fu (Communist Headquarters)

. . . Chungking broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon Japan should be attempted. The Yen-an-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in point of fact we are Allies with Britain and the United States. The war against Japan is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an opportunity for the Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis Powers, which is something we should find it important to realize at this time. Among the Axis Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of Germany is the main purpose of the world wide strategems. That is to say, taking advantage of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expansion of the line of operations on the continent is most important. The importance of the war in the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Imperial Command for China in this connection is the pressing of war against aggressor nations regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of Hitler will be victory for China(?) so at the present time cooperation with the Allies plus the greater and greater extension of the policy of long time resistance, is the method of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers. . . . This is the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.

19 DEC. 1941.

130A

From: Peking.
To: Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow.
Yen-an-Fu report. . . .

The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho Jih Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present war are to incite peoples of all of the South Seas areas in order to secure the resources (of that area), expel British and American Interests - - - act in union - - - Germany and Italy - - - to increase her power. Japan's southward advance is, at

the same time, the strengthening of the policy of encircling southwestern China, and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable from the China Japanese war.

On this critical occasion you(?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must attack actively; together with this the 8th route army, and the new fourth army must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border friction, stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese. Make most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people of Formosa, and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.

(Funada).

100 A

DEC. 18 0443.

From: Buenos Aires.

To: Tokyo.

Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the navy minister before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been reported, so I ask your honorable inquiry into the matter.

/s/ HOKIKIRI, Japanese Ambassador.

DEC. 16.

From: Nanking.

To: Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.

. . . regarding the rejection by the British military in HongKong of the well intentioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made the announcement; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by Japan lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibility of the exposure of a million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our compatriots (?) in Kongkong Yotai notice of subjugation compatriots in line with the - - - national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with the greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you people to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out (expunge) the humiliation of your country which has been practiced by the English for a hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the revival of East Asia . . . along this line he gave out his interview.

DEC. 16

From: Tsinan.

To: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking.

. . . in the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the local maintenance guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?) have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possible been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent (coiling up—the word used of snakes coiling to spring). About a month and a half have passed since the beginning of these tactics and the efficacy --- carrying out was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began and again there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl about again.

The army lines of communication - - - and the regular communication systems are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri (25 miles, if Japanese "ri"; 39.30 kilometers. If Chinese "li" is intended, then the distance would be 6.54 kilometers). South of Daimon Station, on the Shimpo Line, an attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought); on the - - - Kosai Line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was wrecked; and the like. The chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been warned that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot escape punishment. According to - - - Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had applied appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese, while not showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless, steadily shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the news of Japanese victories. This information is sent for your information.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to Manchuli.

Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi and Yuhashih and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.

MARCH 2.

From: Shanghai to Tientsin, Peiping ?

The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21 of which 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to ?

The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (* . . .) approved (or "understood"). However, - - - (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunderstanding" and so please explain to - - - that the - - - is not higher than the starting point.

MARCH 2.

From: ? to Canton.

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been special code as from 2nd (first name "Seichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to Shanghai.

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

MARCH 2.

From: Tokyo to ?

Special code with regard to hiring on the spot.

- - - (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, - - - have been decided.

MARCH 2.

From: ? to Canton.

Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first name "Seichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.

1203 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Shanghai.

Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation on business.

1204 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to ?

SPECIAL CODE with regard to hiring on the spot

- - - - (Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, - - - have been decided.

1205 A

funada

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

MARCH 2.

With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.

1206 A

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Paotao.

Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same basis as a special employee - - - if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen, please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.

1207

MARCH 2.

From Tokyo to Peiping.

Former SPECIAL CODE, Konji Hawegawa has been SPECIAL CODE as from February 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.

Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

funada

From Shanghai to Tokyo.

MARCH 2.

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Please wire (convey to) councillor.

1208 A

funada

1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Tokio to Hsinking.

MARCH 2.

Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that there is a necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report on your examination along with papers relating to this affair.

1209 A

3-5-42
Yamashiro

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 3, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your information.
For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

From Canton to Tokyo.
Extra.

MARCH 3.

With regard to your wire (extra) (# . . .) of the 3rd.

Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern Station") to this office should have been replied to in General Wire No. 48 of February 20th, but we are sending again by way of assurance.

1210 A

From Shanghai to Tokyo.
Extra.

MARCH 3.

From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akiyama; How is the (previous) question coming? Please reply as to progress made.

1211 A

From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

With regard to taxation in China as assessed at the present time, it is thought that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been decided, in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose of studying this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be formed through the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders'") meeting, with the local Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Importers and Distributors as a center, and that this agency would be made an agency of inquiry (perhaps "on tax matters").

1212 A

funada.

From Amoy to Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.
Police Chief ----. TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi, Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman. RYUU TEN SIN (?) (above ----) Chief of Police, Zempei Yamashita, Takashi Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties)

1213 A

funada.

From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoilow.

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.

Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information set forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually) have to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or "petition") has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtaining loans as dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of

repetitions. Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should cover at least a period of about 6 months, in order that control and business may be facilitated.

Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400: the proclamation on this question has been considered in this city since quite early - - -. The leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to continue as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different than previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these people merely by means of leadership (encouragement). In our area, (therefore) a study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the enemy nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting them cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these people will fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire as aforementioned (" . . .").

1214 A

funada

From: Canton.

MARCH 4.

To: Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking.

The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to us-- for the preservation of peace and - - -. Therefore, measures to meet this should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on the authorized (legal) lists as well as with the under-cover transactions, it is necessary to strengthen control of the market as much as possible. Also to effect reforms in currency (20 (?), and to contrive measures of - - -. Concrete measures will be effected in Davao in the near future.

Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent than those concerning mobilization; however, locally measures will be taken to counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.

1215 A

From: Nanking.

MARCH 4.

To: Tokyo.

Please remit by cable the sum of 36,703.48 yen to cover costs of the following: 31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as per agreement; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants; and 80 sen to cover shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.

1216

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

To: Hankow.

The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO) as an error for FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuji, proclamation—a not unusual tautology in Japanese). the setting up of a Branch office of the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch office on the 28th., as well as the - - - - prder Number 4 regarding the superintendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially published in the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be assigned)—It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recognition of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.

#1217A

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

To: Shanghai.

Regarding your telegram number 4:

Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the price of impliments and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama (a pleated skirt-like garment). Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from the WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments can be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (MEN=cotton; somekind of a cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).

Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your telegram giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.

1218 A

From: Canton.
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

AA-, of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we presume to be a place name). Since the situation in that place is not clear to us, we desire to send En Kido, the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a two weeks trip (The exigencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary) to investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools and for this trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "contact" (renraku) something.)?

1219 A

From: Peiping.
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

(We have found this message practically undecipherable) Line 1—1 your wire number -- 57 and the same number 385 SOO (School RAI SA YOO KOKU subject) In regard to —RA Kai— being, original document —Boo number in N---- GO PYU have do not have--- GI RYOO SERARURU TO --KO -- next (or succeeding) message number --87 GOO TYOO -- and regular report regarding the residences, regarding -- FUN -- Within this month should be sent in.

1220 A

From: Tokyo.
To: Shanghai.

MARCH 4.

Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth department of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air route on the 4th, we desire to advance temporarily (or perhaps, he desires us to advance temporarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase cost of supplies.

1221 A
RSS

From: Tokyo.
To: Nanking.

MARCH 4.

With regard to your wire No. 190.

Please wire contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire. Further, No. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire) No. 3800.

1222 A

From: Tokyo.
To: Shanghai

MARCH 4.

188 bundles (rolls, or batches) of EKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for "steel rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 298 kilograms have been shipped on Taipei Maru which left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN

1223 A

From: Shanghai.
To: Tokyo.

MARCH 4.

---your wire No. 1329 of last year.

As yet-----please-----after-----

1224 A

fnnada

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 6, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

MARCH 5.

From: Tokyo.

To: Holhow.

With regard to your wire No. 19:

Will send upon issuance of permits, 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Government Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) from Special relief and control fund, Miscellaneous, as follows:

Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real Government Expenditure.

Three sets of equipment, their number and use as follows:

Reception room hat racks, 3.

Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.

Inside Chair, 4, out of 6. 2 will be ones used at present.

Round table, 3.

Tea table, 3.

Dining table for dining room, 3.

Side board for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desk for library, 3.

Chairs for Library, 3.

Bookshelves for Library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelf for living room, 3.

Inspector Fujii, Assistant inspector Imai, and—Omura (for three people) from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.

Following are three sets of equipment, their numbers and use.

Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fujii.

Long chair for reception room, 1, the one presently in use.

Inside chair, 2, same as above.

Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.

Dining tables for dining room, 3.

Sideboards for dining room, 3.

Chairs for dining room, 18.

Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.

Chairs for library, 3.

Bookshelves for library, 3.

Miscellaneous shelves for living room, 3.

1225 A

funada

From: Shanghai.

To: Canton, Tokyo.

MARCH 5.

Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Kiukiang to his excellency.

Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty, when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in the condition of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again to Kiukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires nursing, so this office has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of his shift of post for the present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to us, so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial permission.

1126 A

1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Kalgan.

MARCH 5.

Referring to your message number 127.

While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the Consul's residence HAMA (MA = room, and this may refer to some special room in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident in the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this we desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police Outright Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards the portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an especial grant this once only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, the necessary repairs expense shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.

1227 A

1227 A
RSS.

From: Tokyo.
To: Swatow.

MARCH 5.

March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA SPECIAL CODE (is this not probably Vice-Consul, as in following message?) Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family allowance); Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,998.13 which will be sent (by wire—the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your excellency as agent.

1128 A

From: Tokyo.
To: Amoy.

MARCH 5.

March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent by wire to your excellency as agent. ITEMS:

Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi - - - - - 285.09; Tadashi Takahashi, and Aoki, each Yen 212.49; Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 2868 and his special allowance are earmarked for repayment); Morii, Yen 247.70. The end.

1229 A
RSS

From: Tokyo.
To: Hsingking.

MARCH 5.

This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsingking Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers. There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there is such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the Soviet Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in somewhat, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.

1230 A

From: Tokyo.
To: Canton.

MARCH 6.

Extra numeral message.

Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing, we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory answer").

1231 A

From Shanghai to Peiping. Tientsin. Tokyo. Nanking

MARCH 6.

Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan, and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same period last year. (details will be sent by mail).

Tax collections 8169

Sur-taxes (assessments and SUISAI (probably, "collections of delinquent taxes")). 443 *

Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.

Tonnage taxes, 20

Total— 9363 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)

1232 A

From Peiping to Tokyo.

MARCH 6.

Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Constructions"), the repairs necessary throughout the houses in order to make them usable will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a few people who are being transferred here and are arriving with their families, the situation is such that there are no houses in which to place these people. Therefore, as a temporary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate situation") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182, are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals after arranging for permission to rent said houses.

1233 A

funada

From Manchuli to Cut In Tokyo. HSINKING

MARCH 6.

ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old German National, who arrived in Manchuria from Berlin in December of 1939 and has been head of the - - - - -, a German transportatn firm, here, wishes to evacuate to Daren together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine daughters). We find that the situation (political) is alright, and that (this person's records (?)) are authentic, but would like to know if we may issue a visa (would like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to them). Please reply immediately.

1234 A

From Shanghai to Canton

MARCH 6.

From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.

Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the Funds Chief (chief of the department of capital) and gets at the present time a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets, it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you search for another suitable man.

1235A

funada

From Tokyo to Canton.

MARCH 6.

We have already sent your wire No. 165 by means of our wire No. 139.

Regarding No. 167 we are now - - - - (probably "carrying on consultation with - - - -")

Regarding No. 171, although there has been no - - - - (maybe "objections") from all the - - - - (maybe "department heads"), it is believed that the message has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).

1236 A

From Tokyo to Nanking.

MARCH 6.

There is a supply of 58 thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for your office . . . The Minister (of cabinet) - - - - that plans be made within the year - - - - and a part of the land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and that enactment be carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in this case - - - - the training room (or "area") - - - - the plan - - - - is desired.

1237 A

funada

From Tokyo to Nanking

MARCH 6.

Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, - - - - (probably "1140 Yen") out of the fund for - - - - police offices under Consulates in China, as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year. . . .

1238 A

1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From Tokyo to Shanghai

MARCH 6.

With regard to your wire Regular No. 463

The BAN NOO - - ("Bannoo" means omnipotent, Bannookayu, a cureall) according to our experience is not very efficient and goes out of commission very often, and so we have not been giving permits on it. It is difficult therefore to approve of it and ask that the \$25 Yen be sent back.

1239 A

funada

SECRET

SIGNAL OFFICE, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

MARCH 7, 1942.

Memorandum to G-2:

Herewith messages #1240-1253 for your information.

For the Department Signal Officer:

G. A. BICHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Nanking.

March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being sent by wire to your excellency as follows:

(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance, Yen 1,062.50; (2) Takemitsu, - - - DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese, usually begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.

#1240 A

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Shanghai.

The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the 17th, and everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the responsibility of the Contact Department of your office.

#1241 A

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Nanking.

To Councillor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.

Mr. Yasouka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.

#1242 A

RSS

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.

To: Kalgan.

KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Regarding (your reply wire) #124:

SA - - POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)

Yen 6,000 Special Code. (Kin comes before and NARI after a statement of a sum of money, in Japanese).

Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.

Yen 2,000 from the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of the City Police (dept ?) resident in the Consulate.

(KAN=official, KOO=public; indicate the general classifications in the Japanese governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).

#1243 A

MARCH 6.

From: Tokyo.
To: Shanghai.

We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date of sailing.

(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was to be forwarded to another point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent from Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter, or else "Shanghai" is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the purpose of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).

#1244 A

MARCH 6.

From: Kalgan.
To: Tokyo.

Regarding your message #72 of last year:

As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident-abroad, we ask that you send one half year's rental, Yen 1,200, by wire.

#1245 A
RSS

MARCH 6.

From Kalgan to Tokyo.
And with regard to No. 33

Please send 3, AI BOO YEN (?) (3000 Yen) SPECIAL CODE the amount of expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO HI (might be "housing", "expropriation" as in "land expropriation", "training").

1246 A

MARCH 7.

From Tokyo to Nanking.

Extra

As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send again. (Note: - - - happens to be UTAGAI)

1247 A

MARCH 7.

From Shainghai to Tokyo.

With regard to your wire (* . . .) Extra.

Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing number" or "a combination"). No. 3 from the Minister has not been sent because of a mistake here - - - it was sent on 7th of this month, (today).

1248 A

funada

MARCH 7.

From Peiping to Tokyo.

Extra

From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura

I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has been 'drawn to'") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the action mentioned) be carried out immediately.

1249 A

funada

MARCH 7.

From: Tokyo to Hsinking.

At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU, name of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of the Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party Organ dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassador), through having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjuro Hayashi, Premier Feb. to May 1937) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side. To this, I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Ambassador) had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that the Soviet Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is some-

what indefinite), that we believe that the Soviet Union well understands just where the purpose of the Japanese government lies, in having especially picked this new Ambassador who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer) in the diplomatic field, and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs, that we here, on this occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under discussion such as regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange", "freight accumulation" or "compensation"), petitions between Japan and Russia (?), Visas, and floating docks, and that another forward step would thus be taken in the friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU replied that he understood, and that everything will be done towards the solving of the problems as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as (I) had mentioned.

1250 A

funada

MARCH 7.

From: Tientsin to Nanking. Shanghai. Tokyo. Peiping. Thingtao and Tsinan

According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect on business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn and cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the rural areas (probably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies of speculators (?).

Rates falling: Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460 Yen. MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that this might be a mistake for MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour), the import of Shanghai powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps "stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of low rates in the interior, the rates weaken - - - 25.903 Yen IJIRUSHI (?) 24.85 Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled commodities in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency of 1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior, Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar, 188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai through lull in the year's exports. Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also highest on 6th)

1251 A

funada

MARCH 7.

Tokyo to Kalgan.

With regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (perhaps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mongolia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out temporarily in accordance with your wire, Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month. Please reply on following points:

1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to especially make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?
2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the rules and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial workers". Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines, "the Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation")?
3. What were the characteristics of the League(s) of Mongolian Engineering and Construction companies in the past?
4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above corporation?
5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujishima arrived there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the direction of your office; is this true? (Note The last might be a confirmation rather than a question)

1252 A

funada

From: Tokyo.

MARCH 7.

To: Hankow.

To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.

The expense appropriations for your office for the current year are as follows below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow?) and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the organization (or, Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for repairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within the current year.

Government expense, actual expense..... Yen 60.

Ditto, outright expense..... " 250.

Telegraphic expenses for a diplomatic office abroad, Yen 25. Expense for the Foundation of a diplomatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya branch office, and equipment fund, Yen 8,000.

Further, employees daily (wage) GEN ø Yen. (Gen is probably an error for some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.

1253 A
RSS

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 71

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

War Dept Message 465 to Comgen Haw Dept—Paraphrase—Mailgram Secret Re 2B-24 planes for special photo mission X Pilots to be instructed to photograph Truk Island in Caroline group Jaluit in Marshall group X Visual reconnaissance to be made simultaneously X Information desired number and location of naval vessels including submarines airfields aircraft barracks guns and camps X Warn pilots island strongly fortified and manned X Reconnaissance and photography to be accomplished at high altitude X Do not circle or remain in vicinity X Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude X 2 pilots and copilots to be instructed confer with Admiral Kimmel on arrival at Honolulu for his advice X Suggest B-24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake, then Philippines by regular route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby if distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great X Best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit should be told pilots X When reach Philippines 2 copies of each photograph taken to be sent to General MacArthur, Admiral Hart Admiral Kimmel the Chief of Naval Operation and War Department X Insure that 2 B-24s fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure Honolulu.

Date: 8 November 41. Crypto-Group PL/MG CBO HRF Circ. No. 11-887

Originator:

WAR DEPT

MESSAGE 465

COM GEN HAW DEPT

Action:

COMGEN HAW DEPT

Information:

CINCPAC

Classified

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Incoming

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Mailgram—War Dept Message #466 to Comgen Haw Dept—Mailgram

Secret

PARAPHRASE

Secret

2 B-24s will depart United States for Philippines via usual route within 48 hours X Secret photographs made enroute from Wake to Moresby X Instructions covering photography and visual reconnaissance being sent in separate message movements pursuit squadrons from Honolulu to Midway and Wake contemplated X Squadrons to be ready immediately X Lack of space and

1206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

housing facilities at these points therefore personnel of these units should be held to an absolute minimum X Provide all troops with tentage X CinCPac instructed by Navy Department giving additional instructions to CinCPac and arrange for transfer units and their supply X Planes to be flown off carrier at destination X 30 days ammunition to be sent with planes X Two pursuit squadrons to be sent from United States to Hawaii as replacements as soon as possible.

Date: 28 November 41 Crypto-Group. PL/MG' CBO HRF Cir. No. 11-888
Originator:

War DEPT
MESSAGE 466
26 NOV 41
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Action:
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Information:
CINCPAC

CLASSIFIED

INCOMING

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Add to War Dept. Msg. 465 of 26th Nov. Paraphrase Mailgram

"Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation".

Date: 29 Nov '41 Crypto-group Plain CBO FWR Circ. 11-887

Originator:

WAR DEPT
26 NOV '41
COM GEN HAW DEPT
MESSAGE 465

Action:
COM GEN HAW DEPT

Information:
CINCPAC

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 72

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified Outgoing

Grp. Ct.:

Date: 8 December 1941,

From: CINCPAC

To: COMBASEFOR

Info To:

NYD PEARL
PENNSYLVANIA
Classification: Conf.

C. W. O.: 8

081055

Place 2 battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson X One to be alongside and one about 100 feet out X To be in place by 0530.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt. (JG) A S Gordon
A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 8 December 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: OPNAV

Grp. Ct.:
 Classification: Secret
 C. W. O.: HRF
 System: 18

First evidence of hostilities was presence of submarine in Pearl Harbor defense area at about 0715 local X There were only a few minutes warning of approach of aircraft which arrived at 0747 X Their first attacks against our aircraft on ground at Pearl Harbor Eva Kaneohe Hickam and Wheeler were so effective that practically none were immediately available except 10 VPB which were in air X Enemy carriers were not sighted but indications of at least 1 north and 1 south Oahu as there appeared to be 3 separate attacks ending about 0930 X Dive bombing and torpedoing most effective and in spite of magnificent and courageous work by gun crews not more than dozen enemy shot down including those by Army pursuits X Add to report of casualties Arizona blew up and most of her officers and men including Rear Admiral Kidd were lost X Floating drydock sunk X Personnel casualties estimated 2800 about one half dead X Attempted bombing of dock facilities in Honolulu killed about 200 civilians X No other damage from mines X Pearl channel is usable X In addition to ship based and planes in carriers about 30 VPB 15 Army pursuits and 13 Army bombers available X Lexington and 4 heavy cruisers from position east of Midway attempting to intercept southern carrier X Enterprise with other available light forces guarding against repetition of raid X Wake reports heavy damage from bombing by 30 planes X Guam reported being attacked by aircraft

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon
 A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

081015

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 8 December 41.
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMTASKFOR 8 1 3 12
 080532 GR 114

Classification: Secret
 C. W. O.: HRF
 Crypto Grp.: 132 S

Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into two task groups X First group concentrated Indo China area X Second group plus 3 Kongos unaccounted for X Opnav opinion latter force or part attacked Pearl XX Composition second group follows 3 or 4 CA 2 or 4 CV 2 desrons of 2CL 28 DD 1 Subron of 9-12 subs and fast transport force containing 20 ODD APS XX First fleet less seaplane tenders and 1 desron may be in support according Opnav.

Secret Certified to be a true copy

Lt (JG) A S Gordon
 A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7 December 1941.
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COM 11
 080504

Info To: ASP Hawaiian Area Com 14
 Grp. Ct. 21
 Classification: CON

If NPM 26.1 goes off air rebroadcast message from 4205 kcs.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon
 A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date
From: CINCPAC
To:

Info To:
OPNAV
CINCAF
Classification: Secret
System: 132-S

COMTASKFOR 15.1
COMTASKFOR 15.1
ø8ø2øø

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States X Taskforce 15.1 proceed direct San Francisco taskforce 15.5 proceed Sydney.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon
A S GORDON LT (JG) USNR

Sent at ø8ø245
Frequency LL

Secret

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 8 Dec 1941.
From: CINCPAC
To: CTF 8
ø8ø1ø5

Classification: Conf:

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy carriers may be both North and South of Oahu.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (jg) F. R. Bunting
LT (JG) F. R. BUNTING, USNR.

Sent at ø11ø

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 8 December 1941
From: CINCPAC
ø72354

To: CTF 8
Classification: Conf

Detroit Phoenix St Louis New Orleans 14 destroyers and 4 minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you X Also Minneapolis and 4 minelayers ordered to join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel as necessary.

Certified to be a true copy.

Lt (JG) A S Gordon
A S GORDON Lt (JG) USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMTASKFOR 8

Info To:
CTF 1
CTF 3
Grp. Ct.
Classification: Conf.

ø72332

Radio bearings indicate Akagi bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167

Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt. (jg) F. R. BUNTING, USNR No 12-3ø5

Sent at ø72332.

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7 December 41
 From: CINCPAC
 To: CTF 12
 CTF 3 AND 8

Grp. Ct.:
 Classification: Conf.
 Originator: 95.
 C. W. O. O.

Ø72328

Cancel Midway Marine Flight
 Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) A S Gordon
 A S GORDON Lt (jg) USNR
 12-3Ø4

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified Outgoing

Date: 7
 From: CINCPAC
 To: ASP HAWAIIAN AREA

Grp. Ct.:
 Classification Conf
 C. W. O.: HO
 System: ROO

Ø72245

If NPM Fox goes out guard harbor circuit
 Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (jg) A S Gordon
 A S GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2258
 Frequency 42Ø5

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

From: CINCPAC
 To: MINNEAPOLIS
 Info To:
 COMTASKFOR 8

Grp. Ct.
 Classification: Con
 Precedence: Prior
 System: RDO
 Crypto Grp.: 74Ø

Use plane to search Sector 135 to 18Ø distant 15Ø miles from Pearl X
 Certified to be a true copy

Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon
 A. S. GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

Ø7223Ø December 41

Serial No. 12-299

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: ASP HAWAIIAN AREA

Grp. Ct.
 Classification: Conf.
 System: RDO
 C. W. O.: HO

222S

Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point X Attack.

AR

Certified to be a true copy

Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon
 A. S. GORDON Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 23Ø2
 Frequency 26.1

1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41
From: CINCPAC
To: ALL SHIPS PRESENT

Grp. Ct.
Classification: Conf.

Z F5L 072217 CBQ TART O BT

All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable X Report Comtaskfor One in Detroit.

000 2225 SN 7
2562

Certified to be a true copy

W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2225
Frequency 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41
From: COMBATFOR
To: COMBATSHIPS

Grp. Ct.
Classification: Con

2203 BT

Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when ready and Number X 2 California planes at Ford Island probably ready.

Certified to be a true copy

W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR

Sent at 2211
Frequency 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date: December 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: All ships present
Info to: COMTASKFORCE S

Grp. Ct.
Classification: Conf.
C. W. O.: NL

Z 0F2 2132 00 Q 0GS O BT
Urgent

All ships departing Pearl organize as Taskforce One undivided Combesbatfor assume command report Taskforce 8.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR.

Sent at 2135
Frequency: 26.1

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

Date: 7 December 41.
 From: CINCPAC
 To: All ships this circuit

Grp. Ct.:
 Classification: CONF
 System: RDO
 C. W. O.: NL

090 V F5L O BT

Urgent

Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods
 W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2135
 Frequency: 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 41
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMTASKFORCE 8
 ØGS V ØF2 BT

Grp. Ct.:
 Classification: CON

DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 17S from Barbers point.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods
 W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2116
 Frequency: 4295

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 41
 From: COMBATFORCE
 To: Captain of Yard
 Navy Yard Adm Bldg.

Grp. Ct.:
 C. W. O. SA
 Crypto Grp.: LL
 System: LL

The California is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.

Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods
 W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 2112
 Frequency: Landline

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPAO

Classified outgoing

Date 7 December 1941
 From: CINCPAC
 To: COMTASKFORCE ONE
 Z ØF2 2Ø45 ØG1 O BT

Grp. Ct.
 Classification: CONF

Urgent

Do not send any more cruisers to sea.

Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (JG) A. S. Gordon
 A. S. GORDON, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at 205Ø
 Visual

1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: ASP
Z ØF2 2Ø25 CSQ WING O BT
Urgent

Grp. Ct.:
Classification: Conf.

Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.
Certified to be a true copy:

Lt (Jg) F. R. Bunting
LT (JG) F. R. BUNTING

Sent at . . . 2Ø32
Frequency . . . 2562

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified outgoing

Date 7 DEC 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMTASKFORCE 8
Z ØF2 2Ø16 ØGS O BT
Urgent

Grp. Ct.
Classification: Conf.
System: RADIO

Two enemy carriers reported 3Ø miles southwest Barbers Point.
Certified to be a true copy:

W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR

Sent at . . . 2Ø2Ø
Frequency . . . 42Ø5

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified
Outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMTASKFORCE 8
" " 12
" " 3

Grp. Ct.:
Classification: Conf C. W. O.: SA
System: RADIO

Z F5L 2Ø12 XG2 ØG3 ØGS Y O-BT

Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching X some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X addressees operate as directed com Taskforce 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force unknown.

Certified to be a true copy:

Sent at . . . 2Ø48
Frequency . . . 42Ø5

Lt. (Jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt. (JG) F. R. BUNTING, USNR

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

CINCPAC AND CINCPA

Classified
Outgoing

Date 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMTASKFORCE ONE
Z ØF2 195Ø ØG1 O BT

Grp Ct.:
Classification: Conf C. W. O.: SA
System: Radio

Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to see

and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.
Urgent.

Sent at . . . 1956 2005

Certified to be a true copy :

Lt. (jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt. (jg) F. R. BUNTING, USNR

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 73

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:
Copy of Cincpac Secret ltr. dated 12 December 1941, file L11-1(1)/(50), Serial 02019, Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

is a true and correct photographic copy of the document in the official files of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

By direction of Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area.

R. E. Keeton,
R. E. KEETON.

[1]
Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941.

L11-1(1)/(50) (02019)

Secret

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

References:

- (a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
- (b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
- (c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.

1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:

(a) **BATTLESHIPS.**

ARIZONA sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.

CALIFORNIA sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft torpedoes; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

NEVADA damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and aircraft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

OKLAHOMA capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.

PENNSYLVANIA slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been completed and ship is ready for service.

[2] **MARYLAND** damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss. Ship was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and expected to be fully ready for service 13 December.

TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 2 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which

cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the ARIZONA fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the TENNESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.

WEST VIRGINIA sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

(b) *CRUISERS.*

HELENA damaged by bomb hit at frame 30, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 50 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in drydock #2 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side. Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock #1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully effective by 16 December.

[3] RALEIGH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the RALEIGH following completion of the HONOLULU to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

(c) *DESTROYERS.*

CASSIN and DOWNES damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. CASSIN was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on DOWNES. DOWNES appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs to CASSIN will be forwarded later.

SHAW hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will be forwarded later.

(d) *AUXILIARY VESSELS.*

OGLALA sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ton dock at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded at a later date.

UTAH damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

CURTISS damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which destroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are [4] proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one amidships crane by 15 December.

VESTAL damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor, is undertaking repairs with own repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.

2. It is believed that the sinking of the OKLAHOMA, NEVADA, CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA is in large part due to the ships having been in condition XRAY. Had time been available to set condition ZED before receiving damage, progressive flooding might have been avoided.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:
 Buships
 Buord

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Cincpac File No.
A16-3/(05)/
Serial
SECRET

1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/02088) dated December 21, 1941
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
1. Forwarded.

W. S. PYE.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Dec. 21, 1941.

Cincpac File No.
A16-3(02088).
SECRET.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the planes remaining.

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for the magnificent behaviour of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented herewith by enclosure (C).

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining missing narratives have been received.

H. E. KIMMEL.

[1] Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16-3/(02088)

Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec. 21, 1941.

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
Enclosure:

- (A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Cincpac secret letter L11-1(1) (90) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
- (C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships.
- (D) Disposition of our forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer

Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid—Not Drill". Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and strafing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes.

(Enclosure D)

[1]

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., December 20, 1941.

(A) DISPOSITION OF TASK FORCES

TASK FORCE ONE

Batdive 2 and 4 (less COLORADO)-----	5 BB
Crudiv 9 (less BOISE)-----	4 CL
Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK)-----	17 DD
RALEIGH-----	1 OCL
OGLALA-----	4 DM
Mindiv 1 (overhaul)-----	1 OCM

Disposition: In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.

TASK FORCE TWO

Batdiv 1-----	3 BB
Crudiv 5 (less PENSACOLA)-----	3 CA
Desrons 4 and 6-----	18 DD
DETROIT-----	1 OCL
ENTERPRISE-----	1 CV
Mindiv 2-----	4 DM

<i>Disposition: At sea as Task Force EIGHT</i>	<i>In Port</i>
ENTERPRISE	Batdiv 1
Desron 6	Dearon 4
Crudiv 5	DETROIT
	Mindiv 2

Position of Task Force EIGHT: 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward returning from landing VMF at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.

TASK FORCE THREE

Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE)-----	7 CA
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10)-----	5 DD
Minron 2-----	13 DM
LEXINGTON-----	1 CV

[2] *Disposition: At sea as Task Force TWELVE.*

LEXINGTON.

Crudiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA.

Desron 5 less Desdiv 10.

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine

VMSE's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats. MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea S.W. of Oahu—normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

TASK FORCE SEVEN

At Midway-----	2SS
At Wake-----	2SS
At Mare Island-----	5SS
At San Diego-----	4SS
En route to Pearl-----	4SS
At Pearl-----	5SS
PELIAS-----	1AS

TASK FORCE NINE

VP-21—At Midway. 7 searching 120-170. 1450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice.	
VP-11—4 hours notice-----	12
VP-12—30 minutes notice-----	6
4 hours notice-----	5
VP-14—In air (with depth charges)-----	3
30 minutes notice-----	3
4 hours notice-----	4
VP-22—4 hours notice-----	12
VP-23—4 hours notice-----	11
VP-24—4 in air conducting tactics with SS-----	4
on 30 minutes notice-----	1
	72
Overhauling-----	9
	81

[3]

TANGIER—In port.
CURTISS—In port.
MCFARLAND
HULBERT
THORNTON

All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage to the planes prevented.

MARINE PLANES

VMF 221—Wake-----	---
VMSB 231—Enroute Midway LEXINGTON-----	---
VMSB 232—Ewa 4 hours notice-----	18
VMJ 252—Ewa-----	2

BASE FORCE

ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.

Aircraft of Base Force

VJ-1—9 J2F	Pearl
9 JRS	Pearl
VJ-2—10 J2F	Pearl
4 PBV-1	(2 at Johnston)
VJ-3—1 J2V	Pearl
4 JRB	at Maui
1 JRF	
2 BT	

In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port and the submarine tender PELIAS.

The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.

(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on 15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. [4] This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
- (c) A combination of both.

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port. At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5"/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the Fleet would be operating during the day.

Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and recognition. They search the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual [5] contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday morning.

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800, followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl" at 0812.

The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.

(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

The 4 PBY's operating with the submarine started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.

No plane in those areas searched was anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief advised Task Force THREE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued as soon as enemy was located.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the [6] message should have been NOT in sight.

In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223--90 miles from Pearl Harbor." These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat south by west of Pearl. At 1020, 15 VSB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7 PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

Army—2 B-17
 2 A-20A
 3 B-18
 3 B-17 095-165, 300 miles
 Navy—4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles
 2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles.
 3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles
 4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

Battleship & Cruiser Planes

6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles
 9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles
 6 J2F in westward sector

[7] The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force

TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jalint.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.

[8] (h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows:

Task Force TWELVE	—	18-30 N
		168-40 W
Task Force EIGHT	—	20-50 N
		158-50 W
Task Force ONE	—	20-32 N
		159-45 W

Task Force EIGHT was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a south-easterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston Island triangle was completely covered.

In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200 miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to seaward because of the small number of available planes.

(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.

9 December

On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S. S. W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150 mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.

After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.

Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.

[9] Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

300-010	500 miles	10 VP
010-060	300 miles	10 B-18
060-210	200 miles	18 VSO
210-030	300 miles	6 VJ
	and in the afternoon	
330-020		4 Army B-20

The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec 23, 1941.

A16-3/(05)/
Serial 02100
Secret

1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/(0208S) dated December 21, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

1. Forwarded,

W. J. PYE.

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec 21 1941.

A16-3/(0208S)
SECRET

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Report of Action of 7 December 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Cinccpac secret letter L11-1(1) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
- (C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships.
- (D) Disposition of air forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sanpan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid--Not Drill". Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and strafing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MOMAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes.

3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the planes remaining.

1222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and examination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and destroy the enemy forces.

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for the magnificent behavior of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented herewith by enclosure (C).

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining missing narratives have been received.

H. E. KIMMEL.

The attached report (enclosure (A)) is compiled from the narrative reports received from each ship listed in the second column, in addition to the incoming and outgoing messages of the Commander-in-Chief's file and a few intelligence reports.

This is only a partial report as individual ship's reports are still being received. The report contains a few inaccuracies which when time permits, will be checked and verified and a corrected report submitted to the Department.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OCCURRING DURING JAPANESE AIR RAID ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

0618	On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, (Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELLOT, FANNING, BENHAM, GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were returning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vicinity Wake Island. From position approximately 215 miles West of Pearl routine scouting flight launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector through 045-135° for distance 150 miles. These planes to proceed Pearl. Three planes also launched to establish inner air patrol.
0630 ANTARES	Arrived off Pearl Harbor, from Canton and Palmyra with 500 tons steel barge in tow. Sighted suspicious object 1500 yds. on stbd. quarter. Appeared to be small submarine but could not positively identify it. Accordingly notified inshore patrol ship, WARD, to investigate it.
0633 ANTARES	Observed Navy Patrol plane circle and drop 2 smoke pots near object.
0645 ANTARES	Observed WARD commence firing for 2 minutes. Patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charged object which disappeared. 0700 VP Squadron 24 Had four of the six PBV5 planes depart Pearl Harbor for scheduled training exercise in operating area C-5. One of the remaining two planes was out of commission for structural changes; the other in standby status for ready duty.
0700	Plane 14P-1 sank enemy sub. 1 mile off P. H. entrance. FORCES UNDER COMMAND OF PATWING TWO (COMTASKFOR 9) disposed as follows: Patron 21-Midway; Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohoe; Patron 21, 22, 23, 24, Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute from P.H. for Midway. Condition of readiness B-5. (50% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Specific duty assignments required 6 planes from Patron 14 24 and 12 to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. Total number of planes ready for flight or in the air in 4 hours or less: 72. At the time first bomb dropped 14 patrol aircraft were in the air (7 on search from Midway) 58 ready for flight in 4 hours or less. Nine undergoing repairs.

- 0735 PATRON 21 Patwing 2 staff duty officer received and decoded message 14P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor.
- 0740 PATRON 21 Staff duty officer C-C informed by CPW2 of patrol plane sinking report. Patwing 2 proceeded to draft a search plan.
- 0715 KEOSANQUA Began to receive tow from ANTARES. 0758.
0726 HELM Underway from berth X-7 for deperming buoys at West Loch. All hands at special sea detail stations. Both boats manned and in the water with instructions to follow the ship to West Loch. All magnetic compasses and chronometers had been left in the BLUE preparatory to deperming.
- 0743 Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl. Received message from plane #1 of VP14 to CTF 3 that plane had sunk one enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.
- 0745 AVOCET Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.
TUCKER Nested alongside WHITNEY. 5" gun #3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 cal. machine guns fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.
PATRON 11 Two planes in hangar—4 planes at south end of hangar—6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine guns manned in a plane being removed from the hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned and guns moved to safer position. Set up 2 machine gun nests near south end of hangar. Damage received: 7 planes burned; one wrecked; and four damaged but can be repaired. All hangar, office equipment, and stores destroyed.
- 0745 PATRON 12 Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned machine guns in planes, mounted machine guns in pits and used rifles. Observed second wave of horizontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses—8 PBV-5's—planes completely destroyed, two severely damaged; two moderately damaged, all hangar, office equipment and stores destroyed.
- 0750 TRACY Moored port side to Berth 15, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, undergoing overhaul. PREBLE and CUMMINGS moored to starboard in that order. Ship totally disabled with main auxiliary machinery boilers and gun batteries dismantled.
- 0750 TAUTOG Observed enemy three plane formation of dive bombers over Aiea fleet landing on southwest course. Enemy character not discovered until bombs were dropped.
- 0750 CALIFORNIA Sounded general quarters and set condition Zed. Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieutenant, was S. O. P. on board and made preparations for getting underway.
- 0750 CASSIN'S Commanding Officer observed about 100 feet away from starboard side of dry dock #1 at altitude of 100 feet an airplane with large red disks on bottom of wings. Sounded general quarters and made attempts to locate ammunition; part of 5" guns under overhaul. .50 calibre machine guns were unlimbered.
- 0750 PATRON 21 Drafting of CPW2 search plan completed.
0750 OKLAHOMA (0750 or 0753) struck by 3 torpedoes on port side frames 25, 35-40 and 115. Ship heeled to port 45° meanwhile A. A. batteries manned and G. Q. executed. Rapid heeling of ship and oil and water on decks rendered service to guns ineffective.

- 0750 CURTIS Moored in berth X-22, condition X-RAY. Number 3 boiler steaming. Ship at G. Q. Ship strafed by fighter planes. Observed bomb hit on VP hangar at NAS. UTAH, RALEIGH and RICHMOND attacked by torpedoes.
- 0750 PYRO Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard noise of low flying aircraft and explosion in Navy Yard area. Observed two low wing monoplanes about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was observed to be Japanese. Sounded General Quarters and prepared to get underway.
- 0752 AVOCET Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 3'' A. A. battery. Hit Japanese plane which had just turned away after torpedoing CALIFORNIA. Plane burst into flames and crashed near Naval Hospital. Fired 144 rounds 3'' 50 cal. and 1750 rounds .30 cal.
- 0753 PRUITT PRUITT reports 10 planes flying low, 200 ft., bombed Ford Island and blew up hangar.
- 0753 TERN Notified of attack and made preparation for getting underway.
- 0753 TRACY Observed BB's attacked from astern by about 10 dive bombers. Torpedo planes at about 100 feet approached from Easterly direction attacking BB's. TRACY O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BB's (10 planes and Ford Is. from North). Attack followed by horizontal and dive bombers on same objective plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed close enough to observe that it was a single engine by-plane probably type 94.
- 0754 GAMBLE Heard explosions on Ford Island.
- 0755 BAGLEY Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs to starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in action over Hickam Field. They were believed at that time to be Army bombers.
- BOBOLINK Shortly after this time enemy plane approached from the direction of Merry Point at about 30-40 feet altitude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOMA and retired. Opened up with forward machine guns on attacking plane. Machine gun fire bagged 8th plane, it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded in bank 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in channel. Continued machine gunning enemy planes. 3 planes believed to have been shot down by BAGLEY.
- BREESE Observed about 12 dive bombers centering their attack south hangars of Ford Island.
- Moored in berth D-3, Middle Loch, in nest with division order of ships from starboard U. S. S. RAMSAY, BREESE, MONTGOMERY, and GAMBLE. Observed bombing of old hangar on Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters, set Condition "A", and made preparations for getting under way. Sent boats to landing to pick up men.
- CACHALOT Moored at Berth #1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing scheduled overhaul.
- CASTOR Sounded general quarters. Ship berthed at Merry Point.
- CONYNGHAM Heading north moored starboard side to WHITNEY at berth X-S. REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELF-RIDGE outboard. Ship undergoing routine tender overhaul, receiving power from tender. Noted large fire on Ford Island and observed horizontal and dive bombing planes attacking. Sounded General Quarters.

	DEWEY	Observed UTAH to be torpedoed and to list rapidly. DEWEY at nest, DesDiv ONE, with PHELPS alongside port side DOBBIN at X-2 under overhaul.
0755	DOLPHIN	Moored portside to Pier 4, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Japanese aircraft delivered dive bomb and torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.
	HEIM	Turned into West Loch channel and headed up toward deperming buoys.
	HENLEY	Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to quarters for muster at 0755, General Alarm was sounded instead of gas alarm as customary. Observed first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew proceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm sounded the second time. Set material condition AFIRM. Made preparations for getting underway. Opened fire on light bomber, altitude about 17,000 feet apparently steady on Northerly course; approaching from seaward and passing over Ford Island.
	HONOLULU	Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard, Pearl with U. S. S. St. LOUIS alongside stbd. side. Planes were seen diving on HICKAM FIELD. At the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen approaching over fleet landing. Sounded general quarters and passed word "Enemy Air Raid". Ship prepared to get underway. A. A. batteries came into action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber and 30 caliber M. G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes attacking the BB's. From this time until raid ended 30 caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A. A. guns fired at every available target. Service ammunition expended 2,800 rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250 rounds of 5"/25 caliber.
		12 two-seat low wing monoplanes flying low from Southeast dropped one torpedo at each battleship. Saw two planes destroyed.
		18 low-wing dive bombers from Southeast. All bombed Hickam Field.
	MinDiv ONE	Undergoing scheduled overhaul, moored in repair base. Guns and ammunition removed. Crews, except the watch on board, living in Navy Yard receiving barracks.
0755	MinDiv ONE	Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. Men were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, and CUMMINGS, to assist in manning A.A. guns and handle ammunition. Meanwhile receiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to assist in fighting fires or handling ammunition. These men reported to PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the Yard. Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30 caliber MG's were reassembled and remounted and ammunition was obtained from NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO and Marine Barracks. These guns were used against the enemy making the later attacks. No ship of division suffered damage.
	PATTERSON	Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned. Opened fire with main and 50 caliber batteries. The PATTERSON considered that at least one enemy plane was shot down. The plane Claimed by PATTERSON was one observed diving on CURTISS approaching from ahead at about 400 ft. altitude. Plane was seen to fall apart at same time shot was fired by #2 gun.

PHOENIX	First attacking plane sighted from Signal Bridge attacking from north of Ford Island. Plane had all guns firing. Passed over stern of Raleigh and proceeded toward Ford Island Control Tower and dropped bomb.
PREBLE	On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul at berth B-15 with no ammunition on board and the engineering plant dismantled. First attack on battleships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes were in low horizontal flight when observed and attacked from eastward. Enemy planes approached battleships to close range before releasing torpedoes.
RALEIGH	Commanding Officer felt dull explosion and looking out airport observed water boiling amidships. Received report that Japanese were attacking fleet. Sounded general quarters. Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand power. Docter was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to send pontoon and a lighter alongside from BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as an outrigger. Torpedoes, minus warheads were pushed overboard and beached at Ford Island. A1 stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Both anchors let go.
RAMAPO	O. O. D. observed Japanese dive bomber come in close and drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with A. A. Guns (3''). Motor Torpedo Boats on board also opened fire with machine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive bombers strafing, torpedo planes, dive bombers bombing, horizontal planes bombin. Our personnel reported 3'' shell hit plane. No losses in personnel and no material damage.
RAMSAY	Moored at berth D-3 observed bomb land on western end of Ford Island.
REID	Observed unidentified planes attacking Ford Island.
SOLACE	Received report of air raid, closed all watertight doors and ports, called away rescue parties; prepared hospital facilities and sent 2 motor launches with rescue parties to ARIZONA.
SUMNER	Was moored to the new dock at the southern end of the Submarine Base, port side to, bow to eastward. Armament is four 3'' 25 caliber A. A. guns, four 50 caliber machine guns, and one 5'' 51 caliber broadside.
SWAN	Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Railway, boiler upkeep. Observed bomb dropped on South ramp of Fleet Air Base.
TAUTOG	Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of OAHU railroad tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes were dropped from about 50 feet after submarine base pier was passed. Fourth plane in line and plane near end of line were shot down by this ship and HULBERT before torpedoes were dropped.
0755	A Japanese plane flew from North to South over a fish pond adjacent to water front resident of Lt. B. B. Black, U. S. N. R. on the East shore of Pearl City Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun fire was directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish pond, and a single fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen to run rapidly along the breakwater. This material is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots were directing fire at individuals (civilians) at a considerable distance from any military military objectives.
0755	VESTAL Sounded General Quarters. Manned A. A. battery, 3'' A. A. and 5'' broadside and .30 cal. M. G.

- VIREO** Moored inboard at Coal Dock (seaward end) with **TURKEY**, **BOBOLINK**, and **RAIL**, outboard.
- WIDGEON** No remarks except machine gun and rifle fire used against enemy. No losses or damage.
- WEST VIRGINIA** Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull of W. Va. apparently forward and on port side. Ship began to list rapidly to port. Another third heavy shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught on fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20° list on ship to port. Central station directed to counter-flood. The following last explosion flashed a flame about 15 feet high occurred forward on **ARIZONA**. A second flash occurred on the **ARIZONA** higher than the foretop. Burning debris rained on quarter deck of W. Va. After the 2 **ARIZONA** explosions the **W. VA.** began to right itself when a large fire broke out amidships. Word received from central station to abandon ship. A wall of flame advancing toward the **W. VA.** and **TENNESSEE** from the **ARIZONA**. **W. VA.** personnel began to abandon ship as fire had grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of **W. VA.** had been flooded. **W. VA.** personnel report to **TENNESSEE**. Remaining survivors ashore and elsewhere sent back to **W. VA.** to fight fire. Fire on **W. VA.** extinguished Monday afternoon.
- 0756 **BOBOLINK** Ready duty status, moored at next end, of coal docks with **VIREO** and **TURKEY** inboard, **RAIL** outboard. Informed by gangway watch that Japanese planes were bombing us. Sounded general quarters.
- GAMBLE** Wave of about 50 Japanese planes attacked battleships and Naval Air Station, Ford Island, planes flying at low altitudes about 500 feet over battleships from direction of Diamond Head, about 700 feet over Ford Island. Five successive waves of the attack of about 10 planes each.
- MinDiv TWO THORNTON** Went to General Quarters and set condition "A". Reports attack by Japanese aircraft commenced; general alarm was sounded and all hands went to air defense stations. **THORNTON** moored port side to dock at berth S-1, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. Stations manned were as follows: Control, Machine gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. machine guns, 3 .30 cal. Lewis machine guns. 3 .30 Browning automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. Springfield rifles.
- 0757 **BREESE** Ensign Chiles of **JARVIS** called Lieut. Ford and said "Someone is bombing us".
- CONYNGHAM** Opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns. Observed Torpedo planes attacking **RALEIGH**, **UTAH**, and **DETROIT** from the West.
- DEWEY** Sounded general quarters.
- HELENA** Moored at 1010 dock, berth 2, portside to dock, **OGLALA** alongside starboard side. Reported observed planes over Ford Island, 14,000 ft. altitude. Signalman on bridge with previous duty on Asiatic Station identified planes immediately. General alarm sounded and service ammunition broken out.
- HULL** General Quarters. Prepared to get underway.
- 0757 **NEW ORLEANS** Moored at berth 16, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing engine repairs, receiving power and light from dock. Sighted enemy planes dive bombing Ford Island; sounded G. Q.
- 0757 **PENNSYLVANIA** In dry dock #1. 3 propeller shafts removed. Destroyers **CASSIN** and **DOWNES** in dock ahead of **PENNSYLVANIA**. Floating dock west of new dry dock adjoining **PENNSYLVANIA** occupied by **SHAW**.

- Cruiser HELENA and OGLALA at Berth B-2, (PENNSYLVANIA normal berth). CALIFORNIA in F-3, MD F-4 inboard, OKLAHOMA outboard; Berth F-6 TENNESSEE inboard WEST VIRGINIA outboard, F7 ARIZONA, F8 NEVADA. Machine guns in foremast manned and condition watch of A. A. personnel available. Ship receiving steam water and power from yard. Heard explosions on end of Ford Is. and realized an air raid in progress after 2nd explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by Gen. Qtrs. Set Condition YOKE.
- 0757 SUMNER Signal watch and quartermaster on bridge sighted ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard. Observed two explosions in Navy Yard. Sounded alarm.
- 0757 TREVER Mine Division FOUR moored at buoys D-7, bows towards Pearl City, in order from north: TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE, and PERRY. Sounded general quarters at time when first bomb was dropped by Japanese on north side of Ford Island.
- 0757 WASMUTH WASMUTH reports first Japanese planes attacked. Went to General Quarters at once with all guns in action within 3 minutes. However, as ship was inside nest of four only two after guns could bear. Made all preparations for getting underway.
- 0757 PATRON 21 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. Message order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H. X THIS IS NOT DRILL" (a similar message was sent by CinCPac).
- 0757 ZANE ZANE moored bow and stern in nest with Mine Division Four at buoys D-7; order from port to starboard; TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE and PERRY. First call to standby colors sounded. Signalmen on watch observed single Jap plane drop bomb from about 10000 feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from Northward. Sounded General Quarters; manned A. A. battery. Commenced firing with A. A. battery at all planes passing within reasonable distances. Made all preparations to get underway.
- 0758 ANTARES ANTARES heard explosion in P. H. and observed Japanese planes delivering attack.
- 0758 BAGLEY BAGLEY observed torpedo plane come in from direction of Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua Island, 30 or 40 feet altitude, headed for OKLAHOMA. About 2 to 3 hundred yards from OKLAHOMA, plane dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships. Sounded General Quarters and commenced firing. Hit fourth plane coming in which was seen to crash in channel off Officers Club landing. Machine gun fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing torpedo to drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Number one machine gun downed plane in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane hit by BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers HONOLULU and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY. Plane went out of control, dropped its torpedo and seemed to hit I-head crane in Navy Yard. This was about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by BAGLEY came over dock but was downed with a short burst. Torpedo dropped in lumber pile and plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard side, nose directly up into air and spun into crash loosing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought down by BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of attack and after torpedo attack. This plane was shot down by 5" gun and those from other ships.

- 0758 CUMMINGS CUMMINGS observed enemy planes making torpedo attack on BBs moored to East side Ford Island. Sounded General Quarters.
- 0758 GAMBLE Went to General Quarters, opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns on planes passing over nest at about 800 feet altitude. Set material condition affirm except for certain protected ammunition passages.
- 0758 JARVIS General Quarters sounded on JARVIS.
- 0758 HULBERT HULBERT sounded general quarters. Torpedo plane sighted heading west over east lock preparing to launch torpedo against battleship off Ford Island. HULBERT reports bringing down 1 Japanese torpedo plane by .50 cal. A. A. fire from berth S-3, Submarine Base.
- 0758 HULL Gangway watch opened fire with .45 caliber pistol on two (2) planes crossing bow within 50 yards.
- 0758 MUGFORD Moored port side to the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, berth No. 6, Navy Yard. U. S. S. JARVIS moored port side to MUGFORD. Attack started. Japanese planes dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs struck the sea plane landing ramps followed by explosions near hangars. Several Japanese planes came in low from southwest and released torpedoes which struck OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy torpedo planes came in continuously from same direction and fired torpedoes at the BBs.
- 0758 REID REID went to General Quarters.
- 0758 RIGEI Ford Island attack by 10 dive bombers from North at 10,000 feet.
- 0758 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japanese). Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on stern on fire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair I. Smoke so thick, cannot see. Repair I have man standby magazine flood, Turret III. All boats on fire. Fire in maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop seems to be out. WEST VIRGINIA's quarterdeck and planes on fire. Fire on Turret III. Could not get morphine out of doctor's room because it was unsafe; men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe open. D-310 excessively hot—investigate. Squadron of planes diving on Navy Yard. Repair I, unit 3, abandoned station—too hot. Fire on topside seems to be under control. D-310-A is all right. Set Condition ZED in lower handling room of Turret III. OKLAHOMA seems to be capsizing. CALIFORNIA down by the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has pretty bad fire below Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon after attack began; one hit (bomb) on face of Turret II, and bomb hit on top of Turret III, penetrating.
- 0758 THORNTON THORNTON commenced firing with .50 cal. machine gun battery followed immediately by .30 cal. machine guns and .30 cal. rifles.
- 0759 GAMBLE GAMBLE opened fire with 3"/23 cal. AA guns, firing as planes came within range, fuses set 3 to 8 secs.
- 0759 HELM First enemy plane sighted in shallow dive over Ford Island, headed Northwest. Observed first bomb hit on hangar at southwest end of Ford Island. Called crew to General Quarters. Opened magazines and got ammunition to guns.
- 0759 JARVIS Lieut. Ford and Lieut. Johansen of JARVIS reach bridge. Jap torpedo planes coming in at 30 to 60 second intervals, approaching from Merry Point direction and attacking BBs.
- 0759 SUMNER Observed torpedo planes approach over S. E. Loch attacking BBs, circling Ford Island and flying off to south west.

- 0759 WHITNEY Observed air raid attack by Japanese air force and explosions on Ford Island. WHITNEY moored bow and stern to buoys X-8 and X-8x, 6 fathoms of water, supplying steam, electricity, fresh and flushing water to CONNYNGHAM, REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELFRIDGE, moored alongside to port.
- 0759 PELIAS PELIAS reports 9 dive bombers attacked out of direction of sun the Battleships. One broke off and dive bombed PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0800 - - - - Two officers from ship hiking in back of Aiea witnessed attack. They stated later that 3 separate flights of planes appeared at 3 levels: low, medium and high from the north.
- 0800 VIERO C. O. VIERO heard an explosion. Immediately Japanese planes were seen, and General Quarters sounded.
- 0800 ANTARES ANTARES under machine gun fire. Topside hit by machine gun bullets. Bomb and shell fragments. Being unarmed no offensive tactics were possible. In order to avoid placing ship and personnel in jeopardy, authority was requested to enter Honolulu harbor.
- 0800 COMINBATFOR Comincraft in OGLALA observed enemy bomb fall seaward and Ford Island; no damage. The next bomb caused fires near waters. Flames flared up from structures southend of island. Next bomb fell alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1 eastside of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between fifty and 100 feet of water, dropping 3 torpedos or mines in channel on line between OGLALA and seaward end of Ford Island. Torpedo hit OGLALA and HELENA simultaneously. These ships were moored abreast of B-2 of ten ten dock OGLALA outboard. Both ships opened fire with A.A. battery. OGLALA signalled C-C possibility that mines had been dropped. Two contract tugs were hailed to haul OGLALA aft of HELENA. Submersible pumps for OGLALA were obtained from HELENA, but could not be used as no power was available. Observed one Jap plane shot down. Planes were strafing as well as bombing. Observed 4 battleships hit with bombs, fires broke out, and one battleship tured over. Enemy planes appeared to fly in groups of 6 to 10. NEVADA underway to clear channel, but apparently was struck by torpedo or mine. A minute later 2 bombs fell only one hit in the NEVADA. On 2nd attack observed bomb dropped on fwd part of PENNSYLVANIA in dry-dock. Flames appeared from two destroyers in the same dock. Observed another Jap plane fall in water. Observed bomb fall close to destroyers in floating drydock. Destroyer later caught on fire.
- 0800 CASSIN CASSIN saw another plane come down to about 75 feet on parallel course drydock #1. Plane dropped torpedo aimed at CALIFORNIA at range 200 yards.
- 0800 CASTOR CASTOR 3" A. A. and .30 cal. machine guns commenced firing against enemy torpedo planes, low and close aboard, and against dive bombers. Observed one enemy torpedo plane at about 500 to 700 yards range and 500 ft. altitude due aft of ship and heading across to Ford Island with parts of fuselage shot away. Plane grounded either on Ford Island or beyond. Removed covered lighter alongside with 450 aerial depth charges.
- 0800 DOLPHIN Machine guns and rifles manned and fired at enemy aircraft which were flying very low. Ready identification could be made by the large red balls on each

- wing. Report received plane had been shot down and dove into channel off pier 3.
- 0800 BLUE UTAH torpedoed. General alarm was sounded, and word passed throughout the ship to man battle stations and prepare to get underway immediately.
- 0800 RIGEL RIGEL vicinity #1 dry dock and ten ten dock strafed and bombed by 15 dive bombers from South. Altitude 600 to 100 feet.
- 0800 WHITNEY WHITNEY sounded general quarters. First plane passed over ship low altitude, strafing with machine guns.
- 0800 HELM Torpedo planes sighted approaching from direction of Barber's Point. They passed over West Loch channel and dropped torpedoes either in North Channel or across the island. Targets for these planes appeared to be ships in berths F-9 to F-13. The planes came in low, and several strafed the ship. All bullets missed the ship by a few feet. No fire was opened, since the forward machine guns, which could bear, were covered with preservative grease and had to be cleaned before they could fire.
- 0800 HELM Backed engines and commenced maneuvering ship out of West Loch channel to head for entrance.
- 0800 JARVIS Ensign Greene OOD of JARVIS reported on bridge. Prior to this he had been directing activities around the quarterdeck. He was told to go to the after firing battery. Ensign Chiles was actively organizing the forward battery without orders. Ensign Fleece already on the director. Orders given to open fire.
- 0800 MUGFORD Commenced assembly of engineering plant which had been placed out of commission for yard overhaul. Connected fuel oil hose to yard line. 8,000 gallons total on board.
- 0800 PHOENIX Bombing attack on BBs. Plane markings, varied U. S. swastikas, and rising sun painted on fuselage.
- 0800 RALEIGH Opened fire with AA battery of 3"/50 cal. 1.1" and .50 cal. guns. Ship started to heel to port and received report that torpedo had struck #2 fireroom. #1 and 2 firerooms and forward engine-room completely flooded. Fire in #3 went out. Directed counter-flooding. As it appeared that ship would capsize, orders were given to jettison topside.
- 0800 RALEIGH Both planes successfully hoisted out by hand. Doctor was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to cut men out of hull. Sent signal to send pontoons and lighter from alongside BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as outrigger. Torpedoes minus warheads were beached at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids, and life rafts and booms were jettisoned. Anchors were let go.
- Attacked by torpedo plane and bombing plane. Sounded General Quarters. Received severe underwater hit frame 84, portside. Followed by another hit which caused ship to list 15°. Passed word "all hands on deck". Not possible to repel attack as all ammunition was in magazines and secured. 5" and 1.1 guns covered with steel housing; .50 and .30 caliber machine guns dismantled and stowed below decks. Ship covered with two layers 6 by 12 timbers. Above conditions necessitated by UTAH being used by ships as bombing target during current operations. Received bomb explosion in port aircastle.

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0801	PRUITT	Reported OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA attacked from southerly direction. Number of torpedo planes attacked from southeast.
0801	NEVADA	Observed enemy air attack. Sounded general quarters. Two machine guns forward and two aft had been already on continuous watch under the alert program.
0801	MUGFORD	Sounded General Quarters.
0801	SUMNER	Saw dense smoke rising behind Kualuahi Peninsula believed from ARIZONA, blazing oil floating down from line of BBs. Opened fire—#3 gun manned and commenced firing four minutes after the attack on Navy Yard was observed, and before any other gun in the vicinity had commenced firing. Made direct hit on and destroyed torpedo plane making approach on BBs.
0801	HELENA	Opened fire. Hit by torpedo, range 500 yds., starboard side, approximately frame 75, 18 feet below water line. Four near misses from bombs received and one strafing attack with little damaged. Issued gas masks and protective clothing. Once gun opposition was in full swing, Japanese planes were noted to turn away from gunfire or keep at respectable altitude.
0802	DEWEY	Four .50 caliber machine guns fired at planes attacking battleships and Ford Island.
0802	TREVER	Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns.
0802	NEVADA	Opened fire with machine guns on enemy planes approaching on port beam. One plane brought down 100 yards of NEVADA's port quarter; one plane dropped torpedo which struck the NEVADA on port bow.
0802	PENNA.	Attack by Torpedo planes from west and south, about 12 or 15. PENNA. reported as first ship opening fire on plane. After release of torpedoes three planes came in low from port beam strafing PENNA., though not affected. Bearing of torpedo attack and one enemy plane observed to burst into flames 2000 yds on stbd bow. Dive bombing attacks and torpedo attacks on Pearl Harbor, and dive bombing attacks on Hickam Field.
0803	CUMMINGS	After Machine Guns opened fire on Japanese torpedo planes.
0803	CALIFORNIA	Opened fire with machine guns and ready guns, on torpedo planes.
0803	SWAN	Opened fire with 3" A. A. guns. All sea valves and hatches closed and commenced placing boilers in commission. Observed one direct hit with 3" gun—plane crashed beyond drydock area. No material damage suffered.
0803	CACHELOT	Enemy planes passed within range and arc of guns. Opened up with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns.
0803	NEVADA	NEVADA opened fire with 5" A. A. Members of crew claim both broadside scored direct hit on torpedo plane which disintegrated in midair.
0804	JARVIS	Machine guns opened fire.
0804	WHITNEY	Commenced firing with .50 cal. AA guns. Received signal to get underway.

- 0805 MUGFORD Opened fire with .50 caliber MG's. Shot down Japanese plane, altitude 800 feet on the stbd. quarter, passing aft on stbd. hand. This plane had fired a torpedo at the U. S. S. OGLALA.
- 0805 TRACY Observed torpedo planes coming in from easterly direction and launching torpedoes at BBs at Ford Is. At first attack ship closed up as much as possible and broke out fighting equipment.
- 0805 NEW ORLEANS Sighted enemy torpedo planes on port quarter, flying low across stern. Rifle fire and pistol fire opened from fantail as first planes flew by to launch torpedoes at battleships. Manned 1.1 battery and machine guns aft in time to fire at three or four enemy planes.
- 0805 VESTAL Struck by two bombs. VESTAL moored to port side of ARIZONA B-F7. One bomb struck stbd. side fr. 44. Penetrated 3 decks, exploding in GSK stores, cutting fire main and electric cables in crew space. Hold set on fire and wrecked. Another bomb struck at fr. 110 on port side, passed through the shops and fuel oil tank. Bomb explosion forward damaged practically all stores. Heat of explosion necessitated flooding fwd. magazines. Material damaged consisted of 3 life rafts, 6 mooring lines, one gangway, port lenses and windows broken.
- 0805 VESTAL Opened fire, and shortly after A. A. breach jammed, blast from ARIZONA cleared gun station, killing one man. Fired with machine guns on enemy planes until they were withdrawn. Fired at torpedo plane which was seen to burst into flame and disappear over Ford Island. Following personnel damage was done: 9 dead, 7 missing, 19 in hospital.
- 0805 RIGEL BBs attacked from altitude 185 feet from southeast by 12 torpedo planes, 300 to 500 yard range.
- 0805 HELM Opened fire with after machine guns at planes over main channel, followed shortly by forward machine guns firing at passing torpedo planes.
- 0805 HULL #4 machine gun opened fire.
- 0805 CURTISS Firing with 5'' local control and .50 cal. machine guns. Lighted off boilers 1, 2 and 4.
- 0805 UTAH Listed about 40° to port. Attacking planes strafed crew as ship was abandoned.
- 0805 SUMNER Torpedo plane passed close aboard within 100 yards of SUMNER, stern on West course, altitude 75'. Levelled off for launching torpedo at BB. Struck by direct hit from sunner's #3 A. A. gun, range 300 yards. Plane disintegrated in smoke and sank in fragments. Torpedo believed sunk without exploding. 5'' opened fire. #3 gun believed to be the first 5'' gun in harbor to open fire.
- 0805 JARVIS Opened fire with 3'' A. A. guns.
- 0805 BREESE Sounded general quarters and opened fire with .50 cal and 3'' cal guns. RAMSAY liberty party returning in MONTGOMERY boat was strafed by torpedo planes which were observed to fire 3 torpedoes into UTAH and RALEIGH.
- 0805 GAMBLE Mounted and commenced firing with .30 cal. machine guns on galley deck house.
- 0805 BLUE Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns on Japanese planes diving on ships in harbor.
- 0805 CASSIN Observed HELENA open fire followed by PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0805 CALIFORNIA Reported two torpedoes struck port side, frame 100, making 40 ft. long hole extending from first seam below armor belt to bilge keel.
- 0806 PHOENIX Made radio signal to ships of sector four "prepare to get underway".

- 0806 PRUITT Observed Jap bomber shot down. ARIZONA listed sharply, smoke and flames.
- 0806 BOBOLINK and TURKEY commenced firing. Directed other boats in next to tie up to destroyer buoys adjacent to battle rafts in order to disperse.
- 0807 BLUE Opened fire with 5"/38 caliber guns on Japanese planes. The engine room was ordered immediately to light off No. 2 boiler (#1 already steaming) and made all preparations for getting underway. Repair party cleared the ship for action, and made all preparations for slipping quickly from the mooring.
- 0807 HELM Opened fire with 5" battery. No hits observed.
- 0807 HULL #1 5"/38 cal. opened fire.
- 0808 CURTISS Sent Engine Room emergency underway signal.
- 0807 PHOENIX One plane burning in water at end of pipe—line astern of berth F-8.
- 0808 CUMMINGS Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard from southerly direction.
- 0808 CONYNGHAM Opened fire with 5" gun and machine guns on attacking planes.
- 0808 MUGFORD U. S. S. OKLAHOMA had capsized. W. VA. listed heavily to port, ARIZONA blew up.
- 0809 WHITNEY Making preparations for getting underway. Supplies issued to destroyers alongside.
- 0809 HULL #5 gun, 5"/38 cal. opened fire, followed by guns #2, #3, and #4.
- 0810 THORNTON First dive bombing attack ended.
- 0810 CUMMINGS Commenced preparations for getting underway in accordance general signal. Opened fire main battery on dive bombers over BBs.
- 0810 Enemy aircraft bomb struck hangar and aircraft parking space adjacent to VP-24 parking area. Ready plane suffered a severed wing spar. Plane was then machine gunned and caught fire. Fire was extinguished and plane has been repaired and is in service. Plane undergoing structural changes not damaged and is now operating. Personnel present mounted machine guns in available planes and opened fire on attacking planes. One low-winged biplane flying from across hangar 54 on course about 250 lost both wings.
- 0810 NEW ORLEANS All batteries NEW ORLEANS except 8" battery in action. Area around berths 14-19 incl, subjected to dive bombing attack by approximately ten enemy planes. Attack turned away by combined fire of HONOLULU and NEW ORLEANS. Observed three bombs drop: one falling ahead of and another falling astern of the RIGEL. These failed to explode. Third bomb landed midway between RIGEL and NEW ORLEANS exploding and causing damage from flying fragments. During raid yard power failed or was cut off leaving vessel in darkness without power except auxiliary battery power. Heavy drain of machinery raising steam for getting underway exhausted auxiliary batteries so much that lighting was very dim and of practically no use. All work in engineering spaces, magazines and ammunition passageways conducted by flashlight. Hoists and guns worked by hand with consequent reduction of volume of fire. AA directors were off ship.
- 0810 UTAH Listed 80° to port mooring lines parting and two minutes later ship capsized. Ship abandoned.
- 0810 UTAH Capsized. Salvage operations undertaken immediately in order to rescue entrapped personnel. 32 men thus rescued. Estimated number of torpedoes to hit ship about 5; no bombs were observed to have hit.

- 0810 PHOENIX MG battery opened fire on attacking planes.
 0810 DEWEY Guns 1-2-3 and 5.5", no power on ship.
 0810 HELM Fire from port machine gun hit plane approaching from South. Plane observed to veer sharply, catch on fire and crash behind trees near Hickam Field. Damage to enemy:—1 plane shot down by machine gun fire.
- 0810 CASSIN Observed Japanese plane crash over tree near hospital. Five high altitude, 12,000 ft, bombers passed overhead from forward aft and dropped large bombs.
- 0810 PRUITT Observed OKLAHOMA roll over.
 0810 GAMBIE Commenced making preparations to get underway. Lighted off four boilers.
- 0810 CALIFORNIA Opened fire with 5" guns on dive bombers.
 0810 W. VIRGINIA Commanding Officer, Captain M. S. Bennion mortally wounded.
- 0810 WHITNEY Set condition affirm. Commenced firing with 3" A. A. guns.
- 0810 JARVIS Counted 6 or 7 torpedoes in OKLAHOMA. NEVADA, WEST VIRGINIA, and ARIZONA also torpedoed. Apparently, ARIZONA forward magazine exploded. Noted OGLALA torpedoed alongside HELENA at 10-10 dock.
- 0610 REID Opened fire with after machine guns.
 0810 WHITNEY No material or personnel damage.
 0810 PELIAS Reports formation of high altitude planes came in from S. W. attacking battleships and Ford Island followed by another wave from the same direction. Torpedo planes were small and carried only one bomb. Dive bombers also small and carried but one bomb.
- 0810 RAIL At coal docks nested with 4 minesweepers. Opened fire with 3" A. A. 15 minutes after first bomb dropped on Pearl. Opened fire with .30 machine guns, rifles and pistols 20 minutes after first attack. A string of 20 bombs fell in channel astern. Shrapnel fell throughout ship. No material or personnel damage.
- 0812 MUGFORD OGLALA listing to port. Attack started again. Heavy A. A. fire.
- 9812 Outgoing Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl.
- 0812 COMSECTOR FOUR; Sector 4 Prepare to get underway
 0812 HULL All machine guns plus two automatic rifles on the bridge and one on after deck, firing.
- 0812 RIGEL Torpedo planes attacked from S. E. at 500 feet and attacked BBs from altitude 125 feet, range 300 to 500 yards.
- 0812 Task Force 8 received Message from CinC Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor defenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were received that it was realized hostilities with Japan had begun. TF-8 operated in area South Kaula Rock for air attack should enemy be located North or South of Oahu. No authentic information available regarding location. Maintained combat and inner air patrols.
- 0812 SIGARD Undergoing overhaul in Navy Yard stbd side to PRUIT Berth 18. Ship totally disabled as to main and auxiliary machinery and gun battery. Observed Squadron of Japanese planes coming in from Southwest, diving from 5,000 feet on Ford Island.
- 0813 CONYNGHAM Observed attacking plane shot down by fire from nest. Plane crashed near CURTISS.
- 0813 HELM Passed gate vessel.

- 0815 Aircraft in flight informed hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl. VP-24 directed to search sector 240-280 for carriers. Ten miles south of Barbers Point plane 24-VP-4 sighted unidentified submarine near force consisting of INDIANAPOLIS and 4 Destroyers. Submarine made crash dive and spot marked by float lights. Completed search through 200 miles and returned to Pearl.
- 0815 PENNA Reports NEVADA underway and about on PENNA stbd qtr. Distance about 600 yds when dive bombing attack observed approaching PENNA on port bow. 10 or 15 planes coming in succession just before reaching PENNA $\frac{2}{3}$ planes appeared to swerve to left. Number of them dropping bombs at the NEV. 1 dive bomber dropped bomb on SHAW in floating dry dock and set it on fire. NEV observed to slowly swing around head to port broadside to channel, on fire fwd. Observed 2nd Group of enemy planes fly toward Hickam Field. VIREO opened fire expending 22 rounds 3" A. A. Ammunition.
- 0815 RIGEL Undergoing major repairs and conversion at Navy Yard. No motive power available. All power etc. from yard. Air attack began. As this vessel had no armament no offensive action could be taken. Accordingly rescue work was commenced on WEST VIRGINIA personnel. About 100 men (in track of burning oil) had been blown into the water. These were rescued first. The torpedo, bombing and machine gun assaults on the WEST VIRGINIA continued while the rescue operations progressed. One rescue boat was struck by bomb and sunk. Crew thrown into water. Moored B-13 Navy Yard undergoing major repairs. Services from Navy Yard.
- 0815 SICARD Set condition of readiness "AFFIRM". 2 fire parties were formed fore and aft.
- 0815 MUGFORD Shot down one enemy plane bearing astern making approach on battleship at altitude 20 feet off water. Plane crashed on Ford Island aflame, torpedo not launched.
- 0815 PHOENIX A. A. battery opened fire.
- 0815 CASSIN Observed another group of 5 high altitude bombers passed overhead and let loose bombs.
- 0815 PRUITT Observed 12 bombing planes in close "V" formation bombed (horizontal attack) from 10,000 feet from Southwest.
- 0815 JARVIS All guns and machine guns of JARVIS in action. MUGFORD noted to be delivering high volume of fire.
- 0815 SUMNER Checked fire.
- 0817 CINCPAC Directed Compatwing TWO locate enemy force.
- 0817 HELM Sighted conning tower of submarine to right of channel, Northward of buoy #1. Gave orders to open fire, pointer fire, but submarine submerged before guns could get on.
- 0818 CONYNGHAM Opened fire with remaining 5" guns at horizontal bombers passing overhead in direction of Schofield Barracks.
- 0820 TRACY Sent men to CUMMINGS to assist batteries and approximately 15 men to PENNA to fight fires.
- 0820 HELM Opened fire on submarine off Tripod Reef; no hits observed. Submarine appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef, and in line of breakers. Steering motor short circuited—bridge lost steering control.
- 0620 SICARD Was manned 2 .30 cal. M. G.s. Bombers began to attack ships at 1010 dock and battleships in vicinity of Ford Island. SICARD hits were observed on planes but no apparent damage was done.

- 0620 VESTAL Observed torpedo pass astern and hit ARIZONA. Simultaneously ARIZ received bomb hit followed by her forward magazine exploding. Latter started fires aft and amidship of VESTAL. Shortly after that, ARIZ observed to be settling and fuel oil between VESTAL and ARIZ ignited.
- 0820 PYRO Opened fire on planes.
- 0820 MUGFORD Opened fire with 5"/38 battery.
- 0820 SUMNER Ship ready for getting underway. Members of broad-side gun crew and available engineers were armed with rifles and BAR's and stationed in upper works to act as snipers.
- 0820 CALIFORNIA Torpedo struck port side, frame 47, making an irregular hole 27 x 32 ft., the top of which is 6 ft. below bottom of armor belt.
- 0820 SOLACE Reports boat loads of casualties began to arrive. By this time all hospital supplies and facilities had been prepared for maximum service.
- 0820 NEVADA Attack slackened.
- 0820 REID Opened fire with after 5"/38 caliber on high altitude and dive bombers.
- 0820 WHITNEY Observed Japanese plane fall in flames north channel vicinity X-5.
- 0820 CUMMINGS Lull in air attack; ceased firing. Lack of DC power prevented use of director. Sound powered telephone and local control used.
- 0820 HULBERT Claims share in bringing down a bomber.
- 0821 HELM Observed torpedo pass close under stern on a northerly course.
- 0825 TRACY Ready to open fire with 3 .30 caliber.
- 0825 MUGFORD Signal received that parachutists or wrecked pilots were landing in Hickam Field.
- 0825 CALIFORNIA Opened fire on horizontal bombers at 10,000 ft. with 5" guns.
- 0825 BREESE Received signal to get underway but being inside nest could not do so.
- 0825 Outgoing To COMTASKGR 12 & COMTASKGR 8: Report position.
- 0825 SUMNER Opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard Dry Dock. These planes approached from cloud bank in South East. Heard terrific explosion in Navy Yard—vicinity of Dry Dock followed by dense cloud of smoke. Dive bomber passed 300 yards from SUMNER and DD's HULBERT and THORNTON, tail of plane ignited. Plane turned southward and disappeared over Halawa district. Observed six horizontal bombers approaching from southeast at 8,000 feet. Planes circled and approached Ford Island from Southwest and dropped bombs over DD's. Planes then circled to Southeast. One plane left it's formation, turned towards Navy Yard loosing altitude rapidly, passed SUMNER at 400 feet altitude range 500 yards; was fired on by SUMNER. When over center Southeast Loch, plane began smoking and was lost in thick smoke over Navy Yard. It was a two-seater monoplane, gunner in rear seat protected by shield, orange disk on side just abaft rear cockpit. Planes crossing low ahead of nest to Northeast were taken under fire by CONYNGHAM and nest. One burst into flame and exploded in clump of trees in Aiea Hights.
- 0826 BREESE Received report submarine was in harbor.
- 0827 SICARD Cease firing, expended 300 rounds .30 cal. M.G. ammunition.
- 0830 PENNSY Lighted fires under #4 boiler.
- 0830 CONYNGHAM Reports another plane diving toward Ford Island from Northeast shutdown by combined fire of the nest.

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0830	PENNA	Reports about 5 high bombing attacks obs. to have passed over PENNA. one from port bow one from ahead one from ahead to stbd 2 from astern. Altitude about 2000 feet.
0830	VIREO	Brought down one enemy plane which landed in vicinity of Hickam Field. 400 rounds of .30 cal. M.G. ammunition expended. One personnel casualty to PRICE, Radioman, on telephone watch astern of vessel. PRICE returned to duty 10 December. No damage to vessel. Made ready to get underway.
0830	VESTAL	Prepared to get underway.
0830	MUGFORD	Five enemy planes in V formation passed directly overhead, making horizontal bombing attack. Checked fire.
0830	SUMNER	15 Heavy bombers in 3-V formation 8 to 10 thousand feet from S. E. bombed BB's.
0830	RIGEL	Issued ammunition and ordnance stores to destroyers alongside. Secured steam to destroyers.
0830	WHITNEY	Fired at enemy plane with forward machine guns. May have hit plane.
0830	HELM	Heavy bombing attack received.
0830	NEVADA	Two Vee's high level bombers (10,000 feet) directly overhead seen intermittently through the clouds. Opened fire with all guns. Formations broke up and dropped their bombs in cane field.
0830	HULL	Opened fire on Dive bombers with 5" and forward machine guns; shot down one enemy dive bomber which crashed in flames.
0830	CALIFORNIA	Sighted conning towers of two submarines in North channel but could not open fire because of interior berth. Observed MONAGHAN proceed down channel at full speed to ram leading submarine which had just fired torpedo at U. S. S. CURTIS but missed. U. S. S. MONAGHAN dropped 2 depth charges and submarine, about 250 ton type arose upside down and sank.
0830	BREESE	Sighted strange submarine 200 yards astern of MEDUSA moored in K-23. Guns would not bear as ZANE was inboard ship.
0830	ZANE	Received signal from PENNSYLVANIA, Senior destroyer officer report on board.
0830	CASSIN	Underway from buoy X-11. Large bomb struck water 150 yards from port bow. Received signal "submarine in harbor". MACDONOUGH directly ahead made depth charge attack and cleared at high speed. HENLEY was third ship in sortie. After rounding Hospital Point, subjected to straffing attack by light bomber, coming up from astern and showing five distinct sources of machine gun fire from plane as plane passed ship. It was seen to crash offshore in a few minutes. Another light bomber approached from starboard at 2,000 feet and was taken under fire with another destroyer. Close burst forces plane to dive and it crashed into sea.
0830	HENLEY	Open fire with 5-inch, on blocks. DOWNES struck on after deck house by bombs.
0830	DOWNES	Captain returned on board. Bomb struck astern and midway between piers 13 & 14. 150 small holes were blown into port quarter RIGEL. Above waterline.
0830	RIGEL	Ready to get underway. Sighted submarine periscope on starboard quarter, distance 700 yards. Opened fire on submarine.
0835	CURTIS	First group of enemy planes taken under fire of REID with forward 5" and .50 caliber machine guns.
0830	REID	To MPL RDO SAN DIEGO & MPM RDO WALLUPE: I must have instantaneous relay for my dispatches.
0830	Outgoing	

- 0830 COM-14 To NAS Pearl: Hostile Japanese air attack x Hickham Field bombed x stay clear this area as long as gas permits x keep in contact this station.
- 0832 CALIFORNIA Reported one enemy plane shot down over Ford Island.
- 0832 SICARD observed 4 flights horizontal bombers attacking battleships, followed by 8 torpedo bombers. OKLAHOMA struck by several torpedoes, took heavy list to Stbd and capsized. ARIZONA struck by torpedoes and heavy bomb.
- 0832 PYRO Observed enemy planes crash and burst into flame towards Barbers Point. Pilots bailed out. Observed damage to ship which consisted of broken steam line; repaired by ship's force.
- 0835 SICARD Sent working party 20 men to CUMMINGS to handle ammunition, and 4 gunner's mates to NEW ORLEANS to assist her battery. 10 men previously detailed to PENNSYLVANIA to assist damage control.
- 0835 BOBOLINK Moved out of next and to first buoy. Observed Japanese plane crash near Hickam Field. Believe it result of minesweeper firing.
- 0835 PREBLE Reports first phase of attack completed.
- 0836 COM-14 To SHIPS PRESENT: Send boats to Ford Island.
- 0838 MUGFORD W. VA burning. ARIZONA on fire. Tugs trying to pull overturned OKLA clear. U. S. S. VESTAL clearing NEVADA.
- 0840 CALIFORNIA Shaken by 4 near bomb hits and splintered considerably by fragments.
- 0840 CURTIS Submarine surfaced and fired one torpedo up North channel toward destroyers. Conning tower hit twice by gun #3.
- 0843 CURTIS Ceased firing on submarine and observed MONAGHAN drop 2 depth charges. Air bubbles and slick appeared.
- 0840 CUMMINGS Opened fire to repel straffing attack. Glide bomber observed to veer away from ship with smoke trailing, passed over new boiler shop and disappeared in smoke.
- 0840 JARVIS Noted NEVADA underway and standing out. Dive bombed, hit several times and beached. SHAW hit and caught on fire in drydock. Two destroyers in drydock with PENNSYLVANIA hit.
- 0840 TREVER Ready for getting underway. TREVER could not clear because other ships astern were clearing buoys D-3 and D-4. Enemy plane brought down vicinity of Pearl City. Second plane brought down 200 yards off Beckoning Point.
- 0842 MUGFORD U. S. S. VESTAL clear of NEVADA.
- 0845 PHOENIX Ship ready to get underway.
- 0845 SICARD Observed attack broken off.
- 0845 VESTAL Observed ARIZONA quarterdeck awashed. With no steering gear VESTAL got underway while tug pulled her bow away from ARIZONA. Starting to list to Stbd VESTAL was maneuvered into position with South end of MCrews Point bearing 30° distance 910 yds.
- 0845 MUGFORD Executed signal to get underway to Task Forces One and Two. Tugs pulled OGLALA clear of HELENA.
- 0845 CALIFORNIA Commander Stone, executive officer, arrived and assumed command of CALIFORNIA. Combatfor returned on board.
- 0845 CACHALOT Dive bomb and straffing attacks made by enemy.

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0845	HULL	Second Attack. All attacks except one was broken up. One formation of three planes continued on. Two of these were shot down; one by USS DOBBIN and one by the next of ships. Two bombs landed astern of next; close to side of DOBBIN.
0845	CASTOR	Ready to get underway.
0847	BLUE	Underway upon execution of signal to get underway from berth X-7. Maintained fire on enemy planes with main battery and machine guns while steaming out of harbor. Four planes fired on with main battery were later seen to go down in smoke. It is claimed that two of these planes were definitely shot down by this vessel. One was seen to crash in field on Waipio Pena., and the second crashed into crane on stern of USS CURTISS. Two planes that dove over the ship were fired on by the .50 caliber machine guns. It is claimed that one of these planes, seen to crash near Pan American Dock, was shot down by this vessel.
0850	MUGFORD	W. VA. listed heavily to port.
0850	ZANE	Reports MONAGHAN approached and depth charged submarine. Enemy plane brought down flying over nest, struck deperming station.
0850	SUMNER	Dispatched ship's boats to Ford Island to assist in hauling ammunition.
0850	DOWNES	Hit again by bombs and set on fire. Abandoned ship.
0850	COMDESFL0T 1	To DESFL0T 1: Desdiv TWO establish Offshore patrol.
0851	MUGFORD	Executed signal to get underway and sortie according to plan E-S.
0851	COM-14	to Cincpac. Submarine reported in Pearl Harbor for Sector Commdrs.
0854	MUGFORD	Attacked started again from North.
0855	CONYNGHAM	Fired at plane straffing ahead and astern.
0855-		Underway from Buoy D-3 Middle Lock RAMSEY, BREESE, GAMBLE, and MONTGOMERY. Opened fire with AA.
1017		
0855	MUGFORD	NEVADA Underway. Dense smoke over Ford Island. A tanker was towed clear of Ford Island.
0855	PRUITT	Observed about 10 planes made high altitude horizontal bombing.
0855	WHITNEY	Observed second air attack by Japanese bombing planes.
0855	USS RALPH	Was moored bow to southward to buoy X-11 with PATTERSON to port and HENLEY to starboard.
	TALBOT	
0855	RAMSAY	Underway proceeding out of harbor. Believe RAMSAY is responsible for shooting down plane with .50 cal. Assumed anti-submarine patrol on clearing channel.
0857	CTF 2	To all ships: Enemy submarine in North Channel.
0859	UNKNOWN	To Cincpac: Ten aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor from Southwest.
0900	TRACY	Reports high altitude bombers passed overhead in several waves. One bomb fell in slip between stern of RIGEL and CUMMINGS at Berth 15.
0900	MUGFORD	Attack started again from the South. Army planes taking off from HICKAM FIELD.
0900	RIGEL	Executive Officer returned on board. Traffic congestion delayed all hands. The one exception to all hands was Lt. H. E. Morgan who did not return until 0800 next morning. Lt. Morgan's behavior is being investigated.
0900	SICARD	Observed dive bombers from S. E. attack ships moored to Navy Yard docks, followed by waves of dive and horizontal bombers on ships at Ford Island and docks.

- 0900 OGLALA Approaching 40° list to port. Ordered all hands abandon ship. Only gun crews and Cominbatfor remained.
- 0900 PHOENIX Formation of 11 planes passed over fleet on heading 070. Approximate altitude 10,000 feet. Planes appeared to be painted silver. Expended fifty rounds of 5". No apparent damage to planes. There were two flights of this nature. Time of second cannot be approximated. Expended fifty rounds of 5".
- 0900 HONOLULU Enemy bomber sighted flying directly towards this ship from direction Merry Point with an altitude of 1,000 feet. Was seen to swerve to its left, pass over the Navy Yard, smoking, losing altitude and appeared to crash near Naval Hospital. This plane was under the fire of several ships, including the port 5" and machine gun batteries of the HONOLULU. Damage to enemy observed, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21, Submarine Base, one torpedo plane shot down between berth 21 BB. (Note: Damage listed above is at unknown times).
- 0900 TAUTOG Observed planes approaching in direction Hickam Field high in southwest and mostly obscured by clouds. App. 18 planes turned left over Hickam Field and made dive bombing attacks on ships in yard. Dive appeared slow and bombs released were very low. One plane observed out of control in flames. Scattered enemy planes observed until 1130. Most dive bombers appeared to drop two bombs each.
- 0900 CALIFORNIA One bomb, possibly 15" projectile with tail vanes, struck CALIFORNIA abreast casemate one, frame 59, penetrated to second deck and exploded rupturing forward and after bulkheads of A-611 and overhead into A-705. Armored hatch to machine shop badly sprung and couldn't be closed, resulting in serious fire.
- 0900 BREESE Projectile from BREESE 3" AA battery struck dive bomber which had just attacked CURTISS. Forward section of plane with motor landed on North side of Waipie Peninsula.
- 0900 RALPH TALBOT Underway. While enroute to entrance expended 150 rounds 5"/38 cal. and 1500 rounds .50 cal. Observed two planes crash and another start to smoke badly. Two enemy planes dove low over bridge and was hit by our .50 cal machine guns. Plane crashed along shore Pearl City abeam of us. Used after 5" guns to fire on plane attacking CURTISS.
- 0900 DEWEY Second wave attack started by light bombers lasting 10 minutes under fire by DWEY throughout attack.
- 0900 PATTERSON Underway and stood out of harbor. No damage sustained by PATTERSON.
- 0900 SOLACE Ship underway and shifted from Berth X4 to Berth X13. No material or personnel damage to ship proper.
- 0900 BOBOLINK Observed suspicious sign of Japanese submarine and signalled to destroyers, but signal apparently not seen.
- 0900 BOBOLINK Observed three flights of high altitude bombers approaching from due south to north. 7 planes in each flight, altitude about 17,000 feet. One flight dropped bombs on Hickam, second flight passed directly over coal docks and dropped bombs further up in yard; third flight passed over West Lock, one plane dropping bombs near entrance while others maintained course and dropped them beyond Ford Island.

- 0900 RALEIGH Dive bomber attack came in which was met with warm reception. One bomb hit ship a glancing blow going through carpenter shop and oil tank, piercing the skin below water line and finally detonating on bottom of harbor. Plane machine gunned ship also. Steam raised in 3 and 4 firerooms and pumps started. Five bombing planes under fire were observed to crash close aboard.
- 0900 HONOLULU 5 high altitude bombers, 12 to 15,000 feet appeared. 5 high altitude bombers from South, 12 to 15,000 feet. All bombed Pearl Harbor and Ford Island Area.
- 0900 RIGEL 15 dive bombers 6 to 10 thousand feet from N. attacked DDs and NEVADA.
- 0900 SOLACE Got underway and shifted from Berth X-4, near BOBBIN and destroyers to berth X-13 in the clear. Made boat trips to WEST VIRGINIA to bring back casualties.
- 0900 DOBBIN Fired upon enemy plane headed astern of ship. Plane crashed upon trees in Navy Yard.
- 0900 OGLALA Capsized along 10-10 deck.
- 0900-0905 PHOENIX Dive bombing attack on ships berth northern side of Ford Island. Attack was made at about 30° angle, opposed with AA and MG batteries. Expended 20 rounds of 5". One plane disintegrated by DD fire.
- 0900-0930 PHOENIX Effected periodic fire on planes delivering low-level bombing attack on navy yard and ships berth there. Observed twelve scattered planes over Ford Island; air raid resumed. Opened fire with main battery on horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard industrial section.
- 0902 MUGFORD Formation of planes sighted to South. Decks of ARIZONA and W. VA. level with water. Dense smoke pouring from NEVADA.
- 0903 DOLPHIN Reports another attack from higher altitude.
- 0903 Outgoing To MIDWAY: Pearl Harbor bombed no indication direction attack take off attempt locate Japanese Forces.
- 0903 Outgoing To WAKE: Pearl bombed by Japanese be on alert.
- 0905 CURTISS Obs. 1 of 3 planes pulling out of dive was hit by CURTISS and crashed into #1 crane. Tank exploded and plane burned on Boat Deck.
- 0905 SUMNER Fired on wave of dive bombers approaching Navy Yard. Dive bombers also attacked HICKAM FIELD and BB. No hits, when firing on latter planes. Observed light dive bomber with conspicuous red tail zig-zag over Navy Yard as if observing casualties at end of phase.
- 0905 TRACY Attack by approximately 10 dive bombers from direction of the sun, which indicated drydock as objective. Group of 6, 3, and 9 planes observed at altitude of 8 to 10,000 feet. Bomb seen to fall between berths 13 and 15 in slip. TRACY gig damaged by fragmentation; no casualties.
- 0905 PREBLE Observed about 30 dive bombers make second attack in twin-motored monoplanes. Observed one bomb fall in slip 25 yards on starboard quarter. Observed a bomb fall astern of HONOLULU in berth B-21. Observed numerous bombs fall in vicinity of drydock area.
- 0905 WHITNEY Observed one Japanese plane fall down in flames on hilltop, bearing northeast, true.
- 0906 PENNSYLVANIA The second attack coming in slightly on port bow dropped bombs on ships in drydock. One heavy bomb hit the destroyer DOWNES in dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA, and one hit dock approximately

- abreast frame 20 while one hit the boat deck of the PENNSYLVANIA a few feet abaft gun #7. This bomb passed through boat deck and detonated in #5 gun #9 casemate. Fifth bomb believed to have struck water outside of dock. Observed plane crash in hospital grounds. Observers claim to have destroyed six enemy planes. Consider two hit by PENNSYLVANIA.
- 0906 MUGFORD Japanese planes diving at Ford Island from south-east. NEVADA standing down south channel.
- 0907 PRUITT Observed straffing and light bombing attack, plus heavy horizontal bombing attack from about 10,000 feet made on ships and Ford Island. One bomb hit close to stern of RIGEL.
- 0907 PENNSYLVANIA Bomb hit on dock and cut yard power, subsequently power on the ship was taken from storage batteries, meanwhile, firemain pressure cut off.
- 0907 Outgoing ALL HANDS: Cease firing on B17's attempting to land at Hickam.
- 0908 CONYNGHAM Reports one plane attacking on starboard bow shot down by nest and crashed in Pearl City.
- 0908 Com 14
to ASP Do not fire on our planes coming in.
- 0908 NEVADA Attack slackened.
- 0909 MUGFORD Bomb dropped some 400 yards on MUGFORD port bow. Ship in repair basin hit.
- 0910 PERRY Mine Division FOUR underway at intervals and stood out to take off shore patrol duty.
- 0910 SecNav to Alnav Execute WPL FORTY SIX against Japan.
- 0910 Dive bombers attacked ships at Pier 19; bombs fell in water ahead and astern within 25 yds. of CUMMINGS.
- 0910 DOBBIN Attacked by 3 enemy planes. 3 bombs dropped—all near misses. Fragments struck stern of ship injuring #4 3'' AA gun crew. 3 killed, 2 injured. Damage: small holes through decks, bulkheads, booms, #1 MWB hull damaged beyond repair.
- 0910 BLUE Passed channel entrance buoys, and set course 120 true. Proceeded to sector three to patrol station.
- 0910 RIGEL 10 to 12 dive bombers from S. attacked ships in Repair Basin with bombs and mach. guns.
- 0910 PHOENIX Second bombing attack on BB. Expended sixty rounds of 5''. After planes came out of dive and turned towards berth C-6, planes were brought under fire of MG battery.
- 0910 VESTAL Anchored in 35' of water. Soundings and draft readings showed ship settling at and listing to stbd. Draft aft increased to 27', list 6½°. C. O. Vestal decided to ground ship.
- 0912 CURTISS Reports group of planes under heavy fire attacked. During attack one bomb hit stern mooring buoy. 1 fell short, one over, one hit ship starboard side of boat deck, passed through Carpenter Shop and Radio Repair Shop, entered Hangar and detonated on Main Deck. Explosion destroyed bulk heads, deck, etc., within radius of 30 feet. Equipment destroyed in Hangar, Handling Room etc. One plane shot down 1000 yards on port bow and 1 500 yards on port beam. Another plane shot on port beam landing in water off Pan-Air dock. One plane reported crashed in cane field astern and one forward of ship.
- 0910 CONYNGHAM Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching from ahead and from direction of Schofield.
- 0910 THORNTON Second wave dive bombing attack commenced and ended at 0917. Throughout the entire period there was horizontal bombing in various Pearl Harbor areas.

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0911	MUGFORD	Horizontal Japanese bombers passed overhead.
0912	PYRO	Observed dive bombers approach from port bow, altitude 5,000 feet and release bombs. Bombs landed on concrete dock 12' from ship's side amidships. Penetrated dock exploding underneath and jarring ship.
0912	MUGFORD	Heavy black smoke coming from SHAW in floating drydock.
0913	MUGFORD	NEVADA stopped south side of south channel.
0913	PREBLE	Attack completed. No damage. No casualties sustained by this ship.
0915		Large explosion on DOWNES.
0915	HELM	Small enemy fighter approached ship from astern in medium glide and dropped two bombs, which exploded in water about 50 yards off port bow and 20 yards of starboard bow. After machine guns opened fire but did not hit plane. Shock shorted relay to steering (which had just been repaired) and damaged gyro rotor. Choke coils, tubes and resistors in sound gear burned out, echo ranging inoperative. Seems below waterline on starboard side forward sprung. A-15, A-301, A-401, and A-402 flooded. These compartments closed off and pumped out during afternoon. FS smoke generators jumped track, breaking air line connection.
0915		Captain Bunkley returned to CALIFORNIA and assumed command.
0915	NEVADA	5" AA battery fired on enemy planes to eastward. NEVADA suffered at least 6 bomb hits and one torpedo hit.
0915	MUGFORD	Thick black smoke coming from drydock.
0915	TRACY	Commanding Officer returned aboard and found 2 .50 cal. mach. guns mounted and ready. 2 dive bombers attacked out of the sun. 1 plane pulling out over sub. base and flying low over building 155 crashed in flames in vicinity of hospital point after salvo by CUMMINGS. Plane appeared to be a type 95 dive bomber, planes appeared to be at about 3,000 feet to seaward of Hickam, were 18 planes in formation type V.
0917	PRUITT	Observed low flying pursuit planes strafing with machine gun fire on ships moored in the vicinity of Berth 18. Observers on this ship believe many high altitude horizontal bombs either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area where they could not be observed. An indeterminate number of fighters took part in the raid, with approximately 30 bombers. Approaches were made on a steady course and all horizontal bombing was made in close formation at about 10,000 feet. The four cruisers and light minelayers in the Navy Yard were strafed several times by low flying planes but not a single bomb appeared to have been aimed at those ships. Small caliber fire of minelayers brought down one Japanese plane.
0917	BREESE	Cleared nest and proceeded down channel.
0920		CUMMINGS fired on a light bomber. Plane observed smoking heavily as it flew out of sight to southwestward.
0920	HONOLULU	Observed low winged dive bombers from South to Southeast, 400 feet pullout. Two bombers bombed industrial and drydock areas. One bomb, (clearly visible on its descent, 250 lbs), passed through edge of concrete dock, angle of descent 45°, and exploded underwater between ship and dock.
0920		Damage to HONOLULU: oil tanks various, decks bulged in magazines, various leaks sprung and decks slightly fukled, power lease to turret #2 grounded, turret #1 partially grounded, mercury thrown out of gyros, fore and aft, range finders, main battery de-ranged fore and aft.

0920 More Japanese planes from northwest.
 0920 CONINGHAM Opened fire on plane diving from port side of nest. No personnel or material damage.

0920 PENNSYLVANIA Flooding of drydock commenced. Both destroyers heavily on fire. Fire being transmitted to fire on water and dock which set fire to paint on starboard side of PENNSYLVANIA. No hose available for fighting fire on DOWNES, available hose being used on CASSIN.

0921 Outgoing ALL HANDS: Reported that enemy ships have red dot on bottom of fuselage.

0921 Outgoing COMBATFOR: TO ALL SHIPS PRESENT: Get underway immediately.

0923 MUGFORD PATTERSON standing out.
 0923 Outgoing COMBATFOR TO COMCRUBATFOR: Cruisers proceed as soon as possible.

0924 Landline Send over boats to capsized battleship.
 0924 Received COMSUBSCOFOR TO COMSUBDIV 43: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE be prepared to attack on information furnished later.

0924 Received Com 14: All planes approaching from Fox George and Easy.

0925 CALIFORNIA plane 205 capsized and sunk while being removed to avoid gasoline fire hazard.

0925 WASMUTH Reports second phase of attack as glide bombers and torpedo planes approached from westerly direction. Scored hits on several planes and shot down one plane which crashed on Waipio Peninsula near Middle Loch. This plane should be credited to James Patrick Hannon, seaman first class, U. S. Navy.

0925 GAMBLE One Japanese plane shot down by AA fire, falling in water on port beam about 1,000 yards away from ship. Believed shot down by ROBERTS, W. L., BM-2c, USS GAMBLE port machine gunner (#2 machine gun) .50 cal., and JOOS, H. W., GM-3c., USS GAMBLE (#1 machine gun) starboard.

0925 MUGFORD White smoke pouring from amidships on ARIZONA.
 0926 Outgoing CTF 1: Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to sea and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.

Unknown Fire at will.
 0927 Received COM 14: Aircraft coming from Barbers Point 20 or 30 miles. Flash: Enemy planes appear to be massing around Easy. Enemy planes coming from Wheeler Field.

0927 CURTISS After engine room out of commission and evacuated.
 0927 Received RDO SANFRANCISCO to AS: USAT CYNTHIA OLSEN sent distress reports enemy submarine Lat. 33 R 42 N Long 145 R 29 W.

0928 MUGFORD Shot down enemy plane after it pulled out from dive on port bow. Altitude 200 feet. With forward 50 caliber M. G. The plane was a dive bomber.

0928 Received COMAIRBATFOR TO CINCPAC: 220P planes to arrive Pearl about 0820.

0930 MUGFORD OGLALA going over to port. Personnel abandoned ship and getting on dock.

0930 Received COMSUBSCOFOR TO THRESHER, GUDGEON & LITCHFIELD: Assume service ammunition readiness condition ONE x remain in present position x report position.

0930 Received CURTISS TO CINCPAC: Unable to sortie because of damage.
 After OGLALA sank her crew were pooled out and sent to various units of the Fleet to assist ships in maintaining their batteries.

0930 **GAMBLE** Got underway and cleared mooring buoy. Reports Division commenced getting underway. U. S. S. BREESE underway.

0930 Enemy planes strafed CASTOR and NEOSHO. Detailed men to handle NEOSHO lines astern of CASTOR.

0930 **TREVER** Underway, standing out of entrance. Observed PERRY fire at submarine and MONAGHAN raming and dropping depth charge.

0930 **TENNESSEE** Observed enemy planes coming in on port beam. WEST VIRGINIA gangway still burning.

0930 **HELM** Shifted steering motor power to diesel generator; regained bridge control of steering.

0930 **CALIFORNIA** Fire broke out on main deck, starboard side of "F" Division compartment and casemates 3, 5, and 7.

0930 **BREESE** Lookout reported periscope off Coal Docks but could not be observed from bridge, or pickup by supersonics.

0930 **DOBBIN** Reports attacks appeared to have been discontinued.

0930 **WHITNEY** Reports second air attack completed.

0930 **PENNSYLVANIA** Explosions on destroyers commenced, in floating drydock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA.

0932 **WASMUTH** Underway following TREVER on orders from Lt. Comdr. L. M. LeHardy, CO ZANE and S. O. P. Min-div 4.

0933 Received COM 14: Flash: planes coming in from George.

0935 Received RALEIGH TO CINCPAC: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded x damage under control at present x unable to get underway.

0935 Received CHICAGO to CRUSOFOR: Japanese submarines reported inside and outside Pearl.

0935 Received ARMY HDQTRS: Flash: Fishing boat 1 mile off Hanakuli.

0936 Received CPW 2 to CPW 1: We are being attacked by 15 Japanese planes.

0936 CURTISS Fire under control.

0937 **WASMUTH** Lieut. J. W. Leverton, Jr., USN, Executive Officer, reported aboard and relieved Lt. (jg) J. R. Grey, USN, who had been in command until this time.

0937 Received ARMY HDQTRS REPORTS: Friendly aircraft coming from toward Barbers Point 20 or 30 planes.

0937 **GAMBLE** Japanese planes attacked near main channel entrance.

0937 **MUGFORD** Explosion on destroyer ahead of the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA in drydock.

0938 **MUGFORD** Japanese subs reported inside and outside of Pearl Harbor.

0940 **WASMUTH** Lt. Comdr. D. M. Agnew, USN, CO U. S. S. TREVER reported aboard. Proceeded out of Pearl Harbor and took up patrol off entrance.

0940 **BAGLEY** Ship underway from dock. Material damage: Broken windows and light globes and glasses on reduction gears causing loss of lubricating oil. Personnel damage: 4 men slightly injured.

0940 **TENNESSEE** Reports wounded being removed from the WEST VIRGINIA. OKLAHOMA upside down. Bow blown away on ARIZONA. Destroyers getting underway on other side of Ford Island. Fire either on ARGONNE or dock. Air attack coming in on starboard bow. WEST VIRGINIA on fire from turret 1 to bow. Flames up as high as foretop. Fire on port quarter (oil on water).

0940 **BAGLEY** Underway from dock and proceeded around north side Ford Island under belief that other channel was blocked. Because of defective bilge keel, ship was ordered to patrol off shore area and did not accompany Task Force 8. No damage to ship.

0940 NEVADA Grounded off Hospital Point.

0941 PENNSYLVANIA Observed warheads on DOWNES explode covering area with debris. Section of torpedo tube, weighing about 1,000 lbs. landed on PENNSYLVANIA forecastle. Fire brought under control before serious damage resulted. CASSIN rolled over on DOWNES. It was noted by everyone participating in action that after an hour or more heavy thirst was experienced requiring considerable drinking water. This confirms the necessity of having water at all battle stations.

0942 BREESE Cleared channel entrance with degaussing gear cut in and took station as offshore patrol in section 3.

0942 Received COM 14 To ASP & NAVSHORE ACTIVITIES: Brief concentrations reported 25 miles south by south east of Barbers Point x not definite.

0942 MUGFORD BAGLEY underway.

0943 TERN Underway from alongside deck to pick up survivors in harbor. Received 47 survivors.

0945 DEWEY Third wave of attack started by dive bombers. DOBBIN and Desdiv One were target with 3 or 4 planes attacking. One bomb hit close aboard starboard quarter and one hit water between HULL and DEWEY astern. No damage, Guns 1 and 2 firing when not blanked by DOBBIN. It is believed that Desdiv ONE destroyed two planes. Ammunition expended: 76 rounds 5", 1300 rounds .50 cal.

0945 CACHALOT Joined in fire against enemy bombers. No damage received. Nearest enemy bomb dropped 20' off starboard quarter and did not explode. Nearest torpedo passed 100 yards astern.

0945 MUGFORD OGALA capsized to port.

0946 MUGFORD Japanese planes in from SW low.

0947 MUGFORD HONOLULU underway.

0948 TENNESSEE Observed planes coming in on starboard bow; did not know whether enemy or friendly. Ship will not get underway until further orders. Engineering Department, stand by. Destroyer, from Navy Yard, getting underway. Unidentified ship in Pearl Harbor down by stern.

0950 VESTAL Grounded.

0950 BLUE Good sound contact on submarine. Maneuvered to attack and dropped four depth charges. Regained sound contact on same submarine. Dropped two depth charges. Investigated and observed large oil slick and air bubbles rising to surface. It is felt that this submarine was definitely sunk. Obtained third contact on a submarine that was apparently headed for ST. LOUIS, which was at the time heading out on course approximately 150 true, at high speed. Two depth charges dropped, and upon return noticed large oil slick on surface. It is claimed that one, and possibly two, submarines were sunk.

0950 Outgoing Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Barbers Point. (Sent to CTF 8).

0951 TENNESSEE Reports lighter alongside starboard beam on fire (ammunition lighter, top blown out, can see no ammunition on it).

0951 Received COM 14 TO ASP: Two planes seen dropping heavy charges off harbor entrance which did not explode; think they are mines.

0952 Outgoing Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.

0954 TENNESSEE Observed bow of MARYLAND on fire.

0954 Received SOPA SANDIEGO TO ASP HAWAIIAN AREA: Los Angeles Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE effective.

Unknown	SIGNAL TOWER	The following ships have left Pearl Harbor DALE ST LOUIS HENLEY PHELPS RAMSEY WASMUTH PATTERSON MONTGOMERY
0955	GAMBLE	Temporarily anchored, astern of USS MEDUSA.
0955	TENNESSEE	Still playing fire hose on ammunition lighter. Fire seems to be under control.
0955	MUGFORD	Commenced receiving fuel oil from the yard line. PERRY and GAMBLE standing out.
0956	TENNESSEE	Observed SOLACE getting underway.
0957	MUGFORD	CALIFORNIA listing to port.
0958	MUGFORD	BB's order to remain in port.
0958	TENNESSEE	Observed fire on bow of MARYLAND was under control. Superstructure on WEST VIRGINIA on fire—4 or 5 men trapped, trying to escape by crane. Fire (oil and water) at stern of TENNESSEE was out. Fire very close to D-310-M.
1000	CUMMINGS	Opened fire to repel horizontal bombing attack from the southward. One horizontal bomber observed to lose its wing. CUMMINGS gun captain #4 claimed a hit.
1000	WHITNEY	WHITNEY reports REID and SELFRIDGE underway.
1002	CALIFORNIA	Oil fire on surface of water enveloped ship starting many fires, particularly intense one on forecandle. Captain Bunkley, with approval of Commander Battle Force ordered ship to be abandoned temporarily due to enveloping oil fire on surface of water.
1002	TENNESSEE	Flood D-310-M (D-306-M and D-312-M also flooded, not isolated).
1003	MUGFORD	Japanese planes reported dropping mines in channel.
1005	GAMBLE	Underway proceeding out of channel.
1005	FT. SHAFTER	Some heavy bombs dropped at entrance of Pearl Harbor did not explode. Think they are mines.
1005	SOPA San Diego	To ASP SAN DIEGO: San Diego Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE effective.
1005	MUGFORD	U. S. S. SHAW in floating dry-dock exploded. Main engines and two boilers of MUGFORD ready to get underway.
1008	TENNESSEE	Observed ARIZONA aflame all over.
1010	UNKNOWN	To RDO WAILUPE: This vessel and 4 DM in Southwest S2 two enemy carriers in sight. (Rec'd by phone.)
1010	REID	REID got underway on 4 boilers. No damage or casualties.
1010	PHOENIX	Got underway, but returned to Berth C-6 on receiving orders not to sortie.
1010	SUMNER	Fired two rounds at bomber on port beam, altitude 8,000—no hits. Also fired 50-caliber machine guns, two and four.
1010	TENNESSEE	Observed planes approaching from starboard beam; did not come in.
1011	OPW 2	To DENT: Report CPW 2 for duty.
1013	MUGFORD	U. S. B. SCHLEY and ALLEN ready to get underway.
UNKNOWN	VP-24	To CPW 2: Right man of war Lat. 21.10 Long 160. 16 course 090 degrees.
UNKNOWN	USCG 400	To OG RDO STATION: Report immediately to Commander Honolulu Base.
1014	Com 14	Was Lualualei NAD damaged.
1015	GTF 9	To COMPATRON 21: Seareu Sector 000 to 300 Japanese Carriers.
1015	GAMBLE	Shifted .30 cal. A. A. machine guns to top of pilot house on fire control platform.

1018 CINCPAC To CTF 8, 12, 3: Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching X. Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X. Addressees operate as directed Com Task Force 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force unknown.

1018 CTF 8 Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity.

1020 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports ARIZONA looks as if she is on the bottom. Word passed for the 5th division to lay aft to relieve fire party.

1020 Ginspac To CTF One: Do not send any more cruisers to Sea.

1020 CTG 1.9 To All Air Coms Patwing 1 & 2. Observe approach Doctrine when near Oahu.

1020 MUGFORD U. S. S. JARVIS cleared starboard side.

1020 Attack group of 15 VSB's with 1,000 lb. bombs each dispatched to position 30 miles south Barber's Point where numerous reports had been received of enemy carriers and other forces; no contact. CinC informed Comtaskfor EIGHT depended on Pearl Harbor for scouting information. This in order maintain carrier striking group in readiness.

1021 GAMBLE Cleared channel entrance. Eight depth charges were armed and the ship commenced offshore and anti-submarine patrol off Pearl Harbor entrance.

1022 MUGFORD Navy MTB standing out.

1023 WASMUTH Dropped one depth charge on suspicious water, setting 200 feet, results negative.

1023 MUGFORD Floating dry-dock sinking.

1024 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports Torpedo boats leaving harbor.

1027 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE reports people coming from WEST VIRGINIA on board TENNESSEE by way of a five inch gun.

1027 MUGFORD A transport and CUMMINGS underway standing out.

1028 NAS PEARL To CTF 8: Your 2023 Affirmative. (Ref: Is Ford Island available reserve and rearm carrier planes in case necessity).

1028 PENNSYLVANIA Power on ship taken on two generators.

1030 CASTOR CASTOR transferred ammunition to NEOSHO for use of that vessel.

1030 ARMY HDQTS Two enemy coming in 30 miles south of affirm 28.

1030 HENLEY Visual signal from TREVER reported the HENLEY's captain and executive officer on board that vessel.

1030 BLUE Upon completion, of attacks, BLUE screened ST. LOUIS.

1030 SICARD SICARD observed attack break off. Mustered crew, no injuries or casualties.

1030 PHOENIX Got underway and started out north of channel. Received message from TENNESSEE from CINCPAC "Do not Sortie". Turned around in channel and started back to berth C-6. On receipt of orders from Comcrubatfor proceeded via south channel and completed sortie and joined Comtaskfor ONE.

1030 MUGFORD Fuel oil barge moored starboard quarter.

1030 PENNSYLVANIA Sent motor launches to West Lock for more ammunition.

1031 UNKNOWN This vessel and 4 DM in southwest S2 NO enemy carriers in sight.

1032 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE observes ARIZONA abandoning ship. Repair II reports all C&R soundings normal. Repair IV reports all soundings normal. Repair III reports all soundings normal. Pull circuit L28 at aft. Distribution Board. Mr. Teague says hatches cannot be opened from inside wardroom country—too hot.

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1032 SIGNAL TOWER To CINCPAC: These ships underway but have not cleared the entrance yet: DETROIT—JARVIS—PERRY—NEW ORLEANS—GAMBLE—CHEW.

1033 COMBATSHIPS Be ready to repel repeated air attacks.

1033 CTF3, CTFS To ASP: Submarines reported 10 miles south Barber's Point.

1033 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE 6° down by stern from flooding of D-306, D-312-M.

1036 TENNESSEE Unit 2, Repair 1, combatting fire in W. R. Country. Dead men forward of conning tower, sent stretcher party.

1036 WASMUTH Dropped sound depth charge on suspicious water, setting 200 feet, bearing 217°, distance 3.4 miles from Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. Brought up large quantities of oil, but no wreckage.

1040 June 8 bearing (bilateral) 357° or 178° T from HEBIA. June 8 in COMCARDIVS (AKAGI).

1040 Comdesron 3 Underway accordance signal from tower, and oral orders. Joined antisub patrol operating off entrance. Made two sound contacts; dropped 3 and 2 depth charges. Oil observed on water but no conclusive evidence of submarine loss.

1040 COMBASEFOR To Cominron 2: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.

1040 MUGFORD Commenced receiving fuel from oil barge in addition to oil from yard line.

1040 TRACY TRACY reported CUMMINGS underway after returning all TRACY men. 10 men sent to help fight fire in CALIFORNIA.

1042 Combatfor To Cap't. NYD: The CALIFORNIA is on fire inside. Probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.

1045 DOWNES Fire on CASSIN brought under control.

1046 COMBATSHIPS To BATSHIPS IN COMPANY: All battleships send pilots and aviation personnel to Ford Island immediately.

1046 CTF8 DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barber's Point.

1048 TENNESSEE To CINCPAC: TENNESSEE 30% damage. CALIFORNIA has been sunk. Doubtful—checking.

1050 TERN Proceeded to put out fire on USS ARIZONA. Shifted over to WEST VIRGINIA by orders from MARYLAND.

1051 CPW 1 To Plane 2 VP14: Search sector 310 to 320. Take due caution.

Unknown CTF 8 To CINCPAC: CINCPAC 2012 Acknowledge.

1053 MINNEAPOLIS To CINCPAC: MINNEAPOLIS center area VICTOR ONE.

1055 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: Am depending on Pearl for scouting information.

1055 CTF 8 CTF 8 launched six VCS to search sector 000-045° to 150 miles.

1055 SUMNER Fired two rounds 3" at plane dead ahead, altitude 8,000. No hits. Fired all 50 caliber.

1056 MUGFORD Japanese planes attacking from North. (Note: These are apparently friendly planes.)

1058 MUGFORD Numerous explosions from WEST VIRGINIA and ARIZONA.

1058 TENNESSEE Observed Naval Air Station planes in air.

1058 PATRON 23 To CPW ONE: Investigating suspicious vessel 21 00, 159 59.

1100 TRACY Japanese have definitely withdrawn.

1100 COM 14 To NAS PEARL, CPW2: Hawaiian Air Force templates moving headquarters. MUX lines will be kept in commission.

- UNKNOWN COMBASKFOR, COMINRON TWO to COM 14: Sweep South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic and moored mines.
- 1100 TENNESSEE Repair II told to open drain valve and core valves in GSK. Valves to Sick Bay. Enemy plane coming in on bow. All hands not engaged in fighting fire, seek cover.
- 1100 HELM Sound listening watch heard screws on starboard quarter. Ship circled for attack but lost contact. No depth charges dropped.
- 1100 SIGARD Observed horizontal bombing attack.
- 1100 MUGFORD Fire appeared to be under control on NEVADA.
- 1103 TENNESSEE Observed destroyer putting to sea, (other side of Ford Island). Gasoline stowage filled with CO₂.
- 1103 VP23 #11 To CPW2: Ships investigated 2 subs unknown nationality course 271 submerged on my approach.
- 1105 NAS Kaneohe To CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.
- 1105 To ASP: Info CTFS: All ships departing Pearl organize as TASKFORCE ONE UNDIVIDED Comdesbatfor assume command report CTF 8.
- 1105 To ASP this Circuit: Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from South.
- 1108 BREESE Received report Motor Torpedo Boat sighted periscope.
- 1108 ST. LOUIS To CINCPAC: Formed attack group ST. LOUIS, LAMSON, PHELPS, I am proceeding to locate ENEMY.
- 1108 CPW 2 To PATRON 23: Empty tanker no guns showing identity unknown lat. 21 00, Long. 259 59.
- 1110 NYD OPERATIONS To CINCPAC: NYD Operations reports another air raid expected within twenty minutes.
- 1110 SICARD Observed horizontal diving attack completed.
- 1115 NORTHAMPTON Two NORTHAMPTON planes launched to conduct search 150 miles to the north.
- 1115 BREESE BREESE dropped 2 depth charges on spot indicated with no apparent results. Bearings: Barber's Point 297° (t), and Hickam Tower 357° (t).
- 1118 NAS Kaneohe Bay to CINCPAC: Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off Kahana Point.
- 1121 TENNESSEE 2° list to port.
- 1121 TENNESSEE To CINCPAC: Damage 00% to TENNESSEE: WEST VIRGINIA sunk. Note: Correction WEST VIRGINIA for CALIFORNIA. Correction 00% instead of 30% for TENNESSEE.
- 1125 SUMNER. Fired four rounds 3'' at plane crossing ahead from starboard, altitude 6,000 feet, no hits. Fired 50 caliber machine guns No. 1 and 2.
- 1128 CPW 2 TO VP 14 #1, VF14 # 3: STAY OUT.
- 1130 WHITNEY Received orders to remain at anchor.
- 1130 HENLEY Picked up captain and executive officer from TREVER. No losses or damage experienced by HENLEY.
- 1130 PATRON 24, CPW 2 to CPW 2, CTF 3: Eight men of war Lat. 21 10, Long. 160 16, course 090 degrees.
- 1130 TENNESSEE Bridge steering telegraph out (being repaired). Sending planes from Hickam Field.
- 1132 MUGFORD Horizontal bombers approaching from port (Jap).
- 1132 ST. LOUIS To COMDESRON 1: What is your position?
- 1133 SIGARD Observed another horizontal bombing raid.
- 1135 SIGARD Observed bombers withdrawal. No material damaged and no personnel casualties.
- 1135 SUMNER Fired 11 rounds 3'' at formation of five bombers crossing ahead from port—no hits. Fired all machine guns.
- 1135 CSD 43 To Comsubsoor: Point 21 54—Point 56 12.

1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1135 TENNESSEE Sighted two planes bearing 270°.
 1135 BREESE Picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity. Dropped 2 depth charges and oil slick with debris appeared. 2nd attack was made with 4 deep-set charges to make certain but no additional results appeared. Meanwhile destroyers in vicinity dropped additional charges.

1135 NORTHAMPTON Approximately 15 miles west of Kauai. Section attacked by enemy single seat monoplane, engagement lasting about 20 minutes. Enemy plane made total of seven attacks diving from above and side; all recoveries were made above or to the side of the scouting section. On all diving attacks presented an exceptionally good target as he squashed down toward the section. Apparent enemy speed 275 miles or better. Enemy plane broke out in smoke and departed. Search continued until completed.

1136 MUGFORD U. S. Navy planes taking off from Ford Island.
 1136 TENNESSEE Observed light cruiser putting out to sea. Turning engines over to keep fire on water away from ship.

1137 COMBATSHIPS To CTF1: MINNEAPOLIS 2DMs center southern boundary. VICTOR ONE Course 105 speed 15/UKX CAB6.

1139 OTF 9 TO VP24 Planes #1, #2, #3, #5, #11, CPW2: Search to 200 miles.

1139 CTFS TO CINCPAC: TFS flying colors bearing 184 distance 22 from Kaula Rock at 1115.

1140 MUGFORD Japanese planes on starboard beam.
 1140 RDG Wailupe To all Stations This Circuit: Guam attacked.
 1140 DESBATFOR To CTFS: Int posit desig zero George eight.
 1140 NORTHAMPTON NORTHAMPTON plane engaged enemy fighter. This was not known to Comtaskfor 8 until 8 December.

1141 COMBATFOR To COMBATSHIPS: Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when ready and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes at Ford Island probably ready.

1142 Com 14 To Cinpas: Submarine due south Aloha Tower 4 miles has been bombed. Surface covered with oil slick.

1144 COMBASEFOR To COMINRON 2: Designate two DMs sweep approaches to Pearl magnetic mines.

1145 COMCRUBATFOR To CINCPAC: Have no ships in sector 4.
 1146 ANTARES moored to B-5A Honolulu.

1146 PATWING To Unknown: Enemy troops landing on north shore, Blue coveralls with red emblems.

1150 COM 14 To Cinopas: Parachutists are landing at Barber's Point.

1152 CPW 1 To Cinopas, CPW2: 3 planes security patrol patrol 14 are searching assigned sector. All planes have depth charges aboard.

1153 COMCARDIV 1 To Cinopas: SARATOGA ready depart San Diego 0900 tomorrow Monday x escorting ships so far as known have not been designated. Request instructions.

1155 To ASP: All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable x report OTF 1 in DETROIT.

1156 TENNESSEE Observed Army fortresses in the air. Believe enemy planes and submarines lying in channel.

1159 MUGFORD The end of period during which ship maintained 50 caliber and 5" fire.

1200 *Location of Forces 1200, 7 December, 1941.*
 T. F. 8 ENTERPRISE 21-30, 160-55.
 T. F. 12 LEXINGTON 23-50, 171-15.
 Subdiv 43 (3 SS) 80 Miles East, coming ready.
 GUDEON C-5 Ready.
 THRESHER & LITCHFIELD 80 Miles West empty.

- T. F. 1 and 2 less 8 in Pearl.
 T. F. 3 less 12 areas.
 Task F 3 rendezvousing with MINNEAPOLIS and 20Ms southern boundary V1 Course 105.
- 1200 GWIN To Comdesbatfor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON and PHELPS. I am proceeding to South to locate and attack enemy carrier.
- 1200 BOBOLINK Received orders from Combasefor to sweep Pearl Harbor with TURKEY.
- 1200 ST. LOUIS To Comerusoofor: Reporting for duty with LAMSON and PHELPS. I am proceeding south to locate and attack enemy carrier.
- 1201 COMPATWING To Compatron 24: Have search for assign sector 300 miles am returning.
- 1202 CTF 8 To CINCPAC: Your 2100 refers Task Force 8 with 13 ships x request all units be notified.
- 1204 BAMBLE Established sound contact with submarine and dropped three depth charges. Position bearing 168 T from Diamond Head light, distance 2.5 miles.
- 1205 MUGFORD Discontinued fueling. 115000 gallons on board.
- 1205 Comdesbatfor To Comdesflot ONE: About nine thirty witnessed MONAGHAN sink enemy submarine by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of work.
- 1205 SIGNAL TOWER About 0930 witnessed MONAGHAN sink enemy sub. by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of work. Believe RALEIGH accounted for three planes.
- 1205 Com 11 To KENNISON: Submarine reported twenty miles bearing 235 from Pt. Loma investigate.
- 1205 Com 14 All lights extinguished except control lights.
- 1209 MUGFORD Oil barge cleared starboard side.
- 1209 COMBATSHIPS To Cincpac: Design cast desig king baker jig.
- 1209 Combatships To Cruisers and Destroyers: Sortie in accordance until plan indicated.
- 1210 TENNESSEE Draft of ship (internal): Fwd. 34'6"; Aft. 35'10¹/₄"; Mean, 35'4¹/₂". Enemy transport reported 40 miles off Barber's Point. Parachute troops landing on Barber's Point (later proved false). After Battle Dressing Station send stretcher party to left gun, turret III, and remove casualties. Three planes on starboard beam coming this way (do not know whether enemy or not). Said planes flying low; apparently, turning away. Organize a crew of about 30 men to relieve men of Turret IV who are fighting fire on water.
- 1213 SOLACE To Com 14: Expedite your boat all tannic acid, tannic acid jelly, peccic acid, tetanus antitoxin, gas gangrene combined serum, morphine sulphate, morphine syretts, sutures, needles, hypo needles and adhesive type can be spared.
- 1214 MUGFORD Underway. Standing out in channel.
- 1215 HELM Rejoined DETROIT. Ceased patrolling.
- 1217 CTF 9 To PW 24, 23, 19: Search to 300 miles.
- 1221 RDO WAILUPE To all stations: Nine unidentified aircraft over Guam.
- 1225 BOBOLINK Moored alongside coal dock to take wire aboard.
- 1228 CINCPAC To ASP Hawaiian Area: If NPM fox goes out guard harbor circuit.
- 1228 Combatships To Cincpac: PENNSYLVANIA dive bomb hit starboard side grame 86 drydock now flooded. MARYLAND down by the head forward, bomb hit, 50 caliber magazines flooded. TENNESSEE fire in wardrobe country. OKLAHOMA capsized. WEST VIRGINIA sunk but upright. CALIFORNIA down by the head and heavy list to port—probably on bottom. ARIZONA sunk. NEVADA beached off Hospital Point. To VP23: Search to 200 miles any instructions.
- Unknown CPW 2
 1229 SIGNAL TOWER THORNTON is underway and standing out.

1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1230 CURTISS To Cincpac: Unable to sortie because of damage.
 1230 MUGFORD Japanese plane crashed on beach of HICKAM FIELD. (Note) It is believed the ship observed this at this time; (wreckage). not that the crash occurred at this time.)

1216 SIGNAL TOWER These ships have cleared Pearl Harbor Channel:
 DALE WASMUTH MONTGOMERY
 HENLEY RAMSAY WORDEN
 PATTERSON ST LOUIS CUMMINGS
 PHOENIS DETROIT

1219 Combatships To Com 14: Serious oil fire alongside W. Va.-----
 TENNESSEE and MARYLAND send fire boats.

1223 CTF 8 To Cincpac: 21 VSB from ENTERPRISE should have landed Ford Island about 0830. Request information.

1223 Rdo Wailupe To ASP: Air alarm standby.
 1230 TENNESSEE Secure all fresh water, except galley and drinking.
 1230 --- While GAMBLE conducting depth charge attack off Diamond Head, received three despatches from CinC addressed to ASP. Ships ordered to attack transports reported four miles off Barber's Point. All vessels having departed Pearl Harbor organized as Task Force ONE to report to CTF 8 Task Force ONE ordered to take course West after clearing harbor and to report position, composition, and speed. GAMBLE continued with depth charge attack until contact was lost then proceeded to Barber's Point where no transports were found. Continued westward.

1232 CINCPAC To ASP: Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point. Attack.

1235 CTF 12 To: CTF 3 & 8: Cancel Midway Marine flight.
 1240 MU* HE SARA HAHO on 4780 BRG 186 (Believed Submarine).
 1240 MU* HE SARA HAHO on 4580 BRG (Believed Submarine).
 1300 KANURE Appears to be O. T. C. on 6581 BRG. 183.
 1300 SISO On 7033 BRG 167½
 1300 KASO Seems to be Task Force Commander.
 1300 KANURE is probably Commander in the Air.
 1235 CTF 12 To Cincpac: Is Midway Marine flight cancelled.
 1235 MUGFORD Passed entrance to channel. Four 50 cal. and four 5"/38 cal guns during the entire period 0809 to 1159 whenever any planes came within range and bearing maintained fire.

1235 COMBATSHIPS To Combatfor: Combatships in Maryland.
 1235 RALEIGH To Cincpac: Two fire rooms and engine room and stern compt. flooded. Damage under control at present. Unable to get underway.

1244 Plane 12, VP23 To CPW2: Approaching 300 able to search more gas 700 25 I request instructions.

1245 TENNESSEE Planes on port bow (do not know whether enemy or not)

1246 -- CALIFORNIA sinking fast, stern underwater. Close all topside hatches, as turrets will be fired. (Did not). Gun four port reported Hoist #22, 5'/51, in B-510 was damaged. Powder can be sent up, but is slowed. Draft of ship, FWD: 34'9". Magazine temperature of Turret I—84°

1246 WP OFF. 14ND High altitude bombing attack coming in over Diamond Head.

Unknown Cincpac To Rdo San Diego: Receive me on 26.1, transmit on 30.6 (cable to Navy radio San Diego) Via Globe.

1247 CURTISS To CPW2: All of our transmitters are out.
 1247 Combatships To COLORADO: If vessels are not longer in service will furnish men and officers to ships in service to man complete anti-aircraft batteries for continuous watch.

1248 Combbasefor To Cominron TWO: Designate two DMs sweep approach to Pearl magnetic mines.

- 1255 **GAMBLE** Proceeded on course 270T at 20 knots to join friendly forces upon receipt of orders from Cincpac.
- 1300 **ST LOUIS** To Comdesbatfor: **ST LOUIS**, **BLUE**, **LAMBON**, **PHELPS** posit Lat 20.51 Long 158, course 275, speed 25K.
- Unknown Cincpac
1256 **MTB SQUAD** To CTF 8: Your 2206 only nine arrived. Out guarding 3445 voice sqdn. Comdrs. PT20, PT22, PT23, PT24. At dock guarding 3445 voice PT21. On dock at crane no power PT26, PT28. Aboard RAMAPO underway PT27, PT29, PT30, PT42.
- 1258 Com 14
1300 **RALEIGH** Four Japanese transports off Barbers Point. Reports tugs **SUNNADIN** and **AVOCET** came alongside and furnished light and power. One torpedo ran between bow of **RALEIGH** and stern of **DETROIT** and apparently sank in shoal water at Ford Island without exploding. The following planes were destroyed, in which it is considered the **RALEIGH** contributed:
- 1--Bomber flying over stern stbd to port crashed on deck of **CURTISS**.
 - 2- Plane flew over bow from stbd to port and crashed near Pearl City.
 - 3- Plane flying north on our stbd beam crashed in water between **DOBBIN** and **BALTIMORE**.
 - 4- Plane off our stern flying over air station was hit by 3" shell and blown to pieces in air.
 - 5- Plane flying across our stern had tail blown off and fell over Pearl City.
- 1300 Comdesbatfor
1300 **CTF 1** Own DD reports no enemy vessels off Barbers Point. At 1300 join **DETROIT** course 210 speed 18 from point 51. (Action to **ST. LOUIS**)
- 1300 **RAMSEY** Jap ship four miles from Barbers Point. Two sampans further out. Parachute troops landing on North shore. (reported by VJ plane)
- 1301 **CPW 2** Search sector 220 to 230. Return. (Action to 12-VP23)
- Unknown Comtrainron
EIGHT **ANTARES** docked pier five afirm Honolulu. Struck by several machine gun bullets but no damage to material or personnel.
- 1302 Cincpac To CTF 8: Radio bearings indicate **AKAGI** bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167°.
- 1303 **CPW 2** To Comscoron 6: Reported Jap rendezvous 223° 90 miles from Ford Island. Search to 200 miles sector 225 to 215.
- 1305 **NAS Kanoche** Captured enemy chart has marked positions bearing 223 distant 90 miles from Pearl Harbor.
- 1309 Signal Tower **DETROIT** and **PHOENIX** are near Barbers Point. Signal Tower sees no transports.
- 1310 **Combasefor** To Comtrainron 6, Com 14, Cominron 2; Sweep channel from East Lock to entrance magnetic and moored mines.
- 1312 **HULBERT** Army reports that four enemy transports off Barbers Point.
- 1312 **ST LOUIS** Am proceeding with three destroyers to attack Barbers Point. Speed two five position lat. 21-57 long. 158-03.
- 1313 **Combatships** To **NAS Pearl**: For Capt. Bode **CALIFORNIA** urgently needs AA ammunition.
- 1317 **Rdo Wailupe** Signals intercepted and bearing true north believed to be enemy carrier by character of transmission.
- 1319 **FRANK** By phone: Enemy sampan about to land at Naval ammunition Depot.
- **FRANK** Enemy landing party off shore Nanakuli. Friendly planes firing at them.
- **FRANK** Op-1 Southeast enemy and friendly planes in dog-fight.
- 1322 — Enemy naval attack coming in towards Barbers Point. Present position nine miles.

1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1322 Opanav To Mardet Tientsin, Com15, Mardet AM Emb, Peiping Astnavatt Shanghai, Rdo Wake, Navatt Chungking, Jonnstonis, Rdo Guam, Palmyra, Com16, Rdo Tutuila, HOPKINS: This confirms air raid by Japan on Oahu at 1800 today followed by declaration of war by Japan against US and Great Britain

1323 HELENA To Comerubatfor: Due contamination feed water cannot maintain underway status longer than 8 hours. During this time speed limited to 10 kts. Ready this condition on one hour notice F power for fire control limited to two diesel generators. View condition and to effect repairs recommend letting fires under all boilers die out.

1324 CTF 8 UPSN Junction Task Force One and Eight. Propose send Crudiv FIVE to Pearl for fuel.

1328 MINNEAPOLIS Your 072234 (Cincpac's) complying. Ref. #12-299 Use plane to search sector 135 to 180 distance 154 miles from Pearl.

---- CINCPAC To CFT 8: DETROIT, PHOENIX, ST LOUIS, NEW ORLEANS fourteen destroyers and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you. Also MINNEAPOLIS and four minelayers ordered join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel Reports—7632 kes (M) following calls:—SIME; SISO; KASHO; SUREMO; SAMORE; Sends following type of to . . .095.45 085.42

1330 Bearing on SISO—170 S5.

1337 Bearing on SAMORE—165

1341 Report following msg. . . KIBC to SIME Nr. 1 SIME 354.56

1345 Reports SISO (Good bearing) 7632 (M) 337

1330 — BOBOLINK's orders to sweep channel changed to sweeping approaches to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor. Arriving off Pearl it appeared all ships there were engaged in sweeping.

1331 CTF 1 To Cincpac: Task Force ONE proceeding off Barbers Point Notify Army.

1333 CPW 1 To OPW 2: Request instructions for dawn patrol upon their return.

1337 CTF 3 To CTF 8: My force INDIANAPOLIS and 5 DMS. INDIANAPOLIS proceeding from JOHNSTON Island course 054 speed 25. Dog Mike Sail directed proceed Pearl for fuel and rejoin later.

1340 TENNESSEE Plane coming in on starboard beam. (Proved to be friendly).

1345 — CTF 8 launched 9 VSB's to cover sector 110-200T to 175 miles. One of latter reported contact with surface forces believed enemy including a carrier in position Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-16 and cruiser Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-40. Scout reported being attacked by VF's. No further radio contact established with scout. Scout landed later at Kaneohe, reports believed to have been in error.

1348 VIREO Received orders to report to Combbasefor thence to West Loch to bring up 5", 3", and .50 M. G. Ammunition for CALIFORNIA.

1351 Reports SISO calling SAMORE S5 bearing 337 Very loud signal.

1353 Reports bearing SAREMU bearing 337.

1354 Reports bearing SUREMU 165.
Following bearings: 7632 kes (M) 0036—SUSU S5 340
7632 (M) 0040—SYME 336
Following bearings: 7632 (M) 0054—bearing SISO 338 S. 3
7050 (M) 0055—bearing SISO 338.5 S.5

KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR 10 MINUTES"

KANURE 1410 at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE FUEL". Someone on 7033 at 1247 said "HAVE NOT BE OPPOSED."
 SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM "SISO" at 1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE".
 RUS18 and YUNES believed to be Commander Carriers.
 SUT12 believed to be a Carrier.
 SISORE is either another Comdr in the Air or Comdr Transport Group.
 SISO is Boss of SISORE.
 No further bearings of radio intelligence of the Striking Force until following day 8 December 1941.
 TRANSMISSION:
 SIME 010.01 I—HA●NKIARIYA
 ANSWER:
 2 HA●NKAIARI

1410 — BEARINGS—SAREMU 338. S. 4 on 7632 kes (M)
 WASMUTH rigges twin, ship moored minesweep with USS ZANE, 400 fathoms of wire between ships, depressers at 5 fathoms, no floats. At 1547 entered Pearl Harbor entrance channel and swept up channel to gate vessel, where wire parted. At 1620 anchored off Coal Dock and retrieved sweep gear. At 1628 underway. At 1635 the Captain returned aboard, Lieutenant Commander Agnew, USN, left and joined TREVER. Returned off harbor entrance and resumed patrol in company with Mindiv 4.

1412 GAMBLE Sighted sampan bearing 320 T.
 1415 TENNESSEE Set condition ZED from Turret III, second deck, aft. Repair I, Unit 2, leading out fire hose to play water on WEST VIRGINIA. Received report that one of our destroyers sank Jap submarine.

1426 BOBOLINK Passed sweep wire to TURKEY and commenced sweeping off Honolulu Harbor.

1435 GAMBLE Slowed to investigate but did not search. Sampan position approximately 4 miles south of Barbers Point.

1455 VIREO While waiting for arrival of ammunition, towed ammunition lighter with 14' powder away from deck to decrease menace of explosion. Delivered ammunition to ARGONNE.

1500 TENNESSEE Report states that Wake Island had been bombed by 30 bombers. Ens. Kable still alive. Hudgell dead; also Miller and Adams.

1600 MIDWAY Via Commercial Cable . . . "On 7073 - - - - SISO 246 . . . Fair - - - - SIME 245 Poor NAS Midway" Plane language SASO V SAREMU #3 . . . A FU'-KUMA YORI 150 to "30 MAIRU NEN 200 1115 . . . Underway and standing out of harbor.

1505 DEWEY Received orders from Commander Base Force to report 1010 dock immediately.
 1550 BOBOLINK Repair 4.—All outboard voids normal. All soundings normal. Received report that PENNSYLVANIA had been hit while in drydock. No. 2 machine gun repaired and in commission again.

1551 TENNESSEE CTF 12 given orders by CTF 8 to intercept and destroy possible enemy carriers operating south coast of Oahu. It was assumed after attacks enemy carriers would withdraw via Jaulit.

1626 GAMBLE Sighted smoke bomb off port bow.

1628	TENNESSEE	Open up wardroom country and sleepy hollow. Fire on WEST VIRGINIA seems to be under control. Repair I cut off # 32 vent system; smoke coming down. Task Force ONE just ordered by CTF 8 proceed and attack.
1630	n— —	
1631	GAMBLE	Reports submarine surfaced.
1632	GAMBLE	Fired one shot 4" gun and missed, short and to the left. Submarine displayed U. S. Colors, and ceased firing. Submarine submerged and fired recognition red smoke bomb.
1640	BOBOLINK	While off dock 1010, received orders to assist NEVADA. Orders changed to go alongside CALIFORNIA.
1642	— — —	Attack group of 16 VF, 18 VTB's and 4 VSB smokers launched by Comtaskforce EIGHT with no results. (VTB planes armed with torpedoes recovered after dark.) Six VF planes proceeded Pearl mistaken for unfriendly and four shot down.
1647	GAMBLE	Proceed west.
1647	TENNESSEE	Told forward Battle Dressing Station to send doctor and stretcher party to WEST VIRGINIA bridge to get Captain. Ship astern (ARIZONA) blew up. Two planes bearing 350°.
1655	WHITNEY	Reports CASE left from alongside.
1659	TENNESSEE	Engines ahead 1/3. Repairs 2 and 4; — send 2 rescue breathers each, and spare oxygen bottles to starboard side of WEST VIRGINIA quarterdeck.
1703	TENNESSEE	Word received to stop main engines. Delivered 6 gas masks to WEST VIRGINIA.
1705	WHITNEY	Reports TUCKER left from alongside.
1730	BOBOLINK	Moored alongside WIDGEON next to CALIFORNIA for salvage purposes.
1732	CAMBLE	Sighted ENTERPRISE and exchanged calls. Instructed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to join ENTERPRISE.
1736	--	Comairbatfor ordered GAMBLE to join that vessel as part of AS Screen.
1740	BOBOLINK	Commenced pumping to continue throught the night.
1744	GAMBLE	Joined ENTERPRISE and took station as third ship with two other plane guard destroyers.
0755	PELIAS (Insert on p. 12)	Moored at Berths S-11 and 12, Submarine Base, reports first attack was indicated by sound of machine gun fire directed at single engine Jap torpedo plane flying low over ship's bow. The plane launched a torpedo at ARIZONA which seen later burst into flames.
1755	TENNESSEE	Plane bearing 345. Plane signalled with red light; did not understand meaning of signal.
1800	PENNSYLVANIA	Reports complete replacement of ammunition effected.
1823	TENNESSEE	Observed-plane bearing about 300.
1833	TENNESSEE	Plane bearing about 345 (Running lights on; believed friendly).
1835	TENNESSEE	Plane on port beam; running lights on.
1837	TENNESSEE	Plane coming in from dead ahead; bright lights on it.
1838	TENNESSEE	Plane bearing about 245.
1855	TENNESSEE	ENTERPRISE planes approaching Cahu.
1900	TENNESSEE	Plane bearing from dead ahead; running lights burning.
1953	TENNESSEE	Word passed over loudspeaker "All men having hammocks in port hammock nettings remove them, and stow same inboard."
2100	TRACY	Reports friendly planes with running lights were by AA batteries, but TRACY did not fire.
2100	TRACY	Moored alongside CALIFORNIA and commenced salvage work.

2100 SICARD

Observed 3 lighted planes, altitude 5000 approaching FORD ISLAND from South NEW ORLEANS challenged without success and opened. Other ships followed too. SICARD checked fire considering planes were friendly. Other ships continued firing. Observed AA fire opened and planes shot down. Aviator fell astern of VIREO, was rescued and identified from ENTERPRISE. Dispatch was sent to inform control that ENTERPRISE planes were in air.

2110 VIREO

(Enclosure B)

Cincpac File No.
LI1-1(1)/(50) (02019)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

References:

- (a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
- (b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
- (c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
- (d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.

1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:

(a) **BATTLESHIPS.**

ARIZONA sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.

CALIFORNIA sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft torpedoes; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

NEVADA damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and aircraft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

OKLAHOMA capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.

PENNSYLVANIA slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been completed and ship is ready for service.

MARYLAND damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss. Ship was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and is expected to be fully ready for service 13 December.

TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not explode, but put 8 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the **ARIZONA** fire melted and ignited paint in after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the **WEST VIRGINIA** leaning against her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the **TENNESSEE**. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.

WEST VIRGINIA sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.

(b) **CRUISER.**

HELENA damaged by bomb hit at frame 50, starboard side, opening up side under armor belt for distance of about 30 feet. Number one and two fire rooms and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in drydock #8, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side. Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock #1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully effective by 16 December.

RALEIGH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the *RALEIGH* following completion of the *HONOLULU* to effect underwater repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.

(c) *DESTROYERS.*

CASSIN and *DOWNES* damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ahead of *PENNSYLVANIA*. Bomb hit *DOWNES* exploding her torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. *CASSIN* was damaged by fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on *DOWNES*. *DOWNES* appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommendation regarding salvage and repairs to *CASSIN* will be forwarded later.

SHAW hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will be forwarded later.

(d) *AUXILIARY VESSELS.*

OGLALA sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ten dock at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded at a later date.

UTAH damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.

CURTISS damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which destroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one midships crane by 18 December.

VESTAL damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor is undertaking repairs with one repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.

2. It is believed that the sinking of the *OKLAHOMA*, *NEVADA*, *CALIFORNIA* and *WEST VIRGINIA* is in large part due to the ships having been in condition *XRAY*. Had time been available to set condition *ZED* before receiving damage, progressive flooding might have been avoided.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

Buships
Buord

(Enclosure C)

Cinpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. *PENNSYLVANIA*, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 21, 1941.

Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

Ship	Damage incurred and cause	Repairs proceeding and proposed
ARIZONA.....	Sunk at berth. Aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs exploding forward magazines.	Propose caisson the ship and make recommendation thereafter.
CALIFORNIA.....	Sunk at berth. Two or more aircraft torpedoes and one large bomb hit amidships causing fire. Part of A. A. battery still manned and available.	Propose caisson ship, repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Tow).
MARYLAND.....	Bomb hit frame 14, penetrated and exploded, holling shell, decks and bulkheads forward of fr. 24.	NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Decks, bulkheads to be completed at NYPS.
NEVADA.....	Heavy bombs, aircraft torpedoes and possibly a mine in channel. Beached across from Hospital Pt. AA batteries still manned and available.	Propose float ship (caisson may not be required), repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Tow).

Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at Pearl Harbor, December 1941—Continued

Ship	Damage incurred and cause	Repairs proceeding and proposed
OKLAHOMA.....	Capsized at berth. Three or more aircraft torpedoes.	Propose right and float ship (caisson may not be required) repair to make watertight and return to mainland yard for complete repairs. (Two).
PENNSYLVANIA. TENNESSEE.....	Bomb hit starboard side boat deck..... One heavy bomb (dud) through turret top. One medium bomb aft cracked 14" gun. Fire aft 2nd deck due to heat from ARIZONA. Electrical circuits 2nd deck aft damaged by fire.	Repairs completed. NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy and habitable. NYPS complete habilitation, renew 14" gun, and watertight integrity.
WEST VIRGINIA.	Sunk at berth. Four aircraft torpedoes and one heavy bomb hit. Considerable damage by fire.	Propose caisson ship. Repair to make watertight and return to mainland for complete repairs. (Two).
HELENA.....	Forward fire and engine rooms flooded by aircraft torpedo. Some machinery badly damaged.	NYPH repairing shell to make seaworthy. Propose return to NYMI for complete repairs. (Two shafts).
HONOLULU.....	Bomb. Near miss frame 40, port. Flooded five magazines and handling room II turret. Damaged electrical circuits in flooded spaces.	NYPH proceeding with complete repairs.
RALEIGH.....	One aircraft torpedo, and small bomb (dud) which penetrated three decks and ship's side aft. Forward engine room and forward firerooms flooded and damaged.	NYPH to make repairs to make seaworthy when HONOLULU is undocked. Propose return to NYMI (on 2 shafts) for complete repairs.
CASSIN..... DOWNES.....	Drydock No. 1 ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her torpedo warheads and causing serious fire. CASSIN knocked off blocks and fell over on DOWNES.	Propose upright, patch and float out CASSIN for possible repairs to return to full or limited service. Further recommendations later.
SHAW.....	Bombed while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship and floating dock badly damaged by fire.	Propose float and reconstruct forward part—return to mainland yard for complete repairs, possibly under own power.
UGLALA.....	Sunk by aircraft torpedo and possibly near miss by bomb.	Salvage doubtful. Recommendation later.
UTAH.....	Capsized and sunk by aircraft torpedoes.	Recommendations re salvage and repairs later.
CURTISS.....	Enemy plane out of control flew into crane mast. One bomb exploded in hangar space. All radio equipment destroyed. Ship entirely seaworthy.	NYPH, replace radio and effect necessary repairs to hangar space.
VESTAL.....	Bomb hit aft, holing shell. Beached....	Repairs proceeding by own repair force. May not require docking.

(Enclosure D)

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 20, 1941.

(A) DISPOSITION OF TASK FORCES

TASK FORCE ONE

Batdivs 2 and 4 (less COLORADO).....	5 BB
Crudiv 9 (less BOISE).....	4 CL
Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK).....	17 DD
RALEIGH.....	1 OCL
UGLALA.....	1 OCM
Mindiv 1 (overhaul).....	4 DM

Disposition: In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.

TASK FORCE TWO

Batdiv 1.....	3 BB
Crudiv 5 (less PENSACOLA).....	3 CA
Desrons 4 and 6.....	18 DD
DETROIT.....	1 OCL
ENTERPRISE.....	1 CV
Mindiv 2.....	4 DM

1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Disposition: At sea as Task Force EIGHT

ENTERPRISE	In Port
Desron 6	Batdiv 1
Crudiv 5	Desron 4
	DETROIT
	Mindiv 2

Position of Task Force EIGHT: 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward returning from landing VMP at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.

TASK FORCE THREE

Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE)-----	7 CA
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10)-----	5 DD
Minron 2-----	13 DM
LEXINGTON-----	1 CV

Disposition: At sea as Task Force TWELVE

LEXINGTON

Gradiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA

Desron 5 less Desdiv 10

Position (estimated): 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine VMSB's on Midway. When attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats, MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea S.W. of Oahu—normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.

TASK FORCE SEVEN

At Midway-----	2SS
At Wake-----	2SS
At Mare Island-----	5SS
At San Diego-----	4SS
En route to Pearl-----	4SS
At pearl-----	5SS
PELIAS-----	1AS

TASK FORCE NINE

VP-21—At Midway. 7 searching 120-170, 450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice.	12
VP-11—4 hours notice-----	6
VP-12—30 minutes notice-----	5
4 hours notice-----	3
VP-14—In air (with depth charges)-----	3
30 minutes notice-----	3
4 hours notice-----	4
VP-22—4 hours notice-----	12
VP-23—4 hours notice-----	11
VP-24—4 in air conducting tactics with SS-----	4
On 30 minutes notice-----	1
	<hr/>
	72
Overhauling-----	9
	<hr/>
	81

TANGIER—In port.

CURTISS—In port.

MCFARLAND

HULBERT

THORNTON

All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage to the planes prevented.

MARINE PLANES

VMF 221	—Wake	
VM3B 231	—Enroute Midway LEXINGTON	
VM3B 232	—Ewa 4 hours notice	18
VMJ 252	—Ewa	2

BASE FORCE

ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.

Aircraft of Base Force

VJ-1—9	J2F	-----	Pearl
9	JRS	-----	Pearl
VJ-2—10	J2F	-----	Pearl
4	PBY-1	-----	(2 at Johnston)
VJ-3—1	J2V	-----	Pearl
4	JRB	-----	at Main
1	JRF		
2	BT		

In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port and the submarine tender PELLAS.

The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.

(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on 15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. This provided for the possibility of a declaration of war being preceded by:

- (a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
- (c) A combination of both.

The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port. At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and ready and two 5-/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of ammunition at each gun.

(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the Fleet would be operating during the day.

Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and recognition. They searched the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.

(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six months but no actual visual contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had

prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.

These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday morning.

The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800, followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl" at 0812.

The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.

(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

The 4 PBY's, operating with the submarines started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.

No plane in these areas searched saw anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief advised Task Force THREE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued as soon as enemy was located.

(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the message should have been NOT in sight.

In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223-90 miles from Pearl Harbor". These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhere west by south of Pearl. At 1020, 15 V-19 from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barbor's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

- Army—2 B-17
- 2 A-20A
- 3 B-18
- 3 B-17, 095-165, 300 miles
- Navy—4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles.
- 2 planes VJ. 355-005, 300 miles
- 3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles
- 4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

Battleship & Cruiser Planes

6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles
 9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles
 6 J2F in westward sector

The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 189° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force Twelve at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jalint.

No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.

(b) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows:

Task Force TWELVE—18-30N, 163-40 W.

Task Force EIGHT—20-50 N, 158-50 W.

Task Force ONE—20-32 N, 159-45 W.

Task Force TWELVE was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a southeasterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.

In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.

By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston Island triangle was completely covered.

In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200 miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to seaward because of the small number of available planes.

(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.

9 December

On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S.S.W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted

in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150-mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.

After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.

Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

300-010 500 miles 10 VP
 010-060 300 miles 10 B-18
 060-210 200 miles 18 VSO
 210-030 300 miles 6 VJ
 and in the afternoon
 330-020 4 Army B-20

The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 74

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 3 February, 1942.

Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Diary for period 7 December to 1 January.

Reference: (a) Conf. desp. 082307 dated 3 January, 1942 from CinCPac to Com14.

Enclosure: (A) Three copies of subject diary.

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. This diary has been compiled from the logs and reports submitted by various district activities. In certain instances, reports of individuals have been quoted not because their opinions or remarks are considered of special value, but in order to give an insight to the reactions of the personnel concerned.

C. C. BLOCH.

Confidential

WAR DIARY OF FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT FOR PERIOD 7 DECEMBER TO 1 JANUARY

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¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and refer to pages of original exhibit.

[1] WAR DIARY OF FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT FOR PERIOD 7 DECEMBER
TO 1 JANUARY

Preliminary Action on 7 December:

The first indication of an enemy force was the sighting of a submarine periscope at 0350 by the U. S. S. CONDOR, engaged in minesweeping close to the entrance buoys of the Pearl Harbor channel.

After verification, the CONDOR reported the situation by blinker to the guard ship, U. S. S. WARD. The submarine was seen to turn inshore and head in a westerly direction toward Barbers Point.

The WARD's log reports that general quarters was sounded at 0408 and search was made for the unidentified submarine. The ship secured from general quarters at 0435 and continued on patrol of the Pearl Harbor entrance.

The initial positive contact occurred at 0637 when the WARD sighted the conning tower and periscope of a submarine apparently headed for Pearl Harbor, trailing the U. S. S. ANTARES.

The WARD started an attack at 0640, bearing down on the submarine while increasing speed from 5 to 25 knots. She opened fire at 0645 with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The first shot, at a range of 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower. The second shot, fired at a range of 50 yards or [2] less from No. 3 gun, scored a direct hit at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. The submarine was observed to heel over to starboard and start to sink and, after running into the WARD's depth charge barrage, went down in 1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface where the depth charges exploded.

A despatch by voice transmission was sent to the commandant at 0654 stating: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area."

This message was reported delivered to the district duty officer, Lieutenant Commander Harold Kaminski, at 0712. He immediately notified the chief of staff, Captain J. B. Earle, who informed the commandant.

Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715 and also notified Commander Charles B. Momsen, war plans officer for the district.

The commandant ordered the ready duty destroyer (Monaghan) sent out. At 0737 a despatch was sent to the WARD, asking verification of the report and details of the attack.

Following the WARD'S message and prior to the Japanese air raid, no other reports were received at headquarters to indicate or verify the enemy's presence.

Within a few minutes after the raid started, the commandant arrived at headquarters and took charge. Orders issued were: [3] "Close all navy yard gates to traffic. Have the Captain of the Yard detail fire parties. Notify marines to make all men available to assist in fighting fires. Notify marines to bring in from Salt Lake camp all available marines. Notify yard to flood drydocks. Make arrangements for civilian workmen to be rounded up and brought to the yard to assist in damage control. Notify hospital to establish emergency measures for caring for killed and wounded."

The Air Raid:

The air raid on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field area started at 0755, according to most observers. Some reports indicate the end of the raid came about 0940, although apparently there were enemy planes active as late as 1130, Captain H. F. Bruns, the district public works officer, stating in his report that the raid lasted until approximately 1130. (NOTE: Residents on Milliau sighted two planes between 1300 and 1400 flying over that island. One crashed and the other flew on West. Presumably these planes had left Oahu after 1200).

The district supply officer, Captain John J. Gaffney, reported the final attack was over by 0940. His summary follows:

"The heavy pall of smoke from burning fuel oil afforded not only a point of aim for the dive bombing attack which came about 0920 but somewhat obscured vision. A seaplane hangar was on [4] fire at Ford Island and the floating drydock with the SHAW appeared to be burning. The all directional bombing attack came shortly after the NEVADA cleared the dredge opposite Fox-1 where three hits halted the NEVADA in the channel. She dropped one anchor, backed on it, came over in the direction of the floating dock and finally moved over to Waipio Point. A hit in Drydock No. 1 struck the DOWNES and another

hit of a smaller bomb was made on the PENNSYLVANIA. The Japanese pressed home the dive bombing well under 600 feet. Wing and fuselage marking were clearly visible. Their maneuverings to avoid collisions were noteworthy. The attack concentrated over the NEVADA which was underway in the channel and evidently every effort was directed toward sinking her in the channel. This attack was over by 0940. . . ."

First Lieutenant J. S. O'Halloran, duty officer, 3rd Defense Battalion, F. M. F., stated in his report: "At about 0940, after about one hour and 45 minutes after the attack started, the air was clear of enemy aircraft."

Commander Harry R. Hayes, USN (Ret.), directed by Captain C. C. Baughman, captain of the yard, to a station on the signal tower to handle, insofar as possible, the movements of ships and other craft in the harbor, stated: "The attack on the NEVADA apparently ended the raid on Pearl Harbor, but for some time enemy aircraft were observed bombing Hickam Field. . . ."

[5] Captain Baughman, in a summary of events obtained from personnel under him, stated that at 0855 the NEVADA got underway and stood down South Channel. This summary further reported that at "0910 enemy dive bombers attacked Hickam Field, the PENNSYLVANIA, CASSIN, DOWNES, SHAW and NEVADA, the last named ship being in the South Channel opposite YFD-2 (the floating drydock). The three destroyers were set on fire and minor damage was inflicted on the PENNSYLVANIA. The NEVADA was badly damaged and lost way, and with the assistance of tugs was grounded on Waipio peninsula southeast of Beckoning Point."

The captain of the yard's summary placed the end of the raid at 0920.

In line with some observations that the air raid occurred in three waves of planes is the report of Russel B. Smith, radioman 3rd class, in the U.S.S. NEVADA, who was later assigned to duty at the Lualualei radio station. Smith was blown from his ship during the attack in the south channel and swam ashore.

His report follows in part:

"I proceeded to the bridge during the lull after the first attack. From there the ARIZONA was plainly visible, a mass of flames. Her after turrets and mainmast were all that could be seen, the rest was a mass of flames. We cast off lines and started to get underway. As we passed the battle line, I saw the OKLAHOMA completely capsized and the rest of the damaged battleships, some burning fiercely. There were several other ships underway in the harbor.

[6] "As we neared the floating drydock the second attack began. Our anti-aircraft guns again went into action. Suddenly there was a deafening roar. Smoke and debris was flying everywhere. Shortly after another bomb struck, setting the ship on fire.

"The next thing I remember is the cold water hitting me in the face. I was near the drydock, which was burning fiercely, and quite a distance from shore. The life preserver that I had securely strapped on was gone. After reaching shore, I and several other men who had swam ashore started for the naval hospital. At this time the third attack came but the Jap planes were kept off by the anti-aircraft fire."

Sequence and Type of Attacks:

Reports received by the commandant indicate the following sequence of attack:

1. Attack on the naval air station, Ford Island, and Hickam Field. This started about 0755 and consisted of dive bombing and strafing.
2. Attack on major units of the fleet, launched by torpedo plane and dive bombers and accompanied by strafing.
3. Attack on area by horizontal bombing from high altitude. This is reported to have occurred about 0815.
4. A second high altitude bombing attack apparently carried out immediately before the final intensive dive bombing attack and after a lull of approximately 15 minutes in the raid.
5. Dive bombing and strafing attack launched about 0910.

[7] *Number of Planes Involved:*

Reports indicate that approximately 150 planes attacked army and navy activities on Oahu.

Marine corps observers reported that approximately 30 planes participated in the first attack on Pearl Harbor. Other reports stated that up to 50 planes engaged in the initial attack on the Pearl Harbor area, including approximately 20 torpedo planes.

Personnel on the signal tower estimated 30 dive bombers took part in the final intensive bombing attack. The smallest estimate was 18.

On the high altitude bombing, reports of the number of planes observed varied from five to 18, and altitudes were estimated 10,000 and 16,000 feet.

Between 0745 and 0800 an estimated total of 75 planes were sighted by personnel at Lualualei radio station, approaching the station from the west and turning sharply in the direction of Pearl Harbor and Barbers Point upon reaching a position near the shore line. One observer stated that he counted 75 planes. These planes returned on this course some time later, observers reported.

W. L. Waltrous, chief radioman, stated that about 0745 he observed a large flight of planes proceeding toward Pearl Harbor. "Upon reaching a point directly abeam of the radio station, it appeared that a formation of 15 to 20 planes detached themselves from the main flight and turned left. They proceeded [8] directly over the radio station at an altitude of approximately 2,000 feet, in the general direction of Wheeler field."

An observe at the Lualualei naval ammunition depot, according to a report submitted by Captain J. S. Dowell, inspector of ordnance in charge, stated:

"Near 0800 while motorized patrol was being relieved I counted 25 bombers in groups of five flying very high. They proceeded straight over the mountains on the Nanakuli side of the depot headed in the direction of Pearl Harbor. There were also two units of fighter planes, about five in each. They were flying lower than the bombers, about the height of the mountains, in a straight line one behind the other. One group headed for Pohakea pass toward Schofield; the other circled over the depot near the mountains and then headed over Ponakea pass."

Captain Dowell also reported that at West Loch "at 0850, enemy planes were observed leaving Pearl Harbor evidently en route to Ewa mooring mast, passing close to West Loch. Planes observed were approximately 60 to 70 in number . . ."

The officer in charge at Camp Andrews, Nanakuli, reported a flight of 64 planes passed over the camp about 0730 headed toward Pearl Harbor.

Other observations of plane approaches were submitted as follows:

Lieutenant Commander R. B. Norris, C-V(L), then an [9] employee of RCA Communications, Inc., at Kahuku radio station, reported that "at approximately 0740 . . . I observed a group of planes flying at very high altitude approach Kahuku Point in a course from north due south. It is estimated that 20 or 22 planes were in this group . . . Low clouds made it impossible to see the entire group at any one moment . . . The planes were soon out of visible range but still heading due south after passing over the radio station."

A civilian at Mokuleia reported observing a flight of 32 planes coming in over water from the direction of Kahuku Point between 0800 and 0815 and heading directly towards Schofield. Observer reported that the count of 32 was verified by a resident of Waialua.

A man on duty at the direction finder unit at Lualualei reported that he observed "Several formations" at about 0900 heading toward Pearl Harbor from the northwest. "There were at least 55 planes that I was able to count, flying in groups of fives . . . Their height was such that it was almost impossible to see them."

According to this observer, another group of seven, flying at the same altitude but further out from the other groups, turned seaward and circled back over land, heading over the reservation in the direction of Wheeler field.

[10] *Attacks at Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field:*

Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked Kaneohe Bay naval air station. Ewa field at Barbers Point was subjected to enemy strafing.

Commander H. M. Martin, commanding officer of the naval air station, Kaneohe Bay, reported that two attacks were executed at that base.

The initial attack started about 0750, with about a squadron of planes coming down very low in shallow dives and strafing with incendiary bullets. This attack lasted 10 to 15 minutes and was followed after a 25 minute interval by bombing and strafing by another squadron of planes, similar to our BT's. Bombs of 100 pounds were dropped, apparently high explosive in type but some of them probably incendiary because of the resulting fires. The majority of casualties resulted from this attack, the men being struck by machine gun fire and bomb fragments.

Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting to either launch their planes or trying to save those planes not yet damaged. During this attack which also lasted 10 to 15 minutes, the anti-aircraft fire was considerably augmented by machine guns rigged on the planes and on temporary mounts, and one of the enemy planes was shot down on the station. Another crashed in Kailua bay.

[11] *Damage:*

Captain H. F. Bruns, district public works officer, following a survey after the raid, reported:

"There was no serious damage to any navy shore structures except at Ford Island and Kaneohe. It was plain that ships and planes were the objectives of the attackers. By concentrating even briefly on shore structures the attackers could have caused extensive damage, particularly by an incendiary attack on the oil tanks and other inflammable objects."

With the exception of Hangar No. 6 and its surrounding parking area, very little major damage was done to the naval air station, Pearl Harbor. The hangar was apparently set on fire as a result of a bomb explosion immediately to the east and the resultant explosive action of nearby patrol planes which were ignited by the same explosion. There were about five bomb hits in the vicinity of the hangar, the largest producing a crater approximately 20 feet in diameter and seven feet deep. The northeast quarter of the hangar was badly gutted by fire but relatively minor damage was done to structural steel.

Fresh water service to Ford Island from the navy yard was cut off. The U. S. S. ARIZONA at mooring Pox-7 settled on the 12 inch main, crushing it, and the six inch temporary line to the south end of the island was broken at the navy yard side as a result of bombing. Service was restored by installing a new 16 inch main from Hospital Point.

[12] At the Kaneohe naval air station, Hangar No. 2 was set on fire during the first attack and severe damage resulted, although the structure was deemed salvageable. The seaplane warming up platform was also damaged by bomb hits.

Public Works Department Activities:

Action taken by the public works department at the time of the raid was based on the department's acceptance that its function was to maintain essential services—power, water and communications, to furnish transportation as required, to protect against fires and to remedy structural damage.

In a description of activities of the public works department during the attack, Captain Bruns said:

"As rapidly as officers reported, they were despatched to various locations for specific jobs of surveillance and fire fighting. Civilian workers went to their regular jobs, unless otherwise directed. Sizeable forces were sent to both tank farms. The contractors at Kuahua were quickly organized to meet emergency calls, and men and equipment were despatched to points of need in the navy yard area. Repeated inspections were made to locate possible fires. The drydock contractors organized workers to get the Gantry crane clear of the fire between the drydocks and to make the new drydock ready for service as quickly as possible.

"The public works department through its own and contractors' [13] personnel gave assistance in restoring water main to Ford Island, restoring power and communication services in navy yard, furnishing trucks for the transportation of wounded and for other purposes, withdrawing dredges to prevent blocking of channel, establishing watcher services for administration building, arranging burials and providing graves, and answering distress calls generally."

Action by Yard Fire Department and Yard Craft:

In the navy yard, the fire department was first called to Building 367, near the hospital, to extinguish a fire caused by the crash of a Japanese plane. Later the department answered a call to extinguish the fire in Drydock No. 1 where the CASSIN and DOWNES were burning. The major part of the fire yard fire fighting equipment was used in controlling this fire and preventing its spread to the PENNSYLVANIA. The fire in the floating drydock was also combatted.

Yard craft engaged in fighting fires on fleet units, assisted in picking up survivors and in getting ships underway.

Action Reported by _____

Immediately upon the first raid by hostile planes, all sentry posts were doubled and the remainder of the command present were alerted. Those alerted stood by under arms under cover as a mobile reserve for emergency employment. These men were soon assigned to various situations.

[14] The defense battalions immediately went into action with anti-aircraft machine guns with telling effect. Two gun batteries were emplaced in the navy yard but were not ready for action until ammunition could be trucked from the naval ammunition depot. They were ready at 1100.

All motor transportation was pooled for general use and was active throughout the day. Among the services rendered was assistance in collecting and hauling casualties from the waterfront to the naval hospital.

One set of barracks (100 man type), the Noncommissioned Officers' Club and the Post Exchange were vacated and prepared for caring for casualties. The medical officers set up an operating and dressing room in the Post Exchange.

The three general messes were thrown open and served food, on a 24 hour basis, to all comers. It is estimated that during the first 24 hours about 6,000 meals were served to civilian workmen of the navy yard. That service was discontinued only after the food supply at the regular established eating places could be replenished.

Care of Fleet Personnel:

At the Yard Receiving Station, immediate steps were taken to account for survivors and emergency hospital units were established in new barrack buildings and Navy Arena. Fleet pooling activity centered at this station. Emergency rations, stores, [15] bedding and clothing were issued to survivors of sunken ships. Preparations were made for serving meals on a 24 hour basis. Rations were prepared and served to over 8,000 personnel.

All available spaces, including the Navy Arena and barracks buildings under construction were converted into emergency living quarters. All chief petty officers' rooms were converted into officers' quarters.

Between December 12 and 31 all housing facilities were occupied to the fullest degree, and an overflow of from 1,500 to 2,500 men was accommodated in the arena, the number varying with the arrival and subsequent assignment to duties of drafts from the mainland.

Medical Department Activities:

The district medical officer, Captain R. E. Stoops, reported 686 non-fatal casualties were received for treatment at regular navy medical department establishments, at civilian establishments and emergency wards established during the crisis.

In the disposition of the dead, utmost care was taken in the matter of identification.

A total of 313 dead were brought to the naval hospital on December 7. The following day, it became evident that the problem of burial would be much greater than originally contemplated. Additional land for a new navy plot was obtained [16] in Oahu cemetery, and a 25 acre site for a new naval cemetery was selected between North and South Halawa streams at Red Hill.

The following is a summary of interments made during the period from December 7 to 31, inclusive:

Service personnel interred at Oahu cemetery_____	328
Service personnel interred at Halawa cemetery_____	204
Service personnel interred at Kaneohe Bay_____	18

550

Japanese service personnel buried total 18.

Of our service personnel, 293 were unidentified, but at least some of these were expected to be identified following receipt of Forms "N" in their cases at the Navy Department.

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Casualties among Fourteenth Naval District personnel.

	Officers		Enlisted men	
	Dead	Wounded	Dead	Wounded
Navy Yard.....		1		3
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.....		7		43
Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.....			1	4
Naval Ammunition Depot.....				10
Naval Hospital.....			1	1
Total.....	0	8	2	61

A total of 273 casualty patients were evacuated to the mainland.

[17] *Diary of Industrial Department:*

December 7, 1941.—The following vessels were at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, on this date in berths indicated:

Vessel	Berth	Severe damage	Vessel	Berth	Severe damage
USS SOTOYOMO.....	Docked YFD-2.	Yes	YSD-27.....	B-11.....	No
USS SHAW.....	DD-1.....	Yes	YW-10.....	B-11.....	No
USS DOWNES.....	DD-1.....	Yes	USS RAMAPO.....	B-12.....	No
USS CASSIN.....	DD-1.....	Yes	[18] USS RIGEL.....	B-13.....	No
USS PENNSYLVANIA.....	DD-1.....	No	YO-447.....	B-14.....	No
USS CACHALOT.....	B-1.....	No	USS TRACY.....	B-15.....	No
USS HELENA.....	B-2.....	No	USS PREBLE.....	B-15.....	No
USS OGLALA.....	B-3.....	Sunk near end 1010	USS CUMMINGS.....	B-15.....	No
			YO-43.....	B-15-16.....	No
			USS NEW ORLEANS.....	B-16.....	No
USS TERN.....	End 1010.....	No	USS SAN FRANCISCO.....	B-17.....	No
YO-30.....	End 1010.....	No	USS PRUITT.....	B-18.....	No
USS ARGONNE.....	4.....	No	USS SICARD.....	B-18.....	No
150-ton Floating Crane.....	5.....	No	USS ONTARIO.....	B-18.....	No
USS SACRAMENTO.....	6.....	No	USS SCHLEY.....	B-20.....	No
USS MUGFORD.....	B-6.....	No	USS GRBE.....	B-20.....	No
USS JARVIS.....	B-6.....	No	USS HONOLULU.....	B-21.....	No
USS SWAN.....	Marine Railway.....	No	USS ST. LOUIS.....	B-21.....	No
YT-3.....	B-9.....	No	USS BAGLEY.....	End East Quay Pier.....	No

The following named vessels left the Navy Yard on this date:

USS ST. LOUIS	USS RAMAPO
USS CUMMINGS	USS SWAN
USS JARVIS	USS TERN
USS MUGFORD	

[19] *December 8, 1941.*—Yard forces initiated repairs to damages caused in the December 7th raid, and assisted in restoring a supply of fresh water to Ford Island, both fresh water pipe lines to Ford Island having been destroyed. Arrangements were made for Yard Public Works organization and equipment to assist to the fullest practicable extent in ships' salvage operations.

USS ALLEN arrived at B-6.

December 9, 1941.—Emergency electrical supply from Navy Yard power plant was furnished to Hickam Field and the Section Base. Made preliminary survey for air raid requirements for Yard personnel. Construction begun for shelters by personnel of Shop 70 and contractors' force. Sandbags placed for protection of office personnel, electric power transformer substations and communication centers.

December 10, 1941.—USS ALLEN departed.

USS CROW departed.

USS MARYLAND arrived.

YO-43 departed.

USS SWAN arrived.

The USS HELENA was docked in DD-2. This is the first vessel docked in this new dock which was completed approximately one year in advance of the contract date.

[20] December 11, 1941.—USS SWAN departed.

December 12, 1941.—New 25-ton crane was moved from erection tracks to permanent rails, around DD-2.

USS PENNSYLVANIA departed.

USS AYLWIN arrived, docked on Marine Railway, undocked and departed.

USS NARWHAL arrived.

December 13, 1941.—USS NEW ORLEANS departed.

USS SACRAMENTO departed.

YC-477 departed.

USS HONOLULU docked in DD-1.

USS DOLPHIN arrived, docked in Marine Railway.

USS McDONOUGH arrived.

USS PHELPS arrived.

USS THORNTON arrived.

USS INDIANAPOLIS arrived.

December 14, 1941.—USS DOLPHIN undocked and departed.

USS SAN FRANCISCO departed.

[21] USS HOVEY arrived and departed.

USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.

December 15, 1941.—USS MUGFORD arrived and docked in Marine Railway.

December 16, 1941.—USS MUGFORD undocked and departed.

USS TENNESSEE arrived.

USS KAULA arrived.

Night inspection made of exterior lighting and shop blackout conditions by Admiral Furlong, the Captain of the Yard, the Manager, and the Production Officer.

December 17, 1941.—Repairs to crane rail on east side of DD #1 and to 15-ton crane were completed. Received permission from Commanding Officer, Hickam Field, to use area in Hickam Field between Hickam Gate and main Yard Gate for stowage.

USS SOUTHARD arrived and docked on Marine Railway.

December 18, 1941.—USS SOUTHARD undocked and departed.

USS CRELE departed.

Contractors started work in earnest on DD #4.

YSD-27 completed and placed in service.

[22] December 19, 1941.—New 25-ton traveling crane at Repair Basin completed.

USS SHAW docked on Marine Railway.

USS CURTISS arrived.

USS MONAGHAN arrived and departed.

USS BREESE arrived and departed.

USS SEMINOLE arrived and departed.

December 20, 1941.—Work begun to repair and place into operation the 1,000,000 gallon concrete underground reservoir in rear of Administration Building at present unused.

USS SCHLEY departed.

USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.

USS CRAVEN arrived.

USS PENNSYLVANIA departed. This vessel had re-entered the Yard on 12 December, 1941.

USS MARYLAND departed.

USS TENNESSEE departed.

Yard help requested by Base Force salvage party on USS CASSIN, DOWNES and OGLALA.

December 21, 1941.—Yard Public Works initiated work at Coaling Basin to provide space for inflammables.

[23] USS CHEW arrived.

USS RAIL arrived.

Base Force took over salvage work on USS OGLALA and NEVADA.

Draft of workmen from mainland received via USS LURLINE.

	Help-ers	Journey-men		Help-ers	Journey-men
Blacksmiths.....	3	1	Riggers.....	2	0
Electricians.....	3	4	Sheetmetal worker.....	14	5
Machinists.....	11	9	Shipfiter.....	5	6
Molder.....	1	0	Welder, Elec.....	0	4
Pipefitters.....	2	2			

and 88 classified laborers—total, 167 men.

December 22, 1941.—USS CHEW departed.

USS BOGGS arrived.

USS NARWHAL departed.

December 23, 1941.—USS BOGGS departed.

USS WARD arrived.

USS TROUT arrived.

USS RALEIGH arrived.

[24] USS THORNTON departed.

USS SONOMA arrived.

December 24, 1941.—USS SHAW undocked from Marine Railway.

USS CACHALOT departed.

December 25, 1941.—Rear Admiral William R. Furlong, USN, assumed duties as Commandant of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and assistant to the district commandant, in accordance with competent orders.

USS TRACY docked on Marine Railway.

USS HOPKINS arrived.

USS PHOENIX arrived.

USS WARD departed.

December 26, 1941.—USS SCHLEY arrived.

USS NARWHAL arrived.

YF-24C arrived.

December 27, 1941.—USS CURTISS departed.

December 28, 1941.—USS CRAVEN departed.

[25] USS HOPKINS departed.

USS ALLEN arrived.

The 50-ton floating derrick Havaside was damaged, a hole being punched in her bottom by projection from the CALIFORNIA, alongside which she was working.

December 29, 1941.—Work completed on inflammable storage at Coal Basin.

USS FARRAGUT arrived.

USS RENHAM arrived.

USS ELLET arrived.

USS COCKATOO arrived.

December 30, 1941.—USS PHOENIX departed.

USS CHEW arrived.

USS FARRAGUT departed.

USS SALT LAKE CITY arrived.

December 31, 1941.—USS HELENA undocked from DD #2.

During this month the Yard force has been engaged for twenty-four hours each day in herculean efforts to salvage materials and repair vessels and their units damaged during the raid of 7 December. In addition, the regular work load has been properly [26] carried on and expedited wherever possible. Arrivals of vessels entered in this diary indicate arrivals for work to be accomplished; departures indicate completion of the work and release of availability. Base Force Salvage parties, the Mobile Repair Unit and the Navy Yard have pulled together to accomplish a common result.

Authenticated—

/s/ C. S. GILLETTE,
Captain U. S. N.

Notes on activities of the Base Force Salvage organization:

Base Force Salvage was organized under the Commander base force with Commander J. M. Steel, USN, officer-in-charge. Senior Salvage Engineer, Lieutenant Commander C. L. Curtis, USNR, was in immediate charge of salvage operations.

A temporary office was established, north of Building No. 129, and the first vessels assigned to this unit for salvage were the USS CASEIN, DORNES, SHAW and OGLALA.

Both the MARYLAND and TENNESSEE were delivered to the Navy Yard and study and preparation were made for ultimate salvage of the CALIFORNIA, UTAH, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, the floating drydock and a Japanese submarine off Ford Island.

On December 17, the USS VESTAL was floated and the USS RALEIGH was ready for delivery to the yard. Removal of equipment from the [27] WEST VIRGINIA was underway. The OGLALA and NEVADA were surveyed for refloating and this work started.

On December 18 pumping operations and repair work were started on YFD-2.

On December 23, the organization had seven diving units in operation. The Mobile Repair Unit consisting of more than 20 officers and 1,000 men reported for duty this date.

Pearl Harbor water area defense activities:

Captain H. D. Bode, USN, reported for duty as Assistant to the Captain of the Yard on December 10 and was assigned as defense officer in connection with defenses of the Pearl Harbor water area.

A study was made of defense requirements with view to immediate and rapid procurement of defensive material. A Pearl Harbor inner harbor patrol was put in operation. Arrangements were made for use of motor torpedo boats and ready attack destroyer in the harbor patrol organization, and for regular routine sweeping of the harbor by special equipment (magnetic and acoustic). Plan for harbor patrol was established by Naval Base Defense Order No. 11, dated December 26, 1941.

Arrangements were made to expedite the manufacture of antitorpedo nets of yard design. Installation of Light Indicator Net was started and this was placed in operation December 27. Establish [28] ment of 16 observation stations for mine watch was outlined and a start was made on installation of temporary control lines for range entrance lights and outer channel buoys.

Manufacture of special type floating solid steel curtain of interlocking pile sheeting was completed for Drydock No. 2 and cofferdam of Drydock No. 3.

District Material Report:

A total of 31 small yachts and sampans were acquired during the period of 7 December to 31 December 1941 for use as district craft. Such craft have been assigned to Commander Inshore Patrol for inshore patrol, Captain of the Yard for harbor patrol and Commander Base Force for salvage and supply facilities.

The following eight vessels were partially converted during this period: C. G. 400, C. G. 403, XYP-161, XYP-166, XYP-155, C. G. 196, XYP-157 and XYP-14-14.

During the period of this report the shipyard and drydock facilities of the Inter-Island Drydock Co., Ltd., the Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., and Young Brothers, Ltd., have been available to the district for the repair and conversion of district craft. The Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., shipyard has experienced some labor shortage which has limited the facilities to the conversion program of sampans with deferment of small contractors tugs and barges. No improvement in this labor condition is likely as long [29] as other defense contracts are in progress. The work load and productive force at the Inter-Island Drydock Co., Ltd., is satisfactory. Drydock facilities at Young Brothers, Ltd., are in use. The size of the dock and lack of repair facilities limits the availability for other craft.

Supply Department Activities:

After the attack on the fleet, arrangements were made to distribute food and clothing to certain focal points, namely: Ford Island, for the crews of certain battleships, to the Arena, the Receiving Station, the Officers' Club, the Marine Barracks and the Naval Hospital.

The first week of the war was a period of continuous demand for emergency issues of clothing, food, mattresses, blankets, ordnance material, lumber, sand bags, flash lights, batteries and innumerable ship materials. Issues and deliveries of these items were expedited, but a firm check on the requiring activities was made to justify quantities requisitioned.

Replenishment and augmentation of all critical items were immediately started after the outbreak of war. Shipments of fresh and dry provisions, steel, clothing,

lumber, cots, helmets, small arms, burlap sand bags, bedding, salvage gear, etc., were requested of the west coast yards and the Navy Department.

[30] At the end of the first week, practically all of the business of the supply department had been returned to normal, although accelerated, channels of supply.

Communication Activities:

First action taken was the transmission of air raid warning by NPM on all of its circuits, done immediately by direction of the District Communication Officer who was notified of the raid by the communication watch officer at the navy yard.

The high power TAW transmitter at Lualualei had been shut down by previous arrangement to repair radio towers and shift the general power transformers. This transmitter was restored to full commission with power from the Hawaiian Electric Co., by 0949. The high frequency transmitters were placed on auxiliary operation without interruption.

Radio communication and radio control between the navy yard, radio Wailupe and Lualualei, and from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to Lualualei were established by low power sets so that there was no serious interruption of radio communications on any circuit from the Fourteenth Naval District.

There were many cases of interruptions to telephone communications caused by damage to cables.

[31] All radio control activities were transferred from Radio Wailupe into bombproof building No. 2 and Radio Wahiawa by December 17 without interruption of communications.

The activities of the District Combat Intelligence Unit at Radio Heeia have been transferred to Radio Wailupe pending further transfer to Radio Wahiawa.

Additional telephone facilities have been installed to meet the sudden increase of demand and to provide alternate communication channels.

Arrangements for emergency communications, using auxiliary power units and facilities of the commercial communication companies, have been completed.

Two telephone trunks and one teletype circuit between the Harbor Control Post and Aliamanu Crater were completed by January 1, 1942, and the laying of a 100 pair cable to connect the navy yard and the Salt Lake area was underway at maximum speed.

Port Director's Report:

The following Army, Navy, N. T. S., and commercial vessel movements were effected:

December 7, 1941:

S. S. JAGERSFONTEIN arrived Honolulu 0930.

U. S. S. ANTARES arrived Honolulu at 0945.

U. S. S. NAVAJO arrived Honolulu at 1400.

[32] December 8, 1941:

S. S. MANINI arrived at 0700 from Vancouver. B. C.

S. S. PAT DOHENY (TKR) arrived Honolulu at 0730.

S. S. MALAMA arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1630 from Hlckam.

December 9, 1941:

S. S. LANSING arrived Honolulu at 0730 from New Guinea.

U. S. S. ANTARES shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 0935.

S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Honolulu at 1425 from Pacific Coast.

December 10, 1941:

U. S. S. ROBIN arrived Honolulu at 1100 from Palmyra.

U. S. S. ROBIN shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 1245

S. S. WEIMEA arrived Honolulu at 1245 from San Francisco.

S. S. ROSEVILLE (Norwegian) arrived Honolulu at 1530 from Los Angeles Harbor.

U. S. C. & Geodetic Survey EXPLORER arrived Honolulu at 1545 from sea.

S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu at 1800 from Manila.

December 11, 1941:

S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Honolulu 1155 from San Francisco.

S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 1915 from sea.

December 12, 1941:

S. S. PORTLAND arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1145 for Kahului.

S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1330 from sea.

S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE arrived Honolulu 1500 from Vancouver, B. C.

December 13, 1941:

- S. S. LANSING sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Vancouver, B. C.
- S. S. PYRO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1830 for Kahului.
- S. S. COAST MERCHANT arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. REGULUS arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Midway Island.

December 14, 1941:

- S. S. HAWAII sailed from Honolulu at 1600 for Port Allen.
- S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
- [33] 0615 report received that U. S. S. TREVOR was standing by torpedoed merchantman. Position 043° true 29 miles from Makapu Point.
- 0615 report received that S. S. PYRO attacked but not damaged at 0350 by submarine. Position 334° true 85 miles from Barbers Point.
- 0645—U. S. S. TREVOR reported picking up survivors from Norwegian steamer HEOUGH.
- 0850—U. S. S. TREVOR reported standing in Honolulu, berth Pier 6, with HEOUGH survivors.

December 15, 1941:

- S. S. HALHAKALA sailed from Kahului at 0500 for Christmas Is.
- S. S. CASTOR sailed from Pearl Harbor at 0830 for Honolulu.
- S. S. CASTOR arrived Honolulu at 1228 from Pearl Harbor.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Port Allen at 0600 from Honolulu.
- U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT arrived Honolulu at 1242 from Manila.

December 16, 1941:

- S. S. HAWAII sailed from Port Allen at 1600 for Honolulu.
- S. S. MANINI sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
- S. S. MALAMA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
- S. S. RUSA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Panama Canal.
- S. S. PAT DOHENEY sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAKAWELI sailed from Honolulu at 1760 for Kahului.
- S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Sydney, Australia.
- S. S. PERMANENTE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. KAULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Palmyra Island.
- S. S. HUMUULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Christmas Island.
- U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
- S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
- S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Honolulu at (?) from Pacific Coast.

December 17, 1941:

- S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Honolulu at 1730 for Kahului.
- S. S. MALIKO sailed Kahului at 1900 for Hilo.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu 0730 from Port Allen.
- S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Kahului at 130 from Honolulu.

[34] December 18, 1941:

- U. S. S. CASTOR sailed Honolulu at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. JUPITER sailed Pearl Harbor at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MEMPHIS CITY sailed Hilo at 2000 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. HUALALAI sailed Hilo at 1700 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. SEPULGA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1100 from Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
- S. S. MALIKO arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.
- S. S. LAKE FRANCIS arrived Honolulu at 0922 from Christmas Is.

December 19, 1941:

- S. S. LAKE FRANCIS sailed Honolulu at 1348 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. RAMAPO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. LILOA sailed Port Allen at 1345 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. KOHALA sailed Ahukini at 1530 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Pacific Coast.
- S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE sailed Honolulu at 1125 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1045 from Pacific Coast.
- S. S. MAPELE arrived Honolulu at 1000 from New Zealand.
- S. S. ORTOLAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1700.
- S. S. HUALALAI arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Hilo.

December 20, 1941:

- S. S. JAGERSFONTFIN sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Batvia.
- S. S. MONTGOMERY CITY sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT sailed Honolulu at 1630 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Kahului at 1800 for Hilo.

S. S. MAPELE sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1000 from vicinity Wake Island. Last port departure Johnston.

December 21, 1941:

S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Honolulu at 1500 for Kahului.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS sailed Pearl Harbor at 0630 for Honolulu.

S. S. KAILUA sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MALIKO sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Honolulu at 0800 from Pearl Harbor.

S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Hilo at 0600 for Kahului.

[35] Dawn—30 survivors from S. S. LAHAINA arrived Maui and reported vessel attacked by shell fire from surfaced submarine on afternoon of December 11th. Ship sank December 12th. All the ship's crew cleared the ship; four men died on way to Maui; survivors returned to Oahu December 30, 1941 by plane.

December 22, 1941:

S. S. MAKAWELI sailed Kahului at 0625 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kahului at 0700 from Honolulu.

December 23, 1941:

S. S. MAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1755 from Ahukini.

U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor 1330 from sea.

December 24, 1941:

S. S. HAWAII sailed Honolulu 0720 for Kaunakakai.

S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai at 1330 for Kahului.

S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Kahului at 1730 for Hilo.

U. S. S. SUMNER sailed Pearl Harbor at 0800 for sea.

S. S. HUMUULA sailed Honolulu 0832 for sea.

U. S. S. DOLPHIN and 1 destroyer sailed Pearl Harbor for sea at 0930.

U. S. S. ALDEBARAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. HARRIS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. ABINE arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS arrived Honolulu at 1325 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Honolulu at 1330 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. PRES. GARFIELD arrived Honolulu at 1335 from Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Pearl Harbor at 1730 from Pacific Coast.

S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1130 from Honolulu.

S. S. MAKUA arrived Ahukini at 0730 from Honolulu.

U. S. S. GREYLING and U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor at 1400 from sea.

December 25, 1941:

U. S. S. PROCYON sailed Pearl Harbor at 0700 for Honolulu.

S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului at 1657 for Hilo.

U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Honolulu at 0740 from Pearl Harbor.

S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Hilo at 0700 from Kahului.

[36] December 26, 1941:

S. S. LURLINE sailed Honolulu 1045 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MATSONIA sailed Honolulu at 1015 for Pacific Coast.

S. S. MONTEREY sailed Honolulu at 1038 for Pacific Coast.

U. S. S. SABINE sailed Pearl Harbor at 0642 for Honolulu.

U. S. S. PLATTE sailed Honolulu at 0755 for Pearl Harbor.

S. S. HAMAKUA arrived Honolulu at 0955 from sea.

U. S. S. SABINE arrived at Honolulu at 0755 from Pearl Harbor.

U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Pearl Harbor at 0835 from Honolulu.

S. S. HAWAII arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.

S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY arrived Honolulu at 1215 from Panama Canal.

December 27, 1941:

S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Honolulu at 1725 for Port Allen.

S. S. MAKUA sailed Ahukini at 0830 for Kahului.

Twelve (12) survivors picked up off Oahu reported S. S. MANINI torpedoed December 17, 1941, at 1840 A. S. T. (0504 G. C. T. 18 December), position 18°35'N, 156°13'W. Ship sank in six minutes. Two life boats put over. December 29, 1941, 19 more survivors picked up by U. S. S. PATERSON, west of Oahu, making 31 survivors in all.

December 28, 1941 :

- U. S. S. SABINE sailed Honolulu at 1528 for Pacific Coast.
 - U. S. S. NEOSHO sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for sea.
 - U. S. S. CURTISS sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
 - S. S. HAWAII sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.
 - S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.
 - S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Port Allen at 1700 for Honolulu.
 - S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Port Allen at 0700 from Honolulu.
 - S. S. MAKUA arrived Kahului at 0745 from Alukini.
 - S. S. ARTHUR FOSS and two barges arrived Honolulu at 1500 from Wake Island.
- 1000—thirteen (13) survivors from S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu and reported vessel sunk at 0536, 18 December, 1941,—120 miles south of southern point Hawaii. Nine (9) missing.

December 29, 1941 :

- S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului (Time not available) for Kaunakakai.
- S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai (Time not available) for Honolulu.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Kahului at 0700 from Hilo.
- S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kanului at 0700 from Hilo.
- S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 0630 from Port Allen.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1100 from Kahului.

[37] December 30, 1941 :

- U. S. S. HERCULES sailed Pearl Harbor at 0715 for Honolulu.
- S. S. PRES. GARFIELD sailed Honolulu at 1036 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS sailed Honolulu at 1043 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. PROCYON sailed Honolulu at 1010 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. HARRIS sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for Pacific Coast.
- U. S. S. THRESHER sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for sea.
- U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pearl Harbor.
- U. S. S. TRITON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1830 from sea.
- S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu at 0715 from Kaunakakai.
- U. S. S. WALNUT (C. G. S.) arrived Honolulu at 0700 from sea.

December 31, 1941 :

- S. S. HAMAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1752 for Nawiliwili.
- S. S. HUALALAI sailed Honolulu at 1743 for Kahului.
- S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY sailed Honolulu at 1740 for Kahului.
- S. S. NIAGARA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1200 from sea.

/s/ M. R. DERX.

Activities of District Intelligence Office and Office of the Cable and Radio Censor :
 At 0830 December 7, the order was given to have all Intelligence personnel on active duty report to their stations immediately.

Orders were given to mobilize all Naval Reserve Intelligence personnel and to establish censorship of cable and overseas radio.

Appropriate intelligence reports (including interrogation of Japanese lieutenant captured from small submarine stranded in Waimanalo Bay and examination of various documents and equipment from crashed Japanese planes) have been submitted to proper [38] authorities including the U. S. Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, Combat Intelligence Officer, local representatives of the Military Intelligence Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

During the period 7 to 31 December, 1941, the District Intelligence Service in collaboration with the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division conducted investigations of many rumors and reports concerning alleged parachutists, signals, lights, poisoned water, unexploded bombs, etc., and assisted the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division in rounding up suspects and collecting unauthorized radios and firearms.

At 1100 December 7, censorship was established and a ban clamped down on all incoming and outgoing cables, radiograms and trans-Pacific telephone calls. On December 8, after rules for censorship and requirements of messages were issued to operating companies and to the Field Censors, regular censorship and release of all traffic were begun at 1300.

Tentative trans-Pacific telephone censorship regulations were issued to the public on December 19.

Personnel Office Report:

The following information on officer and enlisted personnel. [39] is submitted for the period of 7 December to 31 December, 1941:

Officer Personnel

Officers of the Naval Reserve called to active duty in the Fourteenth Naval District -----	44
Officers of the Retired List, USN, called to active duty-----	1
	<hr/>
Officers received in District from mainland for permanent duty-----	45
Officers received in District for temporary duty from Pacific Fleet Pool-----	39
	115
	<hr/>
	154

Enlisted Personnel

Number of new enlistments in Naval Reserve-----	25
Retired men called to active duty-----	3
Fleet Reserves called to active duty-----	0
Naval Reserves called to active duty-----	43
	<hr/>
Total number of enlisted men called to active duty during this period-----	46

Action at Wake:

Enemy activity started with a bombing attack by 24 twin-engined land planes on December 8. Almost daily attacks were made by Japanese aircraft until the island was finally overwhelmed by aerial and surface attack on December 22. A surface raid was also carried out on December 11. Enemy losses reported include one light cruiser, four destroyers, a gunboat, a submarine and more than 12 planes.

[40] *Action at Midway:*

The only enemy activity against Midway was a surface raid on December 8 in which two cruisers and two destroyers are reported to have participated. Shore batteries registered three 3 inch hits on one of the destroyers and two 5 inch hits on a cruiser. A total of 14 casualties including two dead resulted from enemy shelling.

A curtailment of contract work was proposed under the existing situation and plans made to eliminate projects which would require a long time for completion to a usable stage. It was proposed to stop work temporarily on the submarine base buildings and modify other projects to suit immediate needs. It was further proposed to reduce the contractors' force 50 per cent, leaving a total of 770 workers.

Action at Johnston:

Initial action against Johnston was a star shelling by a submarine on December 12, followed by other surface raids on December 15, 21 and 22. The December 15 raid saw an enemy light cruiser fire 10 salvos at 9,000 yards range. The power house was destroyed and the stills and boilers were badly damaged. Since the enemy ceased fire about 10 minutes after and at a time when the island was well lighted by an oil fire, it was believed that Johnston shore batteries came close to their mark.

[41] A star shelling, probably by a submarine, occurred on December 21, this action ceasing after fire was returned by shore battery. On December 22, a submarine shelled Sand Island and destroyed the CAA homing tower. The 5 inch battery on Johnston fired 10 salvos with each gun at 7,000 yards range before the submarine submerged.

In a directive on December 13, it was specified that a sufficient force of civilians was to be kept at the island to operate all of the power plants and continue with a program as follows: Complete gasoline tanks to a usable stage, complete a runway 2,500 feet in length, construct bachelor officers' quarters and the dispensary, construct temporary magazine as necessary and splinter proof shelters, construct an emergency sewage system and a salt water system, a power plant

and distribution system and a radar installation. A total of 270 civilian employes was estimated as necessary for the outlined work.

On December 25, the commandant directed that the resident officer in charge and facilities of the contractors' organization be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer of the air station for necessary defense and protection measures in the present emergency.

The program was to include shelters and protection around key structures.

After taking care of emergency items, the contractors' force [42] was to complete personnel buildings and services. Temporary storage for ammunition, gasoline and other supplies, the runway and all essential items were to be completed at the earliest possible date to permit evacuation of civilian employes and make room for military personnel. The permanent bombproof shelter and communication center were not to be built as originally planned. Scattered splinter proof shelters would be substituted as needed.

The foregoing was altered the following day by a directive that Johnston was to retain the least number of employes—not to exceed 200—to complete the essential defense structures including the runway to 2,500 feet length and to operate mechanical equipment. The least skilled and the nonessential trades would be evacuated first, and the military force would assist with unskilled labor as necessary after evacuation.

Of a total of 307 contractors' employes, 110 were evacuated by the end of the month.

Action at Palmyra:

There was no enemy activity against Palmyra until December 24 when the air station was shelled by a submarine at about 3,000 yards range. Six rounds fired registered one hit on the U. S. Engineer Department Dredge Sacramento, causing only minor damage.

All of the island's batteries were in Condition 1 before the action. The submarine submerged after a five inch shore battery fired two star shells and 12 navy common A. P. shells. No hits were observed.

[43] Change of the construction program as required by existing conditions was directed.

Palmyra was to maintain the minimum number of civilian employes—not over 250—needed to complete structures and essential defense measures, operate mechanical equipment as well as the dredge and other plant. The island was to provide a 5,000 foot runway together with emergency defenses.

On December 31, the naval air station reported its radar was in commission.

Summary of Actions Against Submarines:

A total of 52 depth charge attacks on submarine contact were reported by district forces during the period of this diary.

Reports were received from the USS WARD, USS CHEW, USS SCHLEY, USS COCKATOO and USCG TANEY.

Enemy submarine activity in the operating areas of these forces was materially curtailed, giving some tangible evidence of the effect of the attacks.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 75

14TH NAVAL DISTRICT

OFFICE OF COMMANDANT

% Fleet Post Office, SAN FRANCISCO, California

7 JUNE 1945.

C-A12-1/ND14
Serial 03093

Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

Subject: War Diaries of 7 December 1941—Extracts from.

Enclosures:

(A) Extract from War Diary, 14ND Naval Base Defense Force.

(B) Extract from War Diary of OinC, Net & Boom Defenses, 14ND.

(C) Extract from War Diary of USS CONDOR.

(D) Extract from War Diary of USS WARD.

1. Pursuant to the verbal request of Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNR, Enclosures (A), (B), (C) and (D) are forwarded herewith.

H. E. Overesch,
H. E. OVERESCH,
Chief of Staff.

(Enclosure A)

EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE

Sunday, December 7, 1941

- 0654 U. S. S. WARD transmitted the following message to Com14:
"We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the Defensive Sea Area."
0712 Message decoded and delivered to Duty Officer, Lt. Comdr. Kaminski.
0713 Duty Officer notified Chief of Staff, who notified Commandant.
0715 Duty Officer notified Commander in Chief's Duty Officer.
0718 Duty Officer notified Commander Momsen, War Plans Officer.
0720 Duty Officer notified Ensign Logan to report for duty.
0725 Commander Momsen called Duty Officer and had ready duty destroyer ordered to proceed as soon as possible to the assistance of the WARD.
0735 Honolulu gate ordered closed.
Certified a true copy:

Geo. H. Simpson,
GEO. H. SIMPSON,
Aide to the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

JUNE 6, 1945.

(Enclosure B)

EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY OF OFFICER IN CHARGE, NET & BOOM DEFENSES, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT. KEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISTRICT ORDER No. 2-42.

Sunday, December 7, 1941

DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

- 11:45 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941.
" Routine duties.
0712 Received despatch from USS WARD . . . "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area". Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Commandant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted CINCPAC duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready duty DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS WARD in defensive sea area". Instructed Communication Office to send copy of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called Chief of Staff Captain Earle, notifying him of WARD's message. He requested confirmation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.
0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).
0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a sampan—we are escorting this sampan into Honolulu—please inform Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".

Certified a true copy:

GEO. H. SIMPSON,
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

JUNE 6, 1945.

(Enclosure C)

EXTRACT FROM THE WAR DIARY OF THE USS CONDOR (AMC#14) OF DECEMBER 1941

December 7, 1941

0210-0445 Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.

0342 Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram illustrates contact:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating contact with a Japanese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342 will be found reproduced as Item No. 297, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on the port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned sharply to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm blinker to the U. S. S. WARD, "Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots." About five minutes later the WARD requested by radio further information concerning the submarine. Information concerning the course was given and the WARD continued search while this vessel continued on its assigned mission. The submarine was not sighted again.

Certified a true copy:

GEO. H. SIMPSON,

Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[Stamped:] 6 Jun 1945.

(Enclosure D)

EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY, U. S. S. WARD

December 7, 1941

0 to 4

Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance patrol off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds to maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 187 r. p. m.

0200 U. S. S. CORSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor and commenced mine sweeping operations.

4 to 8

0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".

0408 Sounded General Quarters.

0443 Secured from General Quarters.

0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 MAGNETIC AND WAS HEAD-ING FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".

0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.

0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION".

0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".

0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.

0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded General Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125° T and pgc, 118 psc.

0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salvos. Observed second salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced depth charge attack.

0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.

1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.
- 0654 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
- 0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack.
- 0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
- 0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.

Certified a true copy:

Geo. H. Simpson,
Geo. H. SIMPSON,
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

JUNE 6, 1945

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

ND14/N&B/A16-3/RWO
Confidential

FEBRUARY 14, 1942.

From: The Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Via: Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: War Diary of the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses.
Reference: (a) District Order 2-42.

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), subject War Diary is herewith submitted.

J. H. Hoefler,
J. H. HOEFFER,
By direction.

First Endorsement
ND14/ISP/A16-3/RWO

INSHORE PATROL,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
February 14, 1942.

From: Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
1. Forwarded.

J. W. Rogers,
J. W. ROGERS,
By direction.

WAR DIARY OF OFFICER IN CHARGE, NET & BOOM DEFENSES FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Kept in accordance with District Order No. 2-42

Sunday December 7 1941

DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

- 1145 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941.
" Routine duties.
- 0712 Received despatch from USS WARD. . . "We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area". Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Commandant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted CINCPAC duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready duty DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS WARD in defensive sea area". Instructed Communication Office to send copy of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called Chief of Staff Captain Earle, notifying him of WARD'S message. He requested confirmation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.
- 0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).

- 0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a sampan—we are escorting this sampan into Honolulu—please inform Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".
- 0726 Called Coast Guard. Could not contact an officer but was informed by Communications Office (14ND) that Coast Guard had received WARD'S second message simultaneously. Comdr. Momsen arrived Operations Office a few minutes after Ensign Logan.
- 9728 Started to call all department heads, after arranging with telephone office to keep lines open.

0755 At approximately 0755 (but not later) heard a plane approaching from south. I saw it from southerly lanai of Administration Bldg. and could discern Rising Sun insignia of Japan under the wings. Plane was joined shortly by others with some insignia on it. They were the dive bomber type. Bombs were dropped and the first attack was on. Tried to reach the YNg 17 by telephone. Unable to get through. Continued calling YNg 17 without being able to make contact. Made telephone contact with YNg 17 at approximately 0830 and ordered Ensign Eastman to close the A/T and A/B immediately. About this time there was a slight lull in the attack, followed by a much heavier and concentrated attack, and I believe that it was in this attack that the formations of torpedo planes came in over PEARL HARBOR. It was during this attack that our defensive firing was increasing perceptibly. Noise was deafening. This attack lasted much longer than the first.

Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, arrived during this second attack.

Endeavored to close HONOLULU A/T and A/B. Had considerable difficulty in getting through. Finally, Lt. Ottley's home was called and was informed that he had departed for the Control Station of the HONOLULU Net and Boom. Tried to reach him there without success. During this period the third attack began. Defensive firing exceedingly heavy, bombing likewise.

The Commandant and his Aide arrived during the third attack.

Fires from Hickam Field and 10-10 dock were raging. Everything was obscured by smoke. It was impossible to use the phone during this time because of noise. This attack appeared to me to be the heaviest and longest. After the third attack subsided, contact was made with the Officer in Charge, HONOLULU Net Operating Station, and he was ordered to close the HONOLULU Net and Boom immediately. Was later informed by Mr. Ottley that the Mess Hall at Sand Island had been bombed and one man injured, but that they were still able to operate.

Capt. Finlay, Senior Coast Guard Officer, had assumed his duties as Captain of the Port (HONOLULU) and was in direct administrative charge of the HONOLULU Net and Boom.

Commandant's Aide for Aviation arrived during the last attack.

There followed a lull, followed by what I considered a relatively light attack.

Shortly thereafter the attacks ceased.

Simultaneously with the events listed above the following occurred on December 1941.

Communications with YNg 17 and the Section Base were out. To become informed of the conditions of the gate vessel, the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom Operating Crew, and of Net & Boom vessels at the Section Base, Ensign John H. Hofer went to the foregoing and subsequently arranged to have additional weapons, ammunition gas mask and helmets delivered to them.

Enlisted personnel was not adequate for the war time operation of the Net & Boom Defenses. Follow up requests for personnel requirements previously submitted were made to District Personnel Officer.

Study was given to the obtaining of standby winches for the HONOLULU Net & Boom, and for the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom.

Routine Duties.

H. KAMINSKI

Lt. Comdr. D-V (G) USNR

Monday, December 8, 1941

1. In accordance with previously formulated plans, action was taken to provide war time ordnance, for all Net and Boom Stations and vessels. Requests were made to the District Ordnance Officer.

2. An underwater inspection was requested to made of the Pearl Harbor anti-torpedo net and anti-motorboat boom (by divers to be obtained from ComBaseFor) for the purpose of determining whether the Nets had been directly penetrated or disturbed during or prior to the attack of the 7th. This inspection, conducted on the 12th of December, revealed that the nets had not been penetrated and substantiated the belief that the Japanese submarine known to be in Pearl Harbor, entered in the wake of our own AMc's, Sunday a. m., December 7th.

3. A recommendation was submitted to the Captain of the Yard to cancel the system of visual signals now in effect for denoting the opened and closed status of the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. This was approved.

Tuesday, December 9, 1941

1. Enlisted personnel urgently needed in Net and Boom operating forces were obtained from the Emergency Fleet Personnel office. Additional personnel requests were submitted to District Personnel office to complete operating forces.

2. The attack of Dec. 7th, re-opened the subject of the unprotected areas existing under the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. The conventional A/T Net stipulated for this installation by BuOrd extends to a depth of 35' only, and was designed primarily for torpedo protection. There is a section directly under the main gate of approximately 350' ranging in depth from 45' to 82' (dredged for a damaged ship channel), and the possibility of a submarine passing through this section undetected is realized. Pending the receipt of reliable information or directives it is not deemed advisable to make any immediate changes in the Net and Boom. However changes will be made as soon as advisable.

3. The District Ordnance Superintendent advised that two 50 cal. machine guns would shortly be made available for Net and Boom defenses. It is intended to place one on the YNg 17 and one on the YN 47.

Wednesday, December 10, 1941

1. A study was made and action was taken to provide emergency standby opening and closing wires for the Nets and Booms at both Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. This wire will be available for immediate use in case of damage to wire now in use.

2. In view of the questionable reliability of the temporary winches installed for operation of the Nets and Booms at Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. The Bureau of Ordnance was requested by despatch to expedite shipment of the regular Bureau of Yards and Docks winches. In anticipation of the delay expected in the shipping of the regular winches alternate means of opening and closing the gates in case of breakdown were established as follows:—

HONOLULU A/T AND A/B:—PIER 1 WINCH STATION (CLOSING STATION)

Emergency means	{	#1 equipment-----	temporary installation, diesel winch.
		#2 equipment-----	YN47, COCKENCE
		#3 equipment-----	Army truck M

SAND ISLAND WINCH STATION (OPENING STATION)

Emergency means	{	#1 equipment-----	original installation, two diesel winches
		#2 equipment-----	YN47, COCKENCE
		#3 equipment-----	Army tractors M

PEARL HARBOR A/T AND A/B GATE VESSEL (CLOSING) STATION

Emergency means	{	#1 equipment-----	starboard winches
		#2 equipment-----	port winches
		#3 equipment-----	YN56, WAPELLO
		#4 equipment-----	YN2, YN7, YN53

FORT WEAVER WINCH STATION (OPENING)

Emergency means	{	#1 equipment-----	temporarily installed two diesel winches
		#2 equipment-----	YN56, WAPELLO
		#3 equipment-----	YN2, YN7, YN53
		#3 equipment-----	Army tractors M

M Arrangements were made with the Army officers concerned for the use of this equipment in event of a breakdown of equipment temporarily installed.

Thursday, December 11, 1941

1. Commander Base Force designated staff officer Lieutenant Commander RAINES to assist in the preparation of tentative plans, and also in the installation for aerial torpedo net protection of ships, berths, and drydocks in Pearl Harbor. Working in cooperation with the Public Works Department, improvised materials were envisioned as being temporarily necessary for this work. Arrangements were made to obtain sheet piling, re-inforcing rods welded to fencing, and target rafts to augment the relatively meagre quantity of regular A/T nets and appurtenances now available at the Net Depot. Work commenced on this project and the wire fencing separating Pearl Harbor Navy Yard was removed for this purpose.

2. The baffle in front of the YNg 17, which serves as torpedo protection for that part of the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B which otherwise would be unprotected, was moved in closer to the YNg 17 in view of the data received regarding the midget Japanese submarine which washed ashore at Waimanolo Bay.

. Action was taken to provide a direct phone from the YNg 17 to the Captain of the Yard's office.

Friday, December 12, 1941

1. A study was made of the feasibility of manufacturing torpedo-net grommets in the Navy Yard, so as to make available as soon as possible the large amount of net that will be needed for protection of capitol ships in Pearl Harbor. To this end a canvass was made of the following local firms with the intention of securing whatever wire could be used for this job: Honolulu Iron Works; Theo H. Davies & Co. Ltd., Oahu Junk Co., American Factors, and the local utility companies. Samples of some of this wire that could be obtained were delivered to the District Chemical laboratory for measuring tensile strength and ascertaining chemical composition. Reports received later revealed that this wire would be unsatisfactory for the job, it being much too low in carbon content to afford suitable wire for manufacturing A/A net grommets.

2. Plans were made to lower the inner A/T and A/B net at Pearl to within 2 feet of the bottom of the channel. This is to be done as soon as additional net is received from the mainland.

Saturday, December 13, 1941

1. Detailed soundings and the taking of profile data was completed for the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B for the purpose of providing working information as to how to best lower the nets to protect the space created by the dredging of the damaged ship channel. The problem is attributable to the fact that the depths of water under the nets when in a closed position is greater than the depths of water under the nets when in an open position. This condition prohibits the lengthening of all the nets to the deepest depths because if this were done, the nets would then become fouled on the bottom when opened because of the lesser depths existing as stated afore. To overcome this problem a recommendation was made to fill in, with dredged materials, the hole directly under the center of the net to a depth of approximately 45'. This recommendation was opposed because of the lesser depths which would then exist in the damaged ship channel. A further study is being made of the afore problem.

Sunday, December 14, 1941

1. Plans were made to install a light indicator net at the site of the old anti-boat log boom in Pearl Harbor channel. Operating personnel, officers and men, equipment and supplies, were arranged for.

2. The Bureau of Ordnance was despatched to ship by Clipper material needed for this installation.

Monday, December 14, 1941

1. Work continued on the organization of the Light Indicator Net Station.

2. Captain Bode, U.S.N., assisting the Captain of the Yard, discussed plans for protecting ships, berths, and drydocks in Pearl Harbor. A study will be made of materials needed, and BuOrd will be despatched to ship same as soon as possible.

1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Tuesday, December 16, 1941

1. In preparation for the installation of the Light Indicator Net, the old anti-boat log boom was removed to the Net Depot quay wall and later stored ashore.

2. An inspection was made of part of the midget Japanese submarine now at the Submarine Base. Available information indicates that it would be extremely precarious, if not impossible, for an underwater craft of this type to directly penetrate or even go under the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B when the gate was closed, without advertising its presence.

Wednesday, December 17 1941

1. Routine administration.

Thursday, December 18 1941

1. In consonance with ONI reports relative to attempted attacks on British Net and Boom Defenses, consideration was given to the installing of large searchlights at Net and Boom stations. Approval was granted by BuShips to install 12" searchlights on the YNg 17 and at the Honolulu Net Operating Station. This will be done at once.

Friday, December 19, 1941

1. Installation plans were completed for the Light Indicator Net. The Net Depot will commence assembling the Net today, using these plans for reference.
2. Arrangements were made to equip the YN 7 with electric power transmission wire so as to enable her to supply current to the YNg 17 in event of power failure in the gate vessel.

Saturday, December 20, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Sunday, December 21, 1941

1. The ground moorings for the Indicator Net were laid this date.
2. Indicator Net panels were assembled and brailled up to conform to bottom soundings. This Net will be installed December 22 and December 23rd. Indicator floats were shipped by clipper.

Monday, December 22, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Tuesday, December 23, 1941

1. Study is being made of the practicability of installing a Light Indicator Net to the seaward (balk) line (main gate section) of the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B. If the study reveals this expediency to be practical, then the opening now afforded by the damaged ship channel to attacking underwater craft will be closed. This study is being conducted in conjunction with the study of the feasibility and advisability of installing an anti-submarine net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor channel.

Wednesday, December 24, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Thursday, December 25, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Friday, December 26, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Saturday, December 27, 1941

1. In accordance with District policy, Net and Boom vessels completed strip ship plans.

Sunday, December 28, 1941

1. In light of expanded Net and Boom operations, a complete revision of Net and Boom enlisted personnel was submitted to District Personnel Officer for forwarding to the Bureau of Navigation.

Monday, December 29, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Tuesday, December 30, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

Wednesday, December 31, 1941

1. Routine Administration.

U. S. S. WARD,
Hawaiian Area, February 4, 1942.

DD139/A12-1 (870)

Confidential

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Subject: War Diary.

Reference: (a) District Order No. 2-42, Jan. 5, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) War Diary of U. S. S. WARD for month of December, 1941.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in Reference (a) there is submitted herewith War Diary of the U. S. S. WARD, in triplicate, for the month of December, 1941.

W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

WAR DIARY

December 7, 1941

0 to 4:

Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance Patrol off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds to maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 137 r. p. m.

0200 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor and commenced mine sweeping operations.

4 to 8:

0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".

0403 Sounded General Quarters.

0443 Secured from General Quarters.

0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 MAGNETIC AND WAS HEADING FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".

0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.

0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from U. S. S. CONDOR: "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION".

0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".

0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.

0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded General Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125°T and pgc, 118 psc.

0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salvos. Observed second salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced depth charge attack.

0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.

Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.

0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.

- 0645 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
- 0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack.
- 0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
- 0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.
- 0736 From radio to Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Coast Guard Station, Honolulu: "WE SIGHTED AND CAPTURED SAMPAN. WE ARE ESCORTING SAMPAN IN TO HONOLULU. PLEASE NOTIFY COAST GUARD TO RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN".
- 0754 Sighted squadrons of enemy planes approaching from Barber's Point heading for Pearl Harbor.
- 0755 Japanese planes commenced bombing attack on Pearl Harbor.

DD139/A16-3/(759)

U. S. S. WARD,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 13, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.

To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Via: (1) Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.

(2) Commander Inshore Patrol.

Subject: Sinking of a Japanese Submarine by U. S. S. WARD.

1. While patrolling Pearl Harbor Entrance on Sunday, December 7, 1941, the U. S. S. WARD attacked an unidentified submarine in the Restricted Area off the Harbor.

The facts are as follows:

(1) At 0637 the Officer-of-the-deck said, "Captain come on the bridge". A conning tower with periscope of a submarine was visible. She was apparently heading for Pearl Harbor trailing the U. S. S. ANTARES. The ANTARES was standing toward the channel entrance towing a lighter.

(2) At 0640 the attack started. The WARD bore down on the submarine while accelerating from 5 to 25 knots.

(3) At 0645 the WARD opened fire with No. 1 and 3 guns and began dropping depth charges. One shot was fired from each gun. The shot from No. 1 gun missed, passing directly over the conning tower. The shot from No. 3 gun fired at a range of 50 yards or less struck the submarine at the waterline which was the junction of the hull and conning tower. Damage was seen by several members of the crew. This was a square positive hit. There was no evidence of ricochet. The submarine was seen to heel over to starboard. The projectile was not seen to explode outside the hull of the submarine. There was no splash of any size that might result from an explosion or ricochet.

(4) Immediately after being hit the submarine appeared to slow and sink. She ran into our depth charge barrage and appeared to be directly over an exploding charge. The depth charges were set for 100 feet.

(5) The submarine sank in 1200 feet of water and could not be located with supersonic detector. There was a large amount of oil on the surface where the depth charges exploded.

(6) The attack was made at 0645 which was before Pearl Harbor was bombed by Japanese planes.

(7) A dispatch by voice transmission was sent to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District at 0645 which stated:

"WE HAVE ATTACKED, FIRED UPON, AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".

(8) The performance of duty by the officers and men during this attack was in accordance with the traditions of this service.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Appearance of submarine: Cylindrical tube about 80 feet long with small oval shaped conning tower. It had no deck. It was painted dark green and was covered with moss indicating that it had been at sea for a considerable period.

Behavior during attack: In spite of the five minute run from the time of sighting and time of attack, the submarine apparently did not see or detect the WARD. It was making from 8 to 10 knots and was apparently bent on following the ANTARES into port. Exact distances are not known but at the time of the first shot the range was not more than 100 yards and for the second shot the range was 50 yards or less. The submarine passed very close to our stern.

W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

DD139/A16-3/(793)

U. S. S. WARD,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 23, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.
Subject: Attacks on Submarines, report of.

1. The following is a summary of attacks made upon submarines by this vessel between the dates of 7 and 17 December, 1941:

Date	Time	Summary	No. of charges
12-7-41	0640	Fired 2 shells at and dropped 4 depth charges on enemy submarine on surface. Sank submarine. See Commanding Officer, U. S. S. WARD Ltr. of 13 December 1941 to Commandant, 14th Naval District.	4
12-7-41	0705	Dropped 5 depth charges on sonic contact. Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern after attack.	5
12-7-41	0840	Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	2
12-7-41	1020	Dropped 3 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed oil on surface. Dropped 2 more depth charges on sonic contact under oil slick. No further contact.	5
12-7-41	1127	Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface after attack.	4
12-8-41	0619	Dropped 5 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown. Dropped 4 more charges on sonic contact after circling to verify first attack.	9
12-8-41	0655	Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed heavy oil slick on surface.	2
12-8-41	1349	Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	4
12-9-41	1158	Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact indicated by smoke bomb from patrol plane. Circled for second attack. Dropped 6 more charges. Contacts were excellent. Large air bubble came to surface. Heavy oil slick in bombed area was seen. Planes also dropped depth charges.	12
12-10-41	0033	Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	4
12-10-41	1728	Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Heavy oil on surface.	6
12-10-41	2115	Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	4
12-11-41	1514	Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	4
12-11-41	1547	Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Considerable oil on surface.	6
12-11-41	1637	Dropped 6 depth charges on plane indication and sonic contact. Heavy oil slick on surface.	6
12-11-41	1920	Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown.	6
12-16-41	2042	Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Seventh charge brought up a large air bubble accompanied with a quantity of oil.	8
12-17-41	1648	Dropped 8 depth charges on patrol plane indication. Results unknown.	8
12-17-41	2012	Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Contact was made at 1500 yards. Ranging was not stopped in order to listen for screw noises. Bearing was practically steady. Sound operator reported that it might be a surface ship at 800 yards the ship was 15° wide. Contact was clear and positive. Went ahead full speed. At 200 yards slowed to 15 knots. 10 seconds later dropped 8 depth charges at 4 second intervals. Charges set alternately for 50 and 100 feet. The seventh charge sent up a double column of water in a "V" shape which rose 25 feet higher than any other column. All charges exploded. No contact could be made after the attack.	8

/s/ W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.

December 7, 1941

8 to 12:

Steaming as before.

0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

0809 Sighted oil pool. Under intermittent gunfire from unidentified guns at times during air attack, and bombed several times, no damage being sustained. At one time enemy fighter planes repulsed with machine guns.

0840 Dropped two more depth charges, continuing search with sound gear.

1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0901 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet commenced standing out of Pearl Harbor.
- 1020 Made attack on enemy submarine, dropping three depth charges.
- 1031 Dropped two depth charges on oil slick.
- 1032 Steering gear jammed hard left.
- 1035 Steering gear repaired.
- 1127 Made contact with enemy submarine on sound gear. Dropped four depth charges. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface.
- 1150 Made depth charge attack; none of charges exploded.
- 12 to 16:
No comment.
- 16 to 20:
No comment.
- 20 to 24:
Steaming as before.
- 2110 Sighted anti-aircraft fire from Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.
- 2130 Secured from General Quarters.

December 8, 1941

- 9 to 4:
No comment.
- 4 to 8:
Steaming as before.
- 0530 Sounded General Quarters.
- 0610 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack, dropped four depth charges, no evidence of hits scored on enemy submarine.
- 0645 Secured from General Quarters.
- 0645 Established sound contact on enemy submarine and commenced attack, maneuvering on various courses and speeds conforming to attack; dropped two charges.
- 0710 Returned to the position of attack sighted heavy oil slick.
- 0742 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet standing out of channel.
- 8 to 12:
No comment.
- 12 to 16:
Steaming as before.
- 1240 U.S.S. ALLEN stood into Pearl Harbor.
- 1349 Made contact on sound gear and attacked, dropping four depth charges.
- 1513 U.S.S. THORNTON escorting U.S.S. TRESKER, stood into Pearl Harbor.
- 16 to 20:
Steaming as before.
- 1648 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE stood in with Destroyer Screen.
- 1710 U.S.S. PERRY stood out.
- 1745 Made contact with submarine, maneuvered for attack, lost contact.
- 20 to 24:
No comment.

December 9, 1941

- 0 to 4:
No comment.
- 4 to 8:
No comment.
- 8 to 12:
Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
- 3940 U. S. S. PLUNGER, U. S. S. POMPANO, U. S. S. POLLACK and an unidentified submarine stood into Pearl Harbor.
- 0943 U. S. S. LITCHFIELD stood in.
- 1158 Spotted smoke bomb dropped from plane, sounded general quarters. Made contact with sound gear on object believed to be submarine, maneuvered on various courses and speeds conforming to attack and dropped six depth charges.
- 12 to 16:
1207 All engine ahead full. Made sound contact on enemy submarine, maneuvering on various courses conforming to attack. Dropped 6 depth charges.

1230 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol in South Western Section of Restricted Area.

16 to 20:

1610 Sounded general quarters in accordance with air raid warning from Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

1658 Secured from general quarters.

1740 Sounded general quarters, having contact on sound gear.

1747 Secured from general quarters.

1910 Established contact with enemy submarine. Sounded general quarters.

1916 All stations manned and ready for general quarters.

1943 Lost contact with submarine; secured from general quarters.

20 to 24:

2320 Sounded general quarters; proceeded to position off Ahua Point to investigate report that shore battery was being illuminated by light from small boat off shore.

2345 Completed thorough investigation which revealed nothing, returned to patrol.

2355 Secured from general quarters.

December 10, 1941

0 to 4:

Steaming under boilers number 1 and 2 on various courses and speeds maintaining patrol station in Southwestern Section of Restricted Area, Pearl Harbor, T. H., standard speed 15 knots (184 r. p. m.).

0029 Sounded general quarters.

0033 Commenced depth charge attack on enemy submarine. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to attack. Dropped 4 depth charges.

0049 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.

0230 Observed U. S. S. TANEY commenced depth charge attack off starboard quarter, distance 700 yards.

0239 U. S. S. TANEY resumed patrol duties.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

1724 Sounded general quarters. Steaming on various courses and speeds conforming to search for enemy submarine.

1725 Definite sound contact established.

1728 Dropped 6 depth charges on contact bearing 188° 2.3 miles from number 1 entrance channel buoy.

1744 Secured from general quarters. Proceeded to investigate surface water at scene of attack and observed heavy oil slick.

20 to 24:

2110 Made contact with submarine; sounded general quarters.

2115 Made attack on submarine, dropping 4 depth charges.

2129 Secured from general quarters.

December 11, 1941

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

No comment.

12 to 16:

Moored as before.

1400 Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY shifted to U. S. S. WARD.

1410 Underway pursuant to Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY orders, on various courses and speeds conforming with channel for Channel Entrance Patrol. Captain at the Conn, Navigator on the Bridge.

1455 U. S. S. WARD relieved U. S. S. RAMSAY of Channel Entrance Patrol, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1512 Made contact with submarine. Sounded general quarters.

1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1547 Made attack, dropping 6 depth charges. Inspected slick and found considerable oil in slick caused by attack.

1550 Secured from general quarters.

16 to 20:

1637 Sighted smoke bombs dropped from U. S. Navy patrol bomber. Sounded general quarters. Made contact with sound gear on submerged object. Navy planes dropped depth bombs two points off starboard bow, distance 2000 yards. Made depth charge attack on submerged object, dropping 6 charges. Investigation revealed heavy oil slick on surface.

1815 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.

1920 Made sound contact on submerged object. Sounded general quarters. Made depth charge attack, dropping 6 depth charges.

1940 Secured from general quarters.

20 to 24:

No comment.

December 12, 1942

No comment.

December 13, 1942

0 to 4:

Steaming under boilers number 1 and 2, patrolling southwestern section of Prohibited Area off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet, various yard and district craft in vicinity; U. S. S. CHEW patrolling southeastern Prohibited Area. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds maintaining position, with standard speed 15 knots, 182 r. p. m. Ship darkened; condition 2 set.

0220 In accordance with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District dispatch 1236 of December 11, 1941, proceeded to Channel Entrance to search for lighted vessel reported off entrance buoys. Found entrance and surrounding area clear.

0255 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.

4 to 8:

0530 Held general quarters.

0640 Secured from general quarters.

0659 Heard propellor sounds on listening gear. Held general quarters.

0706 Secured from general quarters.

0715 U. S. S. WASMUTH, U. S. S. PERRY stood out.

0735 Sighted body of Japanese aviator bearing 220° from channel entrance buoys, 2 miles distant.

0748 Heavy cruiser stood in.

8 to 12:

Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

0915 Patrol Torpedo Boat stood out of channel, picked up body of Japanese flyer and stood in Pearl Harbor Channel.

12 to 16:

No comment.

16 to 20:

No comment.

20 to 24:

No comment.

December 14, 1941

0 to 4:

No comment.

4 to 8:

No comment.

8 to 12:

Steaming as before.

0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

0816 Navy tanker stood in.

0925 Sounded general quarters. Proceeded to East of Channel Entrance Buoys to search for reported submarine.

- 0958 Discovered body of Japanese Aviator bearing 207°T from Channel Entrance
 Buoys, 1¼ miles distant.
 1015 Secured from general quarters.
 1045 Various destroyers standing out preparatory to a Fleet Sortie
 12 to 16:
 No comment.
 16 to 20:
 No comment.
 20 to 24:
 No comment.

December 15, 1941

No comment.

December 16, 1941

- 0 to 4:
 No comment.
 4 to 8:
 No comment.
 8 to 12:
 No comment.
 12 to 16:
 No comment.
 16 to 20:
 No comment.
 20 to 24:
 Steaming as before.
 2037 Made sound contact with submarine.
 2042 Sounded general quarters. Maneuvers on various courses and speeds conforming with attack, dropped 8 depth charges. Bubble from the seventh charge was large and of a dark color.
 2050 Lay to in area of contact but could not renew contact.
 2057 Secured from general quarters.

December 17, 1941

- 0 to 4:
 No comment.
 4 to 8:
 No comment.
 8 to 12:
 No comment.
 12 to 16:
 No comment.
 Steaming as before.
 1635 Sounded general quarters and proceeded to smoke-bomb dropped by plane
 4 miles south of Hickam Tower.
 1640 Dropped 8 depth charges.
 1648 Secured from general quarters.
 20 to 24:
 2002 Made sonic contact and sounded general quarters. Attacked, dropped 8
 depth charges. Location of contact: 3.2 miles, bearing 231°T from
 Entrance Buoys.
 2025 Secured from general quarters.

December 18, 1941

No comment.

December 19, 1941

No comment.

December 20, 1941

No comment.

December 21, 1941

No comment.

December 22, 1941

No comment.

December 23, 1941

No comment.

December 24, 1941

No comment.

No comment. December 25, 1941
 No comment. December 26, 1941
 No comment. December 27, 1941
 No comment. December 28, 1941
 No comment. December 29, 1941
 No comment. December 30, 1941
 No comment. December 31, 1941
 No comment.

USS CONDOR AMc #14

December 7, 1941

0210-0445: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.

0342: Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram illustrates contact:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating contact with a Japanese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342, will be found reproduced as Item No. 298, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on the port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned sharply to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm blinker to the U. S. S. WARD, 'Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots.' About five minutes later the WARD requested by radio further information concerning the submarine. Information concerning the course was given and the WARD continued search while this vessel continued on its assigned mission. The submarine was not sighted again.

0758: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at Section Base, Bishops Point.) Two .30 cal. machine guns were rigged and attacking Japanese Planes were fired on with no apparent results. Expended 50 rounds of .30 cal. ammunition.

0943-1015: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.

1015: A Cruiser of the ST. LOUIS class evidently mistaking the Oropesa float of the CROSSBILL for a submarine turned sharply to the left and commenced firing at said float. In so doing she severed the magnetic cable of this ship approximately 100 yards from the out board end. The following diagram will serve to illustrate the situation:

(The diagram referred to, *supra*, illustrating attack by a U. S. cruiser on a float mistaken for a submarine, will be found reproduced as Item 299, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

1205-1230: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.

2110: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at side to Berth #12 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.) Expended 50 rounds .30 cal. ammunition.

2140: Secured from General Quarters.

2400: No casualties to Personnel.

December 8, 1941

0435: Sounded General Quarters. Air Raid Alarm. (Moored port side to Berth #12 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.)

0703: Secured from General Quarters. No action.

1010-1105: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to the Net.

December 9, 1941

- 1600: Sounded General Quarters. Standing by for an air raid. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
1815: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.

December 10, 1941

- 0401: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
0520: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.
0721-0905: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area of entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 11, 1941

- 0705-0905: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 12, 1941

- 0325: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
0421: Secured from General Quarter. No Action.
0732-1025: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Honolulu and in channel to the Net.

December 20, 1941

- 0642-0900: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 21, 1941

- 0648-0855: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.
0927-1050: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance Bouys to Pearl Harbor.
1350: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side to USS REEDBIRD at Section Base, Bishops Point)
1412: Secured from General Quarters. No Action.

December 22, 1941

- 0632-0830: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to Net.
0905-1155: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to Net.

December 23, 1941

- 0705-1035: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to Net.

December 24, 1941

- 0710-1055: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 25, 1941

- 0655-1058: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 26, 1941

- 0623-0930: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 27, 1941

0628-0915: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 28, 1941

0618-1015: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

December 29, 1941

0623-0925: Swept for Moored Mines off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in the channel to the Net.

December 30, 1941

0618-1036: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to Net.

December 31, 1941

0623-1038: Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and in channel to the Net.

W. A. Wisler,
W. A. WISLER,
Commanding.
Sn

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 76

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 4, 1942.

Cinepac File No.
A16-3/PH/(11)
Serial 040
Confidential

First Endorsement on Com. 14 CA12-1/A16-3/ND14 (01531) of Dec. 30, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Report on Battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941.

1. Returned.

2. The statement contained in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) to the basic letter, regarding the CONDOR's sighting a periscope, at 0350, while sweeping off the channel entrance bouys, is information not previously reported to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is requested that the report be confirmed, if possible, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, advised what action if any was taken to inform either the Commandant or the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, in this case.

3. Return of all papers is requested.

C. W. NIMITZ.

C-A12-1/ND14
(074)
Confidential

JANUARY 7, 1942

Second and -----
Com 14 C-A12-1/A16-3/
MD14(01531) of Dec. 30 1941.

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report on battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

1. Returned.

2. The information submitted in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) was taken from report of Commanding Officer of CONDOR dated 19 December 1941, and verified by extracts from Signal Log of WARD.

3. Statements by the Officer of the Deck, Ensign R. C. McCloy, USNR, R. C. Utrick Qm. 2c USNR, and R. B. Chavez, Sea 1c, USNR (Helmsman), on watch aboard the CONDOR at the time, indicate the following:—At about 0350 on 7 December 1941 the CONDOR was conducting sweeping operations approximately 1¼ miles south west of entrance buoys. The attention of Ensign McCloy was attracted to what, in the darkness, appeared to be a wave. After studying it momentarily, he called Utrick and with further examination with binoculars they both were convinced that what they saw was the periscope of a submerged submarine. Chavez could make out a wake but no periscope. The best estimate of least distance from CONDOR to periscope at any time is about 50 yards.

4. The CONDOR at 0357 informed the WARD, Channel Entrance Patrol, by visual of this contact. The WARD immediately instituted a search for the submarine. At about 0650 she sank an unidentified submarine and made report as recorded in her file 759 of December 13, 1941.

5. No report was made to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, until the WARD had actually and definitely established contact with an unidentified submarine.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 77

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

3 NOVEMBER 1941.

C-A16-1/A&N/ND14

(01171)

Confidential

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.

(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29 October 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).

1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R. N., who gave his views on this subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; his comments in connection therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Aliamanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived therefrom.

5. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefited by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post; this

is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air corps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.

7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Headquarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.

8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What should be done later in connection with a combined operating center can best be determined by actual experience.

C. C. Bloch.

C. C. BLOCH.

Advance copy to: Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.

Confidential

Admiral C. C. BLOCH,

Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

DEAR ADMIRAL BLOCH: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21, 1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined operating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.

While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same structure. The different elements have distinct missions, and while it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.

The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Aliamanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, antiaircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter. Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrangements can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.

It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, consideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post,

and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington

(Du-Et)

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-6
(SC)A16-3(9)
Doc. 37746
Serial 01212

Confidential

FOURTH MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Combined operating center from Army and Navy.
References:

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
- (b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December 1941.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. Turner.
R. K. TURNER.

Copy to:
Op-12B
Op-14
Op 30

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-30C-DG
(SC)A16-3(9)
Doc. 37746

MEMO FOR CAPTAIN READ

DECEMBER 31, 1941.

Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to CNO via Cinpac C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)

1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now does, I am returning this informally.

2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed the boat".

R. W. Cary
R. W. CARY
Room 1066

Op-14/LJH
 (SC)A16-3(9)
 Serial 01114
Confidential

5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops, respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local duties and routine.

S. C. HOOPER.

In reply to Initials and No.
 Op-14/LJH
 (SC)A16-3(9)
 Serial 01114

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 Washington, December 6, 1941.

Confidential

Second Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
 To: The Director, Naval Districts Division.
 Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded.
2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme command is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.
3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel duties, and command of local units of their respective over-all commands, will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.
4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.

OP-12B-6
 (SC)A16-3(9)
 Doc. 37746
 Serial 01212
Confidential

(Du-Et)

Fourth Memorandum Endorsement

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
 To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 Subject: Combined operating center for Army and Navy.
 References:

- (a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.

- (b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CRO190) and 292120 (CRO346) of December 1941.
- (c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.

1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a), and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indicated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without further action.

2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.

3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this correspondence.

R. K. TURNER.

Copy to :

- Op-12B
- Op-14
- Op-30

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op-12B-7-My
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0134212

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington

Confidential—First Memorandum Endorsement

NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

From : The Director, War Plans Division.
To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Via : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as desired.

2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers, comment, and recommendations be returned.

R. K. Turner.
R. K. TURNER.

[2] JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

Table of corrections

Change No.	Date of entry	Signature and rank of Officer Entering Change

CONFIDENTIAL

Urdis 140400 to Budocks X Request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CincPac Comfourteen Comtrain Comsubfor Compatwing and parallel activities of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and

Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X Comment with recommendations including location and estimates of cost requested.

[Handwritten:] For Cdr Griswold—General Bd.

(This is a copy made from microfilm records.) 10 July 45.
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV 19-68

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

CinC File No.
A1/A&N/(18)
Serial 01810
Confidential

1st Endorsement
on Com-14 C-A16-1
A&N/ND14 (01171)
dated Nov. 3, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.

2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.

3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the following:

(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of orders and information.

(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.

(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.

(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication system were damaged or destroyed.

(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post—with the post necessarily in an inactive area.

(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.

5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph (1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Submarines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without further delay.

H. E. Kimmel
H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: Com-14.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 78

From: Tokyo.
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
Note: The above is the translation furnished the *President* and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, *one* code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

Note: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

"Relations between Japan and - - - - - are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States."

Note: See JD #6985.
Tokyo Circular #2494

ORIGINAL

SF DE JAH

S 7 DEC 41

621 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG

KOSHI PANAMA

URGENT 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO AKRUNITUKI HAITORI MINAMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIK YUU DENPOO ARITASI STOP—TOGO

1208 S JP
7630

S 387/7 850S GR20

OBESE OVALS RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO GNOME

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION

SF D9 JAH S 7 DEC 41

622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG KOSHI HAVANA

623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU

624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEWYORK

625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER

626 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWAONT

(Same text and sign as our NR5651.)

1220 JP
7630

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION

SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41

627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SANFRANCISCO
 628 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI PORTLANDORE
 629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
 630 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI NEWORLEANSLA
 631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGOILL
 632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOSANGELESCAL
 (Same text and sign as our NR5651.)

1243 JP
7639

JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 79

(Exhibit No. 79 is a photostatic copy of Page 44 of a volume containing translations of files of operations orders, orders, memoranda, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA NOCHI. This page will be found reproduced as Item No. 303, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 80

SECRET
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 April 1941.

S-A16-1/A7-3(3)/ND14
(0398)

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42.

Subject: Original 14ND-JCD-42.

References:

- (a) WPL-42.
- (b) FTP 155, Introduction, Chapter II.

Enclosures:

- (A) Original 14ND-JCD-42, Reg. No. 19 including List of Effective Pages.
- (B) Receipt and Destruction Form, in duplicate.

1. The Original 14ND-JCD-42 (Army Short Title HCF-41) is hereby promulgated to the officers on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-42, including those on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-13. It was signed and placed in effect by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District on 11 April 1941, to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved, in part or in whole, by either the War or Navy Departments.

2. This Original Plan, prepared in accordance with references (a) and (b), supersedes 14ND-JCD-13 (Army Short Title HCF-39) and will be handled as follows:

a. All holders of 14ND-JCD-13 remove and destroy by burning all pages now contained in 14ND-JCD-13.

b. Insert this letter and the pages of Enclosure (A) in their proper places in the old binder, if used, in accordance with the List of Effective Pages contained in Enclosure (A); new holders on the Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42 provide own binders.

c. Report receipt, destruction of superseded pages of 14ND-JCD-13 and check of contents on the form herewith, Enclosure (B). New holders report receipt and check of contents only.

3. a. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations and in the Registered Publication Manual.

b. This volume *shall not be carried in aircraft*, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage, as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.

4. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM, OR COPY, PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

C. C. BLOCH.

Naval message—Navy Department

Extension Number	Addressees	Precedence
Drafter: ND14/N3-1(Y&D). From: OPNAV. Released by H. R. STARK. Date: 15 Oct. 1941.	Asterisk (*) Mailgram Ad- dressee: For Action: COMFOURTEEN.	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room Decoded by Typed by Routed by	Information: CINCPAC.	Priority Routine Deferred

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

152227 Oct 1941 NCR 425

If Operational
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[1] SECRET

Register No. 19

FULL TITLE: JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SHORT TITLE: HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42

Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this document will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret), Subject: Hawaiian Department War Plans.

Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Distribution List, page 3.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

List of effective pages, 14ND-JCD-42

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	inclusive	

HCF-41-iii-Original, April 1941, 4ND-JCD-42.

¹ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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Navy distribution list

Official to whom issued	Registered Numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations.....	18 and 19
*Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.....	20
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	21
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	22
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	23
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†Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE.....	36
†District Intelligence Officer.....	37
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* Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.

† These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered Publication Section.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
PEARL HARBOR NAVY YARD, T. H.,
11 April 1941.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN
DEPARTMENT, AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. **RESPONSIBILITY.** This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **BASIS.** This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **METHOD OF COORDINATION.** The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

4. **PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES.** The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40a page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1945).

5. **JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.** A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[6]

SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.** "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU".

It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIHAU, LEHUA ISLAND, NIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. **HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

8. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

9. **HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE.** The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY

ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.

10. *HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL-8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER** approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL-8—have been established by executive order for **PEARL HARBOR** and **KANEOHE**.

(1) *DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.* The Defensive Sea Area of the **HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER** includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI, KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI, LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOO LAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—**HAWAIIAN D. S. A.**

(2) *PEARL HARBOR—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The **PEARL HARBOR—Defensive Sea Area** comprises—

The area of water in **PEARL HARBOR** lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in and about the entrance channel to [7] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the PUULOVA Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from AHUA POINT LIGHTHOUSE. This area is given the short title—**PEARL D. S. A.**

(3) *KANEOHE BAY—DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.* The **KANEOHE BAY—Defensive Sea Area** comprises:

All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from KAOIO POINT, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from KAPOHO POINT, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—**KANEOHE D. S. A.**

(4) *PALMYRA, KINGMAN REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, and WAKE DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS.* These defensive sea areas comprise:

Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA.* The Defensive Coastal Area for OAHU comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

KEAHI POINT—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.

PUU KAPOLEI—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.

PUUIKI STATION

KAHUKU POINT Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.

This area is given the short title—**OAHU D. C. A.**

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Tasks and Forces

12. *CATEGORY OF DEFENSE.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. *TASKS.*

a. *JOINT TASK.* To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. *ARMY TASK.* To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. *NAVY TASK.* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces,

[8] 15. *FORCES,*

a. ARMY FORCES.

The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. NAVAL FORCES.

Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.

(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. CIVIL ORGANIZATION. A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. GENERAL.

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[9] *c.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. *ARMY.* The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEHOE area is recognized.

b. An anti-aircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. *a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. *e.*

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940".

[10] *j.* An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[11] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i.*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. MOBILIZATION PLANS.

a. GENERAL.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the manpower and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

b. *ARMY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for:—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (civil organization (Par. 15 *d.* above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on OAHU.

c. *NAVY PLANS.* The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for:

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This

HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,

*Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.*

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

*Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.*

[14]

DISTRIBUTION

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HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 81

Op-16-FE.
(SC) A17-24(1).
Secret.
Serial 001434316.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, 9 July 1945.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.

Subject: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.

Reference: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning a further Pearl Harbor investigation.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a):

(a) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 4, 1941—Subject "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(b) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 10, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(c) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 18, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(d) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 25, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(e) FE-2 Memorandum dated December 1, 1941—Subject, "Japanese Fleet Locations".

(f) Conf. Dispatch #012358 (April 1, 1941) from OpNav to ComAllNav Districts NY Wash. Governments of Guam and Samoa.

(g) Conf. Serial #27-41 (April 29, 1941) from FE to Op-16-F-2 Subject—"Japanese Navy Organizations Fleets" with two routing slips.

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that letters (a) to (e) are classified Secret, and (f) and (g) are Confidential. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.

James Forrestal.
JAMES FORRESTAL.

Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

(Note: See Op-16-F-2 ONI Serial #54-41, dated October 30, 1941 for the new organization of the Japanese Fleet.)

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>First Fleet</i> -----	In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB-NAGATO-----	In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB-MUTSU-----	" " " "
BB-YAMASHIRO-----	At Yokosuka
BB-FUSO-----	In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB-ISE-----	" " " "
BB-HYUGA-----	" " " "
BB-HIYEI-----	" " " "
BB-KONGO-----	At Maizuru
BB-KIRISHIMA-----	In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB-HARUNA-----	Undergoing repairs (2)
10 BB-----	
4 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area (3)
2 CL-----	" " " "
27 DD-----	" " " "
<i>Second Fleet</i> -----	In Kure-Saeki area
12 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area (3)
1 CA-----	In Yokosuka (4)
2 CL-----	In Kure-Saeki area (3)
28 DD-----	" " " "
<i>Third Fleet</i> -----	Near Maizuru or Sasebo
1 CL-----	Near Maizuru
4 CM-----	" "
12 AM-----	" "
12 PC-----	" "
1 CL-----	Near Sasebo
12 DD-----	" "
1 AS-----	" "
6 SS-----	" "
2 CM-----	" "
6 XPG-----	" "
46 AP or AK-----	" "
<i>Fourth Fleet</i> -----	Mandated Islands
4 CL-----	In Truk-Ponape area
8 DD-----	" " " "
1 AS-----	" " " "
3 SS-----	" " " "
8 XPG-----	" " " "
8 AP or AK-----	" " " "
2 CM-----	Near Saipan
1 DD-----	" "
3 XPG-----	" "
11 AP or AK-----	" "
4 SS-----	" Palao
4 XPG-----	" "
17 AP or AK-----	" "
1 Survey Ship-----	" Jaluit
1 AS-----	" "
4 XAM-----	" "
3 PC-----	" "
1 AP or AK-----	" "
1 CM-----	In home waters
7 SS-----	Near Sasebo
2 SS-----	Near Maizuru
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	Maizuru (6)

(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	In Home waters
4 CL-----	" " "
2 AS-----	" " "
1 AP-----	" " "
42 SS-----	" " "
<i>Carrier Fleet</i> -----	S. Kyushu-Takao
CV—AKAGI-----	S. Kyushu
CV—KAGA-----	" "
CV—SORYU-----	" (?)
CV—HIRYU-----	" "
CV—HOSHIO-----	" "
CV—KORYU-----	" (?)
CV—KASUGA-----	" (?)
CV—RYUJO-----	Takao area
CV—ZUIKAKU-----	" "
CV—SHOKAKU-----	" "
4 DD-----	" "
11 DD-----	S. Kyushu
<i>Combined Air Force</i>	
4 AV-----	Kure-Saeki area
1 AV-----	Takao
1 XAV-----	" "
1 XAV-----	Gulf of Tongkong
1 XAV-----	Near Sasebo
<i>Combined Fleet Train</i> -----	Scattered
4 AO-----	In Kure-Sasaki area
2 AO-----	Maizuru
1 AO-----	Takao (S)
1 AO-----	Near Yap (9)
1 AC-----	" "
1 AF-----	Kure-Saeki area
2 AR-----	" "
1 Ice Breaker-----	Saghalien
1 Target Ship-----	Kure-Saeki area
<i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>	
1 OCA-----	Left Chefoo October 3rd
1 PG-----	Shanghai
3 DD-----	" "
<i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
4 PG-----	Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR-----	" " " "
1 AP-----	" " " "
<i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CA-----	Sasebo
1 CL-----	Canton-Hongkong area
4 TB-----	" " " (10)
1 PG-----	" " " "
2 AM-----	" " " (10)
13 Misc-----	" " " "
<i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 OCA-----	Tsingtao
1 DD-----	" "
8 TB-----	" "
1 AP-----	" "
<i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	French Indo-China coast
1 CM-----	" " " "

NOTES

(1) The Combined Fleet has been located somewhat more exactly than before, in the Kure-Saeki area. This includes the western portion of the Inland Sea, between the western parts of Honshu and Shikoku, and the northern part of Kyushu.

(2) Earlier in the year, the HARUNA was reported undergoing major repairs. Since the HARUNA has not been specifically mentioned among the active battleships for some time, it is believed that the ship is still undergoing repairs.

(3) It is believed that the various cruisers and destroyers in the Combined Fleet, which were formerly divided between Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, have now rejoined the main body of the Fleet in the Kure-Saeki area.

(4) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at Yokosuka.

(6) The Fifth Fleet has its flag in a light cruiser at Maizuru, but nothing else is known about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of a Japan Sea Fleet.

(7) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines is at hand, so that the detailed survey given last week no longer holds good. However, certain units of the submarine fleet have been active in the Chichijima-Marcus-Saipan area, south and southeast of Honshu.

(8) The SATA has moved from Canton to Takao.

(9) The SHIRETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.

(10) The detached torpedo boats and mine sweepers in the South China Fleet are believed to have rejoined the main force in the Hongkong area.

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Op-16-F-2

NOVEMBER 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>First Fleet</i> -----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—NAGATO-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—MUTSU-----	“ “ “ “
BB—YAMASHIRO-----	At Yokosuka
BB—FUSO-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—ISE-----	“ “ “ “
BB—HYUGA-----	“ “ “ “
BB—HIYEI-----	“ “ “ “
BB—KONGO-----	At Maizuru
BB—KIRISHIMA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—HARUNA-----	Undergoing repairs
10 BB-----	
4 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
2 CL-----	“ “ “ “
27 DD-----	“ “ “ “
<i>Second Fleet</i> -----	In Kure-Saeki area
12 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
1 CA-----	In Yokosuka
2 CL-----	In Kure-Saeki area
28 DD-----	“ “ “ “
<i>Third Fleet</i> -----	Near Maizuru or Sasebo
1 CL-----	Near Maizuru
4 CM-----	“ “
12 AM-----	“ “
12 PC-----	“ “
1 CL-----	Near Sasebo
12 DD-----	“ “
1 AS-----	“ “
6 SS-----	“ “
2 CM-----	“ “
6 XPG-----	“ “
46 AP or AK-----	“ “

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Fourth Fleet</i> -----	Mandated Islands
4 CL-----	In Truk-Ponape area
8 DD-----	" " " "
1 AS-----	" " " "
3 SS-----	" " " "
6 XPG-----	" " " "
8 AP or AK-----	" " " "
2 CM-----	Near Saipan
1 DD-----	" "
3 XPG-----	" "
11 AP or AK-----	" "
4 SS-----	" Palao
4 XPG-----	" "
17 AP or AK-----	
1 Survey Ship-----	" Jaluit
1 AS-----	" "
4 XAM-----	" "
3 PC-----	" "
1 AP or AK-----	" "
1 CM-----	In Home Waters
7 SS-----	Near Sasebo
2 SS-----	Near Maizuru
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>	1 CL----- Maizuru
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)	
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	4 CL----- In Home Waters
	2 AS----- " " "
	1 AP----- " " "
	42 SS----- " " "
<i>Carrier Fleet</i> -----	S. Kyushu—Takao
CV—AKAGI-----	S. Kyushu
CV—KAGA-----	"
CV—SORYU-----	"
CV—HIRYU-----	"
CV—HOSHO-----	"
CV—KORYU-----	"
CV—KASUGA-----	"
CV—RYUJO-----	Takao area
CV—ZUIKAKU-----	Kure-Sasebo area (1)
CV—SHOKAKU-----	Takao area (?)
4 DD-----	" "
11 DD-----	S. Kyushu
<i>Combined Air Force</i>	4 AV----- Kure-Saeki area
	1 AV----- Sasebo-Kure area (1)
	2 XAV----- Sasebo-Kure area (2)
	1 XAV----- Saigon-Camranh Bay area (3)
<i>Combined Fleet Train</i>	Scattered
4 AO-----	In Kure-Saeki area
2 AO-----	Maizuru
1 AO-----	Takao
1 AO-----	Near Yap
1 AC-----	" "
1 AF-----	Kure-Saeki area
2 AR-----	" " "
1 Ice Breaker-----	Saghalien
1 Target Ship-----	Kure-Saeki area
<i>Japanese Naval Forces in China.</i>	
1 OCA-----	Left Chefoo October 3rd.
1 PC-----	Shanghai
3 DD-----	"
<i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
4 PC-----	Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR-----	" " " "
1 AP-----	" " " "

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CA-----	Sasebo
1 CA-----	Canton-Hongkong area
4 TB-----	“ “ “
1 PC-----	“ “ “
2 AM-----	“ “ “
13 Misc-----	“ “ “
<i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 OCA-----	Tsingtao
1 DD-----	“
8 TB-----	“
1 AP-----	“
<i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	French Indo-China coast
1 CM-----	“ “ “ “

NOTES

The fleets have remained in the same operating areas as previously reported. Several minor changes in the position of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders have been observed:

- (1) The ZUIKAKU (CV) and the NOTORO (AV) have moved from the Formosan straits to the Dure-Sasebo area.
- (2) Two auxiliary seaplane tenders are now in the Sasebo-Kure area. One of these was formerly in the Gulf of Tongking.
- (3) The KENJO MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the Saigon-Camranh Bay area.

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NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>First Fleet</i> -----	
BB—NAGATO-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—MUTSU-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—YAMASHIRO-----	“ “ “
BB—FUSO-----	At Yokosuka
BB—ISE-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—HYUGA-----	“ “ “ “
BB—HIYEI-----	“ “ “ “
BB—HONGO-----	At Maizuru
BB—KIRISHIMA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
BB—HARUNA-----	Undergoing repairs at Sasebo
10 BB-----	“ “ “ “
4 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
2 CL-----	“ “ “ “
27 DD-----	“ “ “ “
<i>Second Fleet</i> -----	
11 CA-----	In Kure-Saeki area
2 CA-----	In Yokosuka (1)
1 CL-----	In Kure-Saeki area
1 CL-----	In Yokosuka area (2)
28 DD-----	In Kure-Saeki area

1320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Third Fleet</i> -----	Near Maizuru, Sasebo, and Bako (3)
1 CL-----	Near Maizuru
4 CM-----	" "
12 AM-----	" "
12 PC-----	" "
1 CL-----	Sailed Amoy Nov. 4th (3)
2 DD-----	Near Sasebo (4)
1 AS-----	" "
6 SS-----	" "
2 CM-----	" "
6 XPG-----	" "
46 AP or AK-----	" "
3 DD-----	" Maizuru (4)
7 DD-----	" Bako-Takeo (4)
<i>Fourth Fleet</i> -----	Mandated Islands
4 CL-----	In Truk-Ponape area
3 DD-----	" " " " (5)
1 AS-----	" " " "
3 SS-----	" " " "
8 XPG-----	" " " "
8 AP or AK-----	" " " "
2 DD-----	Near Saipan (5)
2 CM-----	" "
1 DD-----	" "
3 XPG-----	" "
11 AP or AK-----	" "
4 SS-----	" Palao
4 XPG-----	" "
17 AP or AK-----	" "
1 Survey Ship-----	" Juliet
1 AS-----	" "
4 XAM-----	" "
3 PC-----	" "
1 AP or AK-----	" "
1 CM-----	In home waters
3 DD-----	Near Sasebo
7 SS-----	" "
2 SS-----	Near Maizuru
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	Yokosuka (6)
(The Composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)	
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	
2 CL-----	Kure (7)
2 CL-----	Sasebo (7)
1 AS-----	Kure (7)
1 AS-----	In Home Waters (7)
1 AP-----	Yokosuka (7)
7 SS-----	Yokosuka (7)
13 SS-----	Kure
22 SS-----	In Home Waters
<i>Carrier Fleet</i> -----	S. Kyushu Takao
CV—AKAGI-----	S. Kyushu
CV—KAGA-----	"
CV—SORYU-----	"
CV—HIRYU-----	"
CV—HOSH0-----	"
CV—KORYU-----	"
CV—KASUGA-----	"
CV—RYUJO-----	Kure (6)
CV—ZUIKAMU-----	Kure-Sasebo area
CV—SHOKAKU-----	Takao area (?)
5 DD-----	" "
11 DD-----	S. Kyushu

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Combined Air Force</i>	
4 AV-----	Kure-Saeki area
1 AV-----	Sasebo-Kure area
2 XAV-----	Sasebo-Kure area
1 XAV-----	Saigon-Camranh Bay area
<i>Combined Fleet Train</i>	
4 AO-----	Scattered
1 AO-----	In Kure-Saeki area
1 AO-----	Maizuru
1 AO-----	Takao
1 AO-----	Near Yap
1 AC-----	" "
1 AF-----	Kure-Saeki area
2 AR-----	" " "
1 Ice Breaker-----	Saghalien
1 Target Ship-----	Kure-Saeki area
<i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>	
1 OCA-----	Left Chafoo October 3rd
1 PG-----	Shanghai
3 DD-----	"
<i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
4 PG-----	Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR-----	" " " "
1 AP-----	" " " "
<i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CA-----	Sasebo
1 CL-----	Foochow (9)
4 TB-----	Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG-----	" " "
2 AM-----	" " "
13 Misc-----	" " "
<i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 OCA-----	Tsingtao
1 DD-----	"
8 TB-----	"
1 AP-----	"
<i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	French Indo-China coast
1 CM-----	" " " "

NOTES

(1) The CHOKAI (CA) is in Yokosuka. The TAKAO is still in drydock at Yokosuka.

(2) The NAKA (CL), Flagship of Desron 4, is at Yokosuka. The destroyers in Desron 4 are still in the Kure-Saeki area.

(3) The NATORI, Flagship of Desron 5, sailed Amoy November 4th.

(4) Ten of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, formerly at Sasebo, have been shifted—3 to Maizuru, and 7 to Bako.

(5) Three of the 8 destroyers in Desron 6, formerly in the Truk-Ponape area, have moved to Sasebo; and 2 to Saipan.

(6) The flagship of the Fifth Fleet, an unidentified CL, has moved from Maizuru to Yokosuka.

(7) Many of the units of the 6th Fleet have been located more exactly.

(8) The RYUJO has returned to Kure from Taiwan.

(9) The ISUZU (CL), temporary flagship of the 2nd (or South) China Expeditionary Fleet, has moved from Hongkong to Foochow.

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NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>First Fleet</i> -----	Home Waters
BB—NAGATO-----	Near Kure (1)
BB—MUTSU-----	“ “
BB—YAMASHIRO-----	At Yokosuka
BB—FUSO-----	Near Kure
BB—ISE-----	“ “
BB—HYUGA-----	“ “
BB—HIYEI-----	Near Sasebo (2)
BB—KONGO-----	Near Maizuru
BB—KIRISHIMA-----	Near Kure
BB—HARUNA-----	“ “
10 BB-----	
3 CA-----	Near Kure (1)
1 CA-----	Near Sasebo (4)
2 CL-----	Near Kure (1)
27 DD-----	“ “
<i>Second Fleet</i> -----	In Home Waters
11 CA-----	Near Kure
1 CA-----	In Yokosuka (5)
1 CA-----	Near Sasebo (6)
1 CL-----	Near Kure
1 CL-----	Near Yokosuka
13 DD-----	Near Yokosuka (7)
15 DD-----	Near Kure (7)
<i>Third Fleet</i> -----	Sasebo and Bako area
1 CL-----	Near Sasebo (8)
5 CM-----	“ “ (8)
12 AM-----	“ “ (8)
12 PC-----	“ “ (8)
4 DD-----	“ “ (8)
1 AS-----	“ “
6 SS-----	“ “
6 XPG-----	“ “
16 AP or AK-----	“ “
1 CL-----	Bias Bay (8)
7 DD-----	Near Bako
1 CM-----	“ “
1 DD-----	Near Maizuru
<i>Fourth Fleet</i> -----	Mandated Islands
4 CL-----	In Truk-Ponape area
3 DD-----	“ “ “ “
1 AS-----	“ “ “ “
9 SS-----	“ “ “ “ (9)
8 XPG-----	“ “ “ “
16 AP or AK-----	“ “ “ “
2 DD-----	Near Saipan (9)
1 SS-----	Near Saipan (9)
1 Survey Ship-----	Near Saipan (9)
3 XPG-----	“ “
17 AP or AK-----	“ “
4 SS-----	“ Palao
4 XPG-----	“ “
30 AP or AK-----	“ “ (9)
1 AS-----	“ Jaluit
4 XAM-----	“ “
3 PC-----	“ “
13 AP or AK-----	“ “
1 CM-----	In Yokosuka
3 DD-----	Near Sasebo (8)
1 SS-----	At Maizuru (9)
1 SS-----	At Kure (9)

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>	1 CL----- Chiehijima (10)
	(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	2 CL----- Near Kure
	2 CL----- " Sasebo
	1 AS----- " Kure
	1 AS----- Sasebo
	1 AP----- Yokosuka
	7 SS----- Yokosuka
	12 SS----- Kure
	23 SS----- In Sasebo and other Home waters
<i>Carrier Fleet</i>	
	CV—AKAGI----- S. Kyushu
	CV—KAGA----- "
	CV—SORYU----- Kure (11)
	CV—HIRYU----- " (11)
	CV—HOSH0----- " (11)
	CV—KORYU----- S. Kyushu
	CV—KASUGA----- "
	CV—RYUJO----- Kure
	CV—ZUIKAKU----- Kure
	CV—SHOKAKU----- Kure (11)
	10 DD----- S. Kyushu and Kure
	5 DD----- Yokosuka (11)
<i>Combined Air Force</i>	
	4 AV----- Near Kure
	1 AV----- Truk (12)
	2 XAV----- Near Sasebo
	1 XAV----- Saigon-Camranh Bay Area
<i>Combined Fleet Train</i>	
	2 AO----- Near Yokosuka (13)
	2 AO----- Near Kure
	1 AO----- Near Sasebo (13)
	1 AO----- Near Maizuru
	1 AO----- Near Saipan
	1 AO----- Near Yap
	1 AC----- Near Saipan (13)
	1 AF----- Near Yokosuka (13)
	2 AR----- Near Kure
	1 Ice Breaker----- Saghalien
	1 Target Ship----- Sasebo
<i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>	
	1 OCA----- Shanghai (14)
	1 PG----- Shanghai
	3 DD----- "
	7 AK or AP----- (15)
<i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
	4 PG----- Between Wuhu and Ichang
	10 PR----- " " " "
	1 AP or AK----- " " " "
<i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
	1 CA----- Sasebo
	1 CL----- Foochow
	4 TB----- Canton-Hongkong area
	1 PG----- " " "
	2 AM----- " " "
	13 Misc----- " " "
	About 30 Ap or AK----- South China coast (15)
<i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
	1 OCA----- Tsingtao
	1 DD----- "
	1 TB----- "
	1 AP----- Tsingtao
<i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
	1 CL----- French Indo-China coast
	1 CM----- " " " "

- (1) The Kure area includes the whole Inland Sea area, together with the Saeki area, which controls the straits between Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku.
- (2) The HIYEI (BB) has moved to Sasebo from the Kure area.
- (3) The HARUNA (BB), formerly undergoing repairs at Sasebo, has rejoined the fleet as flagship of Batdiv. 3.
- (4) The FURUTAKA (CA) is at Sasebo, separated from the other CO of the division which are near Kure.
- (5) The TAKAO (CA) has left the drydock at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd Fleet units near Kure.
- (6) The SUZUYA (CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.
- (7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near Yokosuka. The other 15 are still near Kure.
- (8) The Third Fleet has reduced the number of its units near Maizuru, and increased the number in the Formosan Straits. The NATORI, which sailed from Amoy on Nov. 4th, is now at anchor in Bias Bay.
- (9) The Fourth Fleet has been augmented by the addition of 8 divisions of ex-merchantmen (about 32 ships). Increased activity has been noticed among other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except for the shift of 6 submarines to Truk, the total number of fighting ships in the Mandates has not been increased.
- (10) The Fifth Fleet has moved from Yokosuka to Chichijima, with certain portions possibly near Marcus Island.
- (11) The aircraft carriers SORYU, HIRYU, and HOSHO have moved from South Kyushu to the Kure area. The SHOKAKU has moved from Takao to Kure. The plane guard destroyers have shifted slightly.
- (12) The KAMOI (AV) is near Truk.
- (13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a number of minor shifts.
- (14) The IZUMO is assumed to be in Shanghai.
- (15) Ten transports left Shanghai between the 14th and 17th, with troops, supplied and landing boats; seven transports are still there. In addition, 17 transports, southbound, were sighted between Hongkong and Shanghai between the 10th and 14th. Over the week end, 18 transports sailed up the Pearl River, and 12 downstream.

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DECEMBER 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>First Fleet</i>	Home Waters
BB—NAGATO.....	Near Kure
BB—MUTSU.....	“ “
BB—YAMASHIRO.....	At Yokosuka
BB—FUSO.....	Near Kure
BB—ISE.....	“ “
BB—HYUGA.....	“ “
BB—HIYEI.....	Near Sasebo
BB—KONGO.....	Near Maizuru
BB—KIRISHIMA.....	Near Kure
BB—HARUNA.....	“ “
10 BB.....	
3 CA.....	Near Kure
1 CA.....	Near Sasebo
1 CL.....	Near Kure (1)
1 CL.....	Near Sasebo (1)
27 DD.....	Near Kure
<i>Second Fleet</i>	In Home Waters
10 CA.....	Near Kure (2)
2 CA.....	Near Sasebo (2)
1 CA.....	Off Camranh Bay (3)
1 CL.....	Near Kure
1 CL.....	Near Bako (4)
4 DD.....	Near Yokosuka (4)
12 DD.....	Near Kure (4)

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Third Fleet</i> -----	Sasebo and Bako area
1 CL-----	Near Sasebo
5 CM-----	" "
12 AM-----	" "
12 PC-----	" "
4 DD-----	" "
1 AS-----	" "
6 SS-----	" "
6 XPG-----	" "
46 AP or AK-----	" "
1 CL-----	Bias Bay
1 CM-----	Near Bako
1 DD-----	Near Maizuru
<i>Fourth Fleet</i>	Mandated Islands
4 CL-----	In Truk-Ponape area
3 DD-----	" " " "
1 AS-----	" " " "
9 SS-----	" " " "
8 XPG-----	" " " "
16 AP or AK-----	" " " "
2 DD-----	Near Saipan
1 SS-----	" "
1 Survey Ship-----	" "
3 XPG-----	" "
17 AP or AK-----	" "
4 SS-----	" Palao
4 XPG-----	" "
30 AP or AK-----	" "
1 AS-----	" Jaluit
4 XAM-----	" "
3 PC-----	" "
13 AP or AK-----	" "
1 CM-----	In Yokosuka
3 DD-----	Near Sasebo
1 SS-----	At Maizuru
1 SS-----	At Kure
<i>Fifth Fleet</i>	1 CL----- Chichijima
	(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)
<i>Sixth Fleet</i>	2 CL----- Near Kure
	2 CL----- Near Sasebo
	1 AS----- Near Kure
	1 AS----- Sasebo
	1 AP (XAS)----- Bako (5)
	4 SS----- Bako (5)
	5 SS----- Yokosuka (5)
	12 SS----- Kure
	21 SS----- In Sasebo and other Home waters (5)
<i>Carrier Fleet</i>	CV—AKAGI----- S. Kyushu
	CV—KAGA----- " "
	CV—SORYU----- Kure
	CV—HIRYU----- " "
	CV—HOSHO----- " "
	CV—KORYU----- S. Kyushu
	CV—KASUGA----- " "
	CV—RYUJO----- Kure
	CV—ZUIKAKU----- " "
	CV—SHOKAKU----- " "
	10 DD----- S. Kyushu and Kure
	Yokosuka

<i>Fleets</i>	<i>Locations</i>
<i>Combined Air Force</i>	
3 AV-----	Near Bako (6)
1 AV-----	Near Kure (6)
1 AV-----	Truk
2 XAV-----	Near Sasebo
1 XAV-----	Saigon-Camranh Bay area
<i>Combined Fleet Train</i>	
2 AO-----	Near Yokosuka
2 AO-----	Near Kure
1 AO-----	Near Sasebo
1 AO-----	Near Maizuru
1 AO-----	Near Saipan
1 AO-----	Near Yap
1 AC-----	Near Saipan
1 AF-----	Near Yokosuka
2 AR-----	Near Kure
1 Ice Breaker-----	Saghalien
1 Target Ship-----	Sasebo
<i>Japanese Naval Forces in China</i>	
1 OCA-----	Shanghai
1 PG-----	Shanghai
3 DD-----	"
7 AK or AP-----	"
<i>Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
4 PG-----	Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR-----	" " " "
1 AP or AK-----	" " " "
<i>South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CA-----	Sasebo
1 CL-----	Foochow
4 TB-----	Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG-----	" " "
2 AM-----	" " "
13 Misc-----	" " "
About 30 AP or AK-----	South China coast
<i>North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 OCA-----	Tsingtao
1 DD-----	"
4 TB-----	" (7)
4 TB-----	Canton-Hongkong area (7)
1 AP-----	Tsingtao
<i>Southern Expeditionary Fleet</i>	
1 CL-----	French Indo-China coast
1 CM-----	" " " "

NOTES

- (1) (CL) SENDAI moved from Kure to Sasebo.
- (2) The ATAGO (CA), Flagship of the 2nd Fleet, has moved from Kure to Sasebo. Further southward movements are expected.
- (3) The CHOKAI (CA) has probably become flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, off Indo-China.
- (4) Desron 4, consisting of the NAKA (CL) and 12 DD have moved to Bako.
- (5) The NAGOYA MARU and the 4 Minelaying SS of Subron 6 (I-121-124) are now near Bako.
- (6) Airron 7 has moved from Kure to Bako.
- (7) At least one division of Torpedo Boats have moved to South China.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Naval message—Navy Department

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Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

012358

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT

TEXT

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Originator 10/11 File

ONI: 16 Copy, 16-A Copy, 16-B Copy, F-4, F-3, F-1.

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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[DO NOT DETACH—This slip is a part of permanent file record]

N. N. I. 122

ROUTING SLIP

27-41

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

Subject: Organization of the Japanese Fleets (Op-16-F-2. ONI Serial, dated July 29, 1941).

Reference:

Date: July 30, 1941. File No.

From Director of Naval Intelligence	Room No.	To
Secretary of the Navy.....	2046	-----
Under Secretary of the Navy.....	2054	-----
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.....	2030	-----
Chief, Naval Operations.....	2064	(2)
Assistant Chief, Naval Operations.....	2064	(1)
Central Division.....	2068	-----
Communication Liason.....	2613	-----
Communications.....	2621	-----
Fleet Training.....	2804	-----
Inspections.....	3630	-----
Fleet Maintenance.....	2610	-----
Naval Districts.....	1057	-----
Ships' Movements.....	2603	-----
War Plans.....	2605	-----
Naval Reserve Policy.....	2616	-----
General Board.....	2743	-----
Budget Officer.....	2002	-----
Aeronautics.....	2929	-----
Ships.....	2208	-----
Hydrographic.....	1027	-----
J. A. G.....	2524	-----
Marine Corps.....	3406	-----
M. & S.....	1073	-----
Navigation.....	3940	-----
Ordnance.....	3139	-----
S. & A.....	1007	-----
Y. & D.....	2409	-----
Aeronautical Board.....	1907	-----
Office of Inventions.....	1515	-----

CHECK ACTION REQUIRED

(2)	Information and return O. N. I. Room 4826
(1)	Retain
	Note, initial, and pass to next
	For comment and return
	Necessary action or reply
	Cognizance activity checked
	Information on which to base reply
REMARKS:	

(At this point in the Exhibit, two items appear, as follows:

1. A copy of Naval Intelligence Division Routing Slip 27-41 dated 30 July 1941.
2. Navy Department Intelligence Report, Serial No. 27-41, dated 29 July 1941, relating to organization of the Japanese Fleet.

The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 301 and 302, EXHIBITS—ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMALOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

MUTSU, Flagship

FIRST FLEET

Baldir One

MUTSU (F)
NAGATO
YAMASHIRO

Baldir Two

FUSO (F)
ISE
NYUGA

Baldir Three

KONGO (F)
NIYEI
KIRISHIMA
HARUMA

Cardir Six

FURUTAKA
KAKO
AOBA
KINUGASA

Cardir 3

ZUIKAKU
SHOKAKU

Desdir 34

IAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
TACHIKAZE

Cardir 5

RYUJO
HOSHO

Desdir

SHIMAKAZE
SAWAKAZE
YAKAZE
NADAKAZE

Cardir 7

CHITOSE (F)
CHIYODA
MIZUHO

Desron One

ARUKUMA (F)

Desdir 6

IKAZUCHI (F)
SAZAMAMI
INAZUMA
HIBIKI

Desdir 7

OBORO (F)
USHIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKI

Desdir 21

NENOMI (F)
MATSUMARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA

Desdir 27

SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE

Desron Three

SENDAI (F)

Desdir 11

FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
MATSUYUKI

Desdir 12

SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGUMO

Desdir 19

SHIKINAMI (F)
ISONAMI
AYANAMI

Desdir 20

AMAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI

COMBINED FLEET

SECOND FLEET

KOGA Mineichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)
KAYA, Flagship

Crudiv Four

ATAGO
TAKAO
CHOKAI
NAYA

Crudiv Five

NACHI (F)
HAGURO
MYOKO

Crudiv Seven

KUMANO (F)
MOGAMI
MIKUMA
SUZUYA

Crudiv Eight

CHIKUMA (F)
TONE

Cardiv 1

AKAGI (F)
KAGA

Desdiv 3

HOKAZE
SHIOKAZE
NAMIKAZE
NUMAKAZE

Cardiv 2

SORYU (F)
MIRYU

Desdiv 23

UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKASUKI
YUZUKI

Desron Two

JINTSU (F)

Desdiv 8

ASASHIO
ARASHIO
OSHIO
MICHISHIO

Desdiv 15

KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
HAYASHIO

Desdiv 16

HATSUKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
TOKITSUKAZE

Desdiv 18

KASUMI
ARARE
KACERO
SHIRAN'UHI

Desron Four

NAKA (F)

Desdiv 2

YUDACHI (F)
MURASAME
HARUSAME
SAMIDARE

Desdiv 1

HAGIKAZE
ARASHI
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE

Desdiv 9

ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMIO
NATSUGURE

Desdiv 24

KAWAKAZE (F)
YAMAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
UMIKAZE

THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo, Cine (Vice Admiral)
NAGARA, Flagship

Cardiv 6

NOTORO
KAMIKAWA MARU
Minclayer Div. 17
ITSUKUSHIMA
YALYAMA
KUMAJIRI

Desron Five

NATORI (F)

Desdiv 5

ASAKAZE
HARUKAZE
MATSUKAZE
HATAKAZE

Desdiv 27

SATSUKI
FUMITSUKI
MINATSUKI
NAGATSUKI

1st Base Force

Guard Division 1

SHIRATAKA
AOTAKA
HATSUTAKA

Minc Suceper Div. 1

AM-1
AM-2
AM-3

AM-4	<i>Subchaser Division 11</i>
AM-5	PC-4
AM-6	PC-5
<i>Mine Sweeper Div. 21</i>	PC-6
AM-7	<i>Subchaser Division 21</i>
AM-8	PC-7
AM-9	PC-8
AM-10	PC-9
AM-11	<i>Subchaser Division 31</i>
AM-12	PC-10
<i>Gunboat Division 1</i>	PC-11
Gunboats	PC-12
(Converted Fishing Vessels)	<i>27 or more Transports</i>
<i>Subchaser Squadron</i>	
KATSURIKI	
<i>Subchaser Division 1</i>	
PC-1	
PC-2	
PC-3	

FOURTH FLEET

KATAGIRI Eikichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)

KASHIMA, Flagship

<i>Crudiv Eighteen</i>	<i>Subdiv 33</i>
KASHIMA (F)	RO-63
TENRYU	RO-64
TATSUTA	RO-68
<i>Air Group 24</i>	<i>3rd Base Force (At Palau)</i>
KAMOJ	<i>Guard Division 3</i>
1—XAV	15 XPG
2 VP—Squadrons	<i>Subdiv 8</i>
<i>Desdiv 17</i>	RO-56
MINEKAZE	RO-57
OKIKAZE	RO-58
<i>Minclayer Div. 19</i>	RO-59
TOKIWA	10 Transports
OKINOSHEA	<i>4th Base Force (At Truk)</i>
<i>Desron Six</i>	9 Transports
TAMA	Air Group 7 (At Ponape)
<i>Desdiv 29</i>	2 Transports (" ")
OITE	<i>5th Base Force (At Saipan)</i>
HAYATE	<i>Guard Division 4</i>
ASAMAGI	(Composition unknown)
YUMAGI	<i>Guard Division 5</i>
<i>Desdiv 30</i>	(Composition unknown)
KISARAGI	<i>Gunboat Division</i>
MUTSUKI	(Composition unknown)
YAYOI	<i>Air Group 8</i>
MOCHITSUKI	10 Transports
<i>Subron Seven</i>	<i>6th Base Force (At Jaluit)</i>
JINGEI (F)	<i>Mine Sweeper Division (At Jaluit)</i>
<i>Subdiv 26</i>	AM-13
RO-60	AM-14
RO-61	AM-15
RO-62	AM-16
<i>Subdiv 27</i>	13 Transports
RO-65	<i>Subchaser Div. 5 (In Mandates)</i>
RO-66	PC-51
RO-67	PC-52
	PC-53

SUBMARINE FLEET

KATORI, Flagship

Subron One

KATORI (F)
TAIGEI

Subdiv 1

I-9
I-15
I-16
I-17

Subdiv 2

I-18
I-19
I-20

Subron Two

KITAGAMI (F)

Subdiv 7

I-1
I-2
I-3
I-7

Subdiv 8

I-4
I-5
I-6

Subron Three

ISUZU (F)

Subdiv 11

I-74
I-75

Subdiv 12

I-8
I-68
I-69
I-70

Subdiv 20

I-71
I-72
I-73

Subron Five

YURA (F)

Subdiv 28

I-59
I-60

Subdiv 29

I-61
I-62

Subdiv 30

I-64
I-65
I-66

Subron Six

KINU (F)

Subdiv 9

I-123
I-124

Subdiv 13

I-121
I-122

Subron Ten

KISO (F)

Subdiv 18

I-53
I-54
I-55

Subdiv 19

I-56
I-57
I-58

Subdiv 21

RO-33
RO-34

TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SATA
TSURULI
SHIRIYA
IRO
ONDO

NAYATOMO
NARUTO
NANIYA
ASAHI
AKASHI

MUROTO
OTOMARI
SETTSSU

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

SHIMADA Shigetaro, CinC (Admiral)

IzUMO, Flagship

*Shanghai Base Force**Desdiv 11*KURI
TSUGA
HASU*Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section**Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai**Nanking Base Force**Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking*CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR
FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

1st China Expeditionary Fleet.

KOMATSU Teruhisa, CinC (Vice Ad-
miral)

UJI, Flagship

*Patrol Division 11*ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
ATAMI
FUTAMI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE*Air Group 10**Hankow Base Force**Kiukiang Base Force*SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR
SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

2nd China Expeditionary Fleet

NIMI Masaichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)

ASHIGARA, Flagship

Crudiv Fifteen

ASHIGARA (F)

Patrol Division 14

SAGA

AM-17

AM-18

Torpedo Boat Division 1

OTORI

HAYABUSHA

HIYODORI

KASASAGI

Guard Division 15

Composition unknown

Guard Division 16

SHIMUSHU

*Canton Base Force**Amoy Base Force**Hainan Is. Base Force**13 Special Service Ships*NORTH CHINA FLEET, OR THIRD
EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

3rd China Expeditionary Fleet

SHIMIZU, Mitsunami, CinC (Vice
Admiral)

IWATE, Flagship

*Patrol Division 12*IWATE (F)
MANRI MARU*Torpedo Boat Division 11*HATO
SAGI
KARI
KIJI*Torpedo Boat Division 21*

CHIDORI

MANAZURU

TOMOZURU

HATSUKARI

Gunboat Division 2

Composition unknown

Gunboat Division 13

Composition unknown

Gunboat Division 14

Composition unknown

Tsingtao Base Force

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